Anomie and Violence

John Braithwaite, Valerie Braithwaite, Michael Cookson and Leah Dunn
Anomie and Violence
Non-truth and reconciliation in Indonesian peacebuilding

John Braithwaite, Valerie Braithwaite, Michael Cookson and Leah Dunn
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All readers are invited to post comments and suggestions on the future direction of the project at  http://peacebuilding.anu.edu.au

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Anomie and Violence

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# Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abangsan</td>
<td>Javanese Muslims who follow adat as well as Islamic practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adat</td>
<td>customary or indigenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJI</td>
<td>Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (Alliance of Independent Journalists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALDP</td>
<td>Alliance for Democracy in Papua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIN</td>
<td>Badan Intelijen Negara (Indonesian National Intelligence Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (Aceh Reintegration Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brimob</td>
<td>Brigade Mobil (Police Mobile Brigade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bupati</td>
<td>regent or district head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSA</td>
<td>Commission for Security Arrangements (Aceh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewan Adat Papua</td>
<td>Papuan Customary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRD</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Provincial Legislative Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRP</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua (Papua Provincial Legislative Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsham</td>
<td>Lembaga Studi, Advokasi dan Hak Asasi Manusia (Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy) (Jayapura)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKM</td>
<td>Front Kedaulatan Maluku (Maluku Sovereignty Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKPM</td>
<td>Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu (Communication Forum for Malay Youth) (West Kalimantan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKUB</td>
<td>Forum Komunikasi Umat Beragama (Communication Forum for Religious Harmony)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOKER LSM Papua</td>
<td>Forum Kerjasama LSM Papua (Networking forum for Papuan NGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forkum</td>
<td>Communications Forum (Central Sulawesi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdekan (Free Aceh Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gotong royong</td>
<td>A core tenet of Indonesian philosophy meaning mutual aid or ‘joint bearing of burdens’ (Geertz 1983b) or ‘reconciliation through working on shared projects’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPK</td>
<td>Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (Gang of Security Disruptors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPST</td>
<td>Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah (Youth Movement of Central Sulawesi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hibua lamo</td>
<td>A cultural tradition of binding Christian and Muslim villages together in pacts of peace and mutual help in North Maluku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMI</td>
<td>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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</table>
JI  Jemaah Islamiyah
kabupaten  district-level governments
KDP  Kecamatan Development Program (World Bank)
Kodam  Komando Daerah Militer (Regional Military Command)
Kodim  Komando Distrik Militer (District Command)
Koramil  Komando Rayon Militer (Subdistrict Command)
Komnas-Ham  Komisi Nasional Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia (Indonesia’s National Commission for Human Rights)
Kontras  Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence)
Kopassus  Komando Pasukan Khusus (Indonesian Special Forces)
Korem  Komando Resor Militer (Resort Military Command)
Kostrad  Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat (Elite infantry, army strategic reserve command)
KPA  Komite Peralihan Aceh (Committee for the Transition in Aceh)
KPK  Koalisi Pengungkapan Kebenaran (Aceh Coalition for Truth)
KPU  Komisi Pemilihan Umum (National Election Commission)
LEMASA  Lembaga Masyarakat Adat Suku Amungme (Amungme People’s Tribal Council, Papua)
LMMDD-KT  Lembaga Musyawarah Masyarakat Dayak dan Daerah Kalimantan Tengah (Central Kalimantan Institute for Dayak and Regional Social Consultation)
LPSham  Lembaga Pengembangan Studi dan Hak Asasi Manusia (Institute for the Development of Legal and Human Rights Studies)
marosso  Indigenous brotherhood institution (Poso)
merdeka  freedom or liberation
MPR  Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly, Legislature of the Indonesian Government)
MRP  Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People’s Assembly)
MUI  Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulamas’ Council)
Musrenbang  Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan (development planning meeting using local bottom-up planning processes)
musyawarah  Indonesian conception of deliberative democracy
NGO  non-governmental organisation
OPM  Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement)
PDI-P  Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
PDP  Presidium Dewan Papua (Presidium of the Papuan Council)
pela gandong  Oaths of allegiance that bind two villages to mutual help and defence, or sometimes two clans in Maluku
PKI  Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PPP  Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
preman  semi-organised criminals
PUSA  Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (All-Aceh Union of Ulamas)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PVK</td>
<td>Papoea vrijwilligerskorps (Papuan ‘volunteer’ defence force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reformasi</td>
<td>Democratic reform movement at time of fall of President Suharto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMS</td>
<td>Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of South Maluku)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>Senter Informasi Referendum Aceh (Centre for Information on Aceh Referendum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKP</td>
<td>Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian (Catholic Office for Justice and Peace)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>Tentara Negara Aceh (military wing of GAM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPN</td>
<td>Tentara Pembebasan Nasional (National Liberation Army) (Papua)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ulama</td>
<td>Muslim scholars recognised as having specialist knowledge of Islamic sacred law and theology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uleebalang</td>
<td>An aristocratic caste of local rajas in Aceh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSF</td>
<td>United Nations Security Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTEA</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Executive Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wide Fund for Nature</td>
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Map of Indonesian conflict provinces
1. Healing a fractured transition to democracy

This chapter first outlines the ambitions—methodological and substantive—of the Peacebuilding Compared project, of which this book is the first product. It then describes the history of the crash of the Indonesian economy in 1997, followed by the collapse of the political order in 1998, then progressive unravelling of the social order for regulating violence between 1998 and 2001. It is argued that Indonesia is a resilient democratising society that has managed to restabilise all these institutions to create peace (except in West Papua) and better long-term prospects for its people. Few of the structural injustices that contributed to armed conflict have changed substantially. Even though Western investment has not yet returned to the levels enjoyed by Indonesia before 1997 (Hill 2007), its economy did resume strong economic growth at the end of its millennial conflicts, with much of the benefit flowing to the poor. In 2008, Indonesia ranked eleventh in the world in the share of income or consumption that went to the poorest 10 per cent of the population (UNDP 2008).

From being the society with the biggest terrorism problem in the world by 2002 (Kivimäki 2007:50)—a position thereafter lost to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan—Indonesia became the first Muslim society with a massive terror problem to get on top of it. Indonesia showed a better path for solving it than a crude war on terror. It is hard to see Indonesia’s peacemaking as having been accomplished by truth, reconciliation and tackling structural injustices, as was advocated by the senior author eight years ago when Indonesian conflict was at its height (Braithwaite 2002:Ch.6). Rather, this book finds a great deal of peace to have been secured in Indonesia through non-truth and reconciliation. While political game playing by the security forces continues to be a risk to peace in Indonesia (especially in West Papua), in most parts of the country the military has moved from being a large part of the problem to being a big part of the solution.

This book argues that between 1997 and 2004, theoretically, Indonesia experienced a period of anomie (Durkheim 1897): a breakdown of the regulatory order that secured the institutional order (the rules of the game). A security sector that pursued its own interests by taking sides instead of preventing violence from all sides was one important part of that wider problem of anomie. This will recur as a problem in the next three volumes of Peacebuilding Compared—on Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. Abuses by the security forces escalated communal defiance before finally helping to bring violence under control. A Mertonian reading of anomie theory that dissects legitimate and illegitimate opportunity structures in a micro–macro way is
found to be fertile for understanding the onset of these conflicts. Emulation (modelling) of strategies for seizing illegitimate opportunities contributed to the diffusion of violence. Remarkable accomplishments of the reintegration of combatants from organisations such as Laskar Jihad, in which religious leaders showed great leadership for peace, was a feature of Indonesian peacebuilding. So was reconciliation through sharing power combined with the sharing of work (gotong royong) for reconstruction. The chapter then moves on to consider the complex multidimensionality of the factors that make for both war and peace. This evidence is used to argue for locally attuned multidimensionality and redundancy in peacebuilding strategy. This is the key to managing the inherent risks of violence in the gaming of transitions to democracy.

Comparing conflict, comparing peacebuilding

The Peacebuilding Compared project hopes over more than 20 years to code 670 variables in relation to the major armed conflicts that have raged across the world since 1990. This book is a report on the first seven cases coded. It is hoped the next three volumes will appear in quick succession to cover four conflicts coded in Bougainville and Solomon Islands and then Timor-Leste. The project started with the region around the home country of the senior author simply because it was easier to learn how to do it in the region with which the research team was most familiar. As it happens, this region experienced a great deal of armed conflict during the 1990s. It was popularly referred to as ‘the arc of instability’ around Australia. As we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, this arc is a much more stable—though still vulnerable—region.

Peacebuilding Compared started in 2005. During the first five years of the project, the senior author managed to do some serious fieldwork across each of the sites in the four nations where these first 11 conflicts occurred. In some cases, he was joined by co-authors or advisory panel members who had far greater knowledge of that site and its languages. Joint rather than solitary fieldwork is better, more reflexive and reliable, but often is not logistically possible. In general, we were

1 The senior author dabbled at the beginning of the decade in some writing on peacebuilding in Indonesia after several trips there in the 1990s before and after the fall of Suharto (Braithwaite 2002; Chapter 6) and spent time as an anthropology student living in a village in Bougainville at the end of the 1960s.

2 John Braithwaite was present for about 90 per cent of these interviews and he typed up the fieldwork notes or used voice-recognition software to record almost 90 per cent of them. The most common reason for not creating an electronic copy of fieldwork notes was that culpability for war crimes was discussed in the interview or other information was provided that might conceivably put someone in danger. The second most common reason was that there seemed so little that was truthful or valuable in them! Handwritten notes taken during such interviews were still kept, in case a changed view of their truthfulness and value emerged later. No interviews were taped. Co-researchers had often done extensive fieldwork of their own for quite separate research projects—for example, associated with their PhD theses. The latter fieldwork is not included in the interview statistics summarised in the appendices.
surprised at the level of access won to key players such as warlords, generals, foreign ministers, peace agreement negotiators and peacekeeping commanders. As is clear in the appendix to each chapter that summarises the types of players in the conflict who have been interviewed, there is, however, always uneven coverage in the types of stakeholders accessed. In every case, there were regional specialists in the study of this conflict who had secured broader access to the key players and who had talked many times to decision makers we did not manage to tap. This means it is always more important to attend to the published fruits of the fieldwork of others than to one’s own fieldwork notes.

This raises the question, however, of what added value there could be in research of inferior coverage led by a researcher with an inferior background and inferior language skills in the regions of conflict. One added value is that sometimes inferior researchers whose fieldwork engagement is thin are nevertheless lucky enough to gain superior access to some significant bits of information. Already in Peacebuilding Compared there have been many instances in which we have accessed generals, warlords or politicians whom our betters have not managed to get to. There have also been more than a few instances in which we have discovered that the best scholars of that case have published a claim that is wrong—not just wrong as a matter of interpretation, but incontrovertibly, factually wrong. Doubtless, there are even more howlers in this text than in theirs. In this business, we all get things wrong. There is therefore some value from our research in adding a little to the superior body of data and insights accumulated by the very best experts in these conflicts. This is not, however, the main contribution of comparative research. Its main added value is in the comparison and in the different ways of seeing that a comparative lens opens out. In each case study of Peacebuilding Compared, there tend to be a couple of scholars who have done the most insightful or thorough research on that case. The frequent citation of the work of these scholars in each chapter makes it clear who they are. We are deeply grateful to them. Their work remains the scholarship to read on that case; but we do hope that by standing on their books, we might be able to peer over their shoulders to begin to see more clearly a comparative landscape of patterns of conflict across the globe.

Peacebuilding Compared offers a different kind of comparative method than the dominant kind that is based on quantitative analysis of statistical information from databases maintained by organisations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and national statistics bureaus. Peacebuilding Compared uses

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3 To date, more than two-thirds of the interviews for Peacebuilding Compared have been conducted in English, most of the rest with an interpreter, some with a co-fieldworker fluent in the language concerned, a small number with the senior author struggling alone in another language in which he is not fluent (perhaps helped by an informant struggling with English in which they are not fluent). The last were rare and data from them were of poor quality.
these databases as well to code one-third of its 670 variables in relation to each conflict. Most codes, however, are things not available in these databases, such as whether insurgents have received training from a foreign power or whether significant numbers of the combatants are female, based on our interviews (and the published fieldwork of others). Good examples of the kinds of variables never coded in the leading quantitative research are the dynamics and shape of reconciliation processes post-conflict. This is a particularly important neglect according to some of the theoretical frameworks we address in this volume.

We also attempt to deal with two fundamental problems in the quantitative literature. One is that it is often interested only in data coded at the national level. The study of ‘civil wars’ dominated by the disciplines of political science and international relations is often, moreover, interested only in armed conflicts in which one of the combatants is a state. Peacebuilding Compared seeks to maximise coding at the local or provincial level. Hence, the way a variable is coded for the separatist conflict in Aceh might be quite different to how it is coded for the separatist conflict in Papua, at the other end of Indonesia. Another difference is that Peacebuilding Compared is content to code conflicts that are many things at once. For example, Peacebuilding Compared codes Aceh and Papua as separatist conflicts and also as ethnic conflicts. This is different from the approach in the quantitative literature, which tends to force conflicts into one category or another. Third, as is clear from appendices at the end of each chapter, we also enter certain codes as ‘consensus’ codes among scholars and other expert commentators on the case, and others as ‘contested but credible’.

A difference from the ethnographic/qualitative literature is that Peacebuilding Compared is much less engaged with adjudicating the most contested debates about the case. We just code them as contested interpretations and we report the nature of the contestation in our narrative. What we are interested in doing is ruling out non-credible interpretations. Conflict zones are teeming with them: wild unsubstantiated rumours, ridiculous theories propagated by people who

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4 Peacebuilding Compared studies armed conflicts where one armed group with a command structure—even if its organisational auspices were episodic or non-institutionalised—engaged in a group attack with weapons on another armed group with a command structure. This means a clash of two warlord armies or two armed gangs may count as an armed conflict for Peacebuilding Compared if it passes certain other threshold conditions. For the moment, these are that two of the following three conditions are met: that at least 200 people were killed in the fighting within three years; at least 30,000 people were driven from their homes by the fighting; and an internationally sanctioned peacekeeping mission was sent to make peace in the war-torn region. Including the last condition prevents us from excluding from consideration serious armed conflicts that started but were prevented from escalating into mass slaughter by the peacekeepers (for example, the arrival of UN peacekeepers in Timor-Leste in 2006). This, however, is just a starting definition for our armed conflicts that might change as new wars occur. It sets a threshold that excludes a lot of conflicts that one might want to include. In the context of Indonesia, if we assume (probably correctly) that the attacks on the Chinese community in Jakarta resulting in some 1200 deaths in 1998 were orchestrated by the Indonesian military, this is a conflict that still would not satisfy the conditions for inclusion in Peacebuilding Compared. It was an ethnically targeted riot that did not escalate to armed conflict according to our definition.
spread lies to protect their culpability, clever pieces of misinformation planted by double agents and imagined histories concocted by supposed combatants with grandiose visions of their own self-importance to saving their nation. A significant level of fieldwork on the ground and in the capitals of combatant and peacekeeping states (or at UN headquarters) is needed. The intent is not to get the research team to the point where it can settle the most contested debates among the experts, but to the point where it can rule out most (hopefully all) the myriad non-credible interpretations.

This renders Peacebuilding Compared a distinctive form of comparativism. The approach was motivated by reading most of the best research as falling into one of two camps. The first is a large number of wonderful books on particular conflicts, or comparing a couple, written by scholars who have deep knowledge and long experience of that region. The second is the more recent quantitative tradition led by outstanding comparatists such as Ted Gurr, Jack Goldstone, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Virginia Page Fortna, James Fearon, David Laitin, Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, among others cited in the references. In choosing a method that aspires to significant fieldwork engagement that is inferior to the best ethnographic work, and is on a smaller number of cases than the best quantitative work, we are simply filling a methodological niche that has been under-exploited in the literature. We do not have the view that it is necessarily a superior method to the dominant two. One of its demands is that it

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5 One battleground between large-n quantitative methods and single case studies arises from the qualitative critique that quantitative methods freeze (into one code) dynamic phenomena that are one thing at one point in time and another thing at another point in an unfolding conflict. This means that case studies of single conflicts do not in fact have an n of 1. Rather, they are studies of many separate episodes of violence, some of which might be more ethnic, others more religious or involving attacks by different ethnic groups than the first episode. Hence, combining the results of X qualitative analyses of protracted conflicts is more like a qualitative meta-analysis than it is like combining X cases each with an n of 1. What we are attempting in Peacebuilding Compared is a unique kind of meta-analytical hybrid. John Braithwaite deploys his knowledge of the narratives of the set of episodes of violence that make up a particular case to code most variables as ‘High’, ‘Average’ or ‘Low’ on that variable. If there is some doubt about how to code (a common occurrence), it is coded ‘Average’. So, ‘Average’ is given the broad meaning of ‘the range on this variable where most cases of armed conflict in Peacebuilding Compared lie’. If there is both doubt and thinness of data that make it very hard to code, it is also coded as ‘Hard to code’. Imagine coding two variables on the extent to which greed and grievance are motivations for fighting. The first point to make is that they can both be high or both low or they can have different values. The second is that if greed is highly prominent in some episodes, moderately present in most and totally absent in some, the greed variable will be coded ‘Average’. So, these three-point codes are really crude summaries from a sometimes large number of data points within the single case. For some variables, such as the number of combatants on various sides and the number of refugees, we code a real number (or estimate a midpoint of a best-guess range). We code, however, both a maximum number (the high-water mark of the number of combatants or refugees across all episodes of the conflict) and a separate variable, which is an estimated average number across the various episodes of the conflict. All this is perhaps only slightly less crude than a purported single quantitative estimate for a single conflict (as in the extant quantitative literature). However crude, it is an attempt to quantitatively summarise from qualitative cases that are more than narratives of an n of 1. Moreover, this approach to aggregating from a multiple-n sensibility for each conflict is combined with really writing an episodic, dynamic narrative for that conflict. This is what we are doing in each chapter of this book. The hope is that new kinds of insights will ultimately come from the interplay between multiple case study narratives and quantitative analysis of the codes with this multiple-n sensibility.
requires one person to read very extensively on each case and to be in the room or under the tree for most of the fieldwork. Otherwise it would be impossible to code the 670 variables consistently across cases. Otherwise the thematic unity of narrative volumes such as this might offer no advance on an edited collection of haphazard comparisons, insightful though such casual comparativism can be.

By 2030, we hope that some sort of cluster analysis or fuzzy set analysis to the best quantitative standards of that time will reveal something new about types of conflicts. We would also hope to define what might be the most important of probably a long list of risk factors that conduce to the persistence of armed conflict—and what are the most important protective factors for preserving peace. Narrative and analytical books such as this lay an important foundation for this future quantitative work. They discover new variables that are worth coding for all cases and new complexities in the dynamics among these variables that might ultimately account for why certain quantitative models will not explain much and why others might do so.

A final part of the method was to invite the people who seemed to be producing some of the best insights and writing the best books on the case to be members of an advisory panel; our thanks to Sinclair Dinnen for this idea. We asked the advisory panel to suggest important people to interview, to read our first draft and comment on erroneous insights within it and on research and lines of inquiry that needed to be pursued before the next draft. Many were internationally distinguished scholars. Others were PhD students, including a number from The Australian National University, who had the luxury of recently spending long periods in the field that senior scholars could not sometimes manage. We tried to recruit as interpreters individuals who were commended to us as having unusual levels of insight or contacts. Some were ex-combatants and one was the son of the leader of an insurgency. Sometimes we used two interpreters, one to lead us to informants on one side of the conflict, the other to the other side. Most often we sought out as an interpreter (collaborator) an academic who taught at a leading university in the area of the conflict. A number of advisory panel members made such great contributions to our work that we invited them to be co-authors of particular chapters. In many cases, they declined this invitation because they wanted to get on with their own writing rather than work on a text straitjacketed by the senior author’s first draft. Or perhaps they just thought that first draft was awful! A few who helped a lot did not want to be acknowledged even as panel members because they feared being harassed by authorities.

Our ethical obligations under The Australian National University’s Research Ethics Committee approval were explained to all participants. These included an obligation to report quotes and insights from each informant anonymously unless they specifically indicated that they wanted to be quoted as the source.
Wherever in the text a quote appears without a citation to some other source in the literature that is an anonymous quote from an informant interviewed for Peacebuilding Compared.

The Indonesian conflicts

Few, if any, nations experienced a higher density of armed conflict in the late 1990s and early 2000s than Indonesia. Still, we must keep this in perspective by recognising that Indonesia is the fourth-largest nation on Earth, and the largest Muslim one, during a period of history in which armed conflict is unusually concentrated in Muslim nations. More than 90 per cent of Indonesia’s villages and urban centres survived the 1990s and 2000s without losing a single citizen to armed conflict.

Nevertheless, Indonesia did suffer eight conflicts that met the Peacebuilding Compared definition of armed conflict in Note 4. Beyond the conflicts in Timor-Leste—which will be narrated in the fourth volume of Peacebuilding Compared—we started the research assuming Indonesia might have five post-1990 armed conflicts: in Aceh, Papua, Central Sulawesi, Maluku and Kalimantan. We found, however, that the conflict in North Maluku had to be coded very differently from the one in Maluku and that Central Kalimantan was a different conflict from West Kalimantan. One big difference in the last case, for example, was that the most dramatic aspect of the West Kalimantan conflict involved the ethnic cleansing of Madurese by ethnic Malays. In Central Kalimantan, there was no Malay–Madurese armed conflict, only conflict between Madurese and Dayaks. To count as separate in Peacebuilding Compared, conflicts must be separated in time or space, or both, though they may occur within the same nation. That said, it should be recognised that the same conflict can be intermittent and flare up at different points in time and space. For example, the Free Papua Movement insurgency first sprang up in one corner of Papua, then later in another corner. If the intermittent flare-ups can be coded in roughly the same way, they will be treated as part of the one armed conflict.6

Separatist, ethnic and religious conflicts

Aceh and Papua are often described as separatist conflicts because the objective of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Free Papua Movement (OPM) was independence of their province from Indonesia. The Kalimantan conflicts are often described as ethnic. The conflicts in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North

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6 How intermittent versus continuous a conflict is between its start date and its finish date is also something we code.
Maluku are usually described as religious wars between Muslims and Christians. While these adjectives capture the dominant thrust of each of these conflicts, the narratives in this book show that such a separatist-ethnic-religious typology is far too simple. For example, Chapter 5 shows that class conflicts of different kinds are central to understanding the West Kalimantan conflict.

Let us illustrate further with the way Chapter 3 describes the fighting in North Maluku. At first, it broke out between two ethnic groups—the Kao (with Jailolo) and Makians—over a change in subdistrict boundaries close to a goldmine and over a marginalised group (the Kao) feeling they were discriminated against by the government. In time, conflict erupted across the fault lines of a number of more enduring ethnic divides, such as between Tidorese and Ternateans, between the Ternatean ethnic traditionalism of North Ternate and the multicultural Muslim modernism of South Ternate, and many other ethnic tensions and land disputes that might or might not have been connected to ethnicity in different parts of the province. There was conflict among the military and the stirrings of democracy among students, between the police and the military, between the Sultan of Ternate’s palace guards and people who felt they had been threatened or tortured by them because of their political opposition to the sultan. There was levelling rioting directed by disparate mobs at the Chinese business community. There was armed conflict between gangs hired to support different political parties. There were rioting university students and other youth who believed in democracy/reformasi railing against what they saw as a feudal order harnessed by Golkar (former President Suharto’s party) and epitomised by the sultan. There was the movement for a jihadist Islamic turn that expanded throughout Indonesia in the 1990s versus local syncretic Islam. Indeed, the most politically decisive pitched battle opposed one Islamic force against another (one supportive of the sultan, the other opposed). There were local groups who joined the North Maluku conflict to settle scores on any number of idiosyncratic humiliations or slights that someone on the other side had inflicted on them. There were some who became highly motivated for more ‘rational’ reasons, such as the desire for jobs at a goldmine. There is increasing evidence from the literature on modern conflict that fights that start for even the most noble ideals attract psychopaths to the front line who seek out rape, torture and mutilation (for example, Collier 2007:29–30). Especially on the Christian side in North Maluku, a progressive yet rapid shift from capture of the conflict by a sometime ethical idealism of pastors to capture by psychopaths was evident. This is not to deny that a great deal, even most, of the human rights abuses are ‘good people doing bad things’; it is just to say that psychopaths join conflicts and over time increasing numbers of traumatised and vengeful fighters model psychopathic scripts rather than follow the ethical compass that launched their struggle.
In all of the conflicts discussed in this book, revenge for relatives and friends lost in earlier phases of the conflict is one of the most important motivations for new fighters and groups of fighters joining a conflict. It would therefore be more accurate to describe many episodes in these mostly intermittent conflicts as revenge conflicts than as separatist, ethnic or religious conflicts. Some conflicts that start with motivations that are chiefly about greed, such as control of a goldmine, end being motivated chiefly by grievance over what has happened in earlier phases of fighting. Many conflicts that start chiefly with a grievance motivation end with a large component of motivation by greed as warlord armies morph into protection rackets and organised crime groups. Elements of GAM in Aceh and OPM in Papua illustrate this dynamic well (Chapters 6 and 2).

In all of the conflicts in this book, elements of the Indonesian army operated as organised crime groups that ran rackets in arenas that included protection, illegal logging, drug trafficking, arms trading with insurgents and enforcement of commodity cartels. These were conflicts that were therefore many things at once and were best coded as such. Wars are often organised crime problems and crime is often organised as war. They must also be understood as many things at once if we are to grapple with what are the reconciliatory strategies that might work, or might fail because they are pitched at too truncated a vision of what a war is about. They must be studied in an integrated micro–macro explanatory framework if we are to understand the forms of bottom-up reconciliation needed and the forms of top-down and middle-out reconciliations needed to grapple with more macro-grievances.

The period 1996–99 saw some anti-Chinese rioting in West Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku, Central Sulawesi and even Papua to a small degree (Purdey 2006:219–20). Aceh did not seem to experience this, though Aceh had in earlier decades and centuries suffered much more extensive slaughter and had ethnically cleansed more than half its Chinese, especially in 1966. As we will see in the next two volumes of Peacebuilding Compared, with the conflicts in East Timor, Bougainville and Solomon Islands as well, Chinese were targeted by violence even though they were not the central players in the conflicts concerned. Across Asia and the Pacific, as Amy Chua (2004) has argued, the Chinese are a resented ‘market-dominant minority’. As with most of the structural drivers of our Indonesian conflicts, nothing transpired in the peacebuilding to address the structural driver of the recurrent targeting of Chinese businesses. This driver was economic inequality: the fact that 80 per cent of Indonesia’s private corporate wealth was owned by Chinese and that 13 of the 15 biggest taxpayers in the late 1990s were Chinese, the other two being President Suharto’s sons.
Anomie and Violence

(Purdey 2006:22). The fact that so few Chinese were killed in these conflicts compared with groups of other ethnicities, even though their properties were so often targeted, does make one wonder whether opportunistic looting could have been a bigger motivation than resentment over inequality. Another reason was that our interviews revealed a widespread philosophy of flight rather than fighting to defend property among the Chinese.

Most of the anti-Chinese rioting that occurred in Indonesia in the late 1990s was not connected with the seven armed conflicts that are the subject of this book. In addition to the upsurge in separatist violence, in ethnic cleansing and in religious battles that occurred in the three years before the turn of the millennium and the five years after it, there was an upsurge in pro-democracy and other political demonstrations that turned violent, in urban riots of other kinds connected with a quite disparate range of grievances, including food riots, in ‘anti-vice’ militias attacking nightclubs and other places seen as a threat to an Islamic way of life, and in terrorism. All these forms of violence declined from the middle years of the 2000s or earlier. The argument of this book is that while each form of violence that spiked around the turn of the millennium had specific, usually very local, kinds of explanations, there were also national and global factors of some general explanatory purchase across all the forms the historical spike in violence took. We focus particularly on anomie as a macrosociological explanation that fits our early cases.

Descent into authoritarianism and well-ordered crony capitalism

When the Dutch East India Company colonised what is today Indonesia, it was one of the wealthiest parts of the world. That wealth was based on highly elaborated trading networks that stretched north-east to China and north-west to the Malay Peninsula, India and the Arab world. Capitalism based on vibrant inter-town trade was as emergent across the archipelago as it was in the Hansa League in Europe. Chapters 3 and 6 provide especially pointed accounts of how the Dutch East India Company crushed these flourishing markets by using force of arms to impose corporate commodity monopolies. We will also see that in different ways in different cases, colonial ethnic politics in some places created groups with privileged access to government jobs and education, while in other cases they consciously sought to divide and conquer, forging new ethnic and religious identities that were hostile to competitors (Davidson 2008b:182–7).

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8 Citing Davidson here should not be taken to imply that Davidson finds colonial history fundamental to the explanation of violence from 1997 across Indonesia; he does not. Moreover, in the case of West Kalimantan, he finds a more important causal role in the early New Order’s ‘destabilizing politicisation of ethnicity’ (Davidson 2008b:202).
Indonesia not only suffered comparatively greater economic decline than other developing economies because of the way colonialism operated there, it had a less benign exit from colonialism than countries that were assisted to establish democracy before European masters voluntarily handed over power. Indonesia had to fight the Dutch for independence for four years between 1945 and 1949. In Aceh, this armed independence struggle has raged for most of the period since 1873 (Chapter 6).

This left Indonesia with a legacy like that of China in the sense that a rural-based people’s army was the great unifying force of the new nation, and like Burma, where a politicised army was forged in a struggle to oust British colonialism (Crouch 1988; Singh 1995:8). We will argue that the military that liberated Indonesia became the font of new forms of exploitation of its people. The military took over many Dutch businesses and also became the principal source of managerial competence in the new nation for several decades. Under its ‘dual role’ as a ‘military force’ and a ‘social-political force’—a philosophy installed in the unstable late years of the Sukarno presidency—the military became powerful at all levels of government (Crouch 1988; Singh 1995; Lowry 1996). Policies to bring the military under democratic control had little traction until the governments of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono from 2004 (Mietzner 2009:360). The circumstances of anomie until then meant that, as in the rape and razing of East Timor in 1999, the military could manage crises in open defiance of the preferences of their president.

While Dutch colonialism and Indonesian military authoritarianism after independence were important elements of the deep historical structures that opened up many of the fissures in Indonesian society in the late 1990s, we will also see that they quelled a great deal of internal conflict. ‘Pacification’ is an odd word in the Dutch colonial lexicon for how headhunting, cannibalism, intertribal warfare and other forms of internal violence were ended across Indonesia. ‘Pacification’ was in fact substantially achieved at the point of a gun in many parts of the colony. Henley (2004) concluded, however, that indigenous groups across the archipelago often welcomed ‘stranger-kings’ when they could solve their Hobbesian problem by superior firepower and unbiased arbitration that stood above local divisions. Some ceased inter-group warfare the moment the Dutch arrived, seemingly relieved with the excuse to end the life ‘dominated by fear’ of feuds (Li 2001:50). Li (2001:50) quotes one of her Lauje hill farmers from Central Sulawesi expressing gratitude to the colonial and the post-colonial state: ‘In the old days there was fighting because people were not afraid of the government. Now it is safe because the government is strong.’

Likewise, in an ethnically fragmented country in the six decades since independence, the military has successfully nipped in the bud countless outbreaks of internal conflict. Only about 7 per cent of the villages in Indonesia
experienced (mostly low-level) local conflict in 2002, just past the peak of Indonesian violence, with only one-quarter of these incidents resulting in a death. Of the 3544 village-level local conflicts reported by village heads to have been resolved in 2002, in 46 per cent of the cases it was the security forces who were reported to have resolved them, with Java being the region where the security forces were most successful in driving the resolution. In Aceh, they were least effective (Barron et al. 2004:13). This must be balanced by grasping the fact that even more of the conflicts were stopped by local civil society in the village. It is also important to understand that community self-organisation of security in the form of citizen checkpoints, night watches and the like is predictive of low conflict, as is the density of places of worship (which this book repeatedly shows to be peacemaking nodes) and the presence of a democratically elected village council (which can lend legitimacy to village peacemaking) (Barron et al. 2004:27). In the big picture, however, colonial and post-colonial military forces played a huge role in creating Indonesia as a large pacified space that imposed a nation on an archipelago of cultures.

Indonesia enjoyed a comparatively short period of post-colonial republican democracy before President Sukarno installed ‘guided democracy’ in 1957, formally dissolving the elected parliament in 1960. Guided democracy was really a balance of power between the president, the army leadership and the Indonesian Communist Party (the largest in the world after the Chinese and Soviet parties) (Crouch 1988:45). As inflation reached 500 per cent, an alleged communist coup attempt led to General Suharto displacing Sukarno’s old order in 1965. Suharto’s ‘New Order’ was anti-communist but authoritarian. Perhaps 500 000 people believed to be members of the Indonesian Communist Party were slaughtered in the aftermath of the Suharto takeover (Cribb 2001).

The New Order was authoritarian rather than totalitarian; it left space for a ‘limited pluralism’ (Aspinall 2005a:3). This limited pluralism meant political activism was possible for reforms that did not challenge the fundamentals of the regime. It was a combination of repression and constrained forms of political reformism that rendered the New Order more resilient than an unfettered totalitarianism that might have radicalised a revolutionary opposition (Aspinall 2005a). By the 1980s and 1990s, Indonesia suffered extraordinarily systematic corruption, with the Suharto family and its Javanese military and Chinese business cronies the primary beneficiaries of its ‘crony capitalism’.

Guided democracy was thin on checks and balances, but did incorporate an Indonesian conception of deliberative democracy as *musjawarah*. Sukarno articulated it as traditional village democracy as practised in Java, Bali, Lombok, Sulawesi and elsewhere: ‘But do they in these village meetings apply the practice of voting? Of free-fight liberalism where half plus one is always right? No my friends...Everybody says something different until at one time a compromise is achieved out of all these different opinions, without voting...There is not dictatorship in *musjawarah* and *musfakat*. That is why democracy with leadership is a true, original Indonesian democracy’ (Grant 1996:126).
Nevertheless, huge Western investment for the three decades of the New Order was attracted by the stability and anti-communism of the regime combined with its geopolitical importance, rich oil, gas, mineral and other resources and impressive national investment in education. Institutional weakness in banking and many other sectors mediated by the massive corruption of crony capitalism ultimately rendered this a fragile accomplishment. Most of the international capital that had flowed to Indonesia fled overnight when the Asian financial crisis descended in 1997. This crisis affected Indonesia more than any nation and was greater than Indonesia had experienced during the decade after the Great Depression of 1929 (Hill 2007). What Indonesia suffered in 1997–98 was, in the words of Paul Krugman (2008:92), ‘one of the worst economic slumps in world history’.

**Indonesian renaissance of peace, democracy and prosperity**

Other books have documented how the Asian financial crisis ushered in the collapse of Suharto’s New Order in May 1998 (Aspinall 2005a; Bertrand 2004; Rinakit 2005). What is relevant to this book is that all the conflicts discussed herein, plus the conflict in East Timor, escalated markedly after the New Order collapsed, even though those in Aceh, Papua, East Timor and West Kalimantan had begun before the collapse. In addition to these eight armed conflicts that each resulted in more than 1000 deaths, in many other parts of Indonesia there was an upsurge in ethnic and religious rioting—targeted mainly against Chinese—that incinerated many homes and businesses and cost thousands of lives (Lindsey and Pausacker 2005; Purdey 2006). The anti-Chinese violence peaked first in 1998, when there were at least 34 serious outbreaks around the nation, falling to only three in 1999 (Purdey 2006:219–20). While the structural inequality between Chinese and non-Chinese Indonesians was the widest one in the nation, this ethnic conflict ended first because of widespread revulsion/shame/denial over the dozens (perhaps hundreds) of rapes of Chinese women that occurred in May 1998, the shock at the loss of about 1200 lives in Jakarta (mostly of looters caught in fires) and the widespread belief that the riots, rapes and anti-Chinese hysteria had been provoked by pro-Suharto military leaders. For all kinds of violence combined, 1999–2001 was the worst period in Indonesia (Varshney et al. 2004:23). Terrorist bombings by Islamic groups, particularly Jemaah Islamiyah, were the last form of violence to fall sharply. There was considerable decline in terror after the first Bali bombing in 2002 and the second in 2005 (Table 1.1).10 Nine deaths on 17 July 2009 in Jakarta hotel bombings

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10 By 2005, support in public opinion polls for Al-Qaeda had also fallen dramatically from 58 per cent of the population in 2002. During the second Gulf War, Saddam Hussein was the most popular name for babies
were suspected at the time of writing to be revenge attacks for the execution of the Bali bombers by a Jemaah Islamiyah splinter group masterminded by Malaysian hold-out Noordin Top, who was killed in a shootout with the police.

Table 1.1 Terrorist fatalities recorded in the Global Terrorism Database

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<th>Year</th>
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Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland and US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism report, viewed 15 March 2009, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/s00s/pdf/index.htm>

Note: These public databases exclude large numbers of terrorist incidents in Indonesia of which the authors are aware, but nevertheless portray accurately the pattern of their rise and fall.

The period 1999–2002 seemed to many commentators to forebode a break-up akin to that of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. Two leaders, President B. J. Habibie and President Abdurrahman Wahid, lost their jobs in quick succession because they were unable to control the violence more than perhaps for any other single reason. Indonesian politics had also taken a radical Islamic turn away from its traditional commitment to preserving a state based on religious tolerance. In the seven years after the fall of the New Order, Indonesia’s terrorism problem worsened dramatically, as hard as its leadership attempted to suppress news of the extent of what was going on. Few nations experienced anything like the simultaneous bombing of 38 Christian churches across Indonesia during Christmas Eve services in 2000. Only two of these incidents are recorded in the databases that generate the numbers in Table 1.1. Indeed few of the Indonesian terrorism incidents known to the authors—even one incident in which possibly 200 people perished in a mosque bombed by Christians—are recorded in the international databases. This is because their main source is searches of wire services and ‘major international newspapers’, which take little interest in remote islands of the Indonesian archipelago. Moreover, the international media was denied access to them by the army when they did show some interest at times of acute violence. Beyond terrorism, we look back with amazement at vividly filmic battles that were not reported by the international media, in which thousands of Muslim fighters were arrayed against Christian ‘armies’ led by pastors leading the faithful into battle singing *Onward Christian Soldiers*.

Beneath the surface during these terrible seven post-Suharto years, Indonesia was really renewing itself rather than disintegrating. We will see that a corrupt, violent and anti-democratic military was at the heart of Indonesia’s problems during this period—and still is today. In 2004, however, the leader of the democratic reform faction in the Indonesian military, General Yudhoyono, born in Indonesia (Kivimäki 2007).
became president in an election with an 84 per cent voter turnout. That was the last year of the fighting in what had been the most deadly conflicts of the previous decade in Aceh and Maluku. Deeper reform dynamics were in play in Indonesia than simply the assumption of power by a non-corrupt president who was a democrat, a reformer of the military and a peacemaker. The lifting of New Order authoritarianism had also engaged a renewal of Indonesian civil society and business. According to a Reporters Without Borders index, Indonesia had acquired one of the freest presses in Asia and the Pacific (UNDP 2006). The devastating effects on the country of religious conflict energised widespread leadership from all faiths, but especially from Islamic ulamas, working for religious tolerance. This is not to argue that suddenly all was rosy in Indonesia. One interviewee expresses the change as everything moving in the right direction now but far, far too slowly. Many people see President Yudhoyono pushing for deeper democracy and freedom, but he is also seen as weak and easily deflected by opposition from ultranationalists and military conservatives who he fears—with good reason—could unseat him. We see the effects of this weakness in the president in the next chapter in his failure to confront military excess in West Papua (compared with the willingness he showed to do so in Aceh; Chapter 6). Caveats aside—and Papua is a huge one—what we have seen in the past six years is a remarkable renaissance of peace, unity, tolerance, improved governance and democracy in Indonesia. While most of these changes have been painfully gradual, the decline in violence has been remarkably sharp. These are the key elements of the renaissance.

- While few, if any, nations would have experienced more terrorist bombings than Indonesia between 1999 and 2002, the years since saw a sharp decline, though the problem was still acute until 2005.
- For the seven conflicts in this book (plus East Timor), we have seen a shift to positive peace in all but one: Papua, which at least has a (fragile) negative peace.¹¹
- Ethnic rioting targeting Chinese homes and businesses has reduced to near zero from a remarkably widespread pattern of ethnic vilification in the 1990s (Purdey 2006).
- For the period 2000–03, Indonesia had one of the highest number of ‘Recorded Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances’ by the Geneva Declaration (2008:135)—43—declining to just one for 2004–07 (though there were unrecorded cases in West Papua in this period). As with the numbers

¹¹ Negative peace means the absence of war in this project, while positive peace means a peace secured through commitment to the justice of the post-conflict institutional settlement (see Galtung 1969 for the original formulation). Also see, in turn, the foundations for this in the seventeenth-century thought of the Dutch philosopher Baruch de Spinoza: ‘Peace is not an absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice’ (cited in New Internationalist 2005:82).
for terrorist attacks, this database gets the pattern right, but the absolute numbers are way too low (Hernawan 2008).

- The Indonesian homicide rate today of probably about 1 per 100,000 people is lower than that in most continental European and Anglo-Saxon societies. Between 1999 and 2005, it had the lowest imprisonment rate (28 per 100,000) in the world (Karstedt 2010), though it has probably slipped a few places since. This is a big change from the 1970s and 1980s, when unrecorded murders—particularly of citizens the military believed to be criminals—were widespread and when Indonesia maintained a vast carceral complex for unknown numbers of political prisoners. It is also a big improvement since a decade ago when people lived in acute fear of armed gangs in many parts of Indonesia.

- While corruption is still a very large problem in Indonesia, vibrant anti-corruption efforts have escalated since 2004 that have included undercover and sting operations. Since then, 317 Members of Parliament (mostly not national), three national ministers, five provincial governors and other senior officials in the judiciary, police and regulatory agencies as well as CEOs of major private companies have been prosecuted, with acquittals rare (Jasan 2009).12

- Notwithstanding sharp falls on the Jakarta stock exchange in the worldwide recession of 2009, the Indonesian economy had been recovering well before then (Hill 2007) and still grew strongly during 2009, with its banking and other institutions renewed by improved private and public governance. An example was institutional renewal of tax administration, which resulted in steep increases in voluntary compliance and in tax collected by 2008.

- Democracy has become slowly yet progressively more deeply institutionalised. Indonesia shifted in a decade from being one of the least democratic countries in South-East Asia to perhaps the most democratic, along with its former province Timor-Leste. Dissent and freedom of the press are vibrant. Not only can elected national presidents, provincial governors and district bupatis be defeated at election without violence, Indonesia has become an interesting experiment in bottom-up democratisation of development planning from the village and subdistrict levels upwards through the World Bank-funded Kecamatan Development Program and the Indonesian Government’s Musrenbang. Most chapters of this book describe successes and limits of this

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12 At the time of writing in 2009, there was concern that political support for tough corruption enforcement could be waning, with, for example, President Yudhoyono being publicly critical of sting operations against fellow politicians during the 2009 election campaign. November 2009 saw large demonstrations to push the president to step up his anti-corruption promises after allegations that the police framed and arrested two deputies of the Anti-Corruption Commission who were investigating corruption by senior police (see various articles in The Jakarta Post throughout November–December 2009, especially 6 December). In response, after initial vacillation, at the time of writing, the president seemed to be saying that he was firm about renewing his anti-corruption commitments.
new local participatory decision making in the part of Indonesia discussed in the chapter.

Recovery from anomie

Amy Chua (2004:293) opined in the final paragraph of her interesting book on how democracy could unleash violence against ‘market-dominant minorities’ (such as the Chinese in Indonesia) that ‘the results of democratisation in Indonesia have been disastrous’. Like many others, she reached a conclusion too soon. Democratic integration of 300 ethnic groups dispersed across 13 000 islands and building new institutions after four decades of autocracy are not challenges that can be met overnight. We can interpret such a sharp rise and steep fall in conflict in Indonesia before and after the millennium in anomie theory terms (Durkheim 1897; Merton 1949). The Greek etymology of ‘anomie’ is from ‘α’ (without) and ‘nomos’ (law). ‘Norms’ is a much wider concept than law today: it means customary expectations of behaviour that coordinate interactions with others. Anomie is instability resulting from a breakdown of the regulatory order that secures norms. We might also interpret the sharp rise in the size of the Indonesian underground economy at the end of the New Order (Wibowo 2001; van Klinken 2007:49) in these anomie theory terms. Karstedt (2006:55) concludes that increased homicide rates following transitions to democracy are not usually short-term results of disruption from the demise of an autocracy, but involve anomie tendencies that persist through quite a long duration of transition. We saw extremely elevated homicide rates for many years in post-communist transitions, and in South Africa, for example. Karstedt (2006:64) argues that the data show that ‘when the grip of an authoritarian regime loosens, the anomie tendencies produced during the preceding period of autocracy erupt in violent conflicts and a wave of violent crime’.

Ordinary Indonesians often describe themselves as ‘di antara dua dunia’—between two worlds (of tradition and modernity). This implies a clear separation between the traditional and the modern that is too simple for the more messy reality of norms in flux, of unsettled contexts in which norms of tradition and rapidly evolving norms of modernity might evoke commitment. Indonesia in 1998 was a society in which norms were in such flux that it was hard for people to identify any semblance of a position that marked a normative constellation of the ‘good citizen’.

The source of anomie in many parts of Indonesia from the late 1990s was the collapse of Suharto’s New Order in conditions of uncertainty created by the Asian financial crisis. Jacques Bertrand’s (2004:5) analysis was that this was a ‘critical juncture’ in state development: ‘when institutions are weakened during transition periods, allocations of power and resources become open for
competition.’ Jemma Purdey (2006:203) articulated this in a slightly different way: ‘many Indonesians interpreted reformasi [post-Suharto] as a new freedom to resolve injustices, perceived or real, by means of mass mobilisation.’ The Indonesian state under Sukarno and Suharto sowed seeds of this normative flux by valorizing militias and vigilantes in defence of the ‘nation’ by its use of imagery of Pattimura and other guerrilla heroes from the struggle against Dutch colonialism (Cookson 2008). In some contexts of anomie, including many of those described in the chapters that follow, violence becomes an effective form of competition. Institutions are a society’s most embedded rules of the game. The situation in Indonesia in 1998 was that the old rules were swept away for a period. What the new rules of the game would be was up for grabs. From 2004, Mietzner (2009:377) saw a new consolidation of the polity, whereby

> the norms of democratic competition were clarified in new sets of legal regulations, providing alternative institutional mechanisms to resolve disputes not only between state institutions, but also between powerful civilian groups. This, in turn, helped reduce the tendency of civilian leaders to mobilise their masses against opponents, and consequently undermined the position of the armed forces as conflict mediators.

Merton (1949) gave anomie a specific meaning in terms of the structure of institutions. The unfettering of individuals and organisations from settled norms arises in conditions where there is a discrepancy between widely shared societal goals and legitimate means to obtain them. Structural shifts in the society prevent actors from achieving valued goals legitimately, so they experience strain to resort to illegitimate means of attaining those goals. Armed violence is one such illegitimate means. Merton’s way of building on Durkheim is attractive here because what happened in Indonesia in 1997–98 was a rupture of the normative order and a rupture of the opportunity structure. Both were involved in the scramble for new kinds of illegitimate opportunities.

Anxiety and uncertainty about what the rules of the game would be in the new institutional order led to acutely defensive reactions to political events that might have been interpreted more benignly in other times. For example, among many Christians in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku, Habibie becoming president in May 1998 was feared to be the completion of an Islamic takeover of a formerly secular state (Sidel 2008). The reason for this interpretation was that Habibie had been the leader of the Association of Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals, whose mission was to increase the influence of Islamic norms and values within the state, and political leadership by the faithful.
In some of our cases (Maluku, North Maluku, Central Sulawesi and to a lesser extent Aceh), though not in others (Papua, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan), anomie was mediated by a security dilemma. The valued goal at issue for village leaders was security for the village. The legitimate means to that goal was calling in protection from the security forces. Unfortunately, in a case such as Maluku, it was often the security forces that did most of the killing. Local Christian police were killing many Muslims and the (mostly non-Malukan) military accounted for much of the slaughter of Christians. The security dilemma was that Muslim and Christian villages wanted peace, yet Christians came to believe that unless they drove out Muslims first, Muslims would attack them, and vice versa. The blockage of legitimate means to security resulted in resort to illegitimate means: forming militias and making homemade weapons to attack neighbours, burning their homes to the ground and driving them out.

The security dilemma was in turn driven by security sector anomie. The New Order had been forged by the military. When the New Order collapsed, there were various factions within the military. Some generals wanted the military to step back from its political role and submit to democratically elected leaders. Others wanted to destabilise the emerging Indonesian democracy and reassert political control by the military elite through physical intimidation. Others simply wanted to exploit the climate of instability to make money by demanding protection payments from frightened people or by selling weapons or ammunition. In Maluku, there were even military snipers who sold their assassination skills to both sides. In short, when legitimate paths to power were blocked for the military, many seized illegitimate opportunities to recoup wealth and power.

Security sector anomie played a role in all of the conflicts in this book—and in East Timor as well—as did attempts by political opportunists of various kinds to impose new rules of the game in conditions where the old rules had collapsed. Most regions, however, moved through to the new millennium without any escalation of political violence. Three factors distinguished the regions where national anomie played out as regional violence: 1) regional grievances that were structurally deep; 2) leaders with an entrepreneurial determination to connect those grievances to an identity politics that could mobilise organisations and people to violence; and 3) security sector anomie sufficiently deep (in that locality) to accelerate the violence.

The Indonesian patterns of transitional violence fit the finding from quantitative studies that semi-democracies are more likely to suffer civil war

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13 Some Javanese and Gayonese minority communities were attacked by GAM for fear they might form militias with the support of the Indonesian military.
than full democracies or autocracies (Esty et al. 1998; Hegre et al. 2001; Gurr 2000; Marshall and Gurr 2003:19–20; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). In a case such as the initial outbreak of Kao grievances against the Makians in North Maluku (Chapter 3), the state was ‘neither democratic enough to reduce grievances by allowing greater participation nor autocratic enough to be able to suppress opposition during the early stages of rebellion’ (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:35). Indonesia also fits de Tocqueville’s (1955:182) hypothesis that ‘[u]sually the most dangerous time for a bad government is when it attempts to reform itself’ (see also Huntington 1991). Regime change triples the risk of civil war soon after the change, reducing to double the risk a year later (Hegre et al. 2001). In effect, Indonesia stumbled violently from being a stable autocracy to being an unstable semi-democracy. Ultimately, however, the resilience of its civil society and political leadership saw it through on the other side to become a society with good prospects of being a stable full democracy. It is not there yet and at the time of writing it faces the formidable challenge of surviving the 2009 world recession less violently than it did the 1997 Asian financial crisis. While 2009 saw another escalation of armed violence in West Papua, the 2009 national election campaign that re-elected President Yudhoyono was overwhelmingly peaceful and honest.

Our interviews suggested that after West Kalimantan erupted in 1997, modelling or emulation effects accelerated anomie effects on conflicts. The Central Kalimantan attempt at ethnic cleansing of Madurese involved considerable modelling of ethnic cleansing in West Kalimantan. The attempts by Muslims to cleanse Christians and vice versa in other locations also involved some emulation of Kalimantan and other provinces where this had happened. Demands for referenda backed by insurgency in Aceh and Papua involved considerable emulation of East Timor.

The multidimensional drivers of war and peace

The simplest message of this book is about complexity.14 It is that a complex of factors—structural, proximate and precipitating—are involved in the onset of these armed conflicts. Each chapter organises this complex of drivers of conflict into the structural then the proximate factors, then the precipitating events, then the types of actors that play out these events, the motivational postures

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14 One of our referees worried at the thought that complexity could be a theme of the book, calling for pruning of explanations that did not connect with the core ones of anomie, memory/forgetting and reconciliation. We suspect complexity will, however, be precisely a theme we theorise in future volumes, not necessarily in formal complexity or chaos theory terms. The discussion of redundancy in the theory of prevention in the concluding sections of Chapter 3 gives only glimpses of how this theory development is progressing. We feel we need to accumulate more complexity before we are ready to offer a theory of complexity and multidimensionality in peacebuilding.
and principles they mobilise and the strengths and weaknesses of peacebuilding in this case. While we explore our emergent overarching themes of anomie and recording of truth and reconciliation in each chapter, we also discuss all the candidates for variables that credible commentators on the case would regard as more important drivers of conflict than these. All of them are coded for future quantitative analysis.

There is also a complex relationship between the factors involved in the onset of war and those implicated in the onset of peace; some peacebuilding factors are a mirror image of war-making factors, others are not. Likewise, a diversity of actors drives the decisions that induce armed conflict. Sometimes these actors flip from war-makers to peacemakers; sometimes very different people and organisations do the peacebuilding from those who executed armed conflict and sowed its seeds. Religious leaders, political leaders and journalists in all of these cases played roles in fanning flames of conflict by propagating from their privileged communication forums bellicose interpretations of comparatively minor incidents in the early stages of the conflict. Different religious, political and journalistic leaders also became leaders in brokering and promoting peace.

Kivimäki’s (2004) work discussed in Chapter 5 shows that combatant groups often have very different conceptions to their opponents of what the fighting is about. This leads to the following kind of strategic mistake. The group that thinks this is a local turf war between gangs looks at its local dominance and thinks it will win; the group that interprets it as an inter-ethnic war looks at the greater strength of its ethnic group across a whole province and decides it will win. Peace journalism has a critical role in educating gangs that are escalating a conflict because they think they will win. It challenges their understanding of why the other group is fighting. If they did understand why their enemies were fighting, they might comprehend the disaster they could bring on themselves and their families.

Each of our cases also reveals quite idiosyncratic actors playing important roles in building peace. For example, in West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan, there were credit unions that had previously been vehicles for creating economic opportunities for disadvantaged Dayaks. Post-conflict, these credit unions started extending assistance to needy and displaced Madurese and they started employing Madurese for the first time. This was a tangible and helpful manifestation of reconciliation in these conflicts. Such micro-finance illustrates one of our main points about the importance to peace of contextual micro-leadership in resolving conflicts that have macro-structural drivers.

Some of these conflicts started as riots sparked by relatively inconsequential fights between young men, stonings of houses or even traffic accidents. While we will have something to say about dowsing sparks as one of the things a
multidimensional strategy of peacebuilding needs to accomplish, these sparks are preceded by a build-up of expectation. Hence, when the triggering incident snapped, there were sighs and cries that ‘it’s finally started’. So if one spark had not lit the conflagration, another might have. We concluded from these Indonesian conflicts that if an effective security sector response could not succeed in dousing all the potential initial sparks, it generally could, with time and determination, extinguish the youthful rioting and inter-gang fighting that escalated from the initial incident. The fact that it often did not was a reflection on the Indonesian security sector’s anomie of the period.

In the inter-religious conflicts in Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi, when a security dilemma ensued from escalated fighting and house burning by semi-organised youth gangs, the age structure of the combatants changed. When older men (and sometimes women) felt that the situation had deteriorated as their village descended into a dilemma of attack or be attacked, they became leaders of the conflict, organising younger fighters into disciplined units and mobilising the resources for the acquisition and production of weapons. In all of the cases that started with youthful fighting there were also older male political opportunists who saw leadership of organised combatants as a path to their personal political and economic ascendancy in a time when uncertain rules of the political game seemed to open up opportunities for opportunists. When a conflict becomes ripe for peace making as exhausted fighters find themselves in a hurting stalemate (Zartman 1985), we find the key players tend to become even older men and women. In Barron et al.’s (2004:27) study of 4872 outbreaks of local conflict across Indonesia, the presence of a female village leader was statistically associated with a lower level of conflict in rural areas. Religious and adat (customary) elder statesmen and women whose sermons pleading for peace pushed them to the margins of political influence when the conflict was hot were increasingly turned to as it cooled into a hurting stalemate. Again, an important role of the security forces, often not realised in these Indonesian conflicts, was to prevent such prophets of peace being assassinated at the height of tensions.

Peacebuilding Compared sets out to be radically inductive in approach to understanding the drivers of war and peace. We start with real conflicts in this volume and try to understand what makes those conflicts tick and what leads to their resolution. Writing each conflict narrative has led to the addition of new variables to our coding spreadsheet, causing us to re-interrogate the data from previously coded conflicts to see if these newly discovered drivers might

15 Wilson’s (2008) research on North Maluku, as discussed in Chapter 3, highlights the role of youthful masculinities, the pursuit of excitement in the onset of that armed conflict. Just as a demography of a youth bulge can be important to sharp upward movements in rates of common crime, so our systematic empirical work over time might show that youth bulges are associated with increased risks of armed violence, including in some of these Indonesian cases.
have been in play there, sometimes necessitating extra interviews, emails and interrogation of documentary sources to reach a view on this. Of course, we start the projects with theoretical prejudices grounded in the social science traditions in which we have lived long intellectual lives. Some of them perhaps will prove productive prejudices; others will blinker us in stupid ways. At least we can say that our prejudices are many and contradictory and our mission is to submit them to empirical contestation not only in our data collection, but by inviting our advisory panels to challenge them. We also advise everyone we interview that our working papers will be placed on the Peacebuilding Compared web site for many months before volumes such as this appear. We give them an information sheet and a pen with the web site address on it. They too are encouraged to contest our interpretations. We regret to report that our ambitions of crafting a semi-wiki approach to case studies so far has generated limited critique, however, it is still the early days of the project.

Notwithstanding this wide-ranging inductiveness, the medium-term ambition of Peacebuilding Compared is to build new theory. Our eclecticism will be patient. In the end, it will not be just an eclecticism of building longer and longer lists of relevant factors. We will seek to generate new clusters of types of conflicts and new explanations for their differential dynamics. Each volume will focus on some emergent theoretical syntheses that seem promising, if provisional.

The open-textured inductive approach to the early years of the research has led so far to a decided micro–macro interpretation of the first three volumes of cases. Structural factors in the historical background of the conflict have seemed important in each case, as have micro-factors such as individual leadership of specific kinds for war or peace. It seems a mistake to see macro-historical factors such as colonialism as slightly relevant to a long-run understanding of why a conflict is possible, but irrelevant to a contemporary understanding of how to build peace. The Aceh case (Chapter 6) illustrates how its specific history of Dutch and ‘Javanese’ internal colonialism16 has framed the identities that have been at the heart of the politics of war and peace at every stage of the conflict. Shadd Maruna’s (2001) research on serious common criminals shows that when criminals put violence behind them, they do not decide that their violence was wrong so much as opt into ‘redemptive scripts’ that connote a violence that was almost unavoidable in the awful circumstances of their past. That violence was not the ‘real me’; it was, for example, the me who was recovering from abuse by my father.17 Likewise, an identity politics of peace might allow combatants redemptive scripts that say things such as ‘in those times, the forces of Dutch

16 There is a tradition of scholarship that draws a connection between ethnic and separatist conflict and patterns of internal migration that are interpreted as ‘internal colonialism’ (Hechter 1975).
17 The operator of a gas chamber to exterminate Jews can say that was not the real me; that was the me who was terrorised by the Nazis; the Jews were lucky they had me there because I was doing my best for them
then Javanese colonialism gave us little option but to fight, but today the Helsinki peace process gives Acehnese a new opportunity to be the peaceful people we really are. In other words, structural facts of the past often become part of a well-crafted identity politics of peace and reconciliation.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the major findings of the book in terms of the themes of anomie and reconciliation. The next four sections give some specificity to what an opportunity-theory formulation of anomie means. First, we consider the geography of opportunity, which includes the opportunities for conflict that resources provide (a ‘resource curse’?). Then we flesh out more fully how a Mertonian version of anomie theory makes sense in the Indonesian cases. The section after that considers the military opportunity structure as that site of anomie and opportunity that is particularly strategic in Indonesian conflict. Then we consider when and why military force escalates defiance rather than deters those whom the military seeks to subdue. This leads to another theoretical section on the implications of this for redundancy in peacebuilding strategy. The final sections of the chapter reveal the essence of what we have found about reconciliation, by first discussing the process for reaching peace agreements, then reintegration of combatants, then reconciliation among combatants and non-combatants across the society.

The geography of opportunity

A perhaps banal example of a structural variable that is important to enabling and sustaining armed conflict is geography in the form of mountains to which fighters can retreat in comparative safety. The way this is explored in qualitative research such as this is different from the quantitative association that has been established between proximity of mountainous terrain and the duration of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Collier 2007). The importance of this variable is established by combatant leaders (and ordinary combatants) describing how important it has been to their strategy to be able to hit the enemy then run into the mountains. Aceh, Papua and Central Sulawesi particularly show the importance of this aspect of the geography of war, though it has played some part in North Maluku and Central Kalimantan as well. Geography was also a relevant structural variable in ways unique to single conflicts. The conflict in North Maluku started because Makians were forced to flee their island because of a volcano. The Kao ethnic group resented many aspects of the way Makian refugees from the volcano invaded their lands—grievances that flared in the anomie conditions of 1999. While this is a unique geographical contingency,

within the Nazi system; I was treating them better than they would have been treated had another guard replaced me. In other words, redemptive scripts can do remarkable work of salvaging a peaceful identity from a history of exceptionally un-peaceful conduct.
it sensitises us to the possibility that a more general cause of displacement than a volcano—rising waters from global warming—could become a growing structural driver of new conflicts. Interestingly, in Barron et al.’s (2004) quantitative analysis of 4872 local conflicts across Indonesia, there was a general positive correlation between conflict and a village being impacted by a natural disaster (see more generally Wisner et al. 2004). On the other hand, Chapter 6 shows how the tsunami in Aceh was turned into an opportunity for peace—something sadly not the effect of the same tsunami in Sri Lanka.

Another important fact in the geography of armed conflict in these cases was where natural resources such as gold, oil and gas happened to lie in the ground. While this is an enduring structural fact of the geography of these places, it often plays out as a proximate factor in conflict when the resource is discovered or commercially exploited for the first time. The data in this book give highly qualified support for the ‘resource curse’ thesis (Collier 2007). There are no classic instantiations of it in Indonesia in the sense of insurgents capturing a diamond mine and using the mine to fund their insurgency. This is the classic sense in which a country being blessed with a valuable, but lootable resource such as diamonds increases the incentives for insurgents to start civil wars. Ross (2003:33) and Aspinall (2007) conclude for the war in Aceh that extortion of protection money from an ExxonMobil gas project and nearby enterprises did happen and could have helped sustain the duration of that war. The ‘resource curse’ was not, however, the major source of funds for any side in the conflict. Aspinall (2007) sees resource politics in Aceh more in a frame of sustaining an Acehnese identity as a people whose resources have been pillaged by colonialists and imperialists, and who therefore must fight to seize back those resources. One could proffer the same kind of analysis of the significant role the US Freeport mine played in sustaining conflict in Papua. The Free Papua Movement never attempted to capture it, but at times did extort a little from it, while the Indonesian military was given an interest in sustaining the conflict by managing to extort a great deal from the mine to ‘protect’ it. In Papuan narratives of exploitation by the invading power from Jakarta, pillage of Papuan resources through the agency of Freeport loomed large.

The paradoxical nature of resource politics is well illustrated by the case of BP’s natural gas project in West Papua. BP rejected the Indonesian military as the guarantor of its security and negotiated community-based security guarantees with local Papuan civil society and Papuan political elites. The paradox was that this created incentives for the western region of Papua around the BP project to break away from the province of Papua, creating a new province. Chapter 2 construes this new and resource-contrived partition of Papua as an important risk factor for further conflict.
More paradoxical still is the effect of the Australian Newcrest goldmine on the Kao lands in North Maluku (Chapter 3). Makian political opportunists succeeded in getting subdistrict boundaries redrawn so that the new mine would fall in lands where the population would be overwhelmingly Makian. This move was at the heart of starting a conflict that cost more than 3000 lives. Our analysis, however, accuses Newcrest of missing an opportunity for preventive diplomacy to stop this conflict before it started. We argue that it had the political connections to do that, but lacked the preventive diplomacy imagination to do so. One reason why Chapter 3 takes the resource curse argument in this paradoxical direction is that later Newcrest did work with the security sector to accomplish a major de-escalation of the conflict that was in fact the beginning of the end of the conflict. Resource endowments can create interests in peace just as they can constitute interests in war. Our argument becomes that diplomacy must take resource riches seriously indeed, but not in the formulaic way that the resource curse hypothesis currently projects. Second, the importance of geographical nodes of resource riches goes to the importance of preventive diplomacy as not just something foreign politicians do, but as something socially responsible businesses can do (Ford and McKenna 2008).

The data in this volume also connect resource diplomacy to Mary Kaldor’s (1999) idea of protecting ‘islands of civility’ as a peacebuilding strategy. Chapter 3 provides two other examples where nodes of resource development motivated foreign and local business elites to work with the security forces to protect their nodes of nickel mining and oil distribution. One of these islands of resource civility became the only village on Ambon free of violence and the only place where certain peace meetings between Christians and Muslims could occur in safety. It fits Kaldor’s model of an island of civility from which peacebuilding can begin to ripple.18

As with the war in Bougainville, in the Indonesian cases, the most important effect of geographically concentrated resource development in fuelling conflict

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18 Restorative justice was one way peace was rippled out from islands of civility by the Peace Foundation Melanesia after the Bougainville civil war (Howley 2002). One village that is an island of civility extends a hand of reconciliation to a particular person in a nearby village that remains riven with hatred, violence and injustice. Perhaps they rebuild her house, which they burnt down during the war. If that woman has what Maori thinkers on restorative justice call ‘mana’, she can become the bridge that ripples just sensibilities out through the new village. She can be the catalyst of their local peace process. In terms of the sociology of networks, this is a ‘strengths of weak ties’ argument (Granovetter 1974). The idea is that justice is something that ripples out from nodes more than issues down from specialised central institutions of justice such as courts and prisons. It is a more general idea in paradigmatic shifts in sociology towards micro-macro explanation in network terms (Castells 1996). For example, Job and Reinhart (2003) find empirically that social capital does not issue mainly from associations in civil society, as Putnam’s (2000) theory suggests, let alone downwards from state structures. Rather individuals learn to do things such as trust prudently and generously in the primary institutions of their families and immediate work groups. Trust ripples out from those primary group sites through various stages of trust building in intermediate institutions in civil society to ultimately construct social capital in interactions with states and markets.
was the way it encouraged influxes of immigrants from more privileged ethnic groups who obtained better jobs than locals. Sometimes migrants violated local customs and sparked conflict by sexual assaults on local women. In the imaginations of the people of Aceh and Papua, the New Order policy of transmigration, particularly of Javanese, to move from overpopulated to underpopulated regions of the nation, was a policy to colonise and dominate them, especially when the transmigrants were seen as central government agents in the theft of their richest resources. Also in Papua—even more so than in Bougainville and to a lesser but significant extent in Aceh—environmental destruction, spoiling of agriculture and fishing and displacement of villagers from their traditional lands were important sources of conflict.

Few issues are more important to understanding war and peace than resource politics. The politics of gold and timber was also important in Central Kalimantan (Chapter 5). The data in this volume suggest, however, that there might not be any simple statistical relationship that makes resources a curse (or a blessing). The third volume of Peacebuilding Compared will discuss how Timor-Leste has funnelled its oil and gas resources into an offshore sovereign fund for the future development of its people that would be hard for incumbent politicians or plotters of coups to loot. This also shows how institutionalised resource prudence can undercut any inevitability of a resource curse, just as does the history of a country such as Botswana in managing its diamond resource. Our interim theoretical conjecture is that resource concentrations constitute both legitimate and illegitimate opportunities in Mertonian (1949) terms. This means a more general opportunity-theory framework will prove more fertile than a resource-curse theory.

**Opportunity theory**

We saw earlier how in Robert K. Merton’s (1949) institutional interpretation of anomie theory, when legitimate opportunities for achieving socially valued goals were blocked, there was strain to resort to illegitimate means. Cloward and Ohlin’s (1961) elaboration of Merton says not only must legitimate opportunities be blocked, illegitimate opportunities for violence must be open. So when the Kao ethnic leaders in North Maluku concluded that Makians so dominated the circuits of power in their province that civil servants, legislatures and courts would simply dismiss their grievances again and again, they concluded that legitimate opportunities were closed to them (Chapter 3; Wilson 2008). They then had to decide that the illegitimate opportunity to drive the Makians from their lands was open. To conclude this, they had to weigh whether they could mobilise superior forces and arms to drive all the Makians into the sea and whether they would then have the political clout to ensure this new fact
on the ground would be allowed to stand. They calculated rightly about the first aspect of the illegitimate opportunity as they razed all Makian villages on their traditional lands. They miscalculated, however, that their traditional support from the sultan would allow this to stand. What happened was that the Makians managed to redefine the conflict as one between Christians (the Kao) and Muslims (the Makians) rather than the ethnic conflict it was over land and resources. The Makians projected the attacks on them as Christianisation even though there were significant numbers of Muslims among the Kao forces.

We have seen that the collapse of the New Order closed off legitimate opportunities for many older elites, especially those in the military. It also, however, opened up many new illegitimate opportunities, especially because of the conditions of military and police anomie, which in some places left the security sector, or at least some factions within it, up for sale to the highest political bidder.

One of the illegitimate opportunities often supplied by the military was guns and ammunition. Arms are the most recurrently important part of the illegitimate opportunity structure for warfare. The army often found it could expand its legitimate opportunities to acquire resources to fight an insurgency while also seizing illegitimate opportunities to make money by selling arms to the enemy. Hence, for example, in some cases it used intelligence operatives or double agents to organise a contact where the military and the insurgents would arrive at the same place at the same time, feign a fight by both firing in the air, then the military would retreat leaving behind guns or ammunition to be ‘captured’ by the insurgents in return for cash. This kind of classically anomic security sector crime happened in most, perhaps all, of the conflict areas in the years immediately after the collapse of the New Order. Laskar Jihad, the Free Aceh Movement and the Free Papua Movement were the combatant groups that benefited most from arms supplied by the Indonesian military, but other fighting groups also benefited in smaller doses.

International diasporas are important to constituting this part of the illegitimate opportunity structure for war. The quantitative literature shows that insurgent movements that have large diasporas of support in wealthier nations sustain more persistent insurgencies (Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Collier et al. 2005:9). Such a wealthy diaspora is precisely what the Free Papua Movement lacks (Chapter 2), but the Free Aceh Movement has benefited considerably from international support from a moderately wealthy Acehnese diaspora a short boat ride away in Malaysia. While Laskar Jihad received most of its arms from the military, there was almost certainly some funding from a far-flung Islamic diaspora that included Saudi Arabia.

Gerry van Klinken (2007) has made a particularly important contribution to understanding why some parts of Indonesia have suffered more conflict
than others about the turn of the millennium. This contribution is framed in opportunity theory terms here. Van Klinken aptly characterises a number of the conflicts discussed in this volume as ‘small-town wars’. He focuses on the decentralisation reforms legislated in 1999 in Indonesia that subsequently shifted control to the local level of many formerly centrally controlled resources. It shifted a lot of legitimate and illegitimate contestation, and a lot of corruption, from the national to the local level of politics. Van Klinken’s imaginative empirical work reveals that armed conflict is most likely to erupt in provinces that experience the most rapid de-agrarianisation. This is not quite the same as urbanisation; it means declining dependence on agriculture as a result of penetration of town life into rural areas. West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Aceh, Papua, Central Sulawesi, the Malukus and East Timor were also all provinces in the 1990s where the ratio of civil servants to non-agricultural workers was greatly higher than in the rest of Indonesia. Conflict therefore broke out where economic opportunities were shifting to small towns and particularly into government jobs in those small towns.

In an environment where the rules of the game were up for grabs, there was often a no-holds-barred grab for political power in those towns of the Indonesian periphery. Some ambitious local politicians seized power by mobilising violence against their opponents. Sometimes they organised both support for themselves and opposition to their enemies by mobilising around religious or ethnic divisions. In many of these small towns, religious and ethnic organisations were the only well-formed organisations available for mobilisation at a time when democratic parties had yet to become strong at the local level. They were therefore coopted to projects to seize local control and thereby distribute government contracts and jobs to supporters. These political entrepreneurs ‘managed to create a climate in which the only positive course of action was to support a district chief who belonged to their communal group’ (van Klinken 2007:143).

In West Kalimantan in particular, van Klinken also identified a class dynamic in some of the power shifts that occurred. He pointed to the evidence that the lower middle class was unusually dominant in small towns and had more acute interests in small-town politics than upper-class elites whose gaze cast more to Jakarta. We therefore saw the lower middle class get behind projects of ethnic cleansing in West Kalimantan that enabled them to seize opportunities to control many legitimate businesses such as town transport and inter-town river transport (and to cartelise local pricing) and illegitimate businesses such as gambling, prostitution and human trafficking. We saw Malay-organised crime groups get behind cleaning out the Madurese-organised crime groups for the same reason. It was local politics by illegitimate means. In the late 1990s, there was a wave of attempts to criminalise the state at the local level, not in those
localities where legitimate business opportunities remained plentiful, but in those where they were not, and where government employment and contracting opportunities were low-hanging fruit. This seems to us the brilliant insight in van Klinken's interpretation of the pattern of armed violence. It is also important to note that van Klinken brings this conclusion together with the conclusions of those who identify a security dilemma in some of these cases: 'In each case ordinary people felt moved to action by the politics of fear, while local elites made their calculations on the basis of the politics of opportunity’ (van Klinken 2007:143).

We can read van Klinken’s (2007) work as showing, as van Klinken (p. 19) himself concludes from his review of the empirical research, that the explanation of ethnic and religious conflict is not to be found in the quantitative distribution of ethnic or religious fractionisation (see also Barron et al. 2004; Mancini 2005).19 Rather, we read it as showing that, like resource politics, ethnic and religious politics matter in explaining violence to the extent that they open new illegitimate opportunities when legitimate economic and political opportunities close.

The military opportunity structure

At every juncture in the history of the Indonesian state, right up to the present, the military has been the most concentrated focus of collective political power. The sharpest decline in that political power, however, was experienced in the few years after the resignation of President Suharto—the very years when armed conflict seemed to presage the disintegration of the state. The Asian financial crisis caused most of the military’s business interests to become unprofitable or insolvent (HRW 2006:14), decreasing the purchasing power of the military by 30 per cent in the first year of the crisis alone (Bourchier 1999:152). The nature of these business investments was so tied to the crony capitalism of the New Order that they never recovered their former profitability. Budgets were pruned most in the far-flung regions of Indonesia where most of the violence occurred. It was here that the truncation of legitimate opportunities at first seemed so sharp that illegitimate opportunities quickly opened up for military officers working with provincial political entrepreneurs.

The decentralisation law reforms of 1999 created opportunities for the military to compensate for its loss of power in Jakarta by grabbing a large part of the action in far-flung districts of the nation. As power fragmented in Jakarta and the

19 Barron et al.’s (2004) and Mancini’s (2005) research shows, however, that areas with high unemployment, low human development index scores and differential child mortality rates between groups have more communal conflict and deadly violence in Indonesia.
military became more marginal in the institutions of the capital, they no longer had a stake ‘in defending a specific political regime, either at the centre or in the regions’…Accordingly, the TNI provides security services to an individual power-holder rather than offering institutional support’ (Mietzner 2003:256). Whereas control of logging during the New Order was franchised to Suharto cronies from Jakarta (McLeod 2003:7), after 1998, countless local commanders in forested areas got into the illegal logging business. Smuggling was another lucrative area. When oil prices hit $70 a barrel for the first time in the mid-2000s, global consumption of oil moderated in response to the market signal, yet it surged in Indonesia. The reason was that the navy responded to the price signal by increasing its smuggling of oil purchased at the government-subsidised price, sold into the Singapore market at twice that price, then sold back to Indonesia. Business regulatory challenges in Indonesia must be understood more than in other nations as challenges for the Minister for Defence rather than, as in this example, challenges simply for an anti-cartel, competition regulator or some other civilian regulator.

The puzzle of military force and defiance

In every conflict narrative in this book, the Indonesian security forces and the moves they have made are at the heart of turns towards war and peace. In every conflict, the security sector made mistakes or committed crimes that made the conflict worse. In Papua, Aceh and Maluku—the three most deadly conflicts—murder, brutality and human rights abuses by the military were very major factors in conflict escalation. They were also major factors in escalation in Central Sulawesi. In the six conflicts that have ended, the effective application of Indonesian military force has been a critical factor in bringing it to an end. Aceh is perhaps the least convincing of these five critical contributions of central government force to the ultimate peace. In 2003 and 2004, Indonesian counterinsurgency was much more sophisticated, better resourced and effective than it had ever been in Aceh. It displaced GAM from control of most of the villages it had previously controlled and killed perhaps 20 per cent of GAM’s fighters, leaving GAM so exhausted and devoid of hope of victory that the situation became ripe for peace talks. The paradox was that those peace talks recognised that the military was a cause of, a solution to and a risk factor for reignition of the conflict. Unarmed foreign soldiers and police therefore came in as the Aceh Monitoring Mission to oversee the withdrawal of most Indonesian troops as part of the peace deal.

A peace agreement of this kind is probably what is needed if Papua is to achieve a positive peace. It is the seventh case where military force has been a major causal factor in the conflict. The military, however, never became a causal factor in
producing a credible peace. We will see in Chapter 2, however, that tactics such as sabotage on Freeport pipelines were abandoned by the Free Papua Movement at various stages of the conflict because they feared a repeat of reprisals in the form of slaughter in villages where the insurgents were believed to have come from. In the context of Aceh, however, at least until 2003–04, such reprisals against civilians served only to strengthen the insurgency by increasing hatred of the military, defiance and a will to revenge. Partly this was connected with a GAM recruitment strategy of training the sons of partisans murdered by the military. Partly it was about the centrality to Acehnese identity of vindicating the sacrifices of past generations who had struggled for merdeka (freedom) for Aceh from infidels and colonial oppressors.

We hypothesise in Chapter 2, however, that something more general is needed to theorise the contexts in which military force increases conflict and where it reduces it. We argue that punitive military force almost always has a deterrent effect and almost always has a defiance effect, which runs in the opposite direction. The deterrent effect of the deployment of force reduces future violence; the defiance effect increases it. Our interviews with many combatants in Papua and Aceh clearly suggest deterrence and defiance effects have been in play in both places; it is just that the deterrence effects were less and the defiance effects greater in Aceh (at least until 2004) for the reasons outlined above. We rely in Chapter 2 on the body of experimental psychological research marshalled by Brehm and Brehm (1981) that reveals the shape of the deterrence curve and the defiance curve that arises in response to the use of force. In short, there is an evidence base for arguing that at low levels of force, defiance effects exceed deterrence effects, so force in fact makes things worse. There is a point, however, at which force becomes so overwhelming that the deterrence effect exceeds the defiance effect. Past this point military force succeeds in crushing resistance.

The importance of these dynamics is also why every chapter of this book diagnoses the conflicts in terms of Valerie Braithwaite’s theory of motivational postures. It shares with Brehm and Brehm’s (1981) theory a grounding in considerable psychological research on micro-encounters with state authority. That research reveals a more nuanced set of motivational postures driven by an individual’s morality, greed and grievance. Moral considerations, a sense of grievance and a desire to profit at the expense of an authority all often increase simultaneously after a punitive encounter with an authority (Braithwaite et al. 2007). How these sensibilities balance out shapes the motivational posturing of individuals. One response is capitulation, when the citizen gives in without committing to the legitimacy of the authority. The second is commitment, when the citizen yields to state authority and also grants legitimacy to it. Commitment, we argue in Chapter 2, is the dominant posture of positive peace, of triumph
over anomie—as in most of Indonesia today. Capitulation is the posture of negative peace and is widespread in Papua today. Few indigenous Papuans are committed to the legitimacy of the Indonesian state, but they overwhelmingly capitulate to it in the current phase of that very long conflict. Resistance to Indonesia, however, also continues to be widespread, with a huge proportion of Papuans being secret supporters of the Free Papua Movement. Other Papuans manifest the motivational posture of disengagement from politics. This is the most classically anomic reaction to distasteful authority. We might say that in Durkheim’s (1897) foundational work on anomie theory, the ultimate manifestation of disengagement in the face of normlessness or meaninglessness is suicide. Other extreme forms of it are drug addiction and alcoholism, which are not uncommon among the traumatised Papuans we have met. The most common form of disengagement, however, is political alienation whereby many Papuans take no interest in politics. They are in Papuan political society but not of it, living a daily existence in the village that opts out of a Papuan political situation that seems too awful to contemplate.

Finally, there are the game players. These actors are quintessentially in and of the political game. They see political awfulness as creating opportunities. The most consistently important game players in the conflicts in this book are the Indonesian military and police. In each conflict zone, however, there are also plenty of civilians who game the military’s gaming by becoming agents and double agents, by working with the military to profit from illegal logging and other criminal enterprises or simply by grabbing local political power—often by being a stooge for a local military commander. Just as we see Mertonian opportunity theory as a useful elaboration of Durkheim’s anomie, so we conceive Valerie Braithwaite’s motivational postures as putting specificity of content into the form anomie takes. Normlessness can mean withdrawing interest in the normative order (disengagement), intense interest in bending and manipulating norms (game playing), resistance to norms or capitulation to norms while spreading contempt for their legitimacy (capitulation).

Chapter 2 describes in some detail how we see motivational posturing playing out in Papua, with each subsequent chapter giving a shorter insight into how we interpret this more nuanced form of coding than simply coding deterrence and defiance. Our plan is to code the five motivational postures for all future conflicts in terms of their salience during the conflict and post-conflict. Valerie Braithwaite (2009) has a number of hypotheses about what works in resolving conflicts driven by different kinds of posturing. While resistance is the most classically defiant posture, Valerie Braithwaite’s (2009) prior research concludes that it is easiest to reverse through dialogue and responsive institutional change, to flip it to commitment. We see some evidence of this phenomenon in post-
conflict Aceh today, where many former GAM members—Governor Irwandi being a key example—are committed to making the new institutional order work (Chapter 6).

Those who capitulate or disengage in response to a peace process can be a bigger problem in the long term. A disturbing result we report in Chapter 6 is that half of the children of GAM fighters are not attending school. This generates a considerable risk of a generation of alienated youth who lack commitment to anything much, with poor future prospects in the world of legitimate work. Such young people are receptive to scripts that justify illegitimate paths to ‘easy money’ by, for example, becoming fungible operatives of organised crime groups—thugs for hire, ganja dealers for hire—as many are doing in Aceh today. They are also vulnerable fodder for enrolment in any future insurgency on any side that will reward them well. Some young people who have been most traumatised by the war or by the family violence of their ex-combatant fathers count among the psychopaths who might join future conflicts for sadistic motivations of human domination.

Valerie Braithwaite’s (2009) previous research suggests that for resisters, dialogue followed by responsive institutional reform can rebuild commitment quickly. For those who are ‘dismissively defiant’—the disengagers and game players, in fact all those who have low levels of commitment to a legitimate political order—power sharing is, however, more likely to be the productive remedy. Power sharing was needed in Aceh because the people of Aceh had become so committed to GAM, so dismissively defiant of the Indonesian state and so weak in commitment to its legitimacy. ‘Special autonomy’ as a purely institutional reform (that kept GAM out of power) did not work in Aceh and is not working in Papua, which is consistent with Valerie Braithwaite’s theory. Power sharing was also needed in the districts afflicted by Muslim–Christian armed conflict, because Christians would have been dismissively defiant towards a Muslim-dominated government in those districts, and vice versa. This is not to say that consociational political solutions—in which constitutional guarantees are provided for so many Christian seats and so many Muslim seats in a legislature—are a good idea. Power sharing might be needed only for long enough to replant the seeds of political commitment. We saw in the 2005 elections in Poso, Central Sulawesi (Chapter 4), that all five political parties contesting the election agreed to have balanced slates of Christian and Muslim candidates. This doubtless will break down in future decades when religious identity might cease being an issue in Poso’s electoral politics. Ad hoc temporary power-sharing deals such as Poso’s might do better by long-run democratic politics than a constitutionalised

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20 See also Hutchens (2009) applying motivational postures to fair trade organisations.
consocialism that ossifies identities in the contorted form they manifest at war’s end. A healthy democratic politics of the long run is one that fosters crosscutting identities (Krygier and Mason 2008).

The idea is that because it is so hard to persuade disengagers and game players that a reformed institutional order is not just another illegitimate opportunity structure for a new team of elite gamers of the system, the best response is to bring the dismissively defiant into the game of politics. The hope is that then the game will become legitimate because of its participatory qualities. This is why we see promise, even in the face of flawed implementation, in the bottom-up participatory reforms of the World Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program and the Indonesian Government’s Musrenbang (both discussed throughout our chapters) as peacebuilding strategies that share post-conflict power across a broad base of the politically uncommitted, right down to the village level. At this stage of the 20-year journey of this project, these are just hypotheses to explore as we code variables such as institutional transformation, power sharing and motivational postures as meaningfully as we can.

Just as we see motivational postures as potentially more nuanced and empirically attuned concepts for understanding the politics of war and peace than deterrence and defiance, so we see it as more nuanced than the influential model of juxtaposing greed and grievance as motivations for war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This does not mean that we find deterrence versus defiance and greed versus grievance to be lenses without value for seeing conflict. We in fact found them valuable correctives to previous generations of analysis that were obsessed either with deterrence to the neglect of defiance or with grievance to the neglect of greed. We think, however, that a motivational-postures lens sometimes helps us see a more fine-grained picture. Moreover, we can apply to greed and grievance the finding from the motivational posturing empirical work that after a bruising conflict with authority, a sense of wanting to profit at the expense of others (greed) will often rise at the same time as a rise in a sense of victimisation (grievance) and a lift in the sense of wanting to establish credentials as a good person; the outcome is a function of which motivational posturing increases most in response to provocation (Braithwaite et al. 2007). Warfare is a condition in which there is more greed and more grievance, more deterrence and more defiance. Outcomes depend on which predominates in a particular situation. In none of our cases did we discover many situations in which pure greed or pure grievance explanations had much purchase. Greed and grievance were very often intertwined in ways that made it difficult for peacebuilders to come to terms with one without comprehending the other. This was because grievance often excused greed and the greed of some often coopted the grievances of others.
Redundancy in peacebuilding strategy

Five of the seven conflicts in this book (the exceptions being the separatist conflicts in Aceh and Papua) were ethnic or religious riots or gang fighting of young men that escalated into organised armed conflict. This led in these five cases to temporary or permanent ethnic cleansing. In the concluding sections of Chapter 3, we discuss the evidence from cases of rioting and ‘people power’ throughout history that major political change never occurs in this way when the security forces are determined enough and organised enough in their use of force to clear the streets. Moreover, very few of the countless ethnic and religious riots that have occurred throughout history have resulted in the loss of dozens of lives, let alone hundreds or thousands (as in our cases), if the security forces act decisively to stop them before they get out of hand.

Using the Maluku and North Maluku conflicts as a backdrop, Chapter 3 argues that it does not follow from this that the efficient strategy for foiling ethnic conflict is simply to get the security sector working properly. Our narratives demonstrate that there are many reasons why the security sector fails to do its job. Sometimes these are more complex in their politics than the reasons for the ethnic conflict itself. Without tackling the political problems that produce security sector anomie, there can be no guarantee that the security sector will ‘work’ in nipping violent rioting in the bud before it escalates to civil war. Without grappling with the drivers of security sector grievance and greed, the peacemaker cannot count on the military and police to control the violence born of the grievance and greed of others. And when the military, or large factions within it, shares the same grievances as the rioters, and seeks to seize complementary entrepreneurial opportunities to make money out of the disorder, the military, far from supplying the solution, can become the largest part of the problem. This is what happened in Maluku (Chapter 3).

An argument of Chapter 3 is that because empirically there are many reasons why security forces fail under pressure, it is best we limit the frequency with which they have to face down mobs throwing bombs. We try to show how much better it might have been in a number of our cases if the security sector had never been put to this test (and then failed it). How much better it might have been in North Maluku, for example, if management of the Newcrest goldmine had used its knowledge of what was happening on the ground around its mine to mobilise the preventive diplomacy that was within its power. Why rely on a fallible last line of defence when earlier lines of social defence are available? Redundant defence, we argue in Chapter 3, works best when radically different kinds of peacebuilding strategies are attempted. The theory is that redundancy in prevention works best when weaknesses of one preventive strategy are covered by the strengths of another. This means societies should invest in resolving
structural causes at the root of the conflict—such as discrimination against an ethnic group—as well as proximate causes, and in addition they need effective community policing that smothers sparks that could ignite conflicts. As a last resort they need the capability to halt riots and out-gun rampaging militias. Societies strong in all these capabilities might be less likely to experience civil war—at least, that is a hypothesis we will explore in our empirical work.

While we do not assume that the factors that make for peace will be the opposite of those that made for the war, an important discipline in diagnosing a case is to scan the peacebuilding strategies to assess if they are tackling many of the factors that drove the war. Just as our starting theory is that a multidimensional understanding is needed of what leads societies into war, so it is that unidimensional peacebuilding strategies have less prospects of success than multidimensional ones (Ricigliano 2003). The latter is indeed partly an empirically grounded theoretical prejudice, as evident in the work of Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006), showing that multidimensional peacekeeping operations with extensive civilian peacebuilding components achieve greater success than peacekeeping with narrowed military objectives. A more specific question we hope to test in Peacebuilding Compared is: when the strands of a particular multidimensional intervention tackle the specific structural, proximate and precipitating drivers of that conflict, is peace more likely to be sustained? Put another way, the hypothesis here is that a multidimensionality that simply tackles a standard set of World Bank good governance templates that are not necessarily connected with conflict risks will be less effective. Another variable we measure is how many of the specific future or emergent risk factors identified in the literature on the case are remedied in the peacebuilding intervention.

The reason we systematically list structural factors, proximate factors and precipitating incidents for each conflict is not that we think these distinctions are analytically fundamental. As seen above in the discussion of why the ‘resource curse’ can be sensibly viewed as either a structural or a proximate factor, it is a distinction that is not precise or reliable. Moreover, there are cases such as Aceh where precipitating incidents do not seem important at all to understanding the conflict (see Appendix 6.1). The discipline of listing the different kinds of variables is more a pursuit of the methodological virtue of checking that in our natural inclination to focus on factors that are proximate in time to the conflict and that change during its unfolding we do not ignore deeper structural factors that have long been creating a structural context more conducive to sparks igniting. In disciplining ourselves to look at whether there are precipitating incidents, we make ourselves attend to the most micro-aspects of the violence, which supports our micro–macro methodological ambition with a modicum of
structured scanning. An even more banal reason is that the consistent grouping of factors in these appendix tables makes it easier to scan them in search of points of comparison.

Peace agreements

One reason why formal peace agreements such as the Malino accords (that partially settled Poso and Maluku) and the Helsinki agreement that settled Aceh were major turning points was that until they were signed local peace activists felt unsupported by their national leaders. The feeling, and a lot of the reality, was that politicians in Jakarta left questions of war and peace in provincial wars under the control of military leaders who they did not dare second-guess. Vice-President Jusuf Kalla’s and President Yudhoyono’s leadership in changing the front-stage politics of peacebuilding empowered a much more energised backstage politics of reconciliation after the accords were sealed.

Another of Gerry van Klinken’s (2007) contributions was to apply a ‘dynamics of contention’ model to most of the conflicts considered herein. Recent scholarship in this tradition finds a synergy between such collective action theories and classical Mertonian strain (opportunity) theories (Buechler 2004). The five key processes of the dynamics of contention are identity formation, escalation, polarisation, mobilisation and actor constitution (McAdam et al. 2001). Van Klinken does not, however, follow these dynamics through to the extinction of the conflicts. This book begins to explore what a ‘dynamics of contrition’ looks like when it reverses a ‘dynamics of contention’. In Chapter 3, we use the Maluku case to show a reformation of a syncretic Christian–Muslim identity, de-escalation, depolarisation, demobilisation for war and mobilisation for reconciliation (an institutionalised peace system), de-constitution of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus as organisations, peaceful reconstitution of violent street gangs and constitution of new pro-peace organisations. Likewise in Aceh (Chapter 6), we can identify the transformation of a monarchical Islamic Acehnese identity among GAM into a democratic secular Acehnese–Indonesian identity amalgam, de-escalation as Helsinki was negotiated and the Aceh Monitoring Mission oversaw destruction of GAM’s weapons and the departure of Indonesian troops, depolarisation as reconciliation ceremonies were held to welcome returning fighters from both sides back to their villages, demobilisation of GAM and pro-military militias as fighting units and reconstitution of GAM as a political party and a welfare organisation for reintegration of combatants (and sadly as an organised crime network).

This book seeks to show the dynamics in play in both escalation to war and de-escalation to peace. In the process, some of our starting hypotheses have
been refuted. Our previous work on restorative justice in business regulation revealed the value of a strategy of widening the circle when agreement could not be reached with a corporate law breaker to repair the harm and commit to compliance policies that might prevent re-offending. A first meeting with the executives directly responsible for an alleged breach of the law by the regulator and other stakeholders (for example, harmed consumers) could run into a brick wall. Instead of the regulator responding by immediately launching a prosecution, another meeting is set up, with the responsible executive’s boss invited into the circle. When that fails, there is another meeting to which the boss’s boss is invited. In some cases, regulators kept expanding the circle right up to engagement of the chairman of the board. The theory is to keep widening the circle until the most senior person in the circle is moved by corporate social responsibility concerns rather than combative motives.

The dynamics of the Aceh peace process described in Chapter 6 at one level show what an inapplicable model this is to peace processes following armed conflict. On the other hand, the Aceh dynamics do reveal the centrality of wisdom of getting the right players into the circle to make peace work. Chapter 6 argues that had Jakarta stuck with an earlier strategy of cutting the Stockholm-based leaders of GAM out of the negotiations, or had Jakarta persisted with having military leaders present at the negotiations, the peace could have disintegrated. It could be that a comparatively narrow, democratically suboptimal set of principal players in the war must hammer out an initial agreement. Those players need not represent all factions or all warlords, but they need sufficient legitimacy to speak for the various factions and bring them along with the deal. The probability of success with peacebuilding following civil wars almost halves as the number of fighting factions increases from two to three, halves again when factions increase from three to four and again when increased to five. With more than six fighting factions on the ground, the prospects for peace are virtually zero (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:126). William Zartman (1995) argues that a first step for peacemaking is a reconcentration of power whereby either the most powerful are recognised as legitimate or the legitimate are made the most powerful.

Some potential spoilers (Stedman 1997) probably had to be kept away from the table at Helsinki, but then a process for engaging the potential spoilers to the inevitability of the peace had to be tackled quickly and authoritatively. International diplomacy and peacekeeping support (as with the Aceh Monitoring Mission) can be important here. Peace agreements then need to be open textured enough to leave space for civil society groups that were excluded from the negotiation of the peace agreement to have a genuine voice in fleshing out the implementation of the new agreement and a transformed set of democratic institutions. Again, that was accomplished moderately well with
the engagement of a wide section of Acehnese civil society in the drafting of the Aceh consensus draft Law on the Governing of Aceh. The problem was that the military elites and their ultranationalist supporters in the Indonesian legislature fought back from their exclusion from the Helsinki talks by scuttling the Aceh draft. We look forward to the challenge of gathering further cases to test the options for getting the balance right between a peace agreement that will hold and a democratic politics that does not exclude most of the stakeholders (including victims of the war). Victims in particular deserve a voice in the institutional terms of the peace.

Reintegration of combatants

For all the major ethnic and religious conflicts in this book, once the security forces were fully mobilised and did their job, combatants were eventually brought to heel. It was generally not necessary to offer combatants reintegration payments or other benefits to get them to put down their arms and return to their villages. In the case of Laskar Jihad, cutting off payments to them was part of a sophisticated strategy for persuading them to put down their weapons that included the threat of arrest and persuasive appeals by their home and host religious leaders to end the jihad (Chapters 3 and 4). An exception was the longer-term hold-out jihadists in Poso, who were given considerable reintegration benefits to abandon their bombing campaigns and other means of terrorising Christians in Central Sulawesi (Chapter 4). In the much longer-running separatist insurgencies in Aceh and Papua, insurgents had normally been cut off from legitimate opportunities for many years living in the mountains and really wanted and needed reintegration support in exchange for their surrender. Free Aceh Movement and Free Papua Movement leaders who renounced the armed struggle were given real opportunities to share local power. In Aceh, many former GAM leaders have become major figures in Aceh’s shadow economy of government contracting, protection rackets and other semi-organised crime (Chapter 6; Aspinall 2009). In West Kalimantan, leaders of Malayan semi-organised criminal gangs who led the seemingly permanent ethnic cleansing of Madurese in Sambas have taken over Madurese organised crime, becoming bigger, more organised criminals with stronger links to the local state (Chapter 5).

21 Of course it would have been better had they been prevented from ever arriving in Christian areas, as happened in 1999 when the first 300 of what was said to be a contingent of 800 Laskar Jihad were intercepted and sent back by police on their way to Manado in Christian Northern Sulawesi (the source for this is an undated manuscript by David Henley, Mieke Schouten and Alex Ulaen entitled ‘Preserving the peace in post-New Order Minahasa’).
There was some concern in Poso that terrorists who persisted with bombing campaigns until January 2007 and had a degree of integration into national and international Islamic terror networks were bought off with generous reintegration deals and were now corrupting government contracting in Poso, establishing themselves as organised criminals. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the considerable success of the remarkably non-punitive, reintegrative approach in Indonesia to assisting serious terrorists to find opportunities in the worlds of legitimate work and business. Again, families and religious leaders received a lot of financial assistance to assist in reintegrating terrorists into a life of non-violence.

At one level, we have to be impressed by Indonesia’s success in hugely reducing all forms of political, ethnic and religious violence, including terrorism. In international comparative terms, Indonesia has become a low-violence, low-terrorism society, falling from being one of the nations in the world most riven with deadly violence and terrorism in the years around the turn of the millennium. At their peak in 2002, Indonesian terrorism deaths accounted for one-third of global deaths due to terrorism (Kivimäki 2007:50). It is hard to resist the conclusion that the utterly inconsistent policies of the Indonesian state in ‘doing what it takes’, with kindness and understanding, to persuade perpetrators of politicised violence to renounce it have played a significant role in securing their desistance. At the same time, we have seen that not all of the perpetrators of political violence have been reintegrated into legitimate businesses. Some have been reintegrated into semi-organised crime and the underground economy, solving one social problem by contributing to another.

Reconciliation

As a research team that has long been interested in restorative justice, we have come to the literature on the post-1990 conflicts struck by how little attention the question of post-conflict reconciliation has attracted—this when Indonesian approaches to reconciliation seem so distinctive. For example, gotong royong, a core tenet of Indonesian philosophy meaning mutual aid or ‘joint bearing of burdens’ (Geertz 1983b), is a widespread modality of healing. The military, whose actions in fuelling the conflict in Poso, and whose inactions in preventing it, caused so much resentment on both sides, participated widely in gotong royong by rebuilding Poso houses that had been lost to victims on both sides. One reason why reconciliation has been less studied in Indonesia than elsewhere is perhaps that little of it has been done by national elites or even provincial elites. The politics of reconciliation that matters happens from the bottom up.
as a micro-politics massively dispersed among thousands of leaders of villages, clans, churches, mosques and subdistricts. In a limited way, we try to remedy the literature’s neglect of reconciliation modalities in the pages that follow.

Reconciliation is a word that can mean many things. We can see the point of view of some restorative justice scholars who think it is a concept with too little precision (Parmentier and Weitekamp 2007:109–44). Some research suggests that restorative justice can be more effective in changing hearts than in changing minds (Braithwaite 2002). This includes Californian research showing that after restorative justice encounters between Palestinian and Jewish people, empathy for the suffering of the other increases, but political views about the politics of Israel do not change. Changing hearts, changing minds, forgiveness, apology, helping one another through gotong royong, former enemies shaking hands and agreeing to put the past behind them—these are all very different things. We do, however—perhaps unproductively, perhaps not—lump them together in a discussion of types of reconciliation.

There are two definite patterns to post-conflict reconciliation in Indonesia. One was that while the Indonesian legislature passed a law to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2004 (which was declared unconstitutional in 2006) and made this an important term in peace agreements with combatants, the post-Suharto pattern was one of non-truth and reconciliation. At first, we found the low level of political commitment to high-integrity truth seeking at all levels of politics and in most civil society networks disturbing, especially when non-truth meant not just forgetting, but lying. The most common kind of lie was widespread blaming of ‘outside provocateurs’ for atrocities that were committed mostly by locals against locals. To some degree, the provocateur script came up in all of our cases, mostly, though not always, in contexts in which its truth value for really explaining events was limited.

The senior author has been associated with the development of a theory of restorative justice in which high-integrity truth seeking is central and temporally prior to reconciliation (Braithwaite 2002, 2005). There is an alternative view that forgetting and moving on are easier ways for people to cope with atrocities and for political systems to rebuild after them. This is not the stage of this project to rejoin that debate. It is a time, however, for reflection on the data in this book and to question the centrality of a sequence from truth to reconciliation.22 So how was reconciliation without truth accomplished in

22 Maria Ericson identifies three elements in securing reconciliation:
• The establishment of safety, including bodily integrity, basic health needs, safe living conditions, financial security, mobility, a plan for self-protection, safe and reliable relationships, and social support.
• Remembrance and mourning, telling the story of one’s trauma.
• Reconnection with ordinary life. (Ericson, paraphrased in Daly and Sarkin 2007:47)
On reflection, none of these requires learning the truth of the root causes of the conflict.
most of these cases? Thousands of meetings across these conflict areas in the early 2000s were called reconciliation meetings. Some included only a dozen or so leaders; quite a number had hundreds of participants, some had more than 1000. The most common number was more like 30 people who were key players from two neighbouring villages or the Christians and Muslims from the same village, who had been at war with each other not long before. Other meetings were called inter-faith dialogues, others adat rituals bearing various customary names for reconciliation meetings among the ethnic groups of that locality.

Sorrow, even remorse, for all the suffering was commonly expressed at these meetings. Tears flowed and there were often deeply sincere hugs of forgiveness. No-one ever, in any of the reports we received of these meetings, admitted, however, to specific atrocities that they or their group perpetrated against the other. Most of the agenda was dominated by practical concerns of rebuilding and reintegration. Sometimes the ethnic group that ended with control of the village would invite back only a small number of trusted families of the ethnic other as a first step towards rebuilding trust. Much of the discussion at these reintegration meetings was with government officials and humanitarian agencies who attended to offer practical assistance with the resettling of people into their old villages. A common gesture of practical reconciliation was for a Christian community to start rebuilding a mosque they had burnt down or a Muslim community to start rebuilding a church they had razed. The cleansed group might be invited back to the village to see this for themselves as a sign of the sincerity of the desire for reconciliation and to give advice on how to do the rebuilding. They might then do some work together on the project.

When the cleansed group returned, their former enemies would often organise a moving welcome ceremony for them. Former enemies who, before the conflict, had also been friends and neighbours, would shower them with gifts of food and other necessities in a steady stream of visits to their home. The point of this summary narrative is not to say this always happened. There were also bitterness, unpleasant exchanges and people who were shunned. The point of our narrative will be to give a sense of how reconciliation without truth worked when it did work, which was quite often. When a mosque substantially built by Christian hands was opened, the Christian community would be invited and Christian prayers would sometimes be said inside the mosque. We also found rituals of everyday life to be important to reconciliation. Christians attending the funeral of a respected Muslim leader and embracing Muslims soon after the conflict were sites of reconciliation. So were Christians being invited to the celebration of Mohammed’s birthday, Muslims to Christmas celebrations, to *halal bi halal* (a forgiveness ritual among neighbours that occurred at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan), and so on. In our interviews, we were told

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23 Papua and West Kalimantan are the cases where the least reconciliation has been secured.
of simple acts of kindness that were important for building reconciliation from the bottom up: an ulama who picked up an old Christian man in his car and dropped him at the market, the loan of a Muslim-owned lawnmower to cut the grass of the Christian church. In Chapter 3, we will see that peace zones where peace markets can operate to reopen old trading relationships have been central to the trust building of the Baku Bae reconciliation movement in Maluku. All these were included among the great variety of locally creative and meaningful ways that people reconciled without ever speaking the truth to one another about who was responsible for crimes.

Compared with governments in other post-conflict societies, the Indonesian state was also rather consistently generous in helping even those who had been the state’s most ardent separatist enemies. They were given financial assistance to rebuild destroyed homes (of which there were hundreds of thousands across the conflicts in this book), schools, churches and mosques (of which thousands were razed). State-supplied building materials helped greatly for poor people who wanted to show the ethnic other that they could be trusted and could live and work together again. For all this evidence of reconciliation being real, and for all the statements in our fieldwork notes that informants believed it contributed greatly to what they expected to be the likelihood of long-term peace in their communities, our theoretical prejudice was still to believe that while non-truth and reconciliation were so much better than no reconciliation, truth and reconciliation would be an even more solid foundation for the future; truth, justice and reconciliation would be better still.24 This is not only because of the contribution truth and justice can make to reconciliation, but because truth and justice can promote ‘contentious coexistence’ (Payne 2008:4)—a more resiliently democratic form of sociality. Our findings implied that we should be open to the possibility Susanne Karstedt (2005, Forthcoming) discovered in post-World War II Germany: the creation of a space for ‘moving on’ based on a non-truth that just those in Hitler’s inner circle who were convicted at Nuremberg were culpable. That distorted truth, however, laid a foundation for subsequent testimony that gave voice to victims of the Holocaust. Victim testimony from the 1960s ultimately became a basis for an acknowledgment of

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24 The justice enforcement effects in this book also deepen rather than resolve the puzzles of truth, justice and reconciliation. North Maluku (Chapter 3), like Bougainville in the second volume of Peacebuilding Compared, is a case where everyone involved in the conflict has been amnestied—a condition for peace demanded by militia leaders. A contrast was Central Sulawesi (Chapter 4), where there were a considerable number of criminal prosecutions and even executions for war crimes, but where the feeling on both sides was that scapegoats rather than the major elite criminals of the conflict were put on trial. With the exception of thousands of arrests of GAM members in Aceh during that war (almost all amnestied in compliance with the Helsinki peace accord), impunity was overwhelmingly the justice norm across these conflicts. Impunity was mostly accepted by elites and ordinary people alike as part of the spirit of a non-truth and reconciliation that put the horror behind them and saw them move on. Successive governments have therefore had the same philosophy as the current president of a ‘general disinclination to prosecute past abuses, which the president had made explicit on a number of occasions’ (Mietzner 2009:316).
the full, terrible truth. Deeper reconciliation between the German people and their former enemies and victims then occurred. Karstedt’s (2005:4) message is that it is the ‘longue durée’ of truth and memory through victim narrative that matters.

In some ways, the need for high-integrity truth seeking seems greater in Indonesia than elsewhere, given the centrality of the ‘narrative of the broken promise’ (Birchok 2004) to the motivation of many war-makers and the perception of the Indonesian state among its citizens of failing to make commitments that are credible. Peter King (2004:69) more pointedly suggests that it is ‘a moot point whether there is an Indonesian learning curve on Timor, Aceh and Papua—or only a forgetting curve’. Nevertheless, we can only listen to the local voices when they say in effect that given their traditions, reconciliation without truth is what they can manage for now.

If non-truth is the first pattern of Indonesian reconciliation we have identified, *gotong royong* manifests the second. This has already become apparent in many of the examples above. Healing happens through sharing in community work projects, in building that mosque or school together. Indonesians are good at having fun when they work together; they bond through work more than Westerners do partly because the division of labour in village society is less differentiated but also because sharing communal work and community welfare burdens is overlaid with cultural meanings of *gotong royong*. Backbreaking work that must be done to rebuild might be seen as a burden on reconciliation in the West, infused with resentment as people struggle to do it. In Indonesia, it is much more a resource for reconciliation. Valerie Braithwaite (2009) thinks power sharing is a way to transcend disengagement and dismissive defiance more broadly. Perhaps *gotong royong* offers prospects of a different form of re-engagement through doing, through sharing in work rather than sharing in power.

For some village folk who have limited interest in sharing even local political power, there can be a kind of empowerment through work, in deciding where and how the mosque will be rebuilt. This can be confidence building and ultimately commitment building by other (rural Indonesian) means, especially when the military also joins in the *gotong royong*, as it has done from Aceh and Poso to Papua. Again, this could be a virtue of the vision (if not always the practice) involved in the Kecamatan Development Program and the *Musrenbang*. This virtue is that the radically bottom-up nature of the vision enables a more intimate connection of local power sharing with local work sharing. Power sharing and work sharing together enable a dual assault on post-conflict disengagement and game playing. To make this more concrete, a village forum envisions what their village would look like in 20 years if they choose to use the planning resources they are empowered to spend to build a bridge at a particular
Anomie and Violence

spot. That is what they then decide to spend their local infrastructure money on. Then, together, in a spirit of *gotong royong*, with some outside engineering help, they build it. Deciding together and doing together can weave a stronger fabric of peace.

The intertwining of sharing power and sharing rebuilding work through *gotong royong* that we can take to be a lesson of reconciliation in Indonesia can also be important as a means of restoring dignity. All our Indonesian cases pulsate with assaults on people’s dignity as drivers of conflict. Talk to fighters who are Acehnese, Papuan, Dayak, Madurese, Kao, Laskar Kristus or Laskar Jihad and one is struck by the way they see their armed struggle as a stand for the dignity of their people and their faith, dignity that had been trampled under the feet of their enemies. Indeed, we can conceptualise many of these wars as moral panics that construed colonising, Christianising or Islamising others as folk devils. The moral panics led those folk devils to strike back at their stigmatisation (Cohen 1972 see further Chapter 5, this volume). We give dignity back to people who feel a loss of it when we agree to share power with them and when we pitch in to work with them on projects that they are empowered to shape and that they care about more than we do. We hope our readers will learn something about the politics of indignity and the reconciliatory politics of dignity from our telling of this recent history of Indonesia.

‘Indigenous peacemaking versus the liberal peace’

The ancient Thucydidean, Machiavellian and Hobbesian trinity of fear, honour and interest as a motive for war (Donnelly 2008:43) is evident in this book. It is, however, evident in uniquely Indonesian form. The heading of this conclusion is the title of an article by Roger MacGinty (2008). He argues that Western peace support has become non-reflexive, uniform and off-the-shelf—‘peace from IKEA: a flat-pack peace made from standardized components’ (p. 145). This description does not fit the distinctively Indonesian approaches to crafting peace that we will describe in the chapters that follow. In fact, much of the reconciliation work was indigenous, pre-Islamic and not especially ‘Indonesian’; it was to a degree *pela-gandong* in Maluku, *hibua lamo* in Halmahera, *maroso* in Poso and *peusijuek* in Aceh, among other local reconciliation traditions that were even more variegated among Dayaks and Papuans.

An ambition of the Peacebuilding Compared project is to learn from diversity. We fear, however, that MacGinty is right that an indigenous diversity in peacebuilding of disparate strengths and weaknesses is being coopted by templated Western orthodoxy (‘the liberal peace’). MacGinty warns, however,
against romanticising indigenous or traditional peacemaking of the kinds we describe, particularly in the sections of the chapters of this book on ‘reconciliation’. The awful continuing suffering in Papua that we describe in the next chapter makes it difficult to romanticise Indonesian peacebuilding. During questions after presentations we have given on this work at certain centres of intellectual excellence in the West, there has, however, been evident distaste for illiberal aspects of Indonesian peacebuilding that can close minds to seeing its strengths. Truth, justice, electoral politics and the rule of law can be romanticised as well. We hope this book might qualify that romance, promoting contemplation of more contextually crafted negotiations of paths towards republican democracy.

Structure of the remaining chapters

All the chapters begin with a sequence of subheadings on the history of the province that sets a context for the conflict. Some readers might choose to skip these sections. The next major heading describes how the conflict began and continued as armed conflict in the 1990s and 2000s. Following this descriptive half of the chapter is a more interpretative half. The interpretation of the case attempts to summarise the structural factors at the root of the conflict, proximate factors and triggering incidents. It also catalogues who were the key war-making actors, the key peacemaking actors and what were their motivational postures. Peacebuilding strengths and weaknesses are then considered, leading to an interpretation of the most important lessons from the conflict. At the end of each chapter is an appendix table summarising much of the foregoing material. Some readers might choose to consult this appendix first to judge which sections are most worthy of being read.
2. Papua

JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MICHAEL COOKSON, VALERIE BRAITHWAITE AND LEAH DUNN

Papua is interpreted here as a case with both high risks of escalation to more serious conflict and prospects for harnessing a ‘Papua Land of Peace’ campaign led by the churches. The interaction between the politics of the Freeport mine and the politics of military domination of Papua, and military enrichment through Papua, are crucial to understanding this conflict. Replacing the top-down dynamics of military-political domination with a genuine bottom-up dynamism of village leadership and development is seen as holding the key to realising a Papua that is a ‘land of peace’ (see Widjojo et al. 2008).

Papuans have less access to legitimate economic opportunities than any group in Indonesia and have experienced more violence and torture since the late 1960s in projects of the military to block their political aspirations than any other group in Indonesia today. Institutions established with the intent of listening to Papuan voices have in practice been deaf to those voices. Calls for truth and reconciliation are among the pleas that have fallen on deaf ears, which is an acute problem when so many Papuans see Indonesian policy in Papua as genocide. Anomie in the sense of withdrawal of commitment to the Indonesian normative order by citizens, and in the sense of gaming that order by the military, is entrenched in Papua.

Background to the conflict

Troubled jewels of cultural and biological diversity

The island of New Guinea and the smaller islands along its coast are home to nearly 1000 languages (267 on the Indonesian side) and one-sixth of the world’s ethnicities (Ruth-Hefferbower 2002:228). It is the place we should go to think most deeply about the effect of ethnic fractionalisation on warfare and on peacebuilding with plurality. In this chapter, we use ‘Papua’ in the way most indigenous people of the western half (the Indonesian half) of the island of New Guinea use it. This might confuse in several ways. First, we will see that this

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1 The first draft of the paper was written by John Braithwaite with Valerie Braithwaite and Leah Dunn. Michael Cookson led the reworking for the next draft of the paper and contributed additional insights from the literature and from his various fieldwork visits to Papua between 1994 and 2008. We wish to thank, in addition, our advisory panel members, Rika Korain and Thomas Petersson for assistance they provided with making contacts for our fieldwork.
region currently comprises two provinces of Indonesia: West Papua, with its capital in Manokwari, and Papua, with its capital in Jayapura. Second, ‘West Papua’ is a politically loaded term, which has been used since 1961 by Papuans at home and in exile to denote their aspirations for a sovereign state. Finally, Papua was historically the name given to the southern part of the eastern half of the island of New Guinea. That former colony is now part of the independent nation of Papua New Guinea. When we say ‘Papuans’ in this chapter, we mean the indigenous peoples of the Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua. We call residents of these provinces who have moved there from elsewhere in Indonesia (mostly since the mid-1960s) migrants.

Papua is the most troubled part of Indonesia today, suffering the greatest extremes of inequality and poverty, arguably the most debilitating levels of corruption and the worst conduct of the Indonesian military. Papua struggles through its fifth consecutive decade of intermittent armed conflict. It is one of the places in the world with a risk of civil war in the next few years.

Three colonial powers—The Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom—split the island of New Guinea down the middle, creating what is today Indonesian Papua and Papua New Guinea (see van der Veur 1966). New Guinea was once one of the most advanced regions of the world. Jared Diamond (1997:153) identified New Guinea as one of the three regions of the globe where food production arose independently, allowing the shift from hunter-gatherer to sedentary agricultural societies. The other two regions of independent invention of food production were the Fertile Crescent of today’s Middle East and what is today the eastern United States. The civilisational transformation to which intensive agriculture gave birth spread more widely from the other two regions than from Melanesia, from where it did not spread even to nearby nomadic Australia. This is surprising because 40 000 years ago, Australian Aborigines seem to have been more technologically advanced than Europeans, developing the earliest hafted stone tools (that is, mounted on handles) and by far the earliest watercraft in the world (Diamond 1997:297). Austronesian languages spread from Taiwan-Malaya-Indonesia across Papua and New Guinea to New Zealand and all of Polynesia and Micronesia, but not to southern New Guinea and Australia. Variations in topography, culture and physical environments, appear, however, to have vitiated against the rapid development and diffusion of new agricultural technologies from New Guinea’s highland communities to the wider region.

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2 A fact recognised in 2008 when Kuk Swamp in the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea was included on UNESCO’s World Heritage register (see <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/887>).

3 The challenges to the transfer and development of such knowledge among cultural groups in New Guinea is apparent to linguists who have, for decades, sought to link non-Austronesian languages across the rugged interior and southern swamplands of the island (the ‘trans-New Guinea hypothesis’) (see Pawley 2005).
Today, it is not possible to drive into many highland regions of Papua, where two-thirds of the indigenous population live. Flying into the central highlands, you see something similar to what the first Westerners ‘discovered’ in 1938: the ‘Shangri-la’ of the Baliem Valley (see Archbold 1941). What they saw then and what you still see today is extraordinarily rich agricultural land producing a diversity of vegetables and fruit and supporting large populations of pigs. The pigs are auctioned through independently invented economic trading systems that parallel institutions that in the West in the past century made stock exchanges the drivers of capitalist development. Wholesalers and retailers of pigs at Jibama market on the outskirts of Wamena negotiate shareholdings in pigs and litters of pigs and deploy sophisticated arrangements for sharing the profits from the sale of pigs and pork. A large proportion of the men involved in this negotiation to this day wear only their penis gourd (koteka or holim) as clothing. The people of the highlands of Papua continue to be rich in their culture and agriculture and it is hard to find places on the planet less touched by globalising influences. In large areas of these highlands, sustained contact with ‘white’ or non-Papuan Indonesian ‘foreigners’ came only in the 1960s or early 1970s.

Poverty in historical perspective

Many Papuans living outside larger towns or district capitals have no electricity in their village (therefore no mobile phones or information technology), no piped water or road network and limited incomes to purchase basic foods that they do not grow themselves, such as rice. In the highlands, improved agricultural technologies are needed to deliver food security in the staple of sweet potato (especially to cope with drought-related famine and other factors that adversely affect food production) (see Ballard 2000; Bourke et al. 2001). The poverty rate in Papua is more than twice the national average and the Human Development Index (HDI) in the central highlands is the lowest in the country. Children might have access to primary school education but sadly it is very common for

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4 There is a four-wheel drive/truck track from Nabire to Enarotali in the Paniai Lakes region of the western highlands and a road from Wamena towards the western highlands.
5 While some of the men at the Jibama market and in the streets of Wamena are dressed in koteka to pose for tourists (for money), many Dani come to Wamena for business or pleasure wearing their traditional koteka as they would in their village.
6 All district capitals now have local mobile phone coverage and some highland capitals today benefit from micro-hydro power and other hybrid forms of electricity generation.
7 Many Papuans have lacked sufficient protein and trace elements (such as iodine) in their diet, resulting in chronic disease in many communities. Recent socio-cultural changes have also redefined the diet for many (semi-)urban Papuans, shifting the staples for lowland/highland Papuans from sago/sweet potato supplemented by fresh fish/meat respectively, to rice or noodles with tinned fish or meat (pork).
8 The poverty rate in Papua is 41 per cent compared with a national average of 18 per cent (UNDP 2007a:1). The 2006 Annual Report of the UN Development Program for Indonesia gives the extremes for the HDI in the country—with Jakarta at 0.76 and Papua’s central highlands district of Jayawijaya at 0.47 (UNDP 2007b:5).
teachers to not turn up to school. Teachers dislike, even resent, postings to a comfortless life in highland villages remote from townships and most consider their remuneration for such postings inadequate. There are similar constraints on the provision of medicines and professional health care in many highland villages, where this is extremely limited or unavailable.

This could be read as meaning many lowland and highland Papuans are neither better nor worse off than they have been for millennia. The reality, however, is that many are worse off. Unfortunately, foreign contact brought diseases that Papuans had not suffered before, including venereal diseases that decimated some coastal communities in the early twentieth century (see Vogel and Richens 1989) and HIV/AIDS in recent decades. AIDS came with entrepreneurially organised prostitution—again, something Papuans believe did not exist before the Indonesians arrived. Many Papuans alleged to us that in recent years the military had brought in HIV-infected prostitutes from other parts of Indonesia (see Butt 2005, 2008). Informants allege that military officers own brothels and take protection money from others, though we are not able to confirm these allegations. Papua ranks second after Jakarta in reported AIDS cases, with an infection rate 15.4 times the national average (van de Pas 2008:4).

Commercial development is also removing forests and causing erosion in some areas, making traditional agriculture and hunting more difficult. Tree kangaroos, deer, cassowary and other wild animals important to the diet of many indigenous Papuans are now scarce in many regions of Papua. Papuan traditions of self-sufficiency have been challenged by these changes and in some areas people recount stories of being hungry for the first time in their oral history. Little of the benefit of the commercial development that has transformed these habitats goes to indigenous Papuans; it flows mostly to a diaspora of Chinese importers.

