Observing Protest from a Place: The World Social Forum in Dakar (2011) examines the impact of the global justice movement, as seen from the southern hemisphere. Drawing upon a collective survey from the 2011 World Social Forum in Dakar, the essays explore a number of methodological issues pertaining to the study of transnational mobilizations. How to study international activist gatherings and how can scholars overcome those challenges? How to combine quantitative and qualitative research in such an environment? The essays also examine topical issues inside the global justice movement: how do participants combine material inequalities and a shared taste for activism? What are the roles of NGOs, political leaders, religion or nationalism in the making of such an event? By demonstrating the importance of the global justice movement in gathering and unifying a diversity of causes and people, this volume is an important addition to the literature on transnational mobilization as well as social movements in the South.

Johanna Siméant is professor of political science at the University Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne (CESSP), and has published La cause des sans-papiers (1998), Le travail humanitaire (2002), La grève de la faim (2009), Contester au Mali (2014) and edited books.

Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle is assistant professor of political science at the University Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne. She is currently director of the French Institute of Research in Africa (IFRA) in Nairobi (Kenya).

Isabelle Sommier is full professor of political sociology at the University Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne and former director of the Centre de recherches politiques de la Sorbonne. She has published on the theory of social movements, political violence, radicalization and terrorism.
Observing Protest from a Place
Protest and Social Movements

Recent years have seen an explosion of protest movements around the world, and academic theories are racing to catch up with them. This series aims to further our understanding of the origins, dealings, decisions, and outcomes of social movements by fostering dialogue among many traditions of thought, across European nations and across continents. All theoretical perspectives are welcome. Books in the series typically combine theory with empirical research, dealing with various types of mobilization, from neighborhood groups to revolutions. We especially welcome work that synthesizes or compares different approaches to social movements, such as cultural and structural traditions, micro- and macro-social, economic and ideal, or qualitative and quantitative. Books in the series will be published in English. One goal is to encourage non-native speakers to introduce their work to Anglophone audiences. Another is to maximize accessibility: all books will be available in open access within a year after printed publication.

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Jan Willem Duyvendak is professor of Sociology at the University of Amsterdam. James M. Jasper teaches at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York.
# Table of contents

Acknowledgements 9

Introduction 11

   Johanna Siméant, Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle and Isabelle Sommier

   1 Methodological reasons for observing a WSF in Africa 12
   2 The division of labor and the paradoxes of activist internationalization 15
   3 Contexts of international collective action 18

1 What can quantitative surveys tell us about GJM activists? 21

   Isabelle Sommier

   1.1 Data and methods 22
   1.2 The seemingly convergent portrait of the alter-global activist 26
   1.3 The evolution of the multi-organizational field of alter-globalism: a delicate comparison 32
   1.4 Conclusion 38

2 Activist encounters at the World Social Forum 41

   Nationalism and sovereignty in an internationalized event

   Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle

   2.1 Internationalized nationalism and sovereignty 44
   2.2 The misunderstanding that produces nationalist commitments 50
   2.3 Conclusion 58

3 Mapping a population and its taste in tactics 59

   Johanna Siméant, with Ilhame Hajji

   3.1 What do we know about how familiar alter-globalization activists are with protest practices? 59
   3.2 Familiarity with protest practices among the respondents at the Dakar WSF 63
   3.3 Using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and Ascending Hierarchical Clustering to study populations “in a situation of militancy” in an international event 69
3.4  Ascending Hierarchical Clustering, composition of groups of participants, and “bringing real people back in” through paragons  
3.5  Conclusion  

4  Women’s issues and activists at the World Social Forum in Dakar  
*Julie Castro*  
4.1  Transnational, but not only: the actors of women’s issues in Dakar  
4.2  Strategies, tensions, and blind spots around women’s issues in Dakar  

5  Division of labor and partnerships in transnational social movements  
Observations of North-South and South-South interactions at the World Social Forum  
*Hélène Baillot, Isaline Bergamaschi and Ruggero Iori*  
5.1  Acting “on behalf of” or acting “with.” Methods of North-South cooperation at the Forum  
5.2  South-South interactions at the WSF: another kind of cooperation?  

6  Making waste (in)visible at the Dakar World Social Forum  
A Goffmanian perspective on a transnational alter-global gathering  
*William Herrera, Alice Judell and Clément Paule*  
6.1  Waste management as stage-setting for a transnational alter-global event  
6.2  Audiences  
6.3  Backstage tactics and the boundaries of an institutionalized activist space  

7  Latin Americans at the World Social Forum in Dakar  
The relationship between the alter-global movement and the institutional sphere  
*Isaline Bergamaschi, Tania Navarro Rodríguez and Héloïse Nez*  
7.1  The singularity of the Latin Americans’ relationship to politics  
7.2  Explaining Latin American singularity: a specific militant profile  
7.3  Conclusion
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Groups and organizations at the WSF</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polarities, intermediaries, and hierarchies in the alter-global arena</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Johanna Siméant, with Ilhame Hajji</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Between material support of mobilization and ideological indicators: a forum portrait through organizations</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Organizational space and social space</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Understanding the affinities between organizations</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Stepping back from your figures to figure out more</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Why and how to inquire about “no-replies”</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>A panorama of “no-replies” in the WSF survey</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>Do the conditions of participation shape the modalities of participation?</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>When “no-replies” question the question</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>Level of instruction, social capital, and political competence</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>Feeling of political competence and nationality</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>Conducting surveys in several languages: methodological challenges</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>Insurmountable difficulties? Different worlds of meaning</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>Conclusion: what no-replies reveal</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Johanna Siméant</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical appendix: Surveying an international event through a multinational team</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General data on participants</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appendix to Chapter 8 on groups and organizations: Clusters obtained by Ascending Hierarchical Clustering</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Questionnaire for participants to the Dakar World Social Forum</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Editor’s biographies</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index 265
  Author’s names 265
  Concepts and notions 267
  Organizations, places and public persons’ names 268
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Introduction

