Fighting for a Living investigates the circumstances that have produced starkly different systems of recruiting and employing soldiers in different parts of the globe over the last 500 years. Offering a wide range of case studies taken from Europe, America, the Middle East and Asia, this volume is not military history in the traditional sense, but looks at military service and warfare as forms of labour, and at soldiers as workers. Military employment offers excellent opportunities for international comparison: armies as a form of organized violence are ubiquitous, and soldiers, in one form or another, are always part of the picture, in any period and in every region. Fighting for a Living is the first study to undertake a systematic comparative analysis of military labour. It therefore will be of interest to both labour historians and military historians, as well as to sociologists, political scientists, and other social scientists.

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Fighting for a Living
Most human beings work, and growing numbers are exposed to labour markets. These markets are increasingly globally competitive and cause both capital and labour to move around the world. In search of the cheapest labour, industries and service-based enterprises move from West to East and South, but also, for example, westwards from China’s east coast. People move from areas with few employment opportunities to urban and industrial hubs, both between and within continents. However, labour relations have been shifting already for centuries, labour migrations go back far in time, and changing labour relations cannot be comprehended without history. Therefore, understanding these developments and their consequences in the world of work and labour relations requires sound historical research, based on the experiences of different groups of workers in different parts of the world at different moments in time, throughout human history.

The research and publications department of the International Institute of Social History (IISH) has taken on a leading role in research and publishing on the global history of labour relations. In the context of Global Labour History, three central research questions have been defined: (1) What labour relations have emerged in parallel with the rise and advance of market economies? (2) How can their incidence (and consequently the transition from one labour relation to another) be explained, and are these worldwide transitions interlinked? (3) What are the social, economic, political, and cultural consequences of their changing incidence, and how do they relate to forms of individual and collective agency among workers? These three questions are interconnected in time, but also in space. Recent comparative Global Labour History research demonstrates that shifts in one part of the globe have always been linked to shifts in other parts.

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Fighting for a Living

A Comparative History of Military Labour
1500-2000

Edited by
Erik-Jan Zürcher

Amsterdam University Press
In memory of Gilles Veinstein (1945-2013)
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Preface

He's five-foot-two, and he's six-feet-four,
He fights with missiles and with spears.
He's all of thirty-one, and he's only seventeen,
He's been a soldier for a thousand years.

... 
He's the one who gives his body
As a weapon of the war,
And without him all this killing can't go on.

– Buffy Sainte-Marie, "Universal Soldier" (1964)

This pioneering volume is a remarkable international attempt to bridge the gap between military history and labour history, by exploring the labour of the military as a subject in its own right. During 2009-2012, a team of twenty researchers from nine countries led by Erik-Jan Zürcher systematically reconstructed the similarities and differences between military recruitment and employment systems in Asia and Europe from the sixteenth century onwards. Their comparative approach has made it possible to discover general historical patterns. In turn, these patterns suggest causal relationships which could, should, and no doubt will be the subject of more in-depth studies in the future.

Until now, military historians and labour historians inhabited separate worlds. Military historians were concerned with wars, military doctrines, arms technology, campaign logistics, and similar issues. For them, soldiers usually enter into the picture as the executors of commands, and, in the narrative of military historians, what decides the outcome of battles are the numbers, skills, weaponry and morale of the combatants. Labour historians by contrast regard soldiers above all as the oppressors of labour resistance, who sometimes – in revolutionary situations – change sides and join the workers. According to many labour historians, what soldiers do as soldiers is not “work” – since work is constructive, not destructive – but instead a kind of “anti-work”. The military are indeed conventionally excluded from “the labour force”, and therefore they are not counted in labour force statistics.

The idea that what soldiers do “cannot be work” is a moralistic prejudice, however. Work is the purposeful production of useful objects or services. Thus, work is a purposive activity, and work creates objects or services that are useful to the people for whom the work is done. That makes participation
in military activities just as much a labour process as any other, even if many civilians do not regard it as a “useful activity” and have no use for it.

Soldiers’ work can involve all kinds of different jobs. Of course, the subjugation and killing of people and the destruction of enemy positions are “core tasks”, but the military can also perform guard duties, dig ditches, look after the transport of goods and messages, and construct buildings, roads, canals, and dams. What most soldiers do in army life obviously differs from what labourers do in a factory, or nurses in a hospital. Yet, in real life, soldiers are workers just as much as labourers and nurses are. Significantly, the English word “mercenary” is derived from the Latin mercenarius, which literally meant no more than “a hireling”, that is, someone who is paid for his work (in Latin, merx = commodity).

In their team effort, the authors of this volume have made a great contribution to a new kind of historiography, one that integrates different subdisciplines, and incorporates local findings in a globally oriented approach. The readers of this book have in their hands a path-breaking collection of essays which, I am sure, will inspire historical research about military labour for many years to come.

*Marcel van der Linden*

*Amsterdam, March 2013*
Introduction

Understanding changes in military recruitment and employment worldwide

*Erik-Jan Zürcher*

For a long time, labour historians have not regarded the activities of soldiers as work. Work was defined as an activity yielding surplus value and the efforts of soldiers were seen as being essentially destructive rather than productive. This assumption that military work is necessarily destructive and does not produce surplus value is debatable for at least two reasons. The first is that soldiers everywhere spend far more time in barracks than on campaign and, while they are garrisoned, they have very often been employed as cheap labour in agriculture or in building works and road repair. Many of the greatest infrastructural works in countries as far apart as France and China – city walls, dikes, canals – would never have been realized except for the massive use of military manpower. Soldiers have frequently been employed in the wake of natural disasters, in which case their labour should be regarded as similar to that of nurses and ambulance drivers. The second, more profound reason is that, as Peter Way has argued, the end result of warfare, if successful, is that surplus value for states and their elites is created through territorial gain or economic advantage.¹

Whatever the merits of the argument, the result of the view that what a soldier does is not work has been that military labour has not become the object of research in the same way as the labour of, for instance, dockworkers, textile workers, miners, or agricultural workers.² One of the very first people to resist this approach was Jan Lucassen of the International Institute of Social History (IISH). As early as 1994, he considered the “proletarian experience” of mercenaries in early modern Europe.³ That was a pioneering effort, because it is only very recently that the topic of military labour has begun to receive attention from social historians. In 2003, Bruce

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¹ Following Marx, Peter Way closely identifies the growth of capitalism and the modern state with warfare, particularly, colonial warfare. See Way, “Klassenkrieg”.

² Chris Tilly and Charles Tilly express this point of view in their book *Work Under Capitalism*, p. 23: “To be sure, not all efforts qualify as work; purely destructive, expressive, or consumptive acts lie outside the bound; in so far as they reduce transferable use value, we might think of them as antiwork.”

³ Lucassen, “The Other Proletarians”, p. 185.
Scates published “The Price of War: Labour Historians Confront Military History”, in the Australian journal *Labour History*, and this journal has since continued to show an interest in the subject with the publications of Nathan Wise. However, the scope of the Australian publications had been limited in time and space (mainly the Australian volunteer army of the First World War). In 2006, German historical anthropologist Alf Lüdtke published a text with a broader comparative scope – “War as Work: Aspects of Soldiering in 20th Century War” – which was, however, as the title implies, limited to the recent past. In 2011, the journal *International Labor and Working-Class History* devoted a special feature to “Labor and the Military”, which contained six very interesting articles on the subject. The approach, however, is different from ours in that the military (or the army) and labour, both in the sense of work and in that of the workforce, are seen as two separate elements in the equation, the relation between which is studied, whereas in the context of *Fighting for a Living* questions are asked about military service itself as a form of labour. In our view, soldiers are not a separate category of people who sometimes fulfil the role of workers; they are workers.

Another recent initiative that indicates a growing interest in the subject was a conference at Duke University in April 2011 entitled “Beyond the Battlefield: The Labor of Military Service in Latin America and the Caribbean”, which treats some of the same issues in a regional context. But once more, the papers at this conference largely concentrated on the non-military, or at least non-martial, roles played by soldiers in the societies and economies of the region and thus seemed to understand labour as something essentially outside the core business of soldiering.

I became more and more aware of the degree to which a soldier’s life itself can be understood in terms of labour when I did empirical research in the 1990s on the everyday realities of Ottoman soldiers’ lives during the First World War. The paths of Jan Lucassen and myself converged and in 1999 we published “Conscription as Military Labour: The Historical Context”. Over the years, my specialist interest in the history of conscription in the Middle East convinced me that there was a need to pursue more wide-ranging

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4 Wise, “The Lost Labour Force”, “In Military Parlance, I Suppose We Were Mutineers’”.
5 One article that does strike at the heart of the discussions in *Fighting for a Living* is the contribution by Jennifer Mittelstadt, “The Army Is a Service, Not a Job”, in the special feature edited by Joshua B. Freeman and Geoffrey Field.
research into the circumstances which have produced starkly different systems of recruiting and employing soldiers in different parts of the globe, as well as to analyse the social and political implications that the different systems have had in a number of states and societies. When I moved to the IISH in 2008, this idea was received enthusiastically by the research department of the institute and, as a consequence, the project Fighting for a Living was started in 2009, of which this book is the result. It concentrated on land armies in Europe, the Middle East, India, and China in the period 1500-2000 because the project was limited explicitly to state armies in the context of advanced state formation. That means that important areas and categories were not included – Latin America, Africa and Australasia – but also non-state forces (guerrilla movements, slave or peasant rebel armies). That we also excluded the navy may be seen as a serious omission, but this is because we recognized that navies, which in many respects are very different from land armies in their skill levels, in their traditions, and in their recruitment, offer a hugely interesting field for comparative research on military labour in their own right. We have decided to leave that topic to a possible separate project.7

Of course, it might be argued that “the state” in a sense is a modern concept and that to use it to categorize pre-modern phenomena is anachronistic. Doubtless, neither the sixteenth-century Landsknecht nor the nineteenth-century Swiss mercenary8 would see himself as fighting for a “state”. They were members of corporate bodies whose identities were to a large extent formed in the field, and they were hired by kings. Early twentieth-century Ottoman soldiers certainly saw themselves as defending their ruler and their religion, but that does not have to prevent us, as twenty-first-century historians, from using the state as an analytical category, to distinguish the soldiers recruited by monarchs and republics (directly or indirectly) from guerrilla forces and rebel movements.

7 Such a project could build on the work done by maritime and labour historians in the mid-1990s, which has resulted in the volume of conference proceedings edited by Van Royen, Bruin, and Lucassen, Those Emblems of Hell? This book is not exclusively about navies, however. It is primarily about commercial shipping.
8 The term “mercenary” over time has acquired very negative connotations, especially since the advent of the nation-state, when defending the fatherland came to be denoted as both a duty and a privilege of citizens. Throughout this book, however, we use it without expressing any value judgement, simply to denote those soldiers who operated in a market in the sense that they had a choice of employers and engaged themselves at least formally on the basis of free will. This serves to distinguish them from those soldiers who were also paid for their services (and sometimes generously), but who did not operate under market conditions and had only one possible employer.
If we decide to regard the work of the military as labour, one legitimate question to ask is, of course, whether military labour is in any fundamental sense different from other forms of labour. One could argue that one aspect of military work is unique in that it explicitly transcends humankind’s greatest taboo: killing members of the same species. Even if soldiers spend far more time in barracks or on the march than in actual battles, the fact that the ultimate purpose of an army is to fight and kill makes it different – more so, certainly, than the fact that there is risk involved, as for most people in most societies exposure to risk has been the normal condition, be it from violence, starvation, childbirth, or contagious disease. But whatever its exceptionality, ultimately an army is built on the factors of capital and labour just like any other industry, and it is this that makes it possible to analyse the activities of the soldier as just another form of work.

Fighting for a Living has yielded twenty hugely interesting case studies covering four continents and five centuries and these are now presented in this study. The following is an attempt, based on the twenty draft chapters that the members of the research group have produced and the many thought-provoking discussions we have had, to construct a taxonomy of military labour relations in Europe and Asia over the previous five hundred years, to discern underlying patterns and make some suggestions about what kind of determinants influence the prevalence or demise of certain types of labour relations within the military.

Huge variations

On a phenomenological level, even when we limit ourselves to land armies in the service of the state, the variety of forms of military labour is almost endless but, to make meaningful comparisons possible, a basic classification has to be applied. The search for such a classification was high on the agenda of the research group of Fighting for a Living.

One way of grouping the different phenomena is that employed by John Lynn in his seminal work on the developments of European armies. Lynn distinguishes four basic “army styles”: the “feudal army”, the “aggregate contract army”, the “state commission army”, and the “conscript army”. Central to his thesis is the notion that, around 1650, the aggregate contract army, which Lynn describes as “a force cobbled together from a small number of state troops, the hiring of mercenary bands, and the incorporation of private labour just like any other industry, and it is this that makes it possible to analyse the activities of the soldier as just another form of work.

9 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West”.
armies raised by major aristocrats and put at the ruler’s service”;10 gave way to a recognizably different style, that of the state commission army. The state commission armies that came to dominate in Europe after 1650 were both more national in composition and more uniform, as well as much bigger than the mercenary armies had been. States took upon themselves more of the responsibility for clothing, feeding, and equipping the troops, something that, among other things, led to the invention of the uniform itself. However, in his recent work, Lynn has recognized that in some countries, such as the Dutch United Provinces with their small population but well-filled coffers, the mercenary remained very important after that date. In fact, the eighteenth century was the heyday of the seigneurial system, in which smaller German states hired out their regiments to richer, more powerful states in exchange for “subsidies”. As is well known, the British fought their wars in North America partly with Hessian and Hanoverian regiments acquired in exchange for subsidies.

Although the dividing line of 1650 has kept its validity, the exceptions show that army styles in fact rarely occur in a pure form. Like Max Weber’s bureaucracy, they are ideal types. In reality, our research shows that armies were composite bodies with different army styles coexisting at the same time. Mercenaries continued to play a role in the state commission armies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, even if they no longer dominated and, as Thomas Hippler shows, the army of the ancien régime also included conscripted soldiers long before the formal introduction of conscription during the French Revolution.

Lynn’s classification is both convincing and useful as an analytical tool, but it has to be recognized that it is based on European history only. Several “army styles” that have been extremely important in Asia and the Middle East in the early modern period and even later therefore are not included. The first to come to mind is that of the “slave army”. For a thousand years, from the early ninth century to the early nineteenth, mamluks or ghulams, soldiers who were bought as slaves by rulers outside their realm and regarded as their private possessions, were a prominent feature from Algiers to India. Regions as far apart as the steppes of Central Asia and Ethiopia exported soldier-slaves on a large scale. The janissaries of the Ottoman Empire clearly belonged to the same category, slave troops, although they were levied within the Ottoman domains and not bought abroad. The

10 Noted military historian John Lynn unfortunately had to withdraw from the project at an early stage, but he kindly supplied a written commentary that served as the basis for discussions in the Fighting for a Living working party. This description is taken from p. 2 of his commentary.
second style is that of the tribal forces, which were no longer an important feature of warfare in early modern Europe, but remained important to the Ottoman, Mogul, and Chinese Empires until their demise.

Naturally, a classification of army styles pertains to forms of military organization, and not to labour relations. The temptation is great to assume that the different army styles coincided with different forms of labour relation, but as the case studies in our project have shown, the two do not necessarily coincide. While in what we may perhaps broadly call “feudal” armies – that is to say, in armies raised by landlords from among their own retinue and dependent peasantry – one type of labour tributary relation seems to dominate (the one that we will call “tributary”), the studies show us that not only can two or more army styles coexist, in a single army style (for instance, a state commission army or a conscript army), different labour relations can coexist as well. In other words: a single type of army may contain very different types of labour relation. Following Lynn, Michael Sikora describes how the Prussian canton system was a “hybrid military organization” with a standing army consisting partly of foreigners (designated as mercenaries) and a militia within one structure. Virginia Aksan in her chapter gives a particularly rich example. In 1708, the military population of Damascus consisted of local janissaries or guards, imperial janissaries sent from Istanbul, mercenaries paid by the governor (who themselves seem to have been composed of Anatolian levends, Kurdish musketeers, and North Africans), and the timariot (or sipahi) cavalry – a mixture of forces that had been around since the early fifteenth century and “army styles” that had developed in the seventeenth. The French army of the Third Republic was on paper a conscript army, in which citizens exercised their right and duty to defend their fatherland, but like all nineteenth-century conscription systems, the French one enabled its more affluent citizens to pay for replacements, an opportunity they availed themselves of on a very large scale. As most of the people who were available as replacements were soldiers who had served their turn but because of their long service in the army had little chance of a job in civil society, the conscript army in fact consisted to a considerable degree of veteran professionals. The Italian case, studied by Marco Rovinello, reflects the same reality, but in an extreme form: the state was quite happy that the extra income from bourgeois “liberations” (exemptions) allowed it to recruit veterans to beef up the army and, accordingly, no fewer than forty-six articles of the 1854 regulations detailed “how enlisted people can be exonerated from service”. In the Netherlands, too, we see the same phenomenon of volunteers re-engaging as substitutes after the reintroduction of conscription in 1819-1828.
The studies in this book are about soldiers, not about officers. Everywhere and always, the officer corps was treated very differently from the rank and file and had its own set of labour relations. States have never been able to recruit or control armies on their own. They have always needed to rely on status groups (nobility, landowners, educated middle classes) for this, and mechanisms of negotiation rather than of coercion are typical of the relationship between the state and these status groups. The same seems to be true for cavalry forces, which only rarely seem to have been recruited through coercion.

We are faced with different army styles that succeed each other but in part also overlap, and we also note that within a single identifiable army style a variety of labour relations is possible. The twenty cases studied in the context of the project in total yield about a hundred different forms of labour relation. As I shall discuss below, there are several reasons for this, but one of them is that, in many places, smaller forces of “experts” coexisted with the mass of the main army: from the European Landsknechte and Albanian cavalry to the Ottoman and later Portuguese artillery experts in the Mogul army and the French officers of Mehmed Ali Pasha’s new Egyptian army, armies have always felt the need to employ high-skilled specialists for specific tasks. The seventeenth-century Swedish army of Gustavus Adolphus II offers a very good example of the coexistence of different army styles and labour relations within a single institution. In many ways the most modern army of its day, it rested on Europe’s oldest conscription system, but at the same time the Swedish king was one of the biggest employers of mercenaries in Europe with an army, only 12 per cent of which consisted of native Swedes.

Once we have learned to look at the different forms of military labour in terms of commonalities rather than differences, we then need to establish a taxonomy in which all the different forms of military employment that have occurred in the different areas over a period of five hundred years can find a place. For this we can have recourse to the basic threefold division of labour relations developed earlier in the IISH’s Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations 1500–2000: reciprocal labour, tributary labour, and commodified labour. Of course, one could argue that besides the three broad categories outlined (reciprocal, tributary, and commodified), volunteerism should figure as a fourth variant. There are several reasons why we prefer to avoid this. First of all, and except for individual cases, it is almost impossible to get accurate information about people’s motivations in joining the military. Representatives of the state and commanding officers may grossly misrepresent people’s mindset. Even if the soldiers themselves are literate and write about it in ego-documents, there
(on the basis of shared assumptions about obligations) is subsumed under reciprocal labour. Workers who are obliged by the polity (most often the state) to provide work are categorized as tributary labour. Their labour is owned by the polity. In the third category, commodified labour, labour power is acquired by the employer (the army, the state) in the marketplace.

Our research group has tried to place the different phenomena described in the case studies in the taxonomy and to use the result to help answer the following questions:

1. How can we explain the predominance of certain types of labour relations, and combinations of labour relations, in certain circumstances?
2. How can we explain the replacement of one dominant system by another?

It goes without saying that the taxonomy is a tool to make fruitful comparison possible and should not be forced onto historical phenomena as a straitjacket.

The very empirical richness that makes military labour such an attractive subject to a social historian means that it is as yet too early to give a definitive answer, but in this synthesis I should like to present some preliminary findings that have come out of the project. The aim is not to give a complete overview of the cases and their relevance, but to illustrate the main findings of the project with examples taken from the case studies in order to give a sense of what is possible with this kind of comparative approach, both in terms of testing the usefulness of the basic taxonomy (reciprocal/tributary/commodified) and in terms of finding determinants for the dominance of a particular system of army recruitment and employment, or the change from one system to another.
Reciprocal, tributary and commodified labour

To determine where a particular form of military labour should be placed in this taxonomy, we can look at the following variables:

– Income (wages or fees, high or low, coin or kind, regular/irregular);
– Duration of service (short-term contracts to lifelong employment); and
– Legal constraints (freedom to enter or leave the system, to change employers).

The reciprocal form of labour relations perhaps figures least in our studies. Nevertheless, we see references to the use of tribal forces by the Ming emperors in China and by the Ottoman sultans. The states of Hindustan often had recourse to Afghan tribal warriors. Whether the Eight Banners of Ch‘ing China, the original Manchu tribal forces, represented reciprocal or tributary labour seems debatable. Perhaps one was succeeded by the other as the Manchu tribal chiefs acquired their new status of Chinese emperor and old tribal allegiances were given a place in the Chinese imperial order. Local militias very often were also based on reciprocity: there was a generally recognized mutual obligation within closely knit communities to share the burden of defence. But when state, or “national”, armies were built by incorporating these militias into centralized structures commanded by professional officers, as we see in Ming China or ancien régime France, but also during the American War of Independence, militias evolved into a kind of primitive conscription system. The gradual transformation of militias that were primarily a form of reciprocal labour bound up in local duties to protect the community, into a form of permanent duty to the state, is traced by Sikora to early seventeenth-century Germany. The problem is that the term “militia” is really too all-embracing. Clearly for any analysis the terminology would need to be refined to make a clear distinction between militia systems in which the influence of local society dominates and those governed by the interests of the state. Frank Tallett describes how first France under Louis XIV and then many German states developed the militia system to create a trained manpower pool that could be drafted into the army as the need arose. In these systems, which culminated in the Prussian canton system, clearly a tributary rather than a reciprocal relationship dominates. The roots of modern conscription clearly lie in the militia system of France, which already used a form of conscription with the attendant mechanisms of a draft and exemptions. On the other hand we can also argue that, at the lowest level of early conscription systems like those of seventeenth-century Sweden or eighteenth-century Russia,
the fact that the local village community, which was charged with delivering recruits under the supervision of the landed nobility, spread out the burden of conscription in much the same way as it shared out the use of common lands or the obligation of agricultural labour means that a degree of reciprocity – an equal sharing of burdens and benefits within the community – was involved. As Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter notes, at least until the codification of recruitment rules in 1831, the practices of peasants and local landlords determined the recruitment process in Russia. We can also note that followers of military leaders who themselves had a contractual relationship with the court or the state were tied to these leaders through bonds of kinship or patronage and that because of this their labour relations with their commanders were of a reciprocal nature even if this relationship was itself part of a larger system in which other types of labour relation (the free commodified labour of the mercenary) dominated. The Scottish mercenaries quite often seem to fall into this category, but, as Herman Amersfoort notes, Swiss mercenaries in early modern Europe often had kinship ties with their recruiters as well. As all of these examples demonstrate, reciprocity should not be confused with equality.

The large majority of military labour relations and recruitment practices surveyed in our project fall into one of the other two categories of the IISH Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations: tributary or commodified. Tributary labour occurs when the official position of the state is that serving in the military is an obligation that can be legally imposed and that is essentially interchangeable with the categories of tax and corvée – other obligations imposed by the state. This concept is usually well understood by the populations as is evident from the name given in France to conscription – the “blood tax”. The precise form that the tributary labour relationship takes can vary from legal enslavement (as in the Ottoman devşirme) to levies for specific campaigns, hereditary obligations (as in the case of the Ming where households were obliged to provide one member of the household for military service instead of corvée or tax obligations) and early and modern forms of conscription. In levies and early forms of conscription the obligation is typically imposed on a community (the “People's Stalwarts” of the Ming or the peasants of the Russian mir) while in modern conscription systems it is essentially an individual duty incumbent on the citizen. Tributary and reciprocal forms intermingle in the case of tribes that have a tributary relationship with, for instance, the Mogul, Ottoman or Ming Empire, but that mobilize their own tribal warriors on the basis of reciprocity.
The second quite common category is that of commodified labour. This seems to be the category into which both the aggregate contract army and the state commission army of Lynn's classification fall. Typical for these categories is that there is a contractual relationship for a limited time between the court or state on the one hand and the military on the other. Both the modern volunteer army (like the all-volunteer force of the United States studied by Beth Bailey) and the contractors operating in Iraq or Afghanistan, on whom Yelda Kaya reports, fall into this category as well.

A complicating factor is that different types of labour relationships sometimes figure on different levels of a single system. In analogy to food chains or commodity chains, one could perhaps speak about “recruitment chains”. An early modern European state may contract a mercenary colonel, who will then contract with officers, often from the nobility, who will bring to the army peasants from their feudal estates, who have a tributary relationship with their lord. The fact that early modern states, whether European, Middle Eastern, or Indian, as a rule relied on the landlords or notables to execute levies on a local level opened the door to all kinds of combinations of reciprocal and tributary systems, with the local notables and officials sometimes becoming military contractors. In the Ottoman army of the nineteenth century and right up until the First World War, Kurdish tribal chiefs were given officer rank and placed in the army hierarchy, but it proved impossible to impose regular army discipline on the Kurdish units commanded by these officers, because the rank and file recognized only tribal allegiance, not the hierarchy of the army. Theirs was a reciprocal mini-system within a tributary (because conscription-based) whole of the Ottoman army, with free commodified labour (the officers) at the top. A particularly complex case is that of the Soldatenhandel discussed by Tallett and Lynn. The soldiers hired out by, for instance, the state of Hesse-Cassel to the British crown, were hired and had no interest in the British cause, and in that sense and on that level they were mercenaries; but, one level down, they had in most cases been recruited by their own state through a form of coercion, be it a cantonal militia system or impressment. If they were “volunteers”, it was often in the form of indentured labour to pay off family debts. Robert Johnson gives the example of the native soldiers of the East India Company Army, who enlisted as volunteers, but who at the same time were offered to the army by the heads of their families, who expected these family members to serve out of tradition (and undoubtedly to add to the family income or at least save having to feed an extra mouth). This is a case of a commodified labour relation on top of a tributary or possibly even reciprocal one.
In order to create a basis for comparative analysis of all these forms of military labour relations, we need to find a common language to describe the phenomena, one that is not bound up exclusively in the historical development of one of the regions studied. In other words: rather than busy ourselves overmuch with the question of whether the timar system of the Ottoman Empire or the mansabdari system in Mogul India is a form of feudalism (which is, after all, a term from European social history), we should recognize that for hundreds of years states have been in need of a form of military service in which soldiers, mostly relatively expensive mounted warriors, were remunerated with land or the usufruct of land in exchange for exclusive service to one court or state.

Pay and labour relations

The question of pay does not in itself determine in which category (tributary or commodified) the different forms of military labour should be placed, although it can be an indicator: the porters recruited by the Ch’ing army from native tribes were not paid when they carried foodstuffs for their chieftain, because their work was considered corvée, but they were paid when employed directly by the state, so the very same work was tributary in one context and commodified in the other. It is true that defining military service as a duty analogous to the payment of taxes allows the state to escape the need to compete in the labour market and therefore to offer competitive wages, but most troops in tributary systems were in fact paid. The Chinese Empire, for example, did pay its garrison troops during the Ming era, even if these troops were made up of members of hereditary military households that were obliged to produce soldiers, and the Ottomans paid their janissary troops handsomely, even if legally they were the sultan’s slaves and the members of the corps had originally been levied as a form of tax-in-kind in Christian Balkan villages.

On the other hand, mercenaries and state-commissioned armies – examples of commodified labour – were often paid badly. Mercenaries could be compensated by giving them the right to pillage (about which more later) but once armies grew in size and permanence (something that seems to have happened in China five hundred years before it happened in seventeenth-century Europe), states were forced to allow soldiers to pay their way (and earn a living), either by doing non-military labour for the state (road repair being a popular option all over the world) or by producing goods for the market. Otherwise, these mass armies would simply have been
unaffordable. Here the Russian example is very clear. The soldiers of the 
Russian army were nominally full-time soldiers, but they were allowed to 
do productive work and even benefit from their own workshops and farms 
while they were garrisoned. The tributary labour of the soldiers thus became 
partly commodified. Standing armies, such as state-commissioned armies 
in early modern Europe, the Ottoman janissary garrisons, or the military 
households of the Ming, could (and in fact had to) reduce their costs by 
allowing soldiers to become part-time producers. The garrison troops of the 
Ming military households spent most of their time in agricultural labour, 
not on military duties and half of the grain they raised in the fields had to 
be handed over to the local garrison to cover the expenses of the troops. 
Janissaries very often became co-owners of shops in the bazaar in cities 
such as Istanbul, Damascus, Aleppo, or Cairo and, as Gilles Veinstein notes, 
this was not some form of “degeneration” of the corps in the seventeenth or 
eighteenth century: it had always been part of the system. Problems arose 
only when the janissaries became primarily involved in non-military trades. 

If it is true that many soldiers in standing armies were part-time agriculturalists or artisans, the reverse is also true: peasants and artisans could become part-time or short-term soldiers. Dirk Kolff in his description of the north Indian labour market makes the point that we should primarily look at soldiering as part of the survival strategy of families and village communities. Peasants could turn into weavers or soldiers as the opportunity arose, and making use of the full range of opportunities was a sensible living strategy for families. For this reason, the Hindustani villagers equipped themselves with firearms on a massive scale, much as they would acquire or make looms or hoes. It is very likely that a similar logic holds true for the communities that delivered levends to the Ottoman army and for villages in south-western Germany that provided Landsknechte. Spreading the risk is an essential strategy for peasant communities, and seasonal soldiering could compensate for a bad harvest.

Forms of remuneration

Basically, the state has three options in the way it remunerates its soldiers: through the apportioning or the usufruct of land; through cash payment or payment in moveable goods; or through granting rights, notably the right to pillage. The granting of land or usufruct was always a popular option for cash-strapped states. It had clear advantages for societies with low levels of monetization, and it seems to have been the preferred option for relatively
expensive cavalry forces and commanding officers in medieval Europe as well as in India and the Middle East in the early modern period. Generally the rank and file were paid in cash or kind, but both in Europe (Cossacks, Croats on the Austrian military border) and in China (Banner troops) we see the phenomenon of troops settled on the borders as colonists, who were given land in the area they settled.

Both copper and silver played an important role in systems based on cash payments. Where soldiers were paid on a weekly or monthly basis, copper coin seems to have been used frequently, while silver was preferred when larger sums were involved, as for signing bonuses or payments of arrears. In the Chinese army, soldiers were paid in copper when in their garrisons, but in silver when on campaign, as carrying large amounts of copper coin would have been too burdensome.

Generally, cash payment became more widespread after the flow of silver from the Spanish Americas started, but it was primarily an attractive option for states with a high degree of centralization and huge powers of extraction (the Chinese Empire being in a class of its own in this respect) or states with highly developed credit and banking systems like the Italian city-states, the Dutch Republic, or Britain. Spain and Japan were in an exceptional position in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, because their direct access to rich silver stocks gave them a unique ability to raise troops for cash. For most early modern European states, however, but also for the Ottoman Empire, raising the cash for the aggregate contract armies of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and for the expanding armies of the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was, of course, notoriously difficult. One way of overcoming the problem was by allowing soldiers to raise their income by granting them the right to pillage. As both Lynn and Tallett show, for the mercenaries in the armies of the Thirty Years War this source of income was far more important than their nominal wage, and Tallett clearly has a point when he says that this makes the soldier less a wage-earner than a petty entrepreneur. While this kind of remuneration seems to have lost its importance in Europe from the mid-seventeenth century onwards as states grew stronger and increased their ability to raise taxes (as Charles Tilly has famously argued), it continued in other areas. As Mehmet Beşikçi shows, the Ottoman Empire in 1914 gave volunteer bands the right to collect “donations” from the local population, acting as a kind of de facto tax collector.

In addition to regular pay, there are many examples of bonus and incentive systems in the form of rewards for valour in battle, for the number of enemies killed, for signing up, or for extending one’s service. Aksan quotes
the memoirs of an Ottoman soldier of the early nineteenth century, who confesses to cutting off the heads of unsuspecting Christian villagers with the intention of handing them in as proof of the number of enemies he had killed. When he then meets a company of janissaries, the first thing they do is to rob him of his heads. The incentive, both for him and for the janissaries, is not bloodthirstiness or fanaticism, but simple material gain – the heads represent a source of extra income in the form of a bonus. Signing bonuses were a double-edged sword for the recruiters, however. On the one hand, the immediate attraction of an up-front payment in cash was hard to resist for many poor peasants or casual labourers in the towns, so they were very effective. On the other hand, the cash in hand gave recruits the means of survival (albeit for a limited period), and deserting immediately after the receipt of the bonus seems to have been a common strategy for recruits the world over. Signing bonuses were expensive for the state or its recruiters and, as Sikora points out, imposing military service as a duty (in other words, turning it into tributary labour), for instance, in the form of state-controlled militias, saved a great deal of money.

Perhaps a distinction should be made between the right granted to soldiers to live off the land and exact “contributions” from the population, especially in enemy territory, which can be regarded as a form of regular income, and the right to pillage, for instance after the taking of a town, which, because of its unpredictable nature, can more properly be regarded as a bonus or incentive.

Throughout the period studied there seem to have been huge differences in remuneration between officers and troops, in both Europe and Asia, but also between the well-trained professionals that were hired for their expertise (and who on the whole were much smaller in number) and large masses of peasant soldiers with only basic skills. Officers were not only much better remunerated, either in land/usufruct or cash, but in many cases (European and Indian mercenaries seem to be prime examples) officers also functioned as recruiters and were regarded, as Amersfoort says, as “owners” of their regiments. This allowed them to run their units as private enterprises and turn military service into a very profitable business. As Amersfoort shows, getting rid of these intermediaries, who controlled the military labour market, was a strong argument in favour of the establishment of cadre-militia or conscript armies in the nineteenth century.

The professional mercenaries of early modern Europe, the Household Men of Ming China, and the Ottoman janissaries, with their strong corporate identity and hierarchy based on skill and experience, can perhaps best be compared to guild members and artisans. Landsknechte regarded
their units as independent corporations and as a rule even elected their own officers without interference from any state. The soldiers of the mass armies raised in eighteenth-century France or Prussia, the levies of the Ottoman Empire, the garrison troops of the Ming, or the Green Standard forces of the Ch’ing can be more usefully compared with unskilled labour. The evidence seems to show that pay levels for this type of soldier were fairly consistent with wages being paid at the lower end of the civilian labour market, in both Europe and Asia. Where soldiers were recruited in the labour market, the army generally seems to have been an employer of last resort, as shown by the fact that recruitment generally was easier in times of economic crisis, or in the seasons with little agricultural work, when it was hard to find other jobs. The trump card of armies no doubt was the fact that, apart from the basic wage, they offered a degree of security in the form of board and lodging, however dismal it may have been.

When discussing the remuneration of soldiers it is important to include the long-term effects as well as the immediate reward. Some of the most valuable elements of remuneration may be in the shape of future rewards such as upward social mobility, land, pensions or (in the modern state) insurance, and educational opportunities for the soldiers themselves or their children. This is true of civilian labour as well, of course, but armies have often pioneered this kind of remuneration scheme. Especially in the late twentieth century the cost of the non-pay elements in the total remuneration of soldiers became very considerable. As Kaya writes (citing James Jay Carafano), in the US Army it doubles the cost of employing a soldier.

**The duration of military service**

When we look at the practices in Europe and Asia in the past five hundred years, the basic distinction we see in the term of service is that between long-term and short-term. Long-term service seems to be associated with reciprocal and tributary labour relations. The most extreme form is, of course, military service that is in principle an engagement for the rest of a person’s life, as was the case with the Ottoman janissaries, mamluks, sipahis and *mansabdar*s, Ming household troops, and Ch’ing Eight Banner forces. Obligations within (reciprocal) tribal systems are also generally of a lifelong nature.

Still long-term, although not lifelong, was the obligation that came with militia and canton systems and more generally, with the state commission armies in Europe and, for instance, the Green Standard Army of the Ch’ing.
In the modern all-volunteer army, military service is defined as a career and therefore fundamentally seen as a long-term engagement but, as it is contract-based, the labour relation cannot be defined as tributary and long-term service cannot be enforced.

At the opposite side of the spectrum we find the short-term contracts of mercenaries, tribal auxiliaries, and levies such as the Ottoman levends. Sometimes these were hired for a single campaign season, but more generally the – often implicit rather than explicit – term of contract seems to have been until the end of the present conflict or emergency.

One system of recruitment moved from long-term to short-term over time: conscription. In the older (seventeenth- and eighteenth-century) conscription systems, such as the Russian and the Swedish, service was for an indefinite term, which in practice usually meant twenty-five to thirty years. In the modern conscription systems introduced in the nineteenth century the term of service was much more limited and in general was lowered significantly over the course of the century. Hence, the mass conscript armies of the century between 1870 and 1970, with their two- to three-year service, formed a halfway house between the lifelong soldier and the soldier engaged for one single campaign that is so characteristic of earlier times. It has to be remembered, however, that all conscript armies have been built around a core of long-term professionals.

Free or unfree? Legal constraints

The problem with determining whether soldiers in the different armies can be classified as free or unfree labour is complex. Soldiers serving within a system of reciprocal obligations must at all times count as unfree (as reneging on the communal obligation usually carries a very high social cost), but very few soldiers in history have been legally completely free actors in the sense that they could terminate or change their employment without being subject to prosecution under criminal law. In almost every country, joining the army altered people’s legal status. In most cases this restricted their freedom, but in the case of Russia the opposite was true: conscription turned serfs into free men (and their wives into free women), albeit free men subject to military discipline. As in many other fields, the prototypical Marxian free worker historically seems to have been a quite exceptional phenomenon in the world of the military. In his essay “Who Are the Workers?”, Marcel van der Linden has argued that “there is an almost endless variety of producers in capitalism, and the intermediate forms
between the different categories are fluid rather than sharply defined.”  

He gives examples of slaves working voluntarily for wages part of their time, and he also points out that “free” wage-labourers have at times been locked up by their employers, a practice that in countries such as China or India is still a regular occurrence. Our research seems to confirm the truth of this statement.

Members of aggregate contract armies undoubtedly come closest to the status of free worker. In theory they were free to choose their employer, which gave them some negotiating power, and their contracts were of limited duration, although, as James Miller notes, the actual term of service often seems to have been unrecorded. The premise seems to have been that soldiers served as long as hostilities required their presence. But even the mercenaries were subject to articles of war once they had signed up and received their bonus. According to a decree of December 1789 quoted by Hippler, the soldiers of the French revolutionary army would lose their civic rights for the duration of their (voluntary) service and even the all-volunteer force of the United States, which, according to Bailey, in the 1970s explicitly sought to redefine military service from a citizen’s obligation to the state to just another form of labour, comparable to work in services or industry, subjected its soldiers to a legal regime distinct from the civilian code. The criminalization of breach of contract seems to be an enduring characteristic of military employment that sets it apart from most civilian labour relations.

Appearances can be deceptive: the Ottoman janissaries were technically possessions of their sultan, but had accumulated traditional rights, which they guarded jealously, much like a guild. Many of the janissary mutinies that occurred from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries started as “industrial actions” or pay disputes, when they interpreted government measures as unjustly transgressing on their acquired rights.  

On the other hand, soldiers who signed up of their own accord, as free men, for an eighteenth-century state commission army were faced with draconian regulations and frequent physical abuse, which in armies such as the Prussian could be quite as bad as what plantation slaves had to face.

When judging conditions of service, whether in terms of pay or in terms of the opposition free/unfree, we should always take into account contemporary conditions in society at large. Conditions of service that may seem unfair or even atrocious in our eyes may have looked very different to a Scottish day labourer, a Russian serf, or a Hindustani peasant. The status

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12 Van der Linden, “Who Are the Workers?”

13 See Stremmelaar, “Justice and Revenge in the Ottoman Rebellion of 1703”.

of free actor in the labour market, as enjoyed by a European mercenary or a Rajput warrior, historically is the exception rather than the rule, and that is true for the military profession just as much as for society at large.

**Determinants: general considerations**

Hopefully, the preceding paragraphs have shown that it is possible to classify the different forms of military labour by looking at their shared characteristics and to place them in a taxonomy based on a distinction between reciprocal, tributary, and commodified labour. Taking into account the variables of remuneration, term of service, and legal status, we can try to gauge which factors influence the choice for a particular form of military employment on the part of the state: in other words, which were the most important determinants?

All forms of military recruitment and labour represent different solutions to shared problems. To find the determinants, we first have to look at the basic problems and aspirations of the people and the state. As a rule, people like to be left alone. Outside the ruling elite, they are fully occupied by their daily concerns to make a living, to preserve their health, to protect their children, and, in the more dynamic societies, also to gain advancement or amass wealth. They are prepared to defend their homes and families and throughout recorded history they have also shown themselves ready to defend the larger community of which they perceive themselves to be a part: the village, the town, or the tribe. Indeed, in some societies (those of border and highland Scotland, of Albania, and of the Central Asian steppes, for instance), small-scale local armed conflict was the normal state of things, and it is no coincidence that these societies produced highly sought-after soldiers. Of course, history is also riddled with instances in which people have united in much larger, more anonymous groups to fight in a “cause”: the crusades in medieval Europe, rebellions such as those of the Celalis in the early seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire or the Tai Pings in nineteenth-century China. Sometimes hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people have taken part in these armed movements, but two characteristics distinguish these movements from the kind of organized violence we discuss in our project: they are generally short-lived (even the longest lasting only about fifteen years, most being much shorter) and at least at the start spontaneous. In our project we deal with military systems established by states for the longer term.
States therefore have a problem: it is very difficult to get people to devote themselves exclusively or predominantly, on a permanent basis, to fighting, killing, and dying in the service of distant entities such as courts or abstract notions such as the state or the nation. Yet this is exactly what princes and states need. Faced with the need to raise soldiers, states have a basic choice between two options. To put it in Gramscian terms they can either coerce people into serving or convince them to do so through the establishment of a hegemonic cultural code, in other words, to create a measure of consent. Both coercion and consent have obvious advantages and disadvantages, which are well known from the debates about slavery versus wage labour. At first sight the hiring of professionals, in the form of both mercenaries and standing armies, may seem the more expensive option, because it makes high demands on the state’s ability to pay and often forces the state to compete with other employers in the labour market, but at least mercenaries (but also levies) have the huge advantage that they can be contracted for a single campaign season or emergency only and that they can be disbanded thereafter. This seems to have been the practice in India and Europe as early as the fourteenth century, but also in the Middle East from the seventeenth century onwards. Coercion may seem cheap, but it is more expensive than it appears at first sight, because of the need for forceful recruitment and constant supervision after soldiers have been recruited. Like slaves, coerced soldiers may also be less motivated or “productive” than those who have joined the colours of their own free will. In the Ottoman army in the First World War, conscripted Arab soldiers were sometimes marched to the front in chains and this army had the highest proportion of deserters by far of all armies engaged in the war.

On the other hand, coercion allows the state to escape the need to compete in the labour market. It does not have to entice people to become soldiers with signing bonuses nor does it have to pay wages in conformity with the market. Ultimately, what is the decisive factor may not be cost in itself, but value for money or, in other words, cost-effectiveness. It is extremely difficult to introduce the concept of “productivity” into discussions on military labour. After all, what is a soldier’s productivity when he is engaged in his core business of fighting and killing? Is it the measure of destruction he manages to inflict on the enemy? Or is it the degree to which his activities help to enlarge the tax base of the state through conquests, or further the economic interests of the elites that control the state? In economics, productivity is the total production divided by the necessary

14 Fenoaltea, “Slavery and Supervision in Comparative Perspective”.
workforce, so we not only have to take into account the end result of military campaigns, but also the size of the armed force needed to achieve the result. Although an interesting topic, this issue is too complicated to deal with in the context of this synthesis or even the Fighting for a Living project. In this context it is perhaps best to see cost-effectiveness as the lowest expenditure that would still give a state good prospects of success on the battlefield.

Whatever the definition, it seems to be the case that courts and states historically are looking for the army that is most effective on the battlefield at the lowest possible cost (that even this lowest possible cost can still be crippling to state and society alike is another matter). However, there can be a huge difference between the immediate costs and the long-term financial burden: both early seventeenth-century mercenaries and early twenty-first-century contractors have been expensive in the short run, but they were and are easily dismissed at the end of the conflict, while standing state commission armies were a continuous drain on the treasury and the modern all-volunteer forces bring with them huge long-term obligations to the soldiers and their families.

The choice made by different states at different times is influenced by many more factors than economic or financial ones alone, however. If maintaining a monopoly of violence, or, to put it more realistically, getting as close as it can to a monopoly of violence, is a central function of the state, the dilemma faced by states that create a powerful military they may not be able to control, and that may threaten the established order, is a very real one. This is just as true for the state that recruits highly specialized military experts (like the mamluks of the Middle East or the Turks and Afghans of Hindustan) as for the one that, through conscription, recruits mass armies from a population that is at the same time denied access to civil rights (as in the cases of Prussia and Russia). Apart from this kind of political consideration, ideological considerations or cultural prejudices may play a part. The Ottoman decision to exclude non-Muslim citizens from the conscription system (a decision that cost them up to 40 per cent of their manpower pool before 1878 and at least 20 per cent thereafter) is a case in point, but so is the commitment to general conscription of the late nineteenth-century French Republic and the Kingdom of Italy, which was informed by notions of patriotism and nation-building. As Jörn Leonhard shows, the rejection of conscription in Great Britain was influenced both by the Whig interpretation of history, which saw large standing armies as instruments of tyranny and essentially un-British, and by an idealized view of the army as representing traditional country values, with aristocratic officers and a sturdy peasantry for soldiers. This shifted toward the end of the nineteenth century with a changing image of the imperial military and
an intensified perception of continental models of the nation-in-arms—still it needed the new realities of the First World War to introduce general conscription in Britain.

Many states held strong opinions about which populations produced good soldiers, and these ideas were not without foundation. As Miller writes, one factor that made soldiering attractive for Scotsmen and made Scotsmen attractive as soldiers was the long tradition in the country of military training through the state-imposed tradition of regular weapons training shows. In addition, the internecine small-scale warfare among the Scottish nobles and clans formed a permanent training ground for future soldiers. The same is true for the Albanians, who gained a reputation as warriors both in early modern Europe and in the Middle East. The Albanian Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt turned to conscripting the fellahs of the Nile valley into his army only when he had no other options left, partly because the docile peasant population of Egypt was regarded as completely devoid of martial qualities. In the end, it turned out that with extreme coercion and professional leadership these peasants could be made into a very effective army, but as Khaled Fahmy shows, the population continued to see military service as a kind of corvée and never developed a “military ethos”.

The exemption and substitution systems that were introduced into all countries parallel to the introduction of modern conscription were often motivated by economic and ideological concerns. On the one hand, there was the fear that conscripting the most economically productive males (white-collar workers, people with education) would damage the economy, as the French debates charted by Hippler show. In the Kingdom of the Netherlands even wage-earners were exempted. On the other hand, the tendency of regimes as far apart as the Dutch, the Russians, and the Ottomans to exempt clerical students shows a concern with maintaining the ideological bases of the social order. In Germany, Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) feared that the arming of the workers would constitute a permanent danger for the new nation-state.

Universal patterns

When surveying the different case studies in our project, we are struck by a number of characteristics that seem to be almost universal. One is, as noted before, that we always see different types of army style, and different

forms of recruitment and labour relations, coexisting. One telling example is that of the Delhi sultanate described by Kaushik Roy: its army consisted of mercenaries, retainers of tributary chieftains, slave soldiers, and troops maintained by holders of fiefs. Change from one army style to another may be sudden, but is rarely absolute (the transition of the US Army from conscription to an all-volunteer force in 1973, followed by similar transitions in most NATO countries, seems to be the exception that confirms the rule). While it is true that war nearly always brings with it some degree of change, the introduction of new types of armed forces triggered by developments in war very often takes place side by side with the continued existence of older forces, which remain important even if they are obsolete and have lost their credibility on the battlefield. The Ottomans kept their sipahi forces in existence for at least two centuries after their military usefulness had ended, and the Chinese Empire seems to have been equally conservative, as is shown by the example of the Eight Banners of the Chi'ing, who, according to Christine Moll-Murata and Ulrich Theobald, were militarily effective until about 1680, but were kept in existence until 1912 and consumed about a fifth of state revenues.

It is not hard to see why. Military corps were, after all, in an excellent position to defend their vested interests, especially when garrisoned in major cities or the capital. This is one reason why both the Ming and the Ottomans, when they started hiring, or levying, mercenary troops, left their obsolete formations (garrison troops and household troops in the case of the Ming, sipahis and janissaries in that of the Ottomans) in place. Another, almost inverse reason, also evident in both these cases, seems to be that a military system, even when obsolete on the battlefield, can still be an important element of control inside the country, not just in terms of law and order, but also in ideological terms. Military elites often exemplified the existing social order. The concept of military households was important to the Ming as a vital element in its social order, just as the concept of a “military class” (askeri) was to that of the Ottomans. Moll-Murata and Theobald, basing themselves on the work of Mark Elliott, say that the militarily useless Eight Banners were kept in being and paid by the state primarily because they served “the display of the presence of the ruling elite in the capital and in the provincial garrisons.” The continued reliance of the French state on its nobility for the recruiting and officering of its army even after that nobility had lost its autonomy can be interpreted in the same sense.

Hereditary military labour has been judged very differently in different states and societies. On the one extreme, we find the Ming Empire, which originally imposed hereditary military service on a section of the popula-
tion. On the other, we find the Egyptian mamluks and Ottomans, who (at least in theory) explicitly rejected the idea that sons should follow their fathers in the military profession. In both cases the injunction was closely linked to ideas about a stable social order, as hereditary service under the Ming was only one part of a rigid division of society into hereditary professions, while in the Middle East exclusion of offspring from the military elite was seen as a way to buttress a social order with a military elite (askeri) that was theoretically completely separated from the mass of the ruled in a way that is a perfect illustration of Ernest Gellner’s famous description of the “agro-literate polity”.

Apart from the formal positions of states on hereditary service, for or against, hereditary elements often played a role in communities that traditionally provided mercenary soldiers, such as the Swiss, the Scots, the Rajputs, the Gurkhas, or the “House Men” of the Ming. As Roy says for India, “at times military service defined the identity of various communities”. Indeed, in early modern aggregate contract armies in Europe children often accompanied their fathers (and mothers) on campaign, and being a member of a family with military experience was considered an advantage. Officers the world over mostly came from “military” families, although Europe from medieval times to the twentieth century seems to have been unique in the degree to which performing military service was considered the noble occupation par excellence and a hallmark of noble status. The Rajputs display the same characteristics, but in the Indian context their case seems to have been rather exceptional.

What is very clear is that there is no teleological sequence. There is no single process of armies progressing from one stage to another on some developmental or modernization path. Because of the strong ideological resistance in the Anglo-Saxon world to the idea of conscription, which was closely identified with tyranny, this system, which became universal in nineteenth-century Europe, was not introduced in Britain until a century later and then only temporarily. A century later again, the reduction of the armed forces of industrialized countries after the end of the Cold War, in combination with a glut of arms and officers caused in part by the end of the Warsaw Pact and in part by the end of apartheid in South Africa, led to a resurgence of mercenary forces in the form of “contractors” such as Blackwater as a major component in military campaigns of NATO countries. Only decades before, when mercenaries played a role only in post-colonial conflicts in Africa, the resurgence of a form of military labour that had been in decline since the seventeenth century was not predicted by anyone. Nevertheless, although there is no single path of development,
in some periods certain systems clearly come to dominate while others fade. As Lynn has noted, the mercenary did not disappear after 1650, but in Europe the state commission army did become the norm. In the Middle East the janissaries remained in existence until 1826, but irregular levies had become the mainstay of the army by the eighteenth century. After 1815, many restoration regimes, like those in the Netherlands or Italy, rejected conscription as a revolutionary legacy, but in the decades thereafter the system became dominant throughout Europe and the Middle East. What were the factors determining these changes?

Now let us try to draw up a preliminary survey of those factors that act as determinants where military employment is concerned.

*Manpower and money*

The availability of people and of money seem to be the most important determinants. It is these two factors, the classic factors of labour and capital, that create the parameters within which choices can be made. In these choices political, ideological, and cultural considerations very often play a significant role.

Let us first look at demographics, at manpower. Both the Chinese and Indian experience is determined first and foremost by the availability of an enormous, and seemingly unlimited, manpower pool. This gave the Mogul Empire the chance to raise vast peasant armies and the Chinese Empire the opportunity to raise armies that were of a different order of magnitude altogether, when compared with European, South Asian, and Middle Eastern examples. As Roy notes, at the end of the sixteenth century the population of the Indian subcontinent was five times that of the Ottoman Empire, ten times that of France, and thirty times that of England. The Chinese manpower pool was clearly unique when looked at in a global comparative perspective, as it was almost as large as that of the subcontinent in 1600 (and became much bigger later on), but much more of this population fell under the central control of Beijing than was the case in India. As Bailey shows, the transition from a conscript army to an all-volunteer force in the United States was also very much the result of demographic development, i.e. the baby boom, which “translated into a flood of young men eligible for military service in the early 1960s”. Scotland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had a very small population, but – relative to its size – an abundance of surplus labour that was used to handling weapons. When population growth stagnated in the eighteenth century, the recruitment of Scots by the British Army became a problem. The manpower demands of the army in the nineteenth century meant that the British had to start
recruiting in the urban centres of England, rather than in the countryside, in spite of strong objections to the enlisting of urban riff-raff in the army. For the Dutch, as Amersfoort shows, the small population in combination with the drying up of foreign recruitment sources meant that a return to conscription became inevitable after 1813. This drying up was due to the expansion of the textile industry in Switzerland, which created attractive alternatives to the traditional practice of hiring oneself out as a soldier. Conversely, according to Zhao Zhongnan and Suzuki Tadashi (cited by David M. Robinson in this volume), the manpower pool available to the Ming army increased considerably when civilian farmers and military household soldiers lost their land to increasingly powerful landlords in the late sixteenth century, and this allowed the state to recruit on a large scale.

The second factor is money. Where labour markets were tight, states essentially had only two ways to strengthen their armies: either through more coercion (isolating groups of people from the labour market), which also carries a cost, or through improving the position of the army in the labour market by offering higher wages or other benefits. Coercion is much in evidence, and here too we see recurrent patterns in a number of cases. The “press”, or similar systems, although not used as frequently and brutally as in the case of the navy, was used by British, German, and Ottoman authorities to get rid of social undesirables, which usually meant vagrants, beggars, and more generally men without property, protection, or regular work. Miller gives a telling example from 1630, when the Privy Council of Scotland ordered “all beggars, vagabonds, and masterless men with no lawful trade or means of livelihood” to enlist. In 1769 an Ottoman chronicler noted that provincial governors recruited thieves and the homeless. In Russia, communities and landlords used conscription to send off criminals, troublemakers, drunkards and men deemed disobedient, unruly or simply lazy. It is hardly surprising that armies time and again complained about the quality of the personnel that was provided to them in this way. As Johnson shows, this meant that well-trained native troops in the East India Company Army, who were essentially volunteers, were considered much better than the soldiers shipped out from the mother country.

Paying higher wages was a difficult option for the state. Financing the troops was a continuous problem for most states, certainly in Europe and the Middle East. This is true as much for the Habsburgs during the Thirty Years War, who became dependent on a new breed of general contractors that provided credit as well as an army, as it was for France in the late seventeenth century or the Ottomans in the nineteenth. As Tallett notes, states such as Prussia in the eighteenth century – those which maintained
a disproportionately large army compared to population size and had under-commercialized economies – needed a high degree of coercion to fill their ranks. The Dutch Republic was on the opposite side of the spectrum. In spite of its small population, which was averse to military service because there were more profitable opportunities in the labour market, the Dutch managed to raise sizeable aggregate contract armies because of their financial strength and advanced banking system. The Chinese Empire, when united under the Ming and Ch’ing dynasties, was at the opposite side of the spectrum from Prussia in a different way. Its huge population in combination with its ability to extract and import such enormous amounts of silver and grain that it could provide for its armies in spite of their huge size (between five and ten times that of the biggest European armies) meant that it needed relatively little coercion. Roy draws attention to the fact that, because of their huge manpower pool, neither India nor China has ever had to introduce conscription. France, on the other hand, did. After the restoration of 1814, conscription was abolished, as it was under nearly all other restoration regimes as a detested revolutionary legacy, but according to Hippler the pay offered to soldiers was so low that only 3,500 recruits came forward, and in 1818 a form of compulsory military service was re-established. Conscription was seen as a cheap alternative to the pre-revolutionary state commission army and, faced with the choice between higher rewards to make the army more attractive as an employer (persuasion) and the imposition of a tributary labour relation (coercion), the French state opted for the latter.

**Technology**

As mentioned above, most states were constantly on the lookout for the best army at the lowest cost to the treasury. But the army had to be effective as well, which meant – and means – being technologically state-of-the-art and reliable. Many of the most far-reaching changes in army recruitment and employment were due to the desire to apply lessons learned in war (primarily through defeat) and to emulate more successful competitors. As Tallett has shown, this did not necessarily centre on new technologies (in the sense of hardware) but more often on that of “social technologies”, things such as new forms of discipline, training, and institutional structures. This seems to have been a decisive factor in the long Austro-Ottoman wars of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as well as in the success of relatively small European colonial forces all over Asia. Ultimately, this led to the adoption of Western-style discipline, with uniforms and drill, in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and China. That the change was not necessarily
always in the direction of technological innovation is demonstrated by the case of French revolutionary and Napoleonic armies, which replaced the perfectionist drill of the eighteenth-century professional armies with armies that were poorly trained and armed, but possessed overwhelming manpower, speed, and high morale.

Changes in military technology, financial constraints, and the size of the available labour pool undoubtedly were the most important factors determining the choice for a specific form of recruitment and military employment, with defeat in war acting as a catalyst, but other considerations also played a role.

**Politics**

Political considerations were always important, as balancing the need for a larger army with the need to maintain control over those who could provide it or finance it (in the early modern states) or the need to manufacture or maintain consent among the public (in modern states) has always been high on the agenda of those in power. As Charles Tilly has argued, the development of the modern state rested on its ability to offer protection and the benefits, or rent, of that protection to the interest groups that made the waging of war possible in the first place. The same large modern army that allowed a prince to be successful in fighting external wars and in maintaining a monopoly of violence at home risked delivering him into the hands of his creditors. High numbers of casualties or exorbitant expenditure bring with them the risk of loss of political support. One of the major reasons behind the widespread use of contractors by the US Army in Iraq and Afghanistan has been the way it lessens the state’s need to maintain public support for its policies.

**Ideological and cultural factors**

Ideological and cultural factors determining who should fight or should be excluded from the bearing of arms are also prominent. Conscription was so bound up with the revolutionary period in the eyes of the restoration regimes after 1815 that they preferred to fall back on state commission professional armies and militias (as Amersfoort shows for the Dutch case), while for the French Third Republic conscription as an expression of citizenship and as the supposed legacy of the great revolution became an issue of almost mythical proportions, as Hippler demonstrates. As noted before, the refusal of the Ottomans to conscript non-Muslims severely limited

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16 Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime".
their manpower base until 1909. Rovinello highlights a problem that was faced by many states: while in itself the Italian population after the wars of unification was more than ample to fulfil the manpower needs of the army, the Piedmontese army command had severe doubts about “diluting” the army with unreliable southerners. The same kind of doubts can be found in Britain and France, not so much in terms of regional preferences but in terms of a distrust of the urban proletariat, especially after the Paris Commune of 1871. The reservations of Moltke in this respect have been noted already. The Ottomans considered recruiting Christians and Jews bad for morale, and the Russians rejected Central Asians as unsuitable until 1916.

A change in the dominant ideological paradigm sometimes exerted powerful influence on recruitment practices, especially if it went hand in hand with economic or demographic change. It may have been true that sources for mercenary recruitment in Switzerland dried up primarily because of the expansion of the textile industry, but it was also true that the spread of enlightenment ideas about citizenship and the nation made soldiering for money a disreputable trade. And, while the baby boom certainly decreased the need for forced conscription in the United States in the 1970s and made volunteerism possible, the rise of neo-liberal free-market economists and politicians, who defined conscription as a “hidden tax” and who advocated recruitment through the labour market, was a decisive factor in forcing through the transition to a professional army.

Popular cooperation and resistance
The analysis thus far concentrates almost exclusively on the needs and actions of the state, but we should not, of course, envisage the people who were the objects of the state’s intervention as being merely passive; they had and have agency as well. As much as the state has a repertoire of options, the people also have a repertoire of options open to them. Of course, they can comply with the demands of the state, and this may simply be a form of acquiescence on the part of communities faced with the power of the state. On the other hand, compliance does not necessarily have to equal acquiescence. People can see the army as an opportunity structure, offering them chances of social advancement or of improving their living standards, the chance to escape issues at home including getting women pregnant, feuds, or crimes (as Johnson notes), or simply the possibility to travel and see more of the world than their own village or valley. Rovinello shows that this was a factor for Italian recruits in the nineteenth century. He also makes the point that the draft acquired a symbolic meaning as a rite of passage to adulthood. Being declared fit for the army was a “public certification of their
masculinity” (and, one might add, of their health). In the industrialized world of the twentieth century, young healthy males who had served their country in the army were seen as attractive workers, as they had been declared healthy (psychologically as well as physically) and had acquired discipline.

The fact that the state is in need of manpower to fill the ranks of its army also enables people to instrumentalize military service for their own ends. Communities that provided soldiers during levies often managed to get compensation in the form of tax breaks. The Cossacks of the Russian Empire are perhaps the most telling example of a community that managed to exchange its loyalty and military prowess for concessions in the form of autonomy, royal protection, and tax exemption. Another interesting form of “exchange” is the one that Beşikçi describes for the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, when prisoners were released in large numbers if they agreed to serve in labour battalions or in militia units.

There is evidence that, whether in Asia, the Middle East, or Europe, the army was rarely a popular employer, at least where the rank and file were concerned. It was often an employer of last resort. But even so, when work was scarce, when harvests failed, or when industries went through a slump, the army offered low but regular pay, food, and lodging – in other words a security that was hard to find anywhere else.

On the other hand, people may also resist. But, to borrow from Charles Tilly’s conceptualization of social movements, the repertoire of resistance is also varied. First there is the tendency to avoid service altogether. Conscription systems, old and new, just like enslavement, have generally been deeply unpopular. As Beşikçi says (citing Alan Forrest), “conscription can also be depicted as a battleground between individual and local communities on the one hand and a distant impersonal state on the other”. Privileged sections of society have generally been able to make use of exemptions, and both communities and local authorities seem to have done their best to make sure that "undesirables", who were unproductive and might otherwise create unrest in society, were taken into the army. This is a clear case of instrumentalization of the state’s recruitment drive on the part of social actors. For populations that were faced with coercion on the part of the state and its representatives, different forms of avoidance were open: going into hiding or self-mutilation, which, according to Fahmy, was especially widespread in nineteenth-century Egypt. Once in the army, both desertion and defection became options, even if sometimes highly dangerous ones.

17 Tilly, Social Movements 1768-2004.
18 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, pp. 260-263.
The ultimate form of resistance was mutiny. “Industrial action” by its own armed forces was of course the most serious crisis any ruling elite could face. There seems to be some evidence that groups with a strong corporate identity that could be regarded as “artisans of war” such as mercenaries or janissaries, and troops raised from an urban background, seem to be more prone to mutiny while, on the other hand, peasant armies seem to be more prone to desertion. This may well be linked, as Sikora suggests, to the fact that peasant armies, whether early modern state commissioned armies or conscripted ones, were subjected to stronger coercion, control, and discipline from the late seventeenth century onwards. It may also be linked, I would suggest, to the different repertoires of resistance in towns and in the countryside. To an urban population, industrial action and collective protest were familiar, even before the advent of industrialization, while traditionally desertion – that is, fleeing the land and going into hiding – had been a form of resistance to the demands of the state and the landowning class in many rural societies.

A final word

What the project has shown us is that there is, to paraphrase van der Linden, an almost endless variety of military workers in history, but also that we can develop a taxonomy that allows us to group all these different forms from many different countries and periods in categories on the basis of shared characteristics and to do so in a meaningful way. When we combine the classification thus achieved with a set of the most important determinants, we can discern a number of patterns and reach tentative conclusions about the circumstances that influence the choice for a certain type of recruitment and a certain form of military employment. It is hoped that, alongside similar research conducted at the IISH on industries that offer opportunities for comparative research because of their global nature (textiles, docks, prostitution), this study of military labour helps us to increase our understanding of labour relations worldwide.

In writing this synthesis I have profited from the comments and suggestions of the colleagues who participated in the project and of Jan Lucassen and Marcel van der Linden. My special thanks go to Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter for kindly correcting the English of the original text.
Military labor in China, c. 1500

David M. Robinson

Military labor markets have a long history in China. In fact, as Mark Lewis has shown, policy debates over such issues as conscription, professional standing armies, recruitment, and rewards predated the emergence of the first imperial dynasty, the Qin, in 221 BC. Given this background, modern scholars’ relative indifference to this cluster of issues is striking. This chapter briefly reviews a few key works and debates related to military labor in China c. 1500, most especially recruitment, then moves to consideration of the Chinese example in the light of our common comparative axes and taxonomies, and finally concludes with an effort to assess the causal factors that accounted for the particular forms of military labor in China c. 1500.

A review of the field

In 1937, a pioneering scholar of the Ming period (1368-1644), Wu Han, wrote the first major scholarly essay on the Ming military. His central concern was the transition from what he described as a hereditary conscription military, tightly controlled by the central government, to a system of hired soldiers that ultimately gave greater power to leading generals than to the dynasty. Wu described the transformation in the following terms:

From a garrison system that supported 3 million men at the cost of not a single penny to the state to a mercenary system whose costs fell entirely to the people and dynastic coffers; from garrison troops with fixed levels of men to mercenaries with no fixed numbers; from hereditary garrison troops to hired mercenaries: this sea change was central to the rise and fall of the Ming period and was the largest shift in modern history.²

Before examining Wu Han’s arguments, a thumbnail sketch of the Ming military system is useful here. Borrowing a model developed by his predecessors (the Mongol rulers of the Yuan dynasty, who had controlled China

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2 Wu, “Mingdai de jun bing”, p. 149.
for much of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries), the Ming founder, Zhu Yuanzhang (1328-1398), had assigned hereditary obligations to the state to individual households. He divided the population into dozens of categories – saltern households, mining households, and farming households, to name just a few. Military households were among the largest of such categories. The Ming founder drew upon four major sources of troops for his dynastic army: (a) men who had joined him when he had been a rebel leader during the 1350s and early 1360s, (b) surrendering troops of rival warlords who were integrated into his army, (c) criminals sentenced to military service, and finally (d) forced conscripts, usually assessed as a given percentage of the local population and used to fill out the ranks of the early Ming army.

The imperial army in general and military households in particular were intended to be self-replicating and self-supporting. Each household was responsible for providing one active service member to the state at all times instead of the standard corvée and/or tax obligations rendered by other subjects. Further they were to supply one, two, or three other males whose labor and/or income was to support the active-service soldier. If through death, accident, desertion, or dismissal, the active-service soldier was no longer able to fulfill his responsibilities to the state, the family was to supply a replacement, beginning with the nuclear family and extending out to brothers, cousins, and beyond. By the late fourteenth century, active-service soldiers were stationed in more than three hundred garrisons spread across the empire. The economic foundation of this hereditary garrison system, like the foundation for the dynasty as a whole, was agriculture.

During the early decades of the Ming, the central government seized huge swathes of territory that were turned over to garrisons, which were responsible for opening and working agricultural lands. The primary duty of approximately 70 per cent of the entire 1.2 million-man Ming army (but rising briefly to a reputed 3 million in the early fifteenth century) was raising grains, half of which were to be used by the farmer-soldiers and half to be turned over to the local garrison to cover expenses for active-service

3 Taylor, “Yuan Origins of the Wei-so System”.
4 Wang, “Some Salient Features of the Ming Labor Service System”.
5 For a recent review, see Zhang, Mingdai weisuo junhu yanjiu, pp. 20-50. Another essential set of essays by a leading scholar of the social and institutional histories of the Ming garrisons is Yu, Weisuo, junhu, yu junyi.
6 Yu, Mingdai junhu shixi zhidu.
troops such as wages, equipment, medical costs, and clothing. This was Wu Han’s self-sufficient and well-controlled garrison system.

For Wu and many later scholars, the shift to hired troops grew out of official corruption and exploitation. Underpaid and exploited by their officers, by early in the fifteenth century garrison soldiers began to desert in large numbers. Desertion undermined not only troop strength but also the economic foundation of the system, as fewer and fewer men were available to farm the garrison fields. Other soldiers offered gifts and monthly fees to their superiors to avoid military duties. Efforts to track down deserters or replace them with family members, who might live corvée-free and far away, led to further opportunities for graft. Bribes were demanded to turn a blind eye. Authorities responsible for filling the ranks were not above arbitrarily registering unrelated or unqualified men to serve as replacements. From the early decades of the dynasty, the central government responded with orders for local authorities to compile more accurate registers, eliminate fraud, and locate replacements from the families of soldiers who deserted.

In his famous “Placards to Instruct the People” issued in 1398, the Ming founder repeatedly urged members of rural communities to turn in deserting soldiers who sought to hide from imperial authority. The results were mixed at best.

Another complaint heard with increasing frequency over the fifteenth century was the misuse of military personnel. Officers often treated soldiers in their units as private labor gangs: they tilled officers’ fields, tended livestock, felled trees for lumber, gathered valuable roots such as ginseng (along the northeastern border), conducted trade, and acted as personal servants. In fact, the central government and its agents also used the army for nonmilitary purposes but on a much grander scale. Garrison soldiers provided the labor for many if not most large-scale construction projects.

7 Wang, Mingdai de juntian; Ming, “Tuntian Farming of the Ming Dynasty”.
8 Even during the early years of the dynasty, the military system had never been economically self-sufficient but instead relied on regular infusions of “gifts” from the throne. See Huang, “Military Expenditures in Sixteenth-Century Ming China”.
9 For a fairly recent essay that ascribes manpower shortages – and the dynasty’s ultimate collapse – primarily to corruption among military officers and other administrators, see Liu, “Mingdai weisuo quewu de yuanyin tanxi”. Liu explicitly argues that the dangers of corruption in the Ming have lessons for contemporary leaders in China. The same line of argumentation of course was true for Wu Han writing in the 1930s; he was criticizing the practices of the Guomintang (or Nationalist) government under Chiang Kai-shek.
10 Ma, “Mingdai de jiading”. For an early example of desertion, see Ming Taizu shilu, 193.8a-b.
11 Zhu, “The Placards of the People’s Instructions”.
projects sponsored by the state, including palaces, city walls, dikes, border fortifications, and even stupas for Tibetan monks resident in the capital.  

The Ming was the first Chinese dynasty to institutionalize the use of military personnel as transport workers on a permanent and wide-scale basis. During the late fourteenth century, more than 80,000 soldiers were used to transport grain to the distant but strategically vital northeast border region of Liaodong. Early in the fifteenth century, the principal dynastic capital was relocated northward from Nanjing to Beijing. From this time onward, an even greater number of men moved tax grain along the Grand Canal to the capital in Beijing from agricultural centres in the southeast. Figures from the first half of the fifteenth century suggest that each year more than 100,000 men drawn from approximately 170 garrisons moved 3 million piculs of rice in 3,000 barges along the Grand Canal system from Ningbo to the capital, a distance of approximately 2,300 km. However, the military labor pool that supported the arrangement on occasion proved too tempting to the court. For instance, in 1448 nearly 20,000 grain-shipment soldiers were deployed elsewhere to suppress a major insurrection, severely disrupting the delivery of the grain to the capital. This in turn strained dynastic logistics – the approximately 700,000 imperial troops stationed in Beijing and its environs depended on the timely arrival of tax grain from the productive southern provinces.

The disruption catalyzed reform in the late fifteenth century that resulted, on paper at least, in an even more ambitious program to ship grain along the Grand Canal: 121,500 soldiers moving grain on 11,775 transport barges. The state permitted each grain-shipment soldier to carry items to engage in a limited amount of customs-free trade. The state also built and maintained a series of hostels and pharmacies along the Grand Canal for transport soldiers. The result was a stable and expanded flow of grain. By 1500 or so, approximately 4 million piculs of grain arrived in the capital each year. Court officials congratulated themselves on their success, putting in the mouths of a foreign envoy who traveled the Grand Canal to the capital the following testimony: “The rudders of the Central State are more numerous than the soldiers of this small barbarian kingdom. Would we dare harbor traitorous aspirations?”

12 For the staggering costs of building of the Ming’s northern fortifications, see Waldron, The Great Wall of China, pp. 91-164.
13 Ming Taizu shilu, 193-5a-b.
For Wu Han and others, however, the state’s use of military personnel in major infrastructure projects and for other purposes not only drove many to desertion but also undermined military training. The young and the strong were favored for such labor gangs. The old and infirm were most available but least likely to benefit from regular military drill. According to this line of analysis, by no later than the 1430s, the armies of the Ming dynasty were in steep decline. A disastrous defeat in 1449 at the hands of the Mongol leader Esen at Tumu Fort (north of the capital at Beijing) is often offered as evidence for this collapse. 17

The debacle at Tumu represented a major crisis for the Ming dynasty. The reigning emperor was taken captive; his half-brother was hurriedly put on the throne in his place; the survival of the dynasty, especially the capital in Beijing, seemed uncertain. To revitalize the military, the Ming court enacted several reforms, two of which are most critical to our interests. The first was the augmentation of garrison troops through local militias. The second was the first large-scale effort to hire troops. In 1449 the central government instructed local officials to conscript between one and four men from each administrative community (which putatively contained 110 families). These men were to drill several weeks each fall and spring during lulls in the farming calendar. These local militias (literally “people's stalwarts”) were intended for short-term defense of their localities. When called up for service, each man was to be provided with “travel grain”, i.e., a wage to feed him while on campaign.

The second effort to augment the garrison system during the fifteenth century was the initial and limited use of hired troops. The Ming imperial state employed a range of recruiting methods: it recruited men from within the ranks of garrison soldiers, that is, men from hereditary military households who were already legally bound to fulfill their family’s obligations to the state; it recruited members of hereditary military households who were not actively serving as soldiers but who were supposed to provide income to support their active-service relative; and it recruited those with no military obligations to the state. In each case, recruits generally received signing bonuses and monthly salaries. Later, during the widespread coastal piracy of the mid-sixteenth century, many generals actively recruited hired troops, offering competitive wages and intensive training in weapons and group combat.

Hired troops were especially numerous along the northern border. Already by 1500 or so, nearly 20,000 hired troops augmented dynastic defense

17 Mote, “The T’u-mu Incident of 1449”.
in the single northwestern region of Yansui.\textsuperscript{18} By 1550, officials were recruiting on a large scale. In the wake of destructive raiding in the capital region by the Mongol leader Altan in 1550, recruiting in several northern provinces yielded as many as 40,000 men in the single year of 1550. Wu Han argued that, by this point, hired troops had become the principal fighting forces of the Ming military—not in terms of numbers but in terms of efficacy. Garrison troops were not abolished but neither did they contribute greatly to the defense of the dynasty.\textsuperscript{19} As noted above, however, the state put them to use in a variety of ways.

For Wu Han and others, corruption again eroded whatever military advantages the hired troops offered. Part of the problem was that men signed up, received their bonuses, and fled as soon as possible. Officials at the time claimed that some men did this on a serial basis. At the same time, hired troops expected to be paid on time and did not hesitate to riot when the state failed to fulfill its obligations. As the dynasty’s fiscal conditions worsened in the early seventeenth century, wages were frequently in arrears. Wu Han estimated that, between 1610 and 1627, wages to hired troops were in arrears by nearly 10 million taels of silver (although it is not clear if they were being paid in grain, silver, or a mix of the two).\textsuperscript{20} To put this figure in perspective, the average annual income of the central government was somewhere in the neighborhood of 30 million taels of silver.

Overall, the system of hiring troops contributed to higher costs for military defense, especially along the northern border. In the mid-fifteenth century, the central government began to provide “annual subsidies” to garrisons to support the growing expenses of the northern border. By the early sixteenth century, such subsidies reached 430,000 taels and continued to rise steadily until the end of the dynasty. To cover the higher costs, court and local government levied surtaxes, sometimes years or even decades in advance, which according to Wu Han and others, in turn increased land flight, social discontent, and support for the rebels who eventually toppled the dynasty. During the last reign of the dynasty (1628–1644), these surtaxes amounted to nearly 30 million taels of silver.\textsuperscript{21}

Finally, on the political and social fronts, a common perception at the time and in much modern scholarship is that, by the early seventeenth century, hired soldiers felt greater loyalty to their individual commanders

\textsuperscript{18} Li, “Mingdai mubingzhi jianlun”, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{19} Wu, “Mingdai de jun bing”, p. 188.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 197.
\textsuperscript{21} Li, “Mingdai mubingzhi jianlun”, p. 68.
than they did to the court or central government. In a similar vein, the most powerful generals, who considered their troops as a source of personal power, were loath to waste them in combat with the court’s enemies. Wu Han argued that during the dynasty’s last decades, these generals were unwilling to fully engage with rebel forces, which led directly to the fall of the Ming.22

Other, less well-known scholars have characterized the growth in hired soldiers in different ways. In 1940, the Japanese scholar Suzuki Tadashi examined the emergence and significance of “people’s stalwarts” and hired soldiers during the Ming.23 Like Wu, Suzuki contextualized the appearance of the people’s stalwarts as a response to the decline of the garrison system, a decline thrown into clear relief with the 1449 Tumu debacle. Suzuki, however, pointed to the great regional variation in the size and function of people’s stalwarts. He also viewed the people’s stalwarts as a facet of longstanding traditions of local self-governance, a characterization fully congruent with Japanese Sinology of the first half of the twentieth century.24 Thus, where Wu Han had written chiefly from the perspective of the central government’s efforts to revive the dynasty’s military, Suzuki more fully acknowledged the role of local government and local elites.

Suzuki’s understanding of mercenaries, too, differed from that of Wu Han. Although both argued that the widespread use of hired soldiers dated from the piracy crises of the mid-sixteenth century, Suzuki held that hired soldiers, particularly *jia bing* and *jia ding*, which might be translated as “house soldiers” and “housemen”, respectively, not only bolstered imperial military strength but also enjoyed considerable appeal among the general populace. He offered numerous examples of where contemporary observers portrayed carefully selected housemen as the key to success in battle. Enjoying preferential economic treatment and holding some level of personal loyalty to an individual commander, housemen were thought most effective as shock troops or as vanguard forces. Whereas duty as a people’s stalwart was an onerous obligation, to be evaded if at all possible, service as a houseman was an opportunity to earn cash and a means of escape from a village economy that had suffered considerable damage as

22 Wu, “Mingdai de jun bing”, p. 190. More recently, Kenneth Swope has similarly observed, “the military families in Liaodong came to form a martial caste of sorts, largely independent from central government control” (Swope, “A Few Good Men”, pp. 40-41). Swope, however, offers a far more positive treatment of the contribution of the leading military families of Liaodong to dynastic defenses.
23 Suzuki, “Mingdai kahei kō”.
24 Ibid., pp. 7-10, 24.
a result of piracy and efforts to suppress it. Thus, large numbers of young men were willing to fight for pay.\textsuperscript{25} Although Suzuki too acknowledged that their growing ranks imposed a serious fiscal strain on the dynasty in the long term, he argued that hired soldiers were militarily effective.

Finally, Suzuki disagreed with Wu about the challenge that late Ming commanders posed to the central government. He acknowledged that border generals did have the potential to become “minor warlords”, but he maintained that fighting with the Manchus prevented them from developing into a serious threat to Beijing. If the Qing had failed and these Ming border commanders had continued to grow in power, however, they would have emerged as warlords and brought “a revolution” similar to those that had ended many previous dynasties, Suzuki speculated.\textsuperscript{26}

In 1952, Suzuki published an additional study that focused more squarely on the socioeconomic conditions that gave rise to the “housemen”.\textsuperscript{27} Suzuki saw the housemen as part of a widespread desire for social advancement that predated the sixteenth century. Its background was the monetization of the economy, including the payment of some taxes in silver, improved standards of living, and changed attitudes toward the acquisition of wealth.\textsuperscript{28} Self-castration in the hope of securing employment in the imperial palace and “placing oneself in the care of the powerful” (tou chong) were simply different manifestations of this same desire to advance, he wrote. He characterized housemen as sharing certain similarities with the long-term tenants of landlords in that they were sometimes cast as sharing fictive kin ties with their patrons. Suzuki described the housemen as simultaneously “trusted intimates, claws and teeth, and hawks and hounds”. He emphasized, however, that the sources for military housemen were by no means restricted to household servants.

Suzuki stressed not only the push/pull factor of the new opportunities. He also maintained that the supply of potential housemen had its roots in the intersection of land tenure patterns and strong state influence prevalent in North China, especially in the borderlands. During the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, military commanders, palace eunuchs, and imperial affines used their influence to encroach upon relatively plentiful farmlands that enjoyed tax-free status (whether because they were garrison fields, imperial horse pasturages, or acreage opened up under special government

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., pp. 17-22, 25.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., pp. 23-24.
\textsuperscript{27} Suzuki, “Mindai katei kō”.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 27.
incentives). As a result, the tax burden for the village or county as a whole fell heavily on those who remained in the rolls. In response, many placed themselves under the protection of powerful patrons. Farming households provided the labor to work the fields and tend livestock; they also paid rent to their patrons. The patrons in turn used their political connections to shield them from tax and labor obligations to the state and, perhaps even more importantly, from extra-legal levies that local officials imposed with great frequency.  

Later scholars, such as Ray Huang and Wang Yuquan, would debate whether this arrangement represented a form of political and economic exploitation by elites that reduced hapless peasants to the status of serfs or an economically beneficial accord that allowed farmers to keep more of the harvest for themselves and avoid arbitrary exactions from local officials. In any case, for Suzuki the basic equation was clear – the more land that military commanders controlled, the greater their ability to support housemen, which in turn increased their ability to extract rewards, honors, and special privileges from the court.  

Although it is common to date the widespread use of housemen to the mid-sixteenth century, Suzuki pointed out that, by no later than the mid-fifteenth century, some military commanders maintained housemen on whose behalf they tried to secure rewards from the throne for battlefield exploits. By the mid-sixteenth century, the central government was issuing orders for commanders to recruit housemen (again along the northern border). During the late sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries, housemen grew even more prominent in contemporary consciousness.  

Many writers at the time felt that housemen demonstrated superior valor on the battlefield. Border commanders were often careful to cultivate personal ties with their housemen, “sharing equally their joys and hardships”. Some housemen adopted the surname of their commander. In other cases, the housemen were bound through adoption or marriage ties to their commanders. Thus, it was felt, housemen soldiers were uniquely

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29 Ibid., pp. 27-32.  
32 Ibid., pp. 222-223.  
33 These familial ties are especially stressed by Zhao (“Lun Mingdai jundui zhong jiading de tedian yu diwei”, p. 146), who argues that the prevalence of adoption within the ranks of the military surpassed that of any earlier period in Chinese history.
cohesive as units and willing to endure great suffering on behalf of their commanders. Commanders used units of housemen that might number in the hundreds to anchor much larger and less committed forces. Such bands of housemen sometimes appear in contemporary records as “death soldiers” (si shi) or “dare-to-die soldiers” (gan si shi) because of their reputed willingness to sacrifice their lives on behalf of their commander. Despite these strong ties of personal loyalty, as noted above, Suzuki maintained that both commanders and housemen remained under state control and did not pose a serious threat to the dynasty.34

For a variety of reasons, research on housemen all but stopped until the mid-1980s when scholars revisited the topic, often using new materials and offering new perspectives. In 1984, the Chinese scholar Xiao Xu examined housemen with particular attention to their development in Liaodong (sometimes referred to as southern Manchuria), a strategic region that bordered Korea, Jurchen lands (i.e., whose inhabitants would become the Manchus), and the eastern edge of Mongolia.35 Like Wu Han and most Chinese scholars, Xiao attributed the rise of housemen to the collapse of the garrison system and dated it to early in the fifteenth century, when a portion of housemen was recruited from among the ranks of garrison soldiers – a practice that was not officially recognized until late in the century. Xiao argued, however, that the primary source of housemen was hired soldiers, that is, men not registered in hereditary military households who voluntarily undertook military service for a limited term in exchange for money.

Perhaps Xiao’s greatest contribution was his attention to shifting patterns of funding for housemen. Early housemen were privately recruited and privately funded by commanders. One early source of funding was the income derived from lands seized by military commanders, as Suzuki had noted. Some commanders squeezed funds allocated for garrison troops under their commander to support their housemen. Others resorted to criminal activities. Late Ming commanders such as the famed Li Chengliang supported themselves through war booty, horse rustling in the borderlands, and coercive manipulation of prices in border markets.36

As the number of housemen grew and their importance to dynastic defenses became clearer, the central government took a more prominent role in financing their upkeep. Xiao observed that, during the mid-sixteenth century

35 Xiao, “Mingdai jiangshuai jiading de xingshuai ji qi yingxiang”.
36 Ibid., pp. 110-111; Ma, “Mingdai de jiading”, pp. 234-235.
century, the central government gradually made explicit its commitment to supplying funds for food, arms, rewards, and mounts for the housemen. The process accelerated during the last quarter of the century until the costs for housemen were being figured into the annual subsidies supplied by the central government to cover border defenses.37

Although scholarly literature generally casts any deviation from the founding Ming emperor’s policies as decline or collapse, a far better approach is to understand such changes as flexible responses to evolving challenges. As one of the largest and most important imperial institutions in Ming China, the military was sensitive to developments in many quarters, from demographic trends (including not only population size but also migration and family structure), economic transformation (including the growing size of regional markets and the spreading use of silver), shifting labor supplies, bureaucratic imperatives (such as commuting corvée labor and tax obligations into silver payments), and logistics needs (such as supplying large numbers of men far from economic centres for extended periods of time).

As already noted, such annual subsidies posed an increasingly heavy burden on the finances of the central government. By 1590, efforts were afoot to cut costs by thinning the ranks of housemen, either by removing their weakest members or imposing strict caps on the number of housemen allowed for commanders of different ranks – ranging from ten to sixty. The most important commanders in Liaodong, including members of the Li family, however, ignored the new measures. The court did not push the issue for fear of alienating the generals in a time of dynastic crisis, and the restrictions became an empty writ.38

Xiao also offered several interesting observations on the changing nature of the patronage system surrounding the housemen. Xiao argued that state funding for the housemen often undermined the strong personal tie established between housemen and patrons when recruiting and support had been private. In some cases, personal bonds suffered from the very success of housemen. Xiao offered the examples of the housemen of Li Chengliang (all “surrendered barbarians”), who were rewarded for their battlefield exploits with high positions and independent commands, which in time, weakened

their ties to their patron. He also noted the distinction between “in-garrison” and “accompanying” housemen. The former were recruited to serve for a designed term in a particular garrison, regardless of the comings or goings of individual commanders. The latter, in contrast, followed their patron, even into retirement when they would continue to serve and be supported by their commander despite his no longer holding a command. Housemen who followed their patron in retirement might become indistinguishable from the servants or long-term tenants of local elites. In other cases, they comprised a latent pool of manpower that local and central officials attempted to mobilize in times of crisis. For the most part, Zhao Zhongnan (see below) highlighted the durability of the personal ties between housemen and their patrons in contrast to Xiao who emphasized their provisional nature.

Critics during the Ming period objected that the growth in the numbers of housemen ultimately did not serve dynastic interests. Drawing able men from the garrison troops only hastened the garrison system’s collapse. The housemen’s military successes brought their commanders dangerous power and ambition. The privileges housemen enjoyed eroded morale within the ranks of ordinary soldiers. Qi Jiguang (1528-1588), a prominent general who had made skilled use of housemen and mercenaries, wrote:

Garrison soldiers’ horses are given to housemen to ride; garrison soldiers themselves are given to housemen as servants; garrison soldiers’ grain is given to housemen for their support. In this way, we secure the hearts of 200 or 300 men but completely lose the hearts of 3,000 garrison soldiers under our command.

Other officials of the latesixteenth century characterized the housemen as essentially parasitic, siphoning off food, labor, horses, and money from garrison and civilian populations. One popular jingle of the time held, “If you meet up with the Mongols, you’ll still have your life. If you meet up with the housemen, you’ll have nothing left.” Xiao thus concluded, “The housemen system not only held within itself the dependency and abuses inherent in the garrison system, which was a tool that exploited the classes and oppressed the people”, it added entirely new abuses. Among these he

40 Ibid., p. 115. See also Ma, “Mingdai de jingding”, pp. 229-231.
41 Zhao, “Lun Mingdai jun dui zhong jiading de tidian yu diwei”, p. 147.
42 Ibid., pp. 147-148.
included a shameless pursuit of self-interest over loyalty to commander or dynasty and a sharp decline in the quality of housemen by the early seventeenth century as men signed on for wages and commanders padded the rolls in order to extract more resources from the state.

The last major essay on Ming housemen appeared nearly two decades ago. In 1991, Zhao Zhongnan examined the socioeconomic conditions that undergirded the emergence of the housemen. Building on the much earlier work of Suzuki Tadashi and Wang Yuquan, Zhao Zhongnan emphasized the centrality of shifting patterns in land tenure. The concentration of lands in the hands of powerful landlords during the fifteenth and especially sixteenth century is taken as granted by many Chinese and Japanese scholars. Zhao, like Suzuki, believed that military commanders used their influence to privatize garrison lands on a large scale, creating a revenue stream sufficient to support housemen and withdrawing the lands from tax registers. At the same time, garrison soldiers and civilian farmers lost their lands in large numbers, producing a pool of men in need of employment and protection. The result, maintained Zhao, was multiple layers of dependence that bound the housemen to their commanders/patrons.44 Again following Suzuki, Zhao noted that the shift to mercenaries in general and housemen in particular depended on the partial monetization of tax and labor obligations to the state.45 Finally, perhaps Zhao’s most important contribution was the explicit discussion of regional variation or specificity in the growth of housemen. In this, he drew on the work of previous scholars interested in Liaodong.46

In addition to garrison regulars drawn from Chinese households and the use of hired soldiers, the Ming state drew soldiers from non-Chinese sources in the wider eastern Eurasian military labor market.47 Through a variety of institutional mechanisms and personal connections, the Ming state actively recruited Mongols, Jurchens, Tibetans, Yao, Zhuang, and others into its military. The Ming valued such men for their specialized skills in riding, mounted archery, and mountaineering, their temperament (fierceness and indifference to cold, heat, and hunger) as “martial races”, and the fear they inspired among others.48

46 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
47 For preliminary discussion of Ming efforts to integrate non-Chinese personnel into the garrison system, see Sŏ, “Eijo to ejogun – gunshi no senjū hōhō o chūshin ni”.
48 A small number of Japanese laborers and warriors who fled the harsh conditions of Hideyoshi’s campaigns in Korea in the 1590s were also impressed into Ming military service (Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail, p. 215).
For the most part, such non-Chinese in the employ of the Ming state were settled on the northern frontier. Their leaders generally received military titles within the imperial Ming government commensurate with their previous local status. On one end of the spectrum, those settled within Ming borders received lands, salaries, and periodic gifts from the throne. They were also expected to fight in imperial campaigns, usually against relatively nearby foes. They could expect promotions and further rewards for valor and success on the battlefield. Although recognized as distinct from regular garrison troops, these men and their families were subject to supervision by Ming military authorities (both local and central). Thus, while Mongol men might fight as a Mongol unit under a Mongol commander perhaps against other Mongols (but equally likely against Chinese rebels or aboriginal revolts), overall command remained in the hands of Chinese generals. Chinese bureaucrats vetted battlefield exploits, processed paperwork for promotions or permission to relocate, maintained household registration in military garrisons, and adjudicated criminal and civil legal matters.  

At the other end of the spectrum, Ming control was largely nominal. The Ming state recognized certain Jurchen leaders, granted them nominal titles in the Ming military, designated their polities as garrisons, and permitted them access to the Chinese economy through horse markets on the border and gift exchanges (and opportunities for private trade) during “tribute” missions to the capital in Beijing. Through appeals to their sense of obligation, gratitude, and self-interest, the Ming state attempted to influence the behavior of Jurchen groups. Such efforts ranged from trying to ensure the safe passage of Korean envoys through Jurchen lands to allying with certain Jurchen leaders against others to prevent unification in Manchuria. During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, many of the leading commanders in Liaodong maintained as many as several hundred Mongol and Jurchen warriors as housemen. Contemporary writings stressed their ferocity in battle, their skill in scouting, and their importance to their commanders’ success.  

49 Henry Serruys wrote the foundational work on the Ming Mongols. For more recent work (and full citation to Serruys), see Robinson, “Images of Subject Mongols under the Ming Dynasty”, “Politics, Force, and Ethnicity”.  

50 Xiao, “Mingdai jiading”, pp. 108-109; Zhao, “Lun Mingdai jundui zhong jiading de tidian yu diwei”, pp. 144-145. Like Wu Han, Ma Chujian noted that the practice of recruiting Mongols and Jurchen as mercenaries dated back to the early fifteenth century: “Mingdai de jiading”, pp. 223-225. For the Jurchens, see Rossabi, The Jurchens in the Yuan and Ming.
is discussed in the chapter by Christine Moll-Murata and Ulrich Theobald) is inseparable from this phenomenon.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, at least on the northern border, the Ming state (and individual commanders) had to compete on an international military labor market with other prospective employers.

Somewhere in the middle were communities of non-Chinese that were loosely integrated into the Ming polity and that were expected to contribute military forces only upon request. On the southwestern and northwestern peripheries, the Ming state recognized local leaders from families that had often held power for centuries. Recognition from the Ming throne, access to Chinese economic resources, and occasional recourse to Ming military support strengthened the position of these local leaders. However, the administration of regions under their control was staffed by local men rather than officials dispatched by the central government.\textsuperscript{52} Local populations were not rigorously integrated into the household registration system. One scholar has characterized the result as “dual sovereignty”.\textsuperscript{53} During the periodic struggles among local elites, incumbents and challengers might call upon Ming support. The Ming state, however, had a poor record of exercising effective control. Many officials argued against becoming entangled in violent struggles that were imperfectly understood and seldom essential to critical strategic interests of the dynasty.\textsuperscript{54} However, local leaders regularly contributed units of men to bolster Ming imperial forces in campaigns throughout most of China.

Finally, before turning to our common comparative axes and taxonomies, some discussion of the changing composition of wages is in order. Early in the dynasty, active-service men from hereditary military households – from senior officers to humble soldiers – picked up salaries in kind each month from imperial granaries. Dynastic regulations stipulated that each month a garrison commander was to receive 12 shi (each shi was equivalent to 3.1 bushels or about 130 pounds), an assistant commander 8.5 shi, a chiliarch (that is, a commander of roughly 1,000 troops) 5.4 shi, a battalion commander 1.5 shi, and a common soldier 1 shi. Married soldiers with dependants generally received approximately 20 per cent to 30 per cent more than single soldiers without dependants. However, due to a variety of factors, all ranks generally received only between half and two-thirds of their

\textsuperscript{51} Iwai, “China’s Frontier Society in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”; Wei, “Mingdai Menggu zhubu dui guishun Hanren de renyong ji jiqi junshi yingxiang”.
\textsuperscript{52} There was periodic debate about the relative advantages of staffing by local men or those dispatched from the central government.
\textsuperscript{53} Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mists, pp. 105-117.
\textsuperscript{54} Shin, The Making of the Chinese State, pp. 56-105.
Even taking into account the loss of wages to individual soldiers, the financial burden to the state was considerable. In 1373 for instance, the state distributed more than 3 million shi of grain just to troops in the capital at Nanjing. Finally in the early decades of the dynasty, the state provided monthly stipends of 0.5 shi to the widows of soldiers, provided they did not remarry.

Before I address the considerable temporal and spatial variations behind these figures, however, a broader picture of wages and prices provides some perspective on the position of military labor. As an overarching generality, garrison soldiers earned approximately the same wages as an average urban laborer, while officers received more. According to Ray Huang, rural men specially recruited by the famous general Qi Jiguang during the mid-sixteenth century were also “paid at the rate of day laborers”. Both garrison regulars and hired soldiers enjoyed the possibility of rewards for action on the battlefield such as taking enemy heads or particularly valorous acts.

During the waning decades of the sixteenth century, servants in the county offices of Wanping (in Beijing) earned on average 4.2 ounces of silver each year, wages in rice having largely been converted to payments in silver. Porters, water carriers, and day laborers in the capital earned about the same. During the last half of the sixteenth century, 1 shi of rice was normally worth a bit more than half a tael of silver (but subject to market fluctuations especially in times of harvest failures). Clerks in the government offices in Wanping earned 6 dou (one dou was equivalent to 9.9 quarts) each month but also received accommodation and furnishings. The income of most of the working urban population in Beijing fell between 4 and 6 ounces of silver a year.

Given the relatively modest wages of Ming soldiers, rewards and bonuses could constitute a significant addition to their routine revenue. The variety and scale of “gifts” from the throne are discussed below. Killing an enemy in battle could earn bonuses of between 10 and 30 ounces of silver – provided that a state official verified the circumstances of the kill and the identity

55 Kawagoe, "Dai Min kai ten ni mieru Mindai eijokan no becomes o megutte", pp. 39-40.
56 Okuyama, “Kōbuchō no men ma no shikyū ni tsuite”, p. 12.
57 Okuyama, “Minsho ni okeru gunshi no kazoku to yūkyū ni tsuite”. Okuyama suggests that as a result of government stipend incentives, the early Ming capital in Nanjing was home to a large number of military widows.
58 Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance, p. 172. Qi’s men, who were recruited in southern China, received 10 ounces of silver a year. When they were deployed near the Great Wall in the north, wages increased to 18 ounces a year (ibid., p. 251 n. 67). These are prescriptive figures that do not take into account possible losses through corruption or administrative inefficiency.
of the corpse. Even amounts that might seem trivial on first glance in fact were proportionally large. For instance, in 1510 as part of its effort to mollify soldiers from the northwestern garrisons of Ningxia, the court awarded each soldier 1 ounce of silver, a bonus amounting to approximately one month’s wages.59

In terms of purchasing power, in the capital during the late sixteenth century, 1.3 pounds of wheat flour cost 0.008 ounces of silver; a pound of pork was 0.02 ounces of silver; a pound of either mutton and beef was 0.015 ounces of silver; a pound of pears was 0.05 ounces of silver, and eggplants cost 0.004 ounces of silver each.60 During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a painting from the previous Song or Yuan dynasties might fetch anywhere from 5 to 10 ounces of silver to the astronomical figure of 1,000 ounces.61

As noted above, the Ming founder hoped that military units would be largely self-supporting. To that end, each active-service soldier was to receive 50 mou (1 mou was approximately 0.14 acre; 50 mou was about 7 acres) of land, which he shared with other male immediate family members of the original military household who had traveled with him. The active-service soldier was to keep half of the harvest to support himself and his family; the rest was to be turned over to garrison authorities. In reality, variation in the quality and availability of land ensured that soldiers received plots of different sizes. On the northern border, where soil was relatively poor and the population relatively sparse, and where this arrangement was intended as a way to stimulate agricultural development, a soldier might farm 70 or 80 mou (approximately 10 and 11 acres, respectively), whereas in places like the southeast with more productive lands and less land available, he might receive only 20 mou (less than 3 acres).

During the first half of the fifteenth century, the amount of grain that the state derived from these lands (nominally half the production) fluctuated sharply. One Japanese scholar has documented a dramatic drop from approximately 20 million shi (62 million bushels or 1.3 million tons) to 5 million shi (325,000 tons) in the two decades between 1403 and 1424. After a brief rise to 9 million shi, by 1434, the figure seems to have dropped to 2 million. Thus within the space of thirty years, the revenue from farmlands available

59 Ming Wuzong shilu, 62.10a-12a; 67.1b. However, to put this into perspective, one senior court minister received 100 ounces of silver for his contribution to putting down the same abortive princely revolt. See Li, “Zou wei ci mian en ming shi”, II, pp. 518-519.
60 These figures come from Geiss, “Peking under the Ming (1368-1644)”, pp. 156, 177-189.
61 Clunas, Appendix II, “Selected Prices for Works of Art and Antique Artifacts c. 1560-1620”.

for soldiers' salaries dropped by 90 per cent.\textsuperscript{62} It is unclear, however, whether this was merely the amount transported to the capital or if it included the amount received locally by the garrison administration. After all, there had to be sufficient grain available locally for the garrisons to feed the troops.

The government responded in several ways, depending on the nature of the local economy and the particular needs of the moment. In economically developed regions, commercial taxes were used to pay military salaries. For instance, in affluent Jiading, a portion of commercial taxes civil authorities assessed on shop fronts went to salaries in nearby Taicang and Zhenjiang Garrisons. As noted above, salaries for soldiers on the northern border were often subsidized by generous annual payments from the central government.

A related question is the nature of wages. The Ming founder set salaries in rice. Rice does not grow equally well in all places (and not at all along the northern border mentioned above), is expensive to transport overland because of its weight, and is subject to rotting if not properly stored. Thus, some kind of conversion, if only into other grains or beans, had always been in place. By the early fifteenth century, the Ming state began to commute a portion of monthly wages into paper currency. Thus for example, a garrison commander who drew a monthly salary of 10 shi might receive 80 per cent in rice; the state would then convert the value of the remaining 2 shi of rice into paper money. During the Ming (unlike the Yuan period), however, paper money never really caught on. In fact, it rapidly and consistently lost value. Hence, even partial commutation of wages into paper currency was not popular among military families for obvious reasons. During the 1430s, one source of resentment against Mongol officers stationed in Beijing was that they received their entire salary in rice.

In response to these complaints, by the mid-fifteenth century, the Ming state often commuted a portion of military salaries into items such as cotton textiles, black pepper, and other spices. By the mid-sixteenth century, the commutation of salaries into silver became increasingly common.

Shifting military challenges shaped wages. Okuyama Norio has shown that the Ming state’s deployment of large numbers of troops to the northern border for an extended period of time in the wake of the Tumu defeat of 1449 deeply influenced soldiers’ wages. As noted above, soldiers normally received their salaries, whether in grain, cash, or otherwise, from the granaries of the garrisons in which they served. During short-term deployments, to the northern border for instance, local border garrisons would pay them “travel wages” until they returned home. Dependents, who did not accompany

\textsuperscript{62} Kawagoe Yasuhiro, "Dai Min kai ten ni mieru Mindai eijokan no getsuryōgaku o megutte", pp. 39-40.
soldiers on such tours, continued to draw the monthly salary at the home garrison granaries. When, in an effort to meet the Mongol challenge, the Ming state deployed tens of thousands of soldiers from hinterland garrisons to the north for years at a time, several problems emerged.

Particularly serious was the question of dependants. Soldiers often returned home to visit their families, with or without permission. To ameliorate such a problem, the state experimented with having family dependants accompany soldiers and officers to their new posts rather than remain in their original garrison unit. Another problem was that the men's regular salaries were still disbursed at their original garrisons. Traveling back and forth to pick up their wages was time-consuming and expensive. Some who returned home to pick up their wages did not return to their new assignments. Commanders along the northern border (and in the southern theater where Ming armies were periodically deployed to suppress aboriginal uprisings) successfully petitioned the throne to allow men to receive their monthly wages from granaries wherever they were currently deployed. For this measure to work, border garrisons (and smaller forts) needed to build and then fill new granaries. The construction of granaries was the easy part; securing sufficient grain on an ongoing basis proved more challenging. Administrative measures were also needed to ensure that wages were not paid twice.

As noted above, transporting grain overland was expensive and time-consuming, so garrisons experimented with a number of alternate strategies. One was more extensive use of commutation into items that could be easily transported – yet families still needed to eat. Another was for garrisons to dispatch officers to travel to the major granaries and storehouses of the capital and elsewhere to pick up grain on behalf of the entire garrison; sell it locally in order to purchase things like salt, pepper, etc.; and finally transport these goods back to the local garrison. There, soldiers would receive the goods as salary and sell them in order to purchase the goods they needed. For most soldiers, the various commutations undermined their economic positions. In still other cases, a mixed approach was adopted. For instance, soldiers from one garrison on the border received 80 per cent of their salaries in grain. The remaining 20 per cent was commuted to cash, which during the first six months of the year, they could pick up at local government offices. During the second half of the year, 20 per cent of their salary was commuted to pepper and other spices, which they had to get in specialized storehouses in the capital.63

63 This section is drawn from Okuyama, “Mingun no kyūyō shikyū ni tsuite”, pp. 133-143.
At the same time that the Ming military responded to shifting economic, demographic, and administrative needs, it also transformed China. Economic historians have pointed out that the network required to supply northern frontier garrisons with goods from the south was one of the central factors shaping the entire Ming economy, including its banking and monetization.

Sixteenth-century officials were acutely aware that commuting soldiers’ salaries into silver subjected them to fluctuations in the price of grain. Many reported to the throne that 1 shi of grain was commonly converted into 0.7 taels of silver, sufficient to purchase only 0.6 or 0.7 shi of rice on the market. In some cases, the rate was as low as 0.2 shi, a loss of 80 per cent of the nominative value of soldiers’ salaries. Officials debated how to best address this vulnerability to price variation and impoverishment of military families. In 1538, the court approved plans to adjust rates of commutation according to grain prices. However, throughout the rest of the sixteenth century, the problem persisted. Either adjustments lagged too far behind market changes or local officials were reluctant to break from established conversion rates. Another solution was a partial return to payment in kind, most commonly with soldiers receiving rice for three months of the year and silver for the remaining nine months.64

Local officials, individual military commanders and court ministers worked to address questions as they arose and showed considerable flexibility in their approach to the economic and military challenges posed by changes in determining, funding, and distributing soldiers’ wages. As one might expect given the larger socioeconomic changes transforming China, however, there was no simple solution that perfectly matched the demands of the state with the needs of its military personnel. Throughout the sixteenth century, soldiers (and their officers) periodically organized protests, especially in garrisons along the northern border, almost always in response to state actions that undercut their economic interests. These ranged from short-term and poorly coordinated cases, where violence was limited to screaming in the night and the threat of more, to military uprisings that lasted for months and required large-scale responses from the central government.65

64 Okuyama, “Mindai no hokuhen ni okeru gunji no getsuryō ni tsuite”, pp. 155-162.
65 In 1509-1510, riots and at least one mutiny greeted the court’s efforts to reassess tax rates on military farmlands (Robinson, “Princely Revolts and the Ming Polity”). For discussion of mutinies in Liaodong in 1535, see Morohoshi, “Mindai Ryōtō no gunton ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu”, “Ryōtō heihen to Ro Kei”. On the mid-century mutinies in Datong, see Hagiwara, “Mindai Kaseki no Daitō hanran to Mongoria”. On the 1592-1593 Ningxia mutiny, see Okano, “Banreki nijūnen Neiha heihen”; Swope, “All Men Are Not Brothers”.
Variables, axes, taxonomies, and hypothesis

Zhao Zhongnan has been among the few scholars to discuss the legal status of housemen. He argues that although they may have enjoyed a superior social status as measured in terms of their salaries and privileges granted by their patrons, they possessed the same legal status as garrison troops. The Ming Code, the imperial legal code of the Ming dynasty, distinguished between those registered in civilian households and men registered in hereditary military households, most especially active-service soldiers. Zhao points to a regulation in the Collected Administrative Statutes of the Great Ming Dynasty, which stipulates that housemen were subject to the same Grand Reviews conducted by senior officials in the Chief Military Commission and Ministry of War that tested skills in riding and archery. He also notes that when their patrons were demoted, exiled, or suffered punitive beatings, housemen were subject to similar punishments.66 This is a promising line of inquiry but Zhao’s evidence here is far from compelling in terms of legal status. The Great Ming Code did not make garrison soldiers culpable for the transgressions of their commanding officers. Nor did it demand troops to follow their commander into exile.

The legal status of those registered in hereditary military households, in contrast, was clearer. They had an obligation to provide lifetime (or at least from the mid- to late teens to around 60) military service to the state, which in turn entitled them to regular wages (however inadequate), the use of government lands for farming for their own or accompanying families (though the probability of securing such lands diminished over the course of the dynasty), some tax and corvée breaks, and the possibility of medical care and economic assistance if they fell ill or were injured.67 Maintaining the massive garrison system, including its affiliated operations such as garrison schools, military examinations, training, benefits for widowed wives and/or orphaned children, etc., registration, and the voluminous paperwork required to keep things functioning, was difficult and costly.

The Ming state, like the previous Yuan dynasty, consciously followed a policy that kept large numbers of men formally registered in military house-
As noted above, this was done to maintain a broad and stable labor pool that could be used not only for defending the dynasty (e.g., guarding frontier borders, maintaining internal security, and suppressing revolts) but also for maintaining its infrastructure (e.g., transporting tax grain, constructing city walls, repairing dikes and other water works, etc.). This vast dynastic labor reservoir also served a prophylactic function; it absorbed men who might otherwise contribute to rival labor pools, such as criminal bands, rebel groups, or transnational communities, which challenged the Ming state.

Few contemporary observers, however, viewed these arrangements as either foolproof or static. In their discussions of the military, Ming commentators regularly invoked the phrase “In terms of soldiers, quality is more precious than quantity.” Writing in the late sixteenth century, the historian Lang Ying complained:

Today the military is no fewer than 1 million men and there are more than 200,000 in the capital. This can be said to be ample. Yet, when a region has a crisis, then troops are deployed from the Capital Garisons, Datong, and Yulin [border regions]. Each time they are killed in great numbers. High ministers devote themselves to papering things over. When compared to the ancients who with several thousand men would decimate the enemy and with several tens of thousands were unbeatable wherever they turned, they were really no match. Today we can say that we have no military. 69

Elsewhere, Lang turned his attention to the comparative efficacy of hired soldiers and imperial regulars. He wrote that in antiquity the establishment of an army was to prevent disaster, but that in his day the establishment of the army was a disaster. He argued that garrison troops contributed nothing to the defense of the dynasty or the people. In cases of conflict, those who actually engaged the enemy were either local commoners or hired soldiers from other provinces. Similarly, those who died at the hands of the enemy were either male and female subjects from the area or those recruited

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68 Although the even earlier Song dynasty (960-1279) did not employ the hereditary military household system, it did maintain extremely large armies at great expense in an effort to impose effective control over portions of the population that might otherwise challenge state authority or at least local government. The state also frequently turned to its armies as a general source of labor for infrastructure projects.

69 Lang, “San wu”, p. 154; Ming edn held at Zhongshan Library, 13.10b-11a; reprinted in Si ku quan shu cun mu cong shu, zi 102, p. 545. The entry was entitled “Three Nones”, referring to no music, no history, and no military.
from elsewhere. Thus, the dynasty shouldered the burden of supporting garrison troops without gaining any defense for the people. Lang proposed that the state hold Grand Reviews, where garrison troops would compete with hired soldiers in archery and other events. If the garrison troops won, they would receive half the money used to pay hired soldiers. If the hired soldiers won, half the grain used to pay garrison troops would be used to hire more soldiers.70 Lang’s views suggest that in addition to socioeconomic changes, shifting elite attitudes toward the worth of the hereditary military household system may have facilitated the growing use of hired soldiers.

**Taxonomy of armies**

The Ming military does not fit easily into our taxonomy of feudal army, aggregate contract army, state commission army, conscript army, and modern volunteer army (or John Lynn’s slightly wider taxonomy from which I draw). Some elements of the Ming case resemble the state commission army. These include raising the army from among the ruler’s subjects and in the case of hired troops, the role of officers in recruiting troops, and enlisting voluntarily as individuals.71 Yet, the core of the Ming army at least through 1500 was the hereditary military households and its garrisons. These units were not recruited by officers but served on a compulsory basis by specially designated households that legally owed the state military labor.

In other ways, the garrison system might be seen as a sort of mass reserve army in that most of the time most soldiers spent their time farming rather than drilling or fighting. During a time of war, armies were assembled from the ranks of garrison troops and augmented through hired soldiers and/or aboriginal forces. Yet, garrison troops generally lived in or near garrison forts and cities, received wages and benefits from the imperial government, and were subject to bureaucratic and legal treatment distinctive to hereditary military households.

At the risk of sounding a discordant note in our common enterprise, I would suggest that assigning the Ming a place within a taxonomy explicitly derived from the historical particulars of western Europe (and its projections) probably obscures more than it illuminates. Large central states emerged early in China: they developed fully articulated bureaucracies, demonstrated the ability to extract considerable resources (labor, material,

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and money) from enormous populations that pursued diversified economic and social strategies, and possessed advanced technological and logistical (including military) capabilities. They predated the rise of “nation-states” in Europe by many centuries. The lack of anything comparable to the European aristocracy (after the tenth century), the early and sustained dominance of the imperial throne in the political and ideological realms, and the lack of contending paradigmatic armies (which is not the same as the disinclination or inability to adapt new technologies or methods) meant that many of the critical causal factors implicit in our taxonomy are less germane than they are in the case of western Europe. This is not to argue for a distinctive Oriental warfare per se but to acknowledge that the development of the Chinese military followed a different trajectory or at least a different chronology (certainly prior to 1800) than the one Lynn identified (and which he explicitly described as “a cultural and geographical pattern unique to the West”).

Given that we are attempting to provide a global perspective on military labor, we should not reduce the rich diversity of historical experience of places such as China, Russia, or India to schemata derived from the recent “West”. The more pressing task would seem to be to reformulate our ideas in the light of new research and a wider body of empirical information. Even allowing for such caveats, some of our other terms of comparison have clear applicability for the Chinese case.

Free/unfree labor

On first blush, soldiers registered in hereditary military households would seem in most ways to fall into the category of unfree labor. They spent the vast majority of their time as tenant farmers on government-allocated lands and were subject to life service in the ranks of the imperial military. They did not enter into this service voluntarily; it was a hereditary responsibility of the household into which they were born. To abandon their lands, leave their posts, or avoid their burdens was to invite harsh disciplinary retribution by the Ming state.

72 Ibid., p. 506. Different trajectories do not preclude comparisons. For a systematic comparative study of the “military revolution” in Asia, see Lorge, The Asian Military Revolution. Lorge argues that European military systems and possibly governmental institutions needed “to become more Chinese before they could take full advantage of guns” (p. 21).

73 For calls to integrate greater historical depth and geographical variety into understandings of labor and migration, see Van der Linden, Workers of the World, pp. 1-6; Hoerder, Cultures in Contact, pp. 8-14; Lucassen, et al., Migration History in World History, pp. 7-17.
However, when we use terms such as “free” and “unfree” labor, we must remember that from its earliest days, the hereditary household system was porous. Escape was possible through illegal means such as bribes, false registration, self-maiming, and desertion. More importantly, the natural growth in the size of families meant that, over time, the relative burden of military service for the entire family diminished. It might pose a debilitating burden for an individual man or even his immediate family, but most members of the extended family would not feel the pinch at all, especially if they were located hundreds of miles apart. In fact, through success in business, the civil service examination, or crime, they could put substantial distance between themselves and relatives who served in military garrisons or in military agricultural colonies. Further complicating the situation was the fact that many soldiers simultaneously pursued other forms of employment, which ranged from the sale of their military skills and equipment to private patrons, to menial labor in roadside eateries. It is tempting then to see them as what Marcel van der Linden has termed “subaltern workers”. 74

Hired soldiers during the Ming should be considered free labor. These included both men who served in militias organized by county magistrates or local elites and those who offered their services as military retainers or housemen for imperial generals or civil officials. Men who fought for illicit groups such as bandits, pirates, and rebels might include both free and unfree labor, depending on the degree and variety of coercion involved in recruitment and retention.

Commodified/noncommodified labor

As many scholars have shown, conceptions of labor and wages have varied significantly according to time and place. Although at one level, commodified labor may be understood as a purely financial transaction whereby one party remunerates another party for his or her time, skill, and productive labor, such relations are embedded in larger social, cultural, and religious structures. Thus, it is not surprising to read in contemporary Ming sources that the imperial throne periodically “bestowed gifts” of gold, silver, paper

74 For insightful comments on the assumptions implicit in common notions of social classes, see Van der Linden, Workers of the World, pp. 28-32. Van der Linden stresses the grey areas between social classes, that most subaltern worker households combined several modes of labor, and that individual subaltern workers often “combined different modes of labor, both synchronically and diachronically” (p. 32).
currency, bolts of cotton, winter gowns, shoes, or even pepper upon its soldiers. The scale of the payments was frequently enormous and represented a sizeable if to date poorly analyzed portion of soldiers’ remuneration from the state. As an illustrative if randomly selected example, let us consider the summer of 1388 during the early days of the dynasty. In June the emperor gave more than 209,300 soldiers and officers from Suzhou and other southern garrisons in excess of 109,900 taels of gold and silver, 30,000 taels in paper currency, and 307,600 bolts of cloth. 75 Little more than two weeks later, the court announced rewards of 46,000 in cash, 255,000 bolts of cotton textiles, and 174,300 pounds of cotton fabric for approximately 153,000 troops from the northern garrisons of Beiping, Jizhou, and elsewhere. 76 In July, the throne again announced gifts for nearly 200,000 soldiers in the Fuzhou garrisons and almost 160,000 troops in the Fujian garrisons. 77

Such gifts from the throne represented a considerable transfer of wealth to military personnel. One study has calculated that between 1369 and 1374 the throne issued 1 million taels of silver in gifts. Between 1368 and 1391, Hongwu ordered the distribution of more than 12 million bolts of cotton textiles, 3 million pounds of cotton, and 1.7 million sets of clothing as gifts. Approximately 80 per cent of such gifts went to the military. 78

This rhetoric of imperial munificence owed something to Hongwu’s consistent efforts to establish authority and control in all facets of Ming life. He adopted the pose of a generous patriarch who cared for his people, including his warriors. Imperial mercy and munificence were to be reciprocated with gratitude, loyalty, and the desire to “repay the dynasty” (bao guo, bao xiao). The rhetoric of reciprocal obligations was not restricted to the ruler and his military but formed a pervasive element of contemporary conceptions of social life, religious practice, and political behavior. It is worth remembering that the army was of crucial importance to the fledgling regime. To the degree that we are interested in Van der Linden’s question of “which perceptions do the actors on the stage of history have of the reality that surrounds them, of themselves, and [of] each other”, it is important not to dismiss gifts from our consideration of military labor relations. 79 Occasional gifts from the emperor, in contrast to regular wages in cash and kind distributed by garrison authorities, were intended to forge

75 Ming Taizu shilu, 190.4a.
76 Ibid., 190.5b.
77 Ibid., 191.3b.
79 Van der Linden, Workers of the World, p. 371.
a direct tie between the Son of Heaven and humble soldiers, regardless of how tenuous that bond may have been in reality.

At the same time, Hongwu was fully aware that many officers treated their troops poorly and repeatedly reminded his commanders that they owed their success to the efforts of the common soldier.80 Battles were won not through the individual heroics of generals but through soldiers’ loyalty to their commanders and their willingness to risk their lives in combat. To win such loyalty, commanders had to care for the material needs of their men on a regular basis.81 Even in a political system as efficient and centralized as Ming China, and even with his exceptional power, Hongwu had no choice but to rely on many intermediate levels of administration to collect and distribute wages, supplies, and even his gifts to the dynasty’s soldiers. For this reason, he tried again and again to convince the officer corps that good treatment of the troops, including the fair and timely distribution of wages, was integral to advancing their own self-interest.82

For later Ming rulers who lacked the charisma of the dynastic founder, such demonstrations of imperial munificence could be even more critical. Midway through the dynasty in 1521, the newly enthroned Jiajing emperor, eager to secure the loyalty of his military, announced his intention to bestow 2 taels of silver on each border soldier in recognition of their hardships. After consultation with the Ministry of War and commanding officers from the border, the court disbursed 743,812 taels of silver to 371,906 men.83 In April 1521, his cousin and predecessor the Zhengde emperor had died without an heir or a designated successor. Desperate consultations between senior court ministers and the Empress Dowager led to the choice of Jiajing, a complete outsider to the capital and court politics. The new emperor and his advisors purged the court of many prominent military generals who had enjoyed privileged access to the late emperor. Some of these military men had originally hailed from border garrisons such as Liaodong, Datong, and Xuanfu. Thus, Jiajing no doubt considered the massive sum of nearly 750,000 taels of silver a smart investment in his future.

Remuneration as gift-giving was not restricted to emperors. As Arthur Waldron has noted, nearly one-third of one early sixteenth-century official’s

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80 Two of eight injunctions issued on one occasion in August 1388 by Hongwu to his military commanders related directly to treating their men with benevolence and not inflicting injury on them (Ming Taizu shilu, 193.5a).
81 Ibid., 191.3b-4b.
82 Ibid., 192.2b-3a.
83 Ming Shizong shilu, 3.2a-b.
budget for wall-building was dedicated to gifts for troops. Magistrates and men of local standing similarly appealed to the rhetoric of gift-giving in the context of securing military labor. In times of crisis when men of either governmental or social authority needed to quickly raise levies of men for local militias, they held large banquets for which they would slaughter cows and provide liquor to recruits. The hope was that by showing their social inferiors such honor and respect, elites would secure the men’s gratitude and obedience, at least long enough to ride out the crisis. Accounts of banquet-giving are often accompanied by efforts to raise funds to pay for the recruits. Scattered accounts indicate that the magistrate or man of local standing might sell off a portion of his personal assets to generate cash to be used as wages. The nitty-gritty details of exactly how the men arranged such transactions and with whom are rarely available.

The use of banquets to secure the allegiance of men able and willing to provide military service was not restricted to men employed by or supporting the state. Rebels, brigands, and other men of violence used exactly the same methods to create bonds of patron and client or, in terms more recognizable to men of the day, older and younger brother, lord and follower. The enormously popular sixteenth-century vernacular novel *Heroes of the Water Marsh* (*Shui hu zhuan*) describes scores of greater and lesser such banquets. In addition to the obvious social dimensions of these banquets, they also served as an economic marker. Only a patron of some economic resources could hold a sufficiently generous banquet that would allow conspicuous consumption of meat and drink. It was also understood that the host, whether magistrate, man of local standing, or aspiring brigand chief, would retain the services of his men only so long as he continued to pay them.

In addition to regular wages paid in money and/or grain and periodic gifts of cash, clothing, or food items, soldiers received special rewards for their exploits on the battlefield. Ming troops who killed enemy soldiers were eligible for rewards in silver or promotion. To prove their claims, Ming troops were required to present the decapitated head of the enemy to civil officials, who were responsible both for verifying that the head belonged to an enemy combatant rather than, say, a civilian and for submitting the paperwork. Early in the sixteenth century, the posted reward for an enemy head along the northern border was 50 taels of silver. Private markets in places such as Liaodong, however, sold decapitated enemy heads, a practice

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that the imperial government tried without success to eliminate. Rates for decapitated heads taken from the hinterlands or from the southern border were generally lower. The thinking was that they were taken from less fearsome foes.

To summarize, the Ming military labor market might be characterized as flexible and segmented. A portion of military labor, those registered in hereditary military households, was unfree insofar as such men were legally bound to offer military service to the state for their entire adult life, barring incapacitating injury, premature death, or dismissal for misbehavior or incompetence. However, it should be remembered that, even within hereditary military households, only a small proportion of men were called upon to render military (or other) labor to the state. Furthermore, in exchange for their labor, they received wages in goods and cash.

Hired soldiers, whether engaged for short or long terms, should be considered free labor and commodified labor. They were paid primarily in cash by the imperial government, local officials, or private influential elites. However, part of their “compensation package” regularly included additional “gifts” such as food, wine, and/or clothing. These gifts were essential in the formation of bonds of loyalty and reciprocal obligation. As incentives, the state also offered cash bonuses and promotions to both garrison regulars and hired soldiers.

Remuneration for the third variety of Ming military labor, aboriginal troops, is less clear but perhaps best understood as a variant of Lynn’s feudal or aggregate contract army in the following sense. Aboriginal warriors might owe military service to tribal leaders, who in turn owed military service to the Ming state. Thus, the Ming state in effect contracted entire contingents of aboriginal warriors rather than recruiting individual members. Aboriginal leaders, of course, expected remuneration from the Ming state. Higher titles, gifts (in cash and kind) from the throne, and field provisions were clearly part of the arrangement between the Ming state and aboriginal leaders. Scattered evidence suggests that aboriginal forces too were subject to the trend to commute supplies and wages to silver. In the mid-sixteenth century, aboriginal troops from the southwest deployed to fight piracy along the affluent eastern coastal regions received 80 per cent of the value of their allocation of rice, fresh vegetables, and fuel for cooking in silver. Far less clear is whether the Ming state offered additional

85 Ming Shizong shilu, 3.11a.
86 Xu Jie, “Bi jian shi yi tiao”, in Xu, Shijing tangji, 23.2.3b (Wanli edn held at Beijing University Library; reprinted in Si ku quan shu can mu cong shu, ji bu, LXXX, p. 103).
cash payments. The nature of labor relations and compensation between tribal leaders and aboriginal warriors is perhaps the most opaque part of the equation. Thus, on the questions of free/unfree and commodified/noncommodified labor, further research is needed.

**Deciding factors in Ming military labor relations**

With the exceptions of Suzuki Tadashi and Zhao Zhongnan, scholars have shown limited interest in relating the rise of housemen (or any other developments in the military) to wider socioeconomic developments. By the mid-fifteenth century, the Ming economy, including the assessment and collection of taxes, had become partially monetized. Labor obligations to the state could often be met through the payment of silver. Changes within the garrison system ultimately resulted from wider social developments. Although Wu Han, Xiao Xu, and others were no doubt correct to draw attention to widespread corruption within the garrison system, the entire hereditary household system – whether military, saltern, mining, craftsmen, etc. – came to exercise a less direct influence on individual families. People moved, families diversified their economic activities and raised their social aspirations. This was less dynastic decline than a natural sloughing off of administrative institutions inherited from the Mongol empire, institutions that better reflected the interests and perspectives of the Mongol elite than the realities of China’s society or economy. The growth of housemen and mercenaries of all kinds should be seen as part and parcel of the overall trend toward the monetization of the economy, particularly service and labor.

However, obligations imposed by the Ming state never vanished altogether. Indeed, hereditary obligations linked to household registration during the early Ming could exercise a profound influence on household and lineage strategies. In an excellent case study based on the particulars of the southeastern province of Fujian, Michael Szonyi has observed, “informally, 

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87 For another exception, see Qiu, “Mingdai zhongqianqi junfei gongji tedian de xingcheng yu yanbian”.
88 Heijdra, “The Socio-Economic Development of Rural China during the Ming”.
89 Of course, private retainers and mercenaries were a longstanding feature of Chinese history, dating back to the earliest imperial dynasties of the classical period (second century BC). See Ma, “Mingdai de jiading”, pp. 193-194. Monetization frequently undermined accepted social hierarchies, which produced considerable unease among some Ming elite men. For a broad treatment, see Brook, The Confusions of Pleasure.
military-registered households hired mercenaries themselves to fulfill their obligations. He argues that “the Ming state’s military and taxation systems drove groups of kin to organize themselves”. 90

Contemporary observers were fully aware that the dynastic military system was inextricably tied to wider socioeconomic developments. Proposals were floated to monetize elements of military obligation to the state. For instance, the “purification of troops”, that is, tracking down and/or replacement of missing soldiers, was laborious, expensive, and inefficient. Some officials argued that a more effective policy would be to collect a fee in silver from households who “owed” an active-service soldier to the state – in the same way that households or communities that owed labor to the state could commute the responsibility into silver payments (a transformation nearly complete by the 1460s for some categories of service). 91 Deep concern about the importance of the hereditary garrison system to the political, economic, and military foundations of the dynasty, however, stymied any fundamental reform.

This monetization did occur with some forms of military service. The most obvious example was the decision to hire hundreds of thousands of soldiers to augment hereditary garrison forces discussed in the first section of the paper as a response to the battle of Tumu in 1449. The people’s stalwarts also witnessed a high degree of monetization. During the 1430s, local administrators in various parts of the dynasty had begun to draft men into local constabularies called people’s stalwarts, that is, they were not members of military households. Following the debacle at Tumu, people’s stalwarts were recruited in far larger numbers and their duties expanded to include military functions, which in some cases meant incorporation into garrison units. 92 By the end of the fifteenth century, the court formalized the policy and issued orders for its empire-wide implementation. 93 After experimenting with both conscription and hiring, many local magistrates concluded that hiring military labor yielded better results than did coercive recruiting. 94 The result was that the service levy appeared as a line item in

90 Szonyi, Practicing Kinship, pp. 61 and 23.
91 For a brief discussion and citations to relevant scholarship, see Wu (Go), Min Shin jidai no yóeki seido to chihō gyōsei, pp. 187-192.
92 Kawagoe, “Sōkōki no minsōsei ni tsuite”.
93 Scholars debate the precise year. Saeki Tomi dates the national policy to 1489. See Saeki, “Min Shin jidai no minsō ni tsuite”, p. 35. Ray Huang sees 1494 as the year it became dynastic policy. See Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century China, p. 111.
94 Kawagoe stresses the importance of conscription during the 1450s-1480s (“Sōkōki no minsōsei ni tsuite”, pp. 26-27).
local budgets, as say, forty people’s stalwarts, with between 2 and 10 taels of silver designated for each man’s pay. By 1500 or so, the silver to hire militiamen was regularly apportioned across the local population, in the form of either a land or a poll tax. Estimates of how many people’s stalwarts were hired vary, but the scale was considerable — somewhere between 200,000 and 300,000 during the sixteenth century. One consequence of this policy was to increase the variability or elasticity of local budgets. In times of military crisis, county and prefectural governments needed to hire more militiamen quickly, which in turn necessitated a hike in local taxes that were paid in silver.

Similarly, the military grain-transport system was subject to larger changes within the Ming economy. The late fifteenth-century reforms represented a form of monetization. Prior to this time, some farmers had been responsible for transporting tax grain to the capital, a duty that became far more onerous when the capital was moved to the north. Now, they instead paid a fee to local authorities and the military moved the grain. During the sixteenth century, the grain-transport soldiers ceased to serve much if any military function. During the early fifteenth century, personnel had been drawn from the pool of active-service garrison soldiers; by the 1430s, “supernumerary soldiers”, the men whose function was to aid active-service soldiers, were used in large numbers; by 1500, men completely outside the hereditary military households were increasingly hired as replacements. This last group of men often comprised men who were sailors and transport workers by trade. Men in the military grain-transport corps were not expected to drill, nor were they expected to be proficient with arms.

Finally, the monetization of the economy, including many different kinds of corvée labor due to the state, on this scale in turn was sustainable only through Ming China’s integration into the global economy, most particularly the steady flow of silver from Spanish mines in the New World.

95 Estimates for wages are from Saeki, “Min Shin jidai no minsō ni tsuite”, pp. 53-59. People’s stalwarts might win additional bonuses for noteworthy service or be subject to fines for failing to meet their quotas of, for instance, smugglers.
96 Ibid., p. 48.
97 Saeki Tomi (ibid.) suggests 300,000, while Liang Fangzhong prefers 200,000. See Liang, “Mingdai de minbing”, Zhongguo shehui jingjishi jikan, 5.2 (1937), pp. 200-234; reprinted in Wu, Mingshi yanjiu luncong, I, p. 266.
98 Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century China, pp. 111-112, 126.
100 Ibid., pp. 191-192.
101 The literature on silver and the Ming economy is voluminous. For a convenient point of entry, see Atwell, “Ming China and the Emerging World Economy”.
If changes in the Ming economy, particularly a trend toward monetization, deeply shaped military labor relations, the highly fluid Chinese military labor market also explains much. Nearly all commentators, whether capital ministers, provincial authorities, county magistrates, or local elites, took for granted that substantial numbers of men could be mobilized quickly for military service. When a dangerous princely revolt occurred in 1519, rather than depend on garrison forces, the well-known literatus Wang Yangming (1472-1529) sought his troops locally, recruiting 2,000 to 3,000 men from small counties and 4,000 to 5,000 men from large counties as a way to raise an army quickly. The state provided provisions but the recruits supplied their own weapons.102 During the piracy crisis of the mid-sixteenth century, one official, Zheng Xiao, offered the following proposal: “We should search out and recruit ten men who are adept in martial arts. Each of them shall instruct one hundred men. After one month, again have each one teach ten men. Thus we will able to secure ten thousand men.”103 Although the official expected that training would be necessary, he had no doubt about the pool of men available. The initial training in this case, it should be noted, was to be provided neither by the state nor by military instructors but by hired soldiers already possessed of skills in the martial arts.

Similarly, well-informed officials assumed that arms of the day, including bows and arrows, metal-linked whips, spears, cudgels, and swords, circulated widely among the subject population. Writing in the midst of a large-scale rebellion in 1510, the senior minister Yang Yiqing (1454-1530) recommended that each household in regions affected by the rebellion keep these weapons at hand. Strong young men and hired laborers fulfilling their labor obligations toward the state were to drill with these weapons. Likewise in the late sixteenth century, the famed official Lü Kun (1536-1618) advocated regular drill, this time under the instruction of professional instructors, in the use of “spears, swords, bows and arrows, short cudgels, rope whips and other such weapons” during agricultural slack periods.104

Implicit in these various proposals was the idea that the state or its local representatives could shed excess military personnel once a crisis had passed. Although some advocated registering new recruits into the hereditary military system, others explicitly rejected such a policy. Their most common argument was that permanent registration would undermine

103 Zheng Lüzhun, Zheng Duan jian gong nian pu, 3.22b (Wanli edn held at Shanghai Library; reprinted in Si ku quan shu cun mu cong shu, shi 83, p. 558).
104 Robinson, Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven, p. 95.
recruiting efforts. Men were attracted by the promise of cash and repelled by permanent obligation, they insisted.  

Ad hoc recruiting held appeal for several reasons. For local officials, it provided a relatively high degree of autonomy. They could mobilize local men without incurring long-term fiscal responsibilities, responsibilities that would have required substantial modification of tax regimes, which in turn would have meant negotiation not only with higher-ups but also with local populations. Similarly for the central government, local ad hoc recruiting offered several advantages. It was one way to mitigate the challenges that great distances and enormous regional variation posed in the age before telegraphs and steam-powered travel. Local officials (or at least their staffs) had a surer sense of how and where to recruit quickly. Increasing the number of hereditary military households would have expanded an already overstretched bureaucratic structure and, in principle, put garrison authorities on the hook for expenses related to medical care, assistance to widows and orphans of fallen soldiers, and stipends to the lame.  For better or for worse, the flexible military labor market saved the central government from the need to push through large-scale fundamental reforms.  

Critics of recruiting focused on concerns of finance, security, and governance. Officials frequently expressed frustration that the state’s vast financial commitment to the hereditary military household system was essentially money down the drain. Hiring mercenaries required additional funds on top of standing obligations. These costs could add up quickly. Less than one year after advocating hiring martial artists as troops and trainers as part of an effort to organize a force of 10,000 men, Zheng Xiao expressed some surprise that “within a week’s time of the pirates entering our jurisdiction, we have already used more than 9,000 taels of silver for recruiting soldiers, feeding them, paying out on bonuses, and providing rewards.”  

The ability of the central government, county magistrates, military commanders, and even private subjects with sufficient social status and

105 In 1431, a military officer from the border region of Shaanxi suggested that men who had served in earlier military expeditions in the steppe be kept as a kind of reserve force that would report monthly for drill. The court rejected his proposal. Implicit in its reasoning was that, once men had completed their tour, the soldiers would return to their original units and civilians would return to their farms or herds (Ming Xuanzong shilu, 76.8b).

106 Sometimes wages continued to be issued to soldiers even after their death on distant battlefields, usually because it took some time before garrison authorities received notification of death. Occasionally they tried (usually unsuccessfully) to make bereaved family members repay such wages (Ming Yingzong shilu, 36.5a-b).

107 Zheng Lüzhun, Zheng Duan jian gong nian pu, 3.35a (Si ku quan shu cun mu cong shu, shi 83, p. 565).
economic means to recruit hundreds or even thousands of men quickly (in the space of days or weeks) strongly suggests the existence of a large pool of young men whose labor could be temporarily removed from agricultural production, animal husbandry, artisanal occupations, and other economic activities. This situation is perhaps most profitably viewed from the perspective of family units rather than individuals. Many families pursued sophisticated economic strategies of diversification designed to hedge against risks. Thus, although agricultural production might comprise the core economic activity of the family, individuals within the family would commonly engage in other activities, either full- or part-time. Adult females might contribute to family production through weaving, peddling jewelry, selling food as small vendors, etc. Adult males might work for part of the year on other people’s farms, engage in commerce, fish, hunt, etc. Children could serve as herders for cows and sheep or help with simple tasks on the farm. Thus, many households pursued diverse economic activities in a way that allowed for variable but relatively predictable factors, such as season, natural resources, and age, and for other less predictable factors, such as epidemic, drought, warfare, or dramatic changes in the composition of the household.

Thus short-time service in the military was one element of a larger strategy of economic diversification pursued at the level of individual households or groups of households linked through kinship and or marriage. Young men might serve for a single “tour” of several months or might serve periodically over a more extended period of time depending on demand within the military labor market.

The dynamic for men who served as mercenaries for longer periods of time differed in several important ways. Although such men, too, are best understood in the context of larger family economic strategies, their absence was generally more enduring. Detailed documentary material related to their contributions to larger family units is limited, but evidence from men serving in hereditary military households would suggest that time and distance often weakened economic ties to larger family units. To the degree that “housemen” became long-term retainers, it seems likely (but far from certain) that regular, substantial contributions to their original household may have diminished. An initial study of one region famed in the sixteenth century as a source of military labor, Yiwu County, indicates that military service dramatically influenced local demographics. “Most young men in Yiwu”, wrote one sixteenth-century observer, “have given up their original trade, responded to recruiting drives, and joined the army”. Local
officials complained that the resultant dearth of young men impinged on their ability to secure sufficient labor for government needs.\footnote{Nimick, “Ch’i Chi-kuang and I-wu County”, p. 24.}

As noted above, the conditions of service of “household men” varied significantly, from fairly straightforward short-term arrangements whereby they received cash for military labor, to long-term arrangements that involved accompanying their employer to new assignments or even into retirement. Presumably long-term arrangements involved more than a simple economic transaction: feelings of personal loyalty, an identification with other men serving under the patron, and perhaps the adoption of fictive kinship or oaths of brotherhood. Such behaviors no doubt also shaped the identity of those soldiers serving in regular garrison forces.

In addition to (a) economic changes and (b) supply and demand in the labor market, ideological or political considerations also shaped military labor relations during the Ming. More specifically, the Ming state considered the hereditary military household system and imperial garrisons essential to the maintenance of the empire. The great physical size, geographic variation, ethnic complexity, and economic diversity of China generated considerable centrifugal force. Given such centrifugal pressure, the Ming state went to considerable lengths to ensure the viability of the dynasty by strengthening the centre. Thorough control of the military and the many functions built into the hereditary military household system were essential to such efforts.

The Ming founder used various methods to prevent his generals from gaining sufficient power to challenge the court. Generals were assigned command of garrison units for specific campaigns. Once the fighting was concluded, the generals were to be recalled to the capital or to their positions on the border.\footnote{The prominent official He Qiaoxin considered this as one of the founder’s six greatest accomplishments as a ruler (“Di wang gong de”, in He, He Wen su gong wen ji, 2.24a, 1694 edn; reprinted in Taipeh: Weiwen tushu chubanshe, 1976, 1, p. 109).}

The hereditary garrison system, too, was a critical instrument of central control. Ultimate responsibility for household registration of military families was in the hands of the central government. The court dispatched officials to local garrisons to track down or replace deserting (or deceased) soldiers. Enormous swathes of territory were turned over to the garrisons...
for farming. The central government retained control over the lands, the men who farmed them, their harvests, and granaries. The central government exiled criminals to serve as soldiers in garrisons, especially along the borders. During the early decades of the dynasty, the garrison system was the mechanism through which the central government forcibly relocated hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children from one part of the empire to others (as part of economic reconstruction). Further, it was the tool through which the court tried to keep them there on a permanent basis. When the state first approved measures to hire soldiers from within and beyond hereditary military households, it initially tried to limit the pool to men who could demonstrate evidence of proper household registration.¹¹⁰

Thus, although officials in the central government were fully aware of the monetization of parts of the economy, the flexibility of the military labor market, and the viability of hiring soldiers to defend the dynasty, there is little evidence that abolition of the hereditary military household system or the imperial garrisons was ever given serious consideration. In the case of the Ming dynasty, maintenance of the hereditary military household system was integral to imperial power and legitimacy. This involved a measure of irony. The Ming court had adopted the hereditary military household system from the Mongol Yuan dynasty, a regime that the early Ming emperors spent considerable time decrying as abusive, corrupt, and fundamentally incompatible with the enduring values and customs of Chinese civilization.

Thus, several factors shaped the particular configuration of military labor relations under the Ming. Insofar as dynastic legitimacy became entwined with strong control over military resources and the Ming wished to be considered a successor to the Yuan, the hereditary military household system and its vast array of garrisons owed much to ideological factors.¹¹¹ One might argue that the Ming state’s use of Mongol, Jurchen, Yao, and other non-Chinese warriors could be explained in similar terms. The initial emergence of hired soldiers in the fifteenth century and more especially their proliferation during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries must be understood in the wider context of socioeconomic changes transforming China. The growing, if still uneven, use of silver as a medium of exchange,

¹¹⁰ Li Du (Mingdai huangquan zhengzhi yanjiu, pp. 152-226) stresses the central government’s high level of control. Li notes the initial efforts to recruit only from among properly registered men in “Mingdai mubingzhi jianlun”, p. 66.

¹¹¹ For the Ming court as a successor to the Yuan, see Robinson, “The Ming Imperial Family and the Yuan Legacy”.
the monetization of labor and material obligations to the state, and the decline of the hereditary occupation household system all contributed to conditions favoring hired soldiers. Finally, the large and flexible military labor market must be mentioned. It arose as a result of the socioeconomic conditions enumerated above, a steadily growing population (including the population of young, often single men), diversified economic strategies pursued by individual families and lineages, and competition for military labor by the imperial state, local authorities, private elites, and other groups ranging from mutual-aid societies among farmers, men of force, bandits, pirates, and rebels. This competition for military labor almost certainly contributed to its commodification.
From the mamluks to the *mansabdars*

A social history of military service in South Asia, c. 1500 to c. 1650

*Kaushik Roy*

Introduction

By the first decade of the sixteenth century, the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526), the dominant power in north India, was breaking up. Several autonomous states emerged to challenge the political supremacy of the Delhi Sultanate in the Ganga-Jamuna doab (the fertile tract of land between the rivers Ganga and Jamuna in north India). Deccan (the region between the rivers Godavari and Krishna) and south India had become independent of the Delhi Sultanate’s control earlier during the mid-fourteenth century. The invasion of India by the Turkish warlord Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur in 1526 resulted in the replacement of the Lodi dynasty ruling the Delhi Sultanate with the Mogul Empire. The Moguls (Mughals; the nineteenth-century British officials and historians called them Moghuls) referred to themselves as Chagatai Turks or Timurids even though their family links with the Chagatai branch of the Chingizids were weak. The Moguls claimed that from their father’s side they descended from *Amir* Timur and from their mother’s side from the Chagatai Mongol branch. The newly born Mogul Empire was overthrown in 1540 by the Afghan warlord from east India named Sher Shah Suri. Babur’s son Humayun staged a comeback in 1555.

The “real” founder of the Mogul Empire was indeed Akbar (*Padshah*, i.e. emperor, from 1556 to 1605). Akbar put an end to the political chaos in north India by subduing the Afghans and the Rajputs. Further, he reorganized the administration. By the time of Akbar’s death in 1605, the Mogul Empire had established a stable administrative machinery in north and central India and was in the process of moving slowly into Deccan. Until the fourteenth century, the dominant mode of military recruitment in India was the mamluk system. The mamluks were slave soldiers of the Muslim world. However, by the end of the sixteenth century, due to Akbari reorganization, a sort of quasi-mercenary-cum-quasi-professional military employment

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1 I am indebted to Suhrita and Prof. Erik-Jan Zürcher for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.
known as the \textit{mansabdari} system became dominant. The beginning of the seventeenth century witnessed the gradual expansion of Mogul power into Deccan under Akbar’s son and grandson, named Jahangir (r. 1605-1627) and Shah Jahan (r. 1628-1658) respectively. They continued to operate within the administrative fabric established by their illustrious predecessor. By the mid-seventeenth century, two contradictory processes were unfolding in the subcontinent. While the Mogul Empire under the dynamic leadership of Emperor Aurangzeb (1658-1707) was poised for expansion, simultaneously the administrative institutions established by Akbar were slowly becoming dysfunctional. This was partly because the Mogul economy was in the grip of what is known as the “agrarian crisis”\textsuperscript{2} and partly due to the new forms of warfare introduced by the Marathas and the Persians.

\section*{Research design}

The focus in this chapter is on the combatants of the Mogul army. I will show how the mamluk system became dominant and explain the reasons which led to its demise in South Asia. The various factors that resulted in the transition to the \textit{mansabdari} system and the existence of other mini-systems will be laid out. Since the Mogul army was not frozen in time but evolved over two centuries, the transition to different forms of military labour is portrayed chronologically. This chapter combines original research with a synthesis of the existing materials and has a comparative focus. I will compare the mamluk and \textit{mansabdari} systems alongside other forms of military profession which were in vogue in the subcontinent between 1500 and 1650.

\textsuperscript{2} The agrarian crisis was an amalgam of structural and managerial factors. Long-term agricultural decline, price rises, etc. resulted in a decrease in income from \textit{jagirs} (agricultural land assigned to the Mogul officials) from the late seventeenth century onwards. The deficit budget of the Mogul central government – due to continuous warfare in Deccan against the Marathas as well as to the rising cost of warfare – forced Aurangzeb to requisition \textit{jagirs} from the Mogul nobles (officials), which were then transferred into the \textit{khalisa} (land under direct crown management). In addition, newly conquered land was not assigned as \textit{jagirs} among the nobility but put under \textit{khalisa}. Aurangzeb hoped, through this measure, that the central government would be able to exercise greater financial control over the agrarian economy. A lack of \textit{jagirs} for assignment to the Mogul nobles caused \textit{be-jagiri} or \textit{paibaqi} crisis among the Mogul nobility. This scenario resulted in increasing factional fighting among the nobility trying to acquire the available \textit{jagirs} in the Mogul Empire. After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the powerful nobles, in a bid to get hold of the \textit{jagirs}, became independent of the Mogul centre and carved out semi-autonomous principalities for themselves and their followers. In the long run this resulted in the dismemberment of the Mogul Empire. See Habib, \textit{The Agrarian System of Mughal India}; and Chandra, \textit{Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court}. 

This is necessary because both the mamluk and the mansabdari systems emerged in interaction with various local/regional forms of military labour service in medieval South Asia. Again the timeline is not rigid because, to explain the rise and fall of the various forms of military recruitment at different times, we have to consider the years both before 1500 and after 1650. In order to assess the uniqueness or lack thereof as regards the social history of South Asian military labourers, some comparisons will be made with the military systems that were operational in other parts of the world. Let us now explore the existing modern works on the subject.

**Historiography of military labour history of medieval South Asia**

Military history is neglected in the South Asian academic field due to the dominance of Marxism and, more recently, post-modernism. We have a few books on the military history of medieval India. The earliest modern work on the Mogul army is by the British historian of colonial India, William Irvine. He argues that Indian “racial inferiority” resulted in continuous treachery, infighting, and backbiting, and that this racial/cultural trait prevented the Moguls from constructing a bureaucratic professional standing army capable of waging decisive battles and sieges.3 The latest work on the Mogul army by a Dutch historian, Jos Gommans, asserts that the Mogul army was not geared for decisive confrontations aimed at destroying the enemy. Rather, the Mogul grand strategy was to absorb potential enemies within the loose structure of the Mogul Empire. The Mogul army functioned as an instrument to frighten, coerce, and deter enemies.4

We have a crop of biographies of medieval warlords, rulers, and nobles, which deal with their administrative and military activities. The decline of the Delhi Sultanate started under Sultan Firoz Shah Tughluq. R.C. Jauhri’s biography of Firoz is still useful.5 The best biography of Babur for political and military affairs remains that by the British historian Stanley Lane-Poole, who wrote in the last year of the nineteenth century.6 The most recent biography of Babur by Stephen F. Dale concentrates mostly on political culture.7 The standard biography of Akbar remains the one written by Vincent Smith,

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5 Jauhri, *Firoz Tughluq.*
6 Lane-Poole, *The Emperor Babar.*
a British civil servant in colonial India. The best biographer of Aurangzeb, the last great Mogul, is Jadunath Sarkar. On Sher Shah Suri, the founder of the short-lived Afghan Suri Sultanate, there are two good biographies. As regards the biographies of the warlords, one example is Radhey Shyam’s biography of the Ahmadnagar Sultanate’s slave-turned-warlord, Malik Ambar, who later fought against the Moguls. We have a good biography of Mir Jumla, the famous noble of Aurangzeb. Most of these biographies follow the “history-from-the-top-down” approach and give detailed narrative accounts of the “great men”. However, some data regarding the social aspects of military employments can be gathered from these biographies.

The principal debate in the field is about weak states and flower/ritual warfare versus strong states, standing armies, and decisive battles. Most modern non-Indian scholars (Dirk Kolff, Gommans, Andre Wink, Douglas Streusand, Burton Stein, Lorne Adamson, Stephen Peter Rosen, etc.) argue that the Mogul state was a shadowy structure. The imperial fabric comprised innumerable semi-autonomous principalities held together by the personality of the emperor and the pomp and splendour of the Mogul durbar (court). The emperor did not enjoy a monopoly of violence in the public sphere. The Moguls lacked a drilled and disciplined standing army for crushing opponents on the battlefields. Treachery, diplomacy, bribery, and a show of force resulted in the absorption and assimilation of enemies. What Irvine has categorized as Indian racial inferiority had been transformed as the unique culture of the “Orientals” in the paradigm of these modern scholars.

In contrast, John F. Richards and many of the Indian Muslim historians who are influenced by Marxism and belong to a group which can be labelled the Aligarh School, assert that the Mogul Empire was a centralized agrarian

8 Smith, Akbar.
9 Sarkar wrote a five-volume biography of Aurangzeb, and an abridged version in one volume was later published (A Short History of Aurangzib).
10 Aquil, Sufism, Culture, and Politics; Matta, Sher Shah Suri.
11 Shyam, Life and Times of Malik Ambar.
12 Sarkar, The Life of Mir Jumla.
13 Flower/ritual warfare means indecisive skirmishing, pillaging, and plundering, etc. The objective of such warfare is not destruction of the enemy but to cause harm so that the defeated enemy, with its militia, could be co-opted into the victor’s camp.
15 Richards, The Mughal Empire, p. xv.
bureaucratic polity. The Aligarh School turns the limelight on the agrarian economy; focusing on the revenue documents, they argue that the Moguls’ ability to claim about 50 per cent of the gross produce from the land proves that they had a strong presence at the regional/local level. The sucking of economic surplus from the countryside was aided by the military supremacy of the Moguls, exemplified by the use of cavalry and gunpowder weapons.\(^{16}\) However, M. Athar Ali notes that, unlike the Tudor state, the Mogul state lacked the capability and the intention to legislate.\(^ {17}\) Probably the nature of the Mogul state and Mogul warfare lies somewhere in between the two extreme viewpoints discussed above. Now, let us review the primary sources which are our raw materials for piecing together the social history of the various forms of military employment in Mogul South Asia.

**Review of the primary sources**

Most of the sources generated by the Mogul chroniclers are in Persian. Very few people in the world can read Persian calligraphy of the medieval manuscripts which are scattered in the various museums and libraries of the world. Luckily most of these works have been translated into English. Various regional courts in the Mogul Empire generated chronicles and poems in vernacular languages such as Hindi, Rajasthani, Marathi (*modi* script), Punjabi (*Gurmukhi* script), and Bengali (*charjapada*). These scripts vary from the present-day scripts, and not all the vernacular sources have been translated. For reconstructing the cultural ethos of the Rajputs, who fought the Islamic armies and at times also joined them, *Prithvirajvijayamahakavya* is of some help. This poem, composed by Jayanak, comprises 1,067 *slokas* (stanzas).\(^ {18}\) Somadeva Bhatta’s collection of poems, known as *Kathasaritsagara*,\(^{19}\) composed around 500 CE, offers a glimpse of the warrior ethos of the Hindu mercenaries. In this regard, the various Sanskrit *niti* *sastras* (legal literature such as *Arthasastra*, *Nitiprakasika*, *Sukraniti*) are of some use.

One of the principal sources for our purposes is the memoir of the first Mogul emperor, Babur. Babur wrote his autobiography in Turkish with the title *Tuzuk-i-Baburi*, which was translated into Persian as *Babur-Nama*. A.S.

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\(^{16}\) Habib, *Akbar and His India*; Ali, *Mughal India*; Hasan, *Religion, State, and Society in Medieval India*.

\(^{17}\) Ali, “Political Structures of the Islamic Orient in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, p. 95.

\(^{18}\) Subsequent translations are by the author.

\(^{19}\) All translations are by the author.
Beveridge translated it into English in two volumes. While the first volume deals with Babur’s adventures in Central Asia, the second volume narrates Babur’s activities in Hindustan (north India). Babur’s great-grandson Jahangir (r. 1605-1628) also wrote an autobiography. An intimate biographical account of Babur’s son Humayun is available in a narrative written by the latter’s domestic attendant, Jouher. The **Maathir-ul-Umara**, a collective biography of 730 Mogul nobles by Nawab Samsam-ud-Daulah Shah Nawaz Khan and written between 1768 and 1780, is an important source. This work has been translated by H. Beveridge into English into two volumes. Shah Nawaz Khan’s objective is to give “an account, in alphabetical order, of the lives of the great amirs and exalted nobles – some of whom had, at the time of their glory, by dint of fortune and good conduct, been the authors of great deeds [...] while others had, by the wind of their arrogance and presumption, heaped up final ruin for themselves”. In Akbar’s reign, the highest rank to which an amir (noble) could aspire was that of 5,000 sawars, meaning that he was supposed to maintain 5,000 cavalry. However, a few people attained the rank of 7,000 sawars. These higher ranks were held mostly by the royal princes. Under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, mansabdars of 3,000 possessed their own drums and flags. A noble holding the rank of 500 was of considerable importance. Hence, Shah Nawaz Khan writes, he has included the biographies of nobles who held the mansab of the rank of 500 and upwards. For details of Akbar’s reign, the best source is **Akbar-Nama** by Akbar’s courtier Abul Fazl. Abul Fazl’s **Ain-i-Akbari** is a statistical and ethnographic study of the Mogul Empire. For Shah Jahan’s reign, we have Inayat Khan’s **Shah Jahan Nama**. For abridged translations of the various medieval Persian works dealing with India, the eight volumes of H.M. Elliot and John Dawson’s **History of India** remain useful.