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9 As a result, truancy is common among children already struggling to adapt to formal education and/or disenchanted with past educational experiences (see Lake 1989). In 2007, it was reported that many children graduating from primary schools (especially in the interior) were illiterate and less than 30 per cent of the total adult population had primary school education (see Kompas 2007). Hernawan (2005:53) states that the literacy rate in Papua for women is 44 per cent compared with 78 per cent for Indonesia as a whole and 58 per cent for men compared with 90 per cent for the nation (figures that combine indigenous Papuans with migrants).

10 HIV/AIDS was first reported in Papua in 1992, introduced by Thai fisherman working in Indonesian territorial waters off southern Papua (under contract to PT Dijanti Group). These fishermen frequented prostitutes during their shore leave in the coastal towns of Merauke and Fak-fak (now part of Mimika Regency), where the first recorded cases in Papua were reported. These towns now have the highest number of confirmed HIV-positive cases (and deaths) in the province. Once the disease was introduced, other socio-cultural and political factors caused its rapid spread across the territory, although the disease remained poorly diagnosed in many parts of Papua and West Papua provinces (see Butt et al. 2002; Rees and Silove 2007).


12 Although drought-related famine due to the El Niño–Southern Oscillation appears to be a longstanding phenomenon across much of Papua (see Ballard 2000).
and exporters, the Indonesian military and migrants from islands further west such as Sulawesi and Java. We will see that this is a structural driver of conflict in Papua.

As one travels from Papua New Guinea to the Indonesian side of New Guinea, it is possible to conclude that life is better on the Indonesian side because for half the population—the migrant half—it is. The roads foreign visitors travel on are in areas where migrants dominate. They are populated by large numbers of motorcycles and privately owned new cars. They are lined by much more expensive houses filled with people with more protein in their diet than in many parts of Papua New Guinea. The public buildings in the towns are far better appointed structures than elsewhere in Melanesia. Churches and mosques boast beautiful paintings and mosaics, coloured glass and varnished pews in architecturally fine buildings with fans that work! The schools in coastal towns are also better equipped than many schools in Papua New Guinea. In the highlands, however, school buildings reflect the near collapse of the education system. The buildings are neglected and frequently without furniture, teaching materials or teachers. One must resist the superficial urban impression that these Papuans are better off than their counterparts in independent Papua New Guinea.

Because migrants are seen as the political masters, elite Papuans see themselves as being on the same rapid trajectory as Aboriginal Australians were in the nineteenth century: towards becoming a politically dominated minority in their own land. In some parts of the highlands, traditional tribal warfare that was once self-regulated to result in only small numbers of deaths has hooked into resource developments in a way that has escalated internecine conflict. Papuans feel that the proliferation of Indonesian army posts represents the worst of the deterioration of their lot. They are a feature common to many villages across the numerous conflict zones of Papua. The military posts dominate their lives, dispensing torture and death. A common tactic for the military has been to kill a person with the intention of inciting a particular group to take revenge. The payback then gives the military a justification for widespread retaliation against the group. One villager told us in 2007 how she had made a 200-kilometre journey along the roads of southern Papua. She encountered 40 military posts at which she had to explain her travels, donating a packet of cigarettes at each post. We were told many stories of the difficulty of travel—constraints rarely imposed on non-Papuan migrants. We were also told of restrictions on urban Papuans returning to their own villages, leaving a deep feeling that there was no

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13 Deaths from tribal warfare among indigenous Papuans are not on the scale of the conflicts in neighbouring Papua New Guinea (see Haley and Muggah 2006), where modern firearms are widely available (see Alpers 2005).
freedom of movement for Papuans in their own land. 'Even if you have a church social, you have to provide the military post with a reason for it and a list of the people who will be attending.'

Traditionally the site of greatest population density and prosperity, the highlands of mainland New Guinea were marginalised by colonialism and imperialism—Dutch, Japanese, American-Australian and Indonesian. For much of the period of Indonesian administration, the highlands of Papua have remained at the periphery of development initiatives by the state. Reasons for this relative neglect related to the exploitative practices of the New Order, which focused on Papua’s more accessible coastal resources, as well as the geographic impediments to infrastructure development in the mountainous interior. A consequence of this pattern of uneven development under the New Order is a shift in the demographic of independence guerrillas and activists. In the decades immediately after the transfer of the territory from The Netherlands to Indonesia, most of the resistance to Indonesian rule came from Papuan coastal elites. In recent decades, the majority of calls for Papuan independence and of guerrilla actions have been initiated by highland Papuans.

Papua, in summary, was for millennia a complex quilt of highly diverse local communities, many of which had intricate and highly developed trade and alliance networks. While conflicts were common between and among these peoples, most were relatively localised. Despite often fierce competition for resources among some coastal Papuans and endemic warfare among the larger polities of the densely populated highlands (see Heider 1965; Broekhuijse 1967; Koch 1967), Papuan communities generally lived within the limits of their natural environment. The fact that Papua was largely unknown and untouched by the spread of temperate-zone advances in agricultural technology, metallurgy and writing until so late in its history was one root cause for its comparative poverty today. We are following Diamond’s (1997) analysis here. The other deepest root cause of the poverty and conflict in Papua is that it suffered two colonialisms instead of the usual one.

Although largely overlooked by Dutch colonialism until the twentieth century, many coastal Papuans were afflicted (often by proxy) with some of the neglectful extractive forms of Dutch colonialism for three and a half centuries, especially through the Moluccan slave trade to their west (see also Chapter 3.

14 Quotes without citation are taken from our interviews for this research. For details on interviews, see Appendix Table A2.2.
15 For examples of these trade and alliance networks in New Guinea, see Elmberg (1968), Hughes (1977), Miedema (1984) and Pétrequin and Pétrequin (1993).
16 The large alliance networks of the agrarian societies of the highlands, combined with population pressures, appear to have resulted in large-scale conflicts throughout much of the highlands.
Coastal Papuans then suffered a second form of colonialism as the new economic and political opportunities in the territory in the late Dutch period were given to skilled and semi-skilled migrants from elsewhere in the East Indies (see Sharp 1977; Pouwer 1999:158; Chauvel 2005). This two-tiered colonialism accelerated with the transfer of the territory to Indonesia in 1963–69 and set the tone for the past half-century of repressive resource-exploitative colonialism at the hands of Indonesia. This latter era is more akin to the colonialism English settlers imposed on Aboriginal Australians, and it is seen that way by Papuans. The development economics literature shows that both kinds of colonialism in different ways have created conditions of increased wealth for settlers and increased poverty for indigenous inhabitants of the colonies. Statistically, societies that missed out on nineteenth-century industrialisation did better in the twentieth century when they also missed out on colonialism (for example, Japan, China, Thailand) and those colonised for the longest periods did worst (Easterly 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2004:66–70).

Colonial disinterest in Papua

Europeans divided up New Guinea without conflict in the nineteenth century. It was a low priority for all of them. Sovereignty over the western half went to the Dutch in 1828, the south-east to the British in 1884 (ceded to the new Commonwealth of Australia in 1906) and the north-east to Germany in 1885 (occupied by Australian forces in 1914 and designated as a League of Nations-mandated trust territory under Australian authority in 1920). After more than three centuries of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, by 1938 there were still only 15 European administrators in Papua and only 200 (mostly missionaries) European residents (Bertrand 2004:145). Since 1828, Papua had delineated the easternmost point of the Dutch East Indies. The territory acquired a new strategic significance in World War II. Pitched battles were fought between Imperial Japanese and Allied forces across mainland New Guinea and surrounding islands from 1942 to 1945, but this bloody conflict was restricted largely to coastal towns and their hinterlands. Hollandia (now Jayapura) became General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters for the Pacific War in mid-1944. The town was transformed into a staging post for more than 250 000 Allied air and sea personnel preparing to

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17 The lack of significant Dutch interest or investment in Papua until the early/mid-twentieth century meant that Papuans benefited from a form of Dutch colonialism tempered by the doctrine of the Ethical Policy (see van der Eng 2004).
18 Sharp (1977:31) characterises this two-tiered colonialism as a ‘caste barrier’ based on racial/ethnic grounds deliberately intended to exclude Papuans from economic and political opportunities in their own land.
19 And countries with the longest number of years since independence have the lowest odds of experiencing a civil war (Hegre et al. 2001:39).
20 The territory of New Guinea was not officially under Australian authority until the Commonwealth of Australia passed the New Guinea Act on 9 May 1921.
retake the Philippines and the rest of Asia. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, a war-torn and cash-strapped Netherlands had its hands full at home and with its efforts to reassert its authority over an incipient nationalist movement in its East Indies colony. Papua’s coastal and highlands peoples remained largely peripheral to this process until the late 1940s.

Christian missionaries played a key role in Dutch administrative expansion in Papua from their arrival in Dorei Bay (modern-day Manokwari) in 1855. Christianity made limited headway in Muslim (and Hindu) Indonesia, but its influence grew steadily in Papua in the early to mid-twentieth century, especially from 1928 when Catholic and Christian denominations came into direct competition for Papuan souls (see Pouwer 1999:164). The missionaries, working with attachments of native colonial police, virtually ended tribal warfare that had been endemic in Papua for as long as oral history recalled. Moral appeals that killing was forbidden by God did much of the work. We interviewed old men who remembered the arrival of the missionaries. They said that when mission moral appeals were ignored, the missionaries returned with armed police to enforce compliance. As in Papua New Guinea (Meggitt 1977), many Papuans were opportunistic in their associations with these missionaries, who brought with them valuable trade goods and a new sociopolitical order. The peace dividend that followed mission proselytising and schooling helped Christianity to sweep across Papua. It was a large dividend: it was estimated that before pacification of the Dani in the Baliem Valley, 1 per cent of the population was being killed each year in the mid-1950s (Bromley 1962b:23, 26).

The limited Dutch political and commercial penetration of Papua meant that educated young Papuans at the end of World War II had little stake in the incipient nationalist struggle for an independent Indonesia.21 They were not part of the political conversation among young nationalists from Java and other islands of the Dutch East Indies that began in the early twentieth century. Papuans had experienced Moluccan colonialism before, when the Sultan of Tidore collected taxes for centuries in north-west Papua, and some became slaves. The importance of Papuan slaves in rowing the vessels of, and in service to, royal courts elsewhere in the archipelago has been largely forgotten. The slave trade used Papuans in the production and trade of spices, especially in Tidore and Ternate, but it took them far and wide. Galis (1954:5) reports that ‘in 724 an emissary of Çriwijaya to the Chinese court brought with him a slave girl from Seng-k’i [Papua]’.

Few Papuans imagined themselves to be part of the sovereign State of Indonesia proclaimed by President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammad Hatta on 17

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21 There was some influence among the Papuan elite as a consequence of the internment of communists and anti-colonial Indonesians in Boven Digul, in the south-east of Papua (see Chauvel 2005).
August 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender. They were also isolated from the bloody guerrilla war of independence fought by Indonesian nationalists against Dutch forces from 1945 to 1949. In November 1949, Dutch negotiators effectively excluded Papua from the Round Table Conference. The Dutch doubted that the native ‘population of the territory itself could in a democratic way express the wish whether or not it wanted to be a part of Indonesia’ and argued that the people of West New Guinea ‘racially, linguistically and culturally cannot be considered to belong to the Indonesians’ and needed protection as they were ‘on a much more primitive level than any other people in Indonesia’ (Secretariat of The Netherlands–Indonesia Union 1950:5).

Papua remained a colony of The Netherlands throughout the 1950s while the new Republic of Indonesia struggled to overcome internal dissent and separatist conflict. Papua became an important focal point for the nation-building activities of the Indonesian State, which asserted that the revolution would be complete only once Papua was ‘restored’ to the republic. Successive attempts by the Indonesian Government to bring the issue of the sovereignty of Papua to the United Nations during the 1950s were quashed by The Netherlands and its Western allies (see Subandrio 2000).

Australia, which had supported the nationalist struggle against the Dutch elsewhere in Indonesia, wanted a buffer between the new republic and its PNG colony. The international prestige of The Netherlands suffered a serious blow as a result of its brutal suppression of the Indonesian independence movement. Lijphart (1966:288) argued that retaining Papua afforded the Dutch an opportunity to salve their battered national self-image through national ‘feelings of moral superiority’ and ‘egocentric altruism’ even though their attempts to designate it a UN trust territory were thwarted internationally. The Dutch colonial administration was nominally supportive of Papuan aspirations for self-determination and through the 1950s strengthened policies to promote the ‘Papuaniżation’ of the civil service and police. While change was precipitous for many Papuans, international pressure for decolonisation (particularly from Indonesia) made progress seem slow. Only in 1960 did the Dutch Government unambiguously state its intention to grant Papuan independence by 1970. The first stage of this process came with the inauguration of a New Guinea Council (Nieuw Guinea Raad) in April 1961, a few months after the creation of a Papuan ‘volunteer’ defence force (Papoea vrijvilligerskorps or PVK).

23 Van der Kroef (1968:694) noted that in 1961 Papuans filled 4950 of the 8800 positions in the colonial administration and were of growing importance in middle and executive levels of government.
24 The notion of a ‘volunteer’ defence force reflects a stipulation in the League of Nations Charter (Article 22) to prevent in trust territories ‘the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory’. This provision is echoed
1961, responding to escalating Indonesian Government rhetoric and infiltrations intended to destabilise the colony, Papuan members of the New Guinea Council made their own assertion of sovereignty by declaring the independent nation of ‘West Papua’ with the ‘morning star’ flag (bintang kejora) the symbol of state and Papua, My Homeland! (Hai Tanahku Papua!) its anthem. The response from Jakarta was swift.

On 19 December 1961, President Sukarno declared his ‘three commands to the people’ (‘trikora’, tri komando rakyat) for the ‘liberation’ of Papua. Sukarno was struggling with holding his nation together, so an external challenge was seen as a strategy for unifying the nation. Papua was part of the imagined community of Indonesia (Anderson 1983), but Indonesia was not part of the imagined community of Papuans. The meaning of community for most Papuans did not run far beyond their clan, although a Papuan imagination was brewing, encouraged by the Dutch education system and ambitious Papuan urban elites. Survey research and other evidence from the early 1960s suggested overwhelming Papuan support for eventual independence and rejection of Indonesian rule (Saltford 2003:10). At the same time, as the head of one of the Protestant churches put it to us, ‘few people in Papua actually want[ed] to fight Indonesia’. That was true in 1963 for both Papuan and Dutch forces and is still true today for most Papuans. The early stages of the Indonesian military campaign to liberate Papua were a disaster. The Indonesian troops soon found that Papuans wanted to kill them rather than be liberated by them. We were told many stories of Dutch forces saving Indonesian soldiers from the Papuans. One founding Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) member told us how the Dutch had prevented him from killing the Indonesian paratroopers he captured, though before they were sent back to Indonesia, he made some of them who were Melanesian dig up and eat the soil ‘of the land they had betrayed’.

In the international arena, the United States was concerned about the growing influence that the Indonesian Communist Party had in Sukarno’s government. By the late 1950s, it was apparent that Indonesia was planning to use Soviet support for a military campaign to wrest control of Papua from the Dutch (Pauker

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25 This process began on 19 October 1961 with the election of a National Committee of Papuan leaders and a manifesto for an independent West Papua (see Chauvel 2005:21–5; DPD Pasifik 2000).
26 The three commands were: 1. Defeat the formation of the puppet state of Papua of Dutch colonial make; 2. Unfurl the Honoured Red and White Flag in West Irian, Indonesian native land; 3. Be ready for general mobilisation to defend the independence and unity of Country and Nation’ (see President Sukarno’s ‘Trikora’ speech, accessed 1 September 2008, <www.papuaweb.org/goi/pidato/1961-12-jogjakarta.html>.)
27 Operations Mandala and Djayawidjaya, the major assault phases of the Indonesian military campaign in Papua, were averted by eleventh-hour diplomacy (see Kodam 1971; Platje 2001).
1961; van der Kroef 1961; Platje 2001). In the early 1960s, the United States effectively persuaded Australia and Britain to drop diplomatic support for the Dutch over Papua and bullied the Dutch into signing the New York Agreement (NYA). The NYA allowed for the first UN Transitional Executive Administration (UNTEA), which oversaw the transfer of the territory from Dutch to Indonesian administrative control by 1 May 1963. It was the first time that the United Nations was given direct executive authority for the administration of a territory (the next occasion was in Cambodia three decades later). A cohort of UN personnel and a UN Security Force (UNSF) were responsible for administering and policing the territory during the nine-month transition period. The Dutch had managed to negotiate several face-saving clauses into the NYA, the most important of which was that Papuans would be granted an opportunity to ‘exercise freedom of choice’ on their future before 1969. Indeed, Article XVIIId of the NYA states that such arrangements will include ‘the eligibility of all adults, male and female, not foreign nationals to participate in the act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice’. These deals were done with no Papuan involvement (see Chauvel 1997). It was all about the Cold War. A 1962 memo to US President John F. Kennedy put it that ‘Indonesia is one of the truly big areas of East–West competition’ (Saltford 2003:15). US diplomacy delivered Papua to Indonesia as a crucial step along a successful journey through the 1960s to switch Indonesia from being an emergent Soviet ally to an American client (see Markin 1996; Simpson 2003).

The UN transitional administration of 1962–63 was not the finest hour for the United States, Australia or the United Nations, as attested by a fifth decade of conflict. The British Embassy in Washington, writing to its Foreign Office in 1968, concluded that it was unimaginable that the United Kingdom would see ‘the US, Japanese, Dutch or Australian government putting at risk their economic and political relations with Indonesia on a matter of principle involving a relatively small number of primitive peoples’ (Saltford 2000:189). Saltford (2003:101) also noted that 30 members of the 54-seat Papuan Provincial Council were dismissed in 1968 because many desired a one-man one-vote system.

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28 The NYA (Article VII) specified that the UNSF ‘will primarily supplement existing Papuan (West Irianese) police in the task of maintaining law and order. The Papuan Volunteer Corps [PVK], which on the arrival of the United Nations Administrator will cease being part of the Netherlands armed forces, and the Indonesian armed forces in the territory will be under the authority of, and at the disposal of, the Secretary-General for the same purpose. The United Nations Administrator will, to the extent feasible, use the Papuan (West Irianese) police as a United Nations security force to maintain law and order and, at his discretion, use Indonesian armed forces.’ In practice, the PVK was neutralised in February 1963, several months before the transfer to Indonesian authority (see Saltford 2000:120–4). These Papuans, together with their police counterparts, were among the earliest guerrillas fighting for independence from Indonesia (see below).

29 In our interview with John Perkins, author of *Confessions of an Economic Hitman* (2005, 2007), who was recruited through the US National Security Agency as an ‘economic hitman’ in Indonesia later in the 1960s, he said a second preoccupation was the assessment that expanding oil reserves would be discovered in Indonesia (this was already clear in Sumatra but also a significant issue in Papua) (see Poulgrain 1999) and control of them by US corporations was a key objective.
plebiscite, as stipulated in the NYA. Jakarta then dismissed the entire assembly and set up a new *musyawarah* (consultative council) of 1026 hand-picked representatives (see Pemerintah Daerah Propinsi Irian Barat 1972). Of the 1026, 1025 voted to stay within the Republic of Indonesia in the long-awaited, so-called Act of Free Choice. The international community was indifferent to the sordid proffering of carrots and military sticks used to secure this near-unanimous outcome. Indonesia was allowed to put this democratic veneer on the handover of Papua to Indonesia against the will of many of its people. It happened under the supposed supervision of a handful of UN observers whose influence and movement were restricted by the military. The majority of the UN General Assembly accepted the result and Papua legally became part of Indonesia.

We might say that it was the anomic conditions of Sukarno’s disintegrating sway over Indonesia in the inflationary 1960s that motivated the occupation of Papua as a project he felt might unify the nation behind him. The occupation followed by the sham Act of Free Choice ensured enduring anomie among Papuans. To this day, Papuans have contempt for the rules of the political game that Jakarta imposes on them.

### Describing the conflict

**Fighting begins**

Armed resistance to Indonesian rule increased in the years after the Indonesian administrative takeover of Papua. Much of this early guerrilla resistance came from disenfranchised members of the Papuan Volunteer Corps, which was officially disbanded on 1 May 1963, when UNTEA left Papua. Together with members of the Arfak people (in the hinterland of Manokwari), they launched the first attacks on the Indonesian military in the mid-1960s (see Kodam 1971:121–8). Conventional historical accounts of guerrilla resistance in Papua recognise the emergence of an Organisasi Papua Merdeka or Free Papua Movement by 1965 (see Djopari 1993; Ondawame 2001). On some estimates, the Indonesian military, responding to these early attacks, killed 2000 Papuans (Bertrand 2004:149). Indonesia’s first Governor of Papua, Eliezer Bonay, estimated that

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30 The official account of this ‘Determination of the People’s Decision’ (*Pepera, Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat*) recognises the lone dissenting voice of Eduard Hegemur, a representative in the *musyawarah* for Fak-fak (see Pemerintah Daerah Propinsi Irian Barat 1972:201). Vlasblom (2004:474) notes Hegemur’s speech as the one note of dissonance in the *Pepera* ‘symphony’ and that he ‘was later arrested and severely maltreated’.

31 In the post-Suharto era, this Act of Free Choice has been under considerable scrutiny, most notably by a historical review commissioned by the Dutch Parliament (see Drooglever 2005).

32 It is worth noting that in the western highlands the Me (in the past known as the Ekagi or Kapauku) people have violently resisted foreign authority since the late 1930s (see Giay 1995:47–51).
about 30 000 Papuans were killed in Indonesian military operations from 1963 until the conclusion of the Act of Free Choice in August 1969 (Tebay 2006:5). From the beginning, the guerrilla campaign against Indonesia was episodic and disorganised, characterised by explosive uprisings. For example, in 1977, 15 000 Dani people rebelled in the central highlands. In response, Indonesian military aircraft dropped napalm and strafed many Dani villages. This bloody upsurge of the conflict saw a major military operation in Jayawijaya District that massacred, according to one count, 12 397 Papuans in 1977 (Tebay 2006:6). Another major upsurge was in 1981, when Operations Clean Sweep I and II reportedly killed at least 1000 people in Jayapura District and 2500 in the Paniai District, with thousands more reportedly killed in further major military operations in 1982, 1983 and 1984, and 517 killed in the last major operation of this phase in 1985 (Tebay 2006:6).

Since 1985, there has been no year in which more than 1000 Papuans have reportedly been killed by the military and in most years that number seems to have been much less than 100. It is common for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to use 100 000 or 150 000, or higher, as estimates for the number of lives lost in the Papuan conflict since the 1960s. Australians will remember the six-figure estimates in advertisements during their 2007 national election campaign.33 We have not seen evidence to support such numbers, and they seem too high.34 We can say the loss of life in Papua has numbered in the tens of thousands but is undoubtedly much less than in East Timor since 1974 and in the purges against the Indonesian Communist Party at the time of Suharto’s New Order coming to power in 1965. The last two conflicts clearly seem to have had a six-figure death toll and have been the two deadliest conflicts in the history of Indonesia (Cribb 2001). In these terms, Papua rates as the third-deadliest Indonesian conflict.35 Aceh can be ranked ahead of it only by going back to count Acehnese fatalities in the fight for independence against the Dutch in the nineteenth century (see Chapter 6).

Torture rather than murder has become the dominant means of terrorising the people of Papua into submission (see Hernawan 2008; HRW 2009). Disappearances became more common than murder in the open. For example, after demonstrations in Biak in 1998, 33 corpses were found in the sea (Tebay

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34 See Ballard (2002a:96) for similar concern that these numbers could be exaggerated.
35 Conflict deaths in Papua and East Timor are not due merely to direct actions by the Indonesian security forces or independence guerrillas. In East Timor, as in Papua, sustained and sporadic military operations displaced thousands of villagers from their land and their homes in the past few decades, deliberately denying them food and shelter for prolonged periods and making them extremely vulnerable to drought, famine, disease and other maladies that frequently resulted in premature death. This is one of the reasons for the high loss of life in the case of East Timor. The lack of any systematic attempt to quantify the effects of such operations in Papua is one of the main reasons why figures for conflict deaths in Papua remain speculative.
Anomie and Violence

2006:9). It is believed 139 Papuans were loaded onto two naval frigates, with the women raped on the decks. Only a few who jumped overboard survived to tell the tale (Elmslie 2002:242). The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (Coomaraswamy 1999:18) found that women were raped, sexually mutilated and thrown overboard; corpses washed up on the coast showed signs of sexual mutilation such as removed breasts. When open murder does occur, it is of strategically targeted leaders or in a manner calculated to maximise terror. A report from the Elsham human rights group described a Papuan having his flesh barbecued while the wife and children of the man were all forced to eat his flesh (Tebay 2006:7). When Indonesian soldiers killed Nalogolan Kibak, a prominent Amungme chief, ‘a bucket was filled with his blood’ and other ‘tribal leaders, teachers and pastors of the area were forced to drink the blood’ (Osborne 1985:71).

The Alliance for Democracy in Papua (ALDP) 2002, an NGO working on legal and human rights issues, has done a mapping study of 74 clearly established political killings in Papua between 1995 and 2005. It in fact found that the Suharto era did not have a higher rate of these killings than the post-Suharto era, or a different pattern in their nature. Only five of the killings went to court. In their view, the military was responsible for only 27 per cent of the killings, the police for 31 per cent, government civilian employees for 15 per cent, civil society killers for 15 per cent and ‘corporate killers’ for 14 per cent (unknown, 7 per cent). The Catholic Church’s Office of Justice and Peace in Jayapura found a similar continuity: the practice of torture that was a feature of the New Order regime in Papua had continued unabated in the decade since the fall of Suharto in May 1998 (Hernawan 2008).

Much of the terror inflicted by the security forces in Papua has been sexualised in a way that has motivated observers to join the OPM. In separate cases, we spoke with one informant who witnessed the penises being cut off a number of men in his village. Another informant saw the vagina cut out of a woman and her husband made to eat it. In our research team, we have debated whether it is sensational or appropriate to report this, but the frequency of such accounts among our informants makes it important for us to address this issue (see also

36 Indonesian authorities on Biak claimed these bodies were villagers swept out to sea after a tsunami on the north coast of neighbouring Papua New Guinea. Rutherford (1999:51) offers a rather different analysis, suggesting ‘the argument that the corpses could not be the demonstrators because they were not Indonesians suited the strange logic of Indonesian state terror and sharpened the point of the military attack…Extra-legal violence against separatists…is not intended to purify the nation of alien elements, but to demonstrate the state’s ability to appropriate their potency, i.e. to “nationalize death”’.

37 See Ballard (2002b:17) on pain in Papua ‘rendered visible for other observers’.

38 The total of these percentages is 109 per cent, suggesting that some cases fall under multiple categories.

39 Critics might also say OPM members have an interest in sensationalising these stories, but we interviewed others who themselves had suffered mutilation of their genitals and we were given digital photographs of the mutilated genitals of others by human rights workers.
We report some vivid detail partly because we are shocked—not only in the Papuan case, but across the region—at the extent of this cruelly creative sexualised sadism (against the genitals of men and women, and routinely with audiences forced to watch). It was a feature of nearly all of the conflicts in the first four volumes of Peacebuilding Compared and one rarely mentioned in the published literature, perhaps because it was so offensive. We think it is a recurrent pattern of conflict in the region that demands analysis.

The most sexually sadistic side of humanity has a use in conflicts where the desire is not to kill people on a large scale and to avoid becoming a priority on the UN human rights radar. For decades, many individuals rumoured to be targets for assassination by the security forces have attempted to flee Papua. Some now live in exile overseas while others, such as Arnold Ap and Eddie Mofu, were killed (Budiardjo and Liong 1988:125–36). Vivid images of small numbers of horrific extrajudicial executions that are passed by word of mouth can cause individuals to renounce the independence struggle or flee the country. SMS (text message) campaigns during our 2007 fieldwork were doing the work of letting a person know that they could be a target for execution (even if they had not yet made it onto that list). When we were interviewing one human rights worker who was not a member of OPM, an SMS came in: ‘Recipients of this SMS are members of OPM and should be killed without judicial process.’ He said some days he received as many as 12 such messages. The Alliance of Independent Journalists (AIJ) in Papua told us no journalists had been assassinated in Papua because this would attract international attention. This does not, however, stop journalists moderating their stories when they receive this kind of SMS or when their office is mysteriously ransacked. We were told in late 2008 that this SMS terror campaign seemed to have stopped in mid-2008. Rightly or wrongly, Papuans are very inclined to believe when a political leader disliked by Indonesia dies that the military has killed him.40 They are also inclined to believe when popular pro-independence politicians win elections that the Indonesian State manages to declare them the loser. So the extrajudicial killing problem is part of why Papuans do not believe they live in a democracy or under a rule of law in any sense of the term.

Flag raisings have been the most persistent provocations to which the military has responded with violence. For example, when six women attempted to raise the morning star flag in front of the governor’s office in 1980, they were arrested, raped and imprisoned for long terms (Bertrand 2004:153). On 14 December 1988, Dr Thomas Wainggai (the first west Papuan to obtain a PhD), his Japanese wife,

40 An example is the previous Governor of Papua, Jaap Solossa, who is believed by family members and journalists we interviewed, and by countless Papuans, to have been poisoned. Mainstream media reports suggest that Solossa died of a heart attack, but the fact that no autopsy was performed on his body fuelled suspicions among some Papuans about the cause of his death.
Teruko, and about 60 supporters gathered at the Mandala stadium in downtown Jayapura for a peaceful ceremony to raise the flag of the independent state of ‘West Melanesia’ (see Giay and Godschalk 1993:338–41). They were arrested, charged and convicted of subversion. Wainggai received a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment and his wife and many of his supporters received sentences of four to eight years, even though the military commander for Papua observed at the time that ‘[it is] really nothing more than a diplomatic group…it is not an armed movement’ (Amnesty International 1994). In March 1996, Wainggai died in Cipinang maximum-security prison in Jakarta under conditions many Papuans regarded as suspicious. His imprisonment and death in custody have made him a key martyr to the cause of Papuan independence and have helped strengthen support for his so-called Fourteen Stars Movement (Bintang Empatbelas) for Melanesian Christian solidarity. In the post-Suharto era, this trend continues. Filep Karma and Yusak Pakage were sentenced to 15 and 10 years’ prison, respectively, for raising the morning star flag on 1 December 2004 in Abepura. During their trial, Judge Lakoni Hernie was reported to have made the following statements:

‘Smash in the head of Filep if he’s naughty’ (Uttered in a direction by the judge to the police to break up a public speech by Filep Karma on April 19, 2005).

‘Don’t bring the name of your God in here, your God has been dead a long time’ (Uttered to Karma during the hearing, April 19, 2005).

‘You be quiet, you want to die do you?’ (Uttered by the judge while he was kicking and punching a female pro-Karma protester) (HRW 2007a:23–4)

We conducted sad interviews with friends and parents of Cenderawasih University students convicted over demonstrations in Abepura (2004–06) who escaped their torture in prison through suicide. Karma, who was sentenced to 15 years in the Abepura cases above, somehow managed to climb from his cell onto the roof of the prison and once again fly the morning star flag on 1 December 2005 (the first anniversary of ‘Papuan independence’ after his imprisonment). We will conclude that such extraordinary acts of defiance are the lifeblood of a spirit of merdeka (liberation).

41 Note that the morning star flag and ‘West Melanesia’ or ‘fourteen stars’ flag are different, although in recent years the Bintang 14 movement has appropriated the morning star (on the Bintang 14, see Giay and Godschalk 1993:340).
The meaning of OPM: organisation, army, movement?

Recent (and revisionist) histories of the struggle for Papuan independence frame resistance as a ‘traditional’ response by various indigenous groups in Papua to foreign domination. Some accounts associate millenarian movements and local acts of resistance during the Dutch era with forms of Papuan proto-nationalism (see Penders 2002:104–40), while others go further to suggest a pre-contact Papuan ‘people’ (Rizzo 2004:115). One Papuan elder we interviewed, however, argued that OPM was really a label created by the Indonesians that Papuans subsequently embraced for their movement for *merdeka*. This connects to similar debates about the role of the Indonesian military in the genesis of GAM (the Free Aceh Movement) that we take up in Chapter 6. This also accords with John Djopari’s (1993) popular history of the OPM ‘rebellion’ against Indonesia, in which he traces the earliest use of the term to guerrilla actions led by Terianus Aronggear in 1964 on behalf of an ‘Organisation and Struggle for a Free West Papua’.42 Djopari argued that the name of this organisation was later abbreviated to Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) and that it was popularised by actions in 1965 by ex-members of the Dutch-era Papuan Volunteer Corps (Djopari 1993:100; cf. Singh 2008:129).43 The rise of Papuan guerrilla resistance to Indonesia in the mid-1960s also saw a shift in Indonesian Government rhetoric towards Papua; the integrationist claims and anti-colonial critiques of the 1950s and early 1960s gave way to a new discourse that sought to distance separatist groups such as the OPM from the Indonesian mainstream.

McRae (2000:7) identifies three key features of an official discourse on separatists in Indonesia under the New Order (1966–98). First, the government ‘essentialises’ separatist groups such as the OPM, depicting them as ‘remnants of the movement in an ahistoric manner, and confined to categories familiar to the Indonesian population’—as a ‘security disturbing group’ (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan, GPK), as communists or as foreign pawns. Second, it ‘operates on separatists themselves, in a normative depiction of separatists as mistaken, misguided or misled’ (vis-a-vis a ‘citizen who considers him or herself an Indonesian’). This ‘allows the mobilisation of corrective technologies against separatism, such as “territorial operations” and “pembinaan” (loosely—guidance)’.44 Finally, McRae identifies a ‘third, more insidious aspect of this discourse [that] disallows the

42 It is worth noting that references to (and discussion of) the OPM were banned under Suharto’s New Order. This ban extended to John Djopari’s (1993) history of the OPM even though much of his account of the early years of the OPM was based on an official military history (see Kodam 1971).
43 See also Djopari’s (1993:105–9) analysis of the four key elements that gave rise to the armed struggle and Singh’s (2008:128–32) synopsis of these.
44 Indonesian Government rhetorical claims of misguided or misled separatists are clearly apparent in the presidential decision to grant amnesty to PVK/OPM guerrilla fighters at the close of the Act of Free Choice in 1969 (1A/1969 *Pemberian Amnesti dan Abolisi Kepada Orang-Orang Yang Tersangkut di Dalam Peristiwa Awom dan Kawan-Kawan, Peristiwa Mandacan dan Kawan-Kawan dan Peristiwa Wagete-Enaratoli di Irian Barat*).
political motives of separatist movements, and often implies that the separatists are spoilt or out of touch with reality’. All elements of this discourse are apparent in the approaches of the Indonesian Government to Papuan resistance in the past four decades and remain prominent today.

Many Papuans we interviewed, when asked to explain their anti-Indonesian sentiment, stated ‘we are all OPM’ (see also King 2004:93–101, 106–7). Such claims reveal the attachment many Papuans feel to a broad nationalist agenda in which the OPM is understood not literally as a ‘free Papua organisation’ but as a ‘free Papua movement’. For these Papuans, being aligned with OPM is not about adhering to the strictures or structure of a political organisation as much as it is contributing to and asserting the continuing presence of a broad sociopolitical movement for independence. Papuan participation in the OPM is also a deliberate and emphatic rejection of Indonesian Government discourses intended to diminish the significance and popular appeal of this separatist movement.

The broad appeal of the OPM is symbolic. Few West Papuans today would identify with the socialist or anti-Western sentiment of early OPM leaders such as Jacob Prai. Similarly, support for the OPM is not founded merely on a collective sense of ‘forced territorial incorporation into Indonesia, cultural imperialism, loss of identity, alienation of land and political repression’ (Premdas 1985:1062). The resonance that many Papuans feel with the OPM is derived from the symbolism and mythology now associated with the guerrilla movement. OPM today is evoked by warriors in traditional battledress, armed with spears, bows and arrows and other traditional weapons and who carry the standard of the morning star. In this way, Papuan resistance is represented as a timeless form of resistance to foreign domination and OPM warriors as champions of independence.

Much of the popular support for the OPM today is derived from the symbolism of the morning star, and from the sentimental and emotional attachment to this flag, to the anthem *Hai Tanahku Papua!*, to the Crown Pigeon of State and to the territorial and cartographic control of West Papua (as inscribed in the *Political Manifesto of the National Committee of Papua* in 1961) (see Griapon 2007). As Benny Giay (in Cookson 2008:354) has stated, 'Papuans have sacrificed much and some have given their lives [for independence]. Their struggle is embodied

45 In recent years, Papuans have rarely demonstrated or been photographed armed with machetes or other easily available ‘modern’ weaponry popular elsewhere in the archipelago (see Cookson 2008:121–2). There is a very practical reason for this: Papuans are, on occasions, permitted to carry traditional weapons in public, whereas modern weaponry is considered to be more ‘threatening’. Recent imagery, however, contrasts starkly with clandestine photographs of OPM guerrillas from the New Order period (mid-1960s to late 1990s) in which members of the OPM typically present themselves with ‘modern’ firearms or other weapons (for example, Osborne 1985). See also Ben Bohane’s photo essay with imagery from West Papua taken in 1996 (Bohane et al. 2003:93–151).
in these symbols.’ In this way, Papua is strategically essentialised (see Spivak 1988) and can acquire a symbolic life (as a nationalist movement) of unity and common purpose—transcending the personalities, ideologies and machinations of OPM internal politics.

If, as our informants and our observations suggest, OPM is more a movement than an organisation, how can we answer the question of how many OPM there are? Today the Indonesian State (and some Papuans) makes a distinction between OPM as a general movement for merdeka through armed struggle where necessary and the National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, TPN) as the military wing of OPM. Seth Rumkorem founded the TPN in 1970. A large faction split off from it in 1976, led by Jacob Prai. These groups subsequently reconciled, though only partially, after new major factional splits emerged in OPM, although Papuan resistance to Indonesia remained schismatic (see Singh 2008:134 and later discussion in this chapter). Such divisions, perhaps, need not be taken too literally as it is important not to reify OPM or TPN as more coherent organisationally than they are (see Osborne 1985; Singh 2008:132–6, 144–9). Many claimed that Richard Yoweni was recently elected chairman of both OPM and TPN (Bohane 2008).

When contemporary commentators discuss questions such as how many OPM there are, it is often unclear whether they are talking about the OPM as an organisation, an army or a movement. They frequently don’t say and they might not know, as no-one really knows. When one of the TPN/OPM commanders we interviewed in 2008 said he had 10 000 fighters at his disposal who had been issued an identity card, we didn’t know whether he was talking about OPM or TPN members, although it seemed certain he was exaggerating! The Indonesian military estimated publicly in 2005 that OPM forces totalled only 620 (McGibbon 2006b:28), but we don’t know if they were talking about OPM or TPN, and we suspected it was a number that understated OPM’s strength. Singh (2008:135) has provided the most detailed and contemporary estimate of 1695, listing the estimated number of fighters under the command of each of 23 OPM commanders.46 In this chapter, we do not try to make a distinction between OPM and TPN or to guess the numbers involved in either. We use TPN/OPM only for informants who make a point of insisting on this identity.

Repression after the failed Papuan uprising of 1984 led to 11 000 people fleeing across the border to Papua New Guinea between 1984 and 1986, according to Amnesty International. A key feature of the 1984 uprising was the defection of 100 Papuans from the Indonesian military (Singh 2008:141). OPM throughout the past five decades has been highly factionalised (with two main factions for most of this period, with many divisions within factions). Singh (2008:134)

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46 This is close to Bonay and McGrory’s (2004:440) estimate of 1600.
lists 21 OPM factions. OPM has been militarily, financially and organisationally ineffective, unfunded and untrained by any foreign interests, unable or unwilling to tax local communities in the way of GAM in Aceh (see Chapter 6) and prone to defection by leaders bribed by the Indonesian military to be its agents. On the other hand, we interviewed OPM members who were agents of the organisation within the Indonesian military (unless, as was possible, they were double agents who were lying to us!). One former police officer we interviewed claimed to have run a network of 130 police officers who were underground OPM members; they helped OPM with all manner of supplies—ammunition, typewriters, food and of course information. OPM has access to arms and arms dealers across the PNG border willing to sell to them at high prices by international standards, and now and then OPM manages to capture military weapons. A more important capability of OPM is that it has access to an international safe haven in Papua New Guinea. Because OPM is popular with the people, villagers supply them while they hide in the mountains. OPM became increasingly internationally networked to support groups in Australia and elsewhere, with their own representatives in exile in many countries, with the World Council of Indigenous Peoples and particularly with human rights NGOs and churches internationally. There remain some remote no-go areas for the Indonesian military in the highlands that some even claim are ruled by OPM (King 2004:117)—for example, in Puncak Jaya (Chauvel 2007:49).

In past decades, hostage taking has been used frequently as an OPM strategy to raise the profile of their cause, although press coverage has not always been favourable (see Osborne 1985:88–93, 103–6). In January 1996, several dozen foreign and Indonesian researchers and NGO workers were abducted in the southern highlands of Papua. This hostage taking, led by OPM/TPN leader Kelly Kwalik, resulted in a massive militarisation of the region. With hostages from Britain, Germany, The Netherlands and Indonesia, and mediation by the International Committee of the Red Cross, this action brought prominent

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47 NGOs and churches that are critical of Indonesia also have this problem. They are tempted with bribes and they are infiltrated by paid pro-Indonesian agents who seek to open splits within effective organisational critics of Jakarta.

48 In recent years there has been a growing preoccupation with the identification of members/elements of this network. On 12 June 2006, a special delegation of members of the Commission 1 for Political, Security and Foreign Affairs of Indonesia’s Parliament arrived in Australia with a diagram illustrating the ‘Papuan Pro-Separatist Network in Australia’ (Jaringan Pro-Separatist Papua di Australia). This diagram identified specific individuals and organisations by name and the details of these individuals and groups were published widely in the mainstream media in Indonesia in early April 2006 (in Detik.com, Media Indonesia, Tempo and Republik). The list was prepared by a group of senior Indonesian MPs with input from BIN (Badan Inteldijen Negara), the country’s intelligence agency (AAP 2006). There has been limited interest in this issue in the past among academics (May 1991) but in recent years there has been an efflorescence of interest. See also: King (2004:180–9) for a rich account of the many strands and dimensions of this network; McGibbon (2006b:90–4); Heidübchel (2007:57–111) for a broad analysis of the contemporary actors and interests at stake in the conflict; and Singh (2008:211–21) for a tabulated list of ‘West Irian Emigré Organisations Supporting Papuan Independence’. 
international attention to the plight of Papuans in their homeland. After four long months of negotiations and demands by Kwalik, however, which included an independent West Papua, resolution came through a military operation personally overseen by General Prabowo Subianto, then head of Kopassus (the Indonesian Special Forces). This final engagement resulted in the deaths of several of the Indonesian hostages, but no foreigners. Numerous similar hostage takings through the 1980s and 1990s, such as one in October 1984 when 58 non-Papuans were taken hostage at a logging camp (Giay 2001a:138), attracted little international publicity, as no Westerners were involved.

In 2002, the OPM again attracted significant international publicity for its alleged role in a bloody attack involving foreigners in the PT Freeport Indonesia Contract of Work area. This incident led to an investigation by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the ambush, which left three teachers—two US citizens and an Indonesian—dead. A preliminary investigation by the respected Papuan provincial police commander, General Made Pastika (who later ran the 2002 Bali bombing investigation), suggested military involvement in the killings, but ultimately only OPM members were convicted of the murders (Hernawan 2005:79). The OPM leaders we interviewed all alleged the military killed the schoolteachers (see also Kirksey and Harsono 2008). The murders could have been a response by the military to attempts by the US Freeport mine at the time to wean them off the company’s largesse (Ballard and Banks 2007:22). When there was another attempt to do that in July 2009, there were a further series of perhaps six shooting incidents near the mine in which one Australian mine engineer and two Indonesians were killed and many others were wounded. Again, OPM and the Indonesian military accused each other of the attacks. Attacks continued, however, after seven ‘OPM suspects’ were arrested, with three wounded in one incident on 20 October 2009 (Tempo, 20 October 2009). Ambushes in which Freeport employees were shot continued into January 2010, weeks after OPM leader, Kelly Kwalik, who had been blamed, was shot and killed by the security forces (Jakarta Post, 26 January 2010).

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49 PT Freeport Indonesia (henceforth Freeport) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc., a publicly listed US company.
50 Despite Pastika’s honest and professional reputation, the formal separation of the police and military in the early years of reformasi created a great deal of tension between these two branches of the security forces. There were several serious fire-fights between police and military in Papua in this period, some resulting in deaths, as the two security services tussled over control of extortion and other rackets. Pastika was reassigned to investigate the Bali bombing before he completed his investigation on the shootings in Timika and the final police report did not implicate the Indonesian military in the attack.
Another important OPM strategy has been to draw attention to the brutality of the Indonesian security forces by raising the profile of Papuans seeking sanctuary in Papua New Guinea\textsuperscript{51} and Australia.\textsuperscript{52}

What the OPM does not have is any sense of a military strategy that could lead it to win or mobilise violence that could force Jakarta to the negotiating table. The same low-level guerrilla-war strategy has been deployed for almost five decades with only minor military accomplishments of killing or capturing handfuls of Indonesian soldiers.\textsuperscript{53} There is a naive hope of Indonesia making similar mistakes to those it made in East Timor, handing victory to the OPM, but Indonesia has been careful to avoid the East Timor mistake of massacres of civilians in front of television cameras. It is also unlikely another President Habibie will come along who will grant Papua a UN-supervised referendum on independence.

**Freeport**

Papua became even more important to Indonesia when gold and copper production began at the Freeport mine, owned by the Louisiana Company Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold, in 1972. In 1995, Rio Tinto became a partner in Freeport’s further expansion (Leith 2003:76). Freeport has been the biggest taxpayer in Indonesia for many years and probably will be for a few more decades to come. Since they began to exploit their Grasberg deposit in the early 1990s, they have been mining the richest single body of ore in the world. During the 1990s and through the current decade, the mine accounted for more than half the gross domestic product (GDP) of Papua (Hernawan 2005:53) and 2.4 per cent for all Indonesia in 2005 (Freeport Indonesia 2006:21). Counting indirect jobs, the company estimated that the mine added 283 000 jobs to the national economy in 2006 (Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc. 2006:6). With time, the mine has provoked a profound escalation of momentum for

\textsuperscript{51} West Papuans sought sanctuary in Papua New Guinea en masse in 1969 after the Act of Free Choice, in 1984–85 after an unsuccessful Papuan coup (see Smith 1991:170–228) and again in the wake of the reprisals after the Abepura incident of 7 December 2000 (see HRW 2001c).

\textsuperscript{52} In January 2006, 43 Papuan refugees arrived in Australia and all were eventually granted asylum (see Nichols 2006). This is not to suggest that Papuans do not have legitimate reasons for seeking asylum. In late March 2006, a second group of Papuan students attempted to reach Australia by boat, fearing reprisals by the security forces in Papua after student demonstrations against Freeport (discussed later) in Abepura on 16 March 2006 got out of hand. Several members of Brimob, Indonesia’s paramilitary police, were killed in the incident (see PGGP 2006). An Indonesian navy vessel intercepted this second boat of asylum-seekers en route to Australia. Navy personnel are said to have shot at the boat and its occupants before sinking the vessel and leaving the Papuans onboard to drown (many of the highlands students on board could not swim). This story was recounted to one of our informants in great detail by two survivors of the incident.

\textsuperscript{53} The most successful capture was of seven Indonesian officials, including some high-ranking army officers, in May 1978, the prize being Colonel Ismail, Commander of the Military Resort Command (Komando Resimen, Korem) for Abepura (see Samsudin 1995).
conflict, most recently in 2003 when the central government sought to separate
the wealth of the mine from the Province of Papua by creating a new Central
Papua Province centred on Timika, the town Freeport created.³⁴

As with the comparably vast mine in Bougainville (see Peacebuilding Compared,
Working Paper 6), tailings from the Freeport mine had a massive impact on
the environment and on livelihoods, destroying sago, agriculture and fishing.
The Contract of Work Freeport signed with the new Suharto regime in 1967
guaranteed Freeport a right to take over land and resettle the indigenous
population without any obligation to pay compensation or consult with
indigenous inhabitants of the mine site (Soares 2004:121).³⁵ The terms of the
Freeport agreement were therefore worse than the Bougainville agreement.
Adérito Soares showed that the Freeport contract was about showing the New
Order was ‘open for business’ and strengthening its political access within the
United States. This hope was realised with the appointment to the Freeport-
McMoRan board of former US ambassadors to Indonesia, a former secretary of
state in Henry Kissinger and a former director of the CIA (Ballard and Banks
2007:16). Ex-CIA and US military officers have headed company security.

The Amungme people consider the massive open-pit mine that was once a
mountain
to be their ancestral grandmother, Tu Ni Me Ni…Freeport has decapitated
Tu Ni Me Ni’s head, is digging out her stomach and dumping her
intestines in the rivers, a process that pollutes her life giving milk. To
the Amungme, Freeport’s mining activities are killing their mother…on
which they depend for sustenance—literally and spiritually. (MacLeod
2007:29)³⁶

Indigenous people, angry about exclusion from their land or the unwillingness of
Freeport to share their vehicles and other facilities with them in return for locals
sharing the land with them, began attacks. Working with OPM, they attacked
powerlines and oil tanks and cut the pipeline carrying copper concentrate to
the port (Elmslie 2002:42). This invoked retaliation from the military; many died
from air raids and mortar attacks on villages (Ballard 2001:25). In June 1977, a
foreign pilot witnessed villages near Timika being strafed by Indonesian planes.

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³⁴ The division of Papua into three provinces was first mooted in 1982 and revisited again by the Governor
of Papua, Rear Admiral (ret.) Freddy Numberi, a Papuan from Serui, in a letter to the Indonesian Ministry of
Home Affairs in March 1999 (see Wanggai 2005). The division was formally recognised on 4 October with the
passing of Law 45/1999 by the Indonesian Parliament (UU45/1999) but was almost immediately quashed by
incoming President Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid’s successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, in her first decree of
2003 (Inpres 1/2003) reinstated the division.
³⁵ The Indonesian Government passed its first Investment Law with provisions for direct foreign investment
in 1967 (UU1/1967). Freeport was the first foreign investor of Suharto’s New Order government.
³⁶ See also Ballard (2002b:18).
In Papua, as in Bougainville, military and the police mobile brigade (Brimob) brutality fuelled support for independence. The difference between the two was the level of retaliatory slaughter that could be inflicted by the superior capabilities of the Indonesian, compared with the PNG, military. This meant that the OPM, unlike the Bougainville Revolutionary Army, concluded that it should stay its hand on its undoubted capability to shut down the mine, because the OPM was unwilling to inflict again this kind of price on its families and villages. On 14 September 2008, however, mortar rounds exploded at the mine and near Timika airport, without causing injury or much damage.

Freeport guaranteed loans of US$673 million to Suharto cronies between 1991 and 1997 to purchase Freeport shares and other mine assets associated with agreed profit levels that Freeport also guaranteed. March 2002 saw Freeport declare to the markets one large loan default that required repayment by the company of US$253.4 million (ICG 2002a:18). In 1996, indigenous group LEMASA filed a US$6 billion claim against Freeport in the courts of its home state, Louisiana (Soares 2004:139), alleging seizure of sacred land, pollution and conspiring with the military to commit human rights abuses. While it failed legally, the leader of the suit, Thom Beanal, benefited from appointment to the board of Freeport-McMoRan’s subsidiary PT Freeport Indonesia. A second suit led by Josepha Alomang also failed. Another response in 2001 was a Land Rights Trust Fund used in part to purchase a tiny shareholding in the mine in trust for customary landowners; Freeport voluntarily contributed $500 000 a year to the fund backdated to 1996, increased to $1 million a year from 2005. Freeport has sought to silence critics by spending other monies to support Papuans—for example, through scholarships to attend high school and university in Indonesia (BP also funds university scholarships), vocational training, hospitals, anti-malaria programs and roads. This has not been particularly successful. Critics say many of these investments benefit the mine and its migrant workforce more than Papuans, yet Business Week was apparently impressed enough to crown Freeport as America’s most philanthropic company (Ballard and Banks 2007:22).

JB: Hasn’t Freeport become more generous and sharing than they were 10 years ago [referring to the ‘One Per Cent Trust Fund’—1 per cent of profits for community development]?

Two OPM commanders (in unison): They just give 1 per cent. Their money is bloody. [They then went on to argue that most of the money went into the pockets of the captive Papuans who managed their funds for them.] These people go on trips abroad with the money, [and] hire staff.

Another indigenous leader said: ‘1 per cent of what? We don’t know what the numbers are on which they base the 1 per cent.’ After we cited some data on
disbursements to benefit Papua, he sneered: ‘They control the gold and they control the data. They are rich in gold and rich in data.’ At the beginning of the interview, he said, shaking our Human Research Ethics information sheet: ‘People who come with pieces of paper are people who like lies, like Freeport have pieces of paper for their story.’

Ballard and Banks (2007:21) argued that the ‘One Per Cent Trust Fund’ initiative was effectively hijacked by the security forces,

which insisted that the fund be disbursed among all of the neighbouring ethnic groups, the so-called ‘seven suku [tribes]’. By putting forward their own clients as leaders of these groups, individual security units were able to siphon off the lion’s share of the benefits earmarked for the indigenous communities.

Subsequent narrowing of the direct beneficiaries of the fund from seven tribes to the two whose lands suffered most of the impact of the mine created intertribal resentment and worsened other horizontal tensions that were already present. The five excluded tribes are overwhelmingly immigrants into the land of the Amungme and Kamoro, who arrived in search of Freeport-related employment, though it is more complex than that, with some tribes claiming enclaves within Amungme lands ceded in settlements of tribal wars of centuries past.

Objectively, the almost US$200 million that Freeport claims to have contributed over four decades to the development of the Amungme and Kamoro and other indigenous people up to the end of 2005, including the $1 million a year continuing into the trust fund, does not seem a big number compared with more than US$7 billion the company claims to have contributed to Indonesia’s GDP in 2005 alone (Freeport Indonesia 2006:21). Freeport seems to spend more on its US$15 million-a-year internal security department (‘Freeport’s savage dogs’, as locals commonly dub them) (Ballard 2001:29) to protect it from Papuans and more in payments to the military and police in the past to do so. Military payments of $7.5 million were declared in 2004 (Ballard and Banks 2007:23). We were also told of a variety of additional off-the-books Freeport contributions to the military. Global Witness (2005) reports payments to individual officers, such as a total of US$247 705 between May 2001 and March 2003 to the provincial military commander. The International Crisis Group (ICG 2002a:19) credibly suspected that peaceful protests in 1996 against Freeport were hijacked by the military and turned into riots with heavy losses to property and lives. A push

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57 Ethics Committee’s note: indigenous people who struggle to read in their own language can see these pieces of paper as potentially some sort of trick by white lawyers to disadvantage them if some future conflict arises between them and the university. They are not completely wrong.
to extort US$100 million from Freeport for a bigger garrison then followed. The company negotiated this down to $35 million and subsequently to $11 million annually (ICG 2002a:19; Leith 2003:241; Perlez and Bonner 2005).

Like the Timika elder who thinks Freeport controls the gold and the data, Freeport’s occupational health and safety data could be read as too good to be true: no fatalities and a lost-time incident rate less than one-twentieth of that for mining inside the United States in 2005 (Freeport-McMoRan 2006:51)! On Freeport’s cavalier reputation in the global mining industry for ‘getting the rocks in the box’ to the neglect of safety, the environment, production efficiency and other values, see Ballard and Banks (2007:13, 19). Flying over the environmental devastation caused by Freeport presents an awesome sight. Riverine tailings disposal has been occurring at the rate of 200 000 tonnes (Leith 2003:166–75) or 300 000 tonnes a day (Sumule 2005:111), wiping out vast tracts of rainforest. This is a level of tailings approximately at the combined level of the closed mines in Bougainville and Ok Tedi in Papua New Guinea. Overburden is removed at the rate of 750 000 tonnes a day, with one-third processed as tailings and the remainder dumped in valleys and lakes (Leith 2003:171). Freeport became the first corporation (in 1995) to have the Overseas Private Investment Corporation—a US government agency that insures political risk—suspend its insurance because of environmental or human rights concerns, perhaps a reason why it engaged in unusual forms of spying on its environmental critics (Fernandes 2006:90–1). In September 2008, Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund sold its £500 million stake in Rio Tinto. The fund claimed that Rio, as a joint partner in Freeport’s Grasberg operation, had failed to demonstrably improve environmental and other practices at the Grasberg operation (Robertson 2008).

The mine has created not only new inequalities between ethnic groups that do and do not receive largesse from the mine, but a new kind of class structure between those who have jobs and those who do not and between those who have supervisory positions (overwhelmingly migrants) and those who do not. Freeport’s publicity said it pledged in 1996 to double the number of Papuan employees and then in 2001 to double it again—both impressive targets that were exceeded. After such dramatic improvement, however, in 2006, fewer than 27 per cent of 9000 direct employees were Papuan (Freeport-McMoRan 2006:5) and the percentage for the larger numbers of ‘indirect’ employees seemed worse. These numbers also compare unfavourably with BP’s target of an 80 per cent Papuan workforce by 2026 (ICG 2002a:25).

**Migration**

The other factor that escalated resentment after 1969 was accelerating immigration from more westerly parts of Indonesia. By 1999, transmigrants funded by the
state to move to Papua probably reached 300,000 individuals (Mampioper 2008), although some reported figures were much higher than this. The number of ‘spontaneous’ migrants was higher. The Suharto government had set a target of 1.7 million transmigrants—a plan to make Papuans a minority in their own land (Bertrand 2004:152). Transmigration settlements were targeted at strategic sites such as the area around PT Freeport’s Contract of Work and along the PNG border. Transmigration was abolished as a policy after the fall of Suharto in 1998, but spontaneous migration continued to accelerate. At the time of writing, the literature reported a range of figures, but it seemed Papua might not be far from the tipping point of Papuans becoming a minority. Indeed it is not impossible that it has already passed this point, as some allege Jakarta has a propensity in Papua for counting permanent migrants as temporary visitors. Almost a decade ago, the 2000 national census figures suggested indigenous Papuans were 68 per cent of the population, but these figures had their problems. Tebay (2006:16) quotes local government figures for 2002 suggesting a figure of 52 per cent, but Elmslie (2007) reports 59 per cent for 2005 on the basis of Indonesian Statistics Office figures. What is clear from official data and local accounts is that migrants are now in the majority in all of the major towns across Papua. The ratio of Papuans to migrants continues to fall not only because of in-migration but because of high infant mortality, AIDS and other health problems, poor nutrition and related human security issues that afflict indigenous Papuans much more than migrants.

Many migrants have arrived in recent years because they have skills in oil-palm production. By far most of the better-paid waged employment—whether it is working in plantations, banks, airlines or mining, as drivers or even as shop assistants—is filled through immigrant networking. The civil service is an exception, where by 2002 the governor claimed 40 per cent of the workforce was Papuan (ICG 2002a:8), though this proportion still seemed lower than in 1961 under the Dutch (see Note 23). ‘There are no Papuan pilots. There are no Papuan doctors’ because, according to this NGO leader in Wamena, Indonesia thinks if Papuans are dependent on them for doctors, independence will be less attractive and more difficult for Papua. When it comes to the agricultural

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58 Tebay (2006:16) cites an article in the Indonesian daily newspaper Kompas from 4 November 2002, which gives a figure stating that 546,693 transmigrants were moved to Papua in the period 1964–99.  
59 Significant problems with coding of ethnicity are apparent in the 2000 Indonesian Census, which make it difficult to determine with any accuracy the ratio of indigenous to non-indigenous people in Papua. Similarly, there is a good deal of anecdotal evidence to suggest underreporting of migrant populations (as noted in the text), as well as indigenous populations living in more remote villages of Papua not visited by census takers.  
60 One reason why is that immunisation of children occurs at a 50 per cent higher rate in Indonesia as a whole compared with Papua (Tebay 2006:21). Papuan infant mortality is three times the national average.  
61 An example of this is the displacement of thousands of Papuans in more remote regions of the territory who flee their villages and gardens as a result of sporadic or continuing military operations. In late 2004, more than 5000 villagers were believed to be living ‘rough’ in Puncak Jaya District as a result of a military operation in the region (see Appeal 2004).
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economy, migrant networking secures the best spots at markets for migrants; indigenous women can be found sitting on the hard unshaded ground outside the official markets trying to sell their produce. Migrant fishing technology is more efficient than indigenous fishing, meaning that Papuans often cannot compete with migrants in the market. The ethnic divide has become an ever-widening class divide. Its resentments are inflamed by widespread Indonesian racism towards Papuans, which blames them for being ‘primitive’, ‘stupid’, ‘lazy’ and worse (see Giay 2002; Berotabui 2007). As one European who lived in Papua for 45 years put it:

From the beginning when the Indonesians arrived, they treated the Papuans as the enemy; they don’t love Papuan people; they have no appreciation of their culture and they do not try. There are some good ones among the Indonesians who do try and they do care, but most of the immigrants who come here get the money here to build a good home, perhaps back in Java, then leave…The Indonesians say to the Papuans, you have to love us, but they never learn the languages of the villages. They don’t love Papuans, so why would they expect Papuans to love them?

The following quote from an interview with one Papuan leader indicates they have concerns about immigration destroying the holistic philosophy of land and environment in a similar way to logging and oil-palm development:

The transmigrants kill everything to make a rice paddy. They make a trap to catch all animals so they will not eat the rice. We depend on that animal. We are semi-nomads. Part of the way we get our food is hunting and gathering. Transmigrant agriculture kills all the deer, the cassowary and the kangaroos that we used to hunt.62 It was only in the late 1980s that the largest land clearing for rice got under way.

This old Papuan was well educated by the Dutch and had worked as a civil servant settling transmigrants. He was very ill when we interviewed him and died some days later, with pain in his heart for the future of his people. We dedicate this little piece of our text to telling his sad story. Here are some other snippets of the old man’s wisdom:

[On human rights as the strategic struggle:] Papuans could never fight the Indonesian Army; [they have] so few weapons and no international support. Human rights are our best weapon. With them we get international support and the military knows it. That’s why human rights activists are attacked as separatists.

62 Deer were introduced to Papua during the Dutch colonial period.
[On the power structure in Papua:] There is a pyramid of a great mass of uneducated and manipulable Papuans at the bottom. There are a few Papuans at the top who are used by Indonesia. In the middle are the middle class of migrants who run everything.

[On Papuan generosity in sharing their land even with Freeport:] We have no skills in bargaining about land rights. In our custom, land is not sold...[We agree to let them use it, then they put a fence up to keep us out. Our people are puzzled by Freeport guards, security to keep Papuans out...[Puzzled by the lack of interest of these security guards in providing security for Papuans]. Companies have a kind of mafia to protect the company and not to protect the people.

The genocide argument

Indonesian nationalists believed that Papua was integral to the revolution and the nation from its inception. This contrasted with East Timor, which became integral to the national consciousness from 1975 when it was annexed by Indonesia. Until the early 1960s, Indonesian efforts to integrate West New Guinea into the republic were depicted as the liberation of Papuans from Dutch colonialism. After Papuan elites spurned this narrative, Indonesian ‘benevolence’ was reformulated as a colonial project to uplift the primitive peoples of the territory into civilisation. Some Papuan intellectuals came to see this as cultural genocide.63 It had some totalising features in the 1960s and 1970s, such as banning Papuans from performing their traditional dances and requiring them to learn more refined Javanese dances instead! In 1971, Indonesia inaugurated ‘Operation Penis-Gourd’ to persuade highland men to abandon their penis sheaths as primitive and banning them from the streets of Wamena. Highland women disapproved and made ingenious use of government-distributed underwear as bags and headwear (Howard et al. 2002:6; see also Hastings 1982:159). When a highlander ginger group emerged after the congresses of 2000 to persuade the Papuan leadership to take a more radical line, they called themselves the Penis Gourd People’s Assembly.

The more realist response to Papuan rejection of Indonesian liberation was, however, that of General Ali Moertopo in 1969, as quoted by prominent nationalist leader Thom Beanal: ‘I came here not for you, but for your land’ (cited in Wing and King 2005:46). Beanal in the same interview interprets the

63 It could be argued that the (broad) pattern of policy in Papua was consistent with the definition of ‘cultural genocide’ in the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (26 August 1994). The final version of this declaration, adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2007, did not contain specific reference to ‘cultural genocide’ although provisions for the protection of indigenous cultures remained (see Article 8).
spread of HIV/AIDS in a genocide framework. We heard this in dozens of our interviews. Incidents of authorities being advised of the arrival of AIDS-infected fishermen or prostitutes were ignored in a most cavalier fashion, it was alleged. Beanal says, ‘I believe they allowed the virus to spread deliberately’ (quoted in Wing and King 2005:48). As chairman, Beanal was a signatory of the Manokwari Declaration of Dewan Adat Papua (Papuan Customary Council) of 4 February 2005. Clause 7 calls for a UN investigation of genocide in Papua: ‘We declare that there is a strong indication of a process of ethnic cleansing (genocide) in Papua Land since the integration in 1969.’ Our repeated requests for evidence of Indonesian intent to spread AIDS always drew a blank. Respondents listened when we pondered if it might discredit their cause internationally to allege Indonesian genocide on the spread of AIDS without evidence of intent.

The rape of local women by the military and police has been a serious problem (Coomaraswamy 1999). Rape victims are sometimes threatened with death, as are members of their family and witnesses if they lodge a complaint about the rape (HRW 2007b:58–63). This leaves women in terror of walking to their gardens. The much more widespread problem and concern among women is, however, unwanted pregnancies fathered by Indonesian soldiers in circumstances that lie between rape and consent. ‘Many women are afraid of the man with the gun.’ When propositioned by a soldier, who might be a good man who is genuinely asking for consent, the woman might not be sure whether she has a choice. At military posts in villages, there is a lot of turnover as new rotations arrive from Indonesia. A culture has developed of departing soldiers advising arriving soldiers of the women in the village who are easy targets for sex. Once these women learn they have been so identified, they feel it is even more dangerous for them to say no. One of the main reasons for women being targeted in this way in the first place is that they are women who are ‘not strong’, meaning they are more frightened than other women of the soldiers and their guns.

In many Papuan communities therefore sex under the domination of the gun is seen as a bigger problem than rape; trauma from a single incident of rape, horrific as it is, is not as bad as the trauma of AIDS acquired by repeated fearful consent with soldiers who also frequent brothels with infected sex workers. When children are born of these liaisons, soldiers almost never take responsibility for the children, or do so only until their rotation ends. When the children are born with straight hair, they can be stigmatised and cut off from rights to land that accrue to legitimate children. Mothers might be stigmatised in their village by their own community and subjected to the ‘settler gaze’ of Indonesian society in regional towns (see Butt and Munro 2007). Children are condemned to poverty or a footloose life uncoupled from traditional inheritance and authority, ritually and spiritually disenfranchised. They were reported in our interviews to live psychologically unhappy lives. Adults are polite with
straight-haired children, but children at school can be less sensitive and ask them who their father is, or bully them. This is one of the most profound senses that military occupation is destructive of culture and social structure. Mothers in remote areas have therefore sometimes killed their children when they are born with straight hair (cf. Butt 2007:135–6). This is incidentally a case study of why it is imperative for any occupying military—especially peacekeepers who lean so heavily on legitimacy—to enforce a ban on all sexual liaisons with locals.

The first reference to the suggestion that Indonesian policy in Papua was ‘intended genocide’ appeared in an aerogram from US President Richard Nixon’s Ambassador in Jakarta, Frank Galbraith, on 9 July 1969, which stated that ‘[m]ilitary repression has stimulated fears and rumours of intended genocide among the Irianese’. Papuans then picked up on the internationally resonant discourse of genocide.

Poisoning of food and alcohol sold in locales where the consumers were all Papuan was revealed in our 2007 interviews to be widely seen as the current genocidal weapon of choice, though in the course of 2008, as with the SMS terror campaign discussed earlier, we were told suspicious poisonings seemed to have ceased. One OPM informant claimed that 500 people had been killed this way across Papua in one month in 2007. There were also allegations of Papuans living in Java being poisoned. One might be tempted to dismiss this as OPM propaganda were it not that international NGOs, missionaries and police based in Jayapura talked with workers from hospitals about 53 alcohol-poisoning deaths reported in the seven months of 2007 before our arrival for our first fieldwork (a huge number for a small city where probably far fewer than 100 000 people ever consumed alcohol). The police were convinced that these victims had been intentionally poisoned and said so publicly. The military leadership contradicted the police, saying there was no evidence for this, amid suggestions that it was military personnel who had sold the poisoned alcohol. In one village visited for interviews with a retired OPM fighter of the 1960s, old men and young women spoke of eight young muscular men with short hair in civilian

64 This aerogram was included in a dossier of secret documents posted on the web site of the National Security Archive (NSA), a US NGO, in July 2004 (see Simpson 2004). When this NSA report was released, it was widely assumed (and reported) by pro-Papua activists that this report was an official government document and that it signified a change in US Government policy regarding Papua and an official recognition of US complicity in securing an outcome favourable to Indonesia in the Act of Free Choice. Such disinformation is common in Papua and helps to fuel expectation among pro-independence Papuans.

65 On 18 October 2007, Sabar Olif Iwanggin, an employee of the Papuan human rights group Elsham, was arrested in Jayapura by members of the elite Detachment88 Indonesia anti-terror squad and taken to Jakarta for questioning. After almost two months in custody, he was formally charged on 13 December with insulting the President of Indonesia after receiving and forwarding a derogatory SMS (text message) even though the message was widely circulated in Papua (and sparked by reports of Papuans living in Java being poisoned) (see INFID 2008 for a verbatim statement of the text message). Iwanggin’s case was brought to trial and the charges against him dismissed on 21 January 2008 after he had spent more than three months in detention.
clothes being seen by a villager injecting fruit such as pawpaws and bananas with a syringe. The village elders were called and could see marks on the fruit consistent with this. They fed the fruit to a dog that then died.

Brundige et al. (2004) document a history of poisonings going back to the early years of the conflict. One of the few documented quasi-traditional forms of reconciliation with the military involved the Indonesian Government giving a batch of pigs from Bali as a ‘peace offering’ to the Ekari people after a prolonged counterinsurgency among them in 1972 (see Hyndman 1987). Unfortunately, doctors traced the pigs as the source of an epidemic of cysticercosis that infected 25 per cent of the Ekari population, becoming one of the major causes of mortality among them, before spreading far and wide to other parts of Papua, killing unknown numbers of Papuans. Of course, proof of infection and the state as the source of the infection does not prove state intent to infect. The Brundige et al. (2004:75) team of Yale Law School students uses cases like this—cases of all the men in a village being rounded up and executed (no doubt about intent there!), codenames for military sweeps among civilian populations such as ‘Annihilation’, napalm and chemical weapons used against villages suspected of being OPM strongholds, forced labour (particularly for military harvesting of rare Merbau logs among the Asmat people) and the like—to make a case that ‘[s]uch acts, taken as a whole, appear to constitute the imposition of conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of the West Papuans’ and ‘constitute crimes against humanity under international law’.

The difficult question, as the authors concede, is whether there is mens rea of genocide. We have not seen evidence of it. While we see something less systematic than ‘imposition of conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of the West Papuans’, we do think there have always been and still are some military officers and members of the Jakarta elite who see it as a desirable political objective to make Papuans a minority in their own land by deploying a variety of means (particularly migration) and to exterminate OPM fighters and even their families. We certainly suspect this is a minority view today and perhaps it was throughout Suharto’s reign as well. We do not know. We do know the current President of Indonesia is by no means a genocidal man; indeed, we see him as a decent man and a peacebuilder who is yet to find the strength to stand up to certain homicidal elements within his security forces. He has quietly eased out some of the most brutal and anti-autonomy elements in the military who seized control of the Papua debate under his predecessor (McGibbon 2006b:54–7).

Most OPM (and many Papuans) believe they are being ethnically cleansed. For this reason, many OPM subscribe to a form of ethnic cleansing as rectification. They say part of the independence package should be that all migrants must return to where they came from. When we asked, ‘Is that not ethnic cleansing?’,
and is that not a problem with how the international community would see their cause, they said, ‘No, we would ask them politely to leave. We would not burn and take their things or kill them.’ What if they refused, we asked? What if they set up their own militias to defend their homes with guns? Well, yes, there would have to be force then. But look at East Timor, some said, the Indonesians were not forced to leave; they wanted to leave when the referendum vote for independence succeeded. In fact, some did stay, we pointed out, and burning and killing everything in their path was not a great way of leaving! Much more dialogue is needed to help Papuan activists see they are not the only ones living in fear. The Alliance for Democracy Papua showed us the results of a study they had completed of 160 Muslim women in Jayapura. They were most afraid of Papuans even though in Papua there had not been the systematic and violent attacks on settlers that the Aceh conflict saw repeatedly. The fear of these Muslim women was that one day migrants like them would be killed by Papuans seeking independence. While most indigenous leaders in Papua, and many who have fled Indonesia, support the right of migrants to continue living in an independent Papua, a large proportion of OPM supporters within Papua seem not to.

The Chinese question

And what about the Chinese who had been trading with Papuans for centuries, we asked OPM leaders? Not much thought had been given to them and there were very different views about them, with a clear majority thinking they should be able to stay. ‘The Chinese don’t try to make us live like Chinamen. The Indonesians do try to make us live like Javanese, so there is no need to send the Chinese back. The Chinese are not our enemy,’ said a highlands student leader. Chinese businessmen appear to have little interest in shaping the cultural or political milieu in Papua; the long history of anti-Chinese sentiment and discrimination elsewhere in Indonesia (especially on Java) is not yet apparent in Papua. The central importance of Chinese businesses to the local economy, however, particularly since World War II when the Dutch accelerated investment in the territory, makes them a key stakeholder group in Papua. Chinese entrepreneurship in Papua, as elsewhere in Indonesia and the region, appears to be opportunistic in its links to the military and the shadow economy. This pragmatic approach to commerce has led to Chinese businesses in Papua controlling much of the import and export trade and investment in

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66 The terrible exception was Wamena in October 2000 when Brimob and Kostrad (elite infantry) fired on and killed demonstrators from migrants’ homes. The Dani demonstrators later destroyed many of the migrant homes and killed a number of migrants (perhaps two dozen). Dani elders later described the police action of shooting on them from the homes as a deliberate provocation aimed at inducing a clash with settlers (HRW 2001c:13). If so, it worked. It was the first and last major incident of slaughter of migrants by Papuans and the decisive turning point that ended the Papuan spring of 1999–2000.
the province(s). Unlike Freeport, among firms such as Bintang Mas CV and other family owned Chinese businesses in the province, there is little public accountability or transparency, nor is there among their national counterparts, such as PT Djajanti Group. Chinese business interests have been instrumental in the transformation of Papua’s towns into centres of commerce and consumption with tremendous social, cultural, political and economic implications. Direct foreign investment from China is also of growing significance in Papua, with large hotel chains such as Swiss-Bel (based in Hong Kong, not Switzerland!) now established in the provincial capitals of Manokwari and Jayapura. The importance of Chinese ‘soft power’ in the region is only now coming to the attention of scholars and governments in Indonesia and elsewhere (see D’Arcy et al. 2007; Wesley-Smith 2007). How Papuans will come to understand the transformations brought by such commercial interests over time and the role and responsibilities these businesses define for themselves remain unclear.

We will see in the first two volumes of Peacebuilding Compared a sad pattern across our cases—from Solomon Islands and Bougainville to Timor and across Indonesia from Kalimantan and Jakarta to Aceh, indeed in Java (particularly Jakarta in 1998)—in which the Chinese have been attacked, raped and looted as targets of resentment in conflicts that have not been fundamentally or centrally about them, and that this has happened repeatedly across the centuries. Papua is something of an exception. To date, in the past half-century of conflict in Papua, we have seen little evidence of Chinese Indonesians suffering horrific collateral damage.

The fall of Suharto and the ‘Papuan spring’

When President Habibie relaxed some military control on succeeding President Suharto in 1998, demonstrations and flag raisings accompanied by singing of the Papuan anthem were organised in all the big towns of Papua, demanding a referendum on independence. Habibie sent advisors to the province, who reported back to him that most Papuans would support staying with Indonesia as long as their province was renamed from Irian Jaya to Papua and was granted some kind of autonomy from Jakarta. On 26 February 1999, Habibie was shocked when Thom Beanal, team leader of a group of 100 Papuan leaders (Team 100) who met with him, read a declaration that demanded independence. Habibie told them to think again. Dialogue with his government ended that day. A tragic consensus also crystallised among the Jakarta security and intelligence elite (led by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the National Intelligence Agency) as a result of the failed dialogue with Habibie, with consequences that persist to this
First, the motives of all Papuans, regardless of their past or their standing within Indonesian society or government, were to be considered with suspicion (see Cookson 2008:45–54). Second, the pursuit of a policy to divide the province of Papua would help fragment the movement for Papuan independence. The fact that the division of the province was promoted in the early 1980s as a strategy to enhance development (Wanggai 2005) helped the Habibie government downplay the political imperative for the division. On 4 October 1999, Law 45 (UU45/1999) was passed by the Indonesian legislature, dividing the (then) province of Irian Jaya into three separate provinces. Protest and preparation for armed struggle accelerated in Papua. Events were pulled back from the brink by the inauguration of Abdurrahman Wahid on 1 November 1999. He responded to the protests by postponing indefinitely the planned partition of the province; he allowed morning star flag raisings as long as the Indonesian flag was raised as well. Some estimated that 800 000 people attended flag raisings across Papua to celebrate the thirty-eighth anniversary of the first raising of the morning star flag on 1 December 1961 (Bertrand 2004:155). President Wahid visited the province on 31 December 1999 and is still admired throughout Papua for the way he conducted himself during this visit. He listened; he attended a Christian service at which he spoke of how ‘Jesus Christ was highly respected by the Muslim religion, and this surprised people and they really appreciated it’ from a man who came to power from his leadership of one of the major Muslim organisations in Indonesia. One leader of the Presidium said

we know you are blind but you are the first from Indonesia to see us Papuans. He also said that Irian was derived from an Arabic word meaning ‘naked’, so he wanted the province to use their name of Papua. He said if you wanted to fight for independence democratically you are free to. (Wamena interview)

67 In June 2007, leaders of the main churches in Papua released a special report in which they asserted that ‘two very secret documents of the Government of Indonesia have influenced and affected the way the Special Autonomy was inconsequently and inconsistently implemented’ (see West Papuan Churches 2007:1; Cookson 2008:44).
68 In 2002, a secret report from the head of the Institute for National Defence of the Republic of Indonesia (Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional Republik Indonesia, Lemhannas) made it clear that this was a key rationale for the division of the three provinces and argued that the division should proceed as stipulated by Law 45 of 1999 (Lemhannas 2002). It is reasonable to assume that this report was in part responsible for Presidential Decree No. 1 of 2003 (Inpres 1/2003), which called for the full implementation of Law 45 of 1999.
69 See <http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/index.html>
70 This was a stark contrast with 1 December 2007, when we were in the highlands with an informant receiving reports of flag raisings around Papua. There were not more than two or three, brutally suppressed, but many families told us that at 5am that day they gathered together as a family to pray for independence, and they said confidently they believed that was happening in homes all over Papua. The struggle for independence seems deeply resilient in countless Papuan hearts.
Less punitive military leaders were also posted in 1999 to take over the security of Papua with a philosophy, as one general put it in his interview, of ‘treating human beings as human beings’. He also said his policy was opposed by most generals in Jakarta. It did not last long.

The Indonesian security establishment and the Jakarta elite more broadly were not behind Wahid on Papuan reconciliation. The elite was still reeling from the vote for independence in East Timor that year. While Wahid’s announced policy was to allow flag raisings, to tell Papuans that Indonesia was now a democracy in which they could give speeches in favour of independence if they wanted to, the military resumed crushing such speeches and flag raisings. The 1999–2000 dawn of freedom of assembly and freedom of speech in Papua was partial and short. The fraught national context of armed conflict in many other parts of Indonesia also affected Papua. For example, an influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing the religious conflict in Ambon arrived at Sorong on 27 July 2000. Papuans turned out to protest their arrival, announcing their fear that they would bring religious conflict with them. The police fired on the protesters, killing five. Some days later, three more were killed in Sorong when the police lowered a morning star flag (Hernawan 2005:77).

Papuan nationalist leaders, acting decisively in the early period of reformasi in Indonesia, established new political leadership and organisational structures through two congresses in 2000 (Alua 2002a, 2002b). In February, every district in Papua was asked to send 10 representatives to a ‘Great Consultation’ (Musyawarah Besar, or Mubes). This meeting was followed by a Second Papuan People’s Congress (the name recognising that the First Papuan People’s Congress was held in 1961 when Papuan leaders declared their independence). At the Second Congress in May–June 2000, a further 10 representatives were added from each district in a process attended by 20 000 people. President Wahid, Freeport and BP supported the Second Congress financially (reportedly on condition that the conference would not call for a referendum on independence). At both events, there was mass participation by thousands of people, watchful that there would not be the kind of sell-out that happened with the Act of Free Choice in 1969. A Papuan Council (Dewan Papua) and a Presidium of the Papuan Council (PDP, or Presidium) were formed. The nationalist movement was galvanised and unified by the congresses under the leadership of Beanal, but most charismatically Theys Eluay, who had organised the flag raisings of 1 December 1999. While some OPM factions continued hit-and-run attacks during this period, the Presidium stood for peaceful negotiations and invited OPM leaders to be delegates. The inclusion of these OPM leaders represented a gradually evolving cease-fire that finally embraced nearly all OPM fighters.71

71 OPM informants told us, sometimes tearfully, of how tired they were of their suffering living in the jungle and how they did not want that life for their children.
In this way, the Presidium effectively took over from the OPM in 2000 as the principal organisational vehicle for Papuan nationalism. This process of consolidation was not negotiated without conflict. One OPM founder we interviewed described Eluay as a hypocrite who had sold out independence. He met Eluay on a number of occasions and urged him to lobby The Netherlands, Australia, Israel and the United States for guns to fight. ‘He said we will get there the peaceful way, not through violence [our OPM fighter smirked at what he believed was Eluay’s naivety]. He said this land is blessed by God. It will become a land of peace and he will stop the blood from being spilt.’ The strategy of the Presidium was for a three-stage negotiation, whereas the mass of Papuans wanted independence immediately:

The first stage would be a commitment to non-violence by all parties, with a third party as a monitor. The second stage would be the upholding of the law and prosecution of human rights abusers. The third stage would be to re-open the discussion about Papua’s incorporation into Indonesia in the 1960s and would bring in the United States and the Netherlands as countries that played a part in the original handover.

(ICG 2002a:5)

The Presidium did not make it to first base. Wamena is the main urban centre in the highlands and a heartland of radical Papuan nationalism. A turning point away from freedom of assembly was violent clashes between Papuan nationalists and the military on 6 October 2000 in which 37 were killed, 89 injured and 13,000 became IDPs (HRW 2001). There was more violence at flag raisings in major towns on the 1 December 2000 anniversary of the ‘declaration of independence’. The military was ready with reinforcements for this day, with 37 navy ships offshore (Elmslie 2002:xviii). On 2 December, five leaders of the Presidium, including Eluay, were arrested and jailed for some months on charges of separatist activities. The police and the military in Papua received instructions, as the Wahid presidency collapsed, to eliminate all separatist activities (Bertrand 2004:158). In January 2001, the more progressive military leadership of the Papuan spring was replaced. Major-General Mahidin Simbolon took over the province. He was a chief architect of the murderous militias of East Timor, regional chief of staff of the military when Dili was burnt to the ground in 1999, a veteran of six tours of duty in East Timor including the invasion of 1975 and a master of oppressive civilian containment (Elmslie 2002:xix).

The turning point away from reconciliation that began with the October 2000 killings, arrests and torture in Wamena ended with the assassination of Eluay by Kopassus on 10 November 2001 and the disappearance of his driver. Seven soldiers were ultimately convicted of the murder and sentenced to prison terms of 12–42 months, amid open national praise of the men by military leaders (Hernawan 2005:79). The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ryamizard
Ryacudu, described the soldiers as heroes for killing a ‘rebels’ (HRW 2007b:65). Theys Eluay was one of the most charismatic and talented leaders Papua had ever had. Today, he is a martyr to Papuans and his grave is a shrine.

In reality, like so many political leaders, Theys Eluay had a flawed past. As a leader who sought to become a big-man above other chiefs, he had a fraught relationship with his own Sentani people. He was one of the 1026 who voted for the Act of Free Choice in 1969. He joined Golkar, Suharto’s military-based party machine, and became a member of the provincial parliament (King 2004:38). Many alleged he had business relationships with the military, including involvement in illegal logging. This enabled the military to spread the rumour that his was not a political assassination but a commercial killing over a conflict between (retired) generals seeking control of logging. They also spread the rumour that OPM rivals killed him, though no-one much believed that one. It was likely it was a political assassination. It was likely Eluay was a tainted man who found his greatest strength of character in his last years. It was likely he was moved by the students who taunted him to be willing to go to jail, like other patriots, for his beliefs. He was perhaps the nationalist leader who the military thought they had a chance of controlling in an era when the military lost control of the Indonesian State. In Theys Eluay’s final years, however, the military totally lost control of him. His assassination was a measure of the fact that the military was regaining some control of the state by mid-2001. During their spring, Papuans saw that the rules of the game were up for grabs and that this anomic situation created an opportunity for transformation. By mid-2001, however, the military in Papua was dictating what the rules were; they were rules the military could play, but no-one else.

In July 2001, Megawati Sukarnoputri became president. Her approach to Papua was very different from Wahid’s. She believed that Wahid had been weak in Papua. Wahid had put at risk the bold accomplishment of her father, President Sukarno, in integrating Irian Jaya into Indonesia. While Wahid sought to temper military crackdowns on freedom of speech in Papua, Megawati encouraged them. While Wahid responded to local aspirations for Papuan unity by resisting partition of the province, Megawati embraced her intelligence advice that this was the way to divide and rule Papua. In no time, there were six game-

72 A similar deceit followed shortly after President Suharto extended his amnesty to PVK/OPM guerrilla fighters at the conclusion of the Act of Free Choice in 1969. Acub Zainal, Papua’s provincial military commander at the time, ordered the assassination of the ex-PVK guerrilla fighter Ferry Awom and instructed his agents to spread a rumour that Awom had fled to Papua New Guinea (see Vlasblom 2004:490).

73 An ironic contribution to the literature in this regard is Ross’s (2002:18) interesting analysis of how natural resource endowments can foster separatism. With justification, Ross praises BP for the socially responsible way (compared with Freeport) it has developed a vast natural gas field off the Papuan coast: ‘This is precisely the kind of project that is likely to produce new grievances and add fuel to the separatist movement. BP has made an admirable effort, however, to anticipate this danger by engaging in widespread community consultations to minimize the costs placed on local peoples; by promoting community-based
playing regents with proposals to constitute new provinces with their town as the capital. These enjoyed varying, but considerable, support from the central government and from local military leaders who equated a new province with a need for a new military base.

**Emergent ideologies after the Papuan spring**

Our interviews reveal four ways of seeing this period of history that we consider in turn in the next few sections of this chapter. The first sees the police-military crackdown that stepped up with the Wamena killings and reached its peak with the imprisonment and ultimate assassination of Eluay in November 2001 as the last hope for a negotiated approach to freedom for Papua. This is the view of most ordinary Papuans and it is the view of almost all Papuans—elite and poor—in the highlands. The major exceptions in the highlands are those who are on the payroll of the military or central state. Even many of them say one thing to their Indonesian masters and another in their village (and to foreign interviewers). The moment of profound hope that was in the hands of Wahid and Eluay dissipated with their demise. The special autonomy that emerged in the same year of their demise (2001) is seen in this majority view as a trick of the Jakarta elite. Prominent critics of the autonomy Papua was given in 2001 believe it has been vacuous so far (Alua 2007). Governor of Papua, Barnabas Suebu, has described the implementation of special autonomy as ‘kacau balau’ (chaos and confusion) (Tebay 2009:8). Including as it does a want of regulations for implementation, kacau balau has a meaning akin to anomie. Many of the benefits of special autonomy are flowing back to Jakarta and into the pockets of corrupt local cronies of the Jakarta elite; they are not flowing to the long-suffering programs to help distribute the benefits of development in sensible ways; and by not allowing the Indonesian military to station troops at the facility, so as to avoid the provocations and human rights abuses carried out by the military at some of Indonesia’s other major extraction sites’ (Ross 2002:18). Since the publication of Ross’s article, this positive relationship between BP and elites in Manokwari has made it more attractive for them to support Jakarta’s moves to separate them and BP’s resource wealth from Papua Province and from Papua’s comparatively resource-poor capital, Jayapura. District political elites also sought—so far unsuccessfully and with considerable conflict—to do that by creating a third Central Papua Province in 2003 that separated the resources around the proposed new capital of that province, Timika. Resource-responsive separatism is a game of Russian dolls that two can play. That is, separatists with an agenda of claiming resources as an indigenous right that should be prised away from the national capital can have them prised away from their provincial capital by the state. Both kinds of separatist move can engender the ‘resource curse’ conflict, as the Papuan case demonstrates.

74 The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES 2003) found that 75 per cent of Papuans ‘were aware of the aspiration for independence’ and two-thirds of this group believed independence meant a separate nation. The West Papua National Student Union conducted a survey at the request of the International Commission of Jurists in Australia in 2001, finding 95 per cent Papuan support for independence. Neither of these surveys included migrant opinion in Papua (see further Maraki Vanuariki Council of Chiefs and Port Vila Council of Chiefs 2007:1).

75 One senior government official in Papua expressed the problem as follows: ‘To get money actually spent you need to bribe people in Jakarta and locally. Thirty–forty per cent of the budget [is] actually spent on programs, 60–70 per cent [is] lost into officials’ pockets.’
people of Papua. Many Papuan leaders we interviewed believed most of the special autonomy money was spent on the security services and on the needs of Freeport and other foreign investors for expenditure on ports, six passenger ships for transporting migrants (Chauvel 2007:34), security and other infrastructure rather than the spending on education and health ordinary Papuans wanted to see.\textsuperscript{76} These are therefore the dominant two views: first, the view of the majority of indigenous Papuans that only a referendum for independence can deliver freedom for Papua; and second, the view of Indonesians who are not ethnic Papuans (and small numbers of Papuans on the Indonesian payroll) that the best future for Papua is the status quo of full integration with Indonesia.

One reason why the situation in Papua is inflammable is that the ‘fight for independence’ and the ‘keep the status quo of integration’ views are overwhelmingly majority views held along an ethnic divide of citizens who see themselves as Papuans and Melanesian versus citizens who see themselves as Indonesians who are not Melanesian. There are, however, also two minority views, which have only elite support, but significant elite support. These are the ‘let’s make special autonomy work’ school and the less clear, more emergent ‘Papua, land of peace’ school, and hybrids of the two among actors with ‘let’s negotiate with Indonesia’ agendas. For example, one hybrid found attractive by one senior OPM diplomat involved ‘autonomy like in Bougainville and New Caledonia’ where there could be a vote for independence after 15 years of Papuans preparing themselves to govern and improving education. We consider these in turn in the next two sections.

‘Let’s make special autonomy work’

On paper, the special autonomy deal that was secured in 2001 was a remarkable victory for Papuans. It was especially remarkable because it was delivered in the face of the demise of the Wahid presidency (that had been its lifeblood), the resurgence of the power of the military (which had been its fervent opponent) and the collapse of the authority of the Presidium as the legitimate broker of peaceful change in Papua with the imprisonment of Theys Eluay and its other leaders. Those who did negotiate the special autonomy deal on the Papuan side were brilliant and principled negotiators, but they were not the legitimate negotiators that the Presidium (and OPM) was at that time. Sadly for the future prospects of peace in Papua, a Presidium was crushed that initially came to the table willing to change its position to support special autonomy. In the face

\textsuperscript{76} There is survey evidence from 323 Papuans suggesting this is rather the way the majority of ordinary Papuans think as well (Sijabat 2006).
of political harassment by the security forces, the Presidium finally opposed special autonomy and returned to hardline support for full independence and sympathy for OPM’s armed struggle.

President Habibie’s cabinet had taken the view that political decentralisation was a central plank of reformasi. District-level governments (kabupaten) were to be sites of greater political power. In addition to passing two general decentralisation laws in 1999, the Indonesian Government in 1999 and 2000 in resolutions of the legislature (MPR) advocated special autonomy laws for Aceh and Irian Jaya (Papua). The last were about decentralisation to provinces, whereas the earlier initiatives bypassed provincial governments to increase the authority and resources of district governments.

The then Governor of Irian Jaya, J. P. Solossa, assembled a team of intellectuals, current and former provincial leaders from the government, NGOs and churches, which drafted a special autonomy law and argued competently for it in Jakarta between April 2001 and the ultimate passage of a watered-down version on 21 November 2001. Included among the major concessions to Papuan aspirations by the legislature were

- a right to express cultural identity with a Papuan flag and anthem
- provincial control over all government affairs except defence, foreign affairs, monetary policy and the Supreme Court
- the Province of Papua to receive 80 per cent of forestry and fisheries revenue and 70 per cent from oil and gas production, falling to 50 per cent after 25 years
- future resource development to be more sensitive to customary land use claims than in the past
- the establishment of a Papuan People’s Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP) to represent indigenous Papuans, comprising one-third community leaders, one-third religious leaders and one-third women
- a requirement that the governor, deputy governor and all regents (bupati) and mayors (walikota) must be indigenous Papuans
- the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission for Papua.

As amazing a list of concessions as this was, the governor’s drafting team struggled for legitimacy. They faced protests when they sought to consult over the draft to the point where in the end very little of the intended consultation with the people of Papua over the content of special autonomy transpired. As one informant said, it was a bad process transacted in a bad political climate that led to a pretty good law. At the heart of the bad process was the decision of the central government to involve only those who were in favour of special autonomy, and to exclude OPM. OPM members responded by saying: ‘Special
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autonomy is none of our business. That’s the business of opportunists’ (OPM interview, 2007, Jayapura). Other OPM informants alleged that in the period when special autonomy was being drafted, some members of the Presidium were bribed, gradually transforming the Presidium into ‘a machine to destroy the struggle’, with it no longer representing the movement for merdeka. Certainly the international diplomatic community—not unreasonably—thought, and mostly still does think, special autonomy was the best possible hope for peace and for the aspirations of the people of Papua. Papuans did not get everything they wanted—there was: no right to a referendum if the provincial government was dissatisfied with the implementation of the law, less oversight of Indonesian military and police activity in Papua than was wanted and needed, less control over immigration to Papua, no Papuan human rights commission (only a branch of Komnas-Ham, the National Human Rights Commission, which was barely operating during our 2007 fieldwork after its director had received more than 100 threatening SMS messages), and an MRP that was stripped of legislative power to become only an advisory body. EU, US and Australian diplomats urged Papuan leaders to grab special autonomy as the best possible deal they could hope to get. Leaders in Wamena told laughingly of the struggles of the German ambassador to get past the military to meet with them in 2001. He then told them that if only they would get behind special autonomy things would improve, and in addition lots of European aid for Papua would also flow—but only if they renounced the armed struggle and supported special autonomy.

A compromise is always hard to sell to freedom fighters even if it makes substantial concessions to their positions, as the special autonomy law did. It is, however, impossible to sell if the fighters believe the behaviour of the enemy on the ground indicates that they have no intention of honouring it. Among the OPM hardliners we interviewed there was no trust in the Indonesian state or its agents in Papua. They, like many Papuans, had noted the provisions in the special autonomy law that permitted a Papuan national anthem to be sung and yet observed that the practice of the security forces was to arrest and beat anyone who sang *Hai Tanahku Papua!*. The special autonomy law also permitted (under certain conditions) the raising of a Papuan flag, yet the security services prevented raising of the morning star flag under any conditions—and on some occasions killed, raped, tortured or imprisoned those who did so. The terms of these provisions in the special autonomy legislation were ambiguous for many Papuans.\(^77\) The law also stipulated that there would be a truth and reconciliation commission to expose the historical circumstances of Papua’s integration into

\(^77\) The specific clause of the Special Autonomy Law (Chapter 2, Article 2, Section 2) stipulates that ‘[t]he Papua Province may have regional symbols as its greatness and grandeur banner and cultural symbol for the greatness of the Papuans’ identity in the form of the regional flag and regional hymn which are not positioned as sovereignty symbols.’ Government Regulation 77 of 2007 (PP77/2007) specifically stipulated the morning star as a separatist symbol to strengthen the legal basis for prosecutions related to flag raisings in Papua and elsewhere in Indonesia.
Indonesia (Bill of Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 21 of 2001 concerning the Special Autonomy of the Province of Papua; Ch. XII, Art. 45); none was convened, or even planned. The Special Autonomy Law said new provinces could not be established without a majority vote of support from the MRP and the Papua Provincial Legislative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua, DPRP) (Ch. XXIV, Art. 6). The central government established one new province and attempted to establish a third without that democratic support and indeed in the face of overwhelming votes against partition. This was clearly in breach of Indonesian law; yet courts in Jakarta were persuaded to look the other way, as they generally were when human rights cases came their way from Papua (see Robinson 2005).

The saga of special autonomy persuaded Papuans that they enjoyed no more of a semblance of rule of law under Indonesian rule than they did when the United Nations acquiesced in what they called the ‘Act Free of Choice’. The special autonomy deal might be read as Papuan elite capitulation when the grassroots remained defiant. Indeed, many ordinary Papuans read it as Papuan elite capitulation to Indonesian insistence that independence is off the table. As one of the members of the Presidium conceded to us in 2007: ‘Special autonomy turned out not to be a win-win solution, but a solution that was used to silence OPM.’

Financially, it is also hard to disagree with the majority Papuan view that the windfall of special autonomy is benefiting Indonesians and a handful of corrupt Papuan politicians. One church leader quoted an OPM commander as saying:

Special autonomy is a big cake offered by Jakarta out of pressure from the international community. There are two parties trying to get this cake. One is Papua; the other is Jakarta. Jakarta knows better how to get at the cake and they eat it up.

It is hard to know the facts. Papuans say, ‘Show me the new school, the new hospital, show me the road, show me the running water and electricity that has arrived with the special autonomy money since 2002.’ All we can say is that it is indeed hard to point to them. And it is hard to argue with the Catholic Bishop of Jayapura when he says that in fact, ‘the education sector is getting worse, especially in the highlands and hinterlands’. The UNDP agrees: ‘Papua stands out as one of the few “declining” regions, actually suffering a deterioration in [Human Development Index] status, which is mostly attributed

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78 Note Wing and King (2005:14) on the confusion related to the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruling of 11 November 2004 (Case No. 018/PUU-I/2003). The ruling was that Law No. 45/1999 (UU45/1999) and the Presidential Instruction of January 2003 (Inpres 1/2003) on the establishment of separate Central and West Irian Jaya Provinces violated the constitution, yet that West Irian Jaya Province existed as a fact on the ground. See also Stockmann (2004).
to declines in education and coverage and income levels’ (cited in King 2006:11). A presidential decree of 16 May 2007 on ‘the acceleration of development in Papua and West Papua’ (Inpres, May 2007) has seen the central government retake control of swaths of budget decisions on the rationale that this will push forward development of the region. Papuans see it as a further step to crush the spirit of the special autonomy law and an opportunity for central government officials to eat more cake.

Such data as we have (for example, King 2004:90) suggest that a tiny proportion of the money has gone towards the people’s priorities—education and health—with perhaps as little as 7 per cent on education and 15 per cent on health. Most of the money went straight to regents and mayors who had to deal with long lines of cronies and kin at their front doors with proposals for ad hoc construction projects and study tours to Jakarta, Bali or further afield. At the bupati’s back door were local military and police commanders with proposals for investment in logging and other mutually lucrative enterprises. The monies that did arrive in Papuan budgets went to infrastructure projects demanded by the likes of Freeport and the military—investment in ports, roads (that help the military open up new areas for illegal logging) and the like. This dual dilemma of local kin patronage and central corporate–military cronyism is a recurrent problem in post-conflict societies that cries out for a more sustainable solution than the response of Australia in Solomon Islands (see Peacebuilding Compared, Working Paper 7) and the United Nations in Liberia of having internationals demand dual sign-off control over spending to ensure the money does go to paying teachers’ and nurses’ salaries.

One of the more amazing concessions from Jakarta in the 2001 special autonomy law was a guarantee that all the top political offices in the province must be held by indigenous Papuans in circumstances in which Papuans were on the way to becoming a minority of the electorate. Indeed some Papuan bupatis preside over towns that are more than 70 per cent non-Papuan. As one senior bureaucrat interviewed in Jayapura put it, however, in a sense, the military commander outranks the bupati in the locality79 and also ‘the central government still appoints senior officials’. The central government also controls the budget process, so the province can pass laws that regulate gas, forestry and mining, but the national government then overrides them using regulatory laws for these sectors that apply nationally.

Those of the ‘let’s make special autonomy work’ persuasion include the current Governor of Papua, Barnabas Suebu, and a highly influential member of his staff, Agus Sumule (one of the very capable members of former Governor Solossa’s

79 This relationship is not merely anecdotal. It is recognised administratively through the ‘regional leadership council’ (Muspida), which since 1963 has been headed by the military commander in Papua.
team that drafted the law) and many in the international diplomatic community. Even these advocates tend to agree that the deliverables have been disappointing so far and that there has been a lot of corruption, but these problems can be, and are beginning to be, tackled. The international community needs to work with the Papuan political elite to put pressure on the president, who possibly has good-faith commitment to making special autonomy work but so far has been too weak politically to stand up to the military so that it can be allowed to work.

If there could be a large reduction in the military presence in Papua and an anti-corruption campaign with teeth, the freedoms and prosperity promised by the law could progressively be delivered. These advocates tend to see the first step as to reverse the increasing militarisation of Papua, to stop fresh battalions and deeper Kopassus and Brimob entanglements, and reduce military numbers. This process should also involve more effective training in riot prevention and control as well as clear disciplinary measures against the use of excessive force—all of which have been woefully inadequate in curtailing security sector violence in Papua.80

One constructive suggestion from Father Neles Tebay OFM (2006:60) has been that

> the religious leaders need to encourage the Papuan provincial government and the two West Papuan state universities to set up an advocacy team in Jakarta for implementation of the Papuan Special Autonomy Law. Members of the team would include both Papuans and non-Papuans living in West Papua and Jakarta. They should be experts in different fields, trusted by indigenous Papuans, deeply concerned at the deteriorating situation in West Papua and committed to making West Papua a land of peace. The team would act as a guardian of the special autonomy law and persuade governments at different levels to implement the law in its original spirit.

### Papua, land of peace

At the beginning of the current decade, most of the religious leaders of Papua (of all faiths) were full of hope for peace, as the Presidium had successfully persuaded many OPM fighters onto the path of peaceful negotiation. While some religious leaders remain in the ‘let’s make special autonomy work’ camp, this commitment is hard to find among highland pastors. The religious leadership has attempted to keep a space open for peacebuilding by sustaining a ‘Papua Land of Peace’ campaign. This campaign does indeed embrace a wide church. Devotees of all

80 An example of this is the continued reliance by security forces in Papua on live rounds to disperse gatherings instead of a variety of non-lethal forms of containment (including more effective negotiation, water cannon, tear gas and even rubber bullets).
three positions above are allowed a space under its umbrella, even the military. The military leadership initially condemned the idea when it was proposed by young Papsans and students as an idea for a ‘zone of peace’ at a meeting in Waropen District in 1999 (see Giay 2000), and was subsequently backed by the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP), the Papuan Customary Council (Dewan Adat Papua, DAP) and the human rights group Elsham. Now that the Presidium has been gutted, however, the military attends some peace commemoration events associated with the renamed campaign relaunched by religious leaders to cover the whole of Papua. Indeed in 2007, the military initiated limited informal dialogues with leading human rights NGOs on how to make ‘Papua, land of peace’ a reality. This seemed a slightly hopeful development. Neles Tebay (2009) has authored the most detailed proposal for a dialogue between Papua and the Government of Indonesia located within the Papua Land of Peace framework. Another important one from Jakarta has been produced by LIPI, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Widjojo et al. 2008). So far, however, there has been limited interest from President Yudhoyono.

The NGO Alliance for Democracy Papua (ALDP) believes the Papua Land of Peace campaign neglects dialogue with the military at the village level, where Papsans feel the most acute insecurity (cf. Widjojo et al. 2008:20–6). Terror is, after all, produced by concrete local tactics. In their efforts to broker some local dialogue, the alliance finds that the military does not realise how much little things they do can terrify villagers—things such as visiting homes and asking questions about the whereabouts of people can petrify villagers, even when an inquiry is quite innocent. ALDP suggests instead that security force personnel approach villagers with greater sensitivity—sitting down to ask questions at a village meeting and explaining the reason for the questions. Again, paradoxically for a Melanesian society, there has been far too little of that kind of bottom-up approach to reconciliation with the military. When local village-level commanders resist dialogue, ALDP writes to their commanders. Sometimes central commanders respond with a visit to the village to be a catalyst for the needed dialogue.

As Rodd McGibbon (2004) argued, the elite special autonomy negotiations in Aceh and Papua shared a failure to engage popular elements of their provinces, thus missing the opportunity to build popular support. Systematic bargaining processes are needed in a future dialogue that embraces all the major political factions who support independence. Ted Gurr’s (2000) comparative research on ethno-national movements found, when autonomy packages succeeded, rebel movements were hands-on in negotiations with the government on the terms of such arrangements. In Melanesian cultures in general, dialogue and negotiation

81 The military commanders said because Papua had never been a war zone, it could not become a peace zone.
are cyclical. Agreements are not immutable and may be contested for a variety of reasons, perhaps the most important of which is intergenerational change. Papuans today do not necessarily feel obliged by the conditions or agreements of the past, unless they see benefits. This cyclical renegotiated pragmatism is a source of hope in the very difficult impasse that is Papuan politics today. Kivimäki (2006:39) is critical of both sides in Papua for trying to build momentum for peace by consensus building essentially only on their own side. In his view, pre-negotiation is most productive when it includes early contacts with ‘the enemy’.

**Merdeka** and Papua Land of Peace

The values of the Papua Land of Peace campaign are ‘awareness and respect for plurality, justice, unity, harmony, solidarity, togetherness, sincere fraternity and welfare’ (Tebay 2006:37). This list is not so far from the way MacLeod (2007) interprets the multiple meanings of the term ‘merdeka’ to Papuans. In Indonesian, *merdeka* means literally freedom, but it has a much more complex genealogy (Reid 1998). At one level, it tends to mean those things for Papuans too—only it is independence from Indonesia, not the independence of Indonesia. MacLeod (2007) and Golden (2003), building on the work of Reverend Benny Giay and others (Giay and Godshalk 1993; Giay 2001b), argue *merdeka* has a deeper, more complex, more spiritual set of meanings. One is *merdeka* as liberation theology, so liberation is the better one-word translation than freedom. Or republicans might say *merdeka* is freedom as both political and personal non-domination (Pettit 1997). Giay has developed the idea of *merdeka* as ‘hai’, an Amungme word meaning ‘the irrepressible hope of an oppressed people for a future that is peaceful, just and prosperous’ (MacLeod 2007:157). This vision for modern Papua, reasserted and reinvigorated in the post-New Order era through the spirit of *reformasi*, has clear historical antecedents.

In 1942, in a Japanese internment camp, the Reverend Izaak Samuel Kijne articulated his modernist vision for a new Papua in a children’s book written for his daughter. *The Golden City (De Gouden Stad)* was a clear allegory for the prosperous and harmonious future Kijne envisaged in Netherlands New Guinea if Dutch and Papuans worked together to create a well-ordered, Christian community. A missionary teacher of long standing in Papua, Kijne was not naive about the challenges of this aspirant vision. His novel, first published in the territory in Indonesian (as *Kota Emas*) in 1953, describes a perilous journey for its two protagonists, the Dutch girl Regi and the Papuan boy Tomi. To reach the ‘Golden City’, Regi and Tomi must learn to cooperate, to trust and respect one another and to follow the same moral/spiritual compass (Kijne 1953; Cookson 2008:268–70). *Kota Emas*, a metaphor for the grandeur and promise of the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth, became a beloved children’s story
for young Papuans in the late Dutch colonial era, but the book was banned by the new Indonesian administration in 1963. The fall of Suharto and his New Order regime in May 1998 was followed by the republication of *Kota Emas* in Papua (serialised in the weekly tabloid *Jubi*) and new expressions of hope and possibility for the peoples of Papua.

At the vanguard of the Papuan movement for moral and spiritual renewal in the *reformasi* period, Giay (2001b) published *Towards a New Papua: Principle thoughts for the emancipation of the Papuan people* to help frame discussions among Papuans at their congress in May–June 2000. Giay (2001b:vii) challenged his fellow Papuans ‘to become aware of, critique, debate, and address the themes [of his book] and come up with concrete steps by which Papuans could emancipate themselves from their collective burdens’. Giay’s book incorporated the demands of the Team 100 (the 100 Papuans who met with President Habibie on 26 February 1999) as well as the priorities established through Mubes 2000 (24–26 February 2000). These included the ‘rectification’ of history, the setting of a Papuan political agenda and the consolidation of Papuan political structures and organisations. It also surveyed a range of other issues of immediate concern to Papuans including a memory of collective suffering among Papuans (*memoria passionis*),82 an agenda for non-violent protest based on a moral movement for peaceful change, a program of affirmative action in Papua (*Papuanisasi*), the need to promote and protect Papuan indigenous rights in accordance with international norms and instruments and the importance of placing Papuans at the centre of their history and of all future initiatives in their homeland. Central to Giay’s vision of hope and renewal in moving *Towards a New Papua* is the place of moral rectitude and peaceful non-violent approaches to change.83 His imperative for change has resonance with Clifford Shearing and Les Johnston’s (2005) ‘justice as a new future’ as it has emerged in post-apartheid South Africa.

*Merdeka* also means to Papuans ‘an adat led restoration and recovery of local traditions, local indigenous forms of governance, and identity’ (MacLeod 2007:158). Some commentators argue that the *merdeka* of village and clan-level *adat* is much more important to Papuans than the *merdeka* of state legal sovereignty (Howard et al. 2002). Other meanings MacLeod explores are *merdeka* as human dignity and *merdeka* as ‘mobu’ (material and spiritual satisfaction in which no-one suffers poverty or deprivation).

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82 Giay (2001b) attributes the use of the term ‘memoria passionis’ in Papua to the work of Brother J. Budi Hernawan and Theo P. A. van den Broek (see Hernawan and van den Broek 1999, 2001) of the Secretariat of Justice and Peace of the Diocese of Jayapura, Papua (Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian, SKP).

83 Giay (2001b:39–46) offers three iconic struggles as examples of the ways Papuans might build such a program of change: the emancipative struggle of Martin Luther King, jr, the independence struggle of Mahatma Ghandi in India and the democratic struggle of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar/Burma.
Such depth and richness of meaning for *merdeka* imply, according to Brigham Golden (2003), that ‘independence without *merdeka*’ and ‘*merdeka* without independence’ are possible (see also Indonesia Commission 2003). This is a constructive peacebuilder’s insight. It shows a need to moderate Jakarta’s fears of *merdeka* as being synonymous with political independence in a way similar to the need for Westerners to moderate their fear of jihad as blood-letting. It is hard to see sustainable peace unless Jakarta is willing to commit to a high-integrity peace process based on remorse for the low integrity of previous dialogue, and with discussions of (forms of) *merdeka* on the table.

If *merdeka* as non-domination and spiritual and cultural liberation is the ideal (the interest) and political independence is just one position then dialogue can proceed as an interest-based process (Fisher and Ury 1981). This means people can put aside their preferred positions as they feel their way. One student leader said: ‘We need independence because we are made to feel like we are animals.’ This quote encapsulates the possibility of moving from the *position* in favour of independence to the *interest* in being treated with human dignity. Trust is so low in the Papua case that MacLeod (2007) and King (2006) seem wise to suggest that open-textured trust building is the first priority, taking some small confidence-building steps initially that do little more than reach agreement on a process and some broad principles. What Papua has at the moment is ‘special autonomy without *merdeka*’. The original Papuan draft that was watered down by Jakarta could have been a basis for ‘special autonomy with *merdeka*’. Indeed, Agus Sumule (2003:358, 2001) pointed out how the early discussions of the drafting team were about not treating the issues of *merdeka* and autonomy as *merdeka*or autonomy or *merdeka*against autonomy, but as *merdeka*and autonomy (known colloquially in Papua as *motonomi*, or *merdeka* with *otonomi*). This position accorded with that of former Governor Solossa, who argued for autonomy as self-determination or a form of *merdeka* in his 2005 PhD dissertation (Solossa 2005:53–66).

There is at least one respect in which it might be easier to go back to original Papuan aspirations for special autonomy than to what has really been enacted. The idea of a truth and reconciliation commission has fallen deeply out of favour in Jakarta.84 Ministers in Jakarta told us the elite rejected delivering on this promise to Aceh and Papua. So why not instead go back to what Papuans were originally asking for: a process to straighten history (*meluruskan sejarah*)? Because special autonomy is so discredited today, Golden (2003) is right that any attempt to rehabilitate it will require transforming it, renaming it, imbuing it with integrity and completely reframing it politically.

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84 Although LIPI (Widjojo et al. 2008) has taken up the case for it.
Papua Land of Peace might be the space where this could be done, an umbrella under which all the political contestants in Papua have become comfortable. The reframing being considered here would have the leaders of that campaign respond to the regular accusations the military throws at them of being separatists by saying, ‘No, Papua Land of Peace is not about separatism, but it is about merdeka. Now let us sit down together, not separated but together, and discuss what merdeka might mean.’ Papua Land of Peace, partly because it is so vague, perhaps creates the space where something might emerge that is more resonant to ordinary Papuans (and to the military for that matter!) than ‘let’s make special autonomy work’.

In other post-conflict regions of Indonesia, there is some prospect of non-truth and reconciliation that neglect collective memory (as we discuss in Chapters 3 and 4). What Hernawan and van den Broek (1999) and Giay (2001b) call memoria passionis among Papuans—collective memory of suffering—makes non-truth or forgetting implausible paths to reconciliation in Papua. Events from decades past might be as real and as poignant for Papuans today as when they first happened. Absent rectification, Melanesians might cling to a memory of trauma and wrongdoing with a tenacity that survives generations. This poses profound questions for how the state apprehends this collective memory of suffering and by what means (if any) it can reconcile itself with a community that holds ahistorical perceptions of injustice and grievance (see Cookson 2008:37–40; Chapter 6). Papuans must find a Papuan way, or a syncretic Melanesian-Christian way, for dealing with their memoria passionis. Giay (2001b:35–8) argues that addressing memoria passionis first requires recognition of the ‘truth of the powerless’ and then dialogue (between the state and Papuans) based on mutual respect and understanding, followed by a consistent and incremental program of action.

One hope for peace is that the diplomatic community and the Indonesian President might see the opportunity created by Papua Land of Peace as a space and seize the chance to enter it with constructive proposals for a ‘consistent and incremental program of action’. A confidence-building negotiated reduction in military personnel in Papua in return for concessions by OPM, or a Commission for Straightening of History, or an invitation to an international mediator85 would be among many possible options. Or perhaps just starting small with a peace options workshop. These are some ideas for steps that might be taken. It does seem this space, which is supported by Muslim as well as Christian leaders and now by the military, could be a productive one for the president to enter with ideas and proposals. International donors might also do this. The

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85 An international mediator is the option supported by the West Papua Coalition for National Liberation, specifically suggesting Finland, as used in the Aceh peace process. Most political players in Papua, including most remnants of OPM, support this.
One of the things the international community might do within such a space is persuade Papuans that while Papua might benefit in a way similar to or better than Aceh, the East Timor scenario is utterly unrealistic. East Timor had a vote for independence because the Indonesian President of the time decided East Timor was not critical to Indonesia’s interest; it was not something the international community was insisting that he do. The international community is also not going to insist that Indonesia give independence to Papua—even more so looking back on the huge political cost East Timor imposed on Habibie and his successor. Another reason is Papua’s status under international law: while East Timor was never formally recognised as part of Indonesia by the United Nations, the United Nations recognises Papua as part of Indonesia. And the international community will take firm steps to prevent anyone from supplying arms to OPM. There are many hotheads in the highlands who believe that if they cause enough chaos by kidnaps, fire-fights with the military and sabotage of resource projects, the United Nations is bound to send in peacekeepers eventually, as it did in East Timor. Many said to us words such as the following genuinely puzzled query from one OPM leader: ‘Why won’t Australia support a referendum in Papua when it supported it in East Timor?’ It is easy to see the simple appeal of this perspective, but the international community is not doing much (or anything) to explain to this new generation of fighters why it is a false analogy. To the extent that it talks to OPM leaders, it talks to those on the Indonesian payroll or semi-retired, older fighters, not the angry young men who are aspirants to command a new generation of the insurgency. The German ambassador needs to go back to Papua and admit that Germany was misguided to believe that special autonomy would bring Papuans the solutions they needed. We are saying that the international community right now has no prospect of being an honest broker in Papua because it has not been honest. It was dishonest at the moment of the ‘Act Free of Choice’ in 1969 and it was dishonest at the moment of ‘specious autonomy’ in 2001.

Other countries came and said to OPM that you should accept special autonomy. Countries like Australia, who were part of this, had a
responsibility to equally pressure Indonesia to make sure they deliver on the promises of special autonomy. (Presidium panel member who spent years in prison)

To conclude this section, it is impossible to see the ‘return to armed conflict’, ‘stick with the integration status quo’ or ‘let’s make special autonomy work’ schools of thought as a basis for future peace in Papua. It is also extremely difficult to see peace being solidly built within the space of Papua Land of Peace. That would take much more national and international political will and the political imagination and engagement of adherents of the other three schools of thought than we see today.

Meetings held in Vanuatu in November 2007 and April 2008 in some ways forged new networks of opposition unity under the umbrella of the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation, but in different ways failed to unify pro-independence forces to the degree the Presidium managed in 2000. The pro-independence players are, however, on a path towards formulating a more unified negotiating position that might open up some middle path in negotiations with Jakarta that amounts to more than making special autonomy work and less than full independence now. There is hope in these developments.

Logs, fish and military politics in Papua

The false dawn of Papuan merdeka that began with President Wahid’s cancellation of the division of Papua into three provinces and his announcement of freedom of speech and assembly in December 1999 was decisively over in two years. One interpretation of this puzzling interlude in Indonesian politics offered by a number of people we interviewed in Jakarta and across the country was that the military (TNI) fell from being second only to President Suharto as the most important political and economic actor in Indonesia for a period of only a couple of years. We see this in the fortunes of General Wiranto, who was generally seen, including by his boss, as Suharto’s natural successor. By the end of 1999, not only had Wiranto failed to become president, his conviction as a war criminal for the post-election slaughter in East Timor seemed likely. Within a few years, however, these charges were dropped and he became a credible, though unsuccessful, presidential candidate. On the account of some who saw the political decline of the military with reformasi as significant but short, TNI political networks were critical to ensuring the quick demise of Presidents Habibie and Wahid for the way they applied reformasi to separatist conflict—particularly East Timor in the case of Habibie and Papua in the case of Wahid. The candidate TNI found acceptable in 2001, Megawati, had had her conflicts with the military as a former leading opponent of Suharto, but she was, like her father, President Sukarno, a staunch nationalist who believed in
a strong military. She had generals supporting her. In circumstances in which only a critic of the Suharto era could win, the military was getting someone who would take the hard line it wanted to see in Papua and Aceh.

‘Rome is a long way away’, as one European NGO leader put his view that the real government of Papua in 2007 was neither in the hands of Jakarta nor the provincial governor, but in the grip of the military command structure inside Papua. A number of journalists and others whom we interviewed felt that it was Kopassus in particular that called the shots. In Papua, as in Aceh and much of Indonesia, it is hard for a candidate for regent (bupati) of a locality to be elected if he or she is opposed by the local military commander. Very often the regent is groomed and corrupted by the military commander; often in the past he was a former military commander. Papua is a lucrative posting for a TNI officer. The Freeport mine has been a huge source of personal wealth for senior officers. Illegal logging and illegal fishing by large Indonesian, Chinese, Thai and Malaysian vessels protected by the security forces are also hearty sources of corrupt income. Perhaps as much as 70 per cent of the logs smuggled out of Indonesia (in violation of a ban on log exports applied across Indonesia from 2001) to businesses in Malaysia, Singapore, China and beyond originate in Papua (Tebay 2006:12). The Environmental Investigation Agency and Telapak (2005:9) found that syndicates moving illegal logs to China paid an average of US$200 000 a shipment in bribes. Merbau was the type of timber that was especially valued; Papuan communities received approximately $10 a cubic metre for chopping it down and it was sold in China for $270 a metre for furniture and flooring. Other reports suggest villagers can receive less than 1 per cent of the sale price for their timber and this practice has been going on since the 1970s (see Sword 1991; ICG 2002a:16). Sometimes the military simply steals logs from villagers and they receive nothing (King 2004:123).