Johanna Siméant, Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle and Isabelle Sommier

Is there anything left to say about transnational activism and the alter-global movement? It may seem doubtful, given all the research that has piled up on the topic, the publication of a handbook on World Social Forums (Smith et al., 2011), and even a certain weariness from watching the forums go by, one after another – and even if the World Social Forum (WSF) process does not equate with the whole alter-global movement. But before we conclude that the topic has been exhausted, we should keep in mind two things. First, the feeling of weariness is mainly found among Western observers (journalists and academics), who have indeed been the most influential in drawing attention to this public issue. It may in fact reflect the geographical displacement of alter-globalization from its birthplace in the Latin world to other regions of the globe, particularly Africa. Hence, the intrinsic interest of studying the WSF held in Dakar in January 2011. Second, the spate of research is now dated; it dried up around 2007, when the cause was declared to be dead and buried – again from a Western-centric point of view. As often happens, the epitaph had a performative effect, but it was misleading because, all in all, the alter-global cause was still very much alive and researchers were the ones who, apart from a few exceptions, had abandoned it in midstream. Was this a case of postcolonial occultation? In any event, ten years after the first forum, it was necessary to pick up the research where it was left off, on a continent belatedly incorporated into alter-global networks but crucial to the production of their discourse.

Furthermore, the events that make up social forums, especially when they claim to possess a worldwide dimension, are research objects that have helped to give the sociology of social movements an international vantage point. In so doing, these objects are not only interesting in themselves or because of our interest in them, but also because they question the ordinary categories we use when we ponder the nature of movements, organizations, commitment, etc.

This book is the result of a methodological reflection on how to conduct a sociological survey in an international context and the importance of thinking about the issue of the division of activist labor in this specific context. If, from a Weberian perspective, the task of the social sciences is as much to provide historical context as to make general statements, then the
challenge consists precisely in knowing how to contextualize meaning and observable practices in this type of international setting. In this sense, we perceive the Forum not only as an object in itself – as a “little world” (though it is that, too) – but also as revealing and analyzing broader processes at work (activist internationalization, division of labor, etc.).

1 Methodological reasons for observing a WSF in Africa

The WSF held in Dakar in January 2011 was the second such event organized in Africa, following the Nairobi Forum in 2007. Aside from the Polycentric World Forum in 2006, in which Africa was one of the three sites, all the earlier ones had taken place in Latin America or Asia. One of the primary reasons for specifically studying this Forum lies in the role assigned to Africa in the alter-global movement. Despite its original link to Latin America, Africa is usually described within the movement as a continent victimized by economic globalization (Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011). There is much to learn from examining the issues and particular constraints on global justice advocacy at such a site; this is especially true when we recall that the movement has undergone a decade of geographical and organizational change.

In addition to the content, there was a methodological advantage in choosing to conduct a collective, systematic survey in Dakar: it brought out the difficulties of fieldwork in international contexts, a problem increasingly encountered by researchers studying social movements. The call for “multi-sited ethnography” has unfortunately become a slogan, a magic bullet that does not do justice to Marcus’ text (1995). To grasp transnational activism, it may be useful to look at “knots,” i.e. international organizations, rightly described by Sidney Tarrow as “coral reefs” (Tarrow, 2001) of transnational activists, or other moments in which international actors coalesce. The situations that bring together actors from different national contexts (conferences of major organizations, international meetings of the G8, the IMF or the summit of the Americas, or huge activist gatherings like social forums, etc.) provide exceptional survey opportunities.

This book is based on just such a large-scale, collective study, at once quantitative and qualitative. It is well-known that the use of INSURA (INdividual SUrveys in RAllies), which Isabelle Sommier discusses here, has expanded a great deal over the last 15 years. The method has been practiced less frequently at World Social Forums, however, than at local or regional forums, where there was less linguistic and geographical diversity.
within the survey population. This diversity is precisely what we decided to tackle at the Forum in Dakar, through a survey in five languages handed out by a multinational team to nearly 1,100 people during the five days of the forum (see technical appendix for a longer exposition of the method).

The heuristic dimension of transnational surveys should be underlined here. They help denaturalize the routine categories of social science surveys and their ability to account for comparable realities in other countries (whether they refer to socio-professional categories or levels of education). Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was used to circumvent the increased difficulties of \textit{ceteris paribus} statistical analysis in an international configuration, in which the variables and the practises they measure mean different things to different individuals, depending on their nationality. MCA (see the two chapters by J. Siméant), combined with agglomerative hierarchical clustering, enables the meaning of sociographic variables to be checked more accurately according to reconstructed national groups. Ilka Vari-Lavoisier, in her chapter, shows how useful it can be to analyze systematically Non-response in order to understand diverse feelings of political competence, or self-censorship.