The problem with the Persian sources is that they were written by the elites for the elites, i.e. mostly the relatives of mansabdars for the mansab-

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20 *The Jahangirnama.*
21 *The Tezkereh al Vakiat.*
22 *The Maathir-ul-Umara.* See also I, p. 32.
24 A Mogul official who held a mansab (rank) in lieu of jagirs was known as a mansabdar. In accordance with his rank, he had to maintain a military contingent, which he did out of the revenues of the jagirs assigned to him.
26 *The Akbar-Nama* was first completed in 1596.
27 *Shah Jahan Nama of Inayat Khan,* ed. by Begley and Desai.
28 *The History of India as told by its own Historians.*
The court chroniclers and the nobles who wrote while enjoying the patronage of the rulers concentrated mostly on the doings of the durbar and not on those lower placed. Hence, we can recreate the picture about the officer corps (especially the senior ranks) of the Mogul army but we know very little about the rank and file. And the common soldiers have left us with no written materials. Let us now look at the forms of military employment which were in vogue in the subcontinent when the Moguls arrived.

The rise and fall of the mamluk system, c. 1200-1399

The Delhi Sultanate depended on irregular troops (mercenaries and retainers of the tributary chieftains) and regular soldiers (ghulams, i.e., slaves plus soldiers raised and maintained by the iqtadars). The irregular troops were assembled during campaigns and other emergencies (civil wars, invasion by foreign powers, etc.) and the regular troops were maintained throughout the year as a sort of standing army.

The early rulers of the Delhi Sultanate, such as Muhammad Ghori, Qutub-ud-din Aibak and Ilutmish (or Altamash, sultan from 1211 to 1236), were influenced by the ghulam/mamluk system which was prevalent in the Middle East. For inspiration and a model to follow, these three sultans looked at the political and military system prevalent in the Caliphate and in the other Muslim polities of the Middle East. The mamluk institution first came into existence during the first half of the ninth century, under the Abbasid Caliphate. Peter Jackson writes that by the eleventh century Turkish slave regiments were prevalent in the polities of Transoxiana, Turkestan, Persia (Iran), and the Near East. The shock troops and the core of the Delhi Sultanate’s army comprised mounted Turkish ghulams. Many of the sultans, such as Aibak, Ilutmish, Balban (r. 1266-1287), and so forth, started their careers as ghulams. Firoz Shah Tughluq (r. 1351-1388) maintained 180,000 slaves, of whom 40,000 served in the army. Some slaves

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29 Abul Fazl himself was a mansabdar holding the rank of 4,000: The History of India, Elliot and Dawson, VI, Akbar-Nama of Abul Fazl, p. 2.
30 An iqtadar was the holder of an iqta (a piece of land). The revenue of the iqta went to support the cavalry force of the iqtadar.
32 Jackson, “Turkish Slaves on Islam’s Indian Frontier”, pp. 64-65.
specialized in archery, others in swordsmanship, and so on. The slaves were occasionally paid in cash, but usually through jagirs.33

Next in importance were the contingents of the iqtagars. The nobles were granted land, i.e., iqtas (the equivalent of jagirs), for maintaining cavalry troopers. The iqtagars (holder of iqtas) paid the soldiers under their command out of the revenues collected from their iqtas.34 Initially, the iqtas were granted not to the Hindu chieftains but to the Turkish nobles. The iqtagars and their soldiers (who were their kinsmen)35 joined military service for material gain. However, it would be wrong to categorize them as mercenaries, because their military employment depended on the political fortunes of the sultan. If a particular sultan was overthrown, his favourite iqtagars were replaced by nobles who supported the cause of the victor. The iqtagari system was not professional because the iqtas were given for life; when the regular soldiers grew old, they remained in the ranks, and after their death their male relations inherited their posts.36 The iqta system was a technique of rewarding the free-born Turkish nobles who constituted the support base of the Delhi sultans. In the absence of a bureaucracy, the nobles were installed as iqtagars directly into the countryside, where their function was to collect any agricultural surplus. With the passage of time, especially under the Khaljis and the Lodis, iqta was granted to the non-Turkish Muslims for broadening the support base of the Delhi Sultanate. To an extent, the iqta were somewhat equivalent to timars and the iqtagari cavaliers were somewhat similar to timariots (sipahis) of the Ottoman Army.37

However, shifts in the international balance of power, as well as the enormous demographic resources of the subcontinent, encouraged the Delhi Sultanate to change the ethnic composition of the ghulams and to depend on the free-floating armed mercenaries of Hindustan. Initially, the Delhi Sultanate relied on Turkish slaves to fill the ghulam units. The Mongol invasions of Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iran resulted in the Delhi Sultanate being completely cut off from the manpower supplies of the extra-Indian Islamic world. The cessation of the flow of Turkish and Afghan manpower forced the Delhi sultans to enslave Hindu boys and convert them to Islam; they were then inducted into the ranks of ghulams. This process was somewhat similar to the Ottoman practice of capturing young Christian boys in the Balkans

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33 Jauhari, Firoz Tughluq, pp. 126-128; Jackson, “The Mamluk Institution in Early Muslim India”, pp. 344-357.
34 Jauhari, Firoz Tughluq, pp. 86, 118.
36 Jauhari, Firoz Tughluq, p. 120.
who were, after their forcible conversion into Islam, inducted as janissaries. The Delhi Sultanate was faced simultaneously with Mongol challenges in Sind and Punjab; within South Asia, the Rajput chieftains started to nibble away at the internal frontiers of the Sultanate. One way to maintain and expand the size of the army was to hire indigenous mercenaries as well as to utilize the forces of the defeated chiefs. The free-floating mercenaries had their own horses, armour, and equipment. They were paid in cash and they also had a right to the loot taken from the defeated enemies. Unlike the ghulams and the iqtadari soldiers, the mercenaries were employed either for a single season only or during emergencies.

In 1353, when Firoz Tughluq marched from Delhi towards Bengal with 70,000 soldiers, many Hindu chieftains who had stopped paying tribute joined him with their war bands. These chieftains with their warriors (who belonged to the same religion and mobilized through the territorial clan network) were forced to join the sultanate’s expeditionary armies and were not remunerated in any way. It was a sort of begari (forced unpaid labour) and could be categorized as a case of an ethnic tributary form of military employment.

During the 1365 Thatta (Sind) campaign, Firoz, as well as depending on the ghulams and iqtadari troops, also recruited the free-floating mercenaries. They were paid 40 per cent of their salaries in advance. After Firoz was repulsed in Sind, he prepared another army for a second campaign against Sind during 1366-1367. In addition to mobilizing the soldiers of the iqtadars, Firoz hired mercenaries. The mercenaries were paid three-fifths of their salaries in advance so that they could equip themselves. The personnel of the standing army during this campaign also received payment in cash. This was possible as there were various types of gold and silver coins in circulation in Firoz’s time. In fact, the whole revenue of Gujarat, which amounted to 20 million tankas (coins) was used in paying the army. To prevent desertion of the troops during the second Sind campaign, sentinels were appointed. Deserters were disgraced publicly if caught. Timur’s invasion of India during 1398-1399 with 84,000 cavalry dealt a deathblow to the Delhi Sultanate. Further, it encouraged many other Central Asian adventurers such as Babur to invade the weakening Delhi Sultanate.

38 Jackson, “The Mongols and the Delhi Sultanate in the Reign of Muhammad Tughluq”.
39 Habibullah, The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India.
40 Jauhri, Firoz Tughluq, pp. 46-47.
41 Ibid., pp. 81, 84-85, 118, 131.
42 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 244.
The armies of the early Moguls and their opponents, 1494-1556

In 1494, Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur inherited the Kingdom of Ferghana from his father Omar Shaikh, son of Abu Shaikh, the great-grandson of Timur. Babur relied on different types of military labour. During the Battle of Sar-i-Pul, fought in 1501 with the Uzbek chief Shaibani Khan, Babur deployed household troops. Virginia Aksan writes that the Ottoman sultan's court was organized as a household and that the state was regarded as patrimony. The household comprised the sultan's army and his military headquarters. The household troops constituted the core group of Babur's army. They provided the "braves", the crack soldiers who carried out daredevil manoeuvres on the battlefield. They joined Babur's side due to family and clan connections. And, being attached to Babur by personal relations, unlike the tribal mercenaries, they did not change sides in accordance with the fluctuating political circumstances. By profession, they were warriors and fought bravely for Babur, like a band of brothers. And they got the best rewards after a successful campaign. In 1497, Babur occupied Samarkhand. In 1498-1499, Babur commanded some 2,000 Mongol soldiers from one tribe. He said that these soldiers had come to him from his mother's side. Babur's mother was the daughter of Yunus Khan, who was a distant descendant of the Mongol leader Chingiz Khan. The Mongol horse archers carried out flank attacks (known as taulqama charges), which required special skills. They played an important role in routing the Lodi forces at the First Battle of Panipat (21 April 1526).

Babur mentions that the Mongol settlers in Central Asia were organized in various tribes. Many Mongol tribes who had no blood relation to Babur joined him. Each Mongol tribe at that time comprised 3,000-4,000 families. Most of these tribes were mobile but some had a particular territorial designation. In 1504-1505, Rusta-Hazara, a Mongol tribe from Badakshan, joined Babur. At different times, several tribal leaders with their retainers joined Babur in search of loot and plunder. Babur had not defeated these tribal chieftains and forced them to join his army with their retainers; instead, the

43 Lane-Poole, *The Emperor Babar*, p. 17.
44 Babur-Nama, I, pp. 138-139.
45 Aksan, "Ottoman War and Warfare", p. 150.
46 Abul Fazl uses the term diwanian to designate the household troops who were considered the most loyal and courageous: *The Akbar-Nama*, I, pp. 263-264.
47 Babur-Nama, I, pp. 19, 21, 105, 164. Beveridge uses the term "Mughals" to designate the descendants of Chingiz Khan who were settled in Central Asia.
48 Ibid., II, pp. 472-473.
soldiers belonging to a particular tribe fought under their tribal leader, who acknowledged the supremacy of Babur. The tribal chiefs changed sides in accordance with the fortunes of war. They joined a successful charismatic warlord who provided them with loot and plunder. For example, in 1504, after the defeat of Wali (a brother of Khusrau Shah) by Shaibani Khan, the former joined Babur with his Mongol kinsmen. It was a case of an ethnic (reciprocal) mercenary sort of military employment. However, at certain junctures, the Mongol tribes proved unreliable. Their loyalty to Babur was conditional and pragmatic. In general, the Mongol tribes were more willing to serve a Chingizid prince rather than a Timurid mirza (royal prince) such as Babur. While wandering in Central Asia, Babur mentioned that some rulers maintained ghulams, though he himself never utilized them. The army of about 10,000-12,000 men with which Babur attacked the Delhi Sultanate comprised household troops, various Mongol and Turkish tribes, and a few Ottoman mercenaries. Abul Fazl uses the terms “Turks” and “Tajiks” to describe the ethnic composition of Babur’s force.

Babur’s opponent at the First Battle of Panipat, Sultan Ibrahim Lodi (r. 1517-1526) depended on the indigenous mercenaries. Ibrahim Lodi, being an Afghan, preferred Afghan soldiers. Abul Fazl deliberately inflates the size of Ibrahim’s army to highlight the courage of the Mogul soldiers and the leadership ability of Babur. Fazl claimed that Ibrahim commanded 100,000 cavalry and 1,000 elephants. When Timur invaded India, the Delhi Sultanate commanded a bigger region than the area controlled by Ibrahim. However, the Sultanate could only scrape up 10,000 cavalry and 120 elephants to oppose Timur.

After being victorious at First Panipat, many Afghan chieftains in India (who were either semi-autonomous or in Lodi service) joined Babur as tributaries with their retainers (some of the bands numbering up to 3,000-4,000 men each). In many cases, they were forced to join Babur after being defeated in battle. Again, many important chieftains who submitted to Babur were rewarded with land grants. Fath Khan Sherwani was one of Ibrahim Lodi’s nobles. When Fath Khan submitted to Babur, the former was given 1 crore 6 lakhs (1 lakh is 100,000; 1 crore is 100 lakhs or 10 million) as a

49 Ibid., I, pp. 188-189, 192, 196, 253.
51 Babur-Nama, I, p. 102.
52 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 240.
54 Lane-Poole, The Emperor Babar, p. 172.
reward, and his son Mahmud Khan was taken in the Mogul army. Shaikh Guhran entered Babur's service with 3,000 bowmen from the Ganga-Jamuna doab. Firuz Khan, an Afghan noble of the Lodis who submitted to Babur, received a jagir worth one crore tankas in Jaunpur, and Mahmud Khan received a jagir worth 90 lakhs in Ghazipur.

However, not all the Afghan chiefs submitted to Babur. Many of them allied with Rajput chieftain Rana Sangram Singh (also known as Rana Sangha), the ruler of Chitor (Udaipur) and confronted the Moguls at the Battle of Khanwa (16 March 1527). The combined Rajput-Afghan force, writes Abul Fazl, numbered 201,000 cavalry. Superior firepower and horse archery again gave victory to the Moguls.

After the death of Babur (26 December 1530), his eldest son Humayun ascended the Mogul throne. Gujarat and east India were the two trouble spots for Humayun. In 1533, Bahadur Shah, the sultan of Gujarat, depended on 6,000 Abyssinian volunteers. Some of Bahadur Shah’s infantry were mercenaries from the Bhil and Koli tribes. Bahadur Shah provided 20 crore of Gujarati coins to one of his nobles, Tatar Khan, who with this money hired 40,000 Afghan mercenary cavalry. Some Muslims of Gujarat also joined his artillery branch as mercenaries. Bahadur Shah also relied on some tributary Rajput chieftains who joined his standard with their cavalry retainers. Humayun moved into Gujarat with 30,000 cavalry. By 1535, Gujarat was conquered. In 1531, Humayun moved into east India and defeated several Afghan chieftains. They were ordered to join the Mogul service with their retainers. However, such tributary soldiers proved disloyal, deserting and joining Farid (who became Sher Khan and then Sher Shah) who challenged Humayun.

Sher Shah was from the Afghan tribe of Sur. His grandfather was a horse merchant in Agra. Sher recruited Afghans from Bihar, and many Rajput chieftains with their clansmen also joined his banner. While the Rajputs in his army were mercenaries, the Afghans were mobilized through tribal/clan networks. Sher called the Afghan qaum (community) to mobilize against

55 The Akbar-Nama, I, pp. 256-257.
56 Ibid., I, p. 253.
57 Ibid., I, pp. 260-261. Fazl no doubt gives an exaggerated figure of the enemy force, as maintaining such a large force was logistically impossible.
58 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, p. 7; The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 309.
59 The History of India, Elliot and Dawson, VI, Akbar-Nama, pp. 11-12.
60 Ibid., p. 14.
62 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, p. 3.
63 The Akbar-Nama, I, pp. 326-327.
the alien Moguls. Before fighting Humayun, Sher conscripted the Afghans of Bihar to join his army. This was a rare case of conscription in Indian history. For the Afghans in Sher’s army, it was a case of ethnic conscription. Some of Sher’s officers were ghulam but they were in a minority. By 1540, Sher commanded 150,000 cavalry and 25,000 foot soldiers.

According to one estimate, in 1540, Humayun mobilized 90,000 cavalry against Sher Shah. When Humayun fought Sher in the two battles of Chausa (27 June 1539) and Kanauj (17 May 1540), the household troops of Babur did not prove loyal to Humayun. Many household troops joined Humayun’s half-brothers, Kamran in particular. Kamran provided only 3,000 of his 20,000 cavalry to Humayun. Babur’s nobles were also divided as regards their loyalty to Humayun. After being defeated by Sher, Humayun reached Persia through Sind, which was under the Safavid Dynasty. During 1544, with the help of 14,000 Persian cavalry, Humayun was able to capture Kandahar, which was then handed over to a Persian garrison. In 1545, Humayun recaptured Kandahar from the Persians in a surprise attack with the aid of mercenary Afghan soldiers. In 1551, Humayun captured Kabul from his brother Mirza Kamran. In 1553, Humayun moved towards Peshawar. At that time, several Uzbek chiefs joined his standard. There is no evidence of any Uzbek tribes joining Babur. Some of the Uzbeks served Humayun’s son Akbar. Sher Shah died on 23 May 1545 and was succeeded by his son Islam Shah. On his death in 1553, the Suri Empire broke up into four parts. In 1554, Humayun invaded India and defeated the Afghan ruler of Punjab Sikander Suri at Sirhind. The prospect of plunder attracted many mercenaries from Central Asia to Humayun’s standard. They were employed as temporary volunteers. Jouher writes:

About this time nearly 500 Moghul soldiers came from beyond the river Oxus to seek for employment; but as very few of them were armed, the general consulted me what he should do with them; I said,

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65 Matta, *Sher Shah Suri*, p. 89.
67 *The Tezkereh al Vakiat*, p. 20.
70 *The Tezkereh al Vakiat*, pp. 77, 80-82.
72 *The Tezkereh al Vakiat*, pp. 113-115; Richards, *The Mughal Empire*, p. 12.
“give each of them a bow and a quiver of arrows, and advance them a small sum of money to support them for a month, by which time the business with the Afghans will be settled”. He took my advice, and having advanced the money to the Moghuls, they joined the army as volunteers.73

When Humayun recaptured the Mogul throne, Persian Shias began joining the Mogul service in large numbers.74

After Humayun's death on 21 January 1556, Akbar ascended the Mogul throne at Kalanaur in Punjab.75 A Hindu general of the Suri dynasty named Hemu declared his independence and captured Delhi. Abul Fazl notes that Hemu's tribe, the Dhusar, was engaged in making and selling saltpetre in Gurgaon district.76 Hemu's army numbered 50,000 cavalry, comprising Afghans, Rajputs, and some Brahman mercenaries. Some of the Rajputs were from the Jhansi district of north India. Most of the senior officers of Hemu's army were his relatives from the Brahman caste. Hemu won over the Afghan chiefs by distributing land grants and treasure.77 At Panipat, Hemu deployed 30,000 cavalry. The Mogul army, 10,000 strong, under the nominal leadership of Akbar but actually under the noble Bairam Khan (a Turk), advanced from Kalanaur in Punjab to confront Hemu, again at the historical field of Panipat.78

The emergence of the mansabdari system, 1556-1650

After achieving victory in the Second Battle of Panipat (5 November 1556), Akbar faced challenges from some of the Muslim nobles of Humayun as well as from the Afghans of east India. Unlike Babur, under Akbar the base of the Mogul Empire was no longer Afghanistan, but north India proper. So, unlike Babur and Humayun, Akbar could not tap the Turkish tribes settled around the Oxus River. Moreover, by this time, the Uzbek Khanate, the sworn enemy of the Mogul Empire, had been resurrected in Central Asia. Akbar realized that he needed to broaden the basis of his rule by integrating the Hindu chieftains within his regime, and one way to ensure loyalty among the various

73 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, p. 118. Here “Moghul” refers to Mongols.
74 Khan, “Akbar’s Personality Traits and World Outlook”, p. 82.
75 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, pp. 120-121.
76 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 617.
77 Ibid., II, pp. 47-48, 59; Bhargava, Hemu and His Times; see esp. pp. 13, 90, 100. Richards claims that Hemu was of the Vaisya (trader) caste: Mughal Empire, p. 13.
groups of Muslim nobles and Hindu chieftains was to establish a personalized and semi-bureaucratic relationship with them. Such a relationship, reasoned Akbar, would generate a more cohesive and loyal force than would dependence on the tribal retainers. By trial and error, Akbar evolved the mansabdari system. The mansabdars of Akbar comprised Persians, Turanis, Muslims born in India, and the Rajput chieftains. Many Turani and Afghan chieftains realized that the institution of the mansabdari system was an attempt to curb their independence, so they revolted. However, Akbar was able to quash the rebellions with the aid of his loyal mansabdars. One example will suffice. In 1572, the mirzas in collusion with the Afghan chieftains revolted against Akbar. The forces under the mirzas comprised Abyssinians, and men from Badakshan and Transoxiana. The rebellion was crushed in 1573.

Mansab technically meant rank, and the holder of the mansab was known as mansabdar (an imperial official) and was granted a jagir. The lowest-ranking mansabdar commanded 10 cavalry and the highest-ranking mansabdar 10,000. In Akbar’s time, most of the mansabdars above the rank of 5,000 were his sons. Under Akbar’s successor, a mansabdar held two ranks: zat and sawar ranks. The zat rank denoted the personal rank of the Mogul noble in the mansabdari system while the sawar rank denoted the number of cavalry which the mansabdar had to maintain for imperial service. In a contingent of a mansabdar of 10,000, other mansabdars as high as hazaris (commanders of 1,000) served. In the contingent of a mansabdar of 8,000, mansabdars who were commanders of 800 sawar served; for a mansabdar of 7,000, mansabdars up to the rank of 700 served. Abdul Kadir Badauni (a chronicler who lived in Akbar’s time) had written that the contingent of a mansabdar comprised khas-khailan (his personal dependants which included friends, relatives, and clan members, etc.) as well as bargirs who were mercenaries. To borrow John Lynn’s army style model, the Mogul army, mainly centred around the mansabdari system, was not a state commission army but an agglomeration of quasi-bureaucratic units.

80 The Akbar Nama, III, p. 76.
82 M. Athar Ali claims that sawar rank represented the number of horses and half the number of troopers, a mansabdar had to maintain. This means that a mansabdar of 100 sawar rank maintained 100 horses and 50 troopers. See Ali, “Organization of the Nobility”, p. 250.
84 The History of India, Elliot and Dawson, V, Tarikh-i-Badauni, of Abdul Kadir Badauni, p. 515. A bargir was a trooper without a horse. His employer provided him with a horse when he joined the contingent.
85 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West”.
J.S. Grewal says that the mansabdari system represented a suzerain/vassal relationship. The mansabdari system was also partly a case of the tributary form of military employment. After being defeated, the chieftains belonging to different principalities were encouraged and at times coerced to serve in the Mogul army and in return were rewarded with jagirs. When Akbar established himself at Agra, a large number of principalities were under the control of autonomous and semi-autonomous hereditary chieftains. The latter were known as rajas, ranas, rawats, or rais. They were also known as Rajputs, and the Mogul chroniclers called them zamindars. Some of the Rajput chieftains maintained large numbers of cavalry. Those who joined the Mogul service were granted mansabs. During Shah Jahan’s reign, large numbers of mansabs were granted to the Muslim nobles of the Deccani sultanates in order to win them over to Mogul service.

Throughout the territories under their control, the Moguls collected taxes from the peasants through the zamindars who were allowed a certain commission for discharging this duty. The military retainers of the zamindars, claims Douglas E. Streusand, comprised a nucleus of retainers from their own caste supplemented by the peasants. Many zamindars who were loyal to the Mogul Empire and were in the good books of the Mogul provincial governors (subadars) were inducted in the mansabdari service. By joining the mansabdari service they received additional land grants which enabled them to maintain larger number of cavalry with which they could defeat local opposition to their rule. One example will suffice. In the thirtieth regnal year of Shah Jahan (r. 1628-1658), Salabat Khan, the governor of the suba (province) of Allahabad, introduced Anup Singh, the zamindar of Bandhu in the durbar. Shah Jahan awarded Anup Singh a mansab of 3,000 and granted him a jagir for maintaining the troopers in accordance with the number stipulated in his mansab.

Many Persian and Turani adventurers who came to India in search of employment were also appointed as mansabdars. In 1595, there were 279 mansabdars, of whom 47 were Rajputs (Hindus) and 75 were Persians (Shias). Many Indian Muslims were also given mansab ranks. For instance,

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87 Khan, “Akbar’s Initial Encounters with the Chiefs”, pp. 1, 6.
88 Moosvi, “The Mughal Empire and Deccan”, p. 221.
89 Hasan, “Zamindars under the Mughals”, p. 137.
90 Streusand, *The Formation of the Mughal Empire*, p. 43.
91 Shah Jahan Nama of Inayat Khan, ed. by Begley and Desai, pp. 529-530.
one shaikhzada from Lucknow was granted a mansab of 700 by Akbar. In the eleventh year of Shah Jahan’s reign, the son of Nazar Muhammad, the ruler of Balkh came to India and joined Mogul service. He was granted ranks of 1,500 zat and 800 sawar and given a jagir in Bihar.93

The mansabdari system was a quasi-professional and partly bureaucratic system as there were thirty-three to sixty-six grades. On the basis of their performance, the mansabdars were either promoted to higher ranks or demoted to lower ones. Besides possessing a hierarchy, the mansabdars were also transferred to different regions in their service life and were occasionally suspended from service. Athar Ali asserts that the mansabdars in general were transferred every two to three years.94 Generally, mansabdars were given lifelong employment by the Mogul durbar. Unlike the mercenaries, the mansabdars’ freedom in leaving the service was limited. Khwaja Abdullah, a mansabdar in 1611 under Jahangir’s reign, was ordered to move into Deccan. However, he left Deccan without imperial permission and, in retaliation, his jagir was sequestered by the imperial government. For some time, he was imprisoned in the fort of Asir. When Shah Jahan ascended the throne, Abdullah was reinstated in service and given ranks of 5,000 zat and 5,000 sawar. Again Raja Pratap of Ujjain, a Hindu chieftain of Bihar, who held ranks of 1,500 zat and 1,000 sawar, withdrew from service in the tenth year of Shah Jahan’s reign. An army was sent against him and, after being defeated in battle, he was executed. In the twentieth year of Shah Jahan’s reign, Abdul Haji Khwaja held the zat rank of 900 and sawar rank of 600. In the next year, he was promoted to the zat rank of 1,500 and sawar rank of 800. In the twenty-third year of Shah Jahan’s reign, his sawar rank was increased to 1,000. During the fourth year of Shah Jahan’s reign, Khwaja was deployed in Deccan and then in Malwa. In the twenty-sixth year of Shah Jahan’s reign, Khwaja was sent with Prince Dara Shikoh (Shah Jahan’s eldest son) to Kandahar to fight the Safavids. At that time, his sawar rank remained 1,000, but his zat rank was raised from 1,500 to 2,000. In the twenty-seventh year of Shah Jahan’s reign, Khwaja was given the honour of possessing a flag.95 Again, Akbar introduced the descriptive roll system and the issue of pay was dependent on the inspection of these rolls by the imperial inspectors.

To prevent borrowing of horses between the mansabdars, Akbar made the system of branding horses compulsory.96 The punishment in the Mogul

93 The Maathir-ul-Umara, I, pp. 48-49.
army for looting civilians was physical mutilation, cutting off the nose of the offender.97

The mansabdari system was quasi-professional because there was no training academy for the mansabdars. Unlike the European monarchs and princes, the Mogul emperors did not set up any institution for teaching military arts to the nobles. For instance, in 1606, an academy was founded at Sedan by the duc de Bouillon, brother-in-law of Prince Maurice of Orange. Between 1608 and 1610, the Venetian Republic established four academies (at Padua, Treviso, Udine, and Verona) to train skilled cavalrymen. Similar institutions were opened by Landgrave Maurice of Hesse-Cassel (1618), by Denmark’s Christian IV at Soro in 1623, and by the military entrepreneur Count Albrecht von Wallensteim at Gitschin in 1624. Don Gaspar de Guzman Olivares (1587-1645, count- duke and chief minister of Philip IV of Spain) pushed for the opening of the Colegio Imperial (a military academy for the nobles) at Madrid in 1625.98 The Delhi Sultanate held periodic furusiya exercises for training mounted archers. In addition, the cavaliers were trained in playing chaugan (polo) and swordsmanship.99 We are not sure whether these practices continued in Mogul India or not. Probably, most of the mansabdars and their contingents got on-the-job training on the battlefield. However, hunting as military training continued under the Moguls. The mansabdari system was not hereditary. Nevertheless, mansabdars who displayed bravery and loyalty in imperial service had their male heirs’ and relatives’ cases assessed favourably by the durbar. When a son was allowed to succeed his father, his mansab was generally lower than that of his father. The son had to prove himself to achieve a rank similar to or higher than his father’s. To give an example, Mir Kamal-ud-Din came to India and served Akbar. Kamal-ud-Din’s son Mirak Husain served Jahangir and Husain’s son Muin-ud-Din served Shah Jahan. Under Aurangzeb, Muin-ud-Din became the diwan (officer in charge of finance) of Lahore, Multan, Kabul, and Kashmir. When Abdul Hadi Khwaja, the mansabdar of Shah Jahan and holding zat rank of 2,000 and sawar rank of 1,000 died in 1656, his son, Khawaja Jah, was given the zat rank of 1,000 and sawar rank of 400. For the mansabdars, there was no clear separation of civilian and military posts. Khwaja Abdul Majid, who came from Central Asia, joined Humayun and became a diwan. In Akbar’s reign, he became the governor of Delhi and held

97 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, II, 1754-71, p. 18.
a mansab of 3,000,109 and in his time most of the higher-ranking mansabdars were governors of subas.101

Technical skills and foreign mercenaries

For manufacturing and manning gunpowder weapons, Mogul dependence on foreign professionals continued from Babur to Akbar. During the First Battle of Panipat, Ustad Ali Quli Khan was in charge of positioning the matchlock men behind the chained baggage carts and the field guns deployed in the centre of Babur’s army at Panipat. In addition, Ustad Quli Khan was also in charge of manufacturing stone-throwing mortars of various sizes required for deployment on the battlefield as well as for taking the forts. He was present in the Battle of Chaldiran,102 fought in 1514 between the Ottomans and the Persians, where the Ottomans deployed chained baggage carts behind which they placed their field guns and matchlock men.103 Another Rumi (Ottoman) mercenary of Babur was Mustafa, who commanded the culverins in the Battle of Khanwa and was in charge of arranging the chained carts in the Rumi way during the battle. In this battle, Ustad Quli deployed the matchlock men behind mobile wooden tripods.104 The technical skill of the Ottoman mercenaries in manufacturing and manning gunpowder weapons made Ustad Quli Khan and Mustafa valuable for Babur. They could be categorized as professional mercenaries.

Babur’s son Humayun continued to depend on them; some of these mercenaries were actually deserters who joined the Mogul service probably due to the greater prospect of loot and plunder. Some of the technical/professional mercenaries’ children also followed the profession of their fathers. Ustad Ali Quli’s son, M.K. Rumi, was in charge of the Mogul gun carriages and mortars during the Battle of Kanauj.105 Rumi Khan, the commandant of the Gujarat Sultanate’s artillery department, deserted Sultan Bahadur Shah and joined Humayun in 1533. Rumi Khan was a military engineer and was considered an expert in siege warfare. In 1537, he advised Humayun in conducting the siege of Chunar Fort held by Sher Shah. Mining, sapping, and the construction of batteries were done under

100 The Maathir-ul-Umara, I, pp. 12, 36-37.
102 The Babur-Nama, II, pp. 466, 468-469, 473, 536, 599-600, 667.
103 Lane-Poole, The Emperor Babar, p. 162.
104 Babur-Nama, II, pp. 550, 557-558; The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 263.
105 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 351.
the advice of Rumi Khan. Under Humayun, Rumi Khan became Mir Atish (director-general of artillery). In 1555, Ustad Aziz Sistani from Aleppo was taken into the Mogul army for his expertise in pyrotechnics. In 1591, while campaigning in Sind, the siege operation against Unarpur Fort was directed by Ustad Yar Muhammad Khan. He was considered an expert in the Ottoman technique of raising mounds of sand on which the Mogul batteries were placed during the siege. Yar Muhammad Khan had come from Persia. Certain Ottoman military techniques had seeped into Iran due to Ottoman-Safavid military confrontations. So, we could speculate that he was adept at Ottoman techniques of siege warfare.

Besides the Moguls, the other Islamic polities in South Asia also depended on foreign mercenaries for harnessing gunpowder technology. The largest bronze cannon at Bijapur, Malik Maidan, was cast by a Turkish engineer named Muhammad bin Hasan Rumi in 1548. In addition to the Turks, the subcontinent’s rulers also hired West Europeans in the artillery department. Bahadur Shah of Gujarat had many Portuguese gunners in his army. From the second half of the seventeenth century, the Mogul artillery was manned by Portuguese, British, Dutch, German, and French mercenaries. These foreigners were deserters from European ships and entered Mogul dominion through Goa for higher pay. They were paid Rs 200 per month.

Regional levies

The Moguls, like the Delhi Sultanate, also depended on the indigenous regional levies. For foot musketeers, who were especially important during siege operations, the Mogul Empire hired Hindu mercenaries through the zamindars. Jahangir noted in his autobiography that in 1609: “I ordered the nephew of Bihari Chand, the qanungo [magistrate] of the Agra sarkar, to muster a thousand foot soldiers from the zamindars of Agra, fix a monthly stipend for them, and take them to Pervez in the Deccan.” Most of the foot

106 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, pp. 4-5, 9-10.
107 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 331.
108 Ibid., I, p. 640.
111 Richards, The Mughal Empire, p. 10.
112 The History of India, Elliot and Dawson, VI, Appendix, p. 469.
113 The Jahangirnama, p. 104.
soldiers came from Allahabad, Buxar, and Bhojpur in the Shahabad District, south of Ganga and west of the Son River. These people belonged to the Ujjayina branch of Rajputs. Another locality which provided the foot soldiers was Baiswara in Awadh which was inhabited by Baiswara Rajputs. The Unao and Rae Bareilly districts, which covered about 2,000 square miles, were inhabited by Baiswara Rajputs.\(^{114}\) Incidentally, these groups joined the infantry of Sher Shah and Hemu.\(^{115}\) And after the Moguls, the Rajputs of Bihar served in the infantry of Maratha Confederacy and the East India Company during the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. The *Ain-i-Akbari* notes some regions where matchlock men were available in large numbers, Bhograi and Kasijora mahals (districts) in Jaleswar *Sarkar* (division, which means a collection of districts) of Orissa.\(^{116}\) The Moguls probably also tapped these sources. The musketeers of the Mogul army also came from Bundelkhand and Karnatak. The Karnatakis served in the army of the Bijapur Sultanate as well.\(^{117}\) In addition to musketeers, the Mogul army hired men equipped with *bans* (rockets). The Afghans of Bengal were considered experts in this branch of warfare.\(^ {118}\)

**Miscellaneous mini-systems**

Towards the end of the sixteenth century, in the regions outside the Mogul Empire, various other forms of military employment were operational. In the Ahmadnagar Sultanate in western Deccan, Abyssinian military slaves and Abyssinian mercenaries played an important role.\(^{119}\) The Abyssinians (also known as *Habshis* in India) were African Muslims from Ethiopia who either came to India as free-born adventurers or were imported as slaves. Most of the slaves originated in the Kambata region of southern Ethiopia. The Deccani sultanates exported cotton textiles and ivory, and imported Abyssinian slaves plus Arabian war horses.\(^{120}\) According to one estimate,
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, about 10,000-12,000 slaves were exported annually from Ethiopia for the Deccani sultanates.  

One of the most famous Habshi slaves was Malik Ambar. Malik Ambar was born at Harare in Ethiopia in 1548-1549. His parents sold him in the slave market of Baghdad where he was bought by the slave merchant Mir Qasim. Then, he was sold to Changiz Khan, who had 1,000 slaves and was an important noble of the Ahmadnagar Sultanate. When Changiz Khan died, Malik Ambar enrolled himself as an ordinary soldier in the Ahmadnagar army. We do not know whether Malik Ambar was ever manumitted or not. His rise to power started when he was made a commander of 150 horse-men of Ahmadnagar. This time, Ambar's status was that of a military entrepreneur. Within a few years, Malik Ambar became the “sultan maker” and principal noble of the Ahmadnagar Sultanate until his death in 1626. During the eighteenth century, the Abyssinian (also referred to as Arab) mercenaries continued in the service of the Maratha Confederacy.

In addition to the Abyssinian mercenaries and the slaves, the Ahmadnagar Sultanate also depended upon the semi-autonomous Koli chiefs who provided cavalry and infantry and occasionally changed sides in accordance with the shifting political circumstances. The Kolis joined the Maratha warlord Shivaji’s infantry during the second half of the seventeenth century. In 1625, to fight the Portuguese, who fielded mainly infantry equipped with handguns, Malik Ambar requisitioned foot soldiers (known as hasham) from the karkuns (district officials) of Chaul in western Maharashtra. They were experts in the use of firearms, like the Rajputs of Awadh and Bihar who joined the Mogul infantry. The employment of musketeers spread in response to the firepower-heavy infantry of the Portuguese. As the Mogul Empire spread into Deccan during the second half of the seventeenth century, the mansabdari system more or less eclipsed the other mini-systems of military employment.

Demography, economy, and military labourers

At the end of the sixteenth century, the population of England was 4 million, Spain’s was 7 million, and France’s was 14 million. Between 1450

121 Ibid., pp. 109-111.
123 Ibid., pp. 22, 147.
and 1700, the population of Europe rose from 50 million to 120 million.\textsuperscript{125} During the eighteenth century, while Iran's population was 9 million, the population of the Ottoman Empire was 30 million.\textsuperscript{126} In 1601, the population of the subcontinent (3.2 million km\textsuperscript{2}) was 145 million.\textsuperscript{127} In the seventeenth century, the rate of increase of population was roughly 0.21 per cent per annum.\textsuperscript{128} The vast demographic resources of South Asia resulted in the absence of conscription in the subcontinent.

The very existence of an extensive potential military labour pool did not encourage the Mogul emperors to maintain a select standing army comprising drilled and disciplined infantry and cavalry troopers. Since supply exceeded demand, there was no point in maintaining a big standing army year after year. Rather, during emergencies, infantry and cavalry were raised at short notice and sent to the trouble spots. And after the crisis was over, the soldiers hired from the zamindars for a particular campaign were disbanded. Abul Fazl tells us that in Akbar's empire (which excluded Deccan and south India), the zamindars were able to furnish 4 million and 4 lakh armed men.\textsuperscript{129} The \textit{Ain-i-Akbari} further informs us that the forces under the zamindars of Bengal Suba comprised 23,330 cavalry and 801,150 infantry.\textsuperscript{130}

Politics and the culture of military remuneration, and not the economy of South Asia, payment of the military entrepreneurs and their retainers through land grants rather than cash. Instead of economic forces, the nature of politics determined the form of remuneration to the military labourers. The centralized Turkish state built by Sultan Alauddin Khalji (r. 1296-1316), who had a standing cavalry force paid in tankas, had disintegrated by the time of the establishment of the Lodi dynasty under Bahlul (r. 1451-1489). John F. Richards writes that there was no shortage of precious metal in north India, and trade and commerce were flourishing in the first half of the sixteenth century there. However, due to the decentralized tribal nature of Lodi polity, Bahlul was forced to assign land grants permanently to the various Afghan tribal chiefs (Lodi, Lohani, Farmuli, and Sharwani clans, all of which belonged to the Ghilzai tribe) who maintained troopers from the revenues extracted from the grants. Bahlul had no control over the revenues of these grants. These tribal chiefs were semi-autonomous. Bahlul had to depend on clan ties and blood relationships with the Afghan chiefs while

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} Ali, “The Passing of the Empire”, p. 339.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Axworthy, \textit{The Sword of Persia}, p. 29.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Richards, \textit{The Mughal Empire}, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Moosvi, “The Indian Economic Experience 1600-1900”, pp. 4-5.
\item \textsuperscript{129} \textit{The Ain-i-Akbari}, I, Book Second, p. 241.
\item \textsuperscript{130} \textit{Ibid.}, II, p. 141.
\end{itemize}
mobilizing their forces. In fact, Bahlul lacked a standing army under his direct control. Bahlul's successor, Sikander Lodi (r. 1489-1517), amassed loot by plundering the Rajput principalities. Ibrahim Lodi, son of Sikander, raised the mercenaries just before the battle from the bazaars (markets) of Delhi by distributing cash from the wealth stored by his predecessors. In Ibrahim's reign, the monthly wage of a footman was 5 Sikandari tankas and that of a sawar varied between 20 and 30 Sikandari tankas.

Even the Rajput principalities maintained troops by granting jagirs to their chiefs. Abul Fazl writes that among the Rajputs the custom was that a jagirdar holding a jagir worth 100,000 maintained 100 horses, and a jagirdar holding a jagir worth one crore was able to maintain 10,000 horses.

Sher Shah acquired 900,000 silver tankas after defeating Sultan Ghias-uddin Mahmud of Bengal in 1535. Between 1535 and 1537, Sher's army increased from 6,000 to 70,000 horsemen and the latter's salary bill came to about 12 crore tankas per month. Raziuddin Aquil asserts that Sher paid his soldiers a fixed sum every month in cash and that they were not allowed to engage in pillage and plundering while campaigning. Sher Shah issued coins from his mints at Shergarh in Rohtas and Hajipur near Patna. In 1537, Sher, controlling Bihar and Bengal, had an annual income of 16 crore tankas.

In October 1504, Babur occupied Kabul and Ghazni. Then, he distributed tuyuls (fiefs) to some of his begs (nobles with armed retainers) who had served him from the earliest times. They were probably the chiefs of his loyal household troops. Babur could afford to do this because by that time he was a territorial prince with a kingdom comprising Afghanistan. This was the first instance of regular payment in kind that Babur made to his military officers. After conquering Punjab, Babur bestowed various regions on his different commanders. For example, Dipalpur was given to Baqi Shaghawal. In addition, Babur also depended on pillage and plunder to sustain and reward his troops after victories. To give an example, in 1519, Babur levied

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131 Richards, “The Economic History of the Lodi Period”.  
132 Babur-Nama, II, p. 470.  
133 Roy, Niamatullah’s History of the Afghans, pp. 187-188; 20 Sikandari tankas are equal to 1 silver tanka.  
134 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 260. Abul Fazl does not specify whether the annual revenue was calculated in tankas or dams.  
139 Babur-Nama, I, pp. 199, 227.  
140 Ibid., II, p. 463.
400,000 shahrukhis (20,000 pounds sterling) as protection money from Bhira on the left bank of Jhelum. After victory in the First Battle of Panipat, the Moguls captured Delhi and Agra and acquired a large amount of coined and non-coin treasure that had been accumulated by the Delhi Sultanate. Babur divided a portion of the spoils (jewels, gold and silver money) among his troops. The amirs got between 5 to 10 lakh tankas each and the soldiers got cash. Babur’s son Humayun also followed the policy of parcelling out his realm among his nobles so that the latter could maintain their contingents from the revenues of the tracts assigned to them. After a victory, Humayun would distribute the loot among his nobles and their retainers. For instance in 1533 after capturing Champanir, the capital of Gujarat, the treasure found in the fort was distributed among his army personnel.

The principal income of the Mogul Empire came from land tax, and agriculture was expanding in the Mogul Empire. For example, by c. 1600, the extensive forest in the western part of the Ganga-Jamuna doab was cleared and the region was intensely cultivated and densely populated. The peasants sold the grain to pay revenue in cash. Abul Fazl writes that the peasants in Bengal paid their taxes in mohurs (golden coins) and rupees. Sonargaon in Bengal produced world-famous muslin. India exported cotton textiles, indigo, and pepper to South-East Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East. Economically, Mogul India was in a favourable position vis-à-vis Persia. Silk from Bengal pushed silk manufactured in Persia out of the European markets, and Indian cotton was also imported into Persia. The balance of trade was therefore more favourable to India than to Persia. Prasannan Parthasarathi claims that Indian calicoes and muslins captured the European markets. Due to a loss of bullion, the Europeans raised tariff barriers against the entry of Indian textiles. Parthasarathi and Richards write that the Mogul Empire was self-financing from its own resources. The emperors did not have to depend on loans from the private financiers. State finance depended on a robust monetary system, which in turn relied

141 The Akbar-Nama, I, pp. 238, 248.
142 Matta, Sher Shah Suri, pp. 92-93.
143 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, p. 6.
146 Ibid., II, p. 136.
148 Axworthy, The Sword of Persia, p. 28.
149 Parthasarati, “Was There Capitalism in Early Modern India?”, p. 353.
upon the regular inflow of gold, silver, and copper. India produced inadequate quantities of these precious metals, but its export surplus enabled the country to import large amounts that had been produced in the New World and Japan. Akbar established a tripartite currency system based on gold, silver, and copper coins issued from the centrally administered imperial mints. The important mints of Mogul Empire were at Cambay, Lahore, Multan, Kabul, Patna, Rajmahal, and so forth. In Akbar’s reign, the mints at Ajmir, Delhi, Fatehpur Sikri, and Lahore produced silver coins. The two great cities of Agra and Fatehpur Sikri were bigger than London and Amsterdam. The coins were used to pay the merchants who imported war horses from Central Asia and Persia. Shireen Moosvi speculates that from 1576 onwards the silver currency output of the Mogul Empire was 151.69 metric tonnes annually. Towards the end of Akbar’s period, the Mogul Empire retained an annual surplus of income over expenditure of between 3.9 million and 4.7 million silver rupees equivalent in cash. Streusand is wrong in saying that incomplete monetization of the economy, rudimentary banking institutions, and the difficulty of transporting large amount of cash made the central collection of revenue and distribution of cash salaries impractical, and that therefore the Moguls used the jagir system.

Despite the presence of a monetized economy in the subcontinent, the culture of remuneration was to pay the soldiers (especially the higher ranks, i.e., officers) by issuing land grants, and the ultimate objective of these officers was to establish themselves as landed aristocracy with territorial bases. Only the mercenaries were paid in cash. The pay of the matchlock men varied between 2.5 to 6.25 rupees (henceforth Rs) per month. The pay of a mirdaha (non-commissioned officer of the matchlock men) varied between 6.5 and 7.5 Rs per month. During the first half of the sixteenth century, the level of monetization was low in Deccan. However, in the seventeenth century, west India experienced a high level of monetization.

153 Haidar, “Disappearance of Coin Minting in the 1580s?”, pp. 57-58, 60.
156 Streusand, The Formation of the Mughal Empire, pp. 67-68.
158 The Ain-i-Akbari, I, Book Second, Note by the translator, p. 258.
due to the export of cotton textiles from Surat. Still, the Maratha chieftains wanted to be paid through land grants (saranjams, non-hereditary land grants for military service, and imams, hereditary land grants for special service and merit).159

The mansabdars were not paid in cash. For example, Abdullah Khan, one of the principal officers of Humayun, was granted the rank of 5,000 by Akbar during the seventh year of his reign and was granted Kalpi as a jagir.160 For conducting campaigns on behalf of the Moguls, the emperors gave jagirs to those Hindu chieftains who held mansabs. In an attempt to control these chieftains and also to prevent the expansion of their territorial bases, the imperial court granted jagirs in regions far away from their principalities.161 In case of disloyalty, these jagirs were sequestered by the imperial court. The jama-dami (estimated income from the jagir) was equivalent to the talab (salary) of the mansabdar.162 Moosvi asserts that the price rise in the seventeenth century was about 30 per cent. Between 1595 and 1700, the jama (assessed revenue) of the Mogul Empire (excluding Deccan) registered an increase of about 44 per cent.163 By the mid-seventeenth century, due to the onset of the agrarian crisis, the mansabdars holding ranks of 4,000 and 5,000 were able to extract only three to four months’ pay in a year from their jagirs.164 This was the case during the first half of the sixteenth century for those mansabdars whose jagirs were assigned in Deccan.165 This was due to the gap between jama and hal-i-hasil (the amount which actually could be realized from the jagir). Continuous warfare in Deccan and the failure of the monsoon resulted in famine; these three causes led to the collapse of agriculture, which in turn triggered the agrarian crisis.166 The crisis in the mansabdari system was related to the agrarian crisis,167 an issue which is not relevant for my limited purpose in this chapter.

Most of the land in the Mogul Empire was granted as jagirs to the mansabdars. Only a small portion, known as khalisa (crown land), was administered directly by the emperor’s bureaucrats. The revenue from the

160 The Maathir-ul-Umara, by Beveridge, I, p. 82.
161 Zaidi, “Akbar and the Rajput Principalities”, p. 16.
162 Ali, “Towards an Interpretation of the Mughal Empire”, p. 62.
165 Moosvi, “The Mughal Empire and the Deccan”, pp. 219-220.
167 The literature on the agrarian crisis and its adverse effect on the loyalty of the mansabdars and the efficiency of their contingents is vast. S. Nurul Hasan states that the crisis began in the first decade of the seventeenth century: Hasan, “The Theory of Nurjahan ‘Junta”, p. 128.
khalisa was utilized for meeting the emperor's personal expenses and those of his own small standing army, known as the ahadis.\(^{168}\) Around 1600, the Mogul nobility (mansabdars) absorbed about 82 per cent of the Mogul Empire's total revenue.\(^{169}\) Abul Fazl tells us that the annual revenue of the Mogul Empire in 1594 amounted to 62 crores 97 lakhs 55,246 dams (Rs 90,743,881).\(^{170}\) In 1648, according to one estimate, the net revenue income of the Mogul Empire was 880 crore dams.\(^{171}\) Under Akbar, there were 1,600 mansabdars (1,350 mansabdars with ranks of 150 and below and 250 mansabdars with ranks higher than 150). In Shah Jahan's time, there were 8,000 mansabdars.\(^{172}\)

In contrast to the large number of retainers of the mansabdars, Akbar maintained only 12,000 cavalry and 12,000 matchlock men under his direct control. These 24,000 soldiers were known as ahadis. Under Shah Jahan, there were only 7,000 ahadis.\(^{173}\) As a point of comparison, in 1550, Ivan IV of Russia maintained a standing force of 3,000 select musketeers, each of whom was paid 4 rubles a year.\(^{174}\) In 1648, the force recruited and paid directly by the Mogul imperial establishment amounted to only 47,000 soldiers.\(^{175}\)

Most of the Mogul army personnel were under the mansabdars. The theoretical potential strength of the forces under the Moguls in 1647 numbered 911,400 cavalry and infantry. The revenues of the Mogul Empire amounted to 12,071,876,840 dams (320 dams was equivalent to £1 sterling).\(^{176}\) Streusand interprets Abul Fazl's figure by saying that the Mogul Empire supported 342,696 cavalry and 4,039,097 infantry. The total number of cavalry and infantry comprised roughly 10 per cent of the male population.\(^{177}\) According to another author, Shah Jahan maintained 200,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry (musketeers, artillerymen, rocket men, etc.). This was exclusive of the soldiers maintained by the faujdars (Mogul officials in charge of maintaining law and order in a district) and district officials concerned with the administration of revenue. The breakdown of the 200,000 cavalry was as follows: 185,000 troopers of the mansabdars, 8,000 mansabdars, and

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\(^{169}\) Trivedi, “The Share of the Mansabdars in State Revenue Resources”, p. 411.

\(^{170}\) *The Ain-i-Akbari*, II, p. 129.


\(^{172}\) *The Ain-i-Akbari*, I, Book Second, Note by the translator, pp. 257-258.


\(^{176}\) Fraser, *The History of Nadir Shah*, pp. 27, 33.

\(^{177}\) Streusand, *The Formation of the Mughal Empire*, p. 41.
7,000 mounted ahadis.\textsuperscript{178} A Mogul field army at that time numbered about 50,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry.\textsuperscript{179}

**Culture and combat motivation**

Greed, asserts *Sukraniti*, motivated the mercenaries to join battle.\textsuperscript{180} The *Nitiprakasika* highlights the importance of regular pay in motivating the soldiers.\textsuperscript{181} Nevertheless, men do not fight for pecuniary rewards alone. Mentality is an important constituent of pre-combat and in-combat ethos. And at times military service defined the identity of various communities. Despite the rise and fall of polities due to fluctuations in politics and the changing nature of technologies, the culture of the various communities changes very slowly. So the Hindu texts generated during pre-Mogul era offer a window into the mentality of the Hindu warrior ethos.

The cultural ethos of the Rajputs (the landowning aristocracy also known as thakurs), who resisted the Turks and became an important segment of the Mogul army from Akbar onwards, needs to be evaluated. The term “Rajput” is derived from the word rajaputra meaning sons of the king. Military service, especially mounted service, was very popular among the Rajputs.\textsuperscript{182} The Rajputs’ military ethic was guided by *kshatradharma*, which had some parallel with chivalry of the medieval west European knights.\textsuperscript{183} Loyalty and bravery were the two core values of *kshatradharma*. The ideology of combat centred on duty to one’s master and the display of individual prowess in the battlefield.\textsuperscript{184} The Rajput concept of *namak halali* (loyalty to the salt-giver) means that they should remain loyal to the person whose salt they

\textsuperscript{178} The *Ain-i-Akbari*, I, Book Second, Note by the translator, p. 254.
\textsuperscript{179} This was the size of the army sent against Safavid Kandahar in 1650: The *History of India*, Elliott and Dawson, VII, *Shah Jahan Nama* of Inayat Khan, p. 99.
\textsuperscript{180} Oppert, *On the Weapons, Army Organization, and Political Maxims of the Ancient Hindus*, p. 139. *Sukraniti* and *Nitiprakasika* are political texts generated by the Hindus during the early medieval period. These normative texts deal with the duties of a just ruler, the concept of *dharmayuddha* (just war), the ethics of conducting warfare, the use of new weapons, and political guidance for just rulers.
\textsuperscript{181} *Nitiprakasika*, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{183} Yadava, “Chivalry and Warfare”.
have eaten, in other words, to their employer.\textsuperscript{185} The Rajput heroic ballads emphasized that seva (duty and loyalty) to the lord was more important than duty and loyalty towards one’s family.\textsuperscript{186} The bravery of the Rajputs revolved around the concept of paurusha (manliness), which means sacrificing one’s life in the battlefield. The Prithvirajvijayamahakavya tells us that for the Chauhans (a Rajput clan) fighting was a way of life. The Rajputs considered themselves as Kshatriyas, and soldiering was regarded as their caste duty. They believed that tactical retreat in the battlefield was inglorious, and they considered that sacrificing their lives on the battlefield, rather than becoming prisoners-of-war, was the highest possible achievement.\textsuperscript{187} The medieval Hindu text Sukraniti emphasizes that it is a sin for a Kshatriya to die peacefully at home. Rather, the Kshatriya earns a noble death by dying in the battlefield while slaying enemies. Those Kshatriyas who die in the battlefield achieve viragati (they become heroes and ascend to heaven). Such a reward is acquired by the rishis (sages) only after long ascetic practices.\textsuperscript{188} The Arthasastra also notes that soldiering is the caste duty of the Kshatriyas.\textsuperscript{189} When the Islamic threat was absent, the various Rajput clans fought among themselves for glory.\textsuperscript{190} The contingents of the Rajput mansabdars maintained charans (bards) whose duty was to encourage the soldiers by playing martial music and reciting Rajput heroic ballads.\textsuperscript{191} The Mogul military system also utilized caste and clan feelings to build up primary group solidarity and camaraderie. The mansabdars’ contingents were not mono-ethnic units. The contingents of Rajput mansabdars did not comprise solely Rajput troopers but also included Muslim sowars.\textsuperscript{192} Generally, the Rajput mansabdars had one-sixth of their contingents from the non-Rajput groups. However, Rajput troopers preferred to serve under Rajput chiefs. Several generations served simultaneously in a contingent of a mansabdar. For instance, fathers, sons, uncles, nephews, cousins, and brothers all served simultaneously in the contingent of a particular mansabdar.\textsuperscript{193} The clan members were led on the battlefield by the clan

\textsuperscript{186} Trivedi, “Images of Women from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Century”, p. 209.
\textsuperscript{187} Prithvirajvijayamahakavya, Ditiya Adhaya, Sastha Adhaya.
\textsuperscript{188} Oppert, On the Weapons, Army Organization, and Political Maxims of the Ancient Hindus, pp. 125-126.
\textsuperscript{189} The Kautilya Arthasastra, Part II, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{190} Prithvirajvijayamahakavya, Chaturtha Adhaya.
\textsuperscript{191} Zaidi, “Ordinary Kachawaha Troopers serving the Mughal Empire”, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., pp. 62-63.
The different Rajput clans who joined the Mogul service were the Rathors, Sisodias, Kachawahas, Haras, Bhatis, and others.  

Stewart Gordon asserts that the process of the rise of the Marathas in medieval west India was somewhat similar to the emergence of Rajputs in north India. Through service in the army and subsequently acquiring rights over the land, and then consolidating such rights and following certain rituals and customs, many became hereditary warrior elites. Basically, the warrior ethos of the Rajputs and the Marathas emphasized winning glory and money and acquiring power. Social mobility was achieved by fighting on horseback. They had a disdain for those who practised agriculture. Those families in west India who followed the profession of soldiering and acquired land were known as Marathas, in contrast to the lowly kunbis (ordinary cultivators and artisans). The Marathas served as mercenaries in the Muslim sultanates of pre-Mogul India. Gradually, the Maratha families established themselves in particular regions and became semi-autonomous. Thus, they could not be categorized as service elites.

The ethos of mercenary soldiering existed in pre-Mogul India. The Hindu mercenaries are known as bhrata balas (literally “hired soldiers”) in Sanskrit literature. Several of them belonged to families whose hereditary trade was soldiering. The Panchatantra says that the mercenaries should pursue the profession of soldiering without thinking about the reasons behind warfare. In the villages, akharas (gymnasiums) existed in which the mercenaries engaged in wrestling to keep themselves physically fit.

Many of them were worshippers of the Hindu war gods Kartik and Vishnu. William Pinch writes that the armed ascetics, especially those who were worshippers of Lord Shiva (the Hindu god of destruction), known as Saivaites, played an important role in the military labour market of Hindustan. Pinch continues that the tradition of armed ascetics functioning as mercenaries went back to ancient times. Saiva asceticism did not preach world denial. The yogis (those who engage in yoga, i.e., in ascetic practices

199 Arthasastra, Part II, Kangle, p. 316.
200 Quoted in Oppert, On the Weapons, Army Organization, and Political Maxims of the Ancient Hindus, p. 32.
201 Ibid., p. 85.
202 Kathasaritsagara, I, pp. 42, 156.
to gain spiritual power) did not aim to become saints in the conventional sense of the term. They were not noted for an intense love of God. Rather, they aspired to become a second Shiva on earth. One of the bonds that held the armed ascetic warrior bands together was the concept of chela, a faithful disciple. Most of the chelas were originally slave boys who were sold by their poor parents to the yogis in the asrams (Hindu religious institutions). The armed Hindu devotees of the god Vishnu were known as bairagis. They were led by mahants (heads of the religious order). The armed ascetics consumed bhang, opium, and other intoxicants before joining battle in order to increase their enthusiasm for fighting.

Finally, let us turn our focus to the motivation of the Muslim soldiery. If we believe Simon Digby, then the Turani soldiers of the Mogul army were devotees of the Sufi saints. The idea of Sufis being peace-loving saints engaged in building bridges between the two antagonistic communities, Hindus and Muslims, is now rightly discredited. Digby asserts that even the Afghan soldiers of Sher Shah believed that the Sufi pirs could make the difference between victory and defeat on the battlefield. Many of the Mogul troopers had Naqshbandi affiliations. The Sufi saints traveled to and fro between Transoxiana and Deccan. While some shaikhs functioned as traveling pirs catering to the spiritual needs of the soldiers, other shaikhs established khanqas at the capitals of the subas. Some of the dervishes were also expert bow-makers. The soldiers and their officers believed that the pirs’ spiritual power would protect them against enemy arrows and shots. In return for spiritual support, many soldiers and their officers donated money for the construction of mosques. Abul Fazl notes that, when the Muslim troops loyal to the Mogul sovereign died while fighting rebellious Muslims, then the former achieved martyrdom. How far this assertion represented the actual combat ethos of the loyal Mogul soldiery remains an open question. In recent times, Rosalind O’Hanlon has asserted that Mogul manliness was shaped by a modified version of the Persian concept of javanmardi, which meant displaying courage and bravery in
imperial service. For the mounted musketeers, the skill of shooting from horseback constituted the concept of being a “true” mirza.212

With the passage of time, we see a subtle change in the cultural motivations of both the Muslim and Rajput soldiery. The transformation of the cultural ethos was related to the changes in the power politics of the real world. Notwithstanding the many syncretic and inclusionist dimensions of medieval Islamic culture, asserts Rajat Datta, for the Islamic conquerors and their ideologues, Hindustan was a land of kufr or infidels.213 During the thirteenth century, the discourse among at least a powerful section of the Muslim intellectuals was that jihad on part of the righteous sultan was necessary. The jihad was directed towards despoiling the riches of the temples, killing the Brahmans, and theoretically giving the Hindus the option of death or Islam.214 And those ghazis (religious soldiers) who fell while conducting jihad became shahids (martyrs). When Babur fought the Rajputs at Khanwa, by giving the call of jihad, the former tried to rouse the combat spirit of his Muslim soldiery. However, when the multi-ethnic Mogul army comprising Muslim and Hindu (Rajput and Maratha) soldiers fought the Shia Muslim sultanates of Deccan (Bijapur and Golkunda), the policy was not to give the cry of jihad but to rouse the Muslim soldiery by utilizing the power of the Sufi shaikhs. Similarly, when the Rajputs fought the Muslims then the former relied on the concept of dharmayuddha, but when the Rajputs fought in the Mogul army they strengthened their combat ethos by harking back to their caste pride as soldiers. In such circumstances, the Mogul Padshah was equated with Ram, the Kshatriya hero of the epic Ramayana who waged dharmayuddha.215

Conclusion

Due to the vast demographic resources of South Asia (if one wants, then one can use Dirk Kolff’s term “military labour market”), military conscription was neither necessary nor practised in Mogul times. Though the size of the Mogul army in the first half of the sixteenth century was quite big, if we take into account the vast population of the subcontinent, then the military participation ratio was quite small. Again, military service in South Asia during the Mogul and British eras, unlike in western Europe, remained a

212 O’Hanlon, “Manliness and Imperial Service in Mughal North India”.
honourable profession. Small farmers, marginal peasants, and share-croppers earned more by joining the army, and low castes acquired Kshatriya status. In certain cases, many small farmers became zamindars after a successful military career, and ambitious zamindars became rajas after participating in a successful campaign. So service in the army was a channel for upward mobility. The Mogul army was not a rigid structure frozen in time, but a multi-dimensional organization that evolved with age. However, certain fundamental characteristics of the Mogul army can be elaborated. The Mogul army was not a state commission force but a coalition of forces raised and maintained by the different mansabdars (Persian and Turani adventurers, Hindu chieftains, etc.) operating under the overall control of the emperor. The Mogul army was not a national or Indian (if such a term could be used at all) army. The army did not recruit just from the territories under its control. The Mogul army was a multi-ethnic and multi-faith entity which drew a considerable number of personnel from outside its territory. From the religious perspective, the Mogul army comprised Muslims, Hindus, and some Christians. As regards the Muslims, the Mogul nobility consisted of both Shias from Persia and Sunnis from Turan (Central Asia). Both Hindus (Rajputs from Rajasthan and north India under Akbar and the Marathas from west India from Shah Jahan’s reign onwards) and Muslims (mostly Afghans who settled in the subcontinent, i.e., Bihar during the Delhi Sultanate) from India were recruited in the army. Rather than the region's level of monetization, it was politics and the cultural ethos that dominated payment of the soldiery (especially the higher ranks). Military service was regarded as a means of becoming a landholder or to expand one's patrimony. Hence, payment in kind, i.e., land (except in the case of Sher Shah, an aberration in medieval India), remained dominant in the period under review.

However, foreign and indigenous mercenaries and especially footmen were paid in cash for most of the time. Even in the heyday of the mansabdari system, the professional mercenary form of military employment continued. The Mogul army from Babur to Aurangzeb was dependent on the foreign professional mercenaries for manufacturing and manning gunpowder weapons during both battles and sieges. From Babur to Akbar, the dependence was on the Ottomans and Persians, and under Aurangzeb the Moguls relied on west European Christians. The latter development was due to a global shift in the eighteenth century, when western Europe became most advanced in the production and deployment of cannons, howitzers, and mortars. In the eighteenth century, the mansabdari system was replaced by the regimental system, the latter being characterized by regular cash payment, written regulations, and strict discipline. That, however, is a different story.
On the Ottoman janissaries
(fourteenth-nineteenth centuries)

Gilles Veinstein

The janissaries are probably one of the most famous military corps in world history. Nevertheless, they were only a part of the Ottoman army and not even the most numerous one. At any period in the Ottoman history, they coexisted with a series of other military units, some of them created earlier (hence the name of yeni çeri, meaning “new troops”), others emerging in later times. All of these corps were of different natures as regards their modes of recruitment, the status of their members, their specific role in war, their method of remuneration, and so on. I shall concentrate on the corps (ocak) of the janissaries. Over several centuries, they were both a cause of terror and a source of admiration for the West, but they were also a danger for the Ottoman rulers themselves, due to their tendency to rebel. Beyond these stereotypes, one has to keep in mind that they did not offer only one face during all their long history. On the contrary, they were in a process of constant change, especially as far as their recruitment sources and military value were concerned.

Origins

The janissaries were established in the second half of the fourteenth century, probably under the reign of Sultan Murad I (there is some discussion on this point as well as on the origins of the corps in general, which remain somewhat obscure).  

1 General works on this corps include: Weissman, Les janissaires; Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı devleti teşkilatından kapu kulu ocakları; Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700, pp. 43-49, “Yeni çeri”; Veinstein, “Le janissaire et l’islamologue”. Among the main sources that I shall refer to, I would also like to mention Petrosian, Mebde-i kanun-i yeniçeri ocag tarihi; Petrosian gives the Russian translation and the facsimile of the manuscript of St Petersburg, cited below as Kavânîn; for the Turkish edition of another copy of this work, see Akgündüz, “Kavânîn-i yeniçeriyân-i dergâh-i âli”. On this work, see Fodor, “Bir Nasihatname olarak ‘kavânîn-i yeniçeriyan’”.  

From the beginning, the janissary corps was an infantry unit and a standing army (which not all the infantry components of the Ottoman army were). Furthermore, its members were not free men. They were slaves, even if of a particular kind: they were slaves of the sultan (kapı kulu, hünkâr kulu). I shall return to the origins of these slaves. Initially, they were not allowed to get married.³ Later, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, this ban would be abolished by Sultan Selim I. From then on, there would be two kinds of janissaries, married ones and bachelors. Only the latter would continue to live in the rooms (oda) of the barracks. There is no doubt that this change was of great consequence for the nature of this army. In any case, it remained common for the janissaries to be attracted to young boys and, more particularly, according to certain sources to young Jewish boys.⁴ Of course, it is always better not to generalize in such matters.

**Evolution**

If we try to define their military role more precisely, we must underline the fact that it evolved significantly over time. The janissaries were not, at the beginning, the most efficient part of the army nor the true instrument of the Ottoman conquest that they would become later on. Initially, they were mostly imperial bodyguards who aimed to protect the sovereign and to give a public image of his power and wealth during ceremonies, very much in the ancient tradition of the slave guards of the Muslim princes.⁵ The janissaries never lost this part of their duties. Testimonies from different periods are available showing that they made a strong impression on ambassadors and other foreign visitors with their splendid, brightly coloured uniforms and their perfect discipline when they entered the second yard of the Topkapı Palace for official receptions.⁶ They continued to be bound by a close personal tie to the sultan, under whose direct patronage they always remained. One small manuscript in the Vienna Library is interesting in painting a vivid picture of the close relationship between the sultan, in this case Suleyman the Magnificent, and his janissaries: on the janissaries’ side, they hold the deepest reverence which did not prevent them from making repeated and excessive financial

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³ According to a proverb, a married man is not a kul for the sultan: Kavânîn, fol. 10v.
⁴ See, for instance, Capsali, Seder Elyahu Zuta, I, p. 82.
⁵ Bosworth, “Ghulâm”, parts I, “The Caliphate” and II, “Persia”.
⁶ See, among many examples, Fresne-Canaye, Le voyage du Levant, p. 62.
demands; on the sultan’s side, there is an authority which, under certain circumstances, may become unyielding, but which also gives rise, at other times, to a smiling humour, almost friendly, and even at times indulging in jokes.\(^7\)

The importance of the janissaries in the military field would increase dramatically, in connection with two factors: first, they became a decisive tool in siege warfare, thanks to their specific ability to act as a monolithic and compact block in the final assault. The second and probably even more decisive factor was, following the example of the Balkan armies, the progressive adoption of firearms, more precisely the musket (*tüfeng*), instead of traditional weapons, in particular bows and arrows, starting from the beginning of the fifteenth century. In the Ottoman rulers’ mind, the use of this new and revolutionary weapon was intended to remain the monopoly of the janissaries, in connection – one can imagine – with their status as a standing army under the direct supervision of the sovereign, which gave better opportunities for both training and control. An instructor in chief (*ta’limhâne ibâşî*) was appointed by the sultan. In fact this monopoly quickly became obsolete, and firearms circulated among much larger sections of the population, partly because of quarrels between the various members of the Ottoman dynasty.\(^8\)

The number of janissaries equipped with firearms (*tüfenkli, tüfenk-endâz*) began to increase under the reign of Mehmed II, and this continued under the subsequent reigns. As for the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent, it is not clear whether the *tüfenk-endâz* were more numerous or even whether the use of *tüfenk* was generalized among the janissaries. The same sultan was also famous for having expanded the state arms factories. In any case, the adoption of firearms was the Ottoman response to the military evolution of its enemies, especially the Habsburg troops, who proved to be terribly efficient with their excellent guns made in Germany.

We have no details on the process of the adoption of firearms and we know nothing about the reception of this innovation by the troops, who had already demonstrated their corporatist mind as well as their propensity to mutiny.\(^9\) It remains striking in this respect that, as late as the year 1551, Suleyman considered it necessary to request the aga, the head of the janis-

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\(^7\) Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Turkish Manuscripts, no. 1815, *Kânûnâme-i Sultân Süleymân* (Flügel, III, p. 250) [henceforth, *Kânûnâme*].


\(^9\) We cannot consider the success of this change of arms as obvious if we bear in mind what the Habsburg ambassador, Busbecq, wrote about the failure of the vizier Rustem Pasha when
saries, to train his men, so that – the sultan says – “they will become experts in the use of the musket”. Equally striking is the fact that the sultan is said to have been anxious, at each of his visits to the barracks of the janissaries, to see all the officers shooting, according to their hierarchical order, in the training area, luxuriously laid out by the same sultan. In this context, the act of shooting appears both as a game and as a kind of rite, expressing the close relationship between the sultan and his slaves.

At this stage of their evolution, the janissaries were no longer only the personal escort of the sultan. They also became the main factor in the Ottomans’ military superiority. They took part in all the main campaigns, both on land and at sea, even in the absence of their patron, the sultan. In the same way, they were the elite of the fortress garrisons, scattered throughout the empire.

To this evolution corresponds a spectacular increase in their numbers. Let me give some figures to give an idea of the corps’ size.

Figures

However hypothetical they may be, the oldest figures remained low: 2,000 men in 1389, at the Battle of Kosovo; 3,000 under the reign of Murad II, in the first half of the fifteenth century. Later, they would increase from 5,000 to 10,000 men, during the reign of Mehmed II, the Conqueror (fâtihi), in the second half of the fifteenth century. This increase would have taken place in particular during Mehmed’s wars with the Akkoyunlu sultan Uzun Hasan in the 1470s. The result was reached partly by the incorporation into the initial janissary corps of two new components that had existed independently until then, and that were devoted to the sultan’s hunting activity: the sekban or seymen and the zagarcı, all men in charge of the royal hounds. This explains the puzzling fact that several of the highest officers of the ocak retained designations in connection with hounds: such were the sekban başı, the zagarcı başı, the turnacı başı, the samsuncu başı.

Still later, under Mehmed’s son, Bayezid II, the number of the janissaries would reach 13,000. To this end, Bayezid created a new section of the ocak: he tried in 1548 to arm with pistols 200 horsemen who were his own kuls; see Turkish Letters, pp. 123-124.

10 “Yeniçerim kullarm tüfenk atmaga idman eylemelerin emr edüb...”; Tokapi Sarayi Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Manuscript KK 888, doc. no. 30.
11 Kânûnnâme, fols 13-16.
the so-called companies of the aga (aga böülükleri). Nevertheless, this peak was followed by a marked decrease just before Suleyman’s reign, but things would change significantly during his long tenure (1520-1566), at the end of which their numbers stabilized at some 13,000 men,12 a very high level for a standing army of the time. Nevertheless, one of the most recent historians of Ottoman warfare, Rhoads Murphey, has dwelt on the fact that, at any one time, only a portion of the total ranks were actually deployed at the front, the rest being confined to barracks in Istanbul or dispatched among the provincial garrisons.13

General organization and command

Before going further, let us have a glimpse at the general organization of the janissary corps and its terminology: its structures reflect its complex formation. It consists of three main components: the so-called cemâ’at, which is composed of 101 regiments of sekban or seymen. Consequently the total number of the orta (also called bölijk) amounted to 196 (which became 195, when Murad IV decided to disband the sixty-fifth orta, considered to be responsible for Osman II’s assassination). At the head of each orta was a çorbacı (literally a “soup maker”). Another name for the chiefs of the regiments of the cemâ’at was yayabası or serpiyâde (“chief of the infantry-men”). Each çorbacı had a lieutenant (oda kethüdâsı or başodabaşı) under his orders, as well as a set of odabaşı (“chiefs of barrack-rooms”). An imam and a scribe were also available in each regiment.

At the head of the ocak in its entirety was the “aga of the janissaries” (yeniçeri agası). Originally, he was chosen from among the members of the corps, but after Selim I’s reforms he was one of the high dignitaries of the Palace and, once appointed, he became the first of the so-called rikâb agaları (“agas of the stirrup”). He depended directly on the sultan, with whom he had a close relationship. He had his own palace in the vicinity of the Süleymaniye mosque; he led his own council, the so-called yeniçeri divânı. This council included the five highest officers of the corps, four of them mentioned above in connection with hounds and hunting: the aga’s lieutenant (kul kethüdâsı); the chief of the sekban who, at the time, was the supreme commander of the corps; the zagarcı başı; the samsuncu başı; and the turnacı başı. Each of these high officers was at the same time chief of a

12 Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700, p. 45.
13 Ibid., p. 47.
particular orta. Among the other high officers who were not members of the divân, let me mention the muhzir aga (“bailiff aga”), who was the intermediary between the ocak and the grand vizier; the big and the little hâsseki who were dispatched to the provinces to deal with questions concerning the corps; the baş çavuş (“chief of the sergeants”) who checked the execution of the decisions and supervised the incorporation of new recruits.

Finally, the ocak had its own bureaucracy headed by the yenîçeri efendisi (“secretary of the janissaries”). He held the pay rolls (kötük) and was the chief of the aga’s chancery.

Increase in membership and subsequent decline

After Suleyman’s era, starting from the reign of his grandson, Murad III, the number of janissaries increased dramatically and constantly. At the same time, standards of recruitment became more and more slack and the origins of the recruits much more diversified. The recruitment of new janissaries was hence no longer limited to slaves of the sultan nor, according to a tradition that had been established quite early on, to sons of janissaries. From now on, all kinds of foreigners (ecnebi) and “intruders” (saplama), including Turks, got access to the ocak, against the fundamental regulations. Thus, the corps lost its former homogeneity, which was, according to several of the authors of “books of advice” (nasîhatnâme), a cause of its decline. The same authors attributed these transformations – so reprehensible in their eyes – to the sovereigns’ slovenliness and blindness. Nevertheless, as Murphey underlines, there is another possible interpretation of their behaviour: they would have been trying to meet growing military needs in the face of more and more powerful adversaries. Be that as it may, the burden became heavier and heavier for the Treasury. In 1574, the janissaries numbered 13,600; they amounted to 35,000 in 1597, 37,600 in 1609, and 39,470 in 1670. The numbers reached 53,000 at the beginning of the eighteenth century, at a time when the corps had lost all military efficiency. They remained merely a mighty pressure group in the state and society, as well as a terrible drag on the public finances, all the more so because, starting from 1740, Sultan Mahmud I, desperately searching for money, legalized the marketing of certificates (esâme) which gave the bearer the right to collect janissary wages. This period is generally considered to be the time of decay and corruption of the janissaries. The corps played a central

14 Aksan, “Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?”
role in the overthrow of the reforming sultan, Selim III, in 1808. As a result, his successor, Sultan Mahmud II, decided to abolish the corps in 1826, as a necessary precondition to the introduction of Westernizing reforms in the army. When the janissaries rose in revolt against this decision, the sultan had his artillery shoot them to pieces in their barracks on 18 June 1826, an incident known in Turkish history as the “auspicious event” (vakayi hayriye).

After this general background, let me try to define the corps according to the criteria to be considered in the framework of our research program.

A sultan’s army

The janissaries were clearly a state commission army or, to be more accurate, a sultan’s army. Since their origin, they were intended for the sultan's exclusive use and put under his direct patronage. Even in the later period, when they became a part of the state apparatus and one military institution among others, although the sovereign no longer took part in military campaigns in person, they kept some of their close ties with him. The fact, for example, that we come across sultanic orders concerning janissaries or janissaries’ cadets (who will be discussed below), including orders dealing with very minor affairs, which are not ordinary fermans but edicts of the highest rank (hatt-i hümâyûn, which means that they were issued on the basis of a personal note written by the sultan with his own hand on the paper of the initial request), is significant: it is an expression of the exceptional status of these kuls.15

Pencyek and devşirme

At the beginning, starting from the fourteenth century, the members of the corps originated from a single source, the pencyek.16 This Persian term (Arabic: khums) refers to the fifth part of the booty gathered during the raids and the fights against the infidels – the part which, according to Islamic law,

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15 See, for example, an order following a petition concerning the graduation of janissaries’ cadets working in the İbrâhîm Pasha Palace in Istanbul, with the note “hatt-i hümâyûnumla fermân olmushdur” (“it was ordered with a note of my own majestic writing”): Istanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri, Mühimme Defteri [henceforth, MD], LXIV, p. 42.
16 Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “En marge d’un acte concernant le pengyek et les aqıncı”. The author gives an edition of the important regulation, referred to below, extracted from Bibliothèque nationale de France, fonds turc ancient 81, fol. 97r-v.
belongs to the sovereign. This booty includes, among other goods, captives who were automatically enslaved by those who took them (unless they were intended to be ransomed). In fact, it appears that this pencyek could take two different forms, according to the period and the circumstances. On the one hand, it could be a simple tax of 25 akçe (silver coins), a sum corresponding to the fifth part of the average value of a slave (i.e., 125 akçe). This tax was levied at the frontier, at the point of the slaves' entrance into Ottoman territories. In this form, the pencyek survived, with or without the name, until the nineteenth century. On the other hand, the pencyek was nothing but the requisition, mainly on behalf of the sultan, of all the young male captives, between ten and seventeen years old (occasionally even older, but in that case the sultan had to pay for them), who had been enslaved in raids and who presented the required features of robustness, soundness, and physical integrity. The sources describing this second aspect of the pencyek, crucial for the janissaries' history, are rare. The most developed and explicit one is a relatively late edict issued by Sultan Bayezid II in 1493, which nevertheless, as the text points out, reformulates older provisions. On another side, this edict takes into consideration only those captives who were caught during raids launched in the enemy territory. Nevertheless, we know that the same kind of young captives were also taken in other contexts as well: successful sieges or pitched battles; likewise a portion of these captives – and, indeed, the best portion – was the sultan's own loot.

As a consequence of the nature of the pencyek, the janissaries were initially recruited among foreign, non-Muslim young boys (it was forbidden by shari'a to enslave Muslims, except in extraordinary cases of judiciary punishment). It corresponded exactly to the so-called mamluk paradigm as it had been in force in the Muslim world since the Abbasid era. According to this paradigm, which corresponds to a specific kind of military slavery, the aim was not to enslave already mature and experienced soldiers, but to search for untrained and inexperienced young boys who would not only be enslaved and forcibly converted but also systematically trained in specialized schools. Some historians, such as D. Ayalon and E. de la Vaissière, assumed, more or less explicitly, that such schools may have originated from Central Asian models. It is worth noting that in the account of the origins of the janissaries by the earliest Ottoman chroniclers, in the second

17 Ayalon, "Preliminary Remarks on the Mamlûk Military Institution in Islam"; Crone, Slaves on Horses; Pipes, Slaves, Soldiers and Islam. For a critical discussion, see La Vaissière, Samarcande et Samarra.
half of the fifteenth century; this new unit appears as nothing more than the byproduct of the establishment of the pencyek levies a century before. Much more specific to the Ottoman case was the other method of acquiring new janissaries, which apparently was inaugurated a few decades after the institution of the pencyek. This second method partly replaced the first one after a time of coexistence in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was called devşirme, a Turkish term meaning “collecting” or “gathering”, by reference to the levy of young boys, who were no longer foreign captives caught in the raids, but Christian subjects of the sultan. They were dhimmî, non-Muslim protégés of the sultan, who had lived in his European provinces. Later on, the same practice was also put in force in Anatolia. Young Muslims, especially Turks, were categorically excluded from the devşirme, with the exception of Muslim Bosnians who, for reasons that are not totally clear, were eligible for the system.

The earliest mentions of devşirme operations go as far back as the very end of the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, the practice seems to have become more regular starting from the second quarter of the fifteenth century, under the reign of Murad II. In spite of attempts to justify this institution from a legal and religious point of view, it was an obvious violation of two fundamental provisions of shari’a: on the one hand, it implied the enslavement of dhimmî subjects; on the other, the levy was followed by a forcible conversion, since all these Christian boys entering the sultan's service had to become Muslims.

Volunteers or not?

Under such conditions, it seems at first glance completely unnecessary to ask whether these future soldiers were volunteers or not. Clearly, the young captives, entering the sultan’s service as part of his pencyek, were not volunteers. As for the devşirme, records are extant of attempts to escape the requisition by flight or concealment of the boys, at the approach of the

18 Giese, Die altosmanische Chronik des ʿĀšīkpašazâde, Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken Tevârîh-i Āl-i ʿOs̱mān..
21 See Wittek, “Devshirme and Shari’a”.
recruiting commissioners, or by corruption of these agents. Again, on the way from their homeland to Istanbul, some boys tried to run away; this was also the case at their arrival in the capital, where the forced conversion and the dispatching of the recruits took place. Later, in the first stages of the process of formation that I shall describe below, such attempts still occurred.\textsuperscript{22}

Nevertheless, the question is more complex. If there is no doubt that the devşirme was generally very unpopular, not to say that it was considered to be one of the darkest aspects of the Turkish yoke (as is obvious from Balkan literature and folklore),\textsuperscript{23} on the other side, it remains true that for poor people, mostly peasants, it was also gateway to a better life, with better incomes and a better social position, in spite of the strain and the danger. It was true for a simple janissary, and much more so for the cream of the kuls, who could reach the highest positions in the state apparatus. As a consequence of these realities, some people who, being Muslims, were not eligible for the devşirme, made efforts to enter fraudulently, to the great displeasure of the authorities. It is also true that when people, after the preliminary stages, became full members of the corps, they do not seem to have been inclined to desert. In other words, if there was constraint, it finally turned into a form of acceptance. I shall return to possible explanations for this acceptance.

Moreover, with time, and this evolution can be traced as early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, not all the janissaries were the products of coercion, as in the pencyek or the devşirme institutions. Specifically, as already mentioned, sons of janissaries (kuloglus) started being introduced into the corps, and the same was applied for young Muslims adopted by janissaries (veledeshes).\textsuperscript{24} Likewise, the aga, head of the corps, was allowed to incorporate a number of protégés. In all these cases, entering the corps became a voluntary act.

In the same way, for the people who, according to Mustafa Ali, were admitted in the corps, by the will of Murad III in 1582 on the occasion of the great circumcision feasts of his son Mehmed, this admission was a favour and by no means a requirement. With all these changes in the recruitment methods, janissaries passed progressively from forced recruits to volunteers.

\textsuperscript{22} See, for instance, Istanbul, Başbakanlık Ottoman Arşivleri, MD, III, p. 509, no. 1514; VI, p. 135, no. 284; IX, p. 14; XXI, p. 145; XXX, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{23} See, for example, Georgieva, “Le rôle des janissaires dans la politique ottomane en les terres bulgares”.

\textsuperscript{24} Kaldy-Nagy, “The Strangers (ecnebiler) in the 16th Century Ottoman Military Organization”.
Searching for the janissaries’ identity

However, it remains true that, during the most glorious period of the empire’s history, mainly during the fifteenth and the first part of the sixteenth centuries, the Ottoman conquest, so loudly praised as a triumph of Islam, was in fact largely operated by men of Christian origin. If this paradox was already encapsulated in the “mamluk paradigm”, it takes a particularly striking shape in the janissaries’ case, since a major part of the conquests concerned were to the detriment of Christian lands. When historians look for an explanation of this paradox, it seems that they have to address the various components of the specific culture of the ocak. All of them converge into the making of a new identity, strong and satisfying enough to substitute for the old one (without erasing it altogether). At the root of this identity was an esprit de corps, which is certainly shared by all corps but which, in this case, reached the highest degree for three reasons at least: a sharp consciousness of being part of a military elite in a close relationship with the sovereign and responsible for the empire’s greatness; a common initiation into a rich corpus of symbols (for example, each orta had its own emblem) at work, in a series of rites, ceremonies, and feasts; and the prominent influence of Bektashism, a syncretic form of Islam. The close tie, even the symbiotic connection, between the ocak and this Ottoman Sufi order (tarikat) is well known, even if the exact chronology, causes, and conditions of the interface between the two communities are not altogether clear. Obviously, for chronological reasons, the tradition of the creation of the ocak by the “saint”, Hâci Bektash Veli, founder of the order, cannot be anything but a legitimizing legend. As a matter of fact, it is not even certain that the Bektashi impact moulded the corps from its very origin. The official affiliation came relatively late, not before the year 1591, during the reign of Murad III. Starting from that time, the great master of the order (baba) became the çorbacı of the ninety-ninth orta, and Bektashi dervishes were incorporated into the ocak where they became highly influential in every field, offering spiritual guidance to the soldiers.  

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that syncretic beliefs existed in the religion of the janissaries a long time before the end of the sixteenth century, as it existed in the early stages of Ottoman history in general. Perhaps we have an echo of these beliefs, as they were in force in the second half of the

25 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı devleti teşkilâtından kapu kulu ocakları , I, pp. 26-28; Vatin and Veinstein, “Paroles d’oglan, jeunes esclaves de la Porte”.  
26 Küçükyalçın, Turna’nın Kalbi , pp. 111-120.
fifteenth century, in the puzzling description of Islam which is to be found in the first pages of the “memoirs of the Serbian janissary”, Konstantin Mihailović. A prominent place is given to ‘Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, whom he would have explicitly designated as his successor (in fact, he is always mentioned in the gülbank, the specific prayers of the janissaries). These Shiite features would be confirmed later by a special reverence, not only for ‘Ali and his holy sword, called Zulfikar, but also for his two martyr sons, Hasan and Hüseyn. At the same time, Konstantin also quoted Muslim preachers who combined an expected harshness against Christians with a more surprising love for Christ. In their view, Jesus had not been crucified, a lookalike being killed instead. “Jesus is of God’s spirit but Mohammed is God’s emissary”, they say, along with, “What is Mohammed’s will that is also Jesus?” This reverence for Christ was interpreted as a consequence of the Christian origin of most of the janissaries at that time, but a definitive conclusion on the question remains out of reach. Anyway, it is not certain that it persisted in the later periods, while Shiite inspiration definitely did. How could Ottoman power, having been transformed into a champion of Sunnism in the meantime, tolerate this deviation in its military elite? It is another paradox of the janissaries. Maybe the fact that this Shiite imprint was nevertheless encapsulated in a tarikat, which obviously was a heterodox one, but at the same time firmly controlled by the state, by means of its centralization and hierarchical structure, made things easier. Be that as it may, a degree of Shiism remained one of the peculiarities of the ocak’s culture as well as a unifying factor for its members.

Slaves paid in silver

As I noted at the beginning, janissaries were not free men. They were slaves and remained so all their life. Their patron, the Ottoman sultan, never emancipated them (or very exceptionally, as a reward for extraordinary acts), in contrast to the mamluk sultans of Egypt who solemnly emancipated their own mamluks at the end of their training period in the barracks of the citadel of Cairo. At any rate, they were slaves, but slaves of the sultans, which made a big difference in comparison to ordinary slaves. As several Western travellers noticed, there was not a more honourable position in

27 Mihailović, Memoirs of a Janissary, pp. 3-27; the French translation is Mihailović, Mémoires d’un janissaire.
the empire than to be slave of the sultan. The *kul* elite (of course, neither simple janissaries nor the corps officers but *kuls* who had become governors or viziers) married princesses of the reigning dynasty. They were never sold to private persons and were thus not in danger of being used for menial tasks. Not only could they exert the highest functions, but they were also in a position to accumulate greater or lesser fortunes and, according to their status, totally or partly bequeath them to their heirs.

All these slaves were paid in silver money by the Treasury. This point may explain – at least in part – the fact that the Ottoman beys took some time to adopt a troop of this type, even though it was a piece of their Islamic inheritance: they needed to have reached a sufficient measure of monetization. As a matter of fact none of the previously established other troops were paid in money. As for the janissaries, the initial pay (*ulûfe*) was 2 akçe per diem. But this amount, still very modest indeed, increased with time, through a succession of augmentations (*terakki*), and could reach 12 akçe for a simple soldier. The concrete mechanism of these increases is not altogether clear: we cannot determine the roles of the military value to be rewarded and stimulated, of the length of service, or of favouritism. Officers’ wages were much higher. The aga’s reached the enormous amount of 400 akçe daily. It is possible to see how the amounts varied through the numerous payroll muster lists (*mevâcib defteri*) kept in the archives.29

Janissaries were paid in regular quarterly instalments, in solemn ceremonies in the second yard of the Topkapı Palace. As for the provincial garrisons, their wages were transported across the country with a security guard. Nevertheless, this precious load was sometimes attacked by bandits – this could happen even at the apogee of the empire, during Suleyman’s reign.30 Any shortcoming in these payments (as occurred in the so-called *sıvış* years, the “effaced” years resulting from the gap between the solar and the lunar calendars)31 or any adulteration of the distributed money led to riots among the troops. Besides these regular wages, they received a special bonus (*bakhşiş*) at every new enthronement. Extraordinary grants were also expected during the campaigns, as an incitement or a reward. To neglect these traditional grants was a serious risk for the sultan. Selim II experienced the consequences when he refused to give the *bakhşiş* to the janissaries at the beginning of his reign, as did Osman II who, among other

29 Darling, “Ottoman Salary Registers as a Source for Economic and Social History”.
30 Barkan, “H. 974–975 (M. 1567–1568) Mali bir Yılina ait bir Osmanlı Bütçesi”.
31 Sahillioğlu, “Osmanlı Imparatorluğunda Sıvış Yılı Burhanları”.

foolish mistakes, was not generous enough during the Polish campaign, resulting in his being deposed and in the end in his death.32

These official allocations were not the only source of income for the janissaries. It is well known that they were also involved in craft and commercial activities, mainly in the capital itself and also in the various cities where they were sent (as a way of getting rid of them in troubled times). Contrary to what has often been put forward, this passage from military to economic activities did not occur exclusively during the period of decline. It already existed in former centuries. However, in these earlier periods, crafts and trades were only occupations during the winter or the intervals of peace,33 and not a substitute for military involvement, as it became the case later on. From this point on, close ties were created between the ocak and the guilds of the capital.

Consequently, janissaries succeeded in accumulating properties that they left to their heirs. The countless probate inventories of janissaries, which are to be found in the kadi registers of many cities, provide precise data on this point. Both soldiers and businessmen – in proportions varying according to the period – could join a quite prosperous urban middle class.34

Trainees without much training

Returning to the military activity of the janissaries, the question arises as to what extent they have to be considered true professional militaries, who are not only endowed with a practical experience of the job but who had been systematically trained in a preliminary stage of education, as the “mamluk paradigm” postulated it.

According to my sources, at the very beginning, the boys recruited in the framework of the pencyek were directly assigned to the janissary corps with an initial wage of 2 akçe per diem. In other words, they were immediately operational without a preliminary training period.35 However, this situation did not last. A few decades later, a new corps was established, the so-called ‘acemi oglan’ (literally “the foreign boys”) based in the harbour of Gelibolu (Gallipoli) on the Dardanelles. A second branch of this corps, much larger

33 Murphey, “Yeni çeri”. On the relationships between the janissaries and the corporations (esnaf), see Kafadar, “Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations”.
34 Barkan, “Edirne Askeri Kassama ait Tereke Defterleri”; Öztürk, Askeri kassama ait onyedinci asir Istanbul tereke defterleri.
35 Kavânîn, fol. 4v.
in number, would be created in Istanbul, following the conquest of the city. The ‘acemi oglan’ was meant to be a preliminary stage in janissary training. From now on, it was no longer possible to enter the corps immediately. One had to be an ‘acemi oglan’ first.

Before examining what the real function of this cadet corps was, I have to mention another preliminary stage, an initial one, which took place between the levy as pecengek or devşirme boy and the incorporation into the ‘acemi oglan’. This first stage was carried out in the countryside, among Turkish farmers (Türk üzerinde olmak). The principle was to establish the young recruits “overseas”, so that no flight to their homelands – a common temptation – was possible. That means that Rumelian boys were sent to Anatolia. Logically, the reverse (Anatolian boys sent to Rumelia) must have been true, but I have not come across evidence for this. This stay in the countryside was of quite a long duration: four to eight years, according to the sources. Nevertheless, it could be shortened when boys were needed for an urgent task in the capital. This rural stage did not exist initially and is said to have been established by Mehmed II. A first aim was to make the boys stronger by using them in hard labour, as well as to accustom them to obedience and submission, but another important goal, which Mehmed II would have had in mind, was to allow them to learn Turkish. Consequently, ‘acemi oglan’ and janissaries would speak Turkish (certainly, writing in Turkish was another story, and the janissaries’ literacy another question). According to some sources, the rural stage was also an opportunity for those converted to be initiated into the basis of their new religion (even if Anatolian peasantry were not an authority in these matters). It appears that this period staying “among the Turks” did not survive as long as the devşirme system: it was no longer in force after the devşirme campaigns of 1622 and 1636.

Now, if we come back to the ‘acemi oglan’, we are naturally inclined to consider the period spent in this body of cadets as a time of military preparation and training. Consequently, the fate of an ‘acemi oglan’ would be necessarily to become a full janissary. As a matter of fact, they are frequently called yeniçeri oglanları (or in Persian gilmân-i yeniçeriyân), which means boys who are janissaries-to-be. Consequently, all studies on the janissaries, including the most recent ones, consider the ‘acemi oglan’ to be a cadet corps.

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36 Ibid., fol. 7r.
37 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı devleti teşkilâtından kapu kulu ocakları, p. 24.
or trainees in connection with the janissaries.\textsuperscript{38} However, this interpretation needs discussion and nuancing.

First, I shall observe that the oldest traditions did not explain the creation of the new corps in that way. The sultan took this measure – they say – first to save money, since the initial wages of the ‘acemi oglan were less than those of the janissaries (1 akçe instead of 2); secondly, because he lacked a regular corps intended for a specific need: transporting troops in ships from the Asiatic to the European parts of the state across the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{39}

Now, taking these two preliminary stages into account, we can try to evaluate the number of years coming before the proper entrance into the janissary corps: the stay in the Turkish families is said to last possibly seven or eight years. Afterwards, the time spent as an ‘acemi oglan is said to be about five to ten years. Thus, the total time of these preliminary stages would be from twelve to eighteen years. According to the “treaties of advice” (nasihatnâme) of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a period of fifteen to twenty years was an optimum. In one of these works, the kitâb-i mustetâb, the ‘acemi oglan period is presented as even longer and divided into two parts: a six to seven-year period properly as an ‘acemi oglan, followed by a five to ten-year period as gardeners (bostancis) of the imperial palaces.

In any case, all these figures remain highly theoretical. We know through orders contained in the “registers of important affairs” (mühimme defteri) that these stages could, in fact, be either shortened or extended considerably, according to the circumstances.\textsuperscript{40} On this point as on many others, Ottoman authorities were fully pragmatic.

Be that as it may, it remains true that enlistment in the janissary corps did not occur very early in a man’s life. Janissaries were not young men. It is all the more true that the devşirme recruiters did not take the boys as young as it is frequently assumed. According to a specific law (kanun) dedicated to the institution,\textsuperscript{41} the ages were between fourteen or fifteen and seventeen or eighteen years (remembering that for the pencyek boys the age was ten to seventeen years). In practice, the recruits could be even older; at least this was the case in a devşirme register of the beginning of the seventeenth

\textsuperscript{38} Still today, in the Turkish army, acemilik means the training period.
\textsuperscript{39} Kavânîn, fol. 5r.
\textsuperscript{40} For example, KK 888, no. 1603; MD, VI, p. 223, no. 479; VII, p. 789, no. 2157; IX, pp. 14 and 122; XXI, p. 145; LIII, p. 173. It remains true that, when the authorities had to urgently remove the boys from the Turkish families, they were ordered to choose the ones who had been there for the longest time (eski).
\textsuperscript{41} Akgündüz, “Kavânîn-i yeniçeriyân-i dergâh-i âli”, II, pp. 123-127.
We find that, at that time, 80 per cent of the boys were between fifteen and twenty and 50 per cent between eighteen and twenty years old. If we take all these figures into account – however hypothetical they may remain – we come to the puzzling conclusion that, when becoming a janissary, the man was somewhere between thirty-seven and fifty years, which is hardly believable.

Let us add here that, once a janissary, the man would spend his whole career in the corps, unless he was upgraded to a more prestigious corps, i.e., one of the standing cavalry sections or one of the Palace corps, or acquired fief (timar) in the province, which, at least in certain cases, was considered a punishment and not a promotion. Finally, when a janissary was judged too old (ziyâde ihtiyâr), exhausted, and “out of use” (‘amelmande), he was retired (oturak, korucu, emekdâr) and continued, as such, to belong to the corps, being given a pension. Such a pension (oturaklık) was also given to a soldier who became ill, disabled, or insane. The marked reverence for the old retired soldiers, among the members, can be counted among the signs of this esprit de corps that I emphasized above.

If there was a long time between the first recruitment and the final entrance into the janissary corps (kapuya çıkmak), this time does not appear to be a time of military training sensu stricto. There was nothing to be compared to the several-year, methodically organized training existing in the Cairo barracks of the mamluk sultans, according to the historian Makrizi.  

A glance at the mamluks’ training

Let us remember that in the fifteenth century, there were twelve barracks (tibâq, pl. tabaqa) in Cairo for the education of the “royal mamluks” (al-mamalik al-sultâniyya) who had to become first-class horsemen. Each barrack was capable of accommodating 1,000 mamluks. There was at least one religious man (faqîh) per group of students to teach them the Qur’ân, the Arabic script, some basic knowledge of shari’â, and the Muslim prayers. When the mamluks who had been bought quite young reached majority, they started their actual military training. Each group had a cavalry

42 Istanbul, Başbakanlık Ottoman Arşivleri, Maliyeden müdevver, no. 7600.
43 Kânûnnâme, fol. 16r.
44 Ayalon, “Preliminary Remarks on the Mamlûk Military Institution in Islam”, pp. 9-17; Rabie, “The Training of the Mamlûk Fâris”.
(furûsiyya) instructor, a mu‘allim, whose training included equestrianism, the lance game, archery, and fencing. Tuition in horsemanship consisted of several stages before the young man was able to sit firmly on a bareback horse. At the beginning he practised on horse models made of dry clay, stone, or wood. The first exercise was to jump over it correctly. Then a saddle was placed on the model and the mamluk practised jumping without, and then with, full equipment. In the following stage, the candidate practised training on a live horse.

During his whole training, the mamluk was considered a simple student (kuttâbiya) without pay or personal goods of any kind. On the other hand, when his education was over (disregarding how many years it lasted and what age he had reached at this point), he received, as personal property, a horse, and clothing, as well as a set of arms (a bow, a quiver and arrows, a sabre, and armour). From that moment on, he was a true soldier, eligible for a wage, although it was of course the lowest one. In addition, he was given a certificate, called ‘itâqa, which is not only proof that he had become a trained horseman but also as a mark of emancipation, since the mamluk who at last enters the sultan’s service is no longer his slave. He was a free man even if he maintained a close link with his former patron. Thus, two important differences with the janissaries are to be noticed: the latter remained slaves and did not receive real military training.

**Back to the Ottoman trainees**

As long as the Rumelian boys lived with Anatolian Turkish families, they had to engage in livestock farming and agriculture, both tiresome chores (belâ) which certainly made them stronger as well as more docile, giving them the opportunity to develop qualities already taken into account by the devşirme recruiters upon selection. Such qualities may be necessary preconditions of military capacity, but they are not a substitute for military technical training. Furthermore, the ‘acemi oglan stage does not seem to offer much military training either. As a matter of fact, all these young men were employed by the sultan, his family, and other grandees in a great variety of tasks that had nothing to do with proper military work.

As we saw above, their initial duty was to work on the ships coming across the Dardanelles, as well as to transport heavy material (torba hizmeti). The same kind of tasks were ordered for the Istanbul ‘acemi oglan as well, for ships coming across the Bosphorus, carrying different sorts of provisions for the imperial palace, such as firewood or snow collected in the mountains.
around Bursa. Domestic service in several palaces was also partly carried out by some contingents of ‘acemi oğlan. Another of their major occupations was to care for the imperial gardens in Istanbul and the surrounding areas as well as in Edirne and its district. For instance, in 1577, some 467 ‘acemi oğlan were employed as gardeners in Edirne.45 Another possible destination of the recruits, probably in connection with some inborn gifts quickly discovered by the recruiters, was to become apprentices in the workshops of the Palace and thus to acquire high-level skills in one of the many crafts intended for the sultan's consumption and use. Thus in a list of 1526, we find former devşirme or pencyek boys in twenty-six of the forty workshops of the Palace.46 Likewise, when the sultan undertook the building of a new monument, either a civil or a religious one, he naturally resorted to his ‘acemi oğlan. For instance, we find them on the Selimiye mosque construction in Edirne.47 In the same way, they contribute to shipbuilding in the shipyards of Galata: many boys were mobilized after the destruction of the Ottoman fleet in Lepanto.48 The authorities had the same reaction when a big fire devastated the capital.49 In short, the ‘acemi oğlan appear to be more slave manpower at the disposal of the sultan to meet the various needs of the Palace and the state than a cadet corps for a professional army. A famous passage of the third of Busbecq's Turkish Letters has to be interpreted, at least partly, as an allusion to the ‘acemi oğlan: “If the State requires any work of construction, removal, clearance or demolition, slave labour is always employed to carry it out.”50

It is also true that a proportion of ‘acemi oğlan will never become janissaries. They will spend their entire carrier until their retirement as cadets, though not without an increase in their daily wages in time. ‘Acemi oğlan with grey hair and beards are mentioned, in particular among the gardeners.51 Why this inertia in the graduation? Perhaps because they became so good in their speciality that it would have been a pity to let them leave their job, or simply because they were forgotten, the authorities always remaining anxious to limit the number of janissaries, partly at least for financial reasons.

45 MD, XXX, p. 108.
46 Veinstein, “À propos des ehl-i hırel et du devşirme”.
47 MD, IX, p. 46, no. 122; XXII, p. 206.
48 “Ne kadar dölgerlik ve kalaflıçılık san’atı bilir ve sa’ir tersâneye müte’allik san’at bilir oğlan var ise...”: MD, X, p. 235.
49 MD, LIII, p. 173.
50 Turkish Letters, pp. 101-102.
51 MD, X, p. 158, no. 240; LVI, p. 66, no. 134: “nicesinin saç ve sakalli ankarib pîr olmuştur”.
These assertions, however, may be somewhat too categorical and deserve some nuance. I cannot deny that one finds here and there some hints of military training of the ‘acemi oglan. This is the case in an important source of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the report of Teodoro Spandougino Cantacusino (Spandounes), according to which:

Après qu’il les auront osté de ce meschant mestier, ilz leur font apprendre à tirer de l’arc et des dards. Aprez, ils les despartent à divers capitaines à ce qu’ilz appreignent l’exercice des armes et aulcuns d’eux les mectent sur la mer.\(^{52}\)

In the same way a later traveller, Gilles Fermanel, wrote in 1630-1632:

Les Azamoglans qui sont en grand nombre, après avoir long-temps servy aux jardinages, estant d’aage colmpetent, sont exercez à tirer de l’arquebuze, et après sont faits Janisiaires.\(^{53}\)

Such mentions coming from Western sources are not corroborated, as far as I know, by Ottoman sources. Moreover, the picture that they give of the facts sounds like an attempt at rationalization, which does not correspond to the more complex reality that I have hinted at, with a variety of situations and fates for the boys. Be that as it may, even if some training did exist, at least for a part of the ‘acemi oglan, it was certainly but a minor part of these state slaves’ agenda.

Under these conditions, it was mainly through their experience on the field, and the lessons given to them by their veterans, that the janissaries learned how to fight. As a consequence, extended periods of peace, like during some of the eighteenth century, could not help but have a negative impact on their military value.

\(^{52}\) Spandouyn Cantacasin, *Petit traicté de l’origine des Turcqz*, p. 104.

\(^{53}\) Fermanel, *Le voyage d’Italie et du Levant*, p. 76.
Particularly after the second half of the seventeenth century, when armed forces grew exponentially, armies typically ranked as the largest single employers within states. Thus, soldiers constituted the most numerous unified labour force within Europe. A consideration of troops within the framework of labour history is accordingly both appropriate and also long overdue, especially since in certain circumstances soldiers acted very much like modern workers. For example, it would not be out of line to regard military mutinies as among the largest and most effective strikes in European history before the emergence of labour militancy associated with the Industrial Revolution. However, generalizations about soldier-labour in Europe during the early modern period – taken here to encompass those decades falling roughly between 1500 and 1790 – have to be advanced cautiously and hedged around with caveats. This is for three principal reasons. First, there was considerable variety of practice both within and between polities with regard to the employment of soldiers, which makes generalization hazardous. Secondly, the period was characterized by considerable changes of practice. To be sure, the notion that these changes constituted a “military revolution”, at least in the format originally proposed by Michael Roberts in the 1950s and subsequently amended by Geoffrey Parker, has been challenged and rejected by many specialists. But the debate over the “military revolution” has emphasized the extent of the changes that were taking place, though these occurred over a much longer timeframe than Roberts and Parker envisaged, and lay as much in the areas of state development, the economy, and the management of armies, for instance, as in the realms of weaponry, drill, and tactics. This chapter will seek to do justice to these changes in the space available without misrepresenting the reality of complex and uneven developments. Thirdly, precisely because the exploration of soldier-labour is so important and almost unprecedented, the effort must be undertaken with care so as to avoid distorting categories and conclusions by imprudently constructing generalizations about military

1 I wish to thank Joël Félix and Beatrice Heuser for their comments on an early draft of this paper. I am especially grateful to John Lynn for his advice and permission to use some of the ideas and material from his “Comments on Mercenary Military Service in Early Modern Europe”, paper presented at the IISH Conference in March 2010.
labour from the study of the civilian workforce or by too freely imposing concepts generated by modern labour studies onto an earlier era. As military institutions and practices are incorporated within a broader labour history, it is important to respect the integrity of the military past. These points need to be borne in mind not least of all with regard to the many and varied forms of recruitment that were to be found in the early modern period.

Methods of recruitment, c. 1500-1650

To fill the ranks of their armies, early modern governments made use of a variety of methods of recruitment, which stood on a spectrum between the involuntary and the voluntary. In different ways, all drafted recruits forcibly by making use of the generally accepted – if vague and ill-defined – notion that adult male subjects had some responsibility to bear arms in defence of their homeland. Sweden, with its tiny population (1.25 million in 1620), its need to raise forces to defend its newly won independence from Denmark in the sixteenth century, and its desire to pursue its bellicose ambitions in the following century, came closest to constructing a system of universal conscription. As a result of initiatives launched by Gustavus Vasa (1523-1560) and developed by Gustavus Adolphus (1611-1632), lists of able-bodied males aged over eighteen years were drawn up annually and used by conscript commissioners to select the required number of men. Nobles, clerics, and some peasants, as well as apprentices in the royal gardens and church organists, were exempt from the draft. Yet the system was remarkably wide-ranging. Almost 50,000 men were conscripted between 1626 and 1630, and under Charles XII (1697-1718) levies were taken more than once per year. Significantly, the conscripts could be required to serve outside their homeland.² Other states, including Habsburg Spain and Brandenburg-Prussia, considered the use of conscription, but none adopted it in a fully fledged form until it was introduced by France in the unprecedented circumstances of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

Sweden went furthest in employing conscription, but many other polities – including towns as well as national governments – made use of the obligation to bear arms to forcibly recruit men into militias. True, the local nobility in Bavaria and Brandenburg hesitated at the thought of arming their

² Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe, pp. 179, 189-191, 194-195, 201-206; Tallett, War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, pp. 82-83.
tenants, but elsewhere nobles and rulers had no such compunctions. In
England, for example, the militia system received a new lease of life under
Henry VIII. All those with £10 in land and the equivalent in goods were
obliged to keep weapons and armour and be ready to serve the king. The
enquiry of 1552 revealed the existence of 128,250 available men, though
their military knowledge and ability to equip themselves was patchy.
Venice similarly rostered 20,000 militia to defend the terreferma in 1528
and a number of German states and towns reorganized their militias for
local defence in the crisis years of the Reformation and the Thirty Years
War. In practice, militias proved to be of dubious military value. Poorly
equipped and lacking training, they were unable to confront professional
forces, and their reluctance to serve away from their immediate locality
further restricted their usefulness. However, as we shall see, after c. 1650
they would be reconfigured by inventive rulers who employed militias to
bulk out their regular forces.

Governments also forcibly drafted men whom they regarded as harmful
to society or otherwise useless. This was not a novel expedient: up to 12 per
cent of men serving in English forces between 1339 and 1361 may have been
criminals. On average, the English crown recruited 6,500 men annually for
overseas service between 1585 and 1602, many of them ne'er-do-wells. The
Tudor administration in Ireland was especially keen to encourage social and
economic stability by freeing the body politic of undesirables. It periodically
emptied the prisons of Ulster, leaving the province “in more complete peace
and obedience than has ever been seen since the Conquest”, according to
one seventeenth-century English administrator. Similarly, the republic of
Genoa enlisted Corsican bandits, although it did promise a pardon at the
end of their service. However, the impressment of dissolute persons should
not be exaggerated and probably looms larger in the historiography than
is warranted. Rogues, vagabonds, and criminals made bad soldiers, and
commanders were reluctant to have too many in their forces. Sir Francis de

3 Schnitter, *Volk und Landesdefension*, pp. 123-130.
of 1552”. See also Fissel, *English Warfare, 1511-1642*, pp. 61-66.
und Gesellschaft, 1500-1745”, pp. 11, 591.
8 Quoted in O’Reilly, “The Irish Mercenary Tradition in the 1600s”, p. 390.
10 See the exaggerated comment in Motley, *A History of the United Netherlands*, IV, p. 69, for
example.
Vere was accordingly “careful to send them back again” to England from his command in the Netherlands when he discovered their origins.11 However, governments in the eighteenth century would make increased use of their power to draft such men in their efforts to find recruits for their burgeoning armies.

Standing somewhere between voluntary and involuntary forms of recruitment was what might best be termed the quasi-feudal system. The socio-cultural identity of the nobility remained bound up with military endeavour, and the medieval notion that nobles had a feudal obligation to fight for their ruler retained some vigour. Accordingly, rulers in the sixteenth century still resorted to the customary way to raise troops by calling upon their nobles to turn out accompanied by their retinues. Thus the ban and arrière ban were deployed in France with a degree of success, though some individuals chose to make a financial contribution rather than serve in person.12 Here, the great nobility retained an important role in the provision of the cavalry.13 In England, the great nobility were less important than in previous decades, and the crown relied more upon the lesser gentry, though members of the court nobility still had an important if neglected role.14 Nobles assembled their retinues in various ways: they recruited volunteers; they established contracts with subordinate officers to find men; and they called out their dependants, affinities, and tenants who had little choice but to follow their lord. For instance, the Earl of Leicester, who was authorized by Elizabeth I to raise 500 infantry in 1585, responded by insisting that his tenants, whose leases obliged them to serve “in tyme of warre”, should follow him into the field.15 Nobles continued to obey their ruler’s summons to arms in this way throughout the sixteenth century, not least because they used their role as recruiting agents to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the crown but also over their own dependants.16 The numbers that could be raised in this way were not insignificant. The Earl of Pembroke reportedly brought 2,000 men from his Welsh estates during the Western rebellion of 1549 though, as this example suggests, the use of

12 Lot, Recherches sur les effectifs des armées françaises, pp. 258-261.
13 Potter, Renaissance France at War, pp. 177-179.
these semi-feudal retinues was generally restricted to local service within the homeland. But, as time went on, a declining proportion of the noble class proved willing to honour their “feudal” obligations, and the system fell into disuse. Nobles nevertheless continued to associate their social status, and the privileges it brought, with martial virtues and military service. As we shall see, in the eighteenth century rulers played upon this to make use of them as recruiting agents.

It was generally agreed that volunteers made better soldiers than pressed men. As one captain observed, “it is most sure [...] that persuading without pressing will carry most and make the best soldiers”.

This was one reason why states preferred to use voluntary methods of recruitment. Three main systems for voluntary recruiting can be identified, though they shared some important characteristics. The first involved the use of commissioned officers. Typically a captain would be issued by a ruler with letters patent that left him free to appoint his junior and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and that designated the area in which he could recruit. He, together with a small party that included veterans whenever possible attracted volunteers by broadcasting the need for men and by making soldiering appear as attractive as possible through various means of public display – beating a drum, unfurling the colours, recounting tales of heroic military action – as well as through the purchase of copious amounts of alcohol and the payment of a bounty. Recruiting by commission was used both to raise new companies and to maintain existing ones at something approaching full strength, and was employed throughout western Europe. As one veteran commentator noted, “The levying of souldiers [...] by the sound of the drumme [...] is generally used over the most partes of Christendome.” It reached a peak of efficiency in sixteenth-century Spain where the monarchy raised an average of 9,000 men annually with up to 20,000 being recruited in some years, though the strains of war eventually took their toll and Philip II’s successors reverted to more traditional means, handing over responsibility for recruitment to local towns and nobles as administración gave way to asiento.

The second method of voluntary recruitment involved negotiating an agreement, the Bestallung, with a military contractor for the delivery of a specified number of troops at an agreed time and place. The contract also set out the

18 Quoted in Trim, “Fighting Jacob’s Wars”, p. 229.
20 Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain, pp. 103-145.
terms of service, including levels of pay, duration, and the forms of warfare in which the troops could be involved. Particularly in demand were German *Landsknechte*, all-arms units noted for their reliability in battle, together with specialist forces including Swiss pikemen, German *Reiter* or pistoleers, and Albanian and Savoyard light cavalry. Contract troops developed a reputation for being assertive in defence of their rights, refusing to fight if they were not paid, for instance, and they were not cheap. However, they comprised a high proportion of veterans, came ready trained and equipped, and acquitted themselves so well on the battlefield that few states dared do without them.

One disadvantage of contract troops was that money not only had to be found “up front” to employ them, but a continuing revenue stream was also essential to retain their services. This was always going to be difficult for cash-strapped governments. The situation was just about workable during the sixteenth century when wars had lasted for no more than two or three campaign seasons, but conflicts began to increase in duration, especially after the temporary lull provided by the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559), putting increased strain on state finances. This opened up the potential for a novel form of contracting which, following Fritz Redlich, I will designate “general contracting”. The general contractor differed from the traditional mercenary contractor of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries in that he did not merely raise a troop in return for initial costs. Instead, he met these initial and some ongoing costs – recruitment, wages, equipment, and supplies – well into the campaign, eventually recouping his outlay and making a profit by the receipt of tax revenues, lump sum payments, *Kontribution* levied on friendly and enemy territory, and booty. The unit was “owned” by the contractor who had raised it and thus proprietorship as well as entrepreneurship became significant features of warfare in the late sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries.

The system of general contracting reached a peak during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). Fought largely within the German theatre, but involving almost all the European states, the conflict demanded unprecedented numbers of troops. Rulers lacked the necessary native manpower, the administrative structures, and the liquid cash to recruit and supply the soldiers themselves and turned to the services of general contractors, who undertook the provision of whole regiments and even armies. The foremost employer was the Holy Roman Emperor who had large potential assets in the form of land and tax revenues, but lacked the administrative machinery

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21 Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce*, remains the classic study.
in his Austrian lands to mobilize these. The leading enterpriser was Albrecht von Wallenstein. His army lists recorded total paper strengths in 1625 of 61,900, rising to 150,900 five years later. To recruit and supply forces on such a huge scale perforce involved the contractor in establishing networks with subcontracting colonels and captains who “beat the drum” and produced the volunteers. Not only that, but the contractor made agreements with financiers and bankers, merchants, munitionnaires, arms manufacturers, and others to supply the army with food, munitions, equipment, and pay. Accordingly, regiments or armies such as those raised by Ernst von Mansfeld, Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, Albrecht von Wallenstein, Johan Banér, or Lennart Torstensson represented the accumulation of venture capital on a huge scale, and the commander presided over a group of stakeholders who all expected a return on their investment, whether that investment be financial or purely military, with implications for the relationship between soldier and employer, as we shall see.

Methods of recruitment, c. 1650-1790

From the second half of the seventeenth century, methods of recruitment changed in a number of significant ways. In the first major development, states made greater use of involuntary recruitment. They continued to draft criminals and ne'er-do-wells, but in larger numbers than before. The war minister of France, the Comte de St Germain, noted in 1775 that, “As things are, the army must inevitably consist of the scum of the people, and of all those for whom society has no use.” More importantly, states developed the obligation to perform military service to draft men into militias. These could be used for special purposes, such as policing Huguenot areas, serving as a reserve in time of war, or providing a mechanism for drafting men directly into the regular forces. Of the great powers, it was France under Louis XIV that led the way. Every parish was obliged to provide a recruit who could be taken into the regular army. In this way more than 250,000 men were

23 He employed twice as many contractors as Sweden: Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce, I, p. 206.
25 Kollmann, Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale Illustrantia, IV, pp. 414-446. There were around 210,000 soldiers employed in Germany in 1648: Parker, The Thirty Years War, p. 191.
raised between 1701 and 1713, representing 46 per cent of the native recruits who fought during the War of the Spanish Succession, while some 120,000 militia were drafted to replace garrisoned veterans in the 1740s. Although heartily detested, militia service was supportable because the wealthy and well-connected were able to buy themselves out. Many German states made even greater use of the militia. In Bavaria, Mecklenburg, and Württemberg under the regency of Friedrich Karl (1677-1693), militia formations were raised and then drafted into the regular army as the need arose. Elsewhere, as in Saxony, Mainz, and Würzburg, the intermediate militia stage was omitted and men on the militia lists were taken straight into the army. In Prussia in 1733, Hesse-Cassel in 1762, and Austria between 1771 and 1780, a canton system of recruitment was adopted (*Kantonverfassung*), with each regiment being allocated a district from which it drew regular annual levies, the compulsory element of service being supplied by the obligation that had existed to enrol in the militia.28

The second major development concerned the system of military contracting. This did not end altogether after 1650, but it changed markedly. The general contractors who had figured so prominently in the Thirty Years War disappeared from the scene, and military contracting in its classical sense was substantially modified. Military contracting had always represented a standing affront to princes’ sovereignty. This was what Stephen Gardiner had been getting at in 1545 when he wrote of the need “to eskaip the thrawldom to such noughty mennes service”.29 Moreover, some contractors in the Thirty Years War had displayed signs of a dangerous autonomy. Cardinal Richelieu commented about Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, “An excellent commander but so much for himself that no-one could be sure of him”.30 Accordingly, the use of general contractors was phased out and the role of the private entrepreneur was diminished. For a while, the market for contract troops was left to the younger sons of German princes who had no personal patrimony or hope of royal succession.31 But from the late seventeenth

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31 Barker, “Military Entrepreneurship and Absolutism”.

century and throughout the eighteenth, a substantial number of rulers began to rent out their armies to foreign employers. The states concerned in this “soldier-trade” were principally German but included others such as Savoy-Piedmont and Sweden under the regency of Karl XI. In return for the hire of its forces, Sweden took “subsidies” from France using the money to retain a credible army in Pomerania. The eighteenth-century market for the hire of soldiers was dominated by states from within the Holy Roman Empire, including Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, Württemberg, Bavaria, Saxony, the Palatinate, and Würzburg. Significantly, many of the troops who were hired out had been forcibly drafted into the army with implications for scholars seeking to construct a taxonomy of army types, as we shall see.

As well as relying on impressed men, militias, and hired forces, states also developed their systems for finding volunteers. Even in Prussia, which relied heavily upon impressment, more than half the army continued to be volunteers. How were these found? As noted above, the quasi-feudal system of recruitment was already in terminal decline in the sixteenth century. Nobles nevertheless continued to associate their social status with martial virtues and military service, and rulers made use of this to engage their social and political elites in the recruitment and maintenance of their forces. Many nobles were prepared to put themselves and their private fortunes at the disposal of monarchs in the expectation of gaining prestige and because, quite simply, this was what was expected of them. One way of encouraging nobles to do so was by formally implementing a system of venality under which officers purchased their commissions, as happened most notably in France. Although venality theoretically gave officers ownership of their office and not of their men, in practice they were still expected to recruit their unit. They did so by public appeal to volunteers, by using their influence over dependants, and by deploying their private retinues in those instances where they still maintained them. Equally,
nobles were expected to use their own resources to equip, pay, and feed their men when state funding ran out, as it invariably did. Venality gave officers an incentive to invest their personal resources in the recruitment and maintenance of their units, since they would be more likely to get a return on their investment over the longer term. Profits could be made, for example, by selling rights of leave, from the supply of food and equipment to the men, and from the sale of subordinate officerships and NCO positions. Even where venality was not introduced, nobles could still be lured into accepting a commission and acting as a recruiting agent by the expectation of making a profit through the Kompaniewirtschaft, the system whereby captains made money from administering the finances of a company of soldiers. Austrian colonels expected to earn 10,000 gulden annually. Prussia resisted the trend, though here the lack of alternative employment forced nobles into the army. Proprietorship and entrepreneurship thus continued to be important within armies throughout the early modern period, and integral to the process of raising and maintaining forces.

Looking at the period 1500-1790 overall, three points stand out. First, governments used a variety of systems to recruit their forces. These systems reflected the nature of the early modern state, and in particular the relative fiscal and administrative weakness of central authority. This obliged governments to rely upon the use of contractors, including general contractors for a time, as well as upon their social and political elites to recruit and maintain armies. Even when the use of general contractors was phased out after c. 1650, states still found it easier to hire troops rather than raise them ab initio, and the dependence of rulers upon the co-operation of their nobilities, who served as intermediate agents of government, remained very considerable.

Secondly, despite the increased use of impressment, volunteers constituted the majority of recruits before the French revolutionary wars when, confronted with an apparently overwhelming coalition of European states, the nascent republic introduced the levée en masse in 1793 and further refined its procedures for conscription through the Jourdan-Delbrel law of 1799. The readiness of men to volunteer for military service can be chiefly explained by the overcrowded state of the labour market. For most volunteers, the army was an employer of last resort, and they signed on only because there was nothing better to be had. To be sure, a few may have joined to throw off the humdrum workaday world of civilian employment. “To bee bound an apprentice, that life I deemed little better than a dog’s

37 Asch, “War and State-Building”, p. 326; McKay, Prince Eugene of Savoy, p. 11.
life and base”, wrote Sydnam Poyntz in explanation of his decision to join up.38 Others welcomed the chance to see the world, or the opportunity to enjoy the unrestrained licentious behaviour that characterized what Erasmus termed “the wicked life of the soldier”;39 while for yet others the army offered the chance of glory. Francis I, the Holy Roman Emperor (1745-1765), noted that “what the natives of Ireland even dislike for principle, they generally will perform through a desire for glory”.40 Yet most recruits agreed to serve for the prosaic reason that they simply had no other way to make a living. Hardship and need were the best recruiting sergeants and drove men into armies. Even Poyntz confessed his true reason for enlisting: “My necessitie forced mee, my Money being growne short, to take the manes of a private soldier.”41 The impoverished recruit created by the playwright Caldéron de la Barca summed up the situation for the overwhelming majority of volunteers: “Only great need drives me to the war, I’d never go had I money in store.”42 Recruitment patterns were accordingly closely linked to economic cycles. Volunteers were easiest to find in the autumn months as agricultural labourers were laid off, or in the wake of a slump. Edward Coss has demonstrated that enlistment in the British army soared at times of economic downturn.43 Of course, one might question whether potential recruits faced with a choice between starvation and signing-on were in any meaningful sense “volunteers”. But the fact that they were theoretically free agents, and there was no legal compulsion on them to join, means that we should locate them on the “free” end of the axis of our graph.

Thirdly, the ready supply of volunteers meant that governments throughout our period could use impressment and militia service as a last resort to top up their forces, drawing upon those elements judged to be of little use to society and who had no political clout. There was greater resort to involuntary recruitment in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This was brought about by an expansion in the number of men under arms. Historically, around 1 per cent of the population has represented the ceiling for sustainable recruitment, but this figure began to be routinely exceeded with Louis XIV’s France leading the way. Peacetime levels of about 10,000 and 60,000-80,000 for major wars before 1650 soared to totals of 130,000

38 Goodrick, The Relation of Sydnam Poyntz, p. 45.
39 Quoted in Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, p. 127.
41 Goodrick, The Relation of Sydnam Poyntz, p. 45.
42 Quoted in Stradling, Europe and the Decline of Spain, p. 124.
43 Coss, All for the King’s Shilling.
and 360,000 respectively by the 1690s, representing over 2 per cent of the French population. Prussia during the Seven Years War (1756-1763) had 250,000 men under arms, around 5 per cent of the population of 5 million, and kept an army of 150,000 in peacetime. Britain similarly came close to the 2 per cent mark during the Seven Years War and War of American Independence. These wartime highs proved unsustainable in the long term, but they nonetheless represented an increase on earlier decades, and by the eighteenth century most European states had wartime military establishments that were four or five times bigger than those of their predecessors 200 years previously. One consequence of the increased number of men under arms was the need to make greater use of involuntary methods of recruitment. These methods were deployed especially by those states, such as Prussia, that maintained disproportionately large armies in relation to their population, and whose limited tax base and under-commercialized economies made it difficult to mobilize liquid resources.

The rewards of soldiering

Whatever the process that led to their recruitment, all soldiers expected to be compensated for what they did. This included receipt of pay, and in certain respects being paid made them similar to civilian wage-labourers. Pay rates for the “average” soldier – if such a thing existed – were on the low side but broadly consistent with those in the civilian labour market. The 1514 Statute of Artificers in England set the wages of skilled craftsmen at 6d per day, with other labourers at 4d. By comparison an ordinary infantryman received some 6d in mid-century. When inflation is taken into account this was hardly generous but not out of line with what one might expect. Moreover, soldiers with specialist skills who were in short supply received additional rewards, so that manifold gradations of pay existed in early modern armies. Thus the company assembled by Count Brissac for royal service in 1567 included three commissioned officers, two NCOs, a quar-
termaster, musicians, three kinds of pikemen, halberdiers, and three sorts of arquebusiers, all of whom received different levels of pay with the result that in this small unit there were fourteen distinct pay grades. Specialist troops received higher rewards than their locally recruited counterparts, partly in recognition of their superior fighting skills. Landsknecht pay in sixteenth-century French royal armies was about 20 per cent higher than that of the native infantry, and the German units also received additional bonus payments. Swiss pikemen in French employ received an extra month’s wages in the event of battle, and survivors insisted upon receiving the pay of casualties.

To be sure, higher pay rates did not simply reflect the state of the labour market and the specialist skills on offer. Thus, the heavy cavalry throughout our period tended to be especially well rewarded. During the Wars of Religion, their officers were paid twice as much as analogous ranks in the infantry; and even the lowest-paid mounted archer, at 17 livres per month, had a salary higher than most rank-and-file infantry. This certainly reflected their perceived usefulness on the battlefield, but higher wages were also meant to cover the initial investment in horses and equipment that was required of the mounted soldier. The cost of outfitting a mounted archer was in the region of 400 livres; and a minimum of 600-700 livres was required for an homme d’armes who needed three horses and a significantly greater amount of armour. This was ten or fifteen times the cost of equipping a heavily armoured pikeman. Higher wages were also paid to cover the cost of feeding and replacing the horses while on campaign (given their high mortality levels, the latter represented a significant expense). Finally, and most importantly, higher pay rates in the cavalry were due in large measure to the superior social status of the members of this branch of the army.

It was probably in the artillery regiments – units that proved least attractive to the nobility and where there were the clearest functional divisions – that the laws of the labour market can be seen to have operated

48 Wood, The King’s Army, pp. 88-89.
49 Potter, Renaissance France at War, pp. 129-130, 137. Being hired by the regiment made contract troops more expensive, since the employer had to fund an extra layer of regimental officers: Wood, The King’s Army, p. 137.
50 Wood, The King’s Army, pp. 135-136; Robinson, “Horse Supply and the Development of the New Model Army”, p. 122 and passim. It cost around £12 to mount and equip a cavalryman in England in the 1640s, compared to an infantryman’s pay of 8d per day. See British Library, Thomason Tracts, E306(5) Ordinance...for the Raising of Five Hundred Horse; Asquith, The New Model Army, p. 19. Note the comments of Maurice de Saxe, Mes rêveries (1732), in Phillips, Roots of Strategy, pp. 119-120, 137.
in their purest form. A French memoir from 1568 estimated that 2,620 people would be needed to service the artillery train of the royal army, including clerks, gunners, pioneers, pontoon specialists, tenters, drivers, and others. The highest paid was the grand master, at 500 livres per month; the lowest were the humble labourers or pioneers. As James Wood has indicated, the wages paid to the personnel of the artillery train, and the functions they performed, correlated very closely to an industrial enterprise. Thus there was a clear labour hierarchy, with those exercising managerial/supervisory roles receiving the most pay, followed by the skilled elements (roughly 22 per cent of the total force), then the unskilled workers who comprised some 75 per cent of the workforce. All the skilled workers, beginning with the gunners at 10 livres per month, received higher wage rates than the average pikeman or arquebusiers at 8-9 livres per month, and their pay compared favourably with that of the mounted archers who, when expenses were taken into account, may have cleared only 8.7 livres in monthly salary.51

Like their counterparts in civilian society, soldiers were not averse to using their “industrial muscle” to wring higher rewards out of their employers. This was especially the case with groups such as the Swiss pikemen and the Landsknechte, both of whom had a strong sense of communal solidarity reinforced by well-developed, autonomous internal structures that made them, in some respects, akin to guilds or trade unions. The Landsknechte, for instance, formed self-governing units in which the common soldiers, comprising the gemeente or community, elected their own officers (the voerder, gemeene weyfel, and fourier), administered justice, and agreed their terms and conditions of employment.52 They used their corporate solidarity to drive up pay rates and to impose what now might be termed restrictive practices. Thus the Swiss in 1522 informed their immediate employer, the duc de Montmorency, that they would not assault fortified towns because this was simply “not their trade”.53 Just as the autonomy and restrictive practices of the guilds offended the lumières of later Enlightenment decades, so these same characteristics of the Landsknechte offended their employers even though their military skills made them indispensable. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the remedy in both instances appeared similar: to reduce the autonomy and self-governance of guilds and Landsknechte. In the case of the former this meant exposing them to the

51 Wood, The King’s Army, pp. 161-168.
52 Baumann, Landsknechte; Burschel, Söldner in Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts.
53 Du Bellay and du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 189.
rigour of the free market, and in the case of the latter it involved an attack on their internal structures of governance.

There are undoubtedly parallels to be drawn between soldiers and wage-labourers in civilian society. Yet we should not take these too far. One difference was the irregularity of soldiers' pay. To be sure, wage-labourers in civilian society were commonly laid off: as the need for farm labour was reduced in the winter months or as cyclical slumps hit manufacturing industries. Soldiers too were frequently dismissed at the end of the campaign season as the winter months approached. What was distinctive about the soldier's situation was the extent to which he frequently received little or no pay even while he was employed. This resulted in the accumulation of arrears which could be substantial. By February 1568 a third of the heavy cavalry companies in the French royal army had received no pay since the first quarter of the previous year; and the wages of the rest of the army were more than six months in arrears. During the campaign around Landrecies in 1542, the English commander Wallop, then in imperial service, reported of his men that they were “veray poore and few or none of theym have any greate store of money, victualz be dere, clothes wax thyn, and cold weather encreseath”. Similarly, the veteran Sir James Turner, who fought in Ireland for a Scots contingent during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms (as the English Civil Wars are now more adequately referred to) recorded that the army “fingered no pay the whole time I stayd in Ireland, except for three months”.54

One response of soldiers to low or no pay was to mutiny, and in some respects this withdrawal of labour may be regarded as the equivalent of the strike in the civilian labour market. Mutinies were most common and sophisticated in the Spanish Army of Flanders, though they were by no means restricted to these forces. Forty-five major munities were staged (and there was a good deal of ritualized drama in their conduct) between 1572 and 1607, with some lasting more than a year. Mutineers elected leaders or “management committees”, negotiated with the government, and sustained themselves by levying local taxes.55 However, a second response of soldiers to low or no pay was unique and simply not available to civilian workers. Without the wages that were supposed to buy essential supplies, the soldiers


resorted to pillaging the local population, taking whatever they needed by force. Thus, Thomas Stockdale complained of the atrocities committed by soldiers based in Yorkshire during the 1640s, admitting that if only the troops had been paid “the sufferance and wrong would be unto many less sensible.” This easy, almost casual resort to violence, often involving extreme levels of brutality, can be explained in a number of ways. Robert Muchembled notes the constant and systematic pattern of conflict between troops and members of the rural community. Such poor relations in part reflected the long-standing urban/rural hostility that was a pronounced feature of early modern society; and troops recruited largely from the towns had little regard for inhabitants of the countryside whom they regarded as backward, stupid, and easy prey.

However, we should probably look beyond town/country relations to the huge cultural gulf that separated soldiers from all civilians. As Wood notes, “The soldiery were an instrument of barely controlled violence and destructiveness and their vocation and values were based upon completely different assumptions about rules of law, property rights, and the application of force and coercion that in any other context would be clearly criminal behaviour.” Levels of violence were especially high whenever there was a heightened sense of the “Other” between soldiers and civilians brought about, for example, by pronounced ethnic, religious, or cultural differences. Foreign troops in particular saw themselves as set apart from the native civilian population. The notorious “Day of the Landsknechte” at Caen in 1513 when soldiers ransacked the town after having not been paid for months, the sack of Rome by Charles V’s unpaid German troops in 1527, and the “Spanish Fury” at Antwerp in 1576 were merely the best known of a long catalogue of outrages by non-native troops. Similarly, the appalling treatment of Irish civilians in the 1640s by English soldiers was grounded in the widely held belief that Irish Catholics were “backward” with respect to religion and culture. Barnaby Rich described them as “more uncivil, more uncleanly, more barbarous and more brutish in their customs and demeanours than any other people in the known world.” Moreover, it

56 Johnson, *The Fairfax Correspondence*, I, p. 203.
58 Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe*, pp. 190-191.
59 Wood, *The King’s Army*, p. 236.
60 Hale, “On the Concept of the ‘Other’ and the ‘Enemy’”.
made little difference when soldiers were meant to be allies of the civilian population. This can be exemplified by the behaviour of poorly paid Scots forces in England during the first Civil War, who committed numerous atrocities in their search for supplies, even though they were meant to be billeted upon a friendly population.63

The irregularity of their pay and their ready resort to violence when unpaid were not the only things that distinguished soldiers from civilian wage-labourers. Being paid a wage was not necessarily the main or even sole reason for fighting. All soldiers anticipated an economic reward, but this might equally come from ransom or from booty as from pay, certainly before c. 1650. “Do you think we are in the King’s service for the four ducats a month we earn?”, Henry VIII’s Spanish captains serving at Boulogne rhetorically asked their general. “Not so my lord: on the contrary, we serve with the hope of taking prisoners and getting their ransom.”64 Others expected to make a profit by picking over the dead and wounded on the battlefield and from the sack of a town after it had been taken by assault. The laws of war permitted the soldiers three days of unrestricted plunder of a town that had been stormed after it had unreasonably refused to surrender. This was justified partly on the grounds that it would otherwise have been impossible to bring the soldiers to the point where they were prepared to undertake the hazardous operation of storming a breach. Outside these instances, monetary reward might come through routine pillaging of peasants and others. Thus a sixteenth-century woodcut by Erhard Schön shows a Landsknecht and his female companion with poems accompanying the two characters. The Landsknecht, a former cobbler, explains that he will abandon shoemaking for soldiering to gain what he can, since being a cobbler rewards him little, though “in many wars I have won/Great wealth and manifold honors/Who then knows whom fortune favors?” She replies that, “Perhaps so much may be my winning [from pillage]/Much more than ever I could whilst spinning.”65 We should not be surprised by soldiers’ expectation of reward by means of ransom and pillage, for the spoils of war figured prominently as a form of legitimate compensation in the late Middle Ages, and a long tradition of legal plunder preceded early modern

63 British Library, Thomason Tracts, E365(9), A Remonstrance Concerning the Misdemeanours of some of the Scots Souldiers in the County of Yorke, 1646. On patterns of soldier/civilian violence, see Tallett, “Soldats et actes de violence à l’encontre des civils dans les îles britanniques”.
64 Hume, Chronicle of King Henry VIII...Written in Spanish by an unknown hand.
65 Lynn, Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe, pp. 16-17.
military practice. The taking of spoils was a defining characteristic of just, or public, war.66

Cash-strapped governments, unable to pay the soldiers in full or sometimes at all, had little choice but to accept the routine nature of pillage. The Mercure françois put it bluntly: “One finds enough soldiers when one gives them the freedom to live off the land, and allowing them to pillage supports them without pay.”67 Indeed, sometimes the situation could be turned to one’s advantage. The system of regulated plunder that came to a peak in the Thirty Years War sought, not altogether successfully, to allow armies to live off the population by taking regular Kontributions. Although heavy, Kontributions were meant to preserve the productive capacity of the territory while tapping it for the army’s benefit.68 At other times, giving soldiers free rein to pillage was a deliberate act of strategy, designed to hamper the movements of the enemy forces and bring about their disintegration. Integral to pillaging before c. 1650 was the presence with the army of non-combatants, including women, who foraged, plundered, managed the “take”, and exchanged goods for money or food with the sutlers and “fences”. The significance of all this from our point of view is that soldiers were not so much being paid to fight but rather being given “a de facto licence to pillage in order to support themselves, often with the aid of their comrades and female partners”, and in these circumstances the soldier should be regarded less as a wage-earner and more as “a kind of sub-contractor, empowered to support himself by a form of petty entrepreneurship in a family economy based upon pillage”.69

The relationship of general contractors and noble officers to their “employers” was equally ambiguous. As I have already noted, for the employer the attraction of using a general contractor was that in return for only a modest “up-front” payment, the contractor and his network of subcontracting colonels and captains, financiers, and munitionnaires, were prepared to subsidize initial recruitment costs, and then cover the expense of paying, equipping, and supplying the troops until well into the campaign. The contractor and his network of associates were thus not so much employees of the state as its creditors. True, the use of general contractors was phased out after the end of the Thirty Years War. But, as we have seen, governments turned increasingly to their nobilities, who were expected to use

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66 Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages.
68 See Tallett, War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, pp. 55-56, for a summary.
their personal resources to help with the recruitment, pay, and supply of their unit. As Redlich has observed, regiments ceased to be the large-scale business enterprises of Wallenstein’s day, but they nevertheless represented an investment from which the colonel/captain might hope to recover his capital and, with any luck, generate a profit. Whether nobles did always make a profit is open to doubt: as Hervé Drévillon has shown in the case of France, they acquired honour as a result of military service, but little monetary gain. Nevertheless, the fact remains that they were prepared to subsidize the crown, and in this respect they too were as much creditors as employees of the state.

There are, then, real difficulties in seeing the soldier, certainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as a wage-labourer who fought merely for pay. However, the situation did become clearer by the eighteenth century. As any number of examples testify, the failure to pay and supply troops and the tacit approval of ransom and pillage as substitutes for regular wages resulted in mutiny, indiscipline, disorder, or desertion. Any one of these could cause the collapse of the army as a fighting force and bring a campaign to a juddering halt. As the experienced contractor Count Rhingrave, presciently warned, “The soldier cannot live on air […] where there is hunger and necessity, there will arise disorder.” A seventeenth-century observer similarly noted that “The greatest weakening of an army is disorder. The greatest cause of disorder is want of pay.” The duc d’Estampes warned that if he could not provide for his men they would either desert or join the enemy “because such men follow the éscu”. Accordingly, from the mid-seventeenth century, governments began, albeit falteringly, to put in place a series of linked initiatives aimed at producing military forces that were more tightly controlled by the prince and better supported by the state. The objective behind these initiatives was to improve military efficiency and to turn armies into more effective instruments of state power. As Michel le Tellier succinctly noted, “To secure the livelihood of the soldier is to secure victory for the king.”

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70 Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce, II, pp. 55-62.
71 Drévillon, L’impôt du sang. His archival sources probably lead him to understate the costs incurred.
72 Lublinskaya, Documents pour server à l’histoire des guerres civiles en France, p. 246.
73 British Library, Thomason Tracts, E16(36) Observations Concerning Princes and States upon Peace and Warre, 1642.
75 Quoted in André, Michel le Tellier et l’organisation de l’armée monarchique, p. 64.
First, governments sought to pay their soldiers regularly even if not always in full. The Dutch in many respects led the way, and were generally regarded as the best – in the sense of most reliable – payers in the late seventeenth century. Not only did the States have access to liquid funds, drawn from taxes levied upon the Republic’s thriving commercial trade, but they made use of the innovation of solliciteurs-militair, businessmen who, in return for an agreed monthly sum, were prepared to advance money to a captain and his company, thus ensuring the men their pay. A formalization of the system gave the solliciteurs-militair a monopoly on paying the troops in return for an agreed interest rate of 6.95 per cent on all the funds they advanced. The Dutch system of payment to some extent prefigured what would happen elsewhere. During the War of the Austrian Succession (1741-1749), for example, pay advances to the troops in the two French armies operating in Germany, the armée de Bavière and the armée de Westphalie, were handled increasingly by a body of specialist financiers such as Mauvillain. If soldiers were paid more routinely, governments nonetheless took action to ensure that there was no scope for bargaining over levels of pay and conditions of service. Thus the Landsknecht regiments were reorganized into companies; their elected officers were abolished; pay was tied to musters; and troops lost the right to represent themselves. In a similar way, employers sought means to restrict the autonomy of the Swiss pikemen.

Secondly, paying the soldiers allowed the enforcement of harsher discipline. As Everhard van Reyd stated bluntly, “One could not hang those [soldiers] one did not pay”, a judgement confirmed by General George Monck who concluded that “if [the men] are punctually paid […] then your general can with justice punish them severely”. By the mid-seventeenth century, most of the rules and conventions governing the conduct of warfare were already in place. As far as the ordinary soldier was concerned, these were embodied in the articles of war issued by commanders at the

77 Félix, “Victualling Louis XV’s Armies”, p. 10.
80 Parker, “Early Modern Europe”, p. 41.
start of each campaign. The articles would not be altered in substance, though they were greatly expanded in detail, but from the second half of the seventeenth century they began to be enforced with a new rigour. In particular, those sections that forbade looting, theft, and mistreatment of civilians were implemented in an attempt to cut out or at least restrain unlicensed pillaging. Marshal Claude Villars’s use of “the very greatest severity” against breaches of discipline with respect to pillaging was typical. All eighteenth-century armies thus had their equivalent of the French prêvôts de maréchaux charged with keeping order in the camp and on the march, and military courts were held on a more routine basis than they had been earlier.

Apart from restricting pillage, the enforcement of more rigorous discipline had the extra benefit from the commander’s point of view that raw recruits could be made to march, drill, and practise battlefield manoeuvres. Additionally, troops could now be obliged to perform duties such as digging trenches and latrines, carrying their own baggage, and preparing earthwork fortifications. These were duties that their predecessors had frequently jibbed at and devolved onto the numerous women and other camp followers, or onto civilians haplessly pressed into service. As Wood has noted, these privileges were analogous to those of master-craftsmen, and their existence had meant that troops in the first half of our period had “operated more like skilled and somewhat independent contract workers, and the whole army as a cross between a warrior society and a specialized labor force”. Although it is important not to exaggerate the contrasts with an earlier epoch and to acknowledge national differences of practice, by the eighteenth century soldiers were increasingly cowed and obedient products of harsh discipline, epitomized at the extreme by the robotic Prussian forces, very different from the swaggering freebooters of two centuries earlier.

As well as restricting opportunities for pillage, governments also denied soldiers the possibility of profit by taking over responsibility for ransom- ing prisoners. Henry VIII’s Spanish captains had no counterpart in the

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81 Navereau, Le logement et les ustensiles des gens de guerres; Tallett, War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, pp. 123-126.
83 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, pp. 117-143. See plate 6 and accompanying inscription of Callot’s “Les Misères...de la Guerre” (1633), depicting villagers being led away probably to act as labourers: Daniel, Callot’s Etchings, item 271.
84 Wood, The King’s Army, p. 304.
85 Kunisch, Fürst-Gesellschaft-Krieg, pp. 178-182; and the comments of Frederick the Great on “Prussian Troops” in Military Instructions.
eighteenth century as governments asserted that prisoners became the property of the state which would handle negotiations for their release and take the proceeds of any ransom. Soldiers thus lost out financially on two fronts. More positively, however, governments did begin to take greater care of the welfare of their soldiers, arranging to supply them directly with food, equipment, tobacco, clothing, and housing, things that the soldier had previously been expected to purchase out of his pay. Again, the motivation was not altruistic but pragmatic: governments recognized that poorly supplied troops did not win wars. The Spanish Army of Flanders had led the way in this regard in the sixteenth century, but by the 1700s it was becoming commonplace for governments to put in place arrangements with large-scale civilian contractors for the supply of goods to the army.86 One unlooked-for consequence of the direct supply of clothing to the troops was that there was greater standardization of dress, leading to the development of uniforms with all that this implied in terms of making men more amenable to drill and discipline.87

To be sure, we should not exaggerate either the extent of these changes or the abruptness of the breach with the past. Change was gradual rather than revolutionary. The mechanisms of state administration were creaky and frequently broke down, leaving the soldier unpaid, unfed, and poorly clothed. Despite the harsh enforcement of discipline, desertion and disorder remained common features of armies, and civilians still suffered at their hands. The number of mutinies certainly diminished after c. 1650, but they still continued to take place and might have serious repercussions, as John Prebble’s study of Highland troops in British service demonstrates.88 Nonetheless, there were significant developments taking place, and the eighteenth-century soldier may be seen as more dependent than his sixteenth- and seventeenth-century predecessors on his wage and goods-in-kind provided by his employer, unable to bargain about pay and terms of employment, increasingly hemmed about by regulation, and part of a military machine in which standardization and uniformity was becoming the norm.

86 Félix, “Victualling Louis XV’s Armies”. See also Côté, Joseph-Michel Cadet, for the supply of troops overseas.
87 Labourers in the sixteenth-century French royal army had been given uniforms to make desertion harder: Wood, The King’s Army, p. 166.
88 Prebble, Mutiny.
Social and cultural restraints on soldiering: duration of service

Some of the social and cultural factors that influenced recruitment – the identification of the nobility with military service and the ability of the better-off to avoid impressment and militia service – have already been alluded to, but it is appropriate at this point to look at two other socio-cultural aspects of fighting for a living, and also to ask how long the soldier might expect to serve. It should be noted at the outset that the labour market for soldiers was an international one throughout the period. Foreigners constituted a significant and sometimes the majority element within armies. For instance, around 70 per cent of Francis I’s forces in 1542 were non-native, though the record probably goes to Sweden: only 12 per cent of its forces in 1632 were native. Such examples may not represent the norm, but it nonetheless remained common for a ruler to have half his forces made up of foreigners. One reason for this high percentage figure in the sixteenth century was the need to employ specialist troops whose recruitment had a regional basis: Genoese crossbowmen, Albanian stradiots, German Reiter able to perform the complex manoeuvres associated with the caracole, Bohemian users of the Wagenburg, Savoyard light cavalry, and Swiss pikemen. Thus, in France a memoir prepared for Catherine de Medici, the queen mother, at the start of the first civil war in 1562, envisaged using foreign contract troops to provide 53.8 per cent of the crown’s infantry forces (10.8 per cent Swiss, 27 per cent German, 8 per cent Italian, and 8 per cent Spanish) and 48.6 per cent of the cavalry (21 per cent Flemish, 25.6 per cent German, 2 per cent Savoyard). The development of general military contracting further eroded the distinction between native and non-native troops. The enterprisers’ polyglot forces came from every nationality. As Parrott observes, high-quality soldiers were important; origins were not.

A shift in the methods of recruitment after c. 1650, with an increased emphasis on impressment, militia, and recruiting by commissioned captains, reasserted the importance of national origins, since the captains were often subjects of the prince whom they served. Nevertheless, foreigners continued to represent a substantial proportion of the state’s forces, ranging from 14 to 60 per cent in the armies of Britain, France, Spain, and Prussia, though in the case of the latter many so-called foreigners were actually recruited

90 Wood, The King’s Army, derived from table 2.8, p. 56.
91 Parrott, “From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies”, p. 82.
from Hohenzollern lands. The pattern evidenced by the larger states held good for many smaller ones too. Thus in 1734 Piedmont fielded 14,000 foreigners and 26,000 native troops, the non-native contingent comprising some 35 per cent of the total. In the context of increased army size, non-national recruitment remained a resource that was too important to ignore. One incidental consequence of the international nature of the labour market for soldiers was the high levels of migration, particularly from fertile recruiting grounds such as sixteenth-century Italy and Ireland throughout the period.

If national origins presented little bar to army service, what about gender? This may seem a curious question to pose, given that combatant soldiers were male. But what John Lynn has called the “campaign community” comprised a large number of civilians – craftsmen, lackeys, tradesmen, sutlers, carters, and pawnbrokers, for example. The army’s “tail” included numerous women, though they did not figure on any muster lists. Their presence in armies was essential. They formed part of the libertine lifestyle that induced men to sign on; and they were integral to the maintenance and operation of armies. They were irreplaceable for the performance of gender-based duties: laundering, sewing, nursing, prostitution. They were also expected in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to assist with siege work, digging latrines, foraging, and pillaging. As governments acted to reduce pillage and as the state’s capacity to pay and supply armies grew in the eighteenth century, so women’s role in securing food supplies declined. Governments, which had always regarded women in armies as potentially troublesome and as extra mouths to feed, now acted to restrict their numbers. Fewer women than previously marched with the armies, and as numbers of women diminished so too did the soldier’s freewheeling libertine lifestyle.

What of the length and terms of service? Sixteenth-century contract troops were the most privileged in these respects. Their period of service was defined by the Bestallung and was usually limited to fighting a particular campaign. The contract also set out the conditions of service. Thus, 5,000 German troops contracted for service in Friuli refused orders from their Venetian employers.
redirecting them to the fleet because their original contract had ruled out their use at sea. Additionally, they were in theory free to choose their employer, though in practice this choice might be restricted, since governments in the sixteenth century felt it worthwhile paying retainers to contractors to ensure first call on their services in the event of hostilities. The hard-won victory of Francis I against the Swiss at Marignano (September 1515) ironically encouraged the French to make permanent treaties with the Swiss cantons to ensure a monopoly over their outstanding pikemen. Moreover, the leaders of contract forces sometimes received grants of land and titles that made it hard for them to switch sides; they were reluctant to change during a campaign lest they lose arrears of pay and taxes from their current employer; and they had to consider geographical proximity and political relationships with a prospective employer before signing any contract.

Unlike sixteenth-century contract troops, volunteers who signed on with a captain made an open-ended agreement, to serve until disbandment at the end of the campaign or the war, whenever that might be. In practice, troops were frequently laid off in the autumn, especially in the first half of our period. Impressed men had no choice with regard to the length and terms of employment, and there was a trend in the eighteenth century, especially in some German states, to extend the period of service dramatically. For example, service in the Prussian army for those who had been forcibly drafted was theoretically for an unlimited period, though it was restricted to twenty years in 1792. In practice, however, many recruits were discharged early, and most received long periods of furlough allowing them to return home at harvest time. The extension of periods of service went alongside a trend towards retaining a body of men throughout the year, leading to the establishment of permanent forces. True, this was not a novelty. Standing armies had emerged in many polities during the fifteenth century, and rulers additionally endeavoured to secure the ongoing availability of forces (not quite the same thing) by paying retainers to military contractors and through treaties with the Swiss cantons, as I have noted. But from the late seventeenth century onwards, the number of soldiers retained by the state throughout the year grew quite significantly. The need for peacetime forces grew with the decline of traditional and general contracting which

97 See ibid., pp. 322-323; Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, p. 39, for examples.
99 Wilson, “Social Militarization in Eighteenth Century Germany”, pp. 5, 16.
100 Tallett and Trim, “Then Was Then and Now is Now”, p. 22, and Gunn, “War and the Emergence of the State”, pp. 54-58.
made it harder to hire an army “off the shelf”. A permanently retained body of forces, especially if they were veterans, provided the core around which the army could be expanded rapidly in wartime.

Once enrolled in the army, all soldiers were forbidden to desert, and only sixteenth-century contract troops had the opportunity (at least in theory) of changing sides during a war should the current employer not fulfil his side of the agreement. Desertion and enlisting with the enemy were offences that figured in all military codes of conduct. As with much else to do with army life, there were efforts from c. 1650 onwards to enforce these twin aspects of the disciplinary codes in an attempt to enhance the fighting efficiency of armies.

Aggregate contract to state commission armies?

Our review of early modern soldiers suggests that the broad outlines concerning the evolution of army style advanced by John Lynn in 1996 hold good.\(^{101}\) The aggregate contract army (1450-1650) was indeed pieced together by a variety of voluntary and involuntary methods, as well as through a quasi-feudal procedure that was a mixture of the two. The second half of our period (1650-1790) witnessed the development of the state commission army, a military force that was both better supported by the state and more tightly controlled by the prince. Regulation, discipline, and uniformity increasingly became the order of the day, and there was a growing move towards the direct state supply of goods that the soldier had previously been expected to provide himself, albeit this was generally conducted through the employment of private financiers and merchants. Numbers of soldiers increased, and the period witnessed the development of an existing trend towards the maintenance of standing forces. The Spanish Army of Flanders and the Swedes had been the paradigm forces in the period 1500-1650. After that point, two competing models emerged: the Dutch, who used subsidy forces, and the French army under Louis XIV, the latter being displaced by the Prussians, who became the paradigm for Europeans from the mid-eighteenth century until their defeats during the Wars of the French Revolution and debacle in 1806. However, if the broad outlines of Lynn’s thesis remain intact, some amendments are called for, as he has acknowledged.

It is important to stress the continuing importance of both entrepreneurship and the nobility in recruiting and supporting armies throughout the

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101 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West”.
period and not just between 1500 and 1650. Traditional contracting as well as general contracting did go into steep decline after the mid-seventeenth century. Yet the commercialization of warfare continued in two important respects. First, the role of the nobility, who had always been integral to the raising of forces, was developed in novel ways. Monarchs continued to play upon the longstanding twinning of military service and noble status to persuade their elites both to join the army and to bring men with them. As we have seen, in some armies, most notably that of France, the introduction of a system of venality further encouraged them to use their private wealth and influence to recruit and support troops in the hope of a profit in the long term. Elsewhere, the hope of profit from the management of a company similarly persuaded them to put their money and prestige at the service of the monarch. The regiment was undoubtedly under greater state control in the eighteenth century, but entrepreneurship endured. We should not be surprised by this continued use of the nobility, for much recent scholarship has stressed the extent to which rulers, even in supposedly “absolute” states, relied upon negotiation and compromise with the social and financial elites – whether these comprised the traditional nobility, members of the court, provincial worthies, administrative and legal personnel, merchants, or others – to conduct business. This was especially the case with respect to the creation and maintenance of an army, a body of a size and cost unmatched by any other institution in the state. As David Parrott has noted, “The creation or transformation of an army is not some act of will imposed by the ruler upon a passive body of subjects. Armies and military institutions represent the relationship between rulers and political elites.”