The forests of Melanesia are one of the three great areas of tropical forest surviving in the world, with the Amazon and Congo basins. Brazil is the only country that has greater forest resources than Indonesia (Schloenhardt 2008:51). Indigenous traditions of sustainable use of forests are a great resource in the struggle against climate change. Hence, the practices of Indonesian security forces in making logging safe for business cronies by riding roughshod over those traditions and violently suppressing protest must change for climate reasons as well as conflict reduction. Forestry is a major reason why Papua is at such a political impasse. Until the 2000s, the Suharto family and immediate cronies were the major shareholders in the companies exploiting the forests of Papua (ICG 2002a:14–

86 One of our informants in Papua explained that the governor was ‘protected’ by Kopassus and that this meant he was also ‘guided’ by his military minders.
87 Papuan fishermen report encounters with TNI soldiers on the boats who chase them away when they encroach on areas where the Asian boats wish to fish.
17). They still are significant players, but their assets have been protected by diversifying access to the Papua logging business among many generals and political leaders in Jakarta. Decentralisation has also provided opportunities for local elites—generals, colonels and senior police working with captive local politicians—to cut their slices of a very large pie. Genuine indigenous control of Papua would disrupt this money machine. Recent government initiatives to promote indigenous community cooperatives (kopermas) have, however, failed (see Alhamid 2004). As in so many of Indonesia’s problems, the critical element needed is not a best-practice environmental regulatory agency; it is a political capability to regulate the security forces and the corrupt politicians they capture.

There is a great deal of evidence of forestry department officials in Indonesia becoming minor parts of the illegal logging business as a result of the carrots and sticks proffered to them by the military (for example, ICG 2002a:15). The Indonesian navy has responsibility for intercepting logging ships to enforce the 2001 ban on log exports, yet the Indonesian navy is the most professional smuggling organisation in the region when it gets a share of the action. One way forward might be an internationalisation of enforcement against shipping of logs as part of what nations agree in the Kyoto-Bali-Copenhagen process. The problem is not the navy’s ability to intercept logging ships—it does that very successfully. The problem is that the navy releases the shipments on payment of the appropriate amount to the navy. Internationalisation of maritime logging enforcement would also assist a future peace process in Papua.

Acute security problems around logging and fishing make it possible for the security forces to demand large protection payments. In March 2001, armed anti-logging protestors killed three logging employees at Wasior, leading to Brimob riot police retaliation in the form of the arrest and torture of 140 people, the killing of two, the disappearance of seven and the burning down of churches, public buildings and 55 houses (Hernawan 2005:78–9).88 Relying on Amnesty International and other sources, the ICG (2002a:16–17) reported six killed in an initial Brimob attack and another 12 killed and 26 missing in subsequent indiscriminate revenge attacks on nearby villages by Brimob. Sporadic armed conflict between the anti-logging protestors and Brimob persisted in the region for more than a year to mid-2002. One attack on a Brimob post killed five Brimob officers and one civilian and saw the capture of a machine gun and five rifles in June 2001 (ICG 2002a:16).

88 The Wasior case also coincided with meetings and negotiations between Indonesian police and local communities in the nearby Bintuni Bay area as part of BP Indonesia’s strategy of community policing for its massive Tangguh natural gas operation. The Wasior incident was assumed by some informants to be an attempt by (elements of) the Indonesian security apparatus to destabilise the region and thereby reinsert themselves into the Tangguh project.
Villagers and human rights NGOs told us of a comparable fishing incident in the district of Kimaam on the south coast in 2001. Resentment of the security forces was high after they persuaded local villagers to catch and skin a large number of crocodiles for (illegal) export that the police would organise. The police promised to return an agreed share of the proceeds. The police collected the skins but never returned any proceeds. Then the military shot at a village boat and damaged it, after villagers came too near a large foreign fishing boat the military was protecting. These foreign boats operated by using large nets to catch only certain species of fish that had high export demand and discarded the rest. In local custom, to unnecessarily kill and waste fish makes the ancestors angry. The villagers reported all their concerns to the fishing exporters and wholesalers and to the district regulatory authorities. After these complaints were officially ignored, they attacked and sunk two large boats in 2001, killing 12 Asian fishermen on one boat and 19 on the other. The military retaliated by burning their village to the ground and killing all their animals. At a protest by villagers over this, two were killed and others injured. The large fishing boats struck back by ramming a village boat, resulting in two fishermen drowning.

A particular problem with local logging (more than fishing) as a cause of conflict is that the loggers are one-shot players in their relationship with the traditional custodians of the land. This makes it profitable to use what in other contexts might be short-sighted tactics. Loggers ply local adat leaders with alcohol and prostitutes, in the process collecting compromising information about them, and then make secret payments to them. In rural societies, it is difficult to hide abnormally high consumption. The companies promise that roads, churches, houses and other infrastructure will be built in return for access to the logs and bulldozers left behind to maintain them, but these promises are not kept. Often cash promised is never paid. They promise not to touch sacred parts of forests then whip the logs out before they leave under military or Brimob protection. In every way, their logging is quick and dirty, destructive, wasteful and inefficient. The result is not only indigenous anger at the loggers and the political system they own, but anger at their own traditional leaders, undermining the fabric of traditional authority and the great things it can bring to the tables of forestry management and conflict management.

‘Militias’

The Satgas Merah Putih Movement (Red-White Task Force—a reference to the colours of the Indonesian flag) was the first paramilitary organisation to be established by the Indonesian Government in Papua. Members are indigenous Papuans who are paid by the government, follow the orders of the military and on occasion have joined the security forces in attacks on suspected rebels (Tebay 2006:20). A second paramilitary civilian defence force (Pertahanan Sipil,
Hansip) was established in 1964–65 in Papua under the leadership of a military officer.\textsuperscript{89} For this reason, and also because Hansip was provided with uniforms and sticks and trained by the military to keep order and ensure compliance with government instructions at the village level, Papuans perceived it as an extension of military rule. Kamra (meaning ‘people’s security’) was formed in 1999 with the same rationale. Kamra members were unemployed youth who were put into uniforms and trained by the military to maintain order (Giay 2001a:131).

On 8 June 2000, the leading military and intelligence groups involved in Papua met in Jakarta and produced a ‘top-secret’ document that proposed among other things covert activities and ‘black operations’ against leading separatists and the training and recruiting of pro-Indonesian militia at the village level (Chauvel 2001:23). While there has been the odd report of a killing by militias under the control of Kopassus and of weapons being delivered to them (Wing and King 2005:6–7), during our 2007 fieldwork these groups were not really militias perpetrating acts of violence. Rather they were pro-Indonesia political groups, with some paramilitary trappings, who might heckle separatists at political gatherings or report on separatists so that they might be more quietly targeted (say, for harassment by dozens of threatening text messages). ‘Militias’ might stand ready to be armed by the military if OPM launches military operations, but they do not seem to be armed at present. They were growing in 2007, just as they were during the unsettled time at the end of the Wahid presidency and the beginning of the Megawati presidency, through military-sponsored immigration of young toughs.

A more recent pro-Indonesia militia in Papua is the Red and White Defenders’ Front (Front Pembela Merah Putih). The founder of this group was Eurico Guterres, the most notorious of the East Timor militia leaders and the only person whose conviction for crimes against humanity in East Timor was at least initially upheld on appeal in Jakarta (Tebay 2006:20). He launched the Red and White Defenders’ Front in Timika in late 2003. Unlike the militias above, it recruits mostly from Indonesian migrants, but with considerable numbers of indigenous Papuans as well. Many Papuans interviewed were very concerned about this group, alleging that Guterres had been hired to set up Papuan militias on the East Timor model by General Mahidin Simbolon, who was the military commander of Papua at the time Guterres arrived, and Guterres’s former military boss in East Timor as he went about organising militias there. Guterres’s new militia activity seems to have had the support of the incoming Papuan police chief (also an East Timor veteran) (King 2004:116) and indeed of President Megawati. Senior military officers with experience in East Timor have been quite open about marketing the recruiting of pro-Indonesian paramilitaries, even saying at

\textsuperscript{89} This model of ‘civil defence’ is standard across Indonesia.
a press conference that a target of 2700 recruits has been set. Pupuans reported that this kind of very public recruitment intimidated Pupuans without a shot being fired or a weapon being issued. In 2007 in the capital, Jayapura, there was concern about the promotion of militias by Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian, Korem Regional Commander. He is the subject of two separate indictments for crimes against humanity in East Timor in 1999 issued by the Special Panel for Serious Crimes of the Dili District Court in Timor-Leste (Hedman 2007:10). In 2002 and 2003, there was also a campaign by ‘ninjas’, men with black masks who would threaten and attack people at night—another technique used in East Timor and elsewhere. In August 2008, Simbolon was promoted and transferred out of Papua.

There have been many exaggerated stories of boatloads of Laskar Jihad (Holy War Army) fighters arriving from more westerly parts of Indonesia to kill Christians and burn Christian villages, as they had done in Maluku and Central Sulawesi. In fact, nine jihadists arrived from Pakistan at the beginning of the 2000s. As in North Maluku, in Papua, there could have been agitators who attempted to organise violent jihad, but because of strong support from Muslim leaders for the Christian clerics of Papua in opposing this, military factions and the bankrollers of Laskar Jihad never got behind a large-scale Laskar Jihad invasion of Papua. The Indonesian Ulamas’ Council (MUI) and the two mass-membership Muslim organisations in Indonesia wrote letters to all mosques in Papua warning that Laskar Jihad could be arriving at their mosque and urged that the mosque not be coopted into violence and should consider sermons on why jihad was not about war. It could be that Islamists had been planning a violent Papuan jihad and that these plans were dropped after financial support for Laskar Jihad fighters was withdrawn in the new climate in Indonesia after the 2002 Bali terrorist bombing.

There was, however, modest Laskar Jihad infiltration. A Laskar Jihad office was established in Sorong, but was taken over by Muslims committed to non-violence after Papua’s religious leaders asked a representative of MUI to visit Sorong to sort this out. Wing and King (2005:38) interviewed one man in Sorong in 2005 who claimed to have arrived with a group of Laskar Jihad fighters from Babo Archipelago and Seram, which was revealed to be an international terrorist training and transit base, where, for example, Imam Samudera, the Bali bombing initiator, trained (Böhm 2006:381, 383). He had previously fought against Christians in Ambon. His group was involved in killing Pupuans they believed to be OPM leaders, intimidating and spreading fear through rumours. There was a conviction of the leader of an Islamic boarding school in 2000 in Sorong for having a bomb and of a salafi businessman there in 2003 for possession of bombs, explosives and arrows with tips designed to be dipped in petrol (ICG 2008a:16). None of the bombings of churches planned in this period happened,
nor had any mosques been torched during 46 years of conflict in Papua. Tebay (2006:19) reports some Laskar Jihad infiltration in Jayapura, Sorong, Fakfak, Timika, Nabire and Manokwari, with their members asserting that they have limited themselves to propagating Islam and educational activities, though Tebay asserts they have been distributing VCDs of sectarian fighting in Maluku.

At the high-water mark of reformasi Papuan nationalism in 1999, a Papuan militia, Satgas Papua, was formed. Like the pro-Indonesian militias, and the militias of East Timor, Satgas Papua members had little education. Unlike OPM, it did not seem to engage in any proactive violence. Rather it provided security for anti-Indonesian protests, for the congresses of 2000 and for the Presidium during its brief period of ascendancy. Satgas Papua declined with the plunge in influence of the Presidium and a campaign of police dispersal, arrests and torture of individual members after October 2000. The ICG (2002a:3) estimated that the militia had 20 000 members in mid-2000 but was ‘largely moribund’ by 2002. Davies (2001:34) and others argued that Satgas Papua was funded by Golkar stalwart Yorrys Raweyai, hitman and deputy chairman of the six-million strong pro-Golkar paramilitary youth group, Pemuda Pancasila, as a ‘honey-pot’ counterinsurgency strategy. Yorrys gave the appearance in 1998 of conversion to being a supporter of independence for Papua. This was never genuine. His intent was to personally infiltrate the separatist elite by becoming a member of the Presidium and simultaneously infiltrating its rank and file. He accomplished both objectives. Satgas Papua drew 20 000 ‘separatist moths to the light of intelligence scrutiny’ (Davies 2001:34). King (2004:39) also plausibly conjectures that Yorrys’ strategy could have been ‘to stir up trouble and discredit Gus Dur [President Wahid], rather than to liberate Papua’. Informants on the Maluku conflict (see Chapter 3) argued that he played the same role in mobilising his thugs on both sides to provoke that conflict.

There have been various youth groups or gangs formed in the past decade whose formation has been sponsored by a particular bupati to secure his power—as happens in other parts of Indonesia. Marginalised youth are paid to join. The mixed Papuan/immigrant Timur Samus and Tim Ohan in the Marind tribal area are leading examples. They threaten troublemakers who are proposing political protests and get people out to vote for their sponsor (or threaten them if they refuse). So, for example, when a group of migrant Indonesians protested about a

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90 Kilcullen (2000) identified three tiers of militias in East Timor. The top tier was mobile, armed, trained and included cadre staff from TNI. The second armed themselves or received only limited Indonesian weapons and were trained by tier-one militia leaders. Support for tier one was therefore ‘train the trainers’ support. Tier three was local, non-mobile, part-time militia groups, whose main functions were to provide basic duties such as guarding, reporting on local meetings and activities and recruiting for the higher militia tiers. Tier three was generally ‘unemployed, socially underprivileged and members of the criminal or extremely poor elements of East Timorese society’. This allowed TNI to ‘exploit resentment against the more prosperous elements of East Timorese society’ with a ‘provision of narcotics or alcohol’ and opportunities for ‘money and the chance to plunder’ (Kilcullen 2000:140, discussed in Sebastian 2006:119–20).
road, a journalist suggested groups such as Timin Samus and Tim Ohan went to them and said: ‘You are causing trouble and we have the ticket here to send you back’ (to their place of emigration—and they do). Often they are brazen enough to say in the newspaper that so and so should be sent back to where they came from. They threaten journalists, even foreign journalists and academics. NGOs calling for accountability over some aspect of district finances are particularly likely to be physically attacked; we interviewed one man who was. The bupati gives them protected access to organising prostitution, gambling, drugs and illegal alcohol. ‘If the police want to arrest them for a crime against the common people, like assault, they must ask for permission from the political elite first… They also get projects without having to tender’ (Merauke interview). While these politicised youth groups morph into organised crime groups, they do not pose a huge daily threat to the lives of ordinary Papuans in the way that such groups make the streets of some parts of Jakarta quite unsafe. Putting aside the political and economic crimes of the security sector itself, Papua is a low-crime society even by the standards of an Indonesian society that has a low crime rate. All the Indonesian migrants we interviewed said they were safer from crime in Papua than in the cities they had left in other parts of Indonesia. On the other hand, women’s NGO leaders said they were dealing with an increasing domestic violence problem and we saw some shocking incidents of domestic violence openly perpetrated in public spaces.

These ‘new militias’ nevertheless pose a serious risk to the future daily safety of the people of Papua. The risk is that they get totally out of hand as organised crime groups, as we have seen in Jakarta (van Dijk 2001) and Timor-Leste (see the fourth volume of Peacebuilding Compared). At times of elections, they are already a severe threat to daily security, according to one informant:

They threaten people during election campaigns. ‘If you do not vote the right way and if your village does not, there will be trouble.’ And they do torture and beat, not just threats. They go to the leader: ‘You must persuade your people to vote for…’ If they say no then they threaten them.

Smaller parties are also threatened in a similar way. When they do not have their own candidate running in an election, they might be threatened if they do not throw their support behind the bupati; when they do have a candidate running, they might be threatened to withdraw. This kind of politicised, organised youth crime would not work very well in a Western individualist democracy where leaders of communities have little practical ability to tell their followers how to vote. In collectivist societies in Melanesia and Indonesia, however, it works, especially when the military is willing to back gangs by pointing guns at leaders who defy their ‘suggestions’ as to who their village should vote for. This is one of a number of ways that collectivist societies can have higher...
crime rates than individualist ones (Karstedt 2006). While the military perhaps does not arm them today, as one of Papua’s most distinguished political leaders put it: ‘When force is needed, the military will use the militias [arm them]. They will use Papuan people to do the intimidation. They will use terror if they have to.’ He felt the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) also had a role in their formation. Many militia members are recruited from sons of members or retired members of the security forces. At the time of our fieldwork, recruitment drives were expanding membership rapidly. These developments are supported by President Yudhoyono and government elites generally in Jakarta, who have been persuaded by the military that they are about ‘inspiring youth with the national ideal’ (Jayapura journalist).

The independence movement today and prospects for war

It is hard to foresee the future of conflict in Papua beyond the likelihood that it will be big in the absence of new and visionary preventive diplomacy. At the time of our fieldwork in 2007, the analysis of some NGOs was that we might see a change in the conflict from vertical to horizontal conflicts over environmental and resource management. The violence would then reheat. One problem is that developers bribe a big-man to hand over land for housing, oil-palm development or logging. He wants the bribe so he does not consult his people, who might not agree. He then tells his henchmen not to tolerate any complaining about his decision; and if these henchmen go about their work in a vigorous way, the potential for conflict is real. To their credit, the Papuan provincial bureaucracy in recent years has sought to give land custodians and investors security from such conflict. First, the regulatory agency responsible for plantations often convenes a para para adat meeting⁹¹ to secure collective agreement on who are the appropriate leaders and the terms of the negotiation to win community support for the development. They then ensure that all these leaders participate in the negotiations and agree to the contract, which in most cases today requires return of the land to tribal custodians after a 20-year lease. It does not seem to be part of the process, however, to inform traditional custodians of the results of a credible environmental impact assessment.

OPM interviewees tended to get angry when we would say: ‘It’s hard to see any prospects of OPM victory today. But do you think it is realistic that there could be victory inside, say, 20 years?’ They would say no, they must win next year, in 2009 or 2010, because if not, in 20 years, Indonesia will have won already by turning Papuans into a small minority in the province. Indeed that makes sense. On current trends, the non-Papuan population of Papua will be so dominant

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⁹¹ A traditional process in which people talk and talk and talk until a solution is found.
that Papuans will be outvoted if Indonesia does grant a new referendum at that
time. Partition is also part of this strategy. In the new province of West Papua,
where migrant elites are more dominant and where BP has been a much more
benign foreign presence than Freeport, Indonesian strategists think there could
be a vote against any independence that the eastern and southern provinces of
Papua voted for, creating an unsolvable political problem for the ideal of unified
Papuan nationalism (see Notes 54, 68, 73). With its mostly offshore natural
gas development, BP has sought to do things very differently from Freeport.
They invite NGOs to London for briefings on BP’s human rights policies and
performance in Papua. They have succeeded in managing their security using
local employees and a community security philosophy without the state and by
maintaining a more arm’s-length relationship with the military for which they
perhaps enjoy backing at a high level.92

International mediators could probably play a useful role in confronting Papuan
nationalists with the realities of some of the cards Jakarta is holding, as well as
confronting Jakarta with the prospect of the kind of international opprobrium
it suffered over East Timor and a foreign investment drought if it does not
radically change course. International mediators could bring a sense of reality
to utterly unrealistic views some potential OPM fighters have—for example,
that Israel might give them guns because they are fighting Muslims, that Papua
in the end will be like East Timor, misreading East Timor as a case in which
the United States and Australia imposed the referendum on President Habibie.
International mediators could explain to the OPM that the international
community will never, ever support ethnic cleansing of Indonesians from
Papua. Jakarta is ruthlessly focused on preventing this conflict from being
internationalised in the way it was in East Timor. While the security forces
have been reasonably effective in keeping international journalists and
television cameras out of Papua, this stratagem is, however, unsustainable and
is challenged daily by Papuan and Indonesian activists and media reporting
on developments in the province. It seems clear, however, that the military
would make life very difficult for any Indonesian political leader who would
seek to bring international mediators into the Papuan conflict. It would take
a determined surge of combined international and domestic pressure to bring
Jakarta to the table with an international mediator.

The sad reality is that many OPM strategists see themselves with nowhere else
to go since the Papuan spring proved short and false. Many now favour a return
to armed struggle, kidnaps and sabotage to grab international attention. Support

92 In this, BP has learnt from the adverse publicity it received in the 1990s over human rights abuses by
the Colombian military allegedly funded by BP to protect its assets. (It has also benefited from observing the
negative press and practices of Freeport Indonesia.) A community security rather than state security strategy
has also generally been followed with considerable success by new mining developments across the border in
Papua New Guinea since Rio Tinto’s debacle in Bougainville (see Dinnen 2001).
for this exists outside the highlands, but is strong only in the highlands. More than two-thirds of Papuans are from the highlands, which today supplies most of the men willing to fight the Indonesian military. So a consensus for war in the highlands that is not shared on the coast could still deliver the international attention OPM seeks. OPM leaders in the highlands in 2007 were open about saying in large meetings that it was not their intent to start a war during 2008—but they would not wait beyond 2009 (or perhaps 2010). They must strike before they become a small minority like Aboriginal Australians. Of course, such threats are common from militarily weak insurgents and OPM has made them many times in the past. Their intent in 2007 was to use the focus on Indonesia for the 2009 presidential elections to destabilise the election. One option being considered that was reported in December 2007 and April 2008 interviews was a Papua-wide boycott of the 2009 election. Because most Papuans are so peace loving and war weary, Jakarta would hope that it would be hard to get support for an election boycott in the coastal cities, the only place where television cameras are likely to film boycott demonstrations. What Jakarta should have little doubt about is the capability of OPM to sabotage pipelines and electricity supplies to shut down resource projects and to kidnap foreigners. Jakarta and OPM leaders understand, however, that the current OPM military posture is defensive only, that OPM thinks it important that it has a military option that it is ready to use in the next couple of years, but that its preferred option is to make progress through international pressure that could include, for example, a legal challenge to nullify the Act of Free Choice at the International Court of Justice.  

Jakarta should also have little doubt about the capacity of OPM to kill a lot of Indonesian soldiers and police in the highlands. There are tiny military posts everywhere with few troops at each. Many posts would have no chance in a surprise ambush by 100 brave Papuan fighters, even if they had little in the way of guns. The ICG (2002a:6) reported OPM claims that they had 400 guns across the border in Papua New Guinea, though this was surely a high estimate. A 2005 Indonesian Government estimate was 150 (McGibbon 2006b:28). Indonesian troops in the past have been killed and hundreds have been wounded by OPM arrows. OPM could inflict enough damage to trigger massive retaliation.

93 It is worth noting that despite the obvious interest and enthusiasm among many pro-independence activists, Papuans have not yet capitalised on the growing body of scholarly literature, including recent publications by Penders (2002), Saltford (2003), Drooglever (2005) and Tarling (2008) on the injustices of the transfer of Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia and the subsequent Act of Free Choice. Although the PDP in 2000 claimed that it had engaged international lawyers in a review of the legality of the Act of Free Choice, it appeared there had been no subsequent follow-up to this review and the legal scholar(s) engaged to conduct this review were no longer working on the issue.

94 Krisna (1995) has written of the fears of soldiers working in the ‘wilds’ of Papua.
Unlike in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, today OPM has the audiovisual capability to get images of its attacks—and the human rights abuses that occur in retaliation—out to the international media. One Papuan fighter said:

[C]reating a Super Santa Cruz is always an integral part of our strategy. The choice of timing and location are in our hands. The question is how to entrap the TNI so that the OPM can extract the maximum political capital at home and abroad. (Singh 2008:191)

With assistance from their camps and friends in Papua New Guinea, OPM has the capability of sending boatloads of refugees fleeing these human rights abuses into Australia and of creating digital images of a ‘canoe people’ crisis for Australia, as exemplified by the 2006 Papuan asylum-seeker crisis in Australia–Indonesia relations.

While the long-held view of President Yudhoyono is obviously correct that OPM is not a credible threat to perhaps 17 000 security personnel (police and military) in Papua (ICG 2002a:6), the scenario of the previous paragraph is potentially lose-lose-lose for his presidency,96 for the Rudd government in Australia97 and for the people of Papua, who would suffer untold loss of life and liberty. While this is the most likely catastrophe that could befall the ‘arc of instability’ around Australia at the end of the first decade of the new century, it is a preventable one. Jakarta, Canberra and Washington should be able to see what a disaster this would be for them and the people of Papua and should be able to talk to one another about it in a preventive spirit. Equally, they should be able to see why OPM has been put in a corner where this could become the only card they have to play—unless they see a bold and genuine new dialogue from the president or an international mediator who inspires their confidence. Equally, diplomats should be able to see why a few fire-fights are not such a great worry to the Indonesian military. They know the Indonesian people will rally behind them when they are attacked; they know violence or sabotage will bring more resources to them, create new opportunities to extort increasing amounts of money from vulnerable operations such as Freeport, which fears going the way of Rio Tinto’s Bougainville copper and goldmine, from Asian illegal loggers and fishers who need protection, from prostitution and any number of rackets that flourish in conflict zones. While the Indonesian military is entitled to view the ending of the Papuan spring with its assassination of Theys Eluay as a

95 This refers to the international attention attracted by the Indonesian military shooting a large number of civilians at Santa Cruz Cemetery, East Timor, in 1991.
96 The threat being one of hardline opponents accusing him of being too weak and the international community castigating him for human rights abuses.
97 A flood of boat people would be much more of a problem for the Rudd government than for the conservative Howard government that claimed Labor was weak on deterring boat people.
successful suppression of separatism, more thoughtful Jakarta elites might see it as a longer-term disaster for foreign investment confidence in Indonesia that an opportunity for a permanent peace has been spurned.

The prospect of a renewed war in Papua that would be lose-lose-lose-lose for Jakarta, Canberra, Washington and the ordinary people of Papua is significant precisely because it is possible to imagine how the conflict could at the same time be seen as win-win by hardliners in OPM and the Indonesian military—and they are the players with the capability on the ground to light the fuse. One might go as far as to say that only visionary preventive diplomacy from Jakarta, Canberra, Washington, Brussels and the NGOs and churches of Papua can prevent it.

Here is how one highlands OPM leader put their posture of commitment and resolve:

Once the call is made to fight, everyone will follow the call of the leaders. We can take guns from the military; we have plans for how to do that. Papuans will follow the commander. We have a culture of doing that. Papuans are waiting for the command to resume the fight and next year [2008] is the last year we will wait. (December 2007 meeting with OPM highlanders)

We were struck by how ready some of the young men of the highlands were to die. A local priest reported to us that in the retribution attacks by the TNI after the 6 October 2000 flag raising incident, some Dani were reported to be saying to their wounded comrades, 'Hurry up and die for West Papua!' More than one person asked us to write down their name so that when they died we could write in ‘the book’ that this was what they said when alive.

In all cases of peacebuilding in developing countries where communication of quality journalism across a nation is poor, dealing with false rumours is a major challenge. An example has been the regular rumours of landings of hordes of masked Laskar Jihad fighters intent on genocidal attacks against Papuans. One sad rumour was that then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was getting involved in diplomacy to lead Papua to independence (van den Broek et al. 2005:1). There was another that Annan had already visited Wamena and Manokwari. It might have been good had it been true, but as a false rumour it shattered people's hopes. Given this history of false rumours about Annan, and given his skills and 2008 success in Kenya as a peacemaker, he is one of many choices worth considering as a mediator within the space the religious leaders have created through Papua Land of Peace. As the most distinguished long-serving former UN official alive, his apology for how dishonestly the UN handled the Papua issue since 1963 would be especially valued by Papuans. He would also have
the credibility to persuade Papuans that even though the United Nations did not act with integrity in 1969, the fact remains that there is even less support for independence for Papua in the international community today than there was in 1969. No major nation supports it; indeed hardly any nations at all do. The United Nations will never see it in the way it saw East Timor. Even many in the international solidarity movement have given up on independence as their objective. Though the primary Indonesian interest is in persuading Papuans on these points, even though it would be good for Indonesia’s international standing for the president to stand beside a Kofi Annan and make exactly the same points directly to Papuans, it is hard to imagine even this kind of indirect UN involvement as acceptable to Indonesia. A distinguished Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) diplomat might be more acceptable. On the Papuan side, there is some interest in the New Zealand Government as a mediator or the Henri Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Crisis Management Initiative, the ICG or the Center for Just Peace. And there is commitment to the UN Decolonisation Committee becoming involved (although it is extremely unlikely that any government in Jakarta would accept such an initiative).

Rodd McGibbon (2006b) has fired a broadside at the alleged good intentions and bad effects of the West Papua solidarity movement, particularly in Australia. He is surely right that international pressure from another country on what Indonesians regard as an internal matter engenders resentment in Indonesia and sours the bilateral relationship between that country and Indonesia. He is also surely right that settling this conflict will depend overwhelmingly on domestic drivers and peacebuilding initiatives within Indonesia. That does not, however, preclude international pressure having a role. And McGibbon (2006b) is surely wrong that international pressure will tend to reduce prospects for peacebuilding (because of the way he sees the sensitivity of Indonesia to criticism from countries such as Australia and the United States). Of course, clumsy diplomacy can have that effect, but diplomats keep doing diplomacy because it can work and NGOs keep publicising the human rights abuses of militaries and environmental abuses of multinational corporations and illegal loggers because NGO networks of international pressure can work. They work in limited ways precisely because states and corporations that abuse rights do resent the pressure and want to get it off their backs. Increasingly, they care about their international reputations for good commercial reasons given the way international trade, investment and aid work. And they care about it for its own sake; they want Indonesia to be a respected member of the international community. So it is desirable for international civil society to be more engaged with the domination and the poverty of the people of Papua. Finally, because McGibbon (2006b) is also right that it is counterproductive for international civil society to encourage Papuans in the unrealistic view that they can be the next East Timor, it is especially imperative for international civil society
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to be engaged and vocal in communicating to Papuans that a renewed war of independence will lead only to more suffering. International civil society can make a positive contribution by linking arms with Papua Land of Peace and with those in both Papua and Jakarta who want merdeka with autonomy.

Military strategy debates in Indonesia are profoundly shaped by the fear of international exposure of human rights abuses. That is why Jakarta keeps the international media out of the province. That is why it shoots far fewer of its opponents today than it did in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s. That is why young men and women we interviewed said it was comparatively safe to be arrested in the city. In the bush, however, where there are no cameras or mobile phones or journalists or NGOs, that is where arrest is most likely to lead to beating, rape or death (see HRW 2007b). In turn, that is why protestors today protest rural grievances in the city. That is why in the aftermath of East Timor there was also a real contest of ideas among different TNI generals we were able to interview over whether a counterinsurgency model that hired and armed indigenous militias to do the military’s dirty work was still viable in an era when every second insurgent and NGO activist carried a mobile phone with a movie camera. Some generals think the counterinsurgency strategies developed so brilliantly by the military in its successful war against Darul Islam no longer work in conditions of modern communications technology and scrutiny by organisations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW 2009) networking with (and protecting) local NGOs such as Elsham and Kontras and the church human rights activists. It is precisely international civil society activism that strengthens the hand of those generals advocating a more rights-sensitive approach to counterinsurgency that puts greater emphasis on development assistance and institution building through (admittedly flawed) initiatives such as special autonomy.

International military diplomacy and training have an important role here as well. The diplomacy of the United States will be more effective by putting ever-greater emphasis on dialogue between Indonesian military leaders of the present and the future and great American generals of the present and past who are admired by TNI. In that dialogue, crusty American generals can be counted on to sympathise with their Indonesian colleagues about what bleeding hearts human rights NGOs and international solidarity movements are, but their existence means that approaches such as fence-of-legs counterinsurgency and

98 One of General Petreus’s strategists of the 2007 ‘Iraq surge’ rethinking of counterinsurgency, David Kilcullen, has made the point this way: ‘Indonesia’s approach to counterinsurgency, then, derives partly from its experience in suppressing Darul Islam. The tactics developed in West Java proved effective in the geographical and political circumstances of the 1950s, but have proved ineffective—indeed, positively injurious to Indonesian interests—in other circumstances. Globalisation, and particularly, the influence of world media and international public opinion, undermined the approach’s effectiveness in East Timor, and this highlights the continuing impact of globalisation in contemporary counterinsurgency’ (Kilcullen 2006:61).
retaliatory strafing and dropping napalm or chemical weapons on villagers must remain part of the military past. International civil society activism is crucial for underwriting those practical military peacebuilding dynamics.

Mediation, reconciliation and new tribal wars

The Papua conflict is distinguished by how little determined local or international mediation and reconciliation has occurred apart from the brief effort of President Wahid that was undermined by the military. There has been no Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Compare this with Aceh, which saw successive failed and successful attempts to mediate peace by international and national leaders and NGOs. As one foreign pastor with decades of experience in Papua put it:

Papuans ask for dialogue, but Indonesia never accept dialogues, at least not with the real leaders—they will have dialogue with the leaders that they appoint...There are cultural differences. Javanese people are not open, [they] keep their thoughts to themselves, [they] keep their emotions to themselves, whereas Papuan people say exactly what they feel.99

Aceh has seen a joint ASEAN–EU peacekeeping operation called the Aceh Monitoring Mission (see Chapter 6). While the Indonesia–Netherlands post-colonial conflict saw a tiny group of Australians become the first UN peacekeeping operation in 1947, none operated in Papua at that time and the UN officials who came in 1962 were not agents of peace, reconciliation or mediated democracy, but of Cold War politics.

We have not become aware of any major reconciliation meeting between the Indonesian military and the people of Papua. We were told of a few minor reconciliations in the 1970s whereby, in accordance with local custom after a war, the brother or son of a man killed by the military went to live in the barracks of the military (and was trained by them to become a soldier!). When you stand back from it, it is amazing that such a major conflict can run for almost half a century in Melanesia with so little semblance of reconciliation ritual occurring at any level. Where reconciliation has occurred more widely is among Papuans caught on different sides of the conflict. One unfortunate apolitical man we interviewed was tortured and imprisoned as a spy by both Indonesia and OPM. There seemed no substance to the allegations from either side. OPM tortured him, leaving large welts on his body, cutting off some fingers

99 We are inclined to think these cultural differences, while significant, are not insurmountable. Moreover, while we were in Papua, there were some tentative beginnings to dialogue between the military leadership in Papua and church, NGO and indigenous leaders. So no doors seem impossible to open or even fully closed. The president also regularly meets with Christian leaders and discusses the Papua conflict with them.
and an ear and pushing an arrow through his arm. He reconciled by helping the children of his torturers with education and other difficulties children suffered when their father in the bush could not support them.

We have seen that tribal warfare\textsuperscript{100} in Papua for the most part disappeared during the middle decades of the twentieth century under mission and Dutch-led pacification backed by native police. It then rose again somewhat (though not to anywhere near the deadliness of tribal fighting in the PNG highlands)\textsuperscript{101} in recent decades, partly because it had been coopted by practitioners of Indonesia versus Papua and Freeport versus Papua politics. Traditional reconciliation continues to be used with these conflicts to positive effect. An example from near the Freeport mine in Timika was fighting in 2003 between Amungme and Dani. First, feasts were held for men involved in fighting together in the same group during the war. A second peace process feast included all family members of that conflicting group, including women and children. A third feast brought together all family members of both conflicting parties, at the end of which compensation was paid in both directions for lives lost. Sometimes, traditionally and contemporarily, there are individual as well as collective gifts; Sillitoe (1972:116) reports among the Arapesh each warrior exchanging a polished ring with any enemy he has wounded. The burning of broken arrows is also still a common feature of these rituals, as are speeches of reconciliation from both sides—little apology speeches and little forgiveness speeches at earlier stages that build up to big apology and forgiveness speeches at the finale—enemies washing together in pig fat, prayers and particular dances and songs at particular stages. Even while fighting is still occurring, leaders start the process of mediation by talking (shouting) to each other. It’s a step-by-step tradition of ritualised confidence building towards peace. A mediator is often chosen to facilitate these steps who is an older man with respect from fighters on both sides, often with connections to both but with perceived independence and lack of bias (see also Meggitt 1977:116–17). When reconciliation is finalised, it is truly finalised. It is believed terrible things will befall a person who reopens

\textsuperscript{100} Most traditional highlands fighting was not intertribal, in the sense of whole tribes mobilising against one another, but intra-tribal: family versus family, clan versus clan, village versus village or groups of villages. Were Papuan tribal warfare a pure matter of kinship cleavages, it would be less useful to be harnessed to modern resource, military and political conflicts. Sillitoe (1972:402) points out, however, the relatively unimportant role of descent in New Guinean war on both sides of the border ‘and the crucial role of big men and their small political factions struggling for existence’.

\textsuperscript{101} Between 1991 and 2006, Wiessner et al. (2007:4) analysed 338 tribal wars reported to Enga Province village courts alone, resulting in the loss of more than 3800 lives. ‘For three decades [until independence for Papua New Guinea in 1975, the] Colonial administration had enforced the ban on tribal warfare. The people were not as fearful of the new government composed of their own elected representatives as they had been of the Europeans with their wealth and technology from another world.’ Progressively the situation has also become much worse because of the erosion of the authority of their own elected representatives as they had been of the Europeans with their wealth and technology from another world.
conflict. Peacemaking practices that persist in West Papua have a great deal in common with the way Wiessner et al. (2007:9) describe pre-colonial practice in Enga (Papua New Guinea):

Essential features...were: (1) diplomatic oration, (2) the return of families to their land shortly after hostilities had ceased so that daily communication could resume, (3) the promise of future economic gain through exchange, and (4) the payment of compensation over a protracted period of two to three years to permit the healing hands of time to take effect. Once peace was established marriages were arranged between enemy clans to further strengthen ties. In short, prior to first contact with Europeans, Enga were masters of what is today called 'restorative justice'.

One dewan adat (traditional customary) leader said: ‘Papuans use bow and arrow to solve a lot of conflicts. We just want to use dialogue traditions more instead.’ Looking across to the PNG highlands shows them why—in conditions of modernity—armed mercenaries and arms dealers can complicate, protract and multiply the death caused by tribal fighting. They can also see why from their own recent history: the Indonesian military hired in effect as mercenaries by Freeport, and with divide-and-rule interests, can have the same effect. To some degree, highland people have been influenced not only by Christianity but by lowland traditions of preventive diplomacy, resolving conflict by dialogue before war and resorting to war only if dialogue fails. The highland tradition, in contrast, was ‘if you kill, there has to be a war to make balance. You must do that.’ A big-man must ‘announce it and own the war’. He declares war and at the same time prepares for peacebuilding as soon as the fighting finishes to restore balance. There are rules of war such as against killing women and children and against killing leaders who have the wealth and skills to make peace (see Wiessner et al. 2007:10). The individual declaration of responsibility for and ownership of the war is another rule. Another is that the war must be declared to occur at a specific place at a specific time, say, ‘8am to 11am, then a break, then 1–3pm’ in a specific place. This is war with a lunch break. These rules mean warfare is never total and they limit threats to the security of daily life. You can be trading at the market in the presence of your enemies during a war. No-one is going to jump on you as you walk alone or break into your home at night (in the way the Indonesian military does to instil fear). ‘You are not a true man’ if you attack outside the agreed time when the enemy is not prepared and children are kept at a safe distance.102

102 It is worth noting that not all tribal groups observed such courteous protocols in inter and intra-tribal conflicts (cf. Marind, Asmat and Kamoro in the southern lowlands of Papua).
We were told that wars such as the one just described in Timika were not traditional wars, but some completely new kind of conflict, because women were shot at night. Some call them ‘military wars’. The Indonesians also loosely call fighting in which no-one has come out and owned the war on either side ‘tribal wars’. You cannot go and talk to the owner of the conflict to find out what it is about, what its limits are. The reason, indigenous leaders said, was that if the owners of the war stepped forward, they would be the military or Brimob. Militarised indigenous conflicts are also characterised by intentional rekindling of conflicts after the reconciliation process has started and before it has finished. One strategy of the military in border areas is to hire locals as ‘operational assistant staff’, which was something also done in Aceh and East Timor (Davies 2001:29); conflict arises as their kin and neighbours come to see them as spies. Another feature of militarised fighting is that guns are brought in on one side of the conflict, making balance harder to secure. One Amungme leader said that deaths in military conflicts of the Indonesian era among his people ran at five times the level of wars that occurred before colonial pacification. This is not, however, typical. Fighting has jumped more among the Amungme because the Freeport mine is on their land. Traditional fighting was mostly about women, pigs or land. Military fighting today is about district, provincial and national politics and commercial interests, about the political economy of Indonesian capitalism and militarism. Modernisation is about ever-widening frames of identity (hamlet, clan, district, province, nation) that mobilise conflict, with perplexed highlanders even being caught up in things such as World War II and the global war on terror, and even being so unsophisticated in their understanding of it as to think that it might provide the opportunity of Israel giving them guns.

Here is a concrete example of militarised conflict from our notes of an interview with a Catholic priest:

One cause of the conflict between these two tribes was that some military picked up unsophisticated Dani young men and said to them, ‘We would like you to steal some gold and copper from Freeport.’ They think they have the backing of the military to do that, so they do it. What the military gets out of it is some gold and copper, but they also open up conflict with the Amungme. The reason the military wished to open up this conflict between tribes is that the government decided to replace the military as the main source of security for Freeport, and replace them with the police. What the military are interested in proving through creating conflict is that things were much better when they were in charge, so that the business of security for Freeport should go back to them.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{103} See Kirksey and Harsono (2008) for more on this ‘co-production’ of conflict in West Papua.
Papuan tribes are also coopted into conflict between the military and the police and even between different factions of the police over the control of illegal logging. The military is a master at creating conflict by spreading rumours about who is responsible for the death of a particular person. We were told of cases where church groups that had great authority in calling for peace and reconciliation were barred from entering conflict zones to do peacemaking work when the military wanted conflict to escalate.

We were told that in parts of the highlands more distant from the Freeport mine, Papuans experienced provocations from the military to divide them against other tribes, but that they had an understanding among the tribes that such provocations would always be (and always were) resisted. In this—the majority of the highlands—the dominant view is that tribal fighting stopped soon after the missionaries arrived and has not existed since.

In traditional war, fighting stops when there is negotiated agreement that a point has been reached where balance has been attained. A core meaning of balance is equal lives lost on both sides. This mostly keeps the loss of life in traditional highland warfare quite low. Perfect balance in lives lost is not necessary, as long as the side that loses fewer fighters pays much higher compensation (usually in pigs) in the traditional gift exchange feast at the end of the fighting. Another option has been to betray an unpopular, lazy or dangerous man (recidivist adulterers have been a common choice) to the enemy ‘so that he can be killed in an ambush’ (Sillitoe 1972:114). If one side is foolish enough to deploy a superior military capability to create an ever-widening imbalance in lives lost, it might leave an imbalance it cannot manage financially, causing perhaps the loss of large areas of traditional land where ancestors dwell.

It is also common to seal a peace through a marriage. In Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and various parts of Melanesia, there are traditions of restoring balance by allowing the aggrieved group to choose or be given a bride, as there were between clans in early modern Scotland (Braithwaite 2002:6). This is not only about balance but about building a family bridge to promote reconciliation. Sometimes men or women move in both directions between the two conflicting groups. Among the Asmat, a couple of men and a couple of women would leave both sides to be adopted into the settlements of their enemies (Sillitoe 1972:384). Abelam peace settlement was distinguished by temporary (for a few weeks) swapping of positions in villages by men of approximately equal standing (Stillitoe 1972:114). Traditionally and today in Papua, the marriage partners volunteer. In doing so, they feel they are making a contribution to peace and harmony between their two groups.
The extent to which highland beliefs about balance have been adapted by lowland and Christian influences and by contemporary realities is reflected in our research notes from a large meeting with 20 highlands independence supporters, which included some OPM members:

He spoke of the highlands belief that deaths must be repaid with deaths, with something equal so that there is a balance. That when there is a balance of deaths there could be a finish to the conflict. Special Autonomy does not seem something that provides compensation proportionate to all the deaths that Papuans have suffered. J. B. said wouldn’t it be difficult or impossible to ever achieve a balance of death given the huge numbers of Papuans who had been killed. He replied, and others chimed in, that they did not have the guns to achieve balance, so they have to find some means of achieving balance by letters, newspapers and a peace process that will lead to a better future.

This is the same shift Clifford Shearing detects in South Africa: long-suffering poor people ultimately shift their justice philosophy at the end of a long conflict from justice as a balance of benefits and burdens and justice as proportionality, to justice as a better future (Shearing and Johnston 2005). That was why the philosophy of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission became one of not wanting to spend its resources on building prisons for whites, but schools for blacks.

**Interpreting the conflict**

**What structural factors were at the root of this conflict?**

The deepest structural driver of this conflict, as argued in the introduction, was that Papua was unusual in being afflicted with two colonialisms rather than the usual one. The poverty-inducing effects of Dutch extractive colonialism were compounded by the different poverty-induction dynamics of Indonesian settler-dominated repressive-resource-exploitative colonialism that enriched settlers and pushed indigenous custodians of the land to the margins. They were also colonialisms that left the colony with weak political and economic institutions designed to sustain dependence on the coloniser (Acemoglu et al. 2004). In Mertonian opportunity theory terms, legitimate economic opportunities for Papuans were limited, while the presence of the military opened up systematic illegitimate opportunities for some. Because Indonesian internal colonialism has
been granted so little legitimacy by the people of Papua, an anomic province has been created with limited and fragmented support for the imposed normative order.

It follows that immigration actively promoted by the invading state has been another root cause. This is geopolitically impossible for Papuans to reverse, but it is possible for wise policy to cease encouraging it and to contain and better manage it. Reformasi's abolition of the transmigration program was a sound first step towards mitigating this structural driver of conflict.

An illegitimate opportunity structure driven by certain elements of a ‘resource curse’ is another structural driver. Papua is not a classic case of the resource curse in the sense of insurgents capturing resource projects to fund their insurgency. Few places on Earth are more plentifully endowed with timber, gold, copper, natural gas and fish than Papua. As countries such as Botswana that are endowed with diamonds illustrate, there is no structural inevitability that resource riches induce conflict. They create, however, an opportunity structure that attracts dividers and exploiters. In this case, resource riches (coupled with fear of communism) attracted ‘economic hitmen’ to Indonesia who had been recruited through the US intelligence services, such as John Perkins (2005, 2007). They paved the path of access to the president for Freeport. Freeport then became a major structural driver of conflict. Resources also attracted the military to stay to get ever-larger slices of this action. They accomplished this by fomenting conflict: conflict with OPM, conflict between tribes, conflict between local villagers and Freeport, conflict between Papuan elites in Jayapura and those in Timika and Manokwari, and elsewhere.

While it is no longer relevant today, the Cold War was a structural driver of the conflict. The Cold War was fundamental to US pressure on The Netherlands and other countries to give up their support for Papuan independence and to support the UN-supervised Act of Free Choice, which became a key proximate explanation of fighting. What is a constant is that Indonesia is geopolitically important, while Papua remains peripheral to Indonesia in the eyes of other major states.

What have been the proximate factors in the conflict?

If the opportunities provided by the resource curse (Collier 2007:Ch. 3) are among the structural drivers of the conflict, as explained in the previous section, the invasion of the military to pacify resistance to Indonesia and to secure Freeport are the proximate factors. The great variety of things the security forces have done to exploit the resource opportunities that we have described in this chapter is a key provocation of conflict.
Illegal logging has been shown to be a particularly potent proximate factor in many of the worsening horizontal conflicts in Papua.

Military politics in Jakarta when the rules of the game were so uncertain a decade ago also contributed to the removal of President Wahid. This ended the Papuan spring. That was a critical turning point away from a version of special autonomy that might have delivered peace. Military politics also sustained President Sukarno for the invasion of Papua and President Suharto’s exploitation of the province and subordination of its institutions.

The same military politics (married to the Ministry of Home Affairs and its ancillary agencies) was responsible for the proximate inducement to enduring conflict created by partition of Papua into two, and could result in further provinces in the future. As a Presidium member put it: ‘Indonesian diplomats have the power of pigeons, the military the power of eagles.’

The proximate factor mentioned most commonly by interviewees was the illegitimate nature of the Act of Free Choice in 1969.

What were the key triggering incidents?

Raisings of the morning star flag have been by far the most common triggering incidents for escalation of the conflict up to the most recent burning of houses and killings of villagers by the security forces in late 2009. Other kinds of demonstrations, such as by students against Freeport, have been triggers when they are seen by Brimob and the military to involve thumbing of noses at the authority of the security forces and challenges to the legitimacy of the unitary Indonesian state. Kidnappings, attacks on Indonesian police or military and sabotage of Freeport facilities have also triggered upward spikes in violent conflict.

The murder of Theys Eluay was a decisive incident that made a workable peace process very difficult. It does not, however, fit the definition of a classic triggering incident that sparks an explosion of fighting. On the contrary, it was a kind of surgical incision by the military backed by dozens of naval vessels offshore laden with military personnel that sparked a capitulation by independence supporters. Perhaps in time it will come to be seen as an incident that triggered short-term capitulation and disengagement and long-term defiant resistance. It might have both prevented war and prevented peace.
Who were the key war-making and peacebuilding actors?

Key war-making actors have clearly been the various poorly armed factions that have made up what has loosely come to be called OPM or TPN/OPM, the armed wing of the Free Papua Movement. OPM enjoys unusually high legitimacy compared with other insurgency groups, but is also unusually poorly organised in terms of communication, training, logistics and deployment capability. The Presidium leadership in 1999 and 2000 was the critical peacebuilding actor of that period and briefly enrolled most of OPM as peacebuilding actors—but only briefly. Today some OPM factions are preparing for war again.

The Indonesian security forces are the other crucial war-making actors. Until the 2000s there was no distinction between the military and the police in Papua. We have seen that during the 2000s the police mobile squad, Brimob—its most heavily armed group—has probably killed and tortured more Papuans than the military. Within the military, the most aggressive perpetrator of violence has been Kopassus, the elite special forces group. All elements of the shifting panorama of Indonesian intelligence organisations in the past half-century also seem to have been important in maintaining the momentum for conflict, as have Papua strategists at senior levels of the Home Affairs Ministry. It might be wrong to say militias are key war-making actors because they have been so rarely armed, but it would be folly not to see them as having the potential to do what their predecessors did in East Timor. The risk already being realised of them morphing into organised-crime groups is the most probable risk of a more violent future for Papua than its immediate past.

Foreign business interests—particularly Chinese and Korean with timber and American with mining—rarely intend to cause violence but have done so very often, especially when they network their security with the military and police. Paradoxically, we saw in Note 73 that this made it easier for the Papuan elites in BP’s extraction zone to want to be partitioned with them away from the more troubled resource politics of other regions.

The churches have been the most important peacebuilding actors. Missionaries rather than the thin ranks of the Dutch colonial administration did most of the legwork of the pacification of the tribal warfare that was rife until the end of the 1950s. It would not have been possible, however, without the guns supplied to native police by the Dutch state to support the peacebuilding of the missionaries. Once pacified, tribal war-makers never became key war-making actors again, but simply actors who made war occasionally when coopted to that end by the very modern politics of Freeport and the Indonesian state.
The most central human rights advocate and peacebuilding actor in networking Papua Land of Peace in the past few years has been the Catholic Office for Justice and Peace (SKP). A very active local human rights advocacy partner of SKP during the first half of this decade and in the late 1990s was Elsham (the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy, based in Jayapura). Its head, John Rumbiak, was forced to flee Indonesia. Rumbiak did not advocate independence, but was an eloquent, internationally respected campaigner for human rights and peace in Papua. Tragically, he suffered a stroke in 2005 that left him incapable of continuing his work with Elsham.

In 2007, Yap-HAM was a very active and effective human rights NGO in the highlands, struggling to document instances of torture with almost no international assistance, though it networked with Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The Legal Aid Foundation has an important role in providing legal representation in human rights cases and the national human rights group Kontras and Komnas-Ham and its NGO networks have also been important.

Most of these NGOs are much less internationally networked than in all the other cases in the first four volumes of Peacebuilding Compared. UN agencies have much less presence and impact in Papua to assist in this networking than with our other cases. The churches are very well networked internationally, as are some of the human rights NGOs. Where they exist, these international linkages are crucial for mobilising international pressure. Some human rights NGOs, however, receive no international financial or networking support. Women's NGOs were particularly unusual in their limited or non-existent international networking. In other case studies, these were the most internationally networked of all NGO types. International environmental NGOs also have a surprisingly limited presence. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) does a great job in Merauke with a ‘collaborative mapping’ project with customary communities. On the same map, the journeys of the ancestors and sacred sites are plotted, as are water sources, environmentally sensitive forests and habitats important for indigenous food supply. These collaborative maps define hot spots of mutual threat to indigenous and environmental values. They are overlayed on the state’s planning maps, with their vast allocations to new oil-palm, logging and rice-paddy development. As exciting as this work is, neither WWF nor any other international environmental NGO has an office in the town of Timika, which is the gateway to the greatest environmental hot spot in the South Pacific: the region of the Freeport mine.104

104 WWF has a program to monitor the 2 million hectare Lorentz National Park/World Heritage Site, but meagre resources to maintain or build programs in the region.
There are several hundred (government-registered) NGOs operating in Papua. Of these, 64 are networked through the NGO forum FOKER. Our experience of the NGO culture, which was fairly rich during our fieldwork, was that it was not competitive. NGOs in Papua help each other—something joyously manifest at a FOKER picnic we were able to attend and in many other contexts. The Dewan Adat Papua, or Papuan Customary Council, is also a rich networking institution, linking 250 tribal leaders in conversation. One perceptive Papuan NGO leader, however, identified the following weakness: ‘Most people have big dreams in this [peacebuilding] business, but do not have a sense of how to take small steps towards them.’

The student movement is weaker today than it was before the 16 March 2006 Abepura incident when anti-Freeport protesters, predominantly students, killed four police and one military intelligence operative after they were fired on. Brimob retaliated, torturing 24 students, with 23 of them sentenced to five–15 years in prison; 20 other students fled to Papua New Guinea. They have been brutally suppressed and are more fragmented than they were. Former students of Cenderawash University in Abepura in particular had fanned across the province to coordinate resistance networks from their villages (King 2004:44). When we organised a meeting with Christian student leaders in Abepura, after one with Muslim Student Association leaders, 70 attended. We were expecting a few to turn up for an informal discussion. The meeting ran for hours; some said they were still recovering from trauma at the meeting and some sadly did seem to be in that state.

Most members of the Jakarta and Jayapura security establishment see the Church and human rights groups as fronts for separatism. Some old OPM players see them this way too; they say ‘we got nowhere for so many years fighting in the jungle; it’s time now to see if the churches and students can build international pressure for a referendum’. It would be silly to say this perception from hardliners on both sides of the debate is never true. What we suspect is true is that the religious leaders in Papua Land of Peace are genuinely about peace and respect for human rights; among them are people with a wide range of views on how realistic or desirable is independence. They are a coalition that believes there are deep injustices in Papua and that armed conflict is not a way to address them in a sustainable way. There are important links between the human rights coalitions and the organisations linked more to OPM. The West

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105 The perception that Christian churches in Papua are pro-independence (and anti-Indonesian) is not new. As early as the mid-1950s, this perception threatened to break apart the Dutch Reformed Church, the main Protestant congregation in Netherlands New Guinea (see van de Wal 2006). Papuan churches have struggled ever since to fulfil their spiritual and moral obligations to their congregations (and thereby civil society) while abiding by the authority of the Indonesian state.
Papua National Coalition for Liberation has potential to refine these linkages to help unify a negotiating forum on terms for a peace agreement with Jakarta (see Tebay 2009).

The actor with the greatest potential to be a peacebuilder is the president. President Wahid, for a brief period, was the only Indonesian president to ever be a committed peacebuilder for Papua. The current president has been a disappointment in Papua, unwilling to stand up to the military as the actor most responsible for the conflict, in the way he has been willing to take a stand in Aceh after the tsunami. Similarly, his first Vice-President, Jusuf Kalla, who played an even more prominent role than his president in Aceh, Maluku and Central Sulawesi as a peacebuilder, has been a game player with the business politics of partition of Papua with an eye to his business interests in the west of Papua.

The media, nationally and internationally, and the international diplomatic community have also been quiescent and unimaginative actors in efforts to open up paths to peace. Even when promising peacebuilding efforts from below occur, such as Papua Land of Peace, the journalists and the diplomats, with a few exceptions, have not pushed the bandwagon forward in important ways. Australian diplomacy has been especially insipid in this regard.

The other actors with under-utilised potential as peacebuilders have been students in Papua. University students have been inspiring in their struggles for merdeka, for human rights and for regulation of the environmental destruction caused by the Freeport mine. So far, however, they lack a creative vision of how to make a struggle for merdeka with peace work. Still, there is great idealism and fortitude beating in the breasts of the students that one can sense is waiting for the bell of history to toll. The terrible fear is that the bell will toll above a river of their blood.

Motivational postures of key actors

Valerie Braithwaite (2009) defines motivational postures as sets of beliefs and attitudes that sum up how actors feel about and wish to position themselves in relation to a source of authority. We have seen that there are many authorities in contest in Papua: different levels of Indonesian-led and Papuan-led government, the authority of big-men and hereditary chiefs and elders of the clan and a military that in some ways stands above the authority of elected officials, especially Papuan ones. Then there have been times and places where the authority of OPM and the Presidium has been central.

Actors send signals to an authority (be it a government agency, a big-man or a militia) about how it is regarded and how much social distance is placed between
them and the authority. Beliefs and attitudes making up each motivational posture are based on an appraisal of what the authority stands for, what it is demanding and how it engages with the needs and aspirations of those it seeks to govern. Valerie Braithwaite’s factor analytic studies of beliefs and attitudes of businesses responding to regulators and ordinary and sophisticated taxpayers towards tax authorities empirically found five motivational postures as recurrently fundamental to the human condition.

- **Commitment** means willingly embracing the mission of the authority.
- **Capitulation** means surrender to the will of an authority and to the letter of its law without fully embracing its spirit.
- **Resistance** means vocal opposition to the power the authority has and how it uses it; resistance is about grievance.
- **Disengagement** means psychological dissociation that renders an actor immune to attempts by an authority to steer their actions.
- **Game playing** is a more imaginative and bold practice for escaping constraint by redefining rules, moving goalposts or repositioning the self. It implies keen engagement with the rules of the game, analysing regulatory and governance systems with disarming acuity and clarity of purpose. Authorities are not resented; they are playing the game too, just on a different team. More often than not, game playing is about greed.

It is often difficult to say whether a war is more about greed (and game playing) than grievance (and resistance). This is less so with the Papuan conflict, where most indigenous Papuans feel a deep sense of grievance and want merdeka. Many undoubtedly would sacrifice themselves to join a fight if they thought the fight had a chance to succeed in redressing injustice. ‘We are fighting for our dignity, our independence,’ said a Paniai TPN/OPM commander. When we interviewed older and younger-generation OPM members, they said they joined up because of their sense of injustice. Some mentioned things done to their relatives by the military—a collective memory of suffering, or Papuan memoria passionis. Nearly all mentioned the farce that was the 1969 Act of Free Choice. Many said they gave the Zone of Peace or the Land of Peace a try early in the 2000s, but now that they had been betrayed by special autonomy and attacks on leaders such as Theys Eluay, insurgency resistance and international pressure were the only paths left. It is just a matter of waiting for the right opportunity, such as being able to get the guns.

By the early 1960s, there was an educated Papuan elite who saw themselves having a personal interest in promoting the idea of a Papuan identity, as opposed to clan and tribal identity, and an independent Papua of which they would
be leaders. Gaming identities to pursue greed provides an even less plausible account today of why individual Papuans would be so irrational as to resist Indonesia.

Economic self-interest is, however, very much a factor in why many OPM fighters capitulate. Some nationalist Papuan leaders have allowed themselves to be caught up in business relationships with the military, with Freeport, or both. William Onde was a colourful OPM leader in the Boven Digoel District on the PNG border. He was on the take from Kopassus and the Korean oil-palm plantation developer Korindo, for whom he even drew a salary as a company security guard. He overplayed his hand in his double game when, hardly within the spirit of the deal of allowing Korindo to go about its business without being harassed, he kidnapped 16 Korindo employees in 2001. Among a list of OPM-relevant demands such as withdrawal of Brimob personnel from the district was: ‘Korindo payment of Rp.2.4 million tab in the Nikita bar, Merauke’ (ICG 2007c:8)! Some months later, Onde and his deputy, John Tumin, were murdered, probably by Kopassus (ICG 2007c:8).

Some OPM commanders have been paid by the military to commit provocations that justify a sweep and retaliations the military wishes to execute. Provocations also help the police and military justify more posts (that generate more corruption and business revenue) and bigger budgets from Jakarta. Other OPM are paid as spies. In this business, the Indonesian security sector is acutely pragmatic; they are the consummate game players. Leaders are not asked to renounce separatism; more often they are paid in return for specific, strategic forms of capitulation. The carrot is used to steer rather than destroy. The stick is used to destroy. More than a few OPM leaders who entered business relationships in return for allowing themselves to be steered by the military were subsequently assassinated when they were no longer worth steering. It is not only leaders who capitulate in a self-interested grasp for carrots. A prominent local journalist explained:

> The military do pursue them [fighters] into the jungle. The military and government try to persuade them to come in from the jungle. This is partly to reduce tension across the border. And they want to come back, [they] miss their kids. They ask and government sends out a negotiating team to talk to them. They are given guarantees that they will not be punished when [they] return. In fact, [their return] causes some investment in their village…The government puts in a house-building project in the village so there will be houses for the fighters when they return.

The military does some work for the contractors on the house building ‘to show they are part of the community’. There are none of the concerns Western
governments have about ‘negotiating with terrorists’, or with rewarding them for their crimes against the state. There is probably not much of a moral hazard problem here for Indonesia. Privation hiding in the jungle with a significant risk that either you or your family members will be killed is a high price to pay for a humble Papuan house to be built for you. It would be stretching truth to call the ‘carrot’ of a house ‘combatant reintegration’. Such returnees are watched, perhaps used, not trusted. They capitulate to the might of the Indonesian military while persisting with defiant resistance of the idea of Indonesian rule over them. Reintegration connotes reintegration to some level of commitment to the rule of the state’s law. That is hardly being accomplished in Papua.106

While the appearance of the military and the police is of organisations with fervent commitment to the Indonesian State—and there is a lot of reality to this appearance—it is also true that the security forces are consummate game players of state, provincial, local and indigenous authority structures. Papuans have little attachment to the Indonesian state, but do continue to have considerable commitment to their clan and other traditional authority structures and leaders. The tragedy of Papua is that Indonesia has sought to build loyalty to its state by undermining commitment to indigenous authority structures. During the New Order of President Suharto, the policy was to marginalise traditional local leaders by supplanting them with government officials loyal to the Indonesian State (Howard et al. 2002). Law 5 of 1979 usurped traditional leaders with an imposed Indonesian local leadership structure that was one-size-fits-all across Indonesia. The erosion of the legitimacy of indigenous leaders in conflict resolution did not end traditional dispute resolution. Without legitimacy, however, there was less commitment to local and national law and there was no distaste of forum shopping for the best outcome. Collapse of legitimacy supplants commitment with game playing.

Land law is a good example. Traditionally there were hardly clear land laws—rather a plurality of contested claims to overlapping land usages. The elders said, however, there were clear powers to settle land matters. What was settled was who had the legitimacy to settle. That legitimacy was unsettled by arbitrary trumping by game players who invoked Indonesian land law and the Indonesian Constitution (Article 33.3) on state ownership of land. This also made it easy for game players to use the military to seize coveted land on behalf of the state. Among the Sentani people, whose ancestral lands today constitute part of greater Jayapura, each clan has an Ondoafi and there is a big Ondoafi (an Ondofolo or tribal leader) recognised for inter-clan disputes. In land disputes, the Ondofolo is procedurally bound to consult thoughtfully with all groups involved in the land dispute. When a political game player gets Kopassus to

106 Similar concerns apply in the repatriation of West Papuans who have lived in exile in Papua New Guinea for decades but recently have been enticed to return to Papua.
enforce their claim without traditional consultation, however, conditions for horizontal conflict are created by a military intervention that lacks legitimacy. Where traditional authority over land is no longer working—for example, in disputes over property between two trading companies downtown—elders have no problem with state law taking over, just as they have no problem with its sway in intellectual property or international trade disputes. For disputes of modernity, they see virtue in commitment to state legal authority; for disputes with traditional dimensions, for example, they think the state should defer to Ondofolo.

We have seen that while failing to build the desired level of commitment to the state, the security forces have done considerable damage to commitment to indigenous authority by fomenting militarised tribal wars, by bribing, inebriating and tempting traditional leaders with prostitution in return for selling out their people on crucial issues such as logging. The outcome of this process is a reduced level of commitment to the Indonesian state and to traditional authority structures, causing widespread anomie and disengagement. Disengagement is associated with other problems worsening, such as alcohol abuse and domestic violence. The reality that the supposed paragons of loyal commitment to the Indonesian state are in fact game players, corrupting the financial integrity of the state and its rule of law also fosters disengagement among Papuans. At a more macro-level, we have seen how this has promoted disengagement of Papuan bureaucrats from the special autonomy that could have become the great accomplishment of the Papuan spring.

In this sense, Indonesian colonialism in Papua has had an effect similar to white settler colonialism on the fabric of Aboriginal Australian society. Defiant resistance to white Australia is the healthy and hopeful part of Aboriginal reaction. The more widespread and pathological reaction is disengagement and a total loss of hope, giving up on the future of their children. This disengagement problem is nowhere near as deep a problem with indigenous Papuans as it has become with Indigenous Australians. That might only be because settler domination has been statistically and demographically less overwhelming in the Papuan case and has had fewer decades to do its decimation of traditional authority. What is worse even than in Aboriginal Australia, however, is access to education and health care. We know that education and good health are vital paths to empowerment. We know that educational failure is a path to disengagement, as is a particularly chronic affliction with the exhaustion of malaria. Malaria infection intensity has recently been found in sophisticated econometric work to be the strongest predictor of economic backwardness in

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Africa (Bhattacharyya 2008). Merdeka is imbued with the meaning of resistant defiance of settler hegemony, in defence of dignity through adat. This is why merdeka is a path away from disengagement, a path of hope.

One senior government official in Papua in effect suggested that Papuans needed to shift from disengagement and capitulation to joining the game of the game players in the military, and to resistance: ‘Papuans need to learn to say no to the central government. The way forward is to be assertive with what the law says, to use your authority.’ He used the example of Papuan concerns about being flooded by Indonesian migrants: ‘We must limit immigration. We have power to do that under special autonomy.’ The director of an international NGO made a similar point: ‘No-one is courageous enough to support things like setting up a trade union for big employers. It’s very cultural.’ Despite such political and cultural impediments, however, growing numbers of Papuan students in recent years have joined indigenous student groups, and a Freeport Papuan Employees’ Union (Tongoi Papua) has emerged as a key stakeholder in the future of Freeport (see Cookson 2008:367–79).

There is a great deal of the motivational posture of disengagement among Papuans. We see it among teachers—mostly migrants but also Papuans—who fail to turn up to school to teach their class. We also see a lot of commitment among Papuans—to their clan, their church, to Papua and its independence, but little to Indonesia. Doubtless this reflected some selection bias with our interviews, but we did not interview a single Papuan who was strongly committed to Indonesia, not even among senior bureaucrats. We saw evidence of these civil servants feigning commitment to Indonesia. In reality, however, some seemed disengaged, others resistant and many capitulated in their posture towards the Indonesian state. The last went through the motions with their job. Some of the more disengaged civil servants did not even do that, using their time at work primarily for running a private business. We met one at an OPM gathering whose dominant motivational posture was resistance, though he was also a game player, using the civil service to present a different self that would win him his salary, while being a kind of fifth column within it.

The conclusion here is that commitment and resistance have been the motivational postures in decline since the end of the Papuan spring, and disengagement, gameplaying and capitulation the postures on the rise. This is the motivational climate of a most dangerous calm as we write. Military and police coercion crushed overt resistance at the end of the Papuan spring, but Indonesian military and political game players did not lay out paths for building commitment to their state among Papuans. They secured widespread capitulation without commitment. And they did that using means that left deep residues of Papuan resentment and loss of dignity.
Coercion by the security apparatus of the state tends to simultaneously increase *capitulation* (through rational deterrence) and *defiant resistance* (through emotional reaction) (Brehm and Brehm 1981; see also Sherman’s 1993 defiance theory). Compliance in Figure 2.1 is the sum of a *resistance* effect and a *capitulation* effect. At low levels of coercion, the *resistance* curve in Figure 2.1 is steeper than the *capitulation* curve. At extreme levels of coercion, however, as Brehm and Brehm (1981) have shown to be demonstrated by many psychological experiments, people give up on *resistance*. In the end, tyranny works. The *capitulation* curve becomes steeper than the *resistance* curve; beyond that tipping point people comply rather than defy. Hegre et al. (2001) find a similar pattern with data on the relationship between autocracy and civil war: rising autocracy increases conflict until it becomes quite harsh. Past that tipping point, further increases in repression reduce the odds of civil war. It must be added, however, that when ‘state failure’ does occur (defined by the State Failure Project as internal war and/or political collapse), this is 3.5 times more likely to degenerate further into genocide or politicide when the outgoing regime is highly autocratic (Harff 2003). Indonesia’s politicide against communists at the time of the collapse of Sukarno’s ‘guided democracy’ in 1965–66 was one of the politicides correctly classified by Harff’s model. More interestingly, one of the
seven non-genocides that were false positives predicted by the variables in the model across 126 internal wars or regime collapses between 1955 and 1997 was the dissolution of Suharto’s New Order in 1997.

A paradox could be, in addition, that each round of coercion builds up more resistance in the oppressed community. Then when the next round of coercion is required to counter that build-up of contained resistance, the bar is raised on the level of coercion required to secure capitulation. Successful insurgency does not depend on everyone being so defiant that they overcome the rational incentives to capitulate, only enough to execute the hit-and-run war. If the level of coercion required to secure control ultimately becomes so high as to provoke international outrage against Indonesia then Indonesia ultimately falls into a coercion trap of its own making. Again, the quantitative evidence on the dynamics of 114 civil wars analysed by De Rouen and Sobek (2004) provides some support:

These results indicate that the use of a strong army against an insurgency could exacerbate the civil war if the state cannot win an early victory. This places states in a ‘catch-22’, where the use of the army may win the battles but lose the war. By not using the army, however, the government may signal weakness and encourage more resistance. Indeed…[the evidence shows] chances for government victory plummet if quick victory is not achieved. [The evidence also shows]…that time is potentially the rebel’s friend. (De Rouen and Sobek 2004:317)

Indonesian security strategists should therefore not take great comfort in comparing OPM military capitulation to them with the (partial) capitulation of the PNG state to the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (see Peacebuilding Compared, Working Paper 6). Yes, PNG security forces were logistically incapable of escalating their coercive power to the crossover point of Figure 2.1, whereas the Indonesian military was able to do that. On the downside, however, the Indonesian state has to go into the future with far deeper levels of hatred towards Jakarta in the hearts of young Papuans than Port Moresby has to contend with among young Bougainvilleans (at least at the time of writing). While there is no doubt militarily about the capacity of the Indonesian state to keep coercion above the crossover point in Figure 2.1—just as there was no doubt about that in East Timor—the question is whether it is able diplomatically to keep the coercion up there in the long run of history. The answer is that it is unlikely to be able to unless it comes to the table and persuades the angry young people of Papua that this time the dawn will not be false, Papua will have merdeka in a way that is meaningful and sustainable. A shared commitment by all sides to an international or national peace process is a long way off, because, as one Protestant leader put it: ‘The bottom line is Papuans don’t trust Jakarta
and Jakarta does not trust Papua.’ The conflict between Indonesian authority and tribal traditional authority has so undermined commitment to both that rebuilding trust will be a gradual and great challenge.

**Peacebuilding strengths and weaknesses**

Two strengths of the push for peace in Papua are very widespread commitment to peace and the belief that violence is the wrong way to try to pave a path to justice. Long-serving OPM insurgents are tired of fighting and missing their families while they are in the bush; fighting is not their preferred path to their objectives. The religious leaders—Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu—have consistently worked cooperatively for peace. Launching Papua Land of Peace is just one recent manifestation of this. At times of tension, killing or even conflict in other parts of Indonesia, they network by holding joint prayers for peace. Critics say while this collaboration is outstanding in the capital, in other parts of Papua it is more muted.

The Papua Land of Peace campaign and international pressure mediated through human rights and church groups seem to be the key pressures for peace. Powerful actors such as the United States and the President of Indonesia are influenced by these pressures, however, much less than by the pressures coming from the Indonesian military and Freeport. They see little threatened by conflict in Papua. Trade is not threatened in a major way, military alliances are not threatened by it and it is no longer the sort of conflict the Cold War might play into. Sophisticated thinkers might see some opportunity costs of the poor investment climate created by conflict in Papua, but while Freeport and BP continue to invest, this source of pressure for peace is also limited.

Resource riches are both an opportunity and a threat for Papua. We have seen how natural resource endowments in Papua, as in Aceh (see Chapter 6), are so much greater than the rest of Indonesia and engender separatism of and partition within Papua itself, with both sorts of game playing fuelling conflict. We know that a resource such as diamonds can be a curse for Sierra Leone and a foundation for diversified development in Botswana. Papua and Jakarta need a dialogue that helps them to see that they do have the choice in their hands to build the resource management and effective governance institutions of Botswana. Foreign resource developers have a role here too—a role, for example, where BP has shown a more collaborative, peace-sensitive approach than Freeport. Logging has been a curse, but now the Kyoto-Copenhagen climate change agenda renders it an opportunity for Papua. The opportunity is to be paid by the industrial carbon emitters to shelve some of its grandiose oil-palm plantation plans as an offset. Because Indonesia has the fastest rate of deforestation on the globe, it can be counted as the third biggest contributor
to greenhouse gas increases after the United States and China (Petersson 2007). Deforestation is the cause of nearly 20 per cent of global emissions of carbon dioxide, according to the Stern Review (Stern 2006).

While there is considerable fear of the Islamisation of Papua among Christian Papuans, strengths of Papuan peacebuilding are the climate of religious tolerance and commitment of religious leaders to work together. In the face of a religious divide that maps onto a racial and class divide much more sharply than anywhere else in Indonesia, New Guinea is one of the few major islands of Indonesia where churches or mosques have not been burnt or bombed. As one NGO leader put it: ‘All efforts to turn this conflict into a religious conflict failed.’ Chinese have also not been targeted in the violence, as has happened in most of the conflict areas of the region. Nevertheless, the ICG (2008a) warns of some specific tensions that have grown in recent years, especially in Manokwari over Christian efforts to ban construction of a large mosque and declare Manokwari a ‘gospel city’ through a draft district regulation.

Another strength is that for no player is outright war their preferred outcome, though containable intermittent conflict could be the preferred outcome of sections of the military leadership who benefit financially from it. There is a peace culture in Papua that is very widespread. A weakness is that the military is undermining that peace culture by covert and overt killing and torture and by forming ‘militias’ that put fear into the hearts of Papuans. Two informants alleged military leaders had a sophisticated strategy of causing horizontal conflict between Papuans and migrants, as opposed to vertical conflict between the state and insurgents, should another president seek to take merdeka for Papua in a direction they did not like.

Investment is a weakness for Papua and peacebuilding efforts are really not tackling the investment climate. Super-profits from mineral resources still attract investment in bad security climates. One government official told us there were 55 companies engaged in foreign direct investment in Papua in the 1990s; in 2007, only five of these were still in Papua. While other parts of Indonesia recovered completely from the violence, insecurity and economic contraction of the late 1990s, Papua never recovered investment confidence. Many Papuans do not want investment: ‘Investment is not the solution we Papuans are looking for’ (Christian student leader) because when companies come ‘there is rape’, the military comes and people lose their human rights. Promises are made to employ Papuans but they are put off at the first excuse in favour of immigrants. Investment therefore ‘does not make us better off’.

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108 Not surprisingly, the Indonesian Employers’ Association in Papua said to us the investment climate was really quite good. They bring potential investors to Papua to see what a safe investment environment it now is and when this happens they are generally surprised that it is more secure than they thought.
Women seem to be disproportionately disadvantaged by this contraction. Whereas in most developing economies, women’s participation in the formal sector of the economy rises over time, Papua is an exception. Female labour force participation is moving down (Mollet Forthcoming). Women’s rights is a general area of greater weakness than in the other 10 cases of the first wave of Peacebuilding Compared. Women’s NGOs are less internationally networked and less internationally supported than elsewhere. Some women are being dominated by the gun into sexual liaisons with Indonesian soldiers that they do not want and are caught up in the worst AIDS epidemic in Indonesia and in infanticide. Rape has been used to intimidate women who become politically active (Coomaraswamy 1999; Brundige et al. 2004:63). Papuan women have found it difficult to show the leadership we see in other parts of Melanesia such as Bougainville and in leading campaigns against tribal fighting in Papua New Guinea (Rumsey 2000), and indeed in many places. We have seen that traditionally women are involved only in the later stages of resolution of armed conflict and reconciliation, particularly through women’s dances. This has not changed greatly. When we asked women about it they said there was nothing much they could do until men had worked through towards the end of their conflict, until the men saw balance or a hurting stalemate. An exception was when men had hit a roadblock with a spoiler, women who had the spoiler’s ear might then be asked to reason with him. Polygamy is perhaps not greatly less widespread in the highlands than it ever was. When women compete for the attention of a husband, it is not the easiest context for women to usurp traditional prerogatives of their men to become the peacemakers. Mollet’s (Forthcoming) surveys of women’s work in four districts of Papua show enormous workloads for women in the informal sector of the economy, such as in agriculture. Women work more than a 60-hour week, averaging more than 10 hours a day in the fields six days a week, and often sleeping there. Women also spend 5–6 hours a week on average on religious activities—an amount that is much higher for the women who are most active in organising church activities (Mollet Forthcoming). There is little time for women to be active in demanding their own rights.109

Women were thinly represented at the 2000 congresses. The five top leaders of the Presidium were male and of the wider leadership circle of 29 only two were female. The requirement of the special autonomy law that one-third of the MRP be women was a big step forward for women that was often neglected in the debate on special autonomy—though with the MRP emasculated into little more than a consultative body, it was not the victory women might have hoped for. We have seen that migrant women in Papua have deep fears of secessionist

109 Some of the women’s leaders we interviewed felt that women were given leadership roles as a result of the arrival of Christianity, in areas that included education, peacebuilding and leading services in the Church. When the Indonesians came, however, ‘this prominence of women slipped back’.
violence. Weaknesses in peacebuilding are opportunities to become strengths. One is for Muslim Indonesian and Christian Papuan women to hold out their hands to support each other with the different kinds of fear they experience, thereby opening a new peacebuilding front.

If the leadership of women in general is not a strength compared with other Melanesian cases in Peacebuilding Compared such as Bougainville, the leadership of students—including some young women who are the most brilliant orators among the students we have met—is inspiring. On the other hand, the students did not seem pragmatic enough to be politically effective. Here are some of our notes after a three-hour meeting with 70 students in Abepura in November 2007:

To conclude, this was an inspiring, engaged meeting. It shows why students are the source of vitality, even students who have suffered great trauma as some of these had...In a sense it reminded me of the Vietnam War days in Australia. On the other hand, there was an orthodoxy in the radical analysis. There was not an examination in a hard-headed way of alternative pragmatic approaches...While no one was game, or perhaps even thought it was right to say that a return to arms was the way, there was a kind of exasperation that led to a feeling that this might be inevitable. Even though, like their own demonstrations that caused some of them to lose their lives and so many arrested and tortured, even though this did not achieve a lot, there was a feeling of what else could you do but stand on your dignity......[T]here was a feeling that the rounds of applause [for those who spoke for independence] was rabble-rousing, [and] went only to those who expressed the simple solution.

We were given a video of the Abepura riot of 2006 in which these students were involved. One cannot but be struck by their courage as they attack a phalanx, a formed unit, of Brimob (heavily armed riot police) who seem to outnumber them and fire live rounds at them. Somehow, through sheer courage, they manage to break up the police formation through salvos of heavy rocks. When they break them off, they pound them to death with the rocks (killing five). They were so brave, but so brutal and it was dispiriting to see lives destroyed on both sides of the riot shields. While it seems so clear that universities are where there is the hope and the passion and the talent for the future, here in Abepura the students are not being educated in deliberative pathfinding towards a better future. We explicitly and repeatedly asked them, ‘What is the best path forward now?’ There would be a speech on independence and applause. ‘Yes, but what is the best strategy for getting to that point?’ There would be another speech on how much suffering there had been, ending with another call for merdeka. Papuan universities seem to us to be failing to engage with their students as responsive, powerful democratic actors, who have better weapons of the weak at
their disposal than rocks. International educational support for Papuan students in leadership and negotiation skills could be useful here, to reinvigorate and reinvent traditions of diplomacy and oratory prized by their ancestors.

Corruption is both a deterrent and an attractor of investment. The investment it attracts is often investment of a kind that would not make economic or environmental sense in the absence of the bribe. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for 2007 ranked Indonesia 143, while the countries with the worst corruption rankings were Somalia and Myanmar, with ranks of 179. Within Indonesia, the evidence and the debate are only over whether Papua is the most corrupt or second-most corrupt province. While other parts of Indonesia have seen serious progress in the past three years in combating corruption, Papua has not been part of this progress. So there are few places on Earth with more corruption than contemporary Papua. This is one reason within Indonesia why Papua is ranked 26 places lower in the UN Human Development Index than in GDP; resource endowments are not being harnessed to provide services for people (HRW 2007b:18).

When institutions function so exceptionally badly as in Papua, it is sometimes necessary to find ways to channel monies in ways that bypass state bureaucracies—for example, supporting education through the large system of hundreds of Christian schools where teachers turn up and students learn. The Governor of Papua, Barnabas Suebu, says he is visiting every single village in Papua—2600 of them—delivering R100 million a year to each for five years through Project Respek (Rencana Strategis Pembangunan Kampung). Every village has a semi-independent facilitator of this spending—for example, a university lecturer appointed by the government at arm’s length from both the village and the state. The facilitator’s job is to ensure the money does not simply go into the pockets of big-men and their cronies. This is obviously no panacea; in a province with a deep culture of corruption, not all the risks of big-men taking money for their own uses will be averted. As a result, there is a worry that Project Respek is already another case of worsening anomie from raising expectations without being able to deliver on promises. One Papuan leader worried about this money being handed over in advance of a plan for how to use it, arguing for a plan then money rather than money then a plan. In a province lacking a culture of public investment, there is no guarantee that the whole community will not invest the windfall in immediate consumption as opposed to infrastructure that will benefit their grandchildren. Democracies must, however, learn a culture of public investment and learn how to budget rather than splurge through doing, through being given the kind of trust the governor’s R100 million gives them. The micro-finance initiatives that might emerge from this program could also be strategic in promoting local community prosperity and peace in Papua.
In future chapters, we will describe the promise of the new local bottom-up planning process of the *Musrenbang* (*Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan*), across Indonesia in learning how to govern from below. This was only beginning in Papua at the time of our fieldwork. The idea is that there will be a local link between *Musrenbang* planning and planning to spend the R100 million. This could be one solution to the problem of the handout culture in Papuan governance. The *Musrenbang* design can dampen expectations of handouts that are not contingent on accountability for spending the last tranche on village development, and contingent on an advance plan that justifies the next tranche.

A final criticism of this program is that it is inefficient for the governor and his retinue to invest in the travel costs needed to visit every village. In cost-efficient program delivery terms, yes, but there is also a quite different rationale for democratic leaders of predominantly village societies to get around the villages talking to them as well as to the folk in the capital. A final problem has been game playing the proposal by the creation of new villages. Jayawijaya District Parliament wins the game-playing award with its proposal to create 600 new villages that could each collect the R100 million (ICG 2007c:4)!

Militarisation is a weakness that drives many of the other weaknesses. Military corruption is the number-one form of corruption that drives the culture of corruption. Military provocations create the climate of insecurity and corruption that deters investment. Military abuse of women, as we have seen, is an important driver of their disempowerment.

Education and health systems that do not work for indigenous Papuans are other weaknesses. Education helps ameliorate the disadvantage that Indonesian immigration policies have created: ‘Migrants take control of everything because they have more skills. Therefore education is a top priority’ (Marind customary leader). This is a result of a more general weakness that we might call the failure of the Papuan bureaucracy to work. Widjojo et al. (2008) suggest there is a paradox that the considerable Papuanisation of the bureaucracy has benefited elite Papuans while leaving ordinary Papuans worse served by it. If the bureaucracy worked, when teachers did not turn up to their school, they would lose their job. Corruption and militarisation are in turn root causes of bureaucratic inertia. Because the military really runs the government when the going gets tough, bureaucrats feel they lack power; they feel they are not public servants but military servants. Corruption also ensures the most corrupt rather than the most competent rise to the top of the bureaucracy. Much of special autonomy has not been delivered because of sheer technocratic ineptitude. Jakarta takes bureaucrats to the capital for capacity building, which is laudable in principle, but how much of it is pursuant to securing capitulation to Jakarta, even to enhancing the very corruptibility that is at the root of the problem, as opposed to technocratic competence?
Most bureaucrats seemed to have been highly committed to special autonomy for a year or so after it came into existence; but once they concluded Jakarta was not committed to it, they disengaged from their job as its executors. Papuan bureaucratic disengagement further convinced Jakarta that special autonomy was not something to work at, but rather something to weasel out of. This in turn encouraged bureaucrats to become game players—getting as much out of special autonomy as they could for their own families. A vicious circle was allowed to fester by Jakarta that saw the Papuan civil service shift from commitment to disengagement to game playing. Some whom we interviewed saw President Yudhoyono as part of this vicious circle: he was initially enthusiastic about special autonomy—an enthusiasm that faded and then seemed to almost evaporate altogether. Such commentators say: ‘They want to tell the world that they have given a large amount of money to Papua’ and if the Papuans can’t manage it ‘that’s about their poor level of development ability’.

A strength that so far has had limited application is the rich tradition of reconciliation and peacemaking among the peoples of Papua. Because they had war-making traditions until the 1950s, they also developed sophisticated skills in limiting the impact of war and negotiating and consolidating peace. The biggest weakness of peace processes in Papua has been that there has been so little reconciliation of any kind between the Indonesian state and the people of Papua—at either the provincial level or the village level, but in particular so little that has drawn on indigenous cultural resources for reconciliation. Where conversations and abortive peace processes have occurred, OPM has not been included in them. No truth and reconciliation commission has been established even though the special autonomy law requires this. Trauma counselling for victims has also been very thinly provided to villages thick with traumatised people.

On the other hand, a peacebuilding strength is that when insurgents give up the fight and come in from the bush, villages and the military work together to build them a house and to secure their reintegration back into village life.

Contests of principles

The distinctive contest of ideas around principles is about the meaning of the principles of _merdeka_ and autonomy and how they fit together. The thinking of Benny Giay, Agus Sumule, Jason MacLeod and Brigham Golden has shown the potential of a new dialogue to which Indonesia could find the courage to commit over what autonomy with _merdeka_ might mean, how it might incorporate Papuan _adat_, liberation theology, _hai_ and _mobu_ and connect to the Papua Land of Peace principles of ‘awareness and respect for plurality, justice, unity, harmony, solidarity, togetherness, sincere fraternity and welfare’ (Tebay
2006:37). Clifford Shearing’s ‘justice as a new future’ grounded in the black South African vision of freedom from white domination seems resonant with the Papuan voices in our interviews. Rectification as *memoria passionis* is a Christian principle that connects effectively to Melanesian memory of suffering that cannot be suppressed without being confronted and resolved.

A fresh dialogue might simultaneously involve some confidence-building concessions from Jakarta and a commitment from all stakeholders to put aside their irreconcilable positions on matters such as an independence referendum while they at first discuss only what these principles should be. Then, much later, more hard-edged negotiations might begin that are not position based (Fisher and Ury 1981) but that involve creative engagement with pursuit of the agreed principles.

**Preliminary conclusions**

Quantitative peace researchers might code the Papua case as one that crosses the threshold into civil war only for brief periods in every decade since the 1960s—wars that end and then restart years later. In fact, during the years after each ‘war’ the negative peace (absence of killing) was never total. Isolated small-scale fighting, bombing and kidnapping would always be erupting somewhere in Papua during the years of ‘peace’. Papua also has experienced no positive peace for 47 years; it has had a *memoria passionis*. In this research, positive peace means commitment to peace and commitment to the legitimacy of the governance arrangements for guaranteeing peace and justice (a variation on the original formulation in Galtung [1969] and in the speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr). Positive peace requires the motivational posture of commitment among combatants, not just capitulation. It is enabled by a whole web of institutions that support positive peace: the rule of law, respect for human rights and social justice, reconciliation and market institutions that distribute opportunities widely. Neither combatant commitment to an agreed peace (by the military or OPM) nor the web of institutions that enable positive peace is present in the Papuan case; it was approached during the Papuan spring of 1999–2000, but never attained. So it does not make sense to code this case as four short, small wars separated by years of peace. It is 47 continuous years without positive peace, punctuated by countless moments when negative peace collapses.

At one level, the Indonesian state has been hugely successful in securing not only the capitulation of the people of Papua to rule from Jakarta, but the capitulation of the international community. Even we as authors and critics write very much from within that posture of capitulation. We worry that anyone might read
our text as support for Papuan armed struggle for independence because we suspect that is a romantic quest that can cause untold suffering for Papuans and Indonesian soldiers and their families.

While most of the world has capitulated to Indonesia on the independence question, most of the world is against it on its human rights record in Papua. In the end, it is likely to be Indonesia that capitulates here. Low-level conflict that periodically flares into severe conflict for another half-century in Papua will ultimately bring international disgrace to Indonesia. Indonesia’s friends must persuade it that it is better to commit to the human rights and other principles of Papua Land of Peace in a genuine way now to prevent this. That would require presidential leadership and the leadership of progressive Indonesian generals to stand beside the people of Papua against the kind of military leadership that has called the shots in Papua. It would also require concrete steps to build trust and a sense of leadership integrity. President Yudhoyono was willing to show that leadership in Aceh by standing up to the military there, as we will see in Chapter 6. He has been unwilling to push his luck by doing the same in Papua in the face of the considerable capability of the military to damage his re-election prospects by shifting its financial, coercive and organisational support behind a more pro-military candidate. With President Yudhoyono’s re-election in 2009 (he cannot stand again), some hope he might now show more resolve.

There is little evidence, however, of resolve as we write.

There are so many things that could be done as concrete trust-building measures. The military presence in Papua could be progressively scaled back. Savings from this could fund other needed measures such as micro-finance reform that responds to the considerable evidence we have heard of indigenous Papuans not getting support from banks to start businesses in the way migrants do. King (2006:29) advocates a Papua trust fund, akin to the East Timor Petroleum Fund, to extend the flow of special autonomy money to Papua beyond 2026, when it approximately halves. A second rationale could be for Papuans to postpone deployment of a proportion of the funds until their institutions are less corrupt and funds can be spent more strategically for the development of the province. At the moment these funds do seem to be overwhelming Papua’s absorption capacity and are being channelled towards venality and waste. In anomie theory terms, funds that gush beyond absorption capacity expand illegitimate opportunities. Symbolically as well as concretely, high-level criminal convictions for corruption are needed in Papua that include puncturing the impunity of colonels and generals. Only then is there a hope that Papuans might come to believe that they can have autonomy with merdeka.

The Alliance for Democracy in Papua is showing that there is no need to wait for top-down reconciliation to begin the long journey from the bottom up. There is much that local military commanders can learn and are learning from
the rich Papuan traditions of peacebuilding in the highlands and the coast. *Adat*—military dialogue to stop human rights abuses in one remote village, even as human rights abuses continue in the capital, is the accomplishment that counts here and now for the people of that village. And it creates a local foundation from which some young military leaders of the future are learning from the people the benefits of being reconciliatory, dealing with local truths, the *memoria passionis* of that village.

Even the most trigger-happy of the OPM members we interviewed much preferred the idea of negotiations with Jakarta that might lead to a referendum on independence, but they were not interested in negotiations in which the referendum was ruled out. Ministers in Jakarta, by the same token, would prefer a negotiated positive peace, but are opposed to any negotiation in which a referendum is on the table. While all key Papuan factions want to internationalise the conflict with external mediation and external monitoring, Jakarta wants internal dialogue without mediation or monitoring.110 Our analysis is ultimately therefore that progress depends on leadership—Papuan, national and international—to break through this positional posturing.

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110 We are grateful to Damien Kingsbury for this conceptualisation.
### Table A2.1 Summary of some codes, Papua: 650 other variables are coded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural factors at root of conflict</th>
<th>Is this a ‘consensus’ factor among analysts or ‘contested but credible’ as a possible factor?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dual colonialisms of long duration stunt institutions</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cold War</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmigration/immigration</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources—Freeport (land rights)</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Proximate factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural factors at root of conflict</th>
<th>Is this a ‘consensus’ factor among analysts or ‘contested but credible’ as a possible factor?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act of Free Choice</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some elements of a ‘resource curse’: logging, oil-palm, fishing</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarisation—expanding posts</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military politics to sustain Sukarno and Suharto, and remove Wahid</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key triggering incidents</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Papua flag raisings, independence demonstrations</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM hostage-taking</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM attacks on security forces</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM sabotage of resource projects</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military assassinations (for example, Theys Eluay)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key war-making actors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key war-making actors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian military, especially Kopassus</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian police, especially Brimob</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>’Militias’</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key peacemaking actors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key peacemaking actors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidium in 1999–2000</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Wahid in 1999–2000</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights NGOs</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student organisations</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International solidarity movement</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Peacebuilding strengths**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacebuilding strengths</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community values reject violence strongly; war is no-one’s preferred outcome (though contained conflict is a preference of some in the military)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older insurgents are tired of fighting</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community values of religious tolerance</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource-based economic opportunities</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Papua Land of Peace campaign</strong></td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International pressure mediated by human rights groups, church groups, donors</strong></td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Desire to improve poor investment climate in Papua</strong></td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indigenous reconciliation traditions</strong></td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Village–military collaboration in reintegrating OPM fighters who give up</strong></td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Peacebuilding weaknesses

| **Resource curse game playing** | Contested but credible |
| **Unconstrained military and ‘militias’** | Consensus |
| **Extreme disadvantage of women and weak international networking of women** | Consensus |
| **Extreme corruption** | Consensus |
| **Power of the military** | Consensus |
| **Disengaged, dysfunctional bureaucracy** | Consensus |
| **Education and health systems failure** | Consensus |
| **Limited access to trauma counselling for victims and combatants** | Consensus |
| **Low commitment to and implementation of truth and reconciliation** | Consensus |
| **Impunity for rights abuses** | Consensus |
| **Failure of international leadership in mediation or preventive diplomacy** | Consensus |

### Key contested principles of peacebuilding

| **Independence/autonomy versus national unity** | Consensus |
| **Merdeka** | Consensus |
| **Rectification as *memoria passionis*** | Consensus |
### Table A2.2 Numbers and types of people interviewed, Papua case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected official legislator/MPR/bupati</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidium member or panel member (political leaders of oppositional group)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM (self-identified as OPM officeholder, former or current fighter or an OPM member willing to fight)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adat/indigenous/village leader</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leader</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's NGO</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental NGO</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development NGO</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights/peacebuilding NGO</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NGO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business leader</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student leaders (plus meeting with 70 students)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign government (ambassador, foreign minister of another country, USAID, etc.)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organisations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher/university academic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim/refugee</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total interviews</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total people interviewed</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Maluku and North Maluku

JOHN BRAITHWAITE WITH LEAH DUNN

Anomie, in the sense of a breakdown of the settled rules of the political game, is evident in our two Malukan cases of civil conflict, especially as it affects the security sector. A security dilemma for Malukan villages became more acute with the arrival of thousands of Laskar Jihad and other jihadist fighters. Persuading these fighters to return home was a remarkable accomplishment. These cases describe a rich multidimensionality of reconciliation processes that we come to describe as an Indonesian pattern of non-truth and reconciliation and gotong royong.

Part I: Maluku

Background to the conflict: Maluku

The colonial legacy in contemporary schisms

Maluku is the group of islands in eastern Indonesia that became known as the Spice Islands to early modern European explorers. The main spices it traded were nutmeg, cloves and mace. The Javanese Buddhist–Hindu Majapahit Empire had considerable naval capability. It established a vast trading empire encompassing much of contemporary Indonesia, including Maluku, from 1294 to the late fifteenth century. Like all the pre-colonial empires of Indonesia, it was founded on superior military power (Ricklefs 1993:27). The Majapahit trading empire was probably a royal monopoly that declined from the late fourteenth century in the face of a more competitive, less monopolistic trading system coordinated by refugees from Majapahit military campaigns at the entrepot of Malacca. The Malaccans enrolled military protection from their Chinese trading partners. Malacca’s Arab trading partners also brought Islam to Indonesia at the end of the fourteenth century. By then, the Malaccan trading system had become the greatest of the world—linking Indonesia westward to India, Persia, Arabia, Syria, East Africa and the Mediterranean and northward from Siam to perhaps as far as Japan (Ricklefs 1993:20–1). While bulk items such as Javanese rice and

1 Our thanks go to, in addition to our advisory panel, Ir. Musriyadi Nabiu, Safrudin and Aditya Retraubun for assistance with contacts for our fieldwork in Maluku and North Maluku.
Indian textiles were the bread and butter of the system, the great prize of the Malaccan system was Moluccan spice. The Malaccan trading system declined rapidly under the dead hand of Portuguese attempts to monopolise its trade after Portugal conquered Malacca in 1511. In Maluku, Christian and Muslim villagers worked together to resist Portuguese and later Dutch enforcement of a spice monopoly (Bartels 1977).

Portuguese colonialism left little enduring mark on Indonesia, except in Maluku. At Ambon, the Spanish co-founder of the Jesuit order, Francis Xavier, in 1546 laid the foundation for a permanent mission that by late in the century had converted some 60,000 people to Catholicism. The first Dutch East Indies Company conquest in Indonesia was at Ambon in 1605, targeting the spice trade and opening the door to Protestant missionaries who had even more success in Maluku than the Portuguese Catholic missions. The Dutch East Indies Company was established in 1602 with the primary aim of securing an absolute monopoly in spices by expelling all other traders. The first three Dutch governors-general of the Netherlands East Indies ruled from Ambon until 1619, at which time it was decided that coordination of the empire depended on trade and Ambon was insufficiently nodal to crisscrossing trade routes. Thenceforth colonial and post-colonial governance of the archipelago was undertaken from Java.

Maluku was a classic case of European colonialism enforcing economic and political institutions that hindered long-run development (Acemoglu et al. 2004). The Dutch ceded tyrannical power to local rulers such as the Sultans of Ternate and Tidore as long as they sustained a Dutch East Indies Company spice monopoly and crushed smuggling that competed with it. Village rajas received 4 per cent of sales of the spice monopoly from their village as long as they enforced the monopoly, ending traditional trading with Malays and others, and purchased imports through more expensive Dutch suppliers. The Dutch forced the Ambonese out of their mountain villages down to the coast, ‘where they and the clove cultivation could be more easily controlled’ (Chauvel 1990:4). They also created separate Christian and Muslim villages, ending the pre-colonial tradition of cohabitation based on kinship. In the process, the Dutch destroyed the previous *uli* system of federations of settlements (Chauvel 1990:7), making villages rely more heavily on *pela* traditions for religious coexistence and mutual help. *Pela* will be discussed later. As elsewhere in the Indies, colonial village reforms were designed to make Moluccan society more legible and taxable for the Dutch state (Scott 1998). Similarly, the village governance reforms of the 1970s allowed the New Order to concentrate and socially re-simplify Maluku

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2 Ellen (1983:10) muses that ‘[i]t is often said that the Moluccas were colonized in a different way from the rest of Indonesia, and I think that this is largely true...The desire of the Dutch to maintain their spice monopoly explains why the Moluccas were subject so early to radical programmes of social and cultural change. But as the spice trade became less important in the economy of the Dutch East Indies so the Moluccas became neglected and correspondingly poverty-stricken.’
through the prism of a Javanese state. The demand for plantation labour that came with European colonialism increased the slave trade in Maluku and North Maluku. Demand for slaves also increased the incidence of inter-village warfare (Pannell 2003:15).

North Maluku was especially devastated by the stipulations of the Dutch East Indies Company that Moluccans ‘were forbidden to have trade or political relations with each other, except with the consent’ of the company (Kiem 1993, citing from vol. 2, p. 692, of C. F. van Fraassen’s 1987 PhD in Dutch). They ‘inflicted a deadly blow on the further economic and political development of the North Moluccas’ (Kiem 1993:50):

The interdiction of clove production and allied trade resulted in a drastic economic decline for the sultanates, and at the same time in an absolute dependency on the Dutch, in cultural isolation and in an internal social and political ossification. (van Fraassen 1984:780)

Cash-crop production seemed to cease during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the sultanates were a shadow of their former glory and Ternate, the capital of North Maluku, was largely depopulated and decayed (van Fraassen 1987:86–7).

British naval power and British interest in a stake in the spice trade forced concessions from the Dutch to give the British trading footholds in Maluku from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. There were periods of British rule of Ambon from 1796 to 1803 and 1810–17. Once the Dutch regulation of a spice monopoly was broken and production of spices in new agricultural areas exceeded demand, colonial interest in Maluku receded and Britain withdrew entirely from the area.

North Maluku was the far extremity of Muslim civilisation. Ternate and Ambon were ‘centers on the periphery’ (Ellen 1983). We will conclude that their wars at the end of the millennium were partly about their marginalisation, but also partly about Ternate and Ambon being centres of the margin. Provincial control was up for grabs when the focus of state elites (and checks on the state’s security apparatus) was concentrated on the centre to the neglect of the periphery. While political focus was centripetal into solving Jakarta’s problems during reformasi, the decentralisation reforms of 1999 meant that the flow of resources became more centrifugal. An inward flow of scrutiny and outward flow of resources created opportunities for predatory moves to capture the resource nodes of the periphery.

A positive side of colonialism in Ambon was that mission education equipped Christian but not Muslim Ambonese to become favoured in the Dutch colonial civil service and army. Consequently, Christian South Maluku had by far the
highest literacy of the colony in the 1930 Census: 50 per cent compared with a national rate of 7 per cent (Ricklefs 1993:160). The role of these loyal Ambonese servants of the Dutch across Indonesia, combined with their Christianity, made them a target of great suspicion among twentieth-century Indonesian nationalists. Dutch colonial policy therefore segregated and opened divisions between Christian Moluccans who were provided opportunities in the colonial army and civil service all over Indonesia and Muslim Moluccans who were left in desperate poverty once the spice monopoly collapsed. As the Dutch sought to widen and consolidate control over the archipelago, the combination of Dutch distrust of Javanese and the Christian education of Ambonese created increased demand for Ambonese as soldiers and civil servants, especially in the war to colonise Aceh.

Moluccans fought on both sides during the war for independence from the Dutch from 1945. When The Netherlands formally recognised Indonesian independence in 1949, Ambonese officers in the Dutch colonial army supported by some prominent Ambonese Christian leaders declared the Republic of South Maluku (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS) independent of Indonesia. The Indonesian military crushed them in only a few months of fighting. A legacy of that short war would be that for the next six decades any Moluccans attacking Jakarta’s policies would be discredited with the allegation that they were separatists. For decades, an RMS government in exile in The Netherlands was a worry to Indonesia and their hosts as they were early movers into late twentieth-century terrorism in Europe. The era of hijacking trains and hostage-taking in a Dutch school by Moluccans drawing attention to their cause ended in the 1970s largely as a result of reintegration efforts to embrace the Moluccan exiles into Dutch society.

From Sukarno to Suharto

In President Sukarno’s ‘guided democracy’ of the 1950s and 1960s there were three powerful political forces he had to balance: a variety of Muslim constituencies who preferred an Islamic to a secular state, the Communist Party (PKI) who preferred a communist to a capitalist state, and the military who preferred military to democratic influence. Each group was internally divided and more concerned to strengthen itself vis-a-vis the others than to set up their preferred kind of state. When the military felt Sukarno was becoming too heavily influenced by the PKI, it moved against alleged communists in 1965 in a rather genocidal fashion. Sukarno was then displaced by Major General Suharto. The CIA’s role in these events is still not clear. In particular, we do not know to what extent Suharto’s group was using the CIA to advance its own objectives, or the CIA was using Suharto to advance theirs. It is the case, however, that they were supportive of Suharto and had on their payroll players as senior as Adam Malik, who turned away from Sukarno and became Suharto’s Foreign Minister.
The level of sustained tyranny in the mid-1960s was sufficient for the Communist Party never to re-emerge as a significant political force in Indonesia. Suharto was continuously concerned that radical Islamic politics could become a threat to his moderate Islam and his unitary state that embraced Christians, Hindus and Chinese Buddhists. His solution during the 1970s and 1980s was to suppress radical Islamic politics while providing enormous state support to the social, cultural and religious educational activities of Muslim organisations, partly through his Department of Religious Affairs. The paradox of this approach was that the financial support for Muslim organisations and religious education sustained expanding enclaves of advocacy for an Islamic state and Sharia law. In the 1990s, when Suharto’s control over the military weakened a little, he sought to balance that by cultivating support from politiced Islamic leaders. He made military appointments that created factional division between the longstanding ascendancy of a nationalist (‘red and white’) military faction of predominantly abangan Muslim and Christian senior officers and a ‘green’ faction more networked with radical Islamist elements in civil society. The latter ultimately came to be led by his son-in-law Prabowo Subianto, though he was hardly a radical Islamist. The red and white versus green struggle was much more about positions, posturing and patronage than about ideology. Mietzner (2009:112) saw Prabowo as having a political strategy for shoring up the Suharto regime that happened to involve alliance with radical Islamic groups in support of kidnapping and violence against pro-democracy enemies. In contrast, General Wiranto and his faction were to align with Muslim moderates such as Abdurrahman Wahid as part of a network that might work to calm the unrest.

In 1998, Suharto could no longer sustain this balancing act managing the splits in the military elite, the student-led demonstrations and then anti-Chinese rioting that devastated a large section of the capital. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 increasingly wobbled the tightrope on which he balanced. He fell. Suharto was seen as mismanaging the International Monetary Fund (IMF) terms for saving the collapsed Indonesian rupiah. He had mishandled a sequence of different kinds of demonstrations across Indonesia since the mid-1990s. He had stumbled in handling corruption scandals involving himself and his children and another corruption scandal in 1995 that set cabinet ministers against one another in a way that showed that elites ‘were beginning to jockey for the post-Suharto period’ (van Klinken 2007:23). A group of cabinet ministers threatened to resign if he did not step down. The new president, Habibie, was a protégé of Suharto who wanted to demonstrate that he would be very different from his mentor, a democratic reformer who would respond to what the students were demanding on the streets. The further debates and demonstrations that reformasi engendered about institutional reform also opened new fronts of negotiation over ethnic and religious group claims to representation and access to resources (Bertrand 2004:5). Bertrand’s (2004:10) historical institutionalist analysis points
out that ‘when institutions are weakened during transition periods, allocations of power and resources become open for competition’. In some contexts, violence becomes an effective form of competition—or is believed to be so by certain groups. At critical junctures, the implicit and explicit ethnic inclusions and exclusions can be contested to ‘renegotiate the concept of the nation’ (Bertrand 2004:10).

The context of religious group renegotiation of claims was quite different in Maluku to that in North Maluku. Because the context was so different, a long campaign for North Maluku to become a separate province from Maluku finally succeeded in 1999. In North Maluku, there was not the politics of separatism from Indonesia that there was on Ambon, but there was a politics of separation from Maluku. These separatisms were important to the north and south conflicts, but they were different separatisms with different consequences. North Maluku was overwhelmingly Muslim; Maluku, as its boundaries lie today, had a majority Christian population, but with the Muslim minority quickly closing the gap on them. Laskar Jihad was a decisive player in the Maluku conflict but not in North Maluku. The North Maluku conflict was not fought with modern weapons, but was more deadly for its short eruption. In Maluku, automatic weapons were widely used, partly reflecting military involvement, and the conflict was longer. We found it impossible to code the Maluku and North Maluku conflicts in the same way on a large number of variables. Hence the two provinces are coded as having separate conflicts.

Describing the conflict

Maluku ignites

The Maluku story starts in Ketapang (Jakarta) on 22 November 1998 in a quarrel over parking at an entertainment and gambling centre controlled by a Christian Ambonese gang. The quarrel became a minor Muslim–Christian fight. The next morning, it was widely reported that the Christian Ambonese gang beat and harassed Muslims and damaged a mosque. Aditjondro (2001:111) concluded they were in fact hired to do so. An inter-religious riot ensued and Muslim Ambonese gangs were bussed in to retaliate by attacking the Christian Ambonese gang, destroying or seriously damaging 21 churches and some Christian schools. The gambling casino was also destroyed. It was possible this was the financial motive for paying the gangsters to start the riot; it handed a gambling monopoly in the area to Tommy Winata, a business partner of the Suharto family. Thirteen people were killed.

In the next two months, there was considerable violence and property destruction in various parts of Indonesia where Christian and Muslim communities were
both strong, such as Kupang, West Timor. Contagion can thus be interpreted as a factor in both the conflicts that were to start in Maluku, then North Maluku, as is common in the history of riots since the French Revolution (Rudé 1964:29). In Ambon, as systematic a documenter of newspaper stories in the Christian media as Father Böhm (2005:11) believed that 500 churches and several mosques had already been destroyed across Indonesia before the carnage started in Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi when even larger (and more equal) numbers of mosques and churches were destroyed. Father Böhm’s number, 500, seemed too high for the 1990s, and often the ‘churches’ were private homes where small fundamentalist groups held services. In retrospect, however, large numbers of church burnings and bombings came to light that were not recorded by the Jakarta or international media at the time. This is clear from Böhm’s (2005, 2006) Brief Chronicle of the Unrest in the Moluccas and its supplement, which together are in fact 397 densely packed large pages of violent incidents! One recent Christian statement cited 991 attacks on churches in Indonesia since independence in 1949 (ICG 2008c:3).

There was a more direct link between Maluku and the Ketapang riots. Jakarta police shipped more than 100 gang members arrested in the riots on passenger and navy vessels back to Ambon. Muslim and Christian informants widely believed they were released and given encouragement to continue their Muslim–Christian conflict back in Ambon and were given payment to enrol locals to it as ‘provocateurs’. Ambon police investigations found some provocateurs to be ‘preman’ (career criminals) from Jakarta, others were locals who were recruited in Ambon, taken to Java to be trained together, then returned to their own communities—be they Christian or Muslim—to cause trouble in collaboration with others in their communication network. We were given many reports of Christian ‘provocateurs’ arriving on motorbikes to shout false or exaggerated rumours of Muslim carnage, urging Christians not to be cowards, and many reports of Muslim provocateurs arriving on motorcycles to shout false rumours (such as that a mosque was on fire, when in fact a pile of tyres had been lit behind it to give the appearance of it being alight). We were given enough such stories in enough triangulated detail to believe there was more than a grain of truth to the provocateur theory (see Box 3.1). Multiple sightings of God, Jesus and the Virgin Mary on the Christian side and millennial sightings of angels on battle horses on the Muslim side (Bubandt 2001) on different islands of Maluku were probably not the work of provocateurs, but they certainly caused mass movements of people experiencing high religious fervour that frightened those of the opposite faith. Bubandt (2004b) also showed that millennial revelation testimonies were actively spread audiovisually on the Christian side in Maluku and North Maluku and argued that they did promote conflict—for example,
when they revealed Maluku would be the site of a massive Christian–Muslim moment of truth that would ultimately be resolved by the intervention of ‘America’.

**Box 3.1 Provocation at Poka**

From January to 23 July 1999, the large village of Poka near Pattimura University, a middle-class area where many academics lived, had successfully avoided violence. The raja arranged regular meetings of Muslims and Christians to discuss common needs and fears. A joint Muslim–Christian night watch of 10 patrolled each night, all night, to head off escalation from any minor disagreements. There was much goodwill between Christians and Muslims in Poka and belief that they could hold off the violence so many other villages had been unable to avoid.

At 8pm on 23 July 1999, a simple fight broke out between Christian and Muslim youths, some of whom seemed drunk. Suddenly, many were involved. Almost as suddenly, within five to seven minutes of the fight starting, the military was there. They pretended to try to stop the fight by firing many rounds in the air. This caused panic. All Christians fled to their church. A Christian pastor claimed ‘[i]t was not a coincidence—neither the fight nor the speedy overreaction of the military to cause panic’. His view was that the military made things a lot worse, in circumstances in which it would not have been hard for a contingent of armed soldiers to stop a group of drunken youths from fighting without firing live rounds.

A young Ambonese man from Jakarta, whom we will call Tommy, was noticed to play a recurrent role in escalating conflict in the days that followed. When conflict arose, ‘Tommy would immediately run there and shout to young people to do something, to attack them. He would stand in front whenever there was trouble, stirring it up.’ Poka residents learnt of a similar pattern of behaviour by Tommy in surrounding villages. He would move his activities to whichever village had a rising temperature at a particular time. Tommy was very clever at making bombs, and quickly. He took bombs to people in the village and urged them to use them.
It is possible that only a small proportion of the triggering events were the work of provocateurs, while most of it was just contagion that plugged into longstanding local resentments. We see the provocateur script as part of a widespread Indonesian pattern of non-truth and reconciliation. An extreme example was a leading Islamic cleric we interviewed who had been a hardline supporter of Laskar Jihad offensives until late in the peace process. He said today he did not believe the mosques were burnt by Christians but by provocateurs: ‘Both sides, praise God, we came to realise that we were being used.’ The one thing both sides comfortably agree on as they seek to reconcile after this conflict is that all this destruction was ultimately the work of outside provocateurs. Provocateurs imported from Jakarta were part of the causal fabric of this conflict, but only part of it, and utterly insufficient to explain the bellicosity of 1999–2000.

The young toughs shipped to Ambon after Ketapang had worked for the military-controlled youth movement Pemuda Pancasila, who were specialists in intimidating political enemies of the New Order, especially the students who were demanding the end of the New Order (Aditjondro 2001). Reformasi had seen the youth movement break into separate predominantly Muslim and Christian branches (van Klinken 2007:97), both of which had strong links to different Suharto family members (HRW 1999:9). There was also some self-fulfilling prophecy during December 1998 and January 1999 in the belief across Ambon that boatloads of thugs were arriving to cause trouble. This put the Muslim and Christian communities in a ‘security dilemma’ whereby their youth were girded with courage to defend their communities. The security dilemma thesis is that war can occur when neither side intends to harm the other but both feel they must defend aggressively against their worst suspicions of what the other might do in circumstances of anarchy.

The Ketapang repatriation of gang members also triggered valiant efforts by the Governor of Maluku to organise religious leaders to be on the lookout for provocateurs. Mosques without telephones were assisted to acquire them so they could be in touch with a communications network from the central Ambon...
Al Fatah Mosque to scotch false rumours. Plans were in hand for community night watches, but these had not been implemented when the trouble started. Too little was done too late to foil the agents of violence.

The first riotous slaughter in Maluku was on 13 January 1999 in the tiny town of Dobo in the Aru Islands, far south-east of Ambon. Like most of the outbreaks in the next five years, it was a minor incident between young people that escalated Muslim–Christian resentment. On Böhm’s (2005:11) account: ‘Immediately some provocateur misused the loudspeaker of the mosque to incite the Muslims to wage war on the Christians.’ While about a dozen people were killed over the next four days, Brimob police deployment and local reconciliation efforts meant this violence ended and never recurred at Dobo.

While the Brimob unit was away at Dobo and while most other police were with their families for a religious holiday, on 19 January 1999, the last day of Ramadan, a day when there was a lot of inter-religious conflict across Indonesia, a fight broke out between an Ambonese Christian bus driver and a migrant Bugis Muslim passenger. The conflict was initially conceived more in terms of a migrant–Ambonese conflict than an inter-religious one. Most locals believed the opportunity of the fight was seized by provocateurs to spark and inflame Christian–Muslim violence for the next two months in and around Ambon City. This initial round of fighting probably cost 1000 lives. Van Klinken (2007:98) saw as ‘patchy’ the evidence that provocateurs imported from Java were on the streets of Ambon on 19 January 1999. What was clear was that the rioting was sudden, with both sides going in hard from the beginning. Both sides were ready—the Christian fighters wearing red headbands, the Muslim fighters white headbands—from the start. Some informants reported that headbands were distributed by the same provocateurs, who, whether they were Christian or Muslim, shouted similar things to urge fighting. While fighting between youth from the initial combatant communities—predominantly Muslim Batumerah and Christian Mardika—was a common rivalry over many years, this was more violent and deadly than ever before and was distinguished by repeated attacks on religious symbols. It also spread relatively quickly beyond the traditional rivals from Ambon City across the whole of Ambon Island and to at least 14 other islands/island groups in Maluku (Aru, Arvis, Babar, Buru, Haruku, Kasuai, Kei, Manipa, Sanana, Saparua, Seram, Tanimbar, Teor, Tual). On Baru, where 117 Christians were killed in one incident, the religious repertoire was extended to offering members of the church council the alternatives of seeing their families butchered or converting to Islam, being circumcised or burning their own church to the ground (Böhm 2005:22). Seventeen Catholic churches and an unknown number of Protestant churches were destroyed and the island
was virtually cleansed of anyone who would claim to be Christian by mid-2000. This forced conversion approach was pushed by Laskar Jihad fighters in a number of the outer islands (ICG 2002b:9–10).

From 30 March to 3 May 1999, a large number of Muslim villages and two Christian villages were destroyed in the Kei Islands (on the west coast of Kei-Kecil). Böhm (2005:14) records 37 Christian deaths but has no knowledge of the presumably much larger number of Muslim deaths. As at Dobo, here numerous traditional reconciliation efforts based on adat rituals of shared ‘ethnic brotherhood’ were held in May 2005 and, according to our interview informants, secured a permanent peace. This was the pattern in many other islands that were able to reconcile their own peace without help from the Malino II peace accord of 2002. On the Kei Islands, as elsewhere in Maluku and North Maluku, religious majorities in mixed villages banded together to protect their minority (of both kinds) from attack (Thorburn 2008:136). Thorburn (2008:139) found that across the Kei Islands, the villages that experienced most violence were those with the greatest numbers of government officials and civil servants. Thorburn’s (2008:139) account was that adat worked in securing peace on the principle of ‘once a matter has been settled, we do not bring it up again’. Law enforcement officials agreed with this adat philosophy and no-one on the Kei Islands was prosecuted for any of the violence on the basis that ‘we were all wrong’.

Ambon split into exclusively Christian (60 per cent) and exclusively Muslim (40 per cent) zones of the city. The central mosque and the central Protestant church in Ambon became command centres for a religious war, dispatching reinforcements to villages that reported they were at risk of being overrun. Fighting resumed and intensified in July 1999 after an outbreak of horrific violence at the large village of Poka (Box 3.1), which spread to many parts of Maluku, remaining at its peak until January 2000, by which time the death toll exceeded 3000. Destruction of mosques and churches generated tumultuous rejoicing on one side and resolve for revenge on the other, especially when terrified innocents seeking refuge in the religious sanctuary were cut down during prayer. Van Klinken (2007:100) reports on a video of young Christians moving towards the battlefield supported by the church choir singing Onward Christian Soldiers accompanied by trumpets.

Laskar Jihad lands

To a degree, Christian forces might have had the better of the fighting by January 2000. Then 4000 armed Laskar Jihad fighters departed from Java and
Sulawesi with the encouragement of elements of the military, with at least 2000 destined for Ambon in April–May 2000 (probably increasing to 3000 in the field in Maluku at its peak, though some Christian sources claimed 5000). This eventually tipped the balance to Muslim fighters. Another smaller force of 100–200 Muslim fighters called Laskar Mujahidin had arrived before Laskar Jihad in December 1999. This militia was established as an initiative of the most prominent sponsor of terrorism in Indonesia, the then unknown Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). They wore masks and were often called ninjas. The leader of Laskar Jihad asserted that while he had been offered financial aid at his meeting with Osama bin Laden and had refused it, Laskar Mujahidin had accepted such aid (ICG 2002b:20) and also foreign fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan. JI also seems to have had only a minimal presence in North Maluku, with most of the handful of its members who were keen to participate arriving, to their disappointment, after the fighting had stopped.