Our approach to forums claims to be more than strictly quantitative. Although it is not always possible to conduct ethnographic research at these events (if by that we mean being immersed for a long period of time in a circle of people who are familiar with each other), the fact that they have a dimension of theater (Rucht, 2011) and performance lends them to very rich, qualitative observation. This theatrical dimension is fundamental, due to the unified time and place of the event, its finality and groups mobilizing in front of what they perceive to be a global audience to stage what is at stake worldwide (the effects of globalization, the future of the planet, global inequalities, international solidarity, etc.). It is therefore particularly instructive to observe such events in a systematic way. Given the limited time available to researchers and their lack of familiarity with the local context, this presupposes engaging in collective observation and whenever possible by multinational teams to prevent ethnocentric interpretation. In both cases, the participation of the whole group at every step in the research process, together with accommodations for the group in the same place, which enabled evening debriefing sessions, was a powerful tool to ensure rigorous “qualitative” as well as quantitative results.

\footnote{Even though such investigations were possible due to the fact that most members of our expanded research team also met with an activist network at the Forum to work more specifically.}
We had already adopted a comparable approach (collective and reflexive, with an ethnographic dimension) in Nairobi (Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011) in 2007 (on the benefits of collaboration in participant observation at intense, multifocal events, see also Mazie and Woods, 2003). At that time, we were seeking to understand how Africa was described and staged, how the idea of a capability for action specific to the inhabitants of the African continent was generated and how pan-African and anti-imperialist discourses were mobilized in the process. During the study, which involved some 25 veteran and junior researchers, both French and Kenyan, we engaged in systematic observation of around one hundred workshops selected from the general forum program. The observation guide (Sommier and Agrikoliansky, 2005) encouraged researchers to pay attention to the way the participants expressed themselves in public, the composition of the assembly, whether speakers referred or did not refer to Africa, the degree of expertise mobilized at the workshop, and the role of NGOs, among other variables. Each workshop was observed by a binational duo, which made it possible to grasp points that could be identified only by someone familiar with the alter-global movement, Kenya, or a specific language (Spanish, Swahili, etc.). Working in multinational teams proved to be useful not only from the standpoint of language and social familiarity, but it also revealed that the research teams functioned like a microcosm of the international event: some topics that seemed unimportant to some members of the team, who went so far as to stop observing them, were seen on the contrary as absolutely central by the others (e.g. the topic “Young People and the Future of Africa,” which seemed trivial to some young French researchers but extremely important to Kenyan students). Naturally, incidents that occurred on the sidelines of the 2007 Forum were also scrutinized (such as the looting of a Forum dining room operated by someone close to the Kenyan Minister of the Interior, which was experienced as a moment of radical concrete protest against “the politics of the belly”) (Bayart, 2009).

This qualitative, ethnographic aspect of the study, though less developed in Dakar where we focused on the survey by questionnaire, is nevertheless present in this book. The chapter by William Herrera, Alice Judell, and Clément Paule is intended precisely to show the advantages of using an approach inspired by Erving Goffman to grasp the theatrical dimensions of the event. By choosing an object as insignificant as waste management at the Forum, the authors show how the political dimensions of the forum can be understood not only through discourses but also through practices and performances designed to be exemplary (even if they did not always succeed). Delimiting the area of the rubbish dump was also a way of drawing
a map of Forum boundary lines separating those who belonged from those who were excluded. The chapter by Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle, which examines symbols of nationalism at the Forum, and Julie Castro's chapter on gender dimensions make similar points.

There would be no reason to highlight the methodological aspect of the survey in an international activist situation if all we did was present research procedures, no matter how satisfying they may be. Our methodological reflection is tied to two core issues that nourished this study: the international division of activist labor (Siméant, 2013), and the contexts of transnational collective action.

2 The division of labor and the paradoxes of activist internationalization

Through experience we have found that focusing on the division of labor is an especially fruitful approach to the study of activism, particularly in international contexts. By “division of labor” we mean both the effects of the international division of labor between activist organizations and the forms of division of labor within transnational activist movements (e.g. networks that claim to be rooted in the North as well as the South) or within the alter-global world.

Thinking about these aspects of the division of labor means grasping the asymmetries within a space that challenges them and tries to overcome them.

With few exceptions (Rothman and Oliver, 2002; Wood, 2005; Smith et al., 2011) the sociology of transnational movements has failed to devote much attention to the southern part of those movements, and still less to the social characteristics of southern activists. It is therefore difficult to test in the South the interesting hypothesis proposed by Sidney Tarrow according to which the participants in global justice movements, mainly from northern countries, are both “rooted and cosmopolitan” (Tarrow, 2005).

A few works show genuine sensitivity to the contradictions and difficulties of transnational activist cooperation (Smith and Johnston, 2002; Bandy and Smith, 2005; Bandy, 2004; Chase-Dunn et al., 2008). Some deal in particular with the disparities that may be increasing between the local agendas of southern activists and those of their international supporters (Fireman, 2009), or why some of them receive international support and others do not (Bob, 2001). Even fewer recall the way organizations that operate in the South distinguish between their international and local
workforces. Finally, certain researchers analyze how the transnational social movement has been unified by global narratives (Nepstadt, 2001; Smith and Johnston, 2002; Smith, 2002). But as soon as one shifts from the field of discursive studies to examine the concrete conditions of activist internationalization, based on a materialist sociology, a “sociology of the plane ticket” as it were, the research work grows scarce. It is as if the field of alter-globalization studies combined an ultra-macrosociology of contexts referring to economic globalization with an idealistic sociology of activists without borders (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), who seem to float about freely, eager to align their international ties through discourse.