The commercialization of warfare endured in a second way. A number of mainly German polities, but also Savoy and Sweden for brief periods, began to lease their forces to larger, and richer, states in return for the payment of subsidies. The hire of soldiers for monetary gain to the highest bidder, with little regard for the welfare of the men involved, has led to it being described slightly as Soldatenhandel (soldier-trade); and the ruler of Hesse-Cassel in particular has been vilified for apparently bemoaning the fact that “only” 1,465 of his subjects were killed at the battle of Trenton when the British paid a premium for those killed in action rather than for those wounded or captured. Of course, we should not exaggerate the commercial aspect of this soldier-trade. As Peter Wilson has demonstrated, much more

102 Parrott, “From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies”, p. 77.
103 Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, p. 1; Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg, pp. 74-77, reviews the literature.
than money was involved, the princes who hired out their subjects being concerned at least as much with the political, dynastic, and diplomatic returns to be gained. Indeed, the purely cash profits were frequently quite small or non-existent, most of the subsidy being eaten up by the costs of recruitment. Among the fortunate few to turn a monetary profit were Hanover and the much smaller Ansbach-Bayreuth in 1797. Hesse-Cassel too stood out by virtue of its exceptionality in making large profits from the soldier-trade. Moreover, German states were discriminating when choosing subsidy partners, not always going for the highest bidder; and contracts generally contained clauses protecting the rights of the soldiers by, for instance, insisting that they be kept together as a unit and operate under the command of their own officers. Nevertheless, even when these caveats are taken into account, there remained an important commercial aspect to this Kriegshandwerk, or “warcraft”. 104

The Soldatenhandel poses a more significant difficulty for Lynn’s taxonomy of army style, which needs to be adjusted accordingly, as he has proposed.105 This is because these hired regiments exhibited characteristics both of mercenary forces and of conscript troops at the same time. The term “mercenary” in the early modern period has to be defined with care. Modern definitions centre upon the tripartite notions of fighting for pay, foreign service, and professionalism, and these have frequently and inappropriately been transposed to the early modern period.106 However, none of these qualities quite captures the essence of mercenary service in early modern Europe. First, after c. 1650 all soldiers expected to be paid, but that did not make them all mercenaries. Before 1650 pay was only one form of compensation for soldiering. Yet even if we extend the concept of monetary reward beyond pay to include the profits that soldiers hoped to make from ransoms and from pillage, this does not take us much further, since again all hoped to make a profit in this fashion. Secondly, the notion of foreign service is potentially misleading. To be sure, there is some reason to

104 Wilson, “The German ‘Soldier-Trade’ of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”, War, State and Society in Württemberg, pp. 84, 89; Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, p. 127.
equate mercenaries with foreigners because many of them in the sixteenth century were specialists with some regional basis for their recruitment. The instances of the Genoese crossbowmen, Albanian stradiots, German Landsknechte and Reiter, Savoyard light cavalry, and Swiss pikemen have already been noted.107 But all early modern armies contained large numbers of “foreign” troops, not all of whom were described as mercenaries and, conversely, there were many native recruits who volunteered to serve their ruler but who would be described as mercenaries. Thus, Thomas Churchyard referred to “mercenaries” taken by the Earl of Essex to Ireland, even though they were mostly men from Queen Elizabeth’s domains.108 Finally, professionalism: this has to do with expertise, standards, and longevity in service and, while well-established mercenary units, such as the Landsknechte and Reiter for example, would be expected to display these characteristics, professionalism could equally be a characteristic of non-mercenary forces.109

These points are thrown into sharper focus if we establish what the identifying characteristics of the early modern mercenary actually were. First was the notion that they were “hyred soouldiers”, as one sixteenth-century chronicler put it.110 A second and related point was the notion of free agency. The mercenary was not obliged to fight, by reason of feudal obligation or impressment, for example. He had a choice about whether to serve. Finally, the mercenary had no interest in the cause but fought simply for his own private interest. It is the second of these three, interlocking characteristics that raises problems for the classification of the eighteenth-century Soldatenhandel. The soldiers involved in it were hired, and they had no direct interest in the cause, and in these twin respects they were mercenaries, but many of them were not free agents since they had been forcibly recruited into their ruler’s army, either through impressment or the militia system (or some variant of it). This implies the need for a new category in Lynn’s taxonomy. He suggests a hybrid category, that of the “conscript-mercenary”.111

Discussion of mercenaries leads to a final area in which Lynn’s model needs to be adjusted. He points to the unreliability of the aggregate contract

107 Though these contingents were actually not as homogeneous as is usually supposed and the geographical origins of “German” or “Swiss” units could be quite diverse. The Swiss were occasionally referred to as “Allemans”, and Landsknechte could be recruited in Guelders, the Vaud, and Savoy: Baumann, Landsknecht; Potter, Renaissance France, p. 131.
110 Quoted in Trim, “Fighting Jacob’s Wars”, p. 80.
army largely because it “was composed in the main of mercenary bands” with the consequence that troops felt little loyalty to the ruler they fought for and were ready to turn on their employer, to pillage his subjects, and to mutiny.112 But is such a judgement on mercenaries justified? Early modern contemporaries certainly had a low opinion of them, but this sprang from a distaste for men who made war a profession rather than a vocation, not from any criticism of their fighting abilities.113 So long as they were paid, mercenaries were loyal and prepared to fight to the death if necessary. Thus, at the battle of Dreux (1562) the whole Landsknecht regiment fighting for the Protestants was killed or captured while there were very high casualties among the Swiss infantry fighting in the royal army.114 Potter has concluded that in the sixteenth century mercenaries were employed precisely because “they were the best men available […] and usually, they did their job effectively”; and Parrott reaches similar conclusions with respect to the forces of the general contractors of the subsequent century.115 Thus the employment of mercenaries did not of itself render an army unreliable: quite the contrary, for they proved loyal and effective fighters. Failure to pay them meant they downed arms, mutinied, and turned to pillage. But, as I noted earlier, this was what all troops did in such circumstances, though mercenaries may have attracted the greatest attention and opprobrium. Whatever its composition, any army that went without pay and supplies was liable to desertion, mutiny, disorder, and pillage.

The drivers of change

John Lynn’s taxonomy proposing a shift from an aggregate contract to a state commission army in the early modern period thus appears broadly correct. But what were the reasons for the change? Technological innovation has traditionally been privileged as an explanatory factor in military matters. However, what is notable about the period as a whole is the relative lack of novelty with regard to weapons systems and the slowness of their deploy-

113 This was a significant factor for Machiavelli, who deplored “men who make war their only calling”, even though he also had little regard for their loyalty and fighting qualities. See Machiavelli, Arte della Guerra: Machiavelli, The Art of War, Wood (ed.), p. 20.
114 Wood, The King’s Army, pp. 120, 199.
115 Potter, Renaissance France at War, p. 151; Parrott, “From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies”, pp. 83–85. See too the favourable comments on mercenaries in fifteenth-century Italy in Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters, pp. 185, 195-198, 242.
ment. Pikes gradually gave way to hand-held firearms, and artillery came to have a significant place on the battlefield, but the pace of innovation was slow, and of itself purely technological innovation played little part in the transformation of army style.

Rather than highlighting the “material technology” of conflict as a driver of change, we would do better to concentrate on the “social technology” of warfare, especially the role of discipline, army size, and institutional structures. As noted earlier, one of the features of the state commission army was the attempt to enforce higher standards of discipline. Contrary to what has been argued by proponents of the “military revolution”, discipline was not primarily imposed as a means of ensuring that soldiers were able to handle their weapons and manoeuvre effectively on the battlefield, though these were certainly significant byproducts. Rather, discipline was necessary to avoid the resort to pillaging, mutiny, and disorder that all too often paralysed armies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This was why the enforcement of discipline was only one of a package of measures designed to address these issues: paying soldiers more regularly; supplying them directly with items such as clothing, food, equipment, and housing; taking ransoms out of the hands of ordinary soldiers; restricting the number of women and “hangers-on” who travelled with the army; and limiting the ability of elite units to bargain over pay and conditions.

The rationale behind all these measures was the urgent necessity of making armies more effective as instruments of state power. This was also why the number of men under arms increased, albeit not in linear fashion, for quantity was as important as quality. A large military establishment allowed states to recover from defeat, to replace a routed field army, to sustain the demands of attritional warfare, and to occupy and control territory. To be sure, it could be argued that in imposing greater central control of their armies, governments were seeking to save money, and it was true that they were mindful of the desirability of curbing the activities of corrupt captains who swindled their own men and the royal treasury. But a search for economies was not what drove the transition away from aggregate contract armies, since the state commission forces actually cost more than their predecessors. They may possibly have been “cheaper man for man”, yet overall they were much more expensive. They were more regularly paid, they required more state-provided goods and services, and they were far

117 Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate, is the best introduction to the debate.
more numerous than their predecessors and consequently more costly. Thus, Joël Félix estimates the additional costs to the French treasury of the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War at a staggering 2-2.5 billion livres tournois.119 Though eighteenth-century governments had a larger resource base on which to draw by comparison with their predecessors, the result of demographic growth and a burgeoning (and increasingly global) economy, military costs nevertheless ran well ahead of resources. To bridge the funding gap, eighteenth-century rulers resorted to a range of measures which varied from state to state, including raising levels of taxation, making use of loans, and expropriating resources, albeit with varying degrees of success.120 It was not, then, a search for economies that drove the transition from aggregate contract to state commission armies, but rather an attempt to make armies more fit for purpose even if this meant at its most basic level that the army simply stayed in existence.

We should finally recognize that what informed governments in their search for military efficiency was the intensely competitive relationship that existed between the states of western Europe that all too often spilled over into open conflict. The reasons for war were many and varied: dynastic claims, religion, trade rivalry, territorial aggrandizement, and the pursuit of gloire. Yet whatever the precise cause of conflict, western Europe was in a constant condition of tension, and sensible governments used intervals of peace to prepare for the next round of conflict. No wonder they were concerned with the war-waging capacities of their armies, for the fate of rulers and even of states might be decided by their military capacities. Portugal, Siena, and Scotland were absorbed by their larger neighbours as a result of failures in military campaigns, just as military success was crucial to the establishment of an independent polity in the case of the Dutch Republic. In 1742, France and others planned to dismember Austria, Prussia narrowly escaped such a fate at the commencement of the Seven Years War, Sweden’s dearly won Baltic empire was taken from it, and in 1772 Poland suffered the first of the partitions that would remove it from the map until 1919. This intensely competitive nature of the European state system was what the eminent jurist Emerich Vattel had in mind when he argued for a pre-emptive right of self-defence by coalitions of states against over-mighty neighbours.121

121 Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, bk 3 ch. 3.
The pressures to “keep up” in military terms by imitating or adapting perceived best practice of paradigm armies were therefore intense. It should be stressed that these competitive pressures did not operate in some simple fashion. All states had regard to their own particular circumstances. Some emphasized the use of impressment and militia service over the recruitment of volunteers; some preferred to hire troops, others to take subsidies; some employed especially harsh discipline; some – and Austria would be an example – were notably slow and inefficient in providing for their soldiers. Yet the direction of travel was clear: larger armies, stricter discipline, more direct state supply, and greater state control. The consequences for soldier-labour were profound.122

122 It should also be stressed that interstate competition did not lead inevitably to the emergence of the so-called absolutist or modern state in some Weberian fashion. There were a number of different national trajectories that could eventuate in the emergence of more or less coercive, absolutist states that existed alongside polities with quite different constitutional structures though all had responded to the demands of warfare. See James, “Warfare and the Rise of the State”, pp. 28-29 and passim.
The Scottish mercenary as a migrant labourer in Europe, 1550-1650

James Miller

Between 1550 and 1650 the government in Scotland, whether as the monarch or as the Privy Council acting in the royal name, permitted more than sixty levies of troops to fight in continental Europe. This occurred throughout the period of study but with peaks in the 1570s and the 1620s-1640s, corresponding with periods of fighting in the Low Countries and later in the Germanic lands in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). This is summarized in Table 6.1. As the raising of soldiers to fight overseas also took place before and after these dates and as there were unofficial levies, despite attempts to stop them for fear of unrest or political embarrassment, the true extent of recruitment of men to fight overseas may never be fully known. The size of a licensed levy varied considerably, from as few as sixty men in the licences granted to Patrik Murray on 25 March 1602 for service in the Low Countries and to Thomas Moffat on 23 July 1635 for Swedish service in Prussia, to as many as several thousands. In at least some instances, for example for the 3,000 men each to Robert Earl of Nithsdale, Alexander Lord Spynie, and James Sinclair of Murkle on 3 April 1627 for Danish service, these ambitious targets were not reached; and in the case of others, for example to Robert Stewart for Poland in 1623, very little, if any, recruiting took place. The more usual figures mentioned in the licences are 200 or 300 men. With a proviso in mind about the accuracy and reliability of these figures, it has been estimated that during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), when the recruitment of soldiers for overseas service was at its height, as many as 50,000 Scotsmen bore arms in European conflicts.²

1 I am grateful to Dr David Worthington, Head of the Centre for History, University of the Highlands and Islands, Dornoch, Scotland, for his help and encouragement with this paper.
2 Murdoch, “Introduction”, p. 19. Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean have produced a database on Scots active in the military and other walks of life in northern Europe in the period between 1580 and 1707; this can be accessed at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne.
Table 6.1 A summary of some recruitment of soldiers in Scotland between 1550 and 1650 to join continental armies, as detailed in the Register of the Privy Council of Scotland (RPCS) and other sources. Some of the levies failed to achieve much or to reach the designated target numbers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Number of men designated in the source, with name of senior officer or recruiter in some instances</th>
<th>Source (all RPCS* unless otherwise stated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1552</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>300 footmen and 400 cavalry, followed by recruitment of “2 ensigns” (Gilbert Kennedy, 3rd Earl of Cassilis)</td>
<td>I, pp. 131-136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1564</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>XIV, p. XLVII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1568</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Unknown (Captain Moncur)</td>
<td>I, p. 640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1573</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,600 (Archibald Ruthven)</td>
<td>II, p. 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1573</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>300 (Captain Campbell)</td>
<td>II, p. 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1573</td>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>900, under three separate licences; it is likely that many more went without licence</td>
<td>II, pp. 237, 256.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1577</td>
<td>Low Countries or Flanders</td>
<td>13 licences issued – numbers of men not specified but possibly 3,500</td>
<td>II, p. 643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1577</td>
<td>Danzig</td>
<td>150 (Captain Rentoun)</td>
<td>II, p. 621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1578</td>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>III, p. 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1578</td>
<td>“Protestant service abroad” (Low Countries?)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>III, p. 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602</td>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>460 (including licence to Patrik Murray)</td>
<td>VI, p. 721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Unknown (Colonel Thomas Ogilvie)</td>
<td>Fischer, p. 70**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1605</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,600 foot and 600 cavalry (Sir James Spens)</td>
<td>Fischer, p. 71**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1607</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>200 cavalry (Robert Kinnaird)</td>
<td>Fischer, p. 71**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1610</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>VIII, p. 619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1612</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>300 (Andrew Ramsay’s illegal levy)</td>
<td>IX, p. 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1620</td>
<td>Bohemia</td>
<td>1,500 (Sir Andrew Gray)</td>
<td>XII, pp. 255-259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1621</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>XII, p. 412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1622</td>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>Unknown (Archibald Campbell, 7th Earl of Argyle’s recruitment for Spanish service)</td>
<td>XIII, p. LVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1623</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>8,000 (Robert Stewart)</td>
<td>XIII, p. LVII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1624</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,200 (James Spens)</td>
<td>XIII, p. 478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Number of men designated in the source, with name of senior officer or recruiter in some instances</td>
<td>Source (all RPCS* unless otherwise stated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1625</td>
<td>Count Mansfeld’s army (Palatinate)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2nd ser., I, p. 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1626</td>
<td>Denmark (later Sweden)</td>
<td>Possibly 3,000 (Sir Donald Mackay, Lord Reay)</td>
<td>2nd ser., I, p. 244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1627</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>9,000 (probably fewer than 5,000 recruited) (Nithsdale-Spynie-Murkle levies)</td>
<td>2nd ser., I, p. 565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1628</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>300 (James Spens)</td>
<td>2nd ser., II, p. 397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1629</td>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>Unknown (Hay of Kinfauns)</td>
<td>2nd ser., III, p. 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1629</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,200 (Alexander Hamilton), 1,200 (Sir George Cuninghame)</td>
<td>2nd ser., III, pp. 136, 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1631</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2,000 (Sir Donald Mackay, Lord Reay)</td>
<td>2nd ser., IV, p. 218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1631</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6,000 (Sir James Hamilton, Marquis of Hamilton)</td>
<td>Burnet, p. 5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1632</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,400 (Sir James Lumsden)</td>
<td>2nd ser., IV, p. 483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1632</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>200 (Lt Col McDougall)</td>
<td>2nd ser., IV, p. 525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1633</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,200 (Sir John Hepburn)</td>
<td>2nd ser., V, p. 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1635</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>60 (Thomas Moffat)</td>
<td>2nd ser., VI, p. 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1636</td>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>300 (Lord Almond)</td>
<td>2nd ser., VI, p. 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1637</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,120 (Captain Robert Hume)</td>
<td>2nd ser., VI, p. 401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1637</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,200 (Cuninghame, Monro, Stuart)</td>
<td>2nd ser., VI, pp. 458, 484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1638</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,000 (Andrew, Lord Gray)</td>
<td>2nd ser., VII, p. 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1639</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,000 (Colonel Alexander Erskine of Mar)</td>
<td>2nd ser., VII, pp. 106, 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1642</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>6,000 (James Campbell, Earl of Irvine, and others)</td>
<td>2nd ser., VII, pp. 247, 281, 302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2,500 (William, 3rd Lord Cranstoun)</td>
<td>Fischer, p. 122**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

* Register of the Privy Council of Scotland (1545-1689)
** Fischer, The Scots in Sweden

It can be argued that the term “mercenary” is not appropriate in describing these men. The term current in Scotland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the phrase “waged men of war” – in Scots, “wageit men of weare” or variants of it. “Mercenary” remains, however, a convenient word
to describe the soldiers who were fighting for a commander or a political
state other than that which from their place of birth or normal residence
could be deemed their own, and it is used here in this sense. In discussions
during the workshops in the Fighting for a Living project, it was suggested
that a “mercenary” had to be free from social ties or obligations, available
to be hired, and with no stake in a conflict other than as a paid man. These
conditions do not apply to all the Scots who fought on the continent of
Europe and, as will be apparent from this chapter, it was often social ties
or obligations that led to them being recruited as soldiers in the first place.
Often, too, their stake in a conflict sprang from religious leanings or a sense
of honour; they were not always serving simply for the money.

The military roles the Scottish mercenaries played in the wars of the
period lie outside the scope of this chapter and are only summarized below.3
The focus here is on the circumstances or pressures in Scottish society that
led so many to soldier abroad, in practice to constitute a form of migrant
labour, rather than follow another livelihood at home. The chapter briefly
describes the labour conditions they accepted. The information sources
to which we can turn comprise contemporary legal and administrative
records, letters, and other documents. Ordinary soldiers leave little trace in
the records of the period and what does survive as evidence of their actions
and motives is scant and unevenly spread in space and time. Other sources
are the many histories of families and clans: they were usually written much
later than the events they describe and are always subject to embellishment,
but are our only access to a rich oral culture and tradition and, when treated
with care, can provide valuable additional detail.

The socio-economic background

Lying on the periphery of Europe and having a relatively poorly developed
economy, Scotland was open to the experience of economic emigration, a
phenomenon enhanced during the years between 1550 and 1650 by popula-
tion growth and by frequent seasons of severe dearth with resulting high
food prices.4 Several attempts have been made to estimate the population of
the country in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and they agree that

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3 See, for example, Murdoch, *Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War*; Miller, *Swords for Hire*.
4 Socio-economic conditions are explored in general histories, e.g., Smout, *A History of the
and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe*, has an overview of emigration studies.
the total must have stood between 800,000 and a little over 1 million. The emigration of so many soldiers, therefore, represents the loss, occasionally temporary but often permanent, of a substantial proportion of the country’s able-bodied young men and immediately provokes the question of why it took place, when it might appear to have been detrimental to the country’s own well-being.

The bulk of the population was scattered in rural villages and townships, and most burghs were small enough to ensure almost everyone was closely dependent on a relatively primitive agriculture that was dangerously susceptible to harvest failure. Time and again evidence of distress occurs in the historical record, and we find repeated attempts by the authorities to impose alleviating measures, such as the banning or licensing of the export of grain and livestock, and even attempting to limit the number of dishes that could be served at meals (although gradated in number according to status so that a bishop could have eight, but a burgess only three). On 21 June 1572 the Privy Council ordered people to remove themselves from the city of Edinburgh to stay with friends in the country where they might be “best staikit [best provided for]”. In the *Chronicle of Aberdeen* for the year 1578, we read that at that time there was “a great dearth of all kind of victuals through all Scotland, that the like was not seen in no man’s day before. The meal was sold for six s[hillings] the peck, the ale for tenpence the pint, the wine from the best shipment forty pence the pint; fish and flesh were scant and dear.”

Epidemics of plague and other diseases added to the woes undergone by the general population. The Privy Council attempted to counter the spread of infection through restrictions on travel and the quarantining of sea travellers. There is no information on the numbers of people affected by such catastrophes, but their seriousness comes over clearly in what evidence does survive. In October 1606 the Earl of Dunfermline wrote to the king that “The tounes of Air and Striveling [Ayr and Stirling] ar almoste desolat”; this outbreak of plague lasted from 1603 to 1609, and took 500 lives in Perth in the winter of 1608-1609.

For Scots who were free to go, therefore, the incentives to emigrate were strong. Some moved to England, despite long-standing hostility between

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5 Register of the Privy Council of Scotland (1545-1689) 14 vols (Edinburgh, 1877) [henceforth, RPCS], I, p. 94.
6 Ibid., II, p. 148.
7 Author’s translation of Scots original; in “The Chronicle of Aberdeen”, Miscellany of the Spalding Club (Aberdeen, 1842), II, p. 47.
8 Letters and State Papers During the Reign of King James the Sixth, p. 91.
the neighbouring nations and the fact that there was legislation in England targeted against the Scots as enemy aliens. These emigrants, predominantly men, practised various trades and professions but, unsurprisingly in view of the frequent outbreaks of warfare between the two countries, none is listed as having been a soldier. The pathways to the continent were also well established through trade. In the later sixteenth century the favoured destination for Scottish emigrants was the Baltic area, in what are now Poland and its neighbours. Several thousand Scots are estimated to have taken ship for such ports as Stettin (Szczecin) and Danzig (Gdańsk) and then to have spread throughout central and eastern Europe. Many became respectable merchants, while others remained poor itinerant pedlars. Scotland also had a trading base in the town of Veere at the mouth of the Scheldt – and there was steady traffic across the North Sea. As the Dutch had embraced Calvinism, a form of Protestantism shared with Scotland, it is easy to understand why Scots should be drawn to this part of Europe, where many joined the armed struggle in the Netherlands. When he wrote a prospectus in 1624 to attract settlers to the lands he had been recently granted in maritime Canada, Sir William Alexander observed that “Scotland by reason of her populousness being constrained to disburden herself (like the Bees) did every yeare send forth swarmes, whereof great numbers did haunt Pole [Poland] with most extreme kind of drudgerie (if not dying under the burden) scraping a few crummes together, til of late that they were compelled, abandoning their ordinary calling, to betake themselves to the warres against Russians, Turks or Swedens.” What did the emigrants expect to find abroad? Overwhelmingly they tried to make a living through some kind of trade or mercantile activity, making use of family connections to obtain employment and opportunity. What Sir William Alexander remarks on – abandoning trade for soldiering – was a response to economic misfortune wherever there was a demand for men to fill an army’s ranks.

Emigration as soldiers

Men also emigrated specifically to find employment as soldiers. The Privy Council was aware in June 1573 of “a gude nowmer [good number] [...] of
this realm" prepared to go abroad “under pretens to serve in the wearis 
[wars] in foreyn countries”. The Council also saw an opportunity here to 
relieve social pressure at home: in 1572, mindful of “the present hunger, 
derth and scarcitie of viveris [scarcity of food]”, it allowed men freely to 
travel to the Low Countries to fight in the cause of Dutch independence. The licensing of recruitment was an attempt on the part of government 
to control what was already happening irrespective of the wishes of the 
authorities and, perhaps more importantly, counter any attempt to hide an 
aired conspiracy under the cloak of recruitment for overseas service. In 
September 1587 the Privy Council issued a proclamation to be read at the 
market crosses in all the main burghs forbidding anyone to raise “bandis 
of men of weare [bands of men of war]” or to put themselves in arms, enrol 
under any captain, or go abroad as a soldier without royal licence. It was 
forbidden to attract soldiers away from royal service and for levies to as-
semble within sixteen miles of the young James VI’s residence at Stirling 
Castle. Recruiting captains were urged to embark their men at the nearest 
port, and at times were ordered to recruit without using drums, presumably 
for fear of rousing excitement or animosity in the general populace. Coping 
with the unruly behaviour of mobs of would-be soldiers on their way to 
seaports was a concern of the Privy Council in 1605, and the presence in the 
country in 1609 of two companies of Irish mercenaries forced by bad weather 
to land at Peterhead while en route to Sweden worried the Council greatly.

As an example of an unofficial levy that was also declared illegal, we have 
the episode in 1612 when the Privy Council tried to prevent recruitment 
for service in the Swedish army against Denmark. The Council informed 
James VI, now resident in London as the king of Britain, that men had been 
violeht pressed and taken against their will. Official attempts by the Privy 
Council to nip the levy in the bud included searching ships about to sail, 
ordering the discharge of recruits, and summoning to its presence Alex-
ander Ramsay, the senior officer (who did not appear and was thereafter 
denounced as a rebel).

12 RPCS, II, p. 235.  
13 Ibid., II, p. 148.  
14 Ibid., IV, p. 211.  
15 Ibid., VIII, p. 390.  
16 Ibid., IX, pp. 430-461.
Indigenous military practices

One factor that made soldiering a viable option for young men going abroad and enhanced the feasibility of recruiting was the long tradition in the country of armed service. It was the custom for nobles to keep trains of armed men. The traditional view of Scotland as a country where, up until the Treaty of Union in 1707, the tension between the monarch and the nobility often caused the latter to break into rebellion or take up arms in pursuit of their own interests against either the crown or each other has been queried by recent historians, but it remains true that feuding, raiding, and the signing of bonds of manrent were common and that Scotland was a country prone to the violent resolution of difference. Comments from the writings of John Major (or Mair) are relevant here. “If two nobles of equal rank happen to be very near neighbours, quarrels and even shedding of blood are a common thing between them; and their very retainers cannot meet without strife”, he observed in 1521 in his History of Great Britain. “The farmers [...] keep a horse and weapons of war, and are ready to take part in [their lord's] quarrel, be it just or unjust, with any powerful lord, if they only have a liking for him, and with him, if need be, to fight to the death. The farmers have further this fault: that they do not bring up their sons to any handicraft. Shoemakers, tailors, and all such craftsmen they reckon as contemptible and unfit for war.” Major was more critical of Highlanders: “They are full of mutual dissensions, and war rather than peace is their normal condition. The Scottish kings have with difficulty been able to withstand the inroads of these men.”

The social structure of the country was complicated by major cultural differences between the various regions, the most important being the one between what can be usefully, though crudely, termed the Lowlands and the Highlands, a cultural frontier often termed the Highland Line. John Major was aware of this but it is also commented upon by John of Fordun, a cleric who wrote what is regarded as the first full-scale history of Scotland in the mid-fourteenth century: “The people of the coast are of domestic and civilised habits, trusty, patient and urbane, decent in their attire, affable and peaceful, devout in divine worship, yet always prone to resist a wrong at the hands of their enemies. The highlanders and people of the islands, on the other hand, are a savage and untamed nation, rude and
independent, given to rapine.”

Fordun’s view was biased, but the cultural divide had become real by his lifetime. His “savage and untamed nation” comprised of course the mainly Gaelic-speaking clan society that played a prominent part in the Jacobite risings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This was a largely pastoral culture with a strong warrior ethos, grouped in kindreds and adherents holding territories, very prone to feuding with each other and capable of moving quickly into military mode. Within clan or kindred, blood relationships were important, and war parties of the clan were usually commanded by the chief himself or blood relatives. Writing in 1578, Bishop John Leslie, himself Highland born, showed that this warrior society persisted for a very long time: “A peculiar and proper vice is among these men, and to their well-being most pestilent, that naturally they are fond willingly and vehemently, if their masters command them, to sedition and strife: they rather be esteemed as noble, or at least as bold men of war, than as labourers of the ground or men of craft, irrespective of poverty or riches.”

Mention should be made in passing of a special class of mercenary soldier that sprang from the Gaelic Highland world. This was the “galloglass”, a term Anglicized from the Gaelic word *galloglaigh*, meaning “foreign warrior”. They were a restricted class of professional fighters from the western seaboard of the Highlands who found service in the retinues of Irish chieftains from the thirteenth century until the early 1600s. A few found service in Sweden during the Thirty Years War but, as a specialized group, they lie outside the main scope of this chapter.

In the south of Scotland, in the Borders, the country marking the frontier with England, in the same period existed a society similar to that of the clans in having a pastoral economy and a predilection for raiding and feuding. Here there were kindreds loyal to particular territory-holding families who could switch easily into military mode. In Bishop Leslie’s opinion in 1578, fear of war inhibited the cultivation of the soil among them. The similarity between Highlander and Borderer was recognized at the time: “The roll of the clans that have captains, chiefs and chieftains on whom they depend often against the will of their landlords on the Borders as in the Highlands.”

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20 Ibid., p. 12.
21 Author’s translation of Scots original from *ibid.*, pp. 165-166.
22 A general introduction can be found in Cannan, *Galloglass*.
23 Author’s translation of Scots original, *RPCS*, IV, p. 782.
Between the Highland and Border regions, in which the Scottish monarchy had a continuous struggle to maintain some hegemony, lay the Lowlands where approximately 60 per cent, from the best estimates, of the population lived, in a society divided between rural settlements and larger burghs. This region formed a belt across the centre of the country and extended up the east coast to the environs of Aberdeen and beyond to the Moray Firth. Presumably these were the people Fordun considered of domestic and civilized habit, yet in his study of bloodfeud in Scotland, K.M. Brown noted that 40 per cent of the 365 feuds he identified as occurring between 1573 and 1625 took place in the Lowlands with a further 23 per cent in the Borders.24

Although the Highlands and the Borders had the potential to be a good recruiting ground, it is significant that, as far as we can tell from the surviving evidence, including the names of the men involved, the bulk of the recruiting for overseas service took place in the Lowlands, in the most settled part of Scotland. The recruitment of soldiers in the Highlands did not become significant until quite late in the period of study, when Mackay’s Regiment was raised in 1626. One of Mackay’s officers, Robert Monro, named the senior Scottish officers in Swedish service in 1632: of the thirty colonels in his list, nine are known to have come from the Lowlands or the north-east; another sixteen probably from the same regions, judging by their surnames; only four from the Highlands; and one, the son of Scots emigrants, actually from Finland. Of the fifty-two lieutenant colonels in Monro’s list, only six are Highland, and five of these are from the Lowland-influenced parts on the east coast.25

In his major work on the Scots Brigade in the Netherlands, James Ferguson provides plenty of evidence for the Lowland contribution to this notable example of Scottish military service abroad.26 To give one example, in a document concerning soldiers to be paid after the death of their captain, Archibald Arskin (Erskine) at Zwolle in December 1608, of the forty-one legible signatures, fifteen are indisputably Scots and a further ten could be Scots, and the names suggest a Lowland origin for all of them. As a general comment, Ferguson says in his introduction: Forth-side counties, especially Fife, “had the closest connection with the brigade, but Perthshire, Forfar, Aberdeenshire and the Highlands, more especially after General Mackay [1640-1692] entered it, and other parts of Scotland had their representatives

25 Monro, Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment.
under its colours". The General Mackay referred to is Hugh Mackay of Scourie (c. 1640-1692), with no connection to the earlier Mackay’s Regiment. Proximity to the east-coast ports and ease of travel played an obvious part in this preponderance of recruitment in the Lowlands but, as we have seen, the Lowlands were only relatively more peaceful and ordered than the farther-flung Highlands.

The nobles were capable of laying aside their own differences, at least to some extent, when an external threat appeared – always from England. In February 1546, for example, the Privy Council called on two Border families – the Kerrs of Cessford and Ferniehurst, and the Scotts of Branxholme – to set aside their own raids on each other “during the time of this present war between the realms of Scotland and England” and instead seek redress through the courts of law. The Minute in the Privy Council papers gives a vivid impression of the kindreds involved in these quarrels when it details “their kin, friends, men, tenants, adherents, allies and supporters” as coming under the order. Robert I (1274-1329) was able through violent suppression of his enemies to unite much of the country behind him during the Wars of Independence. His army contained men from different parts of the country, Highland as well as Lowland and Border, but despite such periods of near unity it remained true for most of the Stewart period, from 1371 onwards, that the levying of troops to prosecute the many outbreaks of hostilities with England was primarily a Lowland affair, with only a relatively small contribution of men from the southern edges of the Highlands and from the Borders. In a national emergency, though, the propensity of the Borderers for raiding and feuding allowed the rapid raising of a skilled and mobile cavalry force. This is described in a Minute in the papers of the Privy Council in October 1545: it charges three commissioners with the raising of 1,000 horsemen to “pass and remain upon the Borders for the space of three months for defence of the realm against our old enemy of England”, and notes that they will be paid from an allotted sum of £18,000 Scots.

At various times during the sixteenth century the Privy Council ordered a full levy of foot and horse. The example, noted in the Register of the Privy Council for 21 August 1546, to muster men for the siege and capture of Saint Andrews Castle, divided the realm into four parts, which included the sweep of coastal territory up the east coast via Aberdeen to the shores of the Moray Firth. All four were mainly part of the Lowlands and only impinged

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27 Ibid., I, p. xxv.
28 RPCS, I, p. 22.
29 Ibid., I, p. 16.
on the Highlands, although there were also at times Highland elements in
the assembled army.\(^{30}\) Such summonses were proclaimed at market crosses
in all the burghs, and called on men between the ages of sixteen and sixty,
dwelling in the countryside or in the towns, to assemble for military service
with their weapons and enough provisions for twenty days. The resulting
army was commonly called the Scottish host. A significant feature of the
system was that it allowed the monarch to raise an army at minimum cost
to the usually impoverished royal treasury, as the men called on to fill the
ranks were unpaid.

To maintain a degree of preparedness for fighting there existed a system
of training called wappenschaws (weapon shows) held at regular intervals in
local districts. The first relevant act, in 1424 during the reign of James I, called
on all men to begin training in archery when they reached the age of twelve
years. The wappenschaw acts were reconfirmed and amended throughout the
following years and reigns some fifteen times before 1600. This was partly to
promote them when they had lapsed and partly to keep pace with technologi-
cal change. In 1456 we come upon the first mentions of artillery: “it is thought
expedient that the king make request to certain of the great barons of the land
that are of might to make carts of war, and each of them to have two guns,
each of them to have two chambers with the remnant of the gear that is
appropriate thereto, with cunning [skilled] men to shoot them. And if they
have no craft in shooting them, as now, they may learn before the time comes
that it will be needful to have them.”\(^{31}\) Hand guns in the form of hackbuts are
first mentioned in the wappenschaw legislation in 1535. Every man who held
land to the value of £100 was required to have a gun and people trained in
its use. Fines of livestock or money were imposed upon defaulters who failed
to attend wappenschaws. Those who had no skill for archery were called on
to appear with hand weapons such as a spear or axe. This act from the reign
of James II (1437-1460) is illustrative of the wappenschaw system and also
reveals why it may not always have been popular among the common people.
“It is decreed and ordained that wappinschawings be held by the lords and
barons, spiritual and temporal, four times in the year, and that football and
golf be utterly cried down and disused, and that the bow-marks be made at
each parish kirk, a pair of butts, and shooting be made each Sunday. And that
each man shoot six shots at the least under the pain to be raised upon them
that come not; at the least 2d to be given to them that come to the bowmark

\(^{30}\) Ibid., I, p. 38.
\(^{31}\) Ref James II 1456/5 in Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, available at http://www.
    rps.ac.uk (accessed 3 February 2011).
to drink. And this to be used from Christmas till Allhallowmass after [...] And as touching the football and the golf we ordain it to be punished by the baron’s fine.” 32 The ordinary men of the realm may have preferred their football or their golf to spending what little time they had free from labour in a kind of home guard. Surviving court books from burghs and baronies contain references to men being fined for failure to attend the wappenschaw. For example, the Court Book of the Barony of Leys in Aberdeenshire states, regarding a wappenschaw held on 24 January 1626, that on the following day fourteen men who had failed to attend were fined between 10s and 40s each. 33

Despite some resistance to attending training, by the time of the main period of recruitment for armed service in Europe, there was a pool of manpower with at least some basic military experience on which to draw. There was also a ready precedent for sending troops abroad. In the early fifteenth century, contingents of men, several thousand strong, had been sent to France to fight for the Dauphin against the English. Before that period, individual knights had gone abroad from Scotland to fight in various conflicts but this was the first time there was a deliberate export of soldiers to aid a continental ally, a significant episode in the long-standing relationship between France and Scotland, known as the Auld Alliance. The Alliance also produced the Garde Ecossais, a small elite unit that comprised part of the French royal bodyguard. 34 An attempt to reinvigorate this alliance in the mid-sixteenth century led to the raising of more troops for service in France. In 1552, the Privy Council ordered commissioners “over all parts of the realm” – though significantly no commissioner is named for the western Highlands – “to vesy [recruit] the men of the shire, including the men in the burghs if they are said to be able and reliable” to go to France. The same order included the raising of 400 horsemen in the Borders and the Lowlands for the same service. 35

“The laudable profession of arms”

Against this sixteenth-century background of economic hardship and emigration stands a major factor in our study – the attitude of the noble

33 “Court Book of the Barony of Leys”, in Miscellany of the Spalding Club (Aberdeen, 1852), V, p. 223.
34 See, for example, Macdougall, “An Antidote to the English”.
35 RPCS, I, p. 134.
and landowning classes to warfare, an attitude summed up in the phrase coined by Robert Monro in his account published in 1637 of his experiences in Mackay’s Regiment in the Thirty Years War and used as a heading above. For this section of society, being a soldier was a natural calling. In his study of this class, in *Noble Society in Scotland*, Keith Brown describes how the nobility held a martial ethos as an “integral facet of their identity”. In the system of national defence the nobility provided the monarch with his officer corps and also, through their tenants, with his manpower. In turn the non-noble landowners, the lairds, imitated the actions and shared the attitudes of their social superiors. In the period under study, the revolt against Spanish hegemony in the Low Countries and from 1618 the Thirty Years War, with smaller outbreaks of warfare elsewhere across the continent, offered plenty of opportunity for the members of these leading classes to exercise their love of arms and, in the process, they hoped, win fortune as well as glory. The temptation was particularly strong for those unlikely to inherit family wealth – younger sons, illegitimate sons – and those with a military talent but no patron to help them up the social ladder at home. In his book, Robert Monro talks of his comrades as “worthy Cavaliers […] whereof some from meane condition have risen to supreme honour, wealth and dignitie”. Finding employment as soldiers on the continent became almost a tradition in a few extended families: from the family of the Lords Forbes, three younger brothers, all sons of the tenth Lord Forbes, and the illegitimate son of one of these brothers were killed in the Thirty Years War.

It was also recognized that military service abroad could open the door to other opportunities, as is illustrated by the Innes family of Cotts in Aberdeenshire. Alexander Innes of Cotts had several sons: the eldest son John served in the French guard before he inherited from his father in 1634; the second son Alexander wrote to his father from London on 12 December 1627, “My brother Robert is [...] shortly to return to Germanie. I assure you Sir he has made ane gaynfull voyage. He hes imployed in London [2,000 merks] whitch I hope within half yeir will be in returne foure, and in Germanie he hes foure thousand moir. He hes ane angel in the day allowance from the Regiment so long as he is abrod”; Robert was Alexander’s fifth son and was at this time a captain in the English army after previously being in the French guard.

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36 Monro, *Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment*, title page.
37 Brown, *Noble Society in Scotland*, p. 3.
38 Monro, *Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment*, Address to the reader.
The recruitment of soldiers

These sons of nobles and lairds, who saw themselves as professional soldiers, had a better chance of finding a place in a continental army if, especially in times of war, they could arrive with their own contingent of men, already armed or not. There was also the incentive of benefiting financially from levying men, always a tempting prospect for lairds who had landed themselves in debt, although this did not always work out well. In August 1661 Lord Forbes petitioned Charles II for payment he had never received for levying men for the king of Denmark’s service in 1626 as part of Mackay’s Regiment; the failure to pay him on time had resulted in a serious debt burden.41 The attractions of military service and cash payments for recruiting men are obvious for landowners struggling to make ends meet during years of climatic difficulty, and would have been especially marked in the case of younger or illegitimate sons with no prospect of an inheritance. Unfortunately we know very little about most of the named military captains to whom the Privy Council issued recruitment licences. Many would have been professional soldiers but it is not clear how many were already in the service of foreign armies and had returned home to levy men.

Alongside the professional military men appeared some merchants, referred to as enterprisers, who offered to provide recruits to any needy commander. A prominent example of this group was Sir James Spens of Wormiston, a Fife landowner and merchant adventurer born in 1571. He was probably already trading in the Baltic area when he and his brother were approached by Karl IX of Sweden in 1605 to recruit 1,600 foot soldiers and 600 cavalry for Swedish service against Poland. This service was to be done with the British monarch’s permission, and Spens was to be paid 1,600 daler for every 300 men and appointed as colonel in overall command of them, presumably ensuring for himself a regular salary.42 The daler, rex-dollar, or riksdaler was the Swedish equivalent of the German reichsthaler, the international European currency of the time. This was the start of a rewarding career for the Fife merchant: he went on to organize further troop levies, serve as an ambassador for the British and Swedish monarchs, and was eventually ennobled as a Swedish baron before his death in 1632.

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As an example of a recruiter who failed to fulfil the terms of a recruitment contract, let me summarize the career of John Gordon of Ardlogie. The second son of an Aberdeenshire laird, Gordon received funds to levy and transport men to Germany as part of the larger recruitment under James Sinclair of Murkle in March 1627. This he failed to do and was outlawed – in the Scots legal expression, “put to the horn”. He evaded arrest and eventually escaped to Germany where, it appears, he was killed in 1638 in the contingents commanded by fellow Scot, also called John Gordon.43

During the reign of Karl IX’s son, Gustavus Adolphus, contracts for recruitment were based on rates laid down by the Swedish government.44 A letter dated 21 April 1629 contains articles of agreement between Sir James Spens and a Captain Alexander Hamilton for the recruitment of 1,200 men.45 Hamilton received the sum of £1,696 “lawfull English money” as equivalent to 7,680 riksdaler, or 4.5 riksdaler per £1. The captain’s expenses in recruiting included the provision of food and drink for recruits, usually some clothing, and their transport costs across the North Sea, as well as a hand-out when a man signed on. In his study of recruitment for Sweden in the 1620s, J.A. Fallon calculated that it cost 6s 8d to ship a man from Scotland to the Elbe, and that two weeks’ food and drink for a recruit cost 9s 4d. This leaves a balance of 4s, almost 1 riksdaler, a sum that Fallon suggested would have been handed to the newly signed-on recruit.46 This seems very generous and we must allow the possibility that some of the money might have stayed in the recruiter’s pocket, particularly as a recruiter could face a fine if he failed to bring in the number of men promised or required.

Other factors and motivations

A factor of some importance in recruitment in the 1550-1650 period was religion. Solidarity with other members of the same religious denomination led many to take up arms: this was true of the recruitment to fight in the 1570s in the Low Countries against the Habsburgs; in the effort to restore Frederick and his queen, Elizabeth Stewart, daughter of James VI, to the Rhine Palatinate after 1618; and in the perceived defence of the Protestant cause under Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. The fall of Haarlem to the Span-

45 Quoted in Fraser, *Memorials of the Earls of Haddington*, p. 92.
ish in 1573 aroused an unknown but sizeable number of Lowland Scots to volunteer in the Dutch cause, and the Privy Council noted the issue of a recruiting licence to Captain Thomas Robesoun to be in the “defence of Goddis trew religioun.”

The Scots Brigade in the Low Countries

It can be seen in Table 6.1 that there was a sizeable movement of fighting men from Scotland mainly to France and Scandinavia in the mid-sixteenth century. This was followed by a significant series of levies for service in the Low Countries in the 1570s after the Dutch rising to throw off Habsburg rule. The levies began as the raising of companies under individual captains but in 1586 these companies were amalgamated into two regiments. The organization of the Scots in Dutch service thereafter went through a number of changes but a Scots Brigade, as the units were collectively labelled, remained a feature of the Dutch army until 1782. As already stated, the units of the brigade were initially recruited mainly in the Lowlands, and it was not until the mid-seventeenth century that we find significant recruitment from the Highlands. In an age when sons were often inclined and indeed expected to follow the same trade as their fathers, it is no surprise to find it being said of the Scots Brigade: “Probably no military body ever existed in which members of the same families were so constantly employed for generations.” The records of the Brigade include note of Dutch authorities making the journey across the North Sea to seek men, for example in 1594 when ambassadors crossed from Veere to Leith on such an errand, and again in 1632 when the States General sought to reinforce the existing four English and three Scottish regiments in Dutch service.

Recruitment for service in the Thirty Years War

The second major phase of recruitment of soldiers for overseas service came during the Thirty Years War. The early levies were used to reinforce the army of Count Ernst von Mansfeld, the mercenary commander, in the campaign in Bohemia in support of James VI’s son-in-law, Frederick of Bohemia, against the Holy Roman Empire. Later levies were also destined to

47 RPCS, II, p. 237.
fight in the effort to restore Frederick to the Upper and Lower Palatinate and to strengthen the Danish opposition to west-bound Habsburg forces, as well as to join the forces of Gustavus Adolphus. Large levies were implemented in the late 1630s and early 1640s for French service in the latter stages of the Thirty Years War when France entered the war in alliance with the Swedes and others against the Holy Roman Empire.

Attitudes to military service

The social hierarchies that existed in Scotland made the recruitment of men easier than it might otherwise have been. In the rural Highlands, the clan system could be readily adapted to secure men for continental levies. In 1633 the parish minister of Wardlaw near Inverness recorded that Thomas Fraser, son of a local laird, used his clan connections and the assistance of Lord Lovat, the clan chief, to raise recruits.\(^49\) In another instance involving the Frasers, in 1656, clan leaders helped a recruiter enlist forty-three men in three days. It seems that the use of such social networks was standard procedure. When Sir Donald Mackay of Strathnaver issued commissions in his proposed regiment to the leading young men in neighbouring clans, he undoubtedly expected at least some of them to respond with enthusiasm and bring men with them to the colours, and this is indeed what happened.

In the Lowlands, the subordinate classes appear not to have shared the attitude to martial glory found among the nobles and lairds. The poor socio-economic conditions in the late sixteenth century and the familiarity with travel to the Low Countries prevalent on the east coast of Scotland may have helped in the recruitment of men in the Lowlands to join the conflict in the Netherlands, but later during the seventeenth century there is clear evidence of passive and even active resistance to recruitment. In April 1620, for instance, the levy to provide 1,500 men to go with Colonel Andrew Gray to Bohemia was proceeding slowly, and towards the end of that month the Privy Council ordered all beggars, vagabonds, and “masterless” men with no lawful trade or means of livelihood to enlist. Failure to comply with this command could result in a whipping or being burnt on the cheek for a first offence, and hanging for a second, at first glance a seemingly counterproductive threat.\(^50\) The Council also directed criminals to be placed in the army, and in the Borders a proclamation was read out at market crosses.

\(^49\) Fraser, Chronicles of the Frasers, pp. 255, 417.
\(^50\) RPCS, XII, p. 259.
to announce that reivers, men convicted of feuding and cattle raiding, were to be marked down for transportation. Early in May Colonel Gray had sufficient men to set off for Hamburg, but in the last days before sailing some of the recruits deserted and went into hiding in the Edinburgh area. From 1620 onwards it appears to have become common for courts to offer criminals the opportunity to go abroad in military service and for recruiting officers to visit jails in the search for men.

A major levy was launched in the spring of 1627 to provide men for the service of the king of Denmark, then facing the advancing forces of the Holy Roman Empire in north-western Germany. The three commanders – Robert, Earl of Nithsdale, Alexander Lord Spynie, and James Sinclair of Murkle – were each granted £4,000 sterling for the task. The target of 9,000 men – 3,000 each – was extremely ambitious. Efforts to help recruiters attain it included another pronouncement from the Privy Council about taking up vagabonds and idle men, except that this time the Council went into more detail and mentioned “all Egyptians [gypsies]” and fugitive soldiers from other levies.\(^{51}\) The Council also noted reports of the targeted recruits forming themselves into “societies and companies” and preparing to use firearms to resist recruitment. The Council warned sheriffs and burgh magistrates to apprehend all potential recruits from among the idle and masterless in their jurisdictions and asked them to assist the recruiting officers “in bringing of these people to their colours”. Sea captains were forbidden to give fugitives passage to Ireland. The levy proceeded during the summer but it soon brought objections from respectable sections of the community. Recruiting captains were clearly desperate to fill their quotas and were resorting to dubious tactics. The Council learned in June of men going into hiding and deserting, and also of men being violently taken against their will.\(^{52}\) In July, leading burgesses in Edinburgh protested that their sons and grandsons at the college were being induced to enlist by “alluring speeches”, causing some families to withdraw their offspring from the college and send them to other burghs for safety.\(^{53}\) There were complaints from the town of Burntisland in Fife in September that the soldiers waiting to go abroad were causing “manie great disordours”.\(^{54}\) In the midst of this troubled time around the Forth, Charles I launched a new war against France and called for a levy for men for an expedition to relieve

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 2nd series, I, p. 565.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., 2nd series, VIII, p. 379.
\(^{53}\) Ibid., 2nd series, II, p. 7.
\(^{54}\) Ibid., 2nd series, II, p. 79.
the siege of La Rochelle. The Nithsdale-Spynie-Murkle levy probably raised only 5,000 men by the time the contingents sailed for Denmark in October. In 1629, Murkle was still trying to reach his original target of 3,000, had exhausted the recruitment grant, and had “ingaged his awin estait for the furtherance thairof”.55 Interestingly, in his petition to the Privy Council describing his unfortunate predicament, Murkle seems most concerned over being disgraced in the eyes of the king of Denmark and asks for a hearing with Charles I in the hope the British king will plead his case in Copenhagen.

By the late 1620s, therefore, it is evident that recruiters were finding it difficult to attract sufficient numbers of men to fulfil their obligations in the Lowlands, hitherto the main part of the country for the recruitment of soldiers for overseas service. The articles of agreement for recruitment of men for Sweden between Sir James Spens and Captain Alexander Hamilton in April 1629 refer to “the scantnes of men in Scotland”.56 During this period, the Lowlands enjoyed improvements in trade and the economy, better seasons for agriculture, and fewer outbreaks of infectious disease.57 Prospects at home must have appeared better than they had in the previous half-century. It is only at this point that recruitment in the Highlands becomes significant. Charles I asked for 200 Highland bowmen for his La Rochelle expedition in 1627 but in the previous year Sir Donald Mackay of Strathnaver (ennobled as Lord Reay in 1628) in the far north of the country had taken it upon himself to escape some domestic difficulties by obtaining from the king a licence to raise troops for the continent on a much larger scale. Sir Robert Gordon, a neighbouring landlord, and possibly a cause of some of Sir Donald’s domestic difficulties, recorded the eventuality as follows:

The yeir 1626 Sir Donald Macky (a gentleman of a sturring spirite) finding himself crossed at home, and matters not succeeding according to his expectation, either in his owne particular estate or against his neighbours he taks resolution to leave the kingdome; and to this end he causeth his freinds to deale at court with the king for a licence to transport men to the Count Mansfeild into Germanie.58

55 Ibid., 2nd series, III, p. 147.
56 Quoted in Fraser, Memorials of the Earls of Haddington, p. 92.
58 Gordon, A Genealogical History of the Earldom of Sutherland, p. 401.
Count Mansfeld’s army was defeated before Mackay’s contingents reached it but Mackay’s Regiment, as it became called, entered the service of Denmark. After the Peace of Lübeck in July 1629, its officers offered their allegiance to Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and took their men with them. In contrast with the struggle faced by Nithsdale and his colleagues to fill the ranks, the levy in the northern Highlands proceeded relatively quickly. Mackay received his licence in March 1626 and by October at least 2,000 men were ready to embark for the Elbe estuary.\(^5^9\) There were two possible reasons for this: this part of the country had not been really affected by previous recruitments, and it was a reflection of the ease with which clan society could be mobilized. Mackay was ably assisted in recruitment by the Forbes family in Aberdeenshire, where a proportion of the recruits were raised.\(^6^0\)

Despite the relative speediness of the levy, Mackay’s recruitment drive suffered, probably like all levies, from desertion, from men enrolling, receiving the initial payment, and then going into hiding. According to the Privy Council, “a grite number of thame” did this, and severe punishment was proclaimed for them and any who helped them evade justice.\(^6^1\) In the long run, even the clan system came under stress and did not always produce recruits: in September 1636 Captain Robert Innes, a laird’s son from Mackay’s Regiment, was angered enough to strike tenants of Gordon of Dunkinty near Elgin when they refused to allow their sons or servants to be recruited. Efforts to find new recruits by Mackay himself in 1629 also had some trouble in finding men, partly a reflection of the low population density of the northern Highlands. Possibly to avoid stirring up public unrest over continual recruitment, when the Privy Council granted a licence to raise 300 men as replacements for regiments already in Swedish service, it added the instruction that this was to be done quietly, without drums or display of colours.\(^6^2\)

In July and August 1632, the Dutch States General sought to recruit 2,000 men in England and 1,500 men in Scotland to reinforce existing regiments.\(^6^3\) Charles I gave his permission readily enough to the Dutch ambassador and his colleagues but warned them that the conditions on offer – each recruiting officer to receive 8 guilders per man and the command of a company – would attract no one. Various reasons were put forward – that it

59  \textit{RPCS}, 2nd series, I, pp. 244–245.
60  Tayler and Tayler, \textit{House of Forbes}, p. 177.
61  \textit{RPCS}, 2nd series, I, p. 311.
was the wrong time of year, as high wages were on offer during the harvest; that recruiting was going ahead daily for Sweden and Muscovy, the latter offering 15 guilders per short month to the soldiers; that the targets per recruiting officer were too high; that officers would not like to recruit men and then not be put in command over them; that money was still owing to the Earl of Morton for a previous levy in 1629. These excuses were advanced in England; the ambassador failed to contact anyone in Scotland to find out if there was a better chance of success there. The levy failed. In 1633 the English government prohibited taking men out of the country for foreign service unless they were recruits to keep existing regiments up to strength.

The large levy in 1642 for service in France also ran into difficulties, producing in the Privy Council records of the by-now familiar resorts to impressing “idle persons” and handing over convicted criminals to the recruiters. The Council records also show, however, that the authorities were not undiscriminating: for example, when eleven men complained that they had been taken by force and thrown into prison “where they are yitt lying almost starving for want of maintenance and their wyves and children ar begging through the countrie”, the Council sent officials to investigate with the result that five were set free and six were retained, the latter having been deemed to have freely volunteered.64 There are also instances of landowners seeking the release of members of their workforce who had either volunteered or been inveigled into enlisting, an interesting point to which I shall return below.

Conditions of service

No written agreements or contracts covering the recruitment of the rank-and-file soldiers have been located during the research for this chapter, and it is possible they were rarely if at all used. Verbal agreements founded on the existing conditions of trust and hierarchy could be expected in clan societies with their strong oral cultures, but they were also probably the norm in other parts of the country. The correspondence and contracts that do survive relate to official sources and educated elites.

The soldier serving abroad could usually hope for regular pay and the provision of food and clothing. These conditions appear to have been accepted at the time as reasonably fair, although it is difficult to compare wages and prices in the various currencies of the day. Complaints and

64 RPCS, 2nd series, VII, p. 450.
dissension, amounting at times to mutiny, seem to have occurred only when pay and provisions were not issued when expected. In the late sixteenth century in Scotland, in one year a male farm servant could expect to earn from £1 6s 8d to £6, depending on skill and experience as well as regional variations. Rural wages were often supplemented with accommodation and some food but they seem very low when compared to what soldiers could hope for. The pay scale set by the Privy Council in 1586 for armed men to police the Borders ran from £20 a month for a horseman and £6 for a foot soldier to almost £70 and £50 respectively for their commanding captains.\(^{65}\)

As an example of pay given to Scottish soldiers in Dutch service in the 1570s, we have in the records totals paid out to commanding officers for the fourteen months between 1 June 1573 and 31 July 1574. The largest sum went to Captain Baulfour (Balfour) – £8,015, the smallest to Colonel Ormeston – £50, with widely varying amounts to other officers, which presumably reflect the respective lengths of service and complements of men, as well as the costs of bringing recruits over the North Sea.\(^{66}\) At the same time, under “pay”, Colonel Ormeston received £500, and this seems to have been the going annual rate for a man of this rank. In October 1575, the salary of Henry Balfour, by this time a colonel, was set at 800 guilders per year by the Dutch authorities. In May 1577, Colonel Balfour received £6,000 Artois for his services, as a lump sum at the termination of his period of service; he was soon requested to return to the Low Countries when war broke out anew in October that year.

In 1577 the Dutch laid down that “All captains [are] to pay their men 45 stivers each, half monthly, while the engagement remains at 1,100 guilders monthly for 100 men.”\(^{67}\) A village worker’s salary in the Low Countries at the time was around 200 guilders per year.\(^{68}\) In 1579, the pay scale for a company of soldiers under the command of a Colonel William Stewart ran from 12 livres per month for the drummer, the lowest paid, through 16 for a corporal, 24 for a sergeant, 40 for an ensign, and 45 for a lieutenant, to 90 for the captain.\(^{69}\) In September 1586 the authorities in Amsterdam were asked to pay to 150 Scottish soldiers who had newly arrived in the area 1 florin (1 guilder) per day to the captain, 10 patars (14 pence) to the lieutenant, 6 patars each to the ensigns, sergeants, cadets, corporals, and clerk, and 3

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65 Ibid., IV, p. 111.
66 Ferguson, The Scots Brigade in the Service of Denmark and Sweden, I, p. 36.
67 Ibid.
68 Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 353.
patars to the ordinary ranks.\textsuperscript{70} The request to Henry Balfour to return to fight for the States General in the renewal of hostilities in October 1577 included the remuneration (apparently per year) offered to him and his men: £500 for himself, £200 for his lieutenant, £100 for his sergeant major, £40 for the quartermaster and the provost, £16 for the halbardiers, and £12 for the provost sergeants.\textsuperscript{71}

An attractive feature of service in the Low Countries in the Dutch cause was that the widows and children of officers killed in action were given state pensions, amounts varying from 800 guilders per year awarded to the widow and son of Colonel Balfour in April 1581, to sums in 1610 of the order of £50 to £100 for each surviving relative.\textsuperscript{72}

Costs forced the States General government of the United Provinces in the Low Countries to review the pay scales in 1587, when they dismissed companies they could not afford, asked officers against assurance of a final settlement in the future not to seek payment for arrears as long as the war continued, required soldiers to swear to accept a 48-day month (officers were given a 32-day month), and assigned garrisons to different provinces according to the province’s ability to pay.\textsuperscript{73} The commission dated 26 June 1588 to Colonel Bartholomew Balfour included the statement that his company of 200 men would receive “2,200 pounds, of 40 groats the pound, every 32 days, with the reservation that henceforward he shall content himself with these payments every 48 days. With this he and his subordinate officers and his soldiers, like others in the country’s service, must content themselves.”\textsuperscript{74} A similar commission, dated 15 April 1593, to Captain Patrick Bruce commanding a company of lancers of 100 horses provides higher remuneration for mounted men – “his payment to be 3,000 pounds per month of 32 days, the officers’ salaries and horse fodder included therein, provided he shall take care to procure [...] all such payments out of said levies on the country districts of Flanders, the which he is to exact with all diligence and put in train, so that his pay beyond the present incomes can be escheat (or claimed) out of them; and he, the captain, his subordinate officers, and cavalry shall like others rest satisfied with receiving a month’s pay every 48 days.”\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., I, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{71} RPCS, II, p. 641.
\textsuperscript{72} Ferguson, The Scots Brigade in the Service of Denmark and Sweden, I, p. 226.
\textsuperscript{73} Grimeston, A Generall Historie of the Netherlands, p. 890.
\textsuperscript{74} Ferguson, The Scots Brigade in the Service of Denmark and Sweden, I, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., I, p. 92.
The imposition of 32-day and 48-day months was not popular with the Scottish officers. In June 1588, three captains, named as Meurrey, Nysbeth, and Waddel, told a committee of the States General that they were willing to serve “but that they must have the means to make their soldiers willing and to satisfy them”. There ensued a round of negotiations that lasted several weeks, in which Colonel Balfour tried to win the best deal for his men but which ended with the discharge of some officers and the continuation of the 48-day month.

The pay scale for men to be recruited for Swedish service by Sir Donald Mackay is set out in a letter of June 1629: colonel – 300 riksdaler Swedish per month of 31 days; company captain – 100; lieutenant and ensign – 50; sergeant – 16; drummer or piper – 8; ordinary pikeman or musketeer – 6; scout and reserve – 5. The letter also sets out what would be expected of the mercenary:

[Officers and men] participating in our adventures, shall not turn away from us in times of misfortunes, and as becometh such honourable and brave cavaliers and soldiers, they shall always be ready cheerfully and indefatigably to venture body and life.

There follows a list of the types of action in which the mercenary may expect to find himself – battles, skirmishes, watches, attacks, sieges, by day or night, on water or on land. The Swedish king undertook to provide a sufficient monthly allowance with a twice-yearly settlement of accounts. Pay would not be reduced but there would be deductions for careless damage or breakage. The rate of exchange at the time is revealed in the articles of an agreement drawn up between Sir James Spens and Alexander Hamilton in April 1629 for the raising of 1,200 men, as mentioned earlier. The rewards for senior officers could be very high and come in the form of grants of land and hereditary titles among the nobility as well as in payments of money, although only a few men benefited in this way.

For most soldiers the regularity with which they received their pay, food, and clothing was a major factor in keeping up their morale, and the reputations of commanders often rested on their performance in this regard. On long campaigns across great distances, the systems of victualling and payment could easily break down, and even Gustavus Adolphus, generally a reliable payer, had to deal with threats of mutiny from time to time. Some

76 Ibid., I, p.98.
77 Fischer, The Scots in Germany, p. 280.
mercenary commanders made no special arrangements for the support of their men and expected them to forage and plunder, practices that naturally visited misery on civilians and brought the reputation of the soldier to the level of the thief or rapist.

By the standards of the time, the Dutch were good at maintaining regular payment of salaries, although, as we have seen, there were still occasions when the soldiers were stirred to complain. The conscientious paymaster was always aware that the loyalty of a mercenary could be severely tested by a breakdown in pay, an eventuality that could easily occur when an army was in the field. The provision of clothing appears to have been very important for the attraction of recruits and the morale of the newly formed contingents. In 1627 Lord Ogilvie noted that his recruits would not “imbark with good will except they get thair clothes” and realized how important this was: “it does mutch good, and incurages many, quhen they sie the soldieris weill used, and speciall quhen they sie them passe throch the cuntrey weill apperelled”.

Robert Monro records that the men in Mackay’s Regiment were issued with clothing and muster money after they had arrived in Holstein from Scotland to join the king of Denmark’s forces, and briefly described how the officers refused to wear the Danish cross with their Scottish colours, a short-lived instance of ethnic loyalty that was dispelled when King James VI’s officials told them to obey who was paying them “in a matter so indifferent”. After six months of training and what Monro describes as getting in good order, the regiment was inspected by the king, took an oath of fidelity and heard the articles of war read, completing a comparatively well-organized and measured initiation that may have been far from typical of the mercenary experience.

Mention of duration of service seems to be missing from what we know of the contractual arrangements for the rank and file. It seems to have been customary for a soldier to serve as long as he was fit and the continuation of hostilities required his presence, his time ending when successful peace negotiations brought about disbandment.

Conditions of service related mainly to the active soldier. As mentioned, the States General in the Low Countries provided pensions for the widows and offspring of officers but this was not true of every employer. The conditions offered by Gustavus Adolphus to Sir Donald Mackay included provision for the care of wounded and disabled men: “we shall provide a temporary home for them in our own dominions, but should they prefer

79 Monro, Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment, p. 2.
going beyond our kingdom a month’s pay shall be given to each.” Evidence is very hard to obtain as to what really happened to the ordinary soldier in the ranks when he became too old to continue or had to retire from active duty through injury. A few seem to have found a role behind the lines as cooks or orderlies; many may have been forced to resort to begging or a scrape-by existence in some menial occupation. We know from anecdotal evidence – the mention of veterans in later contexts – that some of the Scots found their way home from mainland Europe, likely taking advantage of the Swedish offer of a month’s pay, but no figures on this are readily available. On his return to Britain in 1633, Robert Monro launched a venture to provide a hospital for wounded veterans.

The response of the enlisted man to the conditions of service seems to have been generally one of acceptance, unsurprising in view of the options open to them once they had enlisted. The soldiers keenly perceived unfairness in treatment. Sir Donald Mackay sought more money from the Danish authorities for his men when they protested that English units in the same army were being paid in a different manner. As Robert Monro put it – “It is a hard matter when the diligent and industrious Souldier is disappointed of his hire, and that he is rewarded with injury who did merit better.” Diligent officers in the field during the Thirty Years War were often exercised in maintaining the payment and hence the morale of their units.

At the last resort, the aggrieved soldier could always withdraw his service. A simple refusal to obey orders and mutiny, although this was an ultimately disastrous step, was made easier in the period under study by the accepted custom that defeated troops could switch sides and join the army of the victor. With the mercenary, loyalty was usually to comrade and commander rather than to country. Of his service with the Swedish army in northern Germany in the 1630s, James Turner commented in his memoirs: “I had swallowed without chewing, in Germanie, a very dangerous maxime, which militarie men there too much follow; which was, that so we serve our master honestlie, it is no matter what master we serve.” In the 1570s-1580s in the Low Countries, when sieges of towns were common, a besieged garrison whose pay had fallen into arrears was often open to negotiation and surrender.

80 Fischer, *The Scots in Germany*, p. 281.
81 RPCS, 2nd series, V, p. 353.
82 Monro, *Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment*, p. 196.
Back home

One of the most difficult aspects of this subject to explore is the effects mercenary service had on the society from which the soldiers came. Although the removal of a significant number of active men from the population must have had some consequences, there seems to be a complete lack of evidence for a shortage of manpower in normal homeland socio-economic life. In times of dearth such a shortage may have been a blessing but this would have been a short-term benefit. The loss of manpower may well have been one reason for increasing resistance to recruitment and may have contributed, for example, to the Aberdeenshire laird’s tenants resisting the efforts of Robert Innes of Cotts to recruit their sons and servants.

In 1635, the Privy Council became so concerned over the amount of foreign “dollars [sic]” in circulation in the country, leading to fraud and a devaluation of the currency, that they passed in August an act allowing traders to use only domestic money for transactions and followed this in February 1636 with an act prohibiting the importation of amounts greater than 56s.\(^{84}\) The continental currency could well have been brought by returning veterans.

By 1650 there must have accumulated in Scotland a pool of men with military experience, men who had served abroad and found their way home again. At least, this seems to be implied by the petition in November 1641 by Alexander Lord Forbes to the London Parliament stating “there are many soldiers desirous of employment [...] Your Petitioner having formerly engaged in foreign wars desires that he may have leave to entreat such of the officers and soldiers as shall not be any longer employed here and will willingly put themselves under his command in the service of any foreign prince.”\(^{85}\)

Events within Britain were soon to provide plenty of opportunity for the man with military training. Growing political tension in Scotland led to the military confrontation of the First Bishops’ War in June 1639. This was followed by further hostilities in 1640 and a gradual worsening of affairs until full-scale civil war broke out in England in 1642. Many of the Scottish mercenaries found their way home from the continent to fight, where their experience served them well. After the mid-century, although individual soldiers and officers still found places in continental armies, the raising of troops on any scale for the service of foreign powers became a memory.

\(^{84}\) RPCS, 2nd series, VI, p. xvii.

\(^{85}\) Tayler and Tayler, House of Forbes, p. 195.
Military service in transition

In the first part of this chapter, I put forward a number of factors as determining the movement of mercenary soldiers from Scotland to continental Europe between 1550 and 1650. These factors are: a tradition of emigration in general, and previous experience of armed service in continental Europe, especially in France; socio-economic hardship at home; domestic military custom; the attitudes of the leading members of society to a military life; and new opportunities for armed service in continental Europe after the Reformation. This expansion of military service abroad as a feature of Scottish society can be seen in labour terms as the response to a growth in demand for a particular skill in a population where other opportunities for making a living were constrained in several ways.

Men with basic fighting skills and experience in handling weapons could be found throughout the country. In the Borders and the Highlands, cattle reiving and clan feuds provided experience in campaigning over rough country, but even in the more settled Lowland areas the nobles maintained bands of armed men in their own service; among the mass of peasants and townsmen the wappenschaw system ensured that experience in handling weapons was normal. The custom of raising a host or army whenever an armed force was needed for national defence or security also kept alive the practices of military service.

Economic hardship at home, experience with weapons and armed service, and existing emigration pathways to the continent were three strong “push” factors in encouraging men to look abroad. This was combined with a strong “pull” factor, the attitude of the nobility and the landowning classes to military service and their enthusiasm for “seeking fortune in the field”. Recruitment for overseas service was also encouraged from time to time by government for several reasons: as a way of coping with food shortages, as a way to get rid of social undesirables, and as an instrument of foreign policy. When mercenary activity by Scots may have had a negative effect on foreign relations, the government took steps to curtail or prevent it, for example, by issuing recruiting licences or, in the case of the Ramsay recruitment in 1612, by seeking to suppress it completely.

It is also useful to see the phenomenon in terms of the work options that were open to a young man at the time. There was a high degree of hereditary employment, with the son of the merchant, tradesman, or labourer generally following in his father’s footsteps to earn a livelihood. This did not militate against some upward mobility but the absence of widespread, accessible education meant that only a few young people were given the opportunity
to attend any classes and benefit from formal tuition outside the family. Talented youngsters were probably spotted and encouraged, especially after the Reformation when a great need for new clergy arose, but this route of advancement lay open only to a relative few. Among the landowning classes, only the eldest son could hope to inherit an estate. Military service of some kind became, therefore, a real career option for many young men, especially when, as Major commented, a positive attitude to military service existed among farmers who scorned trades. To an extent, rural men shared the outlook of their social superiors and may have enlisted willingly, an attitude most likely to be prevalent in clan society and to have been an important factor in the comparatively rapid recruitment of Mackay’s Regiment in 1626.

It is possible that some labourers, urban as well as rural, saw enlisting as a soldier as a means of escape from the restricted life on offer at home and surrendered to the lure of adventure in preference to tedium and familiarity. For those who were fugitives from justice, answering the call of the recruiting officer was an obvious way to evade arrest and a grim fate, and was probably a gamble worth taking, but even for men who had committed no wrong the prospect of soldiering may have been seen as an opportunity. The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland that came into existence with the Reformation after 1560 spoke against the oppression of poor tenants, although it failed to do much to ease their plight.86 In the burghs only merchants and craftsmen enjoyed the privileges that came with burgess status; all the other inhabitants, the majority that included servants, journeymen, labourers, and the poor, were called “unfree” and had no say in local affairs. As the seventeenth century wore on, conditions almost akin to serfdom were imposed on the labour force in the small coal-mining and salt-panning industries around the Firth of Forth.87 Exchanging the constraints of civilian life in such circumstances for the discipline of an army, which at least offered the prospect of regular food, shelter, and comradeship, may have been a relatively easy decision to make. When some masters complained that their servants had been seized by recruiters and sought to have them released, the servants may not always have been so keen to return to civilian servitude. It seems that enlisting did not necessarily take the soldier away from some kind of family life, as in July 1581 the Privy Council complained that the women following the troops abroad were

87 Ibid., p. 168.
bringing dishonour on the country and called on ship captains to allow only legitimate wives of good repute to embark with the soldiers.\textsuperscript{88}

Determining where the Scottish mercenary contingents fall on the axis of free/unfree labour must take account of the clear distinctions between officers and men in the conditions of service. Officers were seen as professionals and were free to resign a commission, the most famous and exceptional example of this being the resignation of Sir John Hepburn from the Swedish army in 1632 after a perceived insult and a quarrel with Gustavus Adolphus.\textsuperscript{89} Sir John was, of course, a senior commander; a more junior officer may not have felt so free to take such an independent course. The rank and file were unfree in the sense that they were expected to stay in service once enlisted, and were subject to laws on desertion.

With regard to the classification of labour relations used by the IISH, the Scottish mercenary soldier appears to accord with more than one category, depending on his individual status. The conscripted and pressed men in the contingents recruited in the Lowlands fit the definition of forced tributary labour. As well as receiving pay, they were paid partly in kind with food and clothing. With recruits who volunteered, the definition of labour relations becomes a little more complicated. In effect they were exchanging one form of labour relationship for another. For those who belonged to the “unfree” section of society, willingly leaving self-employment as a tradesman or employment as a labourer to become a soldier was surrendering a degree of personal independence for indentured tributary labour, but in times of economic hardship the gains could well have been seen as outweighing the drawbacks. Some volunteers from the burgess or landowner classes exchanged a non-working status for soldiering. An example here is James Turner who, in his own memoir, describes how as a student, aged eighteen, studying history and religious philosophy, he responded to “a restless desire […] to be, if not an actor, at least a spectator of these warrs which at that time made so much noyse”, and enlisted in Sir James Lumsden’s regiment bound for Rostock in 1632.\textsuperscript{90} Robert Monro, the laird of Foulis in Easter Ross, volunteered to join Mackay’s Regiment to escape from domestic difficulties: deep in debt, he engaged his estate revenues to his creditors for ten years and went off to be a military officer.\textsuperscript{91}

\begin{footnotes}
88 RPCS, III, p. 399.
89 Grant, Memoirs and Adventures of Sir John Hepburn, p. 182.
90 Turner, Memoirs of His Own Life and Times, p. 3.
91 Monro, Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment, p. 3.
\end{footnotes}
The professional soldier, and in the context of this study, this usually means someone of officer rank, was much more a self-employed individual free to accept a commission and, as circumstances permitted, move from one employer to another. With their enlistment in the military ranks, mercenaries from the Highlands, where clan society prevailed, and from among the Borders kindreds can be seen as moving from a status of reciprocal labour, whether household- or community-based, or tributary labour to indentured employment. In the case of Mackay’s Regiment, one can argue that Sir Donald Mackay saw the possibility of exploiting clan ties to find an honourable way out of personal constraints at home, taking it on himself to “offer” men, for whom he was their natural leader, to the service of others. In doing so, he was pioneering the exploitation of the clan system that the British state deployed from the latter half of the eighteenth century to furnish its army with men. The Scottish host, as raised by the government for a national cause, and expected to serve without pay for a fixed number of days, was a form of tributary serf labour, a development from the feudal hosts of past centuries.

Scottish mercenaries, therefore, came from a variety of backgrounds to reach the status of paid soldier, transitions driven in the period under study, as we have seen, by a growth in overseas demand for soldiers against a background of socio-economic hardship at home, with ideological factors, principally motivations arising from the post-Reformation hostility between Protestant and Catholic, playing a subsidiary part. The period saw the transformation of the men who in an earlier generation would have comprised the post-feudal forces of the Scottish host and the armed followers of regional and clan leaders into the elements of an aggregate contract army. Some of those who survived the fighting in Europe and returned to Scotland then became members of armies commissioned by the contesting forces in the civil wars in the British Isles, armies which were soon to be transformed once again into the forces of the state and the early modern conscript army. In this context, it is significant that a connecting thread can be traced from Sir John Hepburn’s recruitment for France in 1633 and the British line regiment, the Royal Regiment of Foot, more popularly known as the Royal Scots, that was designated in 1684.
The second half of the seventeenth century saw significant changes in the structures of the most important military organizations on the European continent. Collectively, these changes are commonly labelled as the introduction of standing armies. These changes certainly had a deep impact on the terms as well as the conditions of military labour. However, it needs to be discussed whether these developments should be understood as a categorical transformation, putting military labour in a typological framework of its own, or whether it would be more appropriate to stress the aspects of continuity and to embed these aspects of change in a more evolutionary interpretative framework. This chapter will argue that several changes of particular importance altered the face of military labour so that it hardly could be equated with the classical era of mercenaries in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Nevertheless, the components were still tied to various traditions and did not constitute a completely innovative system that could be compared with the later transformations initiated by the French Revolution – though even the revolutionaries, of course, could not avoid being based on existing forms of military institutions.

In accordance with the objectives of the Fighting for a Living project, this chapter will initially outline the current state of research. Particular attention will be given to the modes of recruitment, which not only can be considered crucial criteria for categorizing the type of military labour but which also developed significant variations during the era under discussion here. The second part of the chapter will discuss and reassess the empirical findings in the framework of some more general categories related to the typology and dynamics of military labour.

The most obvious expression of these changes was not inevitably connected with the principles of standing armies and consisted simply of significant growth in the size of many armies. At the forefront of these developments was the French army, which established new levels for the military strength of a leading power within the European concert. Some figures will illustrate the extent of growth. Of course, it is impossible to determine exact numbers; due to the lack of sources as well as discrepancies between normative prescriptions, a limited range of records, and the
presumed reality, the numbers are the result of more or less rough estimates and ongoing discussions. Therefore they cannot offer more than an impression of the quantitative aspect of armies.

During the Thirty Years War, France may have mobilized at the most around 125,000 troops, desperately exploiting all resources. Several decades later, around 1695, the strength of the French army may have peaked at close to 340,000 troops. A comparison of peacetime statistics is no less informative. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the French king was already keeping a few thousand men under arms. However, around 1680 – admittedly only in a short peacetime interlude in France’s struggle for hegemony – the army probably consisted of around 150,000 soldiers, significantly more than during the Thirty Years War only four decades before.

These numbers certainly give some impression of the strength of the most powerful army during this period. However, during the eighteenth century, one may say that obtaining or retaining the status of a leading power required the maintenance of more than 100,000 soldiers in peacetime and the mobilization of at least 150,000 soldiers during war. Such were the levels of mobilization attained by the rulers of Austria2 and Prussia3 during the Silesian Wars in the middle of the eighteenth century, representing a significant augmentation of their strength compared to the first half of the seventeenth century. Though the figures still oscillated within a certain range and tended to grow, these benchmarks were not exceeded significantly until the levée en masse of the French Revolution marked another quantum increase in levels of mobilization.

To get an idea of the overall level of military mobilization in central Europe, one would have to include the forces of several medium-sized powers, including the Netherlands4 and some Italian states, as well as some princely

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1 Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, pp. 41-58, includes some critical reflections on the relationship between the numbers derived from several archived lists and the real strength of the armies in the field. The precision of the methodology employed should cause some concern about comparing these numbers with other, less carefully derived figures.
4 Van Nimwegen, The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions; for a very basic overview, including some overall figures, see van Nimwegen, “The Transformation of Army Organisation in Early-Modern Western Europe”, pp. 172-178.
territories within the Holy Roman Empire,\textsuperscript{5} such as Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel,\textsuperscript{6} or Saxony.\textsuperscript{7} However, the relationship between the strength of the army and the total population (the so-called military participation ratio) also varied markedly. France benefited from the extent of its territories and the size of its population, which resulted, according to estimations of the time, in a ratio of the army’s strength in relation to the whole population of around 1 to 140. In contrast, Prussian military strength was based on a territory not half as big as France with an even smaller population density, so that the ratio was around 1 to 32. In the second half of the eighteenth century even this was exceeded by the military of Hesse-Cassel, reaching a ratio of 1 soldier to 15 civilians.\textsuperscript{8} Of course, these figures are hard to verify\textsuperscript{9} and raise some difficulties of interpretation, which cannot be fully investigated here.

**Observations: recruitment**

As a result of these developments the demand for recruits increased dramatically. Indeed, the growth in absolute numbers was exacerbated by the continuous need for replacements in order to maintain the permanent existence of the armies. To be sure, the need for fresh recruits was unceasing, but reached significant peaks when rulers decided to start a military build-up, when new troops were raised in anticipation of a military confrontation or, even worse, when during war the losses had to be replaced as quickly

\textsuperscript{5} Numbers can be found in Wilson, *German Armies*; mostly, however, they do not relate to general strengths but to wartime strength of territorial contingents deployed as auxiliaries or parts of the composite Reichsarmee. It is noteworthy that even some of the rather autonomous imperial cities maintained their own military, which will not be included here, due to their small numbers and special circumstances; see Schwark, *Lübecks Stadtmilitär im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert*; Kraus, *Das Militärwesen der Reichsstadt Augsburg*; Ehlers, *Die Wehrverfassung der Stadt Hamburg im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert*.

\textsuperscript{6} Ingrao, *The Hessian Mercenary State*; see Taylor, *Indentured to Liberty*; for a recent overview, though focused on early seventeenth-century militia, but with far-reaching considerations, see Gräf, “Landesdefension oder ‘Fundamentalmilitarisierung’?”

\textsuperscript{7} Kroll, *Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung*; for a compilation of several older figures on the Saxon army, see pp. 70–73.

\textsuperscript{8} Ingrao, *The Hessian Mercenary State*, pp. 132–135.

\textsuperscript{9} The numbers are based on a list from the end of the eighteenth century, which can be found in Johann Georg Krünitz, *Oeconomische Encyclopaedie*, L (Berlin, 1790) (http://www.kruenitz.uni-trier.de/), pp. 746–755; the list, as part of the entry “Kriegs-Heer”, covers all of Europe, including a large number of territories of the Holy Roman Empire, and relates numbers of army strength to the population.
as possible. Therefore the business of recruitment met challenges of a new dimension, too. In fact, methods of recruitment changed significantly.

The most important mode of recruitment remained voluntary enlistment. This had been a well-established practice since mercenary service had become dominant in the later Middle Ages and had marginalized the feudal military service of the nobility. A significant aspect of this practice had been the fact that it did not really matter where the mercenaries came from. At one time, in the first half of the sixteenth century, the most reputable soldiers originated in Switzerland or, in the case of the so-called Landsknechte, from the south-western region of the Holy Roman Empire. Other mercenaries, such as the Irish and the Scots, came from peripheral regions of Europe, while still other elements of the armies, even in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, were also recruited either in the ruler’s territories or simply around the theatre of war. Such a composition gave parts of the armies a significant multi-cultural appearance.

On the other hand, the growth of the armies and, probably even more importantly, their enduring institutionalization in peacetime implied a stronger focus on the state’s own population. While precise comparisons are difficult to determine and have to take account of differing local circumstances, the importance of foreign recruits seemingly decreased in armies such as the French or the Austrian, where they dropped as a proportion of the total to below 20 per cent. Recruiting beyond the state’s borders, however, continued to be a common practice. In this respect, France maintained a special relationship with the Swiss cantons by extending traditional treaties that provided fixed numbers of Swiss recruits for

10 Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters; Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force.
11 However, exclusive contracts mostly tied Swiss recruitment to French service; see as an overview Bodin, Les Suisses au service de la France. Swiss research on mercenary services is mostly focused on its social impact in Switzerland itself; see several contributions in Fuhrer et al., Schweizer in “Fremden Diesnten”, though it mostly refers to older works, and Gente ferocissima; Küng, Glanz und Elend der Söldner; Bührer, Der Zürcher Solddienst des 18. Jahrhunderts; Schaufelberger, “Von der Kriegsgeschichte zur Militärgeschichte”; Schaufelberger, Der alte Schweizer und sein Krieg. Many authors also still refer to Peyer, “Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der fremden Dienste für die Schweiz”.
12 Baumann, Landsknechte.
13 Stradling, The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries; Murtagh, “Irish Soldiers Abroad, 1600-1800”; O’Reilly, “The Irish Mercenary Tradition in the 1600s”.
14 Miller, Swords for Hire; several contributions in Murdoch, Scotland and the Thirty Years War.
16 Duffy, The Army of Maria Theresa, p. 47.
the French army, hired by the local authorities in Switzerland themselves. The Swiss were organized in separate units, which were retained during the entire eighteenth century, and they remained loyal until the last ones were massacred defending the French king against the Parisian revolutionaries in front of the Tuileries on 10 August 1792.

Even the individual enlistment of foreigners remained possible in the French army. The Austrian army profited from some scattered Habsburg possessions in southern Germany where recruiters had easy access to minor territories in the region. Along with Switzerland, the highly fragmented political landscape in southern Germany had provided one of Europe's most important soldier-markets since the heyday of the Landsknechte. This was even more important for Prussia when it entered the league of Europe's leading powers in the first half of the eighteenth century. Due to its relatively small population, the Prussian military build-up depended to a considerable extent on foreign recruitment. The proportion of recruits from beyond the borders of Prussia may have accounted for around one-third of the army, and Frederick the Great even tried to increase their numbers. Although the standing armies tended to become more homogeneous than before – further evidence for this will be discussed below – and since different armies had to deal with different conditions, recruitment continued to disregard the origins of the recruits. The concern with the quantity of recruits overrode any other considerations.

This was all the more true since growing armies altered the conditions of recruitment in another important regard. As far as we know, recruitment did not meet serious problems during the heyday of mercenaries in the sixteenth century. Things changed during the seventeenth century, starting with the Thirty Years War, and these were later enforced by the

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17 A very close-up and colourful view of the everyday business of foreign recruitment in a southern German imperial city is offered by Schüssler, “Das Werbewesen in der Reichsstadt Heilbronn”; unfortunately only very few carbon copies of this work exist. The subject is covered fundamentally by Wilson, “The Politics of Military Recruitment in Eighteenth-Century Germany”. See also, from a more juridical perspective, von Rosenberg, Soldatenwerbung und militärisches Durchzugsrecht im Zeitalter des Absolutismus: for concrete examples, see pp. 104ff., 134ff; Heuel, Werbungen in der Reichsstadt Köln 1700-1750.
changes outlined above. Obviously, it became more and more difficult to motivate enough volunteers to join the army; at least, historians have revealed an increasing number of complaints about recruitment abuses in the records.\textsuperscript{21} In fact, recruitment involving the use or threat of violence, or the condemnation of delinquents to military service, seemed to become characteristic of this period of military history.

Some corrections or nuancing of this image are certainly necessary. First of all, one has to consider a certain bias inherent within the primary sources. While abuses were very likely to initiate resistance and formal complaints, and therefore the production of archival sources, a routine performed without opposition tends to be invisible to the historian. Accordingly, it is impossible to obtain a definitive record of the relative proportions of voluntary and enforced enlistment.\textsuperscript{22} Certainly the assumption that armies worked with large percentages of forced recruits seems to be unrealistic, though one should not underestimate either the impact of military discipline even on forced soldiers, which will be discussed below, nor the range of possible motivations for truly voluntary enlistments.

Secondly, involuntary enlistment took very different forms. Of course, a large number of examples of forced recruitment exist. For example, many of them concern Prussian recruitment in the duchy of Mecklenburg in the first half of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{23} Obviously the Prussian military profited from internal struggles in the duchy and from its defencelessness against its already rather powerful neighbour. Typically, however, most of these examples took place during the period in which the Prussian king, Frederick William I, the so-called Soldatenkönig, implemented a strong military build-up by doubling the number of Prussian soldiers, so these examples cannot be considered representative of the usual practice of Prussian recruitment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries without broader


\textsuperscript{22} See Pröve, \textit{Stehendes Heer und städtische Gesellschaft im 18. Jahrhundert}, pp. 42f.; in addition to some reports on recruitment abuses, Pröve offers data for one regiment, comparing the number of recruits during two peacetime decades with the number of official complaints in the local records, which suggests a ratio of only 5 per cent of irregular recruitments; of course, the example is small and the number of complaints might not be complete.

\textsuperscript{23} See von Schultz, \textit{Die preußischen Werbungen unter Friedrich Wilhelm I. und Friedrich dem Großen}. 
research. The same thing seems to be true for the use of military service as a means of social discipline by forcing vagrants and delinquents into the army. Although there were examples for this in continental armies,\(^{24}\) and although such examples severely damaged the image of the military in public discourse, these practices did not contribute significantly to recruitment overall.

On the other hand, involuntary enlistment did not always involve the use of violence. It seems to have been far more widespread for young men to be lured into military service by tricks and traps.\(^{25}\) For example, some signed up in taverns after being plied with alcohol; others were dazzled by unfulfilled promises or high, one-off payments for enlistment; while yet others accepted gifts only to be told subsequently that these represented a signing-on fee and that they were now enlisted. Moreover, even when there was no trickery involved, we should recognize that many men probably went into the army because of poverty or to escape some acute economic crisis.\(^{26}\) Although volunteers in a formal sense, they did not join the military with real enthusiasm. Therefore, even considering that forcible impressment probably did not represent the norm, non-violent enlistments should not automatically be regarded as being wholly unforced. In any event, the great efforts made by governments to recruit soldiers and the undeniable abuses that this involved underline the fact that the growth of military organizations strained the reservoir of potential recruits and pushed the traditional methods of recruitment to their limits.

In response, rulers tried to expand or to develop alternative ways of recruiting. The options, however, were rather limited, too. Leading powers with large resources at their disposal could participate in what was later

\(^{24}\) See Kroll, *Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung*, pp. 95-98; Burschel, *Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts*, pp. 94f. Sikora, *Disziplin und Desertion*, pp. 229-232, also refers to some critics of the time, who were worried about the bad influence of such recruits on discipline and the reputation of the military. For some reflections on the juridical debate, see Fichte, *Die Begründung des Militärdienstverhältnisses*, pp. 129-135. In a literal sense, defectors from the opposing army were considered offenders, too, but their incorporation into one’s own army was quite a common practice.


called the soldier-trade. Britain was the most important client, but France and others also took part in this practice. In short, minor princes, mostly from the Holy Roman Empire, provided troops in exchange for money or so-called subsidies. This practice gained a bad reputation in the late eighteenth century when German princes abandoned their subjects to an uncertain fate by sending them overseas, seemingly motivated by financial interests alone. It attracted even more criticism as such soldiers, perceived as victims of tyrannical arbitrariness, were engaged to fight in the American Revolution.

In fact, this way of increasing military power was already widespread in the seventeenth century. From a more formal view, such treaties can be considered a sort of alliance between rather unequal partners. While from the perspective of the major power, the business of recruitment could in a way be farmed out, the minor partner could hope to defend its own interests by gaining the support of a major player. In the late seventeenth century even Prussia, not yet a major player, transferred its own troops to foreign command in exchange for subsidies. The impressive enlargement of the Prussian army under Frederick William I was mostly motivated by experiences of dependency and unfulfilled promises.

In the context of the subject to be discussed here, the so-called soldier-trade further developed pre-existing mechanisms for foreign recruitment, but exacerbated the need for recruits on the part of the contractor. Even for the client it did not offer a principal solution since this option could only be used for a certain time, usually in case of crisis or war. Typically it was more attractive for Britain than for the continental states because these troops could not contribute to the permanent strength of a standing army. Thus, the soldier-trade did not constitute a new principle of recruitment: it merely exported the problems inherent within the existing system by outsourcing them to others.

The only human resource rulers could unquestionably mobilize came from the population of their own territories. Intensifying recruitment therefore inevitably focused on the domestic population and accordingly contributed to the increasingly homogeneous composition of armies. In general, mobilization of the domestic population was undertaken in two ways. One approach

27 See, for this and the following paragraph, a recent summary and discussion of a long debate, with much further reading, Wilson, “The German ‘Soldier Trade’ of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”; the most recent contribution, focusing on the everyday life of hired soldiers, is Huck, Soldaten gegen Nordamerika.
was to involve local authorities in the struggle for voluntary enlistments, either by supporting the recruiting officers or by obliging the authorities to deliver recruits themselves. Experiences with this option seem to have been variable. When required to meet target numbers of recruits, civil officials tended to avoid confrontations with the local elites by focusing on vagrants, delinquents, or any outsiders regardless of their physical condition. However, it did not necessarily provide the military with capable soldiers; this could generally be better achieved by leaving recruitment in the hands of those officers who would have to deal with the recruits afterwards.

In addition to these alterations to the established recruiting system, several rulers tried to make use of the personal obligation of their subjects to perform military service. From a typological point of view this policy must be understood as being completely different from voluntary enlistment. From a historical point of view this policy could connect with old but rather vague traditions. The duty of collective resistance against aggressors was deeply rooted in European societies, but it had not only been whittled down to times of emergency, but was also based on a much smaller geographical unit than the whole territory, linked as it was to local feudal structures and to urban or rural municipalities. In the case of a general levy decreed by the ruler to defend the whole territory, a rather mixed type of military force could emerge from these structures. In addition to the noblemen following their feudal obligations, there were rural levies from the noble lands as well as from the ruler's personal estates, organized by the villages and court districts, together with contingents from the fortified towns, based on their own local defence systems. These towns gained a special strategic importance due to their walls, often connected with a certain degree of political and military autonomy. The participation of townsmen in defence of their municipalities, though not generally of much military significance, can be traced into the seventeenth and even eighteenth centuries.

29 For Austria, see Hochedlinger, "Rekrutierung - Militarisierung - Modernisierung", pp. 342-345.
30 The importance of the armed services in German cities has recently been stressed, though focusing more on public order and civic mentalities than on military functions, by Tlusty, The Martial Ethic in Early Modern Germany.
31 Since local military customs in the countryside are widely unexplored, the edition of a late-medieval finding of law might be worth taking a look at; see Franz, Quellen zur Geschichte des deutschen Bauernstandes im Mittelalter, pp. 592-596.
32 A very good example of such complexity of military structures, combined with an edition of many archival sources, is offered by Schennach, Ritter, Landsknecht, Aufgebot.
33 Of course, sieges as a crucial part of early modern warfare were mostly carried out by permanent or occasional garrison troops as part of the territorial army. On the role of the inhabitants of a fortified city and their relationship to the garrison troops, see Hohrath, "Der Bürger im Krieg
Such local military organizations are usually called militias. We lack the
detailed studies that would allow us to construct a comprehensive overview
of the role of militias, although enough is known to establish that they were
of varying military value. Nevertheless, for many early modern contempo-
raries the idea of militia service gained a special importance, with military
philosophers such as Machiavelli associating it with the much-acclaimed
ideal of a republican military force, based on the duty performed by free
citizens and seemingly prefigured in the ancient Roman Republic.34 In the
English debates of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the concept
of militia was counterposed to the much criticized standing armies.35 In
Germany during the same period, the term “militia” was frequently ill
defined, and could even designate the military as a whole. In the light
of such divergent terminological usage, I should emphasize that in this
chapter “militia” will be used as an analytical category, denoting a kind of
non-professional military service, based on common duties, performed only
on demand, and therefore, in an analytical sense, opposed in principle to
the characteristics of standing professional armies.

It is important to note, however, that in certain regions a new type of
permanent, though non-professional military service emerged several
decades before the establishment of standing armies. Around 1600, threat-
ened by the Eighty Years’ War and the increasing tensions within the Holy
Roman Empire, some minor princes and counts of the empire started taking
precautionary measures to prepare their territories for military defence.
And while they lacked the necessary resources to hire significant numbers
of mercenaries, they tried to organize regular military training for a large
number of their subjects who were selected in their communities according
to prescribed ratios. Although the participants retained their civil status
and remained within their localities, they were integrated into a loose
organization, e.g., by dividing them into several companies, which were
assigned to certain captains. From time to time, generally on Sundays,
they were convoked for some basic military training, especially in the use
of guns.

34 See Metzger, Die Milizarmee im klassischen Republikanismus.
35 See Schwoerer, No Standing Armies.
Obviously, these formations still met some crucial criteria for militias, according to the definition given above. The participants served as non-professionals, performed common duties, and, in a certain sense, still served only occasionally. However, at least two basic changes are no less obvious. Military service within these structures was no longer limited to times of emergency. In fact, such militias established a kind of periodic military service in peacetime even several decades before standing armies emerged. Secondly, the legal framework was renewed. In contrast to earlier levies the new militias, most often called *Landesdefensionen* (territorial defence forces), were not composed of different contingents but formed – at least in principle and ignoring the practice of privileges and exemptions – a homogeneous organization which did not systematically differentiate between subjects of the ruler, subjects of the noble landlords, and urban inhabitants. Unlike earlier municipal militias, which more or less kept the idea of municipal autonomy and military self-defence, based – at least theoretically – on a reciprocal military obligation of the citizens, the *Landesdefensionen* were exclusively bound to serve the rulers’ policies. Their emergence can therefore be interpreted as enforcing the state-building process, because they helped to establish a monopoly of violence and reinforced a trend towards the equalization of the status of the ruler’s subjects at the cost of former noble and municipal privileges. Of course, one has to be aware of the diffuse realities that lay behind such theoretical abstractions, but the further changes to be discussed below will confirm the general thrust of developments.

Some of these organizations, e.g. in Saxony or in the Electoral Palatinate, in Bavaria, or even in Brandenburg-Prussia, were maintained or resurrected even after the end of the Thirty Years War, though these minor territories started to build up permanent forces too. An even more striking

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36 For an overview, see Schnitter, *Volk und Landesdefension*.
39 Bezzel, *Geschichte des kurpfälzischen Heeres*.
41 Lampe, “Der Milizgedanke und seine Durchführung in Brandenburg-Preußen”, pp. 105-132 (only available as a carbon copy); Göse, “Die brandenburgisch-preußische Landmiliz”. See also, in regard to the duchy of Prussia, later East Prussia, Marwitz, *Staatsräson und Landesdefension*.
example for the relevance of militia forces within the framework of standing armies emerged in France. Here, local militias endured into the eighteenth century, providing, for example, soldiers to guard the coasts and borders. However, in 1688 the establishment of a Royal Militia was decreed. This step in fact created a new type of militia by transforming the principle of local military service into a countrywide organization at the disposal of the king.42 Varying numbers of militiamen could be called up by changing the quotas that each village had to supply; men from adjacent villages were put together in companies; officers were assigned to oversee regular training on Sundays and holidays. In case of war, they formed provincial regiments which were put under the command of the army. These units were expected to support the army in different ways with up to tens of thousands of men, a small but not insignificant number. The involuntary involvement of the population during the bellicose reign of Louis XIV, however, also provoked resistance; service with the militia was perceived as a “blood tax” on poor people. During the eighteenth century the militia underwent a change of fortune and was dissolved for many years, but never lost its bad reputation. From a more general perspective it nevertheless lent the French military system a kind of hybrid character (Lynn) by founding its recruitment on two very distinct principles.

Certainly the military value of militia units was limited, and it in fact diminished in comparison to the increasing efficiency of permanently maintained troops. Nevertheless, militias or levies were still employed, even during the heyday of linear warfare in the middle of the eighteenth century.43 At the very least they seem to have been reasonably effective as defence forces for fortified places or against marauders. Thus, in comparison

42 See, for example, Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, pp. 371-393; Corvisier, L’armée française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul, I, pp. 111-119, 197-231; Girard, Racolage et milice (1701-1715); Hennet, Les milices et les troupes provinciales.

43 Many militia activities are reported, though not yet systematically explored, from Moravia and Silesia, the main theatres of the Silesian Wars; they are mentioned in the multi-volume works of the official historiography, published by the Prussian General Staff, as well as the Austrian. See Großer Generalstab, Die Kriege Friedrichs des Großen, I, pp. 98f., 101, 108, 118, 140, 161, 178, 286f., 313, II, 177f., 101, 220f., 222f., II, 2, 90f., 139, II, 3, 136, 143, 179, (and on Saxon militias) 194, 202, 220, III, 8, 3, 34f., 52, 85, 212; corresponding information can be found in Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung des K. und k. Kriegs-Archivs, Kriege unter der Regierung der Kaiserin-Königin Maria Theresia. Of course, there are also many hints about the lack of efficiency of militias. Striking is the chaos caused by Hessian militiamen during the Battle of Sandershausen in 1758; they were positioned in the middle of the battle order, became disoriented, panicked, and fired on everyone, friend or foe. See Savory, His Britannic Majesty’s Army in Germany during the Seven Years War, pp. 96ff.
to the standing troops, the militias usually played only an auxiliary role. For example, they could serve as guards, thus relieving the army of some duties during wartime.

It seems that the most important auxiliary function was to provide reinforcements for the army, as a pool for voluntary engagement in one way or another. In practice, the distinctions between these two types of military organization could become blurred. Sometimes militia units were used directly to support the army in the field and were more or less integrated, and sometimes rulers called for direct levies to fill the ranks of the standing units. Their traditional duty, formerly restricted to cases of necessity, rooted in local contexts, therefore tended to be transformed, step by step, into a resource for permanent military efforts at the unrestricted disposal of the ruler. Of course, one should add the stories of resistance against such measures.

In the Holy Roman Empire these developments were also reflected in the discourse on public law in the eighteenth century. The crucial point was whether the subjects could be forced into military service beyond those instances of acute necessity, which was out of the question. From the cabinet’s point of view the differences between voluntary enlistment and impressment were less theoretical than practical. Obviously, standing units were preferred to militias because of their greater military effectiveness. Enforcing an obligation on subjects to serve in the militias, on the other hand, was not only an easy way of recruiting, but also a cheap one, and this was crucial. Militias did not generate as many costs as standing armies; even when subjects were forced to enter the permanent units and therefore came to be paid regularly, nevertheless the initial costs of recruitment and especially the premiums for engagement (which were considerable) had been saved.

Furthermore, it is worth discussing the way in which particular problems of recruitment were solved in Prussia mostly during the second decade of the eighteenth century, not least because some contemporaries considered this solution to offer an example to be followed. In comparison to the practices outlined above, it might be astonishing to see that the Prussian military build-up started with a seemingly contrary action. Although Prussia had

44 For an overview, see Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, pp. 238-243.
45 Fichte, Die Begründung des Militärdienstverhältnisses, pp. 136-182; Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, pp. 236-238; one of the most sophisticated contributions, though clearly situational, in opposition to recruitments in Württemberg, is [Moser], Abhandlung von Noethigung derer Unterthanen zu regulären Kriegs-Diensten.
a militia at its disposal at the beginning of the eighteenth century, it was dissolved by Frederick William I soon after he acceded to the throne. His action reflected a typical problem concerning recruitment: the existence of rivalry. The militia constrained recruitment to the standing army because the members of the militia enjoyed the privilege of being exempt from the reach of the recruiting officers. From this point of view, the abolition of the militia should have facilitated more or less voluntary enlistment because the king exclusively favoured the expansion of the standing army.

Yet frictions and rivalries continued, no longer between militia and army, but between the different regiments of the army, which competed to find recruits from within the ruler’s territories. What would come to constitute the distinguishing characteristics of the Prussian system of recruitment did not emerge as the result of an intentional plan, but were developed piecemeal as solutions for particular problems. They can be summarized under three headings. First, the regiments tried to lay claim to potential future recruits to prevent other regiments from taking them. Therefore, at an early stage they started to put the names of young boys in the area around their garrisons onto lists, which were intended to reserve the individuals for service with the local regiment. Secondly, to avoid further conflicts, the central government started to draw boundary lines between the regiments and ended up creating recruiting districts, or so-called Kantone, from which the name Kantonsystem was derived. Once the system was elaborated, these cantons comprised a certain number of households to assure that every regiment had similar opportunities for recruitment. Within these cantons, the future recruits were already systematically registered by the army during their childhood, a task which was subsequently carried out with the help of local civil officials.

Since the enlargement of the army absorbed many domestic recruits, the more so since they were picked out in such a systematic way, the economic advantages threatened to turn into disadvantages. The price was the loss of

46 In fact, he did so less than two weeks after the death of his father. In 1718, Frederick William even forbade the use of the word “militia”, insisting his troops be called “regiments” or “soldiers”. Obviously the king was very keen on marking the difference: Frauenholz, *Das Heerwesen in der Zeit des Absolutismus*, pp. 194, 231f. 47 As a useful outline of the Kantonsystem’s development, see Jany, “Die Kantonverfassung Friedrich Wilhelms I.”; the most recent contribution to its exploration is Winter, *Untertanengeist durch Militärpflicht?* (on its emergence see specifically pp. 39-97). For an overview of the influential debate on the social impact of the Kantonsystem and comparisons with other practices of domestic recruitment in German territories, see Wilson, “Social Militarization in Eighteenth-Century Germany”. Some documents can be found in Frauenholz, *Das Heerwesen in der Zeit des Absolutismus.*
civilian labour force and tax revenue. This could partly be compensated for by intensifying foreign recruitment, but this was rather costly. It could be mitigated in detail by excluding certain professions from being recruited, based on regional and economic factors.\textsuperscript{48} The most important way out of this dilemma, however, was to furlough the domestic soldiers, the Kantonisten, for most of the year. In fact, during peacetime, they were obliged to join the troops only for two months in spring for exercises and manoeuvres. This was the third main characteristic of the Kantonsystem.

If the parallel existence of standing units and militias may be perceived as a hybrid military organization, the Kantonsystem was an even more bastardized form of recruitment. In its final stage it looked, in regard to the Kantonisten, very similar to a militia. Unlike in the Landesdefensionen, however, regular training did not take place in the civilian environment in the form of afternoon exercises, but was concentrated into a few weeks on the garrisons’ drill grounds; therefore, for most of the year, the soldiers lived a real civilian life in peacetime (if we disregard some complications in the details). Nevertheless, they were not organized in a separate institution from the army, but were mixed in with the mercenaries and formed the fundamental basis of a standing army, in respect of its numbers as well as presumably with regard to its mentality, though the latter is rather difficult to discern.

It should also not be overlooked that the intention behind the Kantonsystem was not to enforce obligatory military service on all potential Kantonisten, but rather to serve as a tool for the regiments to simply refill their ranks according to their current needs. After all, it did not emerge as an improvement of former militias, but as an optimization of regimental recruitment, which originally was based on individual volunteering. The Kantonsystem was therefore most precisely characterized as “legalizing a system of forced domestic recruitment” (“rechtliche Fixierung der inländischen Zwangswerbung”),\textsuperscript{49} a definition that includes the assumption that genuine voluntary enlistment turned into a rather coercive practice as the Prussian army doubled in size under Frederick William I. As a result, however, the system turned violence into a predictable obligation – that is to say, physical force into legal force – and provided continuous reinforcements for the army. Therefore, it seemingly offered exemplary solutions for


\textsuperscript{49} Von Schmoller, Umriss und Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte besonders des Preußischen Staates, p. 278.
typical structural problems of the time and inspired similar efforts in other territories, such as Hesse-Cassel and Austria.50

One should add that the implementation of the Kantonsystem in particular as well as militias in general had to take account of the local distribution of power since feudal structures were still of great importance in parts of central Europe. This was especially true in regard to the so-called Gutsherrschaft in parts of Brandenburg, where peasants were subject to a rigorous form of serfdom. However, turning them into Kantonisten also implied that they had been (at least partially) transferred from the jurisdiction of their landlords to the jurisdiction of the military. Although they may be said to have been doubly unfree, there are also hints that the rivalry of two authorities could strengthen their position in conflicts with their landlords. Therefore, the consequences of compulsory service in pre-modern societies may possibly turn out to be rather complex, though this cannot be discussed in detail here.

Looking at the composition of armies during the course of these transformations, but also considering the early modern period as a whole, requires at least two additional points to be made. First, most observations, including those outlined above, deal with the bulk of the army, which was constituted by the infantry. However, the cavalry continued to play an important role on the battlefield as well forming a not insignificant element of the forces. Although this aspect is neglected by historical research, it nevertheless seems that the recruiting of cavalrymen could usually be maintained by way of voluntary enlistment, and the system did not face the problems encountered with the recruitment of infantrymen. This was probably linked to the cavalry’s higher reputation and possibly also with a less exhausting kind of service. Whatever the case, the cavalry did not necessitate the utilization of any new methods of recruitment.

This is also true, albeit for different reasons, with regard to specialist units with more technical functions, such as the artillery. Although their importance on the battlefield increased, they still formed only small units

with long-serving soldiers, so that the need for recruits was rather limited and had no relevant impact on the principles of military organization. 51

The same does not apply, however, to the role of the nobility. Military service was an essential part of the nobility’s collective identity and legitimacy. That did not mean that the glorified traditions of martial endeavour and chivalry aligned with military practice at the end of the seventeenth century. Nor did it mean that every nobleman actually joined the army. In fact, the Prussian king Frederick William I, once again, not only forced his subjects into military service, but also expected the noble houses of his territory to send at least one son into the army, an expectation that was occasionally enforced with all the means at his disposal. 52 The military service of the domestic nobility should have facilitated control either over the army or over the nobility itself. For many noblemen, in Prussia as elsewhere, a period of military service, even if only for a limited number of years, still constituted a meaningful and indisputable part of their biography and an honourable way to earn a living, at least in a symbolic sense, since the income of many officerships did not cover the costs of keeping up noble appearances, which therefore must have been paid for out of the family fortune.

In terms of the army’s composition, the military service of the nobility represented a third constituent of military service alongside voluntary enlistment and the obligation of the subjects. The service of the nobles was based on a framework of cultural values and traditions 53 from which ordinary soldiers were excluded and, although the noble members of the military comprised only a minority of the military personnel, their importance was enhanced by the fact that they almost exclusively occupied the officerships. This reflected their privileged position in the society of orders, and the transference of these principles into the military inevitably led to a fundamental separation between the officers and the ordinary men with regard to reputation, rank, and mentality. This, however, also corresponded to the latter’s everyday experience in civilian life.

Of course, it has to be admitted that not every officer was of noble origin. This was especially true for the technical branches of the army; first of all the artillery, where the need for specialist knowledge made the service less attractive for nobles. This notwithstanding, even in the infantry and

51 See, for example, Duffy, The Army of Maria Theresa, p. 108.
52 Büsch, Militärsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preußen, pp. 79-83; Göse, “Zwischen Garnison und Rittergut”.
53 Some general observations can be found in Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, pp. 343-350.
cavalry there was some opportunity for military careers to be pursued by non-noble soldiers who distinguished themselves. However, until the era of revolution and reform these cases continued to be individual exceptions, albeit with some fluctuations over time. Periods of extended warfare, above all the Thirty Years War, favoured such careers\textsuperscript{54} while the perpetuation of the military organization even tended to stabilize the connection between social and military hierarchy. Additionally it should be noted that climbers from the lower ranks were mostly ennobled as they rose up the military hierarchy. In a certain sense they adjusted to prevailing socio-cultural norms.

By contrast with the common soldiers, no structural changes have been detected with regard to noble entrants to the army as a result of the introduction of standing armies. The pressure exercised by the king of Prussia does not seem to be representative. The transformation of the military into a permanent organization, however, changed the framework for all levels of military service. To complete the outline of the whole process this dimension has to be added to the discussion around recruitment. It certainly also influenced the motivation of possible recruits.

Observations: conditions

First of all, the permanence of the military allowed for the period of military service to be significantly extended. Wholesale demobilizations at the end of a war were reduced step by step\textsuperscript{55}, although all states, even in the eighteenth century, still continued to make use of the short-term formation and disbandment of units\textsuperscript{56}. On the whole, however, armies started to offer options for lifelong careers, or at least a livelihood, though the changes should not be exaggerated. Long periods of armed conflict, especially the Thirty Years War, prolonged in France by the Franco-Spanish War, required long-term service which had not actually been desired for its own sake at this time. The introduction of standing armies, however, not only institutionalized long-term service, but also established peacetime military service as a common practice for many thousands of military employees\textsuperscript{57}.

\textsuperscript{54} See Kaiser, “Ist er vom Adel?”
\textsuperscript{55} The ongoing practice of army reductions even after 1648 has been emphasized by Kroener, “Der Krieg hat ein Loch ...”.
\textsuperscript{56} A recently presented example is Nowosadtko, Stehendes Heer im Ständestaat, pp. 159-178.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., pp. 180-185; Pröve, Stehendes Heer und städtische Gesellschaft im 18. Jahrhundert, pp. 88-94; Fann, “On the Infantryman’s Age in Eighteenth Century Prussia”.
It should be stressed, on the one hand, that this did not mean that a lifelong military occupation became the norm. Of course, the military authorities tried to keep their soldiers in service as long as possible. This was a traditional source of friction between military commanders and the soldiers because, during wartime, the authorities had always tried to compel the soldiers to serve until the end of the conflict. In peacetime standing armies, the circumstances were far less dramatic, but long-term service was still in the interests of the authorities because it kept military experience and skills in the army and saved the cost and effort of recruitment. They therefore tried to impose long-term service as the only option; for example, in Prussia and Bavaria voluntary enlistment was in principle unlimited. There is some evidence from the eighteenth century that in fact soldiers increasingly tended to spend their whole professional life serving in one army.

On the other hand, this situation was not in the interests of potential recruits. There is evidence that most soldiers preferred to serve for a limited time and that there was room for negotiation over the length of service in some circumstances. Whether recruitment was being carried out in peacetime or in wartime obviously made a difference. During the Silesian Wars and the Seven Years War, Bavaria quickly resorted to contracts limiting military service to no more than three years just to get soldiers to sign on at all. Subsequent disagreements over the contract and date of dismissal resulted in conflict and desertions.

Alongside the introduction of a standing army, payment and subsistence had to be permanently provided, which proved a major challenge for state bureaucracies and especially for their treasuries, as well as being a major factor in changing the character of soldiers’ working conditions. In fact, the authorities managed the challenge by pragmatically developing mixed systems, which varied from time to time and from territory to territory, but which typically comprised a number of components. Such expedients had to some extent been prefigured during the Thirty Years War when they had developed as a result of the circumstances which mostly did not allow regular payment.

59 Once again, see Nowosadtko, Stehendes Heer im Ständestaat, pp. 180-185; Pröve, Stehendes Heer und städtische Gesellschaft im 18. Jahrhundert, pp. 88-94.
Of course, a monthly payment continued to form the core of remuneration. While the pay of the mercenaries, at least its nominal level, had been relatively stable during the sixteenth century, some fluctuation can be observed during the second half of the seventeenth century, probably because of the conditions of the recruitment market. As a whole the nominal level of the monthly pay tended to decrease by up to 50 per cent, although precise comparisons are difficult to draw.61

One element in the soldier’s monetary compensation was the premium, or signing-on bounty, paid as a reward for voluntary enlistment, and this did increase in importance. Originally recruits had received a certain sum to cover the costs of travelling from the place of recruitment to the place where the recruits were mustered. Later on, this payment changed its function and became a very flexible device that recruiters used to compete with one another.62 Of course, the premium was designed to overcome a potential recruit’s immediate concerns and to obscure the conditions of long-term service, and certainly its value to the recruit was negligible in the context of an extended period of soldiering. Nevertheless, the premium might well have weighed heavily with some potential recruits as they sought to evaluate the benefits and risks of signing on. On the whole, it is clear that the military authorities focused their efforts on the act of enlistment. Once recruited, the men were subjected to the judicial consequences of their contract and oath63 and the constraints of the institution. In this sense, premiums, as well as forced recruitments, compensated for a lack of supply, which was partly caused by poor salaries, which, for their part, resulted from the costs of standing armies.

The monetary payment did not cover all the soldier’s needs. He required clothes and weapons, food, quarters, and some everyday commodities. In contrast to previous practice, clothes and weapons were usually delivered by the authorities. This was, incidentally, the reason why clothing became more and more "uniform", since it was ordered in large quantities and increasingly prescribed in detail.64 In some armies and in some periods, however, the

63 Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, p. 129; Fichte, Die Begründung des Militärdienstverhältnisses, pp. 88-118.
64 Hohrath, "Uniform"; deep insights into the material culture of an eighteenth-century army, with plenty of illustrations, are now provided by Hohrath, Friedrich der Große und die Uniformierung der preußischen Armee.
cost of the equipment was deducted from soldiers’ pay. There were similar options to ensure the nourishment of the soldiers. Sometimes the soldiers had to use their pay to buy food on the open market; at other times basic foodstuffs were delivered to the army. In this case, sometimes the food was free and at times it was deducted from the soldier’s pay. Finally, in many territories, lodging was still provided by the civilian population, since the construction of barracks, as in France, remained the exception rather than the rule, and the soldiers were allocated to private households. Commodities that the soldiers could demand in many cases included wood, wax, salt, pepper, and vinegar. It seems to have been a widespread practice to shift the delivery of these items to the hosts, which could be considered a kind of tax. In some regions the hosts even had to serve the food for the soldiers.

Thus, the income of the soldiers was a mix of money and non-cash benefits. It is difficult to evaluate the totals, but it seems reasonable to suggest that the level of the soldiers’ income was comparable with the earnings of day-labourers or clerks on the lowest level. This may have allowed at best a modest, but stable living, though some documents also reveal complaints of poor conditions. These were also reflected in the regulations restricting the soldier’s right to marry. Such restrictions were designed to limit the number of dependent women and children in armies, with their associated costs. For a minority of soldiers things could turn for the better since wages grew significantly as they climbed the hierarchy of ranks. Common soldiers could supplement their income by taking on additional overtime shifts within the military, and also by offering their labour on the civilian market or by selling simple products. Many of them, for example, were former journeymen. So even non-military components can be added to a diversified set of income sources and benefits, which on the whole ensured the livelihood of the soldiers.

The non-military aspect of the soldier’s occupation directs the focus to the form of military service itself. Customary peacetime functions consisted of guard duty and sometimes possibly small missions to maintain public order, since the authorities did not yet have the large numbers of personnel required

65 These paragraphs are a summary of the findings of Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 188-192; Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force, II, pp. 236-258.

66 Much deeper insight on this subject can be found in Engelen, Soldatenfrauen in Preußen; on the regulations, see pp. 41-68.

to enforce the civil law. However, these functions could be fulfilled by a small fraction of the soldiers recruited into the burgeoning standing armies. In fact soldiers of these armies enjoyed a lot of time unoccupied by military duties, as their additional earnings indicated. They fulfilled their military function, at least partly, by their simple presence and availability. Of course, the maintenance of their fighting abilities was part of their everyday life as well.

This military training corresponded to the principles of so-called linear warfare which took its more or less final shape towards the end of the seventeenth century. The collective formations of the soldiers had changed over decades from large squares to broad but thin lines only four or three men deep. Since trained infantrymen deployed in such a fashion presented a powerful defensive formation, the extra numbers recruited into armies could be used to broaden the formation, with the option of outflanking the adversary. For the majority of soldiers the objectives of military training derived from this formation although the enduring importance of the cavalry and the growing importance of the artillery should not be denied.

It is well known and obvious even from this very short description that this kind of warfare did not call for outstanding dexterity and flexibility on the part of the soldiers. The main issue was to ensure that they were obedient and acted in a co-ordinated way. The major skills required were the use of the musket and collective movements of the whole body of troops. The handling of the musket was broken down into a certain number of distinct movements which were linked to specific commands. Contemporary military authors loved to illustrate this technique by presenting image sequences which in a certain sense prefigured modern instruction manuals by representing standardized operations. This dissection of the required movements seemingly facilitated teaching the recruits the use of muskets, which in fact required a complex sequence of manoeuvres since they were still one-shot muzzle loaders. Additionally, the fragmentation allowed progress in co-ordinating the action of the troops. By dividing a single operation into a series of discrete movements, the operation could be reconstructed as a collective action. Even more delicate was the challenge of moving many thousands of men on the battlefield in the described way, when the front of an army could span several kilometres. This not

69 Lynn, Battle, pp. 111-125.
70 Sikora, “Die Mechanisierung des Kriegers”; see also Wellmann, “Hand und Leib, Arbeiten und Üben”.
only required strict discipline to keep the soldiers in line but, in advance of this, long columns of marching soldiers also had to be deployed and transformed into a line, ideally without considerable gaps opening up and sections overlapping, all the while taking account of the conditions on the battlefield and the actions of the adversaries.

To keep control over the troops according to these principles and under such circumstances, peacetime training seemingly was inevitable and must therefore be considered a crucial precondition for linear warfare. Of course, there were some differences between chronological periods and armies with regard to the intensity of the training, which ranged from one or two times a week up to daily exercises in the later Prussian army, albeit still limited to the morning. Training for collective movements was done in small units since the performance of large-scale manoeuvres required considerable effort and these were reduced to, at best, annual events, which may have become spectacular affairs attracting members of the court and foreign observers. Certainly it must be admitted that the theory in books and even the practice on the parade ground did not exactly represent the reality of the battlefield, something which will not be discussed at this juncture. On the other hand, however, regular training not only implied something like an employment scheme for the soldiers and an attempt to control future battles, but also a certain military mentality.

This elaborate method of military training, which became well known as drill, can be traced back to the end of the sixteenth century, when the military leaders of the Dutch revolt tried to increase the efficiency of their military forces in their struggle against the superior Spanish army. Their reforms were inspired not only by military experience, but also by contemporary philosophy and the ideas of military authors of late antiquity. Therefore, they propagated not only certain details of military tactics and training, but also the ethical ideals of the perfect soldier, which were integrated into a renewed concept of military discipline. While losing some of its sophistication, the idea of discipline remained a key concept in the debates of military authors. It was substantiated not only in the image sequences mentioned above, but also in

71 All details of Prussian military training, at least as they were intended to be fulfilled, can be derived from regulations which covered the entire spectrum of military duties and are mostly available as reprints; the most important are *Reglement vor die Königl. Preußische Infanterie* [... ] (Potsdam, 1726, repr. Osnabrück, 1968) and, *Reglement vor die Königl. Preußische Infanterie* [... ] (Berlin, 1943, repr. Osnabrück, 1976).
various ways in which weapon-handling was dealt with in the growing number of military manuals, which tended to increase the number of individual movements soldiers were expected to perform and commands they had to obey.\textsuperscript{74} They shaped an image of soldiers as subject to a rather mechanical ideal of training and fighting. Beyond the pure rationale of combat efficiency, the whole appearance of the soldiers was expected to reflect the qualities of discipline and obedience that imbued their whole being.

Once again it should be stressed that the reality of the parade ground probably looked much more prosaic than theories and manuals suggest, but without doubt the introduction of standing armies created the conditions for a significantly higher level of control over the soldiers. This control was expressed through more than just regular drills. It became manifest in a certain weakening of the soldiers’ rights as well. In contrast to the mercenary armies in the armies of the sixteenth century, who had cultivated some elements of corporate autonomy and representation based on their self-conception as contractual partners,\textsuperscript{75} members of the standing armies were increasingly subject to the one-sided duties confirmed by their oaths and subordinated to a military justice that was handled by academically trained jurists in the interests of and according to the guidelines of the rulers. As one example, it has been observed that, starting with the Dutch reformers, the soldiers were confronted with demands to carry out construction work on entrenchments and fortifications.\textsuperscript{76} Although the real extent of such work cannot be quantified, the claim marks a significant change, since such duties were strongly resisted during the heyday of mercenary business as incompatible with the honour of the warriors. The increase in control in the seventeenth century was also reflected in the intensified use of written means of registration and periodic inventory.\textsuperscript{77} Even the distribution of uniform clothing can be regarded as a symbolic expression of increasing control as it reduced the opportunity for individual expression and even eccentricity, which seems to have been quite typical of the older mercenary tradition.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{74} Kleinschmidt, \textit{Tyrocinium Militare}.

\textsuperscript{75} Baumann, \textit{Landsknechte}, pp. 92-130; Möller, \textit{Das Regiment der Landsknechte}, pp. 52-112.


\textsuperscript{77} See, for France, the insight in the vast possible quantity of data from the French records provided by Corvisier, \textit{Les contrôles des troupes de l’Ancien Régime}. Almost all Prussian lists were lost during the Second World War, but even a single example can give an impression of the intensity of documentation; see (with photographic reproductions of the lists) Hanne (introduction), \textit{Rangirrolle, Listen und Extracte ... von Saldern Infanterie Regiment Anno 1771}.

\textsuperscript{78} Rogg, “Zerhauen und zerschnitten, nachadelichen Sitten”, including reflections on the interdependence between military clothing, civilian clothing, and the progress of military discipline. For a number of visual examples, see Rogg, \textit{Landsknechte und Reisläufer}. 
Seemingly, the military turned out to be that element of the population that was best controlled and most disciplined by the authorities, with the exception of prisoners. However, a mere listing of those factors that drove the move towards the implementation of ever more restrictive discipline should not lead us to believe that the military was transformed into a frictionless machine (not an arbitrary metaphor, but one which became common at least during the eighteenth century).\textsuperscript{79} Although it is almost impossible to compare the level of insubordination and refusal, abuse, and disorder over time and changing conditions, at least the manifestations of refusal seem to have changed their profile. While mutinies apparently caught much attention and reflected the structures typical of the classic mercenary armies,\textsuperscript{80} they mostly disappeared from around the middle of the seventeenth century or were at least reduced to minor and exceptional incidents. This might have been the combined result of several factors: the increase in control and the decrease in collective advocacy of common interests, but also the stabilization of maintenance and payment which, though the sums were still rather poor, nevertheless probably prevented discontent and resistance.

On the other hand, desertion started to attract much more attention and effort.\textsuperscript{81} To be sure, soldiers had deserted in the preceding period, too, perhaps in significant numbers, but the phenomenon remained relatively invisible to historians, since even contemporary authorities did not or were not able to focus on this subject. From the second half of the seventeenth century, however, desertion was especially addressed in an increasing number of edicts and decrees. It became more precisely defined in these edicts and in the juridical debate, and in Germany even the word started to become established as a technical term.\textsuperscript{82} The growing tendency of authorities to categorize, list, and archive thus provides the historian with more abundant documentation of the phenomenon which, although often fragmentary, allows a more complete picture to be established than for earlier periods.

\textsuperscript{79} See Sikora, \textit{Disziplin und Desertion}, pp. 45f.; for the parallels between the military discourse and the discourse on state politics, see Stollberg-Rilinger, \textit{Der Staat als Maschine}.


\textsuperscript{81} See Sikora, \textit{Disziplin und Desertion}; on desertion before the era of standing armies, see the contributions from Reinhard Baumann, Michael Kaiser and Peter Burschel in Bröckling and Sikora, \textit{Armeen und ihre Deserteure}; for a different viewpoint, see Muth, \textit{Flucht aus dem militärischen Alltag}.

\textsuperscript{82} Sikora, \textit{Disziplin und Desertion}, pp. 54f.
The motives for desertion must be regarded as diverse, but certainly enforced enlistment, violent modes of training and disciplining, and controversies over the conditions of service played a major role during peacetime. Of course, the reasons and motives for desertion took a much more existential shape during wartime, due to considerable physical exertion, poor weather conditions, the lack of maintenance, and disintegration caused by military defeats. But even then, at least, mutinies remained an exception.

Therefore, on the whole, the intensified focus on desertion does not just indicate friction and considerable differences between the ideal of discipline and control and the realities of garrison life and campaigns. Alongside this, desertion must partly be interpreted as a reaction to, and an unintended result of, an increasing level of control and coercion. Thirdly, however, the efforts to record and to prevent desertion themselves reflect the increasing efficiency of control. In this sense the shift from mutinies to desertions can also be labelled as the individualization, isolation, and marginalization of refusal.

In summary, the introduction of standing armies significantly changed the conditions of military service and the appearance of the soldiers. The permanence of the organization even during peacetime transformed military service into a reliable long-term, if not lifelong, occupation which, paradoxically, meant that fighting was not the only job undertaken by soldiers. Continuous training ensured a higher level of fighting skills, although these skills consisted of rather simple, mechanical manual operations. One should also note the significantly higher level of regulation, control, and discipline, which were accompanied by a greater use of coercion and internal violence. To situate the period 1650-1750 and the central European experience within the broader framework of military labour, however, requires some further discussion of basic issues, not least recruitment, for the method of recruitment profoundly influenced the basic constitution of the military.

**General discussion: structures of recruitment**

As outlined above, recruitment changed its shape, too. Since the concept of mercenary service seems to be inevitably connected with the principle of free contracting, the growing importance both of forced enlistment and of part-time soldiers such as militiamen or Kantonisten may indicate a possible discrepancy and the need for a reassessment of our typological categorization. On the one hand, one must stress the increasingly hybrid character of the processes of recruitment as a pronounced feature of this
stage of the development. It is characteristic mainly because it indicates a crisis in the customary modes of recruitment, as described above.

On the other hand, soldiers serving on the basis of a contract still formed the backbone of the armies. Of course, the increasing number of soldiers who were forced into a contract partly changed the face of military service and violated the principles of voluntary enlistment. However, it is hardly possible to define the forced soldiers as a new and distinctive type of military service. First of all, it is impossible to quantify precisely that proportion of the soldiers who really had volunteered, for whatever reason, how many of them had been duped, and how many had been forced into the army by other means. The number of involuntary soldiers, however defined, was probably significant, but there is no basis for the assumption that they were dominant. Rather, and more importantly, one has to assume that, beyond the ideal types of voluntary enlistments and enlistments forced by physical violence, the distinctions between voluntary and involuntary were quite fluid.

At least, the military authorities did not draw any distinction and dealt with all the contracted soldiers according to the terms of contract or, in practice, according to their own view of those terms. The one-sided interpretation of military duties imposed by the authorities could add yet another aspect of force to the conditions of service from which all soldiers suffered in the same way. On the other hand, the authorities did not order or even legalize forced recruitments. However, they were widely tolerated. At most, authorities exceptionally intervened when forced recruitments caused too much dissent. Jurists who considered the issue dealt very cautiously with it. At least, the number of scholars who critically discussed the validity of a contract concluded by force gradually grew. The crucial point was that the authorities insisted on high numbers of recruits with no respect to the actual supply on the labour market.

Therefore, more or less inevitably, force and violence were adopted by the recruiting officers in times of exceptional demand. It was a means for them to deal with low supply, to compete with other recruiters, and to fulfil the demands of their superiors. This might have happened within or beyond the borders of the territory and therefore still resulted in individual contracts without systematic recourse to any general obligations of the subjects. Obviously, these practices introduced more force into the military organizations and, in this sense, might be seen in parallel to the increasing importance

of military drill. They emerged gradually as an unpremeditated corollary of armies’ growth and, in a formal sense, still harked back to the character of voluntary enlistment, ending up in an individual contract. Therefore it seems reasonable to address these practices as an extreme or maybe even corrupted variety within the framework of individual engagement, at least intended to be voluntary. Since they were not systematically introduced, were without legal basis, and had no definite characteristics, they can hardly be analysed as a distinctive and discrete alternative principle.

In contrast, this was definitely the case with regard to the militias. Their importance may be discussed in an even broader context, as possible forerunners of the military draft. For example, André Corvisier unhesitatingly considered the establishment of the Royal Militia in 1688 as the start of the draft in France. Of course, the Prussian Kantonsystem has also been discussed in regard to the emergence of the draft. Though a certain continuity cannot be denied – and was even emphasized by Prussian reformers at the beginning of the nineteenth century – one should be aware that the system was not intended to impose military service generally across the board but to serve as a tool for a selective supplementation of the regiments. Moreover, like other militia organizations, it was embedded in a pre-modern society, and accordingly included a long list of exemptions from service as a Kantonist due to collective privileges or for economic reasons. Thus, these organizations were far from implementing a general and equal duty with all its socio-political implications.

Even from a more pragmatic perspective one has to keep in mind that, in the framework of the standing armies, the militias’ functions remained mostly subsidiary to those of the units of long-term professional soldiers. In most territories, militiamen, numerically, formed only a small or at least the smaller proportion of the military. Although militia units were used on the battlefield, alongside the line regiments, large-scale warfare was based on the standing professional army. When militias were used as pools for recruitment, they simply turned into a more refined option for the reinforcement of the standing armies.

The example of the Prussian Kantonsystem stands out as an exception since the call-up of peasants established a semi-professional – or, in regard

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84 Corvisier, “Les transformations de l’armée au XVIIe siècle”, p. 90. For a recent contribution to this debate, see Hippler, Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies, which includes considerations on the Royal Militia, pp. 18-23.
85 For a discussion on tradition and innovation in regard to the Prussian military reforms, see Sikora, “Militarisierung und Zivilisierung”, pp. 172-178; Winter, “Kontinuität oder Neuanfang?”
to their absence for the most part of the year, somewhat like a “quarter”-professional – structure as a pillar of the state’s military strength. From its emergence, however, this system can be traced back to pragmatic solutions avoiding the abuses of voluntary enlistment and did not emerge from the militias. As mentioned above, the Prussian militias were dissolved even before the establishment of the Kantonsystem, since they weakened the number of potential recruits for the recruiters. It is also remarkable that, later on, the Prussian officials still fell back on the militias in times of urgent necessity. During the Seven Years War in particular, regional militias were raised. As local and regional defence forces they simply performed the traditional function of militias. In relation to the standing armies they served as an emergency stopgap if troops were absent and provided, in practice, hardly any real support for the army. The burden of strategic warfare was exclusively shouldered by the permanent units including the Kantonisten.

To sum up, standing armies of this period should still be considered as being dominated by the principle of individual enlistment, intended to be voluntary. If this argument is accepted, one can describe military service in this period as mostly characterized by free and commodified forms of labour. In fact, this points to a basic similarity with the preceding forms of mercenary service since this may be considered as the major manifestation of commodified military labour. As has been pointed out, not all military service was of this kind, and the principle of free and commodified labour was to some degree adulterated by the growing use of impressment, the incorporation of militiamen into the professional forces, and the hybrid type of Kantonisten.

Nevertheless, the essence of mercenary service still was far from eroded altogether. Whether to still call these organizations mercenary armies or not depends upon one’s point of view: whether one wants to stress that the changes around 1500 and around 1800 were much more deeply rooted and categorical than the changes around 1700, or whether one wants to privilege the differences that have been outlined on the preceding pages. The author would tend to stress the continuity of mercenary service; although obviously significant and profound changes of military organizations took place during the period under discussion, they cannot be simply described as a disappearance of mercenary structures. The change emerged and proceeded within a framework dominated by paid military service.

87 For broader argumentation on the characteristics of mercenary service and its significance in regard to early modern military structures, see Sikora, “Söldner”.
It should be noted, however, that the concept of the mercenary, although the term is well established in common and scientific language, raises some problems. From the beginning of the early modern period, since the days of Machiavelli, mercenaries were the object not only of military discourse, but also of political and moral attributions. This was exacerbated from the perspective of observers looking back from the nineteenth century, who condemned mercenary service as a fundamental contradiction to the basic values of the nation-state. Even nowadays the debate on mercenaries depends not only on objective analysis, but also on political outlook. For example, modern juridical definitions of mercenaries in fact exclude such institutions as the French and Spanish Foreign Legions which, according to widespread understanding, are otherwise perceived as typical examples of mercenary units; the criteria of these definitions are also difficult to apply to an unequivocal classification of private military companies. Therefore, the term “mercenary service” must be used with caution and reflection.

Since the ideological components of mercenary definitions complicate the analytical use of the concept, the definition should be reduced to its crucial formal feature, which is the individual contract as the basis of a – at least intentional – free and commodified type of military labour. In this sense, the concept of mercenary service still seems the most adequate category for use in characterization and analysis of the dominating structure of military service in the eighteenth century. Thus, to discuss the transitions of mercenary armies, one has to revert to a lower level of structural characteristics, just to gain slightly more sophisticated arguments. Such arguments can be determined from the common characteristics that usually are associated with the concept of mercenary service.

General discussion: factors of cohesion

One such characteristic seems to be the general understanding that mercenaries are basically defined by the fact that they were foreigners in relation to their engagement. The category of foreigner raises problems when used
in the context of the early modern period. For example, the Spanish army fighting against the Dutch Revolt, several decades before the era discussed here, was composed of a significant portion of Dutch soldiers,89 who accordingly fought in their own homeland and for their legitimate ruling authority. On the other hand, they were in a rather ambiguous position since they could also be viewed as foreign members of a foreign army. Other examples from the Thirty Years’ War, chosen at random, reveal the predominantly regional character of voluntary enlistment, or mercenary engagement, depending on the place where the recruitment was undertaken.90 This could mean that large numbers of a ruler’s subjects joined up when the ruler or his army commander decided to initiate recruitment within or close to the ruler’s territory.

Although the composition of armies before 1650 obviously was not of purely foreign origin as most definitions of mercenary would imply, it seems that the percentage of homeland recruits increased as a consequence of the establishment of standing armies; above all, as a consequence of increased efforts to raise recruits from the ruler’s own territory. It is true that proportions varied, but nevertheless genuinely foreign recruits remained a significant element of armies. Change, in this respect, was more gradual than is suggested by those who pose a sharp dichotomy between mercenary and standing armies. Indeed, one may argue that although the percentage of domestic recruits grew significantly, this was not the defining characteristic of standing armies since the number of foreigners in their ranks remained relevant. To put it another way, this fact indicates that, in principle, the origin of the soldiers was still largely irrelevant. It would probably be helpful and adequate for analytical purposes to simply omit the criterion of origin for defining mercenary service, at least in regard to the early modern period, but this is not essential for the problems discussed here.

A more significant change may be detected regarding the framework of military labour. Some aspects of this have already been alluded to earlier, and these can be encapsulated in the notion of uniformity. This was literally true concerning military dress, and nearly so for the modes of fighting and the body movements of the soldiers, which were intended to become programmed. Of course, regulations should not be mixed up with the reality on the battlefield, but the impact of military drill should not be underestimated either. Although the mercenaries of previous decades were

89 Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, pp. 27ff., 271f.
supposed to fight as a part of a homogeneous body of soldiers, the personal drill created a new level of control and discipline.

In a broader sense, a similar argument can be advanced concerning the relationship between soldiers and military commanders since the soldiers’ earlier options of self-determination and protest, though they should not be overestimated, were weakened in favour of the total submission of the soldiers to the disciplinary power of their drill masters, and to a military justice run in the interests of the military commander. Even the fact of peacetime service can be interpreted as a factor leading to greater uniformity. Since the actions of mercenaries in the past had been exclusively linked with the conduct of war, their image, for better or worse, was dominated by the connotations of fighting and bravery, violence and cruelty, adventure and misery. The peacetime members of a standing army were much more on show and to a larger audience than before, but the public perceived them as guardsmen, as puppets on the strings of commanders, and even as earning money, employed not only as soldiers, but working with their own hands in just the same way as many others in town worked. Having a night out on the town with comrades and enjoying the ensuing debauchery seemed to be the most singular aspects of a soldier’s life, but social acceptance of these activities depended largely on one’s point of view.

This certainly must have had consequences for the conception of the role of the soldiers. Recent research has done much to add to our understanding of the public perception and self-perception of the mercenaries in their heyday in the sixteenth century, most prominently reflected and certainly idealized in many printed woodcuts, but also documented in clothes, songs, poems, plays, and (mostly very critical) treatises. Comments from non-soldiers mostly combined criticisms of their idleness, violence, and immorality with a certain fascination, which seemingly fed into the self-perception of mercenaries, thereby helping to enhance their status as an order of outsiders, based on claims of a distinctive honour, autonomy, and extravagance as well as on superiority and a disdain for civilian life. Though extremely ambiguous, being a mercenary attracted a lot of attention and promised, if not esteem, a kind of fearful respect.

No such claims can be asserted on behalf of the members of standing armies. Most obviously, these soldiers were far less attractive for artists, at least in the singular. The soldiers were mostly depicted as drilled puppets or as uniformed masses. Though they were still the object of much moral

criticism, the most prominent attitude beyond this seems to have been pity, due to the poor conditions of life and demeaning discipline. A few memoirs reflect at best a kind of picaresque way of life, but no evidence for keeping the former nimbus of extravagant, though intimidating adventures.92

From an analytical perspective, the changes can probably best be conceived as a quantum leap in professionalization. The possibility of lifelong service, or at least continuous service uninterrupted by peacetime lay-offs, as well as newly rigorous regulation, which should not only be interpreted in the framework of military discipline, but also as a job description, comprising both lists of duties and special skills, contributed to shaping a daily working routine. Thus, the decline of public attention and attraction can also be understood as an aspect of the soldiers’ normalization and integration into civilian society. As a result, the mercenaries of the standing armies achieved a much higher level of professional standards than former mercenaries, who were already commonly perceived as professionals. In partial contrast to this chapter’s emphasis on some crucial continuities, this reshaping of military service has also been taken as an argument to evaluate these changes as a categorical transformation from “mercenary” to “soldier”.93 In terms of soldiers’ self-conception, the new standards left space for adopting a kind of professional self-esteem; however, there is only a little evidence for its real relevance. Towards the end of the century, military authorities tried to encourage its emergence by praise and rewards.94

General discussion: making a living

As outlined above, soldiers’ incomes had lost much of their appeal. This is of particular importance since the desire for personal gain is commonly

92 Some of the most cited sources of this kind include Bräker, Lebensgeschichte und Natürliche Ebenthaler des Armmen Mannes im Tockenburg: Seume, Mein Leben; Kerler, Aus dem siebenjährigen Krieg; Friederich Laukhards, vorzeiten Magisters der Philosophie, und jetzt Musketiers.
94 A public celebration to acclaim a Saxon non-commissioned officer for fifty years of service is anonymously reported in “Schilderung einer Nationalscene”, Bellona (1781), pp. 89–96. Some memoirs can also be understood as an expression of a proud professional self-esteem, for example, those of a former Prussian non-commissioned officer, who had served for fifty-two years: see Leben und Thaten eines Preußischen Regiments-Tambours. Certainly an extreme example, but nevertheless striking, is Müller, Der wohl exercirte Preußische Soldat, a treatise by a former Prussian musketeer who felt compelled to explain the principles of Prussian military training to the public.
considered the exclusive motivation for mercenary service. Obviously, service as a member of a standing army did not offer much prospect of enrichment. Of course, in former times, the mercenaries’ hope for wealth through booty had been mostly unrealized. As was pointed out above, with regard to material rewards, military service at least offered an alternative option among other occupations at the lower end of the social pyramid. In addition, when one considers the attractiveness of the signing-on bounty and the longer term prospects, there is no reason to deny that the expectation of a poor, but at least reliable livelihood may have swayed those contemplating service. Such considerations weighed all the more heavily when the soldier’s comparatively stable existence is compared to the poor conditions in rural villages, which were always threatened by the risks of fluctuating crop yields. The desire for private gain was, then, most likely a relevant factor in motivating soldiers.

Of course, it is impossible to gain a complete understanding of the soldiers’ motives; this is all the more true when dealing with less obvious assumptions and with the question of whether the introduction of standing armies offered new kinds of collective motivation. There are hints of the importance of a certain esprit de corps, which was usually related not to the army as a whole, but to the regiment.⁹⁵ Of course its effects could have an impact only after recruitment. Certainly, the permanent existence of the units strengthened these effects on a smaller scale by stabilizing peer group structures and, on a larger scale, by grouping together icons of glory and tradition and transforming them into a regimental memorial culture. In fact, this kind of collective identity seems to have been supported by the military authorities and, since it corresponded to the values of noble honour and to the social logic of rank and reputation, it might have been the most typical motivational factor. In a more general sense, it can be considered a special mode of professional self-confidence.

In the light of a growing percentage of native soldiers, it seems reasonable to assume that there was an increasing importance of some kind of patriotism or loyalty to the ruler or at least a certain sense of duty. Probably, the Prussian system favoured the transfer of some provincial or even local identity into the army by keeping Kantonisten from the same area.

together.\textsuperscript{96} However, since there is very little evidence on the thoughts of ordinary soldiers, generalized assumptions about the motivation of soldiers are rather speculative.\textsuperscript{97} At the very least, it can be stated that there is no evidence of widespread enthusiasm for military service or of systematic efforts to appeal to the common people in terms of patriotic loyalty. This became more prominent only in later eighteenth-century discourse, but mostly as a debate among the elites. In summary, although the changing framework of military service undoubtedly influenced soldiers’ motives, it is impossible to gain a reliable insight into these on a larger scale. Of course, one has to expect a certain mix of motives, and probably the changing composition of the armies caused an increasing variety thereof.

\textbf{General discussion: military labour and state-building}

Soldiers’ motives, however, may be discussed on a broader horizon since the establishment of standing armies formed one aspect of an even more important process. From the perspective of state-building, standing armies represented the crucial manifestation of state structures themselves. In contrast, these structures definitely lacked the fully developed character of state authority, as long as military power could be exercised by rather autonomous commanders as Wallenstein or Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, who, according to the work of Fritz Redlich, are usually designated as military enterprisers, or by high-ranking nobles in France, making use of their own kind of autonomy and independence.\textsuperscript{98} However, this is not the place to discuss similarities or differences between figures such as Wallenstein and Condé. Regarding the military, the major challenge of state-building was the integration of more or less autonomous military structures and the marginalization of any form of opposing military organization. In fact, the establishment of standing armies reflected the establishment of a monopoly of violence.

\textsuperscript{96} King Frederick II once wrote in his political testament from 1768 that the Kantonsystem would encourage rivalry between soldiers for a reputation for bravery and that friends and relatives, fighting together, would not leave each other: Dietrich, \textit{Die politischen Testament der Hohenzollern}, pp. 516f.

\textsuperscript{97} For some reflections on this subject, see Kroll, \textit{Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung}, pp. 133-179; Sikora, \textit{Disziplin und Desertion}, pp. 305-325.

\textsuperscript{98} Lynn, \textit{Giant of the Grand Siècle}, pp. 284-286; Parrott, \textit{Richelieu’s Army}, pp. 313-365, sees a strong contrast between military enterprisers and the French army, but also gives examples of the crucial role of the high nobility and their networks.
Regarding the military organization itself, the contrast should not be stressed too sharply. The military before 1650 was not a completely private business. Normally, troops were raised at the level of the regiment by licensed colonels, who had capital and networks at their disposal to fulfil organizational work which, at that stage, could not be performed by the ruler's administration. The licence, however, included, beyond basic regulations, a commitment to the ruler as the only source of legitimate power. Our concept of a military enterpriser would be misleading if military business were to be perceived as totally independent from the framework of legitimate power. The princes simply could not enforce total control. On the other hand, even the structures of the standing armies still provided a certain potential for independent economy, in German armies mostly shifting from the level of regiments to the level of companies, forming the so-called Kompaniewirtschaft. Certainly, colonels and captains could no longer act against the ruler, and most definitely had to act according to a more detailed set of regulations, but the regiments and companies still formed, if not autonomous, then self-contained units, combining training, economy, justice, and command, which were all in the hands of the commanding officers. The regiments and the companies remained a source of considerable income for them. Since all sums for paying, equipping, and maintaining the soldiers went through their hands, based on fixed rates paid by the government, the colonels and captains not only took their own salaries but also benefited from the profits to be made from managing their units, whether these were legal or illicit. For example, probably the most widely practised swindle was receiving money for soldiers who had never existed or who had left the unit as a result of desertion or death.

With regard to the common soldiers, they suffered much more from the intensified control, as a result of greater surveillance and military discipline, which was discussed above and which can also be interpreted as the outcome of state-building. Of course, as employees, the monopoly of violence

99 This has been recently stressed by Baumann, "Die deutschen Condottieri". In contrast to warlords such as Wallenstein or Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar during the Thirty Years War, one should also keep in mind the example of the very important Catholic general Johann Tserclaes Count of Tilly, who acted with extraordinary loyalty to and trust in his sovereign, Duke Maximilian of Bavaria: see Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung, specifically pp. 16–23.
101 John Lynn calls the structures of the French army in the eighteenth century still a "semi-entrepreneurial system"; see Lynn, Battle, pp. 137–139, 361. The term was originally coined by David Parrott, who avoided using it in his recent works in order to stress the differences between French practices and German military enterprisers.
was less relevant for them than the monopoly of employment. However, it is not certain whether they really profited from business competition in former decades and, as already mentioned, competition for recruits still took place in some regions and probably offered more opportunities for negotiation than before. This resulted from supply and demand, not from the fact that the recruiters were no longer enterprisers but government employees. On the other hand, the increased effectiveness of ruling elites and military organizations also resulted in a suspension of the market mechanisms through forced recruitment, as a result of which many impressed soldiers paid a very one-sided, existential price by suffering not only from coercion, but also from war injuries and death. Obviously, the high authorities were less engaged in disciplining such recruiting methods. Therefore, for the soldiers, the changes deriving from the increasing control over the military commanders seem to have been of less importance.

As a result, most observations suggest considering the changes as more gradual than categorical. Summed up, however, the gradual changes resulted in a framework of military service which was substantially different from the preceding period, though mostly based on the same principles. As a common denominator, inevitably rather general and superficial, the different levels of change might be conceptualized as aspects of an ongoing institutionalization and integration of the military as a whole within the framework of state-building. From this perspective, the reduced autonomy of the military commanders and their incorporation in the corps of public servants can be paralleled to the intensified disciplining and uniforming of the common soldiers and their location in the everyday life of the garrison cities.

Despite all the continuities, developments around the establishment of standing armies marked a crucial phase in European military history. Although drill practice had been invented several decades earlier, its implementation as a common European feature created an outstanding attribute of modern military organizations as a whole. Obviously, military obligations imposed on the subjects became increasingly significant, although they had not yet became dominant and still served only subsidiary purposes, mostly to avoid the costs of recruitment. Nonetheless, these practices prepared the way for the development of the draft and seem to characterize this period as a stage of transition in which different principles were combined. However, instead of reducing this era to a prelude not yet determined, it might be more adequate to perceive it as the unfolding of options in the course of emerging state power. Not surprisingly, the reasons and motives for this dynamic process have attracted much scholarly attention. The debate was
significantly shaped by Michael Roberts’s concept of a “military revolution”.

This is not the place to either sum up the whole controversial debate or to reinvent the answers. Some aspects of the debate, however, will help to put the changes in an evolutionary context.

According to the original concept, the military revolution was completed just before the spread of standing armies, but these were still perceived as an outcome of the revolution, flanked by the strengthening and centralization of political power to provide the required resources. The roots of this process were traced back to the tactical reforms at the end of the sixteenth century. The main thesis, therefore, was aimed at the assumption that not only military changes, but also major social and political developments, were initiated by genuine military innovations. These started with a new tactic and in addition were fuelled by the new scale of strategic warfare during the Thirty Years War, characterized by long-range campaigns and the need for numerous occupational forces. This should have resulted in the need for more soldiers.

One may object that the main example, the campaigns of Gustav Adolf, were noteworthy due to the constraints, from the Swedish perspective, of a quasi-overseas theatre of war, and that subsequent wars did not see comparable strategic efforts. On a more general level, it has to be considered that the appetite for a growing number of soldiers may have been motivated by even simpler arguments: since technological means were rather limited in their impact, military superiority normally was achieved by larger armies. From this point of view, the more crucial change must be considered the previous replacement of feudal armies by mercenary armies, the expansion of which was only limited by the need for money, while feudal structures had restricted at least the core of military power to the limited number of more or less obstinate nobles. The further development seems to have been mostly, although certainly not solely, dependent on the government’s increasing possibility to absorb resources.

Certainly, the Dutch reforms implemented an important additional aspect. Originally introduced to compensate for the numerical inferiority of the Dutch forces, the result of the reforms turned out to be a significant

102 Roberts, *The Military Revolution, 1560–1660*; since then, the concept of a “military revolution” has been firmly established in academic curricula, but has also been widely and critically discussed and, on the other hand, expanded to other periods and to other parts of the world, so that it has rather lost its significance. Classical critics include Parker, *The Military Revolution*, and Black, *A Military Revolution?* See now Black, *Beyond the Military Revolution*. Other recent publications referring to the catchword include Knox and Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050*, and Nimwegen, *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions 1588–1688*. 
increase in military effectiveness. After this time, the value of soldiers could be measured not only by their number, but also by the quality of their training. Therefore, preparing the military forces before the start of war became an inevitable prerequisite for military effectiveness and consequently resulted in standing armies. Even then, sheer superiority of numbers did not ensure success on the battlefield, as the remarkable victory of inferior forces, such as the Prussians’ at the battle of Leuthen in 1757, indicates. However, such instances did not encourage the king of Prussia or other rulers to reduce their forces by replacing quantity with quality.

A short remark must support the assertion that technological innovation was of less importance, since the seventeenth century saw two major changes. This was the replacement of matchlock guns with flintlock guns, which were easier to handle, and the total abandonment of pikes in favour of the exclusive use of guns, which could be adapted to hand-to-hand combat by the use of the newly invented bayonet. Certainly, the disappearance of the pike marked a watershed of great symbolic meaning since it represented the triumph of gunpowder weapons. This story, however, covers at least two centuries, step by step, and was not completed until the beginning of the eighteenth century. It is noteworthy that, during the eighteenth century bayonet attacks – thus the use of the reduced, but much more manageable version of pikes – in fact could become decisive on the battlefield. Though it was accompanied by tactical changes, the final abandonment of pikes did not indicate a technological revolution, nor does it offer explanations for the arms race at the end of the seventeenth century.

This seems also to be true in regard to the growing importance of the artillery in the eighteenth century. Due to technological changes, which made cannons more mobile on the battlefield, and the corresponding tactical changes, the artillery’s role was subsequently transformed from a merely subsidiary one to having a crucial, though not yet decisive, importance of its own. Although the intensified use of artillery caused considerable losses and suffering, it still did not modify the efforts to produce the highest possible number of soldiers nor did it affect the basic structural characteristics of military service.

103 As a sceptical approach to a rather mystifying event, see Kroener, “Die Geburt eines Mythos – die ‘schiefe Schlachtordnung’”.
104 See, among others, Black, European Warfare 1660-1815, p. 39; Luh, Ancien Régime Warfare and the Military Revolution, p. 139.
106 Ibid., pp. 167-178.
The essential precondition for the quantum leap in army strength was the strengthening of centralized political power and intensified accumulation of resources. The military development reflected, and was closely connected to, a restructuring of governance, pushed forward by the experiences and the results of the Thirty Years War, including a new framework for state rivalry. In different ways, at different moments, and with different degrees of success, but focused on a few decades, rulers profited from the defeat of their enemies, the breaking of opposition, the weakening of participatory elites, the establishment of consensual policies in favour of external competition, and, last but not least, the amelioration of confessional antagonisms. In this sense, it has been suggested that the Thirty Years War enjoys real significance as a state-building war. ¹⁰⁷

The stabilization of internal hierarchies and administrative structures enabled governments to draw conclusions from the rather improvised handling of warfare during the war, including military strength, tactical innovations, control and efficiency of the military, and discipline of the common soldier – all the aspects discussed above. The ongoing conflicts over hegemony on the continent, the Baltic, and the Balkans compelled all participants to reach comparable levels of operational readiness and accelerated the spread of standing armies. Therefore, they represented both the slowdown of internal rivalries and a certain acceleration of external rivalries. The spending of most resources on the needs of the military pushed the soldiers into the centre of this process. In fact, one may assert that they were the most intensively governed section of the population. It is no wonder that they also became a symbolic medium to express the ruler’s power and sovereignty (and in a certain sense, condensed in parades and guards of honour, they have kept this meaning until today). The quality of change in terms of the political framework can be paralleled, in some way, to the changes in military organization as an essential part of this framework.