While there were some horrific single incidents during the remainder of 2000, the death rate when Laskar Jihad was the lead combatant might have been no greater than in 1999. This was because some Laskar Jihad had automatic weapons and even the odd machine gun, mortar and rocket-propelled grenades. A consequence of this superior weaponry was that Christian lookouts and intelligence very often completely evacuated villages in advance of the arrival of Laskar Jihad fighters. Laskar Jihad centralised command of most fighting against Christians, integrating local militias under its authority. On 21 June, Laskar Jihad demonstrated its capacity to organise large numbers of well-armed fighters with military support when, in a spectacular battle during several days, Laskar Jihad overran the heavily armed headquarters of Brimob, causing the president to declare a state of civil emergency. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the Brimob battle demonstrates the military’s capacity to organise Laskar Jihad. At the end of 2000, approximately one-third of the population of Maluku had been chased from their homes, a large proportion of which were burnt to the ground. By the end of the conflict, the proportion of the population who were refugees was between one-third and one-half (Brown et al. 2005:xii). Footloose refugee children joined the battle as Pasagan Agas (‘sandfly troops’). There could have been 2000–4000 seven to twelve-year-old combatants who could perform tasks such as wedging their bodies through tiny gaps in buildings to light fires (Aditjondro 2001:191).

The rule of law was an early casualty of the conflict. In the months after the first spark in Ambon, the two men involved in the initial fight were sentenced to jail terms of six and five months. By July 2000, police had arrested 855 suspects for various acts of inter-religious violence. Trials could not be held, however,

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3 Laskar Jihad could have had a pool of 10 000 fighters to rotate in and out of various conflict areas (Hasan 2002:159).
because prosecutors, judges and court clerks had fled and prisons had also broken down (ICG 2002b:14). When police tried to arrest Laskar Jihad members, they were surrounded by hundreds of protestors who forced their release. By May 2001, some symbolic arrests became possible against some prominent Christian and Muslim leaders to signify that the rule of law was returning.

The first wave of fighting was almost entirely with traditional weapons such as machetes, spears and arrows; the second with large numbers of homemade guns and bombs on both sides; the third with Laskar Jihad dominating with some modern firepower. The period 2001–03 was much more peaceful as changes were made in local military leadership and the security sector increasingly withdrew from participation in the fighting. Indeed in the course of 2001, the military started to put pressure on Laskar Jihad to withdraw. The period 2001–03 was, however, punctuated by many more minor disruptions of the peace, as the most radical elements of Laskar Jihad sought to reignite the conflict. There was also some politically significant violence in this period, such as the killing of Laskar Kristus chief commander, Agus Wattimena. Maluku Police Chief, Firman Gani, expressed concern during the first lull of peace that some undisciplined police and military were ‘disappointed’ at their reduced income from escorting speedboats and allowing passage through checkpoints (Böhm 2005:69). Indeed police and military profiteering could have been an important driver of residual conflict for several years after 2000.

April 2004 saw a major upsurge in conflict in which not many more than 40 lives were lost, but in which property destruction on both sides was massive. Many people in Poka lost their homes for the second time and perhaps as many as 200,000 people were forced into refugee camps. Notable targets of total destruction were four UN cars and the UN building that housed the UNDP, UNICEF and the Save the Children Fund. While at the height of the conflict Christian leaders had called for UN peacekeeping intervention, Laskar Jihad saw the United Nations through an East Timor lens as part of a Christian conspiracy to break up Indonesia. They saw international NGOs as Christian spy networks moving around collecting information.

A trigger for the 2004 violence was raising the Republic of South Maluku (RMS) flag at the home of Alex Manuputty, a Christian leader of the Maluku Sovereignty Front (Front Kedaulatan Maluku, FKM). Sniper fire was another trigger. Violence broke out in quick succession on a number of other Maluku islands in April 2004. Members of the FKM were convicted over the sniper attacks—verdicts that attracted some cynicism from monitoring groups over whether the real guilty parties were convicted, especially since the sophisticated high-powered rifles used were known to be available only to the security forces (Project Ploughshares 2004). FKM is not a military organisation but an advocacy group for Moluccan independence. One popular theory of the origins of the
violence in our interviews was that local military officers instigated ‘separatist’ mobilisation to cause a Muslim backlash. They believed conflict would benefit the financial and political position of the military (see also HRW 1999:6). Other members from the Malino II delegations on both sides alleged that Manuputty, who was one of the original nine members of the reconciliation board in 1999, was bought off by elements of the military to destabilise the peace by playing the separatist card from the Christian side. By 2004, at least 5000 people had been killed in the fighting (Brown et al. 2005:17), though a peace journalism expert from the University of Indonesia, Dr Ichsan Malik, had a late-2001 count of 10 187 (Böhm 2005:201), The Jakarta Post counted 9753 to September 2001 (Tunny 2006e) and the ICG (2002b:i) estimated in the range 5000–10 000.

Since 2004, Maluku has been comparatively peaceful and in the past few years the no-go zones in Ambon have begun to break down to a considerable degree. Real estate market dynamics mean, however, that Ambon will for a long time be more segregated than it was before—for example, one Catholic priest bought many houses from Muslims fleeing predominantly Christian areas at very low prices then sold them to Christians fleeing Muslim areas. In 2006, the police reported only two bomb explosions in Ambon, but four in 2007. Some of these were believed by the police to be the work of a small number of Islamic militants based in Poso; in May 2007, a Javanese man was prosecuted in Ambon for a number of bombings under the 2003 law on terrorism (Tunny 2007a).

Conflict between the police and the military remained a more live issue in Ambon than inter-religious violence, with low-level fighting resulting in small numbers of police and military deaths each year. In February 2008, military personnel destroyed the home of the Central Maluku Police Chief and 56 other police houses. Eleven police cars were also destroyed or badly damaged. Two police officers and one soldier were killed in the fighting that started over a police officer catching a soldier in bed with his sister (Tunny 2008b). By 2004, only one village on the island of Ambon had not suffered considerable devastation and loss of life: Wayame (Box 3. 2).

**Box 3.2 The Wayame peace**

On first sight, a researcher has a hypothesis on why Wayame is the only village of hundreds on Ambon Island not to experience fighting and burning. As you look across the harbour from Ambon city to Wayame on the other side, you notice on the shore a large cluster of oil storage tanks. Villagers agree the oil depot is what saved them.
When the conflict started, Wayame had village meetings on how to stay out of the conflict. They established a joint Muslim–Christian night watch. They also had a reconciliation team of 10 Muslims and 10 Christians (Team 20). It banned alcohol and all weapons (Panggabean 2004:429). All rumours of religious conflict had to be reported to Team 20 for investigation. Christian and Muslim women also had regular meetings together. The women’s priority was to keep the shared Christian–Muslim market going to keep up interaction and trust. Whenever a big bomb went off in nearby Poka, villagers would get together and reassure each other—that was Poka, not Wayame. There were many false rumours of impending attacks, but ‘communication, communication, communication’ saw them through.

One of the leaders of the village explained to us that it was not true that the village was totally free of conflict. On one occasion, eight bombs went off on the same day in the village. They were ignited not by a jihadist, a Christian separatist or a preman sent from Jakarta to provoke trouble. The culprits turned out to be a couple of amateur criminals from a nearby village. Their idea was to exploit the anxiety about this being the only village that had not experienced religious slaughter and motivate everyone to flee by setting off a lot of bombs in quick succession. As families fled, the criminals were organised with trucks to clean out their houses. Unfortunately for the criminals, they were noticed while they were casing the village. Community members passed information to the military, who arrested them. Because courts were not operating during the crisis, the military punished the felons publicly in front of the whole village to give the message that people did not have to start shooting in any such future situation to protect themselves. They beat the criminals and tortured them in the village square with electric shocks.

The village of 200 households had a company of 100 soldiers protecting them because of the oil depot. Most of the time, they were bored, with little to do. Just being there was a signal to provocateurs or any other troublemakers, such as the amateur criminals above, that they had better stay away from Wayame. Laskar Jihad tried to set up a post in the village but the military moved them on.
Wayame shows that however bad the structural circumstances, the proximate causes and the occurrence of precipitating factors, disciplined security forces in sufficient numbers on the spot can prevent ethnic or religious violence of the kind that occurred in Ambon. As Wilkinson (2004:5) puts it: ‘Abundant comparative evidence shows that large-scale ethnic rioting does not take place where a state’s army or police force is ordered to stop it using all means necessary.’ Oil was not a highly principled basis for a commitment to peace, but security sector commitment worked. It was also said that Jakarta wanted to be able to say that not all villages in Ambon were riven by religious violence.

Wayame became what Mary Kaldor (1999) would call an ‘island of civility’ from which peace could spread. It became a node for peacebuilding activity. This was particularly so for Muslim and Christian women from all over Maluku who wanted a space where they could meet in security without fear of Laskar Jihad or any other spoiler attacking them. Wayame was a civil space from which peace did spread. Religious residential integration, however, has not spread from it. At the time of our 2007 fieldwork, it remained one of only two subdistricts on Ambon that were religiously mixed.

We have not found any reporting on the question of rape in this conflict, nor did it come up in our interviews. Perhaps we did not push our questions hard enough to break through resistance to discussing the topic. There is evidence that the leadership of Laskar Jihad enforced a strict code of Islamic sexual propriety. While in Böhm’s (2005, 2006) 400 pages of atrocities against Christians there are a number of stories of abductions of women (as there are of men), it is striking that there is not a single allegation of a Muslim fighter committing rape in those tomes. We took photos of graffiti in a burnt-out village that said ‘Christians are rapists’. When we asked local Christian combatants about this, they said there had been no rape by Christians. There had been incidents of fighters having their penises cut off, but they did not connect this to retribution for rape. The main finding of the UNDP’s consultations with women on violence was concern about intensified domestic violence since the conflict started and sexual harassment and rape by the security forces, particularly in refugee camps (Brown et al. 2005:47).

In these waves of violence, the three major higher education institutions on Ambon Island were attacked twice; one university was totally destroyed, rebuilt and destroyed a second time in 2004. We interviewed the principal of one Islamic
school that was burnt and rebuilt three times. The Islamic University was not attacked, but jihadists viewed the other universities on Ambon, even though they had large numbers of Muslim students, as centres of Christian power. In 1997, Christian leaders had lobbied fiercely to overturn an attempt to have a Muslim appointed as rector of Pattimura University, arguing this was a Christian privilege (van Klinken 2007:94). When the Protestant UKIM University was razed, its rector pleaded with military commanders for protection for his students, who stood in front of their university to protect it from the expected jihadist attack. The military responded by placing tanks in the midst of the students. When the jihadists arrived, however, the turrets of the tanks were turned towards the university and fired at the buildings. As in the Papuan case, in Maluku, one cannot but be struck by the courage and leadership of the students in standing up for more than just the ideal of the university. They were the same brave Ambon students who, 7000 strong, had protested in front of the Maluku military headquarters on 18 November 1998 to link arms with students in Jakarta protesting against violence by the military, demanding democracy and suffering many terrible injuries.

Conflict dynamics

Van Klinken (2007:89) applies a ‘dynamics of contention’ framework to understanding the process whereby ‘normally apathetic, frightened or disorganized people explode onto the streets, put down their tools, or mount the barricades’ (McAdam et al. 2001). One aspect of this is that fighting rises and falls in waves and new factors (such as Laskar Jihad) are constituted, enter and exit in the dynamics of the conflict. The dynamics of contention framework is also about perceptions of threat and opportunity and organisations that respond to contain threats and realise opportunities. The repertoire of mobilisation by those organisations feeds back into perceptions of threat to induce new waves of violence. The five key processes of the dynamics of contention are: 1) identity formation (in this case, religious); 2) escalation; 3) polarisation; 4) mobilisation; and 5) actor constitution (dynamics of the previously unorganised becoming a unified political actor).

We can see the appeal van Klinken finds in this model as an explanation of violence in Maluku. We also see a ‘dynamics of contrition’ as an explanation of peacebuilding in Maluku: 1) a redefining of an inter-religious identity of Moluccan brotherhood and sisterhood as syncretically Christian–Muslim; 2) de-escalation; 3) depolarisation; 4) demobilisation for war and mobilisation for reconciliation; and 5) de-constitution of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus as organisations, and constitution of reconciliation organisations such as the Concerned Women’s Movement and Bacu Bae. To put some flesh on the dynamics of contention model, we must first consider what there was to contend about.
Contests for public offices

Van Klinken (2007:90) points out that Maluku has always enjoyed extraordinarily high levels of public sector employment. This could be partly because of Ambon’s historic role as a capital, partly its highly educated population and because of a desire in the decades after the short South Moluccan independence war of 1950 to consolidate Christian support for the unitary republic. This public sector employment declined by one-third between 1990 and 1998, promoting insecurity among disproportionately Christian beneficiaries of the public sector largesse. Even after this decline, only the conflict-ridden provinces of Papua and East Timor had higher public sector employment in 1998 (van Klinken 2007:90). This reveals one of the dilemmas of containing conflict: a history of it leaves more public sector jobs to fight over in poor regions where private sector opportunities are not as lucrative as elsewhere. Conflict drives private sector opportunities down and public sector (and NGO sector) rent-seeking opportunities up.

Budgets from 1998 were sharply reduced as part of the response to the Asian financial crisis, further retrenching public sector jobs. The decentralisation policies of the Habibie government discussed in Chapter 2 increased financial incentives for corrupt local elites to grab control of key positions that could open up corruption opportunities. Public sector jobs therefore simultaneously became more scarce, more lucrative for those who won them and more contested through democratic mobilisation. This was a dangerous cocktail of increased opportunity on both sides (especially for Muslims) and increased threat (especially for Christians).

Local politicians were learning to be democratic. They were used to securing office by curryng favour with Jakarta elites. What were they to do now to mobilise popular support in the new democratic Indonesia? In circumstances of Christian anxiety that the 1990s had seen some Islamisation of the New Order state, a decline in Christians’ considerable relative advantage in public sector employment compared with Muslims, and immigration eating away their small majority of the population of Maluku (50.2 per cent at the 2000 Census) (Brown et al. 2005:9), local Christian politicians saw potential in mobilising support by appeals to a Christian identity and threats to Christians. On the Muslim side, there was resentment in what became the ignition point of the conflict of predominantly Muslim Batumerah on the fringe of Ambon City that only 8 per cent of employment was in the public sector, while in many nearby Christian areas of Ambon as many as 70 per cent of jobs were in the public sector. Non-migrant Muslims in communities such as Batumerah also resented the employment success of migrant Muslims, which was well above the province average. Non-migrant Muslims were the only large religious group who were disadvantaged in employment opportunities (Brown et al. 2005:26).
Muslim local strength and national support were on the rise, so their local leaders also saw prospects for mobilising democratic support along religious lines. In the mid-1990s, the first non-military Maluku Governor of the New Order, Akiib Latuconsina, was aggressively pro-Muslim in appointments, such that all the *bupatis* (district regents) in the province were Muslim—even in overwhelmingly Christian areas—by 1996 (Brown et al. 2005:24). Latuconsina was Secretary of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI) in Maluku, the state-sponsored political patronage network for Muslims. Both Latuconsina and his Christian rival for the governorship in 1992 and 1997 mobilised criminal gangs in Ambon to coerce support and threaten opponents. They poisoned the minds of ordinary people and sermon-givers in churches and mosques that immigrant takeovers of public offices or markets or areas of villages, or assertive defence of them, were part of a conspiracy of Islamisation or Christianisation that threatened their very existence as a religious community. On the Christian side, Megawati’s party, PDI-P, was a Christian challenger party in Maluku (in a way it was not elsewhere in Indonesia) because the old Protestant Parkindo party in effect became PDI-P in Ambon. Christian political elites hoped for a future Megawati regime that would reverse their decline in return for support against the Muslim parties and Golkar (that had long been dominant in Maluku). Political ambition of specific candidates of both religions for the offices of governor and mayor of Ambon were thus important proximate causes of the violence. Van Klinken (1999:16) concluded that each contender was supported by ‘increasingly anxious communication networks…Each had prepared contingency plans for an attack from the other. When a trivial incident occurred at the city’s bus terminal, the word flew around each side that “it had started”’. Crucial to van Klinken’s analysis is seeing little people’s grievances and big-men’s ambitions as having reciprocally causal roles in the violence.

Van Klinken (2007:91) found that Maluku had more of a youth bulge of those under twenty-five than the rest of Indonesia—comparatively well-educated young people chasing fewer and fewer public sector jobs. In van Klinken’s (2001:20) analysis, the youth bulge and an impending election in 1999 were part of a volatile mix: ‘numerous unemployed young men who socialized along religious lines, local elites who felt this election could make or break them, and personalized, weakly institutionalised links between the elites and those dependent young men.’

**The security forces: part of the problem, part of the solution**

In Maluku, the province and most districts were run by active or retired military officers, especially districts in Maluku’s outer islands, as in most of Indonesia, until quite late in Suharto’s New Order. After the fall of the New Order, political leaders in Maluku continued to see themselves—and to be seen—as clients
of particular members of the military class. Notwithstanding growing green faction influence in the military in the late 1990s, at the end of the decade in Ambon there were more influential Christian generals and retired generals than Muslim. These men, van Klinken (2007:93) argued, were in the background providing resources to different sides of the conflict depending on their loyalties and their business and political agendas. They are also part of the context for understanding why the security sector split to become as much partisans of the Christian or Muslim sides as peace enforcers.

The most devastatingly negative contribution of the military was as a sponsor of Laskar Jihad. These imported fighters were trained in Bogor near Jakarta by several current and former members of the military, and were allowed to travel to Maluku despite orders from President Wahid to the military to prevent them from boarding ships to Ambon. Worst of all, the military sometimes fought alongside Laskar Jihad—and in large numbers, not just a handful of deserters here or there. This was a repeated allegation of Christian fighters we interviewed. In a number of cases, when they took the white robes off jihadist fighters, they were wearing an army uniform under them. In fact, both sides received support from military and police ‘deserters’, with Christians getting more police fighters (especially from Brimob) and Muslims more military fighters (especially from Kostrad infantry).\(^4\) While the security forces provided a minority of the fighters, they were better trained and armed than other fighters, and by some accounts caused as many as 70 per cent of the deaths and injuries (Aditjondro 2001:117).

Our interviews supported some of George Aditjondro’s (2001) interview findings that a network of serving and retired military leaders associated with the then-dominant faction of General Wiranto made key decisions that allowed or encouraged the fighting to escalate. One of these decisions was nurturing links with Ambonese Muslim gang leaders to maintain the rage and spread the poison from the Ketapang riots to Maluku. Colonel Budiatmo nurtured links with Christian Ambonese gang leaders—most notably Agus Wattimena, who became the overall commander of Laskar Kristus. Others cited by Aditjondro (2001) were the roles of Major General Silalahi and Police Major General Bachtiar in allowing Laskar Jihad to embark for Ambon with their weapons being shipped on separate vessels. Another kind of decision taken by certain members of this network was to allow the security forces to become a major source of weapons and particularly ammunition for both sides.\(^5\) Of course, evidence of a set of decisions like this by officers who share certain factional networks is not evidence of a conspiracy to cause the conflagration. Perhaps it was just a set of

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\(^4\) On 8 July 2000, ‘the chief military commander, I Made Yasa, acknowledges that about “only” 5% of the military is “contaminated” as collaborator of the Muslim fighters (which means he concedes at least 350 military to be on the side of the Muslim attackers!)’ (Böhm 2005:40).

\(^5\) In February 2000, General Rusdihardjo, the national police chief, estimated that 80 per cent of the ammunition fired in the conflict came from the security forces (ICG 2002b:5).
decisions by officers who saw one or more of the advantages we list below in destabilising new institutional arrangements that were clearly less advantageous to them than the old. Perhaps they also saw that this was a time when allowing the angry Muslim card to be played in Indonesia was decidedly good politics, and defending Christians when Muslims were being killed was decidedly not.

In retrospect, members of the Jakarta elite might agree that it was a mistake to allow Laskar Jihad to train in Java, to go to Ambon and to fairly openly acquire and carry weapons. At the time, however, to do so would have appeared anti-Muslim— siding with murderous Christian militias. Laskar Jihad was initially mobilised in Java, with others joining from Sulawesi, and, as the fighting progressed, with increasing sprinklings of fighters from Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Mindanao and elsewhere in the mujahidin diaspora (Böhm 2005:71, 81, 188, 266). They mobilised in response to massacres of innocent Muslims in North Maluku mosques, though in the event they never landed in North Maluku in militarily significant numbers. The North Maluku massacres were the trigger for huge rallies in Jakarta and many other major cities in central Indonesia organised by militant Islamic groups calling for jihad. Laskar Jihad was formed in the crucible of these rallies from the bottom up, particularly with support from Islamic youth organisations, for the military infrastructure established by Ja’far Umar Thalib, a follower of the Salafi tradition and Wahhabi movement of Islam. Various informants and authors such as murdered rights advocate Munir (2001) alleged, however, that it was quickly seized on by elements in the military who wanted to destabilise Wahid’s bid for the presidency. These military leaders also wanted to hit back at Wahid for his resolve to call the military to account for the crimes of East Timor and to reform the military generally. The bottom-up mobilisation of Laskar Jihad was probably also seized on by radical Arab and other international funders (Hasan 2002:159), as well as military business cronies who were willing to assist with paying for fighters. Sadly, landmines were also paid for, causing another little piece of the suffering in the Maluku conflict to this day. Landmines were never brought into the more severe conflicts in Aceh and Papua.

The military also wanted a distraction from the East Timor trials issue and the military reform agenda, particularly the abolition of the military’s ‘dual function’ (security and political). And they wanted to demonstrate that taking responsibility for provincial security away from the military and making it a responsibility of the police, who had recently been separated from the military, was a fatal error. The most extreme supporters of this multidimensional factional agenda wanted to demonstrate that democratic reform meant disorder—indeed, chaos—that must be reversed by a return to strong military leadership of the nation. After President Wahid was elected, for some, the agenda changed to destabilising him by showing he could not bring violence under control.
While there is no hard evidence that any Indonesian leader planned to create mass slaughter in Maluku, and perhaps none did, there were almost certainly elements in the military, up to Wiranto and the top leadership, who at least at certain points saw advantages, or ‘little harm’, in letting the situation escalate or deteriorate. In the end, violent religious rioting of the kind we have seen in Maluku is highly preventable—long before it gets so out of hand—by a committed, adequately resourced security sector. It was not the resources that were lacking here but the commitment. It was not the rapidity of deployment that was the problem; it was the deployment of so many who wilfully made things worse.

Ultimately, however, that commitment was found. By the back half of 2000, a new military commander was transferring partisan military units back to their home islands and by early 2001 the new police commander was able to report that 600 police officers had been transferred, 16 dishonourably discharged and 87 sanctioned (ICG 2002b:10–11). Rotations were being used more effectively and police and military units began to desist from firing on each other! While the security sector performance in 1999–2000 was more part of the problem than part of the solution, ultimately the police, the navy and the army played important roles in a multidimensional approach that secured a peaceful future for Maluku. Without their contribution in the final few years of the conflict, Maluku might have morphed into something much worse. That worse scenario is illustrated by Umar Al-Farouq, a Kuwait national6 in possession of Ambon identity documents, who has been involved in multiple terrorist actions including Ambon bombings and training of others in Maluku in 2002 and has admitted to being connected with the Al-Qaeda network (Böhm 2005:277, 2006:381). He escaped from his US prison in Bagram, Afghanistan, in July 2004.

In November 2005, anti-terror police, acting on information from arrested militants, discovered a recently abandoned training and transit camp for terrorists that had been operating for several years on the island of Seram in Maluku (Böhm 2006:381, 383). They also arrested 21 suspected terrorists (10 from Java), including one police officer, still in the vicinity. Terrorists from all over Indonesia were drawn to remote Seram to be trained in how to create terror elsewhere, including Imam Samudera, the Bali bombing initiator. They were attracted by a combination of trainers at Seram with experience in Afghanistan and the Philippines and the opportunity for on-the-job training in detonating bombs demanded by hardline efforts to destabilise the Malino peace accord. In May 2005 in Seram, another man was arrested in relation to a fire-fight in which five police were killed; he and several colleagues had been trained in Moro in the Philippines to undertake the attack on the police (Böhm 2006:371). Police prosecutorial efforts post-conflict have concentrated on bringing post-Malino

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bombers to justice. No attempt is being made to rake over attacks on villages that chased out members of the other religion because such an impossibly large proportion of the population was involved. It was not an option to put half of Maluku in prison.

As in Iraq and Afghanistan, in Indonesia, loose global networks of violent jihadists were given the message that the chaos the security forces had failed to nip in the bud created an opportunity for advancing Islam by killing Christians. Some foreign journalists relying on American intelligence sources were reporting suspicions of this by late 2001, though the ICG (2002b:18–19) view was that there were only a few dozen foreign fighters. The porous maritime border that the military allowed to let in fighters and weapons from Java also allowed in fighters from as far afield as Saudi Arabia and deepened the connections Laskar Jihad had forged with the Taliban and Abu Sayyaf (Schulze 2002). During mid-2000, the navy became effective in cutting off the supply of arms, ammunition and fresh fighters to both sides, ultimately intercepting no fewer than 1000 vessels with munitions onboard (Böhm 2005:51, 63). In the end, military efforts were part of a mix of punitive and persuasive strategies that enticed most Laskar Jihad fighters to return home voluntarily, while most of those who did not, including their leader, were arrested. One account of why Laskar Jihad was declining rapidly by mid-2001 was that once President Wahid had been deposed, the military withdrew financial support for them. The arrests and raids in which many Laskar Jihad fighters were killed by the security forces widened divisions that had already opened up within Laskar Jihad over alleged straying of the leadership from Salafi doctrine (Hasan 2006). We will see in the next section that the path to ridding Maluku of its active bomb-makers and assassins was a tortuous one. When one looks back at the thousands of Laskar Jihad fighters who were in the field in eastern Indonesia, at the speeches of their leader that were at the time no less extreme than those of Osama Bin Laden, at their international networking and funding, at how well armed and well trained some of them were, at how successfully they had coopted support from within a faction-ridden Indonesian military, the ultimate contribution the military and the police made to cleaning up the mess they had helped create is something one has to admire.

The multidimensional nature of the peace processes

The first effort at peacemaking by the Habibie government in March 1999 was to send a delegation of prominent military officers to talk to both sides and reconcile differences. ‘These efforts were met with more bombs and violent outbreaks, in part because of the local population’s growing resentment of the armed forces’ role in killings of the previous months’ (Bertrand 2004:128). A May 1999 attempt to bring Christians and Muslims together for a reintegration ritual to celebrate Pattimura Day was also a disaster when fighting broke out
and the military fired on the crowd, killing seven (Pannell 2003:26). The event was scheduled three days after the signing of a peace pledge by religious, adat and political leaders, witnessed by General Wiranto.

Before this, religious leaders on both sides were secretly reaching out to each other. While many religious leaders were preaching war from their pulpits, others were from the beginning preaching of a God of peace and reconciliation. This required courage, but it was the latter message that ultimately prevailed to become the near-universal message of sermons today in Maluku, and we should not underestimate how the courage of the early 1999 sermons for peace laid a foundation for reconciliation even at the height of the conflict. At that high-water mark of violence, on 4 September 1999, Christians of the Concerned Women’s Movement held a peace demonstration in front of the governor’s office building, drawing out Governor Latuconsina and his senior civil servants, the police, judiciary and military leadership to listen to a ‘Women’s Voice Declaration’. Not long after, the Muslim Concerned Women’s Movement held a similar demonstration. The two Concerned Women’s Movements were afraid to demonstrate openly together, but they were secretly meeting to share peacebuilding intelligence. One of the Muslim Concerned Women had her house burned down after a phone call warning this would happen because of her peace activism. The Christian and Muslim Concerned Women also shared ‘Stop the Violence’ ribbons for women to wear. They had a program to persuade child fighters to get back to school. On 7 December 1999, the governor in a sense followed the women by reading aloud his ‘Declaration of Refraining from Violence and Ending the Conflict’, which was signed by senior leaders of all faiths, but not the top religious leaders. Also in December 1999, President Wahid invited exiled RMS leaders from The Netherlands to contribute their voices to a call for peace.

January 2000 saw the National Commission on Human Rights conduct a course on mediation for 30 Muslims and 30 Christians on Bali. On the first day, they split bitterly and had to conduct the training in separate groups and different hotels (ICG 2002b:22).

Muslim leaders, including the MUI, pleaded with all outside fighters to return to their home villages (Böhm 2005:50). Their commander, Ja’far Umar Thalib, was arguing for the opposite course. In a widely broadcast address from Ambon’s Al Fatah Mosque on 3 September 2000, he had gone close to advocating ethnic cleansing of Ambon:

Keep on fighting the Christians until all their potential to pester the Muslim community will be obliterated…The war will only be over as
soon as the Muslims control the town of Ambon…I am sure we can end the conflict by means of war. There is no other way to pave the way to a bright future for our children and grandchildren. (Böhm 2005:70)

By mid-2001, however, approximately half the Laskar Jihad fighters responded to the appeals to return to their homes voluntarily (Böhm 2005:60). When voluntary return began in October 2000, it put the Christian leadership under pressure from EU and US delegations to drop their precondition for peace talks of a return of all Laskar Jihad fighters. On 25 October 2000, momentum for peace took another step with the arrest of a dozen Laskar Jihad fighters for further attacks.

Christian and Muslim NGOs in Jakarta had established a peace movement and process called Baku Bae (meaning reconciliation) from early 2000. Three reconciliation meetings of progressively larger groups of Moluccan Muslim and Christian leaders were held in Jakarta in August, Bali in September and Yogyakarta in December 2000, supported by the Sultan of Yogyakarta. The last was disrupted when Laskar Jihad members, some armed, marched in demanding the end of the talks. It was agreed to expand the inter-faith dialogue in Maluku from these beginnings and to establish two neutral zones in Ambon for trade and education patrolled by a peacekeeping force of local residents of both faiths. Though bombs were detonated to destabilise them, these peace zones succeeded, and a third was spontaneously established following their lead. At one of them, the destroyed Pattimura University was able to restart in temporary premises, taking students of both faiths, and an army hospital was able to serve both. In March 2001, Baku Bae worked with the Alliance of Independent Journalists to bring Christian and Muslim journalists together in Bogor. They established a media centre to promote inter-faith peace journalism in one of the neutral zones. It sought to end ‘war by media’ and to promote journalism that was an inspiration for finding paths to peace. In a sense, however, some critics argued that what the media did was move from a simplistic pro-war analysis of the conflict as a project of either Islamisation or Christianisation to a pro-peace, simplistic analysis of the conflict as the work of Javanese provocateurs. Subsequent peace meetings were held for many other professions across the religious divide. Also in March 2001, Baku Bae organised a meeting of 1500 leaders, including many who had been involved in fighting on both sides, in the Kei Islands of Maluku, far from Ambon. It was decided that henceforth reconciliation would involve local adat processes that would guarantee security for migrants and refugees.

On 17 January 2001, a children’s prayer meeting of 1000 schoolchildren (500 Muslim, 500 Christian) was organised by the Police Chief of Maluku, Firman Gani, with the message that ‘their parents should be ashamed. Why cannot they make peace where the children have already?’ (Böhm 2005:131). Mosques and
churches, often with support from donors, organised many activities such as camps that brought Muslim and Christian youth together. An inter-faith dialogue was energised during the conflict and continues in post-conflict Maluku to promote peace sermons, learning about each other’s religions—not just their religious symbols and rituals but to comprehend the inner religious life of the other (for example, through praying, fasting and breaking fast together; though they fast in different ways, they share the spirit of fasting). The dialogue also sought to quash rumour mongering on Islamisation and Christianisation and to quash the stereotype of Muslims as terrorists and Christians as separatists. During the conflict, Muslims often focused on the black garments of Christian preachers, calling them ‘devils in black’. By 2007, this had become part of the humour of the inter-faith dialogue to have ulamas laughingly refer to their brother preachers as ‘devils in black’. The inter-faith dialogue was described by one participant as discussing the desirability of ‘having Moluccan Muslims as opposed to Arab Muslims, Moluccan Christians as opposed to Dutch Christians’. In the conflict they said many young Muslims adopted a Palestinian mentality or way of dressing, while many Christians adopted a Western mode. The inter-faith dialogue has established special networks for youth, children and women. They also network internationally with, for example, the Uniting Church Australia Ambassadors for Peace Program. They have pro-peace inter-faith stickers and T-shirts.

Several reconciliation meetings for adults followed the children in the centre of Ambon, attended by thousands of Christians and Muslims, adat and religious leaders, who stood on the platform and prayed together for peace. Collaboration on Christian and Muslim art, music and dance was an important part of these events. They would teach each other their dance and music, then do it together, discovering shared symbols of love, trust and kindness in their art. Other reintegration rituals involved large traditional canoes paddled by 15 Muslims and 15 Christians.

One of the reasons given by many informants for the way the conflict in Ambon escalated was the erosion of adat traditions for de-escalating conflict (see also Bartels 1977). Many of them also said during our 2007 interviews that the shock of the violence had led to a renaissance of these traditions today. An Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation survey in 2002 found 58 per cent of Moluccans to believe that for reconciliation to work it must come from below (dari bawah) (Brown et al. 2005:xv). Moreover, these traditions did work well in many places outside Ambon (see Laksono 2002), especially in south-eastern Maluku. While peace in Ambon was widely believed to have depended on the Malino peace agreement, permanent peace was secured on all the other islands of Maluku without Malino, and well in advance of it, in most cases at the hands of local reconciliation following local traditions. The contrast between the other islands and Ambon
was even sharper because there were at least two efforts at reconciliation on Ambon that led to violence—for example, a reconciliation meeting between Kudamati (Christian) and Waihaong (Muslim) youth after which eight Christian young men were abducted and killed returning from the reconciliation (Böhm 2005:25).

So what is the nature of these reconciliation traditions that Moluccans consider so crucial to understanding where peacemaking succeeds and fails? ‘Pela-gandong’ or ‘pela’ consists of oaths of allegiance that bind two villages, or sometimes two clans, to mutual help and defence. It might be two Christian villages or Christian and Muslim villages in relationships that transcend these faiths. Historically, *pela* was used in both offensive and defensive cooperation and was often formed as a peace pact at the end of a war (Bartels 1977:41). In the ritual of sealing a ‘hard *pela*’ oath (Bartels 2003:134), participants immerse weapons in a mixture of palm wine and blood from the leaders of the two groups. All then drink it. Violation of the brotherhood invokes a curse; the weapons dipped in shared blood kill those who breach the oath. There are, however, also soft versions of *pela* oaths that are just friendship pacts sealed by sitting together to chew betel-nut. Anthropologist Dieter Bartels (1977:325) conceives *pela* as the heart of a distinctively Ambonese religious ontology that ties Islam and Christianity together as different branches of the same ‘religion of Nunsaka’, though some *pela* relationships exist in parts of Maluku beyond Ambon (Pannell 2003:25).

Today the concept of *pela* or *pela-gandong* (‘*gandong*’ meaning born of the same root, a bond based on blood or clan ancestry) as some sort of shared Moluccan brotherhood of Christians and Muslims is perhaps more important than the real inter-village pacts. Most villages on the islands of Ambon, Haruku, Saparua, Nusalaut and West Seram have a *pela* relationship with at least one other village (Bartels 2003:133).

No villages in a *pela* relationship fought against one another during the conflict. There were cases of Christian soldiers saving Muslim villages from destruction by units in which they served because of a *pela* alliance of their home village with that Muslim village (Bartels 2003:132). On the one hand, *pela* relationships might not have been seen as particularly effective for violence prevention because there was little integration of migrant communities into *pela* pacts, and while villages tended to be attacked by nearby villages, their *pela* partners tended to be far away. On the other hand, for reconciliation, a *pela* partner from some distance could open a path to inter-religious reconciliation that was more difficult for neighbours. For example, the community of Batumerah that launched the first major attacks of the battle of Ambon in January 1999 enjoyed a ceremony during our 2007 fieldwork in which its Christian *gandong* partner village, Paso, built and erected the *arif* pole at the centre of its huge new mosque.
Anomie and Violence

to replace the one burnt down by Christians. After such assistance of pela partners with building a mosque or church, devotees of the two faiths enter the building for a shared service. This affirms the Ambonese belief that Islam and Christianity are basically ‘only variations of the same faith’ (Bartels 2003:135).

What we must do is take the values of pela into the public arena, beyond pela villages. Some migrants have learnt to understand and value pela and participate in pela activities in their areas. So we can revitalise a multicultural pela that was always multi-religious. (Protestant minister)

The inter-faith dialogue is one vehicle for this. One prominent Muslim cleric said in 2007 that ‘cultural beliefs rather than religious beliefs created the peace’. While religious leaders felt that pela was important for peacebuilding, in the inter-faith dialogue, they sometimes criticised it for not having enough religious meaning. So one of the projects of the inter-faith dialogue was to give pela more shared Muslim–Christian spiritual content. One way they settled on was to connect pela-gandong traditions to stories from Muslim and Christian holy texts. A number of informants said pela remained a living cultural reality in urban Ambon. Ambon police told us it was local government policy in urban Ambon to facilitate pela-gandong as part of their community policing philosophy, though the police also said it was much easier to rely on elders enforcing adat to deal with violence and other crime in rural Ambon.

In several villages we visited, including Poka, where the second wave of conflict began, Muslims had helped Christians rebuild churches or Christians had helped Muslims rebuild mosques, or both. We also saw a lot of mutual help with cleaning up the grounds of churches and mosques, with the ulama lending the church a mower that the mosque owned on a regular basis. As in Papua (Chapter 2), this was reconciliation through working together on shared projects (gotong royong).

Hohe and Ramijsen (2004) point out that pela often traditionally means a unity between two parties bound in a pact of opposition to a third party, hence amplifying rather than reducing conflict. Post-conflict, there is a tendency to romanticise pela, when, as Brown et al. (2005:22) point out: ‘Even at its height, pela-gandong did not, and was never meant to, ensure cohesion between broad social groups across the region.’ On the other hand, recovery from the worst armed conflict a society has ever experienced is a time when romantic reconfiguring of traditions to make them more ambitious traditions of peacebuilding do occur. We see the same ratcheting up of the geographical scope of more local peacebuilding traditions in a case such as Bougainville, for example (Peacebuilding Compared, Working Paper 6). In the West, just because

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7 A senior Muslim combatant from Batumerah on why they would never fight Christians from Paso: we ‘would be ashamed if we attacked our own brother.’
there is a long tradition of diplomacy amplifying conflict through alliances does not mean that romantic visions of ‘preventive diplomacy’ to deal with the heightened threats of modern conflict are something to shun. So when a ulama tells us he is persuading his faithful to help rebuild the nearby church with the words ‘we must return to the old ways now and learn from our mistakes’, does it matter if what is going on is more learning of new ways and only a little learning from custom? The ulama returned to his theme by saying that in the old days when a clove tree ripened, Christians and Muslims would share and prepare the crop together. Now he says they must aim to be ‘even more like family than we were before’. And they will get there by preaching the brotherhood of the past and of the future in mosques and churches and schools. The ulama summed up with a syncretic Christian–Muslim theology: ‘If we do not have good fellowship with humankind, we will not have good fellowship with God.’

As in the rest of Indonesia, in Maluku, traditional intra and inter-communal conflict resolution was set back by the 1970s centralising and homogenising reforms to replace traditional Maluku village governance based on negeri geographical units (with a hereditary raja as leader) with the more democratic Javanese system of a desa (village) with an elected kepala desa (headman) (Brown et al. 2005:21). When violence broke out, in many villages, the New Order local governance regime meant there was often no-one with the local authority and legitimacy to stop it (HRW 1999:5). On the one hand, elections gave immigrants from elsewhere in Indonesia a voice in village politics. We were also told of cases where coming together to choose informally, then elect a new village leader had caused Muslims and Christians to return to collaborative exchange. On the other hand, in circumstances in which Muslim migrants and Christian Ambonese tended to live either in separate villages or separate kampungs within the same village, it was divisive to allow village elections to be dominated by whichever ethnicity had the majority. Power sharing was less divisive for villages that had a Christian Ambonese kampung with hereditary traditions of governance and an immigrant Muslim kampung. On the other hand, an important part of informal reconciliation in some villages occurred when elders from one faith group approached an outstanding person of the other faith to lead them. In November 2006, 627 traditional chiefs of Maluku formed a council with the principal objective of inter-religious and inter-community reconciliation led by chiefs (Tunny 2006d).

Post-conflict, the international NGO Mercy Corps and the UNDP have been key players in fostering peacebuilding through local NGOs. The Jesuit Refugee Service in East Seram helped reconciliation between people who had fled their island and those who had chased them away by exchanges of video messages in which both sides expressed their hopes, fears and regrets. UNESCO has also had a program on developing a culture of peace—for example, through peace
journalism. Many grassroots reconciliation teams and initiatives and networks have been set up at a local level, often with encouragement or backing from the military or local government. The teams mostly consist of equal numbers of religious, adat, community and youth leaders from both sides. They promote local reconciliation encounters and work at giving assurance to refugees that it is safe for them to return.

When we were in Ambon in 2007, new initiatives continued, such as one of the Interfaith Council in which Christian and Muslim clerics stayed overnight in villages of the other faith, living in a religious boarding school or the home of a cleric of the other faith or just a normal family. In one case, a Christian cleric stayed in the home of a Laskar Jihad leader. There were lots of jokes about their differences, but the stay was extended because such warm bonds were established, gifts exchanged and Christian support organised for poor Muslims in the village. As was also true in North Maluku, a brake on local reconciliation efforts was often that communities would refuse to take the initiative themselves, waiting for the lead of government officials (Jesuit Refugee Service 2006:126). Where we found initiative to be at its best was at the most micro-level. For example, old men explained how the young were still ‘hot’ and would lose their temper. Older men were assigned to watch out and moderate the temper of particular young men, especially if they were drinking. If an angry incident did occur, the older man sometimes took the younger man to the mosque for dialogue and healing for many days after. If a significant incident of inter-religious violence occurred, these old men brought their younger charges to reconciliation meetings with the other side. Even very simple things such as the Muslim villager who owned a car stopping to offer Christian villagers a ride were regarded as important reconciliation work.

One thing we learnt to be wary of from our fieldwork was the view that the kinds of reconciliation that mattered were state or NGO initiated. Beyond the statist and NGO-ist bias in reconciliation research, there can also be a ritualist bias that sees formal rituals of reconciliation as the important stuff. In contrast, what the villagers we met felt was more important was the respected Muslim businessman who bothered to stop to pick up ‘a poor Christian farmer like me’. Another reason why informal reconciliation could be more important was that Laskar Jihad regularly stopped formal reconciliations. Another micro-practice of reconciliation that rural villagers viewed as central to local reconciliation was attending funerals and weddings of neighbours of the opposite faith, for Muslims to offer salutations at Christmas and Christians to visit and say salamat on Mohammed’s birthday. When Christian reconciliation leader John Mylock died, not only did huge numbers of Muslims attend to honour his role in building the peace, all classes at the Islamic University opened with a minute’s silence in his honour. Often reported as particularly important both here and in North
Maluku was for Christians to go to Muslim homes at the ritual of *halal bi halal* and to ask for forgiveness for any (non-specified) thing they had done to treat their Muslim neighbour badly in the past. It is common to read in the Jakarta press how *halal bi halal*—this ritual of mutual asking for forgiveness that is unique to Indonesia—has lost all meaning. People ask forgiveness ritualistically, with no depth of feeling, from people whom they do not feel need to forgive them for anything. After these terrible inter-village wars, the ritual acquired a new depth of meaning. People would hug each other for long periods, weeping, after forgiveness was offered. Both parties would know of the acts of arson or violence for which forgiveness was very much needed, but these specific acts would not be mentioned in the context of the *halal bi halal* ritual.

Hence, there had been a variety of mediation attempts locally at many levels and with outside support that started soon after the fighting began. Even the police held reconciliation rituals between Muslim and Christian police. All this work finally bore fruit with an agreement signed at Malino, South Sulawesi, on 12 February 2002. When we asked Ambonese informants what the turning point in the conflict was, Malino was the near-universal nominee. Jakarta ministers Jusuf Kalla and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono rode into this Malino II reconciliation meeting with the momentum of a successful peace for Poso recently negotiated at Malino I. While Malino II was a turning point, it was a process that did only a small part of the sustained, detailed work of peacebuilding. The most organised perpetrator of killing, Laskar Jihad, was not present. It was a very short process, announced as a proposed meeting by Kalla on 11 January 2002, signed one month later and with poor follow-through, with some initiatives agreed as part of Malino II simply not materialising.

The UNDP concluded from its stakeholder consultations that ‘frequent complaints are made about the unwillingness of the government to publish the findings of the Independent National Investigation Team’ (UNDP interview). It had been intended to provide the truth part of truth and reconciliation. At the preparatory meetings and at Malino, participants decided they would not discuss grievances about specific incidents because it would be the job of the Independent National Investigation Team to get to the truth (Brown et al. 2005:xiii). Malino delegates from both sides told us they felt confident it would reveal the role of certain factions of the military in provoking conflict. Journalists believed the report did name specific military leaders as responsible, as well as Christian and Muslim leaders, and President Megawati felt this would engender anti-military feeling that the military might blame her for. The UNDP stakeholder consultations also concluded that ‘Malino Working Groups (Pokja) set up to monitor and enhance actions in support of the agreement were not
empowered by authorities and lack accountability to the people’ (Brown et al. 2005:xiii). Basically the government took over and completed the agreed Malino work plan without involving the pokja.

While Malino I and Malino II were important contributions that stamped Kalla and Yudhoyono as the men who, as Vice-President and President, respectively, were capable of restoring peace to Indonesia, we must be careful not to fall prey to the front-stage account of politics often too readily accepted by journalists and the kind of political scientist who attends to newspapers more than backstage players who lead reconciliation from behind. First, the Malino II meeting did not start with the initiative of Kalla. A number of the Christian and Muslim leaders who became Malino delegates had been meeting in secret ‘three or four times a week’ for a couple of months, often in Governor Latuconsina’s house. They then started working with Kalla’s office. Second, Malino II can be criticised as a top-down process in which ‘selected leaders’ were whisked off to talks that failed to work at connecting to bottom-up peacebuilding efforts that touched the hearts of ordinary people (Brown et al. 2005:xvi). It eschewed community-driven planning. Some we interviewed said Indonesians looked up to the leaders they accepted as leaders, so reconciliation tended to come from them from the top down. The special contribution of Malino II was that it was more front-stage, involving more high-profile leaders, than in the past. The entire two days of the meeting were televised, causing everyone in Maluku to be glued to their television sets, thereby also causing a total pause in fighting! As one of the delegation leaders said, Malino put central government leaders on television being a party to the peace process: ‘up till then they did not take responsibility as a state.’ Many Moluccans were critical of the ‘it’s your local problem’, hands-off approach to the violence, but tended to have a lot of praise for Kalla’s hands-on role and Yudhoyono’s support.

The confidence that a turning point to peace had been reached at Malino allowed some other positive things to occur. The Malino reconciliation team visited every mosque and church in Maluku, socialising the agreement. The governor announced an amnesty for weapons surrendered from 1 to 31 March 2002. We do not know that it was very successful in destroying a large proportion of the weapons, but it was given some appearance of being successful and enabled the governor to announce that from 1 April there would be intensive sweeps in which anyone found illegally in possession of weapons would be prosecuted. We know that on the island of Seram there was a ceremony in which 1752 weapons were destroyed (Böhm 2005:261), but we also know now that training for bombing campaigns across Indonesia continued to occur on Seram. A first step to the enforcement-swamping problem of almost all males and many females being armed was at least to deter the brandishing of weapons in the open. Weapons were still being voluntarily surrendered in 2006, when 636
handmade rifles and guns, 68 military or police weapons (mostly M16s) and 7000 pieces of ammunition, including explosives, were voluntarily surrendered (Tunny 2006c). Most were surrendered for destruction on the occasion of the Independence Day celebration.

On 2 May 2002, the governor ordered the arrest of Laskar Jihad leader, Ja’far Umar Thalib, after he gave yet another provocative speech urging continued war against Christians and denouncing the Malino agreement. Ja’far was arrested at Surabaya airport on 4 May. His 1 May broadcast included some heady stuff: ‘The second Afghanistan war will take place in Maluku’ (Böhm 2005:245). Ja’far was arrested on two occasions for two crimes. One was this call to armed insurrection; the second was execution of one his fighters by burying him up to his waist and stoning him for adultery. On both occasions, he was quickly transferred to house arrest after protests and then released back into the community. The fact that he could be arrested affirmed, however, that the peace process had passed a turning point. And while he was under arrest in Jakarta on 20 May 2002, Ja’far issued an order for Laskar Jihad to leave Maluku. Perhaps this was part of a deal for his release. Jihadist spoilers were active in the weeks after Ja’far’s arrest. On 12 May 2002, the wife and child of Thamrin Ely, the leader of the Muslim delegation to Malino, were chased from their house by gunfire and the house burnt to the ground. Two other Muslim delegations had their houses bombed and/or burned and threats were made and stones thrown at other Muslim Malino delegates, just as threats had been made against peacemakers on both sides at all stages of peace negotiations. Laskar Jihad launched attacks on Christians in Ambon in the months after Malino in an attempt to derail the peace (Project Ploughshares 2004).

Another critical factor in the return of Laskar Jihad fighters to their villages in Java and Sulawesi during 2002 was that their financial backers stopped paying them. Laskar Jihad was disbanded in October 2002 and its headquarters closed on 15 October, days after the Bali bombing cost 202 lives, though its web site was still active in December 2002, at which point it was blocked by Indosite. There is a debate about whether Bali led to Laskar Jihad being disbanded, or another release from prison of Ja’far or whether it was international diplomacy that led to meetings between Saudi Arabian ulamas and the Laskar Jihad leadership and an authoritative fatwa issued by Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madkhali (Hasan 2006:225) from Saudi Arabia stating that the jihad in the Moluccas was now over. Ambon ulamas we interviewed who were supporters of Ja’far and the most radical spoilers of Laskar Jihad viewed this fatwa as authoritative throughout Indonesia and Maluku. For them, the fatwa was the important reason why it was right for all Laskar Jihad fighters to return to their homes. Most of the remaining Laskar Jihad fighters (800–1000) left Ambon on the Dorondola on 15 October 2002 (Böhm 2005:277). The remaining few hundred were expected to board
other ships to return home over the next few weeks. Some estimates, however, suggest about 100 never returned (Böhm 2005:322), some for reasons of local romantic attachments, but others because, as also happened in Poso, they were hardliners—some of them non-Indonesian hardliners.

One leading ulama said Laskar Jihad was in fact ‘easy to persuade. They were not stubborn. So long as you appealed to them in religious terms, in terms of what is right for the faithful to do.’ He continued: ‘All the religious leaders in Maluku at many different levels, from the greatest Muslim leaders down to the Muslim clerics in the smallest villages were involved in persuading all elements of Laskar Jihad to stop fighting and return to their homes.’ When ‘all’ was queried, he agreed that yes, there were some dissenters who wanted the fight to continue, but they were small in number in the end.

We went house to house, talking to them. There were many jihad checkpoints in villages. We would go to those jihadists [local leaders] first and persuade them it was time for peace. Then we would go house to house doing the same. We went to Seram, all over, to talk to ulamas at the local level about the time for peace. Then we would go to shops to talk with local people about why it was the time for peace with their local ulama.

Friday prayers, he continued, were also important in this peace socialisation process. For women, Ma’jlis Ta’lim, the women’s branch of MUI, was used to socialise the peace process. The organisation of wives of Muhammadir members was also used. Schools were important to show the young that now was the time to ‘break the sword and replace it with the pen’ (Ambon ulama).

The slow conversion of almost all of Laskar Jihad to non-violence was impressive in the way it used a combination of: 1) persuasive overtures from religious leaders they respected in Ambon, Java and Saudi Arabia; 2) elders in the Muslim villages they were protecting thanking them, but saying now it was time for locals to build their own peace; 3) diplomacy that led to an authoritative fatwa to withdraw, withdrawing the financial carrots and political and military support that were inducing them to fight; 4) shutting down the organisation that supported them; 5) shutting down the web site that attracted and indoctrinated many of them; 6) cutting off much of the plentiful supply of ammunition they had enjoyed in previous years; 7) surprise night-time arrests of sleeping hold-outs and death in fire-fights for others. Their leader, who was so vitriolic in his advocacy of holy war and ethnic cleansing and who supported the 11 September 2001 attack on New York, is no longer an outspoken advocate of violence against Christians. He was always critical of Osama bin Laden as someone from a different Salafi stream, but he became increasingly vitriolic in regular denunciations of Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. In January 2006,
the Deputy Laskar Jihad War Commander spoke at the Al Fatah Mosque in Ambon, which was once the centre of violent jihad in Maluku, to an audience of 500 on why jihad should not mean terrorism (Böhm 2006:388). Indonesian Islamic leaders can take pride in how their religious reasoning with such former fighters has persuaded them to give talks in which the Koran is repeatedly used as an authority for non-violent jihad. More broadly, the Indonesian state and Indonesian civil society can take pride in how they have worked together to craft a multidimensional strategy that has prevented the leader of Laskar Jihad from taking Maluku in the direction of Afghanistan, as he had said he wanted to in the same Al Fatah Mosque.

Most Muslim leaders who we interviewed had only kind words for Laskar Jihad. They believed that without their help Muslims would have been driven out of Maluku and that the Christian militant leaders would never have been driven to peace negotiations. In fairness, Laskar Jihad fighters were deployed mostly to Muslim villages in defensive positions to deter Christian attack—and that was the reality many villagers saw. Hasan’s (2006:193) interviews with more than 100 Laskar Jihad indicated that very few of them fought in battles.

In this section, we have perhaps laboured a description of the many types of reconciliation—particularly bottom-up efforts—that occurred. In future chapters, we will not do so in as much detail. We want to make the point, however, that in published work on the conflict there is a neglect of the forms micro-reconciliation has taken. The iterated attempts at reconciliation were not always effective, but they were persistent and the diversity of modalities of reconciliation was broad.

Interpreting the conflict

What structural factors were at the root of this conflict?

Colonialism was a structural factor in the Maluku conflict, though in a very different way from that revealed in Chapter 2 for Papua. Just as colonialism in Rwanda constructed the separateness and privilege of the Tutsi ethnic group above Hutus, so in Maluku colonialism separated Christians from Muslims residually and placed them above Muslims in terms of educational, occupational and political opportunities. Immigrant Muslims, from many of the same communities that created an advantaged group in Papua, constituted a disadvantaged group in Maluku that was resented for their competition for jobs with poor Moluccans of both faiths. The Christian advantage remained in place during the early decades after independence, but began to be sharply reversed in the 1990s, especially in terms of political offices and the civil service jobs flowing from this. Dutch colonialism and Suharto’s re-engineering of
the governance of local communities dissolved much of the cultural glue that helped hold communities together and prevented anomie in the face of religious conflicts until the end of the twentieth century.

Dutch colonialism also shunted the Moluccas towards economic backwardness by terminating the competitive trading traditions, practices and networks that made it one of the wealthiest parts of the world pre-colonialism. That vibrant trading system was replaced with a colonial corporate monopoly for imports and for spice exports. As van Klinken’s (2007) analysis showed, Maluku was left with a thin structure of legitimate opportunities through commerce, compounded by decisions to physically dismantle industries such as shipbuilding in Maluku and reassemble them in Java. It was also left with an unusually deep structure (compared with most of Indonesia) of illegitimate opportunities through corrupt abuse of large numbers of public sector posts. Closing legitimate opportunities and opening illegitimate opportunities is a formula for widespread criminal exploitation by those who grab the illegitimate opportunities. This, as criminologists have long known (Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Braithwaite 1979), is also a structural condition conducive to violence.

Muslim immigration also pushed Christians right up to the verge of becoming a minority of the Maluku population for the first time in centuries. Indian research on Muslim–Hindu riots found that a town approaching a 50/50 religious divide was a structural predictor of the violence of religious riots across 167 towns (Wilkinson 2004:44–5). Little has been done to ameliorate these underlying structural factors in the conflict, though economic growth in Maluku has resumed for most of the 2000s to a very healthy level by any international standard, increasing the number of private sector legitimate opportunities for rich and poor, Christian and Muslim alike.

What have been the proximate factors in the conflict?

The Asian economic crisis was the most obvious proximate factor in the conflict in Maluku. It increased competition for scarce resources, just as the ending of the Asian economic crisis reduced it and supported a return to peace. Especially important was competition for scarcer public sector jobs between Christians and Muslims and between migrants and native Moluccans. It was also a proximate cause of the collapse of the New Order, which meant transition to a new institutional order in which new claims could be made in new ways (Bertrand 2004). Decentralisation increased patronage and corruption opportunities in controlling district government offices, which again fuelled competition between Christians and Muslims, migrants and non-migrants. Democratisation increased perceived opportunities from mobilising popular support along religious lines.
Failure of the security forces to take control at the first sign of conflict was critical. Worse than mere paralysis in the face of surprisingly fast escalation of conflict, many members of the security forces deserted their duty to the constitution, fighting alongside combatants who sought to cleanse either Christians or Muslims. This worsened the security dilemma ordinary people felt and forced them to seek protection from militias and to encourage their young people to join them as fighters. At meetings of Christian and Muslim women of the Caring Women’s Movement, Christian women would report that they had been told that intelligence indicated Muslims were planning an attack on a certain day. Then the Muslim women would report they had been told that on the same date Christians were planning to attack them. Since both sides knew there was no plan for an assault from their side, the women were able to play a role in defusing the security dilemma. It did not always work; sometimes the explosion of violence did occur on that day despite their efforts.

A conclusion of George Rudé’s classic study of the large number of riots that occurred in France and England between 1730 and 1848, *The Crowd in History*, was that crowds could foment historical change as profound as the French Revolution, but only if an important faction of the military defected to the crowd. ‘[T]he key factor in determining the outcome of popular rebellion and disturbance is the loyalty or disaffection of the armed forces at the government’s disposal’ (Rudé 1964:266). From France (1789) and the Philippines (1986) to Romania (1989) and Serbia (2000), people power produces dramatic change only when it enjoys some military support. Because people power in Tiananmen Square could stop the tank, but could not cause the tank crew to stand with the people, regime change did not occur in China.

Van Klinken (2007) perceptively describes the Moluccan conflicts in the subtitle of his book as ‘small town wars’. ‘Villages’ such as Poka are in fact quite large small towns, with thousands as opposed to hundreds of buildings. This is a different context from the ‘villages’ of the Papuan highlands, which are dispersed, clustered hamlets of a dozen or so small buildings. Wilkinson’s (2004:43–7) regressions on 138 Muslim–Hindu riots in 167 Indian towns show that the larger the town, the more likely and the more severe is the religious riot. His conclusion is that

town-level electoral incentives account for where Hindu–Muslim violence breaks out and state-level electoral incentives account for where and when state governments use their police forces to prevent riots…In virtually all the empirical cases I have examined, whether violence is bloody or ends quickly depends not on the local factors that caused violence to break out but primarily on the will and capacity of the government that controls the forces of law and order. (Wilkinson 2004:5–6)
Maluku fits the pattern of Wilkinson’s Indian data. By the end of the 1990s, local politics was increasingly polarised. It was about Muslim politicians being supported by Muslims (and favouring Muslims for public sector jobs) and Christian politicians supported by Christians to get them public sector jobs. Fighting between Christian and Muslim youth gangs, even escalating to a few buildings being torched, had been common in the 1990s. This also fits the pattern of Wilkinson’s data, which find that Hindu–Muslim riots in India mostly led to no deaths and, where deaths did occur, the toll in 80 per cent of riots was in the range one to nine. The Ambon fighting never escalated into wars that embraced all Ambon island and beyond until the disintegration of the New Order left Maluku unprotected by a police and a military who were often more interested in adding fuel to the fire than putting it out.

The interesting question then becomes why the security forces choose to allow or fuel disorder instead of extinguishing it. In Wilkinson’s data, the answer was that Indian police were very much under the political control of elected state governments and in cases where that state government did not depend on minority votes, they sometimes found it politically expedient to allow minorities to be attacked and to attack (rallying disengaged members of their majority ethnic group back to commitment to ethnic voting). Conversely, when state governments did rely on minority votes, they insisted that their police use all means necessary to protect them. Political and military elites in Jakarta in 1999–2000 were concerned about losing Muslim support but not greatly concerned about losing Christian support. Worse, military leaders up to General Wiranto saw the military as having a political interest in instability, indeed in ‘renegotiating the concept of the nation’ (Bertrand 2004:10). Laskar Jihad was therefore allowed to sweep across to escalate the war and at first the military experienced impunity when it took sides. As a result, it is worth noting that the number killed in Maluku between 1999 and 2004 was about the same as all the Indians killed in the many thousands of Hindu–Muslim riots that occurred in India from 1950 to the period of the Maluku conflict (Wilkinson 2004:12). Bertrand’s (2004:10) historical institutionalist analysis that ‘when institutions are weakened during transition periods, allocations of power and resources become open for competition’ seems apt.

Wilkinson’s (2004:58) findings are summarised elegantly in Table 3.1. Maluku has moved from the highest violence to the lowest violence quadrant since 2004. Electoral success in Maluku today depends on attracting support from both the Muslim and Christian communities and we have documented the high levels of civic engagement, gotong royong, inter-faith dialogue and pela-gandong that have been mobilised during the present decade to remedy the collapse of civic engagement that occurred in the decade before. Today Maluku satisfies the condition of having an ‘institutionalized peace system’ (Varshney 2002). Before
2000, it did not. One might say that Maluku does not meet the condition of ‘no previous violence’ in Table 3.1. Intersubjectively, in the sense that matters, it does. Most people on both sides believed it was outside provocateurs and the military that caused the slaughter of 1999–2004. So today Moluccans do not see themselves in a security dilemma whereby an outbreak of violence is best dealt with by a ‘defensive’ attack before the other side gets the better of you.

**Table 3.1 The effect of town and state politics on violence in India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local precipitants of violence</th>
<th>State government determined to prevent riots</th>
<th>State government not determined to prevent riots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>present (for example, high electoral competition, previous violence, low level of civic engagement)</td>
<td>Second-lowest level of violence More riots break out but they are quickly contained by the state</td>
<td>Highest level of violence More riots break out, and these are prolonged and bloody because they are unrestrained by either the state or the local community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absent (for example, low levels of electoral competition, no previous violence, high levels of civic engagement)</td>
<td>Lowest level of violence Fewer riots break out and those that do are contained by the state</td>
<td>Second-highest level of violence Fewer riots break out but they continue because they are not contained by the state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Media reporting often made things worse—in Ambon and Java—sensationalising atrocity in a way that inflamed one side or both. The Maluku media during the conflict split into outlets with wholly Christian and wholly Muslim staffs basically reporting only from their own side. The ‘Australian Peace Committee’ did little for the cause of constructively engaging the United Nations with the conflict with a wildly exaggerated Internet petition to the UN Secretary-General and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights that said that ‘23,000 Indonesian soldiers backed by 30,000 Laskar Jihad mercenaries and some hundreds of Taliban mercenaries are waging a full-scale war against the innocent Moluccan people…Moluccans report that 40,000 of their people have been killed’ (quoted in Böhm 2005:119). Even the office of a senior Indonesian Government minister issued the literally inflammatory statement that 1382 mosques compared with 18 churches had been burned between June and October 2000. The governor corrected the figures with a statement that only 87 mosques had been burned during these three months and 127 churches (Brown et al. 2005:34). Peace journalism made only a late contribution to peacebuilding. In the past few years, the Maluku Media Centre has made an important effort at educating journalists for a conflict-sensitive media that avoids innuendo and corrects false rumours. Ironically, the jihadist radio station Radio Suara Penjuangan Muslim Maluku (Voice of the Maluku Muslims’ Struggle), which
inflamed so much warlike sentiment during the conflict, when the fatwa was issued for the conflict in Maluku to end, was used to persuade fighters that peace was God’s will.

At a more micro-level, more particular proximate factors can be identified. Governor Saleh Latuconsina worked hard at convening reconciliations between Christian and Muslim leaders from before the outbreak of violence, but he made mistakes as well. He gave a speech at one village urging citizens to hold out against the violence and refuse to flee. Further, he said if violence broke out here and they failed to stop it, he would resign as governor. His female vice-governor was a retired police general and lent on her experience to say to him never make that kind of claim again because it created a risk that militias would go all out to destroy the village to try to force his resignation. And that was exactly what they did.

Illegal logging is a significant problem on the islands of Seram, Buru and Wetar. While there was a lot of conflict on the first two of these islands, there was not the kind of evidence there was for the conflicts of Papua, Kalimantan and Aceh of illegal logging being important to the fabric of greed and grievance that led to violence on those islands. Nevertheless, the military has had significant investments in illegal logging and also makes a lot of money by providing security for it.

What were the key triggering incidents?

Minor fights started many conflicts in Ambon city, villages on Ambon island and in towns and villages on outer islands. Flag raisings by alleged Christian separatists were also a trigger on some occasions, notably in the final flare-up of the conflict in May 2004. Our conclusion is that the belief that provocateurs were responsible for it all is part of a fabric of non-truth and reconciliation in Maluku. Provocateurs were also dispatched to Manado, another large town in Sulawesi with a tense political balance of Muslims and Christians who were favoured sons of Dutch colonialism. The sparks they lit were extinguished rather well without escalating to anything like what happened in Maluku. Our conclusion is that in Maluku provocateurs were able to play into a set of structural and proximate political factors, community resentments and community capabilities to organise for violence that was kindling for their sparks. We do conclude, however, that provocateurs were paid and trained to cause violence in Maluku, and they did. That is not to say that outside provocateurs bear most of the responsibility for the slaughter. They do not.
Who were the key war-making and peacebuilding actors?

Some local political leaders played the religious card in divisive and provocative ways to rally polarised support around themselves. Others were leaders of the peace and all ultimately became devotees of a new politics that eschewed religious division. Religious leaders were key organisers of both the war and the peace from command centres in larger churches and mosques. Likewise, the military and the police were key organisers of both the war and the peace.

Gangs that were available for hire by elites of the New Order had become a prominent part of Ambon life during Suharto’s reign. While many of these gangs had innocent beginnings in all parts of urban Indonesia, because they could be useful politically and commercially in threatening and organising people, they increasingly became agents of political, commercial and organised crime. Like all semi-organised crime, they are more than just a reason why many of the cities of low-crime Indonesia have become sites of escalating crime rates; they are also a threat to democracy. They can be coercers and corrupters of democracy. The Maluku case shows they can become something even worse than that: they can be causally implicated in the onset of a war. Agus Wattimena, the overall commander of Christian forces in Maluku, was revered as a war hero when he was shot, but he in fact got the job because he was the most powerful of the violent Christian gangland figures in Ambon. Such greater and lesser gang leaders could call on collective organisation for violence that was formed before the Maluku conflict was ever imagined. Constituting a dynamics of contention is not as difficult when an organisational command structure of collective violence is already on the ground waiting to be either enrolled or payrolled. Laskar Jihad was obviously the most consequential war-making actor in this regard.

FKP was not an actor of major import though it suited pro-war elements on the Muslim side in Jakarta and Ambon to exaggerate its military capability and militancy. FKP certainly did have a political agenda of threats of separatism as a tool to lever support for political emancipation of Christians in the development process. Christian peace leaders who went around to them to ask them not to provoke more conflict through activities such as flag raisings found, however, that in few districts did they have more than 50 supporters. And they were not well armed in the way Laskar Jihad sometimes was; indeed FKP and the separatist movement more broadly had been an underground non-violent movement for decades.

Security concerns severely truncated international NGO activity in Maluku while Laskar Jihad was dominant. ICMC and Mercy Corps supported peacebuilding work though local NGOs. Mercy Corps estimates that there are 400–500 NGOs operating in Maluku today, compared with 30 or 40 in 1999 (see also Panggabean 2004:429). Baku Bae was the local NGO that made the most
decisive peacebuilding intervention in convening meetings between leaders of both sides and organising neutral zones where markets could restart and foster reintegration.

The women’s peacebuilding NGO Concerned Women’s Movement was a key peacebuilding actor. During the height of the fighting, Sister Bridgetta of the Catholic Church was able to go into areas where male pastors would not dare in attempts that were sometimes successful to broker local peace. Women were not only in peacemaking roles: on the Muslim side, there were women fighters, and some women in command roles. One woman was famous for supposedly being bulletproof until finally she was shot. Rituals to make fighters bulletproof and machete-proof were performed before battles. We were told that on the Christian side, some ‘tomboys’ fought—women who dressed and acted like men.

Motivational postures of key actors

In the previous chapter, we described Valerie Braithwaite’s (2009) five motivational postures formulated from factor analytic research in different regulatory governance contexts.

- **Commitment** means willingly embracing the mission of an authority.
- **Capitulation** means surrender to the will of an authority, to the letter of its law without fully embracing its spirit.
- **Resistance** means vocal opposition to the power the authority has and how it uses it. Resistance is about grievance.
- **Disengagement** means psychological dissociation that renders an actor immune to attempts by an authority to steer their actions.
- **Game playing** is a more imaginative and bold practice for escaping constraint by redefining rules, moving goalposts or repositioning the self. It implies keen engagement with the rules of the game and analysing regulatory and governance systems with disarming acuity and clarity of purpose. Authorities are not resented; they are playing the game too, just on a different team. More often than not, gaming is about greed.

*Resistance* is a motivational posture about grievance, while *game playing* tends to be a motivational posture about greed. Was this conflict more about greed or grievance, or neither—mostly just a security dilemma in which inexperienced fighters thought pre-emption would fend off defeat? It is impossible in this case to reach a conclusion on which of these is more important because there is good evidence of all three. The rhetoric of battle was of grievance, of threat to their faith from Islamisation or Christianisation or threat to Indonesian unity from Christian separatism. There was also Christian greed in driving migrant Muslims from markets they had come to dominate and out of domination of other sectors of business such as transport within Christian areas. At the political elite level,
there was greed for the spoils of political office by promising more public sector jobs and contracts for their own faith group, and even greed to harness conflict between Christian and Muslim Ambonese gangs to shut down a competing gambling casino in Ketapang, Jakarta. On the Protestant side, driving Muslim refugees from Ambon was seen as helpful in securing future electoral success for a PDI-P that was a Protestant-dominated party within Maluku.

In the first few weeks of the conflict, many shops owned by Chinese in Maluku’s regional centres were looted and burned (Pannell 2003:24). On 27 July 1999, a large number of Chinese stores on the A. J. Patty Road were methodically looted, then burned. Chinese businesspeople who had suffered great economic loss were remarkably resilient and pleased that they did not suffer more, with one even joking in an interview that there was an old Chinese saying: ‘Where there’s smoke, there’re Chinese.’ Chinese businesspeople rarely came under physical attack; however, many Chinese who lost their homes and businesses and fled to other parts of Indonesia did not return until 2006 (Tunny 2006b). The rhetoric of the conflict did not include anti-Chinese resentment, so we can interpret the looting of Chinatown as about greed within a security vacuum, as we can the shaking down of Chinese businessmen and women for protection money in Muslim and Christian areas. Our interviews with Chinese men and women suggested that the military demanded much higher payments from them for secure passage to the airport compared with other ethnic groups.

The environment of collapse of the social order allowed villages to attack each other to pursue contested claims over scarce land, with Muslim villages even attacking other Muslim villages (ICG 2002b:10; Jesuit Refugee Service 2006:107).

After 2000, security forces wanting to maintain their elevated incomes were major drivers of continued conflict. By then most combatants, including most jihadists, were ready to put down their arms and return to tending their fields to feed hungry families. At all stages of the conflict there were members of the security forces who used the opportunity structure of impunity to offer their skills as marksmen to whoever would pay the highest fee. That is, there were members of the military and police who accepted payment to murder Christians and Muslims and who shook down Muslims and Christians for protection services. There were also many selling ammunition and renting, even selling, military or police rifles.

The most important shift in motivational postures in this conflict was of the military and police from predominantly *game playing* to predominantly *commitment* to the constitution and to the security of the Indonesian state and its people. *Game playing* local politicians, who gamed a politics of religious division, have now *capitulated* to the will of the democracy and of the Jakarta elite to practice a politics inclusive of all religions. *Game playing* provocateurs
are no longer a factor and are no longer on anyone’s payroll. Another critical shift was of Laskar Jihad and all other militias from resistance to Indonesian state authority to at least capitulation and in some cases commitment. Quite unlike the situation in Papua (Chapter 2), where most of the Papuan population retains a degree of commitment to the Free Papua Movement and little commitment to the central state, very few in Maluku sustain any commitment to militias or to separatist movements. Commitments to the authority of religious and adat leaders and binding of villages to each other through pela have strengthened post-conflict. Engagement down to very micro-levels characterises civil society in Maluku rather than the motivational posture of disengagement we found to be so widespread in Papua. Gotong royong in rebuilding neighbourhoods has been widespread and peacebuilding through trustful engagement at markets in peace zones has characterised the development of peace. There remains in Ambon city a large problem of youth gangs disengaged from the traditional authority of village elders and the authority of the state. They remain a risk factor for future violence in Ambon bequeathed by the coercive youth gang politics of the Suharto era.

Peacebuilding strengths and weaknesses

Seven years after the initial eruption of violence in Ambon, there were still 15 788 families living in IDP camps in the city (Böhm 2006:391) and two years later there were still 12 080 in Maluku (Tunny 2008a). Solving the refugee problem was slower in Maluku than in North Maluku because of the segregation of Ambon into totally Christian and totally Muslim zones and no-go areas through 2006. In the circumstances of so much to be done and continuing insecurity, by 2002 the Department of Social Affairs had achieved the impressive accomplishment of rehabilitating 22 000 of the 49 000 homes that had been destroyed. Payment of R3.75 million (US$375) per IDP family was, however, often delayed for years (Brown et al. 2005:54). Corruption in managing funds for IDPs and humanitarian assistance generally has been a major problem. Coordination between humanitarian agencies has also been wanting. Trauma counselling has not been very widely available and permanently disabled victims have received little help. Christians told us their disabled relatives received some help from the Church to cope with their disabilities, but none from the state. Compared with cases such as Aceh, Papua, Central Sulawesi and Bougainville, in Maluku, the reintegration assistance for combatants was minimal.

Limiting international NGO access to Maluku until so late in the peacebuilding process did not help economic recovery. Maluku’s GDP per capita fell to 75 per cent of its 1995 level at the end of 2002 and in 2003 a once-wealthy province had one of the highest poverty rates in Indonesia, driven by a conflict-induced 400 per cent inflation rate in food prices, including rice (Brown et al. 2005:xii). It was affected economically by the millennial conflicts far more than any other
part of Indonesia (Wilson 2005:68). Investment is, however, returning in the face of what is seen as a secure peace; economic growth has improved almost every year since 2002. Women's leadership in peacebuilding has enabled a relative increase in female participation in senior government positions and in commercial activities from which they were formerly excluded (Brown et al. 2005:xiii).

One strength of the Maluku case was the diversity of reconciliation attempted from the highest level of the Indonesian state at Malino down to very local village reconciliation. Maluku is a case of peacebuilding about which John Paul Lederach (2008) might say the ‘interdependence gap’—though hardly the ‘justice gap’—has been closed through building horizontal capacity. Reconciliation work has involved not only top leaders and the grassroots at village level, but middle-range leaders as well—as commended by Lederach.

This strength was a multi-stranded fabric of dialogue, mutual humanitarian and reconstruction help, inter-faith night watches and reconciliation in local civil society. Many elements of the post-Wiranto leadership of the military and the police were also critical in flipping the security sector from being the problem to the solution. Just as the game playing of the security sector was a peacebuilding weakness before 2001, after then its increasing discipline, political neutrality and the sophisticated responsiveness of how it went about re-establishing order helped it become a peacebuilding strength.

International pressure was not hugely important in this case, though the Saudi Arabian fatwa for Laskar Jihad to withdraw and the US/EU pressuring of Christian negotiators to drop the withdrawal of Laskar Jihad as a condition for peace talks were both significant contributions. The pressures for peace that enticed Laskar Jihad to retire were a combination of persuasion by religious and village leaders, withdrawal of financial carrots and arrests.

One could not say Maluku was a case of impunity. First the leaders of FKP, then of Laskar Jihad were arrested, though the latter was not convicted. Other Muslim provocateurs of conflict were convicted, mainly in Makassar and Jakarta rather than Ambon. For this reason, police leaders in Ambon were not sure how many Muslim provocateurs had been convicted, but they were confident 18 provocateurs and leaders of rioting on the Christian side had been convicted. These investigations, the police said, provided clear proof that provocateurs were being trained and paid. One Christian was convicted of bombing a Christian church. When prosecutions occurred there was tension, with large numbers of protestors from both sides massing outside the court.
Contests of principles

The key principle that was in contest in Maluku was between the ‘dual function’ of the military as both a regional political guiding hand and a guarantor of security and the new democratic separation of powers of reformasi that separated the military from local politics but left it firmly accountable for the security of the people. The processes of bacu bae (reconciliation) and inter-faith dialogue embodied principles of deep commitment post-conflict, displacing the prominence during the conflict of principles such as jihad (distorted in a violent way) and ‘Onward Christian Soldier’ reinterpretations of Christian theological principles.

Towards a conclusion for Maluku

Even though the fundamentals of the structural factors in this conflict are still in place, Maluku has excellent prospects for a long peace. Democracy seems alive and civil in Maluku, with 85 per cent of eligible voters casting a ballot in the 2008 election of Karel Ralahalu as governor. Maluku is a good example of how proximate factors in the conflict can be reversed and determination to smother new sparks of conflict institutionalised. The military and the police are now committed to doing their jobs in Maluku. Indeed they seem to be doing it with some finesse, relying heavily on adat justice where they can, firmly enforcing the criminal law against violence in other cases, and even prosecuting significant numbers of ringleaders of the violence of a decade ago as evidence becomes available. Laskar Jihad was persuaded to return through a sophisticated multidimensional public–private mix of religious authority and education, carrots and sticks that helped widen internal divisions and disenchantment with their leadership (Hasan 2006). The police in Maluku seem to work effectively with youth leaders today, steering some of the once-violent gangs into becoming community educators and watchdogs against violence.

There is no inevitability that 50/50 demographic splits will lead to conflict even when compounded with structural injustice. Women rarely go to war against men. We must remember that the first of the five steps in the dynamics of contention model is identity formation. What we have seen since 2000 is a redefining of an inter-religious identity of Moluccan brotherhood and sisterhood as syncretically Christian–Muslim. It is a case that reveals a drawback of consociational political resolutions to conflicts that would guarantee both groups minimum levels of political representation or veto capabilities. The trouble with consociational politics is that it freezes identities, missing the constructivist insight that identities can be deconstructed and reconstructed, as has happened in a determinedly wilful feat of Moluccan civil society. It was
not a matter of retrieving a traditional identity that gathered dust on the shelf during the conflict; a new post-conflict synthesis of identity was still under construction from new and old spiritualities, rituals and peace pacts.

The Maluku case also supports Wilkinson’s (2004) conclusion that state obligation to provide security to local minorities often quickly moves from being a ‘positional issue’ in politics (in which candidates are free to select from alternative positions about which voters have varying views) to a ‘valence issue’ on which almost all voters concur and from which no politically ambitious player can dissent (Wilkinson 2004:239). Christian voters in Maluku today are genuinely committed to being governed by leaders who will guarantee the security of Muslims, and vice versa with Muslim voters. Most indigenous members of both groups, and even many established migrants, are also committed to being governed by both Muslims and Christians who value the syncretism of the shared Moluccan spiritual journey.

Even during the conflict, we saw that there was no inevitability that resource politics would aggravate conflict. Indeed, at the height of the conflict, the politics of oil secured Wayame as an island of civility in which seeds of peace could be planted and spread, especially by women. The logging issue was not the driver of conflict that it was in most of the conflicts in our first two volumes on Indonesia and Oceania. We also have seen how the NGO initiatives of Bacu Bae reconstituted a media that was religiously segregated and was fuelling panic and revenge into the inter-faith peace journalism of today’s Maluku.

Recall that the five key processes of the dynamics of contention are identity formation, escalation, polarisation, mobilisation and actor constitution (McAdam et al. 2001). In Maluku, we have seen reformation of a syncretic Christian–Muslim identity, de-escalation, depolarisation, demobilisation for war and mobilisation for reconciliation (an institutionalised peace system), de-constitution of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus as organisations, peaceful reconstitution of violent street gangs and constitution of new organisations such as the Concerned Women’s Movement, Bacu Bae and the inter-faith dialogue.

Malino II was a turning point in achieving central state ownership of responsibility for security, albeit with limitations as a top-down process. Malino, even more importantly, gave legitimacy to a multidimensional local leadership (from local religious and adat leaders, politicians and women) that was not quite bottom-up because local elites did most of the leading. It was, however, quite inclusive, down to soliciting the contributions of children.

Maluku is the first of a number of Indonesian cases that are challenging our starting theory that reconciliation without truth is not possible. As we will next see in North Maluku, then Central Sulawesi (Poso), meaningful and practical
levels of reconciliation can be grounded in a formidably dishonest analysis of the drivers of the conflict, at least temporarily. Hardly any of the countless thousands of crimes against people and property committed under cover of the conflict have led to an apology for that specific crime. It is more comfortable to blame it all on outside provocateurs. The findings of the Independent National Investigation Team that were supposed to lay a foundation in truth for reconciliation were never published. Professor Harold Crouch, in commenting on a draft of this chapter, pondered that it was not obvious to him that publication of the names would not have provoked further violence. That might not, however, be a strong argument against publishing the report today in the interests of accountable government and learning lessons from history. Another response might be that violence might have been averted even in 2002 by testing the investigation team’s allegations of responsibility before the courts. On the other hand, in Chapter 4, on Central Sulawesi, trials that were not seen as even-handedly administered at times had the effect of increasing conflict in Poso. For now, we will not rush to any final judgments on the virtues of truth and reconciliation versus non-truth and reconciliation. We simply conclude that considerable reconciliation has been accomplished in Maluku without much local or national truth.

Table 3.2 Summary of some codes, Maluku: 650 other variables are coded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural factors at root of conflict</th>
<th>Is this a ‘consensus’ factor among analysts or ‘contested but credible’ as a possible factor?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonialism of long duration stunts institutions and privileges one religious community over another</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed opportunities for Muslims and immigrants especially in public sector</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High proportion of jobs are in urban public sector, fostering competition to control patronage (van Klinken 2007)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmigration/immigration</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive politics based on religious identity as a 50/50 religious divide approached</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed under-twenty-five ‘youth bulge’</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proximate factors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian financial crisis exacerbates religious-group competition for scares legitimate opportunities</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of New Order opens power allocations and the institutional order for religious competition (Bertrand 2004)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political decentralisation increases religiously based patronage opportunities, further increasing politico-religious competition</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military and police sometimes choose to join conflict rather than control it when it breaks out</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Security vacuum fuels a security dilemma, driving both communities into the hands of militias for protection | Consensus
---|---
Youth gangs, already organised for violence on both sides, ready-made to morph into militias | Contested but credible
Inflammatory, religiously segregated media | Consensus
**Key triggering incidents**
Minor fights in public space | Consensus
Paid provocateurs trained in Java | Contested but credible
Flag raisings by alleged Christian separatists | Consensus
**Key war-making actors**
Ambonese Christian and Muslim youth gangs in Jakarta and Ambon | Contested but credible
Indonesian military | Consensus
Indonesian police, especially Brimob | Consensus
Laskar Jihad, Laskar Mujahidin, Laskar Kristus and other militias | Consensus
Moluccan politicians playing the religion card | Consensus
**Key peacemaking actors**
Religious leaders and inter-faith dialogue | Consensus
Concerned Women’s Movement | Consensus
Moluccan politicians building reputations as conciliators | Consensus
Ministers Kalla and Yudhoyono | Consensus
Bacu Bae | Consensus
Adat village reconciliation leaders | Contested but credible
**Peacebuilding strengths**
Transcending religious identity with reconfigured syncretism | Contested but credible
Multi-stranded fabric of dialogue, mutual humanitarian and reconstruction help, inter-faith night watches and reconciliation in local civil society | Contested but credible
Sophisticated multidimensional strategy of religious persuasion; carrots and sticks for Laskar Jihad to withdraw | Consensus
Combatants tired of fighting | Consensus
Community values of religious tolerance and spiritual oneness promoted by inter-faith dialogue | Contested but credible
Peace journalism | Contested but credible
Central state owning responsibility for security by leading Malino II peace agreement | Consensus
Military and police discipline, neutrality and responsiveness reforms from 2001 | Contested but credible
Growing women’s empowerment | Contested but credible
Trust building through exchange at markets in peace zones | Consensus
Wayame island of civility | Consensus
**Peacebuilding weaknesses**
Military and police game playing, taking sides in fighting | Consensus
Slow return of refugees | Consensus
International organisations and NGOs excluded from contributing to the peace until late in process  
Reconciliation but no truth  
Malino peace process top-down and lacking in participatory follow-through  
Corruption in humanitarian assistance for refugees and in governance generally  
Limited access to reintegration and trauma counselling for victims and combatants

**Key contested principles in peacebuilding**  
Dual function of military versus separation of military from politics  
Inter-faith dialogue  
*Bacu bae* (reconciliation)

### Part II: North Maluku

**Background to the conflict: North Maluku**

The conflicts in Maluku and North Maluku are often seen as part of the same struggle. We will see that their dynamics are quite different. Each, however, had effects on the other. The conflict in Maluku signalled to certain political actors in North Maluku that in circumstances of political transition and military fragmentation, playing the religious violence card was an option. Angry refugees escaping the violence in Maluku by flooding into North Maluku did not help. Video footage of the bodies of hundreds of Muslims being bulldozed into a mass grave after being slaughtered while sheltering in a mosque in North Maluku did more to motivate the arrival of Laskar Jihad in Maluku than the violence in Maluku itself. Yet none of the groups that did most of the killing in Maluku—the military, the police or Laskar Jihad—was among the most significant combatants in North Maluku.

While Maluku is a province where half the population and more than half the elites are Christian, North Maluku in contrast is 85 per cent Muslim and almost all the elite is Muslim. The ultimate result of Christian–Muslim conflict in North Maluku was always much more inevitable. That was why Laskar Jihad never became a significant force in North Maluku; they just weren’t needed.\(^8\) While the Christian side was accused of separatism in a certain phase of the conflict,

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\(^8\) The local Muslim militia that ran the campaign was Pasukan Jihad, commanded by a Tidorese, Abubakar Wahid. A Laskar Jihad ‘exploratory mission’ visited North Maluku in February 2000. This mission was convinced that its forces were needed more in Maluku (ICG 2002b:7). Christians argued, however, that some Laskar Jihad arrived in January 2000 on the *Lambelu* and, after having killed Christians on the ship during the journey, landed and fought.
this was not the discourse of schism that it was in Maluku. The RMS rebellion of 1950 in Ambon did not attract significant support or fuel significant conflict in North Maluku; RMS was after all a push for a republic of the southern Moluccas.

The original and underlying drivers of the conflict were not religious, but political. Some of the many roots of the political divides went back to early colonial times. There were many factors, but an important part of the conflict was about the struggle for political control in Ternate, the capital of North Maluku. Ternate is a beautiful volcano rising out of an azure ocean. The way the Portuguese went about their efforts to Christianise North Maluku was deeply resented. After the Portuguese were expelled in the late sixteenth century, along with their ambitions to monopolise the spice trade, Spain invaded Ternate in 1606 in alliance with Tidore. The Sultan of Ternate asked the Dutch to expel the Spanish, but the Dutch managed to seize only the northern half of the island in 1607. For the next 56 years, the Spanish sustained control of the southern half of Ternate and the nearby volcanic island of Tidore, ruling collaboratively with the Sultan of Tidore. Enmity between the two sultanates was partly grounded in the fact that one was a Spanish client, the other a Dutch client. For centuries before and after the arrival of Europeans, the tiny islands of Tidore and Ternate were both major regional powers with influence that spread west to Sulawesi, south-east to Papua and north to the Philippines. That power was based on the fact that the two sultans controlled the only parts of the globe where cloves were grown. While they did not monopolise nutmeg, mace and other spices, these were also economically important. The power of the Sultan of Tidore waned when the Spanish departed in 1663. From then the Dutch ruled southern Ternate and Tidore directly. Northern Ternate, however, continued to be ruled indirectly through the Sultan of Ternate. Realising that Muslim power was entrenched through the sultanates, the Dutch never advantaged Christians over Muslims in North Maluku in the way they did in Ambon. The collapse of the New Order from 1998 created an opportunity for Tidorese, four centuries on, to scuttle the political power of the Sultan of Ternate. This was not, however, the main political divide that prised open the conflict of 1999.

The main divide was between one faction of the late twentieth-century Ternate elite in which the current Sultan of Ternate (Mudaffar Syah) was the key player and a faction opposed to him. The Sultan of Tidore was not an influential twentieth-century political player. The second faction, associated with the bupati of Central Halmahera and the Islamic PPP (United Development Party) harnessed Tidore’s historic enmity towards the Sultan of Ternate. These two factions in Suharto’s time had worked cooperatively together to rule Ternate in a grand coalition under Suharto’s party, Golkar. The collapse of the Suharto regime provided threats and opportunities to these two factions, so they started to compete to control Ternate. They worked together for long enough in 1998–
99, however, to secure a new province of North Maluku. Then began the real competition to control the new province unshackled from Ambon. At the time the violence broke out, the Sultan of Ternate enjoyed military support and was in a promising position to secure the main prize of the governorship of the new province. His main rival was the District Head of Central Halmahera, Bahar Andily, though there were others. Part of van Klinken’s (2007:109) analysis is that a risk factor for conflict shared between Maluku and North Maluku is that their economies both depend on public monies more than in other parts of Indonesia. In both, the absence of a vibrant export sector meant economic opportunity depended on controlling the public purse. This was the underlying prize that motivated the strategists of the conflict—not fear of Islamisation or Christianisation. As in so many islands of Maluku and our next case, Poso, in North Maluku, conflicts started small, then escalated and in the process had their meaning transformed.

**Describing the conflict**

**Makian–Kao fighting breaks out**

As in Ambon, in North Maluku, the conflict was not initially defined as religious. It was between Makian Islanders, who were Muslim, and ethnic Kao people, who were a mixture of Christians and Muslims. The Kao community lived on Halmahera Island across the strait from Ternate. Within those Kao lands, at a place called Malifut, the Makians had been forcibly moved for their safety from 1975 after the volcano on their island threatened to erupt. The Kao and the Makians are among 30 geographically based ethnic groups in North Maluku who speak distinct languages (Papuan languages in the north, Austronesian in the south). The largest of these are the Makians, the Ternates and Tidores. Makians in Ternate were economically successful and at the heart of the anti-sultan faction there; Kao villages were among those that traditionally had been most loyal to the sultan. Alignment with the two political factions in the capital was only one of a complex of local inter-village disputes over land, boundaries, a goldmine, custom and religion. Across the North Maluku conflicts, Wilson’s (2008:25) analysis follows that of Kalyvas (2003) in concluding that events on the ground often connect to local and private issues more than to the war’s ‘driving (or master) cleavage’ and of Thomas (2001:18), who says of the fighting in Barcelona in 1909: ‘On each street they shouted different things and fought for different purposes.’ Interestingly, Wilson (2006:35) identified excitement spreading among young men across these North Maluku conflicts (see also Horowitz 2001:73; Verkaaik 2004), especially when they realised they could enjoy impunity because the security forces were not arresting rioters.
The Kao tended to view the Makians as guests who had overstayed their welcome. Makians in Malifut appealed for support from Makians in the political faction in Ternate that we crudely characterised as the anti-sultan coalition.9 By April 1999, the Makian farmers of Malifut felt under threat from the Kao. When the Makians were forced against their will to leave their island in 1975, they were told the land in Malifut belonged to the government, not the Kao, and that Malifut would become Makian land. At the same time, the district government was convincing the Kao to allow them to settle by saying that the temporary arrival of victims of a natural disaster would not alienate their traditional lands permanently (Wilson 2008:54). The Kao viewed the Makians as guests on their land, while the Makians viewed themselves as legal titleholders. The anti-sultan faction in Ternate was keen to connect up with local concerns that would build bridges to a wider coalition of support to become a more effective challenger coalition (van Klinken 2007). At that time, the sultan was in the driver’s seat of Ternate’s levers of power.

The Makians in positions of influence in government in Ternate worked with Malifut Makians to get support from Jakarta to create a new subdistrict of Makian-Malifut. The new subdistrict would comprise the land occupied by the 1970s immigrants to Malifut (16 villages), but also five Kao villages and six Jailolo villages (Tomagola 2000:22). The Jailolonese also opposed being incorporated into the new subdistrict. The name Makian-Malifut was obviously a provocation to them and the traditional Kao landowners of Malifut. The anti-sultan challenger coalition had an agenda of creating a new district in this area that they would control and that might possibly host a new capital of North Maluku; the creation of the Makian-Malifut subdistrict was a strategic move in that bigger game (Wilson 2008:67). Part of the game was also to capture within the new subdistrict wealth that would flow from a new goldmine due to be opened in 1999 by PT Nusa Halmahera Minerals. An Australian company Newcrest, as majority owner, with an Indonesian joint-venture partner, had been working nearby deposits since June 1999. Makians dominated initial employment at the mine. Makians were the most educated and economically and politically successful of all the ethnic groups in North Maluku. While the company set out with a policy of 50 per cent employment from the Kao and Makian communities, within a year of the establishment of the mine, the workforce was 90 per cent Makian (Wilson 2008:56). The company constructed schools in Makian and Kao villages and, according to Chris Wilson’s interview with an Australian employee at the mine, paid ‘honorariums’ to various local officials, including leaders of the Kao community as well as the Makian. It was not just jobs, schools and honorariums that local leaders believed would flow

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9 It was a crude characterisation because there were ideological divides over the direction Indonesia, North Maluku and Islam should go post-Suharto. For an account of them, see van Klinken (2007:Ch. 7) and Wilson (2008).
in greater measure for the people of the subdistrict that encompassed the mine. An implication of President Habibie’s decentralisation laws, specifically Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance Between the Centre and the Regions, was that the government of the district within which the mine was located would receive approximately 32 per cent of the tax collected from the mine (Wilson 2008:58). It should also be noted that there had long been Muslim Javanese transmigrants in Kao who had good relations with the Kao and who were not seen as playing games to expand the area of land initially allocated to them. The army later evacuated them after being told they might be attacked (Duncan 2005a:73).

When the new subdistrict head arrived to take up his office in Malifut on 18 August 1999, the North Maluku violence started. On some accounts, stones were first thrown at the Kao village of Sosol after a dispute at a party. Ten minutes later, there was significant fighting between Sosol residents and a neighbouring Makian village (Wilson 2008:123). Sosol was overrun. Student leaders of Makian ethnicity from Ternate were involved in the attack. It was likely they provoked and organised the attacks that day and the next (Wilson 2008:63). All residents of Sosol fled in boats and the entire village, including the church and school, was destroyed. The next morning, the Kao village of Wangeotak was likewise overrun and completely destroyed. These were the two villages that were most outspoken in their opposition to integration into the new subdistrict. The small contingent of security personnel in the vicinity felt they could not stop the violence, though they did shoot in the air in an attempt to do so. They concentrated on assisting the evacuation of the refugees.

The North Maluku District chief then asked the Sultan of Ternate to go to Malifut to calm the angry Kao. According to van Klinken (2007:119), far from calming the situation, the sultan saw an opportunity to expand his support base by aligning himself as a Muslim with the predominantly Christian Kao. Van Klinken (2007:119) alleges he gave an inflammatory speech in which he is reported saying, ‘I have a black dog, and now someone has woken it.’ Soon after, when thousands of Makian IDPs would flood into Ternate, the sultan did reconstitute his traditional customary army of palace guards under a Christian commander. It was not done in a small way; ultimately the palace guard swelled to perhaps 7000 (Bubandt 2004a:18). Wilson’s (2008:63) interview with the sultan suggested, however, he did try and succeeded initially in pacifying the Kao. They did then seek to resolve the conflict through diplomacy by establishing a ‘Team of Nine’ leaders to negotiate peace. The Team of Nine failed to secure any stepping back from the new subdistrict, failed to get any commitment for funds to rebuild the destroyed villages or for an investigation into the violence, and no-one was charged over it.

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10 In one interview with a Makian student leader, it was claimed they were there only to help get their families out.
Wilson (2008:180) believes that ‘[h]ad the North Maluku District government responded impartially to this first incident, it is likely the conflict would have ended at this point’. Instead it succumbed to Makian influence to ignore needed assistance with compensation and rebuilding that would be normal in Indonesia. More generally, it might be argued that it was at this point that opportunities were missed for peacebuilding through preventive diplomacy working with the Team of Nine that the district government, the religious leadership, civil society and the Newcrest mine management might have seized. Tomagola (2000:22) agreed that North Maluku elites were ‘negligent’ in allowing their jockeying in establishing the new province to crowd out concern for compensation, reconciliation and preventive diplomacy against escalated violence. Because they did not listen, they underestimated the anger and resolve of the Kao. Chris Wilson (2008:68) concluded that not only was inequality between a disenfranchised Kao and well-networked Makians a root cause, the sense of impunity from prosecution that Makians believed their political networks conferred on them was another. When we asked the Kao Christian commander in 2007 if he would have attacked Malifut had he known it would lead to the huge escalation it did, he said, ‘Of course not’. He ‘did not imagine’ it would go this far and was ‘surprised’ that it did. He still felt in retrospect that the Kao had been in the right to assert themselves after previous Makian attacks and the resources grab for the goldmine. When the Makian refugees finally returned to Malifut, the Kao leadership and ordinary people welcomed them warmly and the Kao subdistrict head expressed sorrow in his welcoming speech, saying this did not need to happen and should not have happened, and he wept.

Believing they would get support from the sultan, the Kao leadership decided in October 1999 that they would act to resist the new subdistrict by diplomacy or the courts preferably, but if that failed, by force. While the first two methods were attempted, it quickly became apparent they would not work. Two months after the attacks on the two Kao villages, possibly 5000 Kao, armed with machetes, spears, bows and arrows and some homemade guns and bombs, massed and counterattacked, driving all 17 000 Makian settlers in Malifut across the strait to southern Ternate and Tidore. The Kao army consisted basically of all the men of Kao plus 200–500 women fighters, according to their commander. All Makian houses were burnt to the ground, but not mosques and schools. While the property destruction was on a massive scale, only three Makians were killed (Wilson 2008:65–6). Kao military commanders told us that ethnic cleansing was their intent, not murder. In each village, the commanders ensured that mosques were unharmed because Muslim Kao were part of their army and because they wanted the world to see that religion was not what this conflict was about.
Transformation into religious conflict

The arrival of such large numbers of desperate refugees triggered anger in Ternate and Tidore. The Makian and anti-sultan challenger coalition seized the opportunity to expand its reach by appealing to radical Muslim activists. This was the point at which the conflict was redefined as a Christian attack on Muslims. Capture of the conflict by the discourse of jihad was perverse as this was most fundamentally a political dispute between ethnic Makians and Kao and an important actor behind the scenes was the Muslim sultan. Soon after the expulsion of the Makians from Malifut, a forged letter was widely distributed in the Muslim community of North Maluku, purportedly signed by Reverend Sammy Titaley, head of the Protestant Synod in Ambon, addressed to the Protestant Church in North Maluku. The letter was headed ‘Bloody Sosol’, the name of one of the Christian villages destroyed in Malifut. It appeared to plan the Christian attack on Malifut and suggested the attack was part of a wider Christianisation strategy for North Maluku (Wilson 2008:84). Muslims are described as ‘ignorant’ in the letter. Most analysts think this letter is an important trigger for transforming an ethnic into a religious conflict. Note also how even if there are quite different provincial political dynamics that drive the Maluku and North Maluku conflict, in the ‘Bloody Sosol’ letter an unknown actor seeks to establish a link in the minds of the Muslim community. Wilson’s (2008:85) interviews suggested that the letter had very little propaganda impact in motivating Muslim violence in Ternate. Bubandt’s (2001, 2004a, 2004b) work sees the letter and the spreading of rumours more generally, including Internet rumour-mongering and even apocalyptic narratives, as important in fuelling the conflict. It is always hard to judge whether rumours create opportunities for political opportunists or whether opportunists spread rumours to cover the tracks of their opportunism. In this case it is likely more of the latter is occurring.

Van Klinken (2007) interpreted what happened in terms of a dynamics of contention. There was polarisation away from discourses of moderation, ‘from adat to armed conflict on one side, from democracy to jihad on the other’ (p. 123). He noted the rapidity with which categorisation shifted: ‘So the challenger side defined its enemy now as the sultan’s feudalism, now as primitive Kao ethnicity, now as a fanatical Christian religion’ (van Klinken 2007:123). In this, their ideological work had a ‘calculating pragmatism’ for evoking a ‘dramaturgy of anger’.

Christians began to suffer mob violence first in Tidore on 3 November 1999, then in southern Ternate three days later (van Klinken 2007:119). The Tidore riot started when all community leaders in the ethnically mixed suburb of Indonesiana were called together to discuss concerns about the ‘Bloody Sosol’ letter. No Christians attended out of fear. Police then escorted the local Protestant
pastor to the meeting to read the letter. Abuse was shouted and a member of the angry crowd punched the pastor. He ran from the meeting and was pursued by some of the crowd who hacked him to pieces and set his body alight (Wilson 2008:86). Immediately the destruction of the churches and all the Christian homes of Tidore began. A Christian militia leader whose job was to listen in on the white forces’ radio frequency at the time learned that it was seen as part of the duties of employment for Tidore government employees to put on the white headband and fight.

Ternate as well as Tidore was cleansed of Christians as totally as Malifut had been cleansed of Makian Muslims. At the time, van Klinken (2007:119) reported, it was often said that driving the Christians out would help defeat the sultan’s group at the planned June 2000 local elections. Makian political leaders in Ternate in fact led the 6 November 1999 riots. Muslim forces attacked the police headquarters in Ternate and the police fled. On Wilson's (2006:11) analysis, from that time on, Christian and Muslim communities throughout North Maluku found themselves in a ‘security dilemma’—preparing to defend themselves or launch pre-emptive attacks. The problem was that any defensive preparation by the ethnic other was at risk of being interpreted in the worst light.

Two days after the Ternate riots, attacks on Christians increased in Central Halmahera and belligerent incidents increased in Tobelo, North Halmahera, the largest town on the province’s largest island. Word reached Tobelo that the security forces had done nothing to protect Christians in Tidore and Ternate, so Christians began to arm themselves and this naturally fuelled anxiety among Muslims in Tobelo (Wilson 2008:104–5). Meetings were held between Christian and Muslim leaders in Tobelo in an effort to maintain calm. The interim governor and the Sultan of Ternate also attended a public meeting on 7 December 1999 in an effort to maintain dialogue.

Trigger in Tobelo

The already tense situation in Tobelo was exacerbated through November and December by rumours of an impending ‘bloody Christmas’. On 24 December, Pastor Charles Kaya decided it would be wise to secure the main Protestant compound in central Tobelo that included the central church, synod office and the Bethesda Hospital (Wilson 2008:107). The compound was the obvious central target of any Muslim attack, so it was reasonable and prudent in the circumstances for Pastor Kaya to request military security for it over the Christmas period. When he received no reply, the pastor asked surrounding churches to supply 40 men to guard the compound overnight. Regrettably, they arrived, carrying spears and wearing red headbands, in a large truck that passed through the Muslim area of the city. This sight terrorised the Muslim community and was probably a trigger for the violence that would ensue two
days later (Wilson 2008:108). On 26 December, some Muslim youth engaged in a stone-throwing incident that escalated to hundreds of men wearing white or red headbands fighting with swords, homemade bazookas and other weapons. The violence spread to adjacent villages. Muslim forces prevailed in these battles. The victory was reversed when Christian forces from around the district supported by Benny Bitjara’s (Doro’s) Kao army arrived on the outskirts of the city the next day.

During the two days from 26 December 1999, Muslim minorities were driven from many parts of Halmahera, the large island that made up most of North Maluku. War raged across the countryside of the islands of Halmahera, Morotai, Bacan, Obi and other islands for the next two months. Muslim IDPs fleeing to Morotai were important in fomenting the spread of conflict there (Duncan 2008:211). The Moslem Relief Organization estimated that 800 Muslims were killed in the worst two days of the fighting. The effect of the many battles in this period was to create purely Christian and purely Muslim parts of Halmahera. Refugees were moving in all directions, fuelling the security dilemma with horrific stories of what could happen if you did not prepare for the worst.

Eerily, in North Maluku, there was a resource-driven replication of the island of civility in Wayame, Ambon island (see Box 3.1), at Weda Bay (Box 3.3).

While Weda Bay stood apart from the majority of North Maluku that was consumed by conflict, Chris Duncan pointed out in a comment on an earlier draft of this chapter that there were several parts of the province that avoided violence, one being ‘almost all of Kecamatan Maba’ on the eastern coast of Halmahera, where Duncan did fieldwork in 1995–96 and which he visited in 2002. He continued that

depending on how you define ‘Weda Bay’, violence did in fact take place in that region. Although it may have not occurred in the villages directly surrounding the mine…the villages of Tilope and Going, and possibly others in Kecamatan Weda were attacked during the conflict.

11 Chris Duncan elaborated: ‘Only one village of Kecamatan Maba (Jara-Jara) experienced violence directly related to the larger conflict, although there was some displacement as people moved around to avoid violence (people from the villages of Dorosago, Lolasita, etc.), but there was no communal violence outside of Jara-Jara. There was some violence in the village of Pumalanga during that time period, but as all sides seem to agree it was unrelated to the larger kerusuhan and had to do with local issues. Kecamatan Patani in southeast Halmahera also largely escaped the violence, with the possible exception of one village. Outside of Halmahera, the Sula archipelago remained peaceful throughout the entire conflict, with the exception of a brief outburst of violence in the town of Sanana on the island of Mangole in January 1999, but the rest of the archipelago, which includes both Christian and Muslim communities, stayed violence free. The same could be said for a large section of northern Morotai, and the island of Gebe.’
Box 3.3 Weda Bay

‘The importance of the security dilemma to the outbreak of violence can further be illustrated by a brief examination of the one area in North Maluku in which violence did not occur, that of Weda Bay in Central Halmahera District. Weda Bay has been the site of a large Nickel exploration activity since 1998 by PT Weda Bay Nickel, whose main shareholder at the time was a Canadian company. In November and December 1999, as tensions reached very high levels throughout the province and at the request of local villagers, the directors of the mining operation asked the military command for approximately 12 Indonesian Marines from Surabaya to be sent to the area to provide security. The marines were dispersed among the four Christian and Muslim villages that surrounded the mine and supplied with two-way radios. This provided not only comfort to the villagers regarding the possibility of external agitation or direct attacks, but also allowed them to stay in constant contact with the surrounding villages and the mine. The primary benefit of this increased communications capacity was the ability to quash the rumours that constantly reached the villages. Remarkably no violence occurred in the area throughout the duration of the conflict elsewhere in North Maluku.’


The Muslim versus Muslim battle for Ternate

Meanwhile, after the 6 November attacks on Christians in Ternate, the police and military leadership there encouraged the sultan to ‘bring out his people’ (his palace guard). Soon, no police or military were to be found on the streets, while the palace guard was everywhere maintaining order, clumsily, with brutality and partiality. Opponents of the sultan worried about the implications his control of the streets would have as the gubernatorial elections approached. The violence, torture of political opponents and torching of houses by the sultan’s guards inflicted on ordinary Muslim people from south Ternate in this period, combined with revulsion at the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the sultan’s Christian allies in Tobelo, Galela and elsewhere in Halmahera, steeled the anti-sultan white forces to mount a decisive attack on the yellow forces of the sultan’s guards. Fighters were recruited from the mosques of southern
Ternate and thousands came to Ternate from Tidore villages with long histories of militant resentment of the Sultan of Ternate. The Sultan of Tidore did not in fact lend his support to the invasion from Tidore (Duncan 2005a:74).

The conflict began to shift some of the control of the challenger coalition towards violent jihadists and away from predominantly Makian students with ideals of transcending both feudal and New Order elites in favour of democracy. This was a paradox too as this chapter of the conflict was the most politically decisive one, yet it was one fought between Muslims and Muslims in the capital. The foundation of this partial shift was laid earlier in the 1990s as Suharto cultivated an Islamic turn in Indonesia to counterbalance the forces that might topple him. Conservative Islamic schools were established in many parts of North Maluku in the 1990s, especially in Ternate, and their graduates provided many of the shock troops with ambitions of turning the conflict into a jihad. This ambition was not widely realised. Again, fighters fought for different reasons. Some fought with Tidore against Ternate, some for a homeland for dispossessed Makians, some to assert the resentments of other more marginalised ethnic groups than Ternates/Tidores/Makians, some for jihad against Muslim defenders of Christianisation, some out of disgust at the sultan’s alleged poor character and the feudal power he represented, and others to avenge brutality and indignity the palace guard had inflicted on their families or their alleged destruction of the Kampung of Pisang in southern Ternate. These rivers of resentment did not converge spontaneously. Wilson (2008:142) has argued that the conflict between north and south Ternate required planning. The planners were the political support teams of competitors of the sultan to assume the governorship of the new province. Their objective was to harness all these rivers of resentment to defeat the palace guard militarily and humiliate the sultan in such a way that he could never be the dominant political force in North Maluku again.

In street battles that pitted the white jihadist anti-sultan forces against the yellow forces of the sultan for three days, the sultan’s traditional soldiers were finally forced to retreat to the palace. The military and the police stayed in their barracks and let them fight it out after a Brimob officer was injured in one of the earlier skirmishes. Interim Governor of North Maluku, Surasmin, asked the Sultan of Tidore to discipline the thousands of Tidore fighters in the city inflicting the violence on Ternate. The Sultan of Tidore responded by arriving at the Sultan of Ternate’s palace with his own palace guards. Fighting stopped when he arrived. He told the white forces to put their weapons down and sit down on the road outside the Ternate palace. After a short meeting between the leaders of the Tidore and Ternate palace guards, the yellow forces likewise sat down as the Sultan of Tidore walked through them into the palace in a moment.

12 Drinking alcohol, having Christian wives or having multiple wives were prominent in descriptions of this alleged poor character.
of unique political drama. It is hard to be certain exactly what happened inside the palace. Wilson (2008:139) concludes on the basis of interviews with senior Tidore informants that the Sultan of Tidore and the Tidore military commanders forced the Sultan of Ternate to sign a document taking responsibility for the yellow–white battle for Ternate and accepting an obligation to rebuild homes destroyed. In our interview with the Sultan of Ternate, he denied being forced to leave the palace, saying he went on a business trip to Jakarta and returned soon after. On the Tidore side, it is argued that the peace agreement stipulated that the sultan relinquish all authority in Ternate and depart. Bubandt (2004a:21) said it was rumoured the sultan was forced to remove and burn his ceremonial clothes before being allowed to flee. In our interview with the sultan back in his palace in 2007, he denied all of this, saying nothing had been signed or burned. On the Sultan of Ternate's account, the two sultans had simply agreed that further fighting was futile and should stop and that the state security forces should take full responsibility for peace enforcement, which was what happened. Vice-President Megawati called him to confirm that he was honouring the cease-fire and disbanding and disarming his army.

It was certainly a devastating turning point in the political fortunes of the Sultan of Ternate. The police and military leadership in Ternate, which had expected the sultan's forces to win the battle for the city against the white forces, turned their backs on the sultan from that point, as did his power base within the Golkar Party and his supporters in Jakarta. With all Christian Members of Parliament having fled, it was easy in January to unseat the sultan as the North Maluku District Parliamentary Chairman. He was, for the time being, a spent political force (Wilson 2008:139). Indonesia’s National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas-Ham), in a peculiar gesture of justice on behalf of the victors, conducted an investigation specifically into accusations of human rights abuses ordered by the sultan on the yellow side. No charges were ever brought as a result of this investigation, nor was any report published.

The victorious white forces paraded through Ternate, burning churches and enemy houses. The arrival of thousands of Muslim IDPs had also provided the militia with a new goal. The group then set about preparing for the invasion across the strait to defeat the Christian forces on Halmahera.

**The Halmahera campaign**

The arrival of thousands of refugees from Tobelo and Galela in Ternate in the days after the sultan's departure motivated many Ternateans from the yellow forces to join the predominantly Tidores, Sananas and Makians of the white

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13 A hybrid account of what happened came from a staff member of the Sultan of Tidore we interviewed who was present. He said the Sultan of Ternate did sign a document in which he said he would not do certain things again, but he did not recall him taking responsibility for any attacks or for the damage done.
forces to counterattack the Christians in Halmahera. They joined to form the Pasukan Jihad (‘Holy War Force’). Many were refugees motivated by a desire to retake their home villages (Wilson 2008:152). As there were Christian pastors who resisted war and demanded protection of women and children, so there were imams who took this position. They were threatened when they showed the courage to do this. While as in most conflicts, males dominated the violence, several male transvestites participated in the jihad (Wilson 2008:153) as did dozens of women (Interviews with commanders). The script that the jihad was fighting for the Republic of Indonesia and in opposition to Christian supporters of a resurgent RMS became prominent by this late stage of the conflict. Abu Bakar Wahid, the commander of Pasukan Jihad, actively promoted this. The presence of small numbers of Ambonese Christian refugees in Halmahera was apparently evidence of this. The leadership hoped that projecting a mission of defeating devotees of a separatist Christian state would help prevent the military from standing in the way of the revenge they intended (Wilson 2008:153). In all of our interviews and Wilson’s (2006) interviews with Muslim leaders, including top military commanders, it was denied that Laskar Jihad was involved in the fighting at this or any other stage. In a number of interviews we and Wilson (2006) did with Christians, however, including with the top military commanders on the Christian side, it was claimed that they found many identity cards from other parts of Indonesia on the bodies of dead jihadists.14 An October 2001 interview by Professor Harold Crouch with a Laskar Jihad leader indicated that they concluded from their early mission that there was no need to send forces to North Maluku. A senior intelligence officer we interviewed in North Maluku felt fairly sure that Laskar Jihad had become involved in the fighting, but that none of the players wanted them there, so they might have been present in quite small numbers. Duncan (2005a:77) also reached a conclusion of a presence in modest numbers. In commenting on a draft of this chapter, Professor Crouch pointed out that there was ‘evidence of a small number of JI-linked people in North Maluku, including a photo of a prominent leader wielding a sword in a mosque’ and he wondered whether there might have been some confusing of JI-linked fighters with Laskar Jihad.

Halmahera was invaded by a 10 000-strong unpaid volunteer private jihad army (which enjoyed some logistical support from the provincial and district governments and a lot of sympathy from elements in the army, who rented some weapons to them). By this point, both sides had been buying or hiring weapons

14 One Christian leader, for example, was specific and very sure that Laskar Jihad had travelled to Ternate on 31 December and 1 January on the Lambelu, because he had been involved in making a post-conflict prosecution complaint on behalf of seven Christians who were beheaded and had their heads thrown into Ternate Harbour by Laskar Jihad fighters on the vessel. This case was targeted by the Christians for investigation because of the comparative ease of proving who was on the ship. Their complaint went nowhere.
in the southern Philippines. Money was flowing in from supporters in Java, and two of Abu Bakar Wahid’s deputies accused him of stealing donations (Wilson 2008:154).

On Halmahera, quite near the Newcrest goldmine, a Kao army massed and moved forward to the inspiration of Pastor Soselissa on the roof of a vehicle singing *Onward Christian Soldiers* (Wilson 2008:170) to meet the advancing Pasukan Jihad. The Muslims had several thousand more fighters than the Kao. The two armies were in sight of each other when the military and police worked together to push back the smaller Kao force of about only 1000 by that stage, on Wilson’s account. While there is great reason to be critical of police and military disengagement as a cause of the loss of life from August 1999, on 22 January 2000, 100–200 military and police forced a battle-hardened Kao army to withdraw by firing repeatedly into the ground around them (Wilson 2008:161). This prevented a battle that could have been the worst bloodbath of the conflict. Note that it was possible only because after the ethnic cleansing of Malifut, the security forces put substantial reinforcements into Malifut to protect the mine, some funded by the company. The mine provided trucks and helicopters for the movement of troops as well as other logistical support and funding. Australian mine staffers were constantly in touch with not only the military commander in Ternate, but Acting Governor Surasmin and other political leaders pushing the imperatives of keeping the mine open. This created political will to prevent further violence near the mine (Wilson 2008:172). The Muslim commander claimed that while the military was cajoling and coercing the Christian forces to pull back, the governor flew in by helicopter and negotiated a pullback of the Muslim forces, on condition that the military maintained security and that the secure return of Makian refugees to Malifut was expedited promptly. It was.

At this point, the Kao leadership revived the peacemaking efforts of its Team of Nine, indicating to the security forces that they wanted a negotiated peace, but that if the Pasukan Jihad advanced, they would attack them. While this was happening, the Kao army was being reinforced by Tobelos and the Pasukan Jihad forces in the area had grown to 5000. When thousands more attempted to embark from Ternate, the military again stood its ground to prevent their embarkation, killing five jihadists (Wilson 2006:317). Frustrated by this new twin resolve of the security forces, Abu Bakar Wahid agreed to negotiations with the Kao leadership mediated by the military. While this bloodbath was prevented, more blood was yet to be shed on a second, far-northern front in Galela.

After an initial smaller battle that was repelled by the Christians on 5 March and on 25 May 2000, on 19 June, a larger force of 10 000 Pasukan Jihad attacked Duma and surrounding villages in Galela. As happened elsewhere, here the military retired from the battlefield rather than confront the massed jihad
troops. The Christians were soon in a desperate situation. All of the women and children were huddled in and around the Duma church with their men and the strongest women fighting off the final assault. Three soldiers arrived and fired at the advancing Pasuka Jihad forces to defend the sanctuary against the final advance. With Duma almost overrun, the assault ceased, probably, according to Wilson (2006:324), because of the arrival of a unit of Indonesian marines. The marines used trucks to evacuate the surviving Christians and allowed Pasukan Jihad to take the village without further bloodshed. While the military failed to prevent the battle in the way it did at Malifut, in the final analysis, these marines prevented much more massive losses than the hundreds that did die on both sides in Duma. Still, it was a disappointing performance by the military because by this time there were four battalions on Halmahera (Brown et al. 2005:50).

Peace

Wilson (2008:166–8) provides several reasons for the cessation of fighting in July 2000. After the tough campaign that led to the fall of Duma, both groups of unpaid fighters were exhausted by months of fighting and were mostly longing to return to their homes. Pasukan Jihad was also suffering divisions in its leadership over many issues, including how grim would be the cost of attacks on the two remaining Christian strongholds in Kao and Tobelo. That human cost would certainly be much higher than in a Duma that was cut off from Christian reinforcements. The costs were further increased by evidence from the Kao campaign that the military was now willing to stand in their way. Larger military forces stood between Pasukan Jihad and the remaining Christian strongholds than had been the case in previous campaigns. There were no mixed Christian–Muslim locales left standing. Only domains totally under the control of Christian or Muslim militias remained, with security forces positioned between them. As in Maluku, here the navy had cut off the entry of weapons and ammunition. After Duma, President Wahid declared a civil emergency in Maluku and North Maluku. This placated military concerns/excuses that they might suffer human rights prosecutions for robust peace enforcement.

After the further heavy losses on both sides in Duma, provincial authorities were no longer giving tacit support to Pasukan Jihad; the caretaker governor was now pushing hard for a negotiated peace. So was Jakarta. Pragmatic Makian and Tidore provincial leaders had by then achieved their first objective of eliminating the Sultan of Ternate as a credible political rival. As a result, the further objectives of moving the capital from Ternate to Tidore’s geographical realm and resecuring a Makian homeland to which IDPs could return in Malifut were now easily within reach through negotiations with the Kao, who had been seeking such negotiations for months.
Pushing on with violence would only erode their credit with Jakarta elites. The large loss of life in Duma had already attracted concerned media coverage in Jakarta. Then on 28 June 2000, the ship Cahaya Bahari, licensed to transport 500, left Tobelo loaded with 750 people fleeing the conflict. It sank with the loss of 492 lives. Many victims were women and children, including the family of the Christian military commander, Benny Bitijara, and people who had been wounded. Some survivors believed the ship was deliberately sunk. However unlikely this was, it contributed to the feeling of ‘enough is enough’ in a wider Indonesian opinion that Pasukan Jihad leaders would have been unwise to ignore. At the beginning of the Pasukan Jihad campaign, joining it tended to confer prestige in the Muslim community; continuing it to Tobelo might have conferred a loss of status in many of those same circles of opinion.

Before all the Christians were chased from Ternate, the senior Muslim leader of Tobelo went to Ternate and said: ‘Please don’t kill Christians in Ternate. If you do they will kill us Muslims here in Tobelo.’ That argument was ignored then; but by the carnage at Duma, the bitter experience of the truth of such warnings meant that those kinds of arguments of the peacemakers held the high ground. Many people we interviewed also pointed out that everyone could see the huge economic costs of the war by then.

Three peace agreement meetings were held with the commanders from both sides, the military, Acting Governor Surasmin and leaders from Jakarta including Vice-President Megawati. There was no emotion of reconciliation at these meetings. They were practical meetings for negotiating terms of the peace and how to hand over to the military to make it stick. After the state of emergency, Pasukan Jihad disbanded even more totally than Laskar Jihad did in 2002. An amnesty in the first week of July 2000 seemed to be hugely successful in persuading militias to hand in weapons (Wilson 2006:327, footnote 689).