We can therefore regret that the international division of activist labor, when it is mentioned, tends to reflect thinking on global economic inequalities, even if it tries to challenge that thinking. Thus, in one of the very few items (taken from a quantitative study of a World Social Forum) that focuses on the differences in the positions of activist workers from the North and South, the protest potential is analyzed as a reflection of their positions in the divisions between core, semi-periphery and periphery, in line with world systems theory (Kwon et al., 2008). But do all the inequalities that limit participation really stem from the structure of world capitalism?

Our approach aims to examine and qualify this point and draw attention to the material aspects of activism. The traditional problems of the iron law of oligarchy, now familiar to activist organizations, are compounded in international configurations where travel expenses can sometimes represent months of wages for activists in poor countries. In Nairobi, we had already engaged in the “sociology of the plane ticket” and observed that not a single African participant would have been able to come to the Forum without funding from a northern organization, which put the spotlight on NGO patronage of African “activism.” But the relationship to the material basis of activism also concerns the extent to which WSFs have become gatherings of organization professionals (in Dakar, 20% of survey respondents were currently employed and 12.5% previously employed by an NGO, a trade union, etc.).

The connection with activist professionalization is even stronger on the African continent, given the importance of the development

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2 Thus, Lesley Wood (2005) points out that southern organizations belonging to the Peoples’ Global Action network clearly distinguish their work and cooperation with NGOs lobbying the North from their participation in popular movements.

3 It should be noted, nevertheless, that in Dakar, 25% of the European respondents were employed, in such organisations, compared with 15% of the African respondents. Travel expenses, combined with the professionalization of the associative world in Europe, certainly explain the high percentage of salaried employees in the first group.
industry. The issue not only fuels recurrent debates over legitimate forms of mobilization (NGOs v. social movements), but also reflects the problem of increasingly moderate types of mobilization. Some activists experience NGOs primarily as a sector of jobs and resources, which may preclude more radical forms of protest. A form of “mobilization without protest,” embodied by advocacy and highly expert types of activism, has now been accepted by this world.

Such an approach also implies identifying the dividing lines within the alter-global movement itself, from the twofold perspective of social composition and the causes proclaimed. The most obvious divide – between North and South – first comes to mind. But cleavages between different “Souths” are equally important. This is the focal point of the chapter by Hélène Baillot, Isaline Bergamaschi, and Ruggero Iori. The authors reveal the inequalities not only between northern and southern activists, but also between activists in the South (in this respect, the advent of the BRICS countries is confirmed within alter-global activism as well). These cleavages translate into different relationships with the alter-globalization cause and with the role of politics, as Isaline Bergamaschi, Tania Navarro, and Héloïse Nez show with regard to the Latin American participants at the Forum in Dakar. The same holds for gender aspects, as Julie Castro explains, which are interpreted differently according to the participants’ origins and activist traditions, which result in practices that are not always attentive to these issues.

In addition to these aspects of the division of labor, the international meeting situation itself can produce paradoxical effects. One of the best examples of these effects is the issue of nationalism. Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle shows that expressions of nationalism and defense of sovereignty were widespread at the World Social Forum in Dakar. In this historically international and internationalist event, nationalist symbols and slogans – Brazilian flags, Palestinian *keffiyehs*, T-shirts proclaiming “Guinea is back,” Congolese hymns – seemed to be ordinary activist repertoires provided they were not contested by other groups of participants. The controversies that arose in Dakar over violent or insistent nationalist claims (Saharawi v. Moroccan; Venezuelan patriots) shed light on more accepted nationalist practices and symbols. Why and how do nationalism and sovereignty become legitimate repertoires of internationalized activist claims? M.-E. Pommerolle demonstrates that the World Social Forum is a delocalized place of encounters, where people are often drawn together by basic national ties as well as around common causes based on “working misunderstandings” (Sahlins, 1981). Structured by anti-imperialist discourses, the World Social
Forum accepts nationalist or secessionist claims as legitimate as long as they come from the global South. Disconnected from their own territories, these claims benefit from the distance and match the diverse expectations of the participants: nationalist intellectuals from the South, anti-imperialist activists from the North, and politicians from everywhere invest nationalist symbols and discourses with their own purposes and in line with their own ideas. These various investments produce different sorts of long-distance nationalism\(^4\) in the context of an internationalist activist event.

Beyond even working misunderstandings, the Forum in Dakar offered an opportunity to observe the “activist taste for others,” a form of enthusiasm peculiar to international encounters, where exoticism mixes with cultural goodwill, if only through clichés that reproduce certain national stereotypes. But such an assessment presupposes that the observations are more deeply rooted in contexts of collective action.

3 Contexts of international collective action

“All politics is local politics.” This truism reminds us, quite rightly, that even in the area of transnational activism, local practices and strategies matter, provided the term “local” is used with care. No doubt the most accurate way of formulating this would be: “All political activity (even international) takes place somewhere.” Hence the importance of identifying that “somewhere,” of localizing it. How can this rule of interpretation be applied to the WSF in Dakar?