However, although the institutionalization of governmental power reached new heights of efficiency and stability, some basic elements stayed the same. The revolution had not yet arrived. Most people were still governed

¹⁰⁷ This point mainly follows the arguments of Black, *A Military Revolution?*, pp. 67–77, including aspects of changes in the sphere of political constitution and the socio-political role of the elites. In this wide sense, the category of state-building wars was elaborated by Burkhardt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg, in nuce* on p. 27. This perspective also touches on the debate on the fiscal-military state, which was brought up by Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*. See also Storrs, *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth Century Europe*, and Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe*; however, the complexities of this approach cannot be discussed and included at this point.
by dynasties from the high nobility whose attitudes towards the military forces were not substantially different from those of former monarchs. The augmentation of army strength and the extension of compulsory service resulted from the intensified power of governments to intervene in their citizens’ lives and was not paralleled by a newly defined and founded relationship between subjects and state.

Therefore, it remained a maxim of ruling and of warfare that the soldier’s role was still a functional one based on payment and force. There was a closely connected political implication, namely that these armies were at the disposal of monarchs and ministers, instruments of their ambitions and interests, and deployed within the context of cabinet warfare. To continue the metaphorical framework, the soldiers served as hired or forced construction workers in the building of the state, at best being inhabitants without rights; they were in no way co-proprietors.
Peasants fighting for a living in early modern North India

Dirk H.A. Kolff

It is several years since historians have abandoned the idea of medieval and early modern India as a huge but static collection of economically self-sufficient and politically autonomous village units. With respect to large parts of India, another image has taken its place, that of a dual world, composed on the one hand of a sedentarized segment of settled, rain-fed agriculture and, on the other, one of mobile pastoralism in the arid half of the Indian subcontinent. The frontier between these worlds ran right across the subcontinent, though, rather than one frontier, the phenomenon consisted of a complex set of frontiers, frontier zones, and dynamic “inner frontiers” of exchange, intrusion, and negotiation linking and holding together vast regions bordering on them. In accepting this model, it should be noted that, on the one hand, cattle-based economies never existed independently from town and village markets, while, on the other hand, the political management of settled agriculture could not do without alliances with, or appeasement and employment of, pastoral warriors. On a more local level, village management often depended on either an annual exodus of seasonal labour and herders to grazing grounds during the post-harvest season or the engagement of mobile frontier manpower from outside during the busiest months of the year. Mobile labour, therefore, did not generally lack an agrarian base of some sort; neither were villagers unacquainted with faraway service, whether as weavers, herders, soldiers, or agricultural labourers. Also, a village’s temporary diaspora would, if it appeared attractive to do so, lead to entire families settling down permanently in regions near or far. Landed communities would welcome in their midst families of relative strangers with their ploughs (a term for a pair of bullocks) from either the pastoral or the sedentarized worlds and integrate them in their systems of exchange of produce and division of labour. Military entrepreneurship by warlords often led to agrarian management rights in a number of villages (watan), mostly in or near their home region, being granted to them and their fighting men. More often than not, in one
way or another, soldiering was an activity directly or indirectly supportive of agrarian pursuits.¹

This is especially the case in northern India, the part of the subcontinent to which my contribution restricts itself, just as the essay by Robert Johnson focuses on southern India. For North India, it makes sense to think in terms of a market for diasporic or mobile labour as an almost autonomous phenomenon kept in existence by the dynamics of the frontier that linked the worlds of extensive agriculture and pastoralism, and by the demographic cycles in non-capitalist village economies primarily focusing on production for home consumption.² That labour market, as well as the ecological exchanges of produce and animal husbandry, played a crucial role in the survival strategies of peasants and cattle farmers, always looking for secure labour conditions under circumstances of unpredictable harvests or supplies of food. It had a major impact on the formation of patronage networks and political entrepreneurship or “states” at the regional and local levels. The migratory and frontier cultures of India’s villages and regions constitute the great machine of much of the subcontinent’s social history. Neither can its political history be fully understood without taking account of its dynamics. Every year, people would look for new niches in the labour markets within their migratory reach on both sides of the divide between agriculture and cattle farming, thus causing the cog wheels of the great frontier machine to change gear according to seasonal patterns. The intensity of the process varied at different times and in different places. Its professional categories – agricultural, industrial, commercial, or military – were not closed compartments. Weavers could turn into peasants and vice versa; both professions required a degree of mobility and, therefore, training in the use of arms. Military labour could be seasonal and dependent on a surplus or deficiency of farm hands at home. Yet, many men spent decades as professional soldiers, most of them never giving up hope of one day returning home to their fields or acquiring an agrarian living. To keep such options open and thus to be able to continue contributing to the economy of one’s home villages or clan area formed an essential part of a migrant’s culture of survival.

When considering how, in pre-modern Indian history, states and regional identities were “forged”, the issue of the management of internal frontiers and labour markets, including the military labour market, will always be

¹ Gommans, Mughal Warfare; for a map of the major ecological frontiers see, p. 11. On the centrality of watan, see Gordon, “Symbolic and Structural Constraints”.
² See for such economies Thorner et al., A.V. Chayanov on the Theory of Peasant Economy.
at the centre of the analysis. Taking as his point of departure the agrarian/pastoralist order of India, Jos Gommans has turned on its head, as it were, our understanding of the geo-political, ecological, and human-resource basis of the Mogul empire. Similarly, in a brilliant recent book on medieval Gujarat, Samira Sheikh has shown the explanatory force of a focus on the “continually contested relationship” between the arid, largely pastoralist Saurashtra peninsula and the fertile agricultural and trading plains of the eastern mainland.3

So, regional and central state-formation in India was to a large extent (though perhaps less so e.g. in Bengal) an effort to establish control over the dynamics engendered by the subcontinent’s climatic and ecological frontiers. Yet, historical experience seems to prove that this regionally segmented military labour market could not in itself serve as a decisive base for the creation of a larger empire. In his contribution to our project, Kaushik Roy shows that, when such empires nonetheless came into being, the initial impulse often came from outside the world of peasant and regionally based soldiering. During the two periods of Indian empire-building that fall within our time scheme, i.e. those of the Moguls and the British, India’s pattern of peasant soldiering – i.e. its main market for military labour – though remaining intact, fulfilled very different functions. Under the Moguls, it was temporarily suppressed and lost its prominence to non-Indian, mostly tribal professionals. This explains why, for too long, as Stewart Gordon has argued, historians focused on the empire’s mansabdari (service nobility) system, thus neglecting “the ordinary, ongoing processes of military service in India”, which often were village-based or predicated on regionally rooted labour markets.4 The vitality of these processes was clear again, when, after a very gradual re-emergence during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the British, though thoroughly reorganizing it, embraced its tradition of professional service and built their Indian empire on it.

In the course of the sixteenth century, the military system of the imperial Moguls was, as it were, superimposed on this tradition by the Central Asian conqueror Babur (in Delhi 1526-1530) and his grandson Akbar (effectively 1568-1605). The core of this system consisted of the descendants of the old Turkic and Mongol nomadic warriors from the deep steppe who were born

3 Gommans, Mughal Warfare; Sheikh, Forging a Region, p. 19. An example of an even smaller-scale frontier is that between the khadar flood-prone lowlands and the bangar uplands of the Upper (Ganga-Yamuna) Doab, the management of which formed the basis of the eighteenth-century Gujar states in the area. See Kolff, Grass in Their Mouths, pp. 471-477.
and raised as horse-breeders, and trained from early childhood as mounted archers and raiders in Central Asia. Provided they were accompanied by cannon, musketry, and heavy cavalry, this arm of light cavalry with their composite bows fired from the saddle and their stunningly swift horsemanship was irresistible on the battlefields of North India and indispensable for those striving for empire at the time.

Demography, technology, and invasion, in short, were the main determinants of the role of military labour in post-1500 India. The vicissitudes of empire continued to have a bearing on the character and military impact of frontier-based peasant recruitment and service. During the sixteenth century, mounted archers still contributed in a decisive manner to the conquests of the Moguls in North India. With more success than some of his predecessors, Akbar overlaid this system on the tradition of peasant soldiering of Hindustan, the central part of the great alluvial plain of North India. My essay focuses on this tradition and I will try to show how, under different guises, it remained a constant force in medieval and early modern Indian history. Its dynamics continued to an important degree to be fed by the survival strategies of a peasantry that was compelled to contend with the exceptional vagaries of the monsoon as it manifests itself north of the Tropic of Cancer. As always, peasants responded to the insecurity of harvests by investing in non-agricultural pursuits such as soldiering. This kind of soldiering was, in other words, a voluntary one, energized in a bottom-up manner by a demand for a source of non-agrarian income that would spread one’s risks and underpin an economy based on inherently unstable family farms. In a characteristically Indian way, the entrepreneurship of brokers who were in a position to negotiate deals with distant warlords and thrones, whether they were clan leaders or independently operating jobber-commanders, so-called jamadars, was crucial in the process.

The Mogul system, therefore, was a complex one. It was, moreover, not an unchanging one, if only because the Indian enemies of the empire adopted some of its techniques, even mounted archery, though a less thoroughly trained version of it, and found answers to the challenges it posed. Meanwhile, the supply of accomplished archers from the Central Asian steppes came almost to a halt. Other weapons came to the fore. During the sixteenth

5 On the technique of horse and bow and their effect in battle, see Hildinger, *Warriors of the Steppe*, pp. 15-32; on the coherence of the Mongol system, see May, *The Mongol Art of War*.
6 For Mogul military superiority in India, see Streusand, *The Formation of the Mughal Empire*, pp. 51-69.
7 The jamadars can be seen as performing the characteristically India function of dalali, the Indian term for brokerage in its widest sense.
century, Mogul artillery arsenals developed and grew. The fighting reputation of musketeers improved as the accuracy of their fire increased; they became a valuable tool in the hands of the central state. Already under Akbar, attempts were made to keep expert units of foot-musketeers under strict central control and keep them away from the nobles. Then, gradually, the broad-based North Indian military labour market – its demographic resources so much richer than those of the steppes – reasserted itself and re-emerged as a vital resource of the state, even of the empire. During Jahangir's reign (1605-1627) Hindustani peasant infantry became strikingly visible again in the sources.

At that time, those available for longer or shorter periods for employment as foot-soldiers in the military labour markets of the subcontinent, whether all-India, regional or local, cannot have represented less than 10 per cent of the adult male population. It was clear that the empire would not have the means to employ a sufficient number of these units and to disarm the rest. Crucial in this respect was the increasing dissemination of the comparatively affordable matchlock among groups of professional foot-archers and many other communities of armed peasants. This phenomenon could not but weaken imperial control over North India, especially in the central part of it, Hindustan. Though men armed with swords and shields successfully continued to offer themselves for hire, many villagers equipped themselves with firearms, resulting in a newly vibrant labour market for peasantry-based infantry. The empire never found an answer to the challenges it posed. It has been suggested that the segmentary nature of Mogul military organization and its policy of delegating authority to employer-noblemen called mansabdars, hampered the “formation of a kind of army in which arms of musketeers and artillery were given their due”, and that a large-scale adoption of the flintlock – which could not, as the matchlock was, be manufactured by village blacksmiths – would have been possible only when the empire itself had taken up the production of superior firearms. Technology, however, stagnated, while attempts by the Mogul court to prevent local blacksmiths from making muskets were late and failed. The massive presence of firearms in the villages turned the

8 Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, p. 3.
9 M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb, rev. edn (Delhi, 1997), p. xx, cited by Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 155. On the importance of the “segmented structure of political control which favoured military units which, in terms of command and control, approximated to war bands rather than to a disciplined army” in India, see Wickremesekera, “Best Black Troops in the World”, p. 34.
agrarian crises of the second half of the seventeenth century into as many explosive challenges to the empire.

So, as after the reign of Akbar, matchlocks spread in the countryside, and the conditions for the development of an imperial army equipped with flintlocks and cast-iron cannon, which would have kept the Moguls in control, remained unfulfilled. It was only during the second half of the eighteenth century that several of the Indian regional rulers established foundries capable of producing cast-iron guns. Some also began using flintlocks and hired European officers to command battalions thus equipped and trained, a development that has been said to represent an “Indian military revolution”. But, as Iqtidar Alam Khan writes, it was not enough: “in the absence of a concerted drive to modernize the entire army organization”, it did not prevent the formation, by another outsider, the British East India Company, of another Indian empire. This new empire, however, unlike the Mogul one, was predominantly based on the indigenous agrarian labour market of North India and on the Company’s drive towards a degree of organization, technological advance, and discipline that the Moguls had not been able to achieve.

Long before the British conquests, therefore, military initiative had shifted from the Mogul mansabdar to patrons, political entrepreneurs, and jobber-commanders with close and efficient links to the supplies of peasant labour in the central provinces of the empire. In due course, the crucial brokerage and recruitment of peasant soldiers from the core region of Hindustan, which had, in a number of cases, been handled by clan leaders with both local roots and strong links with the emperor, came into the hands of numberless independently operating jobbers (jamadars) with strong local links and great freedom of negotiating their terms of service. The increasing monetization of the economy may have had a certain role in the process, though the circulation of silver was already significant in Akbar’s time.

Especially in Hindustan, the demographic factor of the dynamics and the almost limitless supply of armed peasants, as demonstrated in a frightening manner by the late sixteenth-century military census ordered by Akbar, had a decisive role in the slow loss of grip and initiative of the Moguls. But not only there. Further south, in Malwa and in Deccan, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as Gordon has shown, village and regionally based

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11 For the ideas set out in the preceding three paragraphs, see especially Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, pp. 143-199.
troops of cavalry in search of patronage, *watan*, and pay represented a fighting tradition that similarly continued as a high-prestige, high-pay branch of military service, entirely independent of the Mogul and Turkic cavalry tradition. The case proves abundantly that by no means all agrarian-based military service took the form of foot-soldiering.\textsuperscript{12} Even in North India, this was not the case. Yet, in this essay, partly because it will allow me to carry the story into the British period, I will stick to North India and, more specifically, to the example of Hindustani infantrymen.

Families rooted in (semi-)pastoral India, like nomads elsewhere, were, as noted, compelled to adopt flexible survival strategies. Baluchi cameleers, for instance, found employment as armed guards with caravan leaders on the main Gujarat-to-Hindustan routes. Many of them were archers, although some had swords and acquired firearms at an early stage. One seventeenth-century European observer found them an unruly lot and warned against engaging Baluchis and Jats simultaneously as one’s protectors, as they would tend to attack each other instead of working together. Another found that in the Gujarati diaspora and towards Agra there were many honest men among them. For travellers, they were essential. They cost 3.5 rupees a month; their leaders, styled *muqaddam* (a term also used for village leaders) or *mirdah*, received 4 rupees and travelled with their men. Not only did they conduct caravans: between Gujarat and Hindustan, almost any journey was inconceivable without them. Bands of them were easily hired in towns or *qasba* (market towns) along the road. There they had labour agents who answered for their honesty and received 1 rupee for each contracted man. As others with pastoralist origins did, many of them joined the regional military labour market of Gujarat under the denomination of *qasbatis* (townsmen) and, it appears, acquired some land. The *Mirāt-i Ahmadi* says about their activities in the service of the province of Gujarat in the eighteenth century:

They attacked villages, drove away cattle, escorted Mughal officials, took responsibility of collecting tribute from landholders on a small salary, they got enlisted as recruits in the army for a few days, served the chiefs and inspectors of the district police.

Generally reluctant to serve outside Gujarat, some of them nevertheless tried their luck in other provinces and “made bravery their profession”.\textsuperscript{13} Direct employment by the empire could lead to the grant of land, even

\textsuperscript{12} Gordon, “Symbolic and Structural Constraints”.

\textsuperscript{13} Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy*, pp. 4-6.
of entire villages. Aurangzeb, for instance, gave nine villages in the old Saharanpur district north of Delhi to a number of such Baluchis on the condition that they exterminate the numerous highway robbers in that part of the country. This made sense. Safety on the roads had all along been their speciality. Here, in Saharanpur, they remained powerful throughout the eighteenth century and, when the East India Company took over the Upper Doab from the Marathas, the land revenue of the villages concerned was settled with the Baluchi chiefs. The pattern was a common one. Clans must, writes Sheikh, often be seen “in terms of their changing occupations”. “Groups that entered Gujarat as pastoralists could settle down to become cultivators while small bands of forest-dwelling cultivators could achieve military successes and become chieftains.”

The above case of the Baluchis, who, apparently, offered their labour in a purely free and commodified form, may serve as an example of the social and spatial mobility that was typical of North India in the early modern period and in which the military labour market played such a dynamic role. The military entrepreneurship of the Baluchis – who turned into travel guards, then town-based fighters, regional and imperial professional soldiers, landowners-cum-policemen, and finally village managers in British-ruled India – is just an illustration of the kind of flexible occupational genealogy Sheikh draws attention to. It is important to note that, as the quote from the Mirāt-i Ahmādī showed, the military culture of these groups of men was always one of negotiation and of keeping several options for economic survival open. This attribute would, over the centuries, remain a distinguishing feature of the political culture of North India, where, more than in western Europe, the climate, i.e. the monsoon, was fickle and harvests unpredictable. One hesitates, however, to label these pastoralists looking for watan, on the basis of their continuous search for the best terms of service and employment, as “mercenaries”, which is a term that seems to have little meaning before the age of nationalist politics and the love of a “fatherland”.

There were, especially in the world of settled agriculture, many instances in which peasants, though as skilled in the use of arms as most life-long soldiers and, therefore, fit to move and enter the all-India labour market, were never under the necessity to leave home for long periods or fight over other than local issues. Local issues there were many. It was impossible

15 Sheikh, Forging a Region, p. 104.
to retain the respect of and to keep going the negotiations with armed travellers, hostile neighbours, or the representatives of government itself without a readiness to risk armed conflict. When, in 1717, a Dutch East India Company caravan was attacked in Malwa by 2,000 people armed with muskets and 3,000 others, the Dutch merchant in charge described these men as “peasants”. Soldiers employed by traders often plundered along the way. In this case, it seems, the suffering villagers responded to such acts of violence by staging a looting counter-offensive of their own. In 1632, men working the fields near Kanpur in Hindustan did so with their guns, swords, and shields lying nearby, because they were at variance with the people of a town half a mile away. And around 1650 in the nearby Agra area, where every village had a small fort, semi-rebellion was endemic. The ploughmen kept a musket slung on their back and a powder pouch at their waist. It was the heyday of empire. Yet, the landowners never paid revenue without a fight. Their strong negotiating position vis-à-vis the local governor enabled them to have the relief loans (taqavi) they received from him after a bad harvest converted into supplies of lead and gunpowder. But even without the threatening presence of hostile outsiders, carefully measured dosages of violence were a necessary part of agrarian management. Armed gangs of rural stakeholders were a phenomenon inseparable from the country scene.

The martial skills of these men were essential survival tools, however, in other than strictly local circumstances. In combination with forms of small-scale migration, the use of force was often an integral part of the annual agrarian cycle. Seasonal soldiering or looting enabled quite a number of people in town and countryside to survive the slack agricultural season. In August 1636, soon after the onset of the monsoon, partly because the rains made the roads impassable, plundering ceased on the roads of Gujarat; the peasants returned to their fields. Similarly, the weavers of the town of Baroda in the 1620s, who were generally at home during the rainy season, went to serve in the provincial army in the dry months of the year. In times of dearth or famine, this occupational and spatial mobility of labour was the rule rather than the exception and must have saved many lives. No doubt, most of these men were fit to enter the regional or all-India military labour markets. Yet only a limited number of them did so.16

More often than not, rather than offering their services to one of the states in their region, they confronted them. It is striking how frequently we hear of village soldiers attacking state soldiers. Whenever the risks

16 Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, pp. 4ff., 16. For some more examples, see Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, pp. 178-180.
seemed worth taking, peasants resisted and fell on intruders who, from their point of view, were mere mercenaries, though perhaps they had an agrarian base somewhere far away just as they themselves had one nearby. They attacked army units campaigning far from their barracks, and fugitive soldiers making their way from a battlefield. In the latter case, great loot often fell into the villagers' hands. Thus, in the early sixteenth century, the great Rana Sanga's camp was once plundered by villagers in the Agra area. And after Sultan Khusru, Akbar's son, had been defeated in the Punjab in 1606, peasants killed most of the leaderless soldiers they could lay their hands on and captured all the prince's horses, camels, and other animals. There are examples of villagers closing their market to units of the imperial army or defending local merchants badly treated by their governor. The sources mention dozens of such instances. On a battlefield, peasants could even be a significant factor without being recruited by either side. During his years in India early in the nineteenth century, Arthur Wellesley had learned that, if you moved after your enemy with “celerity” and sufficiently distressed him, armed peasants could help you a great deal. “Whenever the largest and most formidable bodies of [freebooters] are hard pressed by our troops, the village people attack them upon their rear and flanks, cut off stragglers, and will not allow a man to enter their villages.”

In principle, of course, these men were martial and mobile enough to make fighting their entire living. During Akbar's siege of Chittor in Rajasthan in 1568, the fort was defended, Abu'l Fazl says, by 8,000 Rajput warriors and some 40,000 peasants who showed "great zeal and activity". This widespread participation in the resistance against Akbar's aggression made him, according to the same source, decide to have nearly 30,000 of the defenders killed on the day the fortress fell, which he would not have done, one assumes, if he had thought them a negligible military presence. These people were fit for service almost everywhere. When the rains and harvests failed, in cases of flood or unbearable devastations of war, many would leave their homes and look for work, whether weaving, ploughing, or military, wherever there was food and a demand for their services. In more or less normal years, on the other hand, the range of mobility of the sedentarized part of the people remained limited in practice, even though some of the young men, hearing of great prizes being won by others in faraway lands, felt a pull to leave and try their luck. For most of them,

17 James, Wellington at War 1794-1815, p. 103.
18 See Kolff, "Chittor".
however, the issue of whether to serve any other leaders than their own local or regional clansmen did not arise. Why was this so?

The reason was that without intermediary agency most armed peasants had no access to military service at the level of the great regional states or at that of the empire. And successful agency was rare. The survival strategies of the state – whether that of the Moguls, their rivals, or their predecessors – and that of the peasantries seemed mutually antagonistic. Confrontation was the rule. There are instances where that confrontation induced a kind of migration or diaspora of its own. In Hindustan, the great fertile region between the Punjab and Bengal dominated by the rivers Ganga and Yamuna that constituted the core of the market for peasant military labour in India, the encounter of the peasantry and the state exacerbated during the 1620s and 1630s and led to regular enslavement, deportation, and extermination. It is reported that Abdullah Khan Firuz Jang, then in charge of the Kalpi-Kanauj region, defeated all the hitherto unsubdued Chauhan rajas and rebels there, had the leaders beheaded, and the peasants’ wives, daughters, and children, some 200,000 of them, transported to Iran and sold there. Abdullah Khan himself boasted he had sold half a million women and men. Large numbers of them, also from other areas, were deported across the Indus, while Afghans were forced, though not as slaves, to move in the other direction to the plains. Certainly, Abdullah Khan was more given to tyrannical methods of pacification than most of his contemporaries. But the spirit of resistance to taxation of many peasant communities in the strategic or core areas of state-building convinced not a few rulers that only desperately stern measures would work. Another aspect of this is the urgent demand for peasants and artisans in Iran and Central Asia, where many of those deported by the state must have been employed, as were the 120 slaves – tillers of grain, diggers of canals for irrigation, bronze and metal workers, a potter, a cook, a tinker, and a bowl maker, “fathers, sons and grandsons [...] all Hindustanis”, who were employed on an estate near Bukhara towards the end of the fifteenth century.19

Such attempts to smother the martial energies of semi-pastoral agrarian Hindustan could give only temporary relief to the imperial rulers of the alluvial plains. If the Mogul empire was aiming to transform itself according to “early modern” military-fiscalist principles, which it did to an extent, the systematic deportation of potential taxpayers would have been an irrational policy. But any other attempt at actually disarming the

countryside would, as we saw, be equally impractical. Only the British Company would, in the 1798 to 1818 period, achieve something approaching the demilitarization, though not the disarmament, of its Indian territories. The Mogul empire, in other words, never adequately overcame the problem of its being faced not with just recalcitrant individual landholders, but also with armed peasants that represented the backbone of society and could not be destroyed without dire consequences to the agrarian productivity on which the regime depended for its survival.

Another course open to state-builders was to selectively seek alliances in the evolving world of pastoralist warlords and to invite to military service some of the migrant bands of warriors in search of patronage and marriage such as were always active on the borders of settled agriculture. 20 In return for local revenues they could be entrusted with the pacification of turbulent territory, so that, if successful, they would have the choice of opting for a sedentary way of life. A provincial Mogul force, sent against uncooperative taxpayers in Gujarat in 1684, included “a numberless multitude of men of the country, consisting of Grasiyas and Kolis, who are tillers of the soil but follow the army by command in exchange for freedom of tribute; as they receive nothing for food, they keep themselves going mostly by theft”. To the state, the local knowledge of such men was valuable; they were also cheap. But their looting for a living could do more harm than good. They certainly partook of the quality that marginal people generally have from a military point of view: semi-pastoralist robbers and men from the hills and forests make excellent skirmishers against similar types of fighters. Though alliances with such groups were part of one of the central aspects of state formation, namely the effort to establish control over the dynamics of the major ecological frontiers, these men might not easily be turned into units sufficiently dependable for use on a major battlefield. Nonetheless, such men were often enlisted and proved useful.

As hinted at, there were yet other strategies open to men who aspired to build an early modern territorial polity. There was indeed no way the Mogul government could do without the help of Indian chiefs and patrons, especially those with access to units of peasant fighters. It was crucially important to find the right agency that enabled the recruitment as infantry from the peasantries of a significant and well-selected number of those one could not otherwise control. This policy was successful to an extent. Before and during the late seventeenth-century “agrarian crisis” of North India that would to a large extent be induced by increasing state oppression and

20 Ziegler, “Marvari Historical Chronicles”.
agrarian overtaxation and would, in Irfan Habib’s words, render the Mogul dynasty, at least partly, “its own grave-digger”, the empire co-opted some of the best managed resources of the armed peasantry. 21

From early on, an important role was played in Mogul armies by semi-migratory professional peasant soldiers, often under the command of their own zamindars (agrarian territorial managers). 22 Akbar’s famous military census of the realm dating from the 1590s resulted in the registration of a staggering 4 million armed zamindars’ foot-soldiers. This inventory of North India’s military labour market betrays the empire’s uneasy awareness of the impossibility of controlling its peasants or employing more than a fraction of them. 23 The phenomenon of a state aspiring to a monopoly over the instruments of coercion on its territory is foreign to Indian history. The negotiating position of some of the leaders of these village-based infantrymen was generally far stronger than that of their contemporaries in Europe. The imperial officers were not entirely free to recruit whom they wished. Many in the end were employed thanks to the crucial agency of lineage leaders and, later, a category of men called jamadars: men to whom the common soldier was far more loyal than to the states that had contracted him.

Let me elaborate on this theme with respect to the most striking example of it that can be found, the recruitment history of the Avadhi- and Bhojpuri- (Hindi dialects) speaking part of Hindustan (now eastern Uttar Pradesh and western Bihar), a little to the east of the part of North India where Abdullah Khan performed his police atrocities. The phenomenon of how for many centuries the peasants of this region maintained their hold on the military profession in North India and turned soldiering into a major tool of their survival represents a major, though not the only, chapter of the military history of India in the early modern period. Other features of that history, especially the apparatus set up by the Moguls to achieve a measure of control over North India’s military labour market, are discussed by Kaushik Roy in this volume.

The soldiering tradition of Hindustan was kept alive by its peasantries for almost four centuries, its village leaders tenaciously guarding their position as a recruitment area for the best-rewarded units of infantry in North India. As a tradition of peasant soldiering, it is traceable at least to the fifteenth-

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21 Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*, pp. 364-405. Habib here shows how, paradoxically, the agrarian collapse of the empire was to a significant extent caused by the extractive opportunities offered to its centrally managed official elite, the mansabdari “apparatus”, of the empire, the organization of which was, in itself, one of the great achievements of the Mogul leadership.

22 For a definition of the term zamindar, see Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*, pp. 384-389.

century Sharqi sultanate of Jaunpur. Many Rajput, i.e. warrior-clan, vassals of this realm served the Sharqi sultans with their peasant war bands. There is evidence of close alliances between the sultans of this period, Sharqis and others, and their Rajput warlords. Such alliances were not necessarily of an unequal nature. In terms of the taxonomy of our project, they partake of the quality of reciprocity. Just as Rajput women occupied an honourable place in the sultans’ seraglios, Rajput alliances with Muslim women and their presence in Rajput royal households were considered regular. Women acted as the seal on and as proof of the intimacy and sacredness of these Hindu-Muslim alliances. After the sultans lost control of Jaunpur to the Lodi Afghans of Delhi in the 1480s, a clan of local Rajputs spearheaded an insurrection in support of this “reciprocal” and “intercommunal” tradition of alliance-formation. In the rising, 200,000 or even 300,000 Hindustani footsoldiers are reported to have participated: inflated figures no doubt, but, compared to the 15,000 horsemen the source mentions, clearly conveying the impression of enormous manpower originating with the regional landholders and their peasants.24

Perhaps because the subsequent failure of the rising and the conquest of Hindustan by the Lodis reduced their chances of military employment in their own region, and possibly even before the Lodis put an end to the Jaunpur sultanate,25 many of these levies moved west and south in search of naukari, the term then and later used for the honourable service of roaming warriors. These migrating professionals proved to be in great demand. They facilitated the renewal of the splendour of the royal Tomar Rajput court at Gwaliyar, as well as of the Muslim courts in Malwa and elsewhere in Central India. The generic term used for these soldiers, “Purbiya”, not only indicates a non-ethnic, geographical origin from the eastward (Purab, i.e. Hindustan, the country east of Delhi); it also came to define a migratory soldiering identity of its own, an identity that implied the ability of those representing it to contract royal patronage in a labour market that extended far beyond their home region.

After the collapse of its fortunes under the Tomars, the Purbiya tradition of naukari marketed, so to say, its next incarnation or soldiers’ identity. It was introduced to the North Indian military labour market under a more distinct brand name than that of Purbiya, namely that of Ujjainiya. The leaders of the Ujjainiya clan were zamindars, or territorial lords, of Bhojpur in the southwest of Bihar. They now assumed the role of recruit-

25 See for this discussion Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, pp. 218-226.
ing captains in a grand way and with their war bands began to compete in the supra-local market for expert fighting units. By the Rajputs of the west of India, especially those in the region later called Rajputana, the Ujjainiyas would, along with most other clans in Hindustan, be considered genealogically “spurious”, that is, not of pure lineage and therefore unfit as marriage partners. And, it is true, their strength lay elsewhere. During the first decades of the sixteenth century, they made themselves indispensable as specialized recruiting agents and commanders of Purbiyas. The role of the clan in marketing the services not only of their own men, but also of all those associated with the old Purbiya recruitment tradition, in negotiating for them their conditions of employment and in leading them in the field was a cardinal one and explains how the name Ujjainiya became the trademark and identity of the men they led. The great reputation these units acquired with the pretenders, warlords, and rulers of North India was enhanced by the close association of Ujjainiya brokerage, first with the pilgrimage centre of Baksar near Bhojpur and, secondly, with the Sur Afghans, then at the start of their comet-like emergence as a North Indian dynasty in the 1530s.

A bath in a holy tank (the term here is used in the Indian sense of a water reservoir) of Baksar, known as Tiger Tank, ensured a young peasant of whatever caste both consecration as a fearless warrior – for that is what a tiger is – and, importantly, after a painless deconsecration during which one shed one’s tiger nature after long years of service (naukari), a chance to return to one’s village farm. The Afghan Farid Sur, the future Delhi sultan Sher Shah, depended a great deal on the Ujjainiya Rajputs’ ability to muster men by the thousands – by no means all from their own clan, but from the inexhaustible manpower of Hindustan – and on his personal relationship with their leaders. From the point of view of the Hindustani peasant fighter, the decision to serve an Ujjainiya lord could turn out to be a first step towards assuming the Ujjainiya Rajput identity oneself and to being adopted as a member of the clan. Military recruitment often was, as noted earlier, a great engine of identity change. But this was not necessarily always so. In the military labour market all identities remained open, multiple, flexible, and temporary for as long it was in the interest of the functioning of the military profession as an aspect of the agrarian economy of Hindustan.

At the battle of Surajgarh, in which Sher defeated the Bengal army, he put 3,000 hand-picked Afghans and 2,000 “Ujjainiyas” under their leader Gajpat Ujjainiya in his first line. After the battle was won,

all the spoils of war, comprising elephants, horses, and other equipments, which had fallen into the hands of [Gajpat] were allowed to be
retained by him. At the time of departure of [Gajpat] he [Sher] tied with his own hand the bejewelled sword to hang round [Gajpat’s] waist, bound his arm with a jewelled armlet, gave a string of pearls round his neck, fixed a bejewelled ornament in his headdress, gave a horse, head-to-foot dress and a sword for prince Bairishal [Gajpat’s brother], and gave Baksar as a fief to him.\textsuperscript{26}

I have quoted this passage because it articulates and advertises the fame of both the Sur Afghans and the Ujjainiya leadership as agencies of great distributive intensity: naukari under a military agent such as Gajpat and, indirectly, under a ruler such as Sher meant a share in spoils that might be huge. The chronicles telling the story of the great early sixteenth-century Purbiya warlords of Malwa such as Silhadi likewise strongly and explicitly emphasize their wealth and largesse.\textsuperscript{27} The organized loot of large-scale war was far more profitable than the haphazard local plundering of straggling travellers and small groups of soldiers. To be recruited in those years by an Ujjainiya broker indeed meant profit and privilege.

The degree, therefore, to which one’s dream as a naukar would come true was dependent on the diplomatic and entrepreneurial talent of the dealer in manpower or the recruiting warlord one joined and entrusted one’s fate to. In addition, however, there was the imponderable factor of big politics. In the case of Sher Shah, his bitter struggle with the Mogul Humayun compelled the Ujjainiya agency to split into factions in order to keep open options of naukari in several directions, a strategy that, as we saw, was of the essence for peasant survival in North India. Sher Shah and Humayun cultivated the Ujjainiya clan connection as desperately as the local Rajput lineages needed the treasure and loot of major campaigns.

In situations like this, positions easily shifted. For groups of peasant soldiers, there was a constant need to reconsider one’s temporary identity as an Ujjainiya naukar, and to re-evaluate the status of the lord or ruler whose salt (\textit{namak}) one ate. Loyalty to a throne could stand in the way of survival. This characteristic of contingent or ad hoc service applied much more strongly to the broker-state relationship (which can be described in terms of commodified labour and aggregate contracts) than to the relationship of the broker, or patron, with his soldier clients (which was of a reciprocal nature). This broker-mediated, two-level model, I suggest, is valid for the entire pre-British period. The commodifying agency that turned village

\textsuperscript{26} Ambashthya, “The Accounts of the Ujjainiyas in Bihar”, p. 438.
\textsuperscript{27} Kolff, \textit{Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy}, pp. 85ff.
labour into state labour was provided by brokers with local roots, who were pivotal in ushering the peasant to a niche of service at the level of the state in a way that preserved his autonomy to a fair degree.

Not all options, however, would be open at all times. After the Moguls firmly established themselves in North India in the 1570s, the patronage of the state became even more of a prize than earlier. The Ujjainiyas retained a hold on only a minor share of it. They hung on as managers of extensive agricultural tracts in western Bihar and continued as pugnacious leaders of undoubted regional notoriety; yet, by the time of Shahjahan's reign (1628-1658), they had lost their role as the principal recruiters and middlemen of the great reservoir of military labour of central Hindustan to others. At least partly, Mogul favour by then had shifted first to the clan of the Kachhwahas of Amber in Rajasthan, and then to the Bundela Rajputs who were zamindars in the region roughly between the home of the Gwaliyar Tomars and that of the Ujjainiyas.

No Bundela leader was ever as spectacularly successful as the Mogul emperor Jahangir's favourite Raja Bir Singh Deo (d. 1627) in channelling the resources, financial as well as otherwise, of the empire towards himself, his clansmen, and the soldiers of Hindustan. A hugely talented recruiting agent and military manager, he succeeded in putting numerous units, mainly infantry, at the disposal of Jahangir without ever having to relinquish personal command over them. He obtained an elevated mansabdari (service nobility) rank: in 1615, it was 4,700, at that time a very high figure. Only very few men in the empire ever succeeded to the same extent as Bir Singh Deo in monopolizing control of the military labour market of Hindustan and combining the usually distinct functions of employer (mansabdar) and recruiter of peasant infantry. Jahangir gave Bir Singh Deo, "than whom in the rajput caste there is no greater nobleman", as he wrote of him, the title of maharaja. Like his Tomar and Ujjainiya predecessors, the financial means Bir Singh Deo was able to invest in and extract from the Mogul state were impressive. In 1624, he first contributed a sum of between 200,000 and 300,000 rupees to the cost of the imperial campaign in eastern Hindustan against the rebellious prince Khurram, the future emperor Shahjahan, and in the end plundered his camp seizing as booty many gold coins, jewels, 3,000 horses, and 40 elephants. Or perhaps it is better to say that he prevented Khurram's enemies from getting hold of these valuables, because, as a Dutch chronicler remarked, Bir Singh Deo was a great friend of the prince. Naturally, as a manpower broker he had to have friends in both camps in order to remain in place as a partner in the empire's extortionate enterprise.
Bir Singh Deo’s spending practices, like those of his predecessors, were impressive. In Agra he had a palace on the river, next to the mansion of the famous Man Singh Kachhwaha. His building activities in Bundelkhand, his home region, advertised his financial might and his standing as a pious and trustworthy leader: the palace-fort of Datiya, erected at a cost of 3.5 million rupees, was only one of them; the famous tanks of Bir Sagar and Barwa Sagar and the Chaturbhuj Vishnu temple at Orchha, part of which still stands, were others. An even greater achievement of his was the Keshav Dev temple, devoted to Krishna, at Mathura, which according to Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, the French traveller, was one of the most sumptuous buildings in all India and was visited by large numbers of pilgrims. Bir Singh Deo himself went to Mathura as a pilgrim to weigh himself against an amount of gold which, together with an additional 81 man of gold, probably representing the eighty-one districts (parganas) that constituted his realm (or fief, if you like), was then distributed as charity. It was his way to wash off the physical and political impurities of his career – he was the murderer of Abu’l Fazl, Akbar’s distinguished minister – and to reconnect with the principles of dharmic order, as well as to advertise, far beyond his native Bundelkhand, his dominant position in the military labour market of Hindustan. But the exercise also shows the enormous distributive energy generated by military entrepreneurship. Through him and men like him, large sums of money found their way back into the village economy, though probably not always into the hands of the same villagers who had paid these sums as taxes in the first place.

In this manner, Bir Singh Deo set in motion the tradition of imperial naukari, or service, of Purbiya/Hindustani peasant soldiers under jobber-commanders of the Bundela clan. Apart from its economic importance in terms of the flow of agrarian revenue back to the countryside, the phenomenon of massive military service, or naukari, had a profound cultural impact on peasant society. This is illustrated by the veneration in which the soldiers – again, by no means all of them of Bundela lineages themselves – who followed Bir Singh Deo and his successors, came to hold Hardaul, one of the great Bundela’s own sons. After his murder by one of his brothers, Hardaul became the object of devotion in a soldiers’ cult that took root in the core region of Purbiya recruitment, i.e., in all the districts that supplied young men (jawans) to the jobber-commanders, Bundela and otherwise, who took over Bir Singh Deo’s business after his death. The story is too long

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to tell here. But the cult was yet another means through which peasant boys came to partake of a specific and cherished soldiers’ identity. The remoulding of old social and ritual distinctions, the adoption of second or parallel identities of a sect or clan nature, whether temporary or permanent, was a natural corollary of what I termed naukari and an inextricable part of the workings of the military labour machine of North India.

After the decline of the Ujjainiya clan and Bir Singh Deo Bundela’s death, minor lineage heads of both clans would continue to be active in recruitment, brokerage, and state service. During the heyday of the empire, however, the Mogul system compelled a considerable number of clans and extended families of zamindars to give up the large-scale employment of war bands that they had undertaken on their own account. Though some continued to seek imperial contracts while at the same time resisting the empire’s interference in their home lands, others fell back on the management of their villages, while attempting to extricate some external income from police duties and local political patronage.

With this, the military labour market for infantry as a longue durée phenomenon once more entered a new phase, this time partly emancipated from the old monopoly of localized Rajput clan brokerage and assuming a more regional identity. It came of age, as it were, in the jobbing and ritual practices of the brahmanical pilgrimage centre of Baksar, already mentioned, right at the centre of the old Purbiya and Ujjainiya recruiting grounds in the Bhojpur district of West Bihar. As early as 1580 we hear of a Brahman Mogul officer who attempted to draft soldiers at that place or, rather, at the holy tank of that name; he was killed on the bank of the Ganga by the Ujjainiya interest, then still too strong to brook interference. Half a century later, however, Mogul intrusion became the rule rather than the exception. Soon, large numbers of soldiers derived their identity from a real or supposed connection with Baksar rather than from a Rajput clan’s agency. Significantly, they became known as Baksariyas, a name that, until the end of the eighteenth century, would almost be synonymous with Hindustani musketeers or matchlockmen, though one also meets some Baksariya cavalry. A Mogul source of 1690 still mentions Baksariyas and Bundelas as the categories that sum up the presence of regular matchlockmen in the imperial army. But soon one finds only the first identity. By the second decade of the eighteenth century, the British East India Company had some of these “sepoys” in its pay. In 1757, “Baksariya” musketeers served under

29 Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, pp. 145ff.
Clive, who, in the next year, raised the third Bengal sepoy battalion in the Bhojpur area.\(^{30}\)

The Baksariyas served under jamadars, officers without an ethnically defined identity, to whom they owed their recruitment. In the eighteenth century, these officers, increasingly without a decisive agrarian base themselves, came fully into their own as a category of recruiters-cum-officers. They represented the crucial manpower-nexus of the military labour market. In the absence of the old clan brokers and probably connected with the adoption of sharpshooting matchlocks by peasant infantry units, men rose from the ranks and set themselves up as autonomous brokers. As jamadars they performed the task – well-known in the labour history of India – of jobbers, in this case jobber-cum-commanders. Without their recruitment expertise and negotiating skills, the Purbiya tradition of soldiering could not have maintained its remarkable near-monopoly of the market for infantrymen in North India. The ordinary sepoy was only “a musket in a mass of firepower”, dependent, as he had always been, on some sort of labour agency.

On the jamadars’ loyalty often depended the political fortunes of the Moguls, the Mogul empire’s successor states, and the British Company. The fate of Siraj ud-Daula, the ruler of Bengal and Clive’s adversary at Plassey in 1757, hinged crucially on his principal sepoy jamadars.\(^ {31}\) However, far-reaching as the revolutions in the brokering profession were for some of the elite groups of Hindustan, in the experience of the peasantry service conditions must have remained largely the same. Their near-monopoly of the labour market never depended on the particular brand or label under which their clan leaders or jamadars negotiated for them and offered their services to mansabdars, provincial rulers, or the British. The Baksariyas, moreover, just as the Ujjainiya and Bundela soldiers before them, and as their successor incarnation, that of the Company’s sepoys, would do, always looked forward to returning to the family farms of Hindustan they had left as boys of perhaps only seventeen years of age. They served as jawans, that is young men, which even today is the name affectionately given in India to the common soldier. At the age of forty, when according to tradition one ceased to be a jawan, it was high time to return home to one’s village.\(^ {32}\)

\(^{30}\) Wickremesekera, “Best Black Troops in the World”, p. 100.
\(^{32}\) The dedication on war monuments in modern India “Jay kisān, jay jawān” (“Hurrah for the peasant, hurrah for the soldier”) is a strong reminder of the continuing association in public opinion of the two occupations.
did not change either, at least for a while, was that, though restricted in their freedom by British officers and new rules of discipline and drill, they endeavoured where possible to keep their options open and renegotiate their contracts, especially with respect to pay and, as we shall see, caste status.

Another centuries-old feature of the Hindustani labour market may, under Company rule, even have become more prominent. I mean the self-recruiting character of the peasant armies discussed earlier. During the eighteenth century, recruiting parties are known to have been sent to villages in Company territory. Often, however, men came to military stations on their own initiative. The regiments actively encouraged their sepoys to bring friends and relatives as potential recruits. In 1773 it was reported that young village men “presented themselves daily on the parade ground for employment”, although, when an urgent need arose, trustworthy Indian officers, jamadars and havildars, were sent out on behalf of the Company regiment to bring in new recruits. Even until the so-called Mutiny of 1857, methods of self-recruitment like these remained the common system.33 From within the regiments, Indian agency and patronage monopolized and fulfilled the military employment requirements of the conquering colonial state. Rather than the Company’s army representing a world separate from village society, it served, in a way, as the military wing of the agrarian economy of Hindustan, a guarantee of a steady flow of cash to numberless village managers.

Members of many different castes, including a large number of low and “spurious” castes, had traditionally maintained a strong foothold on military employment.34 As the Company conquered North India and reduced the number of territorial chiefs and rulers, however, it acquired a unique position in the labour market. To a dramatic degree, the employers’ demand for military labour now fell far short of the available supply. Employment opportunities decreased and competition for fully paid military jobs became fierce. Naturally, the landholding, mainly high-caste elites of the traditional recruiting grounds of Hindustan, who were allowed to recruit whom they pleased by the army authorities, were in a position to be as selective when filling vacancies as they chose. So, they turned their regiments into preserves of their own castes. Any soldier would now make the most of his family and

Wickremesekera speaks of “the jamadari system of recruitment” having become widespread by the early eighteenth century: “Best Black Troops in the World”, p. 40.
34 For examples, see Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, pp. 117ff.
village ties and present his younger brothers, nephews, or fellow villagers to his commanding officer as recruits. The process was already underway in, for instance, the maharaja of Benares' army before it reached that of the Company. So the dominant castes of Hindustan, Bhumihiar brahmans and several clans of Rajputs, made themselves into the dominant castes of the Company's sepoy army, not only culturally, but also numerically. As a result, the Company's regiments, self-perpetuating institutions as never before, became inward-looking preserves of Hindustani elite power. The Company could not have stopped the process. In fact, as it strengthened the social cohesion of the regiments, officers acquiesced to and encouraged it; colonial blindness even made them suggest it was their own predilection for the cleaner castes that had set the process going.35

So, the arrival of the East India Company on North India's labour market did after all mean a break with tradition. The Company was in a position to establish a monopoly as an employer of soldiers, at least at the state level. This largely stopped the ongoing hassle and fuss of the soldiers' brokers over their clients' terms of service. There was little to negotiate now. Village elites may have held on to their monopoly of recruitment in large parts of Hindustan; the fact of the exclusion of other state employers by the monopolist Company severely reduced the sepoys' power of negotiation when it came to formalizing the terms of service.

Genealogically speaking, it is true that the Company's sepoy army was a straight descendant and a reincarnation of the Purbiya-Tomar-Ujjainiya-Bundela-Baksariya tradition of Hindustani peasant soldiering. It is also true that sepoys continued to send huge amounts of pay to their home villages. By its grants of land to pensioned-off soldiers – a kind of latter-day watan system – the invalid establishment of the Company's Bengal Army even strengthened its link and that of its sepoys with the traditional recruiting grounds of Hindustan. But with only one employer left, the role for brokerage, for labour agents and jobber-commanders (jamadars) dwindled to almost nil. Desertion and defection to another warlord or state were no longer options. In the newly juridified atmosphere of the colonial state, aggressive attempts at renegotiating one's terms of service were deemed to be mutinies.

Inward-looking, I said. Those sepoys who were lucky enough to retain employment with the monopolist Company compensated their loss of negotiating power by inventing a cult of themselves as pure brahmans.
and respectable Rajputs. The Company, as we saw, obliged. Lower-caste sepoys, such as the Pasis, who had contributed much to the centuries-old Purbiya tradition of mobile labour and had helped fight Clive’s battles, “were excluded from the line, in order to more fully conciliate the higher classes”.

Even then, the Bhumihars – a new identity of “military brahmans” – and Rajputs who succeeded in holding on to employment, could never completely reconcile themselves to a contract that deprived them of all options of service other than those that suited the British. Their last bid to regain their old freedom of negotiation according to the ancient code of honourable free agency or naukari would come to naught in the rising of 1857.

After that, the options on the market for mobile labour in Hindustan would be even more meagre than before. In a radical shift of policy, the British turned westwards, especially to the Punjab, for its recruits. The old system – which I characterized as a two-tiered one, composed, at the level of the village economy, of a relatively free and reciprocal relationship between surplus agrarian labour and locally rooted brokers and, at the level of the broker-state relationship, of freely contracted service deals of aggregated, commodified labour – collapsed for good. For most men in the old recruiting villages of Hindustan, there was no alternative, then, but to stick to their share of the family fields and, if it seemed advantageous, force out of the agrarian labour market the lower-status men they had deprived of profitable army service two or three generations earlier. No compensation in the form of new employment opportunities was offered except in the tea gardens of Assam, as a strongman in one of the armed gangs of the odd big landholder in Bengal, or as an indentured labourer in one of the overseas parts of the empire. For these jobs, brokerage was in the hands of men appointed by the colonial authorities in Calcutta, men with no roots or interest in agrarian Hindustan, which now entered a long phase of often abject poverty.

“True to their salt”

Mechanisms for recruiting and managing military labour in the army of the East India Company during the Carnatic Wars in India

Robert Johnson

South Asian personnel were critically important to the British military effort in the Carnatic Wars (1746-1748, 1749-1754, 1757-1763). Since European personnel were relatively few in number, they were compelled to augment their strength with a trained cadre of indigenous men. As in other theatres of war in the period 1746-1763, the recruitment of military labour into armies from beyond the parent state was common. In North America, Europe, and South Asia, native or mercenary forces were employed with an emphasis on the steady improvement of their efficiency and cost-effectiveness although quality was linked to the tasks they were to perform.

Drawing on the background to the Carnatic Wars, this chapter analyses the types, recruitment patterns, and uses of military labour, offering a comparison between those drawn from Europe and the subcontinent, including the assessments made by contemporaries. In contrast to recent historiographical trends that seek to emphasize ideological judgements about the use of South Asian labour, archival records suggest the British were eminently pragmatic in their decisions about manpower. They interpreted conditions in India through their own experiences, looking for particular “types”, but they also borrowed from local practices, particularly when the sheer demand for trained manpower in the 1750s outweighed any ideological considerations. Nevertheless, the British were aware of the need to acknowledge cultural sensitivities, and the Company army was not entirely converted to a “European” model.

In order to assist in making wider comparative judgements about military labour in this period, it is possible to identify here certain taxonomies and evolutionary trends in common with other areas of global labour history research. The army of the East India Company in the period 1746-1763, regardless of its quality, represents a shift from a force consisting of Euro-

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1 South Asian labour was not confined to filling the ranks of the Europeans’ armies, as a great number of local civilians and camp followers were vital to the functioning of the logistical chain. However, this aspect of employment remains outside the scope of this chapter.
pean “conscript professionals” with a handful of “ethnic conscripts” and “ethnic mercenaries”, led by an officer corps that was in part “mercenary professional”. By the end of the Third Carnatic War, the troops of the East India Company resembled “ethnic professionals”, augmented by auxiliaries who might still be categorized as “ethnic mercenaries”, thus constituting a “mixed force” of labour types. The European contingent, raised by a combination of voluntarism and “crimping” (impressment), remained either “professional mercenaries” or “professional conscripts”. This chapter examines these changes and continuities, illustrating an army on the cusp of a significant transformation in its imperial labour systems.

Staying true to their salt: The historiographical context

Over the past thirty years, a great deal of attention has been paid to interpretations of the British colonial encounter in South Asia in the light of post-colonial studies. There has been a comprehensive search for the ideological assumptions and constructions of the colonizers and the subsequent reactions of the colonized. The approach itself has been scrutinized and critiqued, with detractors arguing that the colonized were not simply passive victims of colonizing “discourses” and power relationships, but active agents in the dynamic processes at work. Subsequently some scholars have tried to show that the British Empire and its colonial subjects were engaged in “dialogues” of power, that the British system was flexible and porous, and that the debate had not taken sufficient notice of gender in its analysis of class and race. However, there seemed to be a universal acceptance of the idea that “empire” was inherently violent, stripping peoples of power and dignity, and at times altering their behaviour so profoundly that, even after independence, colonial taxonomies persisted. With a deeply moralizing agenda in keeping with late twentieth-century ideas of social justice and equality, the British period in India was condemned as fundamentally unjust, often cruel, and irredeemably corrupt. These debates are particularly important in any consideration of military labour in South Asia in the eighteenth century.

However, far from simply being a system of violence, the East India Company used its army, in keeping with mid-eighteenth-century ideas about

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2 Said, Orientalism; Guha and Spivak, Selected Subaltern Studies; Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”
3 Washbrook, ‘Orients and Occidents’.
the state and public order, to establish pacified regions more conducive to commerce. They were engaged in partnerships and alliances. The recruitment of an effective, trained, and disciplined army was a crucial element of this process, and was seen as fundamental to the exploitation of the military labour market.

It is important to emphasize, from the outset, this pragmatic character of governance, recruitment, military organization, and pacification. Despite numerous attempts to identify ideological reasons for the expansion of Company rule in India, the conduct of its officers and the raising or use of armies, the British displayed a practical approach to the problems they confronted. Their points of reference were, unsurprisingly, entirely European, but they applied no rigid systems and responded in a way that took account of local conditions to establish their own local supremacy, the free flow of trade, minimal costs, and maximum profit. Moreover, the army was crucial to the way that the East India Company developed: faced with a great threat from French forces and local instability, the Company employed a greater proportion of trained Indian personnel and engaged in a series of significant military operations. While the British adopted European standards in selection, training, and tactics, they were also conscious of the limitations of British personnel in terms of health, quality, and availability.

It is generally accepted that the British learned from the French model in the Carnatic Wars of the 1740s, namely, that Indian manpower, trained in European modes of warfare, was crucial to winning campaigns in the subcontinent. Philip Mason suggested that, once the British learned the value of the Indian sepoy, they possessed the means to conquer the subcontinent.4 However, Channa Wickremesekera disagreed, pointing to the widespread contempt for Indian soldiers and their secondary roles in the campaigns.5 He argued that the Europeans felt the Indians were incapable of effective leadership or initiative. Indians were used primarily as factory guards or garrison troops. Where units were raised, they were Europeanized, that is trained, drilled, and even clothed on European lines, under British officers. He argued that Indian troops were rarely used against French troops, and tended to be deployed only to guard the baggage and lines of communication. If they performed well, the British attributed this to their own officers or the inspiration of the British troops who accompanied them. In the key engagements of the Seven Years War (1756-1763, contemporaneous with

5 Wickremesekera, European Success and Indian Failure in the SEC. See also Wickremesekera, “Best Black Troops in the World”.

the Third Carnatic War), European troops invariably led in the assault. The only significant changes, he argued, were in the numbers actually employed (which was a consequence of extended commitments) and an equalization in weaponry between British and Indian troops (since, after 1760, both were armed with flintlocks).

It is easy to assume that racial stereotypes, which were to become so prominent in the nineteenth century, determined ideas in this period. In fact, calculations about the need for, and costs of, military labour were more important. The East India Company was eager to find those who would work with it and sought, in peacetime, simply to keep labour costs to a minimum. Moreover, manpower demands in wartime could overcome peacetime prejudices very rapidly. Furthermore, while it is easy to find episodes in which Indians were not trusted to make independent judgements without the direction of European officers, this would also apply in exactly the same way to European infantrymen. Men with rural backgrounds, lacking education, characterized both European and Indian foot soldiers. Discipline was harsh for both, but was proven, time after time, to be necessary to drill men to overcome their instinctive desire to save themselves in close-quarters battle. The forging of a collective solidarity and sense of purpose, often through the moniker of the regiment or the willingness to follow a particular leader, applied equally to British and Indian troops. The environment and human health also had a part to play. Gerald Bryant argued that the need to garrison India and to provide internal security, in an environment that Europeans found debilitating and even lethal, one for which Indian troops were better suited, meant that Indians were preferred. Moreover, some European officers were critical of the poor performance of low-quality European soldiers compared with the sepoys.

In the 1740s, the British had been content to use casually employed local armed men for the protection of their caravans, goods, and quarters. From the outset, control of territory brought with it the obligation of maintaining the security of the population, although the Company’s priority was to avoid this sort of commitment in favour of commercial activity. Initially, the only reliable military forces were European troops shipped from the British Isles. The first were the King’s troops, four companies of which landed in Bombay in 1662 and who were invited to take up their arms in 1668 as “mercenary-professionals” of the East India Company. In 1664, two companies of “Rajputs” had been enlisted, but they got neither British officers nor training.

6 Bryant, *The East India Company and Its Army*.  
They used their own weapons and possessed no uniforms, and their pay was often in arrears. They were accordingly described by the governor of Bombay as “more like bandits in the woods than military men”. In response, he organized a militia of all freemen and landholders. The officers were British but the ranks were filled with Indians, most of whom had converted to Christianity. Nevertheless, in 1706, six companies of “Gentoos” (Hindus) were disbanded because they were so unreliable. By the 1740s, garrisons were held by Europeans and elderly or infirm “mestees” (men of mixed Portuguese and Indian descent, sometimes described as “Portuguese”), “Topasses” and “Peons” (Christian Indians, the latter being the term used in Madras), and “seapoys” (men armed with their own weapons, fit only for guard duty). In February 1747, Madras was protected by 3,000 peons but only 900 had muskets and these were all matchlocks. The verdict that one must draw is that the Indian troops in the Company’s employment before 1750 were cheap and were attracted by financial reward but were of a very low quality indeed – all of which was the result of peacetime parsimony.

The British Indian forces serving the Company were transformed by encounters with the French. The nawab of the Carnatic had been defeated by a French force made up of Europeans and sepoys under Captain Paradis, while the fleet under Bertrand de la Bourdonnais had taken Madras in 1746. By contrast, the British, despite having a strong fleet, failed to capture Pondicherry simply because they lacked the resources and manpower for a land campaign. Although Madras was returned on the conclusion of peace two years later, the seriousness of the threat and the French alliances with local rulers had revealed the precarious position of the East India Company in the subcontinent. The “unofficial war” between British and French forces in India in fact continued, with each unable to maintain a fleet off the east coast of India for long, and with both sides plagued by the steady loss of European troops, who died of disease. The French and particularly the British had too few European troops to take and hold all the hill fortifications that lay between their territories or those of their allies. Garrisoning the settlements that were captured used up precious manpower. The solution was therefore entirely pragmatic: recruit more Indian personnel who could cope better with the climate, survive local diseases, and augment the dwindling numbers of trained Europeans.

The British position was weakened further when Marquis Joseph François Dupleix, the governor-general of the French possessions in India, allied himself with the new nizam of the Deccan, and earned the Mogul title

8 Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars, p. 88.
of “Commander of the Seven Thousand” from the Emperor. At Arcot, the French had gained another ally, Chanda Sahib, the new nawab of the Carnatic. This put several thousand Indian troops at the disposal of France. The British had backed Chanda Sahib’s rival, Mohammed Ali, at Trichinopoly and provided a garrison of 600 men, but the city was besieged in 1751. At Fort St George in Madras and Fort St David, there were barely 350 British personnel available – too few for a relief force. Nevertheless, Robert Clive, who had been appointed originally as commissary of supply, was permitted to march out with 200 European and 300 Indian troops, and three small field guns, to make an audacious attack on Chanda Sahib’s capital at Arcot. After the surprise capture of the town, Clive put the settlement, with its mile-long perimeter, into a state of defence. Clive possessed only 120 British and 200 Indians fit for duty at the commencement of the siege. After a bombardment, a series of sorties, and a major attack on a breach in the walls, this garrison had been reduced to 80 British soldiers and 120 sepoys. Nevertheless, reinforced, and then relieved at Arcot, by additional indigenous troops, Clive pursued the French and Indian armies and inflicted a major defeat on them at Arni.

Clive’s successes helped turn the tide of the war: Chanda Sahib’s forces were drawn off from Trichinopoly; Mysore and a portion of Marathas joined Mohammed Ali. Dupleix tried to restore the situation by advancing towards Madras with 400 Frenchmen and 2,000 sepoys. This force ambushed Clive at Kaveripak (1752), when the British had force-marched to intercept him. Clive defeated the ambush with his own outnumbered brigade. Indian men employed by the Company went on to fight against the French and their allies, describing themselves as the “veterans of Arcot” which, given there had only been 120 survivors and the new force numbered 600, might refer to French-trained sepoys who had changed sides. There are other possible explanations. They may have been sick soldiers who had recovered, or new recruits who had joined the core of the old formation, although changing sides was not so unusual in the fluid arrangements of the labour market of southern India.

What was clear, from the emergence of the French as a more significant rival to the East India Company in the subcontinent after 1750, was that the British were deficient in trained manpower. Indian personnel were therefore trained by Clive and others on the French model and, by the end of the fighting in 1753, it was clear that organization, improved discipline, and the toughening experience of campaigning had improved the quality

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of the British Indian forces. The fact was that European personnel in India were not available in sufficient numbers. Part of the problem was the supply: there was considerable competition for recruits with the regular army back in Britain. The outbreak of the Seven Years War in Europe therefore necessitated that regular regiments were sent out to India. This immediately raised questions about whether the Company or the Army should exercise command and jurisdiction, but with 63 per cent of the Company’s forces being made up of regular units, the issue of manpower and who was to provide it became a critical and much debated issue.\textsuperscript{10} In Britain, potential recruits sought to avoid all of the tropical destinations as death traps, and that included India.\textsuperscript{11} The regular army, which needed to fill its own ranks, pressured its parliamentary allies to limit Company recruitment quotas. These pressures meant that the Company was compelled to release more funds to raise local personnel.

**The recruitment of the Company Army**

In 1757, Robert Clive had recruited the first Bengal native regiment, the Lal Paltan, as a selected 515 men serving under British officers, thus expanding the Company Army from its companies in Madras and its garrison at Bombay. According to a return of the Bengal troops dated 10 April 1757, Clive commanded some 1,914 “Seapoys”, of which 1,400 were, in fact, from Madras. In addition, the return listed 257 topasses, 157 of whom were drawn from Bombay and the rest from Madras, but all of these were confined to garrison and guard duty.

The new Bengal sepoys were picked using the standard British criteria of the day. Many British soldiers were enlisted in rural Scotland as well as the English countryside because of a preference for rural workers. Tall and physically robust men were selected because of the endurance required in military service. Agricultural labourers were considered tougher, more used to the outdoors, able to move longer distances, and more biddable than urban folk. The Indian recruits had to stand 5’7” tall and meet the same

\textsuperscript{10} Gilbert, “Recruitment and Reform in the East India Company Army”, p. 91.

\textsuperscript{11} In analysing the numbers sick in Clive’s return of 1757, we find that, for the British, 16 officers of 70 were sick, representing 23 per cent of their strength. There were 176 Other Ranks (ORs) of 1,219 (including 25 of 257 Topasses), representing 14 per cent. For the sepoys, 53 of 1,914 were sick, representing just 3 per cent of their strength. Average sick rates in 1790s for the Company Army as a whole were 17 per cent and the death rate was 5 per cent: WO 17 1742 and 1743. National Archives, Kew.
physical standards as would any British enlisted man. There was little that was ideological about this, and the approach was universal.

There were, however, some other considerations. In 1750, Robert Orme drew up a categorization of “martial races” based on the dietary habits and climatic zones of the subcontinent. While the issue of “martial races” has become mired in ideological debates on race that belong to the nineteenth century, in this period the criteria and associations were far more pragmatic. In general terms, Orme believed that wheat-growing areas produced physically better and therefore more “martial” types than the areas where rice was grown and where people were shorter. Accordingly, the Company confined its recruitment to villages in wheat zones and therefore largely within its own territories. In 1757, immediately after Plassey, the Company recruited in the Bengal Presidency because it was dissatisfied with the standards of recruits in the nawab of Bengal’s forces, but it found that few men met the required height standard. The rural men were thought to be “undersized”. As a result, by the 1770s, recruitment had been extended into northern India, where, again, wheat-growing predominated. There, the British most often selected what they considered “higher-caste Brahmans”. This was not just because of their physique however, but of self-perceptions of “warrior traditions” and their ability to influence the recruitment of other “sturdy” peasants. This self-perception as an ethnic professional social group is evident in other locations outside South Asia in this period.

Another criterion for the recruitment of British troops in Scotland, according to John Prebble, had been the need to find employment for unskilled men who might otherwise foment disorder. The significant demographic shift in Britain in the mid to late eighteenth century meant rural overpopulation could be managed in part by a natural flow to urban areas and in part by employment in the armed forces. Having just confronted the serious rebellion of the ‘45, it was understandable that British authorities should be focused on questions of civil order and the management of populations. In the Terai areas of Bengal, Robert Brooke was charged with establishing a regiment to absorb selected hill-raiders and to employ them in the pacification of their own homelands. Warren Hastings expressed the view that preserving the caste system in India would prevent the “danger

12 Orme, *Historical Fragments of the Mughal Empire*.
13 The debate and its origins are fully unravelled in Roy, *Brown Warriors of the Raj*.
14 See, for example, Maj. Stainford to K. Kyd, 9 March and 17 March 1779, P/18/47, India Office Records [henceforth, IOR].
15 Khan, *Seir Mutaquerin*.
that they will soon be united and embodied as an armed nation after the example of the Sikhs”. He was concerned that they might “become too formidable for their rulers”. The Company therefore continued to co-opt potential and even actual enemies throughout the next seventy years and, with the exception of the Bengal regiments, looked particularly for men from marginalized or peripheral rural communities who would have little sympathy for the majority of the population.

The effect of British concerns about rebellion and the raising of Indian regiments was to exaggerate the special status of caste privileges in Indian units, preserving their preference not to travel across the Kala Pani (the black sea), to eat only certain foods, and to respect religious rituals. These enhanced the self-esteem of the troops, but caused resentment among civilians of similar caste. These moves were designed to enhance recruitment, separate the sepoy from any attachment to the people, and ensure continued loyalty to the Company above the local population. It was for these reasons also that the Company’s military men opposed the ingress of Christian missionaries who might, reflected the subsequent commander-in-chief, Charles Cornwallis, “endanger a government which owes its principal support to a native army composed of men of high caste whose fidelity and affections we have hitherto secured by an unremitted attention not to offend their religious scruples and superstitions”.

However, the practice of recruitment, following British methods, was not entirely uniform. In Britain, recruiting sergeants would seek disaffected workers, enquiring as to those who felt their masters were unjust, their wages too low, or their lives too limited by their womenfolk. Pay and employment, especially when other options were limited, were a strong incentive to enlist. Family size seems to have made a difference for some, as opportunities to inherit land or business were curtailed. A tradition of some sort of public service within the family, often military, could make the appeal stronger. Young men, regardless of their nationality, often express a desire to be tested as a rite of manhood, or to experience adventure in such a way as to elevate their esteem with peers, family, or clan. Some men were trying to escape issues at home (the “push” factors) including getting women pregnant, drudgery, and petty crimes, but others felt the army had its own attractions (the “pull” factors), including the ostentation of uniform, or the

17 Warren Hastings, Collections of Essays, Add. 29234, Hastings Papers.
18 Cornwallis to the Bishop of Salisbury, 1788, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/187, National Archives, Kew.
appearance of young men returning on furlough who were better fed, taller, and fitter and who often encouraged others to enlist.\textsuperscript{19} In Britain, there were also some sharp practices. Wealthy men hoping to advance themselves by the raising of a regiment for the government, such as the Duke of Athole in 1778, were not above using the middlemen of local businesses and hired agents as “human blood hounds” to pursue men and conscript them.\textsuperscript{20} Officially, recruiting sergeants were permitted to raise groups of men “by beat of drum”, literally beating a tattoo to get the attention of young men and then regaling them with stories of immediate cash, generous wages, adventure, and personal glory. At country fairs and taverns alcohol and stirring military music sometimes encouraged men further. These tricks tended to attract a low quality of recruit, as recruiting sergeants themselves recognized. Many people had a low regard for the army, and artisan families felt that enlistment was the act of the desperate. However, countless young men still regarded the army as a manly profession, with glamorous uniforms likely to seduce women.

In its search for European personnel, the Company was forced to hire “crimps”, agents who were paid on the basis of the number of recruits they ensnared.\textsuperscript{21} Kidnapping was common, the victims being locked up until they could be placed on board a ship and sent out to India. The only volunteers coming forward were those attempting to escape imprisonment or the gallows. There were no officers to escort them or depots in Britain and consequently there was no attempt to instil any discipline or training. They were largely debtors, drunks, and criminals, and they were accused of carrying “insolence, mutiny, profligacy, debauchery and disease into their Armies in India”.\textsuperscript{22} To make matters worse, the Company did not have the powers of martial law over their recruits while they were still in Britain. Part of the reason for the draconian recruitment process was to prevent men simply escaping back to civilian life.

When the Seven Years War began, the numbers of men recruited for the Company actually fell as the services at home took a larger share of the pool. In 1754-1755, the Company had obtained 1,001 men, but a year later only 488 were procured. In 1759-1760, only 202 men were found, and in 1761-1762

\textsuperscript{20} Penny, \textit{The Traditions of Perth}, pp. 60-61.
\textsuperscript{21} The figures we have for the 1770s suggest that the lowest price was 1 guinea per man (1776), but in wartime (1777) this rose to 5 or 6 guineas per man: Committee of Shipping Report B92, 3 December 1776, IOR.
\textsuperscript{22} Letter by “A.B.”, \textit{The Public Advertiser}, 12 March 1771.
this had fallen to 197. The Company Army complained that too few were being sent to maintain their regiments and they had to turn to as many Europeans in Bengal as they could find to remain effective. In 1759, the Court of Directors admitted it was “impossible” to provide the 2,000 men required by the army in India because it was experiencing “the greatest difficulties in raising recruits”. They directed that operations should be limited to the manpower available.

After the war, gradually there were changes to the system. In 1769, the Company was permitted to raise recruits “by beat of drum”, that is, by officially advertising rather than by kidnapping, and was also empowered to raise a regiment in Britain, with commissioned officers. Complete units would be sent out, rather than “trickle-posting” any arrivals. It was permitted that up to a third of the regiment could consist of “foreign protestants”, but there was a deep suspicion of enlisting Catholics or Germans. Indeed, the Company directors were most concerned that the regiment might be answerable only to the British government and could, therefore, threaten the independence of the Company altogether. Another issue was cost: for all its faults, crimping was cheaper than regular army recruiting or paying vast bounties, and the Seven Years War cost the Company a fortune.

Regular officers in Britain were equally prejudicial on their side about the new arrangements. They argued that India was a drain on manpower which swallowed up men who should be deployed in the defence of Britain. One member of Parliament likened India to “a sink”. As a result, the reforms failed and the system reverted to crimps, only to collapse once more during the American War of Independence until it was decreed that Irishmen might be recruited from 1781 onwards. However, standards of recruits remained very low, and some were actually sent back to Britain. Figures for the 1790s, which appear to be typical even earlier in the century, suggest a rejection rate of 10 per cent. Some were: “particularly incapable of carrying the load of arms, ammunition, necessaries and provisions, and undergoing hardships and fatigues, to which soldiers to be useful[,] to the public must necessarily submit”. It was not until 1799 that the practice of crimping was brought

23 A. J. Farrington, L/Mil/9/85, IOR.
24 Despatches to Bengal, 25 March 1757, IOR.
25 Despatches to Bengal, 1759, IOR.
26 Gilbert, “Recruitment and Reform in the East Indian Company Army”, p. 98.
27 London Evening Post, 16-18 April 1771.
28 See Colonel Brownrigg’s Inspection Records, 1792, WO 113/15; National Archives, Kew.
29 Court of Directors Letter to Bengal, enc. Cornwallis to Directors, 15 December 1790, L/Mil/ Misc./127, IOR.
to an end and recruitment put under the jurisdiction of the regular army.\footnote{A fascinating contrast can be made with the Royal Navy’s patterns of recruitment in the late eighteenth century. New research by Jeremiah Dancy suggests that “pressed men” constituted on average no more than 10 per cent of the crews since ships required skilled labour. The decline of crimping coincides with the disfavour towards impressments in the Senior Service: Dancy, “British Naval Manpower During the French Revolutionary Wars”.
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However, the Company remained short of European men and failed to fill its own quotas.

The organization, management, and performance of the Company Army

In his account of the fall of Calcutta to Siraj ud-Daula, the nawab of Bengal, in 1756, John Holwell noted that the defences were manned by a handful of gunners with 145 infantry of which, in total, only 60 were Europeans. The militia consisted of 100 “Armenians”, who were “entirely useless”, and a further 100 Indian “boys and slaves who were not capable of holding a musket”.\footnote{Cited in Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars, p. 106.} He estimated that, even with men drafted from the ships in port, the garrison numbered only 250, including officers. Predictably, when Siraj ud-Daula’s forces came into view, the militia deserted and some Company officers fled to the ships. The standard interpretation of the war is that dramatic improvements were made to the quality of the Indian troops through the imposition of discipline and European drill. By increasing manpower and quality, the British were able to turn events around. However, the improvement of the Indian troops was only part of the formula: the logistical expertise of Stringer Lawrence, Vice Admiral Charles Watson’s amphibious operations up the Hooghly River, and Robert Clive’s leadership, intrigues, and personal courage were crucial, as was the Company’s capacity, in contrast the French Company, to fund the conflict.

The improvements had begun with Stringer Lawrence in Cuddalore in 1748. He imposed strict discipline on topasses and Europeans alike at Fort St David, mindful that Madras had fallen to the more effective French forces. In December 1758, that new force was put to the test in a siege at Madras, and endured two months of bombardment and more than a thousand casualties before it was relieved. But it was also the growing campaign-combat experience of the Company troops through the Carnatic Wars that made the greatest difference. New units could draw on the expertise of veterans, especially junior commanders, and apply this directly to their
training. Clive’s sepoys displayed remarkable endurance when besieged, on campaign marches and in battle. At the siege of Arcot, for example, their morale remained intact despite a steady attrition of their numbers, and in the march to intercept Dupleix in 1752, his sepoys made 50 miles in just twenty hours, covering a total of 66 miles in thirty-six hours and winning a night battle at Kaveripak against the odds. At Volconda (or Golkonda) (29 May 1752), a force made up almost entirely of Indian personnel in British service charged a French battery and their supporting infantry. Despite taking heavy casualties, the sepoys pressed home with the bayonet and killed or captured the French, which suggests that their discipline, training, and trust in their junior leadership were robust. The following year, Subadar Sheikh Ibrahim, without any British support, defended his battery position against a Franco-Indian force, and earned a significant reward from the Company for his devotion to duty. With six years of fighting behind them, with improved discipline and the personalized and charismatic leadership of Lawrence, Watson, and Clive, the Company had an effective sepoy army with naval support to rival the French.

After the Carnatic/Seven Years War, greater military efficiency in Asian units was manifest in other ways. The standards of British recruits coming to India showed no sign of improvement, prompting the governor-general to write: “what shall I say of the Company’s Europeans [soldiers]? […] I would infinitely rather take the 73rd [Native] Regiment upon service with me than the six Company’s battalions.” Such comments have to be seen in context: the sentiments may be exaggerated because of a sense of exasperation. Nevertheless, European officers were aware that Indian troops were cheaper, better adapted to cope with the demands of campaigning in the heat and humidity of South Asia, and, when trained in the European manner, capable of the same achievements.

Although there had been only companies in the 1740s, it was decided in 1759 to raise battalions of Indian troops to match the French threat. Two had in fact already been formed, but an additional five battalions were mobilized. By the end of the war, the Company Army’s establishment was for ten battalions. Each battalion consisted of nine companies, each of 120 men, and one of these was a grenadier company.

In Clive’s “Return of 1757”, the Indian troops are recorded as having various ranks of subadars; jamadars; havildars and naiks; colour (flag) men; “Tom Toms” (drummers), trumpeters, and “Seapoys”. It had been

33 Cornwallis to Dundas, 16 November 1787, Home Misc. Series, vol. 85, IOR.
assumed in the 1740s that Indian ways were so strange that only Indian officers could command Asian troops at the company level. Indeed, the first Indian officers were really contractors who served as recruiters for the men. Loyalty to the contractor was more important to the early recruits than to the Company. But new contracts in the 1750s changed this. Each man was made aware that he served the Company and was paid by the Company. In November 1755, regulations stipulated that there should be one subadar, four jamadars, eight havildars (sergeants), and eight naiks (corporals). At the end of the war, this establishment of Indian leaders was reduced (one subadar, two jamadars, and six havildars per company) and each battalion was furnished with two commissioned officers, three sergeant-majors (Europeans), and a “Black Commandant”. However, Mason noted that these Europeans were in little more than a supervisory capacity or there to maintain numbers. There was little chance of promotion as a commander in an Indian battalion, as progression could only be made in European units. They were to: “make them keep up a good command amongst the sepoys and to support them well in it”. The sergeant-majors were to have “immediate direction of three of the companies” and were charged to take “care of their discipline”. Mason suggested that the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were the backbone of the Indian units and that the concept of gentlemanly officers had not yet manifested itself. He also argued that the survival of the “black commandant” was testament to the importance of the old “reciprocal” chieftain system. In fact, it seems likely that the commandant was an adviser to the Europeans on cultural matters and the link to the recruiting base on which the battalion depended.

What was the appeal for Indian men to serve in the Company army? There was not perhaps the strong tradition of service that would come to characterize the Rajputs in British formations from the mid-nineteenth century. What the British could offer was regular pay at 6 rupees a month. Many Indian rulers rarely paid their men more than eight months a year, leading to widespread brigandage, but even this salary was often in arrears and siphoned off in ghost pay-rolling by intermediate commanders. The advantage of the small European formations was that it made corruption more difficult. The Company was also flexible in its arrangements. Sepoys of South India were permitted to take their families along with them to stations and garrisons and even on campaign. Pay advances were available, and, as early as 1762, sepoys on overseas service could opt to have a portion

35 Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars, p. 100.
of their pay delivered directly to their families. Indians could pay for commissions from 1763, and these were still relatively cheap (a week’s pay in 1763), making personal advancement possible within the Company Army.

Many European soldiers, enlisted either as conscripts or volunteers, grumbled about having their pay held back because of costs they had to meet: 2d here and 2d there for blankets, boots, cleaning equipment, and additional or extraordinary rations. Some soldiers wrote about not being able to leave the service because of indebtedness. However, this was not always financial, but rather a matter of honour. The Indian expression having to remain “true to their salt” seems to have pervaded British personnel in some cases and not just the sepoys of the Honourable East India Company. Such sentiments would have taken time to develop, but the shared isolation of India, regular pay and continuous employment, and the camaraderie of the ranks transformed an otherwise alienating experience into a positive one. In other words, recruits became regular soldiers with an esprit de corps, and a professional indifference to outsiders. Oaths of loyalty were not introduced until 1766, but they appear to have underpinned some existing understanding about service in the Company Army and how it related to concepts of personal honour. The creation of battalions led to the adoption of colours and these were incorporated into a symbiosis of European and South Asian rituals to create a bond of loyalty and possession. Southern Indian troops, for example, thought of their leaders and their colours as distinctly and uniquely theirs.

Did the Indian infantry in Company service determine the outcome of the Carnatic Wars in South Asia? What assessment can be made of their effectiveness? It was once assumed that the British possessed technological superiority, which gave them the edge in their engagements with the Indian states. In fact, matchlocks with which the Indian forces were armed had a higher rate of fire and a marginally greater range than the flintlock, although the flintlock, in trained hands, could sustain the same rate of fire. Moreover, the French forces in India were armed with the same weapon types as the British. Indeed, within a few years, all the armies in India were using flintlocks.

Certainly the British made extensive use of light, quick-firing, manoeuvrable artillery. At Trichinopoly in May 1754, three British six-pounder guns devastated French infantry with case-shot at close range. Roundshot ricocheting through dense cavalry also warded off large formations of mounted men. Artillery was widely available in South Asia but many guns

possessed by Indian rulers were fixed or difficult to move, and there was little standardization in their ammunition or calibres. However, while Indian forces failed to produce guns that could be manoeuvred easily, many of the batteries of the southern rulers were staffed by European gunners. At Plassey, for example, the guns of Siraj ud-Daula were directed by French artillerymen.

The differences between European and Indian forces were really more regular organization and better discipline, which, in turn meant that, on the battlefield, sepoys and European troops could maintain a high rate of fire and sustain casualties without losing cohesion. These reflected a particular type of military labour organization. Large numbers of ill-disciplined cavalry or poorly armed peasants, led by individuals who merely wished to demonstrate their personal courage, failed against the relentless machinery of European warfare. The point is that it did not matter whether the forces were Europeans or not; what mattered was their level of training, morale, and discipline.37 It is interesting to note that the Marathas adopted European methods to create a disciplined and cohesive army, built up with mercenary troops including Europeans in senior positions, and they too enjoyed some years of success against the British.38

In R.O. Cambridge’s *Account of the War in India*, published in 1772, the key reason for the defeat of Indian armies by the Europeans and their sepoys was the former’s neglect of infantry. While Indian cavalry were perfectly capable of charging against other horsemen, they tended to avoid the well-drilled Company infantry for fear of losing their horses on which their wealth depended. For the Company, raising and training infantry was cheaper than cavalry, and the infantry could hold ports, forts, and garrisons as well as act as a strike force.39 Moreover, if supported by light artillery, infantrymen could traverse all terrain in southern India. Certainly the labour categories in the 1757 Return for Plassey indicate that all the troops were dismounted.40

The lack of cavalry put the Company at a disadvantage in terms of reconnaissance and therefore of intelligence-gathering, but this, if anything, made them even more dependent on local sources of power, their Indian allies, and intrigues against their adversaries.

Comparative analysis

The second part of this chapter addresses the comparative elements of the early East India Company army in terms of terms of service, type of labour, type of army, and the causal drivers of the rise, dominance, or decline of the East India Company's forms of military labour.

In addressing the variables in military labour in the East India Company Army, I should first note that the British had always employed local labour in India, particularly for the unskilled tasks associated with commerce and with the security of their factories, stores, and godowns. Defence against more numerous Indian forces relied largely on alliance and negotiations. The inadequate nature of peons or topasses in any offensive capacity, compared with disciplined and French sepoys, was already evident before the Seven Years War broke out, and so it is perhaps no surprise that the British enhanced their own systems to deal with the French threat. The result was a larger and more effective, if more expensive, Company army and, more significantly for this study, a transformation in the character of military labour.

In the terms of service offered, the East India Company barely differentiated between British and Indian recruits. Troops were paid a regular wage in return for military service. Rates of pay were low but were comparatively better in real terms to Indian troops. In the recruitment of topasses and peons for garrison duty, the rate of pay was high enough to attract some men to employment but appeared to be lower than that for most artisans. For Europeans, recruiters in Britain would target men who perceived their wages to be too low and offer cash inducements and bounties. Nevertheless, the Company failed to attract enough men to maintain its regiments in wartime and was forced to pay for “crimps” to impress manpower. Crimping, despite its unpopularity, proved cheaper than trying to compete in the labour market against civilian artisan wages. British soldiers argued that they were held in a form of bondage because they became indebted to the Company for their rations, uniform, and equipment. By contrast, Indian men were paid a regular salary that proved attractive compared with the standard practices of Indian rulers or corrupt commanders. Indians in British service could transfer salaries to families, purchase commissions, and obtain pay advances.

Soldiers’ duration of service was closely related to the issue of pay. The topasses who garrisoned Bombay in the 1740s had no specified age limits for service and consequently some were quite elderly. European soldiers were all considered to be “long service” but many of them were anxious that
diseases might kill them before they reached the end of their service anyway (the death rate being 5 per cent across the army). Nevertheless, Indian and British personnel shared the desire to take up regular employment and therefore accepted long service as a guarantee of work and wages.

British soldiers in Company service were subjected to far more legal constraints than the Indian personnel, in terms of employment parameters. The Company was unable to compete with the regular British Army for its recruits in the United Kingdom for many years, and it turned to the practice of crimping as a direct result of its consequent manpower shortages. The illegal nature of the practice was ignored by British authorities because it tended to sweep up the elements of society that were thought “undesirable”. The imprisonment of recruits before transportation to India was a measure to offset the lack of legal support for recruitment: recruits were not subject to martial law and would therefore have simply deserted at the first opportunity. However, these conditions suggest that many of the British soldiers in the East India Company army could be categorized as “conscript-slave”.

The constraints on the employment of Indian troops were cultural rather than legal. Caste preferences and ethnic prejudices could limit the type of recruit and the tasks they might be expected to perform. The British themselves adopted cultural preferences of their own, although pragmatism and necessity dictated the numbers and physique of the recruits. For the European troops there were added constraints: a desire to avoid the employment of too many Catholics and Germans, for example, yet an acceptance of criminals. These criteria and the type of recruit the Company managed to employ exasperated the officers who sought greater numbers, efficiency, and effectiveness.

In assessing the taxonomy of military labour in the East India Company Army, it is necessary to categorize their types and variations. While forms of military labour across South Asia as a whole were very mixed, the phenomenological varieties of military employment are, for the purposes of comparison, classified here according to two criteria of either un/free labour and un/commodified labour, and the subcategories of ethnic (reciprocal labour); enslaved (tributary); conscripted (tributary); mercenary (commodified); and professional (commodified). In addition, military labour in the East India Company Army is assessed against the taxonomies of forces that are feudal, aggregate contract, state commission, conscript, or modern volunteer armies. This chapter, while to some extent following John Lynn’s model of acknowledging change and transformation, also addresses
the issue of typology and its dominance, locating the example of the East India Company in the history of military labour embraced by this volume.

The earliest experiments in using local labour by the East India Company were not a success, and in terms of categorization we might identify the first “Rajpoot” garrison troops as “mercenary ethnic” although the Christian converts and mestees were so outcaste in Bombay that they might be described as “conscript ethnic”. The British personnel and local militia of freeman and landholders recruited by the Company in Bombay in the last decade of the seventeenth century appear to fit the category of “mercenary” and “mercenary ethnic”. In Madras in the 1740s, the 3,000 peons employed also seem to fit the category of “mercenary ethnic”. After the setbacks of 1746, where Madras fell to the French, the demand for manpower increased but there was no change to the type of South Asian military labour: the new, expanded force was still “mercenary ethnic” in character. Garrison duties and the protection of lines of communication and depots, for which these new forces were required, did not necessitate a change in labour type. They were raised on the basis of being a cheap and barely trained force, and consequently the quality of these forces was low.

However, by 1753, the type of labour was in the process of changing to “professional ethnic”. Robert Clive introduced standard organization, intensive training, and regular pay. The seasoning experience of being on campaign further improved the quality of the troops, and they began to develop a new identity of professional indifference to other South Asian forces or populations. However, we should guard against exaggerating the change. The muster returns on Clive’s forces in 1757 indicate that the Company’s army was very mixed: while a significant number of men were categorized as trained “seapoys”, there were still garrison troops and militia. In the 1750s, the Company’s forces remained a mix of “mercenary ethnic” and “professional ethnic”.

The further complication with the Indian personnel of the Company army is that, throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, recruits were sometimes offered by heads of families and these soldiers were expected to enlist through tradition. These men might be regarded as “tributary enslaved” labour within a system that was ostensibly “mercenary” and “commodified”. However, it is also clear that, after the success of Arcot in 1751 and with the attraction of regular pay, some personnel came forward as volunteers. Some recruits self-selected on the basis of caste or ethnicity, although the Company Army remained inclusive. The self-perception of “professional ethnic” developed through the second half of the eighteenth century, but, as a trait throughout South Asia, this perspective was not
limited to the Company’s forces. To enhance further the sense of professional status and to ensure there was no fraternization with indigenous populations, the Company recruited men from peripheral regions more frequently. The selection of former hill-raiders in the Terai region of Bengal fit within this design of creating a “professional ethnic” force, but the men employed in the Terai case, who were recruited to absorb surplus labour that had turned to crime, might be regarded as a category of “ethnic slave”.

The categorization of the Company army is problematized still further by the British personnel. Officers were generally “professional-mercenary” in their employment, although some used enlistment merely as the means to gain access to civilian commercial opportunities in South Asia, and therefore regarded themselves as “free” and “uncommodified” labour. Soldiers were far more complex. Those pressed into service by aristocratic landowners through local businessmen or other intermediaries were essentially induced to enlist against their will, and therefore were “enslaved”. Crimping and kidnapping also fall into this taxonomy. Others were lured into the army by the chance of better pay or opportunities and might be classed as “mercenary”. The fact that up to a third of personnel could be recruited from foreign, that is European, and sectarian sources suggests that a portion of the army could be classed as “mercenary ethnic”. Service for long periods overseas, for those that remained or survived the ravages of climate and disease, led to the steady professionalization of the troops. Re-enlistment, or the service of these long-term “professionals”, needs to be considered as other elements of the Company Army in this period.

What emerges is an army of Asians and Europeans that was in a period of transition. Indian personnel shifted from “mercenary ethnic” to “professional ethnic”, while British troops broadly changed from “enslaved” to “professional” in service but remained “enslaved” or “mercenary” as recruit types for most of the century. Yet, the Company Army remained a mixed force, its types dependent on tasking as either a field army or garrison troops. The army overall was dependent on sources of labour supply, low in Britain but abundant in India, and offered terms of service that were considered bad in Britain but attractive in South Asia.

Finally, we must make some assessment of the emergence and dominance of the forms of military labour in the East India Company Army. The reasons for the change in the form of military labour in this period can be summarized as a shift in the supply and demand in the military labour market; ideological factors (on the British side); financial and economic pressures; and changes in the military-strategic situation in South Asia. While it is somewhat artificial to attempt to attribute to each of these
elements a greater or lesser significance, since all are interdependent, it was the military-strategic situation that set in motion changes in the form and structure of the East India Company’s military labour.

The fundamental insecurity of the Company’s position in South Asia, in part caused by the decay of the Mogul Empire and in part by the rivalry and competition of European and Asian agents, necessitated a more effective security force. Attempts to create a compact that prevented the French and the British Companies from going to war with each other, even if there were “Troubles” in Europe, had failed by 1755. Furthermore, the East India Company could not rely entirely on bilateral agreements with local rulers, as Siraj ud-Daula demonstrated in 1756. The subsequent security provided by the Company’s fortresses and new troops acted as a magnet for the traders and peasants around Bombay and Madras, and in some cases these populations provided services, Company servants, and troops. The Maratha raids and the siege of Madras in 1741 nevertheless underscored the vulnerability of the British factories and their dependence on maritime support.

It was the French attack on Madras in 1746, launched by 1,100 Europeans and 800 French sepoys against a garrison of 200 barely trained militia, that spurred the Company to improve its security and release the necessary capital. Fort St David was saved only by the intervention of the Royal Navy in 1748, and it seemed that the Company was clinging to its possessions by its fingernails. Lawrence’s rapid training of a sepoy force enabled him to achieve a small but significant victory at Cuddalore. Dupleix, in command of Pondicherry, used 3,000 sepoys to defend the town against a British amphibious operation led by Admiral Edward Boscawen in 1748, but the British already had 3,500 sepoys in their own force to augment their relatively small European contingent. By 1752, when Lawrence surrounded the French at Sriringham Island, the Company had a large and experienced force of Indian troops led by equally seasoned officers. By the end of the war, there were ten Indian battalions in Madras alone, representing a force approaching 10,000 men. With the infantry came the mobile British artillery that could fire faster and with greater reliability than any Asian equivalent.

To support this apparatus, the Company marshalled its finances carefully, while the fortunes of the French Compagnie des Indes dwindled. Nevertheless, the demands of war tended to push the Company officers towards further conquest to meet the costs and realize the wealth in Mysore, Arcot, Trichinopoly, and Tanjore. Clive acknowledged that control of these territories and their land revenue was “what we are contending for” in the conflict, which has subsequently been termed “military-fiscalism”. The war
had “militarized” the Company in Madras and set up a model which was to be replicated in Bengal.

The fall of Calcutta further necessitated an expansion of the Company’s security forces. Watson and Clive launched an aggressive campaign to recover the city and then to take the fight deep into Bengal. Again the navy’s support was vital, but the decisive element was Clive’s exploitation of the resentment of Siraj ud-Daula by Mir Jafar, his chief of staff, and his subsequent defection at Plassey.

Financial considerations had formerly limited the size, form, and quality of the Company’s military labour but the necessity for more manpower and greater efficiency on operations in the 1750s came to override the desire for economy. In the case of European personnel, the difficulties of raising sufficient numbers of men, made worse by the wastage of disease, remained constant throughout the period, but it proved far easier and more cost-effective to enlist larger numbers of Asian troops. Wastage rates among Asian personnel were also lower. Moreover, the terms and conditions of service were regarded as unsatisfactory by British troops whereas indigenous personnel embraced opportunities for regular pay.

The “ideological” element of the British approach to military labour is problematic. A comparative study of the situation in Great Britain and in India in the eighteenth century reveals the universal assumptions the British brought with them about recruitment and the practical demands for manpower, diminishing notions of a specifically “Orientalist” approach in the subcontinent. At the same time, the diversity of the regions the British encountered, separated as they were by distinct cultures and customs, forced the British to adapt their practices. They did so in an entirely pragmatic fashion to achieve the primary objective of asserting their supremacy and maintaining good order. While the British always favoured physically tall and robust recruits from rural areas, they put more emphasis on discipline, drill, and endurance. Experienced officers and NCOs were preferred, but this was not limited to Europeans. The Company army was not deployed only against the French, although this had been the priority in the 1740s and 1750s. The army was required to protect vulnerable lines of communication and garrison conquered areas to ensure internal security. In Scotland, the senior officers of the army apparently regarded recruitment as a tool to employ and therefore absorb excess manpower in marginal areas to prevent civil disorder. The same practice may have influenced them in India. However, it is clear that they placed loyalty high on their agenda, and believed governments had to make their presence felt within their territories to discourage rioting, rebellion, and raiding.
In India, they maintained this framework, but increasingly paid attention to local systems of patronage and adapted recruitment accordingly. It was perhaps significant that the commander of the Madras Presidency Army was Yusuf Khan, a low-caste Hindu who had converted to Islam, embraced the Company, and rose rapidly through the ranks.

Indian recruits enlisted with a set of cultural norms which the Company embraced and incorporated into their army, even though they often misunderstood and misinterpreted the nature of local societies. While some attempts were made to "Europeanize" their drill and appearance, the Company agreed to recognize the ideas of “warrior castes” and incorporated local expectations and rituals, filtered through the lens of expectations formed by British cultural norms. This ability to transcend their own ideological parameters and create a new synthesis of identity among their military personnel proved to be an enduring strength of the Company Army, but its neglect and erosion were a source of anger and frustration that contributed to the outbreak of the Mutiny in 1857.

The conclusion that might be drawn on the character of the sepoy army in the Carnatic Wars is that it was recruited out of necessity and emergency, and was certainly modelled on the French system, but was really a pragmatic response to an enhanced strategic threat, the need to keep down costs, and the availability of a pool of manpower. The significance of the Indian troops can be exaggerated and authors have tended to focus on it because of its later proud history, or because it appeared to become the instrument of imperial oppression. In fact, it was one tool – alongside the Company’s wealth, the initiative of its local leaders, and the presence of the Royal Navy – that helped to neutralize its European and Asian rivals. The purpose of the army was to fulfil the tasks of the East India Company, namely the acquisition of trade and land revenue.
“The scum of every county, the refuse of mankind”

Recruiting the British Army in the eighteenth century

Peter Way

“There are two ways of recruiting the British army”, wrote Campbell Dalrymple in his 1761 military manual,

the first and most eligible [best] by volunteers, the last and worst by a press. By the first method, numbers of good men are enrolled, but the army is greatly obliged to levy, accident, and the dexterity of recruiting officers for them; by the second plan, the country gets clear of their banditti, and the ranks are filled up with the scum of every county, the refuse of mankind. They are marched loaded with vice, villainy, and chains, to their destined corps, where, when they arrive, they corrupt all they approach, and are whipt out, or desert in a month.¹

In times of war, the fiscal-military state’s appetite for soldiers proved voracious.² The strength of the British Army in the Seven Years War swelled from roughly 31,000 men to 117,000 (on paper or 93,000 in effective strength) from 1755 to 1762, with the army in America accounting for 30,000 of these troops at its peak strength.³ This did not include the numerous provincial troops of the colonies, which numbered from nearly 10,000 to in excess of 20,000

² Military mobilization constituted the greatest enterprise in European societies at this time. The armies of the main European military powers, France, Spain, the Habsburg Empire, Prussia, and Russia, often reached into the hundreds of thousands in times of war. John Childs estimated that in 1756, for example, Austria’s army numbered 201,000, France’s 330,000, Russia’s 330,000, Prussia’s 143,000, and Britain’s 91,179. Even relatively small states fielded sizeable armies, such as Hesse-Cassel (16,500), Hanover (29,000), and Württemberg (12,000). In total, fourteen states fielded 1,300,000 men, and this prior to full mobilization for the Seven Years War. See Childs, Armies and Warfare in Europe, p. 42.
men in any given year during the war. The combined figure of 40,000 to 50,000 should be doubled to arrive at total combatants when considering losses due to battlefield casualties, victims of disease or accident, desertion, and the end of service terms. These numbers were no small matter for any society, especially considering that the overwhelming majority of recruits came from Britain.

The British Army of the eighteenth century had become a modern volunteer force, with a number of qualifications. Impressment (i.e., conscription) was the most significant departure, although it only ever generated a distinct minority of soldiers. Britain also relied on mercenary forces hired from independent German polities, largely to fight for its interests on the continent, but also in the American Revolution across the Atlantic. The army arrived at this particular configuration as the result of a number of long-term historical processes, the first being political in nature. Throughout the seventeenth century, England engaged in ongoing internal conflict and regime change – civil war, regicide, creation of the Commonwealth, restoration of the monarchy, and revolution – that occupied it at home. But with the defeat of the Stuarts, pacification of Ireland, union with Scotland, and, ultimately, succession of the Hanoverian regime it secured its domestic sphere (excepting several Jacobite uprisings), and expanded its human resources that could be turned from the plow to the sword. Secondly, the changes in military tactics, technology, and scale associated with the military revolution and the rise of the fiscal-military state stoked European wars. Late to join in this acceleration of armed conflict, Britain in the eighteenth century became a leading player, fielding ever-larger armies and constructing a state capable of combating continental powers.

Most profoundly, the economic and social transformations associated with the transition to capitalism positioned Britain at the forefront of modernity in terms of waging war. The conversion of agriculture and landholding patterns to commercial production, the expansion of handcraft industries through the reorganization of production, the tapping of global trade through the creation of commercial trading companies and expansion of the merchant fleet, and the establishment of colonies rich in raw materials substantially enhanced the productivity of Britain's economy, enabling it to fund grossly expensive wars. At the same time,

4 For the numbers of provincial troops requested and the number to actually take the field between 1759 and 1762, see The Journal of Jeffery Amherst, pp. 327-331.
5 Conway estimates that 147,000 men from Britain and Ireland served in the regular army during the Seven Years' War: War, State, and Society, p. 65.
these developments, by pushing many agricultural laborers off the land through enclosure and changes to agricultural practices, as well as many artisans out of the trades due to the inexorable deskilling of the crafts, created a proletariat with nothing but their labor to sell, and in times of war the army proved an insatiable consumer of labor. Furthermore, states fought wars of an increasingly commercial nature to maximize national wealth through the defense of home industries, the protection of trade, and the acquisition of colonies, their resources, and peoples. Warfare intimately intertwined with developing capitalism, and military recruitment played a key role in the freeing of labor power to work in the interests of capital. Mobilization functioned as a component of the process of the “primitive accumulation” of capital (to use Marx’s term), which acted to “free” laborers from traditional economic relationships, alienate them from control of the means of production, and harness their labor to commercial activity that benefited others.

The soldiers’ story forms part of a broader proletarian tale, but it is also specific to military workers. And, in the case of the British Army, even that is not a single tale but one with many plots as Britain pulled together diverse peoples from its dominions through force, inducements, or lack of other options. Soldiers came from specific historical backgrounds characterized by particular economic and social relationships, which recruitment necessarily disrupted, not only for the individual recruit but also for the community from which the army extracted him. By the time of the Seven Years War, market forces obtained in England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, albeit in varying configurations, making their populations receptive to recruitment and giving the British Army its modern complexion. In the American colonies, however, the economy had not developed to this extent and labor scarcity prevailed, meaning fewer men proved receptive to long-term service in the regular army and recruitment met with outright resistance, in a foreshadowing of the Revolution, although many joined the colonial forces on yearly enlistments as a means of accumulating capital for their own economic advancement. More than a simple contract between an individual and institution, states, societies, cultures, and communities negotiated military labor. The fiscal-military state thus played an important role in the economic transformation of England and its satellites through its harnessing of human labor to national warmaking in the interest of commercial economic activity.
Mobilization

Military mobilization in the early modern era occurred in three ways. States commissioned noblemen to raise a stipulated number of troops or contracted fighting units from foreign military enterprisers, but neither provided it with direct control of the fighting force. Finally, the state compelled men to fight through pressing those without apparent employment, criminals, and convicts, or by imposing a levy on districts or cities to field a set number of men, a procedure that met with resistance due to its involuntary nature. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, the modern form of mobilization had emerged, in which the nation-state directly raised and administered a standing army. In central and eastern Europe, particularly in Prussia, centralized systems of conscription developed which essentially coerced military labor in wartime, whereas the Habsburg territories, France, and Spain relied more extensively on volunteers to stock their armies.6

The British came to depend upon volunteers due in part, paradoxically, to its unpopularity. The army’s role in the Civil War and English Revolution engendered a fear that the military posed a potential threat to the civil power and rights of Englishmen that had to be kept in check. The often-unscrupulous operations of regular recruiting parties, and the periodic adoption of press acts during wartime alienated many. To help ease these fears the standing army relied upon annual parliamentary enabling legislation by a Mutiny Act, while the civil power regulated recruitment, and adopted conscription only in times of need.7

Recruits usually received a cash bounty from which to purchase a shirt and shoes. Recruits were acquainted with the articles of war and, according to the Mutiny Act, had to be brought before a justice of the peace or constable more than twenty-four hours after but within four days of enlistment to attest to their willingness to join the army. If a recruit denied his willingness to serve he had to repay the money he had received upon enlisting as well as a penalty of 20 shillings for costs incurred by the recruiting party. Once the party had gathered a body of recruits, they took them to a recruiting depot or back to the regiment. Competition among regiments for troops and the uncoordinated nature of regiment-based recruiting made recruiting

6 Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force; Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, pp. 29-39; Childs, Armies and Warfare in Europe, pp. 49-54; Anderson, War and Society in the Old Regime, pp. 16-32; Wilson, German Armies, p. 277; Black, European Warfare 1660-1815, pp. 218-224.
in England difficult. Death, desertion, drafting into other regiments, and discharges meant the necessity of constant recruitment. J.A. Houlding calculated that the regiments stationed in the British Isles had to recruit 1.5 per cent of their strength on a monthly basis during peacetime, and 2.1 per cent in wartime. Thus, regiments often found it hard to get enough men to maintain their strength. Some recruited year-round, establishing depots and having recruiters on permanent duty. Others turned to “crimps”, private individuals paid by regiments to perform recruiting in the stead of a formal military recruiting party. Recruiters and, especially, crimps who had a vested economic interest in producing recruits, did not scruple at kidnapping men and spiriting them away to military service.8

The British state also coerced men into the army, adopting impressment during every major war of the eighteenth century, although it functioned in a more limited fashion than did the naval press gang. Civil magistrates and constables oversaw impressment, which targeted (in the words of the first Press Act of 1756) “able bodied Men as do not follow or exercise any lawful Calling or Employment, or have not some lawful and sufficient Support”. Such men would be brought before the commissioners to determine if they were suitable for impressment, the officials receiving payment for each man pressed. Owning property or possessing the right to vote protected one from the press, as did providing a substitute. Having a large family, being too old or infirm, bearing a good character, or having friends in high places could extricate a man from service; a bad reputation or lack of employment doomed him to the army.9

The Newcastle ministry by the end of 1755 had decided to raise ten new regiments as the Seven Years War loomed, and the need for these additional forces became more urgent in 1756 when fears of a French invasion heightened. With the numbers of volunteers seemingly dwindling, Parliament passed a Press Act in March 1756, but the Privy Council suspended it within a month as the invasion threat had incited enough men to volunteer.


However, by August upon further expansion of the army, it soon became clear the number of volunteers had dwindled, and the government adopted a new Press Act. This act proved less successful, and in 1757 political pressure made Pitt abandoned it. Yet London, for example, yielded 500 pressed men in 1756 for service in the 35th Regiment alone. Coerced soldiers tended, not surprisingly, to be less enthusiastic about military life, often deserting from the transports before sailing and upon arrival in America. Loudoun reported of the 35th’s “raw” troops, “the prest Men, I dare not yet trust so near the enemy”, as he had six desert to the French together, two of whom were discovered starving in the woods and promptly hanged. The army also took up reluctant troops in other manners. People convicted of a crime received pardons contingent on enlisting in the army. Thus, William Desborough, found guilty of stealing sheep in November 1760 and sentenced to death at Huntingdon, earned a pardon by enlisting in a regiment of foot. Similarly John Baker, Jeremiah Smith, Charles Dailey, and Thomas Elliott, sentenced to death for highway robbery at Maidstone that same month, received pardons predicated upon joining the 49th Regiment in Jamaica, which often equated to a delayed form of capital punishment due to the high mortality rate resulting from tropical diseases in the West Indies.

The Duke of Wellington, military hero of the Napoleonic wars, famously referred to his troops as “the scum of the earth”. Such a negative perspective not only mirrored the point of view of British soldiers; it also persists today among some historians of the army. Such classist language not only insults its subject; it also prevents any serious engagement with the social background of soldiers or the historical processes by which they came to serve in the army. Lumping them together as the residue at the bottom of society excuses military historians from conceptualizing these men as either historical agents or victims of power structures; they become merely


14 For example, Chandler and Beckett, the editors of *The Oxford History of the British Army*, purport: “Soldiers were inevitably recruited from the dregs of society […] The unattractive features of service life which persisted until the very end of the nineteenth century were not conducive to recruiting the more respectable elements of society” (p. xvi).
soldiers, units of a more important whole, subsumed within histories of the army that assume nationalist discourses. Dalrymple, at least, captured the distinction between “good men” who volunteered and the pressed “scum of every county”, though the class bias of an army officer still came through. Closer attention to the backgrounds of recruits, however, reveals a martial workforce that neatly mirrored the laboring classes of the era, making soldiers more the salt of the earth than its scum.

The common conception of soldiers presumed they hailed from the rootless mass that willingly lived idle and unproductive lives, exactly the people for whom the state drafted vagrancy and poor laws as well as press acts. Stripped of the moral content such a perspective contains an element of truth. The proletariat thrust up by primitive accumulation, the people who lived by the sweat of their labor and had a tenuous grasp on subsistence, undoubtedly counted military service as one certain form of employment. But they alone could never satisfy the army’s demand for manpower during wartime, especially on the scale of the Seven Years War, when recruitment cut deeply into the British populace. At the same time, economic change cut adrift craftsmen as well as common laborers. Periodic downturns and the high unemployment and prices that came with them had an impact throughout the laboring classes, while changes in the nature of craft production undermined some artisans’ ability to achieve subsistence and rendered others surplus to their masters’ need. Elsewhere I have utilized data garnered from the Out-Pension Books of the Royal Chelsea Hospital to explore the economic background of Britain’s soldiers in the Seven Years War, a study that revealed an unexpectedly skilled background: those with trades accounted for almost half the men, while manual laborers made for in excess of 40 per cent. Within the crafts three trades predominated – textile workers, shoemakers, and tailors – crafts among the first to experience the reorganization of production attendant upon primitive accumulation.15

The British Army, as well as drawing soldiers from the wider laboring classes, also cast the net widely in recruiting to fill the ranks. While in reality an expression of English might, the army in its social composition more exactly reflected the imperial reach of that might. Fighting on the scale that William Pitt aspired to in the Seven Years War required an army beyond the means of England alone, even beyond those of Great Britain. England looked elsewhere in its dominions to man its army, to domains already compromised by English imperialism, Scotland and Ireland, and

beyond. One could argue that the British Army was the most British of institutions by the mid-eighteenth century. Regimental returns for the army in America in 1757 reveal an ethnically heterogeneous rank and file. The English-born accounted for 29.7 per cent of the whole, Scots 27.3 per cent, Irish 27.3 per cent, and continental Europeans 4.3 per cent. Colonials made up 5.3 per cent of the army, while foreign-born residents of America equaled 5.7 per cent (see Table 10.1 and Chart 10.1).

Table 10.1 Nativity of NCOs and Private Soldiers in America, 1757

<table>
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<th>English</th>
<th>Scottish</th>
<th>Irish</th>
<th>American Colonials</th>
<th>Foreigners enlisted in Europe</th>
<th>Foreigners enlisted in America</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4212</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>3873</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>3874</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>607</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>14124</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: LO4011/no. 1/90; LO6695/99; LO2533/no. 4/90; LO2529/no. 1/90; LO4012/no. 1/90; LO1944 no. 5/90; LO 6616/88; LO1683/no. 1/90; LO5661/85; LO1391/no. 1/90; LO1384/no. 2/90; LO3936/no. 1/90; LO6639/89; LO1345/no. 5/90; LO6616/88; LO4068/no. 2/90; Return of Four Independent Companies, 15 July 1757, LO6616/88. The returns represented 14,124 common soldiers and noncommissioned officers of the army in America’s total strength of approximately 20,000 men. See Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 20.

Chart 10.1

Given the relative populations of these elements of Greater Britain, it is clear that Scotland and Ireland disproportionately manned the army.
Working from population estimates for the respective nations (see Table 10.2), each soldier born in England or Wales (Welsh soldiers are typically subsumed with the English in army returns) who served in the regular army in America in 1757 represented 1,599 inhabitants of their homeland. By comparison every Irish soldier served for 824 fellow Irish people, whereas a Scottish soldier left only 327 Scots proportionately at home. Thus, an Irishman was roughly twice as likely and a Scottish male five times as likely to serve in the American army than an Englishman or Welshman. Furthermore, the data estimated total population, male and female, so to arrive at a true approximate service ratio we need to halve those figures, meaning that English and Welsh men had a likelihood of 1 in 800 of serving in the American army, Irish 1 in 422, and Scots 1 in 164. Moreover, the ratio for Scots overstates the case, as the majority of recruits were drawn from the Highlands, which was less populous than the Lowlands. Finally, these calculations do not take into account those soldiers serving within Great Britain, on the European continent, in the West Indies, or elsewhere in the British Empire. Clearly the male populations of Ireland and Scotland had been harnessed to the British war machine, disproportionate contributions that resulted from specific historical developments. Mobilization thus took place in distinct settings, operating differently in and having a differential impact on each locale. A review of the main theatres of mobilization makes this clear, but also reveals a central thread in the process: the interconnectedness of the raising of armies and economic transformations associated with the emergence of capitalism taking place within these societies.

Table 10.2 Population ratios by nativity for British NCOs and private soldiers in America, 1757

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population*</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Soldiers</th>
<th>Ratio to population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>6,736,000</td>
<td>1760/1</td>
<td>4,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>1,265,000</td>
<td>1755</td>
<td>3,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3,191,000</td>
<td>1754</td>
<td>3,874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The fact that soldiers came from all ranks of laboring classes and across the empire means that any engagement with the military as a socioeconomic institution must make allowance for the contingencies of different histori-
cal class experiences. At the same time, the commercialization of human relationships strikes a recurring theme in these different histories. Such change weakened or severed peoples’ grasp on subsistence attained by working the land or plying a trade, as a result preparing them for wage labor including that in the army.

England, military metropole

Linda Colley maintained that the series of wars between Britain and France from 1689 to 1815 constructed Britishness, a sense of difference from those people outside Great Britain, largely founded upon Protestantism and forged in warfare, which connected its different parts together. Colley’s model has been criticized for its exaggeration of the integrating powers of Protestantism, her timing of the real unification of national interests within Great Britain, and, most tellingly, its Anglocentrism. In many ways, Britain should be understood as England writ large. England constituted the heart of the British dominions. England’s Parliament controlled Wales and Scotland from 1707, and retained final authority over the Irish Parliament. The fiscal-military state operated essentially in the interest of England in harvesting taxes and duties from across its possessions, and developing military policy with the defense of England as its main priority. English diplomats crafted foreign policy to ensure the established Protestant religion, promoted trade that primarily benefited England, and protected the interests of the Hanoverian regime. And, when diplomacy failed, England’s politicians set the country on a war footing, dragging Wales, Scotland, Ireland, and its other dependencies along too. Fighting wars, however, constituted one area where the English willingly shared the effort and the results.

The opening of hostilities with the French in the Seven Years War and the rapid escalation in the scale of mobilization sent recruiting parties out across England in a quest to satisfy the need for military manpower. The press played a role but voluntarism proved essential to the war effort. Why men willingly enlist to fight in wars is a question that has long intrigued military historians. Patriotism immediately suggests itself, and one should not underestimate its power in an era that witnessed the emergence of strong nationalist and imperialist currents in British culture. Just as often, historians note that recruits joined up for adventure, or in flight from

16 Colley, Britons, pp. 3-6, 9, 11-19, 38-46, 55-57.
17 Wilson, “Empire of Virtue”.
boring laboring life, overbearing parents, a demanding master, a clinging love interest, or the law. The fact that most recruits were youths in their late teens to early twenties supports the wanderlust explanation. As well, economic necessity prompted enlistment, according to historians of early modern armies. At times of poor harvests and high prices, unemployed or underemployed individuals without the means to support themselves opted for the wage, food, and clothing of the soldier.18

But one must be wary of perceiving a whiplash effect between immediate short-term economic depression and military enlistment. Recruitment cannot be measured by a price index. Long-term economic forces played the primary role, restructuring economies in ways that increased productivity and created a labor surplus that both helped to pay for wars and produced the manpower necessary to do the fighting. And the English agrarian economy proved so productive that it required fewer people to work the land, thus freeing others to work in industry, or indeed the army.19 As the leading commercial nation of Europe, England led the way in the capitalist reconfiguration of society. Agricultural improvement, including the enclosure and conversion of common lands to market production, the reorganization of production within certain trades, and the resultant creation of a landless, tradeless proletariat provided the army with a ready supply of recruits, willing or not. Moreover, England suffered economic depression and incidents of famine beginning in 1756, leading to unemployment, strikes, bread riots, and general discontent at exactly the time recruitment ramped up for the Seven Years War.20 James Wolfe, sent with troops to quell disturbances among Gloucester weavers late in 1756, expressed some sympathy with their situation in letters to his mother. “The obstinacy of the poor, half-starved weavers of broad-cloth that inhabit this extraordinary country is surprising. They beg about the country for food, because, they say, the masters have beat down their wages too low to live upon, and I believe it is a just complaint.” At the same time, he recognized their desperation could prove a bonus for the army. “I hope it will turn out a good recruiting party, for the people are so oppressed, so poor and so wretched, that they

will perhaps hazard a knock on the pate for bread and clothes, and turn soldiers through sheer necessity.”

Stay and starve in England only to get a knock on the head for protesting your condition, or join the army; many faced this conundrum in the Seven Years War. Merchant capital required armed forces to secure and defend its interests, and the changes initiated by capital accumulation – both in the long-term structural changes that freed labor power and in the short-term economic crises that undercut subsistence – generated capital’s own martial labor force. The fact that Britain rose to the status of most advanced economic power and the dominant military power in the mid-eighteenth century derived from no mere coincidence. This story, so familiar from reading Marx and the great British Marxist historians, proves more complex, for remember that only three in ten soldiers in the British Army in America came from England. Viewing the British army as simply the product of internal English economic developments obscures the heterogeneity of the very institution, and the multiple sources of manpower it tapped to wage war, each a product of particular historical forces.

Scotland, the military plantation

“I am for always having in our army as many Scottish soldiers as possible”, William Wildman, Lord Barrington, the member of Parliament for the border town Berwick-upon-Tweed, avowed to the House of Commons in 1751, “not that I think them more brave than those of any other country we can recruit from, but because they are generally more hardy and less mutinous; and of all Scottish soldiers I should choose to have and keep in our army as many Highlanders as possible.” Whereas Colley reads this comment as a measure of Scotland’s successful integration into Great Britain, Andrew Mackillop believes Barrington’s views reflected Britain’s “cannon-fodder policy”, whereby in the aftermath of the failed Jacobite uprising of 1745-1746, Britain harnessed Gaelic militarism to its overseas imperial interests, but not until the Seven Years War did Britain’s policy of stripping the Highlands to wage its wars become fully realized.

22 Here, I will only mention E. P. Thompson and the “bible” of labor history, The Making of the English Working Class.
The fact that English military policy had a direct impact on the governance of Scotland in general and the Highlands in particular derived from the Act of Union and the abolition of the Scottish Parliament. The British Army played a central role in the Highlands, forming six independent Highland companies in 1725 to police the region and build roads to make the “savage” Highlands more accessible to British rule and commerce. In 1739, it formed four further companies, and the ten companies combined to form the Black Watch, the first regiment of Highland troops incorporated within the regular army. In 1745, John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudoun (commander-in-chief in America, 1756-1758), formed a second regiment.24 In the short term, British Army recruitment in the Highlands remained inseparable from the repression of the Jacobite threat, finally laid to rest on Culloden field in 1746. The army then raided the territories of rebels, taking prisoners, disarming suspected rebels, laying waste crops, and confiscating livestock. Trials were held and more than 100 captives executed for treason, and many more were transported to the colonies as indentured servants or to serve as troops in regiments stationed abroad. The British government adopted a number of legislative measures intended to subordinate the Highlands, confiscating rebel lands, disarming the populace, banning the wearing of tartans, regulating the practice of religion, and reforming the legal system. The army played a central role in reclamation of the Highlands, becoming the British state’s most powerful expression in this region tainted by rebellion.25 The threat of Jacobitism had directed government policy into a military sphere, and ensured the persistence of a cultural form, clan-ship, that it was meant to eradicate. In the process, England ghettoized the Highlands as “an imperial-military reservoir”.26

Britain then set about reorganizing the region’s economy on the pattern of commercial agricultural production developing in England, establishing the Board of Annexed Estates to manage the thirteen estates annexed to the crown (other confiscated properties were auctioned off to pay debts). It also shouldered the task of “improving” the Highland agricultural economy by converting clan patterns of land management to a more commercial

24 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, pp. 18-21; Mackillop, “More Fruitful than the Soil”, pp. 13-20, 22, 29.
26 Mackillop, “More Fruitful than the Soil”, pp. 39-40. Scots also had a history of service in continental armies, particularly that of France. See McCorry, “Rats, Lice and Scotchmen”.
basis. It soon developed a program that set about shortening leases, promoting single-tenant farms of sufficient size to produce market surpluses, establishing security of tenure, removing surplus farm labor, restricting subtenure and evicting unwanted tenantry, better managing husbandry, and developing new villages. These acts led to large-scale eviction in some areas and sparked fears of depopulation. In 1760, the commissioners proposed “the propagation of a hardy and industrious race, fit for serving the public in war”. This position merely recognized an ongoing process by which military service absorbed much of the surplus labor generated by changes to the Highland economy.

With the outbreak of hostilities with France, concern over the use of Highland troops dissipated, and William Pitt, who took power in November 1756, decided to raise two new battalions of Highland troops from clans that had followed the Stuarts. Fortuitously, just as economic depression in England had facilitated mobilization, so did famine in Scotland in 1757. Another Highland battalion formed in 1758, two more in 1759, and by war’s end ten new battalions of Highlanders had been raised, making the Highlands much more militarized than the Lowlands. The Press Act also dragooned Highlanders into the army. In April 1756, with the act about to go into effect, the commissioners of supply and justices of the peace in the County of Inverness decided to canvas the gentlemen of the various districts to identify men to draw up a list of “fitt and proper” men to press into the North American service. A return of troops in the 42nd Regiment present at Schenectady, New York, the next year indicates that Highland justices had in some instances to resort to the last method, as thirty-five men were recorded as serving the six-year term of pressed men.

To understand Scottish recruiting, however, it must be situated in its socioeconomic environment. The country’s population was essentially stagnant, growing at just 0.6 per cent in 1750-1800 (half of England’s rate), meaning that recruitment constituted a net loss demographically. At the

30 Commissioners of Supply and Justices of the Peace, Extract minutes, 5, 6 April 1756, L0107/22; Francis Grant, List of the men of the 42nd Regiment who have Inlisted for a Term of Years according to the Press Act, 16 April 1757, LO4214/74.
time of recruitment for the Seven Years War, Scotland as a whole possessed a three-tiered rural social structure of landlords, tenants, and landless laborers. Land constituted the key to subsistence in what was still essentially a peasant society with greater similarities to mainland Europe than to England. In the rural Lowlands, the social structure rested on ferm-touns, which ranged from small units of twenty families or fewer to some the size of villages. Usually tenants rented the lands in the towns by leasehold from an absent landlord, with a smattering of owner-occupiers evident in some areas. A town could be held by one tenant or by several with holdings of varying sizes, larger in the south-east, whereas in the north-east smallholdings proved more common. Cottars (families that held small plots of land by subtenure) mostly worked the land, owing duties to the tenant or landowner. Servants engaged for six months to a year in full-time service, who often came from cottar families and could eventually set themselves up as such, also performed agricultural labor. Changes in the eighteenth century favored tenants and owner-occupiers, with their hold on the land being restrained only by terms of lease, and ordinary people’s access to the land became limited. The number of towns held by a single tenant grew in number. They consolidated their holdings and enclosed lands to convert to pasture for their sole use. This erosion of common rights deprived cottars and subtenants of land, converting them to employees of landlords or tenants. Still smallholdings persisted everywhere, and in some areas so did the old heterogeneous holding, common rights pattern. In the northeast counties of Banff, Kincardine, and Aberdeen, the rise of crofting meant that people farmed small strips of land but also worked part-time for farmers through economic need. Crofters came to replace cottars.

The dwindling availability of land meant people often combined farming of smallholdings with wages earned from labor on farms, as craftsmen, or in the building trade. Rural underemployment became common especially outside the peak farm work seasons, and this pushed people into paid employment, bringing them into competition with tradespeople, especially in cloth manufacture. Weavers often experienced slack periods and had to find employment elsewhere. Outside towns little full-time manufacturing work existed, except in the mining and salt industries. The linen industry, which doubled production about every twenty to twenty-five years between 1730 and 1800, depended on finding cheap, exploitable labor, and developed a putting-out model of production whereby the raw materials were sent out to rural workers for

spinning. In the 1730s-1740s, spinning increasingly encroached on the north and the Highlands. The craft career path broke down and journeymen became lifelong wageworkers. Journeymen’s societies emerge by the early eighteenth century and, later, permanent organizations arose among such trades as tailors and shoemakers. Rising prices caused the most disputes, leading to calls for higher wages, but typically the state backed the capitalist.34

In the Highlands the bàle or clachan, the traditional township and basis of settlement and management, functioned essentially as a communaliastic, multi-tenanted farm managed by tacksmen, who leased lands from clan leaders and sub-leased portions to clan members. From the 1730s, landowners, who viewed traditional clan practices as an impediment to improvement, began eliminating the bàle along with tacksmen in the move to single-tenant farms and crofting communities of individual smallholdings and common pasture. The defeat at Culloden freed clan leaders to pursue progress and break down the communaliastic ethos of the clans, in the process subordinating Scottish Gaeldom to the market and British imperialism.35 Military recruitment played an important role in the process. For the Highland elite, recruiting regiments constituted the main means of “colonizing” the resources of the British fiscal-military state. Recruiting targeted those on the margins of the Highland economy, not established tenants or proven rent-payers. Faced with rising recruitment bounties, landlords sought to transfer the costs of recruiting to their main tenants by asking them to fill quotas or pay for substitutes. These men resisted because recruitment drained the very manpower they required to commercialize their holdings, drove up wages, and made them maintain subtenants and cottars on the land to satisfy landlord levies rather than to evict them and improve the land.36 Also, the need for recruits meant that those at the bottom of Highland society wielded some control over the terms of enlistment. Landlords faced with scarcity felt compelled to offer favorable terms to recruits. Enlistment bounties exceeded the amount allowed by the government in the late 1750s. Those without sufficient liquid capital had to grant land in place of monetary bounties, either securing existing landholdings or promising grants of new land upon returning home from service. In return for providing military recruits, subtenants demanded to

34 Whatley, “The Experience of Work”, pp. 228-230, 233-234; Fraser, “Patterns of Protest”, p. 278.
35 Dodgshon, “West Highland and Hebridean Settlement Prior to Crofting and the Clearances”; Macinnes, “Scottish Gaeldom”, pp. 70-72, 75-76.
hold land directly from the landlord, and thus circumvented tacksmen. Thus recruitment, in part a matter of landlord coercion, also proved a means of social advancement for the subtenantry. Recruiting raised the expectations of landless and subtenant groups, and these were met by subdivision of the land. Mackillop concludes that “one of recruitment’s most important social effects lay in the fact that it undermined the hierarchical structure of Highland farms and expedited the emergence of crofting.” Good in the short term in that it expanded access to land by the lowest ranks of highland society, in the long term, however, it led directly to the Highland Clearances in the postwar era.

The Jacobite revolt of 1745-1746 provided the British fiscal-military state the wedge with which to pry open the Highlands for economic improvement. Military recruitment played a key role in that improvement, skimming off former rebels and the common people uprooted by the commercialization of the Highland economy. While lairds and recruits alike exploited the capital generated by the military leviathan, in the end the army’s needs transformed the region and the clearances followed in its train. At the same time, Scots came to play a central role in the British Army and Highlanders crafted a unique military persona, with the tartan becoming as much a symbol of British militarism as the red coat.

Ireland, island garrison

Ireland’s relation to the fiscal-military state differed from that of Scotland in that it did not serve primarily as a military plantation that produced troops for Britain’s overseas military enterprise. The army officially did not recruit Irish Catholics and only enlisted Irish Protestants during wartime, although significant numbers of Irish did enter the army. The island functioned first and foremost as a military depot and source of funds to support British militarism. By stationing 12,000 soldiers there in times of peace, amounting to more than one-third of the peacetime army, England could maintain a large force without immediately threatening the homeland but easily within reach in times of need. Moreover, by placing these regiments on

38 Ibid., pp. 129, 162-163, 166.
39 Allan Macinnes estimates the army recruited 48,000 men from the Highlands from the beginning of the Seven Years’ War to the end of the Napoleonic Wars: “Scottish Gaeldom”, p. 83.
40 Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 45.
the Irish establishment paid for by taxation set by Ireland’s Parliament, Britain colonized its resources and expropriated its wealth. Finally, given the troubled history between the English and Irish, garrisoning 12,000 troops on the island made them a de facto occupying force, suppressing Irish Catholics, and elevating Irish Protestants, but keeping both subordinate to Britain. Ireland’s unique role resulted from its particular history of colonization by, rebellion against, and religious strife with England.

England viewed Ireland, unlike Scotland or Wales, as a colony. More so than other British colonies, however, its history involved successive invasions and military conquest. First came the wave of Anglo-Norman invaders, followed by “New English” colonizers of Ireland in the period 1560-1660. The rebellion of 1641 led to the Cromwellian reconquest and the imposition of a Protestant ascendancy. The English Revolution and the defeat of James II and VII by William of Orange’s Protestant armies handed control of provincial power and land to the Anglo-Irish ratified in the Treaty of Limerick of 1692, and there soon followed a series of penal laws restricting the political, economic, and social rights of Catholics. Unlike Scotland, however, Ireland retained its parliament, although first Catholics and then Presbyterians would lose the franchise, making it an expression of Anglo-Irish will. This became the body nominally overseeing the Irish establishment of the British Army.

The English Disbanding Act of 1699 set the Irish establishment at 12,000, where it remained until 1769 (although at given times a number of regiments could be on duty elsewhere in the empire). During peacetime, desertion, death, and the old and infirm serving in the ranks vitiated its nominal strength, reducing the number of effective soldiers by as much as a quarter. Conversely, during wartime, the establishment expanded, for example, reaching 17,000 for a period in 1756-1757 and 24,000 from 1761 to the peace in 1763. As it had before the Treaty of Limerick, the Irish Parliament dominated by the Anglo-Irish paid for the army from its revenues, yet had no control over the number of troops or the expense, as a royal proclamation applied the act to Ireland. Here nakedly appears Ireland’s colonial status in military matters. The Lord Lieutenant, the king’s civil representative in Ireland, also acted as a military governor, but exerted limited control over this force. The regiments remained subject to the British Mutiny Act, and their primary functions entailed the defense of England and the provision

41 James, Ireland in the Empire 1688-1770, pp. 22-25, 52, 234-236, 289-291; Linebaugh and Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra, p. 57; Canny, “Identity Formation in Ireland”, pp. 159-160; Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, p. 49; Connolly, Divided Kingdom, pp. 197-203.
of reserve military forces for deployment elsewhere at the expense of the Irish. Only in the 1740s did Britain place regiments sent abroad from Ireland on the English establishment and assume their expense. The Anglo-Irish derived patronage opportunities from it, such as the awarding of commissions and contracts for supplies. Unlike the Scottish example, though, the Anglo-Irish did not directly tap the resources of the British fiscal-military state, instead colonizing the Irish in general through additional taxes. The British government profited substantially, but from the perspective of many Irish, however, the army must have seemed like a giant parasite.

The “Irish” army was Irish in name only. In 1701, Britain proscribed Catholics from serving in the army. Catholics did join the army unofficially, but they had to abjure their faith when enlisting. Many Irish Catholics, in fact, demonstrated their true allegiance by enlisting with Britain’s enemies. Britain also normally rejected Irish Protestants from army service: first to ensure Catholics did not enter the army by claiming to be Protestant; and, secondly, as Presbyterians comprised two-thirds of Irish Protestants, to keep out suspected dissenters. During wartime, however, manpower needs overrode these concerns and the army recruited Irish Protestants. The Irish army, then, amounted to a force of 12,000 English and Scottish troops garrisoned in Ireland and paid for by the Irish through taxation set by the Irish Parliament, which exerted minimal control over the army. Some historians have argued that the combination of penal laws and a standing army did not make Ireland a police state, but the presence of this many soldiers makes it hard not to view the army as an occupying force.

Ireland’s economy in the eighteenth century experienced similar changes to those in Scotland and England, with the expansion of commercial agriculture, the development of new manufacturing activities, and the reorganization of traditional forms of craft production producing surplus labor that elsewhere armies would partially absorb. Yet political and religious reasons prohibited paid military labor as an option for many set

45 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, pp. 49-50; Murtagh, “Irish Soldiers Abroad”; Connolly, Divided Kingdom, pp. 89-90, 286-290, 375-376.
free from the soil and trades. A quick look at Irish economic development identifies the factors that lay behind enlistment when war opened the door to military service for many. A landed aristocracy, urban and rural middle classes, and lower classes of peasants and laborers comprised the Irish social structure. By 1700, most landlords came from the Anglican Anglo-Irish, as the penal laws restricted Catholics landholding in a number of ways, while the middle class was more heterogeneous. Catholics formed the majority of the lower classes, particularly those that tilled the soil, and dominated the countryside. Peasant society had been organized communally into a clachan, a pattern similar to that in Scotland. A group of families leased the land collectively with each getting equal access to land for tillage and pasture in a system called rundale. From the seventeenth century, this arrangement came under increasing pressure from ongoing broad shifts in land management wrought by those who wished to farm the land for commercial purposes, most notably by enclosing tilled land for pasturage of sheep and later livestock. The commercial pressures began the breakup of the peasantry. Some proved able to transform into small tenants with enough land and livestock to farm on their own and pay cash rent. The majority became laborers, most of whom held only small pieces of land they rented with labor, while the rest sold their labor to pay cash rent for small plots in the conacre system. “In both cases, however”, according to Sean Connolly, “their true position was of a rural proletariat exchanging their labour for the means of subsistence.” The relationship between landlord and tenant also altered as a result of the commercialization of land use. Landowners tended to lease their lands in blocks to middlemen who then rented the lands to peasants for a profit, often squeezing too much out of those who worked the land, rendering them vulnerable to even minor problems affecting the Irish economy.

Ireland experienced repeated crises of subsistence with famines occurring in 1720-1721 and 1728-1729, but most devastatingly in 1740-1741, which caused mortality comparable to the Great Famine of the 1840s. The harvest failure of 1756-1757 must also have played a role in the recruitment of the army. Commentators at the time have pointed to the shift from tillage
to pasturage for commercial purposes as a root cause of Irish poverty and social dislocation. Landlords enhanced productivity in large part by weakening the bond between peasants and the soil: by enclosing and consolidating the land; appointing middlemen tenants to further exploit smallholders; shortening leases to an annual basis; and charging excessive or “rack” rents, among other tactics. The net effect was to force people onto ever-smaller pieces of land for cultivation with their only recourse to find paid employment of a temporary or permanent nature. This cottier class grew over the century. Some lost all ties to the land and joined a swelling proletariat that sought work where it could be found, on large farms, in urban centres, or across the Irish Sea, and, indeed, in the military of one power or another. Peasants suffered under this yoke for the most part, but periodically rose up against landlords and improvers using clandestine collective violence to seek to roll back change, most notably in the Houghers campaign of agrarian terror of 1711-1712 and the Whiteboys movement that emerged in 1761.

Ireland’s small but developing manufacturing sector provided a main source of employment for the displaced agrarian classes as well as craftsmen. Many of Ireland’s products came from agriculture. Improved farms produced beef, butter, grain, and (indirectly) beer and flour for urban consumption and, more importantly, for the international provision trade (including supplying the army). The manufacturing sector developed somewhat more slowly, and British trade restrictions have often received the blame, especially the Woolens Act of 1699, which prohibited the export of wool and woolen cloth from anywhere but England. This situation undoubtedly harmed the weaving trade, and protests against the act occurred periodically. Still, wool production for the domestic market remained an important industry. Much of the weaving into cloth took place rurally on the putting-out model, with women spinning yarn in their households. Production soared with the abandonment of the English import duty in 1739.

Linen manufacture concentrated in Ulster constituted the leading sector in the economy. Irish linen production took off with the immigration of

53 James, Ireland in the Empire, p. 217; Miller, Emigrants and Exiles, pp. 27-28, 34, 217-218; Beames, Peasants and Power, pp. 6-13; Mokyr, Why Ireland Starved, pp. 144-147.
55 Connolly, Religion, Law, and Power, pp. 50-52, Divided Kingdom, p. 346; James, Ireland in the Empire, pp. 201-203.
English and Scots, and by the 1670s large-scale commercial production was already evident. In 1696, England removed import duty on Irish linen and in 1705 allowed direct export to other colonies. Economic growth transformed northeastern Ireland. Ulster’s eastern counties came to depend on linen manufacture to the degree that they became net importers of food. Petty producers working in households carried on weaving using their own yarn or that purchased on the market, sometimes employing journeymen weavers. The spinning of yarn and weaving of coarse linen spread west and south of Ulster, while elsewhere farmers raised livestock and crops to support industrial towns. The Ulster economy became overdependent on linen and subject to shock when trade worsened, more so in the east where agriculture had largely been abandoned. When the economy took a downturn in Ulster, some chose to cross the Atlantic to escape, as occurred in 1718-1729 when thousands left as a result of poor harvests, famine, rising tithes, and problems within the linen trade. The Irish economy prospered in the 1730s as the linen trade grew. Conacre continued spreading, with land subdivided to provide small lots for weavers’ subsistence needs. This system also exposed them to any agricultural disruption as happened in 1740, when crop failure caused food prices and rents to rise, famine set in, and the linen trade declined. This crisis prompted another wave of migration, many indenturing themselves to get to the colonies. As the linen industry matured, more weavers were unable to set themselves up as independent producers. All those people who depended on the industry, the women who spun the linen and farmers who grew food to feed the linen workers, also suffered when trade did. Desperation led some to join the Oakboys or Hearts of Oak, formed in 1763 to protest economic conditions.

Irish economic development in the eighteenth century had a negative impact on many. While national wealth and consumption grew substantially from 1700 to 1760, it did so for those already better off. The majority lived a subsistence existence and poverty pervaded society. Cottiers found themselves more vulnerable to their landlords, while the urban poor crowded into slums in the major cities. The spread of commercial agriculture and manufacturing set many adrift. This proved particularly the case at times

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56 Connolly, Religion, Law, and Power, pp. 51-52, Divided Kingdom, pp. 351-352, 354-356; Griffin, The People with No Name, pp. 25-32.
58 Ibid., pp. 159-160.
59 Connolly, Divided Kingdom, pp. 302-303.
60 James opined that, on the whole, conditions for the Irish poor were worse than in England: James, Ireland in the Empire, pp. 212, 222-224.
of economic dislocation, such as the years 1756-1757 when bad harvests and high prices prevailed, coincidentally the time when recruitment for the Seven Years War first spiked.\(^61\)

The Seven Years War affected the army in Ireland early on. The two regiments sent to North America with General Edward Braddock in 1755, the 44th and 48th, had come from the Irish establishment at a peacetime strength of 310 rank-and-file. Drafting 420 men from regiments in Britain and Ireland brought each of the two units to 520 before they left Cork.\(^62\) Such drafting became the norm throughout the war whenever the government ordered reinforcements for North America; whether for existing regiments rotated across the Atlantic or newly raised units, drafts from those forces remaining behind brought them up to strength.\(^63\) The escalating demand for fighting men prompted the dispatch of ever more troops from the Irish establishment: in September 1756, the 22nd Regiment and drafts from the twelve Irish battalions; and in 1757 the 17th, 27th, 28th, 43rd, and 46th Regiments, as well as further drafts.\(^64\) In turn, the remaining units in Ireland found it necessary to recruit so as to return to strength. To meet these additional manpower demands, Whitehall decided to lift the ban on enlisting Irish Protestants, seemingly as early as 1756. In April of that year, a lieutenant of the Royal American Regiment complained that recruiting for the new unit in Ireland had been very difficult as twenty-four companies were to be raised for service and 1,600 men had already been enlisted, making for thin pickings. And, in August, the Earl of Halifax reported that 1,100 men had been raised in Ireland to fill up the regiments in America.\(^65\)

The large number of Irish in the American army by the summer of 1757 attests to the rapid recruitment of Protestants in the short time since the prohibition had been lifted. The regiments sent from the Irish establishment in 1756-1757 for which returns survive exhibited the highest proportion of Irish soldiers: the 17th (39.8 per cent), 22nd (41.4 per cent), 27th (45.8 per cent), and 28th (56.3 per cent). The Irish also accounted for 33.9 per cent of


\(^{63}\) On drafting, see, e.g., Henry Fox to Gov. Lawrence, 14 Aug. 1756, LO1486/34. On desertion, see, e.g., Barrington to Loudoun, 15 June 1757, LO3837/85; D. McDonald, A Return of the Men left by the 62d. Regmt. in Ireland, 19 Dec. 1757, LO5042 no. 1/111; D. McDonald, A Return of the number of men found in Ireland belonging to the 62d. Regmt., 18 Dec. 1757, LO5042 no. 5/111.


\(^{65}\) George Brereton [to Loudoun], 8 April 1756, LO1026/23; Dunk [George Montagu, 2nd Earl of] Halifax, 13 Aug. 1756, LO1478/33; Hiasinte de Bonneville, 28 March 1757, LO392/70.
the four companies of the New York Independent Regiment, a clear indication of the recruiting of Irish natives in the American colonies. 66

Irish Protestants (and clandestine Catholics), dammed up as a source of military labor by imperial policy much of the time, flowed fairly evenly throughout the army once the war-induced need for men opened the sluice gates. The Irish did not attain the same prominent profile in the army as did Highlanders. The contingent basis of their enlistment made them seem more a last resort, while the bogeyman of Catholicism complicated their relation to the British. Nonetheless, in the Seven Years War, they formed a significant component of the army, and their experience with improvers, landlords, and bosses no doubt colored their relationships within the military.

German military migrants

The scale of conflict in the Seven Years War strained manpower resources to such a point that Britain had to look beyond its dominions for war workers. Across the English Channel it found what it needed in two forms: foreign princes willing to hire out their military forces; and individuals who could be recruited directed into the British Army. Although not part of the British Empire, German peoples of Europe did play an important role during the Seven Years War, both on the continent where Prussia proved an essential ally and where mercenary units from other states fought in the British interest, and as recruits to the regular British Army dispatched to the American theatre. Ultimately, Britain decided to fight the war in North America with its own army and to fight in Europe primarily by proxy. In January of 1756 Britain signed the Convention of Westminster with Prussia to prevent that state from siding with France. Frederick the Great waged total war, exploiting resources and civilians to the full, and his policies had a significant impact on western and northern Germany, which had been largely conflict-free since 1714. Not only did Prussia forcibly harness people to the war machine but also the ferocity of continental conflict uprooted many, making them ripe pickings for recruiters from various armies. Frederick’s military support came at a price for Britain, which promised in 1758 to provide Prussia with £670,000 annually to subsidize its war effort. At the

66 13 July 1757, LO2533 no. 4/90; [July 1757], LO2529 no. 1/90; 13 July 1757, LO4012 no. 1/90; 14 July 1757, LO1944 no. 5/90; 15 July 1757, LO6616/88.
same time, Britain assumed the cost of the entire Hanoverian army, which would amount to £1.2 million per year.67

Britain also hired the services of mercenary soldiers. With the decline of independent military enterprisers, mercenary captains who hired their companies to fight for other, larger states found it difficult to raise armies of a sufficient size from their own territories. They could recruit in foreign domains, or could contract units from another army to support their own. Increasingly, they hired a specific number of troops raised and maintained by a foreign power, particularly smaller states in the Holy Roman Empire, in return for the payment of a subsidy. Subsidizing forces from abroad tended to be faster and simpler than raising new regiments at home. Subsidy agreements also proved more flexible, as troops could be hired for short periods and dispensed with when not needed. Political considerations also played a part, as subsidy agreements served as a form of political alliance with mutual responsibilities stipulated.68 Since the Glorious Revolution, the British had depended on a largely volunteer army, but could do this only by extensively utilizing foreign soldiers. Peter Taylor argued that the fear of a standing army led the English to “subcontracting the defense of their liberties and privileges to Germans, Native Americans, and Africans.” The “tributary overlords of German territorial states” secured much English business in supplying troops from within Europe, pushing most independent military contractors out of the market. They could meet this demand for soldiers for hire as their subjects legally owed them military service, but in doing so they had to alter the political economies of their states.69

Many (including William Pitt) thought at the time the Hanoverian regime of Britain in fact cared more about their status as Protectors of Hanover than as defenders of the British realm, and the outbreak of hostilities with France in the colonies in 1754 prompted Britain again to contract with German territories – Hesse-Cassel, Ansbach, and Würzburg – to hold men in reserve to help protect Hanover. Hanover itself received an annual subsidy of £50,000 to expand its army by 8,000 men. During the invasion scare of 1756, Britain paid for twelve Hanoverian battalions and eight Hessian battalions to be stationed in the south of England.70

67 Wilson, German Armies, pp. 263, 275, 277-278; Anderson, A People’s Army, pp. 298-299.
68 Childs, Armies and Warfare in Europe, pp. 85-86.
69 Taylor, Indentured to Liberty, pp. 9, 11, 21.
70 Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 127; Wilson, German Armies, p. 263; Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 323, n. 1.
The “military-subsidy relationship” England had with Hesse-Cassel sheds light on the phenomenon. Subsidy treaties usually took the form of mutual defense pacts, with arrangements for payments made per man supplied, a subsidy to the state for the duration of the war, and pay for the soldiers. The soldier’s food would be paid for out of his “subsistence” (or pay). The British received soldiers who were trained and equipped in return. During the Seven Years War, Britain contracted with Hesse-Cassel, a part of the Holy Roman Empire, for 12,000 men in 1755, almost 19,000 in 1757, 12,000 two years later, and more than 15,000 in 1760. From 1751 to 1760, British subsidies accounted for 40 per cent of all state revenue for Hesse-Cassel. The monies allowed for the maintenance of a standing army of 14,000 within the landgravial domain, equivalent to 1 soldier per 19 Hessian civilians, as opposed to a ratio of 1 to 36 in both England and Prussia.71

The Hessian state raised subsidy armies by developing a military tax, the Kontribution, for the training, equipping, and payment of troops, but the increased military expectations posed ideological problems for the Landgraves. To circumvent the novelty and scale of demands, they targeted “marginal” people – the masterless, indolent, those deemed the most expendable.72 The state in the 1740s became increasingly intrusive of the household and defined marginality more loosely, taking servants, day laborers, and apprentices when it could not be demonstrated that their labor was essential to the local agricultural economy. Just before the Seven Years War, the Landgrave promised not to force people into service if they could not be spared without harming the household. But in 1762, the state removed the distinction between the militia and subsidy army, and all suitable males were expected to serve if called. This penetrated the peasant household more deeply, taking away from the head of household decisions central to its economy and familial relations.73 The nature of the state, society, and economy of Hesse-Cassel became attached to the dictates of the British fiscal-military state, albeit more indirectly than within Great Britain and its colonies. From London, Hessians were viewed as so much military labor; from Hesse-Cassel, with the fortunes of the state resting on the sale of its population as soldiers, the people could not but take on a military cast.

The British Army also attempted directly to exploit the continental market in military labor. Warfare had wracked much of Europe throughout the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, causing social and

economic dislocation. In some areas, as Aaron Fogelman’s study of German immigration in the period reveals, the devastation proved so severe that traditional cultural practices had been subverted, opening the door for the emergence of new forms of social relations and economic production, with expansive states, profit-minded nobles, and commercially oriented peasants looking toward the market. For many pushed to the margins, emigration became an increasingly attractive option, particularly in southwestern Germany and parts of Switzerland. War in the seventeenth century had severely disturbed society in the region through depopulation, and significant change followed in its wake during the decades of peace. States grew in size and became more intrusive in village life. In agriculture, a shift occurred from the three-field system of usage that included common land to more commercial agriculture. The depopulation caused by warfare broke down traditional social and economic practices but also eventually led to marked demographic growth and socioeconomic change. As land proved readily available, people began marrying earlier and setting up independent households, farmed the land more intensively, and practiced partible inheritance. At the same time, both local nobles and the state sought to assert their control over their domains and enhance revenues. Peasants fought enclosure, attempts to alter inheritance patterns and restrain early marriage, and initiatives to push them into manufacturing, at times taking direct action. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, population growth peaked and landholdings were becoming too small to support a family. These processes led to a wave of emigration.  

The labor demands for the all-out North American offensive were such that the army turned to the continent to fill out the ranks. Britain’s Hanoverian dynasty and Protestant faith made Germans an obvious source to tap. Thus, when in February 1756, the government decided to raise a new regiment from among the Germans and Swiss resident in America to be called the Royal Americans (the 62nd, later 60th, Regiment), seasoned non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers were to be enlisted in Holland, Germany, and Switzerland to complement these raw recruits. Recruiting orders did stipulate “none but healthy Steady Men being protestants, and as many as he can procure who have already been in the Service”. The recruits should be between eighteen and thirty-five years old, 5’2” or taller, and no Frenchmen were to be taken. To secure as many recruits as possible, the army allowed the colonel some money “for the passage of a small number of Women and Children, which he will be indispensably [sic] Obliged to

74 Fogelman, Hopeful Journeys, pp. 6, 16, 18-28, 48-65.
take for the Success of the Affair and the acquisition of proper Men.\textsuperscript{75} The British in Frankfurt and Cologne found they were competing with recruiters from the imperial Prussian and Danish armies and were having some trouble meeting their requirements. The pickings proved so thin that one officer suggested getting men as indentured servants for America and then converting them to soldiers, presumably against their will.\textsuperscript{76} But in April, one recruiter reported that he expected to raise 100 good men in Germany. Later in August, he noted that, while the recruits seemed fairly good, he had hoped for more experienced soldiers, or tradesmen, but they were recruiting late in the season. An officer in New York upon reviewing these German recruits for the Royal Americans, complained that the majority were “Raw men”, while he also discovered “12 strange little Lads they Call Miners” and ten boys for drummers.\textsuperscript{77}

A glimpse into the nature of the German influx into the army can be found in one particular recruiting document of troops raised in Europe for service in the Royal Americans by Herbert, Baron de Munster.\textsuperscript{78} The data reveals that 94 of the 152 men recruited as privates and noncommissioned officers (61.8 per cent) reported having prior occupations, each with some specific skill ranging from gardener to peruke-maker but with only brewers, miners, and tailors reaching double figures. No one listed farmer or laborer, although it is safe to assume that some of the fifty-eight individuals who returned no occupation had performed manual labor or came from family farms. Recruits averaged twenty-four years of age, typical for the army as a whole, and it is likely that some had not yet set up independent households. Most appear to have come from German principalities, with Switzerland at twelve recruits the next most likely place of nativity, but others hailed from as far afield as Scotland (two NCOs), Poland, and Bohemia. Clusters of recruits came from individual places, as well: four from Basel, Switzerland; ten from Darmstadt in Hesse; ten from Frankfurt in Hesse; five from Freinsheim in the Palatinate; and nine listing Saxony as their birthplace. These recruits came from mixed occupational backgrounds, but one instance

\textsuperscript{75} Plan for recruiting in Germany [Feb. 1756], LO2576/19. The army also enlisted German Protestants from the prisoners of war of the French army held at Portsmouth. See Earl Loudoun, Memorandum Books, HM 1717, vol. 10, 11 March 1756, Manuscript Department, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California.


\textsuperscript{77} James Prevost to [Loudoun], 7 April 1756, LO1024/23; Prevost [to Loudoun], 14 Aug. 1756, LO149/34; John Young [to Loudoun], 2 Sept. 1756, LO681/38.

\textsuperscript{78} List of Recruits under Command of Herbert, Baron de Munster . . . arrived the 27th of August at New York, 1756, LO1607/37.
occurs of people of a particular occupation from the same town enlisting. Thirteen miners signed up from Clausdal (Clausthal) in Saxony in the Harz Mountains, a town that since the sixteenth century had been associated with the iron-mining industry promoted by the dukes of Brunswick. It is not clear what prompted this exodus from mining in Clausdal, but these individuals likely were the “12 strange little Lads they Call Miners” the Royal American officer referred to upon their arrival in New York.

The regimental returns from 1757 showed 607 foreigners enlisted in Europe with the army in America, or 4.3 per cent of the whole. The Royal Americans had also been active in recruiting foreigners in America. The returns show 803 such recruits in 1757, but it is not clear whether this figure included Scots and Irish recruited in the colonies as well as Germans, although the army sent German-speaking recruiting officers to Pennsylvania and posted recruiting announcements in “Dutch”. A clearer example of the German presence as a whole lies in the dispersion of foreigners throughout the regiments. Seven of seventeen units returned no foreigners recruited in America, and 507 of the 803 men (63.1 per cent) had found homes in the four battalions of the Royal American Regiment, the one specifically raised from Germans in the colonies. This regiment also had commissioned officers from Europe who spoke German.

Wars past and rapid socioeconomic change yielded a harvest of men from German Europe to fight in the red coat of Britain in the Seven Years War. At the same time, the desire of some heads of small states to profit from bartering their military labor power to Britain condemned their people to wage war not of their own making. Britain’s war industry proved blind to national or ethnic boundaries when it came to filling the ranks.

**America, reluctant recruiting ground**

Lord Loudoun, commander-in-chief of the American army, arrived in New York on 23 July 1756, and shortly thereafter began expressing his opinions of colonials. The general wrote in late August that colonials “have assumed to themselves what they Call Rights and Priviledges, Tottaly unknown in the Mother Country and are made use of, for no purpose, but to screen them, from giveing any aid, of any sort, for carrying on the Service”.

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80 From an analysis of the returns utilized in Table 10.1.
81 [Loudoun] to Cumberland, 29 Aug. 1756, LO1626/52.
between the army and colonists soon had congealed into bad blood and they
grew only more heated under Loudoun’s vice-regal rule. Conflict erupted
between the army and the colonies over issues of provisioning, quartering,
and trade, but the mobilization of military manpower constituted a root
source of disagreement. Raising an army in America brought the fiscal-
military state across the Atlantic and to colonies that had little experience
of the military revolution. Attempting to extract even a small proportion
of the British Army from the colonies cut into the heart of local economies and
made the British-American relationship all too frequently an adversarial
one, as a Chester County, Pennsylvania, tavern-keeper made all too clear.
On 12 December 1757, John Baldwin discovered Sergeant James Jobb of the
New York Independent Companies attempting to enlist two young men
and “Swore by God that he would beat the brains of any Scoundrel Soldier”
recruiting in his inn. The sergeant “answer’d that he had Lord Loudoun’s
Orders for what he was about”, to which Baldwin replied, “God Dam Lord
Loudoun and his Army too, they are all Scoundrels and a burden upon the
Country[,] What had he or his Army done Since their comeing but deprived
the people of their hands [indentured servants and hired laborers], and if
the Country Served them right they would kick them all out, like a parcel
of Scoundrells, as they are, for they would never do the Country any good.”
Baldwin then attacked Jobb, wounding him, while his friends attacked
the recruiting party, causing them to flee. Two days later, Baldwin and
his companions disrupted Jobb and his party when recruiting in another
tavern in Wilmington, Delaware, leading to a “Ryot” and the wounding of
several soldiers. Baldwin had laid his hands not only on one poor recruiting
sergeant, but also on the pulse of the conflict over recruiting: who would
control America’s labor, army officers or colonial masters, and to what
ends, state or private?

The supply of military labor, both the provincial troops raised by the colo-
nies and the regular troops recruited by the army in the colonies, provided
a flashpoint for internecine conflict. Every year the commander-in-chief
informed the colonial governors of the number of provincial troops he
expected the colonies to raise for the campaign. The scale of mobiliza-
tion demanded by the British eclipsed past war efforts and the economic
wherewithal of the colonies, so foot-dragging naturally occurred. The often-
strained relations between the executive and legislative branches of colonial
governments, the assemblies’ control of the purse strings, and in certain
instances the prevalence of internal sectarian politics meant the number of

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82 Information of James Jobb, 14 Dec. 1757, LO5011/111.
provincial troops actually fielded often fell well short of those requested. For example, the army requested 9,000 provincial troops for the 1756 campaign against Fort Crown Point and the provinces fielded 6,434 privates and NCOs. And General James Abercromby called for 20,000 provincial troops in total for the 1758 campaign and, although this was supported by Pitt’s promise to reimburse the colonial governments, in April he reported that fewer than 18,000 had mobilized.\textsuperscript{83}

Constitutional concerns regarding the exercise of imperial powers only partly explain the colonies’ reluctance to mobilize on the scale expected of them. The negative impact of extracting so many men from the civil economy worried officials, but so did the fact that broad mobilization caught up those of a status not normally expected to serve in the ranks. Governor Thomas Pownall explained Massachusetts’s failure to meet Abercromby’s request for provincial troops in 1758 in terms that revealed the same class politics operated in the colonies as did in Britain.