Duncan (2005a:79) found there were minor outbreaks of violence in Loloda in 2001 and in Tobelo, Galela and Morotai in 2002. He interprets these as attempts by the military to prolong the civil emergency and profit from the insecurity. During Ramadan in 2003, there were 20 bombings in Tobelo, also suspected by Cutura and Watanabe (2004:16) to have been ignited by Brimob to justify its continuing presence in the area.

**The cost**

Van Klinken (2007:122) concluded that most of the leading protagonists of the conflict gained little, or lost, from it. He concluded that, as in Poso, none of the most militant figures was rewarded with a post-conflict senior government appointment. Many of the leading protagonists were, however, already leading politicians and bureaucrats who retained their jobs. The 2000 local elections
for which the militant factions were jockeying were cancelled by Jakarta as too much of a security risk. The biggest loser was the Sultan of Ternate. Political instability began to subside only during the time of writing on Thaib Armaiyn returning as the Governor of North Maluku. Golkar’s Abdul Gafur was declared elected in the 2003 and 2007 gubernatorial elections, but on both occasions various combinations of local and national electoral commissions, the Supreme Court and the Minister for Home Affairs struck down his declared victory on the grounds that he had used ‘money politics’. At the time of our 2007 fieldwork, while the regulation declaring Makian-Malifut still stood, legal and political battles raged over district and subdistrict boundaries on Halmahera, in particular over how they encompassed villages around the Newcrest goldmine. There was therefore still no certainty that the mine would sit within the Makians’ political sphere, and no certainty that conflict would not reignite. Brimob shot dead one person and wounded four when it fired on hundreds of protestors demanding the closure of the mine in 2004 (The Jakarta Post, 9 January 2004). The fighting had destroyed much but resolved little beyond the political demise of the Sultan of Ternate. On the other hand, none of the militia leaders was prosecuted for crimes against humanity and they did get government positions in post-conflict North Maluku. Leaders of militias on both sides said one of the terms in their peace negotiations with Vice-President Megawati was that no combatants would be prosecuted. The government has honoured this. We asked the Christian military leader if refusal of the amnesty would have been a deal breaker. He definitely did not think so on the Christian side and could not speak for the Muslim side but thought it would not have been a deal breaker for them either.

The final toll of the North Maluku conflict included at least 3000–3500 dead, according to Wilson (2006:13). An NGO count conducted from 32 North Maluku locations in August 2000 was of 3931 dead (Böhm 2005:65). Peace journalism researcher Ichsan Malik counted 3241. Some 200 000 people were displaced, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council (van Klinken 2007:107). According to the UNDP, the peak number of IDPs exceeded 250 000 in mid-2000 (Brown et al. 2005:39). Wilson (2006:14) reported that 18 022 houses, 97 mosques, 106 churches and 110 schools were destroyed, plus bridges and a great deal of other infrastructure. Böhm’s (2005:66) reported count from local NGO investigations was similar: 206 churches and mosques, 14 217 homes and 115 schools destroyed. Infant mortality in the combined province before the separation of North Maluku from Maluku was 40 per 1000 live births before the conflict and 57 in the first year of peace, 2002 (Brown et al. 2005:40). School drop-out rates among children in the refugee camps of Maluku and North Maluku could have been as high as 44 per cent (Brown et al. 2005:42). A lot of

15 The head of the North Maluku Education Office reported in 2004 that 300 primary school buildings had been damaged or destroyed during the conflict and that they had the capability to renovate only 50 schools a year, with 600 schools at that time still on the waiting list for renovation (Agustiana and Pakpahan 2004:11).
the violence targeted defenceless women and children; bodies were mutilated, disembowelled and beheaded, especially as evident in the photographic record for North Halmahera, and sometimes there was consumption of body parts, especially hearts, of the vanquished (Wilson 2008:113). There were also stories of rape and forced conversion of Muslims to Christianity. As with the ethnic violence in Kalimantan to be discussed in Chapter 5, this millennial violence was associated with a cultural re-engagement by some fighters with practices of warfare not seen since colonial pacification ended practices such as headhunting. Fighters brought many diverse scripts to the conflict beyond the media’s master narratives—about land, gold, district boundaries, disrespect, payback for fallen kin, manly bravery, political control, religion, ethnic hatred and loot as soldiers’ pay. Yet another of those scripts was about reviving traditional war practices seen in the past as succeeding in protecting the group, its ways and its homeland from the other.

The security sector: part of the problem, part of the solution again

In some cases, the military failed to back up the police, and some informants alleged this was because the military wanted to demonstrate that the police could not handle security in the way the military was able to in times past. In the aftermath of being called to account for the deaths and rape in the 1998 destruction of Chinese businesses and the violence of student demonstrations, military officers also increasingly defiantly refused to deploy force against rioters, arguing that if they did so they might be charged with human rights abuses. Military resistance to fulfilling their duty to prevent civil war was, however, more than just defiance of the encroachment of global human rights discourses on their traditional prerogatives; it was also resentment against the brass in Jakarta and the province, who in the aftermath of the collapse of so many military businesses were no longer able to provide for them as generously as before the financial crisis. Facing massed militias in this conflict, the security forces were often simply afraid to act as peace enforcers.

The failure of the security forces to offer protection when it was requested and needed stoked the security dilemma, leading the defenceless to the conclusion that they had no alternative other than to arm themselves.

One moment of police and military effectiveness occurred soon after the ethnic cleansing of Malifut and before the cleansing of Christians from Tidore and Ternate. Hundreds of Makians on 28 October 1999 assembled at the port in Ternate ready to invade the Kao lands. A large group of military and police prevented them from embarking and confiscated their weapons. Once dispersed, many of the Makians rioted in Ternate, attacking Christian homes and Chinese businesses. The arrest of some of them resulted in a delegation of the highest-ranking Makian public officials in Ternate, including the mayor,
visiting the police station to appeal for their release on the grounds that locking them up would increase tension and cause more rioting. Eventually the police commander surrendered to that request. No arrests thenceforth were made of rioting Makians (Wilson 2008:83). No arrests were made of the sultan’s palace guards who were terrorising Makians and Tidores. The security forces seemed to decide that a clash of political titans was about to occur and they were not going to make the mistake of getting caught up in it. That was the mistake their colleagues in Ambon had made, as they saw it. From then on they were going to sit on their hands and let the mightiest prevail. They did not want to risk shooting at folk who might be the future rulers of the province. While decisions about promoting senior officers are made in Jakarta, local political leaders have considerable influence (Wilson 2008:92).

During the cleansing of Ternate of Christians in November 1999, while the sultan’s guard in fact stood between attackers and Christians, the police and the military did not. A number of Christian victims we interviewed believed were it not for the palace guards, they would have perished. What unarmed police and military did do was offer a great deal of assistance in evacuating beleaguered Christian communities to safety. Manado in the province of North Sulawesi was the most popular destination to which Christian refugees fled.

One of the Makian student leaders said to us that the military did some very useful peacemaking mediation between the two sides. His most telling point was that only the military could do it because only the military could get safe access to both sides. In these not uncommon circumstances of conflict, the only diplomats on hand can be military officers. The implication is that training of senior military personnel in diplomacy is vital because that can be an inescapable part of their role, which they will do more or less badly or well. Moreover, when the enemy surrounded survivors, only the military could get them out and safely extract them to a refugee camp. One journalist who regularly went behind the battlelines under the protection of the military insisted that the military was often ‘persuasive in advising people to think twice before fighting’.

On Wilson’s (2006:178) account, Muslims in Ternate initially did not have great sympathy for the Makian refugees arriving from Malifut. Their motivational posture was one of disengagement initially, when engagement with peacebuilding was needed. Many felt the Makians caused their own problems by destroying the two Kao villages, and were reaping the consequences of their expansionary, gold-grabbing political manipulations. In the weeks immediately after the ethnic cleansing of Malifut, the security forces and the sultan’s guards between them were able to avert a major counterattack on Christians in Halmahera. According to Wilson, however, the Makian political leadership then decided to do two things: first, to immobilise the security forces; second, to redefine Islam as facing the same battle for survival in North Maluku as it had been facing in
Ambon. Non-Makian Muslims in North Maluku were not persuaded, mostly viewing Malifut as ethnic cleansing of Makians, not of Muslims in general; however, ‘efforts to immobilise the security forces were more successful in allowing the rioting to take place’ (Wilson 2008:82). Makians led and executed most of the early violence and destruction motivated mainly by revenge over the apparent loss of their dream of a Makian homeland that would become host to a new provincial capital, complete with goldmine, in Malifut. On Wilson’s account, as the violence developed, some non-Makian Muslims were attracted by the opportunity to manifest violent jihad against Christian churches, by the opportunity to loot or just to indulge youthful excitement within the mob of the faithful. All this helped the wider project of uniting diverse Muslims against the sultan and his push to become governor.

Two of our informants, and several of Wilson’s (2008:125), asserted that military and police provoked violence—for example, by warning Christians on 26 December that Muslims were planning to attack and Muslims that Christians were planning to attack. A top Christian militia commander said that he had promised a senior military mediator that he would protect the Christians; that officer then told the Muslims that he was going to attack and kill them. Christian informants in both studies also alleged that the military fired on them. Others said the military allowed Pasukan Jihad to chase them out of their village so that the military could follow in behind and participate in the looting of the village. Soldiers often charged cash or higher equivalent payment with goods or livestock to transport refugees out of harm’s way. The evidence of all of these practices is, however, less than what we found for Maluku. Disengagement of the military was a bigger problem in North Maluku than participatory game playing with the conflict. Unfortunately, one of many reasons for this disengagement that Christians often alleged, probably with some truth, was that some of the considerable monies Pasukan Jihad attracted from across Indonesia for their campaign was used to bribe the security forces to stand aside to allow them to attack civilians. One might have expected major deployments of extra security forces on Halmahera as soon as the first two Kao villages were burnt to the ground, but this did not happen in a serious way until after the next major escalation of the conflict.

16 Wilson (2006:277) says of the yellow–white three-day battle for Ternate in December 1999: ‘Several interviews with participants reflected the “rush” involved in large-scale battles along the main streets of Ternate and the sense of power in finally opposing the Pasukan Kuning [sultan’s palace guards].’ It was interesting to go over our fieldwork notes for 22 August 2007, the day the electoral commission ruled the Sultan of Ternate ineligible to contest the next election for governor. When the sultan’s palace guards rioted at the electoral commission office that day (Tunny 2007b), the police fired on them with live rounds, wounding nine, two critically: ‘Interesting to see the city in this state. Many young people quite excited by it, enjoying the spectacle, fun, whatever. This included the young men of the police who I spoke to. They were clearly enjoying an adrenalin rush preparing for what was about to happen’ (J. Braithwaite, fieldwork notes). They were forming up with riot shields to defend the electoral commission office at the time.
As in Ambon, in North Maluku, a legacy of bad blood between the police and the military persisted for years after the end of the conflict, though we did not know if there was a connection between these conflicts, which occasionally resulted in the death of police officers (The Jakarta Post 2007), and what happened between the police and military in their turf battles to cash in on the conflict.

Reconciliation

As in Maluku, in North Maluku, there were many community gatherings, interfaith meetings, youth forums and inter-village forums aimed at reconciliation. Governor Thaib Armaiyn (2006) reported the results of a survey conducted by the Ministry of Social Affairs in five places that had the worst intra-communal conflict in Indonesia: North Maluku, Ambon, Poso, Sampit and Sambas. Seventy-three per cent of the victims of the conflicts in these areas ‘wanted to have the conflict settled by local people in relevant villages by involving religious, customary, ethnic and competent community leaders’ (Armaiyn 2006). Another 13 per cent preferred conflict resolution in places of worship with religious leaders as facilitators. Solving conflict through the courts was the least popular option, with 6 per cent support, with solving conflict in police stations only slightly more preferred, with 8 per cent.17 Seventy-two per cent were opposed to any plan to separate community settlements along ethnic or religious lines—something many victims had experienced in all of these conflict areas. A particularly interesting measure of practical reconciliation was that 84 per cent of conflict victims sanctioned marriages between people of different ethnic groups.

A consistent result was obtained in the UNDP’s (2004:11) Provincial Peace and Development Workshop, where a wide range of stakeholders concluded that the key reconciliation ‘Factor Contributing to Success’ of peacebuilding was widespread ‘[a]cknowledged responsibility for reconciliation and willingness to live together’. Reconciliation has not been achieved only among most ordinary people. Even among the top militia leaders they said they now had many good friends today who had fought against them in 1999 and 2000.

Muslim and Christian kapita (traditional leaders) from across North Maluku attended three peace dialogues in Manado in August 2000, November 2000 and March 2001. These meetings built momentum for trust and peace and 100–200 traditional leaders attended the last one. During 2001 there was a follow-up process of Christian refugees going to Christian communities to urge them to take Muslim refugees back and vice versa. Only after this was it possible for IDPs to begin to return to their homes in most of Halmahera. Duncan (2005a:79)

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17 The UNDP’s (2004) Provincial Peace and Development Workshop among a diverse range of stakeholders in Ternate came to a different conclusion at least with respect to ‘provocateurs’. Part of the ‘Best Case Scenario’ for the future of North Maluku was that ‘Provocateurs are arrested’ (UNDP 2004:3). Though perhaps there was not inconsistency as the purpose of the workshop was to be forward looking. This could mean the arrest of any future provocateurs rather than provocateurs of 1999–2000.
found that the first serious efforts at reconciliation on the ground in the conflict areas began in Tobelo in October 2000 and were led by locals. When Muslim refugees returned to Tobelo, they saw their first priority as rebuilding the main mosque. The bupati worried about what a huge setback it would be to have it rebuilt then have radical elements or the security forces burn it again, so he persuaded Muslims and Christians that the first priority was support for the reintegration of Muslims. ‘First we must build better relationships and better hearts for each other before we rebuild the mosque.’ The bupati had a staged theory of ripeness for different levels of reintegration. At peace meetings in Tobelo, government officials would speak followed by adat leaders from different religious communities, then prayers from all religious leaders. They then ate together and enjoyed traditional dances.

Most regions of North Maluku sent grassroots leaders, religious and adat leaders, women’s leaders, youth leaders and village heads to make a collective declaration of peace that they all signed in front of the Sultan of Ternate’s palace.

Among all these positive moves towards reconciliation, a negative was some fear, particularly on the Christian side in Ternate, to show bottom-up initiative for reconciliation. There was a philosophy among some leaders of hanging back and waiting for the government to show leadership if it decided to. Then civil society leaders would fall in behind and give strong support to the government reconciliation initiative. Christian leaders in Ternate were afraid to make a mistake, that they might cause conflict by doing it badly, and were afraid that the government could get angry with them if they overstepped some line or got in the way of government initiatives. This Ternate tentativeness was very different from the bottom-up initiative we saw in Gorua and elsewhere away from the capital. Cutura and Watanabe (2004:24) also report unwillingness to initiate reconciliations after minor post-conflict flare-ups of violence because, in the words of a village head, that is ‘the responsibility of the higher government’. Duncan (2008:223) reports that there have been many short government or military-sponsored reconciliations, ‘often with adat-themed communal meals’, with speeches that simply declare that reconciliation has taken place. In other locales, victims were simply told to forget about the violence and not worry about reconciliation: ‘We were shocked that the government says we cannot blame anyone, and that we have to look at this as the work of God’ (Christian refugee in Galea quoted in Duncan 2008:223).

One of the objectives for reconciliation of the Inter-Religious Forum sponsored by the Department of Religious Affairs has been to encourage villages to reinvigorate the traditional practice of giving unsolicited gifts, usually of food, to other villages. These gifts tend to be reciprocated. The Department of Education and Khairun University are also working together to build on this tradition in a new way of promoting livelihoods and economic skills.
Christian village is renowned for making traditional bags, they teach a Muslim village this skill. In return, the Muslim village might share their special skill in making mats.

**Gorua–Popilo: case study of reconciliation**

In addition to visiting Tobelo to interview locals about the reconciliation, we were able to interview Christian and Muslim leaders of the adjacent villages of Gorua and Popilo, 20 kilometres north of Tobelo. Two hundred and fifty people died in a five-day battle there—a large proportion of the population of the villages. Perhaps no automatic weapons were used in the fighting. Most victims were killed by arrows, spears, swords, bombs and some homemade guns. Gorua and Popilo were mixed villages. In the first phase of the conflict, the Christian minority was driven out on 27 December 1999 with little loss of life (Wilson 2008:109). Their churches and all but 13 Christian homes were destroyed. On 29 December, the Christians returned to Gorua with supporters from other Christian communities, driving the Muslims out and in the process committing terrible atrocities. This was one of the places where bodies were disembowelled and hearts cut out and eaten. According to local pre-Christian belief, eating the hearts of those vanquished in battle increased bravery and invincibility for future fighting. About 90 people were killed in the battle for Gorua—overwhelmingly Muslim villagers (Wilson 2008:113). The surviving Muslims then retreated along the road to the neighbouring village of Popilo as the Christian forces burnt their mosques and every Muslim home behind them. In Popilo, the surviving Muslim fighters were quickly overran again. Many escaped into the surrounding forest, but a few retreated to the main mosque where those who were too weak to fight—mostly children and women—were huddled. The surviving Muslim fighters fired some arrows from the mosque at the advancing Christians. Christians returned fire into the mosque throughout the night until the resistance stopped. When they went in, the floor of the mosque was covered with many dead and wounded. They discovered a pit beneath the pulpit where many survivors huddled. A Christian militia leader dropped a bomb into the pit. According to Wilson (2008:114), 160 people died in Popilo. Tomagola (2000:24) said 200 were killed in the mosque, including survivors of the assault who were burnt alive after the mosque was torched. Some more could have died in what one Christian militia member described to Wilson (2008:114) as a ‘cleansing operation’ chasing the Muslim escapees into the forest.

The Christian and Muslim leaders we interviewed in 2007 told a similar story both about what happened during the conflict and about the reconciliation process. We also spoke with a group of surviving Muslim children as they were departing from religious instruction at the mosque; they said they were happy to be back in the village and felt safe with the Christian children in their school
and were good friends with them. Like the children, the adult leaders and some common people gathered at the local store where we had a drink; all spoke of a high degree of Christian–Muslim trust today. As in Ambon, there was a tendency to blame outside ‘provocateurs’ for the tragedies they had suffered—only here the provocateurs were seen as refugees (some born in Tobelo) who had fled to Tobelo from Ambon after the fighting there. So while Ambonese blame provocateurs from Jakarta for their woes, North Malukans blame provocateurs from Ambon for theirs. Because there was trust now, they said any threatening rumours were immediately tested through trusting relationships.

Until 2003 the Christians feared and resisted approaches from leaders of the Muslim majority (which had been 85 per cent before the slaughter) to return because they had killed so many Christians. The Christian Bupati of North Halmahera District, Hein Namotemo, appealed to them to take the risk, saying that 40 members of his clan had been killed by the Muslims, but he knew he had to live in peace with Muslims now. Confidence building began. Survivors from the Muslim majority returned to Gorua in four stages: first, 10 brave households, then 20, then 50, then all, including all the Makians and Tidorese. After such atrocities, the return of all refugees seemed a remarkable feat in itself. The first two groups of returnees were all natives of the village. Muslims whose ancestors were from outside Halmahera were not allowed to return at first. They especially did not want the considerable number of Makian and Tidorese Muslims to return. One family with a father from Tidore who had been rejected for return in the first group of 10 families was allowed to return in the second group. Their return was successful and broke the ice. In fact, the son of the man from Tidore was the one who all Christians voted for to succeed the Christian head as soon as Muslims had become the majority again in the village. Christians continued in other important leadership positions in the village, working with the new Muslim head. The IDPs did not return to the totally integrated Gorua that had existed before. The village was divided into three precincts: segregated Christian and Muslim precincts for families who felt a need for the support of immediate neighbours who were of their faith and a mixed precinct where Muslim and Christian families lived side by side.

The bupati played an important role as a catalyst of reconciliation. He established a reconciliation team of Christian and Muslim leaders from the village.18 Trust built out from this team. The reconciliation process from then on came from the people themselves. Families based on Christian–Muslim intermarriage were key bridge builders, as were Christians and Muslims from the same clan. A Christian reconciliation leader told us they organised welcoming parties when Muslims returned. Muslims from the district helped the Christians to put up

18 Such reconciliation teams were established in many parts of North Maluku, generally with little or no resource support from the government (Huber et al. 2004:31). Many were all male.
the tent and all the other work that needed to be done for the welcome. This working together was as important a part of the initial reconciliation as was the welcome celebration itself. They also did gotong royong together with Christians helping rebuild the mosques and Muslims working together with Christians to rebuild the churches. The government funded all expenses for this rebuilding. A number of the rebuilt churches we saw around North Maluku employed peaceful imagery, such as a serene Jesus with a lamb portrayed above the altar.

Gorua had lots of joint Christian–Muslim village meetings: three a month. At the district level, leaders of the village attended a district hibua lamo for reconciliation. Many immigrants from outside Halmahera attended the peacebuilding hibua lamo, though only natives generally spoke. Hibua lamo is a cultural tradition in North Maluku of binding Christian and Muslim villages together in pacts of peace and mutual help that is similar to the pela-gandong described earlier for Maluku. It is seen as a pluralist adat pre-dating the arrival of Islam and Christianity that involves ‘equality among the differences’ (Gorua interview). It was believed that when Islam arrived, hibua lamo meetings were held to agree that ‘this religion will be welcomed, but some will accept it and others will not. But we will still all be brothers together in spite of this.’ Exactly the same kind of meeting was believed to have occurred when the Christian missionaries arrived in Duma. It was widely believed that in the decades leading up to the conflict the bonds of hibua lamo had weakened across North Maluku. At the early reconciliation meetings, the bupati told the story of our friend Pak Edu’s grandfather, a famous historical figure of the district. He was a wealthy man with a big home and, in the spirit of hibua lamo, he allowed his home to be used for both Sunday Christian services and Friday Muslim prayers. In the hibua lamo ritual itself, one side gives sri fruit and the other panang fruit placed on swords and exchanged to indicate they are friends. Sugarcane juice (representing sweet, happy things) combined with traditional cooking oil (representing sincerity, peace, kindness and justice) is then poured over swords, shields, arrows and other weapons. Then there is an agreement called koboto, a sacred declaration to maintain peace. Anyone who tries to destroy it will never succeed in life and will live in misery. Part of the agreement in Tobelo was to hand over weapons to the military. The fact that some who failed to do so later found themselves in trouble with the military for this was interpreted as evidence that the sacred power of the declaration worked.

The Christian leader of Gorua until the Muslims returned said he felt like a member of the Muslim community when he first visited Muslim homes for halal bi halal. He experienced a spirit of forgiveness. There was a great deal of crying as forgiveness was asked for and offered in accordance with this uniquely Indonesian Muslim ritual. Everyone present they said felt deep sympathy for the other. Likewise, the Muslim who succeeded him as leader of the village put
his hand on his heart and trembled when he spoke of the hugs and crying with Christians in the embrace of halal bi halal. And this has happened every year since the conflict. He said that funerals and wedding feasts were very important for reconciliation. It was not just the gesture of large numbers of members of one religious community attending the funeral to show their respect for a member of the other community, it was also the practical work of men from both communities helping each other to put tents up and women cooking together. Christians being invited to Idul Futri and Muslims into Christian homes for Christmas celebrations were also important, especially on the Muslim side because it involved defiance of fatwas that had been issued by some Muslim ulamas forbidding this.

As the leader of the village pointed out into the front garden of his home where his son had been cut down defending the escape of the rest of the family, his wife softly wept. They said they knew who killed him. They tried to forget but could not forgive the one who struck the fatal blow. They forgive all the others but must honour their son. But the couple do not want prosecution for the murderer of their son. No-one in the village, they tell us, wants prosecutions for the crimes of 1999–2000. ‘What’s the point of justice? It won’t bring back our son.’ They want peace rather than justice. They think a return to the true meanings of their two religions is what is needed now and what will honour the sacrifice of their son. They say many others in the village still have anger in their hearts. They work to reintegrate angry youth who remind them of the love of their son through volleyball and football. They dealt with their own anger by focusing on the kindness that the Christian Church showed them when they returned. And when they lived in the refugee camp, there were Christians who came every Sunday for three months with gifts of rice and other food. Today they reciprocate by inviting Christians to their house for the celebration of Mohammed’s birthday. The man pointed to his children who had come into the room and said they mixed with the Christian children at school and got on very well with them.

The couple said that it never happened that anyone went up to someone else in the village and said ‘I killed your son’, or ‘I burnt your house and I am sorry’. ‘Both sides understand no-one is expected to speak in that way. Maybe if someone did, the pressure on others to admit would not be welcomed.’ Non-truth and reconciliation again.

We asked why the fighting stopped. They said because everyone was war weary and suffering. They wanted to stop and for that reason wanted to embrace hibua lamo. ‘In the end, everyone realised they were part of the same culture. That was why the hibua lamo rituals were important.’ Note that this comes from a family of Tidorese descent.
Refugee reintegration

Refugees ended up in many places. In the case of North Maluku, they came to see rather more quickly than with refugees in other cases in our research such as Maluku and Timor-Leste that paths to reintegration were open to them. Most returned to their homes quickly by any international standard of post-conflict speed of resettlement. Many of them could find work in refugee camps located in cities. Some Christian refugees stayed in Manado because they liked their jobs and the new homes they were able to build there. On the other hand, Duncan’s (2005b:32) research on the 35 000 North Maluku refugees in North Sulawesi found most struggled to get work and competed with the poorest among the local community for low-skill jobs. Their vulnerability also enabled a great deal of exploitation by local employers who would pay less than the agreed rates or not at all (Duncan 2005b:34). A repeated refugee complaint was: ‘The Muslims burned our homes and stole all of our possessions in North Maluku, now the Christians are stealing everything from us here in North Sulawesi’ (Duncan 2005b:39). Refugees received financial assistance to rebuild their homes, which was not enough to cover everything, but enough to get construction well under way, even though this was delayed in coming in the case of the first Kao victims of the conflict. North Maluku learnt from the fact that the initial denial of rebuilding assistance to the Kao was a factor in the escalation of the conflict. Duncan (2008:214) reported that corruption and mismanagement so depleted the available aid that in some areas most refugees learned to survive without it. Much of the corruption was in the form of fees to government officials for ‘handling costs’ for their assistance. There were refugees who also rorted the aid, moving back and forth between North Sulawesi and North Maluku several times to collect aid, justifying this by saying that if they did not rip off the money, government officials would (Duncan 2008:215). Some refugee camps we visited had Christian and Muslim sections, seemingly without causing significant conflicts, and enabling many friendships. There have been complaints about rape and humiliation of women by the security forces in the Syoan refugee camp in North Halmahera and this seems to have been part of a pattern of sexual violence, harassment and leaving unwed mothers behind on the part of the security forces across the province (Brown et al. 2005:47). One women’s NGO took complaints to the military commander in North Maluku relating to 28 women allegedly pregnant to soldiers, three rapes in refugee camps and 23 other alleged sexual abuses by soldiers. Some soldiers agreed to marry women to get rid of the complaint, but then just returned home to their original wife.

During our 2007 fieldwork, we were told that 90 per cent of refugees had returned in North Halmahera, but only 65 per cent in Ternate. The Christian churches have been heavily involved in trauma counselling, often with assistance from international Christian NGOs such as Action by Churches Together or World
Vision International. Médecins sans Frontières and other international NGOs also provided some emergency trauma counselling in the Moluccas. Government support for trauma counselling has, however, been extremely limited.

In 2007 there were still many refugees, particularly in Ternate, who had not permanently settled back in their home villages. One Tobelo government official said there still were about 50 families from the district who had become permanent refugees. For years, they had been moving back and forth between the district, Manado and Ternate. His allegation is not that they keep returning to collect repeat refugee payments, but that they return to their refugee hovels in Ternate and Manado to make money for a while from paid employment in the city, then return home to spend it. We wondered if this was what an attractive young woman in expensive clothes was doing, who, while moving between the street and her makeshift downtown home in a Ternate refugee camp, seemed to be working as a prostitute. The government official said some of these permanent refugees worked as ojek (motorcycle taxi) drivers and even as shopkeepers.

The Chinese factor

Anti-Chinese sentiment was not part of the grand narrative of this conflict, yet as in most of the first 11 conflicts to be considered in Indonesia and the South Pacific for the Peacebuilding Compared project, the conflict created an opportunity for a great deal of anti-Chinese resentment and property destruction. As in every case we have studied so far, the Chinese fled without fighting. Some did some creative things to save their businesses, such as handing it over to a respected ulama to run. Most Chinese businesses in North Halmahera were destroyed. Most in the main commercial centre of Ternate were not destroyed as a result of local leadership by the Mayor of Ternate and Yusuf Abdurrahman, the Makian former Rector of Khairun University and former Chairman of the MUI for North Maluku. They asked the security forces to block the street leading to Chinese businesses that triumphant white forces were planning to destroy. These two leaders asked the crowd to stop and listen. They said they advised the crowd, ‘Don’t destroy these businesses. If you do, you kill us economically.’ So, the torching of Chinese investment in Ternate did not continue.

As of 2007 only about 60 per cent of the Chinese business families who had fled North Maluku had returned. Many chose to stay to explore new business opportunities in Manado, while some rebuilt their business in North Maluku based on a company with a head office in Manado and a branch in North Maluku. There could therefore be a semi-permanent cost of the conflict to North Maluku here, notwithstanding the successful intervention of leaders to preserve most Chinese businesses in the capital.
Interpreting the conflict

What structural factors were at the root of this conflict?

Colonialism transformed North Maluku from one of the richest to one of the poorest parts of the world between 1600 and 1900. The once-stable division of power between the Sultanates of Ternate and Tidore, traditionally sealed by the marriage of the Sultan of Ternate to the daughter of the Sultan of Tidore, was permanently ruptured when they became clients of competing colonial powers (The Netherlands and Spain). This fissure was only one that split wide open to drive North Maluku’s millennial conflict over the edge.

The conflict might not have escalated beyond the loss of three lives had the Group of Nine Kao leaders been granted access to either a negotiated settlement of their grievances by the district government or the courts. They also tried to chase the Makians away with magic before they resorted to the only option they believed they had left, which was violent ethnic cleansing. Structurally, when the security forces leave the violence option open to people with an acute grievance and when the doors of the executive, the legislature and the courts are slammed in their faces, violence is likely. So the structural factor at the root of the conflict here was access to justice, access to compensation and a failure to be heard by government.

Barbara Walter’s (2004) empirical analysis of all civil wars ending between 1945 and 1996 found that war was least likely in societies where citizens had access to an open political system and to economic opportunities.

In the Political Instability Task Force model, ‘State-led Discrimination’ is one of the four key predictors of political instability (Goldstone 2008:5). Ethnic groups such as the Kao felt there was discrimination in giving government jobs to Makians and one or two other ethnic groups that effectively excluded them. More broadly, there was a sense of injustice causing jealousy, especially towards Makians among one part of the population, and the Sultan of Ternate and his inner circle among another part of the population.

At the very root of this conflict was an environmental structural cause: the volcano that drove the Makians from their island in the 1970s. The transmigration solution to that crisis then became a social structural factor driving conflict in Malifut.

Non-agricultural and non-governmental employment opportunities are even fewer in North Maluku than in Maluku, so van Klinken’s (2007:Ch. 3) analysis about competition for the prize of patrimonial control of public sector jobs as a motive for conflict applies to both the provinces studied in this chapter.
Many would say a resource curse was one of the roots of this conflict: the political and violent struggle to capture wealth flowing from the Newcrest goldmine. This was really a proximate factor in the conflict as well as the setting of subdistrict and district boundaries and the capture of jobs; ‘honorariums’ and tax revenue from the mine within them were strategic political moves that opened wounds.

What have been the proximate factors in the conflict?

As in Maluku, in North Maluku, the Asian economic crisis was an obvious proximate cause of the conflict in increasing competition for scarce resources, especially scarcer public sector jobs. It was also a proximate cause of the collapse of the New Order and transition to a new institutional order where new claims could be made in new ways (Bertrand 2004). Decentralisation increased patronage and corruption opportunities in controlling provincial and district government offices. Democratisation increased perceived opportunities from mobilising popular support along ethnic and religious lines.

As in Maluku, in North Maluku, failure of the security forces to take control at the first sign of conflict was critical. In North Maluku, however, the security sector problem was much more one of disengagement than of the defiance we saw in Maluku. Handing over the control of the streets of Ternate to the sultan’s palace guards created the conditions for the street battles between their yellow forces and the white forces. There was not the widespread effective desertion from the security forces to fight with one or the other side that we saw in Maluku. Timidity in North Maluku was born of a fear by security sector leaders that they might be seen as backing the losing side, that they might be accused of abusing human rights and that they might be killed if they stood up to forces that were massed in larger numbers in one place than perhaps were seen in any of the other Indonesian conflicts of this period. Some military officers almost certainly took bribes to disengage. The clear evidence that the security forces were disengaged from protecting defenceless civilians created the conditions for a security dilemma becoming a proximate factor. Without security forces to guarantee their security, groups at risk armed themselves before the other side armed, and attacked before they were attacked.

The most important proximate cause was the competition to control the new province of North Maluku. There were a number of aspects of this. One was competition between powerful individuals to become governor and a consensus among all the other potential future governors that there was a need to disrupt the circuits of power controlled by the Sultan of Ternate. There was political party competition and competition between regions, including between the old
Sultanates of Ternate and Tidore, to capture the site of a new capital that might replace Ternate. And there was competition for middle-ranking government offices.

Youth gangs that were in effect organised crime groups and media sensationalism and partisanship were not the important proximate factors that they were in the Maluku conflict.

**What were the key triggering incidents?**

As in Maluku, in North Maluku, there was a widespread belief on all sides—or at least a desire to believe—that provocateurs from outside North Maluku (especially from Ambon!) started the conflict. Perhaps most people knew full well that the conflict was internal to North Maluku, yet they used claims of outside provocation as a way of ‘moving on’. We have seen that at some stages of some conflicts, and especially post-conflict, the military might have provoked some trouble, though not to the extent that it did in Maluku. The military is really the only ‘provocateur’ that can be fingered as an occasional trigger of conflict, but it is certainly not among the more important triggers. The key initial triggers were the attacks by the Makians on the Kao in Malifut and then vice versa. These seemed to be planned and politically motivated.

As in many other conflicts of Peacebuilding Compared, in North Maluku, for some phases, youthful exuberance in stone-throwing and drunken fighting was a trigger of wider conflict. Most of the conflict in Ternate was executed by young people, with many Makian (Huber et al. 2004:16), Ternatean and Tidorese adults, including the Sultan of Tidore, disapproving.

The sight of a truckload of armed Christian villagers going through the Muslim part of Tobelo to guard the central church compound for Christmas seemed to be a trigger there, when it was misread as preparations for attack.

The most famous trigger in this conflict was the fraudulent ‘Bloody Sosol’ letter that supposedly revealed a Christianisation strategy. The role of this letter in triggering violence is, however, a matter of debate, with Wilson (2008) claiming that imputing too much of a role to it perhaps overestimates the suggestibility of North Malukan Muslims (Wilson 2008:132). Obviously, regardless of its impact, this trigger was not a misunderstanding, but intentional provocation through misrepresentation.

**Who were the key war-making and peacebuilding actors?**

Ambitious politicians vying for control of the new province who recruited leaders of citizen militias—white (Muslim), red (Christian), yellow (sultan’s) and Kao—were key war-making actors. Then there were village militia leaders who
had little political motivation, who showed military leadership because they felt the political game players had put them in a security dilemma from which there was no escape. Many of these local war-makers cared little about who would become governor and where the new capital would be located, but they felt that unless their village armed and organised to attack first, it would be they who would be attacked and lose their homes.

Radio peace journalism played a positive role. The media also played a role in generating mass concern across Indonesia. On the debit side, this led to the mobilisation of Laskar Jihad in Maluku; on the credit side, it created a climate of public opinion that would have censured persistence with the conflict after the fall of Duma. North Maluku was just that bit more remote than Ambon and lacked the large Dutch interest in Maluku engendered by 50 000 refugees who settled there. Also the North Maluku conflict was much shorter, so the international media never woke up to it. This was an amazing missed opportunity given how filmic and unique some of the medieval-style battles were, with thousands of massed combatants armed with swords, arrows and spears facing off against each other, and the likes of Pastor Soselissa leading the singing of *Onward Christian Soldiers* from the roof of a vehicle. The comparative silence of the international media was one reason why there were not key international players in the peace process.

There were no international peacebuilding actors who played any kind of significant role, or even national actors such as the government ministers who led the Malino I and II peace talks. In both these respects, North Maluku is a most unusual case. Local military commanders had their moments when they led a local peace or averted local carnage by evacuating cornered civilians. The key peacemakers and post-conflict peacebuilders were local: the two governors who served between 1999 and the present, the Sultan of Tidore, *bupatis* such as the Bupati of North Halmahera, Hein Namotemo, and village leaders such as the Christian and Muslim leaders of Gorua. Religious leaders at the provincial level were not as important in North Maluku as in Maluku. At every level, the key peacebuilders were even more local in North Maluku than in Maluku.

Youth gangs and NGOs were not important players in these events in the way they were in other parts of Indonesia. Student organisations were rather more important.

The whole fabric of peacebuilding was very different in North Maluku from Maluku. In Maluku, the leadership of Ambon elites—especially religious leaders, but also women’s leaders, intellectuals and NGO leaders—was much more important. Such elites in Ternate were less important; the fabric of
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peacebuilding was woven more quickly and tightly in the heartland of the province and where the conflict was most deadly on rural Halmahera among village and adat leaders working with subdistrict and district leaders.

Motivational postures of key actors

There was a lot of evidence of grievance as a motive for violence, as with the grievances of the Kao against the Makians for seeking to occupy then dominate their traditional lands. There was also evidence of greed, as with Kao and Makians seeking advantage from the Newcrest goldmine. There is also evidence of leaders being motivated by neither grievance nor greed, but because they saw their village as confronting a security dilemma in which pre-emption might fend off defeat.

An arresting comment that several informants made when we asked about root causes of the conflict was that people became dehumanised. As a Catholic priest put it: ‘They stopped putting humanity as the main point in their lives.’ It is arresting because it causes us to ponder whether this is part of the dynamic in all conflicts—indeed, such a common factor in conflict that we cease to notice its importance in motivation. It is made so visible in this case because the Christian forces started out with a practice of warfare concerned to minimise loss of human life and maximise respect for the religious symbols of the other. The Kao commander told us that he warned his fighters that if a Makian surrendered and they killed him, the commander would kill them. In this first phase, it was an accomplishment to ethnically cleanse 17 000 using a large, untrained army with the loss of only three lives. And it was an accomplishment that no mosques or schools were harmed, though apparently there was at least one incident of burning a copy of the Koran. Less than a year later, the cycle of revenge and atrocity had so fed on itself that the kind of Christian atrocities described above in Tobelo, Gorua and Popilo became possible. Perhaps the motivational-posture point is that commitment to the rules of war and to humanity always erodes in war—a process of erosion that is acutely visible here. North Maluku was characterised by a total absence of commitment to the rule of law and to security for the community as a national policy objective on the part of the security forces. Disengagement was the motivational posture of most of the security forces until the final stages of the conflict, when they finally showed commitment to peace enforcement. One Christian leader in Ternate said of the military: ‘Their priority was how to get maximum money from both sides.’ While the evidence of game playing by the security forces might not have been as overwhelming as in Maluku, evidence of it there certainly was. Political game playing was also a prominent motivational posture of the Sultan of Ternate and his rivals. Game playing with subdistrict boundaries in Malifut epitomised this posture.
Disengagement was not only the posture of the military after the Makians had levelled the two Kao villages in the first actions of the war and after the Kao retaliated by ethnically cleansing the Makians. Disengagement was also the general reaction of elites in Ternate, at a time when engagement with a peace process was sorely needed from them. Many were in fear of the Makians and uncaring towards the Kao at first, and then felt the Makians got their comeuppance when the Kao struck back.

The militia leaders on both sides moved from defiant resistance to capitulation when they found themselves relieved to be in a situation in which the military was positioned between stabilised wholly Christian and wholly Muslim areas. They then quickly moved to commitment to a new unified province in a united Indonesia. There was no partial quality about either the capitulation or the commitment. It was total capitulation followed by firm commitment to peaceful civil authority.

Peacebuilding strengths and weaknesses

Getting the military more engaged with separating the two militias was a key to peace, as was the security forces standing in the way of the embarkation of more Muslim fighters for Halmahera and a naval blockade on the importation of automatic weapons from the Philippines that was beginning to take off. Increased numbers of security forces were necessary for that. The declaration of the civil emergency by President Wahid also seemed to be a signal of commitment that mattered. The proactive separation of the two militias after the Muslim re-invasion of Malifut was a big step up in commitment to enforcing peace on the part of the security forces, even if it was only political resolve to keep the goldmine open that allowed it to happen. It was the first turning of the tide, which up to that point was a swelling tide of escalating conflict. In North Maluku, disengagement of the security forces was a causal factor in the war; their re-engagement was a causal factor in the peace. Maluku was more about the wrong kind of engagement (taking sides and doing most of the killing) as a causal factor in the war.

Local peacemaking and reconciliation were key pressures for peace, including the use of adat such as habua limo and normal rituals of village life such as funerals, weddings and halal bi halal.

There was no top-down Malino turning point as there was in Maluku and Poso. There was no challenge of persuading thousands of Laskar Jihad fighters to return home. Provincial political stability and democratic legitimacy have been much slower coming to North Maluku than to Maluku. One factor in this has been the Sultan of Ternate retaining the cultural power associated with his title, such as magical power to protect the people from their volcano, and continuing
unsuccessfully to fight a rearguard action to convert this into political power. The interference of Jakarta politicians in twice annulling the announced election of Abdul Gafur—however true it was that he had engaged in ‘money politics’—destabilised the fragile provincial democracy.

As one moves further to the periphery of Indonesia, the NGO sector becomes weaker, an important exception being Banda Aceh, which is an NGO haven for special reasons. As one moves from Jakarta and Ambon to Ternate and more remote parts of Halmahera and Morotai, however, NGOs become less active at each move. In most of the places where the slaughter was worst in North Maluku, active engagement of NGOs in peacebuilding was thin or non-existent. Where there is a presence, NGOs are often not respected by villagers, often being seen as extensions of international NGOs without depth of commitment and competence and as having a raison d’être of extracting funds from donors (Huber et al. 2004:29). One of many areas of neglect as a result of thin government and thin NGOs was limited access to trauma counselling for survivors.

In spite of this, bottom-up reconciliation that locals often refer to as ‘natural reconciliation’ has been active and generously executed by volunteers. It is not quite accurate to call it ‘bottom-up’ because it has tended to be led by very local elites. For example, in one interview, we were told that Kao–Malifut reconciliation in 2001 was led on one side by a former university rector who gathered Muslim village heads together in Malifut, and on the other by a subdistrict head who gathered Christian village heads together in Kao. These two men worked to bring the two groups of heads together in peacebuilding dialogue. Respected leaders with networks on both the Christian and Muslim sides moving about local areas to mobilise those networks for peace were critical in many areas—or so we were told. Many Christians were protected or hidden by Muslims during the fighting and vice versa. These practical legacies of help combined with adat traditions of mutual help, especially hibua lamo, to make reconciliation work surprisingly well.

Impunity for the events of 1999–2000 was total in North Maluku. Amnesties were requested by both sides in the peace negotiations with Vice-President Megawati, and honoured. We did not encounter any constituency who wanted it otherwise. The Catholic Church leadership contrasted the Church’s support for prosecution of war criminals in East Timor with the absolute consensus within their congregation and their agreement with the Protestants and Muslims that there should not be prosecutions. Many informants said ‘nobody wants that’ or, at most, ‘only some refugees who spent a long time in Manado want that’. We asked the police in the major towns of Ternate and Tobelo if there was a problem of revenge attacks for crimes that occurred during the conflict. They said not at all.
The marginalised status of women is a peacebuilding weakness in North Maluku. Post-conflict, in 2004, only two women had been elected as provincial parliamentary representatives, one from the PPP with very conservative views on women’s equality, the other the wife of the Sultan of Ternate (Agustiana and Pakpahan 2004:13). North Maluku has the worst development indicators for women of any province in Indonesia (Brown et al. 2005:46). Women and women’s organisations played only minor roles in comparison with Maluku and other cases in Peacebuilding Compared, though some local contributions have been notable (see Agustiana and Pakpahan 2004:20).

Peace journalism was a strength to North Maluku. With only weekly newspapers, radio was the key medium. One peace journalist with Radio Republic Indonesia explained that if he were interviewing a priest, for example, off-air he would ask him if he thought the scriptures supported killing. If he said no, the journalist would then ask him to say that was what he thought on air. The key, another journalist said, was to be proactive in searching out pro-peace messages. In a battle, if one side lost 10 fighters and the other five, he would not report this, lest it cause a desire to even the tally. It would just be reported that there were losses on both sides. Then he would get complaints from the side that got the better of the fighting that he failed to communicate their magnificent victory. He had been trained by the BBC/British Counsel/UNDP peace journalism program. On the other hand, the media was part of the elite line of non-truth and reconciliation according to which outside agitators were the problem in causing the conflict.

One of the things that was quite surprising about the desperately marginalised plight of the Christian minority in North Maluku after their protection by the sultan was withdrawn was that they did not seem to get support from Western churches to rebuild in the way that churches in Ambon did, especially from the Moluccan diaspora in The Netherlands. We were told of a Christian church in Korea that had provided some support to a church in North Maluku. Perhaps this reflected the fact that the North Maluku story did not find its way into the Western media in the way Ambon did. Many Christians also spoke highly of the peacebuilding work and support for refugees of USAID. The UNDP also played a positive role in the early post-conflict period with rebuilding infrastructure, programs to help resettle refugees and sporting activities to increase interaction across communities formerly in conflict. Since 2005, the emphasis under the UNDP Peace Through Development Program has shifted to capacity building for NGOs (to address one of the weaknesses identified above), capacity building for government (another capacity weakness), building livelihoods through assistance with farming equipment, fisheries and the like, and building social integration and social capital through more bottom-up planning via the Musrenbang. Musrenbang is as multi-stakeholder consultation
forum for development planning, whereby development planning and setting budget priorities should occur first at the village level, then at the subdistrict, then the district, then the province level, and should be participatory at each stage. The ideal is to integrate from the top down with bottom-up planning. This potentially exciting program had only begun to get down to village level at the time of our 2007 fieldwork and would not start in all villages until 2008 (USAID 2008).

While student organisations dominated by Makians were significant irritants of conflict, asking for and receiving payment from politicians to organise protests, North Maluku did not have the problem that Maluku had and still has of youth groups morphing into organised crime groups.

Contests of principles

Like the war, peacebuilding in North Maluku was pragmatic and not deeply infused with animating principles. Jihad and ‘onward Christian soldiers’ were certainly principles of holy war, though hardly experienced with the fervour Laskar Jihad and JI delivered to the conflicts in Maluku and Poso. Localism was perhaps a master principle. In a particular locality, people tended to believe that people in that area had always got on well together. What caused division was politics that came from Jakarta or for central control of the new province or, most commonly of all, religious extremists who came from Ambon, transplanting their southern conflicts in the north. Locals did not want to lean on Jakarta or Ternate for building their local peace; they wanted their trusted local leaders to lead their local peace process.

Towards a conclusion for North Maluku

Fighting in North Maluku was at first between two ethnic groups—the Kao and Makians—over a change in subdistrict boundaries and over a marginalised group (the Kao) feeling it was discriminated against by the government. There were elements of opportunistic grabs for power during a period of anomie that unsettled the opportunity structure and elements of legitimate opportunities being closed (in a Mertonian sense). The most important of these was that the Kao felt there was no opportunity for them to be heard.

In time, conflict erupted across the fault lines of a number of more enduring ethnic divides, such as between Tidorese and Ternateans, between the Ternatean ethnic traditionalism of North Ternate and the multicultural Muslim modernism of South Ternate, and many other ethnic tensions and land disputes that might or might not have been connected to ethnicity in different parts of the province. There was conflict between the military and the stirrings of democracy among the people, between the police and the military, between
the sultan’s palace guards and people who felt they had been threatened or tortured by them because of their political opposition to the sultan. There was levelling rioting directed by disparate mobs at the Chinese business community. There was conflict between Golkar (whose office was burnt down) and PPP (and other parties). There were rioting university students and other youth who believed in democracy/reformasi railing against what they saw as a feudal order harnessed by Golkar and epitomised by the sultan. There was the movement for a jihadist Islamic turn that expanded throughout Indonesia in the 1990s versus local syncretic Islam that incorporated magical adat beliefs—again, epitomised by a sultan whose magical powers supposedly could protect the community from their volcano.

At the individual level, there were people who joined the conflict to settle scores on any number of idiosyncratic humiliations or slights that someone on the other side had inflicted on them. There were some who became highly motivated for more ‘rational’ reasons, such as the desire for a good job at a goldmine or a ‘honorarium’ from its managers. There is increasing evidence from the literature on modern conflict that fights that start for even the most noble ideal attract psychopaths to the front line who enjoy rape, torture and mutilation (for example, Collier 2007:29–30). Especially on the Christian side, a progressive yet rapid shift from capture of the conflict by a sometimes ethical idealism of pastors to capture by psychopaths is all too evident in this conflict. This is not to deny that a great deal, even most, of the human rights abuses are ‘good people doing bad things’; it is just to say that psychopaths join conflicts and over time increasing numbers of traumatised and vengeful fighters model psychopathic scripts rather than follow the ethical compass that launched their struggle. A special contribution of Wilson’s (2006) work is to show the importance of also seeing the conflict as an opportunity to test youthful masculinities. John Braithwaite too saw the evidence of excitement attracting young men with makeshift weapons onto the street. Alcohol was often part of that motivational cocktail. Perhaps the most common motive of all for fighting involved none of the above. It was mature adults who thought that the young had lost their senses, that the world had gone mad. Nevertheless, when the invaders arrived to try to burn their homes and threaten their children, they grabbed their machetes and organised to defend them. That was a difference between what happened on the streets of Ternate, which was almost totally the work of young males, and what happened in so much of Halmahera and other islands, where every single male in the village became a fighter, plus large numbers of the strongest women who were not preoccupied with sheltering the very old and very young.

Finally, there was the master narrative of the conflict: Christianity versus Islam. There is certainly insight in Christopher Duncan (2005a) applying Stanley
Tambiah’s notions of focalisation and transvaluation to this master narrative. Focalisation progressively denudes understandings of local conflicts of their contextual particulars; transvaluation then ‘distorts, abstracts and aggregates those incidents into larger collective issues’ (Tambiah 1996:81). In this case, aggregation is to an increasingly shared understanding that the conflict is about Islamisation versus Christianisation. This insight, however, is itself too focalising. The detailed narrative of the conflict we have sought to provide shows that disaggregation dynamics persist alongside the aggregation dynamics of the master narrative. For example, rioting aimed at shutting down the goldmine is there, reinvigorated, at the death, as is conflict over the particularities of how the boundaries for Makian-Malifut include and exclude this village versus that. When it suited their purposes, even the propagandists of the master narrative dabbled more than a little in alternative transvaluations and particularisations, such as that this was a conflict to defeat separatists, to defend the unitary state of Indonesia, that it was a conflict caused by provocateurs from Ambon and not really by the folk they were killing.

Why this point matters is that there is too much impulse to aggregate within the study of armed conflict, especially from the dominant disciplines in the field: political science, international relations and international law. So the master narrative of what needs to be done must be somehow about the state for the political scientist and about international diplomacy or international law for the other two disciplines. Let’s take the example of the diplomacy that is needed. For two decades, international relations has taken a promising turn towards preventive diplomacy: what do foreign ministers need to do to prevent conflict before it begins, to shift some energy away from the diplomacy of crisis management when it is too late (Evans 1993)? The multiplicity of the schisms that impelled killing in North Maluku points to a need for a preventive diplomacy that is radically disaggregated and local. There was not much the Foreign Minister of Indonesia or the US Secretary of State could have done to prevent this war in early 1999. There was, however, valuable preventive diplomacy the Australian goldminer Newcrest might have done. It had staff on the ground among the Kao and the Makians of Malifut. It had the clout with district political leaders to be a catalyst of the preventive reconciliation based on honest dialogue and equitable treatment for the Kao that almost everyone can see now was needed at that point. It had a commercial interest in that preventive diplomacy, but lacked the diplomatic imagination to undertake it. The fact that the mine could be a catalyst of peace was demonstrated by the fact that it enrolled (Latour 1986, 1987) the police and military to work together with an effectiveness they had not manifested at any earlier point in the conflict to prevent a Malifut conflagration in early 2000. The mine-induced
island of civility at Weba Bay also confirms the capability that the Australian and Canadian mines on Halmahera are able to lever for local peace when the chips are down.

Our narrative showed that even at the point when the conflict was white hot, the preventive diplomacy of local wise men did prevent a dreadful situation from getting much worse. An example was the leadership of the chairman of the ulamas’ council (MUI) and the Mayor of Ternate in causing the Muslim mob to pause, then persuading them that torching the Chinese businesses in the heart of the capital would be an economic-development disaster for the new province and for their future job prospects. There are in fact dozens of stories of preventive diplomacy—by the governor, by village adat leaders, religious leaders, local military and police officers on the ground, by the Sultan of Tidore, and, yes, by most commentators’ villain, the Sultan of Ternate. Military commanders and sultans have multiple selves just as there are multiple sides of the conflict. Soldiers and sultans alike have war-making selves and peacemaking selves. The trick of local peacemaking diplomacy could be to get them to put their best self forward more of the time. This is a local enterprise requiring local knowledge and contextual wisdom. That is why foreign ministers are not competent to do this kind of preventive diplomacy. Nevertheless, there is an international role here that is well illustrated by the ambitions of the UNDP’s Peace Through Development Program in North Maluku. It seeks to strengthen leadership for peace from the lowest level of the village to the subdistrict level of government to district and provincial government. It also seeks to build NGO capacity, which our research finds to be a capability that is especially weak, particularly in empowering women’s voices for peace in this province. We have not studied the UNDP program enough to know how well executed it has proved to date, but our analysis does lead to the conclusion that it is well conceived and strategically connected to an understanding of the many fissures and injustices that have contributed to the conflict. An obscure reconciliation over a village boundary or over a church that encroaches onto land that traditionally belongs to Muslim farmers is the sort of micro-issue that needs to be constantly worked at in poor communities because it might spark the next conflict or inflame and spread it. This is about building positive peace through reconciliation, justice and development throughout all the minutiae and sinews that shape feelings of injustice in ordinary lives.

That is why community policing is a front line of preventive diplomacy for peace when it is responsive to even the most ridiculous minutiae that aggravate in the social order of village societies—the cow that wanders where it should not. Again, international donors have a role here: they need to stop current practices of security sector reform that train developing-country police in Western paramilitary models of urban policing that are myopically concentrated...
on crime control (Dinnen and Braithwaite 2009). This pluralised way of seeing the narratives of ‘small town wars’ (van Klinken 2007) is also why we have the hypothesis that the global movement for restorative justice has a role to play in sensitising people in schools and villages throughout the world to reconciliatory competence (Braithwaite 2002). The idea that ten-year-olds can learn how to deal with episodes of school bullying, and through that learn how to be democratic in a way that equips them as adult peacemakers, is a different frame for peacebuilding than is found in international relations journals. Hard-headed international relations realists might see it as a frame for the soft-headed. That is a matter for evidence in the decades ahead, as we have said to hard-headed police and criminologists who thought restorative justice a romantic approach to reducing crime. Perhaps it is only a tiny part of the fabric of peacebuilding the world needs, but it is at least a thread that does not depend on a fallacy of misplaced aggregation. This leads to the methodological point of our hope that our Peacebuilding Compared method can simultaneously ask ‘what’s the big story here’ and ‘what are some of the little stories’ to help us see both with greater clarity.

Conflict in North Maluku provides a good illustration of why the ambition of the Peacebuilding Compared project might make some sense. Traditional quantitative research on the causes of civil war tends to code civil wars in terms of their master narrative. West Papua will be coded as a separatist war (Chapter 2), Kalimantan (Chapter 5) as an ethnic conflict (Dayaks versus Madurese) and North Maluku as a religious civil war. While the Peacebuilding Compared coding still essentialises the conflict, at least we code North Maluku ‘yes’ to religious conflict and ‘yes’ to ethnic conflict, and we code many, many other things as well in a manner enabled by a methodology that is more qualitatively fine grained than the international comparative methods of the quantitative political scientists, though less fine grained than the work of the best regional specialists from whom we try to learn as we move on to our next case. We code ‘no’ to separatist conflict for North Maluku because separatism is a motive imputed by leaders of the white forces to the red forces, when the red forces did not in fact hold to that motive.

**A danger in interpreting both Maluku cases**

We are in the era of security sector reform in UN and international engagement with armed conflict. While the security forces behaved in very different ways in Maluku and North Maluku, they were both conflicts that could have been prevented had the security forces performed well. They were conflicts that did end when the security forces began to do their job. Wilkinson (2004:5) could be right that ‘[a]bundant comparative evidence shows that large-scale ethnic rioting does not take place where a state’s army or police force is ordered to stop
it using all means necessary’. Does this mean that our friends in the police and the military could be justified in concluding that if only reform and resources were focused on security sector reform, effectiveness in preventing conflict might be maximised? A second strand of this argument is that there are always ethnic and religious conflicts and there is always racism, prejudice and hatred under the surface in every society. Ethnic fractionalisation is not even a strong predictor of conflict in quantitative studies (Collier 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003).\(^{19}\) You cannot stop war by eliminating ethnic and religious divides, but you can prevent ethnic/religious riots from ever escalating into wars by making your security sector work.

One problem with this prescription is that—as these two cases have plentifully illustrated—there are many reasons why the security sector fails to do its job. As Wilson (2008:188–9) argued, in the case of North Maluku, the actions of military personnel and commanders varied from place to place and over time. Sometimes personnel fail to stop violence because they want to support the winner and they really don’t know which side is going to win (yellow or white in the pitched battle for Ternate). Sometimes they move to the side to allow civilians to be slaughtered because their commander has taken a bribe to look away. Sometimes they do so because the attacking forces are huge and they fear for their own safety. Sometimes rank-and-file soldiers join one side because of their own faith in what they see as that moment of millennial showdown between good and evil. Sometimes they fail to do their job because they are annoyed about being hungry and not getting their pay. Sometimes conflict between different factions within the security sector paralyses it. Sometimes they fail to protect civilians on one side because the political elite gives them clear signals that they want this to end by the other side prevailing. Sometimes they fail to do their job because they want chaos on the streets to destabilise a government that they see as hostile to the military. Sometimes they manage these tensions by delegating security to a militia, and then the militia gets out of hand to the point where they can no longer control it. Between them, the Moluccas includes elements of every one of these, mostly highly anomic, things happening.

Because empirically there are many reasons why security forces fail under pressure, it is best we limit the frequency with which they have to face down mobs throwing bombs. Western security forces look good in terms of their capacity to maintain domestic order only because they have never tried to stop a phalanx of 5000 angry people carrying machetes and hurling the odd bomb.

\(^{19}\) Though state-led discrimination is a good quantitative predictor (Goldstone 2008) and Collier (2007) himself concludes that civil war is more likely in conditions of ‘ethnic dominance’, defined as societies with one group large enough to form a majority of the population, but where other groups are still significant.
They look good because they are rarely put under serious pressure domestically, but when armed civilians in places such as Iraq and Vietnam put them under serious pressure, we see them differently.

In the case of North Maluku, we have argued that preventive diplomacy could have saved the security forces from being put to the test in the aftermath of the initial attack by the Makians on two Kao villages. The argument is, why rely on a fallible last line of defence when earlier lines of social defence are available? James Reason (1990) is the pre-eminent theorist of this way of thinking about risk. Redundant defence will not work if it has just any old strings to its bow. Very different kinds of strings are needed to cover the weak spots of one intervention with the strengths of another. Reason (1990) developed the Swiss-cheese model (Figure 3.1) in application to domains such as aircraft accident prevention. A multitude of different types of controls is needed to cover weak spots of one barrier with other barriers that have their weak spots in other places. Covering a pilot with a co-pilot, or a computer with a back-up computer, might be less effective than covering a pilot with a computer and a computer with a co-pilot. Two pilots flying over snow can both suffer the same white-out; two computers can be simultaneously attacked by the same virus.

**Figure 3.1 Swiss-cheese model of risk prevention**

Societies should therefore invest in resolving root causes of conflict such as discrimination against an ethnic group, as well as proximate causes, and in addition they need effective community policing that smothers sparks that could ignite conflicts. As a last resort, they need the capability to halt riots and out-gun rampaging militias. The theory is that societies that are strong at all these capabilities are unlikely to experience civil war.
Even if it were true that security sector reform could patch all the holes and cracks in the security sector so it never failed, criminologists point to another reason why a social problem such as systematic discrimination against an ethnic minority requires a remedy. It is unthinkable that African-Americans could mount a civil war against their white majority, or Aboriginal against white Australians. When they do riot—as happened in Los Angeles and other cities in the 1960s and after the Rodney King incident in 1991—the capabilities of the security forces are so overwhelming that escalation to civil war does not occur. Urban riots are a tiny cost of structural inequality and discrimination in violence compared with a continuing high crime rate (Braithwaite 1979). Indeed, Australia probably bears a bigger continuing cost in violence, especially domestic violence, murder and sexual assault (especially of children), as a result of its racial discrimination than the one-off cost of the 1999–2000 violence in North Maluku.20 Where resistance through warfare is not an option for an oppressed group, disengagement becomes the problem—disengagement from the oppressed people’s own traditions, from education, from employment and entrepreneurship, even from care and responsibility for children. Because the Moluccas are better societies than Australia in the sense that minorities such as the Christians in North Maluku suffer nothing like the structural inequality of the economic gap between Aboriginal and white Australians,21 Indonesia’s costs of discrimination in continuing disengagement and personalised violent defiance are much less. The streets of Ternate are so much safer today than those of towns in central Australia or of South Central Los Angeles. The kind of structural factors, proximate factors and ignition points analysed in the Peacebuilding Compared project might be seen as warning signs of disengagement from the social order that can disrupt domestic peace, as well as warnings of resistant defiance that might lead to riots and warfare to overturn the social order. Perhaps Australia has a more profound need for the UNDP’s Peace Through Development Program than the Moluccas.

20 The Australian Aboriginal population has numbers not much greater than the Christian minority in North Maluku. Of course, the violence that results from racial inequality in Australia is much less in any one year than happened in North Maluku in 1999–2000. That is, however, the point: the costs accrue every single year.
21 This was not always so. Papuan slaves were widespread in the Moluccas before colonialism and early colonial plantation agriculture increased slavery.
Appendix 3.1

Table A3.1 Summary of some codes, North Maluku: 650 other variables are coded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural factors at root of conflict</th>
<th>Is this a ‘consensus’ factor among analysts or ‘contested but credible’ as a possible factor?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonialism of long duration stunts institutions</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate opportunities for Kao to influence government (through legislature, executive, courts) are blocked</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High proportion of jobs are in urban public sector, fostering competition to control patronage (van Klinken 2007)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcanic eruption leads to transmigration/immigration</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disputed boundaries and the control of a ‘resource curse’; a goldmine</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proximate factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian financial crisis exacerbates competition for scare legitimate opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of New Order opens power allocations and the institutional order to competition (Bertrand 2004), especially a successor to Golkar for control of the new province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political decentralisation increases boundary disputes and patronage opportunities, further increasing politico-religious competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military and police disengage from conflict rather than control it when it breaks out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security vacuum fuels a security dilemma, driving both communities into the hands of militias for protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key triggering incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Makians attack two Kao villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor fights and stone-throwing in public space’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck of armed Christians to guard church misinterpreted as mobilisation for attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘Bloody Sosol’ letter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key war-making actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Malukan politicians gaming subdistrict boundaries and playing the religious card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow, white, red and Kao militia leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village-level leaders responding to security dilemma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychopaths who capture many local conflicts, flipping ideals of pacification and respectful treatment of the other into mutilation and desecration of the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people, sometimes affected by alcohol, seeking excitement; youthful masculinities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key peacemaking actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interim Governor Surasmin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some bupatis & Consensus
Many village leaders and adat leaders & Consensus
Peace journalists & Consensus

**Peacebuilding strengths**

- Village-level welcoming of IDP return; village-level humanitarian and reconstruction help and reconciliation through natural rituals such as funerals & Consensus
- UNDP Peace Through Development Program & Contested but credible
- Comparatively rapid return, reintegration and rebuilding for most IDPs & Contested but credible
- Peace journalism & Contested but credible
- Security forces separate combatants who are weary of fighting & Contested but credible
- Local dialogue and reconciliation using adat; normal rituals of everyday life; mutual humanitarian and reconstruction help & Consensus
- Weda Bay island of civility & Consensus

**Peacebuilding weaknesses**

- Military and police disengagement and game playing until mid-2000 & Consensus
- Thin international and national engagement with peacebuilding & Consensus
- Thin NGO engagement with peacebuilding & Consensus
- Reconciliation but no truth & Consensus
- Top-to-bottom impunity for war criminals & Consensus
- Marginalisation of women in peacebuilding & Consensus
- Limited access to trauma counselling & Consensus

**Key contested principles of peacebuilding**

- Holy war versus holy peace & Contested but credible
- Localism; village-up triumphs over metropole-down & Consensus
Anomie and Violence

Table A3.2 Numbers and types of people interviewed, Maluku and North Maluku

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected official, legislator/MPR/bupati</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leader of oppositional group</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatant</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adat/indigenous/village leader</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leader</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s NGO</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental NGO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development NGO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights/peacebuilding NGO</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NGO</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business leader</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student/youth leader</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Other</td>
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4. Central Sulawesi

The conflict in Central Sulawesi was complex, with different dynamics unfolding at different stages. First, there were escalating riots without guns, then villages were attacked by militias joined by large crowds with homemade guns, followed by a phase of bombings and targeted assassinations. Motivations shifted from local political ambitions to revenge being predominant. This meant that indigenous traditions of reconciliation (*maroso*)—like *pela-gandong* in Maluku and *hibua lamo* in Halmahera—had a role in healing and stopping the flow of blood. On the other hand, what was seen as unjust or unbalanced punishment for the violence by the criminal courts increased challenges for the peacemakers. That said, policing networked with persuasion by religious leaders, a form of consociational transitional power sharing and bottom-up opportunities for economic development were all part of a sophisticated peacebuilding package. Anomie and anger, political opportunism and pillage gave way to *gotong royong*, *maroso* and Muslim–Christian political collaboration. ‘Terrorists’ were redefined as ‘ex-combatants’ entitled to reintegration support. The case illustrates how conditions of anomie lead to what we call ‘revenge conflicts’ and then bottom-up reconciliation becomes vital to peace.

Background to the conflict

The island of Sulawesi was integrated into international trading networks much later than Maluku and North Maluku. Islam spread after 1605 from the South Sulawesi kingdom of Makassar. Christianity spread down from the northern centre of Manado. The more peripheral region of Central Sulawesi, under a ferment of these southern and northern influences, came to be a mixed Muslim–Christian population (only 16 per cent Christian) (Brown et al. 2005:9), equally divided at the end of the New Order in Poso District, where most conflict occurred.

Substantial diffusion of Islam and Christianity to the centre of the island did not occur until the nineteenth century or later. Coastal people tended to be Muslim, influenced by Muslim sea traders, while mountain folk tended to persist in animist beliefs until Dutch Protestant missionaries arrived from the late nineteenth century. After a bloody pacification campaign in 1905, a large part of the highlands decided as a block to commit to the religion of

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1 Thanks to Anjar Kusama Soebari for initial leads to get our interviews moving. Dave McRae generously gave us access to his PhD thesis before it was published; this was helpful as the most detailed piece of work completed on this conflict. Dave McRae and Sidney Jones also provided extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of the working paper for this chapter, though they bear no responsibility for its deficiencies.
the Dutch (van Klinken 2007:73). Portugal was the first colonial power to visit Sulawesi, followed by the Dutch and English. Dutch power on Sulawesi became uncontested during the seventeenth century, though apart from moments of pacification and the continuing work of Protestant missionaries, in only limited ways did it shape the economic and political lives of people at the periphery that was the district of Poso.

Central Sulawesi is atypical in Indonesia for being the site of a succession of small-scale Muslim–Christian conflicts during the past half-century. At first, this was caused by Muslim radicalism moving up from South Sulawesi, then by Christian-led separatism moving down into Central from North Sulawesi. The Darul Islam rebellion for an Islamic state in opposition to the Republic of Indonesia (1952–65) was led from South Sulawesi in loose alliance with the Darul Islam movements in West Java and Aceh. Darul Islam was a militarised social movement opposed to the multi-religious republic that Indonesia became. It expanded its influence northwards in part by driving out Christians from the mountains of Central Sulawesi. Permesta was a competing Christian-dominated secession movement from 1957 to 1961 in North Sulawesi. Permesta at times engaged Darul Islam in battle and at other times fought against the Indonesian military. Permesta and Darul Islam even had a period when they fought together against the military for regional autonomy. There were many cleavages in the fighting—Muslim–Muslim as well as Christian–Christian. Locals describe this as the time of gangs (Aragon 2001:52). This meant that not only was there a legacy of Muslim–Christian distrust, there was distrust across other inter-village fault lines. Christians in the Poso Lake region were originally pleased to have Christian Permesta forces drive out Darul Islam, but when Permesta militias mistreated locals, a highlands militia called the Youth Movement of Central Sulawesi (Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah, GPST) was formed to drive them out.

Occasional but minor outbreaks of Christian–Muslim violence were iteratively part of the landscape of Suharto’s New Order in Central Sulawesi between 1965 and 1998 (see, for example, Aragon 2000:316). Between 1988 and 1998, there were a number of Muslim–Christian clashes and fights with local and migrant Muslims in the provincial capital, Palu, in Poso and transmigration sites (Harwell 2000:204; HRW 2002:6; Tomagola 2003:1). A Palu resident said of conditions before the major outbreak of post-New Order violence on 24 December 1998 that ‘[t]here was no smoke yet, but there were embers’ (HRW 2002:6). Veitch (2007:122) argues that

the history of Muslim activism in South Sulawesi continues to influence what happens in the region through movements such as the KPSI (Komite Penegakan Syari’at Islam [Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law]) and its militant wing Laskar Jundallah. The crisis in Poso and
Tentena owed as much to the activities of this group and its allies such as Laskar Jihad as it did to long-standing religious tensions between Muslim and Christian and the earlier influence of Darul Islam. While the violence in Central Sulawesi caused considerably less loss of life than our previous case in North Maluku, it was a higher-profile case because it had that prehistory since the 1950s of Christian–Muslim violence, and because it started earlier than North Maluku, persisting as a serious problem until 2007. Moreover, because it persisted for so long after 11 September 2001, and because Central Sulawesi was for part of that period a significant training centre for mostly local, but some international jihadists, it attracted concern from the United States and other Western powers. Like Maluku, and unlike North Maluku, in Central Sulawesi, Laskar Jihad landed in significant numbers from Java to level Christian churches and villages. Laskar Jihad’s numbers were not as large as in Maluku, however, and other jihadist groups did most of the fighting on the Muslim side. Also like Maluku, here, most outside jihadists returned to their villages in Java and elsewhere when religious, adat and political leaders—Javanese and local—pleaded for this. In some cases, religious leaders flew in to Poso to do so (Police interviews). A rump of hardliners, however, stayed and continued to execute regular bombings (almost every day in the final months of 2006, according to one police intelligence officer; somewhat less frequently than this according to local journalists) until January 2007. In 2004, a stash of no fewer than 123 homemade bombs was discovered—perhaps evidence of preparation for this escalation (Sangadji 2004b).

Migration

By the 1990s, government transmigration programs to move people from overpopulated parts of Indonesia, plus voluntary immigration, saw many of the key niches in Central Sulawesi’s poor economy become dominated by immigrants, especially Bugis (from South Sulawesi) and Chinese, but also immigrants from North Sulawesi and Arabs. As in Ambon, in Sulawesi, the Dutch had favoured Christians for employment in the colonial civil service; however, especially after Suharto steered Indonesia towards its Islamic turn in the 1990s, Christians in Poso looked on with concern as Muslims eroded the advantages they had enjoyed in education and government jobs.

At the time the conflict started, Poso District had the highest proportion of migrants of any district in Central Sulawesi (van Klinken 2007:73) and the migrant share in the population of Central Sulawesi was 18 per cent compared with 10 per cent nationally (Brown et al. 2005:26). Until the late 1990s, Poso District had a majority Protestant population, but by 2002, Protestants were down to 40 per cent (Brown et al. 2005:26). Because almost all the migrants were
Muslim, migrant–indigenous conflict over land, jobs and other resources could be, and was, interpreted as religious conflict. As in North Maluku (Chapter 3), in Central Sulawesi, while migrants, especially transmigrants, relied on Indonesian state land law to argue that the land on which the state wanted them to settle became theirs, locals saw ownership in terms of indigenous land law and custom. An example of how disputes arose was when transmigrants were settled on agricultural land that indigenous farmers had temporarily left fallow. Land conflict was mostly about expansionary entrepreneurial migrant cash-croppers encroaching on indigenous subsistence cultivation. Migrant logging entrepreneurialism on indigenous land was another tension. McRae (2008:81) concluded that religion became the primary cleavage in the conflict but that in the third, most bloody phase of the conflict in May–June 2000 indigene–settler resentment was also significant. The ethnic Pamona graffiti ‘Pamona Poso my birth land, indigenous people of Poso unite’ illustrates this. As in Maluku and North Maluku, here, Pamona combatants at times headed towards battles singing *Onward Christian Soldiers*.

**Political uncertainty**

The end of Suharto’s New Order meant potentially a particularly big change in a province such as Central Sulawesi that had always been viewed as politically unstable. It had been ruled at senior and intermediate levels of governance with top-down tightness by dependable military appointments. The violence erupted in Central Sulawesi during an extended period when it was unclear what form the new democracy promised by *reformasi* would take at the provincial and district levels. ‘Everyone knew that the rules had changed, but no-one knew precisely what the new rules were.’ Such a context ‘radically skewed the “opportunity structure” in favour of political entrepreneurs not averse to risk-taking’ (van Klinken 2007:74).

The view of the head of police intelligence was that political uncertainty was not only a matter of what the new rules were. There was uncertainty about how very settled rules of criminal law would be enforced in practice. Early and late in the conflict, in his view, there were key political leaders who were the subject of major investigations for massive embezzlement of government funds. It suited them to politicise the criminal justice process, to be able to argue that Christian provocateurs were trying to set them up because they were standing up for the political rights of Muslims.

As a result of the strong traditions of military rule of the province, political party organisation—indeed any kind of political organisation—was stunted. The most mature and influential organisations available to be harnessed by political aspirants, or simply to be networking sites for them, were religious—as was true
of small-town social organisation throughout Indonesia (van Klinken 2007:77). The political aspirants who enrolled religious organisations in their projects were themselves enrolled by competing business interests in Poso town. The dominant powerbrokers here were on the one hand Chinese Christian merchants and on the other Bugis Muslim businessmen. They funded political champions who they hoped would deliver them privileged access to government contracts.

**Describing the conflict**

**Major fighting begins**

The triggering incident occurred on Christmas Eve 1998, which fell that year in the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. A riot in Poso town developed from an incident in which a Protestant youth stabbed a young Muslim in the arm. The incident came to be given a religious meaning. Because alcohol was involved, Christian and Muslim leaders agreed to ban alcohol during Ramadan. Police started to seize liquor to enforce this, but trouble escalated from Muslim vigilante actions against Christian Chinese shops alleged to be selling alcohol. On 27 December 1998, Herman Parimo, a district assembly member, trucked his GPST Christian youth militia from Tentena into Poso town (Brown et al. 2005:13–14). Hundreds of Muslim youth, many of whom had also been trucked in, clashed with them. Two hundred people (mostly Protestants) were injured in a week of rioting and looting and 400 Protestant and Catholic homes and some Muslim ones burned, as well as some Christian stores, according to Brown et al. (2005:14). McRae (2008:3) has the lower estimate of 80 injured. One man was doused with petrol and set alight (McRae 2008:46). There was torture, dragging people by rope from a vehicle and many terrifying incidents, but no-one was killed. Parimo and seven other Protestants, but no Muslims, were imprisoned. Parimo’s sentence was 15 years. Naturally, in circumstances in which most of the victims were Protestants, feelings of injustice and anger welled up in the Protestant community. Major General Marasabessy, who announced these arrests on 30 December 1998, was a national player with a keen eye to the Islamisation of politics occurring in this period and a close ally of General Wiranto.

Muslims believed that Parimo was a politician playing the religious card in the lead-up to an election. Parimo was aggrieved that a Protestant colleague, Yahya Patiro, did not appear likely to be nominated for *bupati* of Poso District. During the New Order there had been conventions about Christian and Muslim turn taking and a balance of roughly equal numbers of Muslims and Christians in
top positions in Poso district government. To Christians such as Parimo, non-succession of Patiro from number two to number one, with the retirement of a Muslim *bupati*, would bode a breakdown of balance and a Muslim grab for political power in the unsettled conditions after the fall of Suharto’s New Order. McRae (2008:64) concludes that ‘[w]hile we cannot discount a simple political miscalculation on his part, I would suggest that we can better explain Parimo’s actions as motivated by a sense of indignant anger at a perceived affront rather than by any expectation of political gain’. Banners posted around Poso after the riot vilified Patiro. He fled town and when he tried to return to salvage his reputation and future political aspirations he was driven out by a mob. ‘By this stage, political aspirants in Poso must have thought violence to be a most useful tool’ (McRae 2008:52). Notwithstanding unresolved tension over the politics and the justice of the law enforcement, the June 1999 elections for the district legislature were held without violence. A Muslim who at least had not been a protagonist in the violence became *bupati*, but the compromise candidate left the Muslim and Christian political factions and their business patronage networks dissatisfied, nay furious.

Another fight occurred on 15 April 2000, another alleged stabbing of a Muslim youth by a young Protestant and a second wave of major rioting in the aftermath. Escalation included groups of youths firing arrows at each other. This lasted until 3 May. Muslim youths roamed Poso town in search of young Protestants, burning 130 houses (many of them rebuilt after the 1998 riot), shops, two churches and three schools (McRae 2008:59) and chasing the Protestant and Chinese communities into the hills. Muslim lobbyists had warned the governor—a warning repeated in the Palu daily newspaper—that if he did not appoint the man who had been their preference for the position of *bupati*, Damsyik Ladjalani, to the number-two position (district secretary) in Poso, rioting would break out again. It was when the governor appointed an apolitical Muslim bureaucrat that the promised rioting did break out (van Klinken 2007:82).

The vacillating response of the security forces allowed such a level of escalation to occur. A Brimob riot-control unit arrived quickly from the nearby capital of Palu, but in the process of attempting to secure order they shot and killed three Muslims, incensing their community, causing attacks on the homes of police officers and a police station. Pressure on the governor from the dominant Muslim political elites resulted in the Brimob unit being withdrawn to Palu. It was after this withdrawal that the arson and violence really got out of hand.

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2 Vice-President Kalla argued in 2007 that the Poso conflict was caused by unsettling the political balance of a Christian regent complemented by a Muslim deputy and vice versa: ‘In that case, there was harmony, but when democracy set in, suddenly, the winner decided to take all’ (Suwarni 2007).

3 The Muslim youth was later convicted for provoking violence by pretending to have been stabbed when he was not (McRae 2008:61).
Again, Christian and Muslim fighters brandishing machetes were trucked into Poso town for the fray. Finally, 600 soldiers arrived from South Sulawesi and restored a temporary order by 3 May 2000. There were, however, some further outbursts of Muslim-dominated violence and further limited law enforcement that Christians felt granted impunity to Muslims. Agfar Patanga, who was regarded by Christians as the main Muslim provocateur, was arrested well before the April 2000 violence and subsequently sentenced to a short prison term; however, he never served the prison time. His release was one of the demands of Muslim leaders at the same time the call had been made for the Brimob withdrawal (Sidel 2006:163). Fighting escalated when these demands were initially rebuffed, though in this wave of the fighting not many more than 10 (mostly Protestants) were killed (Sidel 2006:163). The scene had been set for Christian vigilantism to replace public justice with private revenge.

What seemed the inevitable Christian retaliation of the third wave of the conflict came on 23 May 2000. ‘Many Christians describe the May–June violence as “revenge” (pembalasan) for the earlier attacks on Christians, but it is also common for them to describe it as “defending our territory” (mempertahankan kita punya wilayah)’ (McRae 2007:84). For a month, Christian militia had been training at a camp in the highlands with assistance from retired military officers (Aragon 2001:70). About a dozen Christian ‘ninjas’ cloaked in black planned to target Muslims they believed were responsible for the recent violence. While the attacks were bungled and foiled, three Muslims were killed in the process. In the following weeks, there were counterattacks by Muslims, but most of the violence was organised by various Christian militias against Muslims. This time it was not restricted to Poso town, spreading to villages across the district and continuing into July 2000. Between 300 and 800 people died—mostly Muslims, according to Brown et al. (2005:15) and Aragon (2001:47). By July 2000, Poso was virtually empty, a ‘dead city’ (Aragon 2001:47). There were many atrocities committed by the Christians, including cases of Muslim men who surrendered being killed and women sexually assaulted (HRW 2002:17). The fighting was finally quelled with an additional 1500 soldiers, complete with 10 tanks and elite Brimob units from Java. By this stage, Laskar Jundullah from South Sulawesi was actively involved in the fighting (Veitch 2007:130). The successor to Parimo as the Christian militia commander was his brother-in-law, Al Lateka. He was shot dead on 2 June 2000 (McRae 2008:113). Tungkanan, a retired military officer, was his replacement, with Fabianus Tibo one deputy. Tibo was later arrested and sentenced to death with two colleagues for his alleged role in, among other crimes, the murder on 28 May 2000 of 80 or more unarmed Muslims who were sheltering in the grounds of a boarding school—an atrocity that attracted national publicity (van Klinken 2007:83). In July 2000, 124 Christians suspected of Christian militia violence were arrested (Aragon 2001:70).
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Mujahidin Kompak sent some trainers to Poso after June 2000 and an Al-Qaeda organiser from Spain in October (van Klinken 2007:84; ICG 2005b). In addition to at least five local Muslim militias, by 2001, other imported militias included Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Wahdah Islamiyah, Laskar Bulan Sabit Merah and Laskar Khalid bin Walid (ICG 2005b:11). Because Laskar Jihad was better at national self-promotion than the other groups, much popular commentary on Poso gave Laskar Jihad more of the credit for the chaos than it deserved. Mujahidin Kompak referred to them as ‘Mujahidin Pilox’ (spray-paint warriors) because they would allegedly bring up the rear in fighting carrying spray cans to write ‘Laskar Jihad Poso’ on the ruins of buildings others had captured (ICG 2005b:14). Laskar Jundullah was the largest importer of outside fighters into the conflict, contributing 2000, according to Conboy (2006:100)—a number that was probably too high.

Pause, resumption, pause, resumption

During August 2000, there were very ineffective top-down reconciliation efforts by the governors of the three Sulawesi provinces that gave inadequate assurances to IDPs that they could return to their homes in safety. There was an adat peace ceremony attended by President Wahid that included the burying of a buffalo head to signify burying the enmity. Some jeered during the ceremony (McRae 2008:120). Nationally, JI was still seeking to rekindle a climate of religious war. On the night of 24 December, 38 JI bombs exploded in churches spread across 11 cities of Indonesia during Christmas Eve services (Conboy 2006:127).

Low-level violence continued in Poso until another escalation of the violence occurred in June 2001, further escalated with the arrival from Java of 100–150 Laskar Jihad fighters in July 2001. By this time, most of the Laskar Jihad fighters who had been in their successful Maluku campaign had left and peace had returned to North Maluku. This was the second wave of Laskar Jihad muscle-flexing that was a deep worry for President Wahid. It was destabilising of his presidency that the security forces allowed them to embark for Poso against his explicit instructions. Automatic weapons that neither side had available up to that point were introduced in the June–July 2001 escalation. Several weapons were from a police armoury in Ambon city (‘Poso weapons come from Ambon: BIN’, The Jakarta Post, 15 July 2005) and some from the southern Philippines (The Jakarta Post 2003). Laskar Jihad attempted, without success, to take over the coordination of all Muslim militias as they had done in Maluku.

4 See the previous chapter and Hasan (2006) on their genesis and recruitment. Kingsbury (2005:143) says 3000 Laskar Jihad fighters returning from Maluku arrived in Poso. HRW (2002:11) reported an estimate of 2000. Hasan (2006:218) 700, and Erik (2002) 450. Sidney Jones (Personal communication) thinks all of these estimates are too high, with Laskar Jihad never having more than a few hundred fighters on the ground at any time and Laskar Jundullah having more imported fighters, but never as many as 1000.
The chaotic diaspora of jihadist militias got the better of Christian fighters from July 2001. Many Christian villages were overrun and burned to the ground. In this new phase of the fighting, 2400 houses were razed in 124 incidents and 141 people killed, with at least 27 missing (HRW 2002:20). As in Maluku, here the casualties in the phase July–December 2001 were fewer because Christian forces knew they stood no chance of winning against the well-armed jihadist forces and usually chose to flee rather than fight (McRae 2008:127). By the end of 2001, there was concern in Jakarta about the international repercussions of an impending full-scale Muslim assault on Christian Tentena and at the display of Osama bin Laden posters at some mujahidin checkpoints on the road to Tentena (Veitch 2007:132).

Again, there was initially political paralysis in mobilising the security forces to stop the arrival of outside mujahidin. Provincial and district leaders held meetings with them and even gave speeches welcoming the improvement Laskar Jihad might bring to security against provocateurs, and the security forces did not initially stand in the way of their marauding through Christian villages with other outside and local jihadist militias. This climate changed sharply in November 2001 when a Spanish judge concluded that there was an Al-Qaeda terrorist ‘training camp’ in Poso. By early 2002, there were 2500 police and 1600 military deployed in tiny Poso (McRae 2008:184). The commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Command then visited Indonesia specifically expressing concern about Poso and possibly showing Indonesian Intelligence Chief, Lieutenant General Hendropriyono, CIA photos of the alleged Poso training camps (van Klinken 2007:86). Sceptics suspected Indonesian opportunism to turn the tap of American military aid on again, but van Klinken (2007:86) concluded that the subsequent evidence suggested ‘there really had been such camps’ and indeed some Al-Qaeda training money could have flowed to Poso (Conboy 2006:160). A subsequent arrest in the Philippines provided some corroboration of the Spanish evidence; the Washington Post reported unidentified intelligence officials in 2002 alleging that a Poso training camp was attended by ‘two dozen Philippinos [sic] from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, several Malaysians from the Malaysian Mujaheddin Group and “scores” from the Middle East, Europe and North Africa’ (HRW 2002:13). The reality of some internationalisation of the Poso terrorist training of course does not warrant a conclusion that Al-Qaeda was in any way involved in planning the Poso conflict. It was not. It was attracted to it.

**Malino I**

The result of the Spanish revelation was that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, at that time Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, initiated a further injection of fresh troops and police and coordinated a willingness on their part to confront attacks. Weapons were to be confiscated and outsiders persuaded, or forced if
necessary, to return to their homes. A peace conference on 19–20 December 2001 paved the way for the Malino peace accord. Weapons confiscation, increased effectiveness of the security forces and war weariness created a climate for peace (Brown and Diprose 2007:9). Secret meetings of senior ministers with the most militant commanders, elite political backers and business financiers from both sides (separately) in Makassar also paved the way to Malino. At least some of the most central of the key actors in the conflict signed the agreement. Unlike the previous four failed signed peace agreements between political, adat and religious leaders since 1998, field commanders of militias from the two camps signed Malino (Jupriadi 2001; Jupriadi and Erik 2001). A most interesting development was that Jemaah Islamiyah, the highest-profile organisational supporter of terrorism in South-East Asia, and an exporter of fighters into Poso, supported the Malino agreement, ‘arguing that peace would be a better environment for mission work than war’ (van Klinken 2007:86). There was perhaps a mix of stirrings towards a non-violent change in position among many jihadist factions at this time and dissembling by others that took account of the pressures Jakarta was under from the United States. This was almost a year before the Bali bombing was inspired by the Noordin Mohammed Top/Hambali/Mukhlas faction of JI, which rejected the evolving mainstream view of the organisation that terrorist violence within Indonesia now jeopardised their capacity to proselytise. One signatory of the Malino agreement, Jono Priyandi, was imprisoned for bombing four Protestant churches in Palu within two weeks of the signing (ICG 2005b:16).

The alleged founder of Laskar Jundallah was arrested in March 2002 (Sidel 2006:213), as was the founder of Laskar Jihad in that year. Some fighters from Mujahidin Kompak (spawned by JI but organisationally distinct from it) did not return to their homes in compliance with the Malino accord. They rejected Malino because their demand for prosecution of the Christian leaders of the atrocities of May–June 2000 was not an explicit part of the agreement. They continued more sporadic attacks on Christian villages—for example, in October 2003, when 13 Christians were killed. This was also true of a small hard core of Laskar Jihad fighters who stayed behind. Most of these were split off from Laskar Jihad by JI, according to police intelligence sources. One JI and Laskar Jihad strategy was for operatives from outside the province to marry a woman who had lost a husband and/or other relatives to Christian militias. That conflict-affected family would then become a base for JI education through videos, books and religious schools. Most of the worst atrocities committed by Poso JI members since Malino have been by men who lost family members—in one prominent case, 35—before Malino. Police admitted to 19 bombing incidents in Poso in 2003 (ICG 2005b:22); there could also have been 19 shooting incidents (Sidel 2006:166) and some attacks on villages. Those wanting to reignite conflict also engaged in random ride-by hacking attacks with machetes on citizens. In
2004, there were two incidents of Christian ministers being assassinated in front of their congregations. The incident that attracted international attention was three Christian schoolgirls who were beheaded in 2005. While sadism in Poso did not reach the heights of excess of North Maluku, even in a sermon at a funeral for victims of the murder of women and children in the Buyung Katedo massacre, we saw either a pathologically sadistic reality or a pathologically sadistic imagination, or a mixture of both.5 ‘Truly Christians…have acted cruelly towards us ya Allah. They have murdered and chopped up our children, they have slit open the bellies of our women, taken out their foetuses and replaced them with young pigs’ (McRae 2008:154). In October 2006, the head of the Central Sulawesi Protestant Church was assassinated. The war had at least shifted from mass terror to more targeted, vivid and sporadic terror, though one bomb in the marketplace of Christian Tentena killed 22 people in 2005.

While a steady flow of mainly Christian death and injury did continue, it was also true that a sharp downshift in the violence occurred after Malino. In the six months after Malino, religious leaders from both sides went from village to village assuring people that Malino’s security assurances would hold and that they could hand in their weapons. Peace sermons were important. It was in the second half of 2002 that socialisation moved from leaders holding peace meetings with their own faithful to local reconciliation meetings involving Christians and Muslims. Clashes between communities mostly ended. Jihadist strategists adapted to the fact that people were fatigued by fighting (McRae 2008:229) by shifting mostly to terrorist bombings, targeted murders and random shootings. Most Laskar Jihad and other imported fighters did return home as a result of Malino, though mostly months later than agreed. After the Bali bombing in October 2002, Laskar Jihad completely disbanded. Late in 2003, 18 members of Mujahidin Kompak were arrested in connection with the October 2003 violence against Christians and in March 2007 Poso JI leader Hasanuddin was sentenced to 20 years’ prison for planning the beheading of the three Christian schoolgirls in 2005 (ICG 2007b:12).

Quite regularly, less deadly bomb attacks—many simply targeting Christian buildings—persisted until January 2007. Between the Malino accords coming into effect in 2002 and January 2007, Poso remained a kind of flickering flame for the most radical advocates for an Islamic state. It was fertile ground for them. This was because many local Muslims continued to be livid that the alleged Protestant leaders behind the violence were not convicted. From a Christian point of view, this seems perverse because until late 2003 Muslim perpetrators of violence enjoyed impunity, while many Christians went to prison. Three Christian leaders were also executed. All this was a sharp contrast with North Maluku, where all Christian (and all Muslim) leaders enjoyed amnesties when

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5 This is John Braithwaite’s interpretation rather than McRae’s (2008).
they had perpetrated much worse atrocities (Chapter 3). The difference was that Fabianus Tibo, one of the three executed Christian militia leaders, named a list of 16 prominent Christians, including senior civil servants and retired military officers, who he claimed were the real leaders behind the Christian violence of May–June 2000. It was the persistent demands for the arrest of these 16 who had been named by a Christian commander that struck a responsive chord with many grieving Muslim families.6

Extremism therefore continued to flourish, indeed grow, in Poso mid-decade, even as fatalities fell. The ICG (2008c) estimated that 200 JI religious teachers had been attracted to Poso. Police intelligence sources said to us that there was significant JI membership (not necessarily engaged with terrorism) in every subdistrict of Poso. The police believed a local crime problem had emerged of JI using robberies to support their activities. Other crimes, including murder by beheading, were conducted to create the appearance of religious crime when in fact it was probably organised crime (or murder to eliminate an insider who knew too much about political corruption) (Sangadji 2004d). Unlike other conflict areas, in Central Sulawesi, there was, however, no morphing of combatant organisations into drug-running organised crime groups. JI succeeded in reproducing a climate of intimidation and political quiescence in the Central Sulawesi Christian community. In Palu, as in Poso, in mid-2007 all the Christian churches on a Sunday still had armed security personnel at guard posts inside the church grounds. This does make a fearful context for entering a place of prayer.

The hold-outs: carrots, sticks and religious reasoning

The law enforcement tide began to turn sharply during 2006 when information gained from arrests allowed the police to compile a list of 29 jihadists responsible for much of the terror in Poso since 2003. A human rights team was dispatched to Poso to monitor the police tactics in bringing the 29 to justice—an extraordinary gesture of sensitivity to the prospect of procedural injustice reigniting violence (Tauran 2007). Violence had spiked from September 2006 when Tibo and his two Christian colleagues were finally executed after two delays prompted by protests from supporters. The 29 jihadists were heavily armed. The police wanted to avoid a pitched battle with them, so for many months they sought to persuade them to surrender, using religious leaders respected by the terrorists as intermediaries. This was in fact a continuation of a longstanding effort of enrolling major Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul

6 Three of the 16 were sentenced to short prison terms on charges unrelated to the allegations Tibo made against them (HRW 2002:44).
Ulama, the Indonesian Ulamas’ Council and even former Laskar Jihad leaders to the project of persuading hardliners to renounce violence voluntarily rather than through imprisonment.

Several ultimatums to surrender communicated through respected adat and religious leaders, including the head of the Islamic Defenders’ Front from Jakarta, did persuade at least five to give up without a fight. On 11 January, an opportunity arose to surround a house where some of the ringleaders of the continuing violence were believed to be together. One JI leader, Ustadz Rian, was shot dead when, according to the police, he emerged on the scene carrying a bomb. Another on the list of 29 was killed and two arrested. The surviving mujahidin in the Tanah Runtuh area then established roadblocks preparing for the final police assault to capture them. They were joined by militants from other mujahidin groups who were prepared to defend them. When the police arrived on 22 January 2007, they immediately drew fire. Seven police officers were hit; one died. In the fire-fight that ensued, 13 militants were killed (ICG 2008c:2) and dozens were arrested. In the following days, many others either surrendered or were rounded up. By the end of 2007, however, nine of the original 29 suspects were still at large. According to Sidney Jones (2008), five of them fled to Java and went underground. At least one seems to have fled to Mindanao in the Philippines. The arrests also led to information that allowed arrests of JI leaders in other parts of Indonesia. Two Mujahidin Kompak (by then called Mujahidin Kayamanya) members were killed and two were sentenced to prison terms for their role in the 22 January 2007 shootout with the anti-terrorism police (ICG 2008c:4–5). Bomb explosions ceased for months after it and there was no serious incident of religious violence in the next year. These operations have also allowed the police to redeem their reputation. As of 2008, ‘the perpetrators of all the jihadi crimes committed since the 2001 Malino peace accord have been identified, and most have been arrested, tried and convicted, without any backlash’ (ICG 2008c:1).

We cannot be certain whether this will prove to be another lull in a storm that will resume because underlying senses of injustice prevail. One basis for hope is that there is so little support for terrorism now in a Poso Muslim community that is fed up with bomb explosions and murder. Another is that the JI leadership has now decided that they should restrict their activities to purely religious work in Poso. Before the final 22 January 2007 assault, the locals wanted to surrender, while the JI leaders who came from Java urged them to hold out.

The January 2007 assault was part of an iron-fist and velvet-glove strategy. The enforcement paradigm shift was to offer the jihadist hold-outs of Poso an alternative master status to ‘hardline terrorist’. They were proffered the alternative identity of ‘ex-combatant’. In fact, they had been labelled terrorists for the first time only immediately after the 11 September 2001 attacks on
New York. Before then, they had been labelled ‘provocateurs’ (HRW 2002:12) or ‘mujahidin’. Especially after jihadists saw in January 2007 that a terrorist identity might lead to a sticky end, the ex-combatant identity proved attractive to many of the hardliners from Poso and some from Java. To get the benefit of the ex-combatant identity, they were expected to do more than just desist from violence. They were supposed to publicly and actively denounce violence as the path of jihad. When they did that, they received reintegration benefits akin to those provided to former GAM members in the war in Aceh or to Free Papua Movement members who came in from the jungle to renounce insurgency. Vocational training—for example, in automotive mechanics and furniture making—tools and small amounts of capital to start up businesses were among the things provided to the newly redefined ex-combatants. The ICG (2008c:5) shows the relevance of this by describing the life circumstances of the 21 hold-out members of Mujahidin Kayamanya in 2007: nine unemployed, three fishermen, two students, two fish traders at Poso market and the rest all in unskilled jobs. 7 ‘For some of these fighters, both local and non-local, the combination of military training and active combat may have been the most meaningful experience in their lives’ (ICG 2005a:3). When ex-combatants were serving prison time in Jakarta, relatives in Poso—sometimes more than a dozen of them—were flown at the state’s expense to Jakarta to reintegrate them into a post-terrorist life and urge them to resist the pressure from hardliners inside and outside the prison.

Some ex-combatants have received cash grants rather than vocational and in-kind reintegration assistance. These have been the less successful cases, according to the ICG (2007a:5). It finds the program ‘hit-and-miss, backed by large amounts of money, mostly channelled through the coordinating ministry for people’s welfare’ (ICG 2008c:5). Yet all counter-terrorism is hit-and-miss and the benefits we hear beneficiaries receiving mostly amount to a three-figure sum (in US dollars) and rarely, if ever, a five-figure sum. So this seems one of the cheaper campaigns waged at one of the more significant nodes of the war on terror. On the other hand, a former Mujahidin Kompak criminal such as Sofyan Djumpai has been graced with many contracts with the Poso district government to reward his role in leading young men into the reintegration program, and this might have an indeterminably large cost to the public purse (ICG 2008c:6). The Poso police have also been worried about the effect on the integrity of government contracting of large numbers of former preman (semi-organised criminals) who joined mujahidin organisations seizing the opportunity to be reintegrated into contracting businesses. The worry that such a program rewards violence is greater if it is thought likely there will be a repeat cycle of violence—such that terrorists might see themselves as having hope of getting

7 In contrast, Hasan’s (2006:162) interviews with mainstream Laskar Jihad recruits in Java indicated that almost half of them were current students of Javanese universities, drop-outs from university or graduates.
another reward when another bout of violence breaks out. Sidney Jones and the ICG wisely point out that because such programs can be a moral hazard, they need to be continuously and independently evaluated.

Then again, as the ICG also points out, some of the NGO initiatives associated with this program have built reconciliation through forging cross-communal economic links. The police prudently decided, acting on advice from NGOs, that the reintegration program might have more legitimacy if the police did not run it. They contracted an NGO called Training a Self-Sufficient Nation (YB2M). YB2M successfully argued it would be a mistake to exclude Christians from the program:

One of the first to apply was Andi Bocor, who had also been the first on the DPO list to turn himself in, in November 2006. His proposal involved setting up a fish trading company with seventeen others, all considered ‘potentials’ [potential future terrorists]. The police suggested adding three others, Bocor agreed, and YB2M found them a used fishing boat for approximately $8,500…

One [Christian group of potentials] proposed a pig-raising project; Syarifudin [of YB2M] convinced them to change it to fish-raising. Pigs would have been more lucrative, but cooperation with Muslims would have been impossible. With fish he saw the possibility of linking it up with Andi Bocor’s project, so the Christian fish-farmers could market their goods through the Muslim traders. This may prove unrealistic, but it is innovative, long-term thinking. (ICG 2008c:6–7)

A more expensive aspect of the counter-terrorism push in Poso has involved millions of dollars spent building a large, world-class Islamic school that will undercut the influence of the Islamic boarding schools captured by JI. A delicate diplomacy of luring the local religious leadership away from the radicalising schools (and ultimately closing them) and to the new de-radicalising elite school is under way (ICG 2008c:8–9)—as is a diplomacy of balanced support for new Christian educational investment in Poso.

The Poso reintegration initiatives are part of a wider pattern of reintegration responses to Indonesian terrorism in recent years. Basically this approach involves treating terrorists with kindness in prison, engaging them in a community of dialogue with respected Salafi religious leaders and former terrorists who have renounced violence. There are carrots as well—funded visits to prison for far-away relatives, trips to Mecca, early release, funding to start businesses, school fees for children—for those who become part of the program to persuade others to renounce violence. Twenty-nine members of JI and a few members of other jihadist organisations have joined the program (Jones 2008). This is only a small
fraction of the 300 male and one female terrorist suspects who have been brought to trial in Indonesia since the first Bali bombing in 2002 and the 400 arrested (Jones 2008). Some of the anti-terrorism police who coordinate this program treat the terrorists as family, giving them unconditional respect, praying with them in prison, finding out what their problems are and trying to help them out with the problems. In Australia, it is controversial that an Afghan veteran as centrally involved in the first Bali bombing as Ali Imron,8 and who was also involved in the 2000 bombing of the Philippine Ambassador’s residence and the Christmas Eve bombings of 38 churches, could be freely walking the streets to participate in the program just a couple of years into a life sentence. Ali Imron does not argue that violent jihad is wrong in the cause of establishing an Islamic state, but he now sees it as wrong to kill innocent civilians. He also sees terror as something that will never attract the support of most Indonesian Muslims (ICG 2007a:12–13). While many former terrorists seem to have been moved by these reintegration approaches, others have acquired an enhanced commitment to terror from the execution of three Bali bombers in November 2008, as is painfully evident on the Internet.

**Politics and the security forces**

National and international political actors play important roles in the ending of this conflict, as do security forces that move in from other parts of Indonesia. There are not, however, the credible stories of provocateurs coming in from Java to start the conflict that there were in Ambon, for example. On the other hand, JI activists from Java were the key agitators who kept the conflict going through most of the current decade. There are also no credible stories of the military intentionally provoking conflicts like those we discussed in Chapter 2 on West Papua. In the four cases so far, as we moved from Papua and Maluku to North Maluku and Central Sulawesi, we moved from cases where the sources of the conflict were more national to cases where its political sources were progressively more local. In Central Sulawesi, the leading local instigators and escalators were not even provincial politicians (as in North Maluku), but political competitors for corrupt patrimonial power at the level of Poso district government. There was some competition at the subdistrict level as well (as there also was in North Maluku). The cases in Chapter 5—West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan—are also (especially West Kalimantan) more about ambitions for control of district rather than provincial government, and not about ambitions for national political office.

HRW (2002:8) reported survey research, led by Dr Suriadi Mappangara in Poso, which found 67 per cent of respondents attributing the conflict to politics,

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8 He trained the bombers, installed the detonators in their bombs and drove them to the Sari Club.
especially competition for office, with only 6 per cent describing religion as the cause. Respondents mostly felt it was about politics, with religion then dragged into the conflict to build support. HRW (2002:8) also reported NGO research associating spikes in violence with elections in various districts and also in the municipality of Palu.

In Central Sulawesi, there was much criticism—and seemingly justified criticism—of the security forces from both sides for bias against their side, torture, summary execution, reckless firing of live rounds and selling ammunition. Retired military officers seemed to have been involved in training militias on both sides. It was clear, however, that in none of these respects was the misbehaviour of the security forces in Central Sulawesi anywhere near as bad as in Papua or Maluku. The security forces were also not initiators of attacks in the way they often were in these other two cases, though a few police and military personnel might have joined mobs and contributed to the violence (McRae 2007:89). While there were problems of poor coordination between the police and the military sent in to support the police when they lost control, there were not reports of fire-fights between the police and the military as occurred in Maluku, Aceh, Papua, Central Kalimantan and elsewhere in transitional Indonesia.

The main criticism that should be made of the security forces is that they were indecisive in the early stages of the conflict, though much of the blame for this lies with their political masters, who, for example, pushed Brimob in then pulled them out in response to complaints from Muslim fighters, who promptly resumed their rampage. There is an element in common between the police and military responses in Poso and North Maluku. This element is a tendency to vacillate, leaving civilians unprotected, as commanders sniff the air to try to work out which way the political winds are blowing. At the command level, the security forces were too risk-averse in their sensitivity to political backlash. On the ground, ordinary troops were often undisciplined, using the very excessive force their commanders feared could get them into hot water if it were directed against politically powerful locals or well-connected Javanese jihadists.

Worst of all, the security forces welcomed Laskar Jihad and other outside mujahidin instead of preventing their deployment and confiscating their weapons. The irony was that outside mujahidin were warmly welcomed by ordinary Muslims and the political elite of the province because they believed the mujahidin would provide protection to Muslim villages that the security forces failed to provide during the third phase of the conflict. More locally, as HRW (2002:41) pointed out, simple roadblocks were needed right at the beginning of the conflict to prevent the deployment of truckloads of fighters all headed to Poso from Tentena, Palu, Parigi and Ampana. Ironically, Muslim
women and children managed to use roadblocks to stand in the way of the security forces themselves in November 2001 when the security forces sought to capture Muslim fighters.

At the same time, there were many reports of the security forces being effective when used. These included cases in which fighting that had raged for hours ceased as soon as the security forces arrived (HRW 2002:42). Without the more effective deployments of 2001, the Malino socialisation process would never have persuaded villagers, as it generally did, that they were no longer caught in a security dilemma (attack or be attacked) (McRae 2008:169, 194). The verdict is therefore clear that security sector indecisiveness allowed the conflict to escalate; security sector strength helped de-escalation.

Law enforcement that was biased against Christians in the early phases of the conflict was also important to its escalation. On the positive side of the ledger, the effective investigation and firm enforcement of the police against hold-outs in 2006 and 2007 seems to have finally, in January 2007, brought religious violence to a decisive end.

At the time of our fieldwork in 2007, Poso was still the most heavily policed district in Indonesia, with 2697 police, plus 900 Brimob. The peak report in the documentary record is of a mobilisation of 7000 Brimob to Poso hotspots in 2004 (Sangadji 2004a)—quite an extraordinary level of policing, if accurate, for such a small district. Five police officers were living in each village in 2007 to smother ignition points of potential new conflicts. They worked with a group of 15 citizens in each village responsible for community protection. Their job included preventing conflict before it arose and working with journalists to avoid provocative coverage when minor incidents of violence did flare up. This seemed to be working well throughout this period when violence was snuffed out.

A more mundane law enforcement failure in many subdistricts, especially given this high level of police resources, was a failure to ensure that rice fields and other land and property acquired and used by others after IDPs were driven out was returned to these IDPs. Sometimes this enforcement failure was timidity about unsettling a fragile peace. Short-term conflict to ensure that justice is done is, however, sometimes necessary to secure long-term peace. In other cases, the police can reasonably say that title to the land is a civil matter where those occupying the land post-conflict claim the land has been stolen from them in the years before the conflict. For poor people who lack the capacity to litigate such matters in the courts, proactive community policing that mobilises customary legal institutions to have such disputes settled fairly is imperative for eliminating this risk factor for future violence.
Reconciliation

The trajectory of involvement of the majority of religious leaders is rather similar between Central Sulawesi, North Maluku and Maluku. As one religious leader explained to HRW (2002:19): ‘At first religious institutions tried to reduce the conflict. But then it shifted to religion, and religious institutions joined in.’ We can in fact define three stages: first, before the conflict came to be interpreted as one of survival of each religious community, religious leadership was mainly a force for reconciliation. In the second stage, the religious leadership saw the survival of their community at stake; during this phase they ceased being a force for reconciliation; they sacralised violence. In the third phase, as prospects of peace re-emerged, religious leaderships on both sides became forces for reconciliation again. This did not happen mainly through formal inter-faith dialogues, though a Communication Forum for Religious Harmony (Forum Komunikasi Umat Beragama, FKUB) was established in Poso in April 2002. As in the Maluku and North Maluku cases, here, peacebuilding by inter-religious participation in routine religious rituals that had a purpose other than peacebuilding, such as funerals, was important. Christian invitations to Muslims to join in Christmas celebrations and Muslim invitations to join in celebrations of Mohammed’s birthday and halal bi halal were significant sites of reconciliation. John Braithwaite experienced the feeling of shared humanity in one such invitation to a Muslim leader’s home for Mohammed’s birthday. As we found in Maluku and North Maluku, in Central Sulawesi, non-truth and reconciliation are favoured over apology and forgiveness for specific crimes because ‘[p]eople…generally do not want to talk about the tragic incidents they experienced in the past. They expressed that they would rather talk about what actions need to be taken next for a better future than talking about what happened in the past’ (Agustiana and Pakpahan 2004:8). Again, this may be why Shearing and Johnston (2005) could be right, reflecting on their experience in South Africa, that the conception of justice most oppressed people recovering from conflict are interested in is ‘justice as a new future’.

Social cohesion and organic reconciliation at the local level have proved resilient in Central Sulawesi. We were surprised at the depth of religious tolerance that had a remorseful character even among interviewees who had reputations as leaders of conflict. As in Maluku, North Maluku and Kalimantan, here there were many cases of members of one religious community protecting people or the property of friends from the other community at the height of the conflict. Post-conflict, ripples of reconciliation spread from these special relationships of courage and care. After the failure of top-down reconciliation by President Wahid and the provincial governors in August 2000, community dialogue between Muslims and Christians was energised by religious and adat leaders and by NGOs, including some international NGOs such as Mercy Corps, and by...
a magazine. Combatant leaders agreeing to be part of this through Malino was, however, critical to creating the environment in which bottom-up reconciliation could flourish. Joint Muslim–Christian village watches became an important vehicle for reconciliation and prevention of new provocations. Many people said they did not like meetings mediated by the government, preferring mediation by religious, adat and village leaders.

One married couple still living in a refugee camp in Tentena when we visited in 2007 were reconciliation leaders. They said most refugees were by then averse to any third-party mediation of return to homes where refugees still felt unsafe. Between 2002 and 2004, they said, reconciliations between refugees and their home communities were government or NGO mediated. From 2005, they had been self-initiated with respect to their refugee camp: ‘This is better. [The self-initiated ones receive] no financial support. We pay the costs out of our own pockets but we still prefer it. Yes, the adat community attends often and contributes.’ The biggest refugee-initiated reconciliation they had helped organise involved an attendance of 300 people—100 Christian refugees bussed from Tentena to Poso town joined by 200 Muslims in Poso. We asked if they relied on adat rituals and philosophy for reconciliations or whether they would have Muslim followed by Christian prayers or hymns. No, they said, they kept religious rites out of their self-initiated reconciliations. They lean on rites of adat. Adat symbolises that all people of Poso are brothers. Women are involved, they say, and all generations too.

Old adat leaders—some very old—give their blessing for the reconciliation, but a new generation of young adat leaders does most of the work, the preparation and follow-through. Intergenerational respect for adat remains high across Poso geographically (less so in Poso town) and across religions. A comparative survey of satisfaction with ‘informal justice systems’ in former conflict zones in West Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi found Poso District was equal highest in satisfaction with Ketapang, West Kalimantan (UNDP 2007b:70). In Poso, they dance the dero at their self-initiated reconciliations. This involves dancing hand-in-hand in a circle. Doing the dance was a breakthrough in itself because at the height of the conflict many ulamas banned it. They were concerned that dero dancing had become associated with ‘drinking alcohol, hand-holding and boy-meets-girl’ activities among the young. Adat leaders on the Christian side were concerned about this too. So dero was returned to tradition, alcohol was banned and the holding of hands was about reconciliation, not about boys meeting girls.

Dialogue on root causes was an important part of their reconciliations, as was true of NGO-mediated reconciliations. Provocations such as bomb explosions were still common in the months before our fieldwork. Both sides of the reconciliation network met to talk about the new provocation when it occurred. Women-
to-women informal networks forged through the reconciliation process were particularly important in this. The energy and engagement of this reconciliation initiated by refugees and receiving communities in Poso made a stark contrast with the more limited, tentative and fearful reintegration of Madurese in Kalimantan, where we were doing fieldwork during the same period.

Leadership in self-initiated refugee reintegration seemed to be connected in Poso with leadership in building new legitimate opportunities, the blockage of which had been a source of the conflict. The abstract theory that conflict arises when legitimate means to valued goals such as political participation are blocked, and illegitimate means such as violence are open, seems to fit these data. Yet it only connects with transformative peace when there is a path for leadership to grasp new legitimate opportunities and to close off illegitimate opportunities. Leadership for legitimate entrepreneurship and against illegitimate opportunism can begin, as in Poso, by resisting state dependency and NGO dependency for reconciliation. It can be reinforced, as in Poso, by a Musrenbang process, and UNDP support for it, which connects top-down planning with bottom-up leadership of conflict-sensitive development.⁹ This process of village planning in one month followed by subdistrict planning in the next month, then district level, then provincial planning in the final month can be assisted by donor initiatives that help catalyse leadership rather than take over. A good example is Care International’s ‘Vision Mapping’ in Central Sulawesi assisting villages to draw maps of their village now and in five years. This helps them to envision what might happen to patterns of settlement and trade if they make it a planning priority in their village to build a bridge at a particular site. Care International’s work in Central Sulawesi discussing options with groups of farmers for showing leadership to link up marketing opportunities to sell cash crops is another example.

One reconciliation dialogue in 2004 was attended by 2000 young Muslims and Christians (Brown et al. 2005:xiv). When local meetings between Christians and Muslims who had been at each other’s throats occurred for the first time in the back half of 2002, the two groups of religious leaders would sit together at the front facing the meeting. Both groups would call for peace, as would heads of villages, subdistricts and the district. They would call for dialogue and reconciliation ideas from the meeting. Ideas such as a religiously mixed choir, dero dancing together, camping outings for youth, a peace art competition

⁹ In Poso, we heard very different opinions about whether the Musrenbang was beginning to work to empower village-level leadership: some were hopeful, some pessimistic. We attended the ultimate province-level planning meeting of 400 people. It certainly encouraged the pessimistic view. It was about important people, starting with the governor and military commander, making speeches about what would and should happen, with limited dialogue. Safari suits and epaulets crowded out isolated civil society actors silently sitting at the margins. Some said this top-down reality permeated down to the village level of the Musrenbang. Others say the lower you go, the more participatory the reality becomes. The risks and opportunities are clear enough. It is far too early to pass any judgment on the limited fieldwork we have been able to undertake.
and working together to rebuild houses, schools and health centres were forthcoming. ‘The brotherhood of sport’ was often advanced as the path to reconciliation. Donors, in contrast, were wary of fights that might break out at football or volleyball contests and whether the brotherhood would be exclusively male. While not all were ready to forgive at these meetings, many who attended said they were conducted in a spirit of forgiveness. There were expressions of regret and apology, but no-one ever admitted to specific crimes at these meetings. Backstage there was much hugging and tears between old friends who had not spoken since the conflict. Friends then introduced friends to their friend’s enemies.

The Poso Conflict Resolution Group (RKP) and the Institute for the Development of Legal and Human Rights Studies (Lembaga Pengembangan Studi dan Hak Asasi Manusia, LPSHAM) were local NGOs that led reconciliation efforts with funding from Mercy Corps. LPSHAM conducted reconciliation dialogues in a Christian village, then a Muslim village, then with a meeting of the two villages, with an average of 30 people attending more than 300 meetings they organised. Their meetings did not involve apologies and rituals of forgiveness; rather, they focused on practical issues of IDP return. The hope was that forgiveness might follow in time. Facilitators said humour that might seem morbid or inappropriate to outsiders often worked in dealing with tension. For example, one man laughingly said, pointing to a friend with whom he had a minor disagreement in the meeting: ‘When we have the conflict again, you are my target.’ Another said, smiling: ‘Are we attending this meeting as the victims or the actors?’ The Research Centre on Peace and Conflict, Tadulako University (P4K/UNTAD), brought combatants from Muslim and Christian communities together in dialogue (the largest involved 34 Christian and 34 Muslim fighters). It was agreed in these meetings that religion was used as a pretext for conflict that was not really about religion. Local women’s NGOs have also done important reconciliation work, particularly in getting communities to give assurances to women IDPs that they will be safe if they return to their homes. The Group for the Struggle for Women’s Equality convened a Women’s Friendship Meeting of 420 Muslim and Christian women in July 2004.

The Malino I talks, like Malino II for Maluku (Chapter 3), did not deliver a high quality or broad base of reconciliation dialogue. The great strength of Malino that local peacebuilding could not deliver was that three levels of government were brought to the table: central, provincial and district. It did establish a Socialisation and Reconciliation Team made up of members of each side for each affected subdistrict. In many subdistricts, these teams were catalysts for education of the community in the terms of the agreement and for inspiring local reconciliation work.
An interesting feature of the Malino agreement was that it gave a role to the military in rebuilding housing that the provincial government funded. In the aftermath of many tense confrontations and shooting at both sides by the military, this provided an opportunity for reconciliation with the military through *gotong royong*. Many in the military had expertise in house building, equipment and commitment to the task. They enjoyed helping the long-suffering people and it gave them a constructive role in the peace. Payment from the provincial government for the work—some alleged in lieu of normal deployment funding—also gave the military a financial stake in the peace.

The philosophy of *maroso* (or *sintuwu maroso*—strength through togetherness) was seen as pre-dating local religious differences. It means helping each other, including across the religious divide. *Maroso* was also said to mean a philosophy of ‘tightening brotherhood’. This unity aspect is what is drawing more Muslims to *maroso* post-conflict. Pre-conflict *maroso* had more support in the Christian community, leading some Muslims to see it (wrongly) as a Christian rather than pre-Christian tradition. We drove through several villages where almost every home had a painted wooden frame at their front entrance announcing the commitment of the whole village to *maroso*.

There was never a debate about having a truth and reconciliation commission for Central Sulawesi. There has been a debate about a general amnesty for crimes committed before Malino, but this has not transpired, at least in any formal way.

**Interpreting the conflict**

*What structural factors were at the root of this conflict?*

As in other Indonesian cases, in Central Sulawesi, Dutch colonialism played some role in disrupting and destroying cultural bridges between Muslim and Christian communities. The Dutch saw potential in the missionised highlanders early in the twentieth century as a ‘[P]rotestant buffer against the potential political threat of Islam based at the coasts’ (Aragon 2001:52). They introduced regulations and trade measures that disrupted pre-colonial highland–lowland alliances based on trade, mutual military defence and ‘royal’ or elite marriages. Mission schools educated Protestant highlanders but rarely Muslims on the coast. These educated Protestants, as in Ambon, were favoured for positions in the local bureaucracy, which did not endear them to Muslim majorities. Protestant areas received health clinics; Muslim areas did not. The education

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10 ‘*Mutual aid*’ or ‘*joint bearing of burdens*’, as Clifford Geertz (1983b:167–234) put it.
policy of the Republic of Indonesia gradually equalised access to schooling, but Christian dominance of the local civil service was tenacious, continuing discrimination in favour of Christian recruitment. Christian highlanders lost their educational advantage while never fully recovering from being cut off from the coastal trade networks that fuelled business entrepreneurship, cash cropping and logging (especially of high-value ebony) that created wealth. It was Muslim immigrants and the Chinese that networked into the opportunities for entrepreneurship.

Brown et al. (2005:xi) have a nice way of summarising this structural factor in the conflict, which they call horizontal inequalities: "The combination of severe historical inequalities between Christian and Muslim with the Islamization policies of the last decade of the New Order, created socio-economic discontent." As in many parts of Indonesia, in Central Sulawesi, these inequalities were intensified by transmigration and spontaneous immigration, particularly of Bugis from South Sulawesi, giving a particular intensity in Central Sulawesi to competition between Muslim Bugis immigrants and indigenous Christians.

Of all the conflict areas in Indonesia, only Maluku had a longer economic downturn, between 1997 and 2001. The Poso economy declined by 2.1 per cent for these four years. The worst year was 2000, when there was a 4.3 per cent decline in GDP (Wilson 2005:68–9). The decline is therefore an effect of the conflict more than of the Asian financial crisis.