First of all, by understanding what this Forum represented in local politics, both at the Dakar level and in Senegalese political life. We know that representatives of the “Y’en a marre” (We’re fed up) movement spoke out during the event and that this group played an important role later on in challenging the rule of Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade. More broadly, it is necessary to grasp what the organization of this type of event tells us about the field of activism in Senegal, and even about its relationship to political power, which is more complex than clear-cut opposition to the authorities. In contrast, among the NGOs that participated in the Forum, we observed a form of associative activism sometimes closely linked to the authorities’ patronage networks. Beyond the Senegalese political field, we might note that the representations of political legitimacy may differ widely from one

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\(^4\) Significantly, long-distance nationalism has been inadequately studied in transnational social movement studies; for an exception see Guidry et al. (2000).
national group to another and some of the most confrontational forms find less support among African participants than among Europeans, for example.

Contrary to the claims of space-blind social sciences, places are important (Gieryn, 2000 and on forums, Reese et al., 2011) and they are another component of context. Of course we are referring here to physical locations and the constraints they place on organization, such as the campus of Cheikh Anta Diop University. But the history of places and the memories associated with them also count. The fact that the Assembly of the Social Movements (the concluding assembly of the WSF) was held in the main amphitheater of Cheikh Anta Diop University is significant: it was the same amphitheater in which Nicolas Sarkozy, then president of Senegal’s former colonial ruler, gave his all-too-famous speech in Dakar in 2007, asserting to the Senegalese intelligentsia that Africans had not “sufficiently entered into history.”

The advantage of this type of study is that researchers can simultaneously work on the overall survey population and then come back to focus on a national population (the two main ones here were the French and the Senegalese) or a continental population (three large blocs were distinguished in Dakar: Europeans, Africans, and Latin Americans). The value of arriving at cautious generalities about alter-globalists is shown by Isabelle Sommier with regard to the French, Johanna Siméant with regard to the Senegalese and the French, and Isaline Bergamaschi, Tania Navarro, and Héloïse Nez with regard to the Latin Americans. At the same time, close-ups on national context reveal what certain affinities with activism and protest practices owe to local activist traditions or to the influence of the organizations in the home country. Isabelle Sommier correctly emphasizes that it is difficult to deduce a trend in the alter-global movement from the comparison of events that took place under the same label but in very different locations, involving different travel expenses and issues depending on the group. Thus, she asks, does the increase in the number of participants affiliated to religious groups at the last two WSFs reveal the growing involvement of these groups in alter-globalism or simply that the African participants are more religious than their European counterparts? Similarly, the chapter by Johanna Siméant shows the considerable difference between Brazilian trade unionists who were not opposed to violent forms of protest, Senegalese participants who were wary of any form of dissent – even moderate, and left-wing Christians from France in favor of non-violent modes of action.

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5 The number of participants from Asia and Oceania was extremely limited: the total number of respondents from Asia and Oceania accounted for 5.5% of the survey population.
Therefore, if we limit the contextualization of transnational collective action to the processes of international mobilization in a local space (usually understood as referring to a national organizational field), we run the risk of neglecting the impact of certain international fields and configurations. But that would mean reconstructing the most relevant affiliations of the individuals at these events by determining which ones are national and refer to specific groups, training (in human rights, environment, etc.), special status (NGO employees, academic, etc.) and the meaning they take on in various contexts.

One last point to highlight an important lesson of this study: the value of multinational research teams. Due to lack of more plentiful funding, we kept the division of labor to a minimum within our research group. These moments of scientific and communitarian utopia, marked by shared commitment, helped to create a relatively limited division of scientific labor, culminating in research and data production practices that were at times the envy of other, better-endowed colleagues from other nationalities. They convinced us that it is sometimes possible to engage in social science differently.
1 What can quantitative surveys tell us about GJM activists?

Isabelle Sommier

Abstract
Since the rise of the global justice movement (GJM), a number of surveys have been conducted, particularly on the composition of the social forums. This article examines the main surveys (Fisher, Ibase, Reese, Della Porta, Agrikoliansky and Sommier) and the possibility of their cumulative study, a task that curiously has not been undertaken until now. What do these surveys tell us about the activists’ socio-biological characteristics, political, and organizational affiliations and ideological beliefs? We will see that, despite their common scientific interests, any comparison is delicate because of the methodology used and the way the questions are formulated. The surveys nevertheless paint a homogeneous portrait of the attendees.

Since its inception, the global justice movement (GJM) has been the topic of numerous studies. Some of the research has made use of a relatively recent method in the social sciences, i.e. conducting surveys during demonstrations. This method has been consolidated and even become a routine procedure through regular use at protests over the past ten years. Known as INSURA (INdividual SUrveys during RAllies), it had been used only on rare occasions until it was given a methodological framework by Pierre Favre and his colleagues (Favre, Fillieule, and Mayer, 1997).1 Subsequently, the method came into systematic use with the emergence of the new movement opposing neoliberal globalization. It has accompanied this movement since the pioneering work of Della Porta et al. at the anti-G8 event in Genoa during the summer of 2001 (Andretta et al., 2002), followed by the quantitative surveys carried out at the European Social Forms (ESF) and the World Social Forums (WSF) up to and including the 2011 event in Dakar. Alter-global events are particularly well suited to this tool by their very configuration (usually