I believe the real Truth is in attempting to raise 7,000 Men, we have overreached our Strength, the last thousand edges too near upon those who from their Situation & Circumstances thought it would not come to their Share […] Laws will execute themselves while they extend only to a given rank of Men, but when they begin to entrench upon a Rank above that, you are sensible how much they labour and are obstructed.\textsuperscript{84}

Class status played a key role in provincial mobilization throughout the war. The colonial assemblies forced men into service in their regiments, while the usual allowance of the provision of a substitute worked to ensure most draftees came from the laboring classes.\textsuperscript{85} Colonial leaders thus did not scruple at forcing many of their own citizens into the provincial regiments,

\textsuperscript{83} James Abercromby, Return of Provincial Forces of the Several Colonies raised for the reduction of Crown Point, 26 June, 1756, LO1254/28; W[illiam] Shirley to Sir Thomas Robinson, 11 Aug. 1755, LO622/13; Massachusetts General Court, Resolutions regarding Crown Point, 14 Jan. 1756, LO759/17; Connecticut General Assembly, Resolution on the raising of men and money for operations in 1756, 21 Jan. 1756, LO763/17; [Abercromby] Circular Letter to the Governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, 15 March 1758, no. 45, box 1, Abercromby Papers, Huntington Library [henceforth in form AB45/1]; [Abercromby] to Wm. Pitt, 28 April 1758, AB15/5.

\textsuperscript{84} Pownall to Abercromby, 19 June 1758, AB366/8.

\textsuperscript{85} Anderson, A People’s Army, pp. 41-42; Cress, Citizens in Arms, pp. 5-7; Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, pp. 155-162; Titus, The Old Dominion at War, pp. 59, 63-65, 79-80, 98-100, 145-148; Ferling, “Soldiers for Virginia”, p. 316.
but balked when their own class confronted the possibility of having to serve in the front ranks.

The colonies took advantage of their control over the raising and provisioning of provincial troops to limit the impact of mobilization; however, the army exercised direct authority in the recruiting of colonials to the regular forces, and this subject proved more contentious in the British-American relationship. Colonial resistance to British recruitment to the armed services, in particular impressment to the Royal Navy, had a long tradition. In the Seven Years War, however, the enlistment of volunteers to the army provoked much controversy, superficially because of the tactics used in recruitment, but at root due to the impact mass mobilization had on the labor requirements of the colonial economies.

Enlisting in America ran essentially the same as in Britain, even though the part of the Mutiny Act dealing with recruitment did not apply until 1756. Recruiters were allowed levy money for each man, from which they had to provide necessaries, provisions, and transportation, as well as offer a bounty to lure men into the service. But commanding officers pressured them “to get the Recruits as cheap as you can”. Recruiting officers, in their rush to man the army, at times stooped to trickery, and this inflamed public opinion. James McDonell claimed that, while drinking with a friend, he fell in with a recruiting party from the New York Independent Companies, “as he was told next Morning, being that Night so Drunk that he doth not remember seeing a Red Coat in the house, and was greatly surprised in the Morning when the said Corporal told him he was enlisted”. He deserted and received 200 lashes in punishment. Other prospects could require greater subtlety. A Royal Americans recruiting party owed Joshua Boud money for food and lodging in his public house. He took a dollar, he thought in payment, but the soldiers said he had enlisted and took him before a magistrate, who, despite his refusal to enlist, confined him without subsistence until he yielded.

Sharp recruiting practices, acknowledged and tolerated to a degree in Britain, prompted more controversy in the colonies, and to an extent tainted all recruiting for the regular army. Horatio Sharpe, Maryland’s governor,

86 Most notably, a November 1747 impressment riot in Boston. See Rogers, Empire and Liberty, pp. 38-40; Brunsman, “The Knowles Atlantic Impressment Riots of the 1740s”.
87 Lt Col Gage’s Recruiting Instructions, [3 Jan. 1758], LO5328/115. Levying recruits to the Royal American regiment required an estimated £5 per man in 1756. See Estimate of the several Articles of Expense on the American Service, [March 1756], LO6728/22.
89 Joshua Boude, Petition to Loudoun [1756], LO2456/57.
informed Loudoun that recruiting parties for the 44th and 48th Regiments had attacked a vessel in a river and assaulted several persons, including a County High Sheriff in his own house.90 Some citizens brought “Vexatious Suits” in the courts of law against recruiting officers for performing their duties.91 Debts owed by putative recruits were invented or inflated and the men got themselves incarcerated to prevent their having to join the army.92 Colonists could turn to violence if obstruction did not work. A Philadelphia mob attacked recruiters in 1756, beating a sergeant to death, jailing the rest, and liberating the enlisted men.93 Three riots took place in Wilmington, Delaware, in the fall of 1757, in which recruiters suffered beatings. Although the recruiting officer knew the identity of the mob leaders, he did not trust local authorities to prosecute.94 “I have had my party out in the Country but they generally get Mob’d”, Captain Mackay reported from Portsmouth, Maine, in December 1757; “one of them was beat in the Streets the other Evening by five Sailors, as yet I can make no discovery of the Authors, but I have a warrant out against one who has taken the liberty to threaten”.95 In Boston on February 3, 1758 a “Broil […] between a Mob, & some of the Recruiting Parties” took place over NCOs allegedly committing “some imprudences that hurt ye Service. To see a Drunken Man lugg’d thro’ ye Streets on a Souldiers back guarded by others wither it was or was not to carry him before a Justice to swear must certainly give a Strong impression of ye method of enlist- ing & certainly have an ill effect on an inflam’d Mobb”, warned Governor Pownall of Massachusetts. However, Boston justices investigated the “Noise & Tumult” and attributed it to “some mistaken apprehensions among some Young and undesigning Persons”.96 Questionable recruiting practices help explain some of the colonial opposition to the mobilization of manpower, but deeper social and economic factors also played a role.

The struggle over labor most clearly evinced itself in the army’s recruitment of indentured servants. From the military’s perspective, the need for fighting men trumped all other concerns during wartime; to masters

90 Horatio Sharpe to Loudoun, 18 May 1757, LO6353/80.
91 In one instance, the 44th Regiment had to pay the attorney general of the Jersies £12. 16s. for defending recruiting officers from such suits: John Duncan, 44th Regiment of Foot on Account of Recruiting &c for the Year 1757, 24 June 1757, LO6600/86.
93 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America, p. 107; Rogers, Empire and Liberty, p. 42.
94 Capt. Charles Cruickshank to Loudoun, 14 Dec. 1757, LO5012/111.
95 Samuel Mackay to Col Forbes, 16 Dec. 1757, LO5023/111.
96 T. Pownall to Loudoun, 6, 13 Feb. 1758, LO5547/119, LO5569/120; Boston justices to Pownall, 7 Feb. 1758, LO5550/119.
who viewed their servants as commodities, enlistment constituted theft. Instructions for raising the regiments for the 1755 campaign indicated that indentured servants should not enlist without the consent of their masters,\(^{97}\) but in the wake of Braddock’s defeat the need to bring the regiments up to strength led Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts, acting commander-in-chief, to remove this exception. By February 1756, a crisis brewed. Horatio Sharpe warned that masters, “having a great part of their Property vested in Servants”, were outraged by the practice, and expressed fears that “an Insurrection of the People is likely to ensue”.\(^{98}\) Corbin Lee, who managed an iron forge in Maryland worked by indentured servants, complained not only of the loss of the labor but also of the tactics practiced by recruiters. “It is not unusual with many of these recruiting Gentlemen when they meet with a person that will not be bullied out of his Property and tamely give up his Servant without any sort of Recompense immediately to deem him an Enemy to his Majesty’s Service.” He believed the actions of the recruiting officer to be “Illegal nay felonious; for they stole into our Plantations disguis’d like thieves in the dead of night made our Servants Drunk forced them to inlist and curried them off”.\(^{99}\) The Pennsylvania General Assembly advised the lieutenant governor that many masters had complained “a great Number of Bought Servants are lately inlisted by the Recruiting Officers now in this Province, and clandestinely or by open Force conveyed away”, yet according to the law masters possessed “as true & as just a Property in the Servant bought as they had before in the Money with which he was purchas’d”.\(^{100}\)

Complaints soon turned to legal action. “The officers have been arrested for entertaining these Servants, Violences used by the Populace” in Pennsylvania and Maryland “for recovering them from the Officers, and the Servants imprison’d for inlisting”, lamented William Shirley. He looked to the king to establish a policy in an attempt to allay “the present disputes & Heart-burnings”. Masters of two servants enlisted in New York sued the recruiting lieutenant of the 48th Regiment in 1756, and he had to post bail or be jailed. That same year several Pennsylvania masters initiated legal proceedings against recruiters. Colonial lawyers, revealingly, argued that servants, as property, had no free will, and thus could not be taken against

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\(^{97}\) Recruiting Instructions [1755], LO727/15.  
\(^{98}\) Horatio Sharpe to William Shirley, 2 Feb. 1756, LO793/186.  
\(^{99}\) Corbin Lee to Gov. Horatio Sharp, 30 April 1757, LO3506/76.  
their masters’ wishes." Direct action against recruiters also occurred. Pieter Van Ingen of the Royal Americans enlisted a servant of Samuel Henry at Trenton, New Jersey, in August 1756. Henry later confronted him in a tavern demanding his servant or money in recompense, striking him on the head with an iron-tipped cane when he refused. Van Ingen chased him off with his sword, but Henry returned with friends in an attempt to capture the servant. Again the recruiting party drove them off. When they tried to leave, though, Henry attacked Van Ingen with a pitchfork, which he parried with his sword. He retreated inside and had his men fasten knives to poles. They sallied forth and routed Henry’s party, which surrendered the field and the servant. But when mob rule failed, Henry turned to the law, and had a justice send a constable to Van Ingen demanding he give up the man or the money, or go to jail. Van Ingen refused and a writ was served upon him, and he was jailed in a “Stinking” cell despite the protest of his colonel as to the illegality of his imprisonment.

The ongoing furore over recruitment necessitated state intervention. Parliament extended the Mutiny Act to the colonies and adopted legislation on the recruitment of both free individuals and indentured servants in March 1756. To quell any complaints that free men had been duped into enlisting, the law required a recruit to be taken to a justice of the peace after twenty-four hours and within four days of his listing to swear to his willingness to enlist. If he balked, he had to return the levy money and pay 20s sterling for expenses; otherwise he was considered enlisted. The act also addressed the thorny issue of recruiting indentured servants, making it lawful to recruit indentured servants who volunteered, but stipulated that, if the owner protested within six months, the recruiting officer must either give up the servant upon being repaid the enlisting money, or pay the master a sum to be determined by two justices of the peace based on the original purchase price and the amount of time left to be served. Parliament with this act codified the fiscal-military state’s premise that the army’s need for manpower prevailed over private  

102 Pieter Van Ingen, Affidavit, 18 April 1757, LO3376/74; James Prevost [to Loudoun], 5 April 1757, LO3294/72; John Smyth, certificate, 6 April 1757, LO3300/73.
103 Great Britain, Parliament [An act for the better recruiting of His Majesty’s Forces on the Continent of America; and for the Regulation of the Army . . .]. 25 March 1756, LO2583/21.
104 In response, Benjamin Franklin filed a petition on behalf of fellow Pennsylvania masters claiming £3,652 and a half pence Pennsylvania currency for 612 servants listed: List of Servants
interest, whether communal or familial concern for the liberty of individuals who enlisted, or masters’ property in human labor for the purpose of individual economic gain. In taking this position the act effectively made the army the preeminent employer of labor in the colonies, at once master to free laborers and bonded servants purchased from reluctant owners.

The recruiting legislation did not prevent conflict from occurring over mobilization in the colonies, however, as it did not remove the root issue of control of labor power. “We shall have a great deal of difficulty to recruit of our Regiment”, confessed an officer, “the People of this Country having no great affection for a red Coat, nor do they stay long with us after they list when they find an opportunity to take their leave.” Another complained “there is a general backwardness in the people of this province to the Kings service, which is but too much encouraged by all sorts of people, as they seem to consider every man, we enlist, as a real loss to the Province”. Thus regiments in Halifax found it necessary to recruit as far south as Maryland in 1756, having more luck the further south they went, whereas those in South Carolina two years later had to strike 300 miles northward. The physical requirements were also lowered with any man “free from Ruptures, Convulsions, and Infirmities, and fit for service”, being acceptable. In 1758, Loudoun remarked that if the army wanted to get “fighting men, We must not at present Insist either on Size or Beauty”. Perhaps this explains how John Rainsdown, described as “hump back’d, crook’d Legs, and 4 feet 6 inches high”, got into the Royal Americans. Still, the army operated well below its strength on paper. Such reluctance to serve in the regulars played a role in Pitt’s decision to send ever more regular regiments to America.

The army competed directly with other employers for labor but government policy limited what they could offer recruits. The colonial provincial regiments in particular monopolized men of recruiting age because they offered better terms of employment. The provinces paid higher bounties

Belonging to the inhabitants of Pennsylvania and taken into His Majesty’s Service, 21 April 1757, LO341/74.
106 Charles Lawrence to Loudoun, 19 Oct. 1756, LO2042/46; Officers belonging to the Regiments in Nova Scotia upon Recruiting Duty, [9 Nov. 1756], LO2186/50; John Tulleken [to Loudoun], 29 Jan. 1758, LO5486/118.
than the typical £3 inducement for regular recruits.\textsuperscript{108} The regular army's term of service also played a role as well. As a rule, men enlisted for life during peacetime. The need for ever more bodies during wartime, however, forced the army at times to offer short-term service, usually three to five years, but sometimes fewer. Nonetheless, life enlistment remained the basic experience of regular troops in the Seven Years War.\textsuperscript{109} By comparison, provincial soldiers typically signed on for the campaign, usually spring through fall. Provincial service paid better wages as well. Regular soldiers received a daily wage of eight pence, two of which were deducted as “off-reckonings” for payments to various offices (the Exchequer, Paymaster General, Chelsea Hospital, the regimental agent), and to provide the troops’ annual regimental clothing, necessaries, and accoutrements (a further seven pence per week went to the regimental surgeon and paymaster, and to cover company expenses for a man’s “necessaries” like shoes, gaiters, arms repair, and barbering).\textsuperscript{110} Fred Anderson, for example, calculated the net income (wage, food, and lodging) of a Massachusetts soldier at 2s provincial currency per day, or roughly twice that of a regular.\textsuperscript{111} Virginia provincials, by comparison, received only 8d a day local currency (worth 40–70 per cent of sterling), which compared unfavorably to the 2–3s a day wages for unskilled labor or to the earnings of provincials in neighboring colonies, no doubt contributing to the need for the colony to conscript troops in the war’s early years and to offer higher bounties later on.\textsuperscript{112} The average wage for the provincials from the more northerly colonies who did most of the fighting, however, was significantly more than their redcoated comrades in arms.

Many colonists did join the regulars despite all the conflict surrounding recruitment, especially in the first two years of the war. For the regiments that returned the nativity of troops in 1757, those born in the American colonies accounted for 755 of 14,166 men (5.3 per cent) and natives of Europe enlisted in the colonies for 803 (5.7 per cent), making more than one in

\textsuperscript{108} For example, Massachusetts bounties inflated from £3-£4 in 1755 to a peak of more than £26 in 1760. See Anderson, A People’s Army, p. 225.

\textsuperscript{109} For example, the 45th Regiment, which had been stationed in Halifax since the previous war and had recruited extensively in North America, reported in 1757 that of its 955 soldiers: 819 (85.8 per cent) had enlisted for life, 1 for twenty years (0.1 per cent), 1 for seven (0.1 per cent), 5 for six (0.5 per cent), 2 for four (0.2 per cent), and 127 men (13.3 per cent) had signed on for three years. See Muster Rolls of the 45th Regiment, April 1757, LO6987/76.


\textsuperscript{111} Anderson, A People’s Army, pp. 38-39.

\textsuperscript{112} Titus, Old Dominion at War, pp. 4-45, 163 n. 87; Robert Dinwiddie to Loudoun, 24 May 1756, LO1175/26.
every ten soldiers an “American” recruit (Table 10.1). In recruiting such numbers, the British Army did not merely target the marginal but reached into the heart of colonial production. In a sample of sixty-six regular recruits mostly from the Boston area, forty-one (62.1 per cent) came from artisanal backgrounds (with shoemakers and tailors being most represented), eleven (16.7 per cent) came from agriculture, eleven (16.7 per cent) had performed manual labor, and three (4.5 per cent) clerical or professional work.

An account of recruiting in America clearly reveals the army's impact on colonial economies. Great differences existed between regions, most strikingly between north and south because of the latter's growing dependence on slavery. But in the mid-Atlantic region and New England, the two main areas of recruitment for the army, petty production based upon the household in the agricultural and the craft sectors, proved the norm, with familial labor playing an important role and, particularly in the mid-Atlantic, bonded labor making significant contributions. At the same time, labor scarcity prevailed throughout the colonies. Military recruitment exacerbated this situation and this clash between household production and state-sponsored enterprise on an Atlantic scale partly explains the fractious experience of mobilization. Its effect on indentured servitude figured centrally. First without any explicit policy, then with the backing of a British parliamentary act, the army “freed” many servants from bondage and introduced them to paid military labor. Although it promised reimbursement for the loss of contract time, cash could not immediately replace scarce labor. Likewise, the recruiting of free men hit farm and craft households, where the young men targeted by the army performed important labor as family members, apprentices or journeymen, and servants. Their call to arms produced cries of concern as it meant a loss of labor, one reason why colonials looked more favorably upon enlistment to the provincial regiments, given the annual term of service and the fact that money earned tended to be expended locally. To the extent that the regular army (with the government’s backing) facilitated the recruitment of such men and their abstraction from family and village for longer periods, it had a direct impact on domestic economies.

114 For a full presentation of this data, see Way, “Rebellion of the Regulars”, pp. 768–769.
British demands for support thus met with American recalcitrance and outright resistance to the effort to mobilize manpower in the Seven Years War. In the process of a massive mutual enterprise, feelings of difference sharpened, acquiring an edge that the infusion of funds from the British fiscal-military state and the shared military success of the later war years blunted, but the blade had been tempered and needed only another imperial crisis to whet the distinction between Briton and American.

**Conclusion**

Warfare in the eighteenth century operated according to the principles of the military revolution, the basic premise of which hinged on bringing as many men as possible onto the battlefield. For every nation-state, mobilization occurred within a particular political economy at a particular moment in history. In the era of the Seven Years War, a rapidly commercializing economy spread across British dominions and created a surplus of labor that facilitated raising the army. England's control of other political states, achieved through successive colonization of Ireland and union with Scotland, cemented by the repression of the Jacobite threat, enabled the expropriation of their wealth to fund military endeavors and the exploitation of their populations as sources of military labor, while commercialization of their economies along English lines freed individuals from ties to the soil and trades. The attempt to exercise similar force in the American colonies, where labor scarcity prevailed, encountered more resistance from people less used to the yoke of British rule, whose economic activities relied upon the control of labor that could be sorely spared for soldiering. However, the financial might of Britain bought American compliance, particularly in the funding of the provincial regiments, and colonists in the tens of thousands joined the fight against France either as regulars or colonial troops. Warfare for Britain thus required not a simple conjoining of state interest and military acumen, but rested upon the historical development of capital and ongoing class formation, enabling the fiscal-military state to colonize the resources and labor power of dependent polities. As a result, the nation could rely on volunteers to practice the art of war in its interests.
Mobilization of warrior populations in the Ottoman context, 1750-1850

Virginia H. Aksan

Mustafa Vasfi Efendi of Kabud, a native of a village near Tokat, in Anatolia, Turkey, spent the years from 1801 to 1833 in Ottoman military service, first in Erzurum, as part of the troops under Dramali Mahmud Pasha, then in Agriboz (Euboia, Greece), where he signed on with Carhaci (Chief Skirmisher) Ali Pasha, and then Omer Vyroni Pasha, during the Greek Revolution. His simplistic, semi-literate description of battles, sieges, looting, and pillaging is one of the few pre-World War I Ottoman military memoirs we possess. The following passage is typical of the work, and is evocative of the life of one Ottoman irregular. Vasfi Efendi’s escapade here appears to have been a private enterprise, and evoked no discipline other than a scolding from his commander.

“The Janissaries, because they were on foot, soon fell behind,” he begins. “We, who had good horses, went on ahead. We were altogether eighteen horsemen. Anyway, we went off and arrived in an infidel village.” They sat down under two mulberry trees, whereupon some local inhabitants approached them, and said: “We are afraid of you. We have wives and daughters on that mountain over there. If you give us protection, we will come down. We said: ‘the pasha has sent us and we have orders to protect you.’ The infidels were extremely glad, went away and brought lamb and bread to us. About twenty to thirty women and girls came with them.” The cavalrymen grew afraid of being outnumbered, and isolated for the night, when they assumed the infidels would slay them, so “[we] took the infidels, cut off their heads, captured these thirty women and girls, and took off.” They came upon a church, captured the infidels who were inside the church, cut off their heads and hid in the church for the night. They found 5,000 sheep beside the church the next day, and with sheep and captives, returned towards their camp. On the way back, an encounter with a troop of janissaries resulted in their losing captives and booty at gunpoint. “I had a girl and woman with me, and two mules. They [the janissaries] arrived, plundered all my possessions. I remained behind as a simple foot soldier.” Then, running into other janissaries, Vasfi pretended to be of their number and complained of his treatment by his comrades. A Kurdish servant of the janissaries addressed those who had abused him: “you have taken this
man’s possessions, slave girls, and severed infidels’ heads. Things like this do not befit our corps. Now give this man his belongings.” Vasfı Efendi thus retrieved his booty, and returned to camp. His commander rewarded him with two coins for the heads, but chastised him that the deli horsemen (his regiment presumably) had no business advancing ahead of the main army corps.¹

What was it to be employed as a hired gun, either enlisted irregular or mercenary, in the Ottoman military system? Embedded in Mustafa’s description is the problem that confronts us when we try to examine military labor in the Ottoman context. Inter-service rivalries, motivation, loyalty, and discipline – common problems for historians of all armies – are all evident in his account, which is predominantly a tale about military entrepreneurship. Over the long history of the empire, words such as deli, başıbozuk, sekban, sarıca, and levend, terms for bands of warriors, or semi-autonomous regiments, unpredictable and often lethal, have come to exemplify the breakdown of the Ottoman “classical” military after 1650. In the nineteenth century, the notorious başıbozuks (literally “broken-headed” or “masterless” ones), Ottoman irregulars, were blamed for almost all disturbances, but especially the so-called Bulgarian atrocities which led to the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878. The extent to which the images of such irregulars are embedded in the public imagination of post-Ottoman national histories is one of the chief differences between the Ottomans and the other regions of our collaborative project.

This chapter will explore the ways in which the Ottomans conceptualized and utilized volunteer and contractual soldiers over time, especially for the period 1750-1850; I argue that, during one of the most difficult periods for the survival of the empire, the Ottomans evolved from a largely commissioned state army (the janissaries and the timariots) into a federative military system that came to be dominated by semi-autonomous fighters, first as auxiliaries to the traditional janissary/sipahi organization and then as entrepreneurial ethnic bands. This is John Lynn’s “aggregate contract army”, consisting of small numbers of state troops, mercenary bands, and private armies raised by provincial elites. Local officials, in effect, had become military contractors, a system which empowered provincial households and sanctioned the perpetuation of a style and ethos of military life that

persisted into the twentieth century. In what follows, I will schematize the kind of forces available to the sultans before 1700 and how they financed the system before turning to the changes evident after 1750 when the need for manpower became particularly acute in the northern frontier wars with the Russians. As the classical Ottoman military formations broke down, a large proportion of the Ottoman population became complicit in and tied to the Ottoman center through tax privileges and contractual obligations to supply the battlefields of the empire.

Aspects of the pre-1700 Ottoman system

Prior to 1700, the Ottoman military system was based on three components: the janissary standing infantry, created in the fourteenth century and numbering some 20,000 in Süleyman the Magnificent's time (1520-1566); the fief-based timariots, the sipahis, a cavalry class which could muster some 80,000 for imperial campaigns; and auxiliary troops raised locally, with well-defined roles in skirmishing, guarding mountain passes, and garrison support for the Ottoman expansion, especially on the European frontier. The Ottoman strategy with newly conquered populations was to negotiate tax benefits based on the potential of local martial expertise and intelligence.

The Ottoman Empire maintained such center/periphery relationships as a contractual, negotiated enterprise until the 1830s, a system which proved flexible as it accumulated new territories. While coercive in initial conquest, the extension of Ottoman power proved highly adaptive to widely diverse local situations, and attempted no real integration except as related to shari’a law and taxes. Using local systems of defense and awarding tax breaks were attractive instruments to frontier populations initially and, in the early days of empire, Christian as well as Muslim auxiliaries acquired

2 The most recent assessments of the pre-1700 Ottoman military are by Ágoston, “Empires and Warfare in East-Central Europe”, and Murphey, “Ottoman Military Organisation in South-Eastern Europe”.

3 Palmira Brummett, Nicholas Vatin, Gilles Veinstein, Hasan Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski have expanded our knowledge of Ottoman dynastic self-conception and projection as well, but there is much to do to put the Ottoman house in a comparative context as regards sovereignty, imperial designs, and military manpower. A recent work goes a long way to bridging the gap: Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History. Birdal, The Holy Roman Empire and the Ottomans, is an example of new work on the eastern land empires. Also important are Brummett, “Imagining the Early Modern Ottoman Space”; Vatin and Veinstein, Le sérail ébranlé; and Karateke and Reinkowski, Legitimizing the Order.
privileges based on their service in the military system. As time went by, “turning Turk” (becoming Muslim by conversion) was the route to power, whether you were Albanian, Bulgarian, or Serbian. Even then, apart from the *devşirme*, the slave tributary children destined for the janissaries, such conversions were largely voluntary.\(^4\)

What motivated such populations? For the earlier centuries, the *ghazi* warrior, that is, the Muslim warrior whose motivation was solely ideological, was long argued as instrumental to the success of the Ottoman imperial drive for expansion of the *Dar-al-Islam*. Though challenged by new comprehensive views on the diversity of the ethnic and religious populations who collaborated with the house of Osman in the early years, the idea of the fanatical Muslim warrior remains prevalent in much of the literature.\(^5\)

The argument is made that the primary Ottoman social hierarchies and tax categories before 1750 were delineated around religion: Muslims and non-Muslims. Non-Muslims were tolerated as second-class citizens who paid a poll tax (*cizye*) and were not allowed to serve in the military. The *askeri* (military) class, those who did fight and achieved tax-exempt status, were nominally Muslim warrior populations. But it would be naive to insist on the Muslimness of men who surely were motivated by the same self-interest and social networks characteristic of all military environments. Self-interest is especially evident in the eighteenth century when the state came to rely more and more on irregular troops under the command of local provincial elites. Campaign headquarters on the European and Persian frontiers certainly operated as the Ottoman government-on-parade, and employment in the military was naturally a ritual of submission, an essential part of the Ottoman performance of sovereignty, but cash rewards, as indicated in Mustafa’s story, remained a constant incentive for participation in the Ottoman system until at least the 1820s.

In short, auxiliary or mobile warriors, Muslim and Christian, did have a fair amount of autonomy over their participation in imperial campaigns or postings at strategic fortress garrisons. Until the end of the eighteenth century, purging of the Ottoman forces of “infidels” was not part of Ottoman policy. That is to say, little systematic inspection about the “Muslimness” of

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4 This remains a much contested subject in the field. On conversion in the seventeenth century, see Krstić, *Contested Conversions to Islam*; David and Fodor, *Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders*; Anscombe, “Albanians and Mountain Bandits”; Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*; and Minkov, *Conversion to Islam in the Balkans*.

5 Finkel, *Osman’s Dream*; Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650*, 2nd edn; Barkey, *Empire of Difference*. See also Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans among Early Modern Empires”. For an assessment of Barkey’s book and two others, see Aksan, “Turks and Ottomans among the Empires”.  


the Ottoman rank-and-file troops, whether in the janissaries, sipahi cavalry troops or the myriad auxiliaries, seems to have occurred. Declaring oneself Muslim often sufficed for certification and a piece of paper, such as the janissary esame (pay chit), or the six-month contract as part of a mercenary unit, guaranteed an attachment to the dynasty. This was particularly true of the provincial garrisons, where a web of military entrepreneurial networks coalesced around tax revenues and agriculture beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, which would have attracted local inhabitants in considerable numbers.

Call it Ottoman pragmatism or Ottoman secularism, there seems to have been a tolerance for notional Muslimness in these military milieus. Conversely, one of the great ironies of the Ottoman dynasty is that it expressed itself as most “Muslim” after the 1820s, precisely when shrinking territories made manpower shortages a potential problem, and put pressure on central Anatolia Muslim male populations. For the Ottomans, the need to mobilize volunteer warriors became paramount when empire-wide conscription or general mobilization was attempted in the nineteenth century, but the resistance to including Christians restricted the available population to Muslims, and the call to holy war (jihad) seldom produced substantial numbers.6

The post-1700 environment

After 1700, the main obsession of the dynasty was the preservation of the Danubian, Black Sea, and Caucasus borders against the predations of the Russians, their chief and relentlessly successful foe. The need to defend the borders, which became a matter of survival, engendered different relationships between the center and its warrior populations, two aspects of which are noteworthy: the mobility and utilization of diverse ethno-religious nomadic and warrior populations, and the expansion of the askeri (military) population via the redistribution of the wealth of the state. What is striking in this context, as compared to European armies of this later period, is the proportion of horsemen (cavalry) that continued to be available to the dynasty, either in state-financed auxiliary regiments, or as ethnically constructed warrior bands, as contrasted to the European battlefields where

6 Hakan Erdem is very good on this: “Recruitment of ‘Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad’”. The year 1908 was the first time there was a mobilization of “citizens” regardless of religion or ethnicity. See also Aksan, “Ottoman Military and Social Transformations”.
warfare turned to armed confrontations of large numbers of disciplined infantrymen, and cavalry forces served very specific, increasingly limited functions. The obsession with the northern frontier battlefront arc also led in the Ottoman case to a neglect of the southern tier of the empire which allowed for the expansion of nomadic and mobile populations, such as the Bedouin and Kurdish tribes, who maintained autonomy by their original submission to Ottoman hegemony and payment of annual tributes to the central treasury.

Reşat Kasaba has recently theorized that the persistence of mobile populations was facilitated by the important roles they played, such as protecting the Hajj route caravans, and defending the Iranian border against Nadir Shah in the early eighteenth century. The failure to impose sedentarization on such tribal structures, however, ultimately caused the dynasty endless problems in the nineteenth century, especially in forging a modern, conscripted, and disciplined military force from such populations.7

By contrast, in both the Austrian and Russian contexts, fixing the frontiers included efforts to settle what had once been zones of economic and cultural exchange where warrior societies dominated. As the work of Gunther E. Rothenberg and Carol B. Stevens has demonstrated, both Habsburgs and Romanovs strove to settle autonomous warrior populations, the former using Serbs and Croats for a military corridor, the latter engaging to tame frontier populations such as the Cossacks by establishing military colonies guarding the Russian territorial expansion to the south.8 The Ottomans faced a different problem. As the Ottoman Empire contracted after 1700, demobilized soldiers flooded across newly agreed-upon borders, and not all were absorbed, or could be absorbed, into the military environment. It is not insignificant that all the Habsburg-Ottoman treaties from 1699 on have specific clauses relating to how the two sides ought to deal with frontier-transgressing soldiers.9 The failure to settle demobilized populations such as the janissaries crossing into the homeland from Europe after 1700 is very significant, and virtually untouched in the research, the exception perhaps being Vidin, where Rossitsa Gradeva and her colleagues have ably described a city that shifted from being Ottoman hinterland to

7 Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*; Aharoni, *The Pasha’s Bedouin*, has interesting observations about the contrast between Ottoman (Mehmed Ali) and French attitudes to Bedouin tribesmen.
8 Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia*; Stevens, *Soldiers on the Steppes*; see also Stevens, *Russia’s Wars of Emergence*.
Ottoman frontier garrison town after 1699. Thus, the Ottomans had both indigenous nomadic populations and unemployed, demobilized soldiers to contend with as they undertook to reform the military system.

The Ottomans attempted to change the rules regarding tribal/state relationships as the need for the manpower and revenues of Arab and Kurdish tribesmen became acute, especially in the long struggle with Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt over greater Syria from 1821 to 1841. Historians now generally allow that it is only then, when the Ottomans were trying to recover or integrate lost or tenuously held territories such as the mountainous frontiers of Albania or the Caucasus for the first time, that they can be said to have acted as an internal colonial power by civilizing such martial populations. The power of the tribal networks, paradoxically, is said to have expanded in direct proportion to the state’s interest in centralization and reform.

Stefan Winter’s project on the rural history of Ottoman Syria in the nineteenth century is particularly instructive about the Ottoman application of ethnographic labels to hitherto undifferentiated tribal groups as one aspect of Ottoman (re)centralization projects. These were the populations, not just Kurds and Bedouins, but also Albanians and Circassians, who remained fiercely martial and proudly autonomous until the early 1900s, upon whom the Ottoman dynasty came to rely for military labour.

The expansion of the military population

How do we define an Ottoman subject of the askeri class at the turn of the eighteenth century? Recent, systematic work on the Ottoman idea of political households and the devolution of state wealth as tax farms has had

10 Gradeva, “Between Hinterland and Frontier”. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor have also edited two volumes on Hungarian-Ottoman military affairs: Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent and Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe. A recent dissertation, by Tolga Esmer, “A Culture of Rebellion”, includes significant evidence concerning the breakdown of askeri-reaya categories following 1699, and especially in the long struggle between Selim III and Osman Pasvantoğlu of Vidin.

11 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism”, discusses why the Ottomans should be seen as a colonial power in the second half of the nineteenth century; Winter, “The Province of Raqqa under Ottoman Rule”, forms part of an extended project underway: “Tribes and Voivodes of Ottoman Syria: A Rural History of the Early Modern Period”. See also Kühn, “Borderlands of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th and Early 20th Century”, with articles by Thomas Kühn, Isa Blumi, Ryan Gingeras and Charles Herzog. For the Yemen context, a late Ottoman colonial frontier, see Willis, “Making Yemen Indian”.

a great deal to tell us. Tributary, clientage, and patronage relationships were essential to the initial conquests of Ottoman territories as well as to its later survival. In the seventeenth century, we see the expansion of elaborate and expensive household systems which often included military units that drew on the mercenary populations in the provinces. Such relationships, conceptualized as political households, were built on the ability to command coalitions of soldiers and slaves, led by charismatic families who acquired or wrested access to larger and larger parts of provincial revenues, and maintained networks of communication and influence in Istanbul as time went on. That the source of much of this manpower derived from captured slaves turned valued members of an extended family may be the unique aspect of the Ottoman context.

The greatest of the slave/political households was initially that of the sultan and his “sons”, the janissaries, and his harem. Emulating that household at the Ottoman center were “native” families of influence, organized similarly, and competing for the ranks of the ulema and the central administrative offices. These could be made up of slaves (kuls) who might even establish their own slave household. Such was the household of Husrev Pasha, the notorious adviser of Mahmud II, whose Circassian slave household populated much of the late nineteenth-century Ottoman administration. All members of the ruling class derived some privilege via membership in these collectives, the askeri class largely writ, which meant an intensification of competition for access to the resources of the state.

Such political households, replicated on a smaller scale in the provinces, and including slave/client members, grew ubiquitous after the early seventeenth century. How this happened is just now unfolding as more and more regional archival studies are published. The redistribution of state revenues, from timars to tax farming, first annual and then life-term (malikane), as well as the widespread application of new, extraordinary taxes (avariz) to support lengthy military campaigns, empowered the growth of such local households who maintained representatives in Istanbul guarding the interests of the particular household. This trend most represents a similar devolution of state wealth in Bourbon France in the seventeenth century, as exemplified by the military fiscalism of the centralizing state,

13 The most recent summary of the status of the research in Faroqhi, The Cambridge History of Turkey, III, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839, with articles by Bruce Masters, Christoph Neumann, Virginia Aksan, Carter Findley, Dina Khoury, and Fikret Adanir on the subject of political households and Ottomanization.

14 See especially C.A. Bayly’s introductory article, “Distorted Development”, in a volume of comparative essays.
and the creation of a class of provincial officials known as the *intendants*. In the Ottoman case, the beneficiaries of the new system appear to have been the janissaries. In other words, the sultans were forced to redistribute the right to collect the tax revenues of the empire in order to procure the large armies necessitated by the battlefields of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

To what extent this development accelerated the integration of the janissary corps into provincial elites and/or caused the collapse of the sipahi class as a source of battle-ready manpower is still a question for debate. What is clear is that the eclipse of the sipahi class and the simultaneous loss of control over the size and discipline of the janissary forces diminished the Ottoman central capacity to organize warfare effectively. This required the introduction of other methods of raising manpower, which led gradually to the increased use of ethnically/regionally based autonomous bands as described above. Their loyalties lay with their patrons, their households, and their ethnic brotherhoods, but the source of their wealth ultimately remained tied to the continuation of the dynasty. Hence, many authors now refer to this period as the Ottomanization of the provinces, or the creation of the Ottoman-local class, or even as the *reaya-*ization of the janissaries. As Hülya Canbakal notes regarding the Ottoman seventeenth-century resemblance to European trends of the period: “modern state-formation now appears to have involved successive stages of centralism and provincial accommodation that resulted in the rejuvenation of the ruling class and allowed the state to capitalize on wider economic and political resources”. She adds, “In the Ottoman case, the acquisition of stipends, posts and tax farming contracts also made one an ‘askerī, as did claiming descent from the prophet Muhammad or entering a military corps. In other words, one dimension of the process characterized as Ottomanization overlapped with a formal transformation: the expansion of the ‘askerī’."

Canbakal’s *askeri* class, defined according to a survey of 1697, but rooted in long-time practice, included all those on stipends (preachers, prayer-leaders, scribes, trustees of charitable organizations, tax collectors and overseers, inhabitants of dervish convents, Quran reciters, and the like); semiprofessional auxiliary troops; descendants of the Prophet; those providing special services such as falcon-raisers, mountain pass guards, bridge-keepers, messengers, share-croppers on state land, rice cultivators, sheep producers, sheep producers,
sheep and cattle dealers, copper miners, deputy judges, and city wardens; and finally, janissaries and sipahis, that is, some 1,053 members or 36 per cent of all the households. The list reminds us of two things: that the askeri class was made up of far more than just “soldiers”, and that the competition for certification by the center, which in some cases required reapplication on an annual basis, must have been intense, necessitating the spidery webs of households and patronage connections described by Barkey.

What had happened to the financial status of the soldiers in the survey to move them to compete for local revenues as described? In brief, the timariot/sipahi cavalryman, the original free Turkic warrior who was essential to the success of the Ottoman dynasty, was rewarded by the assignment of noninheritable grants of land (dirlik) to support the soldier and his entourage on campaign. By the mid-seventeenth century, the yields/tax returns on such assignments no longer sufficed to entice the sipahis away from their holdings to go on campaign, unless it was to preserve the holdings themselves, by responding to the command either to turn up at the battlefront or lose their entitlement. Their numbers averaged 50,000-80,000 depending on the size of the campaign throughout most of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, but clearly were on the decline. By 1768, the number of sipahis had become insignificant in contrast to the numbers of temporarily hired troops, called levends, who were mobilized by local provincial families or officials with central treasury funds. Orders for the mobilization of as many as 80,000 such troops were sent to provincial officials for the campaign on the Danube in 1769. Ahmed Resmi Efendi, on the battlefront at that campaign, noted that only a few old men claiming to be timariots appeared, and that the janissaries were demanding they be assigned a timar before they would fight, yet more evidence of the competition over local resources.

The janissary infantry system had emerged in the fourteenth century as a strategy aimed at creating a force totally dedicated to the security and perpetuation of the Ottoman house, in contrast to the voluntary commitment of the sipahi cavalry. The janissaries added formidable matchlock/flintlock firepower to the Ottoman arsenal. The effectiveness of both the infantry and cavalry systems, however, diminished precipitously after their peak around 1650. In the 1560s, the janissaries numbered some 12,800; in 1609 their ranks stood at 37,000, a number which remained fairly constant until it approached 70,000 in the protracted war with the Habsburgs from

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18 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870*, pp. 53-57.
1683 to 1699, and 61,000 a hundred years later in the 1768-1774 war with the Russians.\textsuperscript{19} We know of at least two instances when the janissary muster rolls were inspected: in 1688, 20,000 were struck from the registers; in 1771, some 30,000 names were removed.\textsuperscript{20}

By the end of the eighteenth century, there may have been as many as 400,000 janissaries on the sultan’s payroll, but only 10 per cent of that likely exaggerated number could be described as campaign-ready. Sultan Selim III’s (1789-1807) encounter with the inflated registers is recorded in Ahmed Cevdet’s history. The sultan responded angrily when his advisers warned him that it would take decades to settle the claims and rectify the registers in order to accumulate salaries for new recruits: “My God! What kind of situation is this? Two of the barbers who shave me say they are members of the artillary corps! If we call for soldiers, we are told ‘What can we do? There are no salaried soldiers to go on campaign.’ Let others be enrolled we say, and we are told ‘There is no money in the treasury.’ If we say, there must be a remedy, we are told ‘Now is not the time to interfere with the regiments.’”\textsuperscript{21} Cevdet, an admirer of Selim III, is clearly exculpating the sultan from complicity in the corruption evident in this story, but not those around him. The burden of janissary privileges and entitlements had become intolerable but resistant to reform because the entire ruling class was benefiting from the sultan’s largesse, much to Selim III’s chagrin.

Selim III abandoned the accession price (the gift bonus to his janissaries to secure their pledge of allegiance) because he had no money to pay for it. Certainly part of that had to do with central janissary salaries, most of which were paid out of the sultan’s treasury. The annual Ottoman budget of the later eighteenth century has been reckoned at somewhere around $15,000,000$ kuruş. I once tried to establish how much was handed out as salaries only to the Kapıkulu janissaries (infantry, artillery, armoury only) during the 1768-1774 war, and came up with an estimate for the war years 1769 to late 1771 of $6,005,453$ kuruş.\textsuperscript{22} That gives us at least an idea of what

\textsuperscript{19} Ágoston, “Empires and Warfare in East-Central Europe”, pp. 128-129.
\textsuperscript{20} Aksan, \textit{Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870}, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{21} “Looking at a recent register of ‘active’ artillerymen, in order to estimate the financing available for new recruits, he [Selim III] found that, of 1,059 troops listed, 33 were wounded, 90 were assigned to the foundry, 90 to the rapid infantry corps, 76 to the fire Ahmed Cevdet”: \textit{Tarih}, 1st edn, IV, pp. 265-266. The advisers, of course, were the chief beneficiaries of the corrupted muster rolls.
\textsuperscript{22} The two main \textit{defter}s (tax registers) are from the Prime Minister’s Archives in Istanbul, Maliyeden Müdevver MM5970 and MM11786. The payroll (in cash) was carted to the Danube battlefront in great caravans of oxcarts and counted when it arrived.
the largely dysfunctional fighting force was costing the dynasty in wages during wartime, and does not take into account the provisioning of that same force which was, after all, just a portion of the assembled manpower estimated at 100,000 for that war.  

Such numbers do not generally include the janissaries assigned to the garrisons across the empire. These are the subject of our discussion here, as they are the least visible, often melting into the reaya and merchant classes and no longer able to be counted on as a fighting force. We have very scattered information on the size and distribution of such forces, but a recent discussion of the problem gives one rather astonishing figure (from 1761-1762) of 55,731 central troops and 141,116 in the garrisons, for a total of 196,847.

Garrison janissaries were normally paid out of the cizye tax, but the regiments in each of the garrisons had some autonomy over collection and management of their salaries. The ocaklık system (tax farms assigned to janissaries and local forces), while not universally applied, was certainly in play at the main garrisons in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Tax revenues, such as the cizye, were organized as a tax farm for a particular garrison. Initially, it appears that the revenues were controlled by central officials and the proceeds were sent for distribution to the regiment in each of the garrisons. Latterly, the collection and distribution of the revenues appear to have been in the hands of garrison officers or other askeri officials. The janissaries and garrison regiments were self-governing, so it would be natural for them to acquire a certain fiscal autonomy as well, as is abundantly evident in the extant inheritance registers of the askeri class. By the end of the eighteenth century, such resources must have been considerably stretched, as Ottoman territories on the south shore of the Danube became the Russo-Ottoman battlegrounds, and the size of the garrisons increased. Belgrade, for example, had 4,917 janissaries in 1771, which cost 189,544.5 kuruş for wages and provisions. The cizyes in that case were drawn from fourteen different areas, among them Edirne, Sofia, and Thessaloniki; by 1779, there were 6,036 janissaries, whose wages and provisions cost 240,821.5 kuruş, again paid by cizyes drawn from all over Rumeli. Vidin, on the Danube, a true frontier fortress by 1700, had 7,863 janissaries in 1771, at a cost of 344,240 kuruş, drawn from nineteen cizye sources. By 1779, there were 9,229 janissaries in the garrison, costing 416,813 kuruş, and the list of the cizye sources had climbed to twenty-five, with many of the places showing as unavailable (yok), an effect, no doubt, of the conditions

23 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870, ch. 4.
24 Ágoston, “Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia”, p. 304.
of war.\textsuperscript{25} If, in fact, we accept the figure of 5,440 janissaries at Vidin in 1750, recorded elsewhere, the evolution from a sipahi-based timariot force to the militarized population of janissaries is striking.\textsuperscript{26}

By the end of the seventeenth century, the city of Aleppo, as another example, contained a large number of rank-and-file soldiers (\textit{beşes}) engaged in all kinds of market crafts and transactions, including small amounts of money-lending, tax collection and market enforcement. Charles Wilkins has analyzed the \textit{ocaklık} contracts of garrison members including one set up to pay the military unit stationed in the citadels of Kars and Ardahan, some considerable distance from Aleppo. Kars soldiers, mostly citadel guards, managed their assignments by subcontracting them as tax farms to residents of Aleppo, including janissaries and \textit{ulema}, as a means of increasing their diminishing incomes.

Wilkins concludes that these soldiers could be likened to merchants of modest to middling wealth, who show up in the court records as property-owners and money-lenders. The career of one Ali ibn Shabib (d. 1678) is instructive. He is first encountered in court records in 1640 as second-in-command of a local garrison in the Aleppo region, probably of Arab origin, already involved in operating (renting) a watermill, and responsible for collecting certain fees his regiment owed to officials in the city. By 1657, he is still recorded as the second-in-command of the garrison, is listed as a tax-collector with the high status rank of agha, but has also become a prominent member of the water miller’s guild of the city. As Wilkins notes, “The likelihood [is] that soldiers, as they took up trades and crafts, absorbed the cultural norms of their nonmilitary colleagues, thereby displacing or weakening concepts of hierarchical command authority. This process was probably more important than the reverse, of merchants and artisans adopting military norms, since many of these made no pretense of pursuing military training and merely sent proxies when called to serve on campaigns.”\textsuperscript{27}

Damascus provides another example of the military diversification and expansion. In 1708, the Damascus governor was relieved of sending his usual contingent of janissaries (500) to imperial campaigns in exchange for charging the local military forces to serve as guardians of the Hajj pilgrimage caravans as described above, and sending a sum of money as an exemption fee (\textit{bedel}), one more way the state might raise revenues for

\textsuperscript{25} Prime Minister’s Archives D.BŞM 4274, dated 1185-1193 (1771-1779).
\textsuperscript{26} Gradeva, “Between Hinterland and Frontier”, pp. 340-341.
\textsuperscript{27} Wilkins, \textit{Forging Urban Solidarities}, p. 197.
military participation (or lack of it) from the provinces. The Damascus military population of the time included yerlis (local janissaries; elsewhere they might be designated as guards); the Kapıkulu or imperial janissaries, ordered to Damascus after a major rebellion of the mid-seventeenth century; local mercenaries in the governor’s entourage, variously described as Anatolian levends, Kurdish musketeers, and North African mercenaries; and, finally, the timariot cavalry, which had ceased to exist by the turn of the eighteenth century, with their estates likely reassigned to local ayans (warlords; provincial notables or elites) or janissaries. It is tantalizing to speculate that the mercenary population grew as the timariot/sipahi population declined.²⁸

That the warrior populations came to be such a large part of actual campaign forces testifies to the Ottoman difficulties with regulating military budgets, recapturing control over the monopoly on violence, and negotiating effectively with mobile, warrior subjects. As we have seen, there is much allusion to the problem in the literature, and significant work on the provincial families and economic factors contributing to their rise after 1650. Very little empirical work has been published on the size, extent, and impact of the new means of mobilizing sufficient manpower for the battlefields of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Janissaries consistently failed to show up for major campaigns and, when they did so, they clamored for lands vacated by sipahis as a means of support; bands of warriors, with regional and occasionally ethnic loyalties, increasingly replaced them as military labour. What is discernable in the information available to date is a further evolution from diverse, eclectic auxiliaries in 1700-1750 and the increased reliance on ethnic warrior bands, for example, the Albanians, particularly during the first Russo-Ottoman War in 1768-1774. The systems (janissary and levends, with the gradual disappearance of the sipahis) overlapped and intertwined until 1826 at least. The Ottomans moved to a conscript army in the mid-nineteenth century, but başbozkır régiments were included as auxiliaries even then.

Auxiliary cavalry and infantry régiments 1700-1750

By the late seventeenth century, a provincial governor was expected to arrive on campaign accompanied by 200 of his private entourage and 1,000

to 2,000 levend recruits, both infantry and cavalry. By the 1720s, these latter were paid either by way of tax privileges (imdad-i seferiye, special campaign taxes and/or cash) for the provincial governor or other local officials (called kapt halki); through tax farming; or directly out of the sultan’s purse (miri levendat). It was the local officials, in other words, who had become military contractors. If statistics are to be believed, this system expanded a hundred-fold from the siege of Vienna in 1683 to the first Russo-Ottoman campaign of the 1768-1774 war. According to one estimate, 97,000 such soldiers participated in the 1769 campaign, meaning perhaps as many as 100,000-150,000 levend may have initially been mobilized for the campaigns on the Danube and the Black Sea.29 Orders describing how they were to be mobilized, both infantry and cavalry, reveal the understanding of the state concerning their length of employment and salary, as well where they might come from and the problem of control over such troops.

For example, an order to the governor of the province of Anatolia is quite explicit. Beginning with the statement that their misbehaviour was the cause of much harm to the countryside, especially as they had not seen service and rations due to the lack of campaigns, the order announces the coming campaign with Russia, and the urgent need for manpower. It continues by extending an amnesty to any miscreants, and emphasizing the necessity of gathering them up for the spring offensive. Included in the order is the reference to the local provincial officers (mutasarrifs, governors of sancaks, subdivisions of a province) as responsible for the organization of the provincial troops.

Such orders were usually for companies (bölükts) of fifty levends. Spelled out were the monthly salary, expressed in six months’ lump sums, or in two months for an extension, for passage to the battlefront, for fortress duty, etc.; a signing-on bonus (called a bahşiş, an incentive); a 10 per cent commission for the officers; and a calculation of yevmiye, or daily rations. Except for their temporary status, these soldiers on paper were being treated in ways which approximated the janissaries. Exhortations were included that recruits be upright, handsome Muslims, and that they be guaranteed by their local communities, who would serve as their guarantors in the case of desertion. Local officials were responsible for the selection of officers (and often served in that capacity). There is no mention of arms in these documents, so one presumes that these recruits were to bring their own weapons, perhaps part of the explanation for the hefty signing-on bonus

29 Aksan, “Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?”, p. 29, “Ottoman Military Recruitment Strategies in the Late Eighteenth Century"
of 12 kurus for an infantryman and 25 for a horseman, the difference likely to do with the possession of a horse. Monthly salaries ran at 2.5 kurus. Equally interesting is the inclusion in these documents of expected rations. The levend infantryman at war was expected to need a daily intake of a double loaf of bread (100 dirhem or roughly 320 g), or 50 dirhem of biscuit (peksimed 160 g), and was allowed half an okka of meat (641 g); a half kile (12-13 kg) of fodder barley for the packhorses of fifty men. The cavalryman was entitled to the same amount of bread, but only 100 dirhem (320 g) of meat, and additionally 100 dirhem of rice (320 g), 25 dirhem (80 g) of cooking oil or fat, and a yem of barley, roughly 6.5 kg per day per man.

In reality, most of this must have remained highly hypothetical, as the provisioning system for the campaign of 1769 broke down completely. Evidence at least of one effort to recruit such state commissioned regiments provides us with a good indication of the difference between expectations and reality. Historian Şemidanizade, serving as a judge in Tokat, in Anatolia, in 1771, was required to enlist 1,500 soldiers (he calls them janissaries, but they must have been levends) to be sent to Ochakov on the Black Sea. He picked 1,500 of 6,000 volunteers, rejecting both young and old, and organized some 1,500 for the battlefront. He later encountered some of the same troops in Sinop, and discovered that each company (of fifty) had been reduced to eleven men and a commander. He was told that the Tokat governor had excused the men from service for a payment of 25 kurus (the signing-on bonus given the men?), which they split and pocketed.30

On the battlefront in 1769, Ahmed Resmi observed the arrival of the troops from Anatolia. Clearly, he noted, the provincial governors recruited thieves and the homeless and then were held captive by them – at every hamlet or bridge-crossing, the men demanded salaries and bonuses and caused no end of trouble in the camp. While individual commanders arrived with enough men for a battalion, in three days, they could not raise even 100 men. And even should the commanders bring the requested 500 or 1,000 men, they continued to demand pay and rations for any participation in the war effort, and tended to wreak havoc on the countryside when left idle, especially as fodder and food became scarce.31

The reliability and loyalty of such troops were obviously acute problems, as determined by the financial stability and disciplinary control of the state, and whether it was able (or willing) to redistribute provincial revenues for the benefit of local officials. By 1775, the term levend had assumed

30 Aksan, “Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?”, pp. 31-33.
31 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
such disrepute that it was expunged from the official vocabulary of the
Ottoman documents but, as with other such labels, the term persisted into
the nineteenth century. Other terms began to emerge, such as the older
sekban, deli, and başibozuk, which very often signified ethnic warrior bands.

**Ethnic warrior bands 1750-1850**

That is not to suggest that bands of levends could not just as well have
been organized as local, ethnic, or regional companies. It is simply that the
mobile populations discussed above start to appear in large numbers in
the documentation after the 1770s as warrior ethnic groups such as Kurds,
Albanians, and Circassians. While the levends, volunteer military labor,
still have a whiff of the coerced about them, these warrior bands emerge
as entirely autonomous guns-for-hire, like Mustafa Vasfi of Kabud cited at
the beginning of this chapter, and are labeled with their ethnicity in an
era when nationalism had begun to emerge as part of regional identities.

The first significant use of such warrior bands show up in the Morea
Rebellion of 1770, when unrest and Russian instigation, along with the
demands of the ongoing war, triggered a violent rebellion of the Greek
Orthodox population of the Morea. The Peloponnese was yet another of
the militarized frontiers I have described above, especially since it had
been recovered by the Ottomans only in 1715. Vlachopoulou describes the
emergence of a local class of Christian officials, the kocabaşıs, who both
collaborated and contested with the officials of the new government and
with the increased presence of the askeri class.32 The state records of this
period indicate considerable unrest and a lack of stability around resources
and tax-collection, much as we have seen elsewhere. In 1770, then Morean
governor Muhsinzade Mehmed, charged with putting down the rebel-
lion of the Greeks, hired levends, most of who turned out to be Albanians
previously destined for the Danube battlefront. Some 10,000-20,000 troops
obviously disturbed the demographics of the peninsula, but also proved to
be a disaster as, once they had brutally suppressed the revolt, they refused to
leave and entered the contestation over local property and other resources.
Muhsinzade Mehmed is said to have recruited some 75,000 troops from
what Nagata calls mahalli kuvvetleri, or regional forces, to quell the revolt,

32 Vlachopoulou, “Like the Mafia?”
and he did so by taking loans from the regional notables, which he officially recognized as *ayans*.33

The 1787-1792 Russo-Ottoman war saw an increased use of such regional, contractual forces because the central janissaries were simply not prepared to fight. For the 1790-1791 season, for example, Selim III reputedly could find only 6,000 combat-ready janissaries out of a reputed 30,000 in the city, and of those only 1,000 made it to the battlefront. The rest fled within a day’s march of Istanbul. The payroll records were packed with retirees and noncombatants, some 50,000 or more even after Selim III’s experiment with creating new troops, assembling perhaps 10,000 before the rebellion in 1807 which removed him from the throne. Quite apart from the fraudulent records, the janissaries had legitimate complaints about arrears in their own pay, about the higher salaries given to the new troops, about the conditions of the barracks, about the insufficiency of their rations, and about the state of the bread specially baked for the corps.34

Meanwhile, on the Danube, the blending of peasant and soldier continued apace, particularly during the 1787-1792 war. Demographic shifts, occurring multiple times in the long Habsburg-Ottoman-Russian struggles along the frontiers, had seriously altered the landscape of the Ottoman borderlands, and created large numbers of landless and masterless men as previously described. Serbian Orthodox peasants crossed into newly defined Habsburg territories. Tatars and Circassians, chased from Crimea, moved into Romania and Bulgaria in the 1780s following the Russian unilateral occupation of the former Ottoman territories, joining the janissaries already mentioned, who were in effect “coming home” after a hundred years of service in Hungary.

Selim III had little choice but to make use of such readily available manpower for the battlefields of 1787-1793. He called upon the provincial power-brokers, such as Yanyalı Ali Paşa (of Iannina, Greece), Pasvantoğlu Osman Paşa (of Vidin), and Alemdar Mustafa Paşa (of Ruse, Bulgaria), to name but three, to defend the borders with their *sekbans*, the word which replaced *levend*. After peace was declared with Russia and Austria, these same locally raised armies were called upon to put down Pasvantoğlu’s ongoing bid for self-government in Vidin on three separate occasions, all of which failed. Pasvantoğlu died in his bed in 1807.

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33 Nagata, *Muhsinzade Mehmed Paşa ve Ayank Müessessi*. The Albanians (Shkiptar) here described were likely Tosks of the mountainous region of Albania.
Tolga Esmer has vividly described the culture of anarchy and banditry – which had sekbans becoming kirca’alis (a place name that came to refer to particular bandits) and back to sekbans – that dominated the frontier from the 1750s onward. “[T]he borderlands allowed for new, alternative ways of making a living that spread like a contagion, eventually luring anyone from the humblest Rumeli Christians to the highest vezîr from Istanbul and Anatolia into Rumeli and into the networks of violence [...]” 35

However one interprets the ethnicity of these troops, and fixes their date of origin, the important aspect is that they are ubiquitous beginning in the Greek rebellion period (1821-1831). First and foremost, Mehmed Ali of Egypt derives from that context, and it was his own Albanian troops, sent to Cairo in the Ottoman fight against Napoleon, who helped raise him to power in Cairo in the contest with the last of the mamluks. Jezzar Ahmed Paşa, commander of the fortress of Acre, of Bosnian background and mamluk (Cairo) experience, was known for employing only foreign troops, and regularly hired, for multiple campaigns, mercenaries from the Maghreb, Albanian cavalry, and Bosnian infantry, as well as delis, who have been described as Kurds or Turkmen. He paid them well and with his army (perhaps as many as 4,000-5,000 troops of mixed origins) he successfully defended Napoleon’s assault on Acre as ally of the British. In cooperation with the imperial army that marched overland from Istanbul to Cairo in 1799-1801, Jezzar sent detachments of 500 Albanians from time to time to the imperial camp at Jaffa. William Wittmann, eyewitness to the British-Ottoman campaign to oust Napoleon’s remaining troops from Egypt, observed their comings and goings, commenting on how often the Albanians mutinied when the grand vizier tried to muster them, and how they frequently deserted. He notes particularly the ongoing quarrels between the Albanians and the janissaries, still very numerous, but impossible to recognize as the troops of old in a campaign which also introduced the first of Selim III’s reformed troops. 36

The later extensive revolts of the Albanians derived, as suggested above, from the simultaneous effort to draw them into a recentralized state and conscript them for battles between Mahmud II and Mehmed Ali of Egypt. A final example of the persistence of the ethnic-band mentality and volunteerism is evident in documentation around the 1828-1829 Russo-Ottoman War where discussion among military planners indicates the ongoing

35 Esmer, “A Culture of Rebellion”, p. 75.
36 Wittman, Travels in Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria and Across the Desert into Egypt during the Years 1799, 1800 and 1801, pp. 141-149.
difficulties of enrolling the Albanian Tosks in particular, of making them wear uniforms and of getting them to enlist either in the regular army or as basıbozuk. The many Albanian rebellions of the period are evidence of a resistance not just to the Ottoman effort to “colonize” them but also to the attempt to force them into a disciplined military environment. To what extent they might also have been national uprisings belongs to another discussion, but it is easy to see how the requirements of the besieged state and the last warrior populations of the Ottoman frontiers were inimical. 37

The Fighting for a Living template

The Ottomans seemingly evolved from a slave/standing army/state commission army to an aggregate contract to a conscript army. Can we assume that the countryside at large participated willingly (to the degree that that word can be allowed in early modern societies) in the war efforts, until the worsening of the economic capacity of the Ottomans to promulgate war made participation dangerous and unprofitable? So what made these bands continue to sign on?

Of our possible permutations for this project, I believe it is the entrepreneurial aspects, that is, the emergence of the world market economy in the seventeenth century, which drew much of the participation in this context. I think the Ottoman demand for manpower, and the easily accessible (and willing) labour market as the empire drew inwards are determinants of some of the policies and the behavior we can see. The records indicate that they were paid – in cash – or with rights to the tax revenues of the state, and found little to deter them from plundering their enemies or even their fellows.

To the list of our hypotheses for the emergence and dominance of state-supported militias and warrior-band recruits in the period 1650-1850, I need to add another: because it was already a way of life which increased dramatically with the shifting populations and worsening economic conditions of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The political households that emerged were strengthened themselves by the system and reluctant to surrender whatever support (tax farms, extraordinary campaign taxes, and other privileges) that came with the military “contracts”. In other words, the

37 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870, pp. 352-356; Anscombe, “Islam and the Age of Ottoman Reform”; Hakan Erdem discusses the thinking of the Ottoman commanders about how to engage Albanian chiefs and their soldiers in “Perfidious Albanians’ and ‘Zealous Governors’”.
Ottoman need for manpower not only facilitated the emergence of powerful provincial notables, it also sanctioned the flourishing of a style of life for the individual warrior/soldier that persisted into the twentieth century.

I will leave you with a quote from a recent study of the early nineteenth-century Greek/Albanian context. Lack of Ottoman systemic control over that region produced a particularly strong paramilitary culture, as we have seen, where “the development of strong patron-client relations seemed the only socio-political mechanism left for survival. Hence, despite their shortcomings as far as the maltreatment of the Greek peasants is concerned, men who bore arms in such difficult times were highly respected by the agrarian population.”

In sum, post-1650 Ottoman military failures were largely administrative, not technological, and not so much organizational as economic. Just as Europe moved to social discipline and uniformity of its military forces, incorporating “native” troops in regimental fashion, the Ottomans went native, and came to rely on a federative, mercenary, or paramilitary force for the maintenance of its remaining territories on the Danube and in Greater Syria.

38 Karabelias, “From National Heroes to National Villains”, p. 266.
Military employment in Qing dynasty China

Christine Moll-Murata and Ulrich Theobald

This chapter explores the military structures in China between 1650 and 1900 from the perspective of labour history as devised by the Global Col-laboratory on the History of Labour Relations 1500-2000. It will first present the basic structures of the Qing armies. There follows a discussion of the state of the art in research and the major issues and debates in this field. Finally, the authors assess trends and tendencies in the framework of the matrix of hypotheses developed within the research group Fighting for a Living.

The Qing armies, 1600-1911: a short overview

The Manchu Qing dynasty ruled China between 1644 and 1911. It originated from semi-nomadic groups of the Jurchen confederation who lived scattered across the today’s north-eastern Chinese provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang. These groups defined themselves as ethnically and culturally distinct from their mighty, numerous, and affluent neighbours in the south-west, the Chinese or “Han”, and began to refer to themselves as “Man” or “Manchus”. After 1600, their unifier, Nurhaci (1559-1626), organized his followers into socio-military units or companies. Family members and dependants were also registered in the military households. As far as our knowledge goes, “followers” implies the entire population that had pledged allegiance to Nurhaci, voluntarily or by force. In 1615, these companies were officially divided into the so-called Eight Banners. Not only the Manchus were grouped into these formations, but also Mongols, Koreans, and Chinese who had either lived in the areas north of the Great Wall or had submitted to the Manchus before they started their conquest of China proper in 1644. In 1635, Nurhaci’s son and successor Hong Taiji (r. 1626-1643) divided the Banners along ethnic lines, with a Manchu, a Mongol, and a Chinese (the latter also called the “Chinese-martial”) Banner assigned to each of the

1 On the fluid and “inherently transactional” concept of ethnicity, see Elliott, The Manchu Way, p. 17.
eight, resulting in an actual number of twenty-four Banners. The Banners were assigned different colours, according to the flags and uniforms they carried into and wore during battle. Their organization was dissolved only after the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912.

Precise and factual figures are unavailable and are subject to much recent debate. Roughly speaking, the estimates for the entire Banner population, including men, women, children, elderly, and dependants (bondservants and slaves) range between 1.3 million and 2.4 million in 1648, and 2.6 million to 4.9 million in 1720. The potential combat forces, that is, the entire male population between the ages of ten and sixty, may have been between 300,000 and 500,000 in 1648, and 850,000 to 1.6 million in 1720. However, according to one source, only one in three men in a military company actually engaged in combat. The number of companies has been estimated as slowly increasing from some 200 in 1614, to around 500 at the time of the completion of the conquest and assumption of rule over the previous Ming Empire (1368-1644), and 1,155 by 1735. A competing estimate that assumes the higher figures of companies given in the Qing statutes, 320 Manchu, 131 Mongol, and 171 Chinese Banner companies in 1644, arrives at a total of 168,600 men, which can be broken down into 96,000 Manchus, 39,300 Mongols, and 51,300 Chinese troops. The Banners also included a small number of Russians from the post of Albazin, of the peoples of the

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2 Bondservants (Manchu *booi*) were different from slaves (*aha*) in their status of being allowed to constitute special, hereditary bondservant companies attached to the Banners. Some of them played an important role in the management of the Imperial Household Department. Most of them were Manchus (in contrast to slaves, the larger number of whom were Chinese) and were affiliated to other, socially superior Manchu households. Although part of the Manchu conquest group, they nevertheless occupied a marginal position that made them entirely dependent on the throne for their status. While slaves worked in the fields, the *booi* were primarily used in domestic (and military) service. Evelyn Rawski and Susan Naquin are not so sure whether the bondservants were ethnically Manchu in their majority but instead say that they were Chinese captives from the period of conquest. See Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, pp. 81-84, 462 n. 95. See also Rawski, *The Last Emperors*, p. 167, as well as Naquin and Rawski, *Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 7.


4 Fang, “A Technique for Estimating the Numerical Strength of the Early Manchu Military Forces”, pp. 208-209. Fang states that no new companies were established after 1735 (p. 204). Various estimates of the number of companies in the early period exist; most scholars agree upon the number of roughly 300 soldiers per company for the period before 1644; thereafter, one company was formed of 100 to 200 men of service age.

Solun, Daghur, Sibe, or Ölöd (formerly Dzungars), and troops of certain other Mongol tribes like the Chahar or Bargut. The Banner soldiers were mainly cavalry troops, but there were also infantry platoons and specialized musketeers and cannoneers, as well as a few garrisons of naval troops, both maritime and fluvial. The Banner troops displayed their highest efficiency as combat troops in the initial phase of conquest of China proper, the territory south of the Great Wall previously ruled by the Ming dynasty.

The Ming armies, as David M. Robinson explains in this volume, were formally bound to hereditary service, but a variety of forms of mercenary employment existed as well. While it is difficult to weigh the relative importance of the two types of labour relations in military occupations, we can assume that such legal arrangements were not entirely superseded. In any case, the efforts of the Ming to hold out against the military challenges of the Qing and internal rebellions required large amounts of military pay, no matter whether the labour relations were tributary or commodified; or, rather, such efforts would have required large expenditures. According to the fiscal historian Ray Huang, even repeated tax increases after 1618 remained, from a military point of view, a “slow and ineffectual mobilization of the empire's financial resources”, which led to desertions to the bands of peasant rebels, or eventually to the Manchus. The garrisons of the capital Beijing had gone without pay for five months when the city fell in 1644.

The initial phase of Qing conquest roughly corresponds to the period 1600 to 1680. In a “second wave” of Qing conquest and expansion towards the north, west, and south-west (1680–1820), other – Han Chinese – armies became equally important as combat forces. This started out with the Kangxi emperor’s (r. 1662-1722) campaigns against the Russians in Albazin (1685-1686), against the Dzungars, a confederation of western Mongolian nomadic people in Central Asia (1696), and against Dzungarian influence in Tibet (1705-1706, 1720). In the middle and late eighteenth century, Kangxi’s grandson, the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-1795) expanded the territory under Qing influence far into Inner Asia. Furthermore, he conducted military campaigns against what could be perceived as interior rebellions: in 1787-

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6 Huangchao tongdian, p. 70.
7 Huang, “The Ming Fiscal Administration”, p. 153, points out that “In the early sixteenth century, mercenaries had already begun to outnumber regular members of the wei-so garrisons in several northern frontier commands. Being mercenaries, the new personnel expected to be paid regularly.”
8 Ibid., pp. 167-168.
9 Ibid., p. 168.
10 Crossley, “The Conquest Elite of the Ch'ing Empire”, p. 313.
1788 against a rebellion of Fujian immigrants in Taiwan (which had been incorporated into the Qing empire in 1683), and in 1795 against the ethnic group of the Miao\textsuperscript{11} in the inland provinces of Hunan, Guizhou, and Yunnan. Although the emperor had styled himself “the old man of the ten completed campaigns”, “completion” implying “victory”, some of the campaigns against unruly border tribes and neighbouring tribute states ended in disaster or inconclusively, such as those against Burma (1766-1769) and Vietnam (1788-1791).\textsuperscript{12}

After 1644, the Eight Banners were employed as garrison forces in most Chinese provinces, with the highest concentration in Beijing and on the northern and western borders and with the lower density in the east and south.\textsuperscript{13} The inland provinces of Jiangxi, Anhui, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi had no Banner garrisons.\textsuperscript{14} At all times, the Banner people were largely outnumbered by the Han Chinese, who by 1644 may have numbered between 100 million and 150 million, and by 1776 about 260 million\textsuperscript{15} as against a maximum of 4.8 million Banner people of all ethnicities.

For the defence of the Chinese interior, the Qing relied on an army of Han Chinese soldiers under the command of Han Chinese officers subordinated to the Manchu superstructure of the provincial administration.\textsuperscript{16} This was the so-called Green Standard Army or the Green Battalions (\textit{luying bing}).\textsuperscript{17} Its figures are usually assessed as three times higher than those of the Eight

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\textsuperscript{11} “Miao” is a rather general term for all non-Chinese ethnic peoples in south-west China.

\textsuperscript{12} Woodside, “The Ch‘ien-lung Reign”, pp. 251ff., points out that the “ten campaigns” refers to the wars between 1747 and 1792, which were carried out, in chronological sequence in: 1747-1749 against the Tibetan rebels in western Sichuan’s Gold River Valley (Jinchuan); 1755 and 1756-1757 against the Dzungars in Central Asia; 1758 against Turkic Muslim rebels in eastern Turkestan; 1766-1770 against the Konhaung dynasty in Burma; 1771-1776 once more in the Gold River Valley; 1787-1788 against a rebellion in Taiwan; 1788-1789 against dynamic quarrels in Vietnam; and in 1790-1792 two expeditions against the Gurkhas of Nepal who had invaded Tibet. The 1795 expeditions against the Miao in Yunnan and Hunan were not included.

\textsuperscript{13} Powell, \textit{The Rise of Chinese Military Power}, p. 9, characterizes the garrison structure as semi-circles centring on Beijing; Elliott, \textit{The Manchu Way}, pp. 94-96, describes four networks of garrisons guarding Beijing, the metropolitan area around Beijing, Manchuria, and the north-western frontier, and the Chinese provinces as “defense chains”.

\textsuperscript{14} Elliott, \textit{The Manchu Way}, p. 369, Appendix C.


\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Luying} is a special reading used for this term. The alternative reading is \textit{lùying}. See \textit{Hanyu da cidian, haiwaiban} (Hong Kong, 1993), IX, p. 924, and Xing, “‘Lù/luying’ de duyin”, p. 88.
Banners. The role of the Green Standard Army is less well documented and researched than that of the Eight Banners. It is agreed that it drew its personnel from surrendered Ming armies, from volunteers, and from local corps. The Green Standards consisted of both marine and land forces. The main functions of the Green Standards were, besides fighting in battle, those of a constabulary: patrolling on land and water, guarding government institutions such as granaries, capturing criminals and rebels, performing counter-insurgency activities, escorting important and precious convoys, such as copper for use in the provincial and capital mints or grain tributes for the capital, and transporting official mail and dispatches.

The decline of this army commenced in the early nineteenth century and became sorely visible in the defeat during the First Opium War (1839-1842). This mid-century watershed stands at the beginning of the last phase of the Qing dynasty, which was marked by the struggle against internal enemies – the White Lotus, Taiping, Nian, and Muslim insurgencies, to name just the most important. In addition, the foreign intrusion that started with the First and was aggravated after the Second Opium War (1856-1860) led to a series of armed conflicts with the larger west European nation-states as well as the United States, Japan, and Russia, and culminated in the Boxer uprising (1900-1901), when the internal and the external problems of the Qing converged.

Already in the eighteenth century, village militia (xiangyong, “Braves of the Townships”) were occasionally recruited by the local magistrates of some regions. The permanent deployment of Green Standard troops to campaigns in the border regions had deprived these townships and districts of their constabulary forces. In order to keep up public security, it had become necessary to recruit additional personnel on an ad hoc basis. Not much information is available about the payment procedures and the level of payment for these militia troops during the decades around 1800. During the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864), this method was transformed from

18 Luo, Luying bingzhi, p. 1; Elliott, The Manchu Way, p. 128; Crossley, Orphan Warriors, p. 117, who quotes the figures 200,000 for Banner troops and 600,000 for Green Standard soldiers. This 1:3 ratio does not seem quite convincing in view of the more recent estimate by Elliott. However, with the important qualification that only one in every three Bannermen was actually called up to active service, this numerical relation seems to tally with reality. In the late nineteenth century, western observers quote the figure of 400,000 Green Standard troops, as indicated by Prince Ronglu: Heath, Armies of the Nineteenth Century: Asia, II, China, p. 28.
21 Luo, Luying bingzhi, pp. 115-272.
a temporary solution to standard practice to ensure the public safety of local regions, and another, new type of army came into being. These regional armies or yongying “Brave Battalions” (with a membership reckoned at about 300,000) were formed from several provincial armies that had stood under the command of powerful individual commanders, such as the Hunan army or the Anhui army. Western and Chinese scholars generally agree that these military organizations saved the Qing dynasty from an early demise – although they were supported by a small contingent of about 3,000 mercenary European and US troops, the so-called Ever-Victorious Army, as well. Manifold attempts were made to reinvigorate the Qing army, combining Green Standard ranks and officers with Brave Battalion methods of recruitment and employment, and adapting to western weaponry and training methods. The increasing recruitment of non-military personnel to replace the traditional professional armies of the Eight Banners and the Green Standards led, in the eyes of some scholars, to a subtle militarization of the local government.

Finally, as in the case of the Ming dynasty, arrangements with allied non-Han chieftains (tusi, “local administrators”) in the border areas who had accepted the suzerainty of the Qing emperors included that their soldiers, if necessary, would fight for the Qing. This was less the case with the western Mongols and the Kirgiz who were generally held to be very strong and a match for the Manchus. In contrast, the native tribes of China’s south-west (the Miao), of Tibet, Taiwan, and the Muslim city-states of the Tarim Basin were dealt with in a time-tested method by “using barbarians against the barbarians” (similar to the tenet of divide et impera). This means that a submissive native lord or king (of “matured barbarians”) dispatched his own native troops to fight against his neighbour or adversary (the “raw barbarians”). In many cases this was the preferable, because cheaper, method to pacify unruly tribes in the border regions. On the other hand, the collaborating native lord could enlarge his territory and probably would have a prestigious title bestowed upon him by the emperor. Yet this kind of indirect rule over the native tribes proved ineffective and thus was gradually given up in the course of the eighteenth century. Thereafter, the border regions conquered by the Qing were administered by imperial officials. The conquest wars in the south-western region were thus waged by three different types of

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24 See Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, pp. 211-225.
troops, namely Banner troops, Green Standard troops, and native or “ethnic” troops. A typical proportion between Banner troops, Green Standard troops, and native auxiliaries during an eighteenth-century war was about 1:10:3.\(^{25}\)

**State of the field and main debates**

Though the study of Chinese military history is recently expanding in China as well as abroad, military labour during the Qing dynasty remains a relatively little-studied topic. The perspectives of ethnicity, institutional history, military finances, China’s frontier wars, and the debates on Chinese armies compared to armies worldwide offer important information and possible points of departure for the study of military labour in the early and mid-Qing dynasty armies.

Research into Manchu history has blossomed since the reopening of the First Historical Archives of China in Beijing, which houses the most important collection of Qing central government documents. The Eight Banners as a social organization figures prominently in this field. Important studies in English are Pamela Kyle Crossley’s *Orphan Warriors* (specifically the chapter entitled “The Conquest Elite of the Ch’ing Empire”), Mark Elliott’s *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China*, and Joanna Waley-Cohen’s *The Culture of War in China: Empire and the Military under the Qing*. These scholars revise previous convictions about the Qing dynasty, which saw the Manchus as largely adapting to Chinese culture, especially to Chinese methods of civilian administration. The main intention of this new approach to Qing history is to demonstrate that a complex process of reciprocal influences continued throughout the Qing reign. In their analyses of the role of ethnicity within the Banners, this approach makes clear that the Manchus did not constitute a majority in the Banners, (and in some Banner garrisons in particular), so that it is not appropriate to simply equate “Banners” with “Manchus”. Crossley’s study on the conquest elite stringently analyses the fate of the Han Chinese or Chinese-martial within the Banners.\(^{26}\) The Chinese-martial, who had chosen to identify with the new rulers (but some of whom actually had Jurchen or Korean origins),\(^{27}\) were not treated as equals. Within the Banners they lost prestige and credibility when three powerful Chinese-martial

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\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 321.
generals, Wu Sangui, Geng Jingzhong, and Shang Kexi, who for their help in the conquest of the Ming empire had received large territories in southern China, later betrayed their allegiance to the Qing in order to establish independent dynasties of their own. The three generals were defeated in the War of the Three Feudatories (1673-1681).

Further armed resistance against the Manchus arose from several descendants of the Ming dynasty who established the ephemeral Southern Ming Dynasty (1644-1662), and from Ming loyalist generals who wielded power in central and southern China. The last Ming loyalist polity under the rule of the Zheng clan was defeated on Taiwan in 1683. The incorporation of the island into the mainland province of Fujian marks the final consolidation of Qing rule in China.

Elliot in *The Manchu Way* makes important points about the reasons why the Banner people, although they were styled as “martial elites” by the emperors and the central government, became impoverished in the course of the dynasty. This was due to two reasons: the Banner population increased, and some Han Chinese falsely claimed to belong to the Banners in order to enjoy the support of the state. Therefore, the Qianlong emperor incrementally expelled the Chinese-martial Banner households from the Banner structure so that in the nineteenth century the equation of Banner-man and Manchu corresponded to reality. The state shouldered increasingly larger burdens for the upkeep of these warriors and their dependants. In a study on the military expenses in the Qing dynasty, Chen Feng cites figures for the Xi’an garrison in 1735 that suggest that the expenses for the support of Banner families and horses were much higher than those for the soldiers and officers. According to Elliott’s estimates, as much as one-quarter to one-fifth of state revenues was used for the living expenses of less than 2 per cent of the population. In comparison, the expenses for the Green Standard Army, with about three times the personnel of the

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28 For the “genealogical turn” in the early eighteenth century, when stricter proof of Banner descent was demanded, see Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, pp. 326-333.
30 Chen Feng, *Qingdai junfei yanjiu* (Wuhan, 1992), p. 47, tables 2-12, cited in Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, pp. 310-311, calculated that 42 per cent of the expenses in silver went on the wages of soldiers and officers, 20.5 per cent for household dependants, and 37.5 per cent for horses; 7.4 per cent of the grain disbursed was for officers and soldiers, 90.5 per cent for household dependents, and 2.1 per cent for the horses.
Banner Army, were higher in absolute terms but, at 27 to 32 per cent of state revenue, much lower proportionally (if the 3:1 ratio is correct). More economical ways of maintaining the Eight Banners might have been possible. The options would have been, for instance, to relax the ban on Banner people taking up occupations other than serving the state, or to assign land in military colonies to the Banner people where they could have organized their own upkeep. But the Qing state had other priorities, so that the role of the Banners changed from being mainly fighters to the display of the presence of the ruling elite in the capital and in the provincial garrisons.

Monographs and studies on the Green Standard Army as an institution are much rarer than on the Eight Banners. In 1945, Luo Ergang (1901-1997), an eminent specialist on the Taiping rebellion, published a monograph which still is cited as authoritative in present-day scholarship. Since his focus is on the Taiping rebellion, the largest uprising in the Qing dynasty, his particular interest was in the decline of these armies, which proved to be quite inefficient by the 1850s, and their replacement by the new provincial forces.

The differences between the Green Standard Army and the Eight Banners, and ultimately the question of why the Qing maintained two independent armed forces, have long preoccupied military historians. Scholarly consensus exists that, by the time of the Taiping rebellion, both were in bad shape, poorly equipped, with low morale – with the qualification made by Crossley in *Orphan Warriors* that the British were amazed at the fighting spirit which the Manchus displayed during the attack on the garrison of Zhapu near Shanghai in an episode of the First Opium War. The Manchus and the peasant population fought with “sticks, stones, rusted swords and wick-fired matchlocks” against old-fashioned, but still functional British flintlock rifles; hence their resistance was doomed.

As for the differences between the two kinds of armies, Luo Ergang points out that the Eight Banner Army was concentrated in fewer garrisons, while the Green Standards were widespread over the entire country, and unlike the Eight Banners they were present in every province. The tasks of the Green Standards were more varied, and lowlier than those of the Banners, so that there was a clear hierarchy, also and especially in the pay scale,

32 Ibid., p. 310.
33 Ibid., p. 311.
34 Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, p. 117.
between the two. Luo emphasizes that, nevertheless, the Green Standards served more important functions than the Banners: their numbers were greater, and they were the better fighters. There is a certain tendentiousness in this assessment. It was made at a time when the prestige of the Qing dynasty and its ruling elite, the Manchus, was at a very low point. This also highlights what may seem, in contrast, the somewhat apologetic and perhaps romanticizing nuances in the great interest in the Eight Banners shown in present-day China. The Qianlong emperor had already perceived that there was a gap between the claim that the Manchus were warriors dedicating their life to hunting, sports, and battle, and the fact that fewer and fewer Manchus were able to hit the target in archery contests and to speak Manchu. Yet when it came to substantial failure in war, the blame was often shifted to the “cowardly” Green Standard units that deserted rather than to fight the enemy.

The native troops were even less reliable because they often had family relations with those they had to battle against. Most military successes of the Qing armies in the eighteenth century were made possible only by the massive deployment of elite Banner troops from Beijing (the Firearms and Scouting Brigades) and the garrisons in the north-east, the homeland of the Manchus. Also among the elite troops were the Ölöd Mongols who had submitted to Qing suzerainty during or after the conquest of the Dzungars. Thus, troops marching from Ili in the far west and from Aigun on the banks of the Amur River in the north-east covered thousands of miles to reach the battlefields in Sichuan, Burma, Taiwan, or even Nepal. The wars of conquest in Dzungaria were predominantly waged by Banner troops. There is evidence that suggests that the Banner troops did not simply stay in the back while the Green Standard troops served as “cannon fodder”. While the proportion of Banner troops to Green Standard troops serving in a war was typically 1:10, some examples demonstrate that the proportion of

36 Luo, Luying bingzhi, p. 6.
37 Ibid., p. 7.
38 Ibid., p. 9.
39 See, for example, the first assessment of the disaster of Mugom in 1773, when a large camp was surprised and conquered by the enemy. The blame was laid on the “faint-hearted” Green Standard troops. Instead of executing all of them (amounting to several thousand men), the emperor spared their lives as he realized that they had to be supported and induced to fight by more contingents of Banner troops. See Pingding Liang Jinchuan fanglue (Siku quanshu, Wenyuange edn, digital version Zhongguo jiben guji ku, 65, edict of Qianlong 38/7 [s. l. 6]/ dingyou=9 (this citation refers to the ninth day of the seventh lunar month in the year 38 of the reign of the Qianlong emperor, or 28 July 1773)).
deaths on the part of officers in the Banners was 3:10 or even 7:10. If this is a representative sample, this would mean that proportionally many more Banner officers died for their emperor and for fame and glory than their colleagues in the Green Standards.

Due to the enhanced accessibility of archival documents, issues of military finance and logistics offer a large field for new inquiries into Qing military history. The ground-breaking study by Chen Feng has already been mentioned. Recently, important publications in English have been produced by Dai Yingcong. At least as much as the study on ethnicity, this monetary aspect relates to military labour in many ways. Dai Yingcong's work on the Gold River (Jinchuan) campaigns is especially explicit about labour conditions. Her studies highlight two distinct trends that stand in close relationship to labour conditions and labour relations: the Qing state at least formally put an end to corvée obligations, although they could remain disguised below the surface of general tax duties. In the Gold River campaigns, military employment was for the first time completely organized as large-scale hired labour. Dai Yingcong quotes a figure of 462,000 military labourers recruited in the six years of the second campaign (1771-1776) as against 129,500 warriors. The workers were mainly porters, since the Qing armies carried all their provisions and the silver for the soldiers' and officers' wages with them.

The second trend was the increasing involvement of merchants or, in other words, the representatives of the market in military finance. Alexander Woodside has emphasized this on a much more general level, by labelling the Qianlong emperor as “the big merchants’ emperor”. Merchants subsidized the Gold River campaigns and the later wars against the Gurkhas with millions of tael of contributions (a kind of tax equivalent to the regular taxation of entrepreneurship that was not levied), and this social group, much more than the imperial bureaucracy, organized the logistics of the second Gold River campaign. These two trends went hand in hand. Although this did not concern the warriors, it may well have been that the example of the Banner and Green Standard soldiers, who did receive wages, stimulated the recruitment of military labourers who were to receive

41 Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, esp. ch. 6, and “The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labor Force in the Jinchuan Campaigns”.
42 Woodside, “The Ch’ien-lung Reign”: “the salt merchants’ emperor” (p. 240), “the big merchants’ emperor” (p. 241), “merchant-loving emperor” (p. 267), or the Qianlong period as a “reign of plutocracy” (p. 239).
43 Ibid., p. 273. One tael of silver equals about 37.5 grammes at 95 per cent purity.
wages and food provisions like the soldiers. The emperor, despite the immense assistance the private hiring of porters provided the supplying of the troops, did not want to use the procedures of the Gold River campaign as a precedent for future wars. Officially, the problem was not the price of labour, since the logistics managers learned soon that it was as expensive to have an entrepreneur ship the rice as to have this done by the local magistrates. The core of the problem was rather the professed systematic mistrust of private entrepreneurship from the central government, which was convinced that supplying the army should remain *per definitionem* a task of local government. Yet it is not easy to assess how many of this type of statement decreed by the emperor were purely rhetorical, or to what extent the emperor’s mistrust was instead targeted towards an eventual embezzlement of funds which, as the logistics managers claimed, were necessary to pay the “expensive” private entrepreneurs.

Perusal of specific cases, if they have generated as much paperwork as that of the Gold River campaigns, can shed light on processes in the organization of military labour. These would remain hidden if the normative statutes and regulations about military organization alone were studied. Most of the campaigns of the Qianlong emperor are well documented and have left information, including such about military labour and service, which can be applied for further research. For instance, one topic is whether the first Gold River campaign (1747-1749) really was the one in which hired labour was engaged for the first time.  

Recently, the conventional wisdom that Chinese civilization was distinctly civilian and anti-military in outlook is being revised by several authors, for instance by Harriet Zurndorfer, Rui Magone, and Hans van de Ven.  It is correct that, for extended periods of time, it was centralized imperial power that prevailed in China rather than military competition between small states and polities, as in Europe. However, this does not mean

44 The regulations for war expenditure in the *Junxu zeli* (*Xiaxu siku quanshu* edn), *Hubu junxu zeli*, ch. 5, claim that the two Gold River campaigns were the sole instances when merchants were hired to procure and transport grain for the troops. Yet there is some evidence that as early as 1735 merchants were assigned to transport grain to the camps; see for instance *Pingding Junggar fanglue* (*Siku quanshu*, Wenyuange edn, digital version Zhongguo jiben guji ku), *Qianbian* (First part) 39 (YZ 13/10/jiashen=19 [2 December 1735], 12/wuzi=23 [4 February 1735]), *Qianbian* 42 (QL 1/6/dinghai=28 [28 January 1737]) or *Qianbian* 44 (QL 4/4/yiyou=9 [16 May 1739]). Merchants or owners of camel herds were apparently able to ship grain at a lower price than the government with its “official camels” (*guantuo*).  

that military organization was unimportant at any time in Chinese history.\textsuperscript{46} The idea that it was the prevention of warfare and “victory without war” that preoccupied the Chinese, rather than warfare aiming at decisive victory and the annihilation of enemy forces, is being discredited.\textsuperscript{47} At the same time, the often cited Chinese proverb that “a good man doesn’t become a soldier, good iron is not made into nails”, points to a preference for the civilian sphere that lasted for hundreds of years. It stands in conjunction with lesser prestige for military than for civilian occupations and leadership functions. Such ideas were overcome in periods of dynastic or systemic change as in the twentieth century. Yet in view of the present brush-up of the military image, it seems necessary to keep the focus on the actual priority that was given to civilian office until the twentieth century.

**Labour relations in Qing dynasty military occupations**

Military labour can occur in all of the three great categories described in the taxonomy developed by the Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations: namely reciprocal, tributary, and commodified. Reciprocal labour implies that workers provide labour within the household and the community. In most parts of the world from 1650 to 1800, this consisted of agricultural labour and mostly unpaid household work. However, it can also apply in some hunter-gatherer village communities, where defensive and hunting duties might form part of the (mostly) male life cycle. At the borders of Qing China, such arrangements are known in the Taiwanese indigenous population, where boys and men between age six and forty were expected to serve their community in this type of occupation.

In larger polities that cannot be regarded as part of the extended family, the labour power of the populace is often considered to be the property of the state or feudal and religious authorities. This work is not commodified, and the respective labour relations have been designated as “tributary”. For military labour, this type of labour relation can be found in military conscription, military corvée, and obligatory supply services of all kinds. A third category consists of commodified labour. This is the case if an employer acquires labour power and usually pays for it. In the case of military labour, mercenary troops and commissioned armies belong to this type.

\textsuperscript{46} Van de Ven, “Introduction”, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 2, citing Geoffrey Parker.
If applied to the armies of the Qing dynasty, the specific situations need to be assessed separately for the Eight Banners, the competitors to the Banner Armies in the Ming-Qing transition, the Green Standard Army supply services, specialists, civilian officials, militia troops, the Taiping army and provincial armies, and the new armies established after 1865.

The Eight Banners constitute an example of polyethnic, tributary labour that was a “hereditary privilege”, rather than an onerous obligation. The court had taken the political decision to support this “conquest elite” in money and kind, even if they were not active in military or civilian service. Banner people were not supposed or allowed to take up occupations other than service for the state. This could be military for combat or garrison duty, but also civilian. It was only near the end of Qing rule, in 1863, that the ban on market-oriented occupations was officially lifted. In other words, this type of labour was not entirely free, since it was linked to descent, and formally options other than service were not allowed.

While the Green Standard troops also supervised the postal service, patrolled cities and spots of strategic importance, caught bandits, and suppressed rebellions, the Banner troops were mainly deployed to wage war. Yet there were also exceptions like the Guards Brigade in the capital which had to provide personnel to protect the imperial palace. Banner troops were not generally used when a crisis erupted. Most wars began as a local problem of unrest or an imminent threat to a particular locality. Therefore, the first troops to be dispatched were Green Standard troops, not Banner troops. If a local crisis expanded into a war, it was still considered a local affair for which the governor-general of the respective region was responsible. In such cases Banner troops from the local Banner garrison(s) were dispatched to support the Green Standard units. Yet the Banner garrisons were quite small and could mobilize only a small number of troops. If not sufficient, Green Standard troops from other provinces were also sent for assistance. In contrast, elite Banner troops from the capital and the north-east were sent to the war theatre only if really necessary. Bannermen, although more expensive than Green Standard troops, also proved to be more effective. The designations of particular Banner platoons (like huoqijing "Firearms Bri-

49 Compare ibid., p. 201, who points out that, if the Banner people failed to find work, it had to be found for them, “by way of pretext for the payment of a salary”.
50 Crossley, "The Conquest Elite of the Ch'ing Empire", p. 318, who lists work as “salaried policemen, foot soldiers, scribes, teachers, porters, and accountants in the segregated urban garrison communities” as typical occupations of the Banner people.
Mi Litary EM pLoy ME nt in Qin G dynasty c hina 367
gade", pao xiaoji “artillerymen”, or niaoqiang canling “musketry regimental commander”) in the Qing statutes date from the early eighteenth century. Therefore it is not certain how many troops had muskets, cannons, and howitzers, and how many of them had to fight with bows and arrows. The latter were seen as genuinely Manchurian and were of great use in the wars against the Dzungars. The copper-plate engravings depicting the victories of the Qing show a high number of mounted archers, but also musketeers, gunners, and sword-fighters. Gunnery seemed not to have been a monopoly of the Artillery Brigade in the capital. Guns or howitzers were in many cases cast on the spot, for which purpose experts had to be available.

When dispatched to the battlefield, Banner troops were given so-called baggage pay (xingzhuangyin) that was different for each officer rank. It was higher for Banner troops from the north-east than for those from the provincial garrisons elsewhere, but lower than the baggage pay for the troops from the capital. On the way to the theater of war and in the field, the troops were given a so-called salt-and-vegetable (or “salted vegetable”) pay (yancailiyin) to buy food. The regulations concerning the baggage pay, the salt-and-vegetable pay, and the number of menservants and horses an officer versus a common soldier could dispose of were extremely complex. In the beginning, the regulations differed from province to province, and there were many imbalances so that by the late 1770s the emperor ordered the compilation of a nationwide code of regulations for military expenditure, the Junxu zeli. The level of payment in this code was generally somewhat higher than before. The baggage pay was a quite high amount and was roughly equal to one year’s salary. It could be paid out to the family that remained in the home garrison, but it could also be forwarded to the destination where it was paid out in the camp. From this money, the soldier had to acquire weapons, clothing, a tent, and a horse, but there also was sufficient money left over to pay back his debts. No wonder a war was seen as an ideal opportunity to make money. The salt-and-vegetable pay was not very high. It was meant to be just sufficient to still hunger and to regenerate physical strength. Alongside this, everybody was given a fixed amount of rice (about one litre) per day. The distribution of rice was to prevent the tendency to save money instead of spending it on food. Yet there were also cases reported where troops sold their rice in order to earn

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some cash.\textsuperscript{54} The duration of service is not easy to assess. Banner troops had a lifelong obligation to serve, but their actual service in war depended on the location of the garrison and the length of the campaign. Troops from the coastal provinces were very rarely involved in wars: only during those against Burma, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The garrisons with the highest potential to be activated for campaigning were located in Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan (the “belly of the empire”), the capital Beijing, and the north-east. The longest single campaign of the eighteenth century was the second campaign in the Gold River region, which lasted for fifty months. Furloughs were totally unknown, unless a soldier was wounded. In this case, he was granted three months’ leave, and he could also return to his home garrison during that time. The Banner troops served thirty-one months on average, Green Standard troops thirty-eight months, and native troops forty months.\textsuperscript{55}

The bondservants, who served, among other obligations, as supply forces for the Eight Banner soldiers and officers, were less free than the warriors, but some among their ranks could gain great personal influence and wealth. For instance Cao Yin (1658-1712), the director of the Imperial Silk Weaveries in Nanjing and concurrently supervisor of salt production and distribution in central China, gained those important civilian positions due to his close personal relationship to the Kangxi emperor.\textsuperscript{56} Yet few bondservants rose that high. Most spent lives dependent upon their Banners and the household they were assigned to. Elliott gives figures of the ratios of dependants per employed Bannerman as 10:1 in locations with lesser work opportunities, but for Beijing about 5:1.\textsuperscript{57}

Not all dependants were bondservants. One group that stood even lower in the hierarchy were the slaves that were assigned to specific Banner households which they could not leave. However, social mobility was possible. Thus, many slaves could rise to the ranks of bondservants.\textsuperscript{58} The specific tasks of the dependants of Bannermen in warfare still need to be explored. However, a few words can be said about the special type of manservant (\textit{genyi}, literally “follower servant”)\textsuperscript{59} that each warrior (officer or common

\textsuperscript{54} Pingding Liang Jinchuan fanlüe, 57, fols 25b-26b (QL 38/r3/dinghai=28).
\textsuperscript{55} Theobald, “The Second Jinchuan Campaign”, pp. 130-132.
\textsuperscript{56} Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, pp. 740-742.
\textsuperscript{57} Elliott, The Manchu Way, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 51.
\textsuperscript{59} The term \textit{yi} is the same word as for unpaid corvée labour of ancient times, making it seemingly a kind of slave labour, which is not correct. The Manchu term is \textit{dahaltu}, which also means “following servant”.

soldier) disposed of during wartime. The menservants were important for the everyday processes of a campaigning army. They served their masters in erecting the tents, cooking food, cleaning clothing and weaponry, guiding the sumpter-mules, cutting grass for the horses, carrying letters, or forwarding information; some were used as translators. The menservants of the Green Standard troops could even be used as soldiers and therefore in some provinces were called “supplementary troops” (yuding). Although most sources speaking of menservants are related to campaigning, there is also evidence that they were used in peacetime and for civilian purposes. This circumstance and the fact that menservants to the Green Standard troops were automatically seen as part of the corps lead to the conclusion that they were not explicitly recruited for warfare but were permanently affiliated to military households. In the case of the Banner households it has to be assumed that bondservants and slaves took over this role, while in the case of the Green Standard this function may have been performed by sons, youngsters, and new recruits (xinmubing). Even native officers were allowed the privilege of maintaining menservants.

Menservants thus stayed with their masters in the war theatre as long as the latter had to fight. If their masters died, they were obliged to bring back the coffins. Yet this applied only to Banner officers, not to common soldiers, and was not the case for the Green Standard officers. Menservants were also paid out salt-and-vegetable money and were given a daily ration of rice. Moreover, menservants of the Banner troops received their own sumpter-horses to transport luggage, tent, and weaponry. The common troops of provincial Banner garrisons had an allowance for one manservant per two soldiers. In Green Standard units, ten common soldiers were entitled to receive wages for three menservants. This means that between a quarter and a third of the fighting corps were menservants and had a position, seen from their duties, somewhere between the status of labourers and ad hoc fighters. The regulations in the code for military expenditure state only how much the government would pay for. If a soldier preferred to be served by his own manservant instead of sharing one with his colleagues, he would have to pay that manservant out of his own purse. Conversely, a lieutenant served by only two menservants could claim to have employed three menservants and receive the extra money.

The time period of the Ming-Qing transition corresponds to the cross-section year of 1650. This transition was of relatively short duration. Mul-

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60 Compare junxu zeli, Hubu junxu zeli, chs 3-4.
61 See below and n. 100 for an explanation of this term.
tiple arrangements occurred in military labour relations. On the whole, the situation is not as well documented as for the Ming and Qing dynasties, and military statutes or legislation are not available for the contending armies of the southern Ming, the Ming loyalists, and the Three Feudatories. The polity that lasted longest was that of the Zheng clan (1647-1683), founded by Zheng Chenggong (1624-1662), also known as Koxinga. Zheng Chenggong’s army and navy comprised people who were recruited in different ways. Based on textual evidence in the scattered sources on the Zheng government, the Taiwanese historian Shi Wanshou has pointed out that in the early stages Zheng’s troops, which he raised practically from scratch, were a mere 300 men, whom he had recruited in a manner that suggests commodified labour. Additional fighters joined him on their own initiative to defend the cause of the Ming. Zheng’s father Zhilong had been a freebooting trader who had already established an army and navy of his own, which at first he led into battle against the Manchus. When promised the governorship of two important south-eastern provinces, Zheng Zhilong defected to the Qing in 1655, but the Qing did not keep their word and took him to Beijing where he was kept under close supervision. His remaining soldiers were divided among other commanders of his family, and gradually joined Zheng Chenggong’s forces.

These three recruitment methods are referred to as “free recruitment”, “self-recommendation”, and “incorporation of allied troops”. Zheng Chenggong succeeded in expanding his sphere of influence in south-eastern China, so that by its high point in 1658, according to contemporary sources it boasted 170,000 armoured men, 8,000 soldiers with iron [weapons?] (tieren, lit. “iron men”), and 8,000 battleships. However, after a grave defeat during an attack on Nanjing, Zheng had to take refuge on Taiwan in 1661 and died in the following year. In the expansionary phase between 1655 and 1659, troops who had first fought for the Qing defected or were made to surrender to Zheng’s army. This constituted a further manner of recruitment, the so-called incorporation of enemy troops after capitulation. After the large-scale retreat to Taiwan, which involved a siege and the eventual expulsion of a contingent of Dutch colonialists in the service of the Dutch East Asia Company VOC, a relatively peaceful period continued until the mid-1670s. Military colonization was a matter of survival for the Zheng regime as a

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63 Struve, “The Southern Ming, 1644-1662”, p. 676.
65 Ibid., p. 193, citing Minhai jiyao for the year 1658.
whole as well as for the individual soldiers. The Zheng government launched several land-cultivation campaigns in Taiwan, where soldiers were expected to clear the land in a labour arrangement that resembled tenancy. Due to the steady decrease in the Zhengs’ military manpower, military conscription and corvée labour were implemented as a matter of last resort. The latter was utilized especially for military labour, for transportation of provisions, and for the rebuilding of a fort. The era of the Zhengs is thus a case in point for a trend of changing from more commodified to more tributary labour for reasons of labour scarcity and lacking finances at the end of a short-lived rule.

According to Luo Ergang, employment in the Green Standard Army was voluntary, but it was intended to last a lifetime. It was hereditary in the sense that at age sixteen the sons of soldiers had the right – but not the obligation – to present themselves for mustering and, if found acceptable, be admitted to the army as “apprentice” or “expectant” soldiers (yubing, literally “surplus” or “reserve” soldiers). These apprentice soldiers served as auxiliaries; apparently not all companies had them in sufficient numbers. The documents of the Gold River campaign provide for a particular number of hired labourers per hundred soldiers, which was higher (eighty) if those soldiers had no “apprentice soldiers”, and lower (fifty) if they had.

The troops of the Green Standard Army were reimbursed for the same items during war as the Banner troops, but at a much lower rates. Baggage pay, for example for a cavalry soldier of the Green Standards, was 10 taels, for infantry troops 6 taels, for a provincial Banner cavalry soldier 20 taels, for a provincial Banner infantry or artillery soldier 15 taels. Elite Banner soldiers from the capital were given 30 taels, yet native soldiers received only 3 taels. Part of the reason for this was that native troops normally were locals and did not have to cover a large distance to reach the war theatre. The salt-and-vegetable pay and the daily provision of rice were equal for soldiers of all types of troops and for all ranks. A colonel was not given more to eat than a common soldier. If he wanted to eat better, he had to pay for this from his salary.

66 According to Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier*, pp. 94-96, 30 per cent of the harvest was to be paid to the public treasury for the first three years, and thereafter was to be taxed regularly. Ploughs and seeds were provided for by the government. 67 *Ibid.*, p. 103. 68 Luo, *Luying bingzhi*, p. 231. 69 Dai, “The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labour Force in the Jinchuan Campaigns”, p. 45. 70 Compare *Junxu zeli, Hubu junxu zeli*, chs 1-3.
Another important issue is that the baggage pay for the Green Standard troops was granted without conditions: the troops did not have to pay it back. For the Banner troops, it was usual in some provinces, at least nominally, that the troops had to pay back the baggage pay after the campaign. In the beginning, this seems to have been the common procedure, but over the course of time it became customary that the emperor, after a victorious campaign, waived the back payment and bestowed upon the troops the baggage pay *ex post* as a gift. According to the early local regulations for war expenditures and the later nationwide code for them, this was actually against customary usage, although there were also some precedents for such a practice in earlier wars. Yet the necessity to keep the troops in a state of permanent alertness for campaigning, and the desire of the Qianlong emperor to foster his most trusted and most efficient military units, the Manchu Banners, led to the custom that baggage pay was a grant regardless of the legal situation. In other words, while in the early Qing period it was the duty of a soldier to make ready his equipment and to bring it to the site of military operations, the professional soldiers of the mid Qing period were well paid (baggage pay corresponded to one year's wages) for their active service.

As Dai Yingcong has pointed out, the Qing state experimented with a large contingent of wage labourers in the first and second Gold River wars. These porters, workers, and militia were recruited first from the local population, sometimes including women and children, in completely free arrangements or as part of the corvée these people owed to their local officials or chieftains (in case of the native ethnic groups) who had pledged allegiance to the Qing. In the latter case, one can speak of a kind of indirect, but paid, corvée service. In ancient China, three types of taxes had been paid: grain (the men’s duty), textiles (produced by the women), and corvée labour for the construction of dams, dykes, official buildings, tomb mounds, or – most famously – the Great Wall. In the sixteenth century, the system of corvée labour was finally abolished. However, the household and tax registers were still an important source informing the government about the potential labour force of the population. If needed, labourers could be drafted based on the tax registers but, unlike before, their work had to be paid adequately with wages, which were regulated, but at least near the market price. For instance, the repair of dams was still done by labourers recruited from the peasant population, but they were paid, as were those who carried rice to the camps in the war theatre. The latter were recruited from the villages, marched to a predefined logistics station, and carried rice from one station to the next in a kind of relay system. The difference
between the Gold River campaign and other wars is that the first as well as the second campaign resulted in static warfare in which troops had to be provided with rice over a long period of time. The recruited peasants, although paid, had to return to their fields, otherwise the grain yield, and consequently the tax yield, of the district would decline. Labourers deserted in droves, even when they were allowed to return home after three, later five, months of service. The only way to keep them at their work was to pay them much more than the nominal 2.4 taels a month, plus a free daily rice ration. Labour cost for porterage in the steep mountain paths of the Gold River region skyrocketed (by a multiple of up to five).

The managers of the logistics apparatus had discovered that with such prices it was equally costly to have a private entrepreneur commissioned with the rice transport. The entrepreneur would then supervise the recruitment and the replacement of deserters. The entrepreneurs did not have access to the tax registers, but recruited their labourers in the labour market. Immigration into the province of Sichuan and the increase in the local population had led to a growing surplus in the labour force in the eighteenth century. The chance to earn some money in the war logistics process even attracted people to immigrate into the respective provinces.

When the war was over, the porters were set free again, leading to all the social complications that widespread unemployment causes. The porters recruited by the government, as well as those hired by private shippers were short-term employees, some in a contract with the government, others with a private merchant. In the second case, there were no restrictions upon ethnicity or gender, but in the first case, the government recruited only registered males. There was, nevertheless, the possibility of having somebody else take over the duty to carry the rice. There were also rice porters from the native tribes who were mainly used on the paths of the high plateau. If employed by the Qing government, they were also regularly paid and given a daily ration in barley but, if delivering corvée (in the old sense as part of the tax liability) to their chieftain, they seem not to have been paid.

The Banner garrisons had a certain number of regularly employed professional craftsmen, such as arrow-makers, bow-makers, blacksmiths, bronzesmiths, musket-makers, saddlers, and ship's carpenters. The most important of these artisans were the bow- and arrow-makers and the blacksmiths.

They were, similarly to the menservants, called jiangyi, “craft labourers.”\(^72\) As an integral part of the army (called “official labourers”, guanyi), they could be called specialist troops, especially if entrusted to build palisades, wooden bridges, or pontoon bridges, or casting cannons in field foundries. Since many of them had to operate with a number of specialized tools and implements, they were given a baggage pay of no less than 10 taels. Physicians were even entitled to a certain number of menservants.

The Green Standard Armies did not have “official craftsmen” in their garrisons. The production of weapons was done by craftsmen on the private market. During war, when there was a need for new sabres, swords, daggers, halberds, and all the fantastic range of polearms the Chinese used, blacksmiths were hired to produce new arms. The cost for the production of arms was fixed locally and could be reclaimed according to certain rules about the lifespan and the overhaul of weapons.\(^73\) The cost lists also included, besides the material cost, an entry for the labour cost. Craftsmen of all types who were hired to serve the army in a campaign were treated quite generously. They were paid a baggage allotment which was geared to the distance to the war theatre (between 5 and 6 taels). Such craftsmen could also be granted a family allowance (anjiaoyin, literally “money to appease the family”) if living far away. On the way to their destination, they were paid a certain daily sum of money to buy food (0.06 taels), and outside the borders given 1 litre of rice. On the spot where the craftsmen had to work, they were paid monthly sums between 2 and 3 taels, depending on the physical demands of the work. Tailors, map-makers, wood-cutters, ship’s carpenters, and blacksmiths were paid less than cannon-casters. Both the men and their families at home were given daily allowances of 1 litre of rice. Yet these regulations became valid on a national level only during the late 1770s. Previously, the regulations concerning their pay differed widely from province to province. Most of the specialists were hired for a longer period, at least several months. Otherwise their deployment cost would have been too high. References to physicians are very scarce, but it is known that they could either be recruited from the population or come from the Imperial Academy of Medicine. The members of the latter presumably treated only

\(^72\) As in genyi, and as noted above, the word yi is derived from the designation of old, unpaid corvée labour.

\(^73\) Junqi zeli (1791 edn), in Gugong zhenben congkan, 293 (Haikou, 2000): see regulations for the weapons of each particular garrison.
the emperor or princes when out in the field, but not normal officers, and even less the common soldiers.\(^7\)

Civilian officials played an important role in the organization of the logistics behind the battle lines. Naturally, they were, like the professional soldiers, paid their normal salary, but also received baggage pay, salt-and-vegetable pay, and daily provisions of rice. As with the soldiers at the front, an excellent performance of their duties could result in rewards or even promotions. Yet service in the logistics branch was not a very popular task for someone who normally lived in a mansion in the district capital, for example, as a district magistrate. During wartime, they were obliged to leave the city where they were appointed and move to a logistics station somewhere on the way to the war theatre. Civilian officials had to oversee logistics stations, and the number of stations they were responsible for depended on their official rank. Since it was not a very popular task, the logistics lines were mostly put into the hand of newly qualified officials who had passed the state examinations but had not yet been appointed to a post. They were, during that time, not given a salary and did their job in the hope of being moved up in the line of waiting officials and being selected for appointment somewhat earlier than average. Another group of officials who served without monetary pay in logistics were those who had been demoted because of some offence. They were virtually enslaved and redeemed their offence (shuzui) with unpaid service in an unpopular position. Even very high officials could be degraded to service in the military supply without financial payment, as the case of the previous governor-general of Sichuan, Artai, during the second Gold River campaign shows. The proportion of civilian officials to troops was, in the case of this war, about 7:1,000.\(^7\)

Depending on who led the campaign, a whole entourage of civilian officials of the central government could participate, such as physicians, astronomers, members of princely households, scribes, secretaries, translators, edict drafters, members of the ministries (the Censorate, the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, Imperial Entertainments, Judicial Review), and so on. All of them were granted baggage pay, salt-and-vegetable pay, daily rations, and a fixed number of beasts of burden.

The highest-ranking civilian members of the central government who took part in campaigns were generals and marshals. This sentence must be stressed, because it points out the very important issue of the “amphibious”\(^7\)

\(^7\) Junxu zeli, Hubu junxu zeli, ch. 6.
\(^7\) Theobald, “The Second Jinchuan Campaign”, pp. 136, 142.
\(^7\) Dai Yingcong, unpublished manuscript on the functions of civilian officials in warfare.
character of the Bannermen. As members of the Banners, officials in the State Council or the Grand Secretariat were either by definition or by nature soldiers. However, if there was no war, they acted in civilian positions and performed civilian duties like those of salt supervisors, supervisors of the Imperial Canal, censors, provincial judges, or governors. The entirety of the military forces dispatched to the battlefield was normally commanded by a governor-general. Yet if the campaign was so large that troops from other provinces were involved, command had to be assumed by a member of the central government, such as a grand minister commander (jinglüé dachen) or a grand minister consultant (canzan dachen), and the respective persons transmuted back into real soldiers.

The bureaucracy of the Qing Empire thus involved many parts of the population and employed them for the purposes of war. In this respect, warfare was regarded as an aspect to be administered not very differently from any other day-to-day affair. At the end of the eighteenth century, all financial aspects of warfare were regulated bureaucratically, including the wartime allowances of professional troops and the labour corps. The amounts the state would spend on baggage pay, food, special clothing for specialists, family allowances, labour pay, and allowances on days when labourers were not working were regulated. Yet it is not known if the sums listed in the regulations corresponded to the real pay the labourers received. In many cases it might have been more, in order to induce them to remain in the job, but in other cases less, since a high rate of unemployment might have forced military labourers to accept lower wages. In the first case the officials in control of logistics would have to find the extra money to pay the labourers. In the second case, they could embezzle a part of the funds allotted to the payment of the labour corps.

The 1790s mark the point from which the dynasty could no longer cope with the rebellions in the interior with Banner troops and Green Standards alone. During the uprising of the White Lotus (c. 1790-1805), an originally religious, later overtly political, group that harboured strong anti-Manchu feelings, the use of militia or “local corps” (tuanlian) to keep the insurrectionists out of the villages and prevent the villagers from joining their numbers, was introduced by representatives of the local elites. In Philip Kuhn’s analysis, in the militia system of the middle of the nineteenth century, two strands of intentions and motivations were blended together: the bureaucratic efforts to keep control over the countryside and a kind of “natural” and more spontaneous militarization implemented by local

77 Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, p. 38.
elites trying to defend their property and communities.\textsuperscript{78} Therefore, the militia structures were complex, since this was not a case of one centralized dynastic army, and norms set by regional and local administrations would typically differ in their realization \textit{in situ}. Levels of armament, fortification, and professionalization could vary widely, depending on leadership and funding, both of which were organized locally by the elites. Co-operation between individual militia corps was possible, and the more complex the corps was, the better the options for funding and professionalization. While on the lowest level, and from the perspective of the local bureaucracy, an element of conscription or at least obligation prevailed, the larger corps could hire mercenaries, the so-called braves (\textit{yong}). If funds permitted, these professionals usually were provided with better weapons.\textsuperscript{79} Kuhn cites an example of a complex militia corps near the city of Canton which consisted of more than 10,000 hired mercenaries and which could mobilize, if needed, a “reserve” force of several tens of thousands in the villages.\textsuperscript{80} It was active in the 1840s, when it operated against the British in the First Opium War.

While the White Lotus insurrection was subdued with the efforts of Banner Armies, Green Standards, and militias, militarization on a higher professional level, which had already set in earlier, was institutionalized in the course of the next great challenge, the Taiping rebellion. This was implemented in parallel structures: both the Taiping army and the provincial armies were organized along similar lines, according to the degree of militarization, as conceptualized by Kuhn (see Table 12.1).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Orthodox} & \textbf{Heterodox} \\
\hline
The regional army & The community in arms \\
\textit{Yong} (mercenaries) & \textit{Gu} (bandits) \\
\textit{Tuanlian} (local militia) & \textit{Tang} (secret society lodge) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Parallel military hierarchies in central and southern China, by descending order of level of militarization}
\end{table}

\textit{Source}: Kuhn, \textit{Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China}, p. 166.

The next large insurrection was a movement with its beginnings during the First Opium War, 1838-1842. At the start, the Taiping organized themselves

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 70.
as military formations that were similar to those of the militia. In Nanjing, where the entire Banner garrison population was wiped out, they established one army for each of their leaders, but created no single Taiping army under unified command.\textsuperscript{81} The original eight Taiping corps and regiments included about 30,000 men.\textsuperscript{82} When the Taiping rebels reached Nanjing in 1853, they were estimated at about 2 million people.\textsuperscript{83} Basically, the entire Taiping population was organized in military units, and units of female combatants existed as well.\textsuperscript{84}

In reaction to the great danger of the anti-Manchu and anti-Confucian Taiping insurrection, which threatened the interests of the local elites whenever they passed on their trek to Nanjing and later to Beijing, provincial elites wove together individual militia groups to form large armies. Their structure was similar to that of the Taiping armies.\textsuperscript{85} Their soldiers were not confined, like the militia, to defence in their native or nearby localities. Furthermore, not the available, but specifically the able men were recruited from the local peasantry. The pay was said to be four times higher than that of the “regular army”, and the soldiers actually received it, which often was not the case in the standing army.\textsuperscript{86} The financial support came largely from the provincial sources, not from the central government. A particularity of these armies was that personal command played a decisive role. In contrast to the Green Standard Armies, where the higher-echelon officers were not supposed to work in their own home regions,\textsuperscript{87} the soldiers at the level of the battalion (500 men) were expected to maintain personal loyalty to their commander. Battalions could be given the personal name of their leaders, and if due to death or retirement this officer was no longer in command, rather than replacing him, the unit was dissolved and had to be replaced by a newly recruited one.\textsuperscript{88} Likewise, the armies owed loyalty to their founders, with whom they were identified: for instance, Zeng Guofan and Zuo Zongtang with their Hunan armies, Li Hongzhang with the Anhui army, and Yuan Shikai with the Beiyang army. This was so prevalent that Luo

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., p. 476. Kuhn, “The Taiping Rebellion”, p. 273, quotes a figure of some 20,000 by c. 1850.
\textsuperscript{83} Kuhn “The Taiping Rebellion”, p. 275.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p. 276.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., p. 472.
\textsuperscript{88} Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, p. 148.
Ergang captured the phenomenon in the phrase “bing wei jiang you” (the soldiers belong to the general). 89

The last phase of the Qing dynasty after the defeat of the Taiping rebellion in 1864 was characterized by efforts to ward off foreign intrusion and to quell interior rebellions that mushroomed all over the empire. Provincial armies were deployed for the latter purpose. Yet for the former aim an invigorated army and a navy under central command seemed necessary. For this reason, attempts were made in 1865 to reform part of the Green Standards that were stationed in the vicinity of Beijing, in the form of the “disciplined forces” (lianjun), which were to be trained in western military methods by Chinese and western instructors, and equipped with modern and unified weaponry and uniforms. They were to be organized and paid like the Anhui and Hunan armies. If we can trust western observers, this step toward an army reform did not have any great effect. Rather, it was the military reforms by the provincial armies, especially the modernization of weapons, ammunition, and military methods, which had convincing results. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 triggered a series of further attempts at military modernization, among which those by Zhang Zhidong in Hubei and by Yuan Shikai in the northern provinces surrounding the capital were most successful and became the nuclei of the private armies of Republican warlords in the twentieth century. 90

Both armies were known for good and regular payment. 91 The north China army, which was established in 1895, was in fact intended as a first step towards a centralized army. With many halts and hindrances – and the Qing dynasty came as close as ever to abdication in the course of the Boxer uprising (1900-1901) – a systematic army reform was promulgated in 1905. The new field army (Lujun) was tightly modelled on the Japanese army and stressed not only the education of officers, but also the qualifications of ordinary soldiers. Interestingly, it provided for a kind of “voluntary conscription” or “selective service”, so that the idea of a conscript army was fostered, but at the same time the state retained the right to select the most able candidates. Provision was made, for instance, that one-fifth of the enlisted men should be literate. 92 Yet ambiguity remains about the degree of freedom in choosing a military occupation. As an American military attaché reported, localities were ordered to find a certain number of men.

89 Luo, “Qingji bing wei jiang you de qiyuan”.
91 Ibid., p. 78.
92 Ibid., p. 176.
and it was for the local officials to decide whom to choose. Furthermore, the army reform provided for clear command structures and uniformity of weapons and apparel, and had a clear pay scale that ranged from 1,600 taels per month for a corps commander – a corps was to include 1,595 officers, 23,760 enlisted men, 4,469 horses and mules, 108 cannons – to a monthly 4.2 taels for privates. The army was devised as a reserve army, with regular troops and first- and second-class reserves, as in European armies. Regulars were to serve for three years; after their regular service, first-class reserves were available for another three years, and second-class reserves for four. The reservists of the first class were to be paid 1 tael, while the second-class reserve men received half a tael per month, except when on active duty. The plan foresaw that in the course of seventeen years (by 1922) the Chinese Field Army was to include thirty-six divisions, that is, more than 400,000 men.

One pressing problem it did not solve or discuss was that the provinces still had more control over their divisions within the Field Army than the central government, because they financed the divisions that were stationed in their regions. The other was that the Eight Banners and Green Standards were retained, if in smaller numbers. Efforts had been made to train and drill part of the traditional armies in western ways, but change was slow, and the Manchu central government was not prepared to give up the Banner registration for good.

The numbers of the diverse armies were not precisely known to anybody, and the estimates vary widely, not only for the absolute number of men employed, but also for those who would, in the case of war, be able to actively defend the country. On the eve of the 1911 revolution, when a military mutiny ended more than two thousand years of imperial rule, the numbers of the various armies were given as shown in Table 12.2.

93 Ibid., p. 235.
94 Ibid., p. 178.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., p. 268.
Table 12.2 Troop strengths of Qing armies around 1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Number of men (official figures, rounded up)*</th>
<th>Variant estimates (rounded up)**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol and defence troops, Fangying (refers to the provincial armies)</td>
<td>334,000</td>
<td>French General Staff 1908: 216,000; US military attaché 1909: 157,000; China Year Book 1912: 277,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banner Army, Qiying</td>
<td>263,000</td>
<td>1911: 255,000 men, of which 38,000 trained in the Lujun; 37,000 trained in the patrol and defence troops or comparable units; the remaining two-thirds untrained or of no military value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Standards, Luying</td>
<td>133,000</td>
<td>It is doubtful whether they could have mustered more than 50,000 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Army, Lujun</td>
<td>286,000</td>
<td>Between 748,000 and 807,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,016,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
* Shen, “Xinhai geming qianxi woguo zhi lujun ji qi junfei”, p. 140

Trends over time

In the context of the Fighting for a Living project, the trends over time need to be interpreted by a six-layer matrix. In this matrix changes over time in six determinants of labour conditions and relations are described and correlated with each other. These determinants are, first, technology (hard and soft skills, such as technology of weapons and machinery, techniques of recruitment, or the inner structure of the army); secondly, political and socio-economic disruptions (often caused by war); thirdly, economic and financial factors (such as availability of funds or the rise of a monetized mar-

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kret economy); fourthly, demographic factors (such as the sudden availability of new populations or a decline in population growth); fifthly, conditions of supply and demand of labour (such as the army’s competition with other employers for labour); and, finally, ideological factors (such as ideas on the suitability of military labour, or the ideal of nation-building as a common cause). Instead of presenting a matrix with quantitative, binary (yes/no) elements in which those determinants are described as “chronological vectors”, we prefer a qualitative description by which the particular scalar sizes and their change over time can be much better specified. The following large changes in labour relations in the Chinese military can be observed in the cross-section years 1650, 1800, and 1900. These are sample years which the Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations chose for the comparative analysis of labour relations worldwide.98

The takeover of the imperial reign by the Manchus resulted in a transition around 1650 from the Ming corvée military service to the mercenary Green Standard Army, or – roughly – from tributary to commodified labour, with all the intermediary phases explained by David M. Robinson in his contribution in this volume, “Military Labor in China, c. 1500”. It remains to be discussed whether the transition from tributary conscripted, to commodified mercenary military labour is a process that occurred between 1500 and 1650, or whether mercenary labour was, already by 1600, so firmly established that no actual conscription occurred at all.

The ethnic composition of the conquest elite made the new formation of the Eight Banners necessary. With focus on the Manchus, this can be analysed as a transition from ethnic tributary to polyethnic tributary, which in the late eighteenth century comes back to a mono-ethnic model (Manchus only).

For the supply services of both Eight Banners and Green Standards, there was a rise in free wage labour for transport and specialist tasks that was largely organized by the market. This constitutes a change around 1800 from tributary (as a tax obligation in kind, or corvée) to commodified labour remunerated with monetary wages. Wars, especially those against insurgents, were increasingly organized by the local governments in the districts. The organizational complexity of the labour corps decreased because of shorter distances and diminished need for labour services.

Militia and mercenary, proto-provincial armies took over defence tasks from the Eight Banners and especially from the Green Standards.

If the transition from Green Standards to local militia is considered, this represents a change from commodified to tributary labour, since the local militia troops were originally conscripted from the peasant population. The ensuing transition from local militia to provincial armies in the second half of the nineteenth century reflects a change from tributary to commodified labour, since the troops were mercenaries hired by the proto-warlords. Here, change lay in the employing institution rather than in the labour relationship, namely the two-stage transition from the central government into the hands of the localities and then to the provinces.

At the end of the nineteenth century, a transition occurred from commodified labour in the lifelong mercenary Green Standards, and from tributary labour in the Eight Banners to *de facto* professional armies that were, however, established with the intention of introducing conscription. In actuality, the conscription was carried out in ways different from those envisaged. Rather than calling up all able-bodied male citizens to duty, localities decided how to fill their quotas and, in case of emergencies, took recourse to conscription. The transition back from provincial to imperial employment, which the newly established Ministry of War had hoped for, was not fulfilled.

**Explanations for transitions in the matrix of hypotheses**

The matrix of hypotheses for the explanation of change in military labour relations developed by the Collaboratory Fighting for a Living project provides for six options. In the following, we discuss which of these factors carried the most weight in the given cross-section years. Before going into details, it is necessary to stress the very long-term trend of increasing monetization in China between 1500 and 1900. Its beginnings are discussed in Robinson’s contribution, which also makes clear that “tributary” labour could be remunerated with regular stipends and additional gifts and grants. Monetization certainly played a major role in the rise of hired military labour over conscript labour. Nevertheless, tributary military labour in China was not confined to conscription and, given the further increase in population between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, the high amount of labour freely available for the military did not necessitate the use of conscription.
Why did labour relations in military work change?

Military technology, with respect to both "hardware" (that is, weaponry and armour) and "software" (in the sense of military skills), did not significantly influence change around 1650 from tributary to professional labour relations, and thus the change from Ming hereditary military households to Green Standards, or from the rise of the new tributary labour relations in the Banners. Muskets and cannons were used, as before, yet the Manchus particularly valued the skills of mounted archers and considered bows and arrows as genuinely Manchu weapons. Banners armies (hence the tributary rather than the mercenary type of military occupation) were seen as elite troops mainly deployed for the great conquest wars in the border zones. In the initial phase of the naval campaigns between the Ming or Ming loyalists and the Qing, the former had a decisive technological edge over the latter. However, also from this perspective the identification of the naval officers and mariners with the Han Chinese rather than the “foreign” Manchus determined whether people would join the Zheng or the Qing navy.

By 1800, gradual change had occurred in the supply services, in the form of a shift from tributary corvée to commodified hired modes of employment. As far as skills are concerned, the characteristics of the hired form of labour included the possibility of finer specialization, since experts such as cannon-casters or tent-makers could be employed for the conquest wars. The change from the commodified mercenary labour in the Green Standards to the tributary modes in the form of early local militia organization were brought about not by change in the military technology, but again in the field of skills and organization. This type of warfare, which was concentrated in the rebellions in the interior, made the use of specialists and elite troops seem less essential. The technological level of the troops decreased generally during the nineteenth century until the period of self-strengthening and military modernization.

By 1900, change from the mercenary Green Standards to professional, regional armies (which did not bring about a change in labour relations) and the change from Banner Armies to professional armies (which certainly did affect the labour relations, from tributary to commodified) were in full swing. The introduction of modern, western-style weaponry, military drill, and command structures significantly altered the relationship of the troops to their employing agency. With the purchase of new technology in the second half of the nineteenth century, craftsmen from among the population were either incorporated into the arsenals or became suppliers, especially in ship-building. The general trend was that technical expertise
in armaments and ammunition was more and more integrated into the organization of the modernized mercenary armies.

War and the ensuing political and socio-economic disruption played a role in the change in military labour relations as well. This was clearly the case in the integration of what had been the army of the previous rulers and its new designation as the Green Standards, which represents a commodified type of labour relation. On one hand, this was necessary to bind the labour force to the new rulers, and on the other hand because the conquest of China by the Manchus called for a specific type of military unit, consisting of Chinese who could fight against their compatriots and neighbouring peoples. The Manchu population was far too small to take over this task, and the Manchu troops with their cavalry units were not appropriate for battles in many parts of China. The conquest war of China by the Manchus was thus an opportunity to reorganize and reinstitute the previous troops of the Ming dynasty and other contenders.

The Manchus were a conquest elite who in the course of the seventeenth century gained supreme rule over the majority Chinese. The need for constant vigilance of “resident aliens”99 made them garrison their own people, and maintain and foster them as professionals who were theoretically forbidden to seek jobs as civilians. Thus, the working and living conditions of those in the garrisons, rather than labour relations, were modified by the eventual victory in the warfare between the 1630s and 1683.

The large conquest wars in the border regions in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries brought about a change in labour relations since they necessitated the quick recruitment of labour to maintain efficient logistical operations. Specialists were required to supply labour, expertise, and materiel to the military. Tributary labour was not sufficient to meet the demands of the army, so that labour had to be recruited on the market instead of from the population included in the tax registers.

This situation changed with the relocation of war into the interior of the empire. Military operations became less professionalized. War was still an omnipresent phenomenon in the first half of the nineteenth century, but instead of elite troops fighting against enemies with the same level of fighting skills, soldiers fought against inferior rebel troops. The social problems of China’s growing population contributed to the increasing internal rebellions, often inspired by millenarian religious ideas.

The change in 1900, from the declining Green Standards and Banners to professional armies, was influenced by the more efficient warfare of the

imperialist powers. This stands in conjunction with a greater impact of naval warfare, an operational theatre that had been de-emphasized by the Manchus in the eighteenth century. Since the Opium Wars, the Manchus lost sovereignty over parts of their territory. These losses included, for instance, Hong Kong 1842/1898, the international concessions in the treaty ports since 1842, Taiwan 1895, the Jiaozhou Bay (in Shandong province) 1897, Lüshun/Port Arthur 1898, and dependencies in North Vietnam (1884) and the Ili River Basin in today’s Xinjiang, annexed by Russia in 1871 and partly restored to the Qing Empire in 1881. The military weakness on the part of the central government drove home the notion of how urgent military modernization was in terms of both armaments and military skills. Defeat in war was thus a trigger for change in military organization that also had effects on labour relations.

The perspective of economic and financial factors hinges on a series of interconnected questions. Was the availability of funds the cause for warfare, or its effect? In a recent study, Kuroda Akinobu cites figures suggesting that in a comparison of the Qing and the British Empires in 1783, the Chinese treasury possessed a surplus of about six times its yearly tax income of that year, while the public debt of the British Empire amounted to twenty times the annual tax revenue in the same year. According to Kuroda’s account, the total British debts amounted to an equivalent of twenty times the yearly expenditures of the Chinese state.

This implies that Chinese emperors and officials of the central government harboured the idea that wars could be waged only if funds were sufficient. Again and again the Qianlong emperor persuaded the accountants of the Ministry of Revenue (hubu) that there were sufficient funds in the state treasury and that there was no need to be stingy in case of war. Yet any government spending had to be set off against the revenues. Following John Brewer’s persuasive argumentation, during the same period, the British Empire waged wars, for instance in the Seven Years War and the American War of Independence, in order to gain profit. The funds to wage these wars came from credits.

Kuroda attributes the profit-oriented type of warfare to the fundamentally different development path of currency-dependent versus credit-dependent societies. For labour relations, the question is how the wealth...

100 Kuroda, “The Eurasian Silver Century”, p. 269.
of the Chinese public treasury arrived in the hands of those working in the high-risk group of military labour, and whether more or less liquidity of the currency influenced the way in which soldiers were recruited and employed. Did the transition from tributary labour service, which was imposed or conferred on particular households, to mercenary, voluntary arrangements coincide with greater availability of monetary means to pay the soldiers and the supporting services? In other words: did the – mostly non-monetary – tributary labour diminish, or was it altogether abolished for commodified labour arrangements, when money to pay for the military wages was available in sufficient amounts?

The cases under discussion here open some perspectives on these questions. We see in the transition from the Ming to the Qing that both dynasties had two main types of military labour. In the Ming, this was hereditary registration as military household, and therefore legally bound and unfree labour, with a basic arrangement that provided land for the soldiers, but also wages. The labour arrangements for the mercenaries (that is, soldiers hired by individual commanders, the so-called housemen) were, at least legally, if not in actual practice, easier to change or leave altogether.¹⁰⁴ Thus the latter may have constituted the better work opportunity, also because it offered more frequent intervals of wage payment than was the case for hereditary military households.¹⁰⁵ In the Qing, the tributary kind of labour relations was not inflicted upon the Banner people as an onerous obligation; it was instead considered a privilege, both in terms of payment and regarding the social and status assets that came with it. The more commodified military labour in the Green Standards did not command the same dignity, nor was the remuneration as high as that of the Banners. As we have seen, the number of Green Standards may have been about three times as high as that of the Banner people. This shows that, from the perspective of the soldiers, a higher commodification of labour did not necessarily lead to more desirable and better-rewarded employment. From the perspective of the state, the hereditary character of the positions in the Banner structure made a constant supply of professional troops possible. In a kind of paternalistic relationship, the state would care for its elite troops: the Banner soldiers. The

¹⁰⁴ See Robinson’s contribution in this volume, “Military Labor in China, c. 1500”, especially where he points out that housemen could take on their employers’ surnames, and that their status was vaguely in between hired labourers and family members. The same occurred with bondservants in the large households of the Yangzi delta in the late Ming period. See McDermott, “Bondservants in the T’ai-hu Basin during the Late Ming”, p. 679.
¹⁰⁵ As Robinson points out, in comparison to the regular garrison soldiers, housemen were privileged in regards to their wages and other prerogatives.
permanent availability of troops ready for combat was important enough to finance such a costly group of specialists.

For the supply services in the eighteenth century, the advisers for military finance understood that, ultimately, hiring people from the labour market was neither more expensive nor more difficult to organize than levying the services of peasants for military service by means of tax registers. One reason was that the involuntary workers often absconded and had to be replaced. In a similar way, after 1800 it may have superficially seemed cheaper to recruit peasant military service for bandit-suppression militia than to sustain a professional army for this task. Yet the problem here was that militias were worse trained, poorly equipped, and less motivated than the provincial armies that eventually fought the bandits and rebels. In order to achieve specialization of skills and armament for defence against internal and external enemies, nineteenth- and twentieth-century military reformers sought to attain increases in military budgets. China’s defeats in the manifold imperialist challenges of the nineteenth century are largely attributed to a lack of finances for military modernization. In contrast, the case of the struggle between the Nationalist and communist armies in the 1945 to 1949 civil war shows that the military modernization of the Nationalist (Kuomintang) army did not suffice if motivation of the soldiers and credibility of the commanders were lacking.

The demographic factor influenced changes in military labour relations mainly in two ways. First, with the Manchus, a new population became available as fighters and garrison soldiers. A favourable tributary and elite status was conferred due to this ethnic self-definition. Secondly, the period between 1650 and the end of the Qing was one of population growth, with only a slight, temporary decline in the middle and late nineteenth century. Both the military and its supporting services gained an abundant labour force from a general increase in China’s population. This made conscription largely unnecessary. With respect to the tributary labour of the hereditary Banner households, this increase brought about a situation where only a minority of adult males could be engaged in military service. The solution to the economic problem of supporting the Banners was to lift the ban on non-military jobs and to virtually dissolve the Banners in the late nineteenth century.

The issue of competition for military labour between the regular state army and other “employers” is most evident in the last phases of the Ming and the Qing dynasty, as actual rivalry arose which could not be treated as mere peasant rebellions to be quelled easily, without posing serious threats. In 1650, such competition occurred between the Ming-loyal armies, local
Mi lItary EM pLoy ME nt in Qin G dynasty c hina 389

rebel leaders, and the Qing Banners that gradually conquered the country from north to south.

Due to the professed intention of the Qing to provide a better livelihood for their subjects than the preceding Ming dynasty, military labour relations changed from the tributary household registration system of the Ming to the more commodified Green Standards in the Qing. In fact, the corvée obligations were also gradually abandoned in many sectors of civilian occupations for the state, such as in construction or textile production, and instead the workers were hired. For the supporting military labour in the eighteenth century, the permanent long-distance campaigns to the frontiers required a large labour corps, which was supplied by the increasing population. Around 1800, the demand for military labour forces decreased, leading to rising unemployment in border provinces such as Sichuan. The more militias that were set up, the less the regular armies, Green Standards and Banners, were occupied with campaigning, leading to lower motivation, poor training, and fewer opportunities to earn additional income by baggage pay and financial rewards for victories. For the militia troops, the recruitment of peasants for military service may have provided additional income for those living from agriculture, but also impeded them from engaging in their main occupation. The change to commodified labour by recruiting the unemployed can be seen as an inevitable consequence of the first attempts to apply corvée recruitment to cope with rebellions from within.

Finally, the factor of ideology, especially ideas on the suitability of military labour, and the ideal of nation-building, also becomes perceptible in periods when radical change took place. Around 1650, this was the accession to power by the Manchus, who defined themselves as warriors who had inherited the “Mandate of Heaven” and thus the legitimacy of rule over the Chinese despite their non-Han descent. This, as has been shown in the preceding paragraphs, favoured a tributary kind of labour relations. On the other hand, the contending defenders of the Han Chinese Ming dynasty could mobilize a part of their armed forces precisely because loyalty to previous rulers formed an important element of the Confucian state ideology. It is hard to assess whether the motivation of the anti-Qing fighters was mainly rejection of the rulers from beyond the Great Wall or actual loyalty to the Ming. The voluntary nature of the arrangement, at least in its initial phases, probably played an important part in the relatively long-lasting rule of the Zheng family. At the end of the Qing dynasty, the idea of nation-building combined with rising nationalism with racialist undertones that rejected the Manchus, who had proved inefficient in warding off both
foreign aggression and internal challenges. The Manchu self-image of being a born group of warriors was disrupted by the warfare of the mid-nineteenth century; it seemed outdated in an atmosphere that strove for nationalistic modernization.

Conclusion

As a result of the discussion of possible causes for change in military labour relations, we have seen that military technology, war, financial and economic factors, demography, supply and demand of labour, and ideology all had an impact on military occupations between 1650 and 1900. Yet it is not easy to evaluate their impact in regard to the labour relations in question, which are of a tributary or commodified nature. The tributary mode corresponds to the Ming military household registration, the attempts at conscription in the Ming-loyal interlude of the Zheng clan in the 1670s and early 1680s, the Qing Banners, the supporting services in the period of corvée obligations before the expansionary warfare of the Qianlong emperor, and the militia in the early nineteenth century, as well as the efforts in the course of the 1905 military reforms to introduce universal conscription. The commodified mode includes the initial phase of the Koxinga’s recruitments, the Green Standards, the nineteenth-century provincial armies, and the New Army. As this list shows, there is no unilinear trend suggesting that tributary arrangements necessarily precede commodified labour relations. Rather, the two coexisted for long periods in Chinese history. The two attempts at conscription originated from different motivations. The first, by the Zhengs, was initiated because of the imminent danger from a formidable adversary which was conquering all of China. Demographic factors stood in conjunction with defections from Taiwan to the mainland; in simple words: not enough men would voluntarily serve the cause of the Zheng clan. In the second case, universal conscription was not necessary because enough volunteers were willing to join the army, if it could pay. It is only from the middle of the twentieth century onward that both the Republic of China (after the exodus to Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China have commenced conscription systems. On the mainland, this is realized as a selective service system; on Taiwan the draft is more universal, but is in the process of being lifted.

A perspective on the present situation can accentuate the fact that a change in military labour relations is a complex, multi-causal event that hinges on many factors. In addition to the factors discussed, what needs to
be taken into account in the case of Qing China, especially in the nineteenth century, and up until the foundation of the People's Republic of China, is the tension between centralization and particularism. Superficially, even if labour relations do not seem to change and (apparently) remained commodified, there are political aspects during the Republican era which affected the equation. It made a big difference for the command structures within the armies, the loyalty of the soldiers, and regularity of payment whether the employer was the central government or a provincial leader who might aspire, with the help of his army, to rule the entire country. The competition from outside – and thus the threat of war by foreign powers or, as in the case of Taiwan, against an overbearing competing polity – has also been a major ingredient in the combination of changes and continuities between the 1650s and today.
Military service and the Russian social order, 1649-1861

Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter

From roughly the mid-fifteenth century, a centralized monarchy developed in the Moscow region of the Russian lands, and the building of the Russian service state got underway. Critical to the monarchy’s accumulation of powers was the linking of noble status, including the possession of land and serfs, with service to the prince. Although a core of great noble families held patrimonial lands in hereditary tenure, the majority of nobles possessed landed estates on condition of service. By the mid-sixteenth century, all nobles, including holders of patrimony, performed obligatory service and, following the conquest of the khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia, Muscovy joined the ranks of the world’s multiethnic, multiconfessional empires.

The process of political centralization, military consolidation, and imperial expansion came to a temporary halt due to Tsar Ivan IV’s reign of terror (the notorious oprichnina of 1565-1572) and the biological demise of the dynasty in 1598. A period of civil war, social rebellion, and foreign occupation known as the “Time of Troubles” ensued. Order returned after 1613, when the “election” of a new tsar, Mikhail Romanov (r. 1613-1645), ended the troubles and inaugurated a period of institutional restoration and modern state-building. In the reign of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (r. 1645-1676), the Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649 codified serfdom, the social ranks of Muscovite society, and the tsardom’s legal-administrative apparatus. Throughout Russia’s age of serfdom, until the emancipation of 1861, the Law Code provided the starting point for much of the legislation that defined the relationship between social status and military service.

Alongside a centralized bureaucracy and legally defined social groups, seventeenth-century Muscovy also produced a European-style military. Reform began between the 1630s and 1660s with the introduction of new-model infantry and cavalry regiments, large-scale conscription levies, and lifelong service, all of which constituted significant steps toward the formation of a regular standing army.1 The acquisition of Left Bank Ukraine

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1 Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar; Stevens, Russia’s Wars of Emergence; Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia.
and the city of Kiev in the period 1654-1667 revealed that Muscovy had indeed achieved a degree of military effectiveness. Still, the process of reform remained tentative and the monarchy’s military capacity limited. The inability to sustain combat operations in distant theaters, illustrated by the failed Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689, led to a flood of innovation in the reign of Tsar Peter I (r. 1682/9-1725). Under Peter annual conscription levies, lifelong year-round service for noble officers and peasant conscripts, unprecedented levels of taxation, tighter administrative controls, and the massive importation of European technology and cultural models set the stage for Russia’s rise to great-power status. The consolidation of Russian power in the Baltic and Black Seas, the partitions of Poland, the defeat of Napoleon, and Alexander I’s (r. 1801-1825) leadership in the Concert of Europe are just a few of the military and diplomatic successes that over the next century and a half exemplified the empire’s international stature.

Russia’s ongoing military strength has long baffled historians, given that well into the twentieth century society remained overwhelmingly peasant and the economy overwhelmingly agrarian. A critical reason for the effectiveness of Russian power has been the ability of successive governments, and forms of government, to mobilize human and material resources over the long duration. As early as 1630/1, decades before the reforms of Tsar Peter I, regular levies of recruits and lifelong terms of service began. During the Thirteen Years’ War (1654-1667) with Poland, military drafts swept up about 100,000 men and, although this was no small number, it paled in comparison to what would come in the early eighteenth century. Historians estimate that inductees into the Petrine army numbered 205,000 in 1700-1711 alone and at least 140,000 in 1713-1724. At the time of Peter’s death in 1725, the Russian army consisted of 130,000 regular troops; 75,000-80,000 garrison troops; and 20,000 Cossack irregulars. In the post-Petrine era, the military continued to grow, along with the empire’s population and territorial expanse. By the mid-eighteenth century, the army numbered 292,000 troops in a population of 23,230,000; and in 1800, 446,000 troops in a population of 37,414,000. Between 1705 and 1801, roughly 2.25 million men

2 Between 1682 and 1689, Peter I and co-tsar Ivan V ruled under the regency of Sophia, Peter’s half-sister and Ivan’s full sister. In 1689 Peter and his supporters broke with Sophia, who was confined to a convent. Peter’s effective reign began in 1694, when his mother died, but he did not formally become sole ruler until the death of Ivan in 1696.

3 Cracraft, *The Revolution of Peter the Great*.


5 Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia*, pp. 45-46.
were drafted; in the years 1796 to 1815, 1,616,199; and in the period 1816 to 1855, 3,158,199. Just a few years prior to the outbreak of the Crimean War, a time of relative peace for the empire, the size of the army reached 859,000.6

The actual “burden of defense” imposed on Russian society is difficult to calculate, and the figures that are available should be viewed only as rough estimates.7 Russian data from the period are generally inadequate for sophisticated statistical analysis. Nor is it always clear which troops historians are counting. In addition to the empire’s regular standing army, the military establishment included garrison troops, veterans’ units, military colonies, Cossacks, and various irregular hosts manned by ethnic minorities. The point here is not to measure the burden carried by the Russian people – surely it was substantial – but to highlight the organizational effort needed to conscript, train, and maintain such a large military force. However inefficient and arbitrary this effort sometimes appears, it was effective in sustaining costly military victories and ongoing imperial expansion.

Decades before the appearance of revolutionary France’s citizen army, Russia developed a system of mass conscription based on the institution of serfdom, the social arrangements set forth in the Law Code of 1649, and the reforms of Tsar Peter I. Both the Muscovite Law Code and Petrine legislation bound individuals to local communities and social categories that were defined by their privileges and obligations to the state. Beginning in 1719-1728, periodic censuses identified male taxpayers liable for conscription and payment of the capitation. The combination of census registration, conscription levies, and collection of the capitation facilitated resource mobilization and greatly increased state revenues. The groups counted in the censuses included all categories of peasants and townspeople who lacked the capital to qualify for merchant status. Sons of clergy and ecclesiastical ranks who did not have church appointments also could be conscripted by special levy, even though they were not inscribed in the census rolls and did not pay the capitation. Nobles likewise remained exempt from census registration and payment of the capitation, but they continued to serve in the military or in civil administration until the emancipation of 1762 made their service voluntary. With the exception of elite merchants, who paid an annual fee in return for specific socioeconomic privileges, all of these statuses, taxed and untaxed, were inherited from the father at birth. Changes of status

6 Hartley, Russia, 1762-1825, pp. 10-11; Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian Soldier, p. 3; Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, p. 108.
7 Pintner, “The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia”.
could occur through service, marriage (for women only), or monarchical decree; however, such changes rarely affected peasants, who by most counts comprised 80 to 90 per cent of the overall population. Whether peasants were attached to seigneurial, state, ecclesiastical/economic, or crown lands, they remained bound to their village of origin, paid the capitation, and at age seventeen became liable for military service.8

Military service and the peasant commune

Russian military achievements from the reign of Tsar Peter I to the Crimean War of 1853-1856 cannot be understood apart from the history of serfdom, an institution, or social mechanism, that made possible the effective mobilization of human and material resources across a vast and sparsely populated territory. The imposition of legal restrictions on peasant movement had begun already in the late fifteenth century, when the Muscovite monarchy consolidated its authority in the central region of the Russian lands. For the next two centuries, the development of serfdom paralleled the development of noble classes that served the Moscow grand prince. A basic calculus emerged, according to which Russian peasants provided for the Muscovite elite so that the elite could in turn serve the tsar. From the outset, then, serfdom functioned as the means to support military servicemen and mobilize resources for the prince. These statist goals, more than the estate culture of noble landlords, determined the role that serfdom would play in Russian society and polity.9

The basic unit of peasant society was the commune, governed by a village assembly composed of the heads of member households. The origins of the commune remain obscure, but the institution most likely evolved out of the agricultural practices of the East Slavic tribes who, prior to the emergence of the Kievan polity in the ninth century, occupied what would become the Russian lands. When Muscovite state-building began in the fifteenth century, the commune was already managing village relationships and access to resources. From that point onward, successive Russian governments linked monarchical and seigneurial authority to the commune in order to extract resources and exploit peasant labor. Controlled by village patriarchs and elected peasant officials, the commune exercised economic,

8 The Recruitment Statute of 1766 set the age of conscription at seventeen to thirty-five.
9 Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*. 
social, and judicial authority and acted as the intermediary between the peasant community and the landlord or government.

From the peasant perspective, the commune’s most important functions were to regulate production in open fields and to guarantee that each household enjoyed access to common resources such as water, forest, and pasture. Although environmental conditions and agricultural arrangements varied across the empire, the communal structures that developed in the central and steppe regions of European Russia provided the foundation for Russian social and political arrangements. One of the key mechanisms that developed out of communal structures, particularly communal land tenure, was the periodic repartition or redistribution of arable fields based on the number of husband/wife work teams in a household. The goal of this mechanism was to ensure that each household possessed sufficient land to support its members and meet its obligations to the community, landlord, and state. During both the Muscovite and the imperial periods, it was the commune that enforced the fulfillment of labor, monetary, and service obligations. Based on the principle of collective responsibility (*krugovaia poruka*), the entire peasant community assumed liability for the obligations of individual members. Whether the task at hand concerned the delivery of recruits, the performance of labor, or the payment of taxes and feudal dues, the commune guaranteed that government and seigneurial demands were met. If a household could not meet its obligations, fellow villagers took up the slack.

In addition to extracting resources, communal authorities, in cooperation with noble landowners, also policed the countryside. Communal authorities disciplined noncompliant peasants, and the village community provided assistance in times of illness, death, or natural disaster. When social order broke down, peasant officials punished troublemakers or cooperated with the landlord to do so. In cases of collective disobedience or outright rebellion, the arrival of troops usually sufficed to restore calm. The peasant commune most certainly did not embody the natural communism imagined by nineteenth-century Russian socialists, but it was a vibrant and deeply embedded institution that for centuries met the economic and social needs of Russian peasants. Ultimately, the commune proved more resilient than either the monarchy or the nobility. Weathering the storms of political centralization, foreign invasion, capitalist industrialization, social revolution, and wartime crisis, the commune adapted to changes in Russian society and economy. Through World War I, the February and Bolshevik

10 Moon, *The Russian Peasantry*. 
Revolutions, and the civil war of 1918-1921, the commune continued to structure peasant life, disappearing only when the Soviet regime used violence and brutal repression to impose collectivization during the First Five-Year Plan.

In imperial Russia, the process of conscription, which started at the village level, highlighted key problems of social development resulting from the intersection of military service and the peasant commune. Although state-imposed social arrangements defined conscription, particularly liability for service, realities on the ground also affected the official arrangements. Whether the demands of the state or the organization of peasant life determined the parameters of conscription is not always clear. Orders to conduct conscription levies came from St. Petersburg, and officials selected recruits based on units of 100 to 500 men. Usually, one man per unit would be taken, though in times of intensive warfare, the burden increased.11 Once recruitment orders reached the countryside, local officials, landlords, and peasant communities assumed responsibility for delivering the specified number of individuals. At this point, the communal organization of peasant life played the critical role. Because there was very little legislation pertaining to conscription before the early nineteenth century – only in 1831 did a full codification of the rules for conducting levies appear – peasant practices determined the recruitment process. It is possible, therefore, that these practices provided the basis for the specific mechanisms subsequently prescribed by state law.

Like the distribution of land allotments, feudal dues, labor obligations, and capitation payments, the burden of conscription depended on the number of able-bodied males in a peasant household. Each recruitment unit of 100 to 500 men consisted of peasant families, usually extended families, organized in a rotational order defined by the number and ages of adult male laborers. Peasants, landlords, and the state all sought to distribute the burden of service in an equitable manner that would preserve the ability of each household to sustain its members and meet its fiscal and labor obligations. In other words, the loss of a male laborer to the army was not supposed to undermine the economic viability of the household. For this reason, large households stood first in line to provide recruits, while families with only one laborer remained exempt. The recruitment regulation of 1831 extended this exemption to include families containing a father and only one son. The regulation also specified that bachelors be chosen before mar-

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11 In 1812, the year Napoleon invaded Russia and occupied Moscow, there were three levies of 20 recruits per 500 men: Hartley, Russia, 1762-1825, p. 26.
ried men and childless husbands before those with children. Both legislative prescriptions and the egalitarian principles of community justice aimed to minimize the social and economic disruptions caused by military service.

Despite efforts to distribute the burden of service in an even-handed manner, peasants viewed conscription as a tragedy. From the peasant perspective, the reality of conscription defied the egalitarian beauty of the “line system”. Hence the proverb “One son is not a son. Two sons are half a son. Three sons are a son.” Indeed, the legal niceties of official regulations were not always observed in real life. Peasant practices varied significantly and, although many landlords and communes insisted that large households be first in line to provide recruits, others preferred to rid the community of economically weak peasants who were landless or had fallen behind in paying dues and taxes. Communities and landlords also used conscription for disciplinary purposes, sending off criminals, troublemakers, drunkards, and men deemed disobedient, unruly, or simply lazy. Nor was there much protection from the administrative arbitrariness of corrupt officials or abusive landlords. Bribery always remained a possibility in the workings of tsarist administration, and wealthier peasants possessed the means to purchase substitutes or exemption receipts. Physical requirements likewise could undercut the equity of the line system. In 1850, for example, only 66,544 out of 139,002 recruits delivered to the military were accepted into service. The rest were rejected because of height, age, physical disabilities, or chronic diseases. Physical inadequacies and the appearance of chronic disease might be staged or self-inflicted but, regardless of the reasons for rejection, unfit recruits had to be replaced by their respective communities.

Soldiers in society

The institution of serfdom and the relationship of individuals to local communities created circumstances that gave to Russian conscription and the entire military system distinctive characteristics. As noted above, the Law Code of 1649 bound all Russian subjects, except for nobles and clergy, to their place of residence. Peter I’s government built upon this bondage in defining socioeconomic privileges and service obligations to the state. Once a peasant (of any category) or a townsman was drafted, however – more precisely, once he took the oath of allegiance to the tsar – he became

12 Wirtschafter, *From Serf to Russian Soldier*, p. 3.
legally free from the capitation, the mark of lower-class status, and from any obligations to the local community. Given the long term of service – life until 1793, twenty-five years after that, and twenty years with five years in the reserve beginning in 1834 – this legal freedom, which in and of itself constituted upward social mobility, could not be realized in everyday life. Only if a soldier survived the long term of service or became unsuitable for military duties did he have a chance to actuate his legal freedom by moving into a higher social rank or profession.