The proportion of workers who were in non-agricultural jobs was 45 per cent in 1998 compared with 55 per cent for Indonesia overall (van Klinken 2007:39). There is therefore not a huge argument that the comparative shortage of legitimate opportunities through industrial-economy jobs is a structural incentive to use violence to control the other source of non-agricultural economic opportunity in the public sector. On the other hand, the ratio of civil servants to non-agricultural workers was almost three times the ratio for Indonesia overall (van Klinken 2007:41). In this sense, there was a stronger structural incentive in Central Sulawesi compared with almost all other provinces to grab control of public sector patrimony as a path to economic success.

What have been the proximate factors in the conflict?

The Asian economic crisis increased poverty in Central Sulawesi by 251 per cent between 1996 and 1999—twice the national average. Before then, it was

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11 Or as Aragon (2000:318) put it: 'Although this book’s research indicates that these [Muslim–Christian] tensions began with European policies for colonial control and missionization of ethnic minorities, they took on a new dimension when the New Order government promoted competition for modernization among religions and more thoroughly regulated the ways in which followers of Islam and Christianity could relate to one another.'
already one of the poorer provinces in Indonesia (Brown et al. 2005:xii, 9). Transition, according to Brown and Diprose (2007:4), might not be seen as a root cause of violence during democratisation, but transition does create a space where pre-existing grievances can surface. Transition also was a space in which the security forces were indecisive because they did not know which way the wind was blowing. They were accustomed to an environment where they knew exactly who was in charge. This finding opens up the question of whether it might be useful to expand the meaning of anomie from an unsettled sense of what the rules of the game are to include an unsettled sense of who is in charge. Initial tentativeness saw a failure of the police to extinguish minor flare-ups that ignited wider rioting, looting and violence. When the first law enforcement did come, the security forces basically took the side of the Muslim majority, arresting only Christians when it was Christians who had overwhelmingly been victims of this first phase of the violence. Ultimately both sides came to be resentful of what they saw as the religious bias of the justice system and came to view vigilantism as the only path to justice.

Decentralisation created specific new political opportunities in Central Sulawesi during the transition to democracy. In the process of transition, settled power-sharing and turn-taking conventions became unsettled. Political opportunists supported by business opportunists went after chances to monopolise patronage controlled by the new district government. In this winner-take-all, no-holds-barred grab for decentralised political power and business corruption, the organisations most available to be harnessed by those with political ambitions happened to be religious. This was because political parties were comparatively weak organisationally, as were other organisations in civil society. The imperative to enrol the organisations that could mobilise people meant ruthless political competition for spoils became religious competition.

HRW (2002:9) concluded that, once violence erupted for political or religious reasons, economic interests in looting shops and villages, taking the land and cash crops of the displaced and selling weapons contributed to escalation. Looting was not always casual and episodic; at times, well-organised convoys of trucks to transport booty followed militias into attacks.

By the later phases of the conflict, revenge became the main motive for violence. In addition, Poso came to the conflict with more of a history of post-independence Muslim–Christian conflict than perhaps anywhere in Indonesia as a result of being caught between an armed Christian separatist movement progressing down from North Sulawesi and Darul Islam moving up from South Sulawesi. At each stage, the Poso case makes more visible than in other cases the desire to settle the score for violence in earlier conflicts becoming a proximate cause of a subsequent attack. So we can conceive of the cycle of revenge as a particularly major proximate factor in Poso.
Inflammatory media reports were an important factor in escalating the conflict and in bringing outside mujahidin in on the side of Muslims and US diplomacy on the side of Christians (Aragon 2001). For example, the Central Sulawesi Mercusuar helped provoke the fourth phase of the conflict after an incident in which just one man was killed with the headline ‘Phase IV of the Poso conflict breaks out’ (HRW 2002:21). During the conflict, Christian and Muslim journalists established their own newspapers, which have now closed. Over time, the local media has become more sensitive to its role in averting conflict escalation. LPSHAM put out a bulletin with a peace journalism emphasis on stories that touched people’s hearts. For example, items explained why a group of Christians missed their home village and why their neighbours missed them. In 2004, a number of Central Sulawesi journalists attended peace journalism workshops conducted by the BBC. Journalists are now more wary of publishing false or inflammatory rumours and check with accused people to get their reaction to the accusation.

Each arrival in Poso of a succession of jihadist militias was an important proximate factor in escalating the conflict. JI’s substantial presence in Poso was particularly important in extending the terrorist phase of the violence for much longer than anywhere else in Indonesia.

Vacillating police and military intervention to protect civilians and to establish roadblocks to prevent militias from mounting attacks was a proximate factor in allowing violence to spin out of control. There was also mismanagement of attempts to persuade the community that arrests and trials would be conducted without religious bias. Levels of dissatisfaction with the ‘formal justice system’ were higher in Central Sulawesi (47 per cent) than in Maluku (21 per cent), North Maluku (31 per cent) and West Kalimantan (32 per cent) (UNDP 2007b:70). This was also connected to political timidity in the justice sector. The police often arrested individuals, raising expectations from victims, and then backed away from law enforcement when arrests led to large protests or complaints from political elites.

**What were the key triggering incidents?**

The triggers for both of the first two waves of violence dominated by Muslims were fights between Christian and Muslim youths in which the Muslim youth claimed to show a knife wound he had suffered. The third phase, dominated by Christians, was a series of premeditated attacks to wreak vengeance that involved no trigger. In the fourth phase, when Muslims dominated after the arrival of jihadists from outside the province, a typical clash ‘began with a conflict between neighbouring villages, such as over cacao harvests. Rumours of an attack circulated, and fighters from one or both sides gathered before
launching a “pre-emptive” attack’ (HRW 2002:20). When a war has ripened to the point where a security dilemma has become a proximate reason for pre-emptive attacks, there is usually no triggering incident.

Who were the key war-making and peacebuilding actors?

McRae (2008:1) sees the violence as a collective enterprise in which ‘no one was in complete control’. Crowds with homemade weapons perpetrated the worst violence and property destruction. On the Muslim side, crowds were often led by semi-trained outside fighters with automatic weapons who had experience in Maluku or Afghanistan. Politicians aspiring to winner-take-all political control of the district government of Poso and business backers who looked forward to getting contracts and sharing in the looting of the district coffers through embezzlement could have been the actors who did most to destroy peace. The military was not a key war-making actor in the way it was in Maluku and Papua; it was also a more important humanitarian actor in Poso than in any of our other Indonesian cases in building houses for refugees. A variety of different militias with varying degrees of training and organisation were the crucial war-making actors. On the Christian side, all were locally based. The Christian militias were organised ad hoc and temporarily. On the Muslim side, JI was organised from Java and had the most elaborated national and international networking. JI was also the war-making actor with the staying power to carry the conflict forward right into 2007. Laskar Jihad was another important war-maker with national organisation and large membership, but it disbanded in October 2002. Even up to that time, it was never the dominant player in the conflict that it had become in Maluku.

Post-conflict, locals said Poso did not have a large problem of preman (semi-organised criminals) or semi-criminalised youth groups. The police leaders we spoke with were also of the view that preman leadership was not central on either the Christian or Muslim side during the conflict. It was also not an important part of the post-conflict crime problem in Poso. Certainly old militarised youth movements from the conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s were reactivated at the height of the violence, but this collective organisation was disbanded and did not persist. Several informants said there was a significant youth crime problem, associated with alcohol, for example, but this was not mobilised through criminal gangs. Perhaps this was because the main structure competing with traditionally moderate adat and religious leadership was some 200 radical JI religious teachers. Central to their project was steering young people away from the influences of preman and alcohol.
We have seen that religious leaders shifted in the trajectory of the conflict from first being peacemakers, then war-makers to being peacemakers again in the final phases of the conflict. Journalists were key fomenters of conflict in the early phases; they practised peace journalism more often in the later stages.

The most important peacebuilding actors were IDPs who became leaders in IDP camps and adat and religious leaders in local communities who initiated reconciliation and gotong royong to welcome and reintegrate IDPs. As in the Moluccas, in Central Sulawesi, leaders in reconciliatory rituals of everyday life such as funerals were important peacebuilders. There were many important peacebuilding NGO leaders as well. Yayasan Tanah Merdeka (YTM) was one. Ministers Kalla and Yudhoyono played important national leadership roles in making the Malino peace process happen.

Care International, World Vision, Mercy Corps and Church World Service from the United States were international NGOs who helped with emergency responses for IDPs initially and then with rehabilitation and reconstruction. The European Union and USAID were large donors. The major international humanitarian players agreed on a Common Humanitarian Action Plan. This coordination assisted with the comparatively rapid return of IDPs to rebuild their homes. The government assisted IDP families with R4 million in materials for rebuilding houses and R1 million in cash. Families that had lost members received another R2 million for each (Simanjuntak 2001).

There was greater concern from the international community about what was happening in Poso than there was in other parts of Indonesia between 2001 and 2004. This, however, did not translate into international diplomatic actors doing anything especially constructive to build peace. The International Crisis Group did an outstanding job of diagnosing Poso’s problems and Human Rights Watch a fine job in exposing human rights abuses. In spite of this, one would not say human rights groups have been key peacebuilding actors in the way they have been in Papua, for example.

Motivational postures of key actors

Now we analyse this conflict in terms of Valerie Braithwaite’s (2009) five motivational postures towards an authority of commitment, capitulation, resistance, disengagement and game playing. It is often difficult to say whether armed conflict is more about greed (and game playing) than grievance (and resistance). The aspiring winner-take-all politicians and their business sponsors were obviously in the business of greed and gaming reformasi and religious identity. Looters were about greed of a simpler kind; this was an important

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12 Dave McRae, in his comments on this chapter, doubts this, concluding ‘Poso was mostly off the radar’.
motivation in the initial rioting (McRae 2008:47). Moreover, ‘the liquor round-up of the first period may have been a good opportunity for youths to drink for free’ (McRae 2008:67). Some opportunists used the conflict to seize from a wealthier neighbour land long coveted. The security forces made money out of the conflict by extorting payments from trucks and buses, renting weapons to combatants and other illegal business activities (McRae 2008:178). As important as greed was at the foundation of this conflict, in none of the Peacebuilding Compared cases so far was there quite as clear a picture of grievance being more important than greed in the later stages. By 2001, most informants said that most attacks were motivated by revenge for earlier attacks. Most of the JI and Mujahidin Kompak hardline hold-outs who kept the conflict going between 2002 and 2007 remained poor. It seems plausible that the lure of jihad is heavenly rather than earthly riches. Yet the impecunious condition of jihadists made them vulnerable to state carrots of ex-combatant reintegration. Those who walk into war out of grievance can walk out via ‘greed’. We saw this with some Free Papua Movement former guerrillas who came in from the jungle (Chapter 2).

The motivational posture of commitment to religious leaders who at different phases of this history led their flocks to war or to peace was evident. While there seemed to be a great deal of commitment to the hold-out JI ulamas, as manifest in many faithful rallying to defend them in the final assault of January 2007, quite a bit of that apparent commitment turned out to be capitulation. In hindsight, we know this was particularly evident during January 2007 when many local followers of JI religious teachers wanted to surrender to the police, but JI leaders from Java denounced this as weakness. Then when JI was pacified in Poso, local followers capitulated to the state in large numbers. Valerie Braithwaite’s (2009) foundational data on motivational postures show that people hold different motivational postures simultaneously, with degrees of tenacity that vary across time and context. It is the balance of salience of different motivational postures that matters. At critical life moments such as arrest for a crime, impetus can arise for an increase in multiple motivational postures. So a final assault on JI religious leaders can simultaneously induce heightened feelings of commitment to them by their followers and increased attraction to capitulation to the state. Indeed this seems to be what happened. We see the same possibility with the dozens of jihadists who have cooperated with the carrots and religious counterarguments of the anti-terrorism police. These converts of counter-terrorism mostly do not renounce their commitment to the ideal of an Islamic state with Sharia law; while clinging to it, they capitulate to an antithetically secular state. The nub of that capitulation is a cognitive shift about what sort of jihad is most effective in the long run for the triumph of Islam. The cleverness of this Indonesian counter-terrorism work is that its subjects do not perceive themselves as capitulating to the republic as much as they see themselves as capitulating to a more sophisticated and nuanced religious
authority. They capitulate to religious leaders and reformed terrorists working with the police who persuade them that murdering civilians who perhaps have never been given an opportunity to study Islam increases opposition to Islam and is not God’s way.

Commitment to the Indonesian state is rather less in Poso than one experiences in many other parts of Indonesia. We see this in the fact that most of the more important leaders of preventive diplomacy and reconciliation in Poso have been non-state actors. We see it in the ferocious resistance of some Tentena refugee camp members to reconciliations run by the state or even funded by states through NGOs. Yet resistance to the state by refugees and others in Poso with low levels of commitment to the republic is less prevalent than disengagement from the state.

Disengagement was also a problem on the part of vacillating security forces in the early phases of the conflict. In the later stages, however, the security forces mostly did their job, manifesting strong commitment to the republic and its constitution. Extraordinary levels of commitment are also manifest in much of the work of the anti-terrorism police. Not many Western police would be willing to spend a night in prison with terrorists to maintain the momentum of goodwill they are building with them. In Poso, we do not see the heights of resistance to President Wahid’s state and game playing with the state that were so striking in Maluku and Papua. Resistance and gaming the state were certainly evident at times, but so much less frequently than in Papua and Maluku that one would never say the resistance and game playing by security forces were among the fundamental drivers of the Poso conflict. Precisely that was argued about the Papua and Maluku conflicts in Chapters 2 and 3.

Fabianus Tibo’s testimony in his defence against the prosecutor’s case was that there were 16 protestant business and political leaders who were the real leaders of Christian violence. This defence was in essence that he and his co-defendants were convenient scapegoats as minority Catholic transmigrants for the crimes of local Protestant leaders who were game players with the state and also players of religious organisational authority. Many Christians and some researchers such as George Aditjondro and journalists such as those from The Jakarta Post believed Tibo was not involved in the killings at the boarding school. The evidence produced against them included ‘no witnesses [who] actually saw the men commit murder’ (McRae 2007:99). Even the Pope reportedly became involved by writing a letter urging clemency (ICG 2007c:11). Many Christians and Muslims in Poso believed the Protestant leaders who ordered the slaughter at the boarding school bribed justice officials to secure the release of the indigenous Protestant killers, so that ‘outside provocateurs’ in the form of the executed Catholic migrants could be blamed. Without accepting Tibo’s innocence, we can concede his point that the actors who activated war were
Poso (and Palu) politicians and businessmen who sought to play a winner-take-all game of control over district government, plus some retired military officers. The same elites also gamed religious authorities—Islamic and Christian—by capturing the religious organisations they controlled to their projects of power. In particular, Tibo and his defenders said the synod of the Central Sulawesi Christian Church, which represented 1000 churches in the province, directly or indirectly backed the red Christian army that did most of the slaughter of May–June 2000. At the same time, we can accept McRae’s (2008) conclusion that Tibo and his co-defendant Dominggus were on the balance of probabilities ‘more than rank-and-file combatants’, while ‘we know much less about [the third executed defendant] Marinus’.

The execution of these Christians—like the execution of the three Bali bombers in November 2008—seemed to fire up resistance among some hold-outs for revenge.

We have found that maroso mattered in Poso reconciliation because there was a high level of commitment to adat leaders even in Poso town, but especially in most rural villages of the district. Many adat leaders in Poso are very old. At the height of the conflict, they lost authority to younger men who found a non-adat path to village authority by becoming militia leaders. As in Maluku and North Maluku, however, in Central Sulawesi, an adat (maroso) that had been waning pre-conflict and during the height of the conflict has been reinvigorated and reinvented as a more syncretically Muslim–Christian ‘brotherhood’ (and sisterhood). Peacebuilding has also opened new paths to upward mobility in local status systems for young men who are the youthful energisers of adat’s rebirth, but under the authority of elders.

Adat and religious leaders believe that alcohol played a major role in youthful disengagement from and resistance to their authority at the moments when violence spun out of control.

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13 As Universitas Indonesia Professor Franz Magnus-Suseno put it before the executions: ‘Of course if I may say this, their deaths would be really very useful for many people and this is the tragedy of the thing. If these three people are executed then the Muslims of Poso feel vindicated in a certain sense and they will more easily keep to the peace agreement. The Protestants in Tentena also would accept this. Now if they are not executed, then the Muslims will demand that the real perpetrators of the massacre be brought to court and given the death penalty and they would be people from the Protestant community in Tentena. Now, if this happens, people in Tentena will say what happens to those that killed our Christians before this massacre in Poso. They also have to be brought to justice. You see the whole thing will unravel. So the same is true in a certain sense on the national basis. I think that many people, including many Muslims, are afraid that if Tibo and the other two are not executed the Government will have difficulties in executing the Muslim terrorists of Bali and so on and they all want them executed, so they hope that Tibo is executed. You see how the odds are against those three’ (Interview, Encounter, ABC Radio National, 9 July 2006). McRae (2007:105) pointed out that a long judgment in the case made no mention of the testimony of the defence witnesses, though he was not convinced that there was evidence from them that would/should have transformed the judgment.

14 The quoted passage is from email comment from Dave McRae on an earlier draft of this chapter.
Peacebuilding strengths and weaknesses

In one interview, a former police commander and current community leader in Central Sulawesi gave an interesting answer to what were the four turning points

- Malino
- ‘Laskar Jihad’ (and other outside mujahidin) deciding to leave
- the improved integration of top-down with bottom-up planning from 2006, which gave villages, then subdistricts, then districts, then the province a chance to plan budget priorities in a conflict-sensitive way

The surprising part of this answer is the third. It is the turning point most would find it hard to put a finger on. It also occurs so late in this history that prima facie it seems implausible that it could be important. His point was that the announcement of the new participatory governance of the region helped create a new climate of trust in government that assisted with capitulation and then commitment to the final, and seemingly permanent, Poso peace. In addition, we think his intent was to include the work of the World Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program (KDP), which began across Indonesia in 1998 and in Central Sulawesi when conflict subsided sufficiently to allow it to start in a subdistrict. The KDP laid a foundation for institutionalising participatory development, distributing US$60 000–110 000 in block grants to subdistricts (kecamatan) for villages to spend on almost anything they decided through collective deliberation to be a development priority for their village (Gibson and Woolcock 2005). Some credit is due to the World Bank, the UNDP and international NGOs such as Care International for their support for bottom-up planning in Central Sulawesi. While it seems premature to assess the Musrenbang and other more spontaneous bottom-up initiatives in participatory planning as important peacebuilding strengths in Poso, potentially there is promise of that.

The other three parts of the former police commander’s answer are clearer. With Malino I, national, provincial and district governments engaged with and committed to practical steps for peace. One step was persuading outside jihadists to return to their homes. As in Maluku, in Central Sulawesi, there was a sophisticated multidimensional strategy of carrots, sticks and religious persuasion by local and imported religious notables. The carrots were more considerable in Poso than in Maluku, involving an interpretation of jihadists as ex-combatants who should receive assistance with reintegration into the legitimate economy. The sticks were also more potent, with more jihadist leaders being imprisoned or killed while resisting their arrest in Poso than in Maluku. In a sense, the multidimensional strategies to dissipate violent jihad in Maluku and Poso ultimately were impressive in their own ways, partly because
both were responsive to the contextual imperatives for making the persuasion work. So all four of the police commander’s suggested turning points were also plausible candidates as key peacebuilding strengths.

The Malino I accord was not quite as ultimate a turning point towards peace as the Malino II accord in Maluku. Its 10 stipulations were at the vague end of peace agreements. Malino recognised the need for national support for peacebuilding and for a multidimensional approach. The follow-through on the Malino I agreement was even weaker than for Malino II. The nine working groups (pokja) with equal numbers of Muslim and Christian leaders from government, civil society and religious communities established by Malino I ‘achieved very little, suffering from a lack of resources’ (Brown et al. 2005:xiii). In August 2002, after a meeting to review progress in implementation of Malino by most of its signatories, the original working groups were disbanded and replaced by a Communications Forum (Forkum) intended to go down to the subdistrict and village levels rather than just the district and provincial levels at which the pokja operated.

Poso was the least successful of the post-Suharto peace processes in the proportion of outsiders persuaded to give up their stockpiles of weapons and go home. Even so, it was ultimately successful, with most returning home by the end of 2002 and nearly all by 2007. So we can generalise that a strength of all the Indonesian peace processes of this era is that they removed the considerable number of outside terrorists from the scene and returned control of peacebuilding to local hands.

It is hard to say how successful was the amnesty for the voluntary surrender of weapons between 7 January and 7 February 2002 or the heavy penalties for being caught in possession of weapons after that time. Security forces conducted door-to-door searches for weapons using metal detectors. Weapons surrender started with a trickle of hundreds immediately after Malino and by the end of the 7 March 2002 date agreed for the return of all outsiders, the police said 39 000 ‘weapons’ (in fact many of the ‘weapons’ were ammunition or arrows) had been handed in—nearly all homemade. Some said the number of weapons reported as surrendered by both sides was suspiciously even (HRW 2002:31). We do know that hardliners kept impressive stockpiles of automatic weapons and bombs after that date. Even by January 2003, information obtained from the police by McRae (2008:196) indicated that of 1757 guns recovered, only six were factory-standard firearms.

Many thought the quality of peace dialogue in Malino was poor. While it was good to get Jakata more engaged and taking responsibility for the conflict, there was a sense of Jakarta just telling everyone what they had to do now. While it was good that the provincial leadership was there taking responsibility rather
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than saying this was something the district of Poso would have to sort out, many
thought there were too many delegates from Palu and not enough from Poso. On the other hand, many of the powerbrokers behind the scenes provoking and funding the conflict were from Palu. And while Poso was the site of more than 90 per cent of the killing, there were many terrorist bombings and some important assassinations of leaders in Palu after Malino, retrospectively vindicating the importance of attending to the players from the provincial capital during the peace process. Until Malino, a clear weakness of peacebuilding had been the way the political climate of decentralisation was used to excuse Jakarta elites (as in Maluku) saying this was the province’s problem and Palu elites saying it was the district’s problem.

On every political party slate for the 2005 elections for a bupati and deputy bupati in Poso District, there was both a Muslim and a Christian. Brown and Diprose (2007:13) found many actors took credit for this, including ‘grassroots demands’, political parties themselves and the electoral commission. There is also evidence of intellectuals and the media advocating this (Sangadji 2005). There could be some truth in all of these claims to ownership; and perhaps there is something to be said in favour of informal consocialism like this. There is virtue in a multidimensional political consensus that emerges from both the top down and the bottom up out of peace dialogue. By this we mean that the Muslim–Christian power sharing of every slate having running mates from both faiths could be better for being informally a product of politics rather than formally mandated by electoral law. One reason why consensual power sharing between Muslims and Christians might be better is that it can be transitional. You would certainly think that if you were a Hindu political aspirant! So in a future historical conjuncture when wounds across the Muslim–Christian divide are healed, but some different fissure jeopardises peace and state legitimacy, it might be more important to forge political consensus for slates that straddle that new fissure. Slates of co-religionists would at that point become less of a concern than slates of candidates all on the same side of the new social fissure.

As in other cases, here there have been allegations of rape and sexual harassment by security personnel at refugee camps (Brown et al. 2005:xiii, 37; Wahyudi 2002b). Levels of self-reported refugee security and return of refugee children to school were, however, high compared with refugees in other parts of Indonesia (Brown et al. 2005:36) and refugees received help reasonably quickly to rebuild their homes. The Poso District social welfare agency reported by mid-July 2002 that roughly 40 per cent of the 110 227 displaced people at the time of Malino seven months earlier had been returned (HRW 2002:39). This had increased to 75 per cent by 2003 (Aragon 2008:178). While local reconciliation efforts were very successful in encouraging refugees to return compared with the situation

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15 In total, going back to 1998, there could have been more than 150 000 refugees (Wahyudi 2002a).
we found in Kalimantan (Chapter 5), many of those correctly counted as returning to Poso in fact returned to new properties within enclaves of their own religious group (Aragon 2008). Some Chinese business families did not return or, as happened frequently in North Maluku, reopened their businesses but chose to live elsewhere (such as Palu, in a case described by Aragon 2008:195–6). The total number of refugees was later officially revised upwards to 143 000 (Aragon 2008:177)—almost half the population of the regions affected by the conflict. There was high-level corruption in funds allocated for house rebuilding for refugees; a former bupati of Poso was imprisoned for defrauding US$120 000 from the program along with seven other local officials. A former governor of Central Sulawesi was acquitted in the same case (ICG 2008c:10). Corruption and embezzlement do seem major weaknesses of the peace process and a special vulnerability in circumstances where some of the programs to reintegrate terrorists are politically sensitive and therefore off-budget and immune from normal accountability checks. The military and police are particularly involved in corruption around illegal logging on indigenous land. Illegal logging, however, possibly was reduced by the conflict.

The NGO sector in Poso was weak. It was much stronger a few hours’ travel away in the capital, Palu, but even there it was nowhere near as well resourced as in Ambon, Banda Aceh or Jayapura, for example. The main strength in Poso and Palu was with very local NGOs, rather than with the national and international NGO sectors. Locals often saw new NGOs mushrooming post-conflict as opportunistically capturing donor funds. Among other things, a comparatively weak NGO sector has hampered accountability of government for embezzlement of refugee funds, corruption and other abuses (Brown et al. 2005:29, 57). As one women’s NGO leader from an organisation with a large base of grassroots women said of this sector: ‘Many women’s groups are just flags and no action.’ International NGOs have had a quite modest presence in Palu. For most of the conflict period through to the present, only one or two or none have managed to keep an office open in the insecure environment of Poso; international humanitarian and peacebuilding workers were not to be seen on the streets of the town. We could not find an ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) presence in Poso or Palu, though we did find a Red Cross Blood Bank in Poso funded by the European Union. The World Bank’s KDP invested in participatory community development programs in some of the poorest subdistricts of Poso. Villages develop their own proposals for infrastructure or small business to kickstart development. Elected local leaders coordinate the consultation to select proposals, which include separate consultations with women.

Women’s NGOs with international funding have been important in helping overcome the male domination of political life in Poso. Women’s roles in
peacebuilding—for example, in distributing government emergency funds to refugees—have created new political opportunities for some women. In Agustiana and Pakpahan’s (2004:12) assessment, six villages were identified that were headed by women post-conflict. While there was not the extent of female involvement in fighting during the crisis itself as in Aceh or North Maluku, on the Christian side there did seem to have been some female combatants (Agustiana and Pakpahan 2004:19).

One kind of service that was mentioned in several interviews being in short supply—especially for refugee children who had seen terrible things done to their parents—was trauma counselling. A survey by the Health Ministry found 30 per cent of returning refugees to be suffering one kind of mental disorder or another (Wahyudi 2002a; see also Wahyudi 2002b). The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) contributed US$100 000 for psycho-social training and health service programs across 12 subdistricts, with the programs being channelled through the International Medical Corps.

It could be said that a strength of peacebuilding in Central Sulawesi has been that a larger proportion of the leaders of violence—more than 100—have been imprisoned in Poso than in any of our other Indonesian cases. Many received heavy sentences by Indonesian standards. This might especially be said given that the Poso conflict, while intense, was confined mostly to one small district of one province and resulted in less loss of life than our other Indonesian cases. On the other hand, many who renounced violence were treated leniently. Fabianus Tibo and his co-defendants’ defence that they were to be executed as scapegoats, that his list of 16 Christian ringleaders bore the responsibility for leading the violence, might not have been without merit, though he had not had direct contact with most of those he named. Many women in Poso believed, however, that even if Tibo and his associates were not those most deserving of execution for murder, they were involved in undressing Muslim women and in vaginal ‘searches’. This shocked public opinion about the case and created much of the drama around it, though none of the defendants was formally charged with sexual assault. One survivor slapped the faces of the three defendants as she walked into the room to testify that one of them had sexually assaulted her.16

Poso is not therefore a case of impunity for war crimes, including for crimes against women. This strength is tempered by the weakness of great partiality and inconsistency in the administration of criminal law (McRae 2007). In turn, this seemed to be connected with law enforcement officials (anomically, self-protectively) sniffing the wind to try to work out who was in charge or who would end up in charge. Most of the violence by Christians and Muslims during

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16 ‘Witnesses testify about massacre in Poso’ (Jakarta Post, 6 February 2001). There was also a case during the Poso conflict in which a Christian combatant allegedly raped a civilian, for which his comrades executed him without trial (McRae 2008:87).
the deadliest phases of the conflict was motivated by vengeance for crimes for which it was felt the individual and collective perpetrators had been let off by the state.

In contrast with the early years of the decade, from the mid-2000s, it might be said that the Central Sulawesi justice system did as fair and firm a job as one might practically expect in the chaotic circumstances of such widespread violence. The number of cases of violence against women it dealt with doubled between 2005 and 2006.\(^\text{17}\) The police did successfully charge a few on Tibo’s list of 16, but their investigations found the evidence insufficient on most. One of them, Paulus Tungkanan, was charged in May 2004 with possession of hundreds of rounds of ammunition, homemade weapons and military uniforms (Sangadji 2004c). By this stage, however, it was difficult to repair the damage done by the failures to protect people through not enforcing the law in the early years of the conflict. By then even-handed rule of law that resulted in more on one side than the other having charges laid or charges dismissed was going to result in angry demonstrations by the side that fared worse, and counter-demonstrations by those demanding justice on behalf of their murdered relatives. One prosecutor was murdered in Palu in May 2004. When Tibo and his colleagues were executed, Christian rioting occurred not only in Poso but in their home province, where the official residence of a head prosecutor, a courthouse and other public buildings were burned, including a local prison from which all inmates were set free (McRae 2007:109). The paradox of Poso is that for none of the first 11 cases of Peacebuilding Compared did we more frequently hear the complaint that failure to enforce the law in the courts was a root cause of the conflict, yet in no case was the ultimate engagement of criminal law enforcement in bringing the violence to an end firmer or (at least ultimately) more effective. A policeman’s lot is not a happy one. One twenty-one-year-old policeman happened to be passing when the burial of the JI leader killed by the police raid of 11 January 2007 was taking place. ‘He stopped out of respect for the burial and was beaten to death by the mourners’ (ICG 2007c:17).

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\(^{17}\) Feminist NGOs continue nevertheless to be critical of the Poso police for failing to comply with their policies that preclude rape and very serious domestic assault being dealt with by *adat*—village elders deciding on essentially compensatory remedies such as payment of two buffalo to the victim’s family. The overwhelming majority of rape cases are dealt with by compensatory justice through *adat*, especially if the victim is poor. When rape allegations are made against the military, they have no buffalo to transfer in the traditional way. Interestingly, however, the military does often submit to village *adat* in preference to having allegations made against them in an urban court. ‘They pay R500 000 and it is over.’ The women’s NGOs are critical of this too: ‘For the *adat* leaders, it’s money-making because they keep half the penalty’, with only half going to the victim or her family. Again, while we can see the merit in this feminist critique, it is also important to see that what has happened in Poso is an advance on other Indonesian conflict zones where the military has enjoyed impunity for sexual assault and rape. In July 2004, four police officers were prosecuted for alleged immorality in the form of extramarital relationships with Poso girls who became pregnant, with the officers refusing to accept responsibility (‘Police on trial for immorality’, *The Jakarta Post*, 14 July 2004).
The many strands of the fabric of reconciliation we have described in Central Sulawesi involved no sharp turning point, but did gradually build pressure for peace. Confidence built cumulatively, allowing more IDPs to return to their homes. The most important work here was done at a very local level involving reconciliation efforts that were not sponsored by the state or by international donors. Donors and the state seemed to have had the wisdom to see that there was a risk of their efforts to fund reconciliation from the top down crowding out spontaneous bottom-up reconciliation.

A strength of Poso reconciliation has been the leadership of women’s groups, other local NGOs, village leaders, elders of refugee camps and religious leaders. As in the Moluccas, in Poso, *gotong royong* was important, with Christian victors initiating the rebuilding of mosques of Muslims they vanquished and likewise with Muslim victors persuading refugees to return to work together in rebuilding churches. John Braithwaite’s fieldwork notes from one interview with a women’s NGO suggests that women show peacebuilding leadership in this:

The women in the Christian part of the village organize their young people on a certain day to work at repairing the mosque. ‘It doesn’t work if the men try to show this kind of leadership’. But the men join in once it gets underway. Maybe they need an electrician to fix the sound system in the mosque and the local electrician yields to the plea from the women to help the young people with this part of the job. The day ends with visits of the expelled minority to their old village. That is the key part of the objective to show that it is safe for them to come back to their land, that their land is unoccupied, and that there is love and compassion to them from the majority community of their village. By visiting the healing of the mosque they can have a healing encounter with their home and land as something available to them if they want it.

Also as in the Moluccas, in Central Sulawesi, rituals of everyday life such as funerals and *halal bi halal*, and kindnesses of everyday life across the religious divide, have been important to reconciliation. There have been many hundreds of reconciliation meetings—sometimes large, sometimes small. Again, as in the Moluccas, here we heard of no cases where truth and reconciliation occurred. Sometimes survivors’ humour was used to skate around the truth. Sometimes lies that outside provocateurs did what was really done by locals were allowed to push aside the truth. Never did we hear of a reconciliation meeting at which a combatant confessed to rape or killing or even burning a building. While non-truth is a weakness of the Poso peace, non-truth and reconciliation seem better than non-truth and non-reconciliation. The Poso data refute Braithwaite’s (2005) theory that high-integrity truth seeking is a fundamental prerequisite of violence prevention through reconciliation (and superior to impunity or punitive proportionality). Truth and reconciliation do not appear in these data as
the third way to proportionality versus impunity. Non-truth and reconciliation are the third way here. In Poso, reconciliation helps secure effective control of religious violence without truth, and in spite of catastrophic failures in the legitimacy, fairness and effectiveness of the courts. This, of course, is not to deny the possibility that non-truth and reconciliation might be second best to truth and reconciliation (or third best to truth, justice and reconciliation). The Peacebuilding Compared project must collect more data from more cases to tease out these possibilities.

A strength of policing in the Poso case is that it networked with religious leaders to negotiate surrender of many combatants and renunciation of the violent part of violent jihad by many terrorists through reconciliatory means. This has involved a deft politics of identity. It was an identity politics that allowed ‘terrorists’ to be redefined as ‘ex-combatants’ who were therefore eligible for ‘reintegration’ programs and benefits. These programs opened new legitimate opportunities as well as new identities (such as ‘businessman’, ‘fisherman’). These identities define an alternative path to that of survival through the exploitation of the illegitimate opportunities available to those with arms (for example, armed robbery, looting). The police were also, in the final analysis, willing to back that up with arrest supported by lethal force when they drew the fire of holdouts. In that final analysis, this restored some of the lost credibility to the police and to the rule of law in Poso. As in the previous chapter, this has been an accomplishment of a sophisticated, thoughtful combination of carrots, sticks and religious persuasion grounded in local knowledge. Mind you, there were many unsophisticated and thoughtless feats of enforcement/non-enforcement en route to that destination.

Finally, we would emphasise that five police officers living in each village post-conflict has been a large investment in community policing to smother the ignition of new sparks of conflict. This village-level policing is something we find to be missing in Solomon Islands post-conflict, for example (Peacebuilding Compared, Working Paper 7).

The police and the legal system more broadly continue to be tentative and ineffective in grappling with land and property disputes between returning refugees and those who used the war to advance longstanding land disputes. These include conflicts between land claims transmigrants ground in Indonesian law and indigenes base in adat law. Fundamental underlying tensions such as these have not been systematically resolved by transitional or post-conflict justice institutions.
Contests of principles

Clearly, a key contest was between Islamic and Christian principles, even though politically and economically ruthless men harnessed jihad and Jesus only because appeals to their principles accessed the power of religious organisations to mobilise citizens. Still, different kinds of sermons were involved in holy war (defending the faithful and the imperilled faith) and holy peace (loving thine enemies). *Maroso* was the transcendent principle of ‘brotherhood’ binding across religious and other divides, including gender.

Partisan alarmist scaremongering versus peace journalism was another contest of principles, present in other case studies of Peacebuilding Compared so far, but unusually important in Poso. As in Maluku and North Maluku, in Central Sulawesi, *gotong royong* and reconciliation versus disengaged retreat to the security of one’s family was an important contest of principles.

The cost

The total loss of life in Central Sulawesi was perhaps about 1000 (lower in Varshney et al.’s [2004:30] estimate of deaths to 2003; 2000 in the estimate of Brown and Diprose [2007:7, 35]). The government estimated in late 2001 that 7932 houses and 510 public facilities were burnt or damaged (HRW 2002:38), mostly in Poso District. In fact, in a 2007 interview, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Social Affairs said they had rebuilt 14 000 houses and were in the process of completing another 7000. So probably the estimates of losses released when the conflict was still not settled were underestimates with the intent of dampening any political ripples they might cause. Nevertheless, not only was loss of life much less than in either Maluku or North Maluku, in Central Sulawesi, the property damage—terrible as it was—was less than what occurred in either Maluku or North Maluku.

Preliminary conclusions

Poso is better known in the West than more bloody Indonesian conflicts such as North Maluku because hardline Islamic terrorists held out for longer in Poso and there were some international elements involved in the training camps they ran there. The reality, as the ICG (2005b) pointed out, was that the dozen or so militias from various parts of Sulawesi and Java that conducted jihad in Poso were descendants of Darul Islam more than of Al-Qaeda. Most of them were persuaded to return home voluntarily by some rather effective religious diplomacy, as in Maluku (Chapter 3). It took time, there was considerable
injustice and incompetence along the way, but by 2007 law enforcement ultimately proved effective in mopping up the considerable number of hold-out hardliners mostly associated with JI.

There is one especially striking difference between Poso and North Maluku. No-one has been prosecuted or imprisoned over the more horrific and widespread violence in North Maluku, yet this impunity has not been a source of resentment going into the future. In Poso, in contrast, perhaps more than 100 people on both sides of the religious conflict in the past decade have begun serving prison terms (or have been executed). On both sides in Poso, however, there has been continuing and extremely deep resentment that the worst criminals of the other side have not been punished. One NGO described the violence of 2001 in Poso as almost entirely revenge attacks by aggrieved communities (HRW 2002:42). On multiple occasions when alleged leading offenders in the violence have been arrested or charged there have been demonstrations (sometimes of thousands of people) in solidarity with them. There seem to be three reasons for this distinctiveness of Poso. Initially, the legal system showed extreme bias against Christians in terms of who was arrested and who was not. An irony was that many Muslims came to share the widespread view among Christians that the three who were sentenced to death were scapegoats. This was because the Christian defendants chose to defend themselves by producing a list of 16 Christians who were the ‘real’ generals or planners behind the scenes in the worst attacks on Muslims.

This second contingent difference between North Maluku and Poso fed into the more fundamental difference that the most radical jihadists from across Indonesia did not set up training camps and religious training in North Maluku. One of the reasons why they did in Poso was that there was so much resentment there over impunity. A multiplicity of unjust actions by the police—targeted more against the Muslim community in the later years of the conflict—made things worse. For example, after the 2005 Tentena bombings, Vice-President Kalla set the police a seven-day deadline to arrest the perpetrators! The deadline generated more than a dozen arrests of Muslims who ultimately turned out to be innocent (McRae 2008:227). Perhaps as many as 200 JI teachers were able to grow a little power base by amplifying resentment over the injustice of the state. While impunity (as in North Maluku) might be worse than principled justice, it could be a less dangerous option in terms of escalated conflict than law enforcement that comes to be seen by both sides as biased against their group. Some part of the inequitable punishment of suspects was in fact a problem of widespread judicial corruption (HRW 2002:44).

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18 McRae’s (2007:80) research suggested more than 150 and perhaps closer to 200 went to trial.
Like the conflicts in Maluku and North Maluku, the Poso conflict, at its source, could have been significantly about settler–indigene tensions, as opposed to religious ones. It is worth noting that many homes of Hindu transmigrants from Bali and at least one Hindu temple were also destroyed and four of the Balinese transmigrants killed (Irvan 2003). This incident in 2003 and earlier attacks on Balinese in November 2000 (Veitch 2007:131) occurred after outside mujahidin had become major players in the violence, so we could not just assume that indigenous resentments against Balinese migrants were involved. Like the attacks of Muslim villages on other Muslim communities that occurred so many times in the cases in this book that were supposedly Muslim–Christian conflicts, we interpret the attacks on Hindus as a consequence of an anomie that frees any group that resents another, for any idiosyncratic reason, from the constraint the normative order imposes on it in normal times.

As in Maluku and North Maluku with pela-gandong and hibua lamo respectively, in Poso, the indigenous brotherhood institution of maroso was at the heart of how reconciliation was transacted. The pragmatically dishonest tactic of blaming outside provocateurs for most of the serious wrongdoing was also common across these three cases. One of the problems of non-truth and reconciliation based on indigenous traditions of reconciliation is that while inter-religious solidarity among indigenes might well be re-established, this might be done in a way that creates in some ways a deeper divide and distrust between immigrants and indigenes. Many settlers have been wise enough to see this and have therefore adopted or bought into pela-gandong in Maluku, hibua lamo in Halmahera and maroso in Poso. As a result, these indigenous institutions are adapted through violence into more omnibus ‘unity within diversity’19 institutions for the particular history of one Indonesian place. Perhaps the literature on Poso should give more emphasis than it does to the post-conflict failure of law enforcement in resolving multitudinous micro-conflicts over land between settlers and indigenes. The challenges of reducing the injustice of unjust and unclear land laws, and improving the procedural justice with which distributively unjust laws are administered, seem ever present after armed conflict and usually are poorly tackled.

**Methodological conclusions**

Two ANU PhDs—one on North Maluku by Chris Wilson (2006), one on Poso by Dave McRae (2008)—converge in pointing to a tendency in the literature to identify dominant drivers and characteristics of a conflict from those that prevail either at its peak or its onset. The factors that cause a conflict can be quite different from those that sustain it, and those that diminish it might have

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19 This is a reference to the Indonesian national motto to that effect.
nothing to do with the factors that produced it. The characteristics of the long Poso conflict are very different at different stages: first, escalating riots without guns; second, attacks led by semi-trained militias joined by large crowds with homemade guns; third, furtive bombings of markets, buses and buildings and targeted assassinations. Motivations were at first about local political ambitions. Then, when those with the vaulting ambitions were discredited and fled, or were killed, conflict motivation shifted predominantly to revenge. Indigene-settler cleavages that were important early on were in time swamped by a religious cleavage that JI agitators persisted in prising open. While all the Chinese families were driven from Poso town once or twice during this conflict and many had their homes or businesses burnt and looted once or twice,20 anti-Chinese sentiment did not have the importance as a narrative of this conflict that it has had in most of our first set of 11 conflicts. Nevertheless, our interviews suggested it had some subsidiary presence. A first methodological lesson from Wilson (2006) and McRae (2008) is to attempt to tell the entire narrative without suppressing complexity concerning the changing and multiplex drivers and features of the fighting.

A second lesson for the Peacebuilding Compared project is that if religion is a key cleavage at one stage of the conflict and ethnicity at another, the project must code both as key cleavages. This is a different coding practice from extant quantitative research on civil war, which forces cases into single categories: this is a separatist conflict (never mind that Chinese are ethnically cleansed from a town along the way), that is an ethnic conflict, or it is a religious conflict. While coding always abstracts from the complexity of narrative, some coding strategies are more reductionist and uncompromising than others. Comparative methods can draw useful inferences when a large number of cases suggest an explanatory factor is a plausible explanation, even if in each of those cases the regional experts strongly disagree on the validity of the explanation. The imperative of the regionalist is to engage with these contests to argue for why their preferred set of explanatory factors is the right one. The comparativist, in contrast, can be more interested in probabilistic induction, wherein many factors (as in Appendix 4.1) can be coded as ‘contested but credible’, with a less authoritative status than ‘consensus’ factors. It is a better comparative method to code systematically all the ‘contested but credible’ explanations than to be the kind of comparativist who picks and chooses from the favoured interpretations of the regional experts that vindicate the comparativist’s theoretical predispositions. The serious comparativist, however, must engage sufficiently with the detail of each case to be able to make evidence-based judgments about what are ‘non-credible and contested’ explanations, because war zones are rife with wild rumours that give birth to them!

20 Sijabat (2003) reports one non-Chinese case of a refugee in Tentena who built three houses since the beginning of the conflict only to see each of them burned down.
On the other hand, in the Poso case, ‘non-credible and contested’ explanations, as well as some credible ones, are widespread when it comes to interpreting whether the courts are biased against Christians or biased against Muslims. This is similar to our Solomon Islands findings. The Solomons is the only case in our first set of 11 with a higher density of prosecutions per capita than Poso (Peacebuilding Compared, Working Paper 7). To date, in these two cases where post-conflict justice has been most prosecutorial, resentment over the injustice of the courts has been most intense. It has also been intense on both sides in both cases for utterly contradictory reasons! Why is it that in the very circumstances in which people are most angry about insufficient punishment of criminals on the other side, punishment of the other side has in fact been greater than in other cases? Obversely, in the two cases so far where there have been no prosecutions for conflict crimes—North Maluku (Chapter 3) and Bougainville (Peacebuilding Compared, Working Paper 6)—it is hard to find any semblance of community anger over failure to prosecute perpetrators on the other side.
### Appendix 4.1

Table A4.1 Summary of some codes, Central Sulawesi: 650 other variables are coded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural factors at root of conflict</th>
<th>Is this a ‘consensus’ factor among analysts or ‘contested but credible’ as a possible factor?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonialism of long duration stunts institutions, opens horizontal inequalities and disrupts trading relationships</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High proportion of jobs are in urban public sector, fostering competition to control patronage (van Klinken 2007)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmigration/immigration</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proximate factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian financial crisis exacerbates religious-group competition for scarce legitimate opportunities; poverty increases</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of New Order opens power allocations and the rules of the game to religious competition (Bertrand 2004)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political decentralisation increases religiously based patronage opportunities, further increasing politico-religious competition</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indecisiveness in deployment of security forces to protect civilians</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious bias and perceived inconsistency in law enforcement against militias</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security vacuum fuels a security dilemma, driving both communities into the hands of militias for protection</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflammatory, religiously segregated media</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key triggering incidents</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor fights in public space</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key war-making actors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District political and business leaders playing the religion card motivated by greed and criminal intent in capturing district government offices</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many local and imported militias (such as Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Jihad)</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah religious leaders advocating and channelling funds to jihad</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key peacemaking actors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adat leaders</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee, village, women, youth and NGO leaders</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers Kalla and Yudhoyono</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace journalists</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peacebuilding strengths</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local dialogue and reconciliation using adat; normal rituals of everyday life; mutual humanitarian and reconstruction help</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Central, provincial and district governments owning responsibility for security by leading Malino I peace agreement  | Consensus  
---|---  
Increased deployment of security forces and a new decisiveness in sending combatants home, arresting them and seizing weapons; more than 100 war criminals imprisoned  | Consensus  
Sophisticated multidimensional strategy of religious persuasion; carrots and sticks for various jihadist groups to withdraw/surrender; proffering exchange of ‘terrorist’ identity for ‘ex-combatant’ identity  | Contested but credible  
Final ultimatums and capture of most terrorist hold-outs through force in January 2007  | Consensus  
Security forces provide guarantees to combatants weary of fighting who hand in weapons  | Contested but credible  
Fairly quick resettlement of IDPs with support for building houses from government and international donors  | Consensus  
New informal norms to balance Muslims with Christians on political party slates  | Contested but credible  
Improved integration of top-down with bottom-up planning, which gives villages, then subdistricts, then districts, then the province a chance to plan budget priorities in a conflict-sensitive way; World Bank and UNDP leadership to assist with this  | Contested but credible  
Military involvement in gotong royong rebuilding houses in a way that gives them a stake in peace  | Contested but credible  
Community values of post-conflict religious tolerance  | Contested but credible  
Indigenous reconciliation traditions reinvigorated post-conflict  | Contested but credible  
**Peacebuilding weaknesses**  
Security forces’ indecisiveness during the early stages in establishing roadblocks, stopping combatants, preventing outside militias from arriving, seizing weapons and protecting civilians  | Contested but credible  
Early religious bias in prosecutions and later inconsistency, summary executions and perceived unwillingness to prosecute elite players  | Consensus  
Failure of community policing and the courts to deploy rule of law or adat to resolve disputes over opportunistic land grabs during conflict  | Consensus  
Corruption and embezzlement in local government  | Consensus  
Governmental and intergovernmental disengagement; national, provincial and district governments pass the buck on tackling the conflict in the early stages; no international engagement  | Consensus  
Religious leaders’ advocacy of peace collapses at the height of the conflict (but returns post-conflict)  | Consensus  
Weak NGO sector in Poso  | Consensus  
Limited access to trauma counselling for victims and combatants  | Consensus  
Reconciliation but no truth  | Consensus  
Malino peace process from the top down and lacking in participatory follow-through and resources  | Consensus  
**Key contested principles of peacebuilding**  
Violent versus non-violent jihad; on both sides, holy war versus holy peace  | Consensus  
Inter-faith dialogue and reconciliation  | Consensus
Peace journalism versus partisan alarmist scaremongering in journalism

| Maroso | Contested but credible |

Table A4.2 Numbers and types of people interviewed, Central Sulawesi case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected official, legislator/MPR/bupati</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leader of oppositional group</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adat/indigenous/village leader</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leader</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's NGO</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental NGO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development NGO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights/peacebuilding NGO</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NGO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business leader</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student/youth leader</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign government (ambassador, foreign minister of another country, USAID, etc.)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organisations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher/university academic</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim/refugee</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total interviews</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total people interviewed</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan

Crowds do make history, as the West Kalimantan case demonstrates. No-one was absolutely in control of the Kalimantan conflicts, as in the other ‘small town wars’ (van Klinken 2007) of Indonesia to varying degrees. Some of the West Kalimantan scripts and strategies for using violence to achieve objectives were emulated in Central Kalimantan and across Indonesia. While no-one quite planned the ethnic cleansing that occurred in Kalimantan, many harnessed it. Reintegration and reconciliation were thin with these conflicts. Perhaps this was because so many were content to harness the violence, including a wide base of the lower middle class who took over business niches occupied by the cleansed Madurese, organised crime interests and political aspirants who enrolled ethnic NGOs to their political aspirations. Folk devils can be particularly useful when it is crowds who are making history and when it is the shadow state (Reno 1995) more than the state that is seized by opportunists who mobilise the mob.

Background to the conflicts

Gold discoveries in West and South Kalimantan contributed to a limited integration of Kalimantan into the Majapahit (Hindu–Buddhist) Empire and the Malaccan trading system from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. Possibly fuelled by the flight of Malays from Malacca with the conquest of Malacca by Portugal, from the early sixteenth century, Malay trading sultanates spread Islam. The coastal non-Dayak subjects of these sultanates came to be known as Malay even though they included Arabs, Bugis and other ethnicities. Malays imported Chinese goldminers from the 1740s.¹ The Chinese established self-governing kongsis (associations of the miners’ union and associated farmers and traders) and paid taxes to their local sultan.

In the early nineteenth century, the British and the Dutch developed an interest in Kalimantan that had nothing to do with controlling or settling the huge island. Kalimantan sat between the sailing routes from India to China. The regional imperial powers were worried about hostile forces harassing their shipping from the coast. The British (in fact, the Brookes family business) particularly established posts on the northern coastal areas that are today part of Malaysia. The Dutch interest was in controlling the south and west coast that flanked the Java Sea. Pirates and anti-Dutch Chinese were specific worries.

¹ Leaders of the Chinese community insist there is archaeological evidence of Chinese presence in West Kalimantan from the thirteenth century.
The dominant west coast sultanates of Pontianak and Sambas acknowledged Dutch sovereignty in 1818. Coalmines in this area heightened Dutch interest in the mid-nineteenth century, even as goldmining declined (Ricklefs 1993:138). The indigenous societies, swidden cultivation (slash and burn) economies and non-agricultural economies that relied on mobile exploitation of wild sago, forest animals, birds, wild fruit and vegetables of the huge island were little touched by these tiny coastal settlements until the past century or two. In the twentieth century, Chinese traders provided a link between a dual economy of modest coastal enclaves of foreign-dominated plantations and resource extraction and indigenous subsistence economies upriver. Kalimantan is one-third of the landmass of Indonesia, but even after all the transmigration and logging exploitation since 1970, it still has less than 6 per cent of the Indonesian population.

Of the 11 million inhabitants of Kalimantan in 2000, four million lived in the province of West Kalimantan. The ethnic composition of West Kalimantan in 2000 was Dayak 34 per cent, Malay 34 per cent, Chinese 10 per cent, Javanese 9 per cent, Madurese 6 per cent and others 7 per cent (Achwan et al. 2005:4). Central Kalimantan, with a population in 2000 of 1.9 million, was at least 41 per cent Dayak, 24 per cent Banjarese, 18 per cent Javanese and 6–7 per cent Madurese (van Klinken 2007:131). Central Kalimantan under both Dutch and Indonesian rule was carved out as a Dayak province with the idea that it would be run by and for Dayaks. ‘It represented the triumph of “Dayak nationalism” against the domination of Islam, and one of the major unifying elements in the Dayak resistance was their pagan religion: Kaharingan’ (King 1993:163). Before the arrival of the first Malays, Kalimantan was a patchwork of different ethnic groups. Centuries of colonisation and anthropological labelling consolidated a shared identity of these indigenous groups as Dayaks, even though this omnibus identity was an invention of Europeans that Dayaks ultimately came to find useful for political mobilisation (King 1993:Ch. 2).

The coastal sultanates offered protection to upriver Dayaks from competing Dayak societies. Intermarriage occurred, so there was from early on some amiable symbiosis between Dayaks and Malays. We will see, however, that there was also exploitation. The sultanates competed with one another for trade with the rest of the world and regularly used piracy against the ships of their competitors to capture slaves as well as tradable goods. Dayak subjects were cast into debt slavery when they failed to pay taxes to the sultanates (King 1993:129). The sultanates also used allied upriver Dayaks in joint raids against their enemies to capture slaves. While the Malay settlers exploited Dayaks, they were able...
to divide and rule effectively, becoming too dominant an ethnic group for the Dayaks to ever think of subordinating through violence. There is irony, then, that finally in 1996, after centuries of subservience to Malay settlers, Dayaks rose up against Madurese, who had never forced them to be their vassals or slaves, and that the Malays should join them in ethnically cleansing Madurese. Perhaps it is less irony than vindication of Petersen’s (2002:25) hypothesis that ‘the predicted ethnic target will be the group perceived as farthest up the ethnic status hierarchy that can be most surely subordinated through violence’. As we will show, perhaps it is also a result of a particular history of cycles of resentment and revenge.

In 2007 and 2008, ethnic resentment remained very evident between Dayaks and Malays (Khalik 2008) in West Kalimantan, especially after Malay disappointment with the 2008 election of a Dayak as governor and a Chinese as deputy governor of West Kalimantan. This adds more mystery to why the war that did occur from 1996 was with Madurese.

Like the British in the north, the Dutch ‘ultimately secured respect for their rule, and instituted law and order, particularly through the institution of inter-tribal peacemaking’ (King 1993:152). The ‘main effect’ (Rousseau 1990:35) of colonial rule was ‘the disappearance of headhunting and warfare by 1910–25’. A decisive moment in that process was the Tumbang Anoi meeting of 800–1000 upriver Dayak elders in 1894. The meeting was called and funded by Dutch officials. According to van Klinken (2004:3), over two months the delegates ‘discussed and resolved hundreds of intra-Dayak vendettas’.

A difference between the conflict in West Kalimantan and those in Poso and the Moluccas is that its onset cannot be explained in terms of institutional uncertainty with the collapse of Suharto’s New Order. Violence against ethnic Madurese (Madura is an island off the north-east coast of Java) broke out between December 1996 and February 1997, during which estimates of deaths (overwhelmingly Madurese) ranged between 300 and 3000 (Achwan et al. 2005:2; Davidson 2008a:102). The HRW (1997) estimate of 500 seems the most credibly conservative. Further post-New Order outbreaks in January 1999 and in 2001 took another approximately 1000 lives. Varshney et al. (2004:30) found reports of 1515 deaths from collective violence in West Kalimantan between 1990 and 2003. Violence also exploded in Central Kalimantan in 2001, probably costing fewer lives than in the west, though at least 500 (Achwan et al. 2005:2), with Varshney et al.’s (2004:30) database recording 1284. In both provinces, indigenous Dayaks’ longstanding resentment of migrants from Madura motivated violence.

4 Perhaps one should not get too carried away with the import of this. Overall in Indonesia, on one estimate, there were more than 16 times as many deaths from political violence in the four years after the fall of the New Order than in the four years before (Farid and Simarmatra 2004:88). These data in fact seem to underestimate the difference in the numbers collected in the Peacebuilding Compared project.
A major difference between the conflict in the adjacent provinces, however, was that ethnic Malays executed the second phase of the West Kalimantan conflict to accomplish complete ethnic cleansing in the district of Sambas (apart from some Madurese women married to Malays). In Central Kalimantan, Malays did not attack Madurese and ethnic cleansing was not permanent. While the first violence in 1997 was more in the nature of Dayak rioting that got out of control, the 1999 Sambas violence was organised more centrally by Malays as a planned imitation of the 1997 Dayak violence.

All this grew out of longstanding Dayak alienation that had been manifest in a 1994 violent protest against the rejection of the favoured Dayak candidate for district chief in Sintang District. In 1977, there was Dayak–Madurese fighting that killed five and destroyed 72 houses and, in 1979, there was a flare-up in which 20 were killed and 92 houses destroyed (de Jonge and Nootenboom 2006:463). In 1983, there was a Dayak attack on Madurese migrants, leaving at least one dozen dead. Indeed there had been at least six other significant Dayak–Madurese clashes since the late 1960s, and perhaps more than a dozen previous clashes (Davidson 2002:218–25, 2008b:87–90; van Klinken 2007:56; Tomagola 2003:1). Incidents of rape were also important in many of the local accounts of resentment told to us, particularly rapes in the period immediately before the 1996–2001 outbreaks of violence.

In 1967, Dayaks had expelled Chinese from the interior of West Kalimantan. In this Chinese ethnic cleansing, Dayaks were coopted by the military who wanted to remove those Chinese from the interior who they believed were supporting communists.5 The most certain way to accomplish this was to drive all Chinese out of the interior of West Kalimantan. Perhaps 2000–5000 people were massacred (Davidson 2002:158) and probably a greater number died from the conditions in overcrowded refugee camps, including 1500 Chinese children aged between one and eight who died of starvation in Pontianak camps (p. 173). The Chinese retreated permanently to the major towns where they could conduct businesses without posing a threat to Dayak land rights. They were not attacked in any of the violence that began from 1996. As in all the first wave of Peacebuilding Compared cases with a history of Chinese coming under attack, the Chinese in West Kalimantan rarely resisted (though they had in nineteenth-century conflict with the Dutch, and in 1914). Instead, they fled.

One old Chinese man who fled to Pontianak in 1967 said that the Chinese did not even consider or discuss striking back at Dayaks as an option. This was because they were imbued with a philosophy of being a guest on other people’s

5 Some of the provocations of the Dayaks that we presumed to be the work of the military were crude. For example, stories circulated in Bengkayang of a Dayak traditional leader being killed in September 1967 and having his genitals sewn to a pole with a note in Chinese characters (Davidson 2002:150). In another case dubiously attributed to Chinese, a dead Dayak man’s severed genitals were stuffed in his mouth.
land to become a great trading diaspora. It was a philosophy of becoming powerful economically but not militarily. This was precisely why Suharto found Chinese economic power so useful; however great it grew, it would never pose a political threat to him, and his Chinese cronies would always be dependent on him for protection. The Chinese we met were generous in their attitude to Dayaks. We would ask if they had thought of getting their stolen houses back or compensation from those who occupied them. ‘No, those people are not as wealthy as me. They did me a favour in a way’ because he could become a much more successful businessman in Pontianak than he ever could have become in the interior. This man went on to say that while he was angry at first in 1967, he was not now and did not know any Chinese of his generation who was! Possibly it was because of this resilience and non-violence that many Dayaks felt sorry that they had been tricked into attacking the Chinese and they never attacked them again. As another Chinese businessman put it, Dayaks also learnt that successor ethnic groups such as the Madurese who replaced the Chinese were more aggressive in their dealings with the Dayaks.

In late 1967 and 1968, there were clashes between Dayaks and Madurese competing to seize land and other property abandoned by fleeing Chinese (Davidson 2002:214). Revenge killing was an important part of the cultural repertoire of Dayaks and Madurese (Smith 2005). Cycles of revenge that started in 1967, on Jamie Davidson’s (2002) account, were never satisfactorily reconciled. When the cycle hit a major upswing in 1979, the military finally paid attention, but it did so by

forcing both sides to sign an ineffectual peace accord and by erecting a gaudy, thirty-foot monument…In fact the statue’s ominous presence exacerbated the situation by monumentalising the conflict and by announcing to all that a ‘problem’ does indeed exist. (Davidson 2002:218)

Law enforcement officials became inured to Dayak–Madurese riots and gang fights and ignored them as long as they did not threaten elite interests, excusing enforcement neglect with stereotypes of either Madurese or Dayaks, or both, as inherently prone to violent cycles of vengefulness that could never be prevented. There was some truth in this aspect of the stereotypes. Dayaks and Madurese were more prone to resolve conflicts through violence than other ethnic groups in Kalimantan (de Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:462). One source of tension was that they were vengeful in culturally different ways. Madurese traditionally resort to *carok*—revenge killing with a sickle—in response to a serious incident

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6 Indonesian stereotypes of Madurese as vengeful because of their traditions of *carok* are compounded by a perception of them as intemperate, rude, arrogant, short-tempered, uncivilised, avaricious and insensitive. Stereotypes of the Dayak are of a kindly and tolerant people, who incline to extremes of running amok and headhunting only when extreme provocation throws them into a trance that renders them oblivious to violence.
of theft, insult or adultery. This can induce inter-family vendettas that last generations. Dayaks are also quick to resort to violence if insulted; however, it is important that the violence is transacted with bare fists, then reconciled, forgiven and forgotten. If a Dayak is killed by violence with weapons, ‘the whole clan will join in and violence can easily become communal’ (de Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:462). Madurese young men who thought they were engaging in interpersonal or inter-gang violence to settle scores did not understand this about Dayak culture. Madurese young men in this conflict never thought of themselves as engaging in inter-communal warfare and failed to understand that inter-communal warfare was precisely what Dayak warriors saw themselves as engaged with in response. When Madurese–Dayak violence erupted in 1997, it did so in the pre-1967 Chinese districts where these successor groups had competed to control land abandoned by Chinese (Somers Heidhues 2001:141).

Migration

Kalimantan was one of the top destinations for government-sponsored transmigrants and spontaneous migrants. The first transmigration started under the Dutch, but between 1986 and 2002 West Kalimantan received 407 047 transmigrants (Achwan et al. 2005:119). Madurese were overwhelmingly voluntary migrants rather than transmigrants (Nooteboom and White 2009) and they behaved differently than migrants from Java. They frequently eschewed transmigration settlements to work in the very plantation and logging industries that at the same time destroyed the forest on which Dayak livelihoods depended and that provided the limited employment opportunities open to Dayaks. There was also competition between Madurese and Malays over control of illegal businesses, the transport sector and town markets. Urban Madurese sought to monopolise sectors in which they worked, and pretty much did that with urban transport and markets in West Kalimantan and parts of Central Kalimantan. In West Kalimantan, most Madurese were better off than most Malays and Dayaks, though the gap was not huge. In such monopoly projects, they were aggressive and sometimes not reluctant to use violence to protect a monopoly. Dayaks believed that Madurese bribed the police so that they enjoyed impunity for such violence against Dayaks. Madurese were far from the largest ethnic group competing with Dayaks (and Malays), but migration made them by far the fastest-growing ethnic group (Bertrand 2004:55).
Part I: West Kalimantan

Describing the conflict

Major fighting begins

On 30 December 1996, at a music concert in Sanggau Ledo, a group of Madurese youth injured two Dayaks in a fight that revisited a previous altercation over a girl. Rumours spread that the two injured youths had died, which they had not. Dayaks marched on the town, burning hundreds of Madurese homes, markets and other property. Over the next two weeks, 1000 Madurese homes were destroyed and 20 people were killed (Achwan et al. 2005:16). Madurese in the provincial capital retaliated by assaulting Dayak women, burning Dayak homes and a school and other premises of a prominent Dayak NGO (Pancur Kasih Social Foundation). Roadblocks were set up and passing Dayaks were pulled from their cars, stabbed, shot or dismembered. The unfortunate thing for future escalation was that some of the Dayaks pulled from their cars happened to be revered elders from other parts of the province. These areas were then joined into the conflict in ritual escalation on 2 February 1997 as the ‘red bowl’ (of chicken blood) was passed from village to village to invite them to join a war on Madurese or face demonic wrath. By 5 February, ‘rituals to initiate the killing trance, menyaru’ tariu, signalled the mobilization of Dayak war parties to completely extinguish or expel the Madurese’ (Harwell 2000:202). In the killing trance, bodies were ‘occupied by the ancestral warrior spirits who controlled their actions’. Slaughter of women and children was not seen as something the warriors really chose to do because the spirits had occupied them with the mission of completely expelling all Madurese. ‘If you called the spirits to help then you have to surrender to what they want’ (Dayak interview; Harwell 2000:212). Harwell (2000:200) observes that ‘by using “traditional” methods of warfare, participants were not only fighting over culture, but fighting with culture’. Historically, the ritual unit in Kalimantan was the longhouse that managed a particular territory. The constitution of a ritual community of all Dayaks that mobilised trance and spirits for righteous severing of heads and eating of livers was a twentieth-century reconfiguration (Harwell 2000:210–11). Conflict raged until April 1997, by which time perhaps 500, mostly Madurese, had perished. Many Dayaks were armed with factory-standard rifles, some purchased across the border in Malaysia. Dayak children as young as twelve were involved (Linder 1997:2).

In 1998, Dayak elites turned the violence into a political opportunity. This seems to be a case of turning chaos to political advantage rather than creating chaos in order to secure advantage (which better describes the subsequent orchestration of violence by Malay elites). Faced with the possible consequence
of more violence, two district assemblies were successfully pressured in 1998 into selecting Dayak district chiefs. This worried the traditional Malay political elites in West Kalimantan, but they learnt from it, mimicking it in their own ethnic cleansing of Madurese in 1999 (Davidson 2002). Indeed, in various parts of Indonesia, ethnic elites picked up the Dayak strategy of seeking to bully their way to power through ethnic or religious violence once the New Order collapsed. This was encouraged by sensational coverage across Indonesia of the severing of heads and cooking and eating of livers of slain Madurese. It was unfortunate for Indonesia that this first of a sequence of cases across the country of mobilising ethnic or religious violence delivered local political power to a group of Dayak and Malay instigators of violence. It was unfortunate for those who subsequently mimicked the strategy in other parts of Indonesia, including Central Kalimantan, that it rarely delivered positions of local political power to them as militia leaders. More often it led to them being discredited, killed or occasionally imprisoned. One explanation for the escalation of armed conflict in Indonesia between 1997 and 2001 was that successful use of violence by Dayak and Malay militia leaders was emulated. An explanation for the sharp decline in violence after 2001 could be that the modelling of violence ceased after it repeatedly failed to deliver militia leaders to local political power in the cases that followed in the wake of West Kalimantan. So we might interpret the violence in West Kalimantan more as a contributor to the breakdown of the Indonesian normative order than as a result of anomie.

Malay modelling in the Sambas phase

The second round of fighting began in January 1999 in Sambas District in the north of West Kalimantan. It started between Malays and Madurese, with Dayaks joining on the side of the Malays. Some Malays beat a youth who had allegedly stolen a motorbike. The next day, a Madurese preman (semi-organised criminal) leader and the mother of the victim led an assault on a Malay village in which three Malays were killed and many wounded. Malays were dismayed that the police did not come to protect them. A group of adult Malay gangsters and business leaders with whom they were networked seized the opportunity to form a Communication Forum for Malay Youth. It took central control of the conflict on the Malay side and established neighbourhood militias who procured weapons, sharpened bamboo spears and produced homemade shotguns (Davidson 2008a). The forum helped Malays to speak with one voice on what they projected as the Madurese threat. When we asked senior local journalists if this was a case of gangsters using politicians or politicians using gangsters, we were told it was both. Late in February, there was another incident that triggered the violence the forum had been preparing for. In Sambas, a Madurese stabbed a Malay bus conductor. The violence escalated when a Dayak was killed.
in March, causing Dayak attacks on Madurese as well. Dayaks joining the fray against the Madurese greatly accelerated the confidence and tenacity of Malay violence.

Davidson (2008b:140) doubted that ethnic cleansing was initially the Malay plan but it evolved into a plan as the momentum of expulsions fed on itself. This fits Michael Mann's (2005:7) thesis that cleansing and slaughter are rarely the initial intent of fighters. Madurese were completely driven out of the Sambas District, 200–500 were killed and the rest fled to refugee camps in the provincial capital, Pontianak, to Madura or Java. One senior Madurese leader asserted that all levels of government had an interest in talking down the numbers killed. He said he was sure, and had case-by-case records to prove, that 3000 Madurese had perished in the old Sambas district alone. Malay Muslims destroyed dozens of Madurese mosques as well as homes. Rape, mutilation and beheading were included in the repertoire of violence to encourage flight (Davidson 2003:80).

Davidson (2008b:120) interprets the Malay mobilisation as an attempt to match the Dayak ethno-political resurgence that had been enabled by Dayak violence. The hope was that Malay violence would also work to support Malay ethno-political resurgence. ‘[A]s the Dayak example had shown, mass violence against a scapegoat can galvanize a movement, fortify ethnic identities, and deliver institutional power’ (Davidson 2008b:120). In all this, Dayaks were in fact the deeper competitors of Malays than were the Madurese. By emulating Dayak violence, ‘“Malay” could rightfully challenge “Dayak” for the attendant patronage and largess associated with the decentralized state’ (Davidson 2008b:120).

In Sambas, Madurese enjoyed considerable control over several sectors of the economy including the transport sector and most illegal vice and organised crime, including gambling, extortion and prostitution (Davidson 2002, 2003), and perhaps illegal timber (van Klinken 2006a) and smuggling consumer goods into Indonesia from Malaysia (de Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:462). It must be pointed out that Malays and Dayaks also had long had a presence in many of these illicit markets and their less successful organised criminals coveted the domains of Madurese control. The Madurese were more wealthy generally compared with other ethnic groups in Sambas than was the case elsewhere in Kalimantan, where Madurese were not particularly well off. One Madurese leader claimed that in spite of their lower numbers, Madurese owned more land in Sambas than Malays. Madurese did not pose a threat to Malay control of senior political offices, but ‘as long as Madurese thugs roamed and operated in Sambas, Malay elite domination would be tenuous at best’ (Davidson 2003:85).

West Kalimantan is a major centre of human trafficking because of its porous border with Malaysia. Women and children are gathered up from all over
Indonesia and exported through Pontianak. Pontianak could also be a transit node for shipping sex workers sourced across the country to other destinations in Indonesia. Most of the trade is in female domestic workers destined for Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia, but there is also a trade in women destined for sex work, mail-order brides, pregnant women trafficked to sell their babies for adoption, bonded plantation and factory labour. Migrant workers of all types suffer restrictions on their freedom of movement. Malaysian agents often give their passport to their employer or keep it themselves so the migrant worker cannot return home without their permission. Accumulation of debt, resulting in debt bondage, often leads women to become migrant domestic workers. Sexual harassment, abuse, exploitation and violence can follow. In West Kalimantan, there is a corrupt market for falsification of passports for underage girls (Misra and Inggas 2003:187). Refugees with little hope of return to their homes and jobs have created a large supply of families desperate enough to submit to the human traffickers. The trafficking trade is not mainly about local refugees, however, and it affects all ethnic groups in West Kalimantan (see Box 5.1). Human trafficking is integrated into Dayak stereotypes of Madurese as violent. Dayak parents are reported by Giring (2004:52) to scare their children with the admonition: ‘Beware, there is a Madurese. He will kidnap you. Don’t play in [a] far place.’

**Box 5.1 Human trafficking: one story**

Su Phin, a young ethnic Chinese girl from a small village near Singkawang, Kalimantan, was fifteen years old when an agent arranged for her to marry a Taiwanese businessman three times her age. The agent promised her parents R25 000 000 (approximately US$2500) for the contract marriage.

Her first few months in Taipei were fine. Su Phin and her husband spoke different dialects, but his parents taught her their language. They treated her well. It was only after the large wedding celebrations in Taipei that things started to change.

Her husband had lied about being from Taipei. The house that they had been living in for the past three months was rented. The family in fact lived in a small village in the countryside. He also lied about his employment. He was not a businessman but rather a minimum-wage factory worker. They all moved to his parents’ house in the village. Su Phin was told to clean the house every day and then work in the rice fields until the evening. She didn’t mind the work. She was determined to be a good wife and daughter-in-law.
Half a year later, Su Phin’s husband claimed he had been fired. He told her that he ‘sold her’ so he could continue to feed the family. Every night, he would take her to the brothel to which he had sold her. In a local nightclub, Su Phin was forced to sexually entertain men. If she did not entertain enough customers her husband would beat her.


The takeover of organised crime in Sambas from Madurese gangsters by leaders of the Malay militias of the Communication Forum for Malay Youth (Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu, FKPM) has had some negative economic consequences. Davidson (2002:328) reports some stories of Malay preman becoming so overzealous in their collection of extortion payments that significant numbers of Chinese businesses have left town. He also reports a problem of armed Malay youth who regard themselves as war heroes becoming a disorganised crime problem to match the organised crime problem of their older commanders.

In each of the next years (2000 and 2001), there were violent incidents in Pontianak, to where 70 000 refugees had fled from Sambas. The first riot was triggered by a traffic accident involving a Malay and Madurese. There was Malay community resentment about plans to settle the refugees permanently in Pontianak. In the worst riot in 2001, Malay and Dayak youth associations issued ultimatums to the refugees to leave within five days, which the Madurese refused to do. One effect of the riots was to drive Madurese out of businesses they had dominated in the capital. Their market stalls were burnt and their places in the market occupied by Malay traders. Malays also took control of their intra-city transportation business after the Madurese were driven out and Chinese took over the intercity transport. The private security sector was another area Madurese were driven from by the 2001 riots. Jamie Davidson (2002:344) attributes the October 2000 riots to the machinations of Governor Aswin, ‘a prototypical New Order general-cum-governor-cum millionaire unaccountable to the province’s populace’. Students, legislators and ethnic leaders were calling for his ouster and for reform. According to Davidson (2002:344), he responded by ‘calling upon figures of the city’s underworld to orchestrate the riot…vanquish[ing] his challengers, thereby rescuing his lucrative patronage network’. In effect, Aswin deflected those seeking to unseat him by playing the Madurese folk-devil card again and promising to be the defender of social order in the face of it. A Dayak crowd also attacked the provincial parliament building in protest over the candidates chosen to represent West Kalimantan in Jakarta
at the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR). The Dayak mob was confronted by groups of preman recruited by politicians (Achwan et al. 2005:24).

In this period there were also various political confrontations between Dayaks and Malays over control of the province. Some informants argued that the real political contest was over Dayak versus Malay control of provincial and district governments as reformasi in 1999 effected decentralisation away from Jakarta. Dayaks and Malays realised the other was too strong to subordinate them in West Kalimantan politics through violence. All the large ethnic groups—the Malays, the Dayaks and the Chinese—gained by seizing opportunities to take over Madurese businesses, to loot their stock, take their land or assume control of organised crime the Madurese had controlled. The Madurese were stereotyped as exclusive because most Madurese lived in exclusively Madurese communities and prayed at Madurese mosques. Because they were also stereotyped as disrespectful and thuggish in Jakarta as well as across all sections of Kalimantan society, they were the easiest target to subordinate through violence. Dayaks became a political force in a way that they had not been since the 1950s in West Kalimantan. While this was a threat to Malay political domination of the province, Malay gangsters connected with the political elite gained enormously from taking over organised crime previously monopolised by Madurese—from illegal gambling to people trafficking across the border into Malaysia—and the Malay independent trader class was the main beneficiary in taking over Madurese businesses. Hard-working, respectable Malay society and the Malay underworld that connected crime to politics were well satisfied with their spoils. Because there was in a sense a planned takeover of Madurese business rather than chaos and destruction, the economic cost of the conflict was less than in any of the first 11 cases of Peacebuilding Compared, except perhaps for the quick cleansing of Madurese from Central Kalimantan. The West Kalimantan economy grew 0.5 per cent even in the worst year of the conflict and in the wake of the Asian economic crisis in 1999 (Achwan et al. 2005:33). The violence also, however, had a negative impact on the economy of Madura, a region with high unemployment, which could not absorb the more than 100 000 refugees who arrived there.

Democracy was a loser in West Kalimantan. Thugs intimidating rivals and opponents of the candidates who paid them and thugs organising demonstrations brooding with violent threat became features of elections in West Kalimantan—more so than of politics before the violence and of politics in other parts of Indonesia. Thugs organising mobs to threaten the police when one of their comrades was arrested became more characteristic of West (and Central) Kalimantan than of Indonesia as a whole. Just as the business and criminal classes had divided the spoils of Madurese ethnic cleansing, Malay and
Dayak political elites delivered peace to the province through a power-sharing deal that in effect excluded all other groups from political office. In essence, the deal was that in areas where Dayaks and Malays were in equal numbers, one group would get the bupati (district head) and the other the deputy bupati positions. Where one ethnicity dominated, it would get both positions (Achwan et al. 2005:41). So in Sambas (after Bengkayan and Singkawang were carved out of Sambas as separate districts), the payoff for the Malay political elite from the conflict was essentially that only Malays could serve as bupati and deputy bupati. Indeed the only bupati they could possibly have after the conflict was the FKPM-backed candidate, the premans’ candidate. While Dayaks secured only four of the 12 bupati positions, this was better than before the violence, and Dayaks held seven deputy bupati positions by 2004.\(^7\) After 2005, when regional direct elections for bupatis and other chief executives came into force across Indonesia, the influence of ethnic power-sharing pacts eroded in West Kalimantan (Davidson 2008b:208).

Throughout the New Order, Dayaks, like Papuans, were regarded as ‘primitive’, unfit to govern and, unlike today, were never appointed as provincial governor of West Kalimantan (Bertrand 2004:54). They had also been excluded from top positions in the military and in government in Jakarta. This had not been the case under Sukarno and under the Dutch, when Dayaks were substantially trusted through indirect rule of their own land and held many senior positions throughout Kalimantan. While it was to Malays that Dayaks had lost most power in West Kalimantan, and the Dayak–Malay political tussle remains today the greatest long-term risk of serious future violence in the province, the largest waves of Madurese migrants arrived precisely when the New Order chose to demean and disempower Dayaks. This temporal association is one possible interpretation for the puzzling selection of the Madurese as scapegoats for Dayak grievances rather than the Malays (de Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:466).

Another part of the power-sharing settlement was to partition some districts into two—one to be controlled by Dayaks, the other by Malay FKPM cronies. The winning elites shared considerable spoils of political corruption, including from illegal logging, and divided up the remaining logging concessions to complete the rape of the forests. It seems a perverse kind of progress that through violence a Dayak elite received a share of the last profits from destroying the sustainability of the future of their brothers and sisters.

Van Klinken (2008:35) interpreted the violent cleansing of Madurese by Dayaks as a ‘theatrical manoeuvre’ designed to intimidate not only Madurese, but any non-Dayaks who stood in the way of a Dayak assumption of power in certain district

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\(^7\) Though not as good as the four out of the then seven bupati positions that Dayaks held in 1999 (Davidson 2002:271).
governments. Mobs initially inflamed by a sense of grievance, dispossession and revenge against Madurese were, on van Klinken’s (2008) account, quickly hijacked by Dayak militants who had long been close to the state. These Dayak district elites—‘second-rung government officials and aspiring officials’ (van Klinken 2007:125)—shared the ethnicity of the aggrieved mob, ‘but not their misery’. They harnessed the violence and followed its wake into power in districts that were still rich in timber. Then, on van Klinken’s (2008) account, they further increased their wealth in the black economy associated with the illegal timber trade, much of it controlled by Malaysian Chinese businessmen (Wadley 2005). For van Klinken, this first phase of the West Kalimantan conflict is therefore better explained by a ‘resource curse’ of lootable tropical timber than by grievance. On his account, forest resources were not a proximate factor in the conflict in the sense of fostering resentment among ordinary Dayaks, as advanced by Dayak activists such as John Bamba. Rather the lure of logs ‘weakened the state such that internal factionalism along ethnic lines led to violent conflict at a moment of political transition’ (van Klinken 2006b:193). The Malay versus Madurese part of the conflict was then about Malay elites close to the state imitating what they saw as a successful Dayak politics of violence. Malay violence also worked at first for these Malay political game players. It worked not so much in getting control of districts that still had lots of lootable timber, but in securing control of districts that had other illicit markets of greater magnitude than those of the rural districts grabbed by Dayaks.

Not only were electoral politics and the politics of the civil service captured by ethnic power sharing, so was NGO politics to a considerable extent. This NGO controlled by Dayaks received public funding as a response to their grievances, then that Malay NGO received government funding in response to theirs. Exclusivist NGOs connected with the circuits of exclusivist political power and provided platforms to launch Dayak and Malay political careers.

An element of complexity we must bring into the analysis at this stage is that neither the Malay nor the Dayak communities were monolithic in how they responded to the escalation of violence. A great number in both communities deplored it and many Malays and Dayaks acted on this belief by offering protection to Madurese neighbours, hiding them, tipping them off about impending attacks, helping them to get away and watching over their abandoned property.

The role of the security forces

The police came in for much criticism from Dayaks and Malays for protecting Madurese gangsters. Part of the justification of the conflict was about the need to take the law into your own hands when the authorities could not protect you against thugs. Madurese were also critical of Kalimantan-born police and
military for failing to protect them when ethnic cleansing began. In fact, some military posts did allow truckloads of Dayak warriors to pass on their way to purging Madurese communities in 1997, while others (particularly imported Javanese troops) stood in their way and on some occasions opened fire on Dayak raiders, killing an unknown number, but probably dozens. Similarly in Sambas District in 1999, there were incidents of the military (especially those who arrived from Java) firing to stop and kill advancing Malay militias, but ‘most of the time officials and local security personnel cooperated with the FKPM programme to expel all Madurese from Sambas’ (van Klinken 2007:61). Sambas district police and military chiefs and the bupati even attended the first FKPM (Communication Forum for Malay Youth) meeting. When the local security forces safeguarded Madurese property after assisting with evacuating them, it was often so they could sell it. As the Madurese were great cow-herders, these security force sales extended to thousands of Madurese-owned cows (Davidson 2002:312).

There was limited documentation of how many arrests there were after each phase of violence, but it seemed some but not most who were alleged to be ringleaders were prosecuted and that after the 1997 fighting 184 people were formally charged—eight with murder (HRW 1997). It was also clear that there was not the widespread sense of injustice about who was and was not imprisoned over attacks on villages that there was in Poso (Chapter 4). There was Dayak resentment, however, over what they saw as a long history of failing to prosecute Madurese criminals, indeed police protection of them, often as a result of bribes. One senior West Kalimantan political leader said that in 1997 the military decided not to put themselves at risk by getting between angry mobs any more than they had to be seen to. ‘Their attitude was: let the Dayaks and the Madurese, especially their criminal classes, give each other a bad experience, kill off many of their worst elements, and they will learn from the bad experience’ (Pontianak interview). When the conflict escalated to a point where it threatened the perception of their competence, the military became more concerned, especially when the chaos was used by those who wanted an Islamic state. At this point, the military counselled Dayak leaders about how catastrophic things could become if they burnt mosques; the Dayaks were quick to be sensitive to this. So one might say the military played a role in ensuring that an ethnic conflict did not morph into a religious conflict in the way that subsequently occurred in North Maluku (Chapter 3).

In 2002, after police attempted to shut down a gambling operation protected by the military, fighting broke out between the police and the military (HRW 2006:66).

A number of informants said that police intelligence about impending violence was more on the ball today than a decade ago. A senior police commander says
that a network of Dayak police who live in Dayak areas and Madurese police who live in Madurese areas is a critical part of an early warning system to defuse violence before it starts. Moreover, the police are quicker to mobilise to smother suspected sparks of conflict. In 2007, for example, there was an escalating Dayak–Madurese incident over a shopkeeper’s allegation that a customer had not paid. The customer returned with a mob from his community to sort out the shopkeeper. The police arrived quickly to stand between the two sides in the confrontation and convened a meeting of leaders from the two communities to calm everything down. There was no need to prosecute anyone because violence was prevented.

At election time, the police commander of the province calls all candidates into his office. He asks them all to sign a promise that they will not use ethnic division, violence or rioting to achieve their political ends. If they fail to keep this promise, which happens, he calls them in to remind them of the promise. Sometimes when politicians are playing the ethnic violence card, he calls political candidates to a meeting together with the media. He tells them in front of the selected journalists that he has intelligence that this is going on and that it had better stop, because if it does not, there will be prosecutions for the violence. The police believe these warnings work. Candidates worry that even the launch of a formal investigation by the police targeting a particular candidate will derail the election campaign of that candidate. In such meetings, foreboding expressions are used such as ‘political leaders are not immune from the law’. We asked in other parts of Indonesia whether police commanders adopted similar strategies and were told, ‘no’, this would be police going too far with involvement in politics. It is an interesting question whether this should be seen as overstepping the separation of powers in a democracy. Or should it be seen as applying principles of community policing to prevent violence with as much vigour against the political elite as against other segments of society? Adérito Soares, an ANU colleague and former Timor-Leste legislator, suggests it is a good thing to do, but it would be better for the election commission to do it, as has been his experience in Timor-Leste. The office of police commander is vulnerable enough to influence from political parties as it is.

Refugee resettlement

The UNDP has assessed the initial mobilisation to the violence by government agencies as quite responsive (Achwan et al. 2005:47). While the security forces only sporadically attempted to prevent assaults, they did manage the evacuation of refugees to camps away from the conflict zones safely and quickly. The provincial government initiated dialogues at district and subdistrict levels to manage the humanitarian disaster. The national government allocated R67 billion for relocation, temporary housing and basic needs of refugees. Each refugee family was allocated R5 million to assist with rebuilding. NGOs delivered
survival needs to refugees and some trauma counselling. Unfortunately, however, after the initial responsiveness of the state’s mobilisation, the medium and longer-term process of refugee reintegration bogged down badly, in the assessment of the UNDP. The R67 billion became an embezzlement honey pot. One on-the-ground research effort suggested that a maximum of one-quarter of the money allocated to building houses for refugees was so used (Davidson 2002:380). At least one prominent Madurese leader was centrally involved in siphoning off funds intended for desperate Madurese refugees (Bóuvier and Smith 2008:244; Davidson 2008a). Leaders of state agencies and NGOs with humanitarian responsibilities seemed more concerned with extracting their share of the loot than with collaborating effectively to make the best use of it. ‘Each agency followed its own agenda, which was often in direct contradiction to that of other agencies’ (Achwan et al. 2005:47). Because refugees were excluded from decision making, they could not demand the needed coordination. Médecins sans Frontières showed great leadership, but was actively obstructed when it attempted to push through the blockages to provide better sanitation in the refugee camps. Refugees International and the UN-OCHA wrote negative reports on refugee conditions and resettlement in 2003 and 2004 (Achwan et al. 2005:48). Various international humanitarian agencies including Catholic Relief Services, the International Organization for Migration, World Vision International, UNICEF and Save the Children helped with programs to provide basic needs and reintegrate refugees into livelihoods.

The fundamental problem remains, however, that most of the conflict areas have been unwilling to accept refugees back 12 years after the initial violence. In particular, there has been no return of refugees whatsoever to the district of Sambas. In interviews with Malay elites, the line was that Madurese would probably never be allowed to return to Sambas District, but their property would not be taken; it had nearly all been purchased from them at a fair price.8 A Madurese community leader, in contrast, claimed only 40 per cent of Madurese land in Sambas had been paid for by 2007, with most of the rest being used by others who had not paid for it. When one Madurese refugee returned to Sambas to negotiate the sale of his land, he was murdered and his body was not returned to his relatives.9 Since then no refugee has returned to sell their land. This weak bargaining context makes it a buyer’s market. Overwhelmingly now refugees fear returning to Sambas, but do sell their property for whatever they can get.

So the real failure of Indonesian governments at all levels has been to allow dialogue over post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation to not only

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8 In an email communication, Dr Timo Kivimäki of the National Institute of Asian Studies in Denmark said in 2007 that the Sambas district government had told him that 80 per cent of the Madurese land in Sambas had been sold.

9 This incident was mentioned in interviews. Jamie Davidson, in commenting on the draft, said there was more than one such incident.
exclude the voices of the Madurese refugees, but to suppress their interests by allowing the victors to do deals to share the spoils of Madurese suffering and exclusion. It was a dangerous precedent of unconstitutional ethnic cleansing for the new democracy. These victors were Malay and Dayak political opportunists, criminals and business interests (as opposed to the mass of ordinary Malay and Dayak citizens who quickly became deeply cynical of their winning elites). The Malay and Dayak elites at the resettlement and reconciliation negotiation tables mostly had the agenda of resettling refugees anywhere but in their own district and of frustrating efforts to mediate return and rebuilding of their homes. They had no interest in sitting down with Madurese for reconciliation meetings. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was so far off the agenda that it was an unfamiliar concept even to highly educated commentators. While non-truth and reconciliation characterised post-conflict dialogue in Maluku, North Maluku and Poso (Chapters 3 and 4), non-truth and non-reconciliation were mostly, though not exclusively, what happened in West Kalimantan.

Reconciliation

There were areas of West Kalimantan that had conflict without violence. Ketapang was one where it was claimed that the Dayak Customary Council effectively mediated disputes as they arose, using *adat* law, before they escalated into violence (Achwan et al. 2005:70). A comparative survey of satisfaction with ‘informal justice systems’ in the former conflict provinces of West Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi found Ketapang District was equal highest in satisfaction (UNDP 2007b:70). Davidson (2002:235) concurs that in many areas at many times since the late 1960s, ‘peace ceremonies kept minor incidents minor’, fostering a sense of finality after which Dayaks and Madurese can associate in limited but civil ways. Dayak culture has traditions of war-making and headhunting (which are quite separate phenomena), but also has rich traditions of peacemaking (Bamba 2004; Flavia et al. 2004). After the initial riot dissipated in Tujuhbelas subdistrict in January 1997, local government officials together with Dayak and Madurese leaders and the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas-Ham) convened a traditional peace ceremony and signed a peace accord. This unravelled after Madurese attacks on Dayaks in Pontianak later in the month (Davidson 2002:228). In February, the government, the military and police organised another round of traditional peace ceremonies with Dayak and Madurese elites from each subdistrict affected by violence. HRW (1997) described them as formulaic, using almost identical wording in pledges to uphold the unity of Indonesia sworn in each subdistrict. They were said to fail to engage Muslim religious leaders on the Madurese side and were elite oriented in a way that did not engage with

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Jamie Davidson, in commenting on the draft, doubted that it had anything to do with the council.
pacification of the masses who were angry on the streets. Davidson (2002:232–3) was critical of them for appropriating only Dayak traditions of peacemaking, reinforcing Madurese exclusion as the resented and intruding other who lacked any traditions of peacemaking worth incorporating into rituals. Some limited survey evidence suggested that most Madurese disagreed and few agreed that Dayak ‘customary law should be applied to non-Dayaks’ (Davidson 2002:243). Ceremonies also brought to the peace table the Dayak and Madurese elites most coopted by the state, not those with the greatest legitimacy (or the greatest pain). The result was peace pacts that made things worse. Not taken seriously, they were soon broken, resulting in mutual recriminations and allegations of bad faith (Davidson 2002:233–4).

The first post-conflict peace meetings between Dayaks and Madurese were conducted more than four years after the first wave of serious violence in March 2001 in Jakarta and Palangkaraya. By then, peace for Central Kalimantan was also on the agenda. Sponsored by the central government, the talks agreed on maintaining peace, strengthening law enforcement to correct the limp enforcement against violence in the past, investment in development opportunities and poverty reduction for Dayaks, revitalisation of adat and more regulation of migration to Kalimantan. This was a start at least and gave community leaders the confidence to test the water with reconciliation in civil society. Some Dayak leaders, mainly from Central Kalimantan, travelled to Madura for dialogue with refugees and invited their return. These, however, were mainly Dayak leaders from rural areas who wanted Madurese to return because development had suffered once Madurese businesses withdrew from their area. The government conducted set-piece, New Order-style reconciliation meetings, pleading for all ethnic groups to maintain the spirit of national unity. Participants in the meetings were senior government officials down to the subdistrict level, military and police commanders and Dayak and Madurese elites. They did not touch the hearts of ordinary people who often questioned the legitimacy of those who signed peace accords on their behalf. The ceremonies were not constructed on a foundation of reconciliation dialogue. Malay elites refused to sign any peace accord with the Madurese. At an April 2001 reconciliation conference in Pontianak among all ethnic groups, the Malay delegation even insisted that the word ‘peace’ be excised from the proposed title of the gathering, ‘A Deliberation for Peace’ (Davidson 2002:390).

Madurese ulamas have shown leadership in attempting to foster reconciliation dialogue. They have visited the Sambas District government offices and apologised for past violence and insensitivity of Madurese. The Foundation for the Sambas Riot Victims convened a dialogue among the conflicting ethnic groups in Sambas (Farid and Simarmattra 2004:79). As one Sambas NGO leader said: ‘It can be dangerous to speak out in favour of reconciliation, even for
the king [sultan], because the gangsters don’t like it, so people don’t do it.’ In Sambas, reconciliation failure has been the general picture; the UNDP organised one reconciliation meeting in Sambas to which only the Madurese, who had paid R175 million for their security, turned up.

The leadership of Christian churches for reconciliation seems to have been muted and devoid of energy. The Indonesian Congress of Women ran a campaign to show solidarity with Madurese refugees and provided humanitarian assistance for them. Other women’s NGOs that have attempted to show a path to reconciliation through community education and discussion have been the Peace Forum for Reconciliation and the Institute for the Empowerment of Women and Children (Achwan et al. 2005). The international NGO Search for Common Ground in Indonesia has assisted refugee children with coping with trauma while teaching alternatives to revenge. They also established a peace journalism centre and facilitated reconciliation meetings of Madurese and Dayaks in Java. The Dayakology Institute works with 12 community radio stations to promote peace journalism. The Pontianak Historical Assessment Center opened perpetrator–victim dialogues in Singkawang and Pontianak in 2000 and 2001. There is a view among human rights activists that most of these programs have had very limited impacts on reconciliation, with many members of all the protagonist groups clinging tenaciously to stereotypical views of their adversaries (Farid and Simarmatra 2004:79).

From 2001, Madurese schoolchildren started to learn Dayak studies as part of their curriculum. Dutch Government funding also supported a program that targeted homogenously Malay schools to study Dayak and Madurese cultures and homogenously Dayak schools to study Madurese and Malay cultures. Appreciation of the culture of the other began to emerge. Interviews in the Dayak community revealed appreciation of gestures from the Madurese community such as producing a big banner in 2004 that read: ‘Madurese community congratulates Dayak people for their celebration of the first harvest festival.’

Credit unions started as institutions of Dayak empowerment. The Pancur Kasih Credit Union was established in 1988 to support Dayaks with micro-finance and to foster Dayak investment in institutions owned by Dayaks. It had 270,000 members and a capital base of R137 billion by 1999 (Davidson 2002:255). Its success was modelled by other Dayak credit unions. Post-conflict, some of these institutions of empowerment became institutions of reconciliation. Today the Dayakology Institute has shifted the philosophy of the micro-finance movement from Dayak empowerment to multi-ethnicity and financial interdependence as a path to peace. The credit union movement is seen at the village level as helping Dayaks and Madurese to borrow from and loan to one another through shared membership and joint management of credit unions, though probably more so in Central than in West Kalimantan.
Interpreting the conflict

What structural factors were at the root of this conflict?

In the late 1960s in West Kalimantan and the late 1970s in Central Kalimantan, a process of decimating the forests on which Dayak livelihoods depended began as the central government started to issue 300 logging concessions across Kalimantan to Jakarta-based logging and plantation companies. Suharto crony and ‘timber king’ Bob Hasan came to be the leading figure in forest exploitation during the New Order. Smaller illegal logging operations, many owned by Madurese or Dayaks and protected by the security forces, also spread. Perhaps 2.5 million Dayaks were displaced from their traditional lands (Ricklefs 2001:394). Logging was not the only cause; there was also clearing for firewood and agriculture to support arriving migrants. This resulted in the worst fire in recorded human history in 1981, which burned for two years and destroyed 3.6 million hectares of forest (Ricklefs 2001:394).

Dutch indirect rule had interpreted all forest episodically used for slash-and-burn cultivation or for other purposes as ‘native’ land regulated by customary law (de Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:464). A series of law reforms, seen by the Indonesian state as modernising, laid the foundation for the destruction of the way of life of the Dayaks who depended on forests. The Basic Agrarian Law No. 5 of 1960 recognises customary law ‘as long as adat law does not conflict with national interests, as they are defined by the state’. The Basic Forestry Law No. 5 of 1967 decrees that a state forest is any area of forest on land that is not privately owned. Together these laws allowed the Suharto regime to ride roughshod over traditional Dayak communal land ownership, while recognising individual land ownership. The modernising and assimilationist policies of the central government towards the Dayaks were aggressive. They implored Dayak people to move from their longhouses in remote rainforests into modern Indonesian-style villages. Partly this was about the developmental objective of rendering the delivery of services such as electricity cost effectively. Partly it was about concentrating them where the eyes of the state could more readily maintain surveillance and control over them (Scott 1998). That ‘villagisation’ was partly a project of cultural imperialism was manifest in the fact that villages were given Javanese names rather than the ‘original’ names of these groups and places in indigenous language (Giring 2004:52). The juridical foundation of this was the 1979 Village Government Law No. 5 that laid down uniform rules for the governance of all Indonesian villages. The law made Dayak village heads accountable to the head of the subdistrict rather than to the members of the village. The state alienated these leaders from adat. The people became alienated from leaders who were seen as captured by the dark forces destroying their way of life. Part of the fallout was that traditional Dayak courts ceased to function,
replaced by Indonesian courts that people were afraid to use and resented using. This undermined indigenous conflict-resolution competence, something that was needed to steer the forest mismanagement that was a structural cause of the conflict and to transact peacemaking and reconciliation once conflict had broken out.

West Kalimantan scored highest of all provinces in Indonesia on the Human Poverty Index at the beginning of this decade, though on the broader Human Development Index it was not a long way below the national average (Achwan et al. 2005:4). It was a province in which natural resource development created opportunities for many of the settlers who arrived in Kalimantan from elsewhere, but bypassed Dayaks. Hence, migration, the seizure of legitimate opportunities for development by migrants and the blockage of non-violent legitimate opportunities for Dayaks were structural drivers of this conflict.

Van Klinken (2007:40–2) made the interesting point that the most unstable places after the collapse of the New Order were places where de-agrarianisation had come latest and most rapidly. West and Central Kalimantan were the two Indonesian provinces with the fastest rate of de-agrarianisation in his data set between 1979 and 1990 (and also in the three decades from 1971). Remember, de-agrarianisation is the rate of increase in the proportion of the working population that is not in agriculture. It is not completely about urbanisation. It is also partly about the penetration of town life into the countryside—workers who live in the countryside but work in non-agricultural jobs. Van Klinken’s incipient idea is that there could be a parallel with transition to democracy being structurally conducive to armed conflict rather than being a democracy. So it could be that transition to non-agricultural economic institutions might be more conducive to violence than being a non-agricultural economy. Just as conflict is more likely when the rules of the game for control of the national polity are in flux and undefined, conflict is also more likely when control of town economies is up for grabs and poorly institutionalised. Violence is one of the possibilities for laying down new rules for local monopoly, local extortion and local patronage. Small-town economies can become criminalised and cliental at times of rapidly expanding illicit opportunities when the rules of the game for capturing the local state are open for contest, or at times of setback after the expansion of illicit opportunities.

The Kalimantan conflicts were certainly about who would control non-agricultural jobs; their effect was to ban an ethnic group from certain employment sectors in towns that it had previously monopolised. The high levels of migration from Madura, Java and elsewhere in recent decades could be part of what built up the non-agricultural economy; indeed this was part of the intent of transmigration as a modernisation policy. Rapid non-assimilation of large tranches of migrants could have been a factor in the conflict. Several
informants said those Madurese who had been in Kalimantan for a long time had become respectful of Dayak custom; it was recent arrivals who showed open contempt for Dayak ways and did not make an effort to be polite, in their view. Van Klinken (2007:42) wondered whether recent rapid de-agriculturalisation might explain why West and Central Kalimantan had ethnic conflict while an equally ethnically diverse province such as East Kalimantan did not (though East Kalimantan did experience high levels of tension that almost led to violence in late 2001 and November 2005 and caused 10–15 per cent of the Madurese population to flee in anticipation) (de Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:469). East Kalimantan had the third-lowest de-agriculturalisation in van Klinken’s data set because it had de-agriculturalised earlier. While van Klinken interprets this as an effect that is about competition for non-agricultural jobs, de Jonge and Nooteboom (2006:471) reverse this lens to point out that competition from Madurese for Dayak traditional lands for agriculture had been a major source of tension in West but not East Kalimantan. Peacebuilding Compared interprets both as ‘contested but credible’ interpretations.

Following the scholarship of Harriss-White (2003) on the unorthodox idea that in small-town development ‘an economy might become dominated not by the rich but by the much more numerous lower middle class’, van Klinken (2007:46) sees these intermediate classes as well organised—often ethnically organised—to dominate the apparatus of the state at a local level. The lower middle classes fix the prices of intra-town and inter-town transport, regulate the town economy to create artificial scarcities, drive competitors out of markets in vice and corrupt state officials. They corrupt officials in order to perpetuate their domination of those markets and of government contracts and jobs for their families in government. The increase in illegal logging since the fall of Suharto illustrates this possibility well (Casson and Obidzinski 2007). During the New Order, the military patrolled logging to ensure only cronies favoured by Suharto benefited. After the New Order, the security sector became available to be paid by local businessmen to allow exploitation of forests. Decentralised regulatory control over forests also meant local businessmen could bribe and lobby local politicians to look the other way as they destroyed the remaining forests of Kalimantan (Casson and Obidzinski 2007).

What have been the proximate factors in the conflict?

As argued above, a resource curse, particularly with illegal logging (though not as much as in Central Kalimantan), opened up a violent struggle over access to illegitimate opportunities. Illegitimate opportunities to control organised crime were also proximate factors in the conflict. Organisation was mobilised to seize a variety of illicit opportunities. Grasping them became more thinkable for the criminal classes, the lower middle (trader) classes and local political elites when the collapse of the New Order left all the rules of social and political ordering
unsettled. Decentralisation opened up new kinds of opportunities from 1999 for Malay and Dayak elites to control district shadow governments that managed markets, government contracts, transport and vice. NGO politics becoming ethnically organised was not an insignificant factor in the conflict.

Weak and inconsistent law enforcement after inter-ethnic fighting, arson and rioting were proximate grievances on both sides, but especially on the Dayak side. Corruption of law enforcement officials was part of this problem.

When major violence erupted, fearful and incompetent deployment of security personnel to get between rampaging mobs and their victims, and intelligence failures to alert the state to impending mobilisation of mobs, were proximate factors.

What were the key triggering incidents?
Fights that broke out between young men—for example, over a girl, a stolen motorbike, alleged non-payment for goods in a shop—that did not necessarily have an ethnic meaning of salience were the recurrent triggers. In one crucial instance, a motor vehicle accident dispute was a trigger.

Who were the key war-making and peacebuilding actors?
Gerry van Klinken, whose work is extensively cited above, might say the key war-making actors here are district shadow governments-in-waiting (see Reno 1995). We have characterised them as coalitions of aspiring political leaders, gangsters and businessmen. Some individuals were all three of these simultaneously. These local elites saw an opportunity that initially probably arose spontaneously (though not in the case of the second Malay round of attacks) to acquire power through ethnic power sharing. They mobilised through Malay and Dayak ethnic NGOs such as the FKPM. So the mob mattered, the crowd did make history here—history from which aspiring shadow governments in many other parts of Indonesia learned and tried (much less successfully) to apply. The mob was motivated by ethnic hatred, on the Dayak side by feelings of being disrespected and humiliated, with Madurese standing for all the deeper forces that were disintegrating their traditional way of life. Loot was a very secondary motivation for them. Much of the handiwork of the Dayak and the Malay mobs was more expressive than instrumental. It was, however, at the same time an instrumental struggle for ethnic recognition pursued by elites and an expressive plea for recognition from poor perpetrators in the mob.

Between the mob motivated by grievance and the shadow government-in-waiting motivated by greed, there was the lower middle class. They were not key instigators of the slaughter, but they have been the longest-term beneficiaries of it. So they became crucial in resisting reconciliation, especially in Sambas.
Harriss-White’s (2003) idea is that small-town economies can be dominated more by a very numerous lower middle class than by the rich. In West Kalimantan, van Klinken is surely right that this is an interesting idea, as the lower middle class has been well organised—and ethnically organised—to dominate by fixing prices of transport and other services.

Inspiring reconciliation leaders are harder to find in the West Kalimantan case than in any of the first 11 cases that will make up the first four volumes of the Peacebuilding Compared project. There have not been major provincial or national religious leaders, political leaders or military leaders who have taken large steps towards peace and reconciliation. There are, however, many local religious leaders, NGO leaders and village leaders who have helped reconcile Madurese, Dayaks and Malays back to harmoniously living and trading together in particular localities. Dayak leaders in some areas reconciled using customary peacemaking before escalation to killing occurred. The best we can say about the military is that some military officers deployed their troops to prevent violence from being worse than it might have been in some localities.

Peace journalism has been given some impetus in West Kalimantan by the establishment of the Betang Media Centre to educate about peacebuilding initiatives and prevent distorted information from dominating the local media. The centre has representatives of all ethnic groups including Madurese.

**Motivational postures of key actors**

For the elites and perhaps for the lower middle classes of West Kalimantan, this conflict was more about greed (and *game playing*) than grievance (and *resistance*). For the youthful mob, it was more about grievance, with some elements of motivation by excitement and loot. One-in-all-in cultural norms reinforced by rituals such as passing the red bowl that engendered the motivational posture of *commitment* to *adat* authority on a wide front were also important to understanding the psychology of the youthful warriors. The masses were also motivated by *resistance* to incumbent local governments and their security apparatus because of their part in humiliating Dayaks and disrespectfully dismissing their grievances. This mass *resistance* was in the cause of asserting the dignity of Dayak (and later Malay) ethnic identity.

The military showed weak *commitment* to the Indonesian constitution, in effect collaborating in the permanent ethnic cleansing of Sambas. There was a great deal of unprofessional *disengagement* on their part. *Game playing* was also an important part of their repertoire, when they seized opportunities to pretend to protect Madurese property so they could sell it and when they extorted payments to escort terrified Madurese citizens to safety.
Malay lower middle classes were also *game players* in the way they seized opportunities to take over control of markets, transport monopolies and land, as were Chinese businesspeople in taking over inter-town transport, Malay gangsters in taking over organised crime and Malay and Dayak politicians in taking over district government offices and proceeds from illegal logging and other rackets.

Early in the conflict, Madurese youth and gangsters overestimated their power in the localities where they attacked Dayaks. They did not have the imagination to see that their local, mostly non-ethnic, fighting could be seen in a wider frame of ethnic politics that would lead to their certain defeat. Suddenly, when they saw this wider interpretation of ethnic war, the entire Madurese community *capitulated* and fled. Later, West Kalimantan society as a whole *capitulated* to the powerbrokers of ethnic politics who carved up political offices between those anointed by the violent men in control of Malay and Dayak militias. The most structurally remarkable *capitulation* to the bicultural power sharing was of the Chinese. They were the third-most numerous ethnic group in the province, more numerous than in any province of Indonesia, by far the most economically powerful ethnic group and by far the group with the most influential political connections to the decisive levers of power in Jakarta. Those levers were never pulled in Jakarta, where elites were preoccupied with their own problems. More remarkably, the Chinese never even tried to call in a more interventionist Jakarta or to question locally the power-sharing deal in which all ethnic groups other than Malays and Dayaks were excluded from the highest offices. We might say that the most remarkable facts about West Kalimantan were the *capitulation* of the commanding heights of national political and economic power to local ethnic political authority. Perhaps emerging political parties in Jakarta hoped to recruit the new shadow governments of West Kalimantan districts into their fold, figuring it was better to harness them than to resist them, though we collected no relevant evidence in this project. To *capitulate* to permanent ethnic cleansing of an ethnic group from one large district of the republic was a major constitutional capitulation by Jakarta.

Beyond the trampling of human rights in this terrible crime against humanity, the other tragedy of West Kalimantan was the legacy of a provincial polity of utter citizen *disengagement*. Most non-Madurese were terrified by the events happening around them, petrified that they might be mistaken as Madurese (when such judgments were being made based on how people smelled) and just relieved that their families were not being beheaded. So they *capitulated* to and *disengaged* from a post-conflict corruption of democracy in which only the favoured candidates of the two armed ethnic groups could assume power. As a result, the children of West Kalimantan inherited corrupt, extortionate
government that supported a shadow government of gangsterism, fixed prices, fixed contracts and contrived shortages to keep inflated prices flowing from the pockets of ordinary folk to the custodians of the shadow government.

Poor Dayaks therefore remained more disengaged than ever from their government when they were betrayed by their own game playing elites who cashed in on illegal logging at the cost of survival of traditional Dayak ways of life and forest culture. At the same time, the flexing of their muscles continued a revival of commitment to a Dayak identity. While pride in the Indonesian polity was hardly restored among Dayaks by these events, pride in Dayak identity and rituals was promoted and a more assertive spirit of indigenous rights emerged.

**Peacebuilding strengths and weaknesses**

Apart from tiny pockets of valiant work by NGOs, peace journalists and ethnic and religious leaders at a very local level, there is little peacebuilding strength to identify from this case. International, national, provincial and NGO engagement with peacebuilding was thinly resourced and energised in this case compared with others in the first set of 11 Peacebuilding Compared cases. Dayak and Malay remorse over the slaughter is not widespread—a sharp contrast with widespread remorse in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku. Rather, the common feeling is that what happened in Kalimantan was unfortunate but necessary. Dayaks mostly are now very willing to allow Madurese to return as long as they understand they will be ethnically cleansed again if they return to criminal victimisation of Dayaks and disrespect for their culture. Malays mostly feel they cannot face even the possibility of having to cleanse the Madurese again, so they think permanent cleansing is unfortunate, but just and right. Malay fighters possibly might have just as permanently driven Madurese from Pontianak as they had from Sambas had the military not resisted this in Pontianak. This final dispensation is a huge defeat for reconciliation and for building a human rights culture in Indonesia. It is also a demonstration that reconciliation is unlikely to work unless the conflicting sides can muster respect for the culture of the other and find a dignified space for that culture in reconciliation processes and rituals.

More than in other parts of Indonesia that suffered ethnic conflict, in West and Central Kalimantan, violence worked in advancing the political and business interests of many who promoted it. The legacy of poor leadership that has fallen out of this grab for power and the persistence of thuggery in politics are continuing vulnerability to conflict. The comparatively powerful position of organised crime in the province is part of this problem, which requires law enforcement attention. The law enforcement corruption that is the status quo also remains a conflict vulnerability.
Embezzlement meant that refugees got a terrible deal in terms of humanitarian assistance. Those who returned to Madura experienced great poverty because of the overcrowding and absence of economic opportunity there. Many sold daughters as exported domestic workers. Little trauma counselling was funded.

**Contests of principles**

An animating principle of this conflict was Dayak indigenous identity. The mass of Dayak fighters on the street saw themselves as asserting Dayak empowerment, Dayak rights to decide who would and would not be guests on their land and to demand respect for Dayak custom (Davidson 2008a). Identification with historically more important and longstanding identities associated with Dayak language groups or Dayak longhouses was not important. Very important in the early stages of this conflict were Dayak NGO entrepreneurs of Dayak identity formation. This was not a contest of believers in Dayak identity and devotees of Madurese identity. Madurese attacks were not mounted in the name of defending Madurese identity in any important sense. There was, however, a contest between Dayak and Malay identity. Moral entrepreneurs of Malay indigeneity emerged when they saw the political claim that Dayak indigeneity was effectively staking (Davidson 2008b). The real contest for political power here was between Dayaks and Malays. Each was too strong to be attacked by the other. Each energised their own sense of in-group identity by attacking the same out-group, and both staked their claim for political representation by violent proclamation that they were indigenous sons of West Kalimantan’s soil. Colonially concocted though the identities ‘Malay’ and ‘Dayak’ were, they did come to have such deep meaning to ordinary people that they could see killing as just when it defended indigenous rights so defined.

**Table 5.1 Summary of some codes, West Kalimantan: 650 other variables are coded**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural factors at root of conflict</th>
<th>Is this a ‘consensus’ factor among analysts or ‘contested but credible’ as a possible factor?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racism towards Dayaks under Dutch and Indonesian governance</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural inequality that disadvantages Dayaks in their own land</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation of Dayak customary law</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logging and agriculture that destroy traditional Dayak economy</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Villagisation’ from traditional longhouse villages to large Indonesian-style villages</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmigration/immigration</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rapid de-agrarianisation in recent history (van Klinken 2007)</strong></td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proximate factors</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Collapse of New Order opens power allocations and the rules of the game to ethnic competition (Bertrand 2004)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lure of the illegitimate opportunity of taking over Madurese organised crime and taking over Madurese legitimate businesses and land</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource curse—lure of lootable logs (legitimate and illegitimate opportunity constitution)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown of Dayak trust that executive, legislature and courts will hear their grievances</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO politics becomes increasingly ethnically organised among Dayaks and Malays, thereby providing an organisational base to mobilise ethnic violence</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madurese constituted as folk devils by racist exaggeration, false rumours, self-fulfilling prophecies and other dynamics of moral panic (Cohen 1972)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicious circle of revenge escalating revenge</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indecisiveness in deployment of security forces to protect civilians</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived weakness, corruption and inconsistency in law enforcement against murderers; law enforcement becomes inured to the repeated Dayak–Madurese gang fights and rioting</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key triggering incidents</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth fighting over a girl, a stolen motorbike, alleged non-payment in a shop, traffic accident</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key war-making actors</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Young Madurese toughs seeking local dominance and excitement through retribution, with no thought that they are initiating a war of ethnic cleansing</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leaders, businessmen and gangsters playing the ethnic card to capture district governments and shadow governments</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young men and boys who organise themselves into Dayak and Malay militias to seize the historical moment on behalf of their ethnic group</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay and Dayak ethnic NGOs such as the Communication Forum for Malay Youth (FKPM) provide an organisational foundation for mobilisation of violence</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key peacemaking actors</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local community Dayak and Madurese leaders, including adat and religious leaders, who prevent conflicts from escalating to ethnic cleansing</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some local multi-ethnic NGOs with a reconciliation agenda and a humanitarian agenda of assisting IDPs</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace journalists</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding strengths</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pockets of local dialogue and reconciliation using local adat</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heightened recognition post-conflict of Dayak marginalisation as a social problem</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace journalism</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit unions shifting from ethnically exclusive membership to a conscious post-conflict policy of ethnically plural membership with the intent of creating ethnic interdependence through micro-finance</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<th>Peacebuilding weaknesses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security force indecisiveness and extortion</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak and inconsistent pre-conflict law enforcement against violence and post-conflict impunity for elite players</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic cleansing allowed to become permanent in Sambas; slow and partial return of refugees elsewhere</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and embezzlement in government (including aid for refugees and law enforcement)</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government and international disengagement from conflict prevention and reconciliation</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Only limited integration of respect for Madurese culture into peacebuilding rituals</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak NGO sector in terms of NGOs that are not ethnic NGOs</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited access to trauma counselling for victims and combatants</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-truth and non-reconciliation apart from pockets of local reconciliatory leadership</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and immiserisation for refugees stuck in Madura</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding not multi-stranded and multidimensional in the way it was, for example, in Maluku</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
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<tr>
<th>Key contested principles of peacebuilding</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dignity of indigenous Dayak and Malay identities</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom of movement of Indonesian citizens as guaranteed in the Indonesian Constitution</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
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Part II: Central Kalimantan

Describing the conflict

Major fighting begins

Four Madurese men were killed by a group of Dayaks near Sampit, Central Kalimantan, on 17 February 2001 and some Madurese bars and houses were destroyed. The attackers were relatives of a man who had been killed allegedly by the four dead men in a gambling dispute months earlier. The next day, a Madurese mob burned a dozen houses associated with the Dayaks who had killed the four Madurese. They also killed 14 Dayaks. By 19 February, Dayak informants said, Madurese gangs were in control of Sampit, where Madurese formed a majority and controlled much of the timber industry and other business. Madurese accounts dispute this (Bóuvier and Smith 2008). On many Dayak accounts, Madurese youth rampaged through the city with banners that said things such as ‘Sampit is the second Sampang’ (a reference to a town in Madura) and shouting slogans about Dayaks being cowards—all of which was interpreted by Dayaks as great provocation. Some Madurese accounts contest the existence of the ‘Sampit is the second Sampang’ banner, or say it was put up by Dayaks to incite resentment (ICG 2001:4–5).

Boatloads of perhaps more than 1000 Dayak warriors arrived in the city from rural areas upstream on 20 February 2001. Many seem to have been recruited from goldmining and logging gangs that enjoyed corrupt relationships with certain military officers and that in some cases had been in competition with Madurese. HRW (2001a) and the police alleged that two senior district officials who believed they were going to lose their jobs in a restructure of district government paid R20 million to two ‘coordinators’ to start the violence in Sampit (Bubandt 2004a:14–15). The warriors began to slay Madurese with traditional Dayak swords in Sampit and surrounding rural areas and smaller towns, beheading many in a conscious campaign intended to effect fear and flight. Some Dayak villagers who were trying to protect Madurese were also killed (Smith 2005:5). The next week the violence spread to the provincial capital of Palangkaraya and by March almost all Madurese in the region of these two cities had fled. In April, it spread to Pangkalanbun, by which time there were 100 000 Madurese IDPs (Achwan et al. 2005:23). Bouvier and Smith (2008:231) put the total number of Madurese forced out of Central Kalimantan in 2001 at more than 150 000. Thousands of Dayak men were involved in the ethnic cleansing. Months before the February 2001 incident that escalated into this provincial conflagration, there had been other incidents of serious violence, such as a deadly December 2000 Dayak–Madurese brawl in the karaoke bar of a brothel, followed by hundreds of Dayaks destroying at least four Madurese-
owned karaoke bars (ICG 2001:3) and predictions that more organised violence by Dayaks would occur if key alleged Madurese perpetrators of previous incidents were not arrested, which they were not.

The ICG (2001) reports 469 deaths from the Central Kalimantan conflict of 2001—456 of them Madurese. Interviewees in the province consistently thought this was too low, feeling official figures kept the numbers artificially low and generally believing more than 1000 and often several thousand had been killed (Achwan et al. 2005:33; Smith 2005:17). Van Klinken (2007:124) sees the credible estimates as ranging from 500 to nearly 1300. Much of the reporting in the Indonesian media seized on the large number of Madurese who were beheaded, fitting this to a script of headhunting resurgence by primitive Dayaks. While we will never know quite how bloody the Central Kalimantan conflict was, it was over in two months. And it was a rare case in which the economic impacts of the conflict were not large. Of course, they were large for more than 100 000 Madurese refugees. Whether because the conflict redistributed some assets and opportunities from them to the poor Dayak majority, or for some other reason, Central Kalimantan experienced a slight increase in its position on the Human Development Index between 1999 and 2002, moving up one place in the ranking of Indonesian provinces (Achwan et al. 2005:35).

Sampit police reported to Claire Smith (2005:17) that property crime fell 30 per cent after the flight of the Madurese. Violent crime, however, increased 20 per cent, which was attributed to immediate post-conflict unemployment, post-conflict trauma, alcohol abuse and Dayak young men carrying weapons in a way they had not done before 2001.

Refugee return and reconciliation

Anti-migrant laws were passed in Central Kalimantan in the aftermath of the conflict. In the first few post-conflict years, returns of Madurese refugees were modest, as central government financial aid for return began to flow only in 2004. Returning families received R3 million (US$310) plus R500 000 per family member to assist travel and rebuilding. Payments to intermediaries were, however, required for refugees to get hold of this money. A number of returned refugees interviewed said they had received nothing. Corruption in various programs designed to assist refugees was on a formidable scale. In some areas, it was common for returning refugees to make hefty payments to squatters to get their property back (Bóuvier and Smith 2008:246), and some returned to Madura because they could not afford these.