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1 Favre et al. cite three experiences prior to their 1994 survey: the first was at an antinuclear demonstration in Washington, D.C. on May 6, 1979, the second at a demonstration against Margaret Thatcher in Sheffield in April 1983, and the third at a demonstration in favor of public school education in France on January 16, 1994 (Favre et al., 1997: 16-17).
indoor meetings, protest camps or villages, and less frequently at marches where administering questionnaires is more delicate) and their audiences, which are usually willing to cooperate in answering survey questions. What is the real value of this research? What does it tell us about the activists’ socio-biological characteristics, political and organizational affiliations and ideological beliefs? These questions have already been raised in a comparison made by Fillieule and Blanchard (2008) of two surveys conducted in France in 2003. Our study and its conclusions are in line with theirs, but it differs in two respects: it is less ambitious from a theoretical standpoint: the earlier researchers were seeking to assess the benefits of a method one of them had helped to invent, after it had been applied elsewhere. On the other hand, our research is more ambitious in terms of the number of studies included in the comparison – 20 surveys from 2000 to 2011 (presented in Part I). As we shall see, the surveys paint a homogeneous sociographic portrait of the attendees, but we will also have occasion to point out how the formulation of the questions can make comparison a delicate process, thus weakening the results or sometimes making it impossible to draw a conclusion (Part II). Nevertheless, as Fillieule and Blanchard note (2008: 14), while “INSURA is certainly well suited to explore the demographics of alter-global events, as well as relational networks of individuals and multiple belongings (...) organization networks and the movement’s boundaries are far more difficult to explore through, a fact that seriously limits international cross comparisons of movements based on that tool.” Like any survey concerned, by definition, with individuals, it provides a realistic snapshot of them at a given time and is therefore necessarily ephemeral. As a result, it is not really designed to track the evolution of the multi-organizational field over time (Part III). We will conclude by looking at more heuristic research approaches that take advantage of INSURA’s contributions while at the same time allowing us to step back and grasp the connection between the micro-sociological level of the activist and the meso-sociological level of the organizations – something the automatic use of the INSURA method fails to bring out.

1.1 Data and methods

Contrary to the assertion of Reese et al. (2011: 64), many quantitative surveys have been conducted at alter-global events. One could sense this intuitively at social forums, for example, from the large number of researchers who were present or who were asking each other to fill out questionnaires.
For our assessment, we chose twenty surveys on the necessarily selective basis of their academic reach, i.e. the fact that the results were published in research works or in French- or English-speaking peer-review journals. This means a great deal of research has not been included, either due to the language or because they were intended for a very small audience, such as grey literature or student theses. Social scientists clearly supported the alter-global movement in its early stages (Alberoni, 1981) beginning in 2000. Without a doubt, they promoted it, along with media coverage, giving it visibility and often legitimacy by adopting an empathetic or even committed viewpoint. Like most journalists, they began to turn away from it from 2007, with some exceptions, as evidenced by the drying up of new publications on the subject (but not reissues like Sen and Waterman, 2012, Smith and Karides, 2014). Also, the book edited by Reese in 2011 (and reissued the following year) contains half of the articles already published in the mid-2000s on events prior to 2008. In short, this survey conducted in 2011 in Dakar is the first large project for seven years. This academic interest and its subsequent discontinuation can be explained in three ways: first, the Western background of the researchers – of the seven teams, only one was from the “South” (Brazil), three were from Europe, two from the United States, and one from Australia; second, the changing form of the Forum, which has obviously become more routine and therefore less attractive in recent years, particularly in Western countries; third, the circularity of the GJM (i.e. the ties that developed between alter-global activists and movement researchers may have initially led them to share their enthusiasm and later their disappointment).

Of the twenty studies (see Table 1), eight were conducted at WSFs (Ibase, 2005 and 2007, Reese et al., 2011, Pommerolle et Siméant 2008), seven at counter-forums (Fisher et al., 2005, Andretta et al., 2002, Fillieule et al., 2004), three at European Social Forums (Della Porta, 2009, Agrikoliansky and Sommier, 2005) and two at local social forums (Bramble in Australia, Reese et al. in the US). Though the questions were quite similar, as we will see in the next section, there was a perceptible difference in their sampling methods. With the help of WSF office support, the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses (Ibase) built a stratified sample divided into four groups (Brazilian participants; Latin American participants; Participants from other countries; and Campers) according to the official

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2 In addition to Ibase (Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas), which conducts research on the WSF and is one of its main promoters in Brazil, we might also mention Tom Bramble, a co-organizer of the Australian GJM events that he also studies.
registration database. The other surveys had no knowledge of the contours of the constellation of participants and either had to adopt a totally random selection method or weight their sample in varying ways. This could be done *a priori* by doubly saturating the sample, following very detailed survey preparation ahead of the event: first they studied the program to find the widest possible panel of lectures where survey team members would be present to distribute questionnaires, by comparing the discussion topics with the organizations represented on the platform; second, by setting up research teams to be present simultaneously at all the sites. The weighting could also be done *a posteriori* by adjusting the sample using the attendance figures provided by the main organizations at the anti-G8 in Genoa (Andretta, 2002: 221-222) or the regional and country-level registration data released by the WSF Organizing Committees in 2005 and 2007 (Reese 2008b, with sometimes surprising results as we will see later on). One final control technique, in keeping with the INSURA method (Favre et al., 1997: 21ff; Fillieule and Blanchard, 2008), consisted in giving very strict instructions on how to administer questionnaires.