The ambiguity of the soldier’s social advancement was equally striking in the case of his wife. Because a woman’s social status depended on her father and, after marriage, on her husband, soldiers’ wives also became legally free at the moment of a husband’s induction into military service. Once again, however, the upward mobility represented by legal emancipation contrasted sharply with harsh social reality. No longer a legally bound member of the village community, soldiers’ wives became dependent on the generosity of relatives, communes, and landlords. Many villages provided land and assistance to support soldiers’ wives and their children, especially male children who would grow up to become able-bodied members of the peasant community. But given that soldiers served for life or for twenty-five years, and given that a woman could not remarry without proof of her spouse’s death, soldiers’ wives also produced illegitimate children and gained a reputation for loose morals. Needless to say, illegitimate children and unattached women were not always welcome in patriarchal village communities.

Soldiers’ wives did have options, however. Most remained in the village, but if they chose or were forced to leave home, their legal freedom created a number of possibilities.14 Soldiers’ wives, when practicable, could live among the troops, or with the permission of their husbands, obtain passports that allowed them to settle in towns. Military commanders employed them in “female occupations” such as making tents; sewing, washing, and mending clothes; and working in hospitals. Because soldiers’ wives enjoyed the privileges of free social categories, they also could engage in urban trades, that is, in occupations and commercial endeavors preserved for the legal residents of towns. Women who became town-dwellers remained outside the formal urban community and therefore enjoyed exemption from the capitation and various labor obligations. There is limited information about the occupations pursued by soldiers’ wives, but they are known to have been active participants in prostitution and in the trafficking of unwanted children between the countryside and the Moscow and St.

14 Shcherbinin, Voennyi factor v povsednevnoi zhizni russkoj zhenshchiny.
Petersburg foundling homes. By the mid-nineteenth century, some also found employment in the factories that had begun to dot the landscape of central Russia. Although the loss of membership in an officially recognized community gave soldiers’ wives legal tools for social advancement, it also deprived them of secure socioeconomic moorings. Both literary and official sources give the impression that soldiers’ wives struggled to find a place in society. Most continued to live as peasants, and some managed to achieve independence by establishing themselves in urban occupations, but others suffered endless exploitation and abuse.

The vulnerability of soldiers’ wives also affected their children, both legitimate and illegitimate. Family life could be complicated in the Russian army, especially outside the garrison towns. In general, the presence of retired soldiers and soldiers’ families created legal ambiguities and welfare problems that the government could not ignore. One response was to establish yet another legally defined social category, the “soldiers’ children” (soldatskie deti). This category existed from 1719 to 1856 and included any children born to soldiers after their induction into active military service. The illegitimate children of soldiers’ wives, girlfriends, and daughters also belonged to the “soldiers’ children”. All of these children, regardless of origin, came under the authority of the military domain (voennoe vedomstvo), and the males among them were destined for a life of military service. Soldiers’ sons could live with parents or relatives until age eighteen, when they began active service, or they could enter special military schools at age seven. In 1797, 12,000 soldiers’ sons were enrolled in military schools and, by the time the category was abolished in 1856, the number had reached 378,000. Most became common soldiers or noncommissioned officers, though some learned crafts, worked as copyists, or acquired technical and administrative skills needed by the military.

Unlike conscripted peasants and townsmen who began military service in the lowest unskilled ranks, soldiers’ children possessed a modicum of education that created opportunities for meaningful social mobility. They were especially important as a source of noncommissioned officers. In the years 1836-1856, the schools for soldiers’ sons, which also could include students from other social categories, produced 15,634 noncommissioned officers and 6,771 musicians for the army. Data from 1863 show that among officers promoted from nonnoble social groups, 56 per cent or 365 of 654 came from the soldiers’ children. Despite the chance of real upward mobil-

15 [Wirtschafter], “Soldiers’ Children, 1719-1856”.
16 Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian Soldier, pp. 38-39, 166n.
ity, the parents of soldiers’ children did everything possible to conceal their offspring from military officials. Just as the fact of legal emancipation did not make military service desirable among peasants, so too the opportunity to receive an education and rise in the social hierarchy did not undermine the natural desire of soldiers’ wives to keep their sons at home. Landlords too proved eager to claim soldiers’ children as peasants in order to augment the population of their estates. No wonder the Decembrist leader P.I. Pestel described the status of soldiers’ children as bondage or slavery (*kabal*) to the state. Many parents obviously agreed. Separated from home and hearth at a young age, forced to endure harsh discipline and material privation in underfunded and poorly administered military schools, soldiers’ sons still faced twenty-five years of active service beginning at age eighteen.

The story of the serf Makei Aleksandrov, who sought recognition as an illegally enserfed soldier’s son, highlights the challenges faced by military families. Brought before the Bronnitsy district court in Moscow province in 1843, Aleksandrov was accused of striking a peasant official (*starosta*) and failing to extinguish a fire. Aleksandrov denied the identity ascribed to him and instead claimed to be Makei Filipov, the illegitimate son of a soldier’s wife, a status that carried legal freedom. After several peasants testified to Aleksandrov’s disorderly and negligent conduct, the court sentenced him to fifty blows with birches and returned him to his master. Aleksandrov denounced the judgement, and his case was forwarded to the Moscow criminal chamber, which approved the lower court’s decision. Undeterred, in September 1844, Aleksandrov petitioned the Moscow military governor-general, who immediately took steps to corroborate the serf’s self-proclaimed free status. Perhaps because the tsarist army always needed soldiers, the provincial-level authorities treated Aleksandrov’s assertions seriously. They instructed their subordinates to investigate his origins and ordered his master, Provincial Secretary Isakov, to present appropriate documentation.

In Aleksandrov’s appeal to the governor-general, he claimed that his birth to the soldier’s wife Nastas’ia Nikiforova could be verified in the parish registers of a village in Bronnitsy district. To support this story, Aleksandrov identified his godparents, an older sister (also illegitimate) who lived on another estate, and several additional relatives, including a son from a forced marriage. Aleksandrov admitted to being registered to the nobleman Isakov in the eighth census, and during the judicial proceedings he con-

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17 Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv goroda Moskvy, f. 16 (Kantseliariia Moskovskogo general-gubernatora), op. 13, d. 449.
continued to make quitrent payments. But, the serf proclaimed, he remained a wrongfully condemned free man, prosecuted for his alleged crimes only after he initiated a lawsuit seeking emancipation. Aleksandrov’s boldness notwithstanding, he did not expect to receive fair treatment at the hands of local officials. His master, Aleksandrov declared, was himself an official and friendly with members of the district court. In light of such unjust circumstances, Aleksandrov requested the transfer of his case to another locality and written permission to live independently until authorities reached a final decision. These requests were denied; however, district officials, under direct pressure from superiors, continued to seek additional information from Aleksandrov’s registered owner.

At this point the archival record falls silent, and the final resolution of the case is not known. Perhaps the governor-general’s interest produced documentation that corroborated the convicted serf’s story. If Makei Aleksandrov was in fact the illegitimate son of a soldier’s wife then, earlier in his life, his mother or landlord, or perhaps he himself, had successfully hidden his identity from the military authorities. Maybe by 1843 he was old enough to think that he could avoid front-line duty if he entered military service. Regardless of how the case ended, and it is possible that no decision was reached, the tribulations or machinations of Makei Aleksandrov, self-defined as Filipov, demonstrate how the legal freedom of soldiers and their families could become both a source of vulnerability and a tool for survival among the empire’s lowliest subjects. The telling point is that a serf understood the legal freedom associated with the status of soldier’s son, or a soldier’s son understood the illegality of his enslavement. In either situation, belief in the benefits of legal freedom, including the chance to escape the conditions of servitude, led an individual to act.

The special condition of soldiers’ children resulted from the legal and socioeconomic realities of servitude and from Russia’s broader social arrangements based on inherited status. The intersection of servitude and military service created a class of free individuals situated outside the peasantry and other widely recognized social categories. Soldiers’ children were not the only group that occupied ambiguous terrain in Russian society. Retired soldiers and soldiers’ wives were similarly placed, as were a variety of service, proto-professional, economic, and educated ranks. Built around the institution of servitude, the Russian social order produced numerous small categories defined, like the larger “estates” (soslovii or sostoianiiia), by specific privileges, obligations, and functions. These categories, referred to collectively as the “people of various ranks”, illustrate the uncertainties
of social status that were broadly characteristic of imperial Russia.\textsuperscript{18} In addition, their development shows how individuals, communities, and groups in society were able to use official categories and legislative prescriptions, precisely because of the ambiguities they produced, for their own purposes – in order to survive, prosper, resist authority, and negotiate position within the framework of the social order.

\textbf{Soldiers in service}

After a peasant or townsman entered military service, received appointment to a regiment, and underwent basic training, he became a soldier in the service of the tsar, but a soldier whose everyday life remained closely connected to civilian society. The modern standing army created by Tsar Peter I and repeatedly reformed by his successors – the army that established Russian power in the Baltic and Black Seas, secured Russia's western and southwestern frontiers against Sweden and the Ottoman Empire, eliminated the threat posed by the Crimean Tatars, established a Russian foothold in Transcaucasia at the expense of Persia, and utterly destroyed Napoleon's \textit{Grande Armée} – this army was far from regular and only partially standing. Even if one disregards distinctly irregular troops such as the Cossacks, who played such an important role in Russian military history, and looks solely at the regular line forces, the Russian army is best described as semi-standing. Housed primarily in peasant huts and urban homes, Russian troops lived in a variety of conditions and remained economically dependent on local, often civilian, resources. In the spring and summer, military units came together in camps to train and perform state works (for example, building and maintaining roads, bridges, and fortresses), but for six to eight months out of the year, in peacetime of course, soldiers lived dispersed in private homes. As late as 1860, only 28 per cent of the tsar's troops could be housed in barracks and other state buildings.\textsuperscript{19} State works and dispersed quarters limited the attention given to military training and kept soldiers in a civilian environment for extended periods of time.

The interconnectedness of military and civilian society reached deeply into the workings of the regimental economy and hence also into the everyday life of common soldiers. The army's peacetime system of supply dated

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Wirtschafter, \textit{Structures of Society}, \textit{Idem}, "Legal Identity and the Possession of Serfs in Imperial Russia".
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Wirtschafter, \textit{From Serf to Russian Soldier}, p. 81.
\end{itemize}
from the reign of Tsar Peter I, when the central government began to assume responsibility for clothing, housing, provisioning, and equipping the troops. That said, in the underinstitutionalized administrative environment of the Russian Empire, the desire to centralize resource allocation could only go so far. The limits to bureaucratic regulation, even in conditions of absolutist monarchy, were readily apparent. Unit commanders retained immediate responsibility for the wellbeing of their subordinates and were often forced to acquire supplies locally. As late as the mid-nineteenth century, state resources remained inadequate, and the troops repeatedly faced shortages of food, clothing, and equipment. The solution to this dilemma was local procurement and economic self-sufficiency within military units. Although the government tried to regulate the norms of pay, provisioning, and supply for the individual soldier and his regiment, official standards were difficult to enforce, especially when the troops were dispersed in peasant huts and economically dependent on civilian hosts. The need to concentrate troops in border regions and garrisons also meant that the burden of supplying the troops could not be evenly or fairly distributed among the civilian population. Conflicts between soldiers and local residents inevitably erupted although, on average, the Russian people accepted the obligation to provide for the troops.

The economic improvisation required of the Russian army produced material uncertainty, administrative arbitrariness, social volatility, and effective solutions. To understand how the army functioned, it is important to look at how individual units coped with the concrete conditions they faced. In September 1822, for example, soldiers from the Second Battalion of the Thirty-Second Jäger Regiment complained of not receiving money for cartage in 1818 or for meat and liquor during eight months of guard duty. In addition, the men of the Second Carabineer Company claimed that in 1818-1819 they had earned 560 rubles, presumably at outside work, but did not know the whereabouts of the money or how it had been spent. They also complained that 800 rubles belonging to their artel’, a collective soldiers’ fund, had been sent to the treasury without their permission. Whereas the soldiers’ complaints revealed detailed knowledge of their economic rights and resources, as well as suspicions about the good intentions of their commanders, the response of the battalion commander highlighted deficiencies in the supply system that repeatedly produced these and similar disorders.

An investigation ordered by the commander-in-chief of the Second Army showed that in 1818 a regimental order had reallocated funds assigned for transport to the repair of equipment. The soldiers had in fact received money for meat and liquor to cover two months of the May trimester. But because
the regiment had not received any funds for the September trimester, commanders had withheld allocations for the remaining two months of the previous trimester. The units in question also had not received provisions for January because the Kiliiia magazine, located in Bessarabia, was empty. As a result, it had been necessary to insist that hostile local residents feed the men. Finally, the corps commander had ordered the battalion commander to put 800 rubles that belonged to the soldiers’ artel’ in a loan bank to earn interest. In the end, the commander-in-chief accepted the explanations of the battalion and company commanders, requiring only that they pay the expenses of the three officials sent to investigate the soldiers’ complaints.20

As conditions in the Second Army illustrate, commanders repeatedly provided for their subordinates by rearranging allocations and demanding that civilians supply food. Another response to inadequate state supplies and monies was to purchase goods from private contractors using regimental funds. Soldiers also sometimes produced items such as uniforms and footwear for themselves, assuming they had the necessary materials on hand. In any of these circumstances, unofficial outside work might be a critical source of supplementary income used to fill the gaps in state supplies. Archival documents from the first half of the nineteenth century describe four types of outside work. First, soldiers worked directly for superiors and theoretically received payment for their labor. Second, parties of five to ten men worked under contracts concluded between company commanders and outside parties. Third, soldiers with special skills – for example, artisans and tailors – used their free time to produce goods for sale; and fourth, among stationary regiments located in fortresses and garrison towns, it was sometimes possible to establish economic enterprises such as gardens and shops that provided supplies and profits for military units.

Private enterprise among the troops could be mutually beneficial for commanders and soldiers, though such activities did little to promote military efficiency or effectiveness.21 Conditions in the Kinburn Artillery Garrison in the reign of Nicholas I (r. 1825-1855) illustrate the point. According to a report from August 1850, submitted by the commandant of the Kinburn Fortress, the commander of Artillery Half-Company No. 1, Lieutenant Colonel Loman, managed a farm where he kept up to twenty head of cattle, pigs, and geese. The farm was not in itself regarded as illegal, though the extent of Loman’s enterprise raised concerns. The stench and filth produced by the farm were considered harmful to the health of the

20 Ibid., p. 94.
21 Ibid., pp. 89-90.
troops. The commandant’s report led to an investigation, and in December 1851 three bombardiers testified that soldiers willingly worked for Loman, who paid them 75 paper kopecks a day. Of this, 25 kopecks went into the soldiers’ provisioning *artel’* and the rest belonged to the individual men. The result was a mutually satisfying relationship between Loman and his subordinates.

Other officers in the Kinburn Garrison told a different story. Critical of Loman, they complained that he freed soldiers from service obligations and training if they worked for him without pay. When, moreover, the officers ordered the soldiers to work, they responded with disrespect, coarseness, and outright disobedience. The military judicial authorities agreed that Loman’s attitude toward unofficial work had begun to interfere with the fulfillment of service duties, but the archival record does not indicate that he was punished or that his farm was shut down. Military performance aside, Loman’s activities may have been motivated by the need to provide for his men. As long as state supplies remained inadequate, officials could not effectively combat economic corruption and abuse. In many circumstances corruption was born of necessity.

Just a few years before the Kinburn investigation, on 9 March 1846, the commander of the Southern Artillery Region had informed all garrison commanders that, if state monies were not sufficient to produce munitions for their soldiers, they should release three privates from each half-company to engage in outside work. The men sent to labor would receive a quarter of their earnings, and the rest would go to the economic resources used to purchase material for uniforms and other equipment that the state was supposed to fund. Citing the Military Code of 1838 (book 1, part 3, article 438), the regional commander justified the order by noting that the Commissariat continued to issue munitions monies for the artillery based on a table of 1809. Given that the allocated sums were no longer adequate, the garrisons had no choice but to release soldiers for outside work. Military training was important, but physical survival came first. Despite the legal separateness of Russia’s military ranks, soldiers remained dependent on the civilian economy, and many of their routine activities would have been familiar to any peasant.

The flexibility of Russia’s socioeconomic and legal-administrative structures surely helped the army to function; however, the vulnerabilities of the military economy also could be socially explosive. This is illustrated by an 1857 court-martial of twenty-one soldiers from the Åland fortifications, who
were accused of disobedience against their commander. \footnote{Rossiiskii gosudartsvennyi voенно-историческii arkhiv, f. 801 (Auditoriatskii departament voennogo ministerstva), op. 73, d. 32. The case is discussed in Wirtschafter, \textit{From Serf to Russian Soldier}, pp. 145-147.} On 28 September 1856, Ensign Shchetinin had informed his men that provisions were low and that supplies would be obtained from Åbo. The men, agreeing to provide for themselves with state funds until provisions arrived, received money for food through 8 October. In addition, for the period 7-14 October, the soldiers reportedly were able to buy beef, which was supposed to last until 21 October. Although the defendants claimed that half the meat was spoiled, they also had received funds for meal and potatoes.

On 14 October, when the expected supplies did not arrive, the situation at Åland began to deteriorate. The soldiers again received money on the 14th, but when they requested additional funds on the 15th, Shchetinin told them they would have to wait. On the 15th and 16th the men carried on with their duties, but then on the 17th a noncommissioned officer informed Shchetinin that the men of Company No. 4 were demanding money. Shchetinin had run out of state funds, so he distributed his own money for the 15th and 16th. He also questioned the men of Company No. 4, who complained that they had nothing to eat and already owed local residents money for the past two days. Shchetinin doubted their story, believing that the soldiers did have adequate provisions. He also insisted that local residents could wait until supplies arrived to be reimbursed. Ensign Shchetinin therefore ordered his men back to work.

At this point, soldiers from other companies also started to complain. A few men from Companies No. 5, 6, and 7 obeyed the order to work, but eighteen men from Company No. 4 refused and returned to their quarters. Shchetinin responded by giving them more of his own money for 17 October. Meanwhile, soldiers from other companies refused to work. Why are we going to work, they asked, when Company No. 4 refuses to go? “Hardly so that they [alone] will be guilty.” In the end, on 17 October, only Company No. 7 and some men from Company No. 6 complied with orders. Supplies arrived soon after this incident, and Shchetinin took steps to restore his authority. A complete breakdown of discipline had been averted. But then on 18 October, when Shchetinin tried to punish three “instigators”, the men of Company No. 4 refused to allow the punishments. “They did not steal anything”, the soldiers proclaimed. Nor, as one gunner put it, did the tsar “order us to starve”. With that the entire company walked off, and Shchetinin initiated a judicial process.
In the eyes of the military authorities, the events at Åland represented a clear case of insubordination. Military judicial officials condemned the men of Company No. 4 on two grounds. First, the testimony of some soldiers indicated that the men had sufficient supplies of food. Still, the archival record does not indicate that Shchetinin actually inspected Company No. 4, which was quartered at some distance, so it is possible that this unit did not have enough to eat. One also has to wonder why Shchetinin continued to give out his own money, if he was convinced the men had adequate provisions. The second point raised by officials of the Military Judicial Department was that the men of Company No. 4 could obtain food on credit from local inhabitants. In general, commanders assumed that when state supplies were unavailable, military units would acquire provisions from local residents. Moreover, even when this proved impossible, the lack of food and funds did not justify disobedience. Clearly, the situation at Åland resulted from circumstances beyond Shchetinin’s control.

The soldiers’ testimony tells a different story. In their eyes, the “crime” of Company No. 4 consisted of demanding money allotted to them by law. They knew their commander was responsible for feeding them and thus refused to work when they did not receive their daily allowance. They also refused to allow their comrades to be punished: the soldiers had a right to the money, which meant that no one was guilty and no punishment justified. Repeatedly, in the first half of the nineteenth century, Russian soldiers committed acts of disobedience when their rights were violated – when their commanders abused them, neglected to provide for them, or punished them unjustly. Although in the eyes of the government disobedience could never be justified, if a commander’s negligence or abuse caused the disobedience, he would be punished along with his subordinates. In this case, Ensign Shchetinin faced two weeks of arrest for “inefficiency” in provisioning his unit. Eighteen men from Company No. 4 were found guilty of “overt disobedience” and sentenced to run the gauntlet two to four times through 100 men, followed by three to five years of service in a convicts’ company. Four of the men were judged medically unfit to undergo corporal punishment and so avoided that part of their sentence. Other men from Companies No. 5 and 6 faced milder punishments, and two noncommissioned officers were demoted and transferred for failing to ensure that their subordinates returned to work. As this and many other court cases show, the system of military justice afforded soldiers a measure of protection. In theory and practice, military justice sanctioned expectations of decent treatment and economic security.
The unrest at the Åland Fortress highlights the extent to which local circumstances determined the army's ability to maintain the troops. Although the details of concrete cases differ, local commanders repeatedly had to improvise in order to provide for their men. Soldiers cooperated in this effort, as did civilians who made “donations” to nearby military units. In addition to seeking donations – the alternative to which might have been food riots by armed soldiers – commanders put their men out to work in the local economy. Improvisation and nonmilitary work represented key tools in the arsenal of physical survival. Of course, local self-sufficiency also produced significant variations and chronic irregularities. Outright corruption likewise played a role, and it is no surprise that economic crimes were among the most common for which officers faced courts-martial. Some officers exploited the labor of their men in the manner of noble serf-owners; others abused or seriously neglected their subordinates. Even when soldiers and their commanders cooperated to achieve economic security, or if, from the state's perspective, they colluded to rob the treasury, the vagaries of the supply system produced endless conflicts, both between officers and soldiers and between the military and civilian populations. These conflicts created disorders, but they did not undermine the overall effectiveness of Russia’s military system. To understand this effectiveness, it is important to consider how the monarchy sustained its legitimacy, how the government wielded social control, and why soldiers and their commanders remained loyal servicemen.

Political culture and social integration

Given the interdependence of military and civilian life, it is no surprise that the Russian monarchy governed the army in the same way it governed society at large – through direct personalized relationships between subordinates and figures of authority. These relationships reached from the village, town, or military unit to community and local authorities; to landlords, provincial governors, and military commanders; then on to high-level officials and officers, and most importantly to the monarch. “For Faith, Tsar, and Fatherland” may have been an official mantra, but it accurately represented important features of Russia's enduring political culture. Throughout Russia’s age of serfdom the cement of society remained widespread acceptance of social hierarchy, absolutist monarchy, and church authority. The threat of repression invariably hung in the air, but without reference to the belief in church, monarch, and country, it is impossible to
explain how until the 1860s, the Russian Empire – an empire built upon human bondage – sustained great-power status in Europe and Asia. Only by addressing questions of motivation and morale is it possible to understand how the Russian government consistently mobilized material and human resources for military service.

Across the Russian Empire, ordinary people expressed themselves, and now speak to historians, through judicial proceedings. Although judicial speech acts do not take scholars into the recesses of social consciousness, they do shed light on how individuals negotiated the social order and became integrated into society and polity. To determine whether judicial testimony represented genuine conviction or clever dissimulation designed to achieve a specific goal is frequently impossible. In the military judicial records of the early nineteenth century there are numerous instances of what could have been dissimulation. As the cases already discussed illustrate, disobedient soldiers, deserters, and reluctant recruits knew what they needed to say in order to gain a sympathetic hearing from officials. For this reason, despite concerns about reliability or truthfulness, judicial records reveal much about political culture and the functioning of authority relationships. Time and again, in judicial testimony, Russian subjects described their life experiences and circumstances in terms that they assumed to be not only permissible but also capable of eliciting sympathy and a favorable outcome. Clearly, formal justice offered people a measure of protection against abuse and exploitation. Equally important, it allowed individuals and communities to manipulate legal prescriptions for personal and collective gain.23

In the Russian army of the early nineteenth century, soldiers correctly assumed, and sincerely believed, that they were entitled to food, clothing, and fairness. They also knew that cruelty and negligence on the part of military commanders represented punishable offenses. For this reason, they used accusations of abuse to justify disobedience and desertion. Even if neglect or cruel treatment did not excuse such behavior, it might gain soldiers a sympathetic hearing before higher authorities. There was, however, a problem with the soldiers’ understanding of cruelty. Unlike the economic crimes of commanders, which could be identified with relative ease, the meaning of cruelty remained amorphous and changeable. Official and popular notions of what constituted cruelty did not always coincide.

23 Wirtschafter, Structures of Society, Idem, “Legal Identity and the Possession of Serfs in Imperial Russia”.
The ambiguity surrounding accusations of cruelty can be seen from an investigation of 1818, during which soldiers from the Astrakhan Grenadier Regiment complained of abusive treatment at the hands of their former commander, Major Kridner.24 The investigating officer, General Adjutant Baron I.I. Dibich, commander of Main Headquarters of the First Army, found that some of the soldiers’ claims were indeed justified. Kridner had subjected decorated soldiers to corporal punishments, which, while not excessive, did violate legal prohibitions. In addition, some men also testified that they had received 500 blows with sticks and 100 to 150 blows with broadswords. These punishments may have been illegal, although, according to Dibich, the soldiers’ claims were exaggerated: every time he questioned the men, they reported a higher number of blows. Most of the soldiers’ complaints concerned punishments of twenty-five to fifty blows with sticks for neglect of duty. These punishments rarely occurred more than once a month, and, while they were frequent and severe, in Dibich’s judgment, they did not exceed legal norms. To the contrary, the men of the Astrakhan regiment were lazy and insubordinate, and because the regiment’s performance lagged in comparison to other units, strict measures were in order. Baron Dibich therefore cleared Major Kridner of any wrongdoing.

In other judicial cases officers were found guilty of cruel treatment and punished accordingly, but the definition of cruelty remained imprecise and dependent on circumstances. What might be regarded as cruelty in one situation became justified severity in another. The losers in this arrangement were of course the soldiers, who were left to develop their own understanding of what constituted cruel or unjustified punishment. That soldiers frequently did not have their way in judicial proceedings is no surprise. Russia remained a monarchical polity, hierarchical society, and aggressive empire. Although many high-level officials and commanders did try to uphold the law, the preservation of order always took precedence over legal rights. Still, despite definite, though not necessarily clear, limits to the redress available to regular people, there was just enough justice in the Russian system of government to perpetuate the myth of the tsar. Soldiers, like peasants, continued to believe that individual landowners, state officials, and military commanders were responsible for corruption and abuse, and that, if only the ruler could be informed of the abuses, he or she would intervene to address grievances and make just amends.

Absolutist monarchy persisted in Russia long after the empire became integrated into the European state system, and long after the court, nobility,
and educated classes became culturally Europeanized. One explanation for the strength of the monarchy is that, contrary to present-day misconceptions, absolutism in Russia (and elsewhere in Europe) never meant absolute control of state, society, or economy, and certainly not of local communities or individual lives. It did mean, however, that the monarch represented the highest judicial and legislative authority and that at any moment he or she could overturn the decisions of administrative offices and courts. Divinely anointed and answerable to God alone, the monarch was bound to obey the law, though he or she also could change the law at will. Equally significant, Russia did not possess time-honored institutions or legally constituted corporate bodies that mediated the monarch’s relationship to individuals, communities, and groups in society. The peasant commune can be counted as a collective “institution”, but the commune embodied a set of peasant practices that were not legally or contractually constituted. The self-sufficiency of the commune, and likewise of military units, highlighted the fact that, despite the tsar’s absolutist political power, the empire remained undergoverned and underinstitutionalized. The remoteness of effective state power, and the de facto freedom it allowed, kept authority relationships personalized and abuses individualized. In these conditions, the tsarist myth could be perpetuated, and people could manipulate laws and institutions to meet their own needs.

The monarchy’s relationship to Russia’s service classes, including the nobility, represented another critical element in the calculus of political legitimacy. Beginning in the late fifteenth century, a “place system” or rank ordering of noble families (called mestnichestvo) regulated relations within the Russian elite and between that elite and the tsar. The place system determined precedence in service appointments and at court, ensuring that no individual received an appointment or occupied a position above another whose family held a higher place in the genealogical hierarchy. Mestnichestvo disputes undermined the corporate power of Muscovy’s upper nobility and kept many a family and official busy with time-consuming litigation. But mestnichestvo also encouraged social cohesion based on shared notions of family honor and represented a formal limit on the power of the tsar. This formal limit did not, however, produce contractual or constitutional arrangements. During the seventeenth century, mestnichestvo eroded and, even before its abolition in 1682, the ruler acquired sufficient power to appoint favorites and men of undistinguished lineage to high office, especially in the military. The process of modern state-building meant that not only favorites, but also Russia’s noble ranks as a whole, benefited from the service and educational opportunities created by a growing bureaucracy and army.
Even with the rise of new nobles, there was sufficient room in the service class and sufficient demand in the service hierarchy for established families to preserve their power and privileges. The result was a lack of opposition to abolishing the traditional order of families protected by mestnichestvo and a strengthening of the individual serviceman’s dependence on the tsar.

In the early eighteenth century, a new set of institutions began to regulate the noble service classes and their relationship to the monarchy. The new arrangements came to fruition in the Petrine reforms, which agglomerated the noble ranks of Muscovy into an hereditary nobility. This meant in principle that all nobles (lineal and service) enjoyed the same rights, privileges, and obligations, though in practice economic stratification and family ties continued to determine access to education and the rewards of service. The Russian nobility’s character as an open “class” also endured, becoming codified in the Table of Ranks, which from 1722 regulated and bureaucratized the relationship between lineage, service, and noble status. The Table of Ranks consisted of fourteen classes or grades, each of which corresponded to specific titles and offices in the service hierarchy. In military service, the attainment of rank fourteen, the lowest commissioned officer rank, granted noble status, and in civil service, the attainment of rank eight brought ennoblement. Well-connected nobles, and increasingly men of education, continued to enjoy advantages in receiving service appointments and promotions, but, along with lineage and the tsar’s favor, a measure of merit had been written into the legal mechanism of social advancement.

The Table of Ranks did not transform the Petrine service state into a meritocracy, but it did regularize and institutionalize promotions based on education, talent, and zeal. As in the seventeenth century, the ongoing expansion of the military and bureaucratic establishments, combined with the demand for educated servicemen and technical specialists, increased the opportunities for men of humble birth to rise. Over the long duration, social origin became less important in defining service careers, though elite birth and high position still tended to go hand in hand. Even when opportunity truly depended on education, nobles, and to a lesser degree the sons of nonnoble officials, possessed greater access to education and thus could more readily be identified as men of talent. The goal of Peter and his successors was not to dislodge Russian grandees from positions of social and political dominance, but rather to ensure that nobles acquired the education and skills needed to compete in the modern European world. For nobles, as for peasants and townspeople, the burden of service increased significantly in the Petrine era. Russian nobles accepted this burden, just as they accepted the abolition of mestnichestvo, with surprisingly little resistance. As the
power of the state increased, so too did their own power, privileges, and status, not just in Russia, but also on the larger European stage.25

From the late seventeenth century, it can be said, the Russian nobility, a service nobility from the outset, bought into the Russian state project. Equally important, throughout the eighteenth century, Russian elites continued to lack a political language or set of shared ideas that would have allowed them to conceptualize political arrangements outside the serviceman’s personal relationship to the monarch or to superiors and patrons. At no time during Russia’s age of serfdom did the authority of noble landowners extend beyond the boundaries of their patrimonial estates. Russian nobles held no offices or military commands, and they sat in no corporate bodies – noble assemblies were created by monarchical decree in the reign of Catherine II (r. 1762-1796) – simply because they were born noble or possessed landed estates. All offices and commands in the imperial system represented appointments by the monarch or royal representatives. To be sure, patronage, clientage, and family connections played a role in the political economy, but these factors could always be overridden by the will of the tsar. Although the 1785 Charter to the Nobility guaranteed that the deprivation of noble status would not occur outside court proceedings, when it came to state offices and military commands, the ruler could disgrace or elevate any individual at any time, regardless of his or her family position. Russia’s nobles, including military officers and higher-ranked civil servants, comprised a service class, not an autonomous corporation. Whatever “corporate” rights or privileges they acquired were granted by the monarch and could be taken away by imperial decree.

Of course, this did not happen in practice, except arguably in 1861 when Alexander II (r. 1855-1881) deprived nobles of their human property by emancipating the serfs. In most circumstances, the ruler’s disfavor affected individuals or small groups of conspirators, and not until the Decembrist Rebellion of 1825 did the monarchy face any overt political opposition. In eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Russia, social and political ideals stayed within the bounds of the moderate mainstream Enlightenment, which sought to reconcile equality, rationality, and freedom with established political and religious authority. The democratic principles of the radical Enlightenment did not begin to affect Russian thought, much less actual social and political arrangements, before the 1820s. Dissident voices did arise in the eighteenth century, but few called for radical social or political change. Instead, enlightened thinkers focused on the moral

25 Wirtschafter, Russia’s Age of Serfdom, pp. 19, 27.
self-reformation and perfectibility of the individual human being, and because of the emphasis on the individualized pursuit of enlightenment, as opposed to the institutional realization of democratic principles, the Russian version of European Enlightenment appeared fully compatible with absolutist monarchy and the teachings of Orthodox Christianity.26

Throughout Russia's age of serfdom, the strength of the monarchy remained closely intertwined with the strength of the Orthodox religious tradition. The Russian Orthodox Church preached a concept of Christian rulership that based both authority and obedience on morality and love. By the late eighteenth century, state-builders, preachers, and poets had conceptualized the personalized authority relations between the Russian monarch and his or her individual subjects into an explicitly moral relationship in which virtuous rulers deserved to be obeyed. Although the monarchy's first concern was state power and the church's the salvation of souls, the means to these ends overlapped. Subjects who lived an enlightened life, a life of civic and Christian virtue, both served the monarch and obeyed God's commandments. Historians who find it difficult to explain how in the face of inequity, injustice, and abuse, Russian subjects, including educated and enlightened individuals, accepted social and political arrangements based on serfdom should listen carefully to the empire's religious teachers. Until the 1820s, church, monarchy, and educated service classes alike understood the social order to be natural or God-given, and few imagined that traditional relationships built upon patriarchy and hierarchy might be incompatible with modern progress. As monarchists who believed in the power of Christian love, they combined Enlightenment universalism with belief in the unity of God's creation. The result was a holistic conception of the relationship between society, polity, and church. All were of a piece, all had a role to play, and all belonged to the harmonious universal order that underlay Enlightenment aspirations and the modern idea of progress – the idea that the condition of humanity could and should be ameliorated.

Russian intellectuals could be highly critical of their society, yet before the 1820s this criticism tended to produce reconciliation rather than revolt. Echoing legislative projects and church teachings, literary works and personal correspondence revealed a desire to live within existing institutions, despite awareness of their costs. Because Russia's laboring people and common soldiers rarely expressed themselves in writing and almost never revealed their thoughts or feelings about the social relationships that defined their lives, historians cannot know if they subscribed to the ideas

26 Israel, Revolution of the Mind; Wirtschafter, Russia's Age of Serfdom, pp. 144-165.
and ideals expressed in religious, legislative, and literary sources. Prior to the abolition of serfdom in 1861, peasants and townspeople appeared to accept conscription, taxation, and a host of labor obligations, and soldiers appeared to go obediently into battle. The pages of Russian history may be filled with repressive coercion, but there is considerable evidence that the integration of society and polity, and hence also the obedience of Russian soldiers, hinged on more than fear of punishment.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, large numbers of Russian subjects either accepted absolutist monarchy or remained convinced that it could not be altered. On average, belief in the tsar’s goodness and desire for justice held firm. When an individual ruler behaved tyrannically or violated rightful order, he or she could presumably be removed – not because anyone questioned the legitimacy of monarchy, but because the person occupying the throne had turned out to be a false tsar. That peasant conscripts obediently entered service, that peasant soldiers bravely marched into battle, that noble and educated elites did not rebel against the monarchy until the second quarter of the nineteenth century – these circumstances suggest that long after secularism, materialism, deism, and atheism had become firmly established in western and central Europe, most Russians continued to believe in God, tsar, and church.

Conclusion

The outstanding feature of imperial Russia’s serf army was its economic, social, and cultural flexibility – a flexibility that emanated directly from the mechanisms connecting the Russian service state to the structures of society. With a social order based on unfree labor and a political system rooted in absolutist monarchy, the Russian Empire competed effectively in military and diplomatic arenas that stretched across Europe and Asia. Sharing borders with Europe, the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and China, the empire encompassed multiethnic, multiconfessional territories inhabited by nomadic, peasant, and “modern” European peoples. Precisely because the Russian army depended for its survival on local resources and communities, it proved capable of responding to diverse needs and challenges. The adaptability of Russia’s social and political institutions, including military institutions, is often overlooked in discussions of the autocratic monarchy and centralized state apparatus. Political arrangements may have been absolutist and sacred, but social arrangements were amorphous and
changeable. It can therefore be difficult to describe the Russian military system with reference to a specific typology of variables.

As a system of labor, the Russian army combined serfdom with mass conscription, and until 1762 even hereditary nobles, the bulk of the officer class, were bound to serve. Within the regimental economy, monetary payments played a role, but remained inadequate, and so the need to improvise produced free, unfree, commodified, and noncommodified forms of work. The long term of service and the change in legal status that accompanied conscription turned common soldiers and nonnoble specialists into a distinct class of military ranks and families whose labor could be exploited but whose social welfare needs also had to be addressed. During the period under study, despite technological progress and population growth, fundamental socioeconomic and institutional change did not occur. Only after the general emancipation of the serfs in the Great Reforms of the 1860s could universal liability for conscription, a shorter term of service, and effective combat reserves be established. Already in Muscovite times, and with greater precision and comprehensiveness from the reign of Peter I until the emancipation of 1861, the Russian monarchy governed a service state in which every social group performed specific functions. Nobles, clergy, and merchants, not to mention peasants, lesser townspeople, and nonnoble servicemen, occupied legally defined social statuses that at once granted privileges and imposed obligations. Even among the most elite social groups, the acquisition and preservation of privileges depended on service. When privileges became hereditary and independent of service, as occurred with the nobility in 1762, they still represented a grant from the monarch, defined in state law – a grant that he or she could rescind at any time. If military service in the age of serfdom constituted a system of labor, so too did every other social status and occupation.
The French army, 1789-1914
Volunteers, pressed soldiers, and conscripts

Thomas Hippler

According to a common belief, modern military conscription was invented during the French Revolution. Subsequently it became a cornerstone of republicanism in the French understanding. Without any doubt, there is some truth in this view; however, there is also much confusion about the terms of the debate. If we have a closer look at actual recruitment practices in France in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and if we compare these to practices in other historical periods or geographical contexts the distinctions quickly become less clear. The first question to be addressed is thus how to distinguish in a historically convincing way different forms of military labour, which are enslavement, professionals, mercenaries, and conscription. It will actually turn out that these distinctions have necessarily to be linked to systems of social representation, and they are inseparable from social norms and values, as well as from representations of social justice and of legitimate social orders. Things get worse if we keep in mind that historical scholarship in itself is always and necessarily linked to and indeed involved in the construction of these normative and symbolic orders themselves. To stick to the French case: there has been a constant tendency to link the setting-up of the cadre/conscript system during the last third of the nineteenth century to the legacy of the French Revolution and, more particularly, to the category of “national volunteers” fighting for liberty. In the light of this imaginary genealogy, recruitment practices of the ancien régime have been dismissed as military “enslavement” by a despotic state. The outcome was obviously the construction of a normative dichotomy between legitimate and illegitimate forms of recruitment. If we take a closer look at what had actually been going on in terms of recruitment practices, it appears in many cases that the differences between the earlier and the later practices were less important than commonly believed. On the contrary, there is a great deal of continuity between the ancien régime and the modern republic.

However, the analysis should not stop there. It is obviously not the same thing to serve in the military as a pressed soldier or to accomplish one's civic duty through military service, although the concrete practices, of military
drill for instance, may, from another point of view, be strictly the same. This example clearly shows that it is impossible not to take into account the historical construction of the meaning that is attached to these practices. In other words: looking at different forms of recruitment with a historian’s eye implies of necessity adopting a historical perspective with regard to the taxonomic categories that we employ to describe and to distinguish between different forms of military labour.

There are many studies of the military history of, and of mobilization efforts during, the French Revolution and the Prussian reform period, but comparative or transnational approaches are still rare. I will focus the discussion of the state of the art on recent works and those that appear to contribute to the theoretical discussion. Generally speaking, French historiography has never abandoned the field of military history in general and of the revolutionary levies in particular. With regard to the wider perspective, Eugen Weber’s *Peasants into Frenchmen* deserves to be mentioned, since it considers the inner colonization of the French countryside in the period between 1871 and 1914 exclusively and positively from the point of view of the central power.

The general problematique of how to conceive the role of military service in a democracy has been posed chiefly by Torsten Holm and Eliot Cohen – but in a rather aporetical perspective – from the point of view of the rational-choice theory of democracy by Margaret Levi, from a military point of view by Richard Challener and Maurice Faivre, and from the point of view of moral philosophy by Michael Walzer. For a historical inquiry, however, these works may be regarded as not very helpful.

On the methodological level, the study *Le corps militaire* by the French sociologist Alain Ehrenberg is, by contrast, very useful, even if its topic is not military service as an institution in itself. The specific interest of Ehrenberg’s work lies in the correlation he seeks to establish between military drill and democratic citizenship, thereby questioning the validity of traditional

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2 Holm, *Allgemeine Wehrpflicht*.
3 Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers*.
4 Cohen’s expression may be considered as symptomatic for this interpretative dilemma: if “military service touches the very essence of a polity” this is because it “incorporates some of a liberal-democratic society’s most precious values and some values utterly repugnant to it”: *ibid.*, pp. 33 and 35.
5 Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism*.
6 Challener, *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms*.
7 Faivre, *Les nations armées*.
dichotomies such as autonomy and power, liberty and constraint, self-government and obedience. Democracy, according to Ehrenberg, sets up a particular type of political relationship that goes beyond traditional distinctions between those who command and those who obey and execute, in favour of a “tactic that aims at the power and the obedience of everybody”. The autonomy of the individual is not to be considered solely as an obstacle to the exercise of power, but at the same time as its “intermediary” (relais):

Autonomy and its double wording (intermediary and obstacle) ought to be reinscribed into the mechanisms of power, into the practice of authority. One should look for their common matrix and cease to perceive it from the angle of the figure of the Other, for it is not what is outside that would necessarily and objectively do harm to power, but a form of government of human beings, where human beings are incited to govern themselves. Neither disciplinary nor liberating by nature, it is an element in a system of relations.9

The essential historical work of the armies of the French Revolution remains Jean-Paul Bertaud’s La revolution armée. Inspired by this fundamental work, Bertaud’s followers, such as Annie Crépin,10 Jean-Michel Lévy,11 Pierre Jacquot,12 or recently Bruno Ciotti,13 have studied the revolutionary levies on a regional level more closely, providing an essential basis from which the perspective can eventually be geographically enlarged. Moreover, the factor of desertion may said to be well documented, mainly due to the works by Alan Forrest14 and Frédéric Rousseau.15 The German and the French Offices for Military History published both collective volumes on the history of conscription, giving a very large chronological overview on the topic. The French volume, edited by Maurice Vaïsse, contains foremost a contribution by Jean Delmas, who gives a useful summary of the French debates on compulsory military service and the lottery draft during the nineteenth century.16

9 Ehrenberg, Le corps militaire, p. 173.
10 Crépin, “Levées d’hommes et esprit public en Seine-et-Marne”.
11 Lévy, “La formation de la première armée de la Révolution française”.
12 Jacquot, “Les Bataillons de volontaires en Haute-Marne”.
13 Ciotti, Du volontaire au conscrit.
14 Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters.
15 Rousseau, Service militaire au XIXe siècle.
16 Delmas, L’armée française au XIXe siècle.
Some recent publications deserve a closer discussion. Being not a scholarly historical study but rather an essay – relying exclusively on secondary literature – Michel Auvray’s book *L’âge des casernes* analyses military service as being in historical continuity with much older obligations to the state, and its revolutionary origin nothing more than a “myth”. Annie Crépin’s book *La conscription en débat*, on the other hand, is essentially based on “macro-sources”, such as parliamentary debates, proposals for laws, and newspaper articles. The same author has recently broadened the perspective with the publication of *Défendre la France*, which takes into account the reactions and attitudes of civil society towards military obligation, and *Histoire de la conscription* which sums up the author’s work of many decades and widens the chronological horizon to the twentieth century. Crépin is the most accomplished expert on the matter in France and provides a very useful framework of the political debates of the period. There are, however, also decisive shortcomings in her analyses, inasmuch as she remains firmly grounded in the tradition of French republican and “Jacobin” historiography and thus has a tendency to accept too readily the conceptual grounds of this tradition. With the methods of the historical anthropology, Odile Roynette has analysed the “experience of the barracks” in France at the end of the nineteenth century with an impressive mastery of source material and according to an interesting problematique, insisting on the conscripts’ processes of adaptation to the social microcosms of the army and the impact of the institution to the shaping of national and gender attitudes.17

**Recruitment practices of the ancien régime**

At least since 1583 the right to raise troops has been codified as a royal prerogative.18 The construction of a centralized state in France went hand in hand with the nationalization of the armed forces; private armies and the personal possession of weapons gradually disappeared, to the advantage of central power. In the case of eighteenth-century France, the institutional situation of recruitment was extremely complex; different and even contradictory practices coexisted over a long period. Three different stages of recruitment policy in pre-revolutionary France, however, can be roughly distinguished: (1) feudal recruitment, (2) “touting”, and (3) militia incor-

17 Roynette, “*Bons pour le Service*”.
18 The following paragraphs rely mainly on Hippler, *Citizens*, pp. 13-27 and 46-76.
porations and “national recruitment”. However, chronological boundaries between these stages were by no means clear and are distinguished here only for the sake of clarity.

Despite the 1583 act, the king did not raise his troops directly. Characteristically, having first deprived the aristocracy of the right to keep troops, the central power delegated the raising of troops back to them. The military administration chose the colonels – generally nobles – who were charged with raising and maintaining regiments. In principle, the central power thus did not provide regiments with soldiers; instead, enrolment was the task of the officers, who were virtually “proprietors” of their corps. Recruitment was thus a “private” contract between a soldier and an officer, relying on existing feudal bonds, which meant that soldiers generally came from among the officer’s dependent peasantry. This kind of personal recruitment had certain advantages. The military hierarchy and social structure exactly reflect the social relations between local lords and their peasants. They knew each other and they were bound by a system of mutual obligations. And, last but not least, the desertion rate was comparatively low with this kind of recruitment system. However, this feudal recruitment also had certain limits. In times of war, in particular, it appeared to be impossible to significantly increase the strength of the army without other methods of enrolment.

Having exhausted the resources of personal recruitment, officers were forced to enlist soldiers they did not personally know and with whom they had no relation in civil society. This kind of recruitment is generally called “touting” (racolage). The difference between feudal recruitment and racolage can be summarized in the following way: in the case of feudal recruitment, the soldier was enlisted by an officer, whereas in the case of touting he was hired as a soldier. The procedure, however, was not different in form, since drafting was still the affair of the commander of the unit. In contrast to the procedure of feudal recruitment, the officers usually touted outside their home towns or regions. In contrast to personal and feudal staffing, “touting” allowed enrolments to be increased considerably; this kind of practice, however, turned out to be problematic, too. The more difficulty the recruiters had in finding soldiers, the more they were forced to compete with each other, and the more they were tempted to use violence or tricks in order to find recruits.

19 See André, Michel Le Tellier et l’organisation de l’armée monarchique.
20 Corvisier, L’armée française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul, I, p. 736.
There was, however, another military institution, one that truly came under the control of the central government: the Royal Militia. The militia had been established as a regular institution under the Marquis de Louvois, the minister of war, in November 1688. In reality, militia systems had existed since the Middle Ages under various labels; their principle was the mobilization of peasants under the command of the lord in wartime. A militia system, in the traditional sense of the term, thus involved the duty to fight for the defence of the community in the case of danger; it did not involve, however, a regular military service. The feudal militia was disbanded as soon as a war was over. Moreover, a certain number of particular militia institutions coexisted until the end of the eighteenth century. There were, in the first place, the milices bourgeoises formed by inhabitants of towns. Their first purpose was to maintain public order, i.e. they were a municipal police force. Occasionally, however, they were used as auxiliaries for the regular army. By the end of the century, though, the burghers tended increasingly to pay a substitute instead of themselves serving in the militia; they were, however, opposed to any attempt to abolish the institution that they considered as the expression of the cities’ political liberty. When the Royal Militia came into being in 1688, its organization differed considerably from these predecessors. First, it was raised in the name of the king and not by local lords. Secondly, it was conceived of as a kind of standing auxiliary army that gathered even in peacetime and was regularly employed in wars, and not only at particular critical moments. The Royal Militia was recruited by a conscription system, which was very unpopular. As a result of the opposition of public opinion, compulsory conscription in the militia was abolished in 1697, re-established in 1701, abolished once again in 1712, and then, in 1726, definitively institutionalized.

Only a small proportion of those who were potentially subject to the militia were actually conscripted, and the choice of those who had to serve was obviously subject to serious quarrels. In most cases a lottery system was adopted, but large segments of society benefited from legal exemptions, both personal and statutory. Moreover, in the course of the eighteenth century the legislation on exemptions became increasingly complex. Service in the militia being not a personal, but a communal duty, it became normal to collect money in the parish before the lottery day; this was then handed over to the chosen militiaman. This money was, on the one hand, a kind of compensation for serving the community and, on the other, a contribution

21 Corvisier, Armées et sociétés en Europe, pp. 36-57.
22 Gébelin, Histoire des milices provinciales (1688-1791).
to the costs of the uniform and equipment. The existence of this kind of practice induced the government to make this contribution obligatory.

Another development needs to be highlighted. Traditionally, the militia and the line army were strictly separate organizational institutions. From 1701, though, when military service in the militia was re-established, the government gradually changed its military policy towards assimilation between the militia and the line army. From then on, each militia battalion was attached to a regiment of the line army. The militia units were now labelled “second battalion” and designed to assist the “first battalion” in tactical matters. The militia thus increasingly became a recruitment pool for the regular army. With regard to the kind of recruitment, the difference between the “volunteer” recruitment of the line army and the “conscription” of the militia was eroded by the actual situation on the ground: militiamen and soldiers of the standing army were pressed. The line army was recruited to a great extent among conscripts, while the newly raised militia units consisted exclusively of “outed” volunteers. In this way, the dissimilarity between the conscripted militia corps as auxiliary military forces, on the one hand, and the regular army with volunteer recruitment, on the other, gradually faded away. Simultaneously, the functions of the state’s military administration increased, which meant that recruitment became directly governed by state authorities and not by relatively autonomous army officers.

The ultimate step towards a centralized system of military recruitment before the French Revolution can be dated to the ordinance of 10 December 1762 stating that “the king charges himself with recruiting”. The basic characteristic of these “national” or “royal recruits” was that they were enlisted not for a particular unit, or by a particular officer, but as soldiers for the army in general. Centralized state apparatuses like the intendances of the provinces were charged with recruitment, and a refined system of bureaucratic control was set up in order to co-ordinate large-scale recruitment operations.

The French Revolution and the Napoleonic period

Confronted with these eighteenth-century developments, the innovations in matters of military recruitment in the early years of the French Revolution seem rather insignificant. From July 1789 the bourgeoisie had reorganized

their own militia troops as the National Guard, partly in order to back the National Assembly in its struggle to impose its own political agenda against the monarchy, and partly in order to uphold domestic security. This second role, however, was rather dubious, since National Guardsmen took part in popular uprisings and in looting. In theory, only “active citizens” and sons of active citizens – that is, those who had a material interest in public affairs – should be allowed to be armed as members of the National Guard, but the practice was much less clear-cut. In some regions, the Guard’s social composition was much less bourgeois than it should have been according to the legal dispositions. In other cases, the legal dispositions were politically challenged by excluded social groups, such as the Parisian servants who in 1789 claimed a universal human right to serve in the National Guard or the feminist Société des citoyennes républicaines révolutionnaires who addressed a petition to the National Assembly in 1792, demanding the creation of a “female national guard”. In short, service in the National Guard was intimately linked to the question of civic rights and as such became a subject of political quarrel.

In December 1789, the National Assembly rejected a request made by republicans to establish a system of universal conscription. After a week of passionate debate the Assembly decreed, on 16 December 1789, that “French troops, of all kinds, other than National Guards and Militia, will be recruited by voluntary engagement.” Conscription was rejected in favour of voluntary recruitment. The general structure of the regular army was to remain more or less the same: executive power over the army was in the hands of the king, military service was rejected, and the term of service lasted eight years with the possibility of extending that period. More particularly, the age limit for enlisting was fixed at sixteen. Furthermore, the actual procedure of recruitment was revised: recruiters were to work only in their home district so that they were under the control of their fellow citizens, which was supposed to prevent the notorious disorders of

24 Soboul, La Révolution française, p. 152.
27 For a detailed regional analyses see the contributions in the third part (pp. 267-409) of Bianchi and Dupuy (eds), La Garde nationale entre nation et people en armes.
29 Léon, Adresse individuelle à l’Assemblée nationale. See also Godineau, Citoyennes Tricoteuses, p. 119.
traditional recruitment. Another important point was the nationalization of the army: only Frenchmen were to be recruited into the French corps.\footnote{Bouthillier, \textit{Rapport sur le recrutement, les engagements, les rengagements et les conges}, pp. 10-15.} This principle, however, did not include the foreign corps of the army, but French and foreign corps had to be separated. Finally, soldiers would lose their civic rights for the duration of the engagement.

The outcome of the debate was thus an attempt to make recruitment into the army morally acceptable, without changing its structure or the general patterns of staffing. The long term of service, the possibility of joining the army at the age of sixteen, the maintenance of foreign corps, and the loss of civic rights for soldiers explicitly kept the armed forces at a certain distance from civil society. The third estate, furthermore, did not try to destroy the supreme power of the king over the state and the army, and contented itself with the recognition of the National Guard as the expression and guarantee of bourgeois participation in political matters.

It was war, or the imminence of war, that brought about an evolution in the patterns of recruitment. After having tried in vain to enlist 100,000 volunteers into the regular army, the Assembly decided, in June 1791, to organize battalions of “national volunteers” from the members of the National Guard. The decree affirmed clearly that these measures were limited to the time in which “the situation of the state required extraordinary service”.\footnote{“Décret relatif à une conscription libre de gardes nationales de bonne volonté dans la proportion de un sur vingt”, printed in Déprez, \textit{Les volontaires nationaux (1791-1793)}, p. 101.} Being such an extraordinary military force obviously meant that the forms of organization and military discipline had to differ considerably from those in use in the line army. In this respect the most important feature was certainly the question of officers. The way officers were chosen was the same as in the National Guard: that is, soldiers had the right to elect their commanders. The government issued various calls for volunteers during the following years, and the whole culminated in the 1793 \textit{levée en masse}, which has become a myth in French national historiography.\footnote{On the myth of the “national volunteers”, see Hippler, “Volunteers of the French Revolutionary Wars”.} In theory each citizen was liable, but the exceptions were so numerous that the \textit{levée en masse} by no means established general conscription.\footnote{Auvray, \textit{L’âge des casernes}, p. 42, and Jean-Paul Bertaud, \textit{La révolution armée}, p. 100.} Moreover, this civic call to the colours was clearly presented as an extraordinary event that was not meant to be translated into permanent institutional reality. The word “\textit{levée}” has several meanings: it connoted the ideas of both “levy” and...
“uprising”. The recruitment of troops, which is one of the main prerogatives of central power, and revolt are put on the same level. The oxymoron both affirms and denies state power. The idea for a *levée en masse* occurred during the spring of 1793 in the highly politicized milieus of the Parisian *sans-culottes*, and it was part of their plan for political terror. Sébastien Lacroix, one of the main ideologists of the *levée en masse*, recommended a vast political programme that involved stockpiling food in Paris, fixing prices for foodstuffs, monitoring public opinion, and co-ordinating a huge propaganda effort. This particular situation which would “decide the fate of the world” imposed a general mobilization of a very short duration: “eight days of enthusiasm may be more efficient for the fatherland than eight years of battle”.

The idea of a *levée en masse* and the politics of terror were only reluctantly adopted by the Jacobin government under popular pressure, and the concrete measures taken differed considerably from the intentions of the promoters of the idea. Most importantly, the *levée en masse* was transformed into a requisition: instead of an anarchic seizure of sovereign power by insurrectionists, it was, on the contrary, the state that “seized” individuals for service in the army. In this respect, the mythical *levée en masse* actually prefigured some of the constitutive paradoxes of republican conscription.

Most of the “national volunteers” were very young men. A majority of them came from urban areas. In terms of their social origin, the petty and lower bourgeoisie were well represented, and artisans and journeymen were over-represented. What actually happened during the following years was that the soldiers who were already enlisted were kept under the colours for many years, in most cases against their will. On the other hand, the turnover of the military personnel was particularly high in these years – in 1792, for instance, more than a third of the soldiers had served less than one year. Moreover, the emigration of officers, most of them nobles, enabled those who were left to make very quick career progression. People from lower social origins could attain positions of command that had been almost

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36 Guérin, *La lutte de classes sous la Première République*.
38 In their ranks, 79 per cent were younger than twenty-five. In the Ain department, 249 of 544 soldiers raised in 1791 were younger than twenty (Lévy, *La formation de la première armée de la Révolution française*, p. 115).
40 Bertaud, *La révolution armée*, pp. 67-68.
exclusively reserved for nobles a couple of years earlier: the armies of the French Revolution and of the Napoleonic empire were thus a very powerful mechanism for upward mobility.

Nonetheless, in 1798, the needs of the war effort induced the government to issue a law on conscription.\(^{42}\) According to the deputy – later Marshall – Jourdan who presented the proposal in parliament, the law aimed less at creating new political forms than at institutionalizing the experience of the Revolution.\(^{43}\) The project, however, was also quite moderate and tried explicitly to avoid a militarization of society. There were thus two contradicting goals to be achieved: on the one hand, Jourdan advocated “universal service”, essentially because partiality would have had a negative impact on the social acceptability of military service; on the other, he strived to limit the burden of conscription by enlisting only the number of soldiers that was necessary for the army and not all available individuals.\(^{44}\) The solution to this conundrum was found in the distinction between “conscription” and “military service”: conscription meant that the individual was registered as a potential conscript, but this did not imply that all these conscripts had to do military service. “Many will be destined to serve, but in reality few will probably serve”, as Jourdan put it.\(^{45}\) The criterion by which the soldiers were chosen from the mass of conscripts was their age, which meant that the youngest of a class were enlisted first. The law, however, did not fix the length of service, and decisions about the discharge of soldiers were left to the government.

Unsurprisingly, opinions were divided about the conditions for exemptions and about the question of whether conscripts should be allowed to hire a substitute instead of doing military service personally. The 1798 law did not actually allow substitution, since the goal was that “the law penetrates the thatched cottages of the poor as well as the sumptuous palaces of opulence”.\(^{46}\) This settlement, however, was discussed again two years later and substitution allowed. What is interesting about this discussion was the fact that similar arguments, which had been brought forward in 1798 to justify the act of conscription and the interdiction of substitution, now served as arguments for substitution. What is more, the adjustment of military duties to the needs of “arts, commerce, and agriculture” in Jourdan’s

42 On the 1798 legislation, see Crépin, *La conscription en débat*, pp. 24-30.
project was translated into a criticism of “those lovers of a chimerical equality” who wanted to “force all the members of a big nation strictly to do the same work”. The “general interest” could serve as an argument not only for an equal obligation for everybody, but also for a differentiation of social tasks, that is, for the possibility for the rich to buy themselves out of the obligation by hiring a substitute. The privilege, however, was also justified as salutary for the poor: “the option of substitution will allow the poor to receive money”. The legislative basis for French recruitment policy was rather elastic: on the one hand, military obligation was conceived as a consequence of citizenship, and the recruitment model can thus be described as conscription; on the other hand, the law could be interpreted as authorizing the forced recruitment of a selected number of individuals with the possibility given to the wealthy to buy themselves out.

The 1798 law was the legislative basis for the recruitment of Napoleon’s army. As regional studies have shown, the rates of desertion and refusal of military service (insubordination) were extremely high: up to 90 per cent in many cases. Socially, deserters and insoumis came mainly from rural regions, and were well integrated into society. Families and rural communities helped deserters and insoumis escaping from the military. It was easier to enforce conscription in urban areas, and in this respect the social pattern of staffing remained the same during the Revolution and the Napoleonic period. In order to fulfil the military needs, Napoleonic authorities set up specific military corps for searching the countryside and hunting deserters. Moreover, many of the peace treaties during the period obliged Napoleon’s “allies” to contribute to the war effort of the empire. As a result, about a third of the soldiers in the Russian campaign were not French. Finally, from 1808 onwards, “extraordinary levies” were organized in order to meet the enormous manpower needs of Napoleon’s campaigns. In the ten-year period 1804-1814, between 2,000,000 and 2,400,000 Frenchmen were enlisted

47 Jaucourt, *Opinion de Jaucourt Sur le projet de loi*, p. 3.
49 Deserters are those who, after becoming soldiers, leave the army without permission, whereas insoumis means those who refuse enlistment altogether.
50 See Rousseau, *Service militaire au XIXe siècle*.
51 On German soldiers in Napoleon’s army, see Hippler, “Les soldats allemands dans l’armée napoléonienne d’après leurs autobiographies”.

by conscription, and many of them died or were injured. Among those enlisted, only about 52,000 were actual volunteers. Unsurprisingly, the social impact of twenty-five years of revolutionary and imperial mass warfare was enormous.

The constitutional monarchies and the Second Empire

After Waterloo, and the massive desertions that had followed Napoleon's ultimate defeat, King Louis XVIII disbanded the remainder of the army and on 3 August 1815 decreed the formation of one “legion” in each department. Between 1814 and 1818 the recruits for the royal French army were exclusively volunteers, many of them in reality veterans of the old imperial army. The “Constitutional Charter” of the reformed French monarchy stipulated that “conscription is abolished”. A couple of years later, however, in 1818, a form of compulsory military service was re-established. The reason was that the military authorities failed to enlist more than 3,500 men a year, which was insufficient to meet manpower needs. On the other hand, it was argued that the difficulty of finding recruits on the labour market was mainly due to the government's unwillingness to provide adequate funding. Conscription was viewed as a cheap way of manning the army. Amended in 1824 and in 1832, the 1818 legislation remained the basis of French recruitment policies until the Third Republic. Beyond the purely military concerns, the question of recruitment was linked to a whole series of uncertainties about the nature of the political regime, about political culture, and about the relationship of the re-established monarchy to the revolutionary past. This relationship to the past was particularly difficult in post-1815 France, and two quite different sets of memory politics confronted

52 Girardet, La société militaire de 1815 à nos jours, p. 19. See also Smets, “Von der ‘Dorfidylle’ zur preußischen Nation”, p. 717. Quantitative aspects of the social impact of conscription can be found in the “Compte general de la conscription” by Antoine-Audet Hargenvilliers, published in Vallée, La conscription dans le department de la Charente (1798-1807). More recent scholarship has shown that the figures given by Hargenvilliers are sometimes flawed; see Rousseau, Service militaire au XIXe siècle, and Dufraisse, Napoléon, p. 69.
53 See Houdaille, “Le problème des pertes de guerre”.
54 Girardet, La société militaire, p. 20.
55 On the social impact during the nineteenth century see Petiteau, Lendemains d'Empire.
56 Monteilhet, Les institutions militaires de la France, p. 5.
57 Vidalenc, “Engagés et conscrits sous la Restauration 1814-1830”, p. 240. See also Vidalenc, “Les engagements volontaires dans l'armée de la Restauration”.
58 Porch, “The French Army Law of 1832”.
each other: an official effort to forget the Revolution and the empire (unité et oubli, “unity and forgetting”, was the imprint on official papers) and a discourse of atonement, promoted by the “ultras” of the Restoration. The military in general and conscription in particular were universally viewed as cornerstones of the republic and of its continuity in Napoleon’s empire.

According to a proposal by Laurent de Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, an annual contingent of 40,000 men would be raised by voluntary recruitment or, if not enough volunteers were forthcoming, by a draft operated through a lottery. The duration of active service being six years, the general strength of the army would be 240,000 men. These numbers, however, were only a maximum, which was subject to budgetary constraints; that is, the actual strength of the army and the annual levies could in reality be lower and the effective duration of service shorter. In 1824 the duration of active service was increased to eight years from six, which further contributed to the professionalization of the conscript system: after many years in the army many conscripts had no other professional choice than to “voluntarily” remain soldiers. In this sense, and in the eyes of many contemporaries, “conscription” was little more than a legal framework for forced enlistments into a professional army. Moreover, the system allowed the possibility of hiring a substitute, which was obviously a possibility offered to the wealthy to buy themselves out of the military obligation.

In terms of the social origins of the soldiers, the army of the Restoration comprised two rather different sections. The bulk of the soldiers were veterans of the Napoleonic army, in particular those who had lost any contact with their home communities. In contrast, those who were recruited after 1815 came to a very large extent from poor rural backgrounds. This led to quite an unusual ideological configuration: the political right and the liberal bourgeoisie were suspicious of the military, whereas those who were nostalgic about the Revolution and the empire upheld the image of France’s past military glory. In contrast to the social habits of the ancien régime, the aristocracy of the Restoration and the July Monarchy was reluctant to follow military careers. According to the 1818 law and similar stipulations in 1832, two-thirds of the officers should have been recruited through the military colleges of Saint-Cyr and Metz. However, the number of those who passed the entrance exams of these colleges and who were able to pay for tuition and equipment was notoriously lower than the military needs. As a result

59 See Elster, Closing the Books, pp. 24-47.
60 See Hippler, “Conscription in the French Restoration”.
of this, nearly two-thirds of officers were in reality non-commissioned officers and thus former rank-and-file.  

The army, in other words, still functioned to some extent as a mechanism of upward mobility during the first half of the nineteenth century. However, in contrast to the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, this upward mobility was extremely slow and of little attraction in financial terms. It usually took seven to eight years to get promoted from second lieutenant to lieutenant and the same amount of time to get promoted from lieutenant to captain. Most officers ended their military careers ended as captains after some twenty years as lieutenants. As a result of this, very few young bourgeois enlisted; instead they preferred careers in civil administration, in the liberal professions, or in business. During the mid-nineteenth century non-commissioned officers earned between 75 centimes and 1 franc a day, whereas the average daily salary of industrial workers was about 2 francs, which was itself already notoriously insufficient. As for lieutenants, their salary was between 4.5 and 5.5 francs a day and their pension between 2 and 3.2 francs. In other words, the military held no attraction for the bourgeoisie, and salaries hardly allowed a man to ensure a decent life for his family. Moreover, the cultural image of the military was of little attraction.

The spirit of the time being understood as pacifistic and commercial, military life was depicted in contemporary literature as tedious waiting in some provincial garrison for a war that was never to come. Apart from colonial expansion after 1830, the main task for the military was actually domestic counter-insurgency. Given the social composition of the army, it was obviously necessary to prevent fraternization between soldiers and insurgents. From the point of view of recruitment, care was taken to enlist primarily in rural areas and to keep the urban working classes out of the army in order to maintain a cultural distinction between soldiers and potential insurgents. From the point of view of “military education” care was explicitly taken to separate the army from civil society: the geographical mobility of units was extremely high, and contacts with civil society were viewed with suspicious eyes and could seriously harm careers.

In terms of labour relations, the outcome of this pattern was twofold. On the one hand, the army increasingly became a social microcosm with its own rules and separated from the rest of society. On the other hand, solidarity and even a certain sense of equality developed within this closed microcosm. This was due to the facts that a majority of officers

61 Serman, Les Officiers français dans la nation.
62 The following relies on Girardet, La société militaire, pp. 13-63.
were former rank and file and that even those who came from bourgeois or noble backgrounds had somewhat lost their former social status. Differences in rank came thus foremost down to duration of service and the progressive incorporation of the values of military society. In this sense, the military was a self-reproducing system. It was, however, almost utterly incapable of attracting recruits and was thus in need of forced enlistments by the means of the lottery-draft. Another aspect needs to be highlighted: it was during the nineteenth century that a certain model of “officialdom” (fonctionnariat) became hegemonic and grew into one important aspect of military labour relations. In terms of careers the soldier was a model of what later became a “civil servant”: as a state employee ideally he did not change his profession during his lifetime, and his relative comfort in retirement was guaranteed by a state pension. Careers, though slow, were stable and foreseeable; payment, though barely sufficient, was guaranteed.

In this sense, there was an important difference between the French army during the Revolution and the Napoleonic period on the one hand and after 1815 on the other. Revolutionary soldiers were considered to be lacking discipline but to be superior to the military of the ancien régime in terms of motivation. They embodied indiscipline and the animalistic force of the rabble but, at the same time, also a heroic sense of honour which stemmed from their quality as defenders of the fatherland. The key concept was “enthusiasm”: revolutionary soldiers had a goal to identify with, whereas soldiers of the ancien régime were considered to be indifferent about the outcome of the fight. Some of these characteristics continued to exist during the Napoleonic period, and ego-documents from foreign soldiers under Napoleon suggest that the relations between officers and rank and file were perceived as much better than they were in other armies of the time. Moreover, Napoleon inherited one of the basic features of revolutionary warfare, which is the logistical principle that the army live off the countryside. In many cases this in practice meant looting, but also the possibility for the soldiers to supplement their pay. According to the cultural imagination of the time, the French soldier of the revolutionary and Napoleonic period was the mirror of “the people”: undisciplined, violent, and uncultured, but also passionate, even enthusiastic, and, above all, of impressive strength. Rarely wearing proper uniforms, Napoleon’s armies were viewed by his adversaries as hordes of rabble, and by his followers as

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the emanation of the heroic strength of the nation. The post-1815 army was the perfect antithesis of this image. Pedantic discipline, subordination, patient military labour, and slow careers were the distinctive features of the new army after Napoleon. The *Diary* of Marshall Boniface de Castellane is perhaps the most explicit source for this return to an older “military spirit”: “a soldier should not even think about the possibility to act otherwise than he is ordered to”.65

The European revolutions of 1848 were an essential turning point with regard to the cultural representation of soldiers in France. Around 1848 the military was progressively assimilated to the maintenance of social order, rather than with revolutionary uprising. This is obviously linked to the role of the military in crushing insurrections and revolts all over Europe. A complete reversal of the cultural and political significance of the military was the result of this. The military became progressively part of the defence of social order, of civilization, and of religion, and the miseries of military life were now glorified as the necessary renouncement of worldly pleasures. The military, in short, was depicted as disciplined, invigorated, and healthy, and was thus the perfect antithesis of the corrupt urban and working-class life:

> Ce qu'il y a de plus grand, de plus beau, de plus digne d'admiration dans nos sociétés modernes, c'est certainement le paysan transformé par la loi en soldat d'infanterie. Pauvre, il protège la richesse; ignorant, il protège la science. [...] Ce soldat est l'expression la plus complete, la plus noble, la plus pure de la civilisation créée par le christianisme, car il met en pratique la pensée chrétienne: le sacrifice.66

This renewed image of the military came to a peak under Napoleon III. Attempts were made under the Second Empire to get closer to a “real” conscription, as had been realized, according to many French observers, in Prussia. Napoleon III actually adhered very closely to the Prussian recruitment system. In a series of articles he had written for the newspaper *Progrès du Pas-de-Calais* in 1843 – thus before coming to power – he had called for the abolition of substitution and the organization of a strong military reserve. According to him, “the Prussian organization is the only one which is adapted for our democratic nature, for our egalitarian habits”. In Prussia, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte went on, the whole nation was armed

65 Cited by Girardet, *La société militaire*, p. 75.
for defence, whereas in France “only the bourgeoisie is armed for the defence of private interests”. 67 When he became emperor his rhetoric became less democratic, but he still admired the Prussian way of identifying the citizen and the soldier. What was even more important, however, was the fact that the Prussian system promised a decisive increase in numbers in the French army, especially by the means of the formation of a strong reserve which could be incorporated in times of war. The project of the new conscription law was published by the emperor himself in a notice that appeared in Le moniteur universel on 12 December 1866. However, Napoleon’s nephew faced serious resistance, both from the officers for whom the “quality” of “military spirit” – which needed long years of military education to be acquired – mattered more than the quantity of conscripts. The attitude of the republican party towards conscription was ambiguous: on the one hand, they strongly approved of the idea of a universal military service; on the other, they were against the regime, and the law was not radical enough in their view. 68 In this political situation, the emperor did not succeed in imposing his will: the law of 4 February 1868 was significantly modified by the Corps Législatif, and its main achievement was to forbid private contracts of substitution in favour of a procedure of replacement according to which, instead of hiring a substitute, the wealthy could directly buy themselves out. 69

The Third Republic

The period following the French defeat in 1870-1871 was characterized by what French historiography has termed the “German crisis in French thought”. 70 The defeat was attributed to a feeling of lack of attachment on the part of individuals to the fate of the nation and the state, and relief was sought by a partial adaptation of German models. This concerned, most importantly but not exclusively, the patterns of military recruitment.

The new recruitment law, issued on 27 July 1872, was a compromise between quite different, and indeed even antagonistic, political expectations. Professional soldiers highlighted, on the one hand, the need to instil a “military spirit” which necessitated long years of habits of subordination and obedience, and on the other, the need to train a large number of

67 Napoléon III, Projet de loi sur le recrutement de l’armée, p. 23.
68 See Casevitz, Une loi manquée.
69 See Schnapper, Le remplacement militaire en France.
70 Digeon, La crise allemande de la pensée française.
conscripts to be incorporated in time of war. However, the most important change concerned the attitude of the political right towards compulsory military service. Conservatives invoked the role of the military in 1848 and, more recently, during the Paris Commune of 1871, when the army had saved “civilization”: “nous nous demandons si ce n’est pas là l’école où il faut envoyer ceux qui paraissent l’avoir oublié, apprendre comment on sert et comment on aime son pays. Que tous nos enfants y aillent donc et que le service obligatoire soit la grande école des générations futures.”71 On the political left, compulsory military service was traditionally linked to the republican heritage. If the army had been instrumental in crushing uprisings and revolutions, this was due, according to the republicans, to the fact that the army was not recruited through universal conscription and that it had been maintained at a distance from civil society.

In 1872, the lottery system was maintained and those with “bad numbers” were obliged to serve five years on active service, and another four years in the reserve, whereas those holding “good numbers” received a basic military training of only a year. The goal was to provide military training for every male, and a proper military education – the development of the specifically military virtues – for a minority. This law, however, was inspired by the idea of the obligation of personal and universal service. Beyond the military necessity of this form of recruitment, the topic of the educational function of military service was stressed very much to justify universal military service. Military service as an educational project was actually a programme that had been developed since the Restoration. According to Captain Louis Pagézy de Bourdéliac, time under the colours could most usefully be spend by providing an intellectual and moral education for the soldiers: reading and writing, but also patriotism, honesty, and a cult of honour should be on the military agenda.72 Towards the end of the Second Empire, General Louis-Jules Trochu had argued for a military service of short duration: this kind of conscription has “le triple effet de donner du ressort à l’armée, de moraliser la population, de faire pénétrer les habitudes et l’esprit militaires dans le corps social tout entier”.73 If this kind of thinking was marginal before 1870, it became hegemonic after the Franco-Prussian War and it obviously affected labour relations within the military.

71 Cited by Girard, La société militaire, p. 122.
73 Trochu, L’armée française en 1867, p. 278.
The growing influence of republican positions in French political life after 1871 could not but have an impact on the subsequent legislation, and the 1889 law may be considered an institutionalization of the republican conception of military service and of the relationship between the individual and the state. It also remains true, however, that a genuinely equal obligation of the individual to the state never existed, not even after the 1905 legislation, which revoked the exceptions granted to certain categories, such as priests, thus establishing a theoretical equality of service. In practice, however, the well-educated sons of the bourgeoisie still benefited from certain advantages in terms of employment, career prospects, and even the duration of actual service. France adopted the Prussian model of the “one-year volunteers” (Einjährig-Freiwillige) which permitted the educated classes to be discharged after a single year of service and to be promoted as officers in the reserve.74 Later on, holders of university degrees could be employed entirely in civilian duties while being in theory members of the army.

On the social level, the changing pattern of recruitment had enormous consequences. First of all, there is a tendency towards the “gentrification” of the military profession. This movement started under the Second Empire but accelerated with the advent of the Third Republic. The proportion of those who were made officers after having attended military colleges rose significantly in contrast to the promotion of non-commissioned officers and thus the former rank and file. The social origin of those alumni of military colleges was predominantly the mid-level bourgeoisie, but there are also, along with sons of the petty bourgeoisie and of low-ranking civil servants, young men of noble descent and those stemming from the higher bourgeoisie. Moreover, the only way for non-commissioned officers to become officers was to be admitted to a staff college. These measures were intended to raise the level of education of military personnel, but they had also the side effect of considerably altering the social composition of the army. Among the professional cadres two distinct classes emerge: on the one hand the high-ranking officers, usually from higher social origins, who rapidly became officers after graduating from military colleges; on the other hand, non-commissioned officers and low-ranking officers, usually from lower social origins. Military hierarchies, in other words, now mirrored the hierarchies in civil society and the army lost its role as a mechanism of upward mobility.

74 See Frevert, Die kasernierte Nation, esp. “Bürgerliche Arrangements: Einjährige und Reserveoffiziere”.
Labour relations within the army were also altered by the educational role of the military. Before the Third Republic officers and the rank and file largely shared a common background of social origin and manners. From the last third of the nineteenth century onwards, officers and non-commissioned officers were charged with morally and intellectually “improving” the recruits. The latter were no longer part of the same “family”, since their presence under the colours was of limited duration. The more egalitarian recruitment of universal conscription thus had the paradoxical consequence that social relations within the army became less egalitarian on all levels. During the first years of the republic, religious instruction was a pivotal part of the moralizing mission. Moreover, the army was charged with eradicating bad behaviour such as alcoholism – only, however, among the rank and file and not among professional cadres. The army being charged with delivering basic instruction to all recruits, the social inequalities became even more accentuated. Upon arrival, the recruits had to pass exams in reading, writing, and basic mathematics. The results of these exams were important in the future differentiation of labour within the military. The fact that those who held degrees could be discharged after a shorter period of actual service created a somewhat paradoxical situation: in contrast to those who benefited from a shorter term of service, very few among the regular conscripts fulfilled the necessary conditions and had the requisite skills to be promoted to the rank of non-commissioned officer. The non-commissioned officers’ proverbial stupidity was a result of this situation. However, the social hierarchies were also perceptible on other levels. There is some evidence that recruits from higher social origins were less subject to the physical violence which was often part of the rites of passage in the army.

Variables and taxonomies

This short overview of the evolution of recruitment policies leads to the striking conclusion that the evolution of military recruitment over the “very long nineteenth century” should above all be read in terms of different approaches to state construction and nation-building and that the changes from one pattern of recruitment to others were but consequences of the overall political and cultural processes. There was a slow shift away from a

76 Ibid., p. 269.
military obligation in the name of the community towards its encoding as an obligation to the nation-state, that is, military duties as a civic obligation. This shift in scale was accompanied by a change in meaning of the military obligation in general and of conscription in particular. In this sense, the four basic variables of the general taxonomy of the project (payment, duration, legal constraints, and cultural factors) were constantly under debate during the period.

The general outcome of the evolution of French recruitment practices from the late eighteenth until the end of the nineteenth century is the declining importance of payment. Traditionally soldiers received a quite significant amount of money when signing the recruitment contract (*prime d'engagement*). Once they were soldiers, their normal pay was notoriously too low to enable them to live a decent life. Originally, the “proprietor” of the regiment had to pay this money but, as pointed out earlier, there was a tendency in the eighteenth-century militia system to transform this into a pecuniary contribution by the recruit's home community. This means on the one hand that military obligations were conceived of as the local community’s duty; on the other hand, this practice implied that the patterns of manning both the militia and the regular army became those of a “professional” army, which implies military service for payment. There is, however, a double difficulty. The first difficulty lies in the fact that staffing was both “professional” and a communal duty, inasmuch as each parish had to furnish a certain number of recruits. The second difficulty lies in the fact that the *prime d'engagement* was given only once and, by accepting this money, the future soldier had, so to speak, “sold himself”.

Enlightenment critics thus denounced “military slavery” and called for a system in which citizens “freely” defended their fatherland. This debate continued for virtually the whole nineteenth century. Against the government's argument that it was impossible to find enough volunteers, the adversaries of conscription regularly replied that this was mainly due to the authorities’ unwillingness to grant *primes d'engagement* that were substantial enough to attract people to the army. Conscription, in this sense, was clearly a means of saving public money.

During the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period, payment does not seem to have played a predominant role in enlistment. The older practices of communities collecting money for their recruits continued to exist for a while; however, this served more as compensation for the financial losses that the soldier would face compared to what he could have earned in other employment. However, the government’s unwillingness to provide adequate funding was partly compensated for by an ideological
justification of the extended military obligations. As pointed out, the poor payment was probably the main reason why the restored monarchy decided to re-establish a selective draft on the basis of a lottery system in 1818. In any event, during the whole period, payment was never sufficient to attract the necessary number of recruits. On the contrary, there is a very clear trend towards a delegitimization of military labour for payment. Apart from the financial aspect of the matter, payment was considered as intrinsically immoral. The only morally legitimate motivation for fighting was the attachment to the nation and the fatherland.

The question of the duration of service is handled quite differently in periods of war and in periods of peace. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire were characterized by nearly permanent war, and soldiers were not normally released during wartime. This meant that desertion was the only way to quit the service, and the desertion rate was actually extremely high. In reality, the legal duration of service thus became an issue only with the Restoration, and the early nineteenth century saw a return to the pre-revolutionary practices, that is, a long term of service of six to eight years. In both cases, the debate essentially focused on the question of “military spirit”. Professional officers and conservatives argued that long years of service – and ideally enlistment at a very young age – were needed to instil a “cult of subordination” and military discipline. Republicans, on the other hand, argued that the necessary military training could be achieved in a very short time. The example of the armies of the French Revolution has proven that a quite effective military could be trained very quickly. It was not the technical skills that took time to develop but rather the personal dispositions of a disciplined soldier who was used to obeying. Revolutionaries and republicans were opposed to a long term of service, precisely because they contested the necessity of a “military spirit”. On the contrary, what was needed, according to them, was a “civic spirit” which included a sense of military duty, but which was not opposed to the values of civil society. It was thus necessary to ensure a high turnover of personnel and thus to limit the time of service to a strict minimum. In the words of French republicanism, this was a “national army”, i.e. an army that was an emanation of the nation, i.e. of civil society. However, a limited term of service led to some paradoxes of the cadre/conscript system in which professional soldiers with lifelong military careers commanded short-term recruits and in which the military culture was essentially defined by profes-

77 See Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters.
sionals. In short, conscription led to the militarization of society rather than to the socialization of the military.

As to legal constraints, they seem to be subordinated to financial considerations, to social change, or, more importantly, to changes in political culture. The most important feature in this respect seems to be the changing understanding of nation and nationality. Matters of ethnicity were for the most part debated as matters of nationality, and we need to pay attention to the shifting meaning of the term “nation” during these years. During the eighteenth century, the term could be employed in the sense of “civil society” or even as a synonym for the third estate, as in Abbé Sieyès’s famous 1789 pamphlet Que’est-ce que tiers-état? The answer to this question is well known: the third estate is of right the “nation”, and this latter is defined as the part of the population that does useful work and that produces wealth. In contrast to many other European languages, the English language has kept this meaning. Famous examples are Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, in which “nation” designs something that we would probably term “society” today. In Disraeli’s Sybil or the Two Nations, or in the “One-Nation Tory” movement during the 1980s, the “nation” designates one part of the population within a given territory, and indeed within a constituted nation-state. The French language lost these meanings almost completely during the nineteenth century. During the Revolution, however, concepts such as the nation and la patrie (and similar notions like patriot, patriotic, etc.) had a clear social and political background, rather than a “nationalistic” understanding in the modern sense.

A clear illustration of this can be found in the military realm: foreign corps – and most famously the Swiss – were assimilated to “satellites of despotism”, i.e. to adversaries of the cause of the nation in both senses of the term. Foreign units were foreign to the nation in the sense that they were not a part of the revolutionary community, and also in the sense that they did not belong to the French community of descent. The consequence of this, however, was not the disbanding of foreign corps but an institutional separation between units of French nationals and of foreigners. The same logic was employed during the Napoleonic campaigns, when France’s allies had to furnish large contingents of the Grande Armée, and with the founding of the Foreign Legion in 1831. The tension remained palpable, and the nation, however undefined, became the ultimate source of legitimacy. In the case of the foreign units in Napoleon’s army, it can be argued that their presence underpinned an ideological orientation of the First Empire, that is, the idea of a European federation under French leadership. In the case of the Foreign Legion it is certainly not by coincidence that the reward for long years of
service for France consisted of the naturalization of the legionnaires, that is, to their becoming French nationals.

The most important issue, however, is certainly the renegotiation of the meaning of *liberté*. The French language does not distinguish between freedom and liberty, and both issues were discussed under the term of *liberté*. *Liberté* has indeed become a *Grundbegriff* in the sense of Reinhart Koselleck’s conceptual history, that is, a concept that all parties were obliged to use in order to defend legitimate social claims. But the meaning of the concept was constantly under debate. Enlightenment criticism of military obligation regularly used the term “military slavery” to denounce militia obligations or peasant conscription. The military obligation was thus criticized in the name of liberty.

A conceptual reversal occurred with the French Revolution. Regarding conscription, it was striking that both its supporters and its opponents underpinned their claims with references to liberty. The conceptual quarrel is clearly displayed by the words of the Count of Liancourt who declared, during the 1789 debate on conscription, that he was “astonished to see that liberty is invoked to support the hardest and the broadest of slavery”, adding that “it would be a hundred times better to live in Constantinople or in Morocco than in a country in which laws of this kind are in force”.78 And indeed, the task was obviously easier for the adversaries of conscription, since they could argue that liberty implied that people ought not to be forced into the military against their will. The promoters of conscription had thus to redefine the concept according to their needs: they held that liberty was not so much a personal as a political matter, closely linked to the existence of the “public force”; that is, to a strong state, liberty “is a chimera if the stronger one can with impunity oppress the weaker one”.79 No real liberty was conceivable if not in a republic, and the absence of state power equalled the oppression of the weaker one by the stronger one and was therefore understood as “slavery”. The real issue was thus access to civic rights, and a whole republican tradition had linked civic rights to military obligations. Modern conscription is unthinkable without this ideological link.

The debate over the link between liberty, freedom, and citizenship on the one hand and military obligations on the other went on under the Restoration. At the moment when the 1818 military legislation was discussed, this link became particularly problematic.80 The reason for this was that it was

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80 For the following, see Hippler, “Conscription in the French Restoration”.
difficult to separate the meaning of these concepts from their revolutionary legacy. The defenders of limited conscription underpinned their claims with a reference to citizenship: it was the duty of each citizen to defend their polity. Conservative critics made use of the same arguments as in 1789: Bonald, for instance, depicted conscription as “a law that confiscates my personal liberty prior to any misdemeanour”. Liberals, on the other hand, made use of the reference to liberty to argue for the possibility for the wealthy to buy themselves out of the obligation. Military obligations, according to them, were comparable to financial contributions, that is, to paying tax. Each one should thus have the possibility to contribute to the safety of the state in either financial terms or by means of personal service. This parallel between taxes and military service was quite clearly expressed in the popular name given to conscription: l’impôt du sang, blood tax.

On the other hand, this possibility to buy oneself out of the obligation was denounced by both conservatives and republicans as illegitimate commodification. The conservative deputy Cardonnel thus depicted in 1818 the image of “the French youth becoming a commodity [...] object of a humiliating traffic and a shameful trading and sordid interest and infamous cupidity triumphing over all feelings and over all laws of nature”. The interplay between the developing capitalist structures of the economy and the possibility of replacement led to insurance companies being set up against the risk of the draft; they became a flourishing business during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century. During the Second Empire, “substitution” superseded “replacement”, the difference being that the buying-out was no longer a private transaction since drafted soldiers could pay a certain amount of money directly to the state in order to be exempted. The main argument advanced for substitution was that it was a more “moral” procedure than replacement. As pointed out above, financial aspects were dubious per se, and they were even more so if they took place in the capitalistic civil society, whereas a mediation by the state conferred some legitimacy on the buy-out. The reason for this is certainly to be looked for in the fact that the state is as such the sphere of the common interest, in contrast to the private interests that confront each other savagely in a market economy.

82 Cardonnel, *Opinion de M. le président de Cardonnel, député du Tarn*, p. 10.
83 See Schnapper, *Le remplacement militaire en France*.
The above discussion of the key concepts in which military obligations were historically understood and thus culturally and politically constructed as legitimate obligations made clear that taxonomies are always and of necessity a fragile endeavour. Taxonomies always run the risk of an ahistoric – and thus in the last instance teleological – understanding of the historical material. The only way to escape from this seems to be to historicize the terms of the taxonomy itself. The above discussion of the uncertainties about the concept of liberté is part of this endeavour to historicize the key concepts.

As to the catalysts of change, it appears that the experience of revolutionary war was of crucial yet only temporary importance. Contemporary military observers were surprised or shocked by the “regressive” nature of the tactics of armies of the French Revolution, which differed from the very sophisticated tactics of traditional eighteenth-century armies. The same holds true for weaponry, since the most striking fact for foreign militaries was that the French used the long-superseded pike. The basic lesson that foreign observers learnt from this experience was that the motivation of the soldiers was of crucial importance for military success. As a first step, this lesson was conceptualized in terms of “enthusiasm” and in a second step in terms of the legitimizing force of nationalisms.

In this respect, the most important operator of change is certainly to be found in the realm of political representations and ideologies, that is, in the now overwhelming importance of the nation as a source of legitimacy. And the uncertainties in terms of military recruitment that are characteristic for important periods of nineteenth-century French history can without too much difficulty be linked to the uncertain nature of the post-revolutionary nation.

Perhaps the most important outcome of the French Revolution in terms of military policy was the defeudalization of the French army. Backed by republican ideology and by social turnover in the positions of command in the army, the state succeeded in establishing its supremacy on a permanent basis. It was only under the Third Republic that nobles sought military employment en masse, however, not without submitting to republican, and thus ultimately bourgeois, modes of selection. Economic and financial factors played a paradoxical role. As pointed out above, financial considerations were certainly one of the main motivations for the restored monarchy not to reintroduce the form of military recruitment that its ideologists considered fit for a constitutional monarchy, that is, a strictly voluntary recruitment. On the other hand, in many cases financial considerations also prevented conscription from becoming truly universal, for the simple
reason that the overall strength of the army was subordinated to financial constraints and not to the amount of the potentially available manpower.

The most general conclusion about French recruitment policies concerns, without any doubt, the ideological link that was established between military obligations and citizenship. However, the theoretical principle that each citizen ought to be a defender of the fatherland was never universally applied, not even during the French Revolution or under the Third Republic. One had always to cope with financial constraints on the one hand, and with social acceptance – especially by the upper classes – on the other. This is why the boundary between conscripted soldiers and pressed soldiers is sometimes difficult to draw. This point becomes particularly visible under the constitutional monarchies and the Second Empire, when only a very small proportion of the potential conscripts were actually enlisted.
The Dutch army in transition
From all-volunteer force to cadre-militia army, 1795-1830

Herman Amersfoort

In 1748, the last year of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the army of the United Provinces had a strength on paper of 126,000 men, the actual strength being approximately 90,000.1 This was an impressive number and by and large the equivalent of the complement during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714).2 Over the peacetime years after 1748 numbers declined to just over 40,000. This still constituted a considerable force. As a rule of a thumb eighteenth-century political-military leadership considered an army equivalent to 1 or 1.5 per cent of the population acceptable to secure the safety of the state in time of peace. Given a population of 1.9 million inhabitants around 1750 the United Provinces mobilized an army of 2.1 per cent of the population. However, the actual strength of the army of the Batavian Republic (1795-1806) and the Kingdom of Holland (1806-1810) sank to numbers ranging from only 22,000 men to 37,000. This is remarkable taking into account that the second half of the eighteenth century saw a slow growth of the population, reaching a total of just over 2 million inhabitants in 1795 and considering that during those years Holland was fully engaged in the war effort of revolutionary and Napoleonic France.3 These decreasing numbers reflect the persisting financial exhaustion of the United Provinces after the War of the Austrian Succession. From 1810 onwards things were hardly any better. During the period of the annexation of Holland to the French Empire (1810-1813) in all an estimated 35,000 Dutch military served under Bonaparte’s colours.4 The shift came after the restoration of Dutch independence in November 1813. As from January 1814 the peacetime establishment of the army of the newly founded kingdom of William I called for a total of 52,000 men. On this basis, after a five-year period a wartime strength of 145,000 would have been within grasp.5 For the first time since 1748 the Dutch army on a war

1 Van Nimwegen, De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden als grote mogendheid, p. 103.
5 Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 62-90.
footing as well as on a peace footing would have exceeded the figures of the
days of the old republic, when the country was considered a power of the
first rank in Europe. These 145,000 soldiers, however, are a theoretical figure
since the system of army formation as it had been designed in January 1814
was superseded by new legislation the next year and since the demographic
resources were dramatically expanded to 5.4 million inhabitants after
the union of the Northern and Southern Netherlands in June 1815. But
the 145,000 figure unmistakeably indicates that William I's army was of
a completely different nature than its eighteenth-century predecessor.6

This transformation had needed only the twenty-five years between
1795 and 1820 to come about. The most sweeping change had been the
introduction of military conscription. After 1820 the army of King William
I was a cadre-militia army. When on a war footing some three-quarters of
the complement consisted of conscripts and only one-quarter of volunteers.
The army of the United Provinces, the State Army (Staatse Leger), had
been an all-volunteer force. The introduction of conscription also led to a
totally different national composition of the army. In the second half of the
eighteenth century some 50 per cent of the rank and file of the State Army
was made up of soldiers of national birth.7 The Dutch labour market simply
could not sustain a higher proportion of nationals. Since the Eighty Years'
War (1568-1648) the army of the United Provinces had recruited in Germany,
Scotland, Switzerland, and the prince-bishopric of Liège. However, in the
second half of the eighteenth century these recruiting areas gradually
ran dry.8 Due to booming business in agriculture and industry as well as
restrictive and protective governmental measures in Prussia, the Austrian
Netherlands, and Britain the captains commanding the companies of the
State Army met increasing difficulties in their recruiting efforts. Moreover,
the bounties and soldiers’ pay had not kept pace with rising wages. The
States-General now had to resort to so-called seigneurial recruitment.9
They contracted with petty German princes for ready-made regiments
recruited by these princes from among the population of their states.

The Royal Army of William I from 1820 onwards was of predominantly
national composition. In the beginning two regiments from the principality
of Nassau and four regiments from the Swiss cantons reinforced the army,

6 Ibid., pp. 88-90, 97-105.
8 Suter, Inner-Schweizerisches Militärunternehmertum im 18. Jahrhundert; Bührer, Der Zürcher
echoing eighteenth-century recruiting practices. However, the first two returned to their homeland in 1815 and 1820 respectively, and the Swiss regiments were disbanded in 1829 since they no longer fitted in with the new army with its militia-like nature. Had these foreign regiments been at full strength in 1815, which incidentally they were not, some 25 per cent of the rank and file of the infantry, the mainstay of the army, would have consisted of foreign volunteers.10 What this figure does indicate is that the king during the first years of his reign was ready to accept a considerable foreign element in his army and that this element was rapidly diminishing. By 1820 the remaining foreign regiments were already of marginal importance. As the army had lost its Swiss regiments in 1829, its foreign element was reduced from then on to practically nil.

The transition from the eighteenth-century all-volunteer force to the early nineteenth-century cadre-militia army also entailed a change in the foundations of the military power of the state. Until 1795 the military power of the United Provinces, like most other states of the ancien régime, in the end depended upon the fiscal efficiency and the credit-worthiness of the state, military manpower being for sale on the national as well as international labour market and war being too expensive to be exclusively financed out of the annual revenues of the state. This is why the rich and, according to contemporary standards, financially and fiscally well-organized republic, in spite of its very limited population, could afford the army (and navy) it needed to play a key role in all anti-French coalitions from the War of Devolution (1667-1668) up to the War of the Austrian Succession. And this is why the republic could no longer play this role after this last war had exhausted it beyond repair. From 1814 onwards the military power of William I’s kingdom was a function of both national demography and the weight of the conscription burden the national population was willing to bear. The introduction of conscription in large parts of Germany and the subsequent introduction of restrictions on recruitment by foreign powers brought Dutch recruitment in Germany to a halt after 1814. The two regiments from Nassau in fact marked the end of seigneurial recruitment.11 Given the limitations of the national labour market the army increasingly had to rely on conscription to fill its complement, thus limiting the military

power of the Dutch kingdom to the rather modest demographic resources of the Netherlands. Only the union of the Northern and Southern Netherlands (1815-1830) masked this otherwise inescapable conclusion for the time being.

Two further consequences of the introduction of conscription were that one of the plagues of the Staatse Leger – namely the ineradicable gap between the strength of the regiments on paper and the actual strength after 1820 – under normal conditions ceased to exist, the other consequence being that in times of crisis the army could be brought onto its war footing by simply calling to arms the reservists and integrating them in the companies of the existing peacetime regiments. Conscription freed the wartime army as well as the peacetime army from the volatility of supply and demand on the labour market, the conscript serving for the fixed and low pay he simply had to accept by force of law.

Another important change was that the Royal Army was primarily a military instrument of the state, intended to provide for internal and external security. During the reign of the last Stadtholder Prince William V (1766-1795) the officers’ commissions had increasingly been granted to members of the aristocratic governing families who supported the House of Orange.\(^\text{12}\) Because of the Stadtholder’s intention to buttress his clientele, in many cases political loyalty and reliability of the officer corps prevailed over professional attitude, knowledge, and expertise. By doing this the last Stadtholder had transformed the officer corps into an instrument for the maintenance of internal political stability. It is true that King William I in many instances treated the army as his personal, dynastic instrument of power, managing the army by royal decree rather than legislation as much as possible, but conditions had changed since 1795. The kingdom was a constitutional monarchy governed by the rule of law. Article 59 of the Constitution of 1815 invested the king with supreme authority over the armies and navies of the state, but not with their supreme command. The army and navy now belonged to an abstract entity separated from the person of the sovereign and his court, namely the government and the state, embodied in the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. Here management and control were centralized on the national level and lay in the hands of professional civil servants: the administrative legacy of the Kingdom of Holland and the years of the annexation to the empire. It was only natural that the civil service, now that it had come into existence,

\(^\text{12}\) Gabriëls, "Tussen Groot-Brittannië en Frankrijk", p. 153. For the United Provinces as a clientele state in the closing decades of the eighteenth century, see Gabriëls, *De heren als dienaren en de dienaar als heer.*
would try to develop policies of its own designed to serve the interests of
the state; such policies might even run counter to the interests of the king.¹³

A further contrast between the army of the United Provinces and that of
the kingdom of William I, and related to the previous one, was the changing
political control over the army. The Constitution invested the king with
supreme authority over the armed forces and, as far as the king himself
was concerned, he considered the armed forces as belonging to his royal
prerogative. But since the Constitution introduced the separation of powers,
the king shared power with the States-General, even with respect to the
army. The States-General had the right to vote the state’s budget and the leg-
islation that controlled the weight of the conscription burden. Although in
both matters the initiative was with the king, the States-General possessed
a certain countervailing power. The Liberals in the parliament quickly
learned to use this right to lay the royal military prerogative under siege.

The creation of the modern state also had sweeping consequences for the
rank and file. The army of the United Provinces had been a typical product
of the ancien régime. The companies, squadrons, and regiments were owned
by the captains and colonels who commanded them. They exploited their
units as pieces of private property on the basis of the commission that had
been granted to them by their paymaster, the States-General. The rank and
file swore an oath of allegiance to the States-General, but otherwise had no
direct relationship whatsoever with the sovereign they served. They were
recruited, enlisted, equipped, armed, and paid by their captain and had to
deal only with him. This system was abolished in 1795. Private ownership of
the companies and regiments ceased to exist. The task of recruitment now
devolved upon the state. Henceforth the soldiers and non-commissioned
officers (NCOs) were all directly enlisted by the state as represented by the
regiment and subsequently distributed over the companies. The activities
this entailed were carried out by a captain appointed specially for the
purpose. All the expenditure this involved was financed out of the corps’
recruitment fund, which was itself financed centrally by the Ministry of
Finance. A similar arrangement was introduced for the clothing, equipment,
and armament of the NCOs and soldiers.¹⁴ Now, this new system was here to
stay. It survived all political changes of the 1795-1813 period and was adopted
by the Royal Army in 1814 without major modifications.

All these changes in the military domain reflect the modernization of
state and society that is so characteristic of the transition from the ancien

¹³ Amersfoort, “De strijd om het leger (1813-1840)”.
régime of the closing decades of the eighteenth century to the centralized bureaucratic national state and modern society of the nineteenth century, not only in Holland but in large parts of the Atlantic world as well. In the Netherlands the foundations of the nineteenth-century cadre-militia army were laid in the years 1795-1813.

The army of the Batavian Republic and the Kingdom of Holland

The army of the Batavian Republic was an all-volunteer force, like the army of the old republic. This may come as a surprise since the founding fathers of the new state were democrats and since they were the direct heirs of the Patriot movement. This political opposition movement had its origins in the third estate, the burghers, and had fought a short civil war (1786-1787) to overthrow the régime of the Stadtholder and the aristocracy that supported him. Before the outbreak of hostilities they had organized themselves into Free Corps and ‘exercise societies’ of citizen volunteers and had effectively taken control in a number of towns in Holland, Utrecht, and elsewhere. The Stadtholder had hesitated to throw his army against them, and in the end it was the intervention of the Prussian king that subdued the uprising, the Patriot armed citizens being no match for the Prussian professional regiments. The most radical Patriots and their families (totalling some 40,000) thereupon fled the country and found refuge in France and the Southern Netherlands. They returned to their fatherland in the victorious French army that conquered the United Provinces in 1795. These radicals gained power after two coups d’état in 1798. So why did they not rebuild the Batavian army out of a mixture of professionals from the old army, volunteering soldats-citoyens, and a National Guard like the revolutionary French Republic had done? In fact they tried, but failed.

Already in 1795 the political leadership of the Batavian Republic had started to reorganize the army and had discharged all Orangist partisans in the army to assure its political reliability. The new army was to be an all-volunteer force with a strength of 35,000 men. However, this strength was soon reduced as it entailed too heavy a financial burden. The Batavian Republic was also charged with all expenses for the 25,000-strong French Auxiliary Corps that was garrisoned in the Netherlands. Since it was evident

15 Schama, Patriots and Liberators, pp. 64-106; Roegiers and Van Sas, “Revolutie in Noord en Zuid”; van der Capellen, Aan het volk van Nederland, pp. 10-13.
16 Schama, Patriots and Liberators, pp. 107-132.
that even the combined Batavian Army and French Auxiliary Corps were
not strong enough to defend the borders and man the garrisons in case of a
two-front war against Prussia and Britain, the Batavian political leadership
planned to reinforce the army with a National Guard of volunteer citizens.
However, enthusiasm among the population and local elites proved to be
low. In 1786-1787 citizens had been willing to join the Free Corps and
local militias to defend their political ideals in an internecine struggle for
political power. After 1795 they were not prepared to serve in a National
Guard that was to be organized into regiments and trained for warfare
against the professional armies of foreign powers. So the initiative for a
National Guard came to naught. Reinforcing the professional army with
units of armed citizens would have required a full-blown conscription
bill that made armed service compulsory, after the example of the French
Loi Jourdan-Delbrel of 1798, but this the Batavian leadership apparently
considered a bridge too far at the time.

After the demise of the Batavian Republic in 1806 and the foundation of
the Kingdom of Holland under Bonaparte’s younger brother, Louis Napol-
eleon, the potential introduction of some form of armed service reappeared
on the scene. Bonaparte brought heavy pressure to bear upon his brother
to follow the French example and promulgate a Conscription Act in order
to raise the numbers he needed for the never diminishing war effort of the
empire, but Louis Napoleon wanted to avoid this at all cost. He clung to the
existing all-volunteer force and hoped to satisfy the emperor by revitalizing
the National Guard.17 All towns of more than 2,500 inhabitants were told
to establish a local militia, organized into companies and battalions, in
which all men in the range of eighteen to fifty years old would have to be
enrolled. One-fifth of them performed active service, the remainder forming
a reserve. Their task was to protect against unrest and to perform local guard
duties, operational command lying in the hands of the local authorities. But
from the very start they were also expected to fulfil full-time garrison duties
in the event that the regiments left for the mobile field army. In 1809, after
the outbreak of the War of the Fifth Coalition, service for the National Guard
was extended to all inhabitants irrespective of their residence, and the king
proclaimed himself general and supreme commander of the National Guard.
Furthermore, he intended to transform the National Guard into a military
force by organizing it into regiments. However, when this plan provoked
serious disturbances among the population he drew back, with the result
that the position of the National Guard remained rather ambiguous. On

17 Joor, De Adelaar en het Lam, pp. 283-298.
the one hand, they were part-time local militias, tasked with local policing duties under local operational command. On the other hand, they were supervised by the Department of Home Affairs, stood under the nominal command of the king, and could be tasked with full-time military duties, even outside their home towns.

However, all this was not enough to save the Kingdom of Holland as an independent ally of the empire. Bonaparte wanted more troops than Louis Napoleon was able to muster. In July 1810 Louis Napoleon abdicated in favour of his son and Holland was annexed to the French Empire. The army was immediately reorganized and fully integrated in the French force structure.\textsuperscript{18} French conscription, the \textit{Loi Jourdan-Delbrel}, was introduced to fill the complement of the Dutch regiments in French service, and the enlistment of volunteers came to a halt. The French National Guard was introduced in the Dutch departments which meant that time and again units of the National Guard were transferred to the army and incorporated in the \textit{Grande Armée}. Over the years 1811-1813 some 35,000 Dutch conscripts and National Guardsmen served in the French army. Many of them died or simply vanished somewhere on the road from their hometown to Moscow and back.

This sad conclusion also marks a turning point in the system of Dutch army formation. In the 1786-1787 civil war the Patriot movement had demonstrated that corps of citizens volunteering for armed service embodied a viable alternative for professional forces, provided that their political motivation was strong enough. For them soldiering and political participation as citizens were just two sides of the same coin. At the same time it must be admitted that the sorry fate of this bottom-up army against the seasoned Prussian regiments also proved that armed citizens could supersede the professional army only if they were organized, led, armed, and trained as professional soldiers. This, of course, was a sensitive matter and encountered resistance. Only the state possessed the financial and organizational means to ensure that armed citizens would be a match for professional soldiers. Inevitably, this entailed that the citizen's right to bear arms in this bottom-up army remained firmly rooted in the local community and in which the citizen served under the command of officers elected among the local elite,

The Dutch Army in Transition

was transformed into a duty laid from the top down upon him by the state, especially so since the citizen's political rights evaporated as time wore on. In contrast to the democratic constitutional nature of the Batavian Republic, the Kingdom of Holland, not to mention the French Empire, was an authoritarian non-democratic monarchical regime. This explains why the attempts of the Batavian leadership, as well as those of Louis Napoleon, to transfer the National Guard from the local level to the central state and to the army provoked serious unrest and disturbances among the population. In France, similar doubts had been swept away by the need to protect the republic and the revolution when they faced the intervention of reactionary foreign powers, as was testified by the famous levée en masse of 1793. In the following years the strength of the French army dropped as revolutionary fervour faded away. It needed the conscription act of 1798 to pave the way for the mass armies Napoleon needed to realize his political ambitions. In Holland it needed the annexation to the French Empire to break the stalemate. In both countries revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare were the driving forces behind the disappearance of the professional army of the ancien régime and the birth of cadre-militia army of conscripts.

These developments were part and parcel of the more comprehensive process of the modernization of state and society. At the heart of this process was the break-up of the self-contained local community, by making the common man and woman part of a greater entity, namely the state and its ideological counterpart, the nation. In the Netherlands the Batavian Revolution of 1795 abolished the estates as intermediate powers between the individual and the state as well as the right to govern as the attribute or even personal property of a restricted circle of aristocratic families. The 1795-1813 period saw the transfer of political power to an abstract impersonal entity, the centralized bureaucratic national state. This transformed the subjects of the ancien régime into the citizens-in-the-making of the nineteenth century. At least legally and in theory, every single man and woman now had an individual direct relationship to the state. It is a well-established fact that the introduction of conscription played a major role in the construction of the nineteenth-century nation and nation-state. Conscription tore young men away from their families and local community. It brought them in contact with brothers-in-arms from other parts of the country, subjected them to the formal and informal rules of the military world, and tied up their personal fates with the interests of the king and the state. It goes without saying that this was not brought about overnight. Moreover, it must be admitted that such conclusions are partly products of hindsight: the historian's reconstruction of events endows them with a meaning for the
future that was not always understood or even desired by contemporaries at the time. So let us return to these events and explore the driving forces behind the Dutch cadre-militia army and conscription that emerged from the seven eventful years between 1813 and 1820. It is a historical paradox that the hated French conscription in fact laid the foundations for this army.

Bouchenröder’s army

When in November 1813 the French administration and the French army left the Netherlands in great haste, a triumvirate took power as a provisional government. At that time there was no such thing as a Dutch army. Dutch conscripts raised for Napoleon were scattered all over western Europe, incorporated in the retreating French armies. Meanwhile the rebuilding of an army was a matter of urgency. Although most of the French garrison troops had retreated to France to avoid being cut off, a number of them had stayed behind and continued to occupy several garrison towns across the country, constituting a threat to Dutch independence. At the same time there was the danger that – should the tide of war turn – French troops left behind in Germany would invade the Netherlands to occupy the coast against Britain. Finally, the war against Napoleon had not yet been decided. A Dutch contribution to the allied war effort would certainly improve the bargaining position of the new state vis-à-vis the allies after the defeat of the French emperor.

The triumvirate, as far as the military was concerned, now did two things. In the first place it began stimulating the creation of local militias comprising volunteers and commanded by local “men with military experience”, that is to say, officers from the former Dutch army or from the town militias.19 These volunteer forces were to defend their town if the French returned. In the second place the triumvirate appointed as colonel Frederick Baron von Bouchenröder to organize these local volunteer forces into a national army, fit to lay siege to the towns still in French hands and ready to take part in the continuing war against Napoleon. Bouchenröder was a German officer from Mannheim who had served in the army of the

19 Staatsblad van het koninkrijk der Nederlanden (The Hague: Van Stockum, 1813-present), vol. 1813-1814 [henceforth, Staatsblad with year], no. 1.
United Provinces and who was a close friend of one of the members of the triumvirate, G.K. van Hogendorp.20

The army Bouchenröder came up with had a complement of 25,560 men and 6,462 horses.21 It consisted of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The local militias were to be organized and trained for war by bringing them together in companies, battalions, and regiments of this army. To quicken the pace of his plans he also proposed to engage existing military units in a number of small states in Germany on a temporary basis, as had been common practice in the second half of the eighteenth century: the system of seigneurial recruitment. Although the national element of Bouchenröder’s army was a volunteer force it implied no return to the army of the eighteenth century. In peacetime this army would exist only on paper since the volunteer citizens would remain in their hometowns as a sedentary force at the disposal of and under the authority of the local government. Only in times of crisis or imminent war would they march and be incorporated into the regiments of the national army, commanded by the head of state as supreme commander and his General Staff. And only then would they be trained as soldiers fit for real warfare. This meant that, quite intentionally, in peacetime the volunteers serving in this army would have to deal only with their local masters, the well-respected aristocratic families who had governed the city within living memory. Their hometown, where they would also do their initial training, would be the garrison base. In fact Bouchenröder’s plan aimed at the transformation of the former town militias into a national volunteer force, while retaining the upper hand for the local elites in the debates with the sovereign that would inevitably unfold in times of crisis. As a matter of fact this corresponded beautifully with the state Van Hogendorp had in mind at that time: one in which the traditional estates would have sufficient countervailing power against the king and the centralization of the administration.

Bouchenröder’s project was short-lived, however. On 30 November 1813 Prince William Frederick, the eldest son of the last Stadtholder, returned to the Netherlands and assumed power as sovereign prince. It goes without saying that he was not pleased with this rather complex project when it was presented to him on 7 December 1813. In his eyes Bouchenröder’s army was certainly too weak to wage war against the French. But, above all, to have

20 NA Stamboek officieren van de Landmacht 1813-1924, 204-124; de Bas, Prins Frederik, III-1, p. 198.
21 His plan is to be found in NA Archives of the Generale Staf van de Koninklijke Landmacht 1813-1918 (1939) 543 and NA ASS 6591.
no proper army at his disposal in peacetime and to be dependent on the collaboration of the local communities for the creation of one in times of crisis, simply was beyond anything he was ready to consider. He dismissed Bouchenröder, disbanded his administrative office, sent him on a mission into Germany, and finally granted him a pension. The shelving of Bouchenröder’s army closed an era since it was the last time that the army of the state was conceived of as a bottom-up force. It intended to recruit volunteer citizens for the state’s army without resorting to top-down conscription. As such, his project was to be the last in the tradition of the Patriot Free Corps and exercise societies as well as the Dutch- or French-style National Guard. From now on, organizing, forming, training, and commanding the army were the business of the state, even if this involved calling up citizens for the army.

The only place where armed service in local units lived on was outside the army: the so-called Schutterijen. These local militias were reintroduced as a police force at the disposal of the local authorities and were supervised not by the Department of War, but by Home Affairs. Sure enough, the Schutterij Act contained provisions that permitted the Schutterijen to serve as a citizen force of last resort alongside the army in times of crisis, but after the War of the Belgian Secession (1830-1839) military experts considered this an increasingly unsatisfactory arrangement.22

The army William Frederick wanted for himself was an eighteenth-century-style all-volunteer professional, standing army. This was to be a royal army, with officers commissioned by him and soldiers committed to him. It would be a symbol of his dignity, shore up his throne and his dynasty, represent the central state on the local level in the garrison towns, and be an instrument of his foreign policy. It was to be ready to wage war within as well as beyond the borders. Once enlisted, the soldiers would in fact quit civil society and their local community. They would enter a separate sphere, that of the state and national interest as embodied by the king. On the other hand,

22 Schutterij Act of 27 December 1815, Staatsblad 1815, no. 20, and Recueil Militair, bevattende de wetten, besluiten en ordres, betreffende de koninklijke Nederlandse landmacht 1813-1914 (The Hague: Van Cleef, 1815-1914), vol. 1815 [henceforth, Recueil with year], I, pp. 382-431; Schutterij Act of 11 April 1827, Staatsblad 1827, no. 17; Sickesz, Schutterijen in Nederland, pp. 215-216; van Dam van Isselt, De ontwikkeling van ons krijgswezen sedert 1813, p. 10; Schoenmaker, Burgerzin en soldatengeest, pp. 396-397. The ideal of an army completely made up of amateur soldiers, trained in their free time outside the barracks and meant to be “polder-guerrillas”, re-emerged at the turn of the century, stimulated by among other things the Swiss example and the Anglo-Boer War. This people’s army (Volksleger) concept was supported by left-liberals and social democrats. It was heavily opposed by the military establishment and never developed into a serious threat to the cadre-militia army concept. See Klinkert, Het vaderland verdedigd, pp. 209-216; Amersfoort, “Lodewijk Thomson, militair waarnemer”, Dienstplicht, draagvlak en democratie.
William Frederick very well understood that an all-volunteer force would be slow to come into being. Given the limits of the population – some 2.2 million at the time – and foreign recruitment sources drying up, conscription would inevitably have a part to play as well. But this implied that at some time a conscription bill would have to be passed by the parliament, giving it ample opportunity to meddle in a domain William Frederick considered his prerogative. This explains why from 1813 onwards army recruitment was pursued along two parallel lines, namely voluntary enrolment and conscription. They raised the complement for two different, even separate parts of the army, the so-called Standing Army and the national militia, each of which had its own function in the country’s defence.

William Frederick’s army

In early 1814, the formation of a volunteer mobile army was William Frederick’s priority. Alongside the on-going war against France and the participation in the allied war effort, William Frederick had another reason to make his army as strong as possible. Britain coveted a ‘special relationship’ with William Frederick and his kingdom. In Britain’s strategy the Netherlands were an advance post for the deployment of the British army on the continent in case of future French expansionism. This was a rehabilitation of the role the United Provinces had played in the coalition wars against France up to 1748. Before and after the battle of Waterloo, Wellington urged William Frederick to be relentless in his efforts to build up an army strong enough to withstand an initial French invasion. This army was to buy time for the British expeditionary force to join the war. As from September 1815 Britain supervised and co-financed the construction of a series of fortified towns in the Southern Netherlands (the ‘Southern Frontier’) which represented the re-establishment of the old barrière that had been demolished by the French in the course of the War of the Austrian Succession. For his part William Frederick was eager to play the role assigned to him by London. For some time he even aimed at the union of the Netherlands and his Nassau possessions in Germany, by including the Rhineland in his kingdom. This would

23 Van Sas, Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot.
24 See, for example, Wellington to Castlereagh, 29 April 1816, in Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken der algemene geschiedenis van Nederland, VIII-1, p. 31; William Fredrick to Clancarty, 4 April 1814, ibid., VII, p. 756.
have made his state a power of the middle rank and would have restored the pre-1748 position of the United Provinces in the European balance of power.

Now all this pointed in the same direction: the creation of a strong, all-volunteer field army. To enable it to operate independently, all arms were included in this force, which came to be called the Standing Army. The first organization (January 1814) provided for six rifle battalions, sixteen line battalions of infantry, four regiments of cavalry, four foot battalions of artillery, one corps of horse artillery, one battalion of pontonneers, miners and sappers, and one support (train) battalion. It had a total strength of 30,241 men, of whom 21,884 were in the infantry.\(^{26}\) When after Waterloo and the Treaty of Paris the threat of war receded, the Standing Army was given a more general task. It was conceived of as the operationally ready unit of the army, permanently under arms, out of which a mobile army could instantly be drawn and despatched to the borders to ward off attacks. Moreover, the king (on 16 March 1815 William Frederick proclaimed himself king of the United Northern and Southern Netherlands) could at any time send a corps of the Standing Army to the colonies – a necessary provision since there was no separate colonial army until the early 1830s. Hence the Standing Army carried on the eighteenth-century tradition of recruitment and organization: enlistment of volunteers, the possibility of conducting operations beyond the country’s borders and in the colonies, and a comprehensive organization with the inclusion of all arms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Salary per annum in Dutch guilders (DFL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-colonel</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First lieutenant</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second lieutenant</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The officers in the Standing Army were appointed and promoted by the sovereign and engaged for an indefinite period of time.\(^{27}\) Moreover, their


\(^{27}\) Hardenberg, *Overzigt der voornaamste bepalingen*, II, pp. 7-27, 53-60, 63-73, 76-83, 100-104.
engagement ended by royal decree as well, whether at the officer’s request or not. The pensions officers enjoyed after their resignation were granted to them as a royal favour and came at the charge of the treasury, no contributions being due by the officers concerned during their engagement. Officers enjoyed a salary calculated as an annual sum which was paid to them in twelve equal terms. Infantry salaries are shown in Table 15.1, all expenses for lodging, clothing, food, and personal armament being at their own charge. NCOs and soldiers were engaged and if they wished, re-engaged on two-, four-, or six-year contracts, the first contract always starting in the rank of soldier. The minimum age of the recruit was eighteen years (or seventeen with parental consent) with the maximum being forty. Preferably they were unmarried. Minimum height was 1.596 metres. For a two-year contract the soldier received a bounty of DFL 10, which was considerably lower than the bounties paid before 1795 when sums ranging from forty to sixty guilders had been normal. Soldiers and NCOs were paid a sum calculated on a daily basis, depending on the position they were in (in the barracks, on leave, in hospital, in detention, etc.). Apart from that, they received a pound of bread every three days. Lodging, clothing, armaments, and equipment were at the charge of the regiment. Soldiers and NCOs ate their meals together in their chambrées, the room they lived and slept in. Meals (a stew of vegetables, beans, rice or potatoes, and meat, fish or bacon) were at their own expenses. To this end the pay of all soldiers in a company was put into a common fund and used to purchase ingredients for the meals, the so-called ménage system. Every five days any remaining cash was distributed among the soldiers according to their rank as their pocket-money. To protect the rank and file against rising food prices, the regiment guaranteed minimum pocket-money of DFL 0.25 every five days, which left the soldier DFL 18.25 on a yearly basis. When in the barracks the NCOs’ and soldiers’ pay were as shown in Table 15.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Pay per annum in Dutch guilders (DFL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant-major</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>237.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>127.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>91.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 The lodging of the garrison was provided for by the local town authorities. Since the Netherlands had few purpose-built barracks, old schools, factories, and so on were used.
At virtually the same time as the inception of the new standing army, regulations were introduced to raise troops by means of conscription. These were to be the militia units of the army. To avoid association with conscription during the Napoleonic period, the militia, although an integral part of the army, was initially quite separate from the mobile operational part. To begin with, until 1817 the militia consisted almost exclusively of infantry. In January 1814 the infantry of the militia had a complement of 21,920 men, of whom 18,840 were organized in twenty infantry-battalions and 3,080 men organized in four battalions of supporting artillery. The earliest regulation, the *Reglement van Algemene Volkswapening* (20 December 1813), conceived of the militia (the so-called *Landmilitie*) as a force recruited out of the so-called *Landstorm*, a home guard, which can best be compared with the town militias (*Schutterijen*) that had existed before 1795. The *Reglement* assumed that the *Landmilitie* would be made up mainly of volunteers, i.e. *Landstorm*-men who offered to do their period of service on a voluntary basis. Only if the numbers of volunteers fell short of that required would civil registration be used to select by lot the additional men needed. Needless to say, the reality was the other way around, with hardly any *Landstorm*-men willing to serve voluntarily (some of them were even pressed or paid by local government wanting to get rid of their undesirable subjects and avoid conscription for others) and the great majority of them being forcibly recruited.

The fact that the *Landmilitie* was recruited from the *Landstorm* may at first sight be interpreted as a continuation of the line of thought behind Bouchenröder’s force. But in contrast to Bouchenröder’s project the local origins of the *Landmilitie* had no practical implications, as this provision in the December 1813 *Reglement* was a meaningless phrase to sugar the pill of the first form of Dutch conscription. Bouchenröder’s force would have been firmly rooted in the local town community. Only in times of crisis it would have been organized as a national army under the command of the sovereign. Certainly, the word *Land* in the name of the *Landmilitie* referred to the local community and its task was territorial defence, i.e., the protection and defence of their own areas. But, in contrast to Bouchenröder’s force, from the very start the *Landmilitie* was perceived by the sovereign

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29 Sovereign Decree of 21 January 1814; Van Dam van Isselt, *De ontwikkeling van ons krijgswezen sedert 1813*, pp. 2–3.
30 “Proclamatie tot aanmoediging der vrijwillige wapening”, 6 December 1813; Van Dam van Isselt, *De ontwikkeling van ons krijgswezen sedert 1813*, pp. 2–3; Hardenberg, *Overzigt der voornaamste bepalingen*, II, pp. 20–21, 25; for the *Reglement van Algemene Volkswapening* (20 December 1813), see *Staatsblad 1813-1814*, no. 14.
as force at his disposal, separate from but parallel to the army: a means to free the Standing Army from garrison duties and territorial defence, now that a mobile army had to be formed. As such it was a force somewhere halfway between Bouchenröder’s project and conscription. In hindsight it was in many respects a temporary arrangement and a typical product of the turbulent last months of the war against Napoleon.

The *Reglement* had been promulgated by the sovereign prince without the consent of the States-General. In fact it was no more than a one-time requisition to meet the urgent manpower demands of the moment. It contained no provisions for the future. These defects were remedied by the Conscription Act of 27 February 1815. Like the *Reglement*, the act conceived of the militia, now renamed the National Militia, as an independent organization, separate from the Standing Army. The act went even further by separating the national militia from the *Landstorm* as well. The concept that military service for the state was rooted in some local force was now a thing of the past. As from 1815 the militia rested upon conscription, comparable to the French system of the *Loi Jourdan-Delbrel* of 1798.

It was now also possible for the militia to take part in the operational tasks of the Standing Army. In this instance, the militia was called to arms and made mobile, that is to say, divorced from its local ties and dispatched to the Standing Army. The Dutch troops at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo in June 1815 consisted partly of line battalions, from both the Northern and Southern Netherlands, and partly of militia battalions from the Northern Netherlands. Actions beyond the country’s borders, however, could be ordered only with the consent of the parliament; hence, special legislation had to be introduced to enable the militia to take part in the campaign of 1815. Militia conscripts could only be asked to serve on a voluntary basis with the navy, and under no circumstance were militia units to be sent to the colonies.

Contrary to the requisition-based *Landmilitie*, the National Militia now rested upon true conscription, every new yearly cohort being registered by the local authorities. There was to be a maximum annual intake of 1 percent of the population, making 22,000 men available for the militia. After five yearly levies, the militia would thus reach a wartime total strength of 110,000 men in the age range of eighteen to twenty-two years old. For recruiting purposes, the kingdom was divided into ten militia districts of 100,000 inhabitants, each district consisting of ten militia cantons. All twenty-four battalions of the militia were attached to a district from

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31 *Staatsblad 1815*, no. 19. See also *Recueil 1815*, I, pp. 382-431.
which they drew their recruits. In March all eighteen-year-old men had to present themselves before the Militia Council of their district for physical examination and had to take part in the *loting*, the drawing of numbers. The lowest numbers (the “bad numbers”, as the conscripts used to say) were then enlisted to fill the contingent of the district and sent to their regiment no later than 1 April. Wage-earners and theological students were exempted from conscription. Conscription was further mitigated by allowing substitution and the exchange of numbers in the draw. This was subject to two conditions: the substitute must have lived in the same province as the conscript for fifteen months preceding the first day of service and, secondly, it would only be possible to exchange numbers with someone in the same intake and from the same municipality. The considerable sums (100 Dutch guilders, the equivalent of a year’s pay for a private, being typical) needed to find someone willing to serve as a substitute or after an exchange of numbers meant that this mitigation extended only to the well-to-do and well-educated sections of society. Within a couple of years of the introduction of conscription, insurance and broker companies appeared on the marketplace to match those offering to serve as substitutes and those wanting to avoid serving in person. Over the nineteenth century some 15-20 per cent of the militia normally consisted of substitutes.32

After initial training in the depot of the regiment, from 1 April onwards the fresh conscripts were joined by reservists of previous years in May and trained with them as well as with battalions of the Standing Army during the “summer exercises” until 15 June. After the summer exercises one-quarter of the total militia (125 per cent of the yearly intake) returned to barracks to perform garrison duties during the winter and to provide for the trained nucleus of the battalions when the new conscripts arrived in April the following year. All others were sent home to enjoy their leave. The so-called remaining part of the militia was composed of different kinds of conscripts. In the first place those who had tried to evade conscription by not appearing before the Militia Council were tracked down and sent to their regiment to serve for the full five years. *Ipso facto*, they were allotted to the remaining part. Secondly, every conscript had the right to volunteer for the remaining part as a way of earning a living. Thirdly, all substitutes were incorporated in the remaining part since they served the full five-year term of their conscription. The remaining part was then completed by having all other conscripts draw numbers, with the exception of those who had been in the remaining part in previous years.

32 Bevaart, *De Nederlandse Defensie*, p. 197.
Given the peculiarities of this system the time a conscript had to spend in the barracks could vary significantly. Those who proved to be physically unfit, those drawing a “good number” and those whose parents could afford a number-swapper or a substitute did not enter the barracks at all. Those serving in person spent two-and-a-half months in the barracks and the training facilities, while conscripts in the remaining part spent fourteen-and-a-half months in the army. Punished conscription-evaders, substitutes, and volunteers soldiered for the full five years. As from the summer exercises of 1820, the conscription burden was increased, since from then on the annual exercise was held in September and October, adding a four-month period to the terms mentioned above. All conscripts served under the same administrative regulations as the volunteers in the Standing Army and received the same daily pay. The officers and NCOs who commanded the militia battalions technically belonged to the Standing Army. Conscripts had the right to opt for promotion to the rank of NCO, provided they met the qualifications (mastering the basics of reading, writing, and basic mathematics) or, in case of illiteracy, were prepared to attend the courses in the company’s school.

Over the years following 1815 the importance of conscription and the National Militia increased. As regards the standing army, soon after its inauguration it proved to be impossible to reach the required numbers by voluntary recruitment. The number of men obtained from the French army, or returning from Prussian, Austrian, Russian, and British captivity, was insufficient to meet demands, even when the six rifle battalions and sixteen line battalions of infantry were reduced to four and twelve respectively in September 1814. In April 1814 the combined actual strength of the Standing Army (the two regiments from Nassau included) and the militia amounted to a meagre 28,232 men. And in spite of all efforts in February 1815 the situation was only slightly better. Now 34,094 men were in William Frederick’s pay.

For a while it was hoped that the recruitment of foreigners, for which considerable funds were available, would make up the full complement of men but, as has been shown, this proved an illusion. This naturally increased the reliance on conscription and explains among other things why the Militia Act of February 1815 had to supersede the Reglement. With the first volunteer contracts for the Standing Army expiring from 1817 onwards

33 Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 78-79.
34 Snapper, “Het negentiende eeuwse Nederlandse leger”.
35 Wüpperman, De vorming van het Nederlandsche leger na de omwenteling, pp. 4-6; NA ASS no. 6568, Exhibitum, 24 March 1815, no. 12.
the standing army gradually lost men to the militia, with former volunteers re-engaging as substitutes with the militia.\textsuperscript{36} The considerable desertion from the ranks of the standing army, which had the same background, further increased this effect. The repeated pardons for deserters are an indication that the problem was in fact insoluble.\textsuperscript{37} The king’s bounty of 10 guilders for service in the standing army was much less than that of the conscripts who wanted to avoid service.

Already towards the end of 1815 it appeared necessary to find a solution to the shortage of manpower in the army. The only way out seemed to be the expansion of the army’s militia element. A first step in that direction was the formation in October 1815 of seventeen new, larger units, the so-called Afdeelingen, which were later to be called Regiments.\textsuperscript{38} Each of these consisted of three battalions of National Militia and one line battalion of the Standing Army. The hope of the Department of War that the closer contact between volunteers and conscripts would tempt the latter to opt for voluntary service was soon dashed. The next step was an increase in the number of arms and branches in the organization of the militia. In 1817, cavalry and logistic support (train) corps were added to the militia’s infantry and artillery. Finally, in 1819, a reorganization was started which, in effect, amounted to the complete merging of the Standing Army and the National Militia, the so-called amalgame.\textsuperscript{39} Within each Afdeeling the battalion of the standing army was spread over the three militia battalions. As a result, each company from then on consisted of 25 per cent regular personnel and 75 per cent conscripts. This reorganization, beginning in the infantry with the other arms and branches following suit, was completed in 1828. In the same period, all foreign regiments were removed from the army’s organization. The consequences for the strength of the army and the numbers present in the barracks in autumn 1819 are shown in Table 15.3.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{36} Keyzer to d’Aubremé, 28 May 1818, no. 10, Archives of the Ministerie van Oorlog [henceforth, MvO] Geheim Archief [henceforth, GA] 11.
\textsuperscript{37} Mollerus to Soeverein Vorst, 15 June 1814, in Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken der algemene geschiedenis van Nederland, VII, pp. 598-599; Sovereign Decree of 25 June 1814, no. 59A, in Staatsblad 1814, no. 71; Mollerus to all corps of the army, 30 June 1814, no. 13, in Recueil 1813-1814, I, pp. 353-354; Janssens to all corps of the army, 4 August 1814, no. 105, ibid., II, pp. 461-465; Janssens to all corps of the army, 11 August 1814, no. 14, ibid., II, pp. 468-469; Mollerus to all corps of the Landmilitie, 20 December 1814, no. 1, ibid., II, pp. 678-680.
\textsuperscript{38} Royal Decree, 8 October 1815, in Recueil 1815, II, pp. 93-98.
\textsuperscript{39} Law of 28 November 1818, in Noordziek, Handelingen van de Staten Generaal gedurende de vergaderingen van 1814-heden, 1818-1819, pp. 6-8, 29-47, and Annexes, pp. 18-23; Recueil 1818, II, pp. 121-141; Staatsblad 1818, no. 41.
\textsuperscript{40} Hardenberg, Overzigt der voornaamste bepalingen, II, pp. 139-140.
Table 15.3 Strength of the army in 1819

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1819</th>
<th>Total strength</th>
<th>Reservists on leave</th>
<th>Present in the barracks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>112,818</td>
<td>62,894</td>
<td>49,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion in %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hardenberg, *Overzigt der voornaamste bepalingen*, II, pp. 139-140

The importance of these rapid developments can hardly be exaggerated. Originally, in 1813, William Frederick had intended to rely on the partly foreign, partly Dutch regular personnel of the Standing Army to make up the operational field army. The militia would see to territorial defence and security at the local level. Moreover, it was expected that voluntary enlistment would provide a portion of the manpower for the militia. The hated conscription could thus be restricted as much as possible. Within a few years, however, conscription had become the foundation on which army manpower rested, and it was clear that the bulk of the mobile army, in the eventuality of war, would have to consist of conscripts, while the officers and NCOs would be made up of regular personnel from the Standing Army. So after a rapid succession of events the Dutch population accepted, albeit grudgingly, the transformation of armed service on a voluntary basis in the local community into full-blown conscription for the army of the state. The road for this remarkable development had been paved by foreign rulers, King Louis Napoleon and the French emperor. After 1813 the Dutch population put up with the national conscription system as it had done before with French conscription: it was a very unpleasant, even hated interruption of normal civilian life but this sentiment would never disrupt the smooth working of the system. In the end each year in March the new conscripts responded to the call-up to appear before the Militia Council and underwent the administrative logic of the Conscription Act. Certainly, some conscripts tried to evade military service, by not appearing before the Militia Council, or by deceit, self-mutilation, or desertion; some escaped conscription thanks to administrative errors. But it is important to note that these acts of resistance and their underlying sentiments remained strictly individual and personal. They never reached levels of organized, let alone political or violent, resistance. Middle-class and upper-class conscripts would certainly

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41 Even French conscription had been accepted by the Dutch as a detested but unavoidable fact of life: Joor, *De adelaar en het Lam*, pp. 451-454; Welten, *In dienst voor Napoleons Europese droom*. 
have been able to articulate their objections in the political arena, but they had other means of staying out of the barracks: number-swapping and substitution.

However, this is not to say that the introduction of conscription was without political consequences. On the contrary, already in 1813 the abrupt dismissal of Bouchenröder and his proposed army by William Frederick and his decision to opt for a royal all-volunteer force raised an important political-military question: to whom would the army belong? If the army was segmented into local militias, only to be brought together under royal command in times of crisis and after the consent of the local elites, for all practical purposes it belonged to the local aristocracies. They and nobody else would have a firm grip on the local military labour market. In this case, in peacetime, the central state and the king would have no direct access to the manpower hidden in the population from which to raise an army. If, however, the army belonged to the state and the king, it would be a true national army. In this case, the state would be given direct access to individual citizens, be it via voluntary enlistment on the military labour market or by force of law, the Conscription Act. As William Frederick did not hesitate to choose the latter option, this implied that, as far as the military was concerned, the local community was in fact broken up in favour of the state. Conscription – being technically speaking a tax-levy in kind, irrespective of the sweet words spoken of citizenship and voluntary conscription – was only added to the list of already existing taxes from the central government. This, of course, required the co-operation of the same local elites, since they dominated the States-General that had to pass the Conscription Bill. But here they were ready to grant their consent, given the provisions, among others, for substitution and number-swapping which favoured them more than anybody else.

So, at the heart of question was the fact that, in the end, the modern state and its conscripted army on the one hand and the local community on the other, were mutually exclusive. This was visible not merely in the National Militia and the growing importance of conscription. The same problem presented itself in the other part of the army, the Standing Army. Here the problem focused upon the four Swiss regiments that were part of the army organization from 1814 to 1829. It took some time for the problem to surface but, when it did appear, it soon proved insoluble. The Dutch state simply did not have the means to break up the local communities in the Swiss cantons the way it had done at home. After fifteen troublesome years, the same regiments that had been essential to the army when they arrived on
Dutch soil in 1814 and following years had to be dismissed. Their fate thus confirms the conclusions arrived at above.

The Swiss regiments 1814-1829

In December 1813 William Frederick was informed by envoys he had sent to Allied headquarters in Frankfurt that the Swiss cantons were willing to resume raising regiments for service in the Netherlands, as they had done in the eighteenth century. This prompted him to send Elie van der Hoeven, an offspring of an aristocratic family from Rotterdam, on a mission to the Swiss cantons, giving him orders to conclude contracts (capitulations) with the governments of, if possible, all Swiss cantons for no fewer than 12,000 troops and no later than May 1814. Although the conditions in Switzerland were by no means as favourable as The Hague had been led to believe and Van der Hoeven had to go through much hard bargaining over the years 1814-1816, he managed to conclude capitulations with a sufficient number of cantons to enlist three regiments with a complement of some 2,000 men each and a fourth regiment (no. 32) of 3,000 men from the Roman Catholic cantons in central Switzerland, adding a total of 9,000 professional Swiss soldiers to the king’s service. They were incorporated in the Dutch army as Regiments no. 29, no. 30, no. 31, and no. 32. They served under the same financial and administrative conditions and regulations as the national regiments, with the notable exceptions of the bounty the recruit received on his enlistment, the travel expenses, and the provisions for regular leaves. To cover the expenses for recruitment the Treasury paid the funds of the Swiss regiments DFL 67,20


43 The capitulation with the Canton of Bern, concluded 23 September 1814, was the model for all other capitulations: NA Archives of the Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1813-1870, Eerste Supplement Ratificaties 1814-1900 [henceforth, BuZa Ratificaties] 4. See also Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 312-321.

44 Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 109-141. A complete overview of the distribution of all companies over the capitulating cantons in the 1814-1829 period is given in NA BuZa Ratificaties, as well as in Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 322-324.
for each soldier signing a four-year contract and DFL 95.20 for a six-year contract. National corps were credited with DFL 28 for a six-year contract. Bounties paid in Switzerland on average amounted to between DFL 35 and DFL 70: much higher than the DFL 10 offered to Dutch recruits enlisting for the national corps. As part of the Standing Army and benefiting from the time-honoured excellent reputation of the Swiss soldier, the regiments were given vital garrisons in the border areas of the Northern and, after 1815, Southern Netherlands. Van der Hoeven had indeed performed his duty well.

However, over the years after 1816 inspections by Dutch military authorities indicated that, in violation of the capitulations, non-Swiss soldiers served with the regiments. Other soldiers were too old or too young to serve. Certain companies proved to be severely under strength, probably due to massive desertion, with their officers being absent, spending long leaves in their canton, allegedly to recruit. At first the Department of War was inclined simply to ignore these problems, given the existing difficulties of recruiting for the Standing Army from the Dutch labour market. But other problems came to the fore as well. Over the years the Department of War saw itself confronted with seemingly never-ending complaints and requests from the governments of the Swiss cantons and members of the aristocratic families from which these governments were elected. Most of them concerned some pretended injustice that had befallen their relatives, serving as an officer in the Netherlands. These letters invariably asked for promotion, better pay, longer leaves, appointments of cadets, and other personal advantages or benefits for the sons, cousins, nephews, and other relatives of the cantonal governing families or the families with which they were affiliated in business. In some cases a whole regiment was concerned. In 1818 the government of Bern requested the transfer of its regiment from the town of Breda to Antwerp, claiming that Breda was an insupportably parochial place in which to live – and Roman Catholic at that – and that only a vibrant city such as Antwerp could offer the pleasures and cultural diversions Bern considered its native sons entitled to.

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45 Tindal to Von der Goltz, 28 December 1816, no. 188, NA Archives of the Ministerie van Oorlog 1795-1844; Collectie Van Thielen, Archief van de eerste Inspecteur Generaal der Infanterie lt.gen. W.G. Tindal 1816-1818 [henceforth, IGI] 8; Von der Goltz to Tindal, 3 February 1817, no. 4, NA IGI 2; Von der Goltz to Van der Hoeven, 23 November 1816, no. 1942, NA Archives of the Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Inventaris van de Legatiearchieven in beheer bij de Tweede Afdeling, Legatie Zwitserland 1814-1918 [henceforth, Leg Zw] 16; Von der Goltz to Van der Hoeven, 20 January 1817, no. 38, NA Leg Zw 16; Von der Goltz to Tindal, 15 March 1817, no. 112, NA IGI 2.

46 Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 179-182, 201-204; D’Aubremé to the King, 17 September 1824, La. E9 NA MvO GA 27.
The most serious problems were revealed in Regiment no. 32. In the eyes of the Department of War, the commanding officer of the regiment, Major-General Louis d'Auf der Maur from the canton of Schwyz, proved to be nothing less than a fraud. From the very start Auf der Maur had behaved not as a responsible officer, respecting the regulations of the Department of War, nor as a loyal servant to the king, but as a sixteenth-century-style military enterpriser. He had sold commissions to the highest bidder and had offered extremely low bounties (some DFL 15), which had led him to enlist vagabonds, criminals, and ne'er-do-wells, in a word the scum of Europe. Since neither the Department of War nor Major A.L.W. Seyffardt (the Dutch muster commissary in Switzerland) had been too inquisitive, and since Auf der Maur had covered up his acts with forged documents provided to him by an accomplice in the bosom of the government of Schwyz, both practices had gone unnoticed and had brought Auf der Maur considerable profit. The most lucrative source of income had been desertion. As the rules were, every time an individual enlisted the regiment received a payment, the level of which was fixed in the capitulation. This might be higher or lower than the real cost of recruitment, depending on the conditions of the labour market of the time. Moreover, every enlisted soldier the regiment lost due to illness, death, or desertion was a charge against the Treasury. This was the logic of the modern state in which the regiments of the army were the property of the state. In the logic of a military enterpriser like Auf der Maur these rules had been an incentive to be lenient to desertion, even to foster it. Moreover, he had managed to implicate most of the regiment's officers in his enterprise by offering them a share in the profits.

After all this had been revealed to the Department of War in The Hague, August count of Liedekerke, a nobleman from the Southern Netherlands

47 Van der Hoeven described him as someone "que je connais pour un homme à projets et entreprises". In 1814 this was to be considered a recommendation: Van der Hoeven to Van Nagell, 7 April 1814, no. 15, NA BuZa 5; Van Liedekerke to Von der Goltz, 28 August 1817, no. 17, NA Leg Zw 16; Van Liedekerke to Von der Goltz, 1 January 1818, no. 26, NA Leg Zw 16; Van Liedekerke to Van Nagell, 30 January 1818, no. 44, NA ASS 6343; Wagenaar to D'Aubremé, 25 August 1819, T4 NA MvO GA 16.

48 The accomplice was Landammann F.X. Weber. Auf der Maur appointed him as recruitment officer in his regiment, in which capacity Weber also shared in the profits of Auf der Maur's enterprise. Seyffardt was frequently invited to stay in the house of Auf der Maur in the Strehlgasse in Schwyz. Nowadays the house is known as the Hotel Hediger, after the Hedinger family who had owned it previously.

49 The contract concluded to this effect between Auf der Maur and the Council of Officers of the regiment can be found in Hauptarchiv Archiv 1 Akten bis 1848 B Kanton Schwyz, Staatsarchiv Schwyz Switzerland, 554.
and permanent envoy to the Swiss Confederation since April 1817, was given
orders to lodge official complaints against the cantons concerned and to
urge their governments to respect the capitulations conscientiously. Van
Liedekerke, however, reacted half-heartedly. On the one hand he executed
his orders, but on the other he began writing a series of long dispatches
explaining to the Department of War things it should have known about
the Swiss Confederation or apparently had forgotten since 1795.

To begin with, Van Liedekerke explained the peculiarities of the Swiss
labour market.50 In the second half of the eighteenth century Switzerland had
developed a flourishing textile industry and textile trade. As a consequence
wages had gone up considerably. Already in the eighteenth century this had
meant that even rising bounties and wages for foreign service had only been
able to attract soldiers of declining quality. Van Liedekerke pointed out that
the normal determination of prices by the interplay of supply and demand
no longer applied to foreign recruitment in the Swiss cantons. Due to the
behaviour of the ruling aristocracy supply and demand in the cantons,

s’y exercent en raison inverse de ce qui se passe à cet égard dans les
entreprises d’industrie. Quant à elles celles-ci font ordinairement
baisser les prix, perfectionner les fournitures. Pour les cantons, car ces
capitulations appartiennent un peu au domaine des spéculations, ils
les font hausser en multipliant les prétentions de la partie qui livre la
matière première bien qu’elle soit devenu de moindre qualité.51

The common Swiss farmer and labourer, when offered a choice between
his spinning jenny and power loom or the uncertainties of service abroad,
pREFERRED to stay in his own valley. Napoleon’s Continental System had
temporarily cut Switzerland off from its overseas markets, and 1816 and
1817 had seen serious food shortages and rising food prices due to crop
failures. The ensuing unemployment and poverty had stimulated many
Swiss farmers and labourers to follow the Dutch recruiting drums. But after
1817 these incentives subsided. From then on, the Netherlands, France, and
the Kingdom of Naples competed in Switzerland for military manpower
in a contracting market.52 For a typical canton government, foreign service
amounted to an opportunity to get rid of their poor and destitute subjects in

50 Van Liedekerke to Verstolk van Soelen, 25 June 1826, no. 132, NA ASS 6344; Suter, Inner-
Schweizerisches Militärunternehmertum im 18. Jahrhundert.
51 Van Liedekerke to Verstolk van Soelen, 25 June 1826, no. 132, NA ASS 6344.
52 Maag, Geschichte der Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten 1825-1861, pp. 1-22.
the first instance. The other side of this coin was that, under the influence of the Enlightenment, military service abroad was now seen differently in Switzerland. Traditionally it had been a honourable occupation, something to be proud of. Now liberal politicians and intellectuals criticized it as a social evil and morally wrong: the selling of the skins of one's citizens to foreign rulers instead of caring for them and protecting them. In the case of Regiment no. 32 it came as no surprise to Van Liedekerke that Tessin had been a coveted recruiting ground for Auf der Maur since this canton, bordering Italy, was a traditional hub of seasonal labour.

In the face of this situation, not very much could be done, other than accept the changing structure of the labour market, Van Liedekerke argued. The same advice applied as far as the never-ending stream of requests for benefits and advantages from the governing families of the cantons was concerned. The government of a canton and the families behind this government in 1814-1816 had been prepared to conclude capitulations only because of the commissions for their relatives these contracts entailed. The military service in itself or the quality of the troops, let alone their fighting power, were of secondary importance. Clinging to traditional values, these families viewed foreign service as a means to provide profitable positions as officers for their offspring, as a means to shore up the resources of the family but above all as a means to buttress their well-respected position, honour, and reputation at the head of their canton. Their foremost concern was keeping up with the other governing families and commanding the respect of their clientele and their subjects. For them, their scions serving in the Netherlands were part of their personal network of power, like any other member of their family. Increasingly, these immaterial profits came to the foreground and overshadowed the already diminishing financial returns of foreign service, which became a status symbol for them instead of a way of earning a living. Moreover, in a traditional state the distinction between state interest and family interest had been blurred as a matter of course since ancient times. Auf der Maur had stressed this to the extreme. For him

54 Quadri and Lotti to Van Liedekerke, 28 December 1819, NA Leg Zw 19; Van Liedekerke to Van Nagell, 13 March 1820, no. 180, NA Leg Zw 18.
55 See, for example, Van Liedekerke to Van Nagell, 10 April 1820, no. 184, NA Leg Zw 18; Van Liedekerke to Van Nagell, 3 August 1820, no. 209, NA Leg Zw 18; D’ Aubremé to Van Nagell, 9 September 1820, La C10 NA MvO GA 19; Van Liedekerke to Van Nagell, 17 October 1820, no. 223, NA MvO GA 19.
Regiment no. 32 had been a cash-cow to provide the funds he needed to run for the highest office in Schwyz, that of Landammann.

If, Van Liedekerke warned, the Department of War refused to grant them the benefits they expected, these families would inevitably lose any interest in their regiment whatsoever. And this would rapidly bring recruitment to a standstill, as no Swiss farmer would be prepared to enlist when he could not follow a member of a well-respected family. So the battle between the king and the Swiss cantons would terminate “faute de combattans”. 56

Six years later, when discussing similar problems in Regiment no. 31, Van Liedekerke underlined the same point by invoking “the authority of the facts”, as he phrased it. 57

It is important to note that the analysis of Van Liedekerke has been confirmed by modern historical research, not only for the years under consideration here, but even for the second half of the eighteenth century. 58

However, there is no indication whatsoever that the Dutch Department of War was aware of the changing conditions in Switzerland. As a consequence, the dispatches of Van Liedekerke were unpopular in D’Aubremé’s offices. Since the fall of the ancien régime and especially since the introduction of the principles of modern government in a centralized, bureaucratic state over the years 1806-1813 this department had learned to act as a guardian of national interests in its own right, under or, if necessary, even in opposition to the king. The interest of the state was, among other things, to dispose of reliable well-trained regiments on which the security of the state could depend. Hence the decision to garrison the Swiss regiments on the borders. In the eyes of the department a flawless execution of the capitulation was the cornerstone of Swiss service. Family power networks

56 Van Liedekerke to Van Nagell, 17 October 1820, no. 223, NA DvO GA 19. Another calculation, reaching the same conclusion, can be found in the Koninklijke Huisarchief Archives of Prins Frederik VII b41: Nota betrekkelijk het Regement Zwitsers no. 32. The document is undated but the content indicates that it was written in October 1819.

57 Van Liedekerke to Verstolk van Soelen, 25 June 1826, no. 132, NA ASS 6344. After having explained the nature of Swiss society and politics one more time, Van Liedekerke continued by arguing: “nous n’avons pas mission pour la changer. Prétendre donc que ces capitulations vivent et se soutiennent sur leur propre fond, c’est vouloir l’impossible, elles doivent fléchir devant les circonstances locales et s’associer surtout aux intérêts privés des Magistrats qui ont de l’influence et ici on se permettra d’abonder ses raisonnements pour invoquer l’autorité des faits.” See also D’Aubremé to the King, 16 February 1822, NA Leg Zw 14.

crossing national borders, as the Swiss aristocracy deployed them, were of no concern to an administration that had to function within the limits of a modern, territorial state. Swiss officers and soldiers were no different to their Dutch counterparts, with the exceptions of their Swiss nationality and the stipulations of the capitulation. Concluding a capitulation meant that the process of bargaining and negotiations was over. The department refused to accept, as Van Liedekerke seemed to imply, that a capitulation was a kind of entrance fee to the service of the Netherlands, with bargaining and negotiations only starting afresh. And what about Auf der Maur? In the department, scornful and scandalized remarks were heard of public money being spent on buying votes in a faraway Swiss canton instead of on the hiring of good soldiers for the defence of the country.  

But this was not enough. Since the capitulations had been concluded, the political and administrative control of the Swiss regiments had fallen to the Department of War as a matter of routine. Confronted with the above-mentioned problems the department began to inform the king and to exercise influence on him to look for a more drastic solution. As early as March 1819 the War Department calculated that the average national soldier was considerably cheaper (17.5 respectively 23 per cent) than those from Nassau and Switzerland, as is shown in Table 15.4.

Table 15.4 Average cost of a soldier per annum (1819)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Swiss soldier per annum</th>
<th>DFL 213.32</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Nassau soldier per annum</td>
<td>DFL 201.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average national soldier per annum</td>
<td>DFL 164.77</td>
</tr>
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</table>

From 1820 on it began considering the possibility of a complete dismissal of all four regiments, as it became increasingly evident that these corps, as remnants of the ancien régime, no longer fitted in with the characteristics of the Dutch state and its army. To change the nature of the cantonal background of the Swiss regiments was beyond the power of the Department of War, so the regiments had to go. At first the king showed no inclination to

59 D’Aubremé to Van Nagell, 4 November 1820, La C14, NA MvO GA 19; Van Tengnagel to D’Aubremé, 11 August 1825, no. 20, NA MvO GA 30; Van Tengnagell to D’Aubremé, 11 August 1825, no. 19, NA MvO GA 30.
60 D’Aubremé to the King, 29 March 1819, La Y2, NA MvO GA 15.
follow the argument of the department. But over the years he was losing ground. In the first place the Standing Army, of which the Swiss regiments had been an integral part, in fact had ceased to exist since the *amalgame*. Now the army relied on conscripts to fill its ranks. In the second place, liberal representatives in parliament, especially those from the Southern Netherlands, began to object to the presence of the four corps. They also were aware that these corps were far more expensive than normal Dutch regiments, made up of conscripts. Moreover, they saw them as the symbols of the very royal prerogative those liberals objected to. So in the end the king had to give in, to save his already threatened kingdom. In 1829, after difficult negotiations, doing ample honour to the reputation of the Swiss as hard bargainers, the capitulations were denounced, the regiments disbanded, officers, NCOs and soldiers dismissed and sent home. To demonstrate that different times had arrived indeed, they were replaced by three national regiments, saving 300,000 Dutch guilders on a yearly basis.

**Conclusion**

Although at first sight the birth of the Dutch cadre-militia army and the sorry fate of the Swiss regiments are quite different stories, they bear a striking resemblance. In the end they both underline that the Netherlands in the 1795-1830 period went through a systemic change as far as the army was concerned. Both stories can be seen as a clash between the traditionality of the *ancien régime* and the modernity of the centralized, bureaucratic, territorial state: the former losing and the latter winning. The state wanted to have direct access to the manpower contained in its domestic population and no longer wanted to deal with a labour market that was in the hands of an aristocratic elite at home or abroad, especially if the foreign elite tried to extend its patronage networks across the borders of the Netherlands. In this process the age-old all-volunteer force of the *ancien régime* disappeared from the scene to be superseded by a cadre-militia army.

Now the question that needs to be answered is this: what were the driving forces propelling this profound transformation as far as the Netherlands are concerned? The first and foremost driving forces were the changing...
conditions on the Dutch, German, and Swiss labour markets in the second half of the eighteenth century. The Dutch labour market was too small to provide for the numbers of volunteers the army needed. Traditionally these shortages had been met by foreign recruitment. However, due to the combined effects of booming agriculture and industry, restrictive measures by the Prussian and Austrian authorities and the introduction of conscription in many German states, these foreign labour markets gradually dried up. On top of that, liberals in the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland opposed to foreign recruitment and the all-volunteer force argued that the security of the state was the concern of every individual citizen and that military service as a conscript was a national duty. In their opinion the Standing Army was an oppressive instrument of royal power that had to be curbed by the countervailing power of the militia. These already powerful forces coincided with the exigencies of Napoleonic warfare and the ensuing revolutionary growth in army size. The new Dutch sovereign William Frederick from 1814 onwards readily followed this trend. The special relationship with Britain as well as his own ambitions to restore the Netherlands as a power of the middle rank or even the first rank pointed in the same direction: an army of substantial strength. Events would soon prove that this army increasingly had to rely on conscripts.