By June 2005, about 80 per cent had returned (Achwan et al. 2005:29). About 80 per cent was still the most commonly mentioned figure in our 2007 interviews, though no-one was certain. This was a much better outcome than
for West Kalimantan. One difference was that the Central Kalimantan provincial
government established a policy that, in general, refugees had a right to return—
something the West Kalimantan government never did. This put pressure from
the centre on districts that were not allowing Madurese back to retreat from
this policy. In some of these resistant districts, the returns were, however,
very modest. Returnees found they had to take the lead in assuring Dayak
neighbours that they would meet their conditions for return after several years
of the government failing to take leadership in reconciliation (Smith and Bóuvier
2006:217). From 2004, the provincial government began to take more initiative
to accelerate the community-by-community reconciliation that was already
happening. Many, perhaps most, elite Madurese opted not to return (Bóuvier
and Smith 2008:247). This meant that many elite Dayaks were economic winners
from the conflict after they permanently took over Madurese factories, shops
and other businesses. Even poorer Dayaks who occupied Madurese plantations
benefited nicely from the sale of three or four harvests before their owners
returned and then demanded a payment to quit the land.

Peacemaking attempts occurred in Jakarta and at a congress in Palangkaraya
at first. This led to an agreement on 21 March 2001 brokered by the central
government. On 22 August 2001, a meeting was held in Sampang, Madura, on
refugee return to Central Kalimantan. Subsequent meetings were held in Batu
Malang (February 2002), Semarang and Jakarta, some facilitated by Search for
Common Ground in Indonesia. There was opposition to Madurese return from
a number of constituencies in Dayak society who had benefited from taking
over Madurese assets. Some of these were criminal, others not. The Batu Malang
meeting set conditions for return: only ‘good’ Madurese could return and then
only gradually. At a congress in Palangkaraya from 4 to 7 June 2002 mediated
by the central government, to these conditions was added the requirement that
returnees apologise to Dayaks for causing the conflict and for killing Dayaks
and ‘pay a fine according to Dayak tradition’ (ICG 2001:13). Some district
governments enacted regulations that were more prescriptive. Perda No. 2 2003
of the government of Kotawaringin Timur required migrant arrivals to register
with the local government within 14 days of arrival. The only Madurese to be
accepted were: 1) those with a local ID registered before February 2001; 2) those
with a Dayak spouse; 3) those not involved in the conflict; 4) those with a good
record with the local police; 5) those adaptive to local culture. Some districts
required signed declarations that IDPs would not form Madurese organisations
that were politically active, such as PK-4, which was banned in some districts.
The provincial government in 2002 decided only four types of Madurese
would be allowed to return—Madurese with: local government positions, other
permanent jobs, a Dayak spouse and with ‘good character’ (Smith 2005:18).
The United Nations Development Program has expressed concern that in addition to being prevented from returning to some communities where they once lived, some Madurese returnees were ‘forced to pay compensation to squatters on their property, denied access to certain economic zones or types of employment, subject to intimidation or provocation, or in a word, being treated as second-class citizens’ (Achwan et al. 2005:73).

The Bupati of Sampit facilitated an inter-religious meeting to foster reconciliation—something that happened in some other districts as well (Smith 2005:19). Mosques and churches also conducted reconciliation activities within the bounds of their own flock (Smith 2005:19). This was obviously a desirable thing, particularly in supporting reintegration and healing of Dayak combatants. Because such a large proportion of Madurese had belonged to Madurese community mosques, however, victims were rarely significantly represented in these intra-congregation reconciliations. Smith (2005:21) found the same problem with sub-village and village mediation mechanisms: they were useful for intra-community conflicts, but not for inter-ethnic conflicts. Traditional adat leaders at the village and hamlet levels were respected in the Dayak community but could be biased against Madurese. At the other end of the spectrum, provincial reconciliation mechanisms did not reach down to participation by community-level leaders. Smith (2005:21) saw hope between those poles in district and subdistrict reconciliations for inter-ethnic conflict, though not if mediated by the police, who were not trusted. At the time of her research, it was still to be seen if that hope would be realised for Madurese–Dayak reconciliation. Smith (2005:23) found the government-run, World Bank-funded local development project forums of the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) were also successful in bridging inter-ethnic problems, though at the time of her research Madurese in Central Kalimantan were still not willing to come out into their open public meetings. Just as none of the levels of governance that might have reconciled post-conflict Dayak–Madurese angst was working at the time of Claire Smith’s fieldwork, all of those levels of governance had also failed pre-conflict to prevent the violence in the places where it broke out. Not everywhere, however, because there were many rural spaces where Madurese and Dayaks lived and worked happily together and where, as a result, Dayak neighbours sought to protect, hide and facilitate the escape of Madurese.

In Surabaya in 2005, a Peace Through History conference included reconciliation between the two politically prominent ethnic NGOs in the conflict: LMMDT-KT on the Dayak side and PK-4, the Madurese. It included an exchange of gifts and a collaboration dance specially designed for the conference with elements of Madurese and Dayak music and culture.

Bóuvier and Smith (2008:246) concluded that peacemaking generally followed a ‘no-fault’ trajectory, ruling out of order more complex aspects of the causation
of the conflict such as the failure of outnumbered security forces to stop the violence before it escalated. The mandated script of reconciliation processes was that ‘cultural incompatibility was responsible for the conflict’ (Bóuvier and Smith 2008:246). Madurese understood this was code for an interpretation accepted across Indonesia that they, the predominant victims, were to blame because of their belligerence and cultural propensity for insensitivity to other cultures. As in other cases in this book, this was a script of non-truth and reconciliation. Some Madurese NGOs even bought into the victim-blaming script, participating in a program to send IDP children to Islamic boarding schools in Java where they would ‘abandon their Madurese culture and Madurese language and all the negative aspects of it’ (Bóuvier and Smith 2008:247).

At least one Central Kalimantan journalist travelled overseas on a peace journalism program. Local peace journalism training also occurred with the support of the British Council and Search for Common Ground in Indonesia. Journalists interviewed in Sampit said they wanted to ‘keep everything calmed down’ and to be careful not to blow things out of proportion. The six journalists we met repeatedly referred to the violence of February 2001 as an ‘accident’, presumably in this spirit. The analysis of this chapter is that in fact these events were politically planful. This might reveal a tension between peace journalism and investigative journalism. Kivimäki (2004:83) grasps the tension in pointing out that an important role of the media when conflict breaks out is to prick overconfidence of combatants in their interpretation of their strength based in their analysis of what the conflict is about. So in the case of the first in this cycle of Dayak–Madurese conflict in Sanggau Ledo, Kivimäki concludes that the adolescent criminals did not particularly think of themselves as Madurese in their confidence of their gang’s local strength in its ability to defeat their ‘local enemies’. ‘Their miscalculation was to ignore the possibility of their own group being seen by Dayaks [ultimately across wide sections of West and Central Kalimantan] as a representative group of the Madurese’ (Kivimäki 2004:83). Of course, they could not see that. They were young and uneducated. They had a limited understanding of the history of their own land. They could not imagine that ambitious politicians might seek to harness the chaos for political ends beyond their comprehension. As Kivimäki points out, however, the media can play a role in educating them, or elders might counsel them, that they are playing with fire, that their overconfidence in their capacity to prevail through violence is misplaced. Kivimäki’s contribution in conceiving of peace journalism as challenging overconfidence simply by discussing how different groups might interpret the identity politics in play in different ways is important. His most basic prescription is that ‘in order to avoid playing up the overconfidence of fighters, the media should be exceptionally careful and not repeat uncritically the logic and concepts of the warring parties as truths’ (Kivimäki 2004:85).
Investment in trauma counselling was thin. In the Madurese community, where counselling was most needed, untrained religious leaders shouldered most of this challenge. On the Christian side as well, churches provided most of the counselling support for those suffering trauma.

The role of the security services

By the time military and police reinforcements began to arrive on 26 February 2001, the conflict had already escalated past its peak (Achwan et al. 2005:49). The conflict was not solved by the security forces preventing further attacks, but by the flight or hiding of more or less the entire Madurese population. This must be qualified, however, by pointing out that there was a near-run avoidance of a major bloodbath in the city of Pankalanbuun, home to the second-largest concentration of Madurese in the province, when the military blocked Dayak warriors from marching on it. While some killing did occur there in April, in May, it was the only centre where Madurese remained in large numbers, assisted by Dayak peace rituals to ‘ward off disaster’ in which Madurese participated (ICG 2001:13). Everywhere else Dayak peace rituals were conducted without Madurese.

In early 2001, many dozens of people, including the ‘apparent killers and paymasters [were] apprehended but released due to Dayak outcry’ (Achwan et al. 2005:29; ICG 2001:8). Later that year, however, 233 Dayaks were arrested and 98 sent to the Attorney-General’s office for prosecution (ICG 2001:9). In the context of such mass violence, it was hard to prove murder; most were charged with carrying weapons. The near-universal Dayak impunity for murder during the conflict compounded the failure of the police before the conflict to enforce the law against perpetrators of ethnic violence.

A specific problem was that Dayaks believed Madurese repeatedly made corrupt payments to the police to prevent prosecution for crimes they had committed. A number of informants referred to a previous wave of conflict over Dayak concern that Madurese were committing crime and escaping arrest by the police. This led to the Kasongan Agreement signed in 1985 in the town of Kasongan. Leaders of the two communities are said to have agreed that if Madurese migrants did not desist from crime and violence against Dayaks, ‘the entire Madurese community would have to leave the province’ (Smith 2005:13). To many Dayaks, this justified the expulsion of 2001. Madurese leaders, in contrast, knew little of the agreement. It was said only four senior Madurese leaders had signed in 1985. Perhaps they were not sufficiently representative of Madurese. What was most important in this was that Dayaks felt it was not an option to go to Madurese leaders again and ask them to restrain the violence of their people in compliance with the agreement. This was part of the scaffolding of legitimate means for regulating violence that had collapsed.
Military officers said their orders were to stay in the barracks during the escalation of the violence, leaving control of the armed mobs to the police. Their orders then became to assist only with the evacuation of Madurese. There were incidents of the police and military shooting at each other and of extortion by the police and military for safe evacuation (Smith 2005:15). One of the worst single failures of the police was on 25 February 2001 when 118 Madurese were massacred in Parenggean after their police escort fled when faced with a large Dayak mob (ICG 2001:5).

Interpreting the conflict

What structural factors were at the root of this conflict?

The structural factors at the root of the conflict were much the same as in West Kalimantan, only more acute because this Dayak marginalisation occurred in the province conceived and created as a Dayak province in 1957 (van Klinken 2006a). Therefore Dayak ethno-nationalism in response to problems such as legal and illegal logging and mining was perhaps more intense. The percentage of Central Kalimantan covered by forest declined from 84 per cent in 1970 to about 56 per cent in 1999 (Bertrand 2004:57). De-agrarianisation was a structural factor in both conflicts, raising the stakes of small-town politics in places such as Sampit (van Klinken 2007). A specific focus of resentment was Madurese control of markets in many urban areas and thuggish behaviour associated with sustaining Madurese monopoly of critical commercial spaces in markets. It was interesting to contemplate that in Central Kalimantan most of the slaughter was of urban Madurese by upriver rural Dayaks. In Halmahera, North Maluku, as well, a great deal of the killing of urban Muslims was by highland Christians as opposed to fellow urban Christians. Likewise in Poso, much of the killing was by highland Christian villagers sweeping down on small-town Muslims.

Dayaks knew they were perceived as primitive by much of mainstream Indonesian society, as they had been by the Dutch. For this reason, it was important to them that migrants showed them respect as people and respected certain customs that were important to Dayaks. Most Dayaks believed that Javanese migrants generally showed respect to Dayak society. It was also a common view that the Madurese who had been in Kalimantan for decades had shown respect to Dayaks, maintaining cordial relations with all ethnic groups including Dayaks and often intermarrying. That was not the view, however, about many Madurese immigrants who had surged in recent decades into segregated Madurese enclaves in towns such as Sampit. Madurese men marrying Dayak women without asking the permission of their families was an especially widespread concern. Another was Dayaks being generous in lending land to Madurese for certain purposes and over time Madurese asserting ownership. In most rural
areas of Central Kalimantan, in contrast, there were not enough Madurese to live a segregated existence in their own residential communities and mosques, so they assimilated respectfully with Dayak society. So we might say that racism and marginalisation of Dayaks across Indonesian society were root causes of the conflict, with Madurese suffering the consequences because they were seen as the group who granted Dayak people the least dignity and Dayak culture the least respect. Since the large-scale IDP returns of 2005, informants from many sectors of Dayak society perceived Madurese returnees as behaving much more respectfully towards Dayak culture than before the conflict. Many thought the seeds of a more respectful relationship were planted when Madurese elders made the first visits back to their old neighbourhoods to negotiate who would and would not be allowed to return, and on what conditions.

During interviews at the Central Kalimantan Institute for Dayak and Regional Social Consultation (LMMDD-KT), the Dayak NGO many believed organised the violence, we were told that the Sampang peace agreement of August 2001 included ‘deconstructing Madurese culture’. There was no postmodern intent here; this meant transforming Madurese culture so Madurese were not rude, not disrespectful of the culture of others and rejected ‘their culture’ of violent revenge. Hence, as we conclude that racism and disrespect of Dayak culture were root causes of the 2001 conflict, we must also worry that post-conflict disrespect of Madurese culture has been allowed through one-sided reconciliation to become a risk factor for future conflict.

What have been the proximate factors in the conflict?

A ‘resource curse’ was a proximate factor in the conflict. Dayak patrons and clients competed with Madurese patrons and clients for control of illegal logging and illegal goldmining. It was clear that Dayak logging interests played many leadership roles in the ethnic cleansing. The availability of illegitimate opportunities that could be expanded by ethnic cleansing could have been a reason why Dayak elites seized on mass resentment and vengefulness towards Madurese.

Our narrative makes it clear that revenge for each previous step in the conflict has been a factor in escalation to the next widening of the conflict. Many Dayaks in 2001 came to believe that Madurese aspired to control the province of Central Kalimantan. Almost all Dayaks believed they had lost political control of their own province. That is why allegations of Madurese shouting ‘Sampit is the second Sampang’ are important in their narrative. It also makes sense of why the conflict broke out in full ferocity in Sampit, a town where only relatively recent history had seen Madurese become a majority. Implementation of regional autonomy from 1999 created local political uncertainty that morphed into Dayak political despair when no Dayaks received political appointments in
district reorganisation. It was perhaps not a coincidence that Dayak warriors killed a Madurese family of five in their sleep in Baamang-Sampit on the eve of the installation of the new district officials (Achwan et al. 2005:28). On Bertrand’s (2004) analysis, the violence occurred at a critical juncture when a new political configuration was up for grabs.

Claire Smith (2005) sees multiple institutional malfunctions as responsible for failing to prevent the conflict. One of these was failure of the security forces to enforce the law either before or during the conflict, as discussed above. The second was a complete breakdown of trust in all levels of government officialdom by Dayak society. District and subdistrict officials did plead with Dayak warriors not to go on the rampage, but they were pushed aside. Dayaks had come to see government officials as people who listened to Madurese and other ethnic groups, but not to them. Lacking legitimate means for regulating crime and violence against them, Dayaks resorted to illegitimate means. Third, the authority of damang—traditional Dayak leaders—to regulate conflict had been undermined by the New Order reforms to village governance referred to in Part I of this chapter. In sum, the social control capabilities of the institutions of tradition, of trust in government and the institutions of force had collapsed in Central Kalimantan by 2001, as they had in West Kalimantan by 1996.

Another proximate factor was modelling the violence in West Kalimantan, which many Dayaks in Central Kalimantan saw as a success in dealing with the Madurese problem and advancing Dayak political representation.

What were the key triggering incidents?
The killing of a Dayak man over a gambling dispute was the trigger of a series of escalated cycles of revenge.

Who were the key war-making and peacebuilding actors?
As in West Kalimantan, in Central Kalimantan, small groups of reckless young Madurese men who organised themselves to perpetrate violence and large mobs of Dayak young men who joined them were instigators of violence and actors who gave it momentum to escalate.

Van Klinken sees the Central Kalimantan Institute for Dayak and Regional Social Consultation (LMMDD-KT) as an organising node for the ethnic cleansing. It was an organisation that since 1993 had lobbied for greater Dayak presence in key positions, particularly as Governor of Central Kalimantan, and for ‘Dayaks to become masters in their own country’ (van Klinken 2007:128–9). Van Klinken saw the LMMDD-KT as a de facto local political party with a nativist ideology and populist mobilisation as a method. When other methods of acquiring power failed, it adopted into its repertoire from the 1997 experience in West
Kalimantan a racist campaign of vilification of Madurese as scapegoats for Dayak woes. The Chairman of LMMDD-KT, Professor K. M. A. Usop, who had lost the gubernatorial election in 2000, was arrested over his alleged involvement in instigating the violence. When he was subsequently allowed to return to Palangkaraya under city arrest, he ‘received a hero’s welcome’ (ICG 2001:6). Quite unlike the outcome in West Kalimantan, in Central Kalimantan, little changed in the configuration of power-holding governance as a result of the violence. The leading figures of the LMMDD-KT did not realise their personal political ambitions (van Klinken 2007:135–6).

LMMDD-KT leaders had (mostly illegal) business interests in logging and small-scale goldmining. Similarly, van Klinken (2002:74) suspected that organised Madurese fighters who put up stiff resistance in February 2001 probably also belonged to Madurese associations of loggers and miners that, rather crucially, supplied radio-telephone communications to coordinate attacks across the province. This is a question that has not, however, been well researched. In January 1997, there was formidable violence between illegal miners and the legal miners of a joint Indonesian–Australian goldmine (ICG 2001:3). The ethnic politics of this have also not been researched. As in some other conflicts in Indonesia, in Central Kalimantan, a tangle of ethnic politics (or political ambition playing an ethnic card), business politics and the politics of semi-organised crime could have been involved. For van Klinken, the fighting might be not so much about control of the formal state as about control of a shadow state (Reno 1995)—the informal authority to run rackets and secure contracts for clients that goes with incumbency in formal positions. Wealth and power are made more in the intersection between the shadow state and the black economy than in the intersection between the formal state and the legal economy. The main political competitors of the LMMDD-KT leaders were not Madurese, who always had minimal representation in government offices. It was other Dayaks in competing alliances with Javanese, with national party politics and the local subaltern business politics of illicit markets. LMMDD-KT was a subaltern elite who, after electoral politics did not deliver power to them, sought to compete for mass Dayak support by playing to Dayak ethnic resentments. This play must have been well attuned to mass sentiment because ‘not a single Dayak political figure condemned the ethnic cleansing against Madurese’ (van Klinken 2002:80).

As in West Kalimantan, here national political figures and international actors were not major players in peacebuilding. Likewise, the military did not play a major role, nor did the police, who were widely distrusted on all sides. The provincial government played more of a leadership role than in West Kalimantan, pushing districts that were resisting return of refugees to allow them back. The greater leadership, however, was by Madurese elders returning to the Central Kalimantan communities where they negotiated a modus vivendi for the return
of their people. And there was leadership by community-level Dayak leaders who responded constructively to those overtures, engaging their indigenous traditions of reconciliation to the task. These practical local reconciliations in most places seem to have worked very well, with returned refugees now having lived in peaceful, respectful relationships for a number of years since their return.

Motivational postures of key actors

The Madurese men who were initiators of violence were game players of sorts—players of the crime game, enforcers of gambling debts and managers of brothels. Their action did not spring from a commitment to a Madurese identity. The actions of the Dayak fighters very much did. They were mostly young men and boys with a high degree of commitment to their village leaders who had passed the red bowl to them. The Madurese and Dayak young fighters had very little commitment to the rule of law of the Indonesian state. They distrusted and resisted it. They did, however, capitulate to it within a short few weeks after they started fighting. After their brief interlude of resistance then capitulation, rural Dayak youth returned to their longstanding posture of disengagement from a state that seemed to them irrelevant to solving most of their problems, though relevant to making some of their problems worse.

While grievance over the humiliation of Dayaks motivated the violence of the young fighters, greed could have played more of a role among those with illegal logging and illegal goldmining interests who started the red bowl moving from village to village to recruit fighters. These could have been game players who saw business opportunities from ethnic cleansing of business competitors from their patch and political opportunities for increased Dayak representation in positions of power.

The security forces were also game players much of the time, even to the point of the police and military shooting at each other in contests over who should guarantee transport to safety because they had collected payments from IDPs.

Peacebuilding strengths and weaknesses

As in West Kalimantan, in Central Kalimantan, some peace journalism grew from the ashes of the conflict, especially in the radio and television sectors. While the truth part of truth and reconciliation was no stronger in Central than in West Kalimantan, the reconciliation part had more vitality. This vitality did not come from the reconciliation processes organised by central and provincial governments, but from local leadership for practical reconciliation. Dayak traditions of peacemaking were helpful in consolidating and consecrating the practical agreements.
Anomie and Violence

The limited roles in peacebuilding that national and international leaders and organisations, NGOs (local and international), trauma counselling professionals and religious leaders played in this case meant that peacebuilding lacked the multidimensionality that could be seen in a case such as Maluku (Chapter 3).

Justice has not prevailed any better than truth in this case. Corrupt justice was a factor in the sense of grievance of the fighters and post-conflict justice cast aside in compliance with the wishes of the mob was a weakness of the peacebuilding. Certainly, some murderers went to prison for short sentences and large numbers were arrested in an attempt to apply justice, but the highly politised releases of those arrested meant that no-one could feel any sense of a principled process that sought the truth and imposed justice on the most extremely culpable. The untruthful narrative that persisted post-conflict was one that imposed blame entirely on the victims. Victims unsurprisingly saw the requirement that they apologise before they could return to their homes as profoundly unjust. There was some recognition of Madurese culture in peace ceremonies, but in general the Madurese were required to feign cultural surrender, to create the appearance that they agreed that their culture needed reform as a condition of their capitulation to violence.

On the positive side, one truth that has been made more visible in the aftermath of the violence is that Indonesian institutions have allowed Dayaks to become marginalised in their own land.

Contests of principles

As in West Kalimantan, in Central Kalimantan, a key principle in this conflict was the assertion of the dignity of an indigenous Dayak identity. When it came to the time for refugee return, the countervailing principle asserted much more effectively in Central than in West Kalimantan was the freedom of movement of Indonesian citizens as guaranteed in the Indonesian Constitution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural factors at root of conflict</th>
<th>Is this a ‘consensus’ factor among analysts or ‘contested but credible’ as a possible factor?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racism towards Dayaks under Dutch and Indonesian governance</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural inequality that disadvantages Dayaks in their own land</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation of Dayak customary law</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logging that destroys traditional Dayak economy</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Villagisation’ from traditional longhouse villages to large Indonesian-style villages</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transmigration/immigration</strong></td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rapid de-agrarianisation in recent history (van Klinken 2007)</strong></td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Proximate factors

| **Collapse of New Order opens power allocations and the rules of the game to ethnic competition (Bertrand 2004)** | Contested but credible |
| **Political decentralisation increases ethnically based patronage and resource exploitation opportunities (legitimate and illegitimate), further increasing politico-ethnic competition** | Contested but credible |
| **Resource curse—lure of lootable logs and gold (legitimate and illegitimate opportunity constitution)** | Contested but credible |
| **Breakdown of Dayak trust that executive, legislature and courts will hear their grievances** | Consensus |
| **Modelling Dayak and Madurese mobilisation for ethnic cleansing from West Kalimantan** | Contested but credible |
| **Madurese constituted as folk devils by racist exaggeration, false rumours, self-fulfilling prophecies and other dynamics of moral panic (Cohen 1972)** | Contested but credible |
| **Vicious circle of revenge escalating revenge** | Consensus |
| **Indecisiveness in deployment of security forces to protect civilians** | Consensus |
| **Perceived weakness and inconsistency in law enforcement against murderers** | Consensus |

### Key triggering incidents

| **Murder over a gambling dispute** | Consensus |

### Key war-making actors

| **Young Madurese toughs seeking local dominance and excitement through retribution, with no thought that they are initiating a war of ethnic cleansing** | Contested but credible |
| **District and provincial political and business leaders playing the Dayak card to capture local formal and shadow governments** | Contested but credible |
| **Young men and boys who organise themselves into violent mobs inspired by a Dayak warrior ethos** | Consensus |
| **A Dayak NGO (Central Kalimantan Institute for Dayak and Regional Social Consultation) that provides an organisational foundation for a subaltern elite** | Contested but credible |
| **Networks of Dayak loggers that provide organisational resources, in particular radio phones** | Consensus |

### Key peacemaking actors

| **Local community Madurese and Dayak elders, including adat and religious leaders** | Consensus |
| **Provincial government leaders insisting on change of policy from laggard districts that refuse to accept return of refugees** | Consensus |
| **Peace journalists** | Contested but credible |
### Peacebuilding strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Consensus/Contested but credible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pockets of local dialogue and reconciliation using local adat</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heightened recognition post-conflict of Dayak marginalisation as a social problem</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace journalism</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit unions shifting from ethnically exclusive membership to a conscious post-conflict policy of ethnically plural membership with the intent of creating ethnic interdependence through micro-finance</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Peacebuilding weaknesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Consensus/Contested but credible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security force indecisiveness and extortion; police and military fighting each other</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak and inconsistent pre-conflict law enforcement against violence and post-conflict impunity for elite players</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow and often selective return of refugees</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and embezzlement in government</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government and international disengagement from conflict prevention and reconciliation</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only limited integration of respect for Madurese culture into peacebuilding rituals</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak NGO sector in terms of NGOs that are not ethnic NGOs</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited access to trauma counselling for victims and combatants</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-truth and muted reconciliation apart from pockets of local reconciliatory leadership</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual IDPs of the most victimised ethnic group required to apologise on behalf of the group as a condition of return</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding not multi-stranded and multidimensional in the way it was, for example, in Maluku</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and immiserisation for IDPs stuck in Madura</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Key contested principles of peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dignity of an indigenous Dayak identity</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of movement of Indonesian citizens as guaranteed in the Indonesian Constitution</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part III: Preliminary conclusions—West and Central Kalimantan

The Dayak people had already stamped all government institutions as bad before the conflict. The Dayak community could not find a good person who they could ask for help for their problems. The governor, the bupati (district head), the camat (subdistrict head), the lurah (village head), the police, the army; they were all unfair and dishonest figures for the community. (Interview by Claire Smith [2005:15] with Sampit Dayak elder)

In this chapter, we have attempted to explain how the social control capabilities of the institutions of tradition, of trust in government and the institutions of force collapsed in West and Central Kalimantan. The structural context revealed in the above quote seems important to understanding this conflict at a number of different levels. One level is the use of illegitimate means to pursue goals (Merton 1949) by the poor, the middle class and elites. Another level is moral panics that create folk devils (Cohen 1972) as a response to disempowerment and insecurity.

Dayak people in West and Central Kalimantan felt that legitimate means for getting help with their problems and improving their circumstances were blocked. So they became attracted to illegitimate means. Perhaps if they resorted to violence, people in authority would take notice of them and their grievances? In a way, this really happened in West Kalimantan. Post-conflict, there were many more Dayak bupatis, deputy bupatis and Dayak governors of both provinces. The tragedy was that so many of those who came to power did so because they were game players who recognised that they could harness Dayak violence to projects of personal enrichment. The will to empowerment through violence of poor Dayaks was captured by wealthier Dayaks with a will to empower themselves and their cronies, to the neglect of poor Dayaks. These wealthier Dayaks had long been players in local shadow governments; they were palace insiders who wanted to sit on or beside the throne. In West Kalimantan, Dayak and Malay insiders successfully harnessed the mob to their projects of personal aggrandisement.

As happened in other parts of Indonesia, Central Kalimantan Dayak aspirants to the pinnacles of provincial power sought to imitate the West Kalimantan strategy in 2001. In this case, however, the individuals who escalated violence to ethnic cleansing did not acquire power themselves. There also was no profoundly different political dispensation of ethnic power sharing as a result
of the violence, as there had been in West Kalimantan. And the ethnic cleansing itself was almost completely reversed in Central Kalimantan—something that did not happen in the West.

We have seen that at different layers of the Kalimantan class structure, illegitimate means push aside legitimate means for achieving valued goals in different ways. For an aspirant to become a Dayak governor of Central Kalimantan, the hope was that violent ethnic politics might pave a path to the governor’s mansion more effectively than political party electoral politics. At the level of the poor young men of the Dayak mob, it was not all grievance to the exclusion of greed. There was looting, though this really was motivationally secondary. The lower middle class in both provinces rode into town in the wake of the violence to take over the marketplaces, the transport monopolies, the gambling, the prostitution and the human trafficking that Madurese had dominated to different degrees in different places. When they were not actors in the violence, they were political supporters of the vilification of the Madurese. Above them, the Chinese economic elite was not active in violence against Madurese, but benefited from it in taking over some inter-town transportation and logging niches previously occupied by Madurese. They were also pleased that scapegoating of the Madurese reduced the risk that they would be scapegoated, as the Chinese were elsewhere in Indonesia as the Asian economic crisis descended. The Chinese therefore did not speak up to defend the human rights of the Madurese; at best they sat on their hands, at worst they colluded in Madurese racial vilification. In some cases in Central Kalimantan, Chinese businessmen might have bankrolled Dayak mobilisation against the Madurese—perhaps reluctantly and fearfully, in response to Dayak demands for support (Bóuvier and Smith 2008:243).

The structural reality of political and economic domination in West Kalimantan, historically and in the present, was that Malays and Chinese had done much more to subordinate Dayaks than the Madurese. It was unthinkable in 1997, however, for Dayaks to use violence to subordinate either of these groups; they were just too powerful for that. Besides, many Dayaks still felt bad about the way the military had manipulated them to slaughter Chinese in 1967.

So why the Madurese? Why not Javanese when it was Javanese policies that dismantled Dayak village institutions? One might as well ask why Jews in Germany? The feeling that struggling people have in times of economic and political uncertainty is, as we have said, that legitimate opportunities are closed to them. One kind of response is a rational pursuit of illegitimate opportunities. Racist scapegoating is, however, a more common response to anomie. It can make people feel better about themselves to think that the reason why they are not on top, why they are beset by crisis or why they are not being listened to by leaders is that a certain category of person is doing them in. They are then in the market for stereotyped information about that category of person. The
phenomenon is more general than racism. Youth cults such as mods and rockers in Britain (Cohen 1972) and bodgies and widgies in Australia (Braithwaite and Barker 1978) can become folk devils for older people who resent the freedom from constraint these liberated young people seem to enjoy while older folk feel so tethered. They are therefore in the market for a moral panic about these folk devils that will make them feel better about themselves by exaggerating the awfulness of the other, particularly in times of insecurity.

What this literature teaches us is that folk devils—be they of a particular religion, ethnicity or mode of dress—do not have to do much to annoy us. Perhaps they wear tight clothes that reveal something of their young bodies we would not expose of our old bodies. Perhaps their ethnic group manages many of the banks that will not give us a loan in a post-depression environment. Stigmatisation is an expressive plea from alienated masses that they are being denied cultural or economic recognition by attacking a target they think gets more recognition than they deserve (and flaunts it). Folk devils do not need to do much flaunting because the literature in the folk-devil tradition pioneered by Stanley Cohen (1972) shows how many social processes there are that can build on a small number of annoying characteristics to exaggerate and multiply them. When our friends and family realise that it makes us feel better about ourselves to rail about how insufferable Jews are, they share an anti-Semitic joke that attributes a character to Jews that in fact they do not normally have. Shakespeare, in his effort to sell more tickets to his new play *The Merchant of Venice*, appeals to an anti-Semitic stereotype of Jewish financiers. A leader with a new political brand arrives to tell us that Jewish bankers were responsible not only for the Depression, but for Germany losing World War I and for the threat of communism. The media finds it can sell newspapers by appealing to the stereotype, and so on. The moral panic phenomenon of stereotyping, exaggeration, politicisation and commercialisation of folk devils is such a sociologically general one that we do not need to labour it. In times of anomie, the folk devil epitomises for the mob everything that is deviant and dangerous when an old and valued normative order is seen to be crumbling.

In a sense, the ‘why Madurese’ question therefore does not need an answer. Madurese certainly had some annoying cultural predispositions. Many cultures are as relentless as the Madurese at settling scores against their family by attacking someone from the other family—though finding it acceptable to jump a member of the other family with a knife from behind while they innocently walk down the street is an annoying way of doing it, as people from many other cultures (including Dayaks) look at it. In the case of the Madurese, the starting annoyances from the perspective of the Dayaks seem clear and understandable.

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11 One thing some Dayak informants ridiculed Madurese for was the way they excessively flaunted jewellery and expensive cars in shallow efforts to signify their superiority.
enough, but we are deeply suspicious of the opinion of many Dayaks who have said to us that the behaviour of Madurese has improved greatly since the conflict. We are suspicious of it for the same reason we were suspicious of our parents’ generation in Australia when they said how polite they found so many of the ex-bodgies and ex-widgies had become in the 1960s after that moral panic passed—with the change in fashions that had marked bodgies and widgies as deviant. Our suspicion is that the bodgies and widgies really were pretty much the same people in the late 1950s as they were in the early 1960s. What had changed was that they were no longer caught up in a moral panic that exaggerated their vices and suppressed their virtues. Likewise, our hypothesis is that the annoying characteristics of Madurese were never as bad as they were painted when certain Dayak and Malay leaders found it convenient to whip up a moral panic that stereotyped them as folk devils. And our hypothesis is that the perceived post-conflict respectfulness and politeness of the Madurese do not reflect a fundamental change in them, but in stereotyping of them.

We were told stories of proactive efforts by responsible citizens to unwind the stereotyping. One Dayak adat leader told a story of a Madurese door-to-door fruiterer who said something to Dayak women that they interpreted as extremely rude. When he heard the women speak of this, the Dayak elder went to the Madurese fruiterer to explain that the women had interpreted what he said as rude. The fruiterer was shocked, said he had not meant to be rude at all, visited the women to apologise and explained that he had not meant to offend. When a moral panic subsides, when a society moves from anomie to a more secure confidence of citizens that the normative order is not disintegrating, communications such as this that break down stereotypes can resume.

The importance of peace journalism is something that has come out of several of the Peacebuilding Compared cases. Questioning stereotypes is one of the things peace journalism can do. A particularly important part of this is questioning predictive rumours grounded in stereotypes: ‘because Madurese believe in revenge killings, they are planning attacks in such and such a place.’ Kivimäki (2004:83) puts his finger on the need for the media to prick the overconfidence of combatants in their interpretation of their violence. Madurese young men would have been surprised to learn that behaviour they saw as simply settling a local score, and did not interpret as Madurese collective violence, might play into a stereotype of Madurese domination of a space that could lead to violent mobilisation against Madurese across a province. A conflict-prevention role of journalism, political and civil society leadership alike can be to diagnose, deconstruct and critique the stereotypes, exaggerations, predictions, rumours, generalisations and degradations involved in moral panics. It can be to seize
opportunities to behave as the Dayak leader did in giving feedback to the fruiterer. At a more macro-level, this is one of the things a truth and reconciliation commission can do.

One thing that is quite different about West and Central Kalimantan compared with Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi is that Dayak and Malay leaders so often have no regret about the slaughter, even in the face of so much killing of defenseless children, their mothers and elderly grandparents. A more truthful engagement with responsibility for the horror, such as a truth and reconciliation commission might deliver, is one possible remedy. When so much of the violence has been so planful, it will not do to dismiss it as: 1) a justified reaction of oppressed people to Madurese who are victimising them and getting away with it by bribing the police; and 2) the actions of uncontrollable warriors who are not their normal selves, in a trance of righteous slaughter after drinking from the red bowl. These interpretations cut perpetrators off from the experience of empathy for the innocents they slaughter. Just as it is shocking that the Indonesian state has allowed ethnic cleansing to stand in Sambas, it is also shocking that it has allowed this remorseless interpretation to stand. In Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi, at least a kind of non-truth and reconciliation was achieved that was infused with remorse, empathy and compassion for victims. This is a more robust foundation for long-term peace than the non-truth and non-reconciliation we see in much of West and Central Kalimantan. Post-conflict processes of inquiry have not addressed either the structural injustice that Dayaks have suffered under Indonesian and Dutch institutions or the unjust way they have scapegoated Madurese for their insecurity. In the end, a historical process that has treated Dayak and Madurese cultures with contempt has been allowed to stand without honest and painful examination within the society. Perhaps one reason why this conflict was forgotten so much more quickly than some of the others in Indonesia was that its economic development impacts (at least for non-Madurese) were minimal compared with the normally large deleterious effects of massive violence.

Before finishing, some qualification of this picture of non-truth, non-reconciliation and non-remediation of Dayak structural injustice is needed. In West and Central Kalimantan, there were pockets of peace achieved through reconciliation—often through Dayak peace rituals and sometimes through Dayak peacemaking that respectfully incorporated Madurese culture through dance, music or just plain listening. If violence does recur in future decades in a Kalimantan that has never properly healed, the hope is that these places where deeper respect has been re-established through truthful, respectful dialogue will be the islands of civility (Kaldor 1999) from which a new peace following that new war might spread.
A final hypothesis that had become clear by the time these two cases were written was that there was a recurrent age structure of war-making and peacemaking so far in our cases. This is that very young toughs often trigger conflicts by fighting over turf, over girls or simply over being disrespected. These local brawls sometimes become local riots, but are utterly unlikely to escalate to armed conflict that kills hundreds without cooptation by older political schemers who harness or contrive violence to their projects of seizing political or economic opportunities. These older men (there is a gender hypothesis here too) then harness organisations of varied types to recruit much larger numbers of young men and boys to do the fighting. When the time for peacemaking comes, the age dynamic is reversed. Younger men in command of fighters who have had enough of killing pass the baton to peacemaking elders who are usually very different, less ambitious people than those who enrolled the fighters. In Kalimantan, these older men happened to be local elders, *adat* leaders and religious leaders from the same communities where Madurese and Dayaks had lived together. In addition, there were Dayak *adat* leaders who deployed Dayak peacemaking traditions to prevent conflict in their communities from escalating to ethnic cleansing and who then consolidated their communities as islands of civility (Kaldor 1999) from which peace could spread when the time for a wider peace arrived. In other conflicts, such as Bougainville, there is also a gender dynamic to this succession: women as the new peacemakers who supplant some of the male war-makers as leaders of political change. We have not seen evidence of this gender succession in West and Central Kalimantan, though it is quite possible that more thorough research at the relevant local sites might uncover it.

In Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi, there was also a succession from young men leading urban rioting in the early phases of conflict to older men (and significant numbers of women) fighting to defend and attack villages when their villages saw themselves as in a kill-or-be-killed security dilemma. Again, we have seen little evidence of a security dilemma dynamic as an explanation of fighting in Kalimantan. Once the sudden wave of Dayak violence descended on Madurese communities, the imbalance of power was so great that there was no question of Madurese warriors planning counterattacks before further attacks occurred. They all simply fled.
### Appendix 5.1

#### Table A5.1 Numbers and types of people interviewed, West and Central Kalimantan cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected official, legislator/MPR/bupati</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leader of oppositional group</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatant</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adat/indigenous/village leader</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leader</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental NGO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development NGO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights/peacebuilding NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other NGO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business leader</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student/youth leader</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign government (ambassador, foreign minister of another country, USAID, etc.)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organisations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher/university academic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim/refugee</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total interviews</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total people interviewed</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
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</table>
6. Aceh

Anomie is a context for various phases of Aceh’s long conflict. Acehnese never granted full legitimacy to the Dutch or Javanese who they saw as internal colonialists. Neither The Netherlands nor Indonesia ever established stable, legitimate rules of the game in Aceh—nor did the feudal Acehnese aristocracy and sultan or the ulamas who purged the aristocrats. The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdekam, GAM) strode into this context of unsettled legitimacy in power relationships. Yet GAM overestimated how anomic the situation was; its leadership believed Indonesia would fragment totally. It did not. Some GAM leaders became perceptive enough to sense that the Indonesian anomie that enabled GAM’s popularity was ending, closing their window of opportunity.

This chapter repeats many themes of the previous ones. An Acehnese identity evolved to resist the anomic order of the external and internal colonial powers. Anomie also gave rise to motivational postures of disengagement and gaming the disintegrating rules of politics. Transmigration fuelled Acehnese resistance, so did Indonesian military crimes. Revenge again took over from more ideological grievances as a prime driver of the war. Emulation—particularly of East Timor—was again important. Again, there was ultimately a hurting stalemate and capitulation that sustained a new commitment to the state through top-down power sharing and a more bottom-up planning and development process.

Grievance over resource politics fuelled the conflict. A shift in the share of the resources cake from Jakarta to the province was the response. There were many unsuccessful peace processes before one succeeded, and local indigenous reconciliation and religious leadership of reconciliation were important. The peace was not led by a few great men but by a large pool of peacemakers; redundancy in resilient individual leadership for peace was imperative. While wide circuits of civil society animated peacebuilding, it was necessary to narrow the parties to a moderate middle who signed a workable peace in Helsinki. A sequence of peacemaking that was widely diffused, then narrowed and then diffused again seemed to deliver. Yet, as in most of our cases, we are left with reconciliation without truth. Prospects remain, however, for moving on to truth and reconciliation in Aceh.
Background to the conflict

Aceh before Aceh

The great Buddhist trading state of Srivijaya, founded late in the seventh century (Ricklefs 1993:3), dominated Sumatra, though its influence progressively retreated to the southern half of the island. Islam also began to have a presence in Sumatra more than a millennium ago in the period when thousands of Muslim merchants established a foothold in Canton, China. An Islamic state of Aceh at the north-western extremity of what is today Indonesia was established in the early sixteenth century. Before 1500, Aceh did not exist, probably not even as a widely diffused Austronesian language group. What became Acehnese culture and language were shaped by Indo-Chinese emigration, particularly of Chams after the fall of the Champa capital to Vietnamese arms in 1471 (Reid 2006a:7). Aspinall (2009:20) goes so far as to argue that before 1900 there is ‘little evidence’ of a widely shared, conscious Acehnese identity, and there is even less to suggest that such an identity was a basis of mobilization, even during war’. Acehnese mobilisation for war against the Dutch before the twentieth century was more in terms of an Islamic identity. By the mid-twentieth century, revolutionary war against the Dutch—the identity that motivated armed struggle—had morphed into a fused Islamic, Acehnese and Indonesian identity (Aspinall 2009:20).

Anthony Reid’s (2006a) collection shows that, in the pre-colonial period, Aceh was connected more with the world of the Indian Ocean than with the world of the Java Sea. Indianising influences were initially Hindu and Buddhist and later Islamic, but there were also early influences from Burma, Indochina, China and from the Arab world (McKinnon 2006). By the mid–late first millennium CE, ‘Indonesian’ spices were noted in ancient Roman markets and Aceh was a stop on one of the trading routes that connected the archipelago with Europe via Sri Lanka and Tamilnadu to the west coast of India and on to the Persian Gulf (McKinnon 2006). The great discovery here was of long-distance travel across the Indian Ocean using the monsoon. The monsoon meant, however, that traders from the west could not sail back in the same season. Tamil guild visits for long stopovers in Aceh resulted in permanent settlement that redefined the ethnic composition of Aceh (McKinnon 2006). Tamil settlers might also have brought Islam. Later the Tamils brought many great Islamic scholars from the Arab world on their monsoon stopover voyages to a landfall in Aceh. Chinese history records trade with Aceh from the third century CE (McKinnon 2006:24).
Uleebalang versus ulamas versus the Dutch

The Sultanate of Aceh quickly became militarily powerful. In 1518, it defeated a Portuguese fleet, capturing many weapons (Reid 2006a:11). A century later, the feudal sultanate had a navy with galleys that carried 600–800 men, substantial artillery, cavalry and an elephant corps (Ricklefs 1993:34). Acehnese power reached its greatest heights during the 1607–36 reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda. Subsequent centuries saw Aceh weakened by internal divisions, with power struggles recurring through to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The key division in the history of Islamic Aceh was between the uleebalang (an aristocratic caste) and the ulamas (Islamic scholars). The uleebalang emerged over time as hereditary feudal rajas. Initially this was a result of land grants, often to local trading entrepreneurs in gratitude for their loyalty to the sultan. Over the centuries, the uleebalang gradually became more powerful than the sultan, paying little tribute to the sultan in return for the sultan acknowledging their local authority. Effectively the uleebalang came to define the rules of the game and to control trade, particularly in pepper. Pepper was exported out of ports in the mouths of rivers that flowed through fiefdoms controlled by one uleebalang.

Uleebalang were often far too pragmatic for the ulamas, especially when they played political games on the side of European powers against the Islamic state. The ulamas viewed the uleebalang as too exploitative of their flocks and insufficiently attentive to Islamic principles of governance and commerce. The ulamas began to cultivate an Acehnese identity based on pride in being an Islamic state that was the ‘verandah of Mecca’—the greatest outpost of Islamic scholarship in the Far East. Aceh in their view had been responsible for the spread of Islam further east. In some Aceh periods, Islamic law was taken more seriously in certain respects even than in Arabia. In many ways, it was more severe. For example, penalties for consumption of alcohol in pre-colonial Aceh included ‘amputation of hands and pouring molten lead down the throats’ of those found guilty and debtors being liable to enslavement (Riddell 2006:43).

Banda Aceh continued to be a commercially strategic trading port and, by the 1820s, Aceh produced more than half of the world’s pepper (Ricklefs 1993:143). The 1824 Treaty of London guaranteed some independence for Aceh and freedom of British trade with Aceh. This was, however, within the context of Dutch political control of the Sumatran side of the Strait of Malacca and British control of the Malayan side. To the immediate south and within what became the province of Aceh, the Dutch finally achieved victory over the non-Acehnese animist–Hindu ethnic Bataks in the 1872 Batak War. Batak resistance continued intermittently until 1895, by which time the Dutch were successfully
Christianising the Bataks and suppressing cannibalism. As Dutch power was moving north in nineteenth-century Sumatra, Acehnese power was moving south. A clash was coming.

Dutch nervousness about Aceh’s power was fired by intelligence that Aceh had appealed to the Turks for protection in 1869 after earlier diplomatic overtures to French Emperor Napoleon III. This also affected British thinking. The straits were critical to peaceful trade between India and China and much more. British thinking shifted to the view that full Dutch control of Aceh would better serve their interests than its control by a more formidable power such as France or the United States (Ricklefs 1993:144). The Dutch and British also shared concerns about piracy losses they were both suffering along the Aceh coast in an era when Aceh had no effective central government control of that coast. Several Anglo–Dutch treaties ceded total Dutch sovereignty over Sumatra; in return, the Dutch yielded the Gold Coast of Africa to Britain.

Diplomacy in 1873 over the possibility of an Acehnese–American treaty was the pretext for a Dutch bombardment of the capital, Banda Aceh. The invasion force of 3000 troops that followed was, however, pushed back into the sea. A second, larger invasion was more successful in late 1873 and 1874, but at a loss of 1400 men for the colonial army—many from cholera and other diseases. The Acehnese retreated from Banda Aceh to the mountains from which they waged an insurgency against the beleaguered capital for decades. The guerrilla war came to be led by the ulamas, who saw their chance to seize power from the uleebalang. Some of the old aristocrats threw in their lot with the Dutch. Under the leadership of the ulamas, the war acquired the flavour of a holy war to defend Islam.

In the early years of their limited control of the capital, the Dutch were losing 150 men a month to cholera (Ricklefs 1993:145). It was an extraordinarily costly and partial victory, requiring significant tax increases in The Netherlands to fund it. By 1878, the Dutch had lost 7000 men (Reid 2006b:99). Significant losses continued at a lower level for more than 30 more years. They were higher on the Acehnese side. Between 1898 and 1908, 20 000 were killed (Reid 2006b:101). By 1914, The Netherlands’ most costly colonial war in human and financial terms was estimated to have seen 17 500 killed on the Dutch side and 70 000 Acehnese (Alfian 2006:111).

It was not until 1903 that the sultan surrendered. Decisive pacification of Aceh was accomplished only after several leading ulamas were killed in battles between 1910 and 1912. A new revolt broke out on the west coast of Aceh from 1925 to 1927, costing 100 lives (Reid 2006b:103), and there were some other sporadic regional revolts. Decades after the collective provincial war ended, the Dutch continued to be afflicted with individual acts of jihad: ‘at least once a week on
average’ there was a suicidal attack on a Dutchman by an individual Acehnese, the so-called ‘Aceh-mord’ (Reid 2006b:103). This was not a problem for the Dutch elsewhere in the East Indies colony. Alfian (2006:111–17) concluded that the Acehnese fighting spirit was inspired in part by a set of poetic tales called the Hikayat Perang Sabil, which was usually read before going onto the battlefield. Among other things, it promised everlasting happiness for martyrs, delicious food, eternal marriage of martyrs to 72 beautiful angels and forgiveness by God of all the sins of 70 family members of the martyr. Alfian (2006:113) concludes that the defiant Acehnese identity nurtured by these poetic tales helps account for the large numbers of suicidal attacks on Dutch forces during the war by women and children, 700 of whom were killed in battle in 1904 alone, according to Dutch sources.

The first story [of the Hikayat Perang Sabil] contained a narrative of Abdul Wahid, a saint who sat in a discussion with some of the elders concerning the holy war against the Dutch [sic]. Others joined the discussion, while somebody read verses of the Qur’an. When verse 111 (‘Lo! Allah has brought from the believers their lives and their wealth because the Garden will be theirs’ S. 9 al-Taubah) was being read, a young orphan stood up before it was finished. The verse affected his heart so deeply that he asked Abdul Wahid for permission to trade his life for paradise through the holy war. He went home immediately to get clothes, not just for himself but also for all of his friends. He spent all that he had to buy horses and weapons, which were distributed to his comrades, and set off with them and with Abdul Wahid to the holy war. In a dream during the journey, the young man saw an indescribable Heaven, full of gold and pearls, lavishly described in the text. He met beautiful angels, and got into intimate conversations with the most beautiful one, Ainul Mardiyah. When he woke, remembering the wonders of Heaven, he tearfully told Abdul Wahid about his dream, and conveyed his longing for Ainul Mardiyah. Abdul Wahid urged him to go to battle immediately in order to meet the angel without delay. He jumped on his horse, killed many infidels with great spirit, and died in the battle as a martyr. The angels welcomed him and took him to his heart’s desire, Ainul Mardiyah. More than 20 pages of text were taken up with the beauty of Heaven, and of Ainul Mardiyah. The beauty of her yellowish white skin could not be compared with that of any woman in the world. Her calf shone under seven layers of cloth, her legs were like pure gold, and one could not gaze at her face for long without arousing desire. Her voice was as beautiful as the sound of a Persian violin and like melodies produced by a mythical flute, irresistible to men. (Alfian 2006:115–16).
A conflict about economic exploitation as well as identity

In the late nineteenth century, new oil drilling in the contested hinterland—the first by the company that ultimately became Royal Dutch Shell—heightened the economic importance of the war. The company located its head office in East Sumatra and piped the oil out of Aceh for distillation and export. In the minds of many Acehnese, the war for independence never ended. A century later, in 1971, large reserves of liquefied natural gas were discovered in North Aceh; control of these exports became a proximate factor in the late-twentieth-century wave of Aceh’s long war for independence.

A structural grievance of the conflict from the late nineteenth century was that capitalists from outside Aceh exploited the wealth of the province and took the benefits elsewhere. There indeed was a conscious Dutch colonial policy of building up Batavia and Medan as infrastructure nodes for capitalist development (Sulaiman 2006:122). The first of the rapidly expanding palm and rubber plantations established in Aceh in 1908 followed this pattern, under a Belgian company, Socfin, based in East Sumatra. Perhaps of even greater consequence after the conquest of Banda Aceh in 1874 was that ‘[t]he first strategic move of those who sought to rule Aceh from Batavia/Jakarta was to cut off the region from the countries which had been its trading partners before 1873’ (Reid 2006a:2). This replicated the dynamic we saw centuries earlier in Maluku when Ternate was impoverished by cutting it off from the Malaccan trading system from which it had flourished (Chapter 3; see also Acemoglu et al. 2004). Like Aceh, Ternate was forced to submit solely to the circuits of trade monopolised by the Dutch. The difference was the timing; it took three centuries longer to (temporarily) bring Aceh to heel.¹ Another difference was the spices at issue—pepper and a diversity of other products—rather than cloves, nutmeg and mace in Maluku.

Like Ternate, Banda Aceh could no longer see itself after 1873 as one of the great centres of a global trading network that stretched from Europe and the Arab world to India, Malaya and China. It was now cut off from these circuits that had made it the ‘verandah of Mecca’ and an emerging trading node that might have become what Singapore did become. The historical counterfactual that Aceh could have become Singapore was mentioned twice in our interviews. Instead Aceh became part of Batavia’s (and Medan’s) periphery. Resentment of this became widespread.

¹ Dutch monopolisation of the pepper trade gradually spread, however, from a much earlier date. The Painain Treaty of 1663 gave the Minangkabau leaders of the west coast of Sumatra Dutch protection from Aceh in return for ‘an absolute monopoly over the pepper trade’ for the Dutch East India Company (Kell 1995:5).
The Dutch consolidated their control over Aceh by indirect rule through 102 uleebalang (Bertrand 2004:164). The Dutch and the uleebalang had a shared project of asserting their power—pan-colonial and local—over the militant ulamas. The uleebalang–ulama divide meant ‘the final consequence of the Dutch occupation of Aceh was a bitterly divided society’ (Reid 1979:31). The uleebalang were given a generous allowance, ‘sometimes worth as much as half of the income of their district’ (Reid 2006b:102). Dutch indirect rule thereby amounted to a re-feudalisation of an Aceh that to some degree had been on a trajectory of transition from a feudal sultanate to capitalist free trade:

The uleebalang were transformed by [Dutch indirect rule] into something like feudal potentates with sometimes arbitrary powers over land and judicial matters, whereas their pre-Dutch role had been primarily that of entrepreneurs and financiers who opened up a new area, and of leaders who mobilised the population in the event of crisis or war. (Reid 2006b:102)

The uleebalang were unpopular with ordinary people for practices such as appropriating land when its owners could not pay debts. When Dutch rule ended with the Japanese occupation of World War II, the Japanese also preferred stable indirect rule through the politically pragmatic uleebalang. They opted not to side with the ulamas, who had supported Japanese occupation through a campaign of sabotage and guerrilla attacks on the Dutch. The more politically experienced uleebalang persuaded the Japanese that the populist independence movement led by the ulamas would destabilise Japanese control of Aceh.

**PUSA and Darul Islam**

After the Japanese surrender in 1945, Aceh was the only residency the Dutch never attempted to reconquer (Ricklefs 1993:146, 220). The All-Aceh Union of Ulamas (Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh, PUSA), led by Daud Beureu‘eh, had become after its formation in 1939 the popular movement under the leadership of ulamas that the Dutch had always feared. By mobilising the youth it had educated in its schools to support the republic, PUSA seized political control from the unpopular aristocratic uleebalang who had been indigenous proxies of the unpopular Dutch and the unpopular Japanese. Many of the uleebalang and their families were killed. This meant Aceh experienced a social revolution as well as the national revolution experienced in other parts of Indonesia (Kell 1995:10). Whereas traditional Javanese elites continued to hold the reins of local power in Java, in Aceh, the old aristocracy was completely overthrown alongside the ousting of foreign elites.

Acehnese forces were vital in the republican revolutionary war and Aceh was a stronghold for the republic. The ulamas, however, wanted an Islamic
Republic of Indonesia with a high degree of autonomy for Aceh within it. They got neither when in 1950 Aceh was amalgamated with the province of North Sumatra. The new unitary state’s Ministry of Religion withdrew recognition of Aceh’s Islamic courts. Beureu’eh and PUSA rebelled openly against Jakarta from 1953, joining the Darul Islam rebellion that was also flaring in Sulawesi and West Java. Massed attacks of as many as 7000 poorly armed Acehnese against military units resulted in terrible losses. This quickly caused abandonment of Darul Islam’s ‘martyrdom or death’ tactics in favour of a hit-and-run insurgency that characterised all subsequent fighting in Aceh (Aspinall 2006:154). In subsequent decades, insurgency was supplemented by hundreds of kidnappings, piracy, bombings of symbolic targets in Jakarta (for example, the stock exchange)2 and Medan and of electricity pylons and natural gas infrastructure inside Aceh, and strikes to paralyse extraction of profits from the province. Again, Darul Islam was not secessionist; its program was to Islamise the Indonesian State and its legal and education systems.

An only partially successful cease-fire came in April 1957 amid talks to re-establish Aceh as a separate province with an ethnically Acehnese governor ruling from Banda Aceh. In 1959, Aceh was given the status of a Special District with virtual autonomy in matters of religion, adat (customary law) and education. Armed resistance to Jakarta finally but slowly began to grind to a halt in Aceh in the early 1960s. This virtual autonomy faded fast under the centralising bureaucratic pressures of the new unitary state in the 1960s. In effect, Aceh was allowed autonomy only when Jakarta agreed with how local elites proposed to exercise it. Jakarta maintained final veto over everything through its control of appointments and budgets. A residue of the 1950s was the first of several historical waves of resentment against the Indonesian military. ‘[I]ndiscriminate violence against the Acehnese population would become part of the repertoire of memories shaping the grievances against the state’ (Bertrand 2004:167).

Indirect rule through Acehnese technocratic elites

McGibbon (2006a) argued that, like the Dutch, the new Indonesian state opted for indirect rule of Aceh through local elites. The ulamas were not an acceptable option to the secular Jakarta elite because of their Islamisation objectives and the uleebalang had been virtually exterminated. Jakarta therefore moved energetically in the late 1950s and 1960s to create state universities that would qualify a new technocratic elite with an Indonesian identity as technocrats of the unitary republic. The military had a prominent presence on these campuses training student paramilitaries (McGibbon 2006a:321). Many Acehnese

2 Though it has also been alleged that Tommy Suharto organised the stock exchange bombing.
technocrats were vertically integrated into prominence in Jakarta, including within the ‘Berkeley mafia’, architects of New Order economic policy (McGibbon 2006a:321) and into leadership of patron–client networks in business and the military. This was a level of elite integration never seen for the other province imbued with secessionist sentiment, West Irian (Papua). Increasing numbers of compliant ulamas were also coopted into the New Order by appointment to a religious bureaucracy, the Islamic scholars’ council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), and by legislative positions in approved political parties, mainly the PPP (McGibbon 2006a:323). While the ruling elite in Aceh was more indigenous than in any other province remote from Jakarta, these technocrats were cut off from local affection and legitimacy by their Western education, their allegiance to Jakarta and frequent absences in the process of patron–client circulation between the provincial and national capitals. From 1998, the same state universities that created a collaborationist elite would also create the student movement the Centre for Information on Aceh Referendum (Senter Informasi Referendum Aceh, SIRA) that mobilised for an independence referendum.

Aceh enjoyed only a few years of complete peace (something people living then had experienced only in the 1930s) before it was consumed once more by the communist purges of 1965–67. This conflict became an excuse to settle other resentments that had little or nothing to do with communism. The Chinese were often innocent victims of the slaughter in Aceh, with at least 10 000 driven out of the province (Bertrand 2004:64), many fleeing to Medan, Malaya, Singapore or China. On at least two previous occasions in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, ‘Chinese residents were explicitly banned on religious grounds’ (Reid 2006a:5), but they always re-established during the flourishing periods of Acehnese commerce. In the 1930 Census, there had been 22 000 Chinese in Aceh; today there are only about half that number. The Chinese were not targets in the wars of GAM. The Chinese, after all, were part of the old global circuits of trade that had helped Acehnese entrepreneurs flourish by connecting them with the north, east and west before these were cut off to remake Aceh as a periphery of southern cities (Jakarta and Medan). Besides, by the time of GAM, the Chinese were numerically much less significant than they had been in earlier periods of Acehnese history, so it was hard to see them as a structural driver of contemporary grievances. There was less than a decade of peace in Aceh between the communist purges and the rise of Aceh Merdeka, which became GAM, from 1976. This post-1976 conflict phase is the one coded for Peacebuilding Compared. The military quickly became wary of the very religious fanaticism they had harnessed to purge communists. Military intelligence operations were mounted in pursuit of Komando Jihad in the early 1970s, some of whose members later became involved in forming GAM.
The population of Aceh numbered 3.4 million in the 1990 Census, and even after depletion by the tsunami, it was presumed to be more than four million today (Reid 2006a:4). Aceh is more than 80 per cent ethnically Acehnese, speaking various dialects of the Acehnese language. Education is, however, conducted in Bahasa Indonesia. The largest of the ethnic minorities are Javanese immigrants, who make up 7 per cent of the population. Next is the largest of the six indigenous minorities, the Gayo, constituting 5 per cent of the population (Reid 2006a:4–5). Most of the population of Aceh live in villages dependent on rice cultivation, though Aceh’s long tradition of cash-cropping pepper and many other commodities continues.

**Describing the conflict**

**The toll**

Estimates of the number killed across the several waves of pro-independence insurgency by GAM and state counterinsurgency between 1976 and 2005 range from 12,000 to 50,000 (Merikallio 2006:223–24) with some more grounded estimates at the high end of that range. There were a number of mass murders by the security forces that took dozens of lives. At least a dozen mass graves have been discovered. When GAM fighters could not be found, arrest, torture and rape of members of their families were common. The Banda Aceh Legal Aid Foundation records 625 cases of rape and torture of women (Schulze 2006:277; see also Coomaraswamy 1999). The national human rights commission documented 781 extrajudicial killings and 163 forced disappearances in 1999; other government and NGO teams documented 5000–7000 torture cases in Aceh (Drexler 2008:36). Hernawan (2008:56) reported 3266 extrajudicial executions between 1999 and 2002 and 728 forced disappearances.

While thousands of GAM members were tried during the insurgency, there were few trials of the security forces, even fewer convictions and none involving senior officers (Merikallio 2006:223–4). In the only major trial for mass murder—involving the killing of 57 at a religious school in July 1999—a lieutenant colonel who issued the order ‘Let’s kill them all’ disappeared before the trial (Drexler 2008:137–49), though a captain, 23 lower-ranked soldiers and one civilian were convicted for the atrocity and received light sentences (Clarke et al. 2008:34). Rape victims often reported they were harassed by the authorities to whom they attempted to provide evidence (Drexler 2008:159).

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3 Such as the 33,000 count of the Aceh Reintegration Agency (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, BRA) (Aspinall 2006).
A Harvard Medical School victim survey in 14 conflict-affected districts for the International Organization for Migration (IOM 2007) found 35 per cent of respondents had experienced fleeing burning buildings, 46 per cent fleeing danger, 38 per cent a family member or friend killed, 24 per cent forced labour and 40 per cent confiscation or destruction of property (IOM 2007; Aspinall 2008a). Gender differences in physical violence were large: 38 per cent of men reported having been physically beaten (9 per cent of women); 32 per cent of men suffered head trauma (8 per cent of women); 19 per cent of men had been attacked with a gun or knife (8 per cent of women); 16 per cent of men reported being tortured (3 per cent of women); and 15 per cent of men had been taken captive (3 per cent of women). Twenty-three per cent of men were forced to fight against TNI or GAM and 15 per cent were punished for refusing to fight; however, 1 per cent of women reported having been raped (1 per cent of men) and 4 per cent of women experienced other sexual assault (2 per cent of men). Fear of stigma could drive considerable underreporting here. Widespread reporting of mutilation of genitals on corpses suggests a large proportion of rape victims might not have survived to participate in this survey. For men and women, levels of depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms were at some of the highest levels reported for post-conflict settings worldwide. The strongest predictor of these symptoms was the total number of stressful events the person lived through (IOM 2007). Older men and women were less resilient than others in recovering from mental health problems.

A resource curse?

By the 1980s, Aceh accounted for 30 per cent of Indonesia’s oil and gas exports (Bertrand 2004:170). There was limited trickle-down from this wealth to the poor agricultural communities of Aceh, but a great deal of trickle-up to the Jakarta bureaucracy and political and military elite and to multinational corporations such as Mobil (which became the largest corporation in the world as ExxonMobil in 1999). Acehnese elites became resentful over this, including Hasan di Tiro, who in 1974 attempted to supplant the US corporation Bechtel as builder of one liquid natural gas (LNG) pipeline (Ross 2005:41). Di Tiro, whose grandfather was a hero of Aceh’s colonial war against the Dutch, became the driving force in forming Aceh Merdeka, which became GAM, between 1976 and 1979. Di Tiro had defected from the Indonesian Mission to the United Nations in New York in the early 1950s to support Daud Beureu’eh’s rebellion. GAM’s agenda was different from the 1950s revolt in three fundamental ways: it was not led by ulamas; it substantially sidelined the Islamic state issue; and it sought independence from Indonesia rather than the Islamisation of Indonesia. Acehnese ethnicity became more important than Islam, while the narrative of the broken promise (Birchok 2004) and narratives of sons vindicating the struggle
of their fathers connected GAM with Darul Islam. GAM sought to persuade ulamas and their supporters that Islamisation of Indonesia was an impossible project, while establishing an independent Aceh that took Islam much more seriously was an achievable one.

Tactically, di Tiro did not think an independence struggle to declare an Islamic state was something the West would support (Sulaiman 2006). During the Darul Islam rebellion, di Tiro had cultivated good contacts with the CIA—indeed he could even have been ‘a CIA asset of some sort around this time’ (Aspinall 2009:41). In the 1950s, the CIA did support regional rebellions in Indonesia with cash and munitions as part of its anti-communist strategy. With the arrival of the staunchly anti-communist Suharto regime, however, the reality was that there was never a prospect of Western support for GAM. The 1976–79 rebel army of at most a couple of hundred—probably 70 initially—controlled no territory. They did mount some minor actions against the LNG plant, however, stealing the payroll in one attack and shooting two American workers (one of whom died) at the plant in another. Di Tiro was forced to flee to Sweden and run GAM from there after 1979. As in later phases of the conflict, in the 1970s, GAM recruited by a method in which ‘[s]ons and younger brothers of DI [Darul Islam] were assigned by fathers and older brothers to help and join AM [Aceh Merdeka]’ (Mahmud quoted in Nessen 2006:184). Most GAM members in Aceh were either killed by the military or fled with di Tiro to Sweden or Malaysia.

After a decade of quiescence, during which only ‘a skeletal movement’ persisted on the ground in Aceh (Aspinall 2009:90), GAM was able to stage a comeback with training support from Libya. In the 1970s and 1980s, GAM espoused what Kirsten Schulze (2006:242) called a ‘world revolutionary’ anti-Western vocabulary—one that changed at the end of the Cold War to a pro-Western ‘democratic’ vocabulary. The anti-capitalist rhetoric of the 1970s and 1980s was about US imperialists keeping Javanese colonialists in power in Aceh so multinationals such as Mobil could ‘rape’ Aceh’s resources. In the 1990s, Mobil’s sins were framed in an internationalised discourse of human rights abuse (Schulze 2004:9). Syria and Iran had also been willing to help. According to Nessen (2006:190), GAM particularly did not want the Iranian help because it required a commitment to an Islamic revolution that GAM leaders did not want. While some Acehnese activists might have flirted with Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) at the beginning of the present decade (Schulze 2004:24), GAM really did not. On the ground, GAM overwhelmingly followed the Swedish leadership in spurning overtures from global terror networks. Al-Qaeda number-two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and its military chief, Mohammed Aref, visited Aceh in June 2000, but decided Aceh was not a fertile environment for Al-Qaeda’s work (Conboy 2004:235). The Acehnese population in Malaysia provided most of the 250–2000 GAM insurgents who were trained in Libya; 150–800 of these infiltrated Aceh
from Malaysia and Singapore (Ross 2005:43). Support also came from defecting Indonesian troops who followed at least 47 Aceh-based military and police officers who were dismissed, possibly because of involvement in the drug trade (Ross 2005:43). Or possibly not: as one commentator remarked, their alleged involvement in the drug trade could have been government disinformation to discredit them.

Another proximate factor in the rekindling of conflict in this period parallels incidents in Bougainville (Peacebuilding Compared, Working Paper 6, Bougainville). Indigenous Acehnese blamed transmigrants for prostitution, gambling, corruption and ‘un-Islamic behaviour’. There were moments of high conflict associated with allegations of sexual assault against local women by migrants attracted by the LNG project and by the police and military (Ross 2005:43). The military was also blamed for sexual assaults and running brothels (McCarthy 2007:324). There were also occasional arson attacks on nightclubs and brothels clustered in the resource development and industrial zone around the LNG project (Aspinall 2009:55). Migrants were often simply blamed for getting jobs in the industrial zone ahead of Acehnese. Inequality between mostly migrants who benefited economically from the Mobil LNG development with the national oil corporation Pertamina versus locals who did not benefit was a resentment that fuelled a higher level of popular support for GAM in the late 1980s than there had been in the late 1970s (Bertrand 2004:172). Another parallel with Bougainville was wildly exaggerated accounts of how wealthy Aceh could be if only it controlled its resources. A common pamphleteering claim was that with independence Aceh would become as wealthy as oil-rich Brunei, a claim we also heard in our fieldwork from the leadership of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. LNG production peaked in 1992 (Huber 2004:15) and was projected to expire in 2018, though new fields were possible. This claim therefore becomes less true every year. Also as in Bougainville, in Aceh, the Indonesian state rode roughshod over customary laws of land ownership, driving large numbers of indigenous people off their land (McCarthy 2007). Environmental destruction from the resource development also caused a wider circle of resentments and impacts on livelihoods.

The GAM push of 1989–91 was much more formidable than in 1976–79. The uprising began in 1989 in protests against the corruption, gambling and prostitution allegedly associated with the flood of transmigrants into Aceh (Robinson 2001:224). While fighters were chronically short of weapons, probably a couple of hundred factory-made weapons were captured or purchased from the military. GAM did kill a couple of dozen Indonesian military in hit-and-run attacks, but as in 1976–79, it was still not the kind of insurgency that controlled significant territory even in remote parts of the province. The Indonesian military response was disproportionate to the threat. Torture, arrest and arbitrary killing
were deployed against civilians who it was believed were GAM supporters. As in East Timor, in Aceh, ‘fence-of-legs’ tactics were used in which civilians were pushed forward as a shield ahead of soldiers flushing out insurgents. An estimated 2000 people were killed during the two-year campaign (Bertrand 2004:172), though some estimates go up to 10 000 (Ross 2005:44). Often their bodies were displayed in public places to intimidate the community. This was something older informants could not remember happening in earlier phases of conflict in Aceh, and in general the period from 1989 saw a level of military violence against the people of Aceh that had not been seen in the previous two decades (Aspinall 2006:165). By the early 1990s, this heavy hand had effectively crushed the insurgency—again, at the cost of another generation of children imbued with hatred towards a predatory Indonesian State that had terrorised their parents. Many Libyan-trained fighters, however, were back in Malaysia by the early 1990s, available for a more propitious time for deployment.

After Suharto

GAM returned as a much more formidable armed movement in 1999 after the fall of Suharto’s New Order. Before the regeneration of GAM there was an awakening of a massive human rights movement in Aceh, demanding in the new environment of reformasi that the injustices the military had inflicted on the people of Aceh be exposed and punished. This human rights movement was built on the Acehnese contribution to university student protests across Indonesia in early 1998 calling for Suharto to be deposed. As early as August 1998, armed forces commander Wiranto responded to the human rights demonstrations by declaring an end to Aceh’s Military Operations Region (DOM) status that had delivered impunity to the military. Wiranto also announced the withdrawal of ‘non-organic’ troops and apologised for past abuses. It became clear, however, that there would be no prosecutions of military torturers, murderers and rapists, which the people of Aceh had been hoping the fall of Suharto would bring. Demands for the release of political prisoners were also either waved aside or promised and not delivered during this period. Considerable rioting, arson and violence occurred at the official ceremony for the withdrawal of troops from the Mobil hotspot of Lhokseumawe—violence probably orchestrated by members of the military (Drexler 2008:116–17). The pullout also resulted in the assassination of many alleged military informers. It was widely believed military personnel were assassins of Acehnese collaborators they feared could turn into hostile witnesses against them. Ed Aspinall is cynical of the evidence for this and does not see it as a pattern of military conduct elsewhere in Indonesia. In some cases, there are GAM fighters who admit today to killings of informers in this period (Aspinall 2009:157).
Just weeks after President Habibie’s announcement in January 1999 that East Timor would be allowed a referendum on secession, student groups and youth more broadly were organising in Aceh with demands for a similar referendum. SIRA was the key node of organisation for the Aceh students. In November 1999, hundreds of thousands of people—on some frequently cited counts, one million—attended a rally in Banda Aceh in support of an independence referendum. Drexler (2008) argued that only parts of the crowd were there because of a firm commitment to independence and only in part were they motivated by a sense of economic injustice; most fundamentally they were moved by a sense of indignity at the nation’s indifference to their brutalisation by the military and by a want of appreciation for what Aceh had contributed to the nation. The Minister for Women’s Empowerment put it this way when she visited Aceh in November 1999:

Maybe if I had experienced the oppression that the Acehnese people have, I would do the same thing [advocate a referendum]. Even worms writhe if they are stepped on. I am certain that if the people of Aceh are offered money or dignity, they certainly will choose dignity. (Drexler 2008:155)

The level of participation in various strikes and rallies that this movement was able to mobilise during 1999 was remarkable.

Aceh was one reason why President Habibie’s government enacted the decentralisation laws Nos 22 and 25 of 1999. Part of this package was that regional and local governments retained 15 per cent of the net public income from oil, 30 per cent from natural gas and 80 per cent from timber. For Aceh, rich in these commodities, this was a major shift of resources from Jakarta to the province. A law on implementation of special status for Aceh was also passed on 23 September 1999 that promised that elements of Islamic law and education could be reactivated. Aceh eventually acquired a green and white uniformed Sharia police that enforced Islamic dress, a ban on alcohol consumption and gambling and separate service areas for men and women in places such as beauty parlours, gyms and hotels to uphold day-to-day Islamic morality. They also caned offenders outside the mosque on Fridays (Miller 2006:306). The criminal convictions the Sharia police secured were overwhelmingly for gambling and alcohol consumption (Miller 2009:175). This enforcement activity was supported by some, but was very unpopular among others, especially among the urban young.

4 Much of the impetus for this came from Islamic PPP members of the MPR who (erroneously) believed Jakarta’s failure to honour the longstanding promise of Islamic law in Aceh was the fundamental cause of the conflict (McGibbon 2006b:332). Military leaders then put their support behind the bill. GAM leaders alleged they did this to ‘make Aceh look fanatical like Afghanistan’ in the West.
Schulze (2006:260) concluded that the main change that occurred in Aceh’s governance in this period was ‘transition from a province governed by technocrats to one governed by kleptocrats’. Ross’s (2005:46) argument was that the law reforms of 1999 did not bring peace because their limited implementation produced a further collapse in the perceived credibility of commitments by the central government. While this was the fundamental factor, it was also the case that the aspirations of politically active Acehnese had changed since the 1950s—few of them were any longer interested in the Islamic law and education parts of what was promised. We have seen that between 1949 and 1999 there had been a series of promises from Jakarta for autonomy over a variety of matters that were subsequently not delivered, or delivered and later reversed, or delivered and sharply eroded over time. The most recent were promises made by President Suharto to Aceh during the 1987 election campaign that were not honoured any more than President Sukarno’s promises had been. Then when President Habibie came to power he promised to bring human rights abusers to justice in Aceh. Within a year, it was clear he had thought better of upsetting the military, who, according to one informant, warned that prosecutions could implicate very high figures in the military, even in Habibie’s cabinet. Habibie could not survive politically without the support of the armed forces and Wiranto. Wiranto reversed his August 1998 promise to withdraw combat troops. The next president, Wahid, managed even larger reversal. He promised support for a referendum before and after becoming president, as well as prosecutions of human rights criminals even of the highest rank, and withdrawal of non-organic troops. None of this was honoured.

The ‘narrative of the broken promise’ (Birchok 2004) was fuel to GAM’s fire. GAM trebled its fighting force between mid-1999 and mid-2001 to somewhere between 2000 and 3000. A (probably too low) 2002 estimate was 5326 (Sulaiman 2006:139). Its command structure was decentralised, though commanders remained overwhelmingly loyal to the political leadership in Sweden right up to the final peace. In addition, it could call on many thousands of supporters through whom it controlled possibly 70–80 per cent of Aceh villages (ICG 2001). While GAM recruited through force at times, as it spread its geographical influence to areas beyond its core base of support, its main motivational lever was recruiting the children of victims of previous atrocities of the military. On one human rights group count, 16 375 children were orphaned during the crackdown between 1990 and 1998 (Ross 2005:48). After 1999, several hundred women were for the first time recruited as fighters, continuing the nineteenth-century tradition of female commanders in Aceh’s war against the Dutch (Siapno 2002). By 2003, GAM had ‘grown from a small, armed organization with an intellectual vanguard into a popular resistance movement’, controlling most of the province (Schulze 2004:viii, 2). GAM collected taxes from villages and roads it controlled. It also taxed international NGOs and managed to siphon off a large
proportion of the humanitarian assistance that flowed to Aceh between 2000 and 2003 and extorted a proportion of the profits of contractors (Schulze 2004:25, 2007a:91). It trafficked marijuana. Schulze (2004:27) reported that 30 per cent of all of South-East Asia’s marijuana came from Aceh in 2004. Extortion was also used—in one case raising US$500,000 for the release of a senior ExxonMobil executive. Pane (2001:114) reported that twice that amount was extorted from a fertiliser factory in 2000. The Acehnese diaspora, particularly in Malaysia, was also a source of funds. There were dozens of attacks on ExxonMobil LNG facilities and transport, though it was frequently questionable whether the attacks were perpetrated by GAM or by military officers seeking to increase ExxonMobil payments for their protection. GAM certainly got the ball rolling in 1977 by stealing the multinational’s payroll and later in the year shooting two American workers in an intimidation campaign to set up protection payments.

GAM used the resources it collected to destroy Indonesian governance structures in the villages it controlled, even destroying many schools, and establishing its own parallel government.5 Intimidating Indonesian civil servants into deserting their posts was part of a post-1998 strategy of ‘making Aceh ungovernable’ (Aspinall 2009:170). GAM attacked Javanese settlers, driving many tens of thousands of Javanese who had lived in Aceh for decades out of the province (Schulze 2006:234–5). This was popular with many in the Acehnese majority who saw the military as Javanese and the Javanese as their oppressors and thieves of their employment opportunities. The second-largest ethnic minority after the Javanese, the Gayo, also became refugees in large numbers because they generally did not support GAM. Driving out Javanese and Gayo was also a way of thwarting military recruitment of anti-GAM militias among these groups.

Ross (2005:50) argued that it was a conscious GAM strategy to provoke military retaliation against villages to build resentment against the military. Schulze (2007a:107) similarly argued that GAM strategy ‘included striking at Indonesian security forces in populated areas’ in order to create civilian casualties at the hands of the military. Indeed one colonel with experience in East Timor and Aceh said in an interview that East Timor was more a jungle war and Aceh more a village war. He said this was because in Aceh there was more emphasis on tactics such as hit-and-run strikes on military personnel by GAM passing on motorbikes in villages so the military would react by firing inside the village, hitting civilians, or by reprisals in the village. The military was certainly willing to oblige with terrible repression in response to provocation—and this did build support for GAM. Ilias Pase, a GAM commander, said in an interview with a British journalist:

5 GAM Tiro field commander, Amri bin Abdul Wahab, in 2003: ‘The crucial element is how to establish a GAM government so we can exercise control and society does not have to deal with the Indonesian structure. That strengthens our relationship with society and we can spread our ideology’ (cited in Schulze 2006:231).
We know from experience how the security apparatus will respond [to our activities]. They will kill civilians and burn their homes. This makes the people more loyal to GAM. And the people in Jakarta and outside can see that we are serious about our struggle. This is part of the guerrilla strategy. (Ross 2002:28)

If it was a conscious GAM tactic, it was a different approach from the Free Papua Movement, who pulled back from provocations such as attacks on the Freeport mine infrastructure to avert the terrorising of the villages of the men who mounted the attacks (Chapter 2). Ed Aspinall, in commenting on a draft of this chapter, said that GAM also behaved in this way and that there was no central GAM tactic of provoking military retaliation, though some local commanders might have used such a tactic in some contexts. A strategy common between the Free Papua Movement and GAM was to mobilise concern and support from international human rights groups over Indonesian atrocities. This was linked to a strategy of drawing international mediators into the conflict, which ultimately succeeded in securing not independence, but something like the special autonomy for which di Tiro had joined Beureu’eh in the 1950s.

An ineffective step towards this final resolution was special autonomy law No. 18 of 2001 signed by President Megawati. This further increased Acehnese control of oil and gas revenues to 70 per cent for eight years, after which there would be a review. It differed from the 1999 decentralisation laws in strengthening provincial government control—as opposed to strengthening district government control—over resources. Like so much that had gone before, this law seemed more like a piece of paper than a reality to GAM and to SIRA, who at that time believed they could push on to achieve the independence result that had already been secured in East Timor. GAM’s exiled leadership also believed at that time that Indonesia was ‘a failed state about to implode’ (Schulze 2004:ix; Aspinall and Crouch 2003:4). The likelihood that it ceased believing this by 2005 could have been one reason why a conflict that was not ripe for peace in 2002 had become so three years later.

**Peace processes**

GAM did not go into the peace processes between 2000 and 2005 in a particularly strong position. Its guerrilla warfare strategy was not succeeding especially well after 2003 and the internationalisation track of its two-track strategy was not succeeding before 2003. No nation at any time supported independence for Aceh. After 11 September 2001, Indonesia became so vital an ally in the war on terror that the United States—and the West generally—dared do little that might upset Indonesia. GAM legitimacy, while considerable, was eroded by the criminalisation of a substantial part of its armed movement (Schulze
2006:226) and by groups of gangsters who claimed GAM credentials to extort money from people (Aspinall 2000:7). The war had also been used as a pretext for ethnic and political victimisation of civilians and settling longstanding disputes over matters such as land. In the new climate of the war on terror, Indonesia was beginning to have some success in applying pressure on Sweden (and Malaysia and Thailand) to arrest GAM leaders as international terrorists (Schulze 2006:261). An irony was that this made Indonesia more open to the GAM strategy of internationalising the conflict. It also delivered Indonesia international respect as a new democracy that now opted into the diplomatic rules of the game (Schulze 2006:262).

The double irony, as Aspinall (2009:14) put it, was that ‘[i]n essence, GAM’s success in internationalizing its struggle had the unexpected effect of domesticating it’ (indeed, internationalisation ‘tamed’ GAM as well as domesticating its conflict). In the end, the GAM leadership concluded if they did not abandon armed struggle, the international community would abandon them and stigmatise them as terrorists. The United States did at least resist Indonesian pressure to list GAM as a terrorist organisation, even though GAM did fit the definition, so the door to peace negotiations with GAM could be kept open. One of the more terrifying counterfactuals to contemplate is what might have happened to Aceh if it had been placed into the international war on terror category (like Iraq, Afghanistan or Sri Lanka) rather than the category of domestic conflict resolution where ‘persuasion and the promise of respectability can help pacify a rebel movement and bring about lasting peace’ (Aspinall 2009) (as with Northern Ireland and South Africa).

As the decade proceeded, Indonesian counterinsurgency had become increasingly effective, particularly from May 2003 (Schulze 2006:226), leaving GAM forces greatly depleted and weary of war. They were not totally decimated, however, and indeed never diminished to their pre-1998 strength. Most major commanders were not killed or captured. Aspinall (2009:231) reports losses of 10–20 per cent of fighters among GAM units in some areas. While GAM membership had grown steeply up to May 2003, twice before its leaders had seen its fighting force grow only to be all but wiped out by 1979 and 1991. Indonesia was therefore succeeding in its strategy of using force and threat of further escalation to give the GAM leadership no better option than to give up on independence and settle for a semi-autonomy in which they shared power in Aceh.
This was, however, also a period of national weakness on the Indonesian side. Morfit (2006:14) argued that the political costs of failure of the Helsinki peace process for President Yudhoyono and Vice-President Kalla were great by the time the military had accomplished so much success with its counterinsurgency. Failure would have put the military and the ultranationalists back in the ascendancy in Jakarta. Yudhoyono was mindful of the fact that the opinion polls showed strong support for President Megawati when she launched the largest Indonesian military operation in decades in Aceh in May 2003 (Morfit 2006:15). Morfit (2006:24) sees a “surprising asymmetry” between a remarkably disciplined GAM and a national government in Jakarta struggling to bring coherence and discipline to its own house. When Aceh became a sustained focus of international media attention for the first time from December 2004, peace in Aceh became the imperative plank of the government’s program to create a new climate of security that would attract international investors back to Indonesia. In these circumstances, a negotiated settlement was on the cards that could leave both negotiating elites better off than they would be with continued conflict. The journey to this destination was, however, rocky.

President Wahid came to the office with a strong commitment to rule democratically and to push for peace in Aceh. His execution as a peacemaker was vacillation. Perhaps a fairer way of putting it is: ‘Wahid initiated talks during a brief window of opportunity when the TNI was on the political defensive; indeed a major cause for the breakdown of the process in subsequent years was the reconsolidation of the military’s political position’ (Aspinall and Crouch 2003:2). As it did in Papua (Chapter 2), the military acted in Aceh to undermine Wahid’s peace efforts. Wahid’s first initiative came three months into his presidency when he started discussions with GAM on what became agreement for a ‘humanitarian pause’, signed on 12 May 2000 with Hasan di Tiro. It occurred under the mediation of the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (later rebranded just the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue), a Swiss NGO founded in 1999. Within weeks, the government launched muscular raids on GAM claiming they were normal police operations within the terms of the agreement. This led to renegotiations in Geneva and two further agreements that renewed the ‘pause’ until 2 December 2000. At first, there was some reduction of violence (Martin 2006:76), but then deaths rose steadily for the remainder of the extended pause. At least 39 people were killed attempting to get to a SIRA demonstration in favour of a referendum in November 2000 (Bertrand 2004:180) and human rights workers were killed during the pause (Aspinall and Crouch 2003:19), causing international humanitarian NGOs to withdraw staff and close

6 On the other hand, a senior Government of Indonesia negotiator of that time said in interview that polls also showed overwhelming majority support for continuing negotiations: ‘People are not consistent. But elite domestic support for negotiations was weak. [There was a fear] that we would lose Aceh like Timor….as with the US today [2006] we had an over-reliance on hard power.’
offices. GAM consolidated its position during the pause, just as the military leadership increasingly gained the upper hand over their president. In the face of repeated attacks, ExxonMobil shut down production from March to July 2001, thereby causing other businesses dependent on the multinational to close their gates as well. By then, Wahid had already reverted to the more repressive policy position favoured by most military leaders, perhaps as part of his attempt to avert an impeachment that the military supported (Sukma 2003:153). When President Megawati came to office, more troops went in and the military enjoyed an even freer hand with repressive counterinsurgency.

As part of an implementation package of the special autonomy law that promised Sharia legal institutions that GAM did not want, the Megawati government did manage to sign a new cessation of hostilities agreement (CoHA) with GAM on 9 December 2002. The CoHA was a cease-fire rather than a peace agreement; both sides exploited it to regroup. During the CoHA, GAM substantially increased its arsenal of weapons (Schulze 2006:227). This was more important than recruiting more fighters. One GAM commander told us they were turning away recruits who were lining up in droves because they needed ‘quality rather than quantity’ and in his district they had only one weapon for every 10 fighters. The CoHA did give the long-suffering people of Aceh respite from fighting for a few months. Then after some weeks of descent back into violence, the Indonesian Government declared martial law in May 2003. Hours before that declaration, a peace negotiation with GAM in Tokyo was foiled by the arrest of Aceh-based GAM advisors to the negotiators on their way to the airport. Forty thousand troops were thrown into the new Indonesian military campaign (Martin 2006:91) and military recruitment of anti-GAM militias was hugely increased. It was a rather successful military campaign over the next 18 months in crippling GAM capability to mount insurgency attacks and leaving its fighters extremely war weary. It was mostly unsuccessful, however, in capturing or killing the senior GAM commanders.

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue peace processes between 2000 and 2003 did open up lines of communication. They began to change the political discourse and opened alternatives to armed conflict for serious consideration for the first time. Harvard negotiation professor William Ury, who worked with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue’s distinguished team of experts, was credited with ‘prompting GAM participants to engage actively with the idea of pursuing their goals through a democratic process’ (Huber 2004:27). It could be said that the work of the centre helped GAM to understand their interests and alternatives better—in particular, to begin to come to terms more realistically

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7 One interpretation was that the offer of Sharia law was an attempt to coopt the Aceh religious elite and split them from GAM (Sulaiman 2006:141). From 2002, district Sharia offices spread almost exclusively to areas of intensive conflict with support from the military (ICG 2006b:5).
with the fact that independence would not eventuate. We have seen that ‘reality checking’ still had a way to go with GAM leaders who still believed Indonesia would eventually implode, that Acehnese could become as rich as the people of Brunei and that international players such as the United States would eventually support them as they had East Timor.

Huber (2004) and Aspinall and Crouch (2003) also exposed a number of flaws in what the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue attempted. The sequencing of a negotiated cease-fire followed by demilitarisation measures and then by an all-inclusive dialogue to find a creative new solution that would do well by all parties was a difficult sequence to attempt. Normally, a political solution would precede demilitarisation. Why, in particular, would GAM agree to hand in its weapons in advance of seeing the political solution on offer? Once it did that, its key negotiating chip—the threat of resumed insurgency—would be forfeited. It was when GAM refused to relinquish its weapons, in response to a Jakarta ultimatum that this occurred by a firm date, that the CoHA collapsed. Most fundamentally, we have seen that by the time of the collapse of the CoHA, the parties were not ripe for peace, though the work of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue did help ripen them somewhat. In the difficult conditions of 2002–03, it was especially difficult for the centre to take responsibility for organisation, monitoring and enforcement of the agreement. As an NGO, it had no access to rewards or sanctions for non-compliance. It wanted a state such as Norway to take over peace monitoring, as Norway had done in Sri Lanka after the terms of peace had been negotiated with the parties by an NGO. Or, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue wanted UN peacekeepers, as had happened successfully in Mozambique after an NGO had mediated the peace agreement (Huber 2004:69–70).

In the aftermath of Indonesia’s humiliation at the hands of the United Nations in Timor-Leste, however, Jakarta insisted on no UN peacekeeping. There was also no nation willing to jeopardise its relationship with Indonesia by leading a peacekeeping force that most of the Jakarta elite did not want at that time. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue improvised by taking responsibility itself for a Joint Security Committee of GAM members, Indonesian military and military observers from Thailand and the Philippines collaborating to form local tripartite teams to monitor compliance with the CoHA. Huber (2004) detailed why this was not a sufficiently robust third party to deal with spoilers, of which there were many (but most especially powerful spoilers in the senior ranks of the Indonesian military). One strength of the next peace process was that not only was a more potent president pulling the military spoilers into compliance, a third-party monitor of greater logistical reach, with the formal backing of the European Union and a number of ASEAN states, had political clout that the CoHA Joint Security Committee lacked.
Juha Christensen, a Finnish businessman with interests in Indonesia, sought meetings with Deputy Minister for Social Affairs, Farid Hussein, and then with Minister for Social Affairs, Jusuf Kalla, who had already charged Hussein with opening up new lines of communication with GAM at the end of 2003. After a trip to Europe during which the GAM leadership refused to meet with Hussein, Christensen set up a meeting with former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and his Crisis Management Initiative. This led to the Indonesian Government putting their trust in Ahtisaari (perhaps because Ahtisaari in turn had the trust of Javier Solana, EU high representative for foreign and security policy) and the European Union. Indonesia and GAM were at least willing to let him try to mediate peace negotiations between them. Secret contacts between GAM and Jakarta had been happening for more than a year, and more concerted back-channel talks since October 2004 (though not face-to-face meetings between the principals). The 26 December 2004 tsunami, which claimed more than 160,000 Acehnese lives in one day, then energised the first fully fledged meeting in the aftermath of the tragedy.

In pre-negotiations before the tsunami, there was a clarity in Kalla’s office that given that there was no way Aceh could be given independence, Indonesia had to have a clear commitment to peace based on other genuine concessions and on the principle that because GAM would be surrendering their arms and walking away from independence, ‘GAM could not lose face’ (ICG 2005a:2). This concern continued to be important through the work of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). For example, weapons surrender to the AMM had to be transacted without the presence of the Indonesian military, or at least not a large presence, and with careful media management, so that images were not created that gave an impression of proud GAM fighters surrendering to the Indonesian military.

Ahtisaari adopted a different approach from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue mediations. He demanded tough discipline around the talks, especially on media statements from one side that the other had given up this or that. His philosophy was ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’, though he insisted that the agreement could not be expected to solve all the historical grievances the parties might have. In particular, he was insistent with GAM that independence was not on the table as a possible outcome of this process. He explained to them that this

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8 The ‘provokator’ script was also a tool of stigma and face management. During the conflict, ‘provocateurs’ were in fact mostly agents of the military who stigmatised GAM for their violence (Drexler 2008). When the peace process became serious, however, elites increasingly blamed ‘provocateurs’ for violence that could have been perpetrated by GAM or the military. Drexler (2008:181) recounted one amusing episode when she was in the Jakarta office of a member of the Aceh elite close to the military. Anticipating an outbreak of violence, he said on the phone: ‘whatever happens, it must not be from either the TNI or the GAM. Nothing should happen, but if it does, it will be because of the provocateur.’
did not mean GAM had to give up its ambition for independence. Who knows, he told them, a path to it might eventually be found. There was, however, no practical path to it at this time and independence would not be discussed at any stage in the Helsinki talks. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue approach, in contrast, had been to shift focus away from the positional blockage of ‘anything but independence’ versus ‘nothing without independence’. They attempted a shift to ‘immediate concerns such as reduction in hostilities, disarmament, [and] reconstruction’ (Aspinall and Crouch 2003:x) in the hope that confidence and trust would build and that unexpected, creative political reframing of impasses would emerge.

The Crisis Management Initiative team had the view that Aceh was too obscure a place to hold the attention of the international community for long. The tsunami had opened a window of attention that would close soon enough. ‘International involvement was framed in terms of how a peace process would help the post-tsunami humanitarian relief’ (Aspinall 2008a:13). Because Ahtisaari proposed to ‘move very rapidly’ to a ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ settlement, the Helsinki accord would ‘by necessity be a rather minimalist document’ (Aspinall 2008a:12). One observer said that Ahtisaari ‘often emphasised’ that the agreement would not cover all the concerns of the parties: it was merely ‘a commitment from both of you, a start of a process where two sides need to work together and implement it together’ (cited in Aspinall 2008a:14). Powerful domestic players within the internationally powerful Indonesian state were utterly hostile to international intervention. One way of reading the failure of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue peace process was that the window of ascendency of a new president who favoured an internationally mediated settlement over a military who opposed it was brief, and passed before military spoilers could wreck it. Ahtisaari was an assertive, even rude mediator who chastised the parties when he saw them as ‘wasting my time’. If there were to be a peace, it would require GAM to accept the non-negotiable condition of the new President Yudhoyono, who supported international mediation against the wishes of his military. A train would be leaving Helsinki station soon in the aftermath of the tsunami and GAM would be forced to make up its collective mind whether to hop on (Stedman 1997:14).

The suffering of the people of Aceh from the tsunami put pressure on both sides to deliver a peaceful result amid a mood in the province and nationally of ‘why are we still fighting in the midst of the wreckage’. GAM unilaterally announced a cease-fire two days after the tsunami. The military was quickly

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9 While this represents the interpretation in our interviews, Aspinall’s (2009:14) much more extensive fieldwork connects this mood with the wider mood of a hurting stalemate: ‘Eventually even the most committed nationalists saw that their struggle for independence was, if not at a dead end, at least unlikely to succeed in the medium term. The December 26 2004 tsunami reinforced the mood of defeatism, giving rise to willingness by GAM leaders to accede to the Helsinki Memorandum and abandon the independence goal.’
awash with negative international coverage when it exploited this opportunity by killing many GAM in a step-up of offensive operations. It was also excoriated for extorting payments from humanitarian organisations struggling to get help to desperate people (Kingsbury 2006a). ‘There was a feeling in the country that Indonesia was being punished by God. GAM [and TNI] were trapped by all of this’ (Interview with Jakarta peace negotiator). Within the military itself, there were strong currents of the sentiment of ‘why are we still fighting in the midst of all this’. The military had lost many more troops to the tsunami than to all the conflicts from Aceh to Papua in post-Suharto Indonesia and East Timor combined because, unlike GAM, who were mostly in the mountains, TNI had battalions on the coast, one of which might have been almost totally lost.10 Some military leaders quickly realised that a failure to devote their Aceh forces to the humanitarian effort would come at a large political cost. In the event, the military flipped that cost into a big benefit from some superhuman humanitarian work that established TNI as the people’s army in Aceh for the first time. Nevertheless, they kept fighting to maintain pressure on GAM during the peace process.

The view of Sofyan Djalil, one of the key government negotiators at Helsinki, was that GAM was militarily defeated by 2005 and the tsunami ‘gave GAM a face-saving reason to accept the realities of military defeat’ (Morfit 2006:10). Both sides realised that hundreds of millions of dollars in humanitarian assistance for Aceh might be withdrawn unless the violence stopped. Former US President Bill Clinton said as much when he emphasised the importance of aid workers being able to get assistance through to people without danger. 11 Jakarta also wanted the United States to lift its arms embargo on Indonesia. The United States and the European Union made it clear that very large amounts of aid would be withdrawn from Indonesia if the peace process was not made to work and they made it clear to GAM that if they negotiated in bad faith they would cease to regard them as someone to negotiate with and would outlaw them internationally as an Islamic terrorist group. Some of our more cynical informants felt the lavish funding environment post-tsunami allowed key GAM leaders at a local level to be bought off with ‘a nice car from the government’ or an unusually ‘big tsunami house’, though this was post-memorandum of understanding largesse. The most important peacebuilding impact of the tsunami could have been to open up

10 Miller (2009:157) concludes that only 218 soldiers and marines were lost.
11 A number of informants, including the governor, said that Clinton coming out and saying that was influential. It was read in Jakarta as evidence of serious US pressure. In fact, what happened was that in a meeting with humanitarian, human rights and women’s NGO leaders, Clinton was asked to make a statement to that effect. Clinton resisted for 10 minutes, saying that was a matter for President Bush and his people. As soon as he exited the meeting, the Acehnese civil society leaders had journalists arranged to corner him with the relevant question. Clinton relented to their trap and made a notable contribution to the peace simply by saying that peace was needed to make Aceh safe for international humanitarian workers to come in at the level needed. That really gave the peace journalists something to work with on their front pages.
the province to the international community (McGibbon 2006b:348). Indonesia realised it desperately needed the international community to help with such an extraordinary disaster. The international media spotlight that had failed Aceh so totally during a century and a half of near-continuous armed conflict was now focused on the desperate need for a new pragmatics of peace. The torture, rape and razing of homes of GAM supporters was a counterinsurgency strategy that would have been hard for Indonesia to sustain in an environment in which 350 international NGOs had staff roaming across Aceh (McGibbon 2006b:348). The large international NGO presence also made it difficult for spoilers to do their dirty work unnoticed once the central political factions on both sides had signed a peace agreement.

Across five tough negotiating rounds, a memorandum of understanding (the Helsinki MoU) was finally signed, which delivered many of the things that had been promised in previous special autonomy packages, but this time with the credibility of commitment of an unarmed joint EU and ASEAN12 Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) that would monitor and certify implementation of the various clauses in the agreement. The Indonesian Government was responsible for their security. AMM would physically count the departing Indonesian combat troops to ensure that only the agreed number of ‘organic’ troops would remain in Aceh. They would certify the collection and destruction of the number of weapons GAM said they possessed and signed that they would destroy in the agreement. The AMM would ensure that the government disbanded and disarmed several dozen militias with many thousands of members (Aspinall 2005b:53), though doing so was not in the Helsinki MoU. The essence of the MoU was that once GAM was decommissioned as a fighting force, district and provincial elections would be held in which GAM leaders could stand. Moreover, the national legislature was prevailed on through the agreement to change Indonesian law to allow local political parties to contest elections—something that had been banned everywhere under a philosophy of preventing the fragmentation of the republic, particularly by ethnic parties.13 The upshot was that former GAM strategist Irwandi Jusuf was elected governor in 2006 and GAM-sponsored candidates became regent or mayor in eight of Aceh’s 22 districts and towns (Aspinall 2007a). In 2007, this number rose to nine and former GAM members launched the Partai Aceh to contest the 2009 national elections, at which it was the most successful party in Aceh. The Helsinki MoU had an amnesty clause for combatants. Another role of the AMM was to rule on disputed amnesty cases, which it did with assistance from an internationally experienced judge. Schulze

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12 In fact, there were five ‘ASEAN contributing countries’: Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. They participated in their own right as nations rather than representing ASEAN (Center on International Cooperation 2006:83).

13 Brancati’s (2009) qualitative study and quantitative analysis from several hundred elections suggest there is something to this longstanding Indonesian policy. She finds that as regional parties win more votes, the likelihood of decentralisation reducing ethnic conflict and secessionism decreases.
(2007b:2) concluded that ‘an early amnesty process was crucial to building GAM’s confidence in the peace process’. The AMM also would monitor the reintegration of GAM members after their fighting units were decommissioned, monitor the human rights situation and more broadly investigate and rule on complaints of alleged violations of the MoU.

Ahtisaari’s strategy was that ‘[o]ne shouldn’t try to do all the dirty washing at once’ (Merikallio 2006:143). A human rights court would be established to deal with abuses after the signing of the agreement and the Indonesian Government would establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to examine the crimes of the past at a future date. In the event, these institutions for attending to the dirty washing that the negotiations deferred have still not been established.

By September 2005, 1789 GAM members were released from prison, but 65 whom GAM believed were political prisoners were still not released, with the Government of Indonesia arguing that these were serious common criminals (Center on International Cooperation 2007:49–50). Some of the latter were also released quickly on the recommendation of the international judge, but he recommended criminals such as those involved in the bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange that took 10 lives in 2000\(^\text{14}\) should serve their sentences.\(^\text{15}\)

As was common following armed conflict, the level of violence declined little immediately, with murders running at 20–30 a month in the province during 2005 (Merikallio 2006:215). Decline to the low level of homicide normal in Indonesia was rapid, however, with only a couple of murders per month being achieved in less than a year. In the lead-up to the 2009 national elections, there were, however, some (probably five) murders of former GAM leaders. Most GAM people saw these as the handiwork of the military attempting to further widen antagonism between the two ex-GAM factions in Partai Aceh. This failed to undercut Partai Aceh success at the polls. Locals and visitors alike within a year after the Helsinki accord saw a palpable transformation from insecurity to security on the streets and from boarded-up businesses to flourishing commerce. The sheer joy of freedom of movement was a huge peace dividend for most people. The transition to peace was remarkably rapid with surprisingly few incidents. The World Bank counted a peak of 45 ‘GAM–Government of Indonesia’ incidents for the month of June 2005 in its newspaper data set, falling to an average of five a month by the last four months of 2005 and none and one in each month between January and May 2006 (World Bank 2006a:21, 2006c:1). The main kinds of reportable ‘incidents’ in the World Bank’s study, in descending order of frequency, were ‘firefights, kidnapping, ambush, murder,

\(^\text{14}\) Who were in fact serving members of the military, according to Martinkus (2004:37).

\(^\text{15}\) Aspinall (2009:171) interprets this terrorist bombing not as a set-up to discredit GAM but as a GAM decision motivated by the objective of hastening the collapse of Indonesia.
sweeping, extortion, beatings, riot’. The return of GAM fighters from the hills and prisoners from the jails to villages resulted in exceptionally few, almost no, incidents of serious violent revenge (World Bank 2006a:23). Only 2 per cent of 642 active GAM and 1782 released political prisoners reported even experiencing tension with the military and 1 per cent with the police (World Bank 2006a:24). None of the active GAM members mentioned tensions with anti-separatist groups being a problem. In our interviews conducted after the AMM departed, some informants said there was an upsurge of incidents in which military or intelligence officers assaulted ex-GAM—they believed as provocations intended to elicit violent retaliation from GAM. The major epidemic of piracy in the Malacca Strait also fell away quickly (Feith 2007:6; Gordon 2009:307–8) and terrestrial extortion from businesspeople engaged in trade also fell initially (World Bank 2006a, 2006b). Local-level incidents of violence, however, as opposed to ‘GAM–Government of Indonesia’ violence, counted by the World Bank (2007), increased markedly between March and December 2007 in the post-AMM environment.

One of the dynamics of the growth in security was a new willingness of citizens to report serious crimes and abductions to the police. A recurrent scenario during and immediately after the conflict was a group of armed men arriving at night at a home and taking away a person who was never seen again. The AMM encouraged citizens to make reports of serious crime to their local police station. If they were afraid to go to the police, rather than the AMM dealing with it themselves, an AMM officer would accompany them to the police station to make the complaint. The big problem remained reports to the AMM of disappearances from past years that were recorded by the AMM so they could be dealt with subsequently by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, when this commission was never established. Elites on the Government of Indonesia side and on the GAM side know that atrocities have been committed on both sides, so both sides so far have been happy to allow their agreement to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and human rights court to remain unimplemented. This could become a permanent non-outcome because the Constitutional Court declared the 2004 law mandating the national Truth and Reconciliation Commission unconstitutional in December 2006. One senior cabinet minister who had previously been a supporter of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission explained in 2006 why his support had shifted to a non-prosecutorial Truth and Friendship Commission model, which the government was then setting up with Timor-Leste:

We found then that prosecution justice was not that easy. Families of victims were not satisfied [and felt] that not enough were prosecuted or not senior enough people or the charges were too light or the sentences. The quality of the evidence was poor because of the nature of the
crimes. Families of convicted perpetrators felt why did our husband get prosecuted when the big fish got off. That is how we got to the Truth and Friendship Commission. East Timor, like us, found that prosecution justice did not work for them.

Post-conflict, many serious crimes, including murder, continued to be dealt with by *adat* (customary law) in the hands of village leaders.

### The Law on Governing Aceh

There was anger in the Indonesian Parliament, particularly from Megawati’s PDI-P (Miller 2009:166), that the Executive Government had signed an Aceh peace agreement in Helsinki that required a new Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) without discussing the agreement with the Parliament. To get a watered down law through the Parliament, the Home Affairs Ministry resorted to paying bribes to legislators (Miller 2009:166).

In September 2005, the Governor of Aceh, Azwar Abubakar, forged a consensus in Acehnese civil society that included GAM to the effect that the people of Aceh would all get behind the same draft LoGA. Teams at three Aceh universities prepared drafts of parts of the law. There was genuine give and take. GAM did not want Sharia law in the draft, for example, but because many others did, GAM relented on the issue. In October 2005, there was an open seminar on the draft with widespread participation of civil society groups. While consultation with NGOs and other stakeholders in the capital, Banda Aceh, was fairly vibrant, it was not with respect to the rest of the province.

On 26 January 2006, disappointment across Acehnese civil society was widespread when the Indonesian Government introduced its highly diluted draft LoGA into the Parliament. GAM complained that it contained 37 passages that deviated from the Helsinki peace agreement. Distrust was acute on the proposed handling of the clause in the peace agreement that provided for Aceh to retain 70 per cent of natural resource revenues. The government draft provided for all revenues to go to Jakarta, with 70 per cent being subsequently remitted to Aceh. Aceh’s draft gave the province the right to implement its own trade and investment policies, as long as the central government was informed and there was coordination with it. While the devolution of power was less than promised, Aspinall (2008b:8) pointed out that the effect of the law was to continue the trend in earlier special autonomy deals of solving a problem that Jakarta saw as driven by economic marginalisation by hugely increasing
the resources made available to be spent by Acehnese elites. The government’s revisions to the Aceh draft undercut devolution by requiring that trade and investment in Aceh must observe ‘norms, standards, procedures and criteria operative at a national level’ (ICG 2006a:3).

Requirements of the peace agreement that the central government had to make certain decisions only with the consent of the Aceh administration were diluted to a requirement for consultation with the Aceh administration. While the Aceh draft had the autonomous government supervising its own civil service, the government draft reversed this to the Ministry of Home Affairs coordinating supervision. The government’s redrafting of the Acehnese draft excised the phrase ‘self-government’ wherever it appeared. In the opinion of many civil society groups, and of the ICG (2006a:2), the provincial government of Aceh was granted ‘even less authority than it had under special autonomy’. ‘External defence’ and ‘national security’ as central government responsibilities in the Aceh draft were changed to ‘defence’ and ‘security’.

To grasp the enormity of the Indonesian Cabinet’s betrayal of the peace agreement signed on its behalf, it is worth quoting in full the comparison of the two drafts on three clauses as prepared by the Aceh Democracy Network. Note in particular the complete reversal of Aceh–Jakarta authority in (3).

Article 6 of the Aceh draft says:

1. Aceh has authority over all public sectors, except in those areas that remain the authority of the central government.

2. These areas are foreign policy, *external* defence, national security, monetary and fiscal policy, and justice [emphasis added].

3. The authority of the central government as outlined in (2) can be turned over in part or in whole to the Aceh governments in accordance with laws and regulations.

The corresponding article in the government draft says:

1. Aceh and its districts have the authority to manage and take care of their own governmental affairs in all public sectors, except governmental affairs that are the authority of the central government.

2. Governmental affairs that are the authority of the central government are foreign policy; *defence, security*, justice, monetary and national fiscal [affairs] as well as certain issues in the area of religion [emphasis added].

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16 There had been an impasse in the Helsinki talks over the expression ‘special autonomy’ being used in the text, an expression that for GAM evoked the narrative of the broken promise. Damien Kingsbury suggested ‘self-government’ as an alternative without the leaden historical baggage of special autonomy.
3. In addition to the authority mentioned in (2), there are other government affairs that can be designated as coming under central government authority by law. (Aceh Democracy Network quoted in ICG 2006a:2–3)

The law did not honour the provision in the Helsinki MoU that security personnel who committed crimes against Acehnese civilians must be tried in civilian courts (Miller 2009:167).

Nevertheless, the law provided a framework for peaceful elections to be held in Aceh on 10 December 2006 for the governor, vice-governor and district bupatis and mayors. Registration for the election proceeded well and 80 per cent of those registered cast a vote (Miller 2009:169). These elections were conducted with little political violence and their outcomes were granted legitimacy in Aceh and Jakarta, and by EU election observers, though they were transacted within a patrimonial style of electoral competition that continued traditions of corruption and weak accountability in Aceh (Clark and Palmer 2008).

The AMM goes to work

While the AMM had its shortcomings, it was relatively non-bureaucratic. Consequently, it was more nimble and responsively ‘can-do’ than most peace operations. Ninety per cent of respondents to a 2006 survey of 1015 Acehnese rated the AMM as having done a good or excellent job of keeping the peace (Diani 2006). The mission was established in 2005 with 222 monitors, a nine-person Swedish logistical support group and 125 local workers—a combined staff of 356. Experienced Dutch EU official Pieter Feith headed the mission, with Thai Lieutenant General Nipat Thonglek as deputy. EU support also involved an election observation mission. Two-thirds of the monitors had a background in either the military or the police. If an AMM patrol had a leader from an EU country (or Norway or Switzerland), the deputy patrol leader would be from an ASEAN country, and vice versa. Feith established a Commission for Security Arrangements (COSA) that met regularly with the highest representatives of GAM in Aceh and the Indonesian military in Aceh. Tripartite COSA—again without civil society representation—were also established in each district. Feith’s philosophy was to use COSA to make it clear that he was going to be open and responsive with the military players and would not do things behind their backs. We spoke with an AMM officer whose job it was to compile ‘to do’ lists with columns designating who would be responsible for execution of COSA decisions. This, as in a number of things, was modelled on Feith’s experience with NATO in Bosnia. Just as the Geneva and Helsinki peace talks had consolidated the control of the old Swedish successors to di Tiro over GAM, the COSA shifted control towards younger GAM leaders based in Aceh with
(now Governor) Irwandi at the forefront. A widespread criticism of the AMM was the same elitism criticism, albeit with different GAM elites, made of the Helsinki process: ‘The AMM approach is elitist. It works with the leadership of GAM, leadership of Indonesia. These elites decide what is best for victims’ (Acehnese worker with victims employed by an international organisation).

On 27 December 2005, GAM officially disbanded its military wing, the TNA. It was immediately transformed into the Komite Peralihan Aceh (KPA), the Committee for the Transition in Aceh. Each GAM district command was given a KPA office from which it could coordinate demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation programs for local ex-combatants. They in effect also became organising nodes for widely successful campaigns to elect ex-GAM leaders locally and provincially. The KPA structure ‘replicates almost exactly the structure and terminology’ of the old GAM military organisation. The scale of KPA post-conflict predation on contracting and commerce roughly increased in proportion to how high up the GAM pyramid the predator was placed (Aspinall 2008b:9).

The idea was that the AMM would stay until an election was in place under the new law on Aceh. There was delay in accomplishing this, so the AMM mandate was extended three times to mid-December 2006 (in total, a 15-month deployment).

The weapons surrender process was the most sensitive part of the AMM work. Senior AMM monitors believed that large numbers of weapons were not surrendered. Publicly, in order to sustain the momentum of the peace process, AMM and government leaders wilfully created the impression that they believed all GAM weapons had been surrendered, when they did not believe this was the case. There are good reasons for concluding that the method for counting weapons in Helsinki has produced a considerable undercount. GAM and the Indonesian Government agreed that after considering weapons lost during the tsunami and captured since 2003, only 840 remained to be destroyed. This number was destroyed, ahead of schedule, in a ‘Last Weapon Ceremony’ on 21 December 2005. Waszink (2008:7) points out that sudden prospects for peace can create a unique momentum to surrender weapons, ‘which may be lost if the process is delayed and uncertainty about the benefits of peace emerge[s]’. She points out that in many peace operations, this window closes before peacekeepers are deployed or funding is provided for demobilisation and reintegration that includes incentives for weapons collection. This was not the case in Aceh, where the AMM gave weapons destruction priority and it was completed with focus, rigour and efficiency.

There was fear of a ‘real GAM’ equivalent to the Real IRA in Northern Ireland becoming a hold-out, so great confidence was built when the most likely hold-
out GAM groups returned weapons—not at first, but still quite early in the process. A lot of the AMM work has involved keeping the Indonesian military and government calm during the process, persuading them that in peace processes insurgents always try to hold back weapons, that perfection is not the objective. Rather it is maximising the effectiveness of weapons destruction. The AMM was tough in rejecting weapons that were barely serviceable homemade guns as counting towards the MoU’s surrender mandate of 840. The Indonesian military had a right to contest which weapons should count towards the target, and naturally fought bitterly over AMM judgments that accepted weapons that they thought should have been rejected from the count.

The AMM also counted the withdrawal of 25,890 soldiers and 5,791 police that were surplus to peacetime requirements as per the peace agreement. Some 14,700 soldiers and 9,100 police were allowed to remain; and a head count was conducted of those left behind as well, which concluded that somewhat fewer remained than stipulated in the agreement (Merikallio 2006:199). Unlike the 1998 military pullout, now, in the words of one AMM leader, ‘no-one booed them out’, ‘they got their share of flowers’ and they ‘looked relieved’.

Local GAM commanders continued to view themselves as custodians of the legitimate government of Aceh after the peace. In many areas, it was a delicate task for AMM patrols working with the GAM leadership to persuade local commanders that it was now illegal for them to collect taxes. For national governments such as Indonesia’s, which is wary of compromising its sovereignty by allowing foreign peacekeepers a role in administering a peace process, the cessation of the parallel tax system is a good example of something better enforced by third-party peace monitors working with the military leaderships of both sides than by the state. It could be argued that the AMM made progress on this that was not sustained after its departure. The weapons surrender is another good example.

Initially, the intent was that there would be specialist human rights monitors. In the event, what happened was that all monitors were responsible for monitoring everything in the MoU. There has been criticism that one effect of this is that gender rights issues, for example, have never become a top priority for anyone (Lahdensuo 2006:25). The view was taken that the AMM should be demanding of local human rights capacity building, just as it demanded police responsiveness by referring complaints of crime to the police rather than handling them at the AMM (see Box 6.1). Hence, human rights complaints were normally referred to Komnas-Ham (the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights) or to local human rights NGOs. ‘AMM did not intervene when local communities dug up mass graves in some locations, presumably destroying evidence of past abuses in the process’ (Aspinall 2008a: 32). Aspinall (2008a: 32) quoted one
AMM monitor recalling a warning in their pre-deployment training that the ‘EU was worried that the peace agreement would collapse if the human rights issues were investigated or pushed too hard’.

Box 6.1 Two AMM patrols observed

I travelled with two AMM patrols in the mountainous South of Aceh, first to the Gayo Loes District (Blang Kejeren) then to Aceh Tenggara District (Kutacane) in October 2006. These patrols were conducted after weapons had been destroyed but before most combatants had received reintegration payments. The big issue was unrest and distrust over failure of the promised payments to arrive. These are districts with large populations of non-Acehnese ethnicity. The second big issue here was movements for secession from Aceh province. An organized crime group led by a former police officer that was heavily involved in politics, ganja, and illegal logging funded by a prominent legislator were also local challenges.

Until recently, AMM had a regional office here, but as Mission numbers were winding down in late 2006, patrols spent a day and a half in each district checking implementation of the Helsinki MoU. There were six monitors on the patrol and three local drivers who also did odd jobs like taking photos, helping with translation and explaining aspects of local culture. Nearly all the time was spent chatting to elites. We had appointments with the bupati (but ended up being passed down to one of his staff), the local military commander, police commander, the BRA and the independent electoral commission office. We also met some local NGOs and with 17 former GAM members at the two KPA offices. While the organization for open meetings with members of the community fell through, we met and chatted with a lot serendipitously as we walked around town in the evening and as hundreds arrived to greet our helicopter in the middle of town. When AMM had regional offices they had regular socialization meetings in coffee shops, in which many Batak men in particular could spend two hours a day talking about politics.
The team treated the meetings with the two Dandims (both Lieutenant Colonels) and his senior staff as the key ones. Both Dandims still behaved as if they were the ones actually in political control of their district, rather than the civilian authorities, and they probably were. The team asked questions like ‘Are you having regular meetings with your KPA?’ But the Dandims paid limited attention to the questions asked and launched into lectures on the local security and political situation. There were karate-like hand gestures, punching the air with a fist, even cutting it with a baton and lots of jokes at which we all laughed. The team were much more respectful toward him then to anyone else, deferring to him as the military superior he was to most of them. One Dandim launched into a diatribe against the former AMM team leader for interfering too much in the sovereignty of the government of Indonesia. We all looked chastened.

The other Dandim said that he was working well with his KPA, so much so that the KPA leader agreed that if he caught an ex-GAM extorting money or ‘taxes’, he would bring him to the Dandim and they would beat him together (more karate-like body language of rule). The team looked uncomfortable. Clause 5.2 (b) of the Helsinki MoU sets the AMM the task to ‘monitor the human rights situation’. The team leader confirmed with the interpreter that he heard right. ‘Yes’, said the interpreter, not seeing anything out of order, ‘Dandim says they would both beat him’. A joking suggestion was made to the Dandim that of course you would not literally beat him but punish him in some way. The Dandim laughingly agreed. When we visited the KPA we recorded some specific complaints of beatings of ex-combatants by the police. Then at the meeting with the police commander one team member, without any specific reference to these cases, said some general things about how bad it is to beat suspects. The police commander agreed and said his officers never did that.
Later a written request from AMM to the police was sent asking for a response to the allegations of beating. The prediction was the police would write back saying the suspects were difficult and had to be treated firmly, but there was no beating. Perhaps this was inspectorial ritualism without point, or perhaps it was consciousness raising on human rights obligations. Hard for the observer to judge. The police commanders were also asked if their officers were doing human rights training and the AMM was satisfied with the verbal assurance that they were.

The team had a need to stop at a particular building for a meeting. Coincidentally half a dozen police had a check-point in front of the building at which they were stopping vehicles to collect illegal cash payments to let them pass. A member of our team said they might think AMM are stopping here to monitor the collection of these bribes. So he walked over to the officer in charge to assure him we were here for a meeting in this building. But the police were not the least bit worried about any appearance of lawbreaking in front of the AMM and smiled as I took a photo of them (imprudently, even so).

At the independent electoral commission we talked about complaints from GAM members finding it difficult to get the identity cards they will use to vote. Administration, budget and security arrangements for the election were discussed and some suggestions made for ensuring a peaceful ballot. The role of the EU election observers arriving soon was explained. It seemed ironic that this monitoring was led by our team leader from Brunei who had never seen an election in his own country. There was a sign outside the independent electoral commission acknowledging donor support from Saudi Arabia.
Our meetings with the ex-combatants were long. There was agitation about reintegration payments not received, but also about obstacles placed in the way of their right to vote and acceptance back into some villages. KPAs clearly needed training in how to run an office. Basic capabilities like maintaining files were not within the skill set of the combatants. The AMM monitors saw a problem here, but not a solution.