The surveys also varied according to the number of languages used, which was obviously higher for WSFs and reduced to a single vernacular language for local events such as the anti-G8 mobilization in Genoa in 2001 or the Australian forums studied in 2004 by Bramble. Surveys differed above all in the number of questions asked, from the “lightest” version (e.g. the Fisher surveys contain only 6 short questions) to the longest: 56 questions at the last WSF in Dakar in 2011. It should be pointed out that only the latter survey distinguished between administered questionnaires (24% of the total number collected) and self-administered questionnaires (75%).

This article will focus primarily on surveys at the social forums for two main reasons. On the one hand, because they are the key innovation of the GJM and in a way symbolize it, even if they do not exhaust it. On the other hand, it is best to compare what is comparable; forums, counter-summits, and transnational campaigns do not mobilize exactly the same public insofar as the offer of commitment is not the same. The audience is more reflexive and expert in the forums, attracting a significantly older one with more institutional memberships, at least now (see later).

3 For example, at the anti-G8 protest in Evian (“forum of alternatives,” alternative camps – cf. Fillieule et al., 2004: 18) and the second ESF (Agrikoliansky and Sommier, 2005: 15), hence the volume of samples.

4 For the Fisher survey, for example, every fifth person standing in line to enter a rally area, and at other events, choosing every fifth person in a line or row, as determined by the researcher working in a particular area.
Table 1.1  Chart summarizing the various surveys used (2000-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GJM Event</th>
<th>Research Team*</th>
<th>Number of interviewees**</th>
<th>Languages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000-2002: 5 counter-summits (Netherlands, USA, Canada)(^5)</td>
<td>Fisher</td>
<td>1514</td>
<td>English, French, Dutch, and German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2001: Anti-G8, Genoa, Italy</td>
<td>Della Porta</td>
<td>762 Italians</td>
<td>Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2001: First ESF, Florence, Italy</td>
<td>Della Porta</td>
<td>2384-2579</td>
<td>English, French, Italian, Spanish and German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2003: anti-G8, Evian, France</td>
<td>Sommier</td>
<td>2282</td>
<td>English, French, Italian, and German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2003: Second ESF, Paris, France</td>
<td>Sommier</td>
<td>2198</td>
<td>English, French, Italian, Spanish and German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May and September 2004: Brisbane and Sydney Social Forums</td>
<td>Bramble</td>
<td>210 Australians</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005: WSF, Porto Alegre, Brazil</td>
<td>Chase-Dunn</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>Portuguese, English and Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005: WSF, Porto Alegre, Brazil</td>
<td>Reese</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>Portuguese, English and Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006: fourth ESF, Athens, Greece</td>
<td>Della Porta</td>
<td>1058-1144</td>
<td>English, French, Italian, Spanish and German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007: WSF, Nairobi, Kenya</td>
<td>Reese</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>Portuguese, English and Spanish, French, Swahili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007: USA Social Forum, Atlanta</td>
<td>Reese</td>
<td>582 Americans</td>
<td>English and Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011: WSF, Dakar, Senegal</td>
<td>Siméant</td>
<td>1069-1169</td>
<td>English, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Wolof</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The research is obviously the work of more or less large teams; our decision here to use the name of the main initiator is intended to facilitate reading and certainly not to personalize the surveys.

** The possible variation in the number of surveys can be explained by the variable number of questionnaires analyzed depending on the team’s researchers and/or the time required for statistical processing.

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5 November 13-24, 2000: the “Human Dike” at the 2000 Conference of the Parties-6 (COP-6) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Hague, the Netherlands (interviews with 204 protest participants from 25 countries); 2) February 2, 2002: the “Another World Is Possible March” at the 2002 World Economic Forum, New York City (316 surveys with participants from four countries); 3) April 20, 2002: the “A20 Stop the War at Home and Abroad/ Mobilization for Global Justice” at the spring 2002 meetings of the World Bank/IMF, Washington, DC (177 participants from 28 of the 50 United States); 4) June 26-27 2002: the 2002 “G-6B Demonstration” during the G-8 meetings, Calgary, Canada (Eighty-six protesters from four countries); 5) September 28 and 29, 2002: the “Mobilization for Global Justice” at the fall 2002 meetings of the World Bank/IMF, Washington, DC (730 participants from 11 countries).
1.2 The seemingly convergent portrait of the alter-global activist

At first glance, the surveys would appear to be easy to compare, given the similarity in the questions asked by the researchers: basic demographic data (sex, age, diplomas, social position); membership in activist organizations (number and type of organizational affiliations); political orientation: degree of politicization through the individual’s environment and use of political information tools, particularly the Internet; classification on the left-right scale; degree of trust in institutions and organizations, from the most grassroots level such as Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) to supranational bodies (UN, regional organizations) and the various territorial authorities of the country of origin. The fact that the questions coincide can of course be explained by similar sociological backgrounds of the researchers and the routine academic propensity to ask standard questions regarding, for example, ideological or political self-positioning to make them comparable with official or traditional surveys, as well as the circulation and borrowing of questionnaires.6

Under closer scrutiny, however, these seemingly convergent questions produce results that are much less clear-cut and comparison ultimately proved more arduous than expected. In its broad strokes, the portrait that emerges of the alter-global activist remains homogeneous throughout a decade of surveys and corresponds to the usual depiction in that activists have more resources than the overall population average and these characteristics are even more accentuated in this specific case. GJM activists are in a situation of “biographical availability,” to borrow McAdam’s now classic notion (1986: 70), characterized by the absence of family responsibilities (e.g. 60% of the participants at the 2005 WSF had no children under 18 years of age) and youth, which reflects the era of classifications and the uncertainties noted in studies on generations. According to Reese’s surveys, 70% of the 2005 WSF respondents, 50% of the 2007 WSF respondents, and 59% of 2007 USSF respondents were 35 years old or younger. They made up 48% of attendees at the second ESF (but 35.2% of the activists who are very, regularly, and strongly involved in antiglobal mobilizations and have already participated in several no-global events are under 35 years of age) and 75% of attendees at the anti-G8 (see Table 2 for an overall demographic view).