Over the years 1813-1830 these driving forces manifested themselves in three simultaneous conflicts. In the first dispute, the one between the king and the Second Chamber, control over the army and over its financing were at stake. The second controversy between the Department of War and the Swiss cantons centred upon the question of whether the army was purely an instrument of the modern, bureaucratic, territorial unitary state or whether the private interests of foreign aristocratic families and their internal rivalries should be allowed to interfere with the administration and control of the army. The third conflict between the king and his own Ministry of War was about the question of whether the public service would be able to develop itself into an autonomous keeper of the national interests, independent of the court. Taken together, these driving forces and conflicts explain the profound transformation the Dutch army underwent in the decades between 1795 and 1830.
The draft and draftees in Italy, 1861-1914

Marco Rovinello

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, conscription is “compulsory enlistment for state service, typically into the armed forces”, while a conscript and a volunteer are respectively “a person enlisted compulsorily” and “a person who freely enrolls for military service rather than being conscripted”. Seemingly straightforward terms like these become, however, much trickier in the eye of the historian, who is always striving to historicize and compare apparently ubiquitous taxonomies and phenomena.

This chapter faces both challenges starting from the nineteenth-century Italian conscription experience. It will briefly analyze the draft system of pre-unification states, and then will reconstruct the evolution of Italian recruitment laws and practices from La Marmora’s draft act (1854) to the eve of World War I. On the one hand, attention will be paid to the supposed shift from a professional-dynastic militia toward a draft-based army, in order to verify its linearity and the universality of Italian conscription. The chapter will show in particular how much the draft changed according to current political concerns and internal security needs. At the same time, it will highlight some constants in Italian conscription, such as the discriminatory nature of the system and the government’s ambiguous attitude toward draftees. On the other hand, the chapter will approach military service in terms of labor relations between the army and reenlisted people. From this perspective, it will investigate who opted for soldiering as a form of employment and why, while trying to establish to what extent forced/voluntary and commodified/noncommodified military labor can be identified and disaggregated in the experience of nineteenth-century Italian soldiers.

A nation-state in progress: the long road to unification 1814-1858

Although most pre-unification Italian states relied on semiprofessional dynastic militias and mercenary troops, the postunification draft did not start from scratch, and its history is inseparably linked to that of the previous recruitment systems in force on the peninsula.

Starting in 1815, roughly 30,000 Italian-speaking subjects from Lombardy and Venetia were recruited yearly into the Habsburg army (8.5-10 per cent of the peacetime force), and normally served for eight years in Italian garrisons. In the Duchies of Modena and Parma, the law stated that young men were obligated to fulfill their military service in person. In practice, however, the armies were composed primarily of volunteers and substitutes – namely, men paid to replace draftees in the service.

Leopold II’s Tuscany conscription also theoretically involved every male subject, but in practice most youngsters were exempted and the limited needs of the army were easily fulfilled by volunteers. In the Papal States one-third of the army consisted of two Swiss mercenary regiments, and the rest of the annual contingent (10,000 men in 1816-1831, about 7,500 in 1852-1859) was raised through volunteerism and reenlisting, even if military service had been nominally compulsory and universal since 1822. After its temporary abolition in the first stages of the restoration, the draft worked in the continental part of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies too. However, as only 10-20 per cent of the eligible men from each class were actually recruited, the annual contingent was small (8,000 men until 1848, 12,000 between 1849 and 1858, and 18,000 after 1858) and mostly composed of volunteers, since the Bourbons also employed four regiments of Swiss mercenaries (altogether 6,000-8,000 men) and the 1834 conscription law excluded a good twenty-two exempted categories.

Therefore, almost all pre-unification Italian regimes kept the draft alive on paper, but in practice preferred to limit recruitment to a small percentage of their populations, mostly chosen from among the classes dangereuses. This happened for the same reasons explored by Thomas Hippler in the case of France: from the perspective of the restored sovereigns, universal conscription still looked like both a dangerous revolutionary heritage and a very expensive way to set up their militias. Moreover, no Italian state was a first-rank power, in need of an army large enough to back its foreign

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2 Sondhaus, *In the Service of the Emperor*.
3 Zannoni and Fiorentino, *Le Reali Truppe Parmensi*.
4 Giorgetti, *Le armi toscane e le occupazioni militari in Toscana*.
5 Biagini, “La riorganizzazione dell’esercito pontificio e gli arruolamenti in Umbria”.
7 Hippler, “Conscription in the French Restoration”.

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policy; Italian states were not equipped to handle even internal troubles, as the revolutions in 1820-1821, 1830, and 1848-1849 would clearly demonstrate.

The only country with a real desire to play a major role in the postrevolutionary European balance of power, and to leading the Italian unification process, was the Kingdom of Sardinia. Thus, Piedmontese conscription history followed a very different pattern to those of the other states. Vittorio Emanuele I had abolished conscription immediately after regaining the throne in 1814. However, the unexpected outbreak of the War of the Seventh Coalition and the subsequent urgent need for men led the king to reintroduce a slightly modified draft system which mixed the French and the Prussian models, and essentially relied upon professional soldiers integrated with a very small call-up contingent. This hybrid solution remained in place until the 1830s, when Carlo Alberto modified it extensively in order to face the Habsburgs on the Lombard border with around 100,000 men. Therefore, the new system was expected to be a “perfected version of the Prussian one”\(^8\) with part of the army composed of volunteers or substitutes and the other portion raised through one-year long compulsory service followed by periodic training camps in the seven years that followed.\(^9\)

Although the new system involved no more than 25 per cent of those who were technically eligible, and provided, wealthy citizens with several ways to escape enlistment, conscription faced serious resistance: volunteers were fewer than in the Napoleon era, and many youngsters tried to escape enlistment by deserting, simulating disease, self-mutilating, and corrupting the local civil servants who made the conscription lists. The Savoy government, whose “infrastructural development” had not yet enabled it to effectively compel citizens to fulfill their duties,\(^10\) had to compromise by drastically reducing the annual contingent, but it refused to eliminate the draft completely. In this way, Carlo Alberto’s army was weakened – and would be defeated by the Habsburg forces in 1848 – but an important goal had been achieved: both Piedmont subjects and military authorities had already become familiar with conscription.\(^11\)

\(^8\) Pieri, *Storia militare del Risorgimento*, p. 171.
\(^9\) Ales, *L’armata sarda e le riforme albertine*.
\(^10\) I borrow this concept from Weiss, “Infrastructural Power, Economic Transformation, and Globalization”.
\(^11\) Pischedda, *Esercito e società in Piemonte*. 
The Piedmontese-Italian case: some essentials about conscription laws and army features before and after unification

When in the 1850s the new minister of war – General Alfonso La Marmora – was asked to reorganize the armed forces, the parliamentary debate on the military reform was substantive. However, the distance between the backers of the “the army of quality” and the supporters of “the army of quantity” had been much reduced in comparison to the past. Both the majority and the minority agreed on the necessity of considerably enlarging the peacetime contingent, both supported the extension of service time at least up to three years, and it is significant that no one – not even the most traditionalist faction – called for the abolition of conscription and for the reintroduction of the prerevolutionary all-volunteer army. Nearly forty years of the draft represented a shared background among the Piedmontese ruling class.

La Marmora’s draft system of 1854 adapted its guidelines from the French recruitment law of 1818, with the aim of correcting the weaknesses demonstrated by the previous German-style system in 1848. In theory, the Piedmont peacetime army (50,000 men) was mostly composed of career soldiers who had started as volunteers. If not enough men volunteered to fill the annual contingent determined by the government (about 9,000-10,000 men), twenty-year-old male subjects were drafted into a two-tiered system, through a lottery. Men who picked “bad numbers” were enlisted into the first category and had to serve actively for five years. Those who picked “good numbers” were enrolled under the second category and received periodic basic training over forty to fifty days, but they were allowed get married and entered active service only in times of war.

In practice, 75 per cent of the peacetime army was composed of draftees because of the lack of volunteers. Moreover, most conscripts came from the poorest classes because of the extensive system of familial and religious exemptions, and because the upper classes could – in practice – buy themselves out of their obligations. At least forty-six articles detailed “how

12 The debate is reconstructed by Pieri, Le forze armate nella età della Destra, and Del Negro, “Garibaldi tra esercito regio e nazione armata”.
13 On French conscription laws, see Crépin, Défendre la France. In contrast, Ilari has asserted that La Marmora’s model was the Prussian post-1848 system: Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, I, p. 333. On Prussian recruitment practices, see Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army.
14 The contingent recruited in 1860 from the former Piedmontese territories was composed mainly of peasants (54 per cent) and herdsmen (in charge of cattle) (16 per cent), while landowners were only 1 per cent. See Torre, Relazione sulle leve eseguite in Italia, pp. 89-91.
enlisted people can be exonerated from the service. Realistically, the sons of the richest bourgeoisie had two ways of legally escaping enlistment. The first was substitution (surrogazione) – namely, finding a substitute who would voluntarily complete the service on behalf of the draftee. The second was liberation (liberazione/affrancamento) – that is, paying a higher sum directly to the state in order to gain exemption, and then letting military authorities find a substitute.

Substitution could involve either brothers (surrogazione tra fratelli) or unrelated people (surrogazione ordinaria), and the requirements for the substitute were more or less the same: Italian citizenship, a clean record, age eighteen to twenty-six, being physically fit and unmarried or widower with no children. The most important difference between those two types of replacement was that the first was free, while the latter cost 700 L. until 1862, and 1,200 L. thereafter. This difference stemmed from the Piedmont government’s acceptance of Hegel’s idea that family – not the individual – was the smallest component of society. Therefore, at least in theory, each family had to offer the fatherland one of its members.

Liberation was much more expensive. The fee was fixed each year by a royal decree, but it always cost nearly three times substitution – 3,100 L. in 1861, 3,200 L. in 1863, and 4,200 L. in 1866, as the war against the Habsburgs was breaking out. It was a huge sum with respect to the average Italian’s income in the 1860s and to the liberation fees paid elsewhere. Nevertheless, many men were able to buy their freedom before the official unification, and even more so afterwards (see Table 16.1), when Piedmont conscription law was extended to include the whole national territory. As the number of applications overwhelmed the number of available volunteers by a large margin, the government had to reject most applications. Otherwise, in 1864 nearly 20 per cent of the first-category conscripts would have managed to legally escape military service. The percentage of liberated draftees was even higher after 1866, when a new law allowed conscripts to be liberated

15 The main difference was that an unrelated substitute should be at least 1.60m tall, whereas a brother substitute had no minimum height and also could replace the conscript after his enrollment. See Recruitment law n. 1676, 20 March 1854, articles 130-145. All Italian recruitment laws are available in Raccolta ufficiale delle leggi e dei decreti del Regno d’Italia, which was published annually by Stamperia Reale in Turin.

16 The average annual salary in 1860s Italy was about 300 L. See Rosselli, Mazzini e Bakunin, pp. 10-18. Under Napoleon III the exoneration fee amounted to 2,000-2,500 francs (Kovacs, “French Military Institutions before the Franco-Prussian War”, p. 222), that is, an average of 2,430 L., according to the 1866 exchange rate suggested by Frattianni and Spinelli, “Italy in the Gold Standard Period”.
through the payment of fees even in the absence of enough volunteers. To complicate things further, the government did not simply tolerate this practice; it actually encouraged liberation for both economic and disciplinary reasons. In fact, the liberation fee supplied the army budget with precious extra income (see Table 16.2). This income enabled military authorities to employ fit and well-trained men by granting an extra monthly sum (soprasoldo) to the most disciplined conscripts already serving under the colors (affidati anziani) instead of enrolling the substitutes provided by draftees, about whom complaints of low quality were often voiced by officers.

Table 16.1 Liberations in the Italian army in the 1860s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual contingent</th>
<th>Liberations</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>2.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>2,254</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>1,936</td>
<td>4.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>2,592</td>
<td>5.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867*</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869***</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>3.75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Substitution and liberation data were published annually in Torre’s reports. See Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno (1864-1870).

Notes:
* From 1867, data include also recruits from Venetia.
** Conscripts born in 1847 were drafted one year late for economic reasons.
*** Therefore 1869 data concern conscripts born in 1847 and 1848.

17 The annual expenses of the Ministry of War are reported in Rochat and Massobrio, Breve storia dell’esercito italiano dal 1861 al 1943, pp. 67-68. The role of exemption and replacement fees in the army’s balance was a largely shared feature of the European nineteenth-century recruitment systems and a major factor in preventing governments from eliminating socially based discriminations from the draft. On France, see Schnapper, Le remplacement militaire en France; on the Ottoman Empire, see Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice”.

18 Even La Marmora complained about this drawback of his draft system. See Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, I, p. 345.
Moreover, substitution and liberation were common institutions in nineteenth-century European armies. 19 Therefore, La Marmora had to face very little resistance when he submitted his reform to the Piedmont parliament. More criticisms arose after unification, when many officers and civilian observers accused the government of enabling its fittest and most educated citizens to refuse “the holiest duty, serving and defending the fatherland”. 20 Many pamphlets described liberation as the most evident signal of the bourgeoisie’s indifference to the destiny of the state and the nation. Conversely, some officers stressed that “draft fills the gaps in the army only through the poorest classes”. 21 However, these complaints were not sufficient to induce the Ministry of War to question one of the cornerstones of Piedmontese-Italian military organization.

The continuity in the recruitment law unquestionably contributed to the stability of the army structure and social composition in the crucial transition from the pre-unification militias to the national army. Naturally, the new Italian army was much larger than the Savoy one (about 200,000 men), but the militarization rate was more or less the same: generally speaking,

\[ \text{Income from liberations} \times \% \]
it was slightly lower (one recruit out of every three twenty-year-old men), but it was slightly higher (one out of five) if we consider men enlisted in the first category only.\textsuperscript{22} The army’s enlargement had no effect upon its sociological composition: most recruits still were peasants and shepherds, whereas landowners, students, doctors, and lawyers together composed 5.5 per cent of the contingent raised between 1863 and 1869 (see Table 16.3).

Table 16.3 Italian draftees’ professions (1863-1869)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Number of draftees</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peasants / shepherds</td>
<td>282,471</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herdsmen (in charge of cattle)</td>
<td>33,867</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porters</td>
<td>28,677</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen</td>
<td>25,864</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricklayers</td>
<td>24,324</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanners</td>
<td>17,340</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students / lawyers / civil servants</td>
<td>14,938</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joiners</td>
<td>14,805</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavern-keepers / food sellers / bartenders</td>
<td>13,537</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacksmiths</td>
<td>11,384</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landowners</td>
<td>10,942</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopkeepers</td>
<td>8,622</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servants</td>
<td>7,188</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishermen</td>
<td>3,306</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artists</td>
<td>2,524</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewelers</td>
<td>1,461</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinarians / farriers</td>
<td>1,141</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>1,062</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>503,453</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The data concerning the professional status of the 1860s recruits are synthetically reported in Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno 1870, pp. 82-83.

As Bruce Porter has pointed out, the outcome of wars always affects military systems, of both winners and losers.\textsuperscript{23} Therefore, it is not surprising that the 1866 defeat represented the first important turning point in Italian

\textsuperscript{22} In 1861, there were about 25 million Italians, more or less five times the number of the subjects of the King of Sardinia in 1859: Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, I, p. 368.

\textsuperscript{23} Porter, War and the Rise of the State.
conscription history. The disappointing performance on the battlefield along with the evident limits of mass nationalization led several observers to criticize the entire military organization. Most military experts claimed that the Prussians’ crushing victory over the Habsburg forces (1866) had shown the superiority of the “army of quantity” over the out-of-date French-style semiprofessional army. On the other hand, civilian critics stressed that La Marmora’s draft had not significantly contributed to the creation of a solid Italian national identity.

While few dared to defend the status quo publicly, the debate did not rapidly lead to a new arrangement. This was due to the clash between the two major schools of thought and the challenges the government still had to face in order to complete the unification process and bring the whole territory under the control of the central power. It is no coincidence that parliamentary discussion about conscription reform started in December 1870, after Rome had fallen and the Prussian victory at Sedan had swept away all remaining doubts about the German model’s efficiency. Actually, the proposal made by the new minister of war, General Cesare Ricotti Magnani, was largely inspired by the German draft system, not only from a technical viewpoint but, more generally, also regarding the tasks that the army was expected to perform. At the international level, after French power had been scaled down, Italy wished to be recognized as a middle- to high-ranking power; therefore, the army was required to back this new foreign policy objective, mostly through an increase in the annual contingent.

On the internal level, once “Italy was made”, the army had to cooperate more actively with the other nationalization agencies in “making the Italians” and, simultaneously, in keeping the political claims of the lower classes under control.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Ricotti’s reform (which actually consisted of several acts promulgated between 1870 and 1875) not only increased the number of men recruited yearly in the first category (from

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24 See for example Villari, “Di chi è la colpa?” The concrete result of the army’s nationalization effort is still under question. Among those who tend to underestimate it, see Del Negro, “L’esercito italiano da Napoleone a Vittorio Veneto”. More optimistic is Mondini, “La nazione di Marte”.
25 For a detailed reconstruction of the parliamentary debate, see Ilari, _Storia del servizio militare in Italia_, II, pp. 115-128.
26 On Ricotti as minister of war, see Berger Waldenegg, “Il ministro della guerra Cesare Ricotti e la politica delle riforme militari”, and Labanca, _Il generale Cesare Ricotti e la politica militare italiana._
27 The same attitude toward the German system characterized the 1872 French recruitment law. On the general awe of the German system on the part of the French military establishment, see Digeon, _La crise allemande de la pensée française._
40,000 to 65,000) and reduced to three years (four for cavalry) of active service time,\textsuperscript{28} but also radically changed the concept of military service itself: serving evolved from a general responsibility, to be fulfilled only by those who were enrolled,\textsuperscript{29} to a “personal duty” everyone had to fulfill themselves.\textsuperscript{30} The percentage of men recruited in the first category rose from 17 per cent (1870) to 25 per cent in the early 1870s and those who were enlisted in the second category were forced to train periodically anyway, thanks to “good numbers”.\textsuperscript{31}

Additionally, if the army was to be “the true school of the Nation” as the new discipline regulations stated,\textsuperscript{32} keeping the sons of the elite outside of it no longer made sense, especially after the Paris Commune had shown how dangerous it was for the social order to rely on an army almost exclusively composed of proletarians. Therefore, Ricotti abolished both replacement and liberation. This decision generated fierce protest. Both bourgeois and Catholic forces launched powerful and harsh media campaigns against Ricotti. Additionally, many old-fashioned officers commented ironically on the pedagogical task assigned to the military institution and strongly stressed the negative influence of enlisting undisciplined seminarians and bourgeoisie on the discipline of the rank and file.\textsuperscript{33}

However, the Italian conscription system was still far from egalitarian, despite the fears of the upper classes and officers. As in France, substitution and liberation were replaced by an adapted version of the German “one-year volunteerism”, which allowed students and some other eligible parties to pay a sum (about 1,500 L.) to avoid some of the most unpleasant aspects of military service. In fact, one-year volunteers could delay their enrollment until they were twenty-seven, serve for a single year in the regiment of their choice, and then be promoted to officer after discharge by passing an easy exam.

Officially, one-year volunteerism had two major goals: first, it was thought to be the best way to involve the bourgeoisie without angering

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} Nominally, service time was three years. Nevertheless, the minister was allowed to discharge old classes in advance, and he usually discharged them after thirty to thirty-two months of active service.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Recruitment law n. 1676, 20 March 1854, article 4.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Law n. 2532, 7 June 1875, article 1.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ilari, \textit{Storia del servizio militare in Italia}, II, p. 213.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ministero della Guerra, \textit{Regolamento di disciplina militare del 1. dicembre}, article 8, § 33. The regulations represented another key issue of the reform. See Rovinello, “Giuro di essere fedele al Re ed a’ suoi reali successori”.
\item \textsuperscript{33} La Marmora, \textit{Quattro discorsi del generale Alfonso La Marmora}.
\end{itemize}
them, and thus ensure the army of a sufficient number of skilled auxiliary officers. Secondly, the fees of one-year volunteers were supposed to replace the liberation and substitution fees in the Ministry of War’s depleted coffers. Both of these attempts failed dismally. The high fees and other factors discouraged many youngsters from applying for one-year volunteerism. Consequently, from 1875 onwards, the number of one-year volunteers was 70-80 per cent lower than the government had predicted (about 1,000-1,500 a year, instead of 5,000) and the average income for the state dropped from about 7,000,000 L. to about 1,750,000 L.34 Simultaneously, one-year volunteerism did not make military life any more appealing; on the contrary, it rapidly became a way for the richest classes to escape service by exploiting this “heritage of an ancient and hateful privilege”.35

The Italian bourgeoisie was very different from the German one.36 Most well-educated young men from good families aspired to join the liberal professions and had little interest in the military as a career. As General Emilio De Bono wrote, “It is well known that to become a one-year volunteer the first requirement was not to wish to be a soldier [...] and three months spent in regiments certainly did not make them perfect soldiers or even familiar with the army [...] also because they were considered as useless and transitory pleonasms.”37

Although the Italian universal and disinterested duty to serve the fatherland was still largely discriminatory, the 1870-1875 reform was a milestone in the evolution of Italian conscription. Actually, Ricotti’s draft system was repeatedly modified up until the eve of World War I according to the technical assumptions and political frameworks current at any time.38 Nevertheless, these reforms disputed none of the founding principles, such as one-year volunteerism, nor the basic assumption that every citizen should personally contribute to the destiny of his own country.39

35 Ministero della Guerra, Quarta relazione della Commissione d’inchiesta per l’esercito, p. 95. Moreover, each one-year volunteer provided exemption from service to all his younger brothers. On one-year volunteerism, see Del Negro, “La leva militare in Italia”, pp. 192-195.
36 A classical comparative analysis of European bourgeoisies is Kocka, Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert.
37 De Bono, Nell’esercito nostro prima della guerra, p. 48.
38 For a synthetic reconstruction of post-1870 Italian political framework, see Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism.
39 A more detailed picture of the late nineteenth-century Italian recruitment systems is offered by Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, II, pp. 128-194. On the first decade of the twentieth century, see also Botti, “Note sul pensiero militare italiano da fine secolo XIX all’inizio della
A difficult transition: from the pre-unification militias to the Italian army (1859-1863)

In order to better understand the advent of the Piedmont draft system as the forerunner of the first Italian conscription law, it is necessary to understand the political and military framework in which the transition from the dynastic Piedmont militia to the Italian national army occurred. The Italian unification process was a quite lengthy one. It started in 1848, with the unsuccessful war against the Habsburg Empire, and ended only after World War I with the annexation of Trento and Trieste. However, the route to unification was composed primarily of sudden events with unexpected outcomes, such as the conquest of Lombardy, the Mezzogiorno, and the ex-Papal territories (apart from Lazio) between 1859 and 1861. Therefore, after its formal unification in 1861, the newborn Italian state was still not only a jigsaw puzzle which the government had to assemble as quickly as possible, but also a country still at war against both internal and external enemies.

After the end of the Second War of Independence (November 1859), the government considered France to be the most dangerous external enemy they faced, and fear of an invasion from the west deeply affected Italian military policy in the early 1860s. However, the internal threats would prove to be much more compelling. In the south, the new Italian army had to continue the long war against the Brigantaggio. Moreover, the unexpected conquest of the southern regions and the central role played by Garibaldi’s all-voluntary Southern Army in defeating the Bourbons became deeply problematic when the political expectations of those people had gone unmet. Fulfilling the liberal-monarchic-sponsored plan under the Savoy flags, rather than marching on Rome, had disappointed the remaining members of the Risorgimento movement and further solidified the divisions between the volunteers and the regular army. The liberal establishment considered republicans such Mazzini and Garibaldi to be internal enemies.
because of their critical attitude toward the new monarchical state, and the Piedmont General Staff was coming to seriously mistrust the spontaneous “militarization from below” that they considered to be the military expression of antimonarchy sentiment.

The government had to reconcile a compelling need to defuse the republican and anti-unification threats with the military necessity to rapidly integrate different forces into a larger national army, able to face the challenges posed by any kind of enemy. This double necessity led the liberal establishment to opt for a short-term solution, to postpone the systematic and effective reformation of the body of the military, and to deal with the problems one at a time through ad hoc measures.

According to this approach, the 1854 conscription law was extended tout court to Lombardy in June 1859. Shortly afterwards, a provisional draft system, modeled on the one previously established in Piedmont, was set up in Tuscany. In both Lombardy and Tuscany, conscripts easily made up the required numbers. Drafting southern youngsters was much more difficult and politically unprofitable; therefore, only 2,311 (out of 3,600) ex-Bourbon commissioned officers (COs) were allowed to join the national army and most rank-and-file soldiers were automatically discharged. Only the youngest ones (those who were born between 1837 and 1840) were reenrolled, according to local conscription law because they were considered by the Piedmont establishment to be the only part of the former Bourbon army not yet “corrupted by the education they had received”. In other words, they were young enough to embrace the Savoy cause. However, this proved to be an illusion, since most of the ex-Bourbon soldiers failed to report to the corps when called up, and the military authorities had to use extreme measures even to enlist fewer than 48,000 men over approximately three years. This was certainly “not a satisfying result”.

Regardless, the most delicate question was how to handle the approximately 50,000 volunteers enlisted in the Southern Army. In the fall of 1860, the minister of war, General Manfredo Fanti, had complained about the volunteers’ scanty military experience, but the issue of maintaining the integrity of the army clearly overwhelmed this military concern. In actuality, this was a purely political matter, since the Piedmont establishment was not concerned by the volunteers’ lack of technical know-how and experience. Rather, they were worried about the volunteers’ republican

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42 Del Negro, “Introduzione: militarizzazione e nazionalizzazione nella storia d’Italia”.
44 Mazzetti, “Dagli eserciti pre-unitari all’esercito italiano”, p. 574.
sympathies and their blind obedience to their charismatic leader – General Garibaldi – instead of to royal authority.

From the liberal-monarchic point of view, Garibaldi’s explicit acceptance of the king’s leadership and the fierce Italian nationalism of the Southern Army’s soldiers clearly did not suffice. Moreover, it was quite complicated to integrate people with such different loyalties, expressed by very different battle cries, into the same army. While Garibaldi’s volunteers went to battle shouting “Viva l’Italia!” (“Long live Italy!”), thus making no reference at all to the monarchy, the traditional battle cry of the Piedmont army was “Avanti Savoia!” (“Let’s go, Savoy!”). Even more importantly, before receiving a gun, soldiers had to swear “loyalty to the King and His Royal Successors”.45

It should be noted that the moderate government largely misunderstood the complex nature of volunteerism, especially regarding the motives of the southern volunteers. In actuality, the liberals failed to fully appreciate how differently the many components of the voluntary forces felt about the new state; rather, they mechanically linked any kind of military volunteerism with republicanism. As the framework on which the newborn kingdom was built was very fragile, arming thousands of potential enemies of the crown was a risk no government wanted to take.

Therefore, it was no surprise that, as early as November of 1860, Minister Fanti formally disbanded the Southern Army, vastly underestimating the ramifications that this decision would have upon the Brigantaggio’s rising in the Mezzogiorno and the attitudes of former volunteers toward the new state.46 These people were severely disappointed: they had risked their lives in the fight for national unification, but now were paradoxically discriminated against. Meanwhile, the state they had fought to build welcomed into its armed forces men who had fought against it, and then had been accepted as “brothers in arms” simply by changing their uniform and swearing the oath.

45 Ministero della Guerra, Regolamento di disciplina militare e di istruzione e servizio interno per la fanteria, article 1.
46 In the 1860s the southern provinces of the Italian new state were the theatre of a diffuse (albeit mostly uncoordinated) antistate resistance resulting from a mix of political, social, economic, and purely criminal motives. Termed the Brigantaggio already by contemporaries, it resulted in a veritable though low-intensity civil war, in which the new state prevailed also thanks to “exceptional” laws and other repressive measures. On this, see Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, and the more recent work of Lupo, “Il grande brigantaggio”.
Moreover, many were forced to resign from their posts after the imposition of humiliating enrollment conditions; furthermore, many applications to the ministerial commission for reenlistment were summarily rejected. 47

In sum, the liberal establishment preferred the discipline and political indifference of the regular soldiers from the former armies (especially those from northern regions) to the patriotic enthusiasm of the genuine volunteers. Evidently, the key concepts of this selection were political reliability and "Piedmontness", not patriotism and a sense of belonging to the national community. These guidelines led Garibaldi himself to give a very polemical speech in the parliament and further increased the strong tensions between liberals and republicans outside the parliament. This, in turn, prevented a constructive debate on the draft, and the dichotomy between the standing army/nation in arms was rapidly transformed into one of the postunification rhetorical battlefields where the different factions of the Risorgimento fought to achieve their conflicting versions of the Italian state.

In fact, Italian liberals and republicans did not just propose two conscription models, as the Conservatives and the political Left and Right had done in revolutionary and postrevolutionary France or in Prussia. 48 Since the institutional outcome of the 1859-1860 military victories was clearly provisional and there was a serious possibility that the institutional framework of the new state would soon be modified, both parties backed a specific kind of army, linking it (albeit implicitly) to a particular institutional framework. Moderates wished to incorporate hand-picked members of Garibaldi's army into the small Savoy standing army and disband every all-volunteer force, in order to strengthen the monarchy and to decisively defeat its antagonists; on the other side, republicans were not particularly interested in building up the newborn Italian army, since they considered any standing army to be an obstacle to the creation of a nonmonarchic state. Therefore, the only common factor between the various republican suggestions was replacing the regular army with an all-volunteer force. 49

47 Only a few were discharged after being granted an extra allowance. See Molfese, "Lo scioglimento dell'esercito meridionale garibaldino".
49 A brief synthesis of the alternative military models proposed by the Italian political Left during the nineteenth century is in Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, I, ch. 7. On the National Guard, see Francia, Le baionette intelligenti. On the shooting societies as a part of the nation-in-arms project, see Pécout, "Les sociétés de tir dans l'Italie unifiée de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle".
Military historians have stressed the decisive role of this quarrel in the formation of the postunification draft system, but there was no real debate on this topic. Rather, this was a confrontation between two (or more) incompatible concepts of the nation-state and of the role played by a specific model of military draft. Neither really wanted to concern themselves with the features of the conscription system to be adopted after unification, and nor did they want to compromise on this crucial matter. It is most likely that a compromise could have be found regarding the particular features of the conscription system, but it was not possible to reconcile the opposing goals that moderates and republicans wanted to achieve through the draft.

Despite the worldwide fame of some of their opponents, the liberals won the fight on the main substantive issues. The 1859-1861 extension of the Piedmont draft law to other northern regions and the strict selection of the volunteers and former Bourbon soldiers to be allowed to serve in the new Italian army provide ample evidence for such an assertion.

**Drafting a nation, making a state: conscription in the 1860s**

The polemics on the nation-in-arms did not significantly influence Italian military policy in the first years after unification, or in the second half of the 1860s. After facing the 1859-1861 challenges by extending the Piedmont draft to temporarily include the annexed territories, the government continued to follow a conscription policy based on La Marmora’s system until the early 1870s. A new recruitment act was issued in 1862. Nominally, this was the first Italian conscription act. However, it drew substantially upon the 1854 act, and it did not introduce significant innovations or adapt the draft system to accommodate the traditions and the needs of the recently annexed lands. This choice cannot be explained just by stressing the incapability of the ruling class to shape a new draft system, nor can it be analyzed simply in terms of political opportunity or of an increase in the supply of military manpower.

If the 1859-1861 measures had successfully resolved some of the most urgent problems stemming from the sudden unification, confirming La

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50 See for example Mola’s, Del Negro’s, and La Salvia’s essays in Mazzonis, Garibaldi condottiero. For a long-run analysis of the Italian route to the nation-in-arms, see Conti, “Il mito della ‘nazione armata’”.
51 On Garibaldi’s image as an international myth, see Riall, Garibaldi. On Mazzini, see Smith, Mazzini.
52 Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, I, p. 367.
Marmora’s draft was above all the second phase of the broader, coherent, and mostly successful strategy which enabled the Italian state to defeat all remaining threats to its own existence. In fact, some aspects of the pre-unification conscription system perfectly matched both political and technical needs of the new state. In 1863-1865, Italy was still experiencing a true civil war in the south and a centralized modern bureaucracy had yet to be created. In that context, the draft had two main goals. From a military point of view, conscription had to provide the regular army with the manpower it needed to sustain the military effort. From a political point of view, it was an important way of imposing the state’s presence in peripheral provinces and acquainting the new subjects with their status as Italian citizens.

The Ministry of War tried to achieve the first of these goals by conforming the new national army’s recruitment system to the best one available. As mentioned above, the Piedmont army was largely based on the French model, and the Second Empire’s army was still the most feared war machine in early 1860s Europe. Therefore, maintaining La Marmora’s draft did not mean the adoption of an outdated military model, nor was it a merely conservative policy; on the contrary, following the most imitated European example of the time seemed to be both the most obvious and the most effective option.

Politically speaking, La Marmora’s law seemed to be the best answer to the urgent demand for “statehood”. In fact, Piedmont draft’s mechanisms were already familiar to at least a part of the national civilian and military bureaucracy, and they had been already tested – successfully – in some other regions, such as Lombardy and Tuscany. Quite paradoxically, imposing the

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53 Although the Italian territory was much smaller and its populations were ethnically homogeneous, Italy’s attempt in the 1860s to effectively control its territory through the draft shared some features with the attempts made by some multiethnic states such as the Russian and the Ottoman Empires. On Nicholas I’s Russia, see Kagan, *The Military Reforms of Nicholas I*. On the Ottoman Empire, see Beşikçi’s contribution in this volume and the bibliography.

54 Almost all books for conscripts contained basic info about civics. See Sacchi, *Primo libro di lettura ad uso del soldato*.

55 Actually, Napoleon III had started doubting the efficiency of the French army already in the 1850s. See Kovacs, “French Military Institutions before the Franco-Prussian War”. For a contemporary Italian judgement stressing the French army’s superiority shortly before the Franco-Prussian War, see Calà Ulloa, *Guerra tra Prussia e Francia*.

56 It is important to bear in mind that the competition among the European powers and the traditionally supranational nature of military science contributed to the standardization not only of warfare, but also of many aspects of the peacetime military. On this, see Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power”.
Piedmont draft system upon the southern part of the country helped the former Bourbon and Papal civil servants, too. Since, realistically, no draft was in operation in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and Papal States, most of the southern bureaucrats had almost no expertise in enlistment operations. Consequently, they had to learn how to use the basic instruments of the so-called *révolution identitaire*\(^5^7\) for this new task. Therefore, the continuity in legal framework was a precious asset, since it enabled the Piedmont civil servants and officers to better assist their inexperienced colleagues.

In other words, opting for the extension of La Marmora’s law, instead of creating a conscription system *ex novo*, enabled the Italian authorities to rapidly establish a clear rule regarding one of the most constraining and unpopular obligations that the new state imposed on its citizens. Naturally, given the fragile administrative framework, national conscription could not immediately be put into effect, and the first call-up actually happened in 1864. Nevertheless, establishing a shared legal framework was a necessary prerequisite and the first goal to achieve. Enlisting Italian subjects according to the pre-unification rule played a decisive role in this effort. Moreover, exporting the Piedmont draft model was a viable continuation of the strategy adopted by early Italian governments in several other critical fields.

Actually, replacing the previous laws and institutions with the Piedmont ones was the main way in which the liberal establishment was able to build the new national state.\(^5^8\) Furthermore, if forcibly maintaining the previous regulations was seen by the national governments to be the best solution to quickly standardizing the legal framework within which Italian citizens lived, imposing La Marmora’s draft system all over the country was even more profitable, since it successfully dealt with three other very sensitive questions: defending the upper classes’ privileges with respect to military duty, funding the enlargement of the armed forces while respecting the postwar budgetary constraints, and keeping most key positions in the army under the control of the Piemontese military establishment even

\(^5^7\) On the “culture of identification”, see Noiriel, *La tyrannie du national*. For an example of the manuals addressed to draft councils to enable inexperienced mayors to execute the draft correctly, see Bernoni, *Manuale del Consiglio di leva*.

\(^5^8\) The Piedmont penal code was slightly changed in 1865 and kept in force in all national courts (apart from the Tuscan ones) until 1889; the Piedmont school system was imposed on all Italian regions and the fiscal system as well. On Italian state-building in the 1860s, see Romanelli, *L’Italia liberale*. 
though one-third of the potential draftees hailed from the Mezzogiorno.\textsuperscript{59} La Marmora’s draft system met all of those requirements.

First, the 1854 act detailed an extensive system of exemptions and allowed the richest draftees to buy themselves out of the obligation by hiring a substitute or paying a fee. Secondly, a small semiprofessional army was relatively cheap, as it was partially financed by liberation and replacement taxes. Thirdly, the long term of service enabled military authorities to “Piedmontize” southern recruits. Obviously, there was no ethnic dimension to Italian conscription,\textsuperscript{60} nor was the preference for Piedmont soldiers a purely punitive measure aimed at the defeated former enemies. In the eyes of the liberal establishment, “Piedmontness” was not an ascribed, culturally based category, but rather a synonym for “political reliability”. What is more, many high-ranking officers of the former Neapolitan and Tuscan armies had already gained this qualification by demonstrating their unconditional loyalty to the Savoy cause on the battlefields in 1820-1821 and 1848.\textsuperscript{61} After the extension of the draft to non-Piedmontese people, even simple soldiers had to “learn to be Piedmontese”, not in cultural but in political terms. Although several ex-Bourbon soldiers perceived this process as in reality a forced assimilation,\textsuperscript{62} “Piedmontizing” recruits actually consisted of transforming potentially untrustworthy provincial populations into disciplined and loyal subjects. The government was confident that this requirement would be met once the recruits had served five years under the command of mostly ex-Savoy COs.

This kind of long-term service was one of the reasons national conscription had to face very strong resistance in early 1860s Italy, mostly in those areas where the draft had previously involved just a few youngsters.\textsuperscript{63} Even

\textsuperscript{59} Italian census data from 1861 to the present are available at http://www.istat.it (accessed 15 April 2011).

\textsuperscript{60} Ethnically based draft policies were adopted in some nineteenth-century multiethnic states. On Russia, see Keep, \textit{Soldiers of the Tsar}. On the Ottoman Empire, see Aksan, \textit{Ottoman Recruitment in the Late Eighteenth Century}. See also Beşikçi’s contribution in this volume.

\textsuperscript{61} During the Crimean War, three of the five Savoy brigades were led by non-Piedmont officers (Manfredo Fanti, Enrico Cialdini, and Rodolfo Gabrielli di Montecchio) who had previously joined the Piedmont army. See Mazzetti, “Dagli eserciti pre-unitari all’esercito italiano”, p. 564.

\textsuperscript{62} An example of ex-Bourbon soldiers’ negative perception of their integration into the new national army is Fondazione Archivio Diaristico Nazionale [henceforth, ADN], Michele Musella, \textit{Nacqui nella notte de’ 20 Febbraio}, MP/96. Rochat and Massobrio also underlined that “The new unitary army’s ‘Piedmontization’ was carried out in too rigid a way, and it caused resentments, misinterpretations, and crises”. Rochat and Massobrio, \textit{Breve storia dell’esercito italiano dal 1861 al 1943}, p. 23.

If local communities often helped their own deserters by hiding and feeding them, desertion and reluctance were generally individual, spontaneous, and apolitical phenomena both in the Mezzogiorno and in the northern regions. In other words, draft-dodging did not always stem from indifference to the new nation-state, nor did it necessarily express the rejection of military service itself.

As military court sentences confirmed, many draft-evaders artlessly ignored what kind of duties the draft implied and failed to report for military service in good faith: some because they had emigrated for seasonal work, others because they had misunderstood the enlistment procedure, and still others even because in the countryside “These men [...] lived in a world in which the passage of time escaped their grasp” and basically they did not know that they were twenty years old!

Nevertheless, many other youngsters consciously escaped the draft. Some of them were scared of such an unknown experience; some others had been told about hard military life by ex-draftees; most draftees did not want to leave their home villages, not only because the village community was the only one to which they felt they belonged, but also because their five-year-long absence deprived their families of a much-needed source of labor and income.

If military service was a long, unpleasant parenthesis in the lives of most Italian conscripts, some youngsters approached the experience in a more positive way. Cultural and economic factors helped those men make sense of military service. The draft’s symbolic meaning as a rite of passage to adulthood played a decisive role, since most young men wished to be declared fit for the army as a public certification of their masculinity.

64 Bloch, *Feudal Society*, I, p. 73.
65 Like Corselli, *Letture educative compilate pei soldati del 57 reggimento fanteria*, several other books for recruits stressed the negative influence of fellow villagers’ and ex-soldiers’ stories about military service on conscripts’ approach to service and tried to balance them through rosy descriptions of military life, such as De Amicis, *La vita militare*. On the opposition between antimilitarist and militarist literature, see Del Negro, “De Amicis Versus Tarchetti”.
66 On the relationship between village community and national community in Italy, see Cavazza, *Piccole patrie*. The Italian situation can be compared to the German one, analyzed by Confino, *The National as Local Metaphor*.
67 The attitude of Italian youngsters toward the draft has been little studied. Some information is provided by literature. See, for example, Verga, *Cavalleria rusticana*. On the reasons for reluctance in nineteenth-century Italy, see Oliva, *Esercito, paese e movimento operaio*. Italians’ refusal to enlist shared many features with desertion in other countries, such as France and Egypt. See Rousseau, *Service militaire au XIXe siècle*, and Zürcher, “The Nation and Its Deserters”.
68 Oliva, “La coscrizione obbligatoria nell’Italia unita tra consenso e rifiuto”. This seems to be another aspect of conscription that enables international comparison, since such an ambiguous
Therefore, Italian men shared the ambiguous attitude toward enlistment – a mix of fear, resignation, and curiosity – of many other rural communities all over Europe. Economically speaking, enrollment could even represent a profitable employment opportunity.

As the government pointed out frequently, the goal of substitution and liberation was not just to allow the sons of the richest classes to pay for their liberation, but also to employ people who would otherwise be considered unproductive and socially dangerous. Several European governments justified their socially discriminatory systems by paternalistically presenting the exemptions as the prerequisite for employing lower classes in the military.69 Also, in Italy – according to the liberal establishment – long-term service and replacement had to be considered two sides of the same coin, since both acted in the “general interest” of a society in which each class had to fulfill its own role.

On the one hand, replacement strengthened the social equilibrium, since it prevented military obligations from damaging the careers of members of the future ruling class. As La Marmora pointed out, five years in the barracks “would force with excessive strictness [the draftees] to renounce, very often forever, liberal careers and professions, suffering a destiny much unluckier than that of other classes of citizens who are not affected by the military service in their arts or jobs”70. On the other hand, although liberation was perceived to be a hateful privilege by most of the lower-middle-class conscripts, the supplementary income from the liberation fees was redirected to the reenrollment fund, thereby perpetuating the cycle of increased employment and decreased crime and social unrest. Consequently, as the army would not have had enough money to employ volunteers without the liberation fees, it is probable that liberation was also seen by unemployed young men as the major means by which the state could provide them with a military employment opportunity. In the nineteenth-century Italian labor market, voluntary enlistment and even conscription could also be (or become) a professional choice.


69 On France, see Hippler’s contribution in this volume.

70 La Marmora’s talk is quoted by Massobrio, *Bianco, rosso e grigioverde*, p. 42.
“Conscripts by choice”: substitutes, volunteers, and reenlisted soldiers in the 1860s

Despite the double role of replacement as the means permitting the so-called “bourgeois reluctance” and as an employment agency, most studies have focused on the former aspect of the system of exemptions, whereas the latter has been largely neglected. This section deals with this question by briefly analyzing those who escaped the draft, their substitutes, and the reasons some youngsters preferred becoming soldiers to doing other jobs, as long as (re)enlistment in nineteenth-century Italy could be considered the outcome of a free choice.

If we look substitutions by unrelated people, one fact is particularly noticeable: draftees and their substitutes did not just share the same residential area, but also belonged to socially divided networks located in the same territory. In most cases, it is actually impossible to describe precisely what kind of relationship linked those people, and nor can we quantify how many conscripts knew their substitutes personally. Nevertheless, patronage relationships were sometimes evident, since the surrogates had worked for the conscript’s family before enlisting on his behalf. Therefore, replacing could even be considered as the continuation of that work relationship, and it remained, substantially, a family affair, at least according to the wider Latin meaning of the word “family”.

Sometimes, the conscript-substitute relationship was not so obvious. However, the overlapping of everyday life-space and a different social status suggests a previous asymmetrical relationship, which made substitution quite similar to the old regime’s recruitment practices: the state restricted itself to ratifying a private contract between the soldier (now the substitute), who was led to accept by his socio-economic subordinate status, and his “proprietor” (the substituted), whose exemption from serving personally roughly renewed the hierarchical superiority of ancient local lords with respect to their own peasants. Several memoirs and testimonies justify voluntary enlistment as a substitute by resignedly stressing the impossibility of denying a “favor” to a local notable.

71 Del Negro, “La leva militare in Italia”, p. 175.
72 If analyzed in terms of labor relations, brother and unrelated-person replacement cannot be confused, since they took place within quite different legal frameworks. Moreover, the agency of men involved in brother substitutions was probably much more limited, since the voluntary enrollment of one member instead of another could be part of a family strategy to minimize the damage the draft did to the ménage familial.
In other cases, there was no direct link between the draftee and the substitute, and a broker paired the interests of the elite with the urgent needs of jobless youngsters. Theoretically speaking, John Lynn described a “conscription army”73 as a kind of military organization in which labor relations are strictly limited to the volunteers and the public authorities. Nevertheless, in practice very often the broker’s action deeply affected the equilibrium between supply of and demand for manpower by indirectly helping the army employ involuntary instead of voluntary labor. The broker also had an impact on the relationship between these people and central power, as he had to speak positively of military careers and even provide potential substitutes with some essential cultural and behavioral attributes in order to make serving the state as appealing as possible and convince them to opt for a career that involved killing and risking death on the battlefield in the Mezzogiorno or elsewhere. In other words, brokers acted as middlemen in two ways. On the one hand, they connected two socially different worlds; on the other, they acted as a true cultural mediator both between the local culture and the national one, and between the military set of values and the civilian one.

When brokers had to overcome resistance, they did not hesitate to use extreme measures to carry out their business: threats, blackmail, and corruption were common practices, at least according to penal court papers. Actually, moral suasion was probably the most commonly used method of leaning on potential surrogates, but it was informal and has left very few documentary traces. Therefore, it is difficult to state when substitute was a substantially free choice and when it mostly was the outcome of external pressure.

However, hiring a substitute was not very difficult, especially in the first postunification years. Annual substitution data suggest a declining trend, but confirmed that substitution remained a fairly common practice until the early 1870s: in 1863, the Ministry of War allowed 1,654 ordinary substitutions (surrogazione ordinaria) and 394 substitutions between brothers; in 1864-1865, 428 substitutes were enlisted (188 unrelated people and 240 conscripts’ brothers). Obviously, the number dropped in 1866-1868 because of the war against Austria: the Ministry of War allowed only 204 ordinary substitutions and 152 replacements performed by draftees’ brothers. In 1868-1869, the replacement number rose slightly (142 unrelated surrogates and 176 brothers were allowed to serve under the colors on behalf of other men).74

73 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West”.
74 Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno (1864-1870).
From the perspective of the richest families, substitution was affordable\(^{75}\) and – at least in some cases – allowed them to exploit their local influence to force even unwilling fellow villagers to accept replacement and to fulfill the obligation on their behalf. From the surrogate’s perspective, a fixed salary was a tantalizing prospect, and the most common reason why both civilian courts and military authorities had to deal with dozens of fraudulent reenlistments every year.\(^{76}\)

Although substitution was cheaper and easily accessible thanks to wide networks, many elite members preferred paying a higher fee and letting the state find a substitute for them. The liberation tax was so expensive that some people who had applied for it then rejected because they could not actually afford it.\(^{77}\) However, only liberation secured the replaced draftees against the many substitutes who deserted shortly after taking the first payment installment. The richest Italian families did not want to risk both a significant loss of money and – especially – the forced personal enlistment imposed on the draftees whose substitutes then deserted, should they be unable to send a suitable substitute to the corps within a few weeks.

Consequently, in 1860s Italy, substitution was a local phenomenon, mostly involving both the middle and the upper bourgeoisie, whereas liberation was truly elite. Therefore, liberation data can be considered a reliable index of the upper class’s attitude to military obligation.

First, the applications’ geographical distribution confirms that the ex-Bourbon subjects were the ones most reluctant to join the military, whereas only a few former Piedmont citizens used their money to avoid being drafted (see Table 16.4).\(^{78}\) Actually, this is not surprising: several scholars have already emphasized the ex-Piedmont subjects’ stronger attachment to the new state’s destiny.\(^{79}\) Secondly, liberation was predominantly an urban phenomenon: in
1867, for example, Naples, Palermo, Florence, Milan, and Turin supplied about 20 per cent of the annual contingent and 40 per cent of liberated draftees.  

Table 16.4 Origins of liberated draftees and reenlisted soldiers (1867-1870)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former citizenship</th>
<th>Liberated draftees (%)</th>
<th>Voluntarily enlisted men (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of the Two Sicilies</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Sardinia</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Duchy of Tuscany</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Torre, *Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno* (1867-1870).

On the other side, liberation data also supply scholars with precious information about the other two actors involved in replacement: the military authorities who selected the substitutes and the men who replaced their richer countrymen. Since, in liberation, military authorities acted as a broker by encouraging (re)enrollment and matching the conscripts’ applications with the volunteers’ enlistments, the draftee-broker-substitute triangle was independent from the conscripts’ networks. Therefore, the surrogates’ origins reflected not only the people’s attitude toward the draft, but also the government’s attitude toward the draftees. In fact, the ruling class’s mistrust of potential anti-Savoy plotters played a decisive role in keeping the number of southern substitutes low. Consequently, northern citizens were overrepresented within the volunteers’ group.

As in the first postunification stages, the government also tried to keep the army’s composition under control with respect to the percentage of volunteers. La Marmora’s law allowed volunteers with six months of experience to apply for reenlistment, giving explicit preference to all draftees.

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80 The data concerning the origins of the liberated draftees must be read in light of the data on the whole Italian population. According to the 1861 census, only 14.2 per cent of the Italian population lived in cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants. See Malanima, *Italian Urban Population, 1300-1861*; paper available on http://www.paolomalanima.it/default_file/Page646.htm (accessed 28 May 2011).
serving for their last year, on the condition that they had a clean record and a
good-conduct certificate from their previous regiment, were single, and were
fit for service. The preference for regular soldiers led military authorities
to frequently hire men who were already under the flag as conscripts. In
fact, most substitutes were affidati anziani, that is, they simply extended
their service time after discharge. In other words, when those men replaced
their liberated comrades, they were neither true volunteers nor conscripts.
They voluntarily signed on to the army after having previously been forced
to join it. In short, we could call them "conscripts by choice". In 1870-1871, for
example, 76.5 per cent of the substitutes were twenty-five to thirty years old
and 81 per cent had already served for at least five years, whereas volunteers
under twenty-five were just 10 per cent, and only 19 per cent had not yet spent
five years in the army. In the previous years, the picture had been more or
less the same: in 1869, 802 of 1,131 (71 per cent) twenty-five- to thirty-year-old
men were enlisted, every one of them having served for at least five years.

Again, the main criteria for selection was not the applicants' patriotism
and military prowess, but their discipline and respect for authority. In
1870-1871 only 933 men of 2,460 reenlisted men (38 per cent) had fought for
Italy at least once (798 once, 124 twice, and only 11 three times), while 1,527
had taken part in no campaign (62 per cent) and just 23 (0.9 per cent) had
gained a medal for valor. In 1869, veterans constituted 647 of 1,131 (57 per
cent), but 574 of them (89 per cent) had fought only once, despite the several
wars Italy had engaged in between 1859 and 1868.

Although the selection process was not particularly strict, and most
reenrolled men were no more than disciplined soldiers, applying for reen-
listment was a demanding choice, since reenlisted soldiers had to serve
for five more years and could not abandon the army if they changed their
minds. However, reenlistment could seem a good bargain for many reasons,
especially economic ones. From that point of view, the Piedmont-Italian
law followed the traditional pattern which assured that the reenrolled men

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82 According to Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell'anno (1867-1870), reenlistments were 1,324
out of 1,466 in 1864-1865 and 587 out of 653 in 1865-1866.
83 Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell'anno 1847 e delle vicende dell'esercito dal 1 ottobre 1868
al 30 settembre 1869, p. 140.
84 Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell'anno 1845 e delle vicende dell'esercito dal 1 ottobre 1870
al 30 settembre 1871, p. 115.
85 According to Alan Ramsay Skelley, “economic pressure was the principal impetus to recruit-
ment” also in the nineteenth-century British army. See Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home,
p. 248.
received quite a high sum immediately after entering the corps and then extra monthly pay of 12 L. along with the interest (4-4.5 per cent) on the whole amount deposited by the liberated conscript.

Both reenlisted soldiers and scholars pointed out that the salary was too low to live a respectable life – indeed this was a very common complaint among European war professionals. Nevertheless, the Italian rank and file did not get by badly, mostly because the government handled a progressive decrease in available *affidati* by making a military career more and more appealing with respect to monthly salary, which was doubled (from 12 to 25 L.), and other benefits, such as the pension increase to 300 L./year and the automatic liberation from service of all the volunteer’s brothers.

Altogether, the professional soldiers’ salaries were more or less equivalent to those of other low-ranking public employees and basically in proportion to the modest skills they had to offer in the labor market, their human capital. Moreover, the military option assured them of a certain and predictable career, a guaranteed income, and some comforts most of them would not be able to afford otherwise: decent accommodation, clothes and shoes, three meals a day (with meat at one meal) within a controlled diet with limited alcohol consumption, and even medical care, not to mention the beneficial effects on their health from the familiarization with some elementary sanitary practices imposed by discipline regulations. In other words, signing on in the army could be somewhat appealing because it could be paradoxically perceived as a “routine job” like those in the bureaucracy, at least with respect to the benefits attached.

Some long-term benefits accompanied the short-term ones. First, once definitively discharged, reenlisted men received a state pension which was

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87 Reenlistment law n. 3062, 7 July 1866, articles 9 and 11. The law is quoted and commented by Torre, *Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno 1845 e delle vicende dell’esercito dal 1 ottobre 1865 al 30 settembre 1866*, pp. 3-30. It is interesting that Torre explicitly looked at the 1866 act under the light of the direct competition for manpower between the army and other employers, whereas scholars have analyzed it almost exclusively in terms of organizational and draft policy. See, for example, Ilari, *Storia del servizio militare in Italia*, I, pp. 282-283.

88 On civil servants’ income, see Melis, *La burocrazia*.

89 Some classical well-being indexes suggested the quality of life in the army was better than outside. For example, soldiers usually put on weight during their service. See Livi, *Antropometria militare*. On Italian soldiers’ everyday life, see Quirico, *Naja*. On Italian peasants’ everyday life, see the interviews collected by Revelli, *Il mondo dei vinti*.

90 From this point of view, Italian reenlistment had much in common with the French system. See Hippler’s contribution in this volume.
quite low, but was still a privilege in a country where a welfare system did not exist yet. Secondly, as reenlisted men could not marry while serving, they saved much money by delaying marriage and consequently reducing the number of future mouths to feed: not a minor issue for poor rural households whose marginal propensity to consume was very low and whose consumption composition was dominated by basic commodities. Thirdly, all men who reenlisted as soldiers had a good chance to be promoted as noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and some possibilities even to become COs. Despite the low salary and the relatively modest social status of lower ranks in the military, reenlistment could thus be a mechanism of upward social mobility for former peasants and shepherds with few, if any, other chances to improve their conditions within the static Italian society of that time.

Although the appeal of a military career mostly consisted of its economic advantages, some nonmaterial benefits also encouraged men to enlist. Probably the first one was their families’ gratitude for automatically freeing all their brothers from service (after 1866); the second one consisted of their own subjective perception of their new status; the third stemmed from the social prestige linked to their job, at least in the small towns and the countryside. Psychologically, being part of a self-referential male-only society marked both inside and outside by its own habits, dress, and slang was, for most of these youngsters, a source of pride in and of itself. Furthermore, the literate soldiers could even imagine themselves as those patriotic warrior heroes that Romanticism had made famous worldwide and that schoolbooks described as models of virtue.

Socially, wearing the uniform during parades provided these uninfluential youngsters with people’s admiration, despite their social background and current economic conditions. In addition, the liberal ruling class promoted an intensive media campaign to minimize the contribution of a democratic military to the unification process and to stress “the role the army had played in the founding myth of the national community, namely,

91 Scarpellini, L’Italia dei consumi.
92 For a recent sociological analysis of group dynamics mostly focusing on the Italian army, see Battistelli, Ammendola, and Greco, Manuale di sociologia militare.
93 Patriotic soldiers and their heroic deeds constituted the most common plot of the novels addressed to both soldiers and students. See Rigotti Colin, “L’âge d’or” de la littérature d’enfance et de jeunesse italienne.
94 Italian military parades perfectly reflected George Mosse’s idea of mass ceremonies as nationalization and legitimizing means. See Porciani, La festa della nazione. For a coeval example of soldiers’ pride deriving from taking part in parades, see Repetto, Rimpatrio.
Therefore, the habitual fascination with uniforms was boosted by periodic celebrations in which reenlisted soldiers proudly led the rank and file thanks to their long experience in the regiments.

Altogether, both material and nonmaterial benefits could explain why some men reenlisted, despite long marches, hard training, and the strong appeal of and opportunitie in paramilitary professions, such as Custom and Forrestal guards, where many ex-conscripts found “more present advantages and good pensions for the future”. Nevertheless, a major role in encouraging conscripts to reenlist was likely played by the very fact that they were now senior soldiers. As briefly mentioned above, several men refused to enlist voluntarily because of the fear of a sudden and radical lifestyle change. And, according to the draftees’ memoirs, the first steps as a junior recruit were effectively an ordeal. On the one hand, recruits were forced to redefine their networks in a hostile environment whose rules deeply affected sociability even among peers. On the other hand, some of the typical military rites of passage (hair cutting, wearing of uniform, etc.) suddenly altered the draftees’ appearance and brought their previous set of values into question. Consequently, most recruits experienced a sort of loss of individuality, which was made worse both by the compulsory abandonment of their own dialects (at least in official conversations) and by the senior soldiers’ attempts to impose the informal hierarchy upon the newcomers by force.

When draftees had to decide their future after discharge, they had already passed this difficult phase. Actually, the affidati anziani could attain the unofficial rank of senior (anziano). And life in the barracks was much more pleasant for senior soldiers even if rules were theoretically the same for everyone. Their comrades’ respect and the constraints of discipline varied according to seniority, sometimes even despite ranks and positions. Therefore, the first year in the army was unanimously considered to be the hardest, not only because of the extreme rigidity of the NCOs’ control, but also because of the psychological pressure and the physical violence which characterized the asymmetrical relationship between senior soldiers and the younger ones.

Mondini, “Esercito e Nazione”, p. 106. Naturally, linking warfare and nation-building is not an Italian peculiarity. For the British case, see Colley, Britons; for the German one, see Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, especially vol. I, The Prussian Tradition, 1740-1890. For a comparative approach, see Leonhard, Bellizismus und Nation.

Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno 1845 e delle vicende dell’esercito dal 1 ottobre 1865 al 30 settembre 1866, p. 9.
Several memoirs and even some official studies remarked on the high rate of mortality in the Italian barracks during the first year of service.97 One explicitly linked mortality to hazing, while most testimonies restricted themselves to describing the officers’ attitude to “reconcile discipline with the indispensable regard and special consideration” towards “senior soldiers who knew one more than the devil”.98 Such an unwritten untouchability was confirmed also by court-martial statistics: senior soldiers were sentenced much more infrequently and mildly than their younger comrades.99 Therefore, it is at least plausible that another reason why conscripts reenlisted was that they had already passed the adaptation phase of military life and consequently they attained the privileges of their rank in the informal hierarchy of the regiment.

Although at a first glance senior soldiers had more than one good reason for reenlisting, for some of them commodifying their labor was much more a forced choice than the outcome of a freely defined strategy. According to La Marmora’s law, youngsters were recruited at the age of twenty and they actively served for five years before discharge. Therefore, military service not only stripped draftees of about one-seventh (and even more in the poor southern regions with lower life expectancy rates) of their whole life,100 but also broke their cycle of life exactly at the core point. Naturally, the military service’s effects on the recruits’ cycles of life changed according to individual situation. However, going home after military service was a shock for many conscripts, as they found their own world totally changed. In fact, during the conscripts’ absence, parents or relatives often died, girlfriends married other villagers, and friends emigrated forever.101 It was no coincidence that draftees left their villages only after saying a final goodbye to all their fellow villagers.

97 Sormani, Mortalità dell’esercito italiano.
98 Lazzerini, In caserma, pp. 125-126. Naturally, descriptions of hazing largely differed according to the rank of the memoirist. It was depicted from the officers’ perspective by De Rossi, La vita di un ufficiale italiano sino alla guerra, while it was reported from the simple soldiers’ point of view by ADN, L.D.M., Ragazzo, alpino, parà, Mg/01.
100 In 1874, the life expectancy at the age of 20 was still just 37.7 years (31.2 at birth): Corsini, “Per una storia della statura in Italia nell’ultimo secolo”, p. 18.
101 Popular songs and tales are very interesting sources for analyzing the discharged draftees’ perception of their experience in the military. See Ferraro, Canti popolari monferrini, and Nigra, Canti popolari del Piemonte.
The draft affected many youngsters’ professional lives too. Actually, the military service’s consequences on the professional sphere largely depended on the draftee’s job. Obviously, peasants were less disturbed by draft, since they could go back home and start again tilling the soil without looking for another job. And finding a job after discharge was quite easy for farmhands too. Even if the long absence from the village weakened the conscripts’ social capital, the draft was not perceived by their fellow villagers as a voluntary absence. Thus, most draftees were not excluded from the informal welfare system which traditionally helped the former emigrants to get back into the local community and the working world.102

By contrast, craftsmen were more damaged by the draft, since most of them were still doing an apprenticeship with older artisans when they were drafted. As true vocational training was still to be defined in nineteenth-century Italy, learning by doing represented the core of apprenticeship. Therefore, abandoning their apprenticeship for five years in practice thwarted any plan and mostly forced former conscripts to be content with less remunerative jobs. Although the skills required for setting up shop were not very complex, those young men had not still acquired enough expertise to be able to work on their own. Moreover, most ex-conscripts joined the army with very low educational attainment and regimental schools did not really help them improve their nonmilitary knowhow, since training and schooling in the military primarily aimed to transform recruits into disciplined soldiers. Once discharged, this techno-military knowhow was the only skill conscripts had gained by serving. Such expertise had little use outside the army, whereas many memoirs stressed the difficulties that former draftees faced once they tried to start their “career” again.103

In short, many Italian ex-draftees shared the postdischarge destiny of their Austrian and French comrades, as, after many years in the army, they had no other professional choice than to “voluntarily” remain soldiers.104 Naturally, this circumstance cannot be generalized, especially because no source enables us to know the reenlisted men’s professional background and to precisely quantify the percentage of craftsmen within this group. Nevertheless, it is very likely that the reduction of the civilian employment chances stemming from five-year-long military service led conscripts to reenlist.

102 On the informal welfare system operating in most nineteenth-century Italian villages, see Lorenzetti and Merzario, Il fuoco acceso.
103 Fambri, “La società e la Chiesa”.
104 See Deák, Beyond Nationalism, and Hippler’s contribution in this volume.
Altogether, analyzing military recruitment in terms of labor relations leads us to underline both the limits of some previous interpretations of reenlistment and the problems originating in the use of the official taxonomy in describing social actors’ professional choices. On the one hand, reenlistment cannot be simply considered as a sign of the ex-soldiers’ patriotism. Other decisive factors – both economic and noneconomic – encouraged draftees to reenlist in the army. On the other hand, the boundary between volunteerism and compulsory service, as well as that between forced and commodified military labor, was not so clear. Actually, most *affidati* were draftees who prolonged their term of service. In other words, compulsory service and volunteerism were not two antagonistic approaches to military life, but two successive phases. At the same time, the volunteer status of many reenlisted men was questionable, since commodifying their labor force in the army after discharge could be read as the consequence of the juridical constraints that forced these people to serve as conscripts and – in so doing – to renounce any other career.

Generally speaking, the 1860s Italian army was a “typical” conscript standing army, and it simply consisted of randomly selected conscripts, volunteers, and voluntarily reenlisted soldiers. Practically, some features of the Italian military system made the army not correspond to the theory. First, conscription was not universal, and it actually involved only the poorest part of the fit young population. Secondly, most “true volunteers” (those who had left their own home to join the army during the 1859-1860 campaigns) were discharged shortly after the end of the war, since they were suspected of antimonarchy sentiment. Therefore, volunteerism was mostly an alternative to the regular army, not a part of it. Thirdly, long-term service and the government’s preference for a French-style semi-professional militia kept the 1860s Italian army’s professionalization rate high. This policy enabled the army to act as a great employer in nineteenth-century Italian labor market, but it also affected the demand/supply equilibrium by drastically reducing conscripts’ freedom of choice, both while serving and after discharge.
From state-building to nation-building: volunteers and draftees in Italy after 1870

Although scholars still discuss whether Ricotti’s reform was a continuation of the Destra Storica’s military policy, the attempt to balance the army’s social composition “in name of a principle of sacred equality among all citizens in face of the so-called blood tax” represented a true cultural and practical revolution which had important consequences for post-1870 labor relations within the military. The most relevant one concerned the change in the general attitude toward commodifying military labor. During the 1860s, Catholic values and personal benefits stemming from service were largely used by the liberal ruling class for ideologically justifying the military obligation. The extra allowance for reenlistment was obviously one of the most convincing arguments.

In addition, commodifying the labor force was largely accepted as a legitimate economic behavior, just as paying for liberation was mostly considered to be a right indissolubly attached to elite status. In other words, both practices were not only legal, but also morally acceptable. This idea of military obligation had been hegemonic for some years. However, already in the second half of the 1860s, the 1854/1862 recruitment system started showing its limits. On the one hand, a mix of cultural (the end of patriotic enthusiasm), demographic (the retirement of most of the veterans of the battles of the Risorgimento), and economic (the increasing job supply deriving from the recent industrialization in northern Italy, that is, the traditional source of volunteers) factors reduced the number of volunteers. Consequently, the military administration was soon forced to allow liberations without having enough substitutes to comply with the numerous applications, and not to renounce the precious income stemming from the related fees. In practice, liberation rapidly became a sort of ill-concealed exemption tax.

105 The Ricotti policy’s continuity with those of his predecessors was first suggested by Corsi, Italia, 1870-1895. For a contrasting view, see Minniti, “Preparazione ed iniziativa”.
106 Ricotti’s report on his law proposal is quoted by Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, II, p. 285.
107 Although the religious tolerance stated by the 1848 constitution and the tensions with the pope prevented Catholicism from supplying official ideological justification for the draft, Christian virtues played a central role in Italian pedagogy for conscripts. See Paiano, “Religione e patria negli opuscoli cattolici per l’esercito italiano”. The same happened in tsarist Russia. See Wirtschafter, From Serfs to Russian Soldiers. On the French case, see Roynette, “Bons pour le service”, chs 5-6.
108 The opposite trend is precisely described in Del Negro, “La leva militare in Italia”, p. 191.
On the other hand, La Marmora’s discriminatory draft contributed little to making the army a well-organized war machine and an efficient nationalization agency, even if the liberal propaganda continuously stressed the central role of the army in “making the Italians”. In this context, the defeats in Custoza and Lissa during the Third War of Independence (1866) against Austria did not cause the definitive crisis of La Marmora’s approach to the recruitment question, but reinforced a preexisting double trend: on the one side, poor military performance discredited the army’s public image definitively, and transformed a military career into an unattractive professional choice; on the other side, military defeat was attributed to the soldiers’ lack of attachment to the nation. Consequently, military obligation officially became a personal duty, the possibility to buy oneself out of the obligation was denounced as illegitimate, and the army stopped employing a commodified labor force because allowing liberation was morally equivalent to letting people betray their country.

In addition, from the 1870s onwards Italian youngsters had fewer good reasons to reenlist. The army was no longer a mechanism for upward mobility. Budgetary constraints drastically reduced soldiers’ promotions to NCOs. Moreover, NCOs from the rank and file had very few chances to become COs without attending academy courses.109 The advantages of a good standardized educational background were evident by then, especially in countries – such as Italy – where officers had the crucial mission of shaping recruits both morally and patriotically. In fact, these “national cadres” were expected to have sufficient technical knowledge, adequate education, and certain pro-monarchy and antisocialist inclinations which the government supposed were naturally linked to higher social ranks.110 Being bourgeois was regarded as a guarantee on its own, the way “Piedmontness” had been immediately after unification. Therefore, high fees and scholarships reserved for officers’ sons prevented most of the common people from embarking upon a military career and definitely made the high ranks in the army an elite-only prerogative.111 Most conscripts perfectly understood

109 The professionalization of the officer corps was a European trend in the second half of the nineteenth century. On the professionalization of the German officer corps, see Demeter, The German Officer Corps in Society and State. On the French side, see Strieter, “An Army in Evolution”.
110 On the COs’ leading role in the army’s nationalization effort in the 1870s-1880s, see Del Negro, “La professione militare nel Piemonte costituzionale e nell’Italia liberale”.
111 On military schools and academies in nineteenth-century Italy, see Caciulli, “Il sistema delle scuole militari in età liberale”, and Pecchioli, Le accademie e le scuole militari italiane.
the message and preferred to be discharged after the regular term. Very limited career prospects and discrimination in the regiment’s everyday life became additional reasons for the professional soldiers’ discontent, already stoked by the ever more antimilitarist Zeitgeist prevailing in the so-called Age of Capital.

In the 1870s-1880s, most draftees perceived military life not only as routine, out of date, and brutal, but also as an unprofitable parenthesis to close as soon as possible. Although many conscripts’ memoirs still spoke of military service as a hard and long experience, it was no longer the five-year-long uprooting ordeal. Both the term reduction and Ricotti’s insistence on the integration between the army and civilian society enabled draftees to still “feel like civilians” while serving and to quickly reintegrate themselves in their village communities once they were discharged.

As long as recruits were under the colors, the 1872 discipline regulations encouraged them to establish relations with locals. Furthermore, conscripts had to attend not only elementary school courses, but also periodic conferences about practical subjects such as hygiene, agronomy, and family management. Obviously, political and moral indoctrination was the core of those lessons, since the liberal government wanted ex-draftees to “continue their beneficial action by spreading the habit of wisely living and the deep respect for the laws in the whole nation”, especially among those youngsters who had escaped the intensive indoctrination process thanks to a “good number”. However, the effective and systematic education program laid out by Ricotti’s regimental schools reform of 1872 also provided draftees with precious nonmilitary skills they could successfully use in the civilian labor market along with their social capital. When conscripts came back home after “only” thirty months under the colors, they could

113 General De Bono stated that the former NCOs who were promoted as COs were usually ostracized in everyday barracks life by their own colleagues who had attended academy courses. See De Bono, Nell’esercito nostro prima della guerra, p. 27.
114 On the nineteenth-century spirit, see Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875.
115 ADN, S.S., La storia di famiglia, Mp/91, pp. 36-37.
116 Ministero della Guerra, Regolamento di disciplina militare del 1. dicembre 1872, article 10, § 46.
117 On regimental schools, see Manghi, “Scuola e caserma”; Mastrangelo, Le “scuole reggimentali” 1848-1913; Della Torre, “Le scuole reggimentali di scrittura e lettura tra il Regno di Sardegna e il Regno d’Italia”. On Italian military pedagogy, see Labanca, “I programmi dell’educazione morale del soldato”. Italian pedagogic effort had much in common with those elsewhere, e.g., in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. See Roynette, “Bons pour le service”, chs 5-6; French, Military Identities, ch. 3; Kirn, Soldatenleben in Württemberg 1871-1914, ch. 16.
still rely on their previous networks and – in addition – they had acquired significant human capital. It consisted not only of reading, writing, and other practical skills, but also of the social prestige they gained within their own village communities thanks to the experience they had had during military service. Conscripts traveled a lot, visited big cities, took part in grandiose ceremonies, and sometimes even met the king personally; in other words, military service made them more educated and open-minded than most of their fellow villagers. This was a significant competitive advantage within local labor markets and enabled former conscripts to become well-respected members of their village communities despite their young age. Therefore, discharged draftees were really free to choose their job either in the military or civilian world, as long as these two options existed. And most ex-conscripts chose the second option.

Actually, the increasing lack of substitutes was not a minor factor in the government’s decision to banish commodified labor force from the army. Although the defeat in the 1866 war played a role in bringing commodification into question both from a military and an ethical point of view, it would be misleading to read the renunciation of reenlistment as an unilateral and strictly political choice. The evolution in the Italian mentality and the labor market affected labor relations within the military as well.

For years the Italian semiprofessional army had successfully fought for manpower against civilian employers mostly thanks to four elements: first, the competitive set of benefits offered to reenlisted soldiers; secondly, the youngsters’ patriotic enthusiasm because of the unexpected unification; thirdly, the tendency to consider draftee replacement and commodifying the labor force as legitimate economic strategies; and, fourthly, the lack of alternative job opportunities for ex-draftees, especially craftsmen and clerks. By the second half of the 1870s all these conditions had changed and military careers increasingly lost their appeal. Consequently, the government decided (or was forced?) to base the post-1870 army upon unfree labor, i.e., exclusively upon thousands of conscripts forced to look at the army as a “second family” and fight for the only legitimate reason: helping the nation to win the Darwinian struggle for survival. After Ricotti’s reform had forbidden the corps to hire men on behalf of rich draftees, the only form of volunteerism in the Italian army was represented by one-year volunteers. However, as mentioned above, most one-year volunteers were not “true volunteers”; instead they were a privileged group of conscripts

118 Ministero della Guerra, Regolamento di disciplina militare del 1. dicembre 1872, article 9, § 39.
who enlisted as volunteers simply in order to make their military service easier and shorter.

Again, a standard taxonomy is misleading when mechanically applied to the different types of man who enlisted in the Italian army, particularly to volunteers. Actually, voluntary and forced labor continued to be intermingled until the eve of World War I.

Conclusions

This brief overview of the Italian conscription experience suggests the necessity of prudence in applying tricky concepts, such as “universal conscription”, “volunteer”, and “draftee”. On the one hand, different phenomena risk being erroneously confused under the vague label of “conscript army”. On the other hand, the shift from the pre-unification professional-dynastic militia toward the national conscript army risks being wrongly regarded as a linear progression.

Actually, the wide range of draft systems operating on the peninsula (both synchronously and diachronically) shows that conscription is the product of a constant and dialectic process which involves the draftees and the state. On the one side, the state tried to make the opposing needs of political and military authorities compatible. On the other side, conscripts react actively to their military obligation. In so doing, draftees contributed to shaping conscription laws and practices, since their resistance forced the central power both to repress the extreme expressions of refusal and to compromise, by granting some return, material or otherwise, for the draftees' peaceful acceptance of their military duty.

Naturally, the outcome of this negotiation depends mostly on the state's contractual power. Long- and short-term factors (the lack of financial resources, infrastructure, and efficient bureaucracy, etc.) can undermine the state's ability to impose its authority over the entire country and to put its conscription policy in practice exactly as had been planned. In such disadvantaged conditions, conscription can help the ruling class construct a centralized state that can effectively impose its authority on its subjects – but it is also a very dangerous issue. Actually, drafting men from uncontrolled provinces is similar to committing the two most important elements of modern “stateness” – the monopoly of legitimate violence and the right to defend the territory from external threats – to unreliable people, both military and politically. In these cases, a “conscript army” tends to become
nothing more than a legal framework for different forms of recruitment whose major aim is to select recruits according to the ruling class’s interests.

Italy in the 1860s was a perfect example of this. Soon after unification, the liberal government introduced the draft into every annexed land in order to enforce its control over the new provinces and to prevent any external threat to its independence. Nevertheless, the ruling class reduced the risk of arming untrustworthy men by making conscription not genuinely universal. In other words, in the first decade after unification, the government needed its own citizens but it did not trust most of them. La Marmora’s draft system was the solution to this dilemma. In fact, recruiting the Italian nation according to Piedmont draft law was the cornerstone of the government’s strategy to keep the loyalty of the newborn militia under control.

On the one hand, substitution and liberation enabled the military authorities to prevent anti-monarchy and anti-unification feelings from eroding the core of the monarchical power by funding – through the replacement fees – the enlistment of reliable substitutes instead of potentially disloyal draftees. Besides, in 1860s Europe, buying oneself out of military duty was still considered to be morally legitimate by public opinion. Similarly, hiring a commodified military labor force was largely accepted, especially in those countries – such as Italy – where employment conditions in the army were decent, and official rhetoric described reenlistment as a profitable employment opportunity for jobless and poor men.

On the other hand, long-term service enabled officers to transform draftees into disciplined soldiers and loyal Savoy subjects. Moreover, a five-year-long absence from the civilian world led many conscripts to revise their plans, and “voluntarily” reenroll because of a lack of alternatives. Although it is very difficult to state the reason why more than 1,000 males reenlisted every year, these features of the draft help us explain how the army could be competitive in the struggle for unskilled labor, despite budgetary constraints. Moreover, it shows to what extent a sharp distinction between free and unfree military labor was misleading in nineteenth-century Italy. Any taxonomy must be carefully used.

After 1870, the fulfillment of the unification process led the government to modify the aims of conscription from state-building to nation-building. In peacetime, “making the Italians” became the first goal of military service, and a German-style draft system was set up to achieve this aim. In fact, Ricotti’s new recruitment law looked much like the German one: military service became a personal obligation, the service term was halved, and liberation and ordinary substitution were replaced by “one-year volunteerism”. Naturally, the reform affected several variables of post-1875 military
labor: duration, income, and legal constraints at least. Briefly, voluntary enlistment was no longer either a profitable employment or a mechanism for upward mobility.

However, the new conscription’s most significant effect on labor relations in the military was ideological. In particular, the abolition of liberation not only prevented the army from employing ex-draftees as substitutes, but also delegitimized the commodification of labor force in itself. Escaping military service by paying a tax was considered more and more a sign of the draftees’ unjustifiable indifference to the destiny of the fatherland. At the same time, replacing liberated men was more and more seen as an immoral way to earn money from helping those reluctant “Italian brothers” avoid fulfilling their own obligations to the national community.

Consequently, starting from the early 1870s, the idea that lower ranks should be military professionals lost its legitimacy and the army in the main stopped employing free and commodified labor force instead of draftees. Serving in the military became a personal mission that men had to accomplish in the name of the natural brotherhood of countrymen, rather than a job to be performed by professionals.

In conclusion, the Italian case study suggests that the features of the draft systems mostly depend on political issues. An exemption system, replacement, liberation, and voluntary enlistment are the most common means through which the ruling class keeps the sociological composition and the political reliability of the army under control. Technical arguments are usually used by the government to justify its military policies, but they actually do not deeply influence the choices concerning the draft.

Similarly, ideological issues – particularly those connected with nation-building – affect the draft. Charging the army with the task of nation-building produces significant changes in draft practices not only in technical terms (the length of service, the size of the annual call-up, etc.), but also in the official ideological justification of the draft, in the meaning of military obligation, and in the legitimacy of commodifying military labor. A strong ideological link is established between military service, citizenship, and national identity. The Italian draft after 1870 would be not understandable outside this ideological framework.

Economic factors also played an important role. In particular, budgetary constraints affected the Italian draft in two ways. On the one hand, they fixed the number of conscripts effectively enlisted. On the other, they limited the competitiveness of the army in the struggle against other employers for the labor force.
Conversely, the demographic issue is a much less influential factor, as the Italian population largely overwhelmed the recruitment needs. If anything, the sudden availability of new population after unification represents a problem for the Piedmontese military authorities, since it reduced the percentage of politically reliable draftees and supplied the new national army with very few further reliable volunteers. Supply on the military labor market cannot be measured simply by quantifying the eligible volunteers. The employer's political and regional prejudices against some of the available “employees” reduces the supply of labor on the market in reality.

Verifying to what extent the nineteenth-century Italian conscription experience shares these features with other draft systems is the reason why this case study has been involved in an ambitious diachronic and global comparison, the Fighting for a Living project.
Nation-building, war experiences, and European models

The rejection of conscription in Britain

Jörn Leonhard

At the crossroads of state-building, nation-building, and war experiences: the evolution of the model of a nation-in-arms

The evolution of nations and nation-states was linked with experiences of war.¹ The long process of external and internal state-building was a history of warfare and its revolutionary impacts. Most of the numerous territorial states of the early modern period did not survive this violent restructuring of Europe. Between the last third of the eighteenth century and the end of the nineteenth century the number decreased from about 500 states around 1500 to about 20 around 1900. State-building, so much intensified between 1794 and 1815, was directly linked to the experience of wars, and the British war-state of the eighteenth century is a particular illustration of this fundamental aspect of modern history.² As a part of this complex process, justifications of war changed, pointing to the new meaning of nation and nation-state as dominant paradigms of political and social legitimacy.³

But war not only accompanied the external processes of state-building. It also represented, from the 1750s onwards, a possible means of political emancipation and participation and hence became part of internal nation-building: this is why the modern concept of conscription is such a powerful analytical tool. War changed its character: from being merely dynastic affairs, and cabinet wars, fought with hired mercenaries from different countries who did not identify with an abstract notion of the nation, to wars fought, in theory at least, in the name of the whole nation and by the whole nation-in-arms. On the one hand, and from the last third of

¹ See Leonhard, Bellizismus und Nation, “Nation-States and Wars”; see the chapters by Frevert, Jaun, Strachan, Förster, and Beyrau in Frevert, Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, pp. 17-142; for the German case, see the chapters by Schmidt, Carl, and Buschmann in Langewiesche and Schmidt, Föderative Nation, pp. 33-111.
² See Brewer, The Sinews of Power.
the eighteenth century, new forms of “national wars” or “people's wars”, in particular the American War of Independence and then the French revolutionary wars after 1792, meant that more groups of society were now directly affected by war. Warfare based upon mass armies and collective conscription transcended the traditional separation of the civilian population from the direct experience of violent conflict, as had been the aim of traditional cabinet wars since the mid-seventeenth century, fought in the name of monarchical, dynastic, and territorial interests, and avoiding at the same time the horrors of civil war as they had been experienced in the confessional wars of the seventeenth century. On the other hand, national wars strengthened the state as the only legitimate institution which could provide the financial and military means of warfare.

A war fought in the name of the entire nation provoked hitherto unknown expectations of political and social participation. That became obvious in the course of the later eighteenth century, and it became an essential aspect of the new concept of a nation-in-arms which also formed the ideological basis of conscription. The ambivalence of war – externally as a form of collective aggression and violence and, internally, as a means of participation – already played a major role in contemporary war discourses and controversies over the precise meaning and possible justification of war. Thus, the concept of civil war, so dominant in the critical periods of the seventeenth century with its religious conflicts in various European societies, found its way back into justifications of war after 1750. But, in contrast to the seventeenth century, it was now no longer a civil war caused by confessional conflicts, but fought in the light of the secular concepts of liberty and equality as derived from the philosophy of human rights. Already in the 1760s the French philosopher Abbé de Mably described the expansionist wars of the eighteenth century as the natural consequence of monarchical despotism. This justified a new and international civil war of all suppressed peoples against their monarchical oppressors. Mably regarded such an international civil war as a “bien”, legitimizing in this context the “nation militaire”.

During the French Revolution and the subsequent wars from 1792 to 1815 such ideas assumed a new meaning. However, the wars of this period

4 See Münkler, Über den Krieg, pp. 53-55, 75-77; for the state of German research, see Echternkamp and Müller, Die Politik der Nation; Rösener, Staat und Krieg; Wolfrum, Krieg und Frieden in der Neuzeit, pp. 49-51, 66-68, 95-97.
6 Mably, Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen, pp. 93-94.
demonstrated that the paradigm of an international and revolutionary civil war of all suppressed peoples against their despotic suppressors was soon replaced by national wars between distinct states. Conflicts from the 1790s onwards stood between the practice of traditional cabinet or state wars that had characterized European history since the end of the Thirty Years War and a new ideological concept of civil war in the name of abstract principles among which the paradigm of the nation became most prominent.7

The complexity of war experiences became more obvious over the course of the nineteenth century: on the one hand, the wars of the nineteenth century were in many ways still fought according to the rules of traditional cabinet wars, although the wars of the 1860s clearly showed signs of transformation from Clausewitz’s “absolute war” into “total war”.8 On the other hand, these wars reflected, in theory at least, each individual fighter's identification with a more abstract notion of nationality and nation. This justification of war was clearly a legacy of the civil war paradigm, as revived through experiences in America and France from the last third of the eighteenth century. If the contemporary concept of “national war” pointed already to the connection between the citizens’ duty to defend the fatherland and their recognition as politically participating subjects, then the “people’s war” transcended this connotation even further.9 Already during the 1760s and 1770s many American writers had referred to the war against the British as a “people’s war”, representing a people’s ability to organize and mobilize its military in the absence of a monarchical state and at the same time challenging the traditional state’s monopoly of arms on violence.10 In France the prospect of a revolutionary people’s war was also perceived as a potential threat by the new revolutionary regimes after 1792. The regimes therefore responded with deliberate attempts to control and channel this development.

In the course of the nineteenth century, the invention of the new nation-in-arms generated distinct forms of warfare. Three ideal types can be distinguished: first, guerrilla warfare stood for the ideal type of people’s war. Following the collapse of a state’s authority, it was the population which in this case organized and carried out military actions, not in traditional battles but rather in small, individual actions, exemplified by the Spanish guerrilla war against Napoleonic regular troops in 1808. Second, militia

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7 See Kunisch and Münkler, *Die Wiedergeburt des Krieges aus dem Geist der Revolution*.
9 Wohlfeil, “Der Volkskrieg im Zeitalter Napoleons”.
armies combined the two principles of voluntary service with those of state control and professional military leadership in order to fight larger battles and to use the mass mobilization of nations-in-arms. The American War of Independence as well as the early years of the French revolutionary wars after 1792 provide examples for this type. Third, mass conscript armies represented the attempt to fully control and regulate a people’s mobilization for war. It provided the military and fiscal state with enormous resources of power. The principle of conscription as a means of defending the whole nation also justified the use of force necessary to overcome popular resistance against the rigors of compulsory military service. France (during the Napoleonic Empire) and Prussia (from the early nineteenth century onwards) exemplified this type.11

However, mass conscription did not mean an equal share of the burden of military service. Despite the myth of the revolutionary citizen-soldier, the French system allowed many exemptions, and the Napoleonic armies were far from mass conscript armies integrating the whole nation-in-arms. Prussia, during the anti-Napoleonic wars, came much closer to the ideal of mass conscription without exemptions. Yet in contrast to France, the Prussian military reforms under Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August Neidhardt von Gneisenau never resulted in a realistic promise of political participation in return for military service.12 After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, European governments were keen to return to professional armies which were regarded as safer tools against the revolutionary contagion of arming the people. France and the German states after 1815 were particular examples of this development. It was only in the context of further military reforms and against the background of industrialization after 1850 that conscription became an option again, as the European wars in the 1850s, 1860s, and early 1870s demonstrated. However, the examples of 1859, 1866, and 1870-1871 also exemplified the advantages of short military operations which did not force societies to fully mobilize the nation-in-arms and which tried to avoid the combination of revolution and war. Only in the case of the American Civil War from 1861 to 1865 did mass conscription really develop the means of modern warfare with all its disastrous consequences.13

13 Förster and Nagler, On the Road to Total War.
In these wars of the later nineteenth century, particular elements of total warfare became obvious, although “total war” with its new industrial character and hitherto unknown numbers of victims did not become a collective experience in Europe until 1914. Yet already the wars of the second half of the century – the Crimean War, but in particular the American Civil War between 1861 and 1865 and the Wars of German Unification between 1864 and 1871 – pointed to a transformation in the meaning of war and the changing character of modern warfare: this was essentially characterized by a new combination of technological progress, based upon increased firepower and railway transport, and mass mobilization in the name of an abstract ideal of nationality and nation-state. The state’s financial, economic, and military means to achieve its aims reached a peak. This new dimension of mobilization also necessitated a new ideological justification of war. War was no longer regarded as a conflict over territory or dynastic interests, but it was fought for the ultimate existence of nations and peoples. This necessitated the stigmatization of the enemy and the overcoming of the traditional separation between a state’s armies and its people. This essential distinction between the military and the civic sphere became questioned, as illustrated by both the actions of the North American General William Sherman in the Southern states of the Confederation during the American Civil War and, on a lower level of collective violence, the popular warfare of the French against the German invaders after September 1870.

It was the intensive interaction between war and nation-building from the eighteenth century that generated the ideal notion of a nation-in-arms. It included at the same time the new ideal of the politically participating citizen as the natural defender of the fatherland and hence a resurgence of the civil war paradigm against the idea of cabinet wars, separating the military sphere from that of civil society. From that point of view, the perceived national character of conflicts after 1792 instigated civic connotations of citizenship and political expectations, and participation through conscription was the most obvious of these. If the model of a nation-in-arms marked the beginning of a long-term process toward a radicalization of both national self-images and images of the enemy, thereby integrating many ethnic connotations focusing on belligerent myths and military memories, it was at the same time an ideal type of definition: not even the often quoted examples of Prussia in the 1860s, Germany after 1871, or France after 1871 ever implemented a conscription that encompassed the complete nation.14

It was the experience of World War I with hitherto unknown numbers of victims that fundamentally challenged for the concept of a loyal nation-in-arms.\textsuperscript{15}

This chapter tries to reconstruct the particular case of conscription in Britain, taking into account the British discussion of military models in Europe since the last third of the nineteenth century. In view of a European comparison, the reasons why conscription was rejected in Britain for such a long period have to be identified. In comparison with both continental nation-states and empires such as tsarist Russia, the Habsburg monarchy, and the Ottoman Empire, which introduced conscript legislation, Britain did so only during World War I in 1916 when in the context of industrialized warfare the number of volunteers no longer met the military demands of the western front. In the first part, fundamental premises about the relationship between the British military, society, and empire are discussed. The second part concentrates on the changing image of the British military, the contemporary perception of continental warfare, and the concept of a nation-in-arms since the 1870s. Third, I will look more closely at the meaning of the Boer War in that context. Finally, in a brief overview, I discuss the complexities of imperial defense before 1914 and the empire's role for Britain in World War I.

Military, society, and empire: some British peculiarities

In a classical liberal statement on the British Empire, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in 1903 stated “that we cannot provide for a fighting empire, and nothing will give us the power. A peaceful empire of the old type we are quite fit for.”\textsuperscript{16} Against the background of Britain’s painful experiences during the Boer War he formulated a fundamental problem which affected the British Empire and also anticipated future challenges: how could Britain's traditional military structure be reconciled with the realities of military conflict within the British Empire? How was Britain to respond to the new concept of a nation-in-arms, which had decided the outcome of the European wars of 1866 and 1870-1871 and was more and more regarded as a precondition for the political survival of great powers in a period of increased international competition?

\textsuperscript{15} Chickering and Förster, Great War, Total War.

In stark contrast to continental European societies, Britain in the second half of the century did not witness a debate over national and people’s wars, such as developed in Germany, France, and Italy, or in the United States during the American Civil War. Whenever these concepts were used in British discourse, they referred to countries other than Britain. Already this symptom points to particular differences between war experiences and the meaning of the military on the continent and across the Channel. Historically, Britain’s geographical position without direct neighbors allowed it to rely on a relatively small professional army. Even before 1914 its planned size was less than a quarter of that of most continental armies. Furthermore, large standing armies had always been regarded as symbols of absolutist despotism. But in contrast to the continent where, as a consequence of the religious wars of the seventeenth century, princes and dynasties had established absolutist rule on the basis of standing armies, the absolutist experiment had failed in Britain with the end of the Stuarts in 1688. The Whig interpretation of these conflicts and its continuous influence in the early nineteenth century provided ample room for the identification of standing armies with absolutist, potentially Catholic, and therefore un-English principles.

When confronted with increased and intensified armament programs and the introduction of mass conscription in other European nation-states, discussions in Britain after 1870 did not focus primarily on a conscript army. Even Lord Roberts, the popular president of the National Service League, did not demand a mass conscript army but favored specific military units capable of defending the island of Britain in case of an invasion. There was no equivalent to the continental experience which, as in the French revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars before 1815, and during the conflicts that developed in the course of nation-state-building in Italy and Germany from the late 1850s to the early 1870s, had catalyzed discourses about the changing meaning and justification of war. In addition, the British perception of the American Civil War seemed to underline that British society was far from becoming a military nation. Thus the concepts of a nation-in-arms and a people’s war retained a foreign connotation which in the eyes of contemporaries could be applied neither to Britain’s present situation nor to its history.

18 Spiers, The Army and Society.
19 Adams and Poirer, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, pp. 16-18; Roberts, Defence of the Empire.
Furthermore, and distinct from the ideal of a nation-in-arms according to which all groups of society should at least in theory be trained to defend the fatherland, the British army for a long time was regarded as a microcosm of rural society. According to this view, officers were recruited from the landed aristocracy and gentry. Together with volunteer soldiers from the countryside, they represented, in the eyes of contemporaries, the uncorrupted virtues of the nonindustrial sectors of British society. In the British Army of the early nineteenth century, “multiethnicity” referred to the disproportionately high numbers of Scottish and Irish soldiers fighting in the British forces.\(^{20}\) Originally, only Protestants could serve as soldiers or officers in the crown’s armed forces. However, the empire’s rapid expansion during the eighteenth century as well as the military’s development in general necessitated the recruitment of Irish Catholics. Already in the 1770s enlistment of Irish Catholics had started. Very soon large numbers were recruited for the marines and especially for the East India Company’s army.\(^{21}\) By the time of the Indian Mutiny, nearly 50 per cent of the Company’s army of 14,000 soldiers were Irish, and 40 per cent of the 26,000 British troops in India were Irish, mostly recruited from poor Catholic families. The fundamental role played by Irish regiments in putting down the Sepoy Mutiny revealed to many British people the extent of the Irish presence in India.\(^{22}\) An Anglo-Irish officer corps developed, playing a role out of proportion to their numbers in the British army in the nineteenth century. They accounted for approximately 17 per cent of all officers in the British armed forces, and at least 30 per cent of all officers serving in India. Whereas most of the Irish soldiers serving in the British armed forces were Catholics, the officers were mainly recruited from Protestant lower gentry families who sought careers for their sons.\(^{23}\)

Traditional interpretations of the British army in the nineteenth century have highlighted that it was this constellation that prevented any military professionalization by adhering to an amateur ideal of gentleman-officers and peasant-soldiers.\(^{24}\) But in the light of more recent research, this point of view needs a closer look. In comparison with France, Germany, and Italy, it was not the concept of the national wars or people’s wars of 1859-1861, 1864, 1866, and 1870-1871 that dominated contemporary war discourses in Britain,\(^{20}\) Henderson, *Highland Soldier.*

\(^{21}\) Bartlett, “Ireland, Empire, and Union, 1690-1801”, pp. 73-74.


\(^{24}\) Strachan, “Militär, Empire und Civil Society”, p. 79; see also Beckett, *The Amateur Military Tradition.*
but the “small wars” that accompanied the expansion of the British Empire.25 Throughout the long nineteenth century, Britain was engaged in more or less constant military actions in its colonies, and these war experiences were certainly distinct from the national wars on the continent between 1848 and 1871. It was also in this context that the army’s image as a microcosm of rural Britain came to be challenged. The military crisis that the British faced in the Boer War, in the eyes of many contemporary observers, seemed to be the result of the social degeneration of officers and soldiers, due to urbanization and industrialization in the British motherland.26 The experience of imperial warfare thus led to a new and critical assessment of British industrial society’s modernity and its price.

As a result of the colonial small wars, it was not only the political role of the army that changed, but also its social composition, with decreasing numbers of officers recruited from the landed gentry and aristocracy. The army as a whole became more urban and, in contrast to the ideal of Irish, Scottish, and Welsh soldiers, also more English.27 This was not a multiethnic conscript army meant to integrate the many different ethnic groups within the empire. Multiethnicity in this context did not primarily refer to language but to a notion of Otherness as it had historically developed in the different regions of the British Isles. The expectation that the army had to play a fundamental role in keeping the empire together was instead derived from a different collective image that was identified with the armed forces. According to this image, the army was itself a symbol of the union with its high proportion of Irish and Scottish soldiers and officers. At the same time the union was regarded as the very center of the British Empire. Hence the army’s role for the union could not be separated from that for the empire, as the Irish case demonstrated.

In order to understand this change in public perception of the military, the change in the liberals’ attitude toward army and war needs to be taken into consideration. For a long time historians used to point to the antagonism between Gladstonian liberalism and its focus on Home Rule for Ireland on the one hand, and the army as a symbol of the union under English dominance on the other. This relation changed fundamentally in the later nineteenth century. With the institutionalization of regular police forces,

25 Callwell, Small Wars.
27 Strachan, “Militär, Empire und Civil Society”, p. 86; Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society; Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home; Hanham, “Religion and Nationality in the Mid-Victorian Army”.
the army was freed from domestic functions of maintaining law and order. In combination with the heroic and Christian image of the military in colonial conflicts, army and fleet became incarnations of the British Empire and an imperial idea of Britishness. This dimension underlines the necessity of carefully distinguishing between the armed forces' social composition on the one hand and the public view of army and navy on the other.

The empire-nation and the new model of the nation-in-arms

British contemporaries of the wars of German unification between 1864 and 1871 could not anticipate the new meaning of large conscript armies and a new national connotation of the military. Hence the perception of continental warfare and the experience of the empire's military conflicts became essential factors in determining the relationship between British society and the military prior to 1914.²⁸ Britishness gained a new meaning which went far beyond the union and received fundamental stimulations from the perception of continental and imperial warfare.²⁹ The wars of 1870-1871 seemed to reveal a new kind of mass warfare which went together with a “decline of the chivalry of war”.³⁰ The image of a professional army, composed of mercenaries, was challenged by large conscript armies symbolizing the apparent necessity of whole nations-in-arms: “The restless military spirit which produced the soldier of fortune is now on the wane.”³¹

At the same time, the Leitmotiv of the British military as “Christian soldiers” shaped public perceptions of the army. It was essentially derived from the experiences of the empire's wars. Given the absence of large standing armies in Britain itself, the image of the “true Tommy” as the incarnation of national and Christian values became ever more popular and began to overshadow traditional notions of antimilitarism.³² That process had already started during the wars against France before 1815 and was revived

²⁹ Ely, The Road to Armageddon; MacDonald, “A Poetics of War”; Wilkinson, Depictions and Images of War in Edwardian Newspapers; Jahr, “British Prussianism”.
³⁰ Dalberg, The War of 1870, p. 41.
³¹ Grant, British Heroes in Foreign Wars, p. vi.
³² Anderson, “The Growth of Christian Militarism in Mid-Victorian Britain”.
during the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny in 1857-1858. The civic element of antimilitarism, derived from the conflicts of the seventeenth century and so important for the English national self-image, became more and more overshadowed by ethnic and racial connotations of the superior British empire-nation, thus at the same time integrating the different parts of the union. Against the background of the Crimean War, Lord Panmure underlined the changing image of the army in 1855: “I trust our present experience will prove to our countrymen that our army must be something more than a mere colonial guard or home police; that it must be the means of maintaining our name abroad and causing it to be respected in peace as well as admired and dreaded in war.”\textsuperscript{33} The\textit{ Times} in 1856 added that “any hostility which may have existed in bygone days towards the army has long since passed away. The red coat of the soldier is honoured throughout the country.”\textsuperscript{34} The successful repression of the Indian Mutiny in 1858 provoked numerous reactions pointing to Britain’s Christian mission, its pioneering role for civilization, and its superiority over the barbarian. As the\textit{ Baptist Magazine} remarked in 1858: “The tide of rebellion [has been] turned back by the wisdom and prowess of Christian men, by our Lawrences, Edwardes, Montgomerys, Freres, and Havelocks [...] God, as it were, especially selecting them for this purpose.”\textsuperscript{35}

God’s mission in this view served to legitimize even the highest sacrifice: “Such a deed is done [...] when a soldier, true to his Queen and country, is true also to his God and preaches while he practices the principles and gospel of the Prince of Peace, in the presence of those with whom he acts his part in the world’s drama.”\textsuperscript{36} Thus the \textit{topos} of the “soldier of Christ” generated a suggestive self-image: the British nation seemed to act in accordance with a godly mission. Officers and soldiers should act as Christian heroes or die as martyrs. Contrasted with the realities of British industrial society, the imperial connotation of the military generated an exotic counterimage of a nonconditioned existence. This also explains the enormous successes of contemporary war literature which time and again presented the British Empire as a counterworld to Britain’s industrial society.\textsuperscript{37} “British gallantry”

\textsuperscript{33} Quoted in Bartlett,\textit{ Defence and Diplomacy}, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{The Times}, 22 October 1856, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Baptist Magazine} l (1858), p. 323.
\textsuperscript{36} R. M. Ballantyne, \textit{In the Track of the Troops. A Tale of Modern War. With Illustrations} (London, 1878), quoted in Hannabas, “Ballantyne’s Message of Empire”, p. 68; see also Ballantyne, \textit{The Settler and the Savage, Blue Lights; or Hot Work in the Soudan}.
\textsuperscript{37} Hodder, \textit{Heroes of Britain in Peace and War}; Rhodes, \textit{Khartoum. Khartoum has fallen, and Gordon a Prisoner}, p. 5; Howard, “Empire, Race and War in Pre-1914 Britain”; Walls, “Carrying
became a key term in this context. It was used to characterize a collective quality of the British, as their example in India seemed to prove: “Every leaf in the history of the Indian campaigns shines with a brilliant record of British gallantry. In a country where all the forces of nature were often opposed to the advance of troops, now against a climate of unparalleled severity, and then under fierce burning rays of tropical sun [...] England and Englishmen may well feel proud of the victories so hardly gained against native troops of exceeding valour in first-rate military training.”

Apart from this change in the army’s perception, the empire in the course of the 1870s gained a new meaning for Britain’s military position in the world. When Russian troops launched an attack against the Ottoman Empire, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli ordered indigenous troops from India to intervene. It was now no longer the British colonial troops, but the combination of navy, colonial army, and indigenous military that secured Britain’s status and served as an integration of the whole empire. No doubt this was an idealized interpretation, but it explained why the nation-in-arms model as it had developed on the European continent was not regarded as a necessity for the British Empire: “England must have seen with pride the Mediterranean covered with her ships; she must have seen with pride [...] the discipline and devotion which have been shown to her and her Government by all her troops, drawn from every part of the Empire. I leave it to the illustrious duke [...] to bear witness to the spirit of imperial patriotism which has been exhibited by the troops from India.”

This image and the focus on the differences between the British and continental military traditions were clearly challenged by the experiences of the continental wars in the 1860s and early 1870s. British contemporaries now had to respond to the implicit comparison between the ideal of a small professional army on the one hand and large conscript armies on the other. However, in contrast to the continental multiethnic empires, these reactions did not lead to a complete overthrow of the British army’s organization before the experience of World War I, but they stimulated an increasingly intense debate about the relation between the military and society in general and imperial defense in particular. The reason for not following the example of the Habsburg monarchy, tsarist Russia, or the Ottoman Empire, to say nothing of Germany or France, may be seen in the geographically absence of imperial wars conducted by Britain. The British,

38 Armytage, *Wars of Queen Victoria’s Reign*, p. 228.
39 Disraeli, “Berlin Treaty. Speech in the House of Lords, 18th July 1878”.
at least prior to the Boer War, were never confronted with the kind of direct military crises which tsarist Russia had experienced in 1856, the Habsburg monarchy in 1859 and 1866, or the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s and again during the Balkan Wars. There was no similar pressure for the British to act, a factor which was reinforced by the dominance of the Royal Navy, which was never really challenged.

Nevertheless, the perception of the continental model of a nation-in-arms, accompanied by popular Social Darwinism, stimulated a dynamic discussion about British military organization and the future prospects of the empire. The imagined war of the future forced contemporaries to critically reflect upon and challenge the traditional view of the military and led to new concepts of war. When James Ram published his *Philosophy of War* in 1878 he insisted on the belligerent origins of the English nation in analogy to the Romans: “In effect the English nation [...] grew out of a concourse of kindred tribes engaged in incessant warfare among themselves. In the course of time domination over the rest was achieved successively by tribes of higher and higher degrees of pugnacity, and so the lines of a great nation were laid down. It was just the same in ancient Italy and in Greece, where Rome and Macedon respectively took the final lead.” In comparison with France prior to and after the defeat of 1871 Ram came to see the vitalizing effects of war which he applied to the English nation as well: “Was any pure nation ever known with whom war was not a sacrifice enthusiastically offered in defense of what it held holy? In what country is public life so pure as in England? And the English are always at war in some part of the world. The lower French Empire was peace, but what a corrupting peace it was, and how much purer has France been since the Franco-German war.”

At the same time Ram saw Britain as in danger of losing its reputation and power status if it continued to rely on volunteers for a small professional army. The military successes of disciplined and effective conscript armies had clearly demonstrated the superiority of the model of a nation-in-arms. Britain, in contrast, was about to lose the means to secure the nation’s and hence the empire’s survival: “If England cannot command voluntary soldiers enough to defend her homes or to maintain her empire, the sooner we give up the role of a powerful nation the better. A nation that cannot find voluntary soldiers of her own stock deserves to be conquered by any other that can.”

Ram’s premises were derived from a Social Darwinist model of selection,

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40 Ram, *The Philosophy of War*, pp. 32-33, 40, 47.
and he used them to criticize the traditional arguments against conscription as anachronistic and dangerous: “When nature [...] erects the lists of natural selection [...] are we English to give way to competitors really inferior to us? [...] The arming and training of whole nations for supreme struggles with each other, is the latest call that she has made upon their energies, and will do more than anything else to determine with what races superiority really lies, and which are best fitted to occupy and replenish the earth.”

For Ram the dual perception of both the European continent and the empire generated a military dilemma for Britain. The European wars fought in the name of entire nations highlighted the differences between Britain and the continent. Whereas Britain focused on its fleet and the image of a naval power, the traditional military structure came under increasing pressure when confronted with the militarization of continental societies: “Characteristic of the modern system is the increased interest evinced by all classes in each and every country in its military organization, means and methods. This is very observable in the states of the continent, particularly where universal service has been longest established. In Germany conversance with things military pervades all classes. In France the army is enthusiastically supported.” In Britain, he argued, the navy was “our first line” and he could not find any cause to complain of the interest the public bestowed on it. With regard to the army the British legislature “while equally responsible with that of any continental nation” seemed less endowed with the critical knowledge “requisite for the use of its controlling power”. Ram attributed this to the “circumstances of our national history”. But contrary to the ideal of a nation-in-arms, prepared to mobilize the resources of the whole nation, the British military continued to rely on the voluntary system as it seemed to correspond both to British historical experiences and its constitutional self-image: “Whether before the enemy, on the sea, or in the foreign garrison, the quality of spirit and the tone which the voluntary system confers are of incalculable value; nor is it only so in the regular army, the volunteer who gives willingly, as many as one does, more than the number of drills necessary to secure his grant, is equally an exponent of its value.”

Despite the army’s popularity prior to and after 1815, the concept of a nation-in-arms remained a foreign, un-English one. The reality of the empire’s small wars, which were geographically distant events without a

42 Ram, The Philosophy of War, p. 75.
43 Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea, VI; Barrington, England on the Defensive; “Imperial Defence”, Royal United Service Institution Journal (1884); Hamley, National Defence.
direct military impact on Britain itself, added to the belief that a radical change in the military structure was not an imminent necessity. It was not until the 1890s that this position came under serious pressure. Not least against the background of an Anglo-German naval rivalry, a future European war which would directly affect Britain now became ever more realistic. This catalyzed discussions about an adequate military structure, and imperial defense served as a key word in these debates.\(^{45}\) Still it was the Royal Navy that seemed to guarantee the status of the maritime empire-nation: “The Royal Navy is to the British Empire all and far more than her army is to Germany [...]. Naval supremacy [...] signified the promise of a mighty future. To the British Empire of to-day, it is the only possible guarantee of national existence.”\(^{46}\) But fears of a future invasion and the naval race between Germany and Britain challenged the premise of the geographically distant empire wars. Numerous novels about a future war and fictitious invasions of the British Isles contributed to collective hysteria prior to 1914.\(^{47}\) Germany now took over the role of a prime national enemy which Spain had played in the sixteenth and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.\(^{48}\) Confessional and ideological enemy images were replaced by a structure of competing industrial societies. Military power was regarded as a direct consequence of national strength as it became visible in industrial effectiveness.

The Boer War as a crisis of imperial warfare

After the perception of continental warfare in the 1860s and 1870s, the experience of the Boer War marked a major watershed in British discourses on the concept of a nation-in-arms. The combination of initial problems in British military operations, the Boers’ successful campaigns and the


\(^{46}\) Clarke and Thursfield, The Navy and the Nation, p. 3; Clarke, “The German Strategist at Sea”; Thursfield, “Captain Mahan’s Writings”, “The Jeune École Française”; see Rüger, “Nation, Empire, and Navy”.

\(^{47}\) “The Battle of Dorking”, Blackwood’s Magazine (May 1871); Colomb et al., The Great War of 189. [sic] A Forecast; Cave and Tebbutt, The British Army and the Business of War; Le Queux, Invasion of 1910, with a full Account of the Siege of London; A Second Franco-German War and Its Consequences for England (London, 1907); Wells, War in the Air; Ford and Home, England Invaded; Chesney, The Battle of Dorking, being an Account of the German Invasion of England; Doyle, Great Britain and the Next War.

\(^{48}\) Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency; Robbins, Present and Past.
character of the events as a modern media war with a global audience distinguished this experience from earlier small wars within the British Empire. In contrast to the 1870s, this time Britain was directly affected and experienced a serious crisis of its ability to effectively defend the empire. As a result, the self-image as a successful empire-nation suffered severely. The Boer War also marked a watershed in that it demonstrated the realities of an imperial war. Thousands of volunteers from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand had joined the British forces in order to conquer two small states and integrate them into the British Empire. Despite some Irish fighters on the Boer side, the pro-Boer movement in Britain made the war initially quite popular, as the “Khaki” elections in 1900 showed. Initially it had been decided not to include “coloured troops” from other parts of the empire in order to make it “a white man’s war”. However, both the British and the Boers were forced to include soldiers recruited from the African population in the course of the conflict. Consequently, more than 100,000 Africans served as scouts and labourers. Lord Kitchener, the commander-in-chief of the British forces in 1900-1902 had to admit to the arming of more than 10,000 men, but research into the topic has shown that David Lloyd George’s estimation of approximately 30,000 was much more realistic. What became more important was that the military conflict soon revealed the deficiencies of the British colonial military. Final victory was achieved only by quantitative superiority and by radicalizing the means of war, especially by the systematic destruction of Boers’ farms and the deportation of women and children into newly established “concentration camps”.

Below the surface of war enthusiasm, public responses to the events in South Africa and their interpretation by the new mass media also reflected a deepening crisis in the self-image of the empire-nation. William Lecky stated that the war meant a huge disappointment for the British nation. In addition the military operations provoked widespread criticism, which

now turned against the traditional imperial patriotism. For critical contemporaries the war had underlined that the empire was more and more founded on uncivilized violence and that it caused a huge financial burden for Britain, which prevented it from following the German model of progressive social reforms at home.\textsuperscript{53} In this context, it seemed that conscription, if ever introduced, would become yet another burden for British workers: “Empire and Conscription? [...] What have you to say, John Smith, you who are to pay and bleed? No one dare seriously propose Conscription to-day, but in the histories of nations come days of imminent danger and panic; fears become excited and people lose their heads. If Conscription ever comes to England, it will come at some such crisis.”\textsuperscript{54} Other observers pointed to the general unpopularity of conscription in British society and to practical difficulties in applying it to the empire: “Conscription is talked of, but that would not be popular, our people don’t want to be driven. They will always answer the call in thousands, and storm any position to give their enemy the cold steel, there is no lack of pluck, but soldiers must be trained, and their training must be kept up these days, and the best trained will win the day. Again with India and our many Colonies and responsibilities how would conscription act, you would have three or four different armies, each under different rules.”\textsuperscript{55}

Yet, on the other hand, parts of the British public identified enthusiastically with the fate of the British “Tommy” who fought as a volunteer for the nation. According to this position, he deserved at least the same estimation as the military in continental conscript armies, if not more. The superiority of the volunteer over the conscript was defended: “Our hero is not a conscript. He enters the army of his own free will and choice [...] . It will be interesting to note whether any ‘snubbing’ process will be inflicted upon him after he has done his best for the glory and honour of the country, – or whether hats will be touched as he comes and goes in places of resort and amusement, out of respect for the uniform he wears, as is the case with his brothers in Austria and Germany.” As a soldier of the crown and dressed in the Queen’s uniform he ought to expect “as much respect throughout the English Empire wherever he goes, as a soldier of the German Emperor in the Emperor’s uniform receives in every part of the German Empire, – nay

\textsuperscript{53} Maude, War and Patriotism, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{54} Thompson, Towards Conscription, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{55} Godwin-Austin, An Army without Conscription, pp. 1-2.
even more, for the German ‘Tommy’ is compelled to serve, while his English brother serves by choice.”

Kenelm Digby Cotes’s *Social and Imperial Life of Britain*, published in 1900 and widely read, tried to analyze the new relation between the British nation and the military in the light of recent war experiences. To him, as to many contemporaries, the Boer War had underlined the necessity of mobilizing all the resources of the nation. War had become a test of the nation’s survival in an age of dynamic international competition, which Britain could only survive on the basis of a community of citizens and not as a society of antagonistic classes. Hence political participation and imperial defense became necessarily interrelated: “The connection between war and the national character, important as it always was, is of immeasurably greater importance at the present time [...]. Now that the citizen soldier has almost taken the place of the paid soldier, war will be, more than it ever was, an index of the state of the country.” Following the classical premises of the Whig interpretation of history, military service and political participation had to go hand in hand. In the highly idealized sense of a linear process of uninterrupted constitutional progress, the end of dynastic wars and arming the people seemed to come together. It was again the self-image of evolutionary continuity that served as a national self-affirmation: “In England, each stage in arming the people is a stage of industrial and constitutional progress.”

The contemporary mass media’s interest in the Boer War placed the army at the very center of public concern. Yet at the same time earlier questions about the British ability to conduct a future war and to defend the empire against a growing number of European competitors were revived. Although conscription was still no alternative, the contemporary war discourses around 1900 took a new direction, in that recent war experiences were related to the development of industrial society and parliamentary government as they had progressed in nineteenth-century Britain. Hence the conscription controversy after 1900 reflected the different and controversial interpretations of Britain’s modernity in comparison with continental nation-states, in particular the second German Empire of 1871.

In a highly significant contribution to this debate, Charles Ross stated in 1903 that the British nation had been falsely immunized against the vitalizing effects of wars by its economic successes. In comparison with

58 [Cairnes], *The Army from Within*, pp. 1, 148.
continental societies that had survived their critical moments in past wars only as nations-in-arms, Britain was now threatened by decline: “The nation is [...] over-civilised which, through the ease, comfort, and security of its existence, gives no thought to war [...]. Such a nation quickly degenerates; for it is by war, and by the constant study of war, alone, that a nation can maintain itself in such a condition as will enable it to combat and overcome its enemies.” Ross and many of his contemporaries regarded war as the supreme test in the process of human evolution, and modern conscript armies seemed to be the quasi-natural means for that test. From this point of view, nations-in-arms responded to a new stage in human evolution, caused by the development of industrial societies. The Boer War seemed to have underlined that, as a successful empire-nation, Britain was already in decline. Ross also identified the structural causes behind this painful experience: it was the nation’s one-sided focus on politics, administration, and economic well-being as well as the traditional mistrust of the military that had long overshadowed its belligerent qualities and prevented the necessary autonomy of the military in a modern society. For Ross it was a fundamental weakness of representative government that “soldiers and sailors [...] are placed in a position subordinate to civilian officials, whose duty it should be [...] to confine their attention to civil matters”.

Ross reflected upon the primacy of politics, which he regarded as a central problem of European societies around 1900: were democratic systems at all capable of conducting a future war, or would their complex decisionmaking processes on the basis of parliamentary governments and a primacy of the civil over the military not render them incapable of effectively defending themselves in time of war? Here the discussion went far beyond the practical problems of changing a professional into a conscript army. Unsurprisingly, Ross developed his argument on the basis of an explicit comparison with Germany and against the background of highly increased international competition. According to him, the German Empire after 1871 had successfully established a political and constitutional system which corresponded adequately to its military necessities as a new nation-state: “A military despotism which consists of a whole nation in arms, each man of which is as it were his own despot in peace-time and in matters connected purely with his personal comfort, but who is a disciplined member of a great force wielded by the head of the nation in war, is not, it would seem in reality,

59 Ross, Representative Government and War, pp. 7, 11, 162-163.
despotism. The German nation appears to have succeeded where the Romans failed, inasmuch as it would seem to have found a form of government which is not incompatible either with success in war or with true liberty. All other nations liable at any moment to invasion have followed this lead.” In a future war against a nation-in-arms constituted like Germany, Britain seemed inevitably inferior.61

The British Empire’s particular situation with its ethnic groups and heterogeneous structures made the situation still worse. In the light of these fundamental problems integrative institutions were needed to compensate for the lack of unifying war experiences which characterized the continental concept of a unifying and integrative nation-in-arms. In contrast, the British Empire presented only a “conglomeration of [...] nations” which could be kept together neither through language or family ties nor on the basis of economic relations. Ross argued in favor of military cohesion and advocated an imperial military community, which he called a “brotherhood in arms”. For him the lack of such a military community explained many of the empire’s problems. According to him, it had been military service within the British union which had brought the different ethnic groups of the British Isles together: only this experience of common military service had finally integrated Scots, Welsh, and Irish into the Union of Great Britain. The union model of a successful military community now had to be applied to the empire at large. The military experience of the union served as a model for integrating the whole empire, and this allowed Ross to link the South African crisis to the Irish problem when referring to the role played by Irish soldiers in the British armed forces: “The assimilation of South Africa is no more a complicated problem than is the suppression of rebellion in Ireland. The sole difficulty lies in bringing an uneducated nation governed by sentiment and a popular government to grasp the necessity for action. A whole race, related to the Empire in blood, but distinct from it in language, in tradition, and in religion, must be brought to form an integral part of the Empire. No more loyal man than the Irish soldier exists; he has fought side by side with other men of his race, and knows their worth, even as they know his. He is proof against the wiles of the pedagogue and the politician. A brotherhood in arms, the great bond which establishes fast friendship between nation and nation as between man and man, will alone bind South Africa to the remainder of the Empire, as it will alone bring to a termination the intrigue and covert rebellion in the South of Ireland.”62

61 Ross, Representative Government and War, pp. 221-222, 292.
Imperial defense prior to and after 1914

The link which contemporary observers established between the war in South Africa and the Irish crisis is highly significant for the British Empire's complexity before 1914. The military was in many ways the very link between these different scenarios. Ireland was, as Engels had once put it, England's first colony, but it also formed part of the empire's metropolitan center by supplying the empire with soldiers, settlers, and administrative personnel, thus taking advantage of possible careers in the military, in the colonial administration, or in commerce and trade. That was per se no exception: Indians also helped to govern India, and colonial subjects of the French Empire engaged in similar functions. But nowhere did the dual role generate such a paradoxical constellation. The example of the Boer War demonstrates this: two Transvaal Brigades were formed by the Irish on behalf of the Boers, but serving on the opposite side were about 28,000 Irish soldiers in the British army. Ireland's status as both colonial and imperial became obvious during the war: if pro-Boer agitation inspired the Irish republican movement, serving the empire against the Boers in South Africa was an important aspect of Ulster Unionism. Yet comparing Irish and Boer secessionist nationalism ignored the Boers' treatment of black Africans. Pro-Boer agitation certainly radicalized nationalist feelings in Ireland before 1914, in that parliamentary representation was increasingly seen as irrelevant.

This highly complex identity as both colonial and imperial is obvious from many biographies of leading Irish Home Rulers in the last third of the nineteenth century: they were proud of Irish feats within the British forces, yet critical of the British Army itself, which they often regarded as a repressive force in the hands of Protestant Unionists. They welcomed the individual careers of their children in the colonial forces or in the imperial administration, but were critical of the rulers of the empire as such. Hundreds of Irish nationalists exemplified this paradoxical constellation in their own biographies and careers: they welcomed Home Rule, but they also fought in the British forces after 1914, and yet later proceeded in the ranks of the Irish Republican Army.

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64 Kiernan, Colonial Empires and Armies.  
66 Jackson, “Ireland, the Union, and the Empire”, pp. 137-139.
The interrelation between imperial and colonial identity also continued after 1914, but now the constellation began to change. An estimated 200,000 men from all parts of Ireland served in the British forces during World War I. Thus Irishmen made up about 10 per cent of the British army recruits in 1913 compared with 20 per cent in 1870. In the Dominions, enlistment during World War I varied between 13 per cent and 19 per cent of the overall white population, but for Ireland the figures were down to only 6 per cent. Recruitment from Ireland declined especially after the Easter Rising of 1916. At the same time a very influential antiwar movement emerged that included veterans from the Transvaal Committee. The complexity of empire relations meant that serving the British forces did not exclude secessionist and radical nationalism. There was still an elaborate overlapping of military service and revolutionary agitation against London.

Finally, the contemporary reference to Ireland in the context of coming to terms with the experience of the Boer War certainly overshadowed the fact that prior to 1914 it was with regard to the Home Rule debate that serious tensions arose between parts of the military elite and the government in London. The army presented itself as the most important integrating force of both union and empire, as the Curragh mutiny demonstrated. When in March 1914 officers of the 6th Cavalry Brigade in Ireland declared that they were not prepared to march to the North to implement autonomy, Lord Roberts openly supported their position and demanded the resignation of the chief of the General Staff. Here, the army’s self-image as the guarantee of the British union as the empire’s center became apparent. Ireland and not the maritime empire was the testing ground for this process which, because of the outbreak of World War I, was postponed until 1918. The example of the violent actions of demobilized soldiers in Ireland after the end of the war underlined the role of the military at the periphery.

It was World War I that brought about both a new role of the colonies and Dominions and a fundamentally new relationship between Britain and the empire. Radicalizing the earlier experience of the Boer War, the

68 Kenny, “Ireland and the British Empire”, 20; Jackson, “Ireland, the Union, and the Empire”, p. 142.
70 Gregory, “Peculiarities of the English?”
empire now came close to being a single military entity with joint military operations in various theaters of war.71 Pan-British sentiments dominated in the white Dominions, and the outbreak of war was often used to defend the very different positions held in the hierarchy of the empire. Thus reactions from Canada or Australia differed from those in India, where the annual Indian National Congress in Madras during December 1914 was poorly attended.72 What became clear, however, was the growing importance of imperial troops for the military theaters around the world, as the numbers of imperial soldiers sent abroad and lost in military operations demonstrate (see Table 17.1).

Table 17.1 Soldiers from the British Empire in World War I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimated population in 1914</th>
<th>Troops sent abroad</th>
<th>% of population</th>
<th>Killed, died, and missing</th>
<th>% of troops sent abroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Isles</td>
<td>46,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>705,000</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>458,000</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>332,000</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>136,000</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: All data, except percentages, are taken from table 5.1 in Holland, “The British Empire and the Great War”, p. 117.

A special role was played by the Indian army. From summer 1914 to the end of 1918 it recruited another 826,868 combatants and 445,592 noncombatants. Indian army casualties officially included 64,449 killed and 69,214 wounded. In sum, 16.2 per cent of all Indian soldiers recruited during the war were killed or wounded in action. In 1918, a total of 943,344 Indian troops were serving in major war theaters: 14.1 per cent in France, 5.0 per cent in Africa, 62.4 per cent in Mesopotamia, 12.3 per cent in Egypt, 1.0 per cent in Salonica, 5.2 per cent in Aden and in the Gulf. Making India the “barrack in the Eastern seas” also meant changing its weight within the empire, and the result was a new equation between war contributions and political status. A new tacit principle emerged that anticipated future developments: “no contribution without representation”.73

71 Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, p. 1.
73 Ibid., pp. 122-123; Brown, “War and the Colonial Relationship”.
Conclusion: Britain in comparative perspective

Whereas French, German, or Italian societies experienced their war ideal in national wars, fought in their collective imagination by nations-in-arms, the British referred to the empire’s small wars, in which the army came to represent an imagined empire-nation, an idea encompassing many ethnic and racial connotations. In contrast to continental societies, the tendency to anticipate a major future war in Europe as a conflict over the existence of the entire nation was a rather late development in Britain. Only after 1890, and in the context of the naval race with Germany, did a possible German invasion lead to hysterical reactions among the British public. These invasion panics had their origins in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries when they had been focusing on Spain and France as the main political and confessional enemies, a perception that was renewed before 1815 and again during the three anti-French panics of 1848, 1852, and 1859.74 It was only from the 1890s onwards that Germany began to replace France as the anticipated invader of the future. This collective perception increased the popularity of both the army and the navy before 1914. But in contrast to continental countries, it was not a cult of a nation-in-arms that characterized this development, but rather a belated militarization of society, as the numerous paramilitary activities of army and navy leagues, boy brigades, and boy scout movements illustrated.75

National wars, shaping the religious and national identity of the British, had characterized the conflicts with Spain and France in the early modern period and during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Instead of the short national wars on the continent between 1859 and 1871, Britain witnessed more or less constant military action in its colonies. The absence of large conscript armies on the British island and the colonial small wars allowed the imagination of an empire-nation, symbolized by the army abroad which came to represent British and Christian values. In contrast to continental cases, belligerent images of the British nation paradoxically developed both earlier and later: earlier in the wars from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries against Spain and France and later, in the context of armament races, in the anti-German invasion panics during the decade before 1914. With the disappearance of traditional antimilitarism, ethnic

74 Colley, Britons.
75 Strachan, “Militär, Empire und Civil Society”, p. 90; Cunningham, The Volunteer Force; Strachan, History of the Cambridge University Officers Training Corps; Beckett, Riflemen Form.
and racial connotations of Anglo-Saxon superiority and British-Christian civilization increasingly dominated contemporary war discourses.

Before 1914 a large spectrum of connotations associated with modern warfare characterized the British case. The presence of positive and affirmative or critical positions reflected the complexity of a modern industrial society which fell under increasing pressure from the empire's overstretch and international competition. War was accepted as a necessary means and a ferment of state-building. It could be seen as a universalized principle of competition, selection, and rationalization: "The science of organisation must raise and standardise the art and practice of all organisations, whether employed in military warfare, in the warfare which society or a nation wages as a whole, or in a warfare which a section of society wages – must apply to an Empire as to a municipality, to a public department as to a private business." If Britain did not experience the nation-in-arms model by the introduction of conscription, it certainly experienced a process of militarization of society. Popular notions of a belligerent jingoism were a prominent feature of prewar mass culture. Veterans', voluntary and military associations, youth movements, and students played an important role in this militarization of British society before 1914.

Yet at the same time the numerous articles, essays, and books on imperial defense also underline the impact of implicit comparisons between the British Empire and continental powers which were perceived as belligerent nations-in-arms. Conscription remained a controversial issue. This comparison was made even more difficult in the light of British workers' distance toward the military, which was regarded as a potential weakness in a future war: "The mass of the people is utterly oblivious of sound military principles [...] there are millions of the working classes to whom England, as England, does not exist. They recognise [...] no allegiance to a country in which their whole stake is the chance of wresting a bare subsistence from the blind commercial force by which they are wholly dominated."

76 Holsti, “The Relation of War to the Origin of State”.
This was no exception in European comparison. In stark contrast to his belief in maintaining political and military control of war, the military hero of the German Wars of Unification, Helmuth von Moltke, who had benefited so much from the military power of a disciplined conscript army, in one of his last speeches in the Reichstag in May 1890, pointed out that the traditional concept of cabinet wars had now irrevocably come to an end. Reflecting upon the dilemma of the nations-in-arms, he saw traditional cabinet wars replaced by new peoples’ wars as they had developed since 1848. Wars were no longer fought on the basis of a political and military primacy, but seemed more and more influenced by social interests, social conflicts, and public opinion. Moltke argued that the causes that made peace so difficult to maintain were no longer princes and governments, but peoples and classes, pointing in particular to the lower classes’ social interests and their will to use revolutionary force in order to improve their socioeconomic position. Nations-in-arms would ultimately mean arming the people – with all the social and political consequences that would have. Under these circumstances a short and decisive war seemed no longer possible. Given the enormous armaments of all European powers, a future war was likely to last indefinitely. A decisive reason for this prospect was the fact that mass conscription had transformed the limited size of earlier armies into nations-in-arms with virtually unlimited human resources. Anticipating an experience which all European societies would share after 1914-1918, he argued that no power could be totally defeated, and that consequently peace treaties would have only a temporary significance. Moltke was convinced that the war of the future would no longer be fought for territorial gain or power positions, but for the very existence of nations and nation-states. Future wars would therefore transform the complete social and political basis of existing nations and of civilization itself.

Confronted with wars against revolutionary and Napoleonic France, Prussia at the beginning of the century had introduced universal conscription and, in contrast to the French model, exemptions had not been allowed. However, and again in contrast to France, Prussia denied any coupling of conscription and citizenship rights. Moltke noticed to what extent the new tendencies toward nations-in-arms and people’s wars, which he saw advancing after the conflicts of the 1860s and 1870s, would ultimately include the right of political and social participation of all classes of society and hence question the foundations of the new German Empire.

81 Moltke, “Speech in the Reichstag, 14th May 1890”; see also Schlieffen, Über die Millionenheere (1911); Leonhard, “Nation-States and Wars”.

of 1871. The war discourses of the later nineteenth century anticipated what would become reality only after 1914: a new concept of national service, based upon common war sacrifices, by which all classes of society could demand to participate equally in a democratic society. Britain, prior to World War I, had experienced a different path toward this development, but the consequences of relating national war service to political participation after 1918 became a common feature of all western societies which had experienced the Great War.
Mobilizing military labor in the age of total war

Ottoman conscription before and during the Great War

*Mehmet Beşikçi*

As warfare became more industrialized and total from the mid-nineteenth century onward, conscript labor became increasingly necessary to meet the manpower needs of modern mass armies. As a multiform and prolonged war of attrition, the Great War represents the apogee of this process. Military employment in the form of obligatory service, required of every male citizen as a patriotic duty, also defined a new interaction (both inclusive and exclusive) between the state and society, providing the centralizing state with a new mechanism of control at the local level. As a result, conscription was on the agenda not only of nation-states, but also of multiethnic empires, including the Ottoman Empire. This chapter deals with the Ottoman experience of conscription. After discussing Ottoman conscription from its beginnings in the nineteenth century, it focuses on its application during the Great War. Rather than presenting a thorough description of Ottoman conscription, the chapter explores its major characteristics and peculiarities. While basic categories of military labor were similar, the practice unfolded in different ways in different settings. Therefore, emphasizing “the Ottoman difference” is as important as underlining the similarities with other cases. Besides providing a critical analysis of Ottoman conscription, this chapter also aims to shed light on the Ottoman experience in order to bring it into a comparative perspective within the global history of military recruitment.

The evolution of Ottoman conscription

The French Revolution’s *levée en masse* was enacted in 1793 to confront the threat of a multiform war with foreign powers and of rebellions at home by summoning all able-bodied men to defend the “nation”. The levy was regarded as an action that would put into practice Rousseau’s prescription in the social contract that “every citizen should be a soldier by duty, not
by trade”.¹ Whereas the French revolutionary mass levy was an *ad hoc* measure, conscription acquired a systematic form in the age of Napoleon.² But it was the mid-nineteenth-century Prussian model that gave the system a more established obligatory character and formed a military structure drafting large numbers of men in an efficient way.³ Conscription not only increased the efficiency of armies in the age of industrialized warfare, but also, and perhaps more importantly, formed new relations between state and society. It signalled an intrusion of the state into people’s lives and created an area of contention between the state and society. Conscription can also be depicted as a battleground between “individual and local communities on the one hand and a distant impersonal state on the other”.⁴ Compulsory military service in nineteenth-century Europe was envisioned as a way of creating a new form of loyalty to the state, as a form of nationalist socialization, and as a new system of drill and training to ensure military efficiency.⁵

European models, the Prussian one in particular, inspired and influenced the Ottoman conscription system, but a more direct “role model” in this respect was Mehmed Ali Pasha’s (r. 1805-1848) modernized Egyptian army.⁶ His well-trained army of conscripted Egyptian peasants prevailed over Mahmod II’s (r. 1808-1839) Ottoman army in Syria in 1831-1833, when Mehmed Ali was still nominally an Ottoman governor and Egypt a province of the Ottoman Empire. However, while the European influence was significant, the evolution of Ottoman conscription was determined to a considerable extent by its own internal dynamics, culture, politics, and challenges.

When the Ottoman state embarked upon a process of military reform in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to establish a centralized modern army integrated with the population, it increasingly became aware of the potential of obligatory military service as the main recruitment mechanism to realize its goals.⁷ Conscription would not only serve as an efficient way of meeting manpower needs of the newly formed standing

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² Woloch, “Napoleonic Conscription”.
³ On the reorganization of the conscription system in Prussia especially after the defeat of the Prussian army at Jena in 1806, see Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies*, pp. 163-189.
⁵ Mjoset and Van Holde, “Killing for the State, Dying for the Nation”, pp. 9, 51.
⁶ Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice”, p. 81. On the Egyptian conscription system during the time of Mehmed Ali Pasha, see Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*.
⁷ On the background and beginning of this reform process, see Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870*. See also Erdem, “Recruitment for the ‘Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad’ in the Arab Provinces”; Çadirca, *Tanzimat Sürecinde Türkiye*. 
army, but it would also contribute to a more general reform attempt of the Ottoman state, which involved a move toward centralization and better permeation of state power into provinces and local populations. In this sense, the willingness on the part of the Ottoman state to introduce conscription not only stemmed from the necessities of the changing nature of warfare, which compulsory military service served better than previous forms of recruitment, but it was also closely related to the state’s changing political-ideological preferences. Conscription was attractive because a well-established conscription mechanism would give the political center more control at the local level and it would provide more effective power over local magnates who had accumulated considerable autonomy in the eighteenth century. Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the earlier steps taken towards creating a modern centralized conscript army in the Ottoman Empire was the formation of the reserve corps (redif) in 1834 as a permanent armed force stationed in the provinces. In establishing this, Mahmud II acted with a dual objective. This would not only be a reserve force for the army to be activated for external uses during wartime, but it would also contribute to the imposition of central authority over Anatolia, particularly over the rebellious tribes and nomadic groups.

Conscription was also one of the main agendas of the Tanzimat (Reorganization) edict of 1839, which ushered in major administrative reforms

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8 This change occurred both in the sense of “hardware” (weapon technology, infrastructure, etc.) and in that of “software” (military drill, tactics, strategies, etc.).
9 For a concise analysis of this process, see Khoury, “The Ottoman Centre versus Provincial Power-Holders”.
10 The redif units initially recruited men from local populations on a voluntary basis, and then, after 1844, by the drawing of lots. The redif soldiers can be seen as “part-time soldiers”. They were required to gather for training twice a year, and they were called up during wartime. At other times, they continued their civilian lives. The main reason for this method was the scarcity of labor force in agriculture. Compared to conscription, the redif system allowed, during peacetime, the manpower that was employed in agriculture to be left in place. On the redif system, see Çadır, Tanzimat Sürecinde Türkiye, pp. 27-63. The Ottoman reserve corps system became dysfunctional over time and was abolished in 1913; the corps were replaced by regular army units.
11 Aksan, “Ottoman Recruitment in the Late Eighteenth Century”, p. 33. In fact, at a more general level, the main motive for the entire process of Ottoman military reform was to control endemic violence both internal and external. Similar to Charles Tilly’s view, Aksan has linked militarization and the articulation of the modern state: “control of internal violence and defence of shrinking borders drove mobilization and military fiscalism in the late eighteenth century, and propelled the emergence of Ottoman mid-nineteenth-century absolutism” (ibid., 22). See also Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States. For a similar discussion of the abolition of the janissaries and the coming of a modern standing army based on conscription in the era of Mahmud II, see Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok.
aimed at creating a centralized modern bureaucracy, an efficient modern fiscal system, and a modern powerful army. As of this date, conscription was always referred to in the official discourse not only as one of the major foundation blocks of the military reform, but also as a new tool that would be useful in creating an “Ottoman citizenry” out of a multireligious and multiethnic imperial population in the age of nationalism.12

However, the implementation of conscription in the Ottoman Empire was not a smooth process. Although a commitment to conscription emerged in the early 1830s, Mahmud II's modern standing army continued to be a professional army for a while; it recruited men as “volunteers” to be employed as paid soldiers. The first comprehensive legislation concerning conscription was issued only in 1846.13 What pushed Ottoman conscription to be a more established and standardized system were the large-scale modern wars in the second half of the nineteenth century, such as the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878). These multifront and industrialized wars demanded much larger mass armies. The coming of the age of “total war” with the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the Great War required a more efficient system of conscription, which could provide a large-scale and permanent mobilization.14 However, Ottoman conscription, while becoming more established, continued to be incomplete as well as discriminatory to a considerable extent.

The incompleteness had mostly to do with infrastructural problems. The level of the Ottoman state’s “infrastructural development” was far from being satisfactory in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.15 For example, the system of universal conscription required a reliable census to determine where the potential manpower could be found. Such a demographic mechanism then necessitated a sizeable growth in the state bureaucracy, which would include an efficient recruitment organization, economic power to supply provisions to conscripts, and security

12 On the changing nature of the Ottoman recruitment system in the Tanzimat period, see Heinzelmann, Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına; Şimşek, “Ottoman Military Recruitment and the Recruit”.

13 Various major legal revisions were made in 1869, 1886, 1909, and 1914. On the documentation of the Ottoman laws concerning conscription, see Ayın, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Tanzimat’tan Sonra Askere Alma Kanunları.

14 For a concise account of these wars, see Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans.

forces and efficient sanctions to combat draft-evading and desertion. Nineteenth-century Ottoman modernization achieved a certain amount of progress in these respects, but never to the extent that would bring about remarkable success. There were severe geographical differences. The system almost never worked in the economically underdeveloped regions where the infrastructural power of the state was quite weak, such as the tribal Kurdish-populated parts of southeastern Anatolia and certain regions of the Ottoman Middle East, where a nomadic lifestyle was still dominant.

Where and when unable to implement conscription on the individual basis, the Ottoman state resorted to earlier practices in such regions, such as getting into contact with communal or tribal leaders and encouraging them to join the Ottoman armed forces by forming “volunteer” units from their local populations under their own leadership in return for certain political and material gains from the state. One of the best examples of this practice was the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments, which were established by Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909), but also continued in different forms through the Great War. This was an irregular militia composed of select Kurdish tribes. The basis of joining this militia was, at least in principle, voluntary. Besides its intended function as being an auxiliary force in the region acting on behalf of the Ottoman state, the Hamidiye was also a part of a larger sociopolitical project aimed at creating a special bond of unity between the center and the Kurds. It was meant to “tie the empire more firmly to its Muslim roots and provide a defense against Russia and the Armenians, both increasingly aggressive after 1878, and the Kurds could be used as a balance against the urban notables and the provincial governments.” On the other hand, some regions where the state not only lacked the capacity to control but also did not have “reliable” connections with local leaders, such as Yemen, were completely left out of the Ottoman system both formally and informally.

The Ottoman conscription system was discriminatory. The system had a marked religious character and always remained predominantly Muslim in practice. While the universality of conscription was accepted in principle, in practice the focus of the system was on the Muslim Ottomans. In fact, the Ottoman military reform can be described as “the re-construction of a Muslim army”. In this sense, Ottoman conscription served the re-

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17 Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, p. 8. See also Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State; Klein, “Power in the Periphery”.
Islamization of Ottoman identity rather than creating a secular Ottoman citizenry. This does not mean that there were no non-Muslim soldiers in the Ottoman armed forces. In certain specific positions in which there were not enough Muslims, such as medical officers, the Ottoman Armenians, Greeks, and Jews were welcome in the army, and held the ranks of lieutenant and captain.\(^{19}\) As for enlisted men too, in some cases, such as the navy, non-Muslims were enlisted in the Ottoman armed forces as early as the 1830s.\(^{20}\) But such examples were usually related to the specific needs of the Ottoman military at certain times, and they never constituted a standardized common practice integrated into the system. However, non-Muslims were not totally excluded; on the contrary, they were always kept within the system, but in a discriminatory way.\(^{21}\) The Reform Decree (İlahat Fermanı) of 1856 extended the obligation of military service to non-Muslims but allowed for exemption upon payment of a fee. Buying exemptions in this way almost became the norm for non-Muslims, and the exemption fee in practice replaced the cizye, the tax that Islamic law required of non-Muslims.\(^{22}\) The extent of the exemption fee was restricted in the legislations of 1909 and 1914, but it never disappeared entirely.

While the application of the exemption fee was more standardized for non-Muslims, the method of buying exemption was not closed to Muslims, either. But it was not just that this option offered to Muslims was often revised with new regulations; in addition, the payment that they had to make was much higher (it was 50 gold liras after 1870), and only quite rich Muslims could afford it.\(^{23}\) So, conscription was unequal in economic terms, too. The burden of actually serving in the army almost always fell on the poor in general and peasants in particular.

On the other hand, the universality of military service did not mean that all able-bodied Muslim males of military age would be obliged to serve in the military, either. For various pragmatic reasons, there was an extensive system of exemptions for Muslim Ottomans as well. Until more restrictive regulations were put into effect in 1909 and 1914 as well as during the Great War, many categories of Muslims in the empire had the right to be exempt

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20 Heinzelmann, Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına, p. 206.
21 On the history of the conscription of Ottoman non-Muslims, see Gülsoy, Osmanlı Gıyır-irimislimlerinin Askerilik Serüveni.
22 Heinzelmann, Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına, p. 250.
23 Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice”, p. 87. There was also the option of personal replacement to avoid service, but this method disappeared relatively early.
from military service. These included religious functionaries, medrese students, Muslim residents of Istanbul and the Hijaz province (the holy cities of Mecca and Medina), high- and even middle-ranking bureaucrats, much needed skilled laborers, and males who were the only breadwinners of their families.

Was there an ethnic dimension in Ottoman conscription in the sense of being based on a certain ethnicity and excluding others? There were certain “ethnic” preferences, but it is hard to say that the Ottoman conscription system had a clear ethnic dimension from the beginning. Discrimination was based on religion rather than ethnicity. But it should be noted that there was an ethnic hierarchy in Ottoman conscription. The Anatolian Muslim population (Turks, Kurds, Circassians, and Laz) in general and the Turkish element in particular constituted the backbone of the Ottoman military. The “dominance” of the Turkish element was evident as early as during the military reforms Mahmud II.24 This element was preferred as the most trusted group in attempts to make the state more centralized and to subject, for example, “peripheral” Arab provinces to the centralization process. The ethnic core of the new Ottoman army established by Mahmud II was “made up of ‘Turks’, the Türk uşağı (‘Turkish lads’) which Ottoman commanders increasingly saw as the most reliable, most malleable cannon fodder”.25 The Ottoman state always tried to integrate its Arab population into its military, but a certain amount of ambivalence towards and distrust of the Arabs also always existed, reaching unprecedented levels during the Great War.26

Was the Ottoman conscription system popular? It is evident that the system had to cope with occasional major resistance coming from various segments of society. First of all, it should be noted that, while the system was discriminatory against non-Muslims, there was no particular enthusiasm on the part of the latter about serving in the Ottoman armed forces, either. It is true that since inclusion into obligatory military service would provide certain political gains and an increase in status, leading to full citizenship, various political or religious representatives of the Ottoman Greeks, Armenians, and Jews often expressed official approval of the extension of obligatory military service to their communities. For example, an influen-

24 The Turkish element here refers to a sociological category, rather than an ethnic one. This category had certain common characteristics, the most determining of which were being Muslim (mostly Sunni Muslim), speaking Turkish, and preferably being settled (not being nomadic).
25 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870, pp. 357-358; Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok, pp. 181-183.
26 On the relations between the Young Turk regime and the Arabs, see Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks.
tional Armenian political figure, Krikor Zohrab, a deputy from Istanbul in the Ottoman parliament after 1908, considered the equal military service obligation as an important step towards the creation of a solid Ottoman citizenship and described it as “a matter of brotherhood”. Similarly, the Grand Rabbi of the Jewish community, Haim Nahum Efendi, who had had political ties with the Young Turks since the preparation for the 1908 Revolution, openly supported the idea of obligatory military service for Ottoman Jews and worked to convince his congregation in this respect. But this remained merely official rhetoric to a great extent. Ordinary members and potential draftees of these communities usually showed reluctance about conscription. Draft-evasion and desertion of Ottoman non-Muslims were common problems.

Nor was resistance to conscription a problem unique to the non-Muslim Ottomans. Similar forms of resistance also occasionally appeared on the part of the Muslim Ottomans. Draft-evasion and desertion by Muslims increased especially after the 1909 regulations which restricted the exemption status of many Muslim groups. For example, the decision to draft those medrese students who failed to pass their exams in time made many people, not just the medrese students, quite unhappy, because there had been many fake medrese students (among them even illiterate peasants), who had abused this method of avoiding military service. Moreover, the move to draft men from the regions which had previously remained outside the recruitment system also caused the emergence of acts of resistance in those regions. For example, after the 1909 regulations, the Ottoman state had to deal with occasional rebellions against the draft, which came from various sections of the Laz and the Kurds in Anatolia, and the Arabs in Arab provinces. Similar acts of resistance, mostly in the forms of draft-evasion and desertion, sometimes also appeared on the part of the Anatolian Muslim-Turkish population, the backbone of the Ottoman army. As I will show, such forms of resistance constituted a serious problem during the Great War.

28 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, Prelude to War, pp. 153-154.
29 Gülsoy, Osmanlı Gayrimüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni, pp. 145-146.
30 On the issue of conscripting Ottoman medrese students, see Bein, “Politics, Military Conscription, and Religious Education in the Late Ottoman Empire”.
31 Shaw, Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, pp. 166-170.
Reforms after the Balkan defeat

The humiliating defeat of the Ottoman army in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 led the Ottoman authorities to conclude that it was urgently necessary to bring in “a new spirit and enthusiasm” to the army, for which an overall reform and reorganization in the army was needed. This situation was very much similar to the discussions for a major overhaul in the in Russian military after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Reforming the army was a primary agenda of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) government which had established single-party rule in 1913. After less than a month, the Regulation for the General Organization of the Military was issued on 14 February 1913 to execute organizational reforms concerning the army. But a major overhaul began to take place when Enver Pasha, the leading CUP leader in military affairs, became the minister of war on 3 January 1914. This process also included a foreign contribution. After the Ottoman state signed an agreement with the German military on 14 December 1913, the German Military Mission, under the leadership of Otto Liman von Sanders, came to the Ottoman Empire to help reform the armed forces. The German Military Mission provided help with the reorganization of the army, and also offered useful advice to revise the conscription system and the mobilization plans in line with the Prussian-German experience. The German contribution to Ottoman mobilization continued after the secret treaty of alliance signed on 2 August 1914, and also after the Ottoman entry into the war on the German side on 2 November 1914.

The main aim of the process was to create a highly efficient army structure, which could easily and rapidly be utilized in a wartime situation when needed. The new structuring of the army closely and significantly

33 Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation, pp. 25-29.
34 For the complete text of the regulation, see Osmanlı Ordusu Teşkilatı, pp. 147-161.
35 Enver remained at this post through the end of the war, until 14 October 1918. In this capacity during this period he also served as the acting commanding general of the Ottoman army (the titular commander-in-chief was the sultan) and as the chief of the General Staff.
36 Similar agreements were also made with other European countries in the same period. The Ottomans invited a British mission to help reform the navy and a French mission to improve the gendarmerie. But the British and French missions left the country when the Great War began. See Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, I, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Siyasi ve Askeri Hazırlıkları ve Harbe Girişi, pp. 179-180.
37 For a postwar account of the German Military Mission by a German officer-historian who also served in the mission, see Mülhman, İmparatorluğu’nun Sonu, 1914, pp. 13-55.
38 Strachan, The First World War, p. 104.
depended on the recruitment system for its vitality, and required a large number of additional troops within a short period of time. In other words, in order for the new army structure to be efficient, there needed to be an efficient conscription system.

The new structure required about 500,000 troops in total, while the number of the available troops in the army dropped as low as around 200,000 in 1913 due to discharges after the Balkan Wars.\(^39\) According to calculations made in summer 1914, a total of 477,868 drafted men and 12,469 officers were needed to bring the army to full wartime capacity.\(^40\) To cope with the demands of this sudden increase, the existing conscription system, which had been characterized by many setbacks from the beginning and functioned unsatisfactorily during the Balkan Wars, needed to be revised and reformed. Moreover, a revision in the conscription system was needed also because the manpower pool of the empire was considerably reshaped after the Balkan Wars. In addition to about 340,000 casualties\(^41\) and subsequent loss of territories in the Balkans, the immigration of around 400,000 Muslim refugees\(^42\) from the lost territories into the empire also changed the demographic composition from which the military was to be drawn.

Under these circumstances, a new law for military service was issued on 12 May 1914.\(^43\) The main concern of Ottoman authorities was to have an efficient recruitment mechanism which would improve the conditions for an eventual mobilization. The new law aimed to tackle the problem of exemptions. The 1909 regulations had tried to make revisions in this respect, but they were not very successful in practice. The new law of 1914 aimed to minimize exemptions, allowing only for really necessary ones. The law also aimed to make the military service obligation more extensive in drafting more segments of society for active service, including the non-Muslim Ottomans. While a discourse of Ottoman equality accompanied this objective, the real aim was more pragmatic: acquiring the maximum number of draftees. In accordance with the aim of extending the obligation, there was also the intention to abolish, or at least restrict, the exemption fee.

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40 Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, p. 7.
41 Erickson estimates that the number of total Ottoman casualties during the Balkan Wars was about 340,000, of which 50,000 were killed in action, 75,000 died of disease, 100,000 were wounded, and 115,000 were prisoners of war. See Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*, p. 329.
43 For the text of the law, see *Düstür*, series II, vol. 6, pp. 662-704.
Mobilization for the Great War

The possibility of a general mobilization became reality only about three months after the announcement of the law, and it was at that point that the actual process of testing began for the above-mentioned objectives. The general mobilization was declared on 2 August 1914. The response to the call to arms was much better than it had been during the Balkan Wars. But it was not consistent geographically. It was better in western and central Anatolia, but not as good in eastern Anatolia and the Arab provinces. The units in Yemen and Hijaz (almost the entire Arabian peninsula) were never mobilized, and the XI, XII, and XIII Corps, which were stationed in eastern Anatolia, Mosul, and Baghdad respectively, never reach their intended effective strength due to the high amount of draft-evasion and desertion.44

After the declaration of mobilization, the eligible men aged from twenty to forty-five were called up for service.45 But these initial age requirements became insufficient to fill in the gaps in manpower in the armed forces as the war continued, and new arrangements were made in the following years. For example, the minimum age for the draft dropped to as low as eighteen on 29 April 1915.46 Then the maximum age for recruitment was increased to a high of fifty on 20 March 1916.47 Moreover, the duration of military service, which was two years in peacetime, was also extended in wartime until a special order was issued to determine when it would end.48 In practice this meant that enlisted men would have to serve until the end of the war.49

According to estimates from the Ottoman War Ministry and the General Staff at the beginning of the mobilization, the empire had the potential to mobilize about 2 million men for service within a single year. This was about 10 per cent of its general population, which was close to 23 million on the eve of the war.50 However, although the initial level of the Ottoman state’s recruitment performance could be considered adequate, this estimate remained a distant possibility throughout the war. The number of troops

44 Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, I, p. 182.
48 The Ottoman Archives, Istanbul [henceforth, BOA], MV., 196/116, 24 February 1915.
49 BOA, DH.MB.HPS.M., 15/24, 8 July 1914.
50 Of these 23 million, around 17 million lived within the borders of present-day Turkey, more than 3 million in Syria and Palestine including Lebanon and Jordan, and about 2.5 million in present-day Iraq. Additionally, about 5.5 million lived in Yemen and Hijaz under Ottoman rule. See Pamuk, “The Ottoman Economy in World War I”, 112. On the Ottoman population in 1914, see also Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914, pp. 170-190.
in the Ottoman army was 726,692 around the time when mobilization was declared (it was around 295,000 in 1913), and it reached as many as 780,282 men by 25 September 1914.\footnote{Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, III, part 6, p. 290; Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, X, Osmanlı Devri, Birinci Dünya Harbi, İdari Faaliyetler ve Lojistik, p. 102; Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 148.} According to the official statistics, the total number of drafted men cumulatively increased to 1,478,176 by March 1915, and reached 1,943,720 by 14 July 1915. By March 1916 it increased to 2,493,000 and by March 1917 to 2,855,000.\footnote{Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, X, pp. 164-165; Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 148. See also the Turkish Military Archives, Ankara [henceforth, ATASE], BDH, Folder 62/File 309A/ Index 005.} If we add up the “volunteers” including the Kurdish and Bedouin cavalry volunteer units, the number of which is estimated to be around 80,000-100,000, the cumulative total number of men mobilized during the four years of the war would be around 3,000,000.\footnote{The estimates of the total number of recruited men in the Ottoman armed forces during the Great War vary in secondary sources. For example, Ahmed Emin Yalman claimed that 2,998,321 men were enrolled in the army during the four years of war. See Yalman, Turkey in the World War, p. 252. M. Larcher, who claims that he based his research on the official Ottoman data, gives a figure of 2,850,000 men mobilized during the war. See Larcher, La guerre turque dans la guerre mondiale, p. 602. The most recent estimated total number is given by Edward Erickson as 2,873,000, which he has reached by cross-checking the existing statistical data published in the secondary literature. Erickson also breaks up the total figure into armed service classes: 2,608,000 in the army, 250,000 in the gendarmerie, and 15,000 in the navy. See Erickson, Ordered to Die, p. 243.} The Ottoman effort to mobilize men for war declined steadily as the war prolonged, and it suffered some serious internal problems and insufficiencies. First of all, there was the problem of lack of standardization among regions regarding recruitment. In practice, the conscription system did not work in the Ottoman Middle East. While it remained predominantly an Anatolian institution, it was not standard in Anatolia, either. Secondly, although at the beginning a short war was generally expected, the Ottoman state began to have difficulty in sustaining a large-scale and permanent mobilization as the war continued. And, thirdly, resistance to conscription in the forms of draft-evasion and desertion became a major problem especially in the second half of the war. As the war necessitated more and more military labor, the actual war conditions recurrently required changes in the conscription system. Where the formal conscription system did not function sufficiently, the state still tried to acquire necessary manpower by amalgamating old methods of recruitment with modern conscription methods and creating alternative recruitment categories. Volunteers constituted such an alternative category, which not only helped the state mobilize
those segments of its population that could not be conscripted formally due to infrastructural problems, but also provided the armed forces with additional manpower that could be used in “special” military missions.\footnote{For a detailed social history of the Ottoman mobilization during the Great War, see Beşikçi, \textit{Between Voluntarism and Resistance}.}

**Volunteers in the Ottoman army: irregular conscripts or hired labor?**

The use of volunteers in the Ottoman armed forces, a practice that had already been applied in the previous wars, became more systematic during the Great War, with new legal and practical regulations. There were various categories of volunteers, each of which was supposed to serve a distinct purpose. One of the major categories was tribal volunteers. Where the formal conscription system did not work, the state tried to apply the method of recruiting people as “volunteers”. This practice mainly targeted the Kurdish tribal population in Anatolia. Kurdish tribal volunteers were usually employed as separate cavalry forces in the Great War, which served as auxiliary units on the fronts that were near their native regions, such as in the Caucasus and Mesopotamia. Volunteerism in this case was not individual-based: the state entered into dialogue with tribal or community leaders, such as local chieftains, sheikhs, or aghas. The latter decided on behalf of their communities. This decision was itself not entirely voluntary either, because it had to be made under political pressure from the central state, though it promised political and material gains in return. Obeying the state’s call for volunteers politically meant that a particular tribal community expressed compromise with the central authority. In return for this obedience, the central authority recognized that tribe as a peripheral power-holder and allowed it a certain amount of autonomy through which that tribe could regenerate its power in its local setting. On the other hand, the volunteers who were recruited this way did not actually act according to their own will, although they were called “volunteers”.