Basically what the patrol sought to do was to be visible and provide assurance to those who doubted that the obligations of the MoU would be honoured. The AMM acted to assure people that they would be honoured. They also educated people about obligations that those people did not fully understand. Others who did understand, but needed a tap on the shoulder to remind them of their obligations, got that reminder. They tried to caress and cajole MoU compliance with a lot of deference to local authority. If a need to enforce compliance arose, mostly they would need to persuade Indonesian authorities to deliver that enforcement.

Source: John Braithwaite’s fieldnotes.

It is one thing to understand why European diplomats would be nervous about unravelling the mission by pushing human rights too hard in advance of their arrival. It is quite another in retrospect to conclude, as Kirsten Schulze (2007b:1) does, that the AMM’s ‘lack of focus on implementing the human rights elements [of the Helsinki agreement] made it possible for the AMM to complete its mission in the sensitive context of Indonesian domestic politics’. Our interviews with players on all sides suggested that once the AMM had started making good progress on disarming GAM and Jakarta had managed to get away with reneging on large sections of the Helsinki agreement in the LoGA, it was implausible that some pressure from the monitors on implementation of the human rights aspects of the agreement would have caused the Government of Indonesia to prevent the AMM from ‘completing its mission’. Jakarta was doing too well from the peace for it to scuttle the AMM over a bit of irritation about human rights implementation pressure. This would not have been pressure from the West to do things Indonesia was opposed to, but things it had agreed to do. It is necessary to think prudently about the sequencing of peace agreement implementation. ‘Too early or too overzealous focus on human rights’ (Schulze 2007b:14) can be a risk to peace operations. The AMM, however, made the
mistake of being too late and insufficiently zealous on human rights. It therefore must share blame for the dishonouring, as of 2009, of these parts of the Helsinki commitments. Two senior AMM members in our interviews were self-critical of the mission for failing to restructure their priorities when they began to accomplish their military objectives more quickly and cleanly than expected. One said he had learned this from his experience in Somalia: there, the UN peacekeepers went in with a mission based on an analysis of the environment that quickly became wrong when the environment changed. The other thought that instead of extending the mission in the manner that occurred, a new mission should have been established with a new mandate that gave higher priority to compliance with the Helsinki human rights undertakings. Another in mid-2007 saw evidence that the AMM had left at the right time in demonstrations by civil society over incidents of violence; she felt that, while the AMM was there, Acehnese would have sat back waiting for the AMM to fix the problem. Compared with some other peace operations, in Aceh, human rights breaches by the AMM itself did not loom large. There was one case of sexual misconduct by an AMM monitor that led to the dismissal of the monitor and a prompt apology for his behaviour from the AMM (ICG 2006a:9).

The AMM failed not only to push Indonesia to honour the MoU commitment for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Aceh. Many we interviewed were also critical that the AMM showed no leadership in encouraging bottom-up reconciliation based on adat or with ulamas. A women’s leader said there were many women willing to testify about rape to a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that was well designed in terms of giving them assurances of protection, but the AMM had done nothing to work through with them what the assurance needs of rape victims were.

Combatant reintegration

In the later stages of the conflict, GAM members who surrendered were offered literacy education, vocational training in skills such as farming, fish farming, mechanics and carpentry, plus a R2 million stipend (Schulze 2006:251).

Reintegration of combatants was the next major challenge for the AMM and the government. A World Bank/AMM survey of 642 GAM fighters six months after signing the peace agreement found 85 per cent of them hopeful or very hopeful with respect to the peace process (Merikallio 2006:204). Their economic futures, however, did not seem very hopeful. Most had missed out on high school education, but were generally not interested in education. Their fathers had been fishermen or farmers mainly, but most ex-combatants were not interested in returning to this. The AMM encouraged ex-GAM fighters to take the examination for entrance to the police force, but we do not know how...
many did this. Many wanted to ‘chill’ for a while and readjust, but only 30 per cent of them had houses to go to. Half had their family homes destroyed in the war and of course many others had just lost houses to the tsunami. Six months after the peace, only 25 per cent of combatants in the survey had found work (World Bank 2006a:viii), with 40 per cent looking for work. Many of the rest had serious mental problems; 17 per cent had wounds or injuries they were struggling with and 36 per cent said they suffered from chronic disease. Four per cent were women. Very few, if any, had been child soldiers (World Bank 2006a:13). The GAM modus operandi was to use children as lookouts at watch posts on the edge of villages rather than as fighters.

Two years after the 2006 survey that found only 25 per cent of combatants were working, the World Bank found 75 per cent of GAM fighters under thirty and 88 per cent of those over thirty in full-time employment—higher than for non-combatants surveyed. Combatant employment jumped because of what Aspinall (2008b) described as the predatory peace economy under the control of GAM contractors kicking in to provide legitimate and illegitimate work to former fighters. It was, however, also about the analysis of the Indonesian Government that a war substantially about economic grievance could be quelled by buying off fighters, and especially commanders. So, for example, the BRR (the tsunami reconstruction agency) gave top GAM leaders high salaries for jobs in offices that they rarely frequented and gave hundreds of other jobs to more lowly GAM members (Aspinall 2008b:12).

A distressing aspect of the evidence from Aceh in relation to ex-combatant lethargy, reported to us from research by the Aceh Reintegration Agency (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, BRA), was that two years after the signing of the peace agreement, half the children of GAM fighters were not attending school. This is extraordinary in the context of Indonesia, where school attendance is near universal. It was also partly a legacy of the destruction of schools; GAM destroyed hundreds of schools in their campaign to destroy Indonesian Government structures and replace them with their parallel government services (Schulze 2006:232); and the Indonesian military burned hundreds of schools in their retribution against villages they saw as supporting GAM. The tsunami then washed away hundreds more. In retrospect, a portion of reintegration payments targeted at education support for the children of combatants would have been a good policy, partly because it would have targeted a need that was vital to healing for a better future. Targeting a healthy portion of the assistance on

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17 This survey estimate could be an underestimate. The senior GAM official who other informants told us was the most authoritative source on GAM statistics said 600 women had been through training as GAM fighters, though of course this was a different matter from really participating in the fighting.
18 GAM also saw Indonesian schools as places where children were indoctrinated into Indonesian ideology. Schools were also often used as billets for Indonesian troops. Burning Indonesian schools drove students into the rural Islamic schools that were mainly under GAM control (Schulze 2006:232).
children who were innocent victims of the war might have softened criticisms of rewarding killers and ignoring the victims of the killers. Interestingly, Clarke et al.’s (2008:20) study found a great deal of support among victims for prioritising justice as a better future for children:

I think the best way is to provide education for the children of victims, then help us victims economically.

There is justice if the family and children of those who were killed can go to school so their future is assured.

A major threat to the peace process between 2005 and 2007 was the slowness with which cash reintegration payments from the Indonesian Government were handed over (see Box 6.1). This was because of false starts by the new BRA with unworkable delivery strategies for payments that were abandoned before this aspect of the Helsinki agreement was finally delivered. The MoU between the Government of Indonesia and GAM in Clause 3.2.5(a) specified that ‘[a]ll former combatants will receive an allocation of suitable farming land, employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities of Aceh’. It was quickly agreed after the peace by all parties that the lower transaction costs of cash payments would make sense. Combatants could use them to acquire farming land if they chose.

Regional GAM commanders wanted the money for their troops handed over to them to distribute. The Indonesian Government and the AMM worried that some GAM leaders were morphing into organised crime leaders and might embezzle the funds. Or they might use them with political favouritism as they rebuilt GAM as a political party. On their side, GAM commanders did not want to provide lists of names of their members to Indonesian Government officials. If the war resumed, they or their families might be killed. Even if the war did not resume, they still might be victimised by the government. Female combatants were especially afraid of sexual assault by Indonesian security forces if their names were known. Many never allowed their status as GAM fighters to be registered and they missed out on payments. Three initial payments of about $100 on each occasion were handed to KPAs (in effect to commanders) for distribution to their 3000 fighters by the AMM. The way they distributed this money varied from locality to locality with a lot going to widows and orphans, as opposed to the 3000 living ex-combatants (most of whom received $10–30 out of each $100 tranche). Some went to cooperative businesses from which whole villages might benefit in a sustainable way. The AMM staff felt some went into the pockets of their commanders, but that not a great amount was diverted from fair distribution. One fear that the money might be used to buy more guns did not seem to be realised.
Some GAM factions—for example, some who surrendered early and were therefore not in the decommissioning count of 3000—were aggrieved at missing out. At this point it also became clear that the number of 3000 fighters declared in the peace agreement was perhaps only one-third of the real number (Merikallio 2006:207). In July 2006, the issue of disclosure of the names of GAM combatants was resolved by passing the names through the AMM. Finally, a delayed final distribution of a cheque for R25 million (approximately $2500) to each GAM combatant was made. By 2007, about the same total amount was delivered to the larger group of 6500 former members of anti-separatist militias at the lower rate of R10 million per member. Many members of these groups complained that their leaders had not passed on their share (Clarke et al. 2008:16). Earlier, Japan funded reintegration payments to almost 2000 amnestied prisoners and another 3000 combatants through the IOM. The IOM also rolled out a case-management approach with these 5000 former combatants and prisoners, strengthening existing skill sets, building new ones, ‘transforming a conflict skill set into a developmental skill set’ (IOM interview) plus psychological help with trauma and depression. Other NGOs concentrated on language skills for combatants who could not speak Bahasa Indonesia and skills in using computers, which were never learnt in the mountains. Even though accountability was weak with the payments funded by Japan through the IOM, the World Bank (2006a:29) concluded that most released prisoners used the money sensibly, with paying off debt (often accrued by their families while they were in prison) accounting for the largest proportion of expenditure of the Japanese payments, followed by ‘investment’ as the second-most common expenditure, followed by food, farming, health care, housing, education, then transport needs.

The World Bank (2006a:50–1) data showed 1782 political prisoners had worse wounds, worse chronic disease and much worse mental health than a sample of 642 GAM fighters. Political prisoner health outcomes of various kinds were twice as bad, or worse, compared with fighters living in the hills during the conflict. This is probably about torture. Though this result is not as robust, female combatant mental health outcomes are also more than twice as bad (World Bank 2006a:51). The World Bank interprets this in terms of Acehnese women being more open than men about emotional problems, though we can also wonder if it might have something to do with sexual assault and domestic violence in the stressed context of warfare—about which Acehnese women are not so open.

Even though Aceh is a case where ex-combatants have received more reintegration support than has occurred in other conflicts, including in other parts of Indonesia, an interesting perspective comes from the unusually systematic World Bank (2006a:27) survey data that ‘communities themselves have provided the most significant assistance to GAM returnees’. Families,
friends, GAM leaders who were better off, even village members who were not close to combatants and were not GAM supporters were generous to returnees. This is an interesting result indeed—that even poor villagers who were not particularly sympathetic to GAM would make personal sacrifices because they are sympathetic to peace. In other words, poor villagers donated to combatant reintegration for the same reasons as the international donors, only with more generosity:

I am afraid if they [GAM returnees] have no jobs to fill their time and to feed their families, they will resort to other things. I give them cigarettes and some rice not because they ask for them from me, but because I want to help them get back on their feet. My own situation is bad, but they need more support from the community. The peace is everybody’s responsibility. (Village elder, Seruway, Aceh Tamiang; World Bank 2006a:40)

The Governor of Aceh established a peace and reintegration body called the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA). USAID and the UNDP provided financial assistance for the BRA. In 2007, after Irwandi Jusuf had been elected governor, he appointed former GAM negotiator Nur Djuli as head of the BRA. At times there was some confusion over what was the role of the reintegration agency concerning the conflict (the BRA) as distinguished from the role of the reconstruction agency (BRR), which was focused on post-tsunami reconstruction. The cash payments to combatants and *diyat* (Islamic blood payments) to victims were only a tiny fraction of the cost of the $260 million BRA had spent by September 2007 on 120 conflict-related projects. ‘Many of these projects targeted ex-combatants with skills development and training. Others targeted women’s groups to support advocacy and investment in small-scale initiatives’ (Clarke et al. 2008:17). The European Union together with Japan funded the IOM’s considerable reintegration programs.

The big picture, however, is of fewer GAM members being reintegrated into legitimate opportunity structures than into illegitimate opportunity structures. Many GAM leaders used their political clout post-conflict to gain favourable treatment as contractors for construction projects. Others became prominent in illegal logging. These kinds of enterprises created opportunities for lower-level GAM members that were partly in the realm of semi-organised crime and partly in the realm of legitimate employment.

GAM gangsterism and sham GAM gangsterism were problems during the war and continued to be problems of the peace. In one serious incident in March 2008, six people were killed in a gang conflict mostly involving ex-GAM on one side and Javanese ex-militia on the other over control of revenues from a bus station in Aceh’s central highlands (Gade 2008). Some former GAM
commanders have transformed themselves into ‘a parasitic business elite, enriching themselves by gaining favoured access to government contracts and licences’ (Aspinall 2008a). Others partnered with the military in illegal logging businesses. A small number of lower-level ex-GAM members turned to common crimes such as armed robbery.

Aspinall’s (2008b:1) research concluded that ‘most key GAM commanders have moved into business. Specifically, most have become contractors working in the construction industry.’ Building roads, bridges, houses and public buildings or providing materials for infrastructure work are the biggest part of this ‘patrimonial peace’. Few of the former fighters have established reputable contracting companies; rather they use their political networks and threats of violence to deliver contracts to collaborating companies in return for a slice of the profits. Aspinall sees a transition from a predatory war economy to a predatory peace economy. In this transition, there is some continuity between extortion payments collected during the war as taxes to support GAM’s parallel state, civil service and army and extortion payments justified as a community levy to support victims of the war, community development, local security or some such pretext. While some forms of post-conflict extortion could have a different justification and be less widespread, citizens and businesses in both contexts fear non-payment will result in violence to their families or destruction of their property and in both contexts believe not all the money goes to the stated purposes.

In other ways, post-conflict predation is different from predation during conflict in the way that white-collar crime is different from armed robbery. While guns might be in the background, money is taken at the point of a pen rather than at the point of a gun. It is predation by contract. Also, there were/are a lot of contracts to be had in post-conflict, post-tsunami Aceh. It has become quite widespread for donors to be required to pay 10 per cent of the value of contracts to KPA criminal entrepreneurs to get humanitarian work done in those large swathes of Aceh where KPAs effectively control access to the countryside. The same has been the case with the considerable largesse that has flowed to Aceh’s provincial and district governments from public revenue as a result of the LoGA and prior special autonomy deals. Along different channels the gush of funds that flowed to Aceh from 2005 provided a flow, then a stock, of illegitimate opportunities for entrepreneurial criminal contractors.

Aspinall’s interviews revealed that the slow and inept administration of reintegration payments for GAM combatants played into ‘techniques of neutralization’ (Sykes and Matza 1957) for the predatory peace economy. Government officials or donors who criticised extortionate demands for contracts would be responded to with the criticism that they had failed to deliver the
reintegration payments due to the ex-combatants and other promises in the Helsinki accord. So the techniques for neutralising responsibility of ‘accusing the accusers’ and ‘blaming the victim’ were both deployed.

Aspinall (2008b:5) argued that after 1998, when GAM ‘for the first time became a truly powerful and mass-based insurgency’, it also became for the first time ‘a massive money-making machine’. In becoming a criminalised insurgency, GAM followed the pattern of its adversary as a criminalised military in extracting rents from economic activities, small and large. ‘On the surface, GAM and state officials fought each other in a deadly conflict; below the surface they were locked in an intimate embrace of mutual economic advantage’ (Aspinall 2008b:6). Aspinall (2009:165) concluded that even perhaps a majority of Aceh’s preman joined GAM from 1999. As one GAM leader explained: ‘Whoever was brave, even if he had a criminal background. We let them join; we needed people who were brave’ (Aspinall 2009:165).

An interesting feature of Aspinall’s (2008b:10) analysis of predation is that it is about status and power as much as money:

During the conflict, though few GAM fighters became personally wealthy, for many of them joining the movement was a way to earn respect in the gampong. Young men who were unemployed or poor and who were used to being ordered around by their social betters suddenly found themselves with weapons, at the center of an exciting political venture, and with new ability to tell others what to do.

After the conflict, Aspinall argued, it was visible affluence that was the path for ex-GAM members to be listened to as men of status and power, rather than the gun.

The worlds of ‘government by contract’ and ‘predation by contract’ come together in a pan-Indonesian pattern of neo-patrimonialism that sees large numbers of contractors to government who ascend to power in government. Through the practice of contracting, they acquire the political networks and trust to make the transition. Aspinall (2008b:18) reported that 20 of the 25 newly elected South Aceh Provincial Legislative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) members after the 2004 election turned out to be contractors, with his informants variously estimating 20–70 per cent of DPRD legislators across the province had a contracting background.

**Refugee resettlement and rehabilitation**

Large flows of people into refugee camps were at times orchestrated by GAM to mobilise international attention and concern (Drexler 2008:179), with GAM
even alleged to have paid civilians at times to flee to camps (Schulze 2006:238). For most phases of the war, no reliable numbers on refugees are available. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC 2006:4) saw mid-2002 as one high point, when there could have been 1.4 million refugees in Indonesia, perhaps as many as 150 000 of them in Aceh. At various phases of the 30-year war, there was considerable displacement and at one point or another certainly more than 100 000 people were driven from their homes (Aspinall 2008d).

In 1999, President Habibie announced that victims of military violence in Aceh would be given a special opportunity to become civil servants (Drexler 2008:66). The BRA paid a diyat of approximately US$300 a year to war widows or other surviving relatives. Some 20 000 diyat payments had been made by June 2007 (Clarke et al. 2008:27). Three thousand houses destroyed in the conflict were rebuilt with money from the 2005 budget, though Clarke et al. (2008:29) reported that in 2005 and 2006 a combined total of only 4978 houses was built (with a R25 million grant for building materials) out of a total of 59 000 houses destroyed as a result of the conflict. In a mid-2007 BRA interview, we were told this number was up to 9800—still slow inroads, though given the magnitude of the rebuilding challenge in post-tsunami Indonesia, it did not seem to have performed any worse than the United States after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. The BRA identified 13 other kinds of loss, beyond the loss of a relative, such as permanent disability, destruction of a home or forced displacement, with a specified level of payment to be made to victims suffering each kind of loss. Few individuals, however, received these payments, at least directly. Former prisoners and civilian victims were entitled to apply for approximately US$1000 for income-generating projects (Merikallio 2006:211). This was intended to assist many who were displaced from their homes to find a new niche in the Aceh economy and soften criticisms that all the reintegration help was going to GAM fighters. By July 2006, however, 48 485 applications (covering 500 000 individuals) arrived at the BRA for this assistance. The agency simply ordered a halt to further applications. Only 29 of the applications received start-up funding; it was not renewed to complete the projects.

The BRA launched a new assistance program in August 2006 designed in collaboration with the World Bank and dubbed the Community-Based Assistance for Conflict Victims through the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP). The KDP, which had existed in Indonesia since 1998, allowed villagers to decide which victims would receive what kind of assistance in their community. Larger villages and villages that suffered a higher intensity of conflict received proportionately larger sums to distribute to their victims. The KDP was expanded to cover all 5800 villages in Aceh through 12 000 village-level facilitators and 600 subdistrict facilitators. BRA delivery through the KDP ended in 2007 and the BRA moved back to an emphasis on tackling the backlog of housing
construction for homeless victims. A community-based scheme did not meet the political need pressed by GAM and the government to deliver direct support to individuals, so the *diyat* program and other ad hoc BRA programs to provide direct support to victims became the higher priorities, though the evidence was that KDP delivery was quite effective (Barron and Burke 2009:50).

**Reconciliation**

A great deal of reconciliation work remains to be done in Aceh. In the south and west of the province, there is a variety of mostly weak movements for secession from the province—some based on non-Acehnese ethnic groups, some mobilised locally around former anti-GAM militia leaders. Some elite Jakarta players, including 2009 presidential candidate Megawati in the context of her campaign (ICG 2008b:7), have encouraged the main separatist proposals for the creation of Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA) and Southwest Aceh (ABS). An International Center for Transitional Justice set of interviews and focus groups with 113 victims (mostly of murder or forced disappearance of a family member) from nine districts of Aceh found a feeling that the peace process had not recognised their suffering, had provided combatants an unfair share of the assistance, had failed to uncover the truth regarding particularly violent incidents that might for example identify the whereabouts of the remains of their loved ones, had failed to deliver justice through the courts and had failed to leave them feeling assured that abuses would never happen again (Clarke et al. 2008). In many cases, nothing has been done to assist the recovery from trauma of sexual assault victims, though as discussed above, the IOM has launched important work to support those with trauma symptoms. In one International Center for Transitional Justice focus group, all 15 female participants had been sexually assaulted (Clarke et al. 2008:7). Most reports are of sexual assault by the military, but there are also reports of rape by GAM fighters (see also Schulze 2006:277; Coomaraswamy 1999; IOM 2007).

A coalition of civil society groups, the Aceh Coalition for Truth (Koalisi Pengungkapan Kebenaran, KPK) (Clarke et al. 2008:41), has fingered the failure of GAM, the Government of Indonesia and the AMM to deliver the Truth and Reconciliation Commission promised in the Helsinki agreement as the fundamental betrayal of victims with respect to these concerns. The coalition is thinking more creatively about persuading the provincial government to deliver a legally acceptable provincial Truth and Reconciliation Commission in light of the December 2006 Indonesian Constitutional Court decision to strike down the national Truth and Reconciliation Commission law. It has responded by establishing a working party to draft a Truth and Reconciliation Commission law for consideration by the Acehnese Parliament (Clarke et al. 2008:41). The coalition wants the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be victim focused
and to include a community-based reconciliation process, as in Timor-Leste, though based on Islamic as well as customary law, with provision for traditional reparations to be paid by perpetrators to victims. Aspinall (2008a:30) reported that the Indonesian Department of Law and Human Rights announced that a new national draft Truth and Reconciliation Commission bill was being prepared for consideration by the national legislature, but that ‘it seems likely that there will be a long delay, even of several years, before a [Truth and Reconciliation Commission] in Aceh is established’.

A fully effective model would need national as well as provincial authority so that former military leaders in Jakarta could be subpoenaed. Perhaps the greatest cooperation that could be expected from this quarter would be, however, for a model similar to the Truth and Friendship Commission with Timor-Leste in which a certain degree of truth and reconciliation has been advanced, but without any recommendations for prosecutions of individuals. As Aspinall (2008a:10) puts it, ‘one unstated but central element of democratisation in Indonesia has been a political deal by which the military eased itself out of politics in exchange for effective impunity for past abuses’. With respect to the Helsinki process, Aspinall (2008a:15) quotes one insider as having the impression ‘even that peace was sought at the expense of justice’.

According to another observer: ‘At the beginning of the talks, there was a lot of discussion of the past. Ahtisaari asked them “Are you now ready to focus on the future and forget about the past?” They did this…’ Another added that: ‘GAM at the beginning tended to want to go back to the past more. President Ahtisaari tried to pull the parties back to the present time and encouraged them to forget the past, over and over again. He would tell them that the past has to be dealt with, but now is not the time.’ (Aspinall 2008a:17)

Local officials have encouraged former GAM members to participate in traditional reconciliation rituals—peusijuek ceremonies (Mallinder 2008:389). The International Center for Transitional Justice (Clarke et al. 2008:14) reported that peusijueks (welcome-home ceremonies) for amnestied GAM prisoners returning to their villages were attended mostly by AMM, military and police representatives and went off smoothly. One AMM officer interviewed for this study had attended one peusijuek ritual attended by 112 GAM fighters and another in which 25 GAM families stood with 25 non-GAM families who were victims of the war, many at the hands of GAM. The World Bank (2006a:25) found that almost all villages had experienced some form of peusijuek or kenduri ceremony and 77 per cent of active GAM members surveyed reported that they had experienced welcome ceremonies in their village—sometimes family peusijuek, sometimes village peusijuek. Often every member of the village attended these rituals. Peusijuek usually involves pouring sacred water, yellow
rice or powder on those blessed after reconciliation of a dispute, returning from
the hajj and other important events. Separate processes before a peusijuek would
normally work through the resolution of the dispute. For example, suloh is a more
complicated process involving many people in reconciliation by negotiation and
testimony, related to the Arabic (and Jewish) restorative justice practice of sulha
(Braithwaite 2002:4). The peusijuek, in contrast, symbolises only the fact that
the parties are at peace. It can also be a cooling down that prepares parties
in conflict to subsequently sit down to talk. So these watering ceremonies are
’social practices, not discursive practices. It’s actions. Not in the mind, it’s in the
practice’ (Personal communication, Mustafa Arahman, State Institute of Islamic
Studies, Banda Aceh). Watering ‘cools people down’, watering them as if they
were plants. Widows and other conflict victims were often also blessed in these
rituals.

Ex-combatants also widely experienced religious welcomes of reconciliation
and forgiveness, as in sermons by imams in mosques and meunasah (village
halls). Peusikuek is probably a pre-Islamic adat that has some elements widely
interpreted as suggestive of Buddhist/Hindu influence. Sometimes people who
have been in conflict shake hands (peumat jarou) in the presence of an adat leader
who has worked on reconciliation between them, and selected prayers for peace
and selected verses of the Koran for peace may be recited. Some of these were
between GAM leaders and anti-separatist militia leaders who made commitments
to each other in the mosque and hugged in front of the mosque afterwards, with
important figures on both sides adding gravitas to the occasion—for example, a
minister from Jakarta and the Governor of Aceh.

Since returning, there has been a tepung tewar held by my family and also
by the community. This gives us returnees renewed faith in ourselves
to be back in the communities. Some of us get emotional during the
perusikuek, they treat us as if we are heroes that have just returned from
the battlefield. (Former combatant quoted in World Bank 2006a:26)

Of course, reintegration into an old village power structure can be rocky for
young men who are used to being the ones in charge:

You can see from their behavior, how they carry themselves with such
arrogance. They never acknowledge the village elders, they never
say Assalamu’alaikum (traditional welcoming phrase)…they have no
manners, they think of themselves as better than us, as one of the elders
here. (Female villagers in Aceh Timur describing ex-GAM, quoted in
World Bank 2006a:26)

In the AMM interviews, we were told that a lot of reconciliation was done in
civil society without the AMM knowing about it. The AMM would hear about
an incident of the police beating people. Then before they did anything about it they would hear that meetings had been held, compensation payments made and the problem ended as far as the stakeholders were concerned. In other cases, monitors would catalyse reconciliation with minimalist local interventions:

If you can just get people to sit down and talk, very often you can clear something up. Because there are so many little misunderstandings, so many beliefs based on false rumours, there’s a good chance that some damaging misunderstanding will be clarified in any old conversation.

(AMM team leader)

Another AMM officer said he received many requests to engage in shuttle diplomacy to resolve something, to which he would reply: ‘Hey, why don’t you talk to them directly?’ He believed that by catalysing personal relationships that solved problems directly, you dealt with distrust and transcended dependence on the AMM. On the negative side, we had a conversation with one old ulama who said he had attended a peusijuek at the Grand Mosque in Banda Aceh followed by prayers for peace and reconciliation attended by Sukarno ministers and the governor at the end of the Darul Islam rebellion and again with GAM leaders, the governor and a senior minister in Suharto’s time. He was critical that such a Grand Mosque, top-level peusijuek had not occurred in association with the peace sealed by the AMM. Another informant said the military leadership was unwilling to participate in such a top-level peusijuek with GAM leaders, though military officers had participated in less grand reconciliations.

Elizabeth Drexler’s counter-narrative

Elizabeth Drexler’s Aceh, Indonesia: Securing the insecure state (2008) has had a provocative impact, winning an award from the Association of Third World Studies. It amounts to a counter-narrative to the more conventional Aceh conflict narrative to which we have subscribed. The counter-narrative is challenging, based on a formidable fieldwork engagement in Aceh over a number of years, and has some resonances with things said by our own informants in Aceh and Jakarta. What Drexler contests is that the leadership of Hasan di Tiro in forming GAM from 1976 initiated the late-twentieth-century phase of insurgency in Aceh. Her alternative does not differ from our more conventional narrative that for di Tiro the battle in 1976 was fought initially with ideas rather than guns. His theory was that ideological foundations for resistance needed to be laid before conditions would be ripe for armed insurgency. Rather than seeing di Tiro as quickly capitulating to his colleagues’ views that they would not make progress without moving more rapidly to an armed insurgency capability, Drexler sees GAM’s insurgency as fundamentally a creation of the Indonesian military in Aceh.
The military (and indeed the New Order state), according to Drexler, were insecure in the face of ideological challenges of the sort posed by Aceh Merdeka. Moreover, military leaders in Aceh saw opportunities to accrue resources by playing this insecurity card in Jakarta and with foreign investors who paid them protection money. The conditions of insecurity also allowed many GAM groups and many members of the military to make large amounts of money from producing and trading marijuana, often collaboratively (McCulloch 2005:216–17; Drexler 2008:94, 99), and selling or renting weapons, sometimes under cover of fake ambushes to grab the weapons (McCulloch 2005; Drexler 2008:110). Military commanders ordered some of their men out of uniform to commit criminal acts of violence, which they blamed at first on Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (GPK, Gang of Security Disruptors) and later on a separatist organisation that started with the idea of Aceh Merdeka, which the military and its intelligence leadership named as an insurgent movement for independence, GAM. GAM, in Drexler’s (2008:90) view, was created by the military as part of the state’s ‘threat perception system’ in a manner similar to the way states in the Western alliance invented ‘Reds under the bed’ in their efforts to legitimate their state as a bulwark against communism.

What is the most interesting difference between Drexler’s narrative and our conventional narrative? Our standard narrative says GAM appears first as the fundamental fact of insurgency; then the state military adds a great deal of criminal violence to control GAM and its supporters and to mimic GAM, thereby vilifying GAM for violence it does not commit. The military burnt its Rumoh Gedong ‘torture camp’ to destroy evidence when the National Human Rights Commission opened an investigation into it, and accused GAM of the arson. Acehnese who were informers for the military were often murdered by them if they had inculpatory knowledge, and especially if they provided evidence to the National Human Rights Commission, with GAM being blamed (Drexler 2008:117).

Drexler reverses the causal sequence here, suggesting that criminal military violence could have subsequently constructed a GAM that was largely created by its agency. She dismisses the sequence of GAM as a product of the agency of di Tiro, a GAM agency that then provokes military criminality as a response. On some occasions, it suited those labelled as GAM to go along with the fiction that they committed violence that was in fact committed by agents of the military.

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19 It is necessary to say that Drexler (2008:224) goes too far when she says it is possible that ‘the Indonesian military and GAM were as much collaborators as opponents in the protracted conflict that victimized the people of Aceh throughout the 1990s…If GAM were seen as a shadowy expression of the Indonesian military, its nightmare alter ego, with whom it was often exchanging personnel, weapons, and disguises, and with whom it collaborated in carrying out mass abduction, murder, rape, and torture, then the role of the separatist threat and the violence it justified in perpetuating the military’s control of Aceh and its supremacy in the Indonesian state would be clarified.’
or by preman or personal crimes of violence that had nothing to do with them. A complex of disparate forms of violence was reified as separatist violence. One reason for GAM to step up and own responsibility for violence imputed to them was that if it were violence only the military had the power to deliver, owning it transferred that aura of power to GAM. There were other micro-dynamics in the categorisation of disparate disputes into a single separatist conflict. For example, Drexler (2008:89) described a businessman accused of being GAM by a competitor who wished to destroy his business. In a pattern often repeated, the violence of an interrogation in which he was forced to confess to being a member of GAM turned him into a GAM supporter. Some informers nominated random others as members of GAM simply because they could not endure torture (Drexler 2008:104). State violence unpredictably produced enemies when its intent might have been to eradicate them. The military systematically trawled for evidence of grudges, tensions and rivalries in villages (Drexler 2008:101), then sought to prise them open to secure cooperation with its various purposes. Thereby the military also created new crosscutting conflicts that could ultimately be categorised as part of the one big separatist conflict. One reason why the self-fulfilling prophecy of GAM becoming a formidable fighting force might have spun out of control was that when the military armed militias, sometimes it armed the very people it sought to eradicate (Drexler 2008:102).

Ultimately Drexler argued the fiction became convenient for the Indonesian State and for GAM. For the military and its state sponsors, the fiction of a GAM that was a severe insurgency threat throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century became an excuse in the twenty-first century for the military violence that had occurred in the past and would occur in the future. Military leaders admitted in the twenty-first century that their violence could have been excessive, but it was not criminal because these were acts of war waged to protect the nation from disintegration (as opposed to acts of greed or vengeance). For GAM, the myth of its long historical continuity as an insurgency legitimated its leaders as the saviours of Aceh, without whose decades of armed resistance the terms secured in the Helsinki agreement would never have been possible. It was convenient for the Indonesian State to help the myth of GAM as the sole protagonist and legitimate representative of the aspirations of the people of Aceh become a reality. This was because it could coerce GAM into abandoning any referendum for independence more effectively than it could the Acehnese civil society movement of a million-odd people and 102 NGOs coordinated by SIRA. It was also considered cheaper to prioritise reintegration payments to limited numbers of GAM fighters than to provide comparable support to all

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20 One critic commenting on this paragraph said: ‘One can observe all these things without leaping to the conclusion Drexler does.’ Her conclusion fails to engage with the subject at the centre of her analysis: GAM. Instead, ‘drawing entirely on rumours and speculation, she conjures an analysis from them’.

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who fought and all who were victimised. For the GAM leadership, their seats at the table gave them an inside track to becoming successor rulers of semi-autonomous Aceh.

The mutually convenient myth of GAM’s progeny was nefarious according to Drexler not only because it obscured the extent and causal priority of military criminality. It was also nefarious because GAM criminality became a self-fulfilling prophecy after 1999. For Drexler, the mediations of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and of the Crisis Management Initiative were culpable for reinforcing the fiction by privileging the two criminal organisations as the sole parties to the peace process. While the peacemakers realised there were various GAM factions on the ground, they chose to deal with the overseas contingent as the ‘real GAM’, with the historical legacy that connoted, combined with the practical advantage of ease of access to them in Europe. Drexler (2008:188) alleged that the exiled leader of one other GAM faction was the victim of an unsolved murder the day after the Humanitarian Pause was signed.

NGOs that had formerly spoken out against GAM violence were marginalized, blacklisted, and had little access to the funding that the Pause offered. Activists who suggested that GAM did not represent the only voice of the Acehnese people were frequently harassed and intimidated by members of GAM and by police and military officials. (Drexler 2008:190)

This is one of those points where the counter-narrative loses contact with a vivid reality that GAM supporters were being intimidated by the police and military with far greater excess than GAM opponents! GAM representatives did exercise leverage over the distribution of monies under the pause.

For the peacemakers as well as GAM, historical narratives were imposed retrospectively to secure stakes in the present, such as credit for getting a result, even a Nobel Peace Prize. As a sop to civil society aspirations for justice, the two armed parties agreed to establish a human rights court and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. As soon as the ink was dry, however, a consensus quickly emerged between the military, its supporters in Jakarta and some in the GAM leadership that accountability for the crimes of the past could hurt and destabilise both sets of elites. Nobel Laureate Ahtisaari and the AMM failed to speak out against this slight of hand, again acquiescing in the mutually convenient elite deception. Drexler argued that the NGO community in Aceh was part of the climate that made this acquiescence easy. In 2006, they were saying the priority of the people of Aceh was not to unsettle the peace by pushing for accountability for the past. ‘They spoke in terms of eko-sok, economic and social rights, distinguishing them from the individual political rights that they had
worked for previously’ (Drexler 2008:210). For the people, on Drexler’s account, GAM and its leadership that it voted for in the 2006 elections were the only log a drowning populace could grab onto for passage to a peaceful shore.

Drexler concedes that this pragmatism of the people might be rewarded because the elected GAM Governor Irwandi so far has turned out to be a hard-working campaigner against corruption and for efficient delivery of economic justice to ordinary people. Moreover, the governor wisely chose to broaden his appeal by teaming with former SIRA chairperson Muhammad Nazar as running mate for vice-governor. Challenging Drexler, one might argue that no peace process is perfect, and here the pragmatics are of an inheritance of power that delivers greater peace, development, sharing of wealth, commitment to fighting corruption and protecting the forests than existed in the past. So there is a case for emphasising the socially responsible selves of those who deliver these results and for conniving in putting aside (or forgiving) the considerable criminal aspects of the organisations that negotiated their path to power.

In the long run, Drexler (2008:11) sees this as dangerous because ‘each repetition of a politically expedient narrative that does not align with past experiences can diminish the social legitimacy of new institutions’. Moreover, this particular kind of expedience subordinates law to violence in a pattern that is hard to break. It reinforces Indonesia’s habit of national denial of the problem of the politically uncontrollable violence of its military, of a democracy more subservient to the military than the reverse. It leaves Indonesia with law and justice ‘that are not even on speaking terms’.21 Hence, in the exceptional case when a trial for a massacre of 57 people in a school is convened, ‘the masterminds of the massacre were not tried, even though the conspiracy was admitted...[T]he process by which the enemy is fabricated and overlaps with the TNI is inadmissible and corrupts the law’ (Drexler 2008:229). Aceh’s ‘contradictions, complexities and complicities’ cannot be cast into oblivion when they are scarred on the bodies of those who know who wrought the scars. One day, ‘[c]urrent institutions may be undermined by memories that fall outside the official narrations’ (Drexler 2008:230).

In commenting on draft chapters of this book, wise old hands of Indonesia from time to time cautioned the authors to be wary even when the claims at issue in a rumour seemed to be triangulated from different sides, wary that ‘Indonesia is full of stories like that’.22 While we always feel chastened, Drexler’s is a

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21 Goenawan Mohamad, at an ICG seminar on truth and reconciliation in Indonesia.
22 Or, in the context of allegations about conflict, Edward Aspinall (2008b) puts it this way in his review of Drexler’s book: ‘Separatist insurgencies, like many other internal conflicts, are difficult to study. The warring parties typically dissemble and lie. Sometimes, they deny responsibility for violence they commit. They spread propaganda and falsehoods about their adversaries, and often disguise their identities when they carry out their work. Frequently, there are hidden connections between enemies as they seek to gather intelligence about or manipulate one another, or strike deals to profit out of violence.’
liberating move for we sociologists who want to take subjectivities seriously. She analyses the dangers of rumours that ‘circulate in the gap between knowledge and narrative’ (Drexler 2008:232). And her analysis is that even when rumours have no value in truth, rumours, imagined threats and imagined enemies can be constituted as real by those very imaginings. If Indonesian institutions do not even allow a conversation between the law and the people’s justice in the people’s remembered truths (which outsiders call rumours) then Indonesian history could indeed be punctuated by explosions of felt injustice. Drexler is surely right that societies are not self-healing in conditions where legal institutions bottle up mistrust and declare out of order conversations between the law and the deepest sources of lived injustice.

There is a need for Indonesia to reform the politics and expediency that separate law from truth and justice. A somewhat speculative, yet evidence-based Hobbesian historical case can be made, and indeed has been made (Cooney 1997:390, 392), that a reason why England’s homicide rate is massively lower than it was 600 years ago, and probably earlier, is that the improved institutionalisation of courts as forums for airing and responding to felt injustice has reduced vengeance killings by elites and their hirelings. It is hard to get misty-eyed about England’s courts, given how captured they have been by legal professionals, relegating citizens to communication through legal mouthpieces if they can afford them. Likewise it is hard to get misty-eyed over Western democracies captured by large campaign donors and offering little engagement by ordinary citizens. Again, however, this impoverished democracy (compared with the ideals of a Jefferson) at least provides for regime change without bloodshed. Indonesian rule of law and Indonesian democracy are slowly improving as these values slowly erode in the West. In the Aceh case it was democracy more than the rule of law that played an impressive part in peaceful transition. Representatives of two different factions of GAM fought out the decisive battle for the governorship. This contest was resolved through the ballot box. The democratic outcome is delivering the first hopes of sustained peace since the mid-nineteenth century.

While Drexler does not make this case, even if the dynamic of military crime fomenting an insurgency (which then spins out of control) is broken in Aceh, impunity gives a green light to similar patterns of state crime in Papua. Drexler also does not make the following case, but for people recovering from a protracted war, their needs are at the bottom of Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of human needs. They hesitate to support anything that might jeopardise their security, their children’s safety to walk to school and the lifting of the terrible paralysis of fear and trauma they have endured. When peace is well entrenched, however, higher-order needs for justice can return to haunt a society as a new generation seeks redress for the unacknowledged atrocities that afflicted their
parents. This is the theme of the *longue durée* of reconciliation (Karstedt 2005) that we pick up in our first and last chapters. Some new historical moment of crisis when the rules of power unravel could give them that opportunity. The most optimistic reading Drexler (2008:212) can muster is ‘perhaps the most cynical’: ‘if the manipulation of those in power created conditions of possibility for violence that was enacted locally, then a top-down solution is an effective approach to resolving the conflict’. There is something to this cynical view: in an Aceh where so much of the impetus for the war came from out-of-control state violence and shameless breaches of promise, top-down compliance with the rule of law and with solemn undertakings could do formidable peacebuilding.

The biggest question is whether Drexler’s counter-narrative is really more plausible than the more conventional narrative we have opted for above. Marcus Mietzner (2008) thinks definitely not. Mietzner is right to censure Drexler for not attending seriously enough to the data of other scholars on the existence and coherence of GAM from the late 1970s until 2005. While Drexler is attentive to her own fieldwork notes in a very interesting way, Mietzner points out that she is selectively attentive to the data of others. We can value the work on her deconstruction site while questioning inattentiveness to the work of others on their construction sites of GAM, as in interviews with GAM members who trained together in Libya. While we are of the view that GAM was continuously organisationally real as an insurgency from the late 1970s, even if quiescent for long periods, we can still learn from the data that inform Drexler’s counter-narrative. We can have the view that part of the reality of the constitution of GAM as such a politically important organisation from unimportant beginnings in 1977 is that the military and the state ultimately came to impute to it much that was the handiwork of sham GAM. We do not have to choose between a causal path from a complex of violence (much of it military crime) to the consolidation of GAM, on the one hand, versus a causal path from the consolidation of GAM to military crime. The causal arrows almost certainly loop both ways.

We might therefore see such a recursive model in data such as the following from a Drexler interview with a retired general who had been responsible for intelligence in Aceh in the 1980s:

In our previous conversation he had been surprisingly open. Now he responded with outrage. He admonished me that the military was losing men; how could I think they were directing anything? He said that the situation was out of control; no one, especially not the military, likes the situation now, but no one could control it. Then I mentioned a recent newspaper article indicating cooperation between the military and the separatist rebels in Aceh (GAM). He visibly relaxed and affirmed ‘that… yes, of course, in the beginning…’ His voice trailed off, and he threw
his hands up in the air and reiterated that it is ‘out of control now.’ ‘During the New Order,’ he reminisced, ‘we cultivated the rebels, it was profitable.’ (Drexler 2008:6)

Drexler (2008:20) indeed herself suggests that a ‘looping effect’ of the following kind exists in Aceh when she cites Heryanto (2006:140–1) quoting an Indonesian intelligence agency director:

As intelligence officers we make up issues, and we disseminate them in the press, radio or television. We treat them as if they are real. When they are already widespread, usually people will talk about them and they tend to add to and exaggerate the issues. Finally the issues will come back [to the intelligence bodies] in reports. What is so funny is that these reports incline us to believe that these issues are real, hahaha. In fact, we get terrified and begin to think, ‘what if these issues are real?’ Hahaha. (Drexler 2008:20)

We had already completed the Papua Working Paper of Peacebuilding Compared when we read Drexler’s book. We then went to our fieldwork notes to read what one old Papuan near Merauke said: ‘There was never any such thing as OPM [Free Papua Movement]. Papuans never decided to set OPM up. The military created it. Then Papuans adopted it.’ Just as there were many liminal figures between the military and GAM—some GAM–TNI illicit business collaborators, some double agents, some sham GAM, some who switched sides—so there were many liminal figures between the military and OPM. This makes it as false to configure OPM–TNI as a polarised pair as it is to configure GAM–TNI as the polarised pair that counts, to the neglect of other complexes of violence, and to the neglect of non-violent complexes of resistance such as the human rights movement. So in Papua as well as Aceh, we need to take both paths of causality seriously. Military crime to nip in the bud imagined threats can create insurgency that the military names and makes more coherent. Equally, a real insurgency can provoke military crime as a control strategy that makes the insurgency worse. In different parts of Papua and Aceh in different ways, one—more often both—of these dynamics could have occurred.

Reading Drexler’s book, our minds also went to the peace and justice activism of Australian academic Damien Kingsbury in Papua and Aceh. He managed to get himself involved with the projects of unifying GAM and OPM and advising on tactics for a negotiated peace. In the case of Aceh, he was in the room with the GAM negotiating team throughout the crafting of the Helsinki MoU. Kingsbury fits Drexler’s model of a non-governmental actor seeking to collaborate in the forging of a ‘pure GAM’ distanced from its criminal elements. The objective was

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23 For a more elaborate discussion of the possible Indonesian origins of OPM, see Singh (2008:128–9).
that such a ‘pure GAM’ could (and did) attract broad support from Acehnese civil society and could (and did) negotiate pragmatically with Jakarta. In a Papua Working Paper draft for Peacebuilding Compared sent to Damien Kingsbury for comment, one criticism was of a passage that said that even after the 2008 meeting of different OPM factions in Vanuatu, OPM remained far from unified. Kingsbury queried this, arguing that great unity had been accomplished at the meeting he attended in Vanuatu. We had to call that issue as we saw it in our fieldwork notes, while admiring Kingsbury’s support for Papuan initiatives to build a fiction of unity into a reality that might open a coherent path to international mediation towards peace and development.

This kind of symbolic work of unifying, then internationalising, then demilitarising in exchange for power sharing involves a different kind of non-truth and reconciliation to the kind discussed in Chapters 3–5 on Maluku, North Maluku, Poso, West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan. What are most interesting in all these cases—for those of us who have been theoretically committed to truth and reconciliation (Braithwaite 2005)—are the considerable levels of effectiveness of different kinds of non-truth and reconciliation.24 And it does intrigue a scholar such as the senior author that, after reading Drexler’s book, he does connive in his writing to a degree in a more coherent depiction of OPM and GAM and Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah than is perhaps warranted. More intriguing still is to understand the conditions in which the connivance of a John Braithwaite or the contrivance of a Damien Kingsbury are oversimplifying moves with the truth that help analysis, that help discover paths to peace or that hinder those projects. In the long run of history, our hypothesis remains that non-truth and reconciliation, of whatever forms, run up against their limits. That does not mean non-truth and reconciliation cannot be stepping stones to truth, justice and reconciliation. In the case of scholarly analysis of Aceh, there is much silence on how a renewed peace process to grapple with a deeper reconciliation based on truth and justice might begin or unfold, including in the work of Elizabeth Drexler.

24 One reviewer said here: “‘non-truth and reconciliation’ is a straw-man argument—it assumed these were the key ingredients, which they were not. The key ingredients were truth around the reality of war, the tsunami and corruption, and democratisation with the civil qualities that implies.’ Perhaps, but we have shown there was a great deal of effort put into reconciliation as well, especially at the village level, to very positive effect. And a ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ was part of the MoU, though we would agree it was not a ‘key ingredient’ to important players on both sides.
Interpreting the conflict

What structural factors were at the root of this conflict?

Ross (2005:51) sees Aceh as having many of the risk factors in the Collier and Hoeffler (2001) model of the onset of civil wars. Aceh was part of a semi-democracy as opposed to a mature democracy or an autocracy. During its long conflict, it was relatively poor by world standards, particularly measured against its comparative wealth before the 1873 Dutch invasion. On the other hand, Aceh was not a poor province by Indonesian standards and Indonesia was not one of the poorest developing countries. Aceh’s fertile soil has high agricultural capacity, with traded crops such as rubber, coffee, palm-oil and coconuts producing well. In addition, there have been rich natural resources of fish, timber, oil and gas. Increased poverty has been more a consequence than a cause of war in the case of Aceh. While GDP increased dramatically from oil and gas wealth after the formation of GAM, poverty in Aceh increased by 239 per cent from 1980 to 2002, a period when it decreased 47 per cent for Indonesia as a whole (Brown 2005:3). Consistent with the Collier and Hoeffler model, Ross also points out that Aceh is mostly mountainous, has a low level of ethnic fragmentation (but with one dominant ethnic group), has suffered conflict previously and has a ‘resource curse’ of oil, gas and timber. North Aceh, where the ExxonMobil complex was located (and the concentrations of troops to secure it), suffered more violence than any of Aceh’s 13 districts (Ross 2005:53). Military exploitation of these resource curses, and of the marijuana trade as well,25 was a factor in military belligerence. Extortion—more from local contractors in the development zone around ExxonMobil than perhaps from ExxonMobil itself—also financed GAM, as did ganja. Aspinall (2007c), however, pointed out that Riau and East Kalimantan were war-free provinces that experienced virtually identical natural resource exploitation issues in the same nation during the same transitions.26

Aspinall’s (2007c:950) argument was that plunder of resources by outsiders, dislocation of villages, environmental destruction and disruption of fishing and agriculture from the natural gas development became salient only because they were ‘entangled in wider processes of identity construction and…[were]

25 It is likely that this is less today—an outcome Kingsbury and McCulloch (2006:213) attribute to police enforcement after the separation of the police from the military. One police interception of 1350 kilograms of Acehnese marijuana in North Sumatra led to a fire-fight between the police and the military in which six police and one soldier were killed. One bystander was killed and 23 wounded (Kingsbury and McCulloch 2006:214).

26 See also Sulaiman (2006:121): ‘Riau suffered greater exploitation of its natural resources by the government’ than Aceh.
reinterpreted back to the population by ethnic political entrepreneurs in a way that legitimated violence’. A narrative of resource plunder was constructed as a grievance because of the way it was connected to the narrative of the broken promise (Birchok 2004), a narrative of Acehnese sovereignty and a discourse of dispossession by Javanese successor colonialists to the Dutch. Ross (2003) concurs that the Aceh resource curse is more about grievance than greed in the Collier and Hoeffler sense. Grievance was low during the first GAM uprising (1976–79), higher in the second (1989–93) push when resentments had expanded against ExxonMobil and migrants and very high in the third push from 1999 (against ExxonMobil, Javanese migrants, the economic crisis and military brutality). Looting of resources did not support ‘the onset of civil war, though it may have contributed to lengthening it once it began’ (Ross 2003:33).

A widely hypothesised structural cause of the conflict was the reality and particularly the perception that Indonesian, like Dutch, colonialism moved Aceh from a market economy where the benefits of business development remained largely in Aceh to one where those benefits were channelled elsewhere through business headquarters in Jakarta and Medan. We have documented how the Dutch cut off the trade circuits to the west and north that had sustained the economic development of Aceh for centuries. In some ways, the Indonesian Republic took this further—for example, abolishing the barter trade between Aceh and the Malay Peninsula and designating Belawan (Medan’s port) as the export port for North Sumatra (Sulaiman 2006:124). When logging concessions were granted to exploit the forests of Aceh intensively from the 1970s, they were licensed overwhelmingly to companies based in Jakarta and Medan and were protected by the military from the protests of aggrieved local landowners. Similarly, when foreign investors fled the plantation sector after the revolution, the plantations were controlled from Jakarta and Medan rather than devolving to local ownership (Sulaiman 2006:124–6). During the post-1976 conflict, fishermen were forced to sell into a militarised market, in which armed middle men ‘offered’ them much lower than the market price before on selling through a local military fish monopoly, and where they also paid ‘protection’ money to the police or military (Kingsbury and McCulloch 2006:216). As in East Timor, in Aceh, similar arrangements existed in a militarised coffee market—where Acehnese farmers were forced to sell coffee to the military at half the market price (Kingsbury and McCulloch 2006:217)27—and a militarised nutmeg monopoly (World Bank 2006a:65). Aceh, however, did not experience the level of control by ‘legal’ businesses connected with the Suharto family that East Timor did.

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27 Ed Aspinall commented that this happened after GAM had taxed coffee. Military control of monopolies and all other aspects of life was also less totalising in Aceh than in East Timor.
What have been the proximate factors in the conflict?

Ross (2005:52) found the entrepreneurship of Hasan di Tiro important in the onset of a civil war that delivered a limited result to GAM. Likewise, Aspinall (2009:51) pointed out that many of the grievances of the Acehnese about indignities at the hands of the military and economic exploitation by Jakarta were felt in countless corners of Indonesia, but that what di Tiro’s entrepreneurship managed to do was ‘seize upon inchoate grievances in society’, reinterpret them and weave them into a comprehensive nationalist ideology that ‘explained them and promised relief in the form of national liberation’. Di Tiro and his leadership were bold and tireless. They were resilient in the face of early waves of insurgency mobilisation (1976–79, 1989–93) that crashed on the shore of Aceh without changing the landscape. They waited for the ripe moment for another mobilisation, having held back in Malaysia many of their Libyan-trained troops. That moment came with the instability in Jakarta as the New Order collapsed (what we interpreted as the onset of anomie). They waited for the ripe moment for the best peace terms they could ever hope to secure, which came in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami. More entrepreneurial, tireless, resilient leadership that had a strategic sense of seizing the ripe moment for mobilisation for war and peace was a difference between the struggle in Aceh and the struggle in Papua, and a common element between East Timor and Aceh. Emulation (modelling) was another important proximate factor here. When East Timor demonstrated that a referendum for independence was achievable, the Acehnese push for the same demand was massive at the level of civil society mobilisation and credible at the level of military mobilisation.

A progressive and ultimately total collapse in the credibility of central government commitments was also a proximate factor in the conflict until President Yudhoyono was elected and re-established some credibility of commitments that issued from Jakarta with respect to Aceh. The structural fact of centre–periphery economic exploitation of Aceh was mediated by the proximate factor of a narrative of the broken promise that was extremely pervasive.

The unusually strong sense of identity that Acehnese had as Acehnese was constituted by Dutch, then Indonesian, military repression (Aspinall 2003). It connected back with Acehnese pride at being the ‘verandah of Mecca’. The centralising uniformity of the Indonesian State was seen as a threat to Acehnese identity (Sukma 2003:150). Javanese were seen as denying Acehnese a dignified sense of their special history and distinctive culture, which could not be reduced to a variant of Javanese culture. Nevertheless, at no point between the 1940s and the 1980s (or since 2005) was there widespread support in Aceh for independence. That was built by the hatred for the Indonesian military that began to grow from the mid-1970s (Aspinall 2006:151) and then took off after the East Timor demonstration effect. Torture, rape and beatings were read into
more than just a rhetoric of revenge; they were connected into a larger narrative about the humiliation of the Acehnese by Javanese imperialists who stripped them of their dignity (Aspinall 2003). This sense of indignity was also about being ‘treated like slaves’ in many small ways. Just as Acehnese villagers had to stand aside, wait in the drain and bow as Dutch colonial soldiers passed along a path in their fields, likewise they complained that they had to stand aside in the drain for passing Indonesians soldiers (though without having to bow) (Aspinall 2009:50).

There were specific turning points that were akin to the 1991 Santa Cruz Cemetery massacre in Dili, even though the Aceh incidents were not as dramatic and nowhere near as vividly covered by the international media. A turning point after which violence and international concern escalated happened in May 1999. At a large GAM meeting in Cot Murong, North Aceh, a soldier was detected in the crowd and taken away. The local military responded by surrounding the village. A confrontation ensued in Krueng Geukeueh; soldiers fired on the crowd that included many women and children; 40 perished (Bertrand 2004:177).

Military violence against the people of Aceh was probably the most important proximate factor in the conflict. We have seen that this escalated in the decades after the initial rise of GAM in the late 1970s. We have also seen that elements of the military progressively made a great deal of money from the conditions of instability, which fuelled their belligerence. This was not limited to, for example, officers on the ground in Aceh who sold weapons and ammunition to GAM. Military anomie extended to insurgents apparently buying weapons directly from the military’s PT Pinad arms factory in Java and bribing navy officers to allow deliveries of purchases of imported weapons for fees as high as R20 million (Kingsbury and McCulloch 2006:214). This means that GAM negotiators were partly wrong as well as partly right when they said that they did not have to win the war, only prevent Jakarta from winning:

We mainly resort to ambush and hit-and-run. We can’t fight a frontal war. They have better equipment and more ammunition…From a military perspective there is no way for us to defeat them and for them to defeat us. We want to tie down as many of their troops as possible in Aceh. We want them to spend more money on this operation. We want to exhaust them financially. (GAM negotiators in 2001 quoted in Schulze 2006:228)

From the point of view of putting pressure on the President of Indonesia and his government’s budget, this makes sense; however, that president in turn depended—and still does depend—for political survival on support from the military, and more troops in conflict areas meant more income for senior
members of the military. The reason for this is first, as we have seen, that war creates special business opportunities for the military. Second, since junior members of the military must pass up the chain a proportion of their business revenues, the more soldiers there are in conflict areas, the more money moves up the chain. Simple realist theories of deterrence are just too simple in this context because neither side has unified interests. We can read the peace agreement between Indonesia and GAM as an agreement between the central political factions of both sides, who wanted peace, against various combatant factions who often saw interests in continued war. Only these central factions could enforce peace because they had strong support from Indonesian civil society (especially in Aceh itself) and from the international community, its donors and its peace monitors. What made the challenge difficult for the political elites was that both of them had tolerated a strategy of ‘franchising’ violence for a long time—to undisciplined militias whom the military armed, on one side, and to semi-autonomous district warlords whom GAM empowered on the other side.

One positive by the time of the peace was that the Indonesian military had learnt some things from the mistakes of East Timor: in 2002, the military and police started asking for the return of guns previously provided by them to militias when the latter were deemed to have become uncontrollable (Barron et al. 2005:25). In the end, unified pressure from both sets of elites that had created them, battle fatigue, pressure for peace from their villages and religious leaders and the lure of local political office and reintegration payments pushed them, in many cases reluctantly, to capitulate to the peace effectively monitored by the AMM.

One reason why the conflict surged forward at the end of the New Order was that statements by political and military leaders after the demise of President Suharto produced an expectation of prosecution of perpetrators of military atrocities. The upshot of near-universal and complete impunity for senior officers fuelled a surge of support for independence and for GAM (Sukma 2004:5). As of May 2003, military commander Sutarto reported that 57 soldiers had been convicted to prison sentences by military courts for offences related to the conflict, with another 372 lesser cases also being heard for breaches of military law (Clarke et al. 2008:34).

Corruption in the civil administration of Aceh was a proximate factor in the conflict, causing the failure of the second track of the two-track Indonesian strategy of reprisals for those who supported GAM and peace through

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28 This is a simplification because the Indonesian Government earlier in 2004 made several attempts to negotiate directly with GAM field commanders and to marginalise the Sweden-based leaders, but the field commanders consistently insisted that final negotiating positions would be settled by the Sweden-based leaders. These efforts led the president and vice-president to conclude that a deal must be done with the exiled leadership (Morfit 2006:12).
development for those who did not. A Central Bank study in the high-water period of corruption in Aceh in 2001 suggested Aceh was the most corrupt province in Indonesia (Kingsbury and McCulloch 2006:211)—something that is probably no longer true even though corruption remains a huge problem. As in other Indonesian cases of Peacebuilding Compared, in Aceh, President Habibie’s decentralisation initiatives increased opportunities for corruption at provincial levels of governance across Aceh. The corruption problem became less one of Suharto cronies in Jakarta and more one of the provincial governor and his wife and very local kleptocrats.

A World Bank (2006b) study of the amount in bribes required to move trucks on 59 journeys between Banda Aceh and Medan in 2005 and 2006 found that bribe payments were most reduced in those areas where the pull-out of Indonesian military and police pursuant to the Helsinki peace process was complete. Trucking firms had been spending an average of 60 per cent of total cargo revenues in payoffs at formal and informal checkpoints on this road (Consultative Group on Indonesia 2003:15).

New resource developments from the 1970s that were seen as producing far greater benefits for Javanese than for Acehnese, at a time when Javanese transmigration and voluntary migration grew and grew, created the opportunity for the political entrepreneurship that di Tiro seized. Resentment against Javanese was also fuelled by the fact that a higher percentage of them secured urban government jobs and jobs in the professions compared with Acehnese, while they had half the Acehnese unemployment rate (Brown 2005:4). In rural areas, Javanese migrants were twice as likely as the traditional Acehnese custodians of the land to own large landholdings (Brown 2005:6). These horizontal inequalities are explicitly referenced in key GAM documents that justify coding the conflict in this study as an Acehnese–Javanese ethnic war as well as a separatist war. GAM’s founding 1976 Declaration of Independence of Aceh-Sumatra asserts freedom from

the foreign regime of Jakarta and the alien people of the island of Java…

they have stolen our properties; they have robbed us from our livelihood; they have abused the education of our children; they have exiled our leaders; they have put our people in chains of tyranny, poverty and neglect.

What were the key triggering incidents?

Aceh boiled over after a slow simmer over decades and centuries rather than because of a spark of ignition. One might conceive of the tsunami as a trigger of the peace that doused all sparks that spoilers were lighting. There were no key triggering incidents of the three waves of conflict between 1976 and 2005. There
were turning points to war: the decision of Hasan di Tiro to recruit and lead his seemingly quixotic group of 70 fighters into the mountains in 1977; the training in Libya; the closure of ExxonMobil production in 2001. And there were turning points to peace: the election of President Yudhoyono; the acceptance of former president Ahtisaari to take on the mediation; the tsunami; the signing of the MoU; the arrival of the AMM; the completion of weapons destruction; and the departure of military and police. One diplomat who worked for the AMM emphasised the importance of turning points being visible. It was important that guns were destroyed in public places such as football fields—‘none of this putting them in a box with two locks’ (a reference to the unimplemented Cessation of Hostilities Agreement).

Who were the key war-making and peacebuilding actors?

The two leading war-makers were the Indonesian State (particularly the security forces and the militias they enrolled) and GAM. These same actors exclusively negotiated the internationally mediated peace. Throughout the two decades when Suharto’s New Order conducted the GAM counterinsurgency, while its strategy was brutal towards communities it saw as harbouring GAM, at every stage there was a two-track approach that also involved winning hearts and minds. The New Order state sought to educate communities about the advantages of peace within the Indonesian nation, particularly working through ulamas, and believed in a strategy of peace through development (Nessen 2006:187). The problem was that the violent repression track of the two-track strategy was executed with horrific vigour by the military, while a corrupt civilian government limply delivered the gentle persuasion track. Kirsten Schulze (2006:263) made the interesting conjecture (perhaps representing the perspective of military informants!) that this was partly an ‘attitude problem’ among the civilian leadership ‘who expected the military to do everything’.

McGibbon (2006a) concluded that from about 1960 Jakarta elites sought to rule Aceh indirectly through local technocrats trained at state universities. Precisely because of their allegiance to Jakarta, these technocrats enjoyed thin legitimacy. When President Habibie’s administration changed the opportunity structure through decentralisation, further legitimacy was lost when that technocracy morphed into a kleptocracy. This gave rise to anti-corruption NGOs that did influential work in exposing Acehnese corruption (McGibbon 2006a:339). These NGOs coalesced with intellectuals and student leaders from the very universities that had given birth to the technocratic elite to form what McGibbon called a counter-elite. Pressure from this counter-elite eventually led to prosecution of Governor Puteh by the anti-corruption commission, though it was able to get a political green light only after President Yudhoyono replaced President
Megawati. The technocratic elite that had been a creature of the New Order did not survive it because instead of adapting to the challenges of peacebuilding, its leaders resisted a peace that would bring direct elections, as this would see them swept from power. Instead, they opted to milk the largesse of special autonomy for their personal enrichment for as long as they could hang on. McGibbon’s (2006a) analysis was that an elite vacuum was created. The technocrats were discredited, the *uleebalang* were dead and the *ulamas* were weakened by decades of cooptation and support for Sharia police that were resented by an increasingly secular young population. Into that vacuum stepped intellectuals, anti-corruption campaigners, student and youth leaders of 102 NGOs who rallied for a referendum under the SIRA umbrella and, most importantly of all, a new generation of local GAM leaders who wanted peace and vowed to end the criminality and venality on both sides of the conflict. The governor elected from this new GAM leadership and the vice-governor elected from the SIRA leadership epitomised this coalescing of counter-elites that stepped adroitly into the authority vacuum.

The Aceh peace processes of the early and mid-2000s were among the best documented by writers who interviewed many of the key players (for example, Morfit 2006) and by key players themselves who were in the room (for example, Kingsbury 2006b). What we learn from this literature is that many individuals have made important contributions to forging the peace—although almost always flawed contributions. Former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari has been the one singled out to have books written about his contribution (Merikallio 2006) and to have it lauded with a Nobel Prize. Ahtisaari’s forceful ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ negotiating strategy worked much better in this context than the step-by-step confidence building of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue that in some ways undermined confidence, as trust was abused on both sides. GAM was, however, more ripe for settlement in 2005 after the decimation its troops had suffered in 2003 and 2004. Ed Aspinall commented that Ahtisaari’s approach would not have moved beyond square one in 2000–01. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue played a positive role in internationalising mediation, opening channels of dialogue that gave the parties a reality check and a glimpse of possible paths to peace. In the years between the peace and the award of Ahtisaari’s Nobel Peace Prize, there was much speculation in the Indonesian press as to who was most worthy of a Nobel Prize. President Yudhoyono was nominated for 2007. The feeling of many commentators was that Yudhoyono deserved more credit for Aceh than Ahtisaari, particularly for the strength of his leadership in insisting that the military make the peace work, but that Ahtisaari was perhaps more deserving of the prize overall because of his contributions to peace in Namibia, the former Yugoslavia and beyond.

29 We also were able to interview most of those present for the negotiation of the Helsinki agreement for this study, several of them on several occasions.
Michael Morfit’s (2006:19) research showed convincingly that even though the president knew in his own words that he needed the support of the military, he was willing to take the calculated risk of threatening their jobs when they undermined his policies for peace in Aceh. Or, as Mietzner (2006:51) put it: ‘Yudhoyono’s success in enforcing military compliance in Aceh marked a watershed in post-Suharto civil–military relations. For the first time, the government was able to secure the military’s support for a negotiated settlement with separatist rebels.’ Many commentators also said Vice-President Kalla was the individual most deserving of credit because of the extraordinary persistence, initiative and flexibility he showed over a long period in searching for paths to peace (see also Morfit 2006:9). Alternatively, Kalla’s energetic assistant Farid Husein could be given the greatest credit for keeping the peace process alive, tirelessly opening a broken path of dialogue, during the period when GAM remained intransigent and President Megawati was firmly committed to a military solution (Morfit 2006:11). Then there was the argument that Kalla and more so Husein were hands-on for longer than President Yudhoyono. Some commentators suggested that because of the impossibility of putting one of these political leaders of the peace ahead of the others, it would be a good idea to award the Nobel Prize collectively to the AMM, whose contribution we also found important on so many fronts in this chapter.

Finnish businessman Juha Christensen also showed extraordinary energy as a peace broker for a long period, joining forces with his long-time acquaintance Kalla in creative ways and enrolling the international stature of Ahtisaari to the peace process. Australian academic Damien Kingsbury (2006b) played a pragmatically significant role in assisting to bring coherence to the GAM negotiating team, drafting skills and clarity to the international presentation of the GAM position and focus on building out from ‘common ground’ at certain points when diametrically opposed positions were asserted. We would not want to exaggerate the importance of these two controversial Western advisers—Christensen and Kingsbury—who were in fact adversaries for much of the process. We also do not want to undervalue the contributions of other Westerners. We simply focus on these two very different players to say that what is interesting about them is that they both managed to make significant contributions without being stakeholders and without starting with an institutional base for their work. They were influential by enrolling (Latour 1986, 1987) and informing the power of institutions that did become key stakeholders in Helsinki, such as the European Union and GAM. They both felt able to take more risk-taking approaches than diplomats; they had less to lose reputation-wise from failure and had extraordinary personal commitment to secure the peace.

We also learned from the literature that the negotiation progress was a collective accomplishment of the teams who really did the face-to-face work. The task
of the GAM team was especially delicate given that its side had argued for ‘nothing but independence’ for so long. The old Sweden-based leadership and the younger Aceh leadership ultimately showed finesse and courage in the face of this challenge after a long period of being rather disorganised and quixotic. In this, the GAM negotiators drew on leadership resources that were not in the room. This is the civil society leadership that we discuss in the next paragraph and an international media that finally became a force for peace, as discussed further below. There is no great historical interest in documenting the negotiating errors all of these actors made, the moments, for example, when they lost their temper or set the process back for a period by some other miscalculation. What is historically interesting is to have this level of in-the-room and outside-the-room insight into the multiplex contributions to moving the peace forward. On the one hand, it shows that peace processes are fragile accomplishments, that spoilers are many and resourceful, that persistent individual acts of leadership are needed to foil the flap of this or that butterfly wing that might cause a storm to crash down on the peace process. On the other hand, it shows that when the structural conditions for peace are present, weakness of one leader in failing to calm the storm is often compensated by leadership strength from another. It is, however, a mistake to read these events in a structurally determinist way wherein individual leadership does not matter. The fragility of the accomplishment is so clear from the historical record. The storm (which might or might not be in a tea cup) that leads to negotiators walking out can be a permanent setback that gives spoilers a space to unravel all that has been accomplished. What the record of the Aceh peace processes reveals is the importance of a redundancy of resilient individual leadership competence so that the storms unleashed by the weaknesses of one peacemaker can be covered by the strengths of other peacemakers before spoilers seize the opportunity to harness the storm.

The conclusion that the outcome cannot be simply read off from an understanding of the structural and proximate drivers of war and peace is well illustrated by GAM negotiator Nur Djuli saying that GAM went into the Helsinki negotiations reluctantly and sceptical about the government’s intentions: ‘At this point, we were not serious. We were just being polite, but we did not have any expectations that new talks would have any success and we were not really committed to the process’ (Morfit 2006:11). If suing for peace was inevitable from a GAM that was militarily decimated, why was it that the Indonesian Vice-President and President were pursuing GAM to open a dialogue rather than GAM pursuing them (see Morfit 2006)? It was a combination of structural conditions for peace (present in 2005 but not in 2003), a redundancy of peacebuilding leadership competence (present more in 2005 than in 2003) and a taming of spoilers (executed with enhanced finesse from 2005 thanks especially to President Yudhoyono,

30 ‘Just getting to the next day became the main priority, and was a point to which we [the GAM negotiating team in Helsinki] retreated often’ (Kingsbury 2006b:28).
the AMM and the emerging GAM leadership of Governor Irwandi). What the historical record shows to be facile is the cult of peacebuilding celebrity that surrounds the picking of Nobel Peace Prize winners.

During the conflict, commentators commonly saw SIRA and human rights NGOs as captured and cultivated by GAM to broaden support for their armed struggle. When the current vice-governor of Aceh and then chairperson of SIRA was arrested on 20 November 2001, police accused SIRA during his questioning of being ‘GAM without the guns’ (HRW 2001b:20). Today we might ponder whether it was GAM that was beginning to become like SIRA by destroying their guns. In retrospect, we can ask whether after decommissioning of GAM forces and destruction of weapons, it was the GAM fighters who were captured more by the educated younger generation epitomised by SIRA who wanted freedom for Aceh through peaceful means. At the time of the CoHA negotiations, many believed the mostly unemployed, uneducated young rank and file of GAM forces were more war weary and pro-peace than the educated older leadership in Sweden. The massive following attracted by the peaceful movement for change led from the universities could not be ignored by the Sweden-based leadership when the next opportunity for a peace agreement came in 2004. Aspinall (2008c) articulated this influence in terms of ‘GAM leaders who began to use similar language to that of the students’. Once the GAM leadership in Sweden was ensconced as monopoly negotiators as a result of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and Crisis Management Initiative peace processes, civil society groups became quite marginal to the shaping of the peace. Their access to the AMM during implementation of the Helsinki accord was quite limited (Aspinall 2008a:11; Lahdensuo 2006).

Religious leaders were particularly important elements in civil society. In November 2002, a delegation of Aceh notables led by the head of Muhammadiyah in Aceh, Imam Suja’, travelled to Europe and seemed to exert influence over the Sweden-based GAM leaders in opening their minds to the advantages of a negotiated peace (Aspinall and Crouch 2003:30). Even former US President Clinton played a significant role in warning that post-tsunami, a truce was vital for international humanitarian workers to get help to people in safety.

Japan, with strong backing from the United States, the European Union and the World Bank, organised a conference of 38 donor countries in December 2002 to give the message that a successful peace agreement would unlock a generous flow of support from donors (Huber 2004:30). In the event, the aid that flowed after the CoHA was substantially embezzled and extorted by combatants. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the message of a peace dividend paid by donors became one that was helpful. Norway, Sweden, Finland, the European Commission, the United States and Japan all gave mostly backdoor support to the initiatives of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue or the Crisis Management
Initiative or both. Any potential effectiveness of the United Nations or Australia as peacebuilding actors was tainted by what Jakarta saw as their duplicitous roles in levering Timor-Leste’s secession from the republic.

It probably needs to be emphasised that Japan and particularly the United States self-consciously played low-profile supportive roles in the various peace processes with funds and political support. One commentator who felt our account underplayed the backdoor US contributions said: ‘Some US embassy staff members intervened personally to save lives of NGO activists and smuggled them out of the country (but that is probably not for the record).’

The fourth member of what became known as the Tokyo Four group of key donors in Aceh was the World Bank. When the BRA was collapsing under the administrative cataclysm of 48 000 applications for reintegration payments to conflict-affected people, it was the World Bank that came to the rescue with the strategy of integrating payouts into village governance through its Kecamatan Development Program (KDP). Village facilitators mediated grants ranging from R60 to R170 million to individual, group and village beneficiaries in 1724 conflict-affected villages to the tune of $26.5 million, completed by June 2007. The purchase of seeds, cattle and village infrastructure was a common form of disbursement. The KDP operated ‘small development on a large scale’ in 40 per cent of the villages in Indonesia and all villages of Aceh (Barron et al. 2007:27). In some 28 000 villages, the program has sought since 1998 to develop ‘context capacity’ that is attuned to how governance, markets and welfare work very locally. Barron et al. (2006) found in an intensive evaluation of the program in 41 villages in East Java and Nusa Tenggara Timur that the KDP contributed to improvements in inter-group relations across a variety of identity cleavages and contributed positively to a reconfiguration of citizen–state relations at the local level, helping to democratise village life. Most directly relevant to the Peacebuilding Compared research agenda, the KDP helped improve problem solving and conflict resolution, though evidence of this was much more mixed. Villages mostly preferred to rely on more longstanding local institutions to solve conflicts, though the KDP had a role when these had lost legitimacy. The KDP sometimes induced conflict via competition between different projects put up for funding; sponsors of unfunded proposals often resented being losers from the local decision making—for example, when there was elite capture of it (Barron et al. 2007). Conflict also sometimes arose from poor socialisation of the program so that villagers simply misunderstood what its rules and limits were. For all this mixed performance, the KDP is advancing in an evidence-based way our understanding of how to build ‘context capacity’ with the ambition of enabling small development to work on a large scale.
Post-Helsinki, a joint forum to support peace of the World Bank, the European Union, the Japanese Embassy, USAID, the UNDP, GAM, the AMM and civil society organisations, among others, met fortnightly to coordinate the large numbers of post-conflict projects.

The international media took limited interest in Aceh and its protracted wars until the 2004 tsunami, after which the interest was formidable and useful in creating pressure for the peace to work. There had been momentary international media interest at the time of the Dutch invasion of 1873 and the Indonesian one of 2003, but when these degenerated into insurgencies that the international media was warned away from, it lacked the determination to cover them (Reid 2006a:2). This differed from the insurgency in East Timor where Australian and Portuguese media interest was sustained enough to feed into the wider circuits of European and North American interest.

Peace journalism became a factor in the peace. As in other parts of Indonesia, in Aceh, the BBC played a helpful role, along with other international media organisations, in peace journalism training. Journalists who attended the training said they had learned from it to avoid speculation about who might have killed or caused the disappearance of someone and to engender a ‘sorrow focus rather than an anger focus’ by writing about the effect of a tragedy on people. The Alliance of Independent Journalists promoted peace journalism, but did not see this as inhibiting truth seeking. The alliance also ran eight mediations in 2006 between journalists who felt they were intimidated and the military or other state powerbrokers whom they alleged were doing so. Acehnese journalists played an important role in the conviction in 2004 of Governor Puteh, who was at the heart of the corruption problems of the province in 2004. One leader of the Alliance of Independent Journalists in Aceh perhaps was not exaggerating wildly when he said, ‘if there is no media story, there is no court case’ (with corruption). Journalists have also played an important role in exposing illegal logging, including military and police involvement in it. When investigating illegal logging in Aceh, the Alliance of Independent Journalists promotes a policy of journalists never working alone, rather going into the field with other journalists in a group from different media companies (so neither individual journalist nor individual company can be targeted for violence or intimidation).

The AMM was a particularly important peacebuilding actor even though it did drop the ball on post-conflict justice, reconciliation and human rights and worked excessively through elites who were often perpetrators of the violence, to the neglect of its victims. The impressive thing about the AMM was the dispatch and openness with which it executed the most fragile first steps—essentially the military steps—of decommissioning, weapons destruction and
Indonesian military and police withdrawal. Because of the history of Indonesia not being credible in its commitments, the AMM put external backbone and vigilance into a number of the most critical commitments of the MoU.

Motivational postures of key actors

What do we see if we look at the Aceh case through the lens of Valerie Braithwaite’s (2009) motivational postures of commitment, capitulation, resistance, disengagement and game playing? During the revolutionary war against the Dutch, few parts of Indonesia showed more commitment than Aceh to the ideal of the Indonesian state. In the decades that followed, few parts of Indonesia could compare with the collapse of commitment to Indonesia that occurred in Aceh. Between 1950 and 2005, the people of Aceh never recovered commitment to Indonesia, but cycled between resistance and capitulation. During this era, there was also much cycling between commitment and capitulation to Darul Islam, then GAM (with some popular resistance as well in areas where military-backed militias flourished). The big question at the time of writing is whether it is possible for anomie to be transcended post-conflict with commitment evolving among the Acehnese to the Indonesian state simultaneously with commitment to provincial and local governments led by former GAM leaders. This seems far from impossible.

What of the motivational postures of the most important player in this conflict: the Indonesian military? There are two ways of reading the commercial behaviour of the Indonesian military. One is that it is an organisation that receives less than one-third of its operational funding from the national budget (probably more today). Officers got involved in legal and, in the case of Aceh, mainly illegal, business ventures so they could fund their troops. That could be the primary motivation for many—a motivation of commitment to sustaining the military as a national institution and to paying its staff. The TNI is, however, an opportunity structure that provides a superb cover for state crime by officers motivated by maximising personal accumulation of wealth, of whom there are many, and of which their former president General Suharto was the most accomplished state criminal. Many persistently played a game of milking the Indonesian state and a game of extortion of the people and businesses of Aceh.

Game playing entered into the very constitution of who the peacemaking actors were. Neither GAM nor the Government of Indonesia wanted negotiations to be complicated by the inclusion of actors from Acehnese civil society. Hence, when the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue sought to engage and consult with civil society actors, regional military and police commanders, with their limited

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31 Ed Aspinall comments that it is perhaps ‘more like a mixture than cycling’.
experience of pluralised democratic engagement, publicly criticised mediators for conspiring behind the government’s back (Aspinall and Crouch 2003:29). Authoritarian states perhaps always regard mediators who consult with citizens as bypassing its state prerogative to speak for them. Once both sides had forced the mediators to pare down the participants to the core factions of the combatants, the GAM leadership in Sweden used the negotiations as a weapon to consolidate themselves as the sole legitimate spokesmen for the aspirations of the people of Aceh. When meetings did occur between mediators and the breakaway MP-GAM faction leaders based in Malaysia, the Stockholm leaders who held sway over the largest number of fighters in the field threatened to boycott future negotiations (Huber 2004:51).

ExxonMobil was not a peacebuilding actor. It was aligned with the Indonesian Government and the two Bush administrations in the United States, being second only to Enron as a campaign contributor to George W. Bush (Martinkus 2004:17). The Bush State Department in 2002 wrote to a US court urging the dropping of a case against ExxonMobil by 11 Aceh villagers who alleged the company had contributed to their rape, imprisonment at company facilities, torture and the murder of their relatives (through paying and aiding the security forces who carried out the abuses) (Martinkus 2004:16). The court threw out the case. In the 1990s, before the merger with Exxon, Mobil’s Aceh operation accounted for nearly one-quarter of the company’s worldwide earnings (Martinkus 2004:16). This engendered an attitude that spending a few million dollars to buy a bit of peace and security was a small price. As a result, ExxonMobil contributed financially significant amounts to both sides of the conflict—on the GAM side, less directly than indirectly through contractors who were expected to respond to extortion payments. This gave combatants on both sides a financial incentive to prefer continuation to cessation of the conflict. ExxonMobil therefore was a quintessential game player, devoid of a long-term commitment to Aceh, the Indonesian military or the Bush administrations, just keeping ahead of the game of resource politics for the finite period before it pulled out of Aceh.

Finally, the kleptocracy that was the civil administration of Aceh, epitomised by imprisoned Governor Puteh, were also corrupt game players. One commentator said that this was ‘largely because they couldn’t do anything else: they knew their capacity to influence the situation was virtually non-existent, so why not make some money? Their kleptocratic character was more a product than a cause of the conflict.’ Between them, the local military, the civil administration and the dominant national and international corporations gamed markets, not by competing in them but by turning them into monopolies and cartels. This game playing by the key elites has left a terrible legacy of corruption in public life, organised crime and cartelised illegal business structures that have supplanted Aceh’s pre-colonial head start into vibrant markets and free international trade.
Sadly, many among the newly powerful ex-GAM elites in Aceh are contracting into the cartelised illegal businesses in logging (with the military), for example, extorting provincial and district contracts from corrupt political cronies or becoming organised crime players, rather than transforming this terrible legacy of their old enemies.

The amazingly widespread vibrancy of the political engagement of the people of Aceh as manifest in the massive pro-referendum rallies of a decade ago is not dead; in Banda Aceh, many NGOs continue to speak truth to power via varied forms of democratic resistance. As McGibbon (2006b) put it, the elite of kleptocratic game players gave birth to a resistant counter-elite of governance reformers. This was as democratically healthy as the morphing of some of the SIRA resistance to illegitimate state structures into commitment to legitimate, democratic ones. Sadly though, there was a third shift to widespread disengagement. A large driver of political and social disengagement in Aceh is the extraordinarily high level of poor mental health—post-traumatic stress symptoms, depression, anxiety—as documented by the Harvard Medical School research (IOM 2007). The data also show, however, that trauma increases participation in polarised forms of distrustful, us-versus-them politics (Shewfelt 2008:20). These data highlight the importance of trauma counselling to peacebuilding and democratic citizenship, especially for the elderly who seem to suffer most, and for the young who will suffer longest. Disappointment at slow progress by an honest governor in dismantling deeply entrenched kleptocracy also drives disengagement.

Peacebuilding strengths and weaknesses

A strength of the Helsinki peace process was that it seized a window of international pressure to push the parties very quickly to an agreement that covered many of the most important obstacles to peace. The AMM then moved smartly with the parties to deliver the threshold military aspects of disarmament and disengagement of forces. There were two weaknesses. First, these processes engaged a very narrow interpretation of who were the parties to the conflict. Second, the follow-through beyond the first-step MoU undertakings secured with the AMM in 2005 (or to issues on which the MoU was silent) was not impressive. A moment of considerable follow-through promise was the wide engagement of Acehnese civil society with the preparation of a consensus Aceh draft for the Law on the Governance of Aceh. The law that was finally passed in Jakarta then dishonoured the MoU in many fundamental ways. Among other things, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (itself a commitment dishonoured so far) is needed to take stock of what commitments have been and have not been honoured and to diagnose options for jump-starting the stalled delivery vehicles for these commitments.
One thing we must ponder is whether the early strength of the Aceh peace process was possible only because a narrow set of stakeholders participated. If the ultranationalists of the Indonesian parliament and military who really drove the war had been at the table in Helsinki, the process could well have stalled until the window of opportunity closed. A similar point could be made about having a more complex array of parties on the GAM side. It could be that an optimal peace process narrows the parties as much as they need to be to get a timely and workable agreement. A post-agreement broadening of participation in hammering out the details of the peace is then needed to improve it, to widen commitment to it and socialisation of its obligations. One might say that all these strengths were in play right up to the completion of the rather wide civil society participation (though with limited participation of women and rural people) in drafting the consensus LoGA text.

Politics is a messy business. If one has the view that the Helsinki MoU happened only because the Jakarta ultranationalists who were the most important actors in the onset of the war were kept away from the table, it should not surprise that these ultranationalists, who could not be kept away from the table in the Indonesian parliament (because they are elected to be there), would water down the MoU when they voted for the LoGA.

A widespread view in the corridors of the United Nations in New York, where fieldwork for Peacebuilding Compared has also been completed, is that peacekeeping has not worked in places such as Somalia because there was ‘no peace to keep’. If the parties are committed to a peace agreement, internationals can be helpful in monitoring or enforcing the agreement and bringing spoilers to heel in accordance with the wishes of the parties. Here is where Elizabeth Drexler’s work can be illuminating. ‘The parties’ can be a fiction, a reification. Recall Drexler’s argument that in Aceh a whole complex of violence was under way earlier in this decade—yes, fighting by GAM loyal to the leadership, fighting by other GAM factions who were not loyal to them, fighting by petty local warlords who saw themselves as supporting the aspirations of GAM (but who others in GAM did not accept as part of the movement), fighting by gangs who pretended to be GAM but who had not the least allegiance to a GAM ideology or leadership, fighting by proxy militias of the military and of GAM, criminal gangs cashing in on the disorder, military deserters running ganja businesses and even the military and police fighting each other. There were,

32 Indeed, Damien Kingsbury commented on this that two representatives of the military were at the table at the beginning of the Helsinki process, they did obstruct progress and they were then dropped off the Indonesian negotiating team.
33 Aspinall (2009:189) also reported that Kopassus troops sometimes gave GAM advance notice of Brimob movements so they could be attacked and hopefully driven out of areas where the police were competing with the military for business protection rackets. In other cases, Kopassus gave GAM advance notice of their movements so as to avoid clashes, in exchange for not pursuing GAM in pacts of coexistence that prevailed in certain areas.
however, also lots of local agreements to avoid fighting between a military that would profit from protection rackets in one area and GAM, who would enjoy a similar monopoly in an adjacent area. For the purposes of peace negotiations, this complex of violence was reified as GAM commanded by di Tiro fighting Indonesia commanded by the president. Without such a fiction, however, would there have been a peace agreement to enforce? Yudhoyono and Kalla had engaged over a number of years in a search for the most useful fiction for who GAM was. Because they believed the Sweden-based leadership was more belligerent than GAM commanders in Aceh and GAM leaders in Malaysia, they toyed for a while with the fiction that those in Sweden were not the leaders of GAM. This proved an unsustainable approach in the search for the fiction that would be as supportive of peace as possible and command as wide a sway over fighters as possible. Then fighters who did not go along with the deal signed by the reified ‘parties’ could be labelled as spoilers and brought to heel. If the fiction is too fictional, it does not work. Peacemaking, however, will also not work if it requires Drexleresque spurning of oversimplification in the social construction of parties.

Our argument, on the contrary, is that one reason why the peace process has worked is that it embraced a useful simplification of what GAM was and what the Indonesian state was. A morally disturbing aspect of this was that the Indonesian military might have helped the fiction become both more useful and less fictional by killing some more belligerent GAM who might have been obstacles to the peace process. It is more than possible that GAM murdered some of those potential spoilers as well, though that is even harder to be confident about. In the Aceh case, the simplification worked well enough to quickly embrace most of those who were shooting into a peace that was disrupted only by criminal gangs and individuals whose violence involved no province-wide political project. No ‘real GAM’ equivalent of the Real IRA emerged; military leaders and ultranationalists were unable to push for the impeachment of President Yudhoyono in the way they had done with President Wahid. In a short space of months, the AMM and the police were able to do a good job of reducing the violence of criminal gang leaders who were candidates to become warlords, even though violence did increase after the AMM departed. We include the work of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue when we say the peace process embraced the most productive simplification of who was GAM and who was Indonesia. Here ‘most productive’ means most influential over fighters and most supportive of peace. While Geneva did not broker an agreement that held and Helsinki did, the Geneva process laid important foundations for constituting pro-peace actors of sufficient sway on both sides. The Geneva process delivered to the Sweden-based GAM negotiators much of the legitimacy of the mass movement led by SIRA. It also constituted the GAM leadership as more pro-
peace actors by challenging their assumptions that Indonesia would eventually disintegrate, that secession was the only way for them to achieve their objectives and that Aceh could be like East Timor or Brunei.

More broadly, one could say that a strength of the Aceh peace process was that many were pushing and contributing to it. When one player or one negotiator set the process back, others stepped in to push it forward. It is also interesting that some of these were politically insignificant and strategically and locally irrelevant actors such as Juha Christensen and Damien Kingsbury. It is also interesting that as powerful an actor as the United States was not among the most central players—nor was the United Nations. Nor was the most important regional body, ASEAN, even though individual ASEAN nations contributed very constructively to the AMM. Nor was the most important regional power beyond Indonesia itself, Australia. That is certainly not to say this was a peace created by marginal players such as an ex-president of a geopolitically insignificant European state and civil society non-entities. The most indispensable individual contribution came from the serving president of the most powerful nation in the region, Indonesia: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It was, however, an accomplishment of a networked plurality of contributors and cannot be credited to the diplomatic vision of any great man.

Over the longer history from 1976, the determination of the Indonesian military to undermine peace, provoke conflict through its brutality and make money out of the war was the primary peacebuilding weakness. It was compounded by the weakness of successive Indonesian presidents in failing to confront this until President Yudhoyono was willing to bring the military to heel on Aceh.

One grievance that drove the conflict in Aceh was that the province was not receiving a fair share of the wealth it generated. Today Aceh does not deliver a fair share of the wealth it did in the 1980s and 1990s. A succession of post-Suharto presidents has, however, delivered an increased share of revenues collected in Aceh back to be spent in Aceh, culminating in President Yudhoyono’s concessions as part of the Helsinki MoU. By 2006, local governments in Aceh were receiving revenues five times higher than before the decentralisation reforms of 1999. In addition, massive extra resources have flowed to all levels of governance in Aceh as a result of the generosity of donors in the aftermath of the tsunami. The reversal of the outflow of resources to an inflow has been at such a level that the real problem now is the absorption capacity of the ravaged institutions of governance in Aceh. There is a serious capacity deficit in managing and effectively spending this vast surge of resources (Barron and Clark 2006). It was compounded by the fact that the provincial capital was hit particularly hard by the tsunami, devastating the ranks of capable civil servants. In Aceh, as in West Papua, perhaps we should be saying that a strength of the peace processes is that they have reversed a fundamental
driver of the conflict in centre–periphery economic exploitation. In the face of the corruption and extortion that are looting the reversed resource flow, it is, however, delivering only limited improvement to the livelihoods of ordinary villagers. Thus, this is a strength that is tempered by local governance weakness in delivery. On the other hand, this research has revealed much that is inspiring about local leadership from below, from the village level, for better stewardship of those resources, and much inspiring, even evidence-based leadership from above by the likes of the World Bank and Governor Irwandi to empower that leadership from below.

A vibrant civil society is a strength of peacebuilding as it moves forward in Aceh. The civil society capabilities of Aceh were apparent in the sheer scale of the demonstrations organised by SIRA calling for a referendum at the beginning of this decade. On the other hand, while the presence of NGOs is palpable in Banda Aceh, Sigli and Lhokseumawe, elsewhere it is not. The exclusion of this vibrant sector from most of the peace process has been criticised.

GAM made a half-hearted attempt at being inclusive by holding a series of meetings with Acehnese civil society groups from the third round of talks onward. However, the groups invited were carefully selected and did not include those who disagreed with GAM. (Schulze 2007a:111)

Women and women’s organisations were central neither in the peace process nor in the drafting of the LoGA (Crisis Management Initiative 2006). A positive development was the establishment of a Women’s Peace Network of 26 organisations in December 2005. This network did not, however, manage representation or a direct influence on the elite decision makers who were in the room when deals were done. One paradox of the peace process is that Aceh received Sharia laws that the Government of Indonesia, GAM, the SIRA network of NGOs and even many ulamas did not want. In Aceh, like everywhere else in the world, women commit less serious crime than men. In Aceh, however, women suffer much harassment from the Sharia police over their dress and their relationships with men. Women have been targets for caning after Friday prayers at the mosque for breaches of Sharia law. Moreover, there are reasons to worry that it is a politicised, disempowering targeting of women. Women’s rights activist Smita Notosusanto doubtless exaggerates, yet raises a genuine worry when she alleges: ‘What is telling is that all women accused of immorality in Aceh were political activists. So now no one wants to stand for the elections’ (quoted in Schulze 2007b:11). Ironically, there was no precedent for caning as a punishment for the three new Sharia regulations passed in Aceh criminalising alcohol consumption/sale, gambling and illicit relations between men and women (ICG 2006b). Public dissatisfaction with the Sharia police (wilayatul

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34 See also Siapno (2002:179) on the limited footprint of NGOs in the early 1990s.
hisbah, the vice and virtue patrol) and the moral vigilantism it encourages among neighbours has been persistent. The poor, as well as women, are widely believed to be targets:

This public concern, combined with the incumbency of Governor Irwandi, a committed secularist, has clipped the wings of the Shari’a police somewhat, with a shift of emphasis toward guidance more than punishment. (ICG 2008b:4)

A number of ordinary people like our driver said rich men are never caned by the Shari’a police. This has been no easy matter for the governor to navigate. Aceh is probably still the most fervently Islamic of Indonesia’s provinces and the Shari’a police are a bureaucracy committed to their own expansion who have many supporters and wield a certain kind of power on the religious right. (ICG 2006b:1)

The IOM in particular has probably managed a somewhat more systematic approach to trauma than we have seen in other Indonesian conflicts in relation to ex-combatants and refugees. Steven Shewfelt’s (2008:20) research conducted in collaboration with the IOM and the UNDP in Aceh shows one reason why this is important is that ‘wartime trauma brings with it decreases in social trust and increases in political polarization and perception of others’ polarization’. On the positive side, however, wartime trauma is associated with heightened post-conflict political and social participation, though with this polarising baggage.

Local reconciliation seems to have contributed greatly to healing, even if a province-wide Truth and Reconciliation Commission has not happened. Peusijuek and other reconciliation ceremonies have played a part in remarkably low levels of conflict associated with the return of GAM and militias to areas where locals worked on the other side of the conflict. Spontaneous generosity from poor villagers to help returning combatants get back on their feet and to help homeless, crippled and orphaned victims has also been very important to reconciliation, especially when given to former adversaries and their families.

**Contests of principles**

In the conflicts before the rise of GAM, the principles of the Islamic state and Sharia law were important, but they were not as central to the conflict we were coding post-1976, at least not to its latter stages. The principles of Acehnese identity, Acehnese dignity and Acehnese sovereignty (economic and political) were central. On the Indonesian side, the unity of Indonesia and Indonesian identity were central. To some degree, in the evolution of the peace we have
also seen a temporal shift in the principles of justice at stake, a shift from justice as righting past wrongs against Aceh to justice as a better future for the next generation of Acehnese.

**Preliminary conclusion**

Barron and Burke (2009:xii) contrast the narrow, brief mandate of the AMM with the ‘human security approach’ of more sustained, inclusive, multidimensional intervention, as in ‘peacebuilding failures such as Timor Leste’.

> [T]he experience of Aceh, especially if contrasted with places like Timor Leste, appears to show that a limited role for international agencies can result in better outcomes if domestic commitment to peace holds and domestic government bodies are functional enough to put the commitment into practice. (Barron and Burke 2009:54)

Something important is being said here about the way ‘best practice’ in peacebuilding is overly influenced by successes and failures in shattered states such as Iraq and Afghanistan, non-states such as Somalia and weak states such as Sudan.

> It is unclear whether international models for postconflict assistance—which tend to draw on a body of theory and practice largely developed from devastated postconflict states in sub-Saharan Africa—had much relevance for Aceh (or other conflicts in middle-income countries), where the state was still strong and markets were functioning. (Barron and Burke 2009:59)

In all but the Papua case in this book, the combatants themselves (including the military) worked with Indonesian civil society (particularly religious and village adat leaders) and the Indonesian state to rebuild peace, prosperity and democracy. This was done with limited international help or pressure in comparative terms; in fact, Aceh was the Indonesian case where international engagement was most intense. Our argument would be that even the failed Indonesian peacebuilding case, Papua, could be solved with a level of international, national and civil society engagement no greater than in the experience of Aceh. What we see today in intensive international peacekeeping interventions such as Liberia or Solomon Islands seems less relevant to what is needed for Papua.

Most people who we interviewed thought prospects for sustained peace in Aceh were good. A former governor of the province said that justice and prosperity were more important to Acehnese than political positions on autonomy and independence. That was one reason why he thought it important to honour...
Anomie and Violence

the Truth and Reconciliation Commission clause in the Helsinki agreement. He sees independence in Acehnese thinking throughout its history as not an end in itself, but a means to dignity, justice and prosperity. Finally, he thinks that without a peace grounded more solidly in truth and promise keeping, trust between Aceh and Jakarta might break down in the heat of some future crisis.

The more negative view was that Aceh was like parts of the Balkans and the Middle East where a spirit of sovereignty and revenge for its infringement, a spirit of the honour and dignity of Acehnese identity, was unusually resilient. Some GAM commanders spoke chillingly of seeing what they could ‘get out of’ the peace, what could be accomplished in terms of self-government in this period of peace; then when Jakarta betrayed the commitments of the peace deal, as they expected would happen, it would be up to their children to start preparing themselves for the next war. Some informants spoke of comparatively short durations of peace in Acehnese history as merely incubation cycles for the next conflict. This was said to be reflected in the modus operandi of recruitment for the next war: targeting sons who lost their fathers to the last war, offering them the opportunity to honour their father’s sacrifice. So the long cycle is seen as war, a hurting stalemate, ripeness for peace, recovery and demise of the hurting stalemate during which ripeness for war incubates, and on it goes. For other nations, slights to honour and humiliation can fade more quickly than the hurts of the hurting stalemate (and this leads to enduring peace). In Aceh, the reverse could be true: battle weariness is quickly forgotten, while the honour of vindicating Acehnese indignity is not so easily forgotten. At the least, it sits there in waiting as a motivational resource to be harnessed by some future entrepreneur of conflict.

There is insight in the pessimistic analysis of the previous paragraph and the optimistic analysis of the paragraph before it. Their joint validity leads to a conclusion that it is possible to build on the hope one analysis offers to defeat the danger the second forebodes. This would seem to require a movement from the present dispensation of non-truth and limited reconciliation to a full flowering of truth, justice and reconciliation. Perhaps this is politically possible only in small historical steps, and therefore will take decades. It is not to say that every war criminal must be punished and no stone of truth unturned. It is perhaps to say that without high integrity truth seeking that leads to a shared sense of what should be forgiven and what should be prosecuted, insurgency could incubate again in Aceh. On the other hand, with a long-term commitment to truth, justice and reconciliation that allows the dignity of Indonesian identity to embrace the dignity of Acehnese identity, perpetual peace at last seems possible for beautiful, long-suffering Aceh.

A theme of this chapter has been that fictions can be useful in simplifying who are the parties to a conflict who must be at the table of a peace process. A theme
of this book is that a great deal of effective peacebuilding in Indonesia has been crafted from non-truth and reconciliation. Fictions are, however, fragile things when analysis readily fingers them as such. However useful they are in starting a peace that is hard to start, fragile fictions that are never transcended might come to endanger that peace. Capitulation that does not mature into commitment to a new normative order, but instead shifts to corrupt gaming of the settlement, also risks a return to anomic violence. It also risks criminalisation of the state—something that is happening quite a lot in contemporary Aceh.
### Appendix 6.1

#### Table A6.1 Summary of some codes, Aceh: 650 other variables are coded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural factors at root of conflict</th>
<th>Is this a ‘consensus’ factor among analysts or ‘contested but credible’ as a possible factor?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch then successor ‘Javanese colonialism’ cuts off Acehnese trade networks to the north and west, extracts wealth via centres in the south (Medan and Jakarta) that also control monopolies in Aceh</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Acehnese identity develops that venerates vindication of the sacrifices of past Islamic martyrs in struggles against Dutch ‘infidels’ and Javanese ‘mercenaries’</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmigration/immigration; Javanese migrants get better jobs; migrants accused of un-Islamic behaviour, including sexual assaults that foment widespread scandal</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous terrain supports insurgency</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora supports insurgency, especially a large Malaysian one easily accessed by boat from Aceh</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proximate factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExxonMobil and other resource developments enrich Jakarta elites and cut Acehnese elites out of the action</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExxonMobil and other resource developments displace villagers, destroy agricultural land, kill fish and pollute</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExxonMobil and other resource developments increase opportunities for extortion by GAM and the military</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenacious and resilient leadership of Hasan di Tiro starting with just 70 fighters</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and security forces exaggerate GAM as a folk devil that threatens the republic; military commits violence, then attributes it to GAM</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya trains di Tiro’s insurgents</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military reprisals boost GAM recruitment; GAM sometimes intentionally provokes military reprisals</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of New Order opens power allocations and the rules of the game to new forms of political competition (Bertrand 2004); GAM leadership comes to believe Indonesia will eventually disintegrate</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modelling—attempt to emulate independence referendum as in East Timor</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy of iron fist of the military and velvet glove of the civil government backfires because civilian government captured by kleptocrats and military deploys iron fist indiscriminately</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations and promises that collapse of New Order will lead to prosecution of military abusers of human rights are not realised</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One broken promise after another to Aceh erodes the credibility of Jakarta’s commitments; the ‘narrative of the broken promise’ (Birchok 2004) is felt with passion</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Broken promises, economic exploitation, rape, torture and beatings are read as assaults on the dignity of the Acehnese; sons should take to arms to right the humiliation of their forebears

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key triggering incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This conflict is a long, slow simmer of many structural and proximate factors that recurrently boils over; sparking incidents not crucial to starting new outbreaks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key war-making actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militias, some ethnic, some criminal gangs, recruited mainly by military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military agents pretending to be GAM and other sham GAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key peacemaking actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Yudhoyono, Vice-President Kalla, Farid Husein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The GAM negotiating teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Crisis Management Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governments of Norway, Finland and Sweden, European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIRA and civil society organisations, especially university student leaders, pushing for peaceful paths to self-government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA and reintegration donor networks, especially World Bank, IOM, USAID, Japanese Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village reconciliation leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders assisting reconciliation and delivering sermons for peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace journalists, investigative journalists exposing corruption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacebuilding strengths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass civil society movement for peaceful change through a referendum influences GAM; civil society strengths also support peacebuilding and monitor corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue process begins to impose a reality check on GAM beliefs that Indonesia will disintegrate, that Aceh could be as wealthy as Brunei, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A networked plurality of actors that run from Bill Clinton and Muhammidiyah leader Imam Suja to ‘wise men’ mobilised by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and local peacebuilding NGOs creates a redundancy of peacemaking competence that covers the mistakes of one peacemaker with the strengths and resilience of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsunami opens a window of international pressure for peace; need for humanitarian workers to be safe; international scrutiny on spoilers; media scrutiny on threats of aid withdrawal; tsunami also engenders empathy and creates a resource-rich environment to support peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ahtisaari-led ‘nothing agreed until everything agreed’ mediation forces quick progress inside the window opened by the tsunami

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacebuilding weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belligerent military spoilers are resilient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military and GAM war criminals are effectively guaranteed impunity as long as they commit no new crimes after the peace agreement is signed; even a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that gives them amnesty is not yet established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The AMM fails to follow through energetically in the window when the international attention cycle is on Aceh to deliver human rights, reconciliation and key governance aspects of the MoU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are largely excluded from all stages of the peace process, even the most inclusive stages (such as the drafting of the consensus draft of the LoGA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultrananationalist factions of the Indonesian polity fight back from their exclusion from the Helsinki process by securing a substantial gutting of the Helsinki agreement in the LoGA passed by the Indonesian parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and embezzlement in government continue even after election of a governor with a strong anti-corruption agenda; he is part of the solution; other elements of GAM join in to become part of the problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two years of delay and maladministration in delivering reintegration payments fuel distrust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homes destroyed by the conflict are rebuilt more slowly than in other areas of Indonesia afflicted with conflict because of the massive house-building challenge of the tsunami, yet they are eventually rebuilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many local GAM leaders morph into crime bosses who extort contracts from local governments and humanitarian organisations assisting tsunami and conflict victims, collaborate with the military for illegal logging, have extravagant tsunami homes built for themselves, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key contested principles of peacebuilding

| Acehnese identity, Acehnese dignity, Acehnese sovereignty (economic and political) and self-government | Consensus |
| Indonesian identity, Indonesian unity | Consensus |
| Temporal shift from emphasis on justice as righting past wrongs against Aceh to justice as a better future for the next generation of Acehnese | Contested but credible |
Table A6.2 Numbers and types of people interviewed, Aceh case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected official, legislator/MPR/bupati</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leader of oppositional group (GAM negotiators)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAM combatants, commanders</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adat/indigenous/village leader</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leader</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's NGO</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental NGO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development NGO</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights/peacebuilding NGO</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NGO</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business leader</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student/youth leader</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign government (ambassador, foreign minister of another country, USAID, etc.)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other international organisations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher/university academic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim/refugees</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total interviews</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total people interviewed</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. First steps towards a theory of peacebuilding

Emile Durkheim’s (1897) anomie was advanced as an explanation of patterns of suicide across space and time. Here we proffer anomie as normlessness for one lens in examining six cases of armed conflict. We will also find anomie relevant in the next four conflicts of Peacebuilding Compared, for which fieldwork is virtually complete. A story from Robert Lilly’s (2007:123) study of rape by American GIs in Europe during World War II suggests an evocative link between anomie in war and Durkheimian anomic suicide.1 After entering the house of a seventeen-year-old German girl, Private William Blakely threatened to kill her father and mother with his pistol unless she agreed to have sex with him in their presence. Completing the rape, Private Blakely reported being overcome with remorse. Those present agreed that he then handed the girl his pistol and urged her to shoot him. She did not do this, nor did she submit to his alternative proposition to marry her. The rape and the attempt at a proxy suicide in this disturbing incident are suggestive of Private Blakely suffering from the loss of some kind of normative compass he once had.

Non-truth and reconciliation are not peculiar to recent Indonesian history. While the Allied nations reconciled with Germany in the decades after World War II, the rape of hundreds of thousands of German women and girls by Allied soldiers, especially Russians, was not part of the truth that was spoken and acknowledged as a basis for that reconciliation. An important moment in that movement from non-truth to a truth about victor rape in World War II was the publication of Lilly’s (2007) book, which was suppressed for years because no American publisher would touch it. There were other disturbing features about the truth. While the military records that Lilly accessed showed there were a considerable number of executions of GIs for rapes in Europe during World

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1 One of Durkheim’s (1897) empirical findings about suicide in nineteenth-century Europe was that it was higher among soldiers than civilians. For Durkheim, ‘anomic suicide’ happens when the individual is not under the influence of social norms. ‘Fatalistic suicide’ is the opposite of anomic suicide, where the individual is so dominated by social norms that when violation of them is revealed, the individual deems life pointless (as in traditional Japanese suicide that affirms norms through the ritual). Durkheim sees ‘egoistic suicide’ as a result of weak integration into society and the primary groups that are its building blocks; hence his finding of high suicide among divorced men. ‘Altruistic suicide’ fits better the pattern of JI suicide bombers who came from Poso and the nineteenth to mid-twentieth century suicidal jihadists of Aceh. It means a suicide of excessive attachment to a societal group that so engulfs individualism that the individual gives up their life for the society.
War II, most were of black soldiers. And none of them was for rapes of German women; they were for rapes of French and British women, which the records revealed tended to be less bestial and sadistic than the rapes of German women.

The Central Sulawesi and North Maluku conflicts in particular raise the question of whether anomie might be a more powerful explanation of violence if its meaning were to be broadened from the unsettling of the normative order to include unsettling of the sense of who is in charge at a ‘critical juncture’ in a nation’s history (Bertrand 2004). In these cases, the security forces often failed to snuff out spot fires of violence, preferring to sniff the winds to work out who was in charge or who would come out on top. This was not just a matter of wanting to back the winner when the ethnic or religious card was played in a contest for a provincial governorship. It was also a legacy of factionalism and patronage within the military that Suharto had intentionally created so he could control the generals and prevent them from deposing him (Mietzner 2009).

In conditions of anomic unsettling of the institutional order, military officers wanted to place bets on a local governor/bupati who would win and on a general in Jakarta whose faction would prevail. The contest over factional control of the military was, however, also connected with a contest over the normative order: should Indonesia inherit democracy and human rights or stability induced by military rule and renewed authoritarianism?

Anomie means that anti-sadism norms are often suspended at the onset of violence. In turn, our Indonesian stories from victims and combatants reveal that the experience of sadistic behaviour induces hatred and feelings of revulsion and revenge. That is why we are inclined to describe many of these conflicts more as ‘revenge conflicts’ than ‘ethnic conflicts’ or ‘religious conflicts’. Another dynamic we have seen across these conflicts is the youthful suspension of norms that is induced by the historical opportunity for excitement in normally dull rural lives. Another is the space that normlessness provides for psychopaths who flock to armed conflict. Psychopaths seize the opportunity to indulge the sadism that the normative order contained during their prewar lives. We think this social selection effect is a neglected theme in theories of crisis more broadly. We therefore suspect the conditions of anomie on Wall Street that developed in the roaring 1990s attracted the kind of psychopaths who ran Enron, attracting them like bees to a honey pot of illegitimate opportunities at the centre of power. Normlessness meant a corporate game player ruthless enough to want to be a ‘master of the universe’ could indulge even the most ridiculous illegitimate opportunities. The excitement and psychopathy dynamics of anomie provided kindling for vicious spirals of revenge in all these Indonesian conflicts. We suspect this is important to understanding the unpredictability of where conflict explodes. Chaos theory shows that when many explanatory variables have non-linear relationships with one another, the flap of a butterfly wing can
cause a far-away storm. A single act of horrific sadism might therefore be widely communicated, leading to multiple acts of revenge in different places, which in turn multiplicatively produce many acts of revenge for the revenge. This connects with our inference that widely diffused bottom-up reconciliation has been important to the peace secured in Indonesia.

Many combatants we interviewed expressed remorse for things they and their colleagues did during their war, without being specific about what those things were. As in the story of the rape by Private Blakeley, war normally does not permanently unravel a normative order. The anti-rape norm still had an imprint for Blakeley that could be reactivated by the horror of the execution of the crime itself.

For these conflicts, multiple top-down peace processes\(^2\) often manage only to negotiate pauses or permanent suspensions of conflict when they are negotiated by a narrow group of combatant and political leaders. Yet such de-escalations create spaces, including islands of civility (Kaldor 1999) such as Wayame village on Ambon, where more bottom-up and middle-out depolarisation can occur through reconciliation processes. That is when elite peace bargains can connect with wider circuits of civil society. Large numbers of civilians might then become stakeholders in the detailed working out of the peace deal, as we have seen to a degree in Aceh. Before de-escalation and depolarisation can occur in the dynamics of peace, identity formation as peacemakers is also a collective accomplishment in civil society. In the Indonesian cases, just as religious leaders fed much of the war-maker identity formation, they played even bigger parts in peacemaker identity formation, as they will also do in the next four cases to be published from this project. Concrete forms of combatant reintegration assisted demobilisation in the Indonesian cases, often consolidated by *gotong royong* that saw houses and mosques rebuilt, food supplied and paid employment arranged. Finally, we saw de-constitution of the likes of GAM, Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus as organisations, peaceful reconstitution of violent street gangs and constitution of new pro-peace organisations. So we have built on the literature on a dynamics of contention (McAdam et al. 2001; van Klinken 2007) to show how a dynamics of contrition progresses through peacemaker identity formation, de-escalation, depolarisation, demobilisation and de-constitution of fighting groups. Reintegration and reconciliatory gestures—often very simple ones in the course of daily life—grease these dynamics of conflict diminution at each of these stages. Just as small initial causes can spread large escalating spirals

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\(^2\) We counted nine mostly unsuccessful top-down peace processes in Maluku, five in Central Sulawesi, four in North Maluku, three in Aceh and one in Papua, West and Central Kalimantan that engaged the main combatants before a cessation/pause of fighting (that is, excluding reconciliation talks after the killing had stopped, excluding talks with leaders that did not include combatants and excluding very local peace agreements). It therefore seems that positive peace is often preceded by many peace processes that are mostly failures, though often only partial failures.
of revenge, so peace is interpreted as driven less by front-stage peacemaking by national leaders than by more backstage aggregation of countless little reconciliatory rituals of everyday life.

The opportunities that are seized through violence in these cases are highly variable: opportunities for political office, for patronage through government contracts in the shadow economy, for jobs in a goldmine, illegal logging, the takeover of organised crime, revenge, excitement and opportunities for jihad, for a death that sends warriors to paradise. We have not found strong support for master narratives of opportunity, such as the ‘resource curse’. It follows that peacebuilding must be diagnostic in identifying the specific blocked opportunities that could be unblocked. And it needs to be catalytic of economic and political entrepreneurship to find ways of opening legitimate opportunities and of closing illegitimate opportunities. Peacebuilding can thus be conceived as the art of identifying the bottlenecks blocking the flow of legitimate opportunities and forming new bottlenecks that cut off opportunities for violence. The most recurrently important illegitimate opportunity is access to guns. The Indonesian state has been quite successful across these conflicts in blocking that access. The most recurring legitimate opportunity blockage was of the right to a hearing from those in authority about a grievance. This is the easiest to remedy. A case such as Maluku illustrates that a great deal can be accomplished by respectful listening by formerly deaf political and religious leaders, even if deep structural change does not ensue. These conclusions resonate with Barbara Walter’s (2004) finding from all civil wars ending between 1945 and 1996 that war was least likely in societies where citizens had access to an open political system and to economic opportunities.

An opportunity theory version of anomie theory allows us to reconcile what seem to be contradictory conflict dynamics. We can explain wars as unintended (as a result of a security dilemma) or we can explain them as wilful politics by other means. In conditions of normative breakdown where the rules of the game are no longer agreed, it is more open to politicians to attempt a bold manoeuvre to crush their opponents by playing the ethnic violence card, for example. In these same normatively unconstrained conditions, the behaviour of one’s adversaries is less predictable precisely because it is less channelled by the rules of the game. Therefore, people might see themselves as in a security dilemma, whereby it is best to attack the other before they seize the normatively open opportunity to attack us. Put another way, anomie is a background explanation of greed and grievance, of opportunism and security dilemmas.

Anomie creates particularly fertile conditions for Valerie Braithwaite’s (2009) motivational posture of game playing, which our cases repeatedly reveal to be a

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3 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for prompting this paragraph with this point.
useful lens through which to comprehend the proximate action in the onset of violence. The most prominent game player of war and peace in this book was the Indonesian military. An anomic society is also one in which the motivational posture of disengagement is widespread. A bulge of disengaged youth, no longer committed to either their military commanders or the elders who provided them with a moral compass before the conflict, is a recurrent challenge of post-conflict peacebuilding in all these cases.

Capitulation to a new normative order without commitment to it is also an anomic motivational posture. In a sense, however, it is a necessary one in the dynamics of de-escalation and de-polarisation. Across these cases, for many of the fighters who reluctantly and resentfully handed in their guns, capitulation was a transitional posture that saw them ultimately shift to strong commitment to the peace. In our next volume, on the Bougainville civil war, we find an even more dramatic sequencing from capitulation by fighters to their strong commitment to the peace. While resistance to norms is a posture that is part and parcel of anomie, our data on Indonesia—like the data from tax compliance and business regulation in Australia (Braithwaite 2009)—are consistent with resistance also being an easier posture to flip to commitment to a new political order (compared with disengagement and game playing, which are more obstinate). A peace process can cut deals with combatants who are clear about what features of the political order they resist, and what new political arrangements will be a compromise that in time might bind them to a peace.

In these ways, the insights that come to us from the motivational postures perspective go to the relevance of what we coin ‘transitionalism’ in peacebuilding. We are familiar with the concept of transitional justice. Part of the meaning of transitional justice is that there might be a place for amnesties—perhaps on condition of speaking truth to a truth commission—when there is enforcement swamping by the multitude of crimes committed in a war. After the period of transitional justice, the policy settings shift to more consistent law enforcement for serious crime. There is also a case for transitional governance and transitional constitutions. In the case of Poso, we saw virtue in an agreement of all political parties contesting the Poso elections in 2005 to have balanced slates of Muslim and Christian candidates. We argued that this was a prudent transitional consociationalism of sorts. It would, however, be a dangerous basis for an enduring constitution because it would exclude Poso Hindus from politics, ossifying the identities that mattered within the identity politics of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Our ANU colleague Jo Ford is exploring whether transitional justice, transitional governance and transitional constitutionalism might be complemented by ‘transitional business regulation’, using Liberia and Timor-Leste as case studies in his PhD to diagnose what this kind of transitionalism might mean.
The progress that has been made towards mapping the sequencing required of transitional governance, transitional constitutionalism, transitional economic policymaking and transitional justice has been modest in this volume. We have given but glimpses of a few options. We do think there is an important insight in our diagnosis of Aceh as a case where it was necessary for those with power to be reduced to a small group granted legitimacy to haggle a peace deal. In the next phase of transition, it was vital to connect wider circles of civil society (and the Indonesian parliament) with the peace process. In particular, if the game players in the Indonesian military or the hardliners of the Indonesian parliament had been in the room at Helsinki, Aceh would still be at war. So we have shown that a dynamics of contrition comes with patience, in stages. In a phase when the density of game players who pretend to be peacemakers, but are in fact spoilers, is high, a different politics of inclusion is needed than at a later stage when the density of game players is in decline. So we have asserted multidimensional transitionalism as an important research agenda.

Our next volume, on Bougainville, will involve two advances with this agenda. It will describe a constitutional transitionalism that establishes formal linkages between different constitutional stages (culminating in an independence referendum) triggered only when specific demobilisation stages (for example, containment of weapons, arrival of unarmed peacekeepers) are completed. Second, Bougainville will reveal more about the longue durée (Karstedt 2005, Forthcoming) of a dynamics of contrition. It will show that reconciliation is a process that can be constantly renewed by indigenous leadership with new waves of reconciliation initiatives, waves in which male political leaders are crucial, waves in which women's leadership from civil society is crucial, waves for which leadership of chiefs in particular localities is the catalyst and waves in which youth leaders in churches re-energise momentum. Melanesian philosophies of peacebuilding—also evident in a different historical trajectory in our third volume, on Solomon Islands—mean reconciliations and intergenerational renegotiations that take decades rather than years.

Our fourth volume, on Timor-Leste, will show the importance of a transition to a formal separation of powers from a networked governance of transition. The Timor-Leste volume will also show that a patient longue durée of networking in domestic civil society (the East Timor ‘clandestine movement’, particularly of students), combined with token military resistance and a brilliant, patient networked diplomacy at the United Nations led by José Ramos-Horta (linked to an international solidarity network) could defeat the concentrated power of the Indonesian state, the United States and allies such as Australia. These powers fell prey to a misplaced realism. Western diplomats fell for the folly of misplaced realism because Indonesia was so geopolitically important in the politics of Islam and in the Cold War. They therefore thought encouraging Ramos-Horta
and Fretilin was a grave error. Blindness to Fretilin turned out to be the tragic error. In retrospect, we might say the same thing about GAM, about OPM, the terrible waste of life in Aceh and the agony of Papua.

Our intellectual journey with peacebuilding must also be a patient one. We have taken preliminary steps to link theories of transitional justice with theories of transitional reintegration, transitional reconciliation, transitional economic and political governance and transitional constitutionalism with emergent separations of powers that are responsive to peacebuilding imperatives. Transitionalism is an imperative because we have seen that violence explodes in conditions of anomie. And violence is reconciled in conditions of restoration of commitment to a normative order, sometimes a transformed one. Dynamics of contention (McAdam et al. 2001; van Klinken 2007) flourish in conditions of anomie. Obversely, we can begin to understand a dynamics of contrition in the longue durée of reconciliation. One reason why transitionalism in a dynamics of peace must be staged is that at different points in a peace process different motivational postures are dominant: resistance, capitulation, game playing, disengagement and commitment to a transformed or renewed normative order. Perhaps it is only a small start to link Mertonian anomie to motivational postures, to dynamics of contention, to dynamics of contrition, to transitionalism in the theory of peacebuilding. It is, however, some sort of fresh start theoretically—even as it errs at this stage on the side of being a little complicated! We aim not to be too quick to pare to parsimony as we acquire more cases.
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