Muslim immigrants and refugees (\textit{muhacirs}) constituted another major category of volunteers, who were employed both for guerrilla operations and in the regular units. The Muslims who were forced to emigrate because of invasion or political oppression in various territories of Russia and the Balkans had reshaped the demographic composition of the Ottoman Empire since the late nineteenth century. Their numbers particularly increased
with the influx of hundreds of thousands of Muslims from the former Ottoman territories in the Balkans into Anatolia after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. As far as the obligation for military service was concerned, the muhacirş in the Ottoman lands had to fulfill the requirements of the Ottoman conscription system to acquire full Ottoman citizenship status. However, the Ottoman state tended to provide a degree of flexibility to these newcomers in order to make their process of settlement and adaptation easier. This flexibility also covered those muhacirş who had previously been the subjects of the Ottoman state, who immigrated into Anatolia from the ex-Ottoman territories in the Balkans. Article 135 of the Law for Military Service of 1914 determined that all past and future muhacirş would be subject to the military service procedure six years from the date they arrived in the empire. Consequently, during the Great War when almost all able-bodied males of the empire were already conscripted in the military, the male population of such muhacirş provided an attractive source of energetic volunteer fighters for the Ottoman armed forces. When the Ottoman state expected them to volunteer, they also tended to respond to this call positively for various reasons. Volunteering for the armed forces would confirm their rights to be granted land and status in the Ottoman territory and expedite their integration into Ottoman society. Volunteering would open up new channels for muhacirş to engage in dialogue with the Ottoman state, a dialogue which would further establish their legitimate existence in the Ottoman Empire and increase their status.

The Ottoman state’s appeal to muhacir populations to mobilize volunteers was shaped by the specific conditions and objectives of military campaigns on a particular front. As far as the Caucasus front was concerned, for example, former Muslim residents of the Caucasus and the Laz people of the eastern Black Sea region were most preferred. Thus, the Ottomans tried to mobilize Circassian muhacirş who had settled in Anatolian provinces and in Syria during the previous decades. These muhacirş would be useful in two ways: first, they were familiar with the mountainous geographical conditions of the region and, secondly, “they had come into the empire because they been driven out of their homes by the Russians, so they were particularly interested in joining the Ottoman forces that were attempting to regain control of the lands that they had been forced to leave”. The sentiment of revenge was a major motivating factor in their mobilization.

55 BOA, DH.EUM.EMN., 89/14, 29 July 1914.
56 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 157.
The third major category of volunteers included individually recruited volunteers, who would be used in “irregular” warfare, such as in the armed bands of the Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa), a secret paramilitary intelligence organization founded by Enver Pasha soon before the war on the model of Balkan paramilitary groups (especially the Bulgarian IMRO). The Special Organization not only undertook a major role in carrying out propaganda activities to attain support from Muslim populations in India, Russia, Iran, and Egypt for the Ottoman holy war (cihad), but also engaged in guerrilla warfare on major fronts throughout the war. The Special Organization also carried out operations to intimidate the local non-Muslim Ottoman population in Anatolia, particularly the Armenians, on the pretext that the organization acted as a counterinsurgency force against disloyal elements of the Armenian population, some of whom, after evading the draft or deserting the army, formed their own armed bands and voluntarily joined the Russian army. But this mission of the Special Organization took the form of direct abuses of, attacks on, and massacres of civilian Armenians during their forced migration in 1915. Though no precise statistical data are available, the Special Organization is said to have raised as many as 30,000 fighters at its height, most of whom consisted of prisoner-volunteers. Convicted prisoners, who were ready to be used in any form of violent operation in return for their release and also certain material gain, constituted one of the main sources of such volunteers. Many prisoners from various jails across Anatolia applied to become volunteers to

57 Stoddard, “The Ottoman Government and the Arabs”. For more on the Special Organization, see also Cemil, Birinci Dünyada Savascıında Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa; Sencer, Turkish Battle at Khaybar; Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, pp. 353-456.
58 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 354. On the Armenian volunteers in the Russian army, see Gorganian, “Armenian Participation in World War I on the Caucasian Front”. There are also examples showing that some Ottoman Jews and Greeks voluntarily joined the Entente powers. For an example of the case of Ottoman Jews volunteering for the French army, see BOA, HR.SYS., 2403/7, 20 September 1914. For two examples of Ottoman Greeks volunteering for the British and Greek armies, see BOA, DH.EUM.3.Şb., 5/19, 29 April 1915 and BOA, DH.EUM.3.Şb., 8/61, 13 September 1915.
59 Yalman, Turkey in the World War, p. 220; Akçam, “Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur”, 168-180. In contrast, Guenter Lewy has argued that the incomplete character of the available documents does not allow us to attribute all of the abuses against the Armenians to the Special Organization – although he has not denied the existence of convicted criminals in the armed bands and has confirmed the attacks of “irregulars” or “volunteers” against the Armenian deportees. Lewy has also written that Kurdish irregular and volunteer forces, as well as Circassian volunteers, played a considerable role in the massacres of the Armenian deportees. See Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, pp. 82-89, 221-228.
60 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, 373; BOA, DH.ŞFR., 46/134, 1 November 1914.
fight in the armed bands (çetes) of the Special Organization when official announcements were made that prisoner-volunteers would be accepted for guerrilla fighting. These armed bands, which can also be regarded as militia units, were loosely connected to the Ottoman military’s chain of command (the commanders of some were provided by the army), and they acted autonomously in practice.

It can be argued that, when the demand for military labor was so high, authorities could consider it quite legitimate to acquire the locked-in manpower that could potentially contribute to the war effort. Theoretically, like other enlisted men, the volunteers were required to comply with the existing conscription regulations from the moment they joined the armed forces. This included their duration of service. No volunteers were supposed to leave service during the war unless there was a demobilization order, which in practice meant they had to serve until the end of the war. However, the available evidence implies that maintaining discipline among the volunteers, especially the tribal volunteer units which were usually used as separate units, sometimes became a serious problem. Desertions were particularly widespread among them, especially among the tribal volunteers on the Caucasus front.

On the other hand, while the law obliged them to act like conscripts in theory, there was also an aspect of commodification involved in this process. Many volunteers actually served as paid soldiers, because they received payment from the state in either an explicit or an implicit way. The volunteers who were employed in the Special Organization’s missions either received regular money payments from the discretionery fund of the Ottoman military budget or were promised material benefits in return for their service, which was indeed a motivation for many people (especially for prisoners) to become willing to join the Special Organization’s armed bands as voluntary fighters. At the very least, being a volunteer in such an armed band could secure a free subsistence throughout the war years, since the provisions of such armed bands (at least those on the Caucasus front) were legally decided to be provided by the local population in the form of a “donation” (iane). This situation gave the members of armed

61 BOA, DH.ŞFR., 46/134, 1 November 1914.
62 For example, it was reported that, after the battle of Köprüköy in November 1914, the number of Kurdish tribal volunteers in the Third Army, which was around 20,000 at the beginning, dramatically dwindled to around 3,000 because of desertions. See Aytar, Hamidiye Alaylarından Köy Koruculuğuna, pp. 140-141.
63 Cemil, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Teşkilât-ı Mahsus, p. 118.
64 Ibid., pp. 85-86; BOA, DH.ŞFR., 61/88, 23 February 1916.
bands the *de facto* right to act as if they were war-tax collectors and put pressure on civilians for this purpose. They were also effectively entitled to seize “booty” during their raids in enemy territory, mostly in the form of livestock. Money payments and material rewards were also involved in the Ottoman state’s relationship with the tribal volunteer groups as a means of encouraging such groups to volunteer and of maintaining their loyalty to the state.

Can the volunteers who were paid or received material benefits be regarded as a kind of professional soldier and be placed in the category of free labor? It is hard to say that they fit neatly into this category, because there was no contract between them and the military authorities. Moreover, payments were usually made on an *ad hoc* basis, on the initiative of army commanders or militia leaders, and one can hardly speak of a standard procedure in this respect. The situation was more complex in the case of tribal volunteers, since it was the tribal leader who conducted the negotiation with and personally received the payment from military authorities; ordinary members of tribal volunteer units had no say in this process and, although they might receive a share of their leaders’ payment, their case still remained close to the category of “unfree labor”. And, as mentioned above, the law wanted to oblige them to comply with the conscription regulations. But it is obvious that this compliance clause did not make them conscripts *per se*, and it is equally hard to fit them in the conscript labor category. Instead it was an amalgamation of both forms, which resulted in a pragmatic form that included aspects of both categories.

Here it is also interesting to note that, although their numbers were few (statistically negligible), the Ottoman army also employed professional foreign soldiers who served for money during the Great War. A well-known example is the Venezuelan officer Rafael de Nogales (1879-1936). After his attempts to join various European armies (French, Belgian) failed, he applied in 1915 to serve in the Ottoman army as an officer. He served on the Caucasus and Mesopotamia fronts, first as a captain and then major.

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67 He published his memoirs in 1926, in which he gave significant details about daily life in the Ottoman army and presented his observations about social life in the localities where he served. See de Nogales, *Four Years beneath the Crescent*. 
Unskilled vs. skilled labor? The problem of exemptions

Whereas the Ottoman conscription system had been characterized by a long list of exemptions, Ottoman authorities were determined in 1914 to restrict every “unnecessary” exemption. However, while this resolution was never abandoned during the war, it needed to be reshaped and revised under the actual conditions of mobilization and due to political preferences, financial necessities, and the need for technical-skilled labor in the economic and bureaucratic sectors. Therefore, as some exemptions were abolished, others remained in operation and sometimes new exemptions were introduced. The Ottoman Great War experience shows that, although military service was legally declared universal, there was still a general division of labor regulating who would be employed in a military and who in a nonmilitary function, even when meeting the need of military labor was the utmost priority. Those whose civilian skills were considered more useful and important than the service they would provide on the battlefield were granted exemptions and allowed to remain in their post during the war. Generally speaking, the obligation of military service actually fell on the shoulders of those who were providers of unskilled manual labor. A similar division also existed between the rich and the poor, as those whose financial contribution was regarded as more significant than their physical contribution could also be offered an alternative.

While some forms of military labor (especially in the case of professional armies) are based on making a payment to the military laborer, the system of conscription may sometimes require the opposite: the potential military laborer himself is needed to make a payment to the state to avoid service. The issue of the exemption fee, which stood at the junction of the state’s political preferences and financial needs, constituted a major portion of the exemptions in the Ottoman conscription system. But the exemption fee always remained in effect in practice, and the state in actuality did not want to press too hard to abolish it. The Ottoman state never dared to risk this extra source of financial revenue, which served to alleviate its financial burdens. Moreover, its continuation was not regarded as so disturbing by those who paid it, namely the middle and upper strata of Ottoman non-Muslims, who did not have a long history of military service in the Ottoman Empire and were never particularly enthusiastic about revisions after 1909 aiming to include them into the active service obligation.68

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68 On this reluctance of Ottoman non-Muslims after the 1909 Regulations, see Gülsoy, Osmanlı Gayrimüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni, pp. 141-148. On the reluctance of Ottoman non-Muslim
This general approach of the Ottoman state to the exemption fee can be said to have continued during the Great War, while some significant modifications were made. Parallel to the official discourse from 1909, it was announced in 1914 that the abolition of the exemption fee was among the main targets of the new legal and organizational reforms regarding the conscription system. But the points which this discourse needed to emphasize to justify itself acquired different dimensions after the declaration of mobilization. While the language of Ottomanism which stressed the abolition of the exemption fee as a way of equating Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans through including them into the same military service obligation continued to some extent, the discourse now also needed to address certain sources of discontent in the public sphere concerning the unequal treatment of different economic classes in society. The “National Economy” policies of the CUP government offered many economic opportunities and privileges to the Muslim-Turkish elements of the empire and, apparently, a considerable number of well-off Muslims began to use the exemption fee option by the late 1914. This seems to have led to rumors that the conscription system favored the rich and that the burden of defending the fatherland was imposed on the shoulders of the poor. Therefore, in propagating their intention to abolish the exemption fee, Ottoman authorities needed to emphasize that the rich were obligated to serve in the armed forces as much as the poor: “Now the most genteel and the richest would defend their motherland in the same way as the poor peasant little Mehmeds [...] What an honor!”

But neither the new law on military service nor the mobilization regulations could abolish the exemption fee entirely. And the class dimension of the conscription system, namely the inequality in military service caused by economic inequality, continued. But certain restrictions applied. First of all, from now on, paying an exemption fee instead of actively serving in the armed forces did not mean that the payer would be exempted forever. Article 121 of the new law required that, even if a person paid an exemption fee, he was required to get basic military training for six months in the nearest infantry division. The law also stipulated that, while the exemption

recruits during the Balkan War of 1912-1913, see Adanır, “Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army and the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912-1913”.
69 Behic, Mükellefiyet-i Askeriye Kanun-ı Muvakkatin İzahı, p. 7.
70 On the “National Economy” policies in this period, see Toprak, Türkiye’de Milli İktisat, 1908-1918.
72 Ibid., p. 14.
fee remained in effect, it would be available only in peacetime and nobody would be given this option in wartime.\textsuperscript{73}

But not only did the exemption fee continue after the mobilization was declared and during the war, various of its restrictions were also loosened. Initial statements that condemned the practice would have to compromise with actual war conditions and be modified time and time again. For example, the new law on the exemption fee, which was enacted on 6 March 1915, confirmed that the practice would continue in war conditions.\textsuperscript{74} The practice did not disappear during the war and was legally renewed with some modifications.\textsuperscript{75}

While the mobilization during the Great War made military labor top priority, the need for skilled labor in various departments of the state bureaucracy and economy was no less pressing. To keep its large bureaucratic machine running during the war, the Ottoman state also needed to exempt its bureaucrats and officials at key posts from conscription. For this reason, according to Article 90 of the law on military service, even if they were at the age of military service, state employees such as ministers, top officials, ambassadors, governors, judges, and muftis were not obliged to serve in the armed forces. But, more importantly, the state also needed its middle- and lower-ranking civil servants and technical personnel to continue their work in wartime, as their job description now also included supervising the mobilization process in their localities, as well as fulfilling their routine work. People such as post office clerks and telegram technicians, bank clerks, railway technicians and clerks, accountants, policemen, and so forth were equally indispensable during the war. Article 91 of the same law included a long and detailed list of middle- and low-ranking civil servants from many departments.

However, though their function was significant, civil servants increasingly came under the control of military authorities during the war. The martial law situation, which continued throughout the war, gave not only in practice but also officially the ultimate authority to military commanders in local administration. Although the mobilization decree gave the Interior Ministry the power to declare martial law, it was the War Ministry that actually ran all things military.\textsuperscript{76} This created a process in which state employees in the provinces, including the top local administrators, were

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 149.
\textsuperscript{74} Düstûr, series II, vol. 7, pp. 434-435.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., series II, vol. 8, pp. 380-381.
\textsuperscript{76} Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 175.
required to obey the authority of military commanders. The War Ministry occasionally stressed this requirement in its correspondence to the Interior Ministry, whereupon the latter needed to warn its local officials that they should have considered and carried out the measures and proposals coming the commanders. Recruitment became a top priority in which civilian officials were expected to be particularly careful during the war. Civilian officials of the provinces were repeatedly warned by the center about their crucial function in ensuring that the draft procedure was carried out efficiently in their localities.

The law on military service also provided exemptions for religious functionaries of every religion. According to Article 91, not only high- and middle-ranking religious representatives of all religious communities in the empire, but also low-ranking ones, were exempted, including priests, monks, and deacons (who had a certificate) for the Christians, and rabbis and deputy rabbis for the Jews. For the Muslim low-ranking religious functionaries, the exemption list was more detailed. It was stipulated that for each mosque, one imam, one Quran reciter (hafız), one call-to-prayer reciter (müezzin), and one caretaker (kayyum) would be released from the military service obligation.

Apparently, the Ottoman state was relatively flexible in the case of religious functionaries and provided them with an exemption status, especially where Muslim religious functionaries were concerned. Of course, there were reasons for this. Obviously, this flexibility did not stem only from the concern for providing uninterrupted religious service for believers in wartime. Low-ranking religious functionaries, particularly the village imam, also played a crucial role in mobilizing men for the war. Through his sermons, and as a respected personage among the local community, the imam was the key figure in justifying the military service as a sacred duty. He was the one whom local people took most seriously about the exaltation of martyrdom in war. The imam was also influential in convincing draft-evaders and deserters to rejoin the armed forces. Therefore, since the imam was regarded as one of the main propagators and motivators of the Ottoman mobilization at the grass-roots level, their exemption status ensured that enough of them were available in every locality.

77 BOA, DH.ŞFR., 55/157, 22 August 1915.
78 BOA, DH.ŞFR., 42/155, 30 June 1914.
Forced labor through conscription? The labor battalions

Whereas the efforts that were made in 1914 to minimize exemptions and to extend the military service obligation to all elements of Ottoman society were interpreted by some observers as a step towards the principle of Ottoman citizenship based on equality (as decreed in the Ottoman Constitution of 1876), such a perspective of equality was still lacking not only in the legislation, but also in the practice of mobilization. The Ottoman perspective regarding the inclusion and treatment of different religious and ethnic elements of the empire into the conscription system during the Great War was based on an understanding of Ottoman unity which was built upon a nationalist pragmatism. The Ottoman mobilization effort that was run by the nationalist CUP government of course wished to include and make use of the entire population of the empire. But this wish also tended to thwart as much as possible any political expectations and demands of dialogue with the state, which would emerge on the part of the same elements in return for their participation in the mobilization effort. Service of even the most distrusted elements could be accepted by the CUP government as long as that service was used in the way defined by the government itself and as long as that service did not produce any political expectations on the part of the providers.

The Law on Military Service of 1914 included certain ambiguities that could in practice easily be interpreted in a discriminatory way. Article 34 of the law divided active military service into two categories, “armed” and “unarmed service”. In other words, while some drafted men would be regarded as “normal” soldiers who were able to bear arms, others would be denied arms and instead employed in units that would mostly fulfill manual work behind the front lines. However, while this division might seem to be a standard procedure that any army might have, the Ottoman conscription law left two points ambiguous: first, it did not specify exactly who would be registered in the armed and who in the unarmed category. No clear criteria were stated in this regard. The law was much more specific on the procedures concerning medically unfit men who had physical problems or illnesses that could prevent them from carrying out active service (articles 34, 48). But no such clear procedures were defined for the unarmed service category. There are some implications in explanatory texts about the law

79 For example, see Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, III, part 6, p. 232. For a discussion of the Ottoman conscription practice with respect to its relationship with the principle of Ottomanism, see Hacısalihoğlu, “Inclusion and Exclusion”.
that the division might have essentially been based on physical condition of a drafted man, such as having a minor bodily problem which would prevent him from fulfilling active military service on the battlefield but did not hinder him doing manual jobs. There are also some implications that the assignment to unarmed service could be done according to the profession and artisanal skills of enlisted men: medical personnel, for example, could be assigned to medical corps, and the literate could be assigned to posts as scribes in military units. 

Secondly, the law did not specify precisely what unarmed service would involve. In practice, it became synonymous with hard labor and, more specifically, with the labor battalions.

Forming labor-based military units was not an entirely new phenomenon in the Ottoman army. There were similar battalions called the “Service Battalions” which had been formed during the Balkan Wars.81 Nor was it unique to the Ottoman army. Since the work of war required vast amounts of labor, all combatant nations in the Great War constituted labor units to support their war effort. And in many cases, such labor units included recruits who were deemed to be “noncombatants”, a category which was defined by political authorities in a discriminatory way based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or age. Forms of recruitment and treatment of these laborers not only varied according to labor demands, but also were shaped by political circumstances.82 To give but a few examples, a large number of recruits from India were assigned to the labor and porter corps used in Iraq by the British Army in its invasion of the region in the Great War. These labor units, which were pejoratively called “coolie” corps, also included prisoners.83 Similar labor units were formed in Russia for non-Russian draftees such as the Kirgiz.84

Originally, labor units in the Ottoman army were manned mainly by men too old or too young to serve in the army, by wounded or injured soldiers who had become unfit for combatant posts on the battlefield, and by older drafted men who were assigned to active reserve or territorial reserve units.85 But during the Great War the labor battalions were manned overwhelmingly by the non-Muslim Ottoman enlisted men, who were regarded as “untrustworthy” to bear arms, regardless of their age or

80 Behic, Mükellefiyet-i Askeriye Kanun-ı Muvakkatinin İzahı, pp. 52, 188.
81 Özdemir, “I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Amele Taburları”, p. 32.
82 For a comparative account of labor battalions in the Great War, see Proctor, Civilians in a World at War, 1914-1918, pp. 40-75.
83 See Singha, “Finding Labor from India for the War in Iraq”.
84 Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation, p. 79.
85 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 341.
physical condition. By a deliberate decision of Ottoman military authorities, non-Muslim drafted men were mostly assigned to the “unarmed service” category, even if they were physically fit for the armed service category. In an order of the War Ministry issued on 3 August 1914, it was explicitly stated that “the labor battalions were to consist as much as possible of non-Muslims”. Those who were registered in the unarmed category were almost entirely employed in the labor battalions.

In this sense, the labor battalions not only carried out useful manual work, but they also acted as a means of controlling “suspect” conscripts in the army. These suspect elements included almost all non-Muslim subjects during the Great War, who were seen as undependable by the CUP-dominated state authority, which believed that if control over them was loosened even a little, they could easily turn into a subversive group supporting the enemy. For example, after the defeat in Sarıkamış on the Caucasus front, where desertions of Armenian soldiers to the Russian side caused anger among Ottoman authorities who then also claimed that the local Armenians were in collaboration with the Russians, the acting commander-in-chief Enver Pasha issued an order to all military units on 25 February 1915, instructing that “Armenians shall strictly not be employed in mobile armies, in mobile and stationary gendarmeries, or in any armed service.”

However, it should also be noted that, as in the case of many orders given by Ottoman authorities during the war, the application of this order was not always so strict and standardized. Not only after this order, but also after the Armenian population was deported from Anatolia and exposed to ethnic cleansing, there were still some Armenian soldiers serving under arms in various places. For example, there were Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman army fighting with arms on the Sinai-Palestine front as late as spring 1916. In fact, it can be argued that, whereas the existence of such men implies the limits of the Ottoman power in executing its decisions, such exceptions might actually also be desired by the same power since it was congruent with Ottoman pragmatism during the war. If some elements of an ethnic-religious group could provide useful labor for the Ottoman mobilization effort in the way defined by the Ottoman state, Ottoman authorities did not hesitate to utilize it even when they expressed open aggression toward that group in general. For example, since the Ottoman

army suffered from insufficient medical personnel, non-Muslim military
doctors were not assigned to the labor battalions; they were always kept in
regular combat units. While their personnel were overwhelmingly non-
Muslim, many labor battalions themselves did not have military doctors.

In the case of non-Muslims, control by conscription or, more specifically,
control by employment in unarmed labor was a premeditated practice in
the Ottoman system, as shown by the official correspondence between
Ottoman authorities. More direct references to this method can be found
in the later phases of the war, and especially during the early phase of the
Turkish National Struggle (1919-1922). For instance, this was adopted in order
to neutralize the Greek population in the central and eastern Black Sea
region, who were regarded as a potential fifth column. By conscripting the
most physically able elements of their male population, Turkish authorities
also aimed to eradicate any potential resistance to the occasional deporta-
tion of Greek villagers.

While the majority of the enlisted men in the labor battalions consisted of
Ottoman Greeks and Armenians, there were also non-Muslims from smaller
communities, such as the Assyrians (Süryanî). Nor did the labor battalions
include only non-Muslims: Muslim conscripts were also employed in them.
But these Muslim enlisted men were usually the ones who were too old or
regarded as not entirely fit physically or useful for armed service. The labor
battalions also included Muslims released from prisons to contribute to the
mobilization effort. Sometimes labor units were manned by convicts as a
form of alternative punishment, in which way their labor would be more
useful than locking them away. For example, in the Third Army zone of
the Caucasus Front in 1915, about 3,000 captured draft-evaders and desert-
ers were ordered by the army command to be sent to the provinces of
Diyarbekir and Mamuretülaziz to work in agriculture and transportation.

Another common way of compensating for the depletion of the agricul-
tural workforce by using “outcasts” during the war was to assign captured
prisoners-of-war to large farms urgently in need of manpower, a method
that was used especially in the major provinces of Istanbul, Hüdavendigâr/
Bursa, and Edirne, and in the districts surrounding these urban centers,

89 Mutlu, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Amele Taburları, p. 159.
91 Balçioğlu, Belgelerle Milli Mücadele Srasında Anadolu’da Ayaklanmalar ve Merkez Ordusu, pp. 79, 83, 87, 190.
92 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I,p. 341.
93 Öğün, Kafkas Cephesi’nin I. Dünya Savaşı’ndaki Lojistik Desteği, p. 89.
such as İzmit and Çatalca.\textsuperscript{94} It is understood from documents that many Russian prisoners-of-war were mostly employed in agricultural work this way.\textsuperscript{95} Upon the request of landowners, various numbers of POWs were assigned to the farms on condition that the landowner would house, feed, and guard them. Landowners were also required to report every week to their local administration and the military supply station inspectorate (\textit{menzil müfettişliği}) about the situation of the POWs assigned to them. In the case of desertions, urgent reporting was required together with physical descriptions of the POWs.\textsuperscript{96}

Terms of service in the labor battalions were not limited during the war, but drafted men were generally kept in the labor battalions for a minimum of three years.\textsuperscript{97} The main tasks fulfilled by the labor battalions during the war consisted of working in the construction and maintenance of roads and railroads, in the construction of fortified posts, helping transport men and materiel to the fronts, and helping in agriculture.\textsuperscript{98} Separate labor battalions were organized in each army district of the empire. But they were not static units and they could be transferred to any region of the empire whenever they were needed.\textsuperscript{99} There were ninety labor battalions at the time of mobilization was declared and each battalion was planned to include around 1,200 men. In total, there were approximately 100,000 men employed in them in 1914.\textsuperscript{100} There are no precise data available about the total number of men employed in the labor battalions during the four years of the war, but it can be estimated that the total number exceeded 100,000, taking into account the fact that the War Ministry decided to form fifty more labor battalions in 1915.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{94} BOA, DH.EUM.5.ŞB., 34/25, 12 March 1917; Toprak, \textit{İttihad – Terakki ve Cihan Harbi}, 227 n. 14.
\textsuperscript{95} BOA, DH.EUM.5.ŞB., 37/21, 17 May 1917. Another interesting application in this respect was that Muslim prisoners of war in the hands of the Germans were transferred to the Ottoman Empire to be employed in agriculture and factories, where a labor force was needed. See ATASE, BDH, 1835/30/1-37.
\textsuperscript{96} BOA, DH.EUM.5.ŞB., 31/36, 12 June 1917. It is also important here to note that regular Ottoman troops could also be employed in agricultural work in times of urgent need, if there was no combat on the battlefield. For example, an order issued from the War Ministry in November 1916 required that, where and when possible, regular troops should perform agricultural work in their zones. See Öğün, \textit{Kafkas Cephesinin I. Dünya Savaşı'ndaki Lojistik Desteği}, p. 93. For a similar practice, also see BOA, DH.ŞFR., 76/134, 16 May 1917.
\textsuperscript{97} Shaw, \textit{The Ottoman Empire in World War I}, I, p. 342.
\textsuperscript{98} Özdemir, “I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Amele Taburları”, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{100} Özdemir, “I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Amele Taburları”, pp. 21-22, 33.
\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 63.
The labor battalions in the Ottoman army were characterized by notoriously poor living and working conditions. Some of the major problems which the labor battalions suffered from throughout the war were poor accommodation and lack of supplies and equipment. Eyewitness accounts confirm that many soldiers in the labor battalions were underfed and suffered from disease.\textsuperscript{102} Moreover, the treatment of soldier-laborers in the labor battalions was generally bad. Conditions in the labor battalions became particularly atrocious for the Armenian enlisted men especially after the deportation of the civilian Armenian population began in 1915.\textsuperscript{103} Such notorious aspects of the labor battalions, which became known from the experiences of early draftees and were spread among communities verbally from person to person,\textsuperscript{104} intimidated potential draftees and created an extra motive among reluctant non-Muslims to evade military service.\textsuperscript{105} Because of such problems, desertions from the labor battalions were frequent\textsuperscript{106} and, although non-Muslims constituted the majority, Turkish soldiers-laborers also deserted.\textsuperscript{107}

Resistance to conscription: the problem of desertion

Ottoman conscription was unpopular among the masses it targeted, and occasional resistance to getting conscripted, in the form of draft-evasion and desertion, had accompanied the system in times of both peace and war. However, in terms of its considerable extent and intensity, resistance in the form of desertion (\textit{firari}, the Ottoman-Turkish term for deserter, actually covers both deserters and draft-evaders) during the Great War

\textsuperscript{102} For example, Rafael de Nogales states in his memoirs that, while he was in Adana in 1915, he observed that some Armenian and Greek soldiers in four labor battalions in the region, working in road construction, suffered severely from and died of famine: de Nogales, \textit{Four Years beneath the Crescent}, pp. 176-177.

\textsuperscript{103} After this date, the number of armed guards in the battalions was increased and control over the Armenian soldiers became stricter. For an example on such measures, see \textit{Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi}, 81 (December 1982), document no. 1837, p. 181. Eyewitness accounts also recorded direct assaults on the Armenians in the labor battalions in eastern Anatolia, and some have claimed these even included massacres. See, for example, Künzler, \textit{In the Land of Blood and Tears}, pp. 16-20.

\textsuperscript{104} Sotiriou, \textit{Farewell to Anatolia}, pp. 70-71.

\textsuperscript{105} For example, this point is wittily explained in the memoirs of an Ottoman Greek. See Spataris, “\textit{Biz İstanbullular Böyleyiz}”: \textit{Fener’den Anlar}, p. 147.

\textsuperscript{106} BOA, DH.EUM.6.ŞB., 44/32, 20 June 1915; BOA, DH.EUM.KLU., 6/39, 10 January 1915.

\textsuperscript{107} Özdemir, “\textit{I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Amele Taburları}”, p. 96.
presents a unique case. The problem of desertion was a major factor that eroded Ottoman war performance. The total numbers in the official Ottoman casualty statistics do not provide a separate figure for desertions, but include it under the more general heading of “deserters, POWs, sick, missing”, which reached the total of 1,565,000.\footnote{ATASE, BDH, 62/309A/005; Larcher, \La guerre turque dans la guerre mondiale, p. 602.} According to the accounts of various high-ranking military authorities who served during the Great War, the proportion of desertion in this figure was estimated to be as high as 500,000.\footnote{See, for example, Liman von Sanders, \Five Years in Turkey, p. 190; İnönü, \Hatıralar, I, 2nd edn, pp. 126-127.} Various secondary sources also confirm this estimate.\footnote{See, for example, Yalman, \Turkey in the World War, pp. 261-262; Erickson, \Ordered to Die, p. 243.} This represents nearly 17 per cent of all the men mobilized (3,000,000) during the war. The same percentage was about 1 per cent in Germany\footnote{Zürcher, \“Between Death and Desertion”, p. 257. It has to be mentioned here that desertion in the German army proportionally increased in the last year of the war, and it was remarkably high in certain units on certain fronts. For example, the spring offensive of 1918 brought the German soldier to the limits of his endurance: “Up to 10 per cent of men deserted in the preparatory stages en route from the eastern front.” See Engleander, \“Mutinies and Military Morale”, p. 198.} and slightly higher than 1 per cent in the British armed forces.\footnote{Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, p. 741.} Nearly every ethnic or religious group in the empire is represented in this picture. As mentioned earlier, desertions of Armenian soldiers were not infrequent and such desertions in the early phase of the war\footnote{Shaw, \The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, pp. 93-105.} led Ottoman authorities to employ them in the labor battalions. Ottoman Greeks even coined a specific term for their deserters, “the attic battalions”, to describe those who hid in the attics of their buildings to avoid Ottoman recruitment authorities.\footnote{Spataris, \“Biz İstanbullular Böyleyiz”: Fener’den Anılar, p. 148.} Ottoman Jews were not particularly enthusiastic about military service, either. Among various methods to avoid service, obtaining a false medical report declaring an individual unfit for military service was apparently quite popular among this group.\footnote{Aaronsohn, \Türk Ordusuyla Filistin’de, 45. Feigning illness and malingering were also common among Muslim enlisted men. See, for example, Bir Doktorun Harp ve Memleket, pp. 72-73.} Similarly, desertions of Arab soldiers were also frequent, especially in the second half of the war.\footnote{See, for example, BOA, DH.EUM.KLH., 5/56, 22 December 1915. The issue of frequent Arab desertions is also commonly mentioned in the memoirs of German officers who served in the Ottoman Empire. See, for example, Guhr, \Anadoluladan Filistin’e Türklerle Omuza Omuza, pp. 144, 211.} However, most desertions were attempted by Anatolian Muslims (namely, Turks as majority, Kurds, and to a lesser extent Circassian and Laz elements)
who constituted not only the majority of the Ottoman population, but also the bulk of the enlisted men in the Ottoman army.\textsuperscript{117}

Neither the presumed strong Ottoman-Turkish military culture condemning desertion nor severe penal laws or references to the Islamic injunctions against avoiding military service could prevent desertion from becoming a major problem. The reasons for desertion varied. The most common, mentioned in the interrogation reports of deserters captured by Ottoman authorities, as well as of those captured by the British in Iraq and Palestine, include physical and mental exhaustion stemming from dire conditions at the front, despair and frustration resulting from the prolongation of the war, abuse at the hands of officers, the impossibility of obtaining home leaves, and reactions to the almost unlimited extension of term of service.\textsuperscript{118} Although almost all captured deserters express regret about their actions, they also implicitly or explicitly explain that they left as a last resort, when the conditions became unbearable and intolerable. This suggests that, although conscription was an obligatory form of military service, the enlisted men could still see a “tacit” contractual aspect in it. Although an individual potential draftee was legally obliged to enlist, this obligation was accepted as long as certain of the draftee’s basic expectations (provision of basic daily needs, fair treatment, reasonable term of service, continuation of one’s belief in the legitimacy of the service, providing for his family while he is away, etc.) were met by the authorities.

There were of course thousands of deserters who could not be caught immediately. Many of them turned into brigands to survive, forming armed bands, the size of which ranged from about a dozen to a few hundred people. Such armed bands, which were usually formed on the basis of common ethnic and religious ties, presented a major security threat across Anatolia. The trouble they caused reached an intolerable level in the later phase of the war. A telegram sent by the Interior Minister Talat Pasha to all local administrative units on 1 June 1918 complained that murders committed by bands of deserter-brigands were occurring in almost every corner of the

\textsuperscript{117} For instance, according to a report on deserters in the province of Aydin, covering the period from the beginning of mobilization (2 August 1914) to June 1916, shows that Muslims constituted the majority of deserters (28,950 out of a total of 49,228): BOA, DH.EUM.6.ŞB., 9/8, 6 September 1916. The province of Aydin included at this time the subprovinces of İzmir (the centre of the province), Aydin, Denizli, and Saruhan (Manisa).

\textsuperscript{118} For various examples of such reports, see ATASE, BDH, 2322/71/1-1; ATASE, BDH, 2322/71/1-7. For some examples from British intelligence, see the National Archives of the UK, Kew [henceforth, TNA]:PRO WO 157/703, March-April 1916; TNA:PRO WO 157/800, June 1917; TNA:PRO WO 157-727, May 1918.
country.119 Next to murder, the more routine crimes included the pillaging and robbing of villagers and townsfolk.120 This turned desertion into a much larger issue of public security, which required the state to reorganize its gendarmerie to cope with the problem. On the other hand, there are examples showing that roaming deserters in the Ottoman countryside were not treated as complete outcasts by local populations; on the contrary, quite a few of them could easily hide in the vicinity of their own villages and were provided with shelter and food.121 Ottoman military authorities often note the support of the local populations and also lament the fact that this encouraged further desertions.122

In fact, it is even difficult to argue that deserters were treated as complete outcasts by the state, either. When the need for military labor was so pressing and the number of deserters was so high, Ottoman authorities were always looking for a way to restore deserters into service during the Great War. Although military law required the death penalty for deserters, authorities typically reserved it for repeat offenders and those who committed serious crimes during their absence. Milder forms of punishment such as beating or imprisonment were usually applied to those who were caught during or after their first attempt.123 More importantly, three general amnesties were issued for all deserters on behalf of the sultan. The first one of these came as early as the declaration of mobilization (6 August 1914), the second appeared on 28 June 1915, and the third was announced in the last year of the war (15 July 1918).124 These promised pardons for deserters who surrendered to the authorities within a specified time period. The objective of all three amnesties was basically to bring the deserted military labor back in service, which would also help decrease the security problem in the countryside. There were other measures designed to recover the deserted labor, which were implemented in the absence of an amnesty. For example, the Interior Ministry circulated an announcement to all local administrative units on

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119 BOA, DH.ŞFR., 88/3, 1 June 1918.
120 BOA, DH.ŞFR., 79/17, 2 August 1917.
121 Zürcher says that the fact that local people often sympathized with deserters is one of main aspects that differentiate the Ottoman case from West European countries. See Zürcher, “Refusing to Serve by Other Means”, p. 50.
122 See, for example, ATASE, BDH, 2880/323/3, Report sent from the commander of the 37th Caucasus Division to the II Caucasus Corps on 20 June 1917.
123 This was also observed by the Dutch embassy as early as May 1916, which reported that “the army has replaced prison sentences with corporal punishment in the field in order not to deplete the strength of the army further”. See Zürcher, “Little Mehmet in the Desert”, p. 234.
124 For the texts of these amnesties respectively, see Düstür, series II, vol. 6, p. 981; vol. 7, p. 630; vol. 10, p. 553.
21 September 1918, stating that deserters surrendering of their own free will could be enlisted as gendarmes if they met the necessary criteria for eligibility. Such surrendered deserters were usually employed in pursuit squads formed by the Ottoman gendarmerie to capture deserters and fight armed bands in the Anatolian provinces.

Such measures were not entirely ineffective, but Ottoman authorities continued to struggle with the problem of desertion until the end of the war. It remained a major factor eroding Ottoman performance on the battlefield and challenged state authority on the home front. According to the official Ottoman statistics, the number of enlisted men under arms was 560,000 when the Armistice of Mudros was signed on 30 October 1918. As mentioned above, the total number of desertions had reached almost the same level by that time.

Conclusions for a comparative analysis

Obligatory military service became increasingly more compelling as a method of securing military labor in the age of modern warfare, from the late eighteenth century onwards, and the Ottoman case is no exception. As a total war that demanded a permanent and large-scale mobilization of manpower, the Great War was the apogee of this process and made obligatory military service a necessity for all the belligerents. Conscription, however, was never purely a military matter, but was also significantly related to political concerns and internal security. Since its first phase of application in the era of Mahmud II, the system of conscription was in congruence with the state’s centralizing policies. Conscription with a working infrastructure would give the central state an increased ability to control the men at the local level and would help it counteract the power of local notables in the provinces. In this sense, from the state’s perspective the coming of conscription was important also in terms of internal security. The evolution of the system was far from smooth, mainly due to the infrastructural weakness of the state, but the political logic behind conscription remained relevant throughout the Great War.

The ideological preferences of the Ottoman state also played a determining role in shaping the nature of conscription. The religious and ethnic hierarchy of the Ottoman polity was reflected in it. Not only in its human

125 BOA, DH.UMVM., 124/182, 21 September 1918.
126 ATASE, BDH, 62/309A/005.
composition, but also in its symbolism and ideological justification, the system was predominantly a Muslim institution. Conscription was hardly universal in the Ottoman context. But this did not mean a complete exclusion of Ottoman non-Muslims. Instead, their situation was characterized by a discriminatory inclusion within a pragmatic outlook. For a long time, non-Muslims were loosely included in the system: they were denied active service, but were obliged to pay an exemption fee instead. The new regulations after 1909 and then in 1914 made Ottoman conscription more comprehensive, but still in a pragmatic fashion. When the demand for military labor was very high during the Great War, more and more non-Muslims were enlisted into the armed forces. But the overwhelming majority of the enlisted non-Muslims were employed in the unarmed labor battalions. Employing them in this way not only supplied useful labor for manual work, but also provided a means of control which would keep physically able non-Muslim male populations submissive, at a time when the nationalist CUP government increasingly considered them as a potential fifth column. In this respect, conscription as a “nation-building” project failed in the Ottoman case. One may even speculate that it accelerated the dissolution of the imperial demographic composition. On the other hand, it can be argued that Ottoman conscription served as a precursor for, a sort of catalyst of, the Turkish-Muslim identity that became the main basis of Turkish nationalism.

Ottoman conscription was a form of tributary and noncommodified labor, in which eligible males had to serve from legal obligation. There would be no payment in return for this service, the duration of which was supposed to be limited by law. However, wartime conditions could alter this limit. While the duration of active military service was declared to be two years for the army in May 1914, it was continuously extended as the war prolonged. Consequently, enlisted men had to serve until the end of the war. It can be said that this extension pushed conscript labor toward the unfree end on the axis of free/unfree labor.

127 According to the Law on Military Service of 1914, the total duration of service had three parts: beginning with the date of enlistment, the first two years were for active army service (niżam); then sixteen years for active reserve service (iḥtiyāt); and, finally, seven more years in the territorial reserve service (müstahfız). The total period of service was twenty-five years. However, the two years of active service was actually only for the infantry; it varied for the gendarmerie and the navy: it was three years for the former and five for the latter. On the other hand, according to the Article 6 of the law, active army service in all military classes could be extended in wartime, which did actually happen during the Great War. See “Mükellefiyet-i Askериye Kanun-i Muvakkatı”, 29 Nisan 1330/12 May 1914, Düstür, series II, vol. 6, pp. 662–704.
As had been the case in European conscription systems after the French Revolution, obligatory military service was presented to the public as a form of taxation incumbent upon all citizens as a requirement for citizenship. In the Ottoman case religious justification played an important role as well. The discourse of obligatory military service as a patriotic duty was amalgamated with a religious discourse referring to the Islamic legal concept of Holy War.\textsuperscript{128} This religious discourse culminated in a “binding” document for Muslims when the Ottoman state officially proclaimed Holy War (\textit{cihad}). A religious decree, issued through the office of the Sheikh al-Islam on 11 November 1914, invited all Ottoman Muslims to fight as a religious duty, as well as demanding support from Muslims all over the world. The emphasis on masculinity, which equated military service to a “rite of passage” into manhood, was another mechanism for justifying conscription, with deep roots in Ottoman-Turkish popular culture.\textsuperscript{129}

Ottoman conscription practice also shows that, even when conscription is the most dominant form of military labor, existing social-economic-political conditions and the multiple necessities of warfare require the simultaneous existence of different forms of recruitment. In the Ottoman case, conscription was never total, because of the infrastructural weaknesses of the Ottoman state, and the extent of manpower needs for specific purposes. The pragmatic needs of the state and the specific requirements of war simultaneously produced hybrid forms of recruitment (old and new). As discussed above, besides conscript labor, the Ottoman army developed and utilized various hybrid forms under the general heading of “volunteers”. Different from conscript labor, volunteers represented a certain degree of commodification, as many of them received payment or obtained material benefits in return for their service. However, they were still subject to the conscription regulations and had to serve until the end of the war once they joined the colors. Even mainstream Ottoman conscription included a different level of commodification, as it allowed (and sometimes in practice obliged, as in the case of non-Muslims) the avoidance of service through the payment of an exemption fee. The labor battalions can also be mentioned in this respect. These constituted a separate subcategory within conscription, through which conscript labor was used in manual works primarily related

\textsuperscript{128} Heinzelmann, \textit{Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına}, p. 264.
\textsuperscript{129} This emphasis on manhood was frequently used in the Ottoman propaganda literature during the war. In such literature, usually in the form of short and simple stories, the mothers and other female loved ones of potential draftees were always depicted as encouraging their boys to join the war to protect their virtue (\textit{namus}) against the infidel enemy. For an example, see Seyfi, “Oğlumu Hududa Gönderdikten Sonra”, pp. 103-104.
to military need, but also in other economic sectors such as agriculture. It can be said that enlisted men in the labor battalions were employed “forced war workers” within a military framework.

The coexistence of different types of military labor was certainly not unique to the Ottoman case. In his seminal article on the evolution of recruitment types in the modern west, John Lynn has already pointed to the continuity of “old” forms and the possibility of coexistence of different types. 130

In this sense, the Ottoman practice of conscription confirms that types of military labor were rarely entirely exclusive. Various factors such as the pragmatic needs of warfare, infrastructural problems, and political preferences mitigated exclusive categories and required a more hybrid system. Rather than following a teleological line of transition, it is more reasonable to argue that a particular type became dominant at a specific time and place, still allowing room for other types, as in the case of the Ottoman Great War experience.

Finally, the problem of desertion, which reached its peak during the Great War, demonstrates that resistance to compulsory military service was an integral part of the history of Ottoman conscription. The recruitment of military labor in a tributary form did not guarantee absolute control over it. Despite the existence of legal obligation, the threat of severe punishment, peer pressure, and religious-nationalist-cultural discourses that praised military service, the Ottoman case reveals that there was always a limit to obedience to conscription. The Great War was a time for the Ottoman state to use its actual and discursive power to mobilize the maximum amount of manpower but, ironically, it was also a period in which the evasion of military service reached very high levels. The extent of the problem allows us to argue that enlisted men were not entirely passive; they had an agency through which they could react to that obligation – at least when basic expectations, which had been implicitly or explicitly promised by the conscription law at the beginning, were not met by the state. This reaction, which forced the state to take measures both within the military and on the home front, was a major variable that played an important role in reshaping the way conscription was executed.

130 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in Modern West”.
Soldiering as work

The all-volunteer force in the United States

Beth Bailey

On 30 June 1973 Dwight Elliot Stone, the last man to be conscripted into the US military, reported for basic training. The following day the United States began its experiment with an all-volunteer force.¹

Most Americans understood this move as a major and unprecedented transformation – even as a radical experiment – even though the longstanding draft was, in fact, the aberration. Until Cold War pressures convinced Americans that a large standing army was justified, the nation had relied on a volunteer force, turning to conscription only in time of war. But memories were short. Even though the draft had been in effect for only thirty-three years, from 1940 through slightly more than three decades of war and tense peace, conscription had come to seem normal, an expected part of young men's lives.

Short memories aside, however, those who saw the all-volunteer force (AVF) as a radical experiment had a point. It was clear in 1973 that the nation would need to recruit 20,000 to 30,000 nonprior service (NPS) accessions a month – vastly more than in the all-volunteer past. And they would have to do so from a population of youth that could generously be characterized as antimilitary, persuading them to join a troubled institution at the end of a difficult and unpopular war. The chair of the House Armed Services Committee was widely quoted as he quipped – repeatedly – that the only way the United States could get a volunteer force was to draft one.²

The American move from one military form to another was not messy and gradual, as are many of the transitions discussed in this volume. Instead it was clear and absolute, from one day to the next, and both the end of conscription and the structure of the new system were argued over, legislated, planned, observed, analyzed, and evaluated. Thus it is possible to discuss not only the key social, economic, demographic, and technological variables that produced the United States' modern volunteer force, but also the struggles to shape that force and to give meaning to the experience of military service in the post-Vietnam War United States. Significantly, many

¹ Evans, “The All-Volunteer Army After Twenty Years”, p. 40.
² Quote in O'Sullivan and Meckler, The Draft and Its Enemies, p. 228.
of those at the forefront of the move to an AVF consciously and purposely attempted to redefine military service as labor. Rejecting the idea that military “service” was an obligation of citizenship, these partisans worked to shift decisions about who would fight from the community and the state to the individual and the market.

In the first half of this chapter I will offer a history of the move from conscription-based to volunteer force in the United States and explore some of the major consequences of that transformation. Looking past the formative decade, I will discuss the implications of defining soldiering as work and relying on a national labor market to fill the military ranks, always reminding readers that the US all-volunteer force is the product of a specific historical time and place. I will then situate the AVF in the broad taxonomy of military service as labor, analyzing it in relation to the standard set of proposed variables in order to allow crossnational and chronological comparisons.

My analysis here focuses on the US Army. While each force – the army, air force, navy, marines, and coast guard – had specific and somewhat different experiences in the transition to and development of an all-volunteer force, the army was affected more than any other service. As the largest branch of the US armed forces (with active component end strength of 562,400 in 2010, compared to the next largest branch, the navy's 324,239), the army has to recruit, train, and maintain a much greater number of troops than any other service. And, significantly for a study of military service as labor, the army is the least specialized service, the one with the largest range of military occupational specialties (MOSs) or, in language even the army sometimes adopted, “jobs”.

4 The second reason for my army focus is a practical one. Although the AVF is a natural topic for labor historians, that promise has not yet been fulfilled. Very little has been written on the post-1973 volunteer force, and most of what exists is on the army. See Bailey, America’s Army, and Robert K. Griffith’s meticulously researched internal history, The US Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force. Rostker, I Want You!, offers a detailed policy history with an accompanying CD of archival documents. Given the multiple differences in size, structure, organization, and recruiting strategies among the services, I am discussing general factors leading to the move from a conscription-based to an all-volunteer military, but focusing on the implications for and actions of the US Army.
Historical background

From 1973 through the early 1980s, the US Army called itself the MVA: the modern volunteer army. "Modern", here, distinguished this volunteer army from those that came before. Although the draft had been in place (with only a short break) since 1940, the United States had relied on a volunteer force for most of its history. In the beginning, the British colonies in North America had adopted the British militia system, which defined all able-bodied citizens of each colony as members of a common militia, jointly responsible for defense of their homes. While this sounds like universal military obligation, that understanding rests on an anachronistic reading of "citizen". Only free white males had the rights and obligations of citizenship. And although an active militia, composed of volunteers, stood ready, if too few stepped forward, men could be conscripted from the larger common militia. Even in such cases, exemptions were common. More than two hundred laws offered excuse from military obligation, and not surprisingly most of them favored the economically successful and socially well-positioned.\(^5\)

The militia system carried over into the new nation, despite President George Washington’s desire for a standing army subject to federal authority. It was not until the US Civil War (1861-1865) that a federal system of conscription was implemented. This war was fought with mass armies – 2.2 million Union troops and more than 750,000 Confederate – and both governments turned to conscription. Nonetheless, the Confederacy exempted slaveholders and in the north men were allowed to purchase “substitutes”. And conscription met with great resistance; the first Union draft inductees were announced in New York just days after more than 5,500 men died in the battle of Gettysburg. The draft riots that followed cost more than a hundred lives.\(^6\)

From the Civil War until 1940, the United States maintained a small, volunteer, standing army, turning to conscription in times of war. But in 1940, aware that the United States would not likely stand apart from the war raging in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt instituted the nation’s first peacetime draft. A long five years later, as the nation began the process of demobilizing the more than 12 million men and women in uniform,

\(^5\) Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam, pp. 18-24. Segal offers a history of manpower policy from colonial times through the 1980s. Other significant works on the selective service system in the twentieth century are Flynn, The Draft, 1940–1973, and Chambers, To Raise an Army. See also Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers.

Americans assumed that the draft had been, once again, an unwelcome necessity of war. But the Cold War seemed to demand a large standing army, and a brief experiment with voluntarism left way too many boots unfilled. And then the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel.

In a society still shadowed by world war, its people still versed in the language of service and sacrifice, military service and citizen’s obligation remained closely joined. The joint congressional committee on the draft stated unequivocally in 1951 that “the duty of bearing arms in defense of the nation is a universal duty”, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, former commander-in-chief of World War II Allied expeditionary forces in Europe, insisted repeatedly during his 1952 presidential campaign that military service was “an obligation that every citizen owes the nation”. High school students encountered the familiar argument in “Are You Ready for Service”, a filmstrip that was distributed to classrooms across the nation by the same production company responsible for the instructional films “Are You Popular?” (1947) and “What to Do on a Date” (1951), in which a World War II veteran explained to his sons, one already in uniform, that military service was the most significant obligation of citizenship.

Though young American men were subject to the draft, those charged with defending the nation’s security saw a new world in which victory would be won through scientific and technological development, not with the mass armies of the past. (In fact, the overarching message of “Are You Ready for Service” was: stay in school.) The director of the Scientific Manpower Commission argued, rather coldheartedly, that a GI was quickly trained whereas a physicist was not, and such reasoning supported deferments not only for students studying science and technology but for most college students who managed to pass their courses. These deferments, however, were not especially controversial because so few men were drafted.

In the years following World War II the children born of the postwar American baby boom moved though American society like, as people said at the time, a pig in a python. The population bulge that caused elementary schools to sprout on the American landscape at the beginning of the 1950s translated into a flood of young men eligible for military service in the early 1960s. There were 8 million men between the ages of nineteen and twenty-

7 For a more complete version of this discussion, see Bailey, America’s Army, pp. 1-33.
five in 1958; six years later there were 12 million. At the same time, the army (by far the largest service) had fallen from 1.5 million to 860,000 active troops over the course of the 1950s. Abundance created its own challenges: deferment categories were expanded; qualifications were raised – but there were still too many men available for a shrinking armed forces, and no way to conceive of enough legitimate deferments to manage the glut of available manpower. The Pentagon discussed ending the draft in 1958; the issue got some attention again during the 1960 presidential election, as Democrats criticized the existing system, and in 1964 Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, true to his libertarian values, announced that he would end the draft if elected and incumbent Lyndon B. Johnson ordered yet another study of the issue. But in 1965 Johnson authorized a large-scale buildup of American ground troops in Vietnam and, in an attempt to deflect national attention from the escalation, decided to rely on the draft instead of activating the reserves.

**Transition to an all-volunteer force**

On 17 October 1968 – two and a half weeks before the presidential election, and at the height of American involvement in the Vietnam War – Republican candidate Richard M. Nixon proposed to end the draft. It was not quite so radical a proposal as it sounds; Nixon made clear that conscription would continue in some form until the United States resolved its role in Vietnam. Nonetheless, he pledged, if elected president, to begin moving immediately toward that goal.

Nixon’s motivations were, of course, primarily political. He meant to shake up the campaign in its final days, to show himself as someone capable of thinking boldly and of taking action. Nixon had chosen an issue that mattered to a great many Americans and, if many of them did not cross party lines to vote for Nixon, they nonetheless supported his plan. By the late 1960s there was, in effect, a perfect storm of factors that led to the end of conscription, some of which had little directly to do with the military: a strong and widespread sentiment that the draft was not fair, a demographic

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bulge in the draft-age population, attempts by liberals and the left to make it more difficult to send troops to war, newly powerful claims that the free market provided the best solution to most problems, and shifting possibilities for women and members of ethnic and racial minority groups in American society. Nonetheless, it was the Nixon administration’s concerted efforts that brought an end to the draft.13

Many, in early 1969, believed that Nixon’s promise had been no more than last-minute politics, a move meant to sway wavering supporters in a time of enormous political anger and national division. After all, Nixon had not discussed his proposal with the Pentagon, with military leaders, or with members of Congress. Nonetheless, one of his first actions as president was to establish the President’s Commission on the All-Volunteer Force, a group of civilian and former military leaders that was charged not with exploring the possibility of an AVF, but with crafting a plan to create one.

The commission, often referred to as the Gates Commission because it was chaired by former secretary of defense Thomas Gates, included both civilian and retired military members.14 At the beginning, opinion was divided and Gates himself told President Nixon that he was opposed to the change. This group, over several months, moved from initial divisions to a unanimous report. That was due, in large part, to the sorts of evidence they considered. The frame of the debate had been set well before the commission heard testimony or considered evidence. It was the staff, not the commissioners, who proposed the agendas, directed the research, gathered the evidence, drafted the report. And four of the five staff members were anti-conscription free-market economists with significant public reputations of their own. It is not that they were able to impose their opinions on the distinguished members of the commission – it is hard to imagine retired four-star generals and a former secretary of defense being pushed around by their staff – it was that they asked certain types of questions and provided evidence to answer them. Believing in clear data and quantifiable proof, they had little patience for qualitative questions about the meaning of military service or the obligations of citizenship. Their carefully gathered data supported the “hidden tax” argument. Their evaluation of economic variables strengthened the arguments of the three free-market economists

13 For a more complete discussion of Nixon’s proposal and the Gates Commission, see Bailey, America’s Army, pp. 21-33.
14 For records of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (the Gates Commission), see the Lauris Norstad Papers and the Alfred M. Gruenther Papers, Dwight David Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas [henceforth, DDEL].
who sat on the commission: Milton Friedman, Alan Greenspan, and W. Allen Wallis. Thus, while opposition to the draft took a wide variety of forms, the report that would structure the new AVF built on one key premise: the military must compete more effectively in the national labor market. The main answer the Gates Commission offered was competitive wages.

The strongest opposition to the move came from the armed services, though once confronted with an order from their commander-in-chief all generally worked hard to put successful plans in place. From the military and the general public, there were three major objections to the end of the draft.

The first was philosophical. Those who believed that military service was an obligation of citizenship worried about the centrality of money in this new model. One member of the Gates Commission initially noted that he had “serious philosophical reservations about paying people to die for their country”, to which Milton Friedman replied that he did “not see how morale and effectiveness were enhanced by paying people substandard wages”, for the “logic of such an approach would dictate paying them nothing”. Even though, in the end, the commission report was unanimous, some members remained convinced that there were moral issues that could not be reduced to economic terms. And in both public discussions and congressional hearings, the term “mercenary” was frequently used.

The second objection, voiced most strongly by members of the military, was that military service is not simply a job nor the military simply an employer. It was not only the risks that were different, but the other demands: the military required immediate obedience to authority; it exercised control over almost all aspects of individuals’ lives; it attempted to separate its members from the comforts and distractions of civilian society. And while some civilian workers might risk their lives in the course of their work – police officers, firefighters – none of them could be ordered to kill. From a different vantage, others argued that men who think of military service primarily as a job, who are drawn by the promise of a wage, simply would not make good soldiers.

Finally, many commentators and analysts worried that it was imprudent to leave the military at the mercy of the market. Some argued that the military might not compete well in the open market – a reasonable assumption at the end of an unpopular war, though the economic downturn that began in 1973 did create more fertile ground for recruiters. Others feared that the

15 Gates Commission, Minutes of 13 May 1969 meeting, 9, folder 1, box 1, and Minutes of 6 September 1969 meeting, p. 23, folder 5, box 1, both in Gruenther Papers, DDEL.
AVF would simply replace the selective service system with an “economic draft” and that the new all-volunteer force would be filled with poor, alienated African American men (though some were objecting to such potential exploitation while others worried about angry black men with guns and weapons training). Still others quoted the chair of the House Armed Services Committee’s claim: the only way to get a volunteer force would be to draft one. They believed it just could not be done. In the end, however, almost all involved in the debates over the AVF believed the volunteer force would serve as the core of the US military and as the nation’s peacetime force. In the event of a major conflict or long-lasting war, they assumed, the United States would once again turn to the draft.

Implementation

The military did, in fact, face an enormous challenge, and the army most of all. In the wake of a war gone badly wrong, an unpopular institution wracked by internal crisis had to recruit 20,000 to 30,000 young Americans a month (by contrast, in 2010 army recruiting aimed for approximately 65,000 nonprior-service recruits a year) from a racially, culturally, and politically divided society in which young people were overwhelmingly opposed to the military and more comfortable with the urging to “question authority” than with an automatic “yes, sir”. As one quick illustration: a carefully conducted survey in April 1971 discovered that 88 per cent of young men either “probably” or “definitely” did not want to join the army.16

Faced with such grim prospects, the army began two linked efforts, each of which relied, at least partially, on models of civilian labor or the market. During the early 1970s, in an attempt to improve its image, the army initiated a series of highly publicized reforms. Many were based on research into what young people would find acceptable work conditions and often relied on analogies to the civilian workplace. In the early 1970s potential volunteers were promised forty-hour work-weeks and paid vacations. Announcing the end of reveille and bed-checks, army reformers made the point that civilian bosses did not check to see if their employees were

in bed at 10 p.m. More sophisticated arguments also used the language of work. When Pete Dawkins, a young and highly decorated major who had, while at West Point, won the Heisman Trophy for the most outstanding player in American college football, testified before Congress about the coming “modern volunteer army”, he played down the reform of living conditions and the army’s newly competitive pay, emphasizing instead a different aspect of labor. To attract volunteers, he argued, the army would need to offer recruits “the ability to grow in one’s work, the ability to achieve recognition for achievement, the opportunity to really have work challenges [...]” The army Dawkins envisioned would offer the satisfaction of meaningful labor.

The military also began trying to compete more effectively in the labor market, offering benefits that research suggested would attract the sort of volunteers they wanted: bonuses for enlistment, money for college, job training, leadership skills, travel, adventure, and (initially, for women) good marriage prospects. Far-sighted reformers also began to focus on advertising. This was also, in a different sense, a turn to the market, though a market more broadly defined. Economists had, at that time, not yet begun to factor irrational forces into their calculations and the economists whose arguments shaped the Gates Commission conclusions had relied on fairly basic labor models of supply, demand, and competitive wages. Offer young men a decent wage, they claimed, and a sufficient number would enlist. Individuals would make decisions based on rational understandings of their own economic self-interest.

These, however, were not days of measured rationality in American society. And the market, in 1970s America, was not simply a realm of rational economic choice. It was a site of consumer desire; it was a volatile space of inchoate needs, hopes, and fears. These military officers, paradoxically, understood the complexity of this “market” better than the Chicago School economists. They adopted consumer capitalism’s most powerful tools, turning to the most sophisticated marketing and advertising firms of the day in attempts to discover what young people wanted and sell it back to them in the shape of the military. Although the slogans varied (“Today’s Army Wants
to Join You” was the initial campaign), all attempted to convince young people that military service was not about obligation, but opportunity.

That opportunity took different forms. Some of it was slightly misconceived reassurance: the initial advertisements made the unlikely claim that joining the army required no sacrifice of individuality – an important concept to 70s youth – not even the traditional “skin-head” haircut. At the same time, these ads offered a chance to “build your mind and body […] further your education, become expert at a skill, have opportunities for advancement, travel, and 30 days vacation a year”. One series of advertisements asked potential volunteers to “Take the Army’s 16-month tour of Europe”, a witty turn on the multiple meanings of tour that conflated the army tour of duty with the grand tour of Europe that more prosperous youth enjoyed. But many ads made a more basic offer. “We’ve got over 300 good, steady jobs”, read the headline on a Reader’s Digest advertisement that prompted more than 30,000 young men to send in postcards requesting more information. Another ad inquired, “What are you doing after school?”

Initial results of the move to an AVF: “quality”, race, and gender

The turn to the labor market would have profound implications for the composition of the army. Even though selective service system regulations had allowed college youth to defer or avoid military service in high numbers over the previous decades, and even though military reliance on quantitative test scores to sort draftees into different military occupations meant that more privileged youth were less likely to find themselves on the front lines, the draft did reach more widely and deeply through American society than would a volunteer force.

The army entered the national job market with a great disadvantage in that historical moment. While it continued to draw young men and women who had a family military tradition or other cultural reasons to enlist, few of those who had other options chose to enter the military in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War. In the early years of the all-volunteer force, the army relied primarily on those young men who were least competitive

20 Advertisements created for the US Army by N.W. Ayer are collected in the N.W. Ayer Advertising Records, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC.
in the civilian labor market. As the unemployment rate skyrocketed in the early 1970s, from 4.9 per cent 1973 to 8.5 per cent 1975 (or 16.1 per cent for sixteen- to twenty-four-year-olds), the military had greater appeal. But the army still struggled to find a quarter-million nonprior service recruits a year, and struggled also with the fact that the men the marketplace most easily supplied were not those deemed “high-quality”.

“Quality”, according to the US military, is a quantifiable term based on two key criteria. A high-quality recruit holds an earned high school diploma (not a GED) and scores in the top half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) portion of what is now called the ASVAB (Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery). Test scores are divided into five categories, which fall into a bell curve. Thus scores that fall into categories I-IIIA signal “high-quality”. To make clear what military and civilian leaders were arguing about: no one had a problem with category IIIB recruits or even, in many cases, category IVA. But the 10-15 AFQT scores that put potential recruits into CAT IVB were, according to the army, roughly equivalent to IQ scores of 71-81. In the early 1970s, the army was permitted 18 per cent CAT IV nonprior service recruits a year; currently the limit is 2 per cent.

Some of those involved in the transition, most particularly in these early days, insisted that “quality” did not matter. A body is a body, after all, and what mattered most was filling boots. Others, those who would win the day, argued that modern warfare requires soldiers of above-average mental capacity and the sort of day-to-day discipline shown by completing a high school degree. Army studies, over time, found that those who fell into the bottom of CAT IV were very difficult to train for even basic technical tasks; ultimately, only about one-third of such recruits were capable of the basic tasks expected in the modern army. Such concerns, however, were subsumed in political debate. The White House, aware that the army was not wholeheartedly enthusiastic about the move to an AVF, claimed that discussions of quality were simply an attempt to sabotage the volunteer force. And the Department of Defense dismissed army concerns: “how many Vietcong have PhDs?” was the slightly contemptuous phrasing.

Concern about quality was complicated by the fact that African Americans were significantly more likely than whites to fall into the “low-quality” category. Virtually everyone involved in the discussion pointed to socioeco-

21 For a more complete discussion of “quality” and market forces, see Bailey, America’s Army, pp. 88-129.
22 Griffith, The US Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, pp. 186-188; George Doust, interview by Robert K. Griffith, 30 March 1983, AVA-MHI.
nomic explanations: inferior schools, disadvantaged backgrounds – but, in that era of powerful racial division, all discussions of quality were shadowed by the explosive topic of race. When, in the mid-1970s, Bo Callaway, who served as Nixon’s and Gerald R. Ford’s secretary of the army, attempted to raise the quality of army recruits by mandating higher cut-offs across racial lines, opponents charged that he was trying to limit the number of black soldiers. The next secretary of the army, Clifford Alexander, agreed. He insisted that the army’s measure of quality – the high school diploma and a I-III A AFQT score – was unnecessary and prejudicial, and he had the scores removed from the files of 400,000 soldiers in order to prevent their “abuse”.23 (The scores did indeed shape soldiers’ careers, helping to determine not only initial MOS but also the course of promotion and advancement.)

Alexander argued that the army should measure individual accomplishment and success rather than relying on such scores, as they predicted success or failure only in the aggregate and so ruled out many potentially successful soldiers. Army proponents conceded his point, but argued for efficiency. One thousand recruits with high school diplomas yielded 940 soldiers at the end of six months. It took 1,400 recruits without earned high school diplomas to yield the same number of soldiers.24

Despite all the debate, the labor market was functioning: individuals were making decisions, weighing the army against other forms of labor. Some of their decisions were economically rational. Although Congress had increased military pay rates to equal those of basic entry-level civilian jobs in 1973, wages did not keep pace with inflation or the civilian scale and became steadily less competitive over the course of the decade. Cultural and ideological reasons also played a role; antimilitarism did not disappear with the end of the war in Vietnam.

By the end of the 1970s, the all-volunteer free-market army was in crisis. Forty-one per cent of the army’s enlisted ranks were high school dropouts. According to a study done in 1976 at Fort Benning, site of army basic training, 53 per cent of men read at or below fifth-grade level (roughly age ten). The army began rewriting training manuals, moving from eleventh- to seventh-grade reading level, and then to comic books. The American press reported to US citizens and other interested observers around the world that 90 per cent of nuclear-weapons maintenance specialists had failed

their qualification tests in 1978, as had 82 per cent of Hawk surface-to-air missile crews. As a June 1980 cover story in *Time* magazine noted, falling capabilities fit poorly with the rising complexity of weaponry: the modern Blackhawk helicopter, for example, had “257 knobs and switches, 135 circuit breakers, 62 displays and 11.7 sq. feet of instruments and controls”. At the same time, social problems undermined discipline and capability. Crime was rampant, drugs and alcohol abuse endemic, desertion common. Faith in the AVF, never strong, plummeted. In 1978 an American television network ran a documentary titled “The American Army: A Shocking Case of Incompetence”. 25

What seemed like domestic debates about the success or failure of the AVF took on new weight in 1979, when Iranian protesters overran the US embassy in Tehran, taking hostages, and the eventual military rescue mission failed, leaving eight US servicemen dead. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 added new pressures. In the midst of international turmoil, with the clear possibility of military action, stories of a military in crisis had new resonance. In the face of such international instability and widespread concern about the quality of the US military, President Jimmy Carter asked Congress to reinstate registration for the draft. He was not proposing an end to the military’s all-volunteer status, but wanted the draft mechanism in place in case it was needed.

As the turn to the labor market initially left the army in a crisis of quality, it also fundamentally changed its composition. The selective service system had mechanisms that could be used to create a roughly proportional representation by race; the new AVF did not. Very quickly, the percentage of African American men began to rise. Black men who had suffered in a civilian job market characterized by racial discrimination found opportunity in the military, and that opportunity was, in part, due to the functioning of the labor market. In the initial years of the AVF the army could not attract enough well-qualified men, and African American men (who were, in aggregate, less likely to be well educated and otherwise competitive in the civilian job market) took advantage of the disparity in supply and demand. And, in various ways, the army encouraged black enlistment. An army recruiting ad that ran in *Ebony*, a popular magazine aimed at African Americans, read: “It’s tough to get ahead when you start so far behind. No skills. No experience. No jobs to look forward to, except the ones anyone

can do.” 26 By 1974, 30 per cent of new accessions were black, compared to slightly over 11 per cent of the US population. Many of them were men who could find no other jobs, and a high percentage of black volunteers were designated “low-quality”. Those recruits did not qualify for technical MOSs or for any field that required significant advanced training. Thus a disproportionate number of African American volunteers were allocated to the combat arms.

It is not surprising that critics claimed exploitation. African American men had died in disproportionate numbers during the early years of the Vietnam War, and even after the Pentagon attempted to make certain that black soldiers were not overrepresented on the front lines, the language of “cannon fodder” and “genocide” persisted. These were, as well, days of racial division and anger both in the United States and in its military. Charlie Rangel, the congressman who would continue to argue against the AVF through the first decade of the twenty-first century, claimed that the all-volunteer force was simply conscription by another name, the drafting of the poor and black under the language of choice. 27

What is more surprising is the counterargument, which found legitimacy in the army’s attempt to reposition itself during the transition to an AVF. The key spokesman for this position was Ron Dellums, an African American former marine with an MA in social work from the University of California, Berkeley, who was elected to the US Congress on an antiwar platform in 1970. What, he asked, if the army really was, as it claimed, about opportunity? What if there were no war? What if the army did offer good, steady jobs? Should African Americans not have equal access to them? Should African Americans not, finally, have equal opportunity? 28 These were difficult conversations, especially in conjunction with concerns about quality. During the 1980s and 1990s, as overall “quality” numbers rose dramatically, African Americans (both male and female) continued to enlist in disproportionate numbers. During the 1990s, however, 59 per cent of African American recruits scored in the upper half of exam results (CAT IIIA or higher). These “high-quality” recruits had options, both within the military and outside it, and disproportionately few chose combat arms. 29

26 Advertisement in Ebony, December 1972.
28 Dellums, Lying Down with Lions; Dellums’s 1974 correspondence in Rostker, I Want You!, accompanying CD (Go548.pdf).
29 Moskos and Butler, All That We Can Be, pp. 39-40.
The changing racial demographics of the army during this time of transition concerned many Americans. But the change in racial demographics required much less management than did the growth in the number of women. The shift from conscription-based to all-volunteer military had an enormous impact on women in the military, both their numbers and functions. Of course activists in the women’s movement of the 1960s and 1970s played a significant role in creating new opportunities for women in the military, as they insisted that women deserved equal rights and opportunities and mounted legal challenges support their claims. But it was the move to the labor market that jumpstarted the full integration of women into the United States’ armed forces.30 The President’s Commission on the All-Volunteer Force, in a case of extreme short-sightedness, had not factored women into any of its quantitative market calculations about the feasibility of filling the ranks (aside from a proposal to dispense with women altogether), but army planners quickly understood that the army would have to increase the percentage of women in the army in order to meet recruiting goals.31

This would be a major transformation. According to legislation passed in 1948, women could not comprise more than 2 per cent of the nation’s military. That limit had been dropped in 1967, but its legacy remained: in 1971, women made up only 1.3 per cent of the military’s enlisted ranks. When the US Army moved to all-volunteer status in 1973, women were still members of a separate “Women’s Army Corps”. Women could not hold a permanent rank higher than Lt. Colonel. Pregnancy brought mandatory discharge. Married women could not enlist (though women could marry while in the service), nor could women with children under the age of eighteen. Women were restricted to just over one-third of military occupational specialties (MOS), but fewer than 1.5 per cent of actual army positions were open to women.32

From 1971 to 1979, army enlisted ranks moved from 1.2 per cent female to 8.4 per cent female (for the entire military, figures were 1.3 to 7.6 per...
cent). This shift mirrored changes taking place in American society, as economic crises propelled more women into the workforce and a powerful women’s movement challenged traditional limits on women’s public and workplace roles. But the rapid growth of women in the armed forces was also a byproduct of the shift from powerful cultural traditions of military service to the structural imperatives of labor-market capitalism.

As the army relied increasingly on women, it had to reconsider the roles women were allowed to play. In 1972, the army ended restrictions on all MOSs except combat arms. However, as the civilian labor market had done until the practice was outlawed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the army continued to designate each position – not only general job categories but individual slots – by gender: M, F, or I (for interchangeable). In 1973, under structural pressure, the army began reevaluating the gender designation for each of the individual slots.\textsuperscript{33} Realizing that if the army needed women who wanted to repair trucks it likely should not advertise for women who were concerned about their “femininity”, the recruiting command also recast recruiting ads. By the late 1970s they emphasized equal opportunity; in the early 1980s ads portrayed women as members of the team, with no gender-specific pitch.

Congress ruled that the first women would be admitted to the US military academies in 1976, and the Women’s Army Corps was dissolved in 1978. However, when the nation reinstated draft registration in 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, Congress excluded women from registration, a decision that the US Supreme Court endorsed in 1981. According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the draft was to fill the ranks of combat troops, and as women were not allowed to join the combat arms there was thus no purpose in registering them for the draft.

**Stabilizing the all-volunteer force**

Many of the arguments that swirled around the all-volunteer army in its early days hinged on its uneasy relationship to the labor market. Was the military analogous to an employer, its members akin to workers? Or was the military exceptional (because it was responsible for the defense of the nation), unbound by either labor law or the rule of the market? The army itself had helped to create the ambiguity. Army recruiting advertisements

offered “good, steady jobs”. Reformers within the ranks frequently compared army privates to civilian employees, urging that the men of the US Army be allowed the freedom to behave responsibly, turning up on time to their jobs each morning just as civilian workers do. At the same time, army noncommissioned officers and officers expected levels of authority and obedience that extended well beyond those demanded of civilian workers, and recruits were often unhappy that what had been portrayed as a job (or an “opportunity”) was, in fact, still the army.

Given these challenges – of recruiting sufficient numbers, of securing volunteers who could make successful soldiers, of managing a fundamental change in the makeup of the force, of dealing with the fact that calling military service a “good job” did not negate the fact that it was still the military, of dealing with international challenges – how did the AVF persist? Why, given the multiple failures of the fledgling AVF, did the United States not return to the draft?

Largely, I would argue, this was because there was no political will or powerful immediate threat. Nothing is ever monocausal, of course, and it is important to acknowledge the new patriotism of Reagan’s America and the waning shadow of the war in Vietnam. Military funding grew during the 1980s, and the army instituted internal reforms, including a new econometric, computer-based system of recruiting. But market forces also played a role, both labor-market forces of supply and demand and the cultural-consumer marketplace of meaning. Perhaps the most important factor was a change in demand. Congress lowered the target enlisted strength of the army – most dramatically after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 – and as the army needed fewer soldiers, it raised its standards for admission. Not surprisingly, quality begat quality. Army rebranding mattered, as well: this version of the army offered to help American youth “Be All You Can Be”.

Targeted benefits were also critically important. College benefits not only drew more highly qualified recruits; they also helped to rebrand the army. Army researchers had discovered, in the early 1980s, that the biggest disincentive to enlistment was a potential volunteer’s mother. Mothers evidently equated military enlistment with failure; success, to them, was college enrollment. This research gave the army’s deputy chief of staff for personnel (DCSPER) a brilliant idea: link the army to college; make army enlistment the path to college enrollment; transform those mothers’ concerns into pride. In all fairness, the army advocated ceaselessly for the new GI Bill that was instituted in the mid-1980s, and in 2010 the army spent $220 million on higher-education assistance for active-duty soldiers. But as much as the DCSPER cared about the actual education benefits his
soldiers might receive, he meant to use the promise of education to help rebrand the army. And instead of competing with colleges for young men and women, the military would offer higher education as an earned benefit of military service.34

During this same period, the army began a large new program of family benefits. The army did not do so to draw more soldiers with dependants, though that was the consequence. Instead, family benefits were deemed necessary to retain soldiers. This is the logic: a conscription-based force relies on a reenlistment rate of about 10 per cent; an AVF, manpower analysts projected, would require almost 50 per cent of its personnel to reenlist. And researchers, trying to understand reenlistment decisions, discovered that it most often came down to a single question: is my family happy?35

The move to an AVF had transformed the demographics of the army in ways that went beyond gender and race; the new volunteers were more often older (the current maximum age of enlistment is forty-two; the average age is twenty-one), more often married, more often parents. But the military made little provision for dependants; “if the Army wanted you to have a family it would have issued you one”, as the saying used to go. Spouses (mostly wives) and children were often frustrated and unhappy, and good soldiers thus too often faced a choice: family or career. The army’s solution was a broad new program of family-oriented benefits: excellent child-care programs, dental care, and excellent medical coverage; recreation services; psychological counseling; even subsidies for relocating family pets. Such programs made the stark family-or-military decisions ever less likely. But they accelerated the transformation of army demographics. Excellent family benefits drew more men and women with families to enlist; excellent family benefits kept more soldiers with families in the army. There are now 1.5 army dependants for every active duty member of the army. In 2010 47 per cent of soldiers had dependent children, 72 per cent of them under the age of eleven.36 This demographic shift has significant implications in those instances when the “job” becomes deployment to a war zone, and is a significant piece of the debate about labor markets, workplaces, and military exceptionalism.

34 Alan Ono, interview by author, 29 July 2005, Honolulu, HI.
36 For statistics, see Army Posture Statements, www.army.mil.
By the late 1980s the military’s downward trend had been decidedly reversed. The army was no longer in crisis; politicians and pundits and military officers declared the all-volunteer army a success. The navy and marines offered similar success stories, though neither had suffered quite so much as had the army in the transition. (The air force was largely exempt from the problems the other services faced in the initial decade of the AVF, as it remained quite competitive throughout the transition.) After a rocky beginning, the military had learned to maneuver successfully in the market system. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that the military was, in fact, still protected from the labor-market laws of supply and demand. It could compete in the market because it was underwritten by the state – by rising military budgets funded by American taxpayers and citizens.

Despite the success of the all-volunteer force, tensions remained between labor and military models. These tensions came into stark conflict in 2003 as the United States went to war in Iraq. During the 1990s, army recruiting had tried to distance itself from war. When a New York Times reporter suggested that the army’s success in the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991) must be great for recruiting, the Recruiting Command’s director of advertising disagreed. “We don’t want to be misleading”, he said, “but too much combat footage interferes with the long-term attributes of army service that we want to portray: money for college, skills training and relevance to a civilian career.”

Of course, army leaders always understood that the mission of the US Army is to preserve the peace, a mission they understand first as deterring armed violence and second as, when deemed necessary by civilian leaders, fighting and winning the nation’s wars. But the all-volunteer army had, quite purposely, played down prospects of war and of combat. It had portrayed itself as a site of employment, as a source of opportunity. Young men and women who joined the army in the pre-Iraq War years knew, on some level, that the global situation might change, that they might well be deployed. But some of those who joined the Army Reserve on the promise of “One Weekend a Month”, or who enlisted in the active ranks drawn by promises of money for college were understandably upset by what they saw as a bait-and-switch.

In the early months of the war in Iraq General Eric Shinseki, chief of staff of the army, directed the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to define a “warrior ethos”. Driven in part by the conditions of combat in

38 Bailey, America’s Army, pp. 245, 247.
Iraq and the recent death of eleven soldiers and capture of twenty-year-old maintenance clerk Jessica Lynch and her five companions in an attack on their convoy, the TRADOC task force concluded that all soldiers, no matter what their MOS or gender, had to be prepared for combat. The army replaced the Soldier’s Creed that had been adopted in the years after the Vietnam War with one that emphasized the Warrior Ethos. The new creed replaced the initial phrase, “I am a member of the United States Army”, with “I am a Warrior and a member of a team.” In the early twenty-first century, key army leaders were attempting to counter the notion that soldiering was a job.39

Key variables: the all-volunteer force in the United States

The United States traditionally relied on some form of a volunteer force, turning to conscription only during major wars. Between the end of World War II and the Vietnam War, the military expected to fill its ranks largely with volunteers, drafting only enough additional men to reach accessions goals for each service. A relatively small percentage of those who served were draftees during these years, with the exception of the Korean War. In 1949, for example, volunteers were sufficient to fill the ranks; not a single man was drafted. Still, it is important to distinguish between “true” volunteers and draft-motivated volunteers, or men who enlisted because they expected to be drafted and knew they would have more control over their assignments and prospects if, instead, they volunteered for service. Although it is difficult to collect such data with precision, army researchers concluded that 49.7 per cent of volunteers in 1969, during the Vietnam War, were draft-motivated.40

While individuals face no compulsion to join or serve in the US military, once enlisted, members of the military are subject to specific legal constraints. Most fundamentally, enlistment changes the recruit’s status from individual, able to enter freely into contract, to servicemember, bound by the regulations of the US military. In 1890, in its decision In re Grimley, the US Supreme Court ruled that “enlistment is a contract, but it is one of those contracts which changes the status, and where that is changed, no breach of the contract destroys the new status or relieves from the obligations which its existence imposes”. To clarify, the justices offered the analogy

39 Ibid., pp. 248-249.
of marriage. While the “contract obligations” of marriage include “mutual faithfulness, […] a breach of those obligations does not destroy the status or change the relation of the parties to each other”.41

For example, in 1978 Captain Leon T. Davis, a thirty-year-old radiologist, faced court-martial for desertion after he refused to take his assignment in Korea. Captain Davis argued that, in a volunteer force, military service was based on a two-way contract. He had joined the army, he testified, based on promises made by recruiters and by army advertising, most particularly the claim that army doctors would have modern, state-of-the-art medical equipment. Because that was untrue the army was in breach of contract and he was thus “legally and morally excused” from filling his contractual obligations. Captain Davis was court-martialed, though a $2,000 fine replaced the potential sentence of eight and a half years of hard labor. The military court decision was based on In re Grimley: the contractual act of enlistment had transformed Leon Davis from an individual into a soldier and, once his status changed, no breach of contract could destroy his new status or relieve him of the obligations it carried. That decision, obviously, brings into relief the difference between military service and civilian employment.42

A second legal constraint on military service as free labor is the practice of “stop loss”. Stop loss is the involuntary extension of an individual’s active duty service beyond the specified initial term of service, which may be up to the contractual end of obligated service (eight years). The policy, which was created by Congress after the end of US involvement in the war in Vietnam, is based on Title 10, United States Code, Section 12305(a): “the President may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national security of the United States”.43 The standard Armed Forces enlistment contract includes the following statement: “In a time of war, my enlistment may be extended without my consent for the duration of the war and for six months after its end (10 U.S.C. 506, 12103(c)).”44 Stop loss has been used during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, primarily to extend when the soldier’s unit is to deploy

41 For complete text of decision, see Justia.com.
43 For this regulation, see http://us-code.vlex.com/source/us-code-armed-forces-1009 (accessed January 2012).
within ninety days of his or her end of initial enlistment. According to the army, 58,300 soldiers were affected by stop loss between 2002 and 2008.\textsuperscript{45}

Stop loss is invoked in unusual circumstances. In most cases, individuals serve an agreed-upon term. Duration of service varies, as branches of the armed forces offer different enlistment options at different points in time based upon the recruiting market and the mix of immediate and longer-term military needs. One argument in favor of the volunteer force, which typically requires longer periods of enlistment than those mandated by the draft (ranging from twenty-one to twenty-four months in the post-World War II era), is that longer periods of training and experience are necessary to master increasingly sophisticated military technology. Most current enlistments in the military are for three or four years, although those who have served are contractually obligated for eight years and maintain “individual ready reserve” status, in which they have no military obligations but may be called up during the balance of that time, as in the stop-loss policy described above.

Military pay in the United States is linked to civilian pay. Until 2006, military pay raises were at least 0.5 per cent higher than each year’s civilian pay raise, as calculated by the Employment Cost Index (ECI). Since 2007, military pay is automatically raised to equal the ECI increase, but may exceed that figure if so authorized by Congress. Military pay follows a carefully calibrated system of pay grades, based on a combination of rank and seniority, which are consistent across all services. Enlisted ranks range from E-1 (private, airman basic, or seaman recruit) through E-9 (equivalent ranks to army sergeant major through sergeant major of the army); warrant officers, which only exist in some services, run W-1 through W-5; officer ranks from O-1 (second lieutenant/ensign) through O-10 (general/admiral). In 2011, pay for E-1 was $1,467.60 per month. Members of the US military also receive benefits, including health care for self and dependants, housing allowances (where applicable), clothing allowance, family-separation allowance, access to lower-cost goods on post, and various forms of incentive and special pay, including that for hazardous duty.

The AVF is based on free labor, although the choice to enlist is, obviously, not made in a vacuum, and critics have, at various times, charged that the AVF replaced the selective service system with an economic draft. Civilian designers of the American all-volunteer force intended for the military to compete in a national labor market and called frequently on principles of free labor as they discussed the shape of the force. Willing or not, the

\textsuperscript{45} Tom Vanden Brook, “DOD Data: More Forced To Stay in Army”, \textit{USA Today}, 23 April 2008.
military has since designed recruiting strategies for labor-market competition, although most who shape such campaigns understand that more is involved in the decision to enlist than the rational economic interests of potential recruits. While I doubt many of those serving in the US military think of his or her service in these terms, an all-volunteer force would fall on the “commodified labor” end of the axis.

Major factors contributing to the emergence and persistence of the US all-volunteer force

Many factors contributed to the United States’ decision to move from a conscription-based to an all-volunteer force. To turn to cliché, a perfect storm of opposition to the draft emerged during the late 1960s, creating strange bedfellows as right and left joined in opposition to the draft. Despite the wide range of factors that undermined the draft, the two most important were demographic and ideological.

Demographic change in the US population was perhaps the most important factor behind the move from conscription-based to all-volunteer force. Between 1964 and 1973, the front end of the baby boom came of age. Close to 27 million young men entered the draft pool during those years, the largest cohort of men between eighteen and twenty-five before or since. Only 2.7 million of them would serve in Vietnam, fewer still in combat.

Over the course of the war in Vietnam Americans came to believe – accurately – that the selective service system was unfair and inequitable, allowing those with resources to escape its reach. Historian Christian Appy calls Vietnam “the working-class war”, and class undeniably played a powerful role in predicting which young men would be drafted. Those from relatively well-off families were more often able to find a sympathetic doctor who would provide documentation for a medical exemption. Higher education, paid for by individual students or their families rather than by the state, was grounds for deferment and, in 1966, only 6 per cent of those serving in Vietnam had college degrees. (The percentage rose to 10 by 1970, with the end of exemptions for graduate students and teachers.) African Americans were more likely to be drafted than whites, more likely to be put into the infantry, and, in the early years of the war, disproportionately likely to die. Black Americans overwhelmingly believed that the toll of the war
fell most heavily on their sons, even though military policies had lowered black casualty rates by the late 1960s. 46

The larger point, however, is that there were vastly more young men than the military required, even at the height of the Vietnam War, and the military continued to rely on deferments to manage that oversupply. (It moved to a lottery system with more limited deferments for 1970 summons.) However, the deferments that had seemed relatively innocuous during times of peace had much greater stakes in an era when a draft notice likely meant deployment to Vietnam. As draft calls rose and more and more young American men died on foreign soil, the selective service system seemed less and less fair.

Many Americans wanted to end the draft because they believed the United States' selective service system was unfair. That belief, ultimately, was due to demographic factors. Because there were so many more young men of draft age than were required for military service, most particularly for combat in Vietnam, risk and sacrifice were, by definition, not fairly shared. Most young men worried about their draft status, but a relatively small percentage of them were conscripted, and a relatively small percentage of those fought in Vietnam. World War II, in contrast, had disrupted the lives of almost all the nation's citizens, with virtually every able-bodied young man serving in the military or doing “essential” defense work. The children of the president of the United States, along with large numbers of students from Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, served in the military along with the sons of struggling hourly workers and middle-class shopkeepers and small farmers. And throughout World War II, despite the much greater loss of life, Americans had confidence in the selective service system. In 1942 93 per cent believed the draft operated fairly; in May 1945 the system still had the confidence of 79 per cent. 47 That was not true during the Vietnam War.

The demographically created inequities helped to discredit the US selective service system, but ideological and political objections were also critical to the creation of the all-volunteer force. Proposals to replace the draft with voluntary service came from all parts of the political spectrum. First of all, President Nixon's proposal to end the draft was a calculated political move intended to undermine antiwar protest. Antiwar movement leaders had often mobilized opposition to the war by focusing on the draft, and anger over the draft did fuel antiwar protest. Both Johnson and Nixon understood that some part of the antiwar protest was so motivated (though

their focus on the opposition to the draft led them to underestimate the depth and breadth of opposition to the war), and Nixon meant to undercut the antiwar movement by winnowing out some of those who were mainly concerned with the draft. The draft provided an opportunity for action. Perhaps antiwar protest would quiet if the draft were not such an issue.

Those on the left made two key arguments. Many to the left of the political center argued that it would be more difficult for American presidents to engage in military adventurism if they could not rely upon conscription but instead had to convince young people to voluntarily put their lives on the line. Their reasoning, though shown by subsequent events to be flawed, has a certain logic. The president would not be able to send troops to war cavalierly, knowing that the draft would supply however many bodies required. Young Americans would not volunteer for unpopular or illegitimate wars. According to this reasoning, an all-volunteer force would be a check on the nation’s ability to go to war.

Men and women who believed that the United States’ war in Vietnam was illegitimate also questioned the legitimacy of the draft. Why, they asked, could the government compel men to go to war against their will, to kill and to risk death in a war that a majority of their fellow citizens did not support? Revelations that the US government had lied to the American people about the initial reasons for escalation of the war, US wartime actions, and the war’s progress lent strength to such questions and helped to undermine willingness to continue conscription. Widely publicized tales of fragging, alcohol and drug abuse, combat refusal, wartime atrocities, desertion, and other acts of disobedience by US combatants during the war contributed to popular antimilitary sentiment and further undermined support for compulsory military service. Thus the specific war mattered greatly, giving force to political and ideological objections to the draft.

Conservative opposition to the draft was much less focused on the war in Vietnam; conservatives supported American war policies much longer than did the liberal-left. Nonetheless, policy-oriented conservatives and libertarians had long been arguing for the end of conscription. Some conservative proponents of an all-volunteer force presented the draft as a “gross infringement on personal liberty”, while a powerful cohort of free-market economists argued that conscription imposed a “hidden tax” on those who were drafted – an argument that goes back to the demographic. Those who are drafted, according to this argument, lose not only the difference between civilian salaries and low military pay during their legally mandated service, but also delay their further education, apprenticeship, or accumulation of seniority, the benefits of which accrue over time. Those
who escape the draft – a much larger portion of the population and of their peers – are not so penalized.48

These free-market critics of the draft believed that the military should compete in the national labor market and insisted that recruiting would pose no difficulty if military compensation matched entry-level civilian pay and benefits. Martin Anderson, the man who convinced Nixon to make his pledge to end the draft, was a junior player in this world. Nixon, in fact, used such language in his 1968 radio address: the armed forces, he explained, were the “only employers today who don’t have to compete in the job market [...]. They’ve been able to ignore the laws of supply and demand.” Higher pay and increased benefits, Nixon claimed, would make military jobs “more competitive with the attractions of the civilian world” and the all-volunteer force a possibility.49

Finally, changes in military technology and doctrine played a role. Echoing Eisenhower, Nixon told the nation in 1968 that in a nuclear age “huge ground armies operating in massive formations would be terribly vulnerable”, and thus the nation needed a smaller number of “motivated men” with the “higher level of technical and professional skill” necessary to operate the “complex weapons of modern war”.50 Nixon’s claim may have been disingenuous, but changes in military technology and doctrine would alter the way the military defined desirable – and acceptable – recruits.

Some of the factors that led to the end of the draft and the creation of the AVF remain critically important to its persistence, while others episodically threaten to undermine it.

Demographics remain significant. While demographic shifts – the baby boom that supplied a large excess of draft-age men – helped make the move to an all-volunteer force feasible, demographics has worked against the AVF in more recent decades. At the height of the baby boom in 1957, the US birthrate was 25.3 (per 1,000 population); by 1973 it had fallen to 14.9. Of course overall population had increased, so the drop in numbers is not so extreme as the more than 40 per cent decline in birthrate might suggest. Nonetheless, births dropped from a high of 4,308,000 in 1957 to 3,136,965 in 1973, or roughly 27 per cent. Put in other terms, the US fertility rate hit a twentieth-century high of 3.8 per cent in 1957, declining to 1.7 per cent in 1976. It did not again reach replacement rate (2.0) until 2007. The US military’s overall recruitment goal for 1974 was just under 428,000. That figure declined steadily over the

48 For a detailed discussion of the “hidden tax”, complete with primary documents, see Rostker, I Want You!, pp. 113-120.
50 Ibid.
following years, especially rapidly in the post-Cold War era. Recruitment targets for the US military were approximately 292,000 in 1989; they were down to 200,000 in 1992, and only 181,000 in 2004. Army recruitment goals, in parallel, were 211,600 (1974); 119,875 (1989); 75,000 (1992); and 77,000 (2004). (It is important to note that these goals are only for active-duty enlisted troops and include both nonprior service and reenlistment.) The army obviously found it much easier to recruit 75,000 volunteers a year than 211,000.

A significant number of these military volunteers are not US citizens. In recent years the US immigration rate, both legal and undocumented, has accounted for a greater percentage of American population growth than does its birthrate. As of 2006, 40,000 noncitizens served in the US military, with approximately 8,000 resident aliens enlisting for active duty each year. By law, enlistees must be legally in the United States and hold a green card, which is evidence that the holder may be legally employed. President George W. Bush signed an executive order allowing noncitizens to apply for citizenship following a single day of active service in the US military, and as of 2006 25,000 men and women have applied for and been granted US citizenship through military service. The “Dream Act”, a bipartisan congressional effort targeted at the approximately 65,000 young people without legal status in the United States who graduate from American high schools each year, would offer a six-year path to citizenship based on earning a college diploma or serving for four years in the US military.

While the military requires a relatively small percentage of draft-age youth, military enlistment standards combine with labor-market pressures to create ongoing struggles to fill the ranks. In the contemporary United States, the military is definitely not an employer of last resort. Seven out of ten young Americans do not meet the standards for military enlistment. Of the 31.2 million Americans between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four, only 4.7 million are considered “qualified military available”, and only 1.6 million are in the army’s target market: young men and women between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four, with earned high school degrees, in good physical condition, capable of scoring in the top half of the military qualification exam, and without criminal records.

53 For an overview of ineligibility, see William H. McMichael, “Most US Youth Unfit to Serve, Data Show”, Army Times, 3 November 2009.
The US military competes with colleges and universities and with civilian employers for the more able of American youth. As of October 2009, 70.1 per cent of those who graduated from high school in spring 2009 were attending college or university.\textsuperscript{54} While a great many young people do not graduate from high school, they fall outside the military recruitment target market. In 2007, for example, despite recruiting pressures during two unpopular wars, only 1.4 per cent of enlisted recruits had not graduated from high school or earned a GED. That contrasts with 20.8 per cent of all Americans aged eighteen to twenty-four.\textsuperscript{55}

Other criteria rule out a great number of potential volunteers. At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, approximately 17 per cent of Americans in the target age group are significantly overweight or obese. Significant numbers used prescription drugs that disqualified them from service. And until 2011, although gay men and women who volunteered for military service were not prohibited from joining or questioned about sexual orientation upon enlistment, they were not allowed to serve openly and risked discharge upon discovery. Approximately 13,000 men and women were discharged from the military under the provisions of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” between 1994 and 2011.\textsuperscript{56} Thus, the reduction of total end strength has made it possible to fill the ranks despite the shrinking pool of eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds, but high admissions criteria make that task more challenging than numbers alone would suggest.

One of the predicted drawbacks of a volunteer force was its cost, and the high costs of recruiting and maintaining an all-volunteer force work against its persistence. The AVF is enormously expensive. Obviously much of the US military budget is driven by high-cost weapons systems, the global presence of the US military, and the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the labor-market military has added extraordinary new costs. According to the Congressional Budget Office, basic pay for lower-ranked enlisted troops


\textsuperscript{56} Ed O’Keefe, “Fight for Gays in the Military Isn’t Ending Any Time Soon”, Washington Post, 10 February 2011; McMichaels, “Most US Youth Unfit to Serve”.
doubled between 1971 (two years before the AVF began) and 1975 (two years after it began), when adjusted for inflation. The US General Accounting Office estimated that the AVF added approximately $3 billion a year to the military’s 1974 budget (more than $10 billion in 2006 dollars). Those who argued that the draft imposed a hidden tax on draftees see that figure as evidence of the scale of the tax imposed. Others make the point that this is not necessarily a cost of an all-volunteer force, as draftees should be paid at reasonably competitive civilian rates. 57

Not only does labor-market competition require higher salaries and significant nonpay benefits, initial costs of recruiting have risen steadily over the decades. Estimates vary depending on what categories are included, but it is safe to say that the army currently spends close to $25,000 to recruit each nonprior service volunteer. Through most of the war in Iraq it took 7,500 recruiters and a budget of millions of dollars each year to convince about 80,000 nonprior service volunteers to join the army. The army offered large bonuses: its budget for fiscal year 2011 included $465 million as bonuses for new recruits. 58 An NPS recruit could qualify for a “quick ship” bonus of $20,000 by reporting for duty within thirty days of enlisting, and those qualifying for high-demand MOSs got up to $40,000 for a four-year enlistment. Reenlistment bonuses were also common, and with private security contractors offering to pay up to $200,000 a year for the best former special operations troops, the army (very rarely) offered reenlistment bonuses of up to $150,000. These financial incentives were combined with college education benefits and student-loan repayment programs. 59 The family benefits that were developed both to encourage reenlistment and in recognition of the changing demographics of the army are also extraordinarily costly. The US military counts about 1.4 million on active duty, but its military health system covers 9.6 million people, the majority of them dependants of both active-duty and retired veterans. Pentagon spending on health care has risen from $19 billion in 2001 to a projected $50.7 billion in 2011, in part because of wartime casualties, but also because the military plan is more generous than any potential civilian coverage. In addition, family

support programs cost $8.3 billion a year – which includes childcare spaces for 200,000.60

Economics certainly plays a role in enlistment rates, and thus in the continuation of an AVF. The recession that began in 2009 led to a flood of enlistments, including more and more young people who have completed college. But the AVF is not an economic draft, in that those who come from the poorest, most disadvantaged backgrounds are much less likely to qualify for enlistment: they are less likely to have graduated from high school, more likely to have gotten in trouble with the law, more likely to have physical ailments, from obesity to asthma, and more likely to have gone to inferior schools and thus more likely to score below the cut-off on military entrance exams. The American military is solidly middle-class, if middle-class is defined by the nation’s median household income, which was $50,428 in 2007. At the same time, military recruiting focuses heavily on small towns and rural areas in which capable young people find few employment opportunities, and it is clear that volunteer rates predictably climb with unemployment rates.61

Finally and most fundamentally, war has a profound impact on the health and persistence of the all-volunteer force, whether in the form of military doctrine and war planning or as wars actually fought. “War”, however, is not a generic category; the specific circumstances of each war or conflict are critically important. The Vietnam War made the move to an AVF possible, largely by creating discontent with the selective service system and fostering antimilitary sentiments. But the antimilitary sentiments aroused by the war in Vietnam also made it difficult to recruit quality soldiers and forge a successful volunteer force in that war’s aftermath. The US military’s performance in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, despite some problems with mobilization, convinced many skeptics that the AVF was a capable force and quieted the calls for a return to the draft that had begun almost before conscription ended. During the 1990s, the US military was frequently deployed in MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War), including disaster relief and nation-building or stabilizing efforts. Such efforts continue in Iraq and Afghanistan, and female personnel are increasingly important in interactions with women in sex-segregated societies. New technologies that require experience and maturity more than youthful physical vigor extend the potential age of service, an important consideration in a nation with an aging population.

61 Watkins and Sherk, “Who Serves in the US Military?”
When the United States began its preemptive war in Iraq in 2003, few discussed a draft. This was in part because the Bush administration presented the invasion of Iraq as a brief and easily accomplished task, but also because most Americans had forgotten that the AVF was envisioned as a peacetime core around which a wartime military could be constructed. Even as servicemen and -women were returned for second, third, and fourth tours of Iraq and were compelled to remain in the military past the end of their enlistments by stop-loss provisions, few military or political leaders seriously contemplated returning to the draft.

Conclusion

There was from its beginning a tension at the heart of the all-volunteer army. The end of conscription did not change the army’s purpose: the fundamental mission of the US Army is to fight and win the nation’s wars. But the all-volunteer army had, quite purposefully and more powerfully over time, tried to recast the meaning of military service. It downplayed notions of duty and service and obligation; it sold itself to potential recruits and to the broader American public both as a source of opportunity and as a “good job”. And while a great many men and women did find opportunity and stable employment in the army during the decades of relative peace, peace was never guaranteed.

Was it legitimate, critics periodically asked, to sell the army as money for college or as job training or as a source of health coverage for one’s children when those erstwhile students or skilled employees or parents would also be soldiers, subject to orders that override other obligations and other roles, and that might well end their lives? Back in 1978, as the false promises of some army recruiters made news and drew the attention of Congress, recruiters were ordered to give all applicants a written reminder. “The Army is a military organization”, the statement read, “which may be called upon to participate in combat operations (to fight) while you are a member of it.” One can understand the bitterness of members of the Army Reserve, which had relied for years on the recruiting slogan, “One Weekend a Month”, who in 2003 embellished their Army Reserve truck in Iraq with a sign: “One Weekend a Month, My Ass!”

What does it mean that the vast majority of Americans remained untouched by war, not even subject to the shared risk of the draft or the obligation of service, while a small volunteer force was sent repeatedly to war during the first decade of the twenty-first century? This is the ultimate but rarely stated problem with an all-volunteer force: the AVF cushions most Americans from the impact of war. By replacing the logic of citizen's obligation with that of the market and defining soldiering as employment, it excuses citizens from their basic obligation to pay attention to what is done in their name and of acting, as citizens, whether to support or to prevent US military actions.

The solution might be obvious – a return to the draft – but that proposal runs up against hard evidence and firm belief. US military leaders are certain that a volunteer force offers the best means of national defense, at least as they envision current and future conflicts. It takes a fair amount of intellectual competence to be a soldier in today’s army – or to serve in any branch of the military – and it takes a great deal of training. While a no-deferments draft would definitely capture more of the most competent American youth, it would also capture a great many more of the less competent. And drafting young men and women, as a matter of course, for more than a year’s term would be hard to justify. But a one-year stint in the army does not offer time for adequate training on increasingly sophisticated weapons, nor does it allow a new soldier time to develop the necessary experience and instincts to function in complex and rapidly changing operational environments. In addition, as the army learned all too well in the last years of conscription, those who are drafted against their will tend to be much less highly motivated than those who have volunteered.

Two other problems further complicate the notion. Reinstituting the draft would create a political storm over women’s roles. Currently, women may enlist in the military but are not required to register for the draft. That policy would certainly be challenged – and few politicians want to contend with that struggle. The demographic issue remains, as well: the military needs but a fraction of the nation’s youth, and a draft that took a small percentage of young men (or young men and women) would, certainly, be intensely unfair. Bottom line: less-able, less-well-trained, less-experienced, less-motivated soldiers are more likely to fail in their missions. And they are more likely to get themselves – and their comrades – killed. While the army had enormous reservations about the move to an all-volunteer force back in the early 1970s, it more strongly opposes the return to the draft today. Thus, despite the various factors that work against the persistence of the all-volunteer force, short of massive, total war, the United States will almost certainly maintain an all-volunteer force.
Private contractors in war from the 1990s to the present

A review essay

S. Yelda Kaya

The single most important change in military affairs in recent history is the unprecedented role private contractors have come to play in modern warfare. This has been a trend in the making from the 1990s on. Quite a number of things have changed since then, though, and this is not just about sheer numbers. Equally important is the fact that today the biggest clients of private military services are the world’s richest, most advanced states. So employment of contractors in combat is no longer about “state failure” as it was in the 1990s when African states lacking any sort of internal props or any means of substantial control over their territories hired mercenary forces to fight insurgents.

The use of contractors in war can be considered as the privatization of (certain) military functions. This is why the phenomenon is usually taken to challenge what is the most basic feature of the modern state for many: the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. Most scholars recognize that this monopoly has never been complete and that modern states have indeed delegated the use of force to private agents in this way or some other. Some argue, for instance, that the history of military contracting in the United States dates back to the Civil War. Nonetheless, it is crucial to see that what we have been witnessing for the last two decades is a break from the past. There has been a dramatic change in the magnitude of military contracting:

In Vietnam, for every one hundred soldiers one contractor was employed. During the Gulf War (1991), one contractor was on the battlefield for every fifty soldiers. During Operation Iraqi Freedom,

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contractors made up one out of every ten personnel. Only six years later, one contractor supported government operations in Iraq for about every 1.5 soldiers.²

Private contractors are now heavily employed in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are training local security forces (army and police), providing logistics support for the US military, escorting convoys, securing headquarters, and guarding top-level officials.

In what follows, I will review five of the most prominent studies on private contractors, which will hopefully help us reach an understanding of the current state of the field. The books are introduced briefly below, which is followed by five sections organized around some basic questions, namely: what are the reasons for the move toward much greater participation of private actors in warfare? Is it proper to call contractors “mercenaries”? What do contractors do in warfare and how can firms be classified? Who are the people employed by contractor firms on the battlefield and what kind of “work” do they do? Is there a limit to privatization of military functions in the sense that certain tasks are seen as inherently governmental and thus ill suited for delegation to the private sector?

Peter Singer’s Corporate Warriors is the first major study on the subject. The book appeared before the invasion of Iraq, in 2003, and as a result, it is not about private military activities in Iraq – or even Afghanistan. The cases Singer examines are mainly from the 1990s. Corporate Warriors centers the discussion on three cases. First there is the now defunct Executive Outcomes, formed in 1989, whose combat operations in Africa brought forth a concern about private military firms for the first time. Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) is the second case. Founded in 1987 by senior military officers, MPRI is one of USA’s favorite military companies, especially in advisory and training-related missions. The final case is Brown & Root Services, which has been awarded many back-end support contracts by the US government in contingency operations from 1990s onward. The updated edition of 2008 of Corporate Warriors, on the other hand, involves a postscript on Iraq, in which Singer notes that the situation in Iraq reinforces the arguments he initially formulated. Some people would disagree with the statement; nevertheless Corporate Warriors is a study everyone working in the field engages with in some way. Especially notable is the typology of privatized military firms Singer proposes, the

² Carafano, Private Sector, Public Wars, p. 38. According to Jeremy Scahill, the ratio is already one-to-one (Blackwater, p. 460).
“tip-of-the-spear” model, which disaggregates firms on the basis of their relative proximity to the tactical battlefield. Tip-of-the-spear typology has received many criticisms, and almost everyone has put forward alternative typologies in response to Singer’s; nonetheless, it may well be argued that his compares favorably with the rest.

Deborah Avant’s *Market for Force* overlaps in significant ways with *Corporate Warriors*. This is not only because the cases examined are more or less the same. It is also that the two analysts share common concerns regarding the privatization of military functions, which basically relate to the twin problems of unaccountability and loss of democratic control over the use of force. On the other hand, the scope of *Market for Force* is narrower: it is confined to the consequences of outsourcing military functions. Avant is particularly interested in the ways in which privatization has had an impact on the control of violence. Avant introduces the triple concepts of functional, political, and social control of force. Functional control is about the “ability to deploy coercion effectively to defend the state’s interests” (p. 40). The concern here is with getting the job done with minimum cost. Political control refers to the political processes by which decisions regarding employment of force are made. The issue Avant focuses upon is whether privatization erodes existing procedures of decision making and changes the balance of power between (old and new) institutional actors. Finally, social control pertains to the containment of force within acceptable norms stemming from human rights, international law, democracy, etc. Avant inquires whether privatization reinforces or attenuates the integration of coercive institutions with these norms. Avant includes two intervening variables in her analysis, the first one being the character of the state which outsources. There is a single distinction here: strong versus weak states. The second variable has to do with the questions as to which functions are privatized and in what ways. Then the author explores the ways in which the variable of state strength interacts with that of the nature of the military function to produce varying patterns of change. Finally, we should also note that *Market for Force* is valuable in particular in scrutinizing cases of privatization where the client is not a government but instead a nongovernmental organization or a multinational corporation. Many NGOs and MNCs working in troubled zones, so to speak, either hire contractors to secure their headquarters/facilities or simply finance the services contractors provide for the host governments. The prominent example of this sort of privatization is Nigeria, where Shell and Chevron have financed (and deployed) public security forces in the face of a popular movement against oil operations.
Then there is *From Mercenaries to Market*. This edited volume has two major concerns. The first major is with identifying the new private actors engaged in military activities. In a nutshell, contributors define contractors as distinct from mercenaries. The other concern has to do with the regulation of private military activities. The bulk of the book is actually devoted to the second topic, regulation – quite understandably because it is a major challenge to come up with procedures according to which contractors will be prosecuted and punished for wrongful deeds. This constitutes a problem because, on the one hand, private contractors are not part of the military chain of command and they fall outside the military code of justice. Therefore, unlike the US soldiers they accompany, American contractors working for the US government in Iraq cannot be court-martialed. Another dimension to this problem is that international law is directed toward national militaries; and private actors seem to be lying outside its jurisdiction. There is also the fact that Order 17 issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority bestowed upon foreign contractors immunity against prosecution under Iraqi law; contractors cannot be taken to Iraqi courts because of crimes they commit on Iraqi soil. All these combine to make regulation a burning issue. Contributors to *From Mercenaries to Market* consider many different scenarios ranging from voluntary self-regulation to regulation by states (that is, states, like the USA or the UK, which export private military services). The problem of regulation is not critical for my purposes, but the problem of identification is, and I am going to examine it in the pages to come.

3 It is true that there has been a recent change in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. According to the code, civilian contractors fall under military justice only in times of declared wars, which is very much a rarity. The application of the code was extended in 2007: now contractors can also be prosecuted for misconduct during contingency operations. The impact of the amendment is yet to be observed.

4 The most interesting contribution in this respect is Chia Lehnardt’s “Private Military Companies and State Responsibility“, which argues that it is wrong to write off international law as irrelevant. This is because, although international law is biased toward states, it is still possible to make use of it through attributing the misconduct of private companies back to hiring states.

James Jay Carafano’s Private Sector, Public Wars stands out in its polemical style. A retired army lieutenant colonel, historian, and columnist, Carafano argues that the public-private balance in military affairs has changed for good. This is most certainly not something to be lamented. It is simply that an unimpeded free market can “provide services faster, cheaper, and more effectively” than any government; military services are no exception (p. 37). For Carafano, private military industry has the potential to be one of the United States’ “greatest competitive advantages in the twenty-first century” (p. 12). Carafano has devoted many pages to responding to critics. At times his account runs the risk of belittling the problems (such as contractor accountability before the law; employee misconduct; contractual problems such as overcharging) associated with privatization of military functions; more often, though, the conviction is that those problems are not inherent to outsourcing, which means that they may well be corrected. The US government up to now has been a “pretty lousy customer”, unable to properly select or manage contractors (p. 12). The key to alleviating problems is “good governance” (p. 37). Good governance involves institutionalized mechanisms of criticism and oversight, by which he means judicial and legislative checks on the executive branch on the one hand, and media and interest groups on the other (pp. 37–38). The book is not all about vindication of military outsourcing, however. It also includes the most detailed narrative of the history of military contracting in the United States prior to the 1990s, focusing chiefly on relevant regulations and procedures of contracting. On the other hand, while private military activities in Iraq are reasonably documented, Afghanistan is conspicuously absent; and unfortunately the same is true for the rest of the studies under consideration here.

Jeremy Scahill’s Blackwater is an in-depth journalistic analysis of the “leading mercenary company of the US occupation” (p. 13). It is only in Scahill’s book that military contractors are identified as “mercenaries”. It goes without saying that he is also the harshest critic of the entire phenomenon of military contracting. Scahill not only provides us with a thorough account of Blackwater’s five-year work in postinvasion Iraq, which is replete with many deadly incidents; he at the same time locates the firm within American politics and the neoconservative network in particular. Moreover, his book has to be credited for touching upon certain issues which are noted only in passing by the other, scholarly studies. One such issue concerns the people employed by military firms. Dozens of questions pose themselves, including: who are these people? Why do they risk their lives working in Iraq? How much do they make? How do they find employment in Iraq? Is this like any other employment? Can they quit if they want to? Scahill’s
book sheds some light on such questions. Scahill presents a glimpse of the prime contractor/subcontractors nexus too. When rewarded government contracts, many big companies split the job, and contract parts of it to smaller/more specialized companies, which is an important facet of the whole business of outsourcing. Finally, one can also discover in the book some clues as to the self-image of a mercenary company, through studying the speeches and congressional testimonies of the intriguing Eric Prince, Blackwater’s sole owner.

**Reasons for change**

Detailed treatments of reasons underlying the rise of private military companies are to be found in *Corporate Warriors* and *The Market for Force*. For both Singer and Avant, the question is one of explaining the origins of a market, which, by definition, is constituted by supply and demand. The reasoning is simple: there should have been some marked changes in both supply and demand so that a previously nonexistent market was brought to being in the 1990s. Singer and Avant concur on the idea that the end of Cold War was of crucial importance, because it eventually created a demand for and supply of private military services.

There arose a demand for private military services, first of all, because western militaries (those of former eastern bloc states included) were significantly downsized following the fall of the Berlin Wall; they, however, were not reorganized to compensate for their much smaller size, so much so that, when new security challenges emerged, it turned out that state militaries were unable to effectively respond with their own resources. The rest of the world too witnessed an upsurge in demand for private military services, for the end of a bipolar world also meant that “developing” states no longer had superpower patronage, or military aid, to rely on. Bipolarization had in fact entailed stability for such states, as internal and external conflicts had been kept in check by superpowers. And when old conflicts did resurface in areas which used to be sites of Cold War confrontation, superpowers were now reluctant to intervene as these hot spots ceased to

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have any “strategic” importance. The “developing” countries, with their shallow political institutions and feeble armies, had no choice but find new forms of military aid.

As for the supply side, downsizing freed a great many number of qualified military personnel, who in turn made up a vast labor pool for military companies to draw upon. Even ex-KGB agents were out there in the market looking for new employment venues, not to mention special operations personnel from all over the world. Especially noticeable were South Africans, who came to the market place in hordes when the massive repressive apparatus of the apartheid regime was dismantled. Thus there were plenty of men to be hired by private companies; and some of whom actually became entrepreneurs themselves founding, most notably, Executive Outcomes. The end of the Cold War facilitated the emergence of private military companies in yet another way. When the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, weaponry from its member states flooded the market, creating a mass inventory which could be readily bought and used by private actors. When Germany was reunified, for example, each and every item in East Germany’s arms stock was auctioned and sold at bargain prices. The market was thus saturated by every sort of weaponry making it cheaper for companies to stage their operations. Executive Outcomes, for instance, employed Soviet weapons in its African operations. Because soldiers and arms were in abundance, it was relatively easy to start a business in this nascent industry.

To conclude, analysts agree that downsizing was the initial spurt behind the beginnings of privatization of military functions. Downsizing has had long-term consequences, and its impact is still being felt today. Nonetheless, there also are other factors that can be said to have reinforced the impact of downsizing. One such factor might be gathered from Avant’s analysis. For Avant, a key element paving the way for the employment of military companies has been the emergence of “global security concerns”, which have to with novel phenomena such as international terrorism, interna-

9 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 58.
12 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 53.
13 Chesterman and Lehnardt, From Mercenaries to Market, p. v; Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 53-54, 166-167.
14 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 54.
15 Ibid., p. 106.
tionally operating drug cartels, and so forth (pp. 32-34). The problem is that nation-states’ security organs cannot successfully deal with these new sources of insecurity in today’s “globalized” world as there is a “scale mismatch”. Avant is nonetheless cautious to add that the rise of global security concerns cannot be said to have necessitated privatization. After all, multilateral institutions should be well suited to meet these new security challenges. However, the UN and the NATO have proven to be ineffective in dealing with security problems of that sort because they cannot act unless a political agreement is reached among member states (pp. 34-38). Employing private contractors is simply the easier option.

The US war on global terrorism in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks alone goes a long way in explaining the newly emerged reliance on private contractors in warfare. In Afghanistan and Iraq there has been an unparalleled boom in contracting spreading to virtually every kind of military function from force training to personal security of senior officials. As mentioned before, Afghanistan does not figure often in the books reviewed, but there are some explanations offered regarding the reasons why private contractors have been indispensable for Iraqi operations. The most obvious explanation is that US regular forces were already heavily employed in Afghanistan. Secondly, the United States initiated its Iraqi operation with insufficient forces, which was partly due to miscalculation, as the administration underestimated the number of troops that would be required once the invasion was over. Yet this was not solely about a failure of military planning, because sending more troops would at the same time be a politically undesirable move in that it would disturb the American public.

Thirdly, the Iraqi operation was virtually unilateral, thus lacking significant allied support to rely on, which turned private contractors themselves into an allied force. Also absent were UN peacekeeping forces, which had been present in the Balkans, for example. Finally, Scahill notes that the decision to dissolve the Iraqi military (as well as the police and internal security services) as part of the process of “de-Baathification” had played a part too, not only because it engendered a massive security gap but also because out-of-work soldiers and other security personnel joined the resistance forces, making the situation in Iraq even worse (pp. 129,

17 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 244.
18 Scahill, Blackwater, pp. 46, 60; Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 244, 247.
19 Avant, The Market for Force, p. 239; Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 244.
182-183, 227). All these combined to make contractors the largest partner of the US military in Iraq.

Afghan and Iraqi operations aside, it is also the case that the advent of the global war on terror is enhancing the strategic importance of parts of the world, such as Central Asia and the Caucasus. Because these areas are now crucial to the US fight against terrorism, they are designated sites for security sector reform, where private military companies are contracted to provide force training. This is best exemplified by the interest in the Caspian Sea region. According to Scahill, rich oil and natural gas reserves and, more importantly, its close proximity to Iran explain the strategic salience of the region, where Blackwater and Cubic have been hired to train local security forces. The interest in the region is linked to the war on terror, writes Scahill, because the US administration is in a search for “operating sites” to be utilized in case there is an attack against Iran.

If it were thirty years ago, US soldiers in uniform would be training, say, Azerbaijani or Georgian forces – this says a lot about the pace of downsizing in military subfields. That is, in the United States, for example, the Clinton government urged the military to focus on “core tasks”, i.e. combat functions; remaining functions were to be outsourced to private firms. As noted above, downsizing hit a heavy blow at back-end support units, which explains why firms specializing in logistics blossomed so rapidly. Also affected were training facilities and programs. In particular, successive Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Acts deprived the military of many training venues. This is actually the backdrop to Blackwater’s entry the industry in 1998: the firm began to operate a training facility, which in fact was little more than a shooting range, in Camden County, Missouri. Similarly, the MPRI’s sprout on home soil owes much to US military’s outsourcing of education and training programs, most notably the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps programs. MPRI and other US firms working in what Singer calls the consultant sector have grown rapidly since then, providing training services all over the world.

Not everyone is satisfied with the downsizing argument, though. For Carafano (p. 43), the downsizing argument is no more than a myth. That is,

21 Scahill, Blackwater, pp. 231-243.
22 Ibid., pp. 237, 239.
24 Scahill, Blackwater, p. 93.
25 Ibid., pp. 96-100.
it is erroneous to associate the reliance of US military on private contractors with downsizing. His argument is that the US military became “hollow” long before the end of the Cold War and the consequent process of downsizing: the military was underfunded from the end of the Vietnam War. Hence, in the years following the war, personnel and equipment were in short supply with no widespread programs of modernization or training. On the other hand, Carafano does not propose a solely negative explanation of the increasing reliance on contractors. There is also a positive explanation, namely the US military’s contentment with its experiment with outsourcing of construction works during the Vietnam War. For the Pentagon, he writes, the employment of contractors was a “big success”. So, Carafano holds that privatization would have continued anyway – even without the advent of downsizing following the end of the Cold War. And this corresponds to a major change in warfare in terms of the balance between public and private forces.

In Carafano’s account the dominant motive behind military outsourcing in the United States is fiscal. There has been, for three decades now, a huge strain on federal budget owing to the ever mounting federal debt, which necessitates cost-saving when it comes to defense spending (pp. 53, 75). So the government had to cut back on military spending (through outsourcing) and this is actually what has been going on since the early days of the Clinton administration. It needs to be stated that, for Carafano, the strain on the budget had not been caused by military spending in the first place. On the contrary, at the root of the fiscal problem is in fact mandatory government spending on entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, which now account for about half of the federal budget (pp. 55, 129). In other words, entitlement spending is booming at the expense of military spending; and this does not appear to be an easily reversible tendency unless, of course, entitlement programs are stringently reformed: the United States has to spend less on defense if it is to continue pouring tax money into health care and other social benefits. The reform of entitlement spending in this way turns out to be the gist of the matter from the author’s neoconservative point of view.

Needless to say, the idea here in this argument is that governments can save if they privatize some of the functions that have been traditionally performed by national militaries (p. 43). Carafano writes that the primary reason why militaries are more expensive relates to “upward-spiraling manpower costs” (p. 56). Soldiers are expensive not because they have high base salaries but because in addition they receive numerous in-kind benefits for themselves and their families (pp. 54, 100, 195). The value of
benefits a soldier and his/her family are entitled to is almost as high as the base salary itself, which means that we need to multiply the salary by two to get the total value of military compensation (p. 100). This is not the case with civilian compensation because a private contractor does not receive benefits, s/he has to pay for insurance and pay tax (whereas soldiers who are abroad on combat missions enjoy tax exemptions) (pp. 99-100). To conclude, although it is true that a contractor’s pay is usually much higher than a soldier’s, the contractor is nevertheless cheaper.

Moreover, as Carafano points out, militaries and private companies are organized in dissimilar ways, as a result of which they require different numbers of employees to get the same job done (p. 96). That is, private units are organized on an ad hoc basis, which means that they are “scaled precisely to the task order in the contract”. For instance, Carafano calculates that the army would have to deploy 48,000 soldiers to perform the exact same security work that Blackwater is doing in Iraq with just 1,000 employees.

Nonetheless, it needs to be questioned whether the governments save money by contracting in every instance. Many observers are disturbed by the fact that most contracts are rewarded with little or no competition; this is the case with sole-source (“no-bid”) contracts. According to Singer, for instance, the practice of sole-source contracts neutralizes the “cost-saving advantages of competition” (pp. 235-236). Still, given the necessity to urgently support US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Carafano asserts that it is perfectly acceptable to limit competition in the awarding of contacts: the normal procedures simply take too long (p. 81). He also adds that the practice of sole-source is not as common as the critics would have us believe; and neither is it confined to military contracting (pp. 78-79). Then there is the problem of cost-plus contracting. In this type of contract, the client guarantees to pay for the costs that company incurs during the mission and, what is more, there is also an incentive fee measured in profit percentage (Singer, 2008: 140). So in a cost-plus contract, the more the company spends, the more it profits, which induces contractors to exaggerate their costs. Hence there is a major problem of overcharging. Carafano, again, defends the practice. For him, it is wrong to conclude in advance that contractors working in Iraq are overcharging the government, because the cost of security has indeed dramatically risen due to escalating insurgency in the country (p. 82). So companies are not pocketing immense profits; they are just passing the rising costs onto the US government.

It certainly may be the case that the actual practice of military contracting failed to deliver its promise, that is, better services at a lower overall cost.

Nonetheless, this would not change the fact that efficiency concerns played a considerable part in orienting governments toward outsourcing. This is best explained with reference to the appeal of the general idea of privatization, which has spilled over into every field from health care to, eventually, war.28

For Carafano, there is a further reason why reliance on contractors is almost unavoidable in the US context: despite the shortage of military personnel and plummeting defense spending, reinstatement of the draft is very improbable (pp. 56, 171-172). The draft, which was in effect between 1940 and 1973, was an exception in the US history – and an exception dictated by successive, large-scale wars. Policymakers saw conscription as the cheapest way of raising troops, which implies that the worth of conscription was instrumental; raising an army of citizens was never an end in itself (pp. 56, 171). The United States’ three-decade long draft was politically palatable because it was conceived as just, since “virtually everybody who could serve had to serve” (p. 56). Today, the size of the military and the draft-age population have changed such that, if the draft were to be reintroduced today, only a fraction of all eligible men would have to be conscripted (pp. 56, 171-172). Hence a draft today would be unjust and “socially divisive” (p. 56).

In any case, Carafano writes, conscription is at odds with the US voluntarist tradition, which has historically derived from the “anti-standing army ideology” (p. 6). In Anglo-American political tradition, a large standing army bears a tremendous risk, namely, it can be turned into an instrument of despotism and tyranny and, as such, it can overwhelm individual liberties (pp. 29, 31-32). Consequently, “peacetime conscription” is associated with “militarism and authoritarianism” in American political culture (p. 32). Accordingly, the convention has been one of keeping the standing army as small as possible without, of course, jeopardizing security (pp. 31-32). When the need arises, the military is to be supplemented, preferably by volunteers, and only subsequently by conscripts if it is absolutely necessary, as it was during the Civil War and World War II (pp. 29, 32, 56).

The whole story about military companies rising to prominence should not be only about economics and politics. In addition, the way wars are fought has certainly changed, which brings up the following question: are military companies somehow better adapted than national militaries to the reality of warfare in the twenty-first century? Unfortunately, none of the studies examined here dwells much on the relation between change in the technology of war and the rise of military companies. There are some

scattered remarks, but they do not add up to a definitive answer. Take Avant’s *The Market for Force*, in which this theme is taken up twice. She mentions the growing “technological sophistication of weapon systems” and writes that “more and more contractors have been hired to work with troops to maintain and support these systems” (p. 19). Then she cites a couple of examples, which, however, fall short of giving a comprehensive picture as to the relative weight of this factor for the transition to privatized wars. Then, elsewhere in the book, she holds that there have been changes in the nature of conflicts and that as a result certain previously nonessential tasks now occupy the forefront of security; the examples she gives are, again, the operation of sophisticated weapons systems and “policing”, which are among the services that private companies commonly offer (p. 3). Similarly, Singer notes that technological sophistication has brought about a “revolution in military affairs”, which “reinforce[s] private firms’ critical importance to high-level military functions” as states are unable to supply such high-tech services from within (p. 231). The essence of the revolution in military affairs is the integration of information technologies to warfare (pp. 62-63). What is so revolutionary about “information warfare” is that small, decentralized, nonstate units are better suited to taking full advantage of new technologies, which renders militaries more and more reliant on private service providers (p. 63). It is not a stretch to take Singer’s reflections to mean that we might be heading toward a new era in which states/regular militaries will no longer be “the most effective organizations for waging warfare” for the first time in modern history (p. 61).

Before concluding this discussion of the reasons for change, we should lastly take a look at Avant’s reflections on political control of force and how it is affected by privatization, which is the most intriguing part of *The Market for Force*. One of the cases she discusses here is the United States, which is an instance of a “strong state” that outsources many diverse military functions. The emphasis, though, is placed on the deployment of contractors in Iraq and how that alters the political process. Her account culminates in a number of conclusions: (1) privatization strengthens the executive as opposed to the legislature; (2) privatization impairs accountability and brings about less transparency; and (3) new actors get involved in the decision making process as a result of the privatization drive (pp. 62, 68, 82, 128-130, 145, 258-259).

29 It seems that these three trends are most clearly observed in the case of the training of foreign militaries by private companies. In such cases, a military company has a foreign government as its client. Although this is a purely “private” matter in being a transaction between the
Especially the first two conclusions might be shown to be relevant to the discussion of the reasons for change, if we turn Avant’s theory upside down. To clarify, what Avant delineates as consequences of privatization can be reconceptualized as functional benefits to be gained from military contracting. In other words, the advantage of employing private military companies instead of regular military is that it is possible for the executive branch of government to evade congressional oversight and public accountability to a degree impossible within normal procedures of decision making. This is a heaven-sent opportunity for executives specifically when domestic support for operations is lacking. At times Avant too seems to opt for such an explanation. To demonstrate, she writes that

The use of PSCs [private security companies] is often regarded as a lower political commitment that reduces the need to mobilize public

supplier and the client, the US licensing system requires that this transaction be approved by the government in the first place (Avant, *The Market for Force*, pp. 149-150). In other words, US military companies cannot sell their services to clients abroad unless the government ascertains that the deal is in accordance with US national interests. The whole point about the redistribution of power among the branches of government is that the final decision about outsourcing and licensing is made by the executive and there is little congressional oversight (p. 128). In fact, Congress is not even informed about most contracts, since a congressional notification is needed only when the contract in question exceeds the $50 million mark (p. 151). However, Avant notes that this is far from an insurmountable obstacle if the executive is determined to override the legislature: when a contract is for more than $50 million, it is possible to partition it into several smaller contracts to avoid congressional scrutiny (p. 151).

This is how privatization of military functions disadvantages the legislature vis-à-vis the executive, resulting in a less transparent process of decision making, which in turn entails dwindling accountability. As for Avant’s third conclusion, the one about the actors who have come to possess preponderance in decision making, the most striking development is the emergence of military companies themselves as hefty players. Military companies are not merely usually the sole source of information that the executive has to rely on when deciding upon the technicalities of force deployment (p. 62); at the same time they endeavor to influence policymaking via lobbying – and they definitely constitute an important interest group that government are bound to reckon with. MPRI’s lobbying to get its contract with the government of Equatorial Guinea licensed is a case in point perfectly illustrating the clout of military companies as interest groups (pp. 154-155). When MPRI applied for a license to train the Equatorial Guinean military for the first time, it was turned down by US government on account of country’s poor human rights record. But the company did not give up and carried out a successful campaign to convince the decision makers that rapprochement with Equatorial Guinea was in the government’s best interest because, its dismal human rights record notwithstanding, the country had oil reserves the United States should take advantage of. Apparently these arguments resonated well, as the MPRI lobbying paid off; the contract with Equatorial Guinea was approved, albeit with an almost two-year delay. The fact remains though: a private company proved capable of affecting US foreign policy objectives.
support for foreign engagement activities. Indeed, congressional leaders and the public appear to be less aware, interested, and concerned about sending PSCs than sending US forces. The use of PSCs [...] makes decisions to use [...] force abroad less visible and less transparent. It thus enhances the authority of individual decision makers in the executive branch and reduces the processes of inter-agency cooperation and institutional wrangling.\(^{30}\)

Therefore, there could be a political cost-saving logic behind the deployment of contractors. This could also be what Singer has in mind when in the postscript to *Corporate Warriors* he draws attention to “the irony that for all the focus on contractors as a private solution, the cost savings were political in nature”.\(^{31}\) And it is certainly Scahill’s contention, who writes that mercenaries are necessary tools for “offensive, unpopular wars of conquest”.\(^{32}\)

This is also about conduct of foreign policy, of course. On the basis of compelling evidence, Avant (along with some other analysts)\(^{33}\) contends that privatization of this sort furnishes the government with a new and much more “flexible” foreign policy tool. It is a flexible tool not only because it avoids Congress, it also has the advantage of deflecting criticism from the international community. MPRI’s training of Croatian forces during the Balkan conflict, which is cited by almost every one working in the field, is the paradigmatic example. The MPRI contract came when there was a UN arms embargo on Yugoslavian successor communities (pp. 101, 113). Hence it was impossible for any law-abiding government to provide military assistance in the form of training programs to any of the forces. There is some disagreement as to how the deal between MPRI and the Croats was struck, but there seems to be grounds to assume that it was the US government which advised the Croats to seek help from MPRI (p. 104, n. 120). The reason for this intervention is that the United States saw it in its interest to support (a coalition of) Croats and Bosnians against the Serbs (p. 104). Yet, in the face of the arms embargo, the government could not do this directly by, for instance, sending US forces to train the Croats or Bosnians. MPRI was the stand-in in this awkward situation. The MPRI training program was called the “Democracy Transition Program” and it was, on paper at least, designed to democratize and reorganize the Croatian military to bring it


\(^{31}\) Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p. 245.

\(^{32}\) Scahill, *Blackwater*, p. 463.

nearer to NATO standards (p. 102). On the other hand, the rumor is that MPRI was not just training but at the same time helping the Croats plan an offensive attack on the Serbs (p. 103). As would be expected, MPRI denies this; nonetheless, many observers agree that it probably was MPRI which planned the attack (p. 103). In any case, the MPRI training program turned out to be a success; the ensuing Operation Storm by Croatian forces was an immense victory against the Serbians and a turning point in the making of the new Balkan landscape (p. 103). The strategic interests of the United States were thus fulfilled – without the US government getting involved.

This is what Avant calls “foreign policy by proxy” (pp. 104-113, 152-153). Thanks to proxies of this sort, the US government (and other governments, for that matter) has the leverage to “affect conditions abroad without mobilizing broad support for troops or (sometimes) even money” (p. 68). The opportunities private military companies create for foreign policy by proxy should also be regarded as a functional benefit of privatization and, as thus, a reason for governments’ opting for military contracting.

Modern mercenaries?

With the exception of Scahill, the analysts whose work I am examining here are resolute against the identification of contractors as mercenaries. It is fair to state that this is at least in part because they build on the internationally recognized definition of “mercenary”. This definition was crafted as an international response to the problems wrought by mercenary involvement in Africa during the decolonization period.34 From the 1950s to well into the 1970s, foreign soldiers for hire abounded in decolonizing Africa – the most well-known case is Congo in the 1960s, where French, British, and South African mercenaries were recruited to fight for a secessionist movement; and it was an Anglo-Belgian mining cartel which hired them in defense of its commercial interests.35 The international community was then urged to deal with the problem of mercenary involvement in conflicts, and the consequent legal arrangements aimed at banning the trade in “guns for hire”.

The use of mercenaries is thus outlawed by international agreements, that is, the Geneva Conventions\(^\text{36}\) and the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries.\(^\text{37}\) According to the International Convention, a mercenary is someone who is specifically recruited for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at overthrowing a government or undermining the territorial integrity of a state, is motivated by the desire for private gain and material compensation, is neither a national nor a resident of the state against which such an act is directed, has not been sent by a state on official duty, and is not a member of the armed forces of the state on whose territory the act is undertaken.\(^\text{38}\)

This is obviously a very restricted definition. And this is not accidental, because the signatory states had an interest in keeping the definition as specific as possible so that they could use mercenaries in internal conflicts.\(^\text{39}\) It is equally obvious that private contractors do not qualify as mercenaries if we are to employ this legal definition. For one thing, contemporary contractors are not individual mercenaries, but they have evolved into business enterprises, which are similar in form to any other sort of enterprise, having CEOs, shareholders, and the like.\(^\text{40}\) In addition to the “corporatization” of private military services,\(^\text{41}\) the analysts also underline that today’s contractors are employed by legal governments\(^\text{42}\) and that they are sanctioned by their parent states.\(^\text{43}\) All in all, the argument is that modern contractors are “market-driven”, “state-sanctioned”, and hence, legal.

\(^\text{36}\) Article 47 of the First Additional Protocol of 1977 deals with the issue of mercenaries.

\(^\text{37}\) This is a UN convention, which was opened to signature in 1989 but entered into force only in 2001 after many ratifications.


\(^\text{41}\) Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, p. 40.

\(^\text{42}\) This is not necessarily the case, however. Singer notes that private military companies have worked for rebels, drug cartels, and even jihadist groups – the latter received military training in combat techniques and explosive devices from a British military company in the late 1990s: Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, pp. 181, 220.

\(^\text{43}\) This is an overgeneralization too: the South African government chose to delegitimize private military companies by legislation in 1998: Lehnardt, “Private Military Companies and State Responsibility”, p. 139.
On the other hand, for some, the problem with the term “mercenary” is more analytical. For instance, Avant refrains from using the epithet precisely because it is a slippery term: it has been employed to describe anything from the Hessian troops to the adventurous individual men roaming Africa during Cold War years. This, Avant says, makes the term analytically quite unserviceable.44

There is yet another argument in favor of dropping the mercenary label. Contemporary private companies, the argument goes, simply do not do what “mercenaries” of the previous eras had done. As Avant writes, “today’s PSCs do not so much provide the foot soldiers, but more often act as supporters, trainers, and force multipliers for local forces”. In other words, the fact that (most) contractors are not engaged in combat operations is assumed to justify the distinction between traditional mercenaries and modern contractors. There seem to be at least two problems with this presumption. On the one hand, they may be small in number, but some private military companies do engage in combat. On the other hand, it can be plausibly claimed that noncombat functions are no less military. Not only did they used to be considered military functions to be performed (almost) exclusively by national militaries, it is also the case that both logistics support and training are there to facilitate actual combat.

Disaggregating the industry

It is easily discerned that there is a strong tendency in the literature to dissociate active/armed/offensive services from passive/unarmed/defensive services – as well as the companies that provide them. The distinction boils down to the opposition of combat and noncombat services and/or companies. Kevin A. O’Brien’s contribution to From Mercenaries to Market is a case in point. O’Brien distinguishes “contracted operations that aim to alter the strategic landscape and those that involving local – in the narrowest sense – immediate impact only” (p. 40). The former category denotes operations such as “defeating an insurgency, ending a war, undertaking peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations, rescuing a besieged government” (p. 38), whereas the latter involves “nonfront-line” services such as “transport, force professionalization training, para-medical services, physical guarding, humanitarian aid, convoy protection, administration and logistics” (p. 40, n. 13). This corresponds to the much-employed distinc-

tion, respectively, between private military companies (PMCs) and private security companies. According to O’Brien, companies that do aim at altering the strategic landscape – PMCs – are atypical of the industry (p. 29), as PSCs are now perceived as “the norm” (p. 35). This assertion to the effect that the industry is evolving into noncombat, security service providers is very typical of the literature. The problem, however, is that the practice of contracting in Iraq poses major challenges to the proposed distinction, as admitted by O’Brien himself alongside Sarah Percy, who seems to employ a similar typology. That is, the presence of “security” firms which are armed and which occasionally engage in combat-like operations in Iraq eludes this categorization. 45

Much the same is true for Avant’s attempt at classifying the private military industry. Avant notes that the very same firm may provide different kinds of services to different clients, which makes classification on the basis of firm unconvincing. She instead suggests that contracts be taken as the unit of analysis (p. 17). She then distinguishes contracts that offer military services (“external security services”) such as operational support, military training, and logistic support from those offering police functions (“internal security services”) such as site security, intelligence, and crime prevention (pp. 16-21). Nonetheless, she admits that there is a grey area between the two sets of functions. This is the case, she writes, with contracts that offer counterinsurgency services. Companies that operate on such contracts carry out armed response against insurgent groups. Interestingly, she mentions Blackwater here. Given the fact that what Blackwater does in Iraq is mostly site and convoy security, its contracts would normally lie within the category of police functions. But in reality the company has been involved in offensive attacks against Iraqi insurgents “in ways that [are] hard to distinguish from combat” (pp. 21-22). And this is far from an aberration; on the contrary the presence of military companies in Iraq evinces a “blurring of the lines between policing and combat” (p. 22).

More promising is the classification proposed in Corporate Warriors. Singer thinks that binary oppositions such as active/passive, armed/unarmed, and offensive/defensive, which are used to differentiate the services provided by military companies, are not very fruitful for two important reasons: first, they ignore that there usually are transitions and some overlapping between the seemingly opposite pairs; secondly, they are based on an antiquated notion of “war” as, for instance, being armed

or otherwise does not make much difference today (pp. 89-90). It is also the case that this kind of classifications conveys the idea that the second terms in the oppositions are somehow less central to military practice; for Singer, however, this is an erroneous assumption – a so-called passive or unarmed activity may equally have “strategic effects” (p. 89). Singer instead proposes a three-tier typology of military companies: military provider firms, military consultant firms, and military support firms.

Military provider firms sell actual combat services in the form of either implementation or command; and, depending on the contract and the situation in hand, they may provide “stand-alone tactical military units” or smaller, specialized units to augment the public forces of the client country (pp. 92-93). The best examples are Executive Outcomes (South African) and Sandline International (British), which made headlines in 1990s helping the governments in Sierra Leone and Angola fight off armed rebels. Executive Outcomes, which is probably the most controversial privatized military firm, is the case that Singer examines in his study, and in reading his account it is easy to see why its operations in Sierra Leone and Angola aroused so much disturbance. First of all, the intervention of a private foreign actor as a belligerent party into someone else’s “war” seemed outrageous to the contemporary observers. Secondly, Executive Outcomes recruited exclusively from the bloodstained special operations personnel of the apartheid regime (pp. 102-103). Thirdly, the financially challenged governments of Sierra Leone and Angola could not actually pay for the services of the firm in cash or in installments; instead, Executive Outcomes was indirectly paid in oil and mining concessions – indirectly because it was an affiliated company, the Branch-Heritage Group, which was given mining privileges (pp. 104-105, 109, 117).

It is possible to observe that most analysts assume that Executive Outcomes is somehow an aberrent case; and they seem to read too much into company’s demise. That is to say, it is as though the company’s decision to dissolve itself (in 1999) is a sign that the industry is maturing and becoming a respectable (meaning, above all, noncombat) international player. On the other hand, Singer appears to see the matter in another light, because he writes that the closure of the firm in no way signaled the end of the military provider sector, which is still alive with many active firms (p. 118). Furthermore, unlike some others, Singer does not imply that provider firms are now employed by “failed states” of the third world. On the contrary, he writes that there are provider firms at work in Iraq, employed by the USA, doing “convoy escort and protection of key bases, offices, and facilities from rebel attack”, among which he cites Blackwater (p. 248).
Back to Singer’s typology: the second type, i.e., the consultant firms, provide military advice and training to armies (pp. 95-96). Singer points out that, although consultant firms are not engaged in actual combat, the services they provide have strategic impact on many regional hostilities, as evinced in the Balkans when the training Croatian forces received from a US firm (MPRI) eventually changed the balance of power in the region (p. 95). Singer focuses upon MPRI, a very high-profile American company, whose ranks are filled with the “highest levels of retired US military personnel” (p. 119). MPRI has had many contracts (both analysis and implementation) with the US military as well as with foreign militaries. The peculiar thing about MPRI is its close ties both to government and to current military ranks, which render the firm almost “a private extension of the US military” (p. 121). There is also a self-proclaimed company policy: never work for a foreign client unless that suits US foreign policy goals – this, too, brings the company into a cozy relationship with the government, which in turn has allegedly recommended the firm to some foreign allies (pp. 119, 121).

Finally, military support firms support troops in the field by providing “nonlethal aid and assistance, including logistics, intelligence, technical support, supply, and transportation” (p. 97). Many of these firms began in business as nonmilitary engineering firms and later diversified into military services (p. 136). Support firms comprise the largest sector in military services (p. 97). This has been a result of the confluence of the downsizing of the logistics units of national militaries and the almost contemporaneous upsurge in multinational operations (pp. 97, 147). This is especially the case with the US military, which was, in the early 1990s, “underresourced” and “overextended” at once with deployments in Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans (p. 147). Singer notes that most studies on the subject of privatized military services do not examine this third kind of firm, because they take the services provided by the support sector to be no different from what “traditional contractors” conventionally do (p. 97). This is not so for Singer – what support firms do might seem “less mercenary”, but their services are nevertheless “military” as they are indispensable to military missions (pp. 97, 145-146). Here Singer takes up the United States’ favorite logistics support firm, Brown & Root Services (BRS), which accompanied US forces everywhere from Rwanda to Kosovo in the 1990s. With the advent of the “war on terror” BRS got some new lucrative contracts, including a contract for the construction of a military base in Central Asia, and it also helped build the Guantanamo detention camp in Cuba (p. 146). Then the company (now called KBR) signed a number of logistics contracts in Iraq, to an estimated value of $20.1 billion in total (pp. 246-247).
Before going on to the next section, it is worthwhile to say a few words on Blackwater, as it figures prominently in the discussions about classification. Blackwater is indeed an atypical case because, while military companies that do engage in combat are usually at pains to deny it, which surely is about the desire to be recognized as legitimate and respectable firms, Blackwater boasts about its military role. Blackwater’s history in Iraq is highlighted by a number of high-profile security contracts, the first of which came about in 2003 when the company was hired to provide personal security for pro-consul Paul Bremer. Other contracts then followed, as a result of which Blackwater came to provide security for “at least five regional US occupation headquarters”. In the course of these contracts, Blackwater was implicated in many suspicious incidents, all of which involved civilian Iraqi casualties; and the company was accused of misconduct. The company owner, Eric Prince, and its lawyers testified before congressional committees a number of times as a result; their defense was all about Blackwater’s role as part of the US military force: for them, Blackwater employees should be immune from prosecution, because if they were made liable, then this would impair “nation’s war-fighting capacity” (pp. 57, 300-301). The company could not restore its tarnished image, however, and changed its name in 2009 (it is now called Xe Limited) as part of an attempt at rebranding.

The employees

It is difficult to say that military contracting as a form of employment in any sense comprises a major concern for the studies under consideration. On the contrary, the issue is largely neglected or subordinated to other concerns. For instance, Avant takes up the issue summarily just a few times and in a very limited sense. She claims that contractors’ background is important in deciding how privatization affects social control, because if companies employ ex-soldiers, who therefore have been socialized into norms of human rights, the rule of law, and the like, there is a much greater likelihood that privatization of force will reinforce compliance with such values (pp. 60, 110-111, 130-131, 133). There is no further discussion of any other dimension of the composition of the workforce or working conditions in this almost 300-page book.

46 Seahill, *Blackwater*, p. 133.
This is not to say that no insight emerges from the books. There is some information regarding the type of employment, for instance. That is, Singer calls privatized military firms “virtual companies” because they have a very small number of permanent, full-time employees; when contracts are signed, positions are filled from companies’ databases of qualified personnel; and databases are usually supplemented by advertisements. Databases are nonexclusive; a special operations veteran may be on the databases of several companies, and may work for Blackwater on a contract and then for Triple Canopy on another.

There is not much information about the databases or the people included in them. Scahill notes that Blackwater’s database includes as many as 21,000 men (p. 433). Singer mentions MPRI’s database of 12,500 on-call personnel, 95 per cent of whom are former US military personnel (p. 120). In more general terms, Singer writes that qualified people included in databases are predominantly former soldiers of all ranks from all over the world, who retired, left their forces, or were downsized and that they are mostly in their twenties or thirties (p. 76). And although he cites low pay and “diminishing prestige” as reasons for young people to leave armed forces and work for private companies (p. 77), he also mentions that this new industry “provides an employment opportunity for those […] who have been forced out of public military activities for past misdeeds” (p. 221).

We know that ex-soldiers from the United States, the UK, and South Africa are featured extensively. There are grounds to assume that most of these men work for companies from their native countries. It can also be speculated that these men get jobs or get on the company databases through former colleagues in a fairly informal way. As for the rest, all the Fijians, Jordanians, Colombians, Chileans, etc., it is necessary to ask how they become affiliated with the companies. Apparently, there are some middlemen who recruit ex-soldiers and put them in touch with private military firms. This is at least true for Chilean ex-commandos who work for Blackwater in Iraq. Scahill reports that a firm called Grupo Tactico, which was founded by an ex-army officer from Chile, mediates between the ex-soldiers and Blackwater (2008: 246-265).

Until now, we have been talking about the elite security personnel who do convoy, site, or personal security. These men are on regular pay and, according to Singer, they are “paid anywhere from two to ten times as much as in the official army and the police” (2008: 74). Reading Scahill’s book, one gets the impression that there is a significant pay discrepancy on the

basis of nationality: Chileans appear to be the most expensive ex-soldiers of Latin America. For Scahill, this is because they had been seasoned in General Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship.

The elite security personnel are in fact only a minority of contractors working in Iraq. There are thousands of people filling low-paid, unqualified positions, such as washing dishes or doing laundry. Carafano (p. 67) points out that less than 20 per cent of these contractors in Iraq are US citizens. As for the rest, there are not mostly Iraqis either. For instance, the majority of KBR employees in 2005 were shown to be “third-party nationals” with quite a number of people from the Philippines. The so-called third-party nationals are a major concern for the writer as they are “more at risk of abuse and exploitation” (p. 109).

The issue was brought to public attention when Cam Simpson of the Chicago Tribune wrote a report in 2005 on Nepalese menial workers employed in US military bases in Iraq. Workers were recruited by brokers in Nepal who did business with Middle Eastern firms providing workforce for KBR-run bases – the Middle Eastern brokers actually were subcontractors to KBR. Most of the men from Nepal were misinformed about their destination: they did not know that they would work in military bases in Iraq. Yet they could not leave: not only were they indebted to Nepalese brokers on the one hand, the Middle Eastern brokers had also seized their passports. The report pointed out that this was human trafficking (not the least because the Nepalese government prohibits its citizens from working in Iraq) and that KBR was denying responsibility as recruitment was done by its subcontractors.

The plight of third-country nationals working as contractors in Iraq is thus a pressing problem, so much so that the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), the industry association formed with the leadership of the notorious Blackwater, has included the issue in its code of conduct stating that potential employees should be thoroughly informed about the nature of their employment, that they should be “treated with respect and dignity”, that they should not be paid less just because of their nationality, and that they should be free to terminate employment.49

And, finally, it should come as no surprise that contract employees are not unionized.50

49 Carafano, Private Sector, Public Wars, p. 110.
50 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 200, n. 20.
What to privatize?

Is there an unambiguous dividing line between military functions which are appropriate to privatize and those which are not? This question may be answered in a number of steps. First, one should inquire whether there are any inherently governmental functions which, therefore, should not be outsourced. Combat functions, for instance, can legitimately be regarded as one such. There have been numerous allegations, raised by the press, politicians, and analysts, that private companies do engage in combat in Iraq. The US Department of Defense was quick to respond, stating that “PSCs are not being used to perform inherently military functions and that contractors are utilized to free troops for offensive actions.”51 Similarly, Pentagon regulations stipulate that private contractors can use “deadly force” either in self-defense or when it is “necessary to execute their security missions, such as protecting embassy personnel, consistent with the tasks given in their contract”; yet launching “preemptive attacks” cannot be interpreted as one such mission since it is regarded an inherently governmental activity.52 So almost all – but apparently not all – forms of offensive action are beyond what contractors are entitled to do. But the problem is that functions such as personal and site security are indeed privatized in Iraq and most of the time it is difficult to tell offense from defense, because this is not a battlefield in the classical sense. As Lehnardt argues,53 in “low-intensity conflict” areas such as Iraq, where there are no clear frontlines, “protecting individuals and buildings can easily slide into participating in hostilities”. This might be one reason why the counterposition of PMCs and PSCs is so difficult to sustain.

Secondly, it may be the case that some functions are too critical or strategic to be left to the commercial sector. After all, it is possible to argue that a national military should be self-sufficient to a certain extent. This does appear to be a major concern, because according to the military doctrine, the US military is supposed to privatize only those services that are not “emergency-essential support” functions; that is, those functions which, if not immediately available, would not impair the military’s mobilization and wartime operations.54

51 Lehnardt, “Private Military Companies and State Responsibility”, p. 147, emphasis added.
52 Carafano, Private Sector, Public Wars, p. 48.
54 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 162.
Singer, though, asserts that the Pentagon did outsource certain mission-critical functions. He takes up weapons procurement and writes that, while the army is supposed to “achieve self-sufficiency in maintaining and operating new weapons systems within 12 months of their introduction”, in reality, the operation and maintenance of weapons are contracted out.\footnote{Ibid.} Hence the military is depended on private companies in this crucial function. Finally, it is possible to speculate that certain functions are just too risky to outsource, because, for examples, there may be abuses. Abu Ghraib, for instance. Recalling the incident, Isenberg claims that tasks such as interrogation of prisoners are “too sensitive to be outsourced”; they should thus remain governmental functions.\footnote{Isenberg, “A Government in Search of Cover”, p. 92.} The reality is quite different, of course. To wrap up, although there is some notion in the military doctrine regarding what not to outsource, it has already been transgressed.

While members of the military, scholars, and journalists complain that past experience of contracting bred a massive problem of over-outsourcing, the industry is heading in new directions. Take Blackwater. Scahill writes that company’s latest interest is immigration and border security. Here, as always, the company is in tune with the neoconservative political agenda which calls for outsourcing of border-training programs (pp. 401-405). On the other hand, Blackwater aspires to diversify into a peacekeeping force which, they hope, will be hired by NATO or the UN; the company has already presented a detailed proposal to the UN regarding Blackwater deployment in Darfur (pp. 411-420). Meanwhile, a development of immense importance has already occurred: following Hurricane Katrina, Blackwater was deployed on US soil for the first time, and that was on a contract with Department of Homeland Security to protect federal reconstruction projects (pp. 60-61, 392-400). And it was not just Blackwater – other military companies too were in New Orleans, their employees fully armed and in battle gear.
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Fighting for a Living investigates the circumstances that have produced starkly different systems of recruiting and employing soldiers in different parts of the globe over the last 500 years. Offering a wide range of case studies taken from Europe, America, the Middle East and Asia, this volume is not military history in the traditional sense, but looks at military service and warfare as forms of labour, and at soldiers as workers. Military employment offers excellent opportunities for international comparison: armies as a form of organized violence are ubiquitous, and soldiers, in one form or another, are always part of the picture, in any period and in every region. Fighting for a Living is the first study to undertake a systematic comparative analysis of military labour. It therefore will be of interest to both labour historians and military historians, as well as to sociologists, political scientists, and other social scientists.

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