6 The questionnaire used by the Della Porta team at the anti-G8 in Genoa and above all the first ESF provided the first model; it largely inspired the French surveys in 2003, which were in turn imported to Australia by Bramble.
### Table 1.2  General socio-demographic data on social forum attendees (2002-2011) [in %]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>43.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>56.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 25 years of age</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>11.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College or university level</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alter-global activists possess a very high degree of cultural capital, which significantly distinguishes them from their non-activist compatriots. The survey shows that the activists also have a very high educational level: 51.6% of the participants in the second ESF had a post-graduate degree (more than 3 years of university) and 17.9% a graduate degree (2 or 3 years of university); 34% and 19%, respectively, among the 2003 No-G8 activists. This means that 53% of no-global activists and 69.5% of ESF attendees have college or university degrees. As a comparison, according to the European Social Survey, at the same period no more than 43% of French people had a comparable level of education. Two-thirds of the participants at Australian Social Forum meetings in 2002 had a graduate or postgraduate degree (Bramble, 2006). More than 50% of all respondents at the three meetings studied by Reese had 16 or more years of education. USSF Atlanta respondents were the most highly educated (69%). In contrast, the WVS (World Values Survey) found that only 12% of respondents in the general public reported having a university degree, while the GSS reports that only 28% of US respondents reported 16 or more years of education (Reese, 2008b). The number of university-educated participants grew from one forum to the next (with the exception of Nairobi in 2007), including the WSF held in Dakar. The conclusion is beyond dispute, but we should not lose sight of the effects of widely varying educational systems from country to country, or of subtleties in the wording of the questions – e.g. asking whether an individual has reached a given level of study or whether he/she has obtained the final diploma – that can yield quite different results. Thus, we can take the example of the surveys conducted in parallel at the WSF in 2005 and 2007: 77.7% of the participants in 2005 had “begun or completed a university education” in the Ibase survey, whereas 49% had an educational level of “16 or more years” according to the Reese survey. In 2007, the respective figures were 82% and 53%.
Unfortunately, the social position of activists is difficult to compare because the surveys, with the exception of the French questionnaires, either paid little attention to the question (Ibase) or did so in a highly impressionistic fashion (see Table 3). The surveys conducted by Reese et al. claim to grasp social position through a feeling of class identity (upper, upper middle, lower middle – the most frequently declared, working, lower class) and a catch-all category called “employment status,” aggregating full-time, part-time, temporary basis, self-employed, investments/savings, volunteer, unemployed, retired, student, and “dependent on family income,” with the total amply exceeding 100%. The Della Porta team included in the same “employment status” category: blue- and white-collar workers (26.5% of the attendees at the fourth ESF), upper class (professionals, managers, employers: 14.3%), teachers (9.2%), unemployed (5.5%), retirees (6.8%) and students (37.6%). We will therefore base our interpretation on the French surveys, as they deal with this subject more specifically by comparing different questions: one open question (“What is your profession?”) and two closed questions concerning the respondent’s current occupational situation and his/her main area of activity today (or in the past for retirees).

Attendees at the second ESF clearly held high social positions (Gobille and Uysal, 2005): among those with an occupation, 42% were executive managers or working in a high-level intellectual occupation and 44.1% a mid-level occupation. The main categories in these two groups were mid-level occupations in the healthcare and social work fields (20.7%), college or university professors and scientific occupations (14%), schoolteachers (9.8%) or jobs in information technology, communication, and the arts (11.4%). Low-level occupations were dramatically underrepresented: white-collar workers accounted for only 8.4% (40% from the public sector) and

7 There are several hypotheses that could explain the extreme variations in the amount of attention given to questions pertaining to socio-professional status: 1) the aims of the research undertaken, which may have little to do with this topic (e.g. Fisher’s interest in mobilizing organizations conveyed through six questions or Della Porta’s focus on the internal workings of SMOs and their relationship with institutions, in line with the European Union call for tenders on the contribution of social movements to democracy, or at the opposite extreme, the activist orientation of the surveys conducted by Ibase); 2) the different disciplines of the teams, not always sociology of social movements like Della Porta or the French researchers (e.g. Bramble is an economist and trade unionist, Reese a specialist on the Welfare State and women, Fisher on the environment, etc.); 3) the specificity of the professional nomenclatures used in France (the socio-professional “categories” since the post-war period, inspired by constructivism), a fortiori in a sociology inspired by Bourdieu, no doubt destined to disappear with the project to harmonize European Union socio-economic classifications (ESeC), inspired by the opposing Anglo-Saxon model.
blue-collar workers 2.2%. In France, these two categories represented 56.5% of the active population in 2002. This particular sociological profile was reinforced by the social origin and social position of the respondent’s husband or wife. Half of the activists’ spouses belonged to the public sector, 40% were managers or engaged in a high-level intellectual occupation, 34% were in mid-level occupations, 3% were blue-collar workers, and 10% white-collar workers. Among the parents of the activists in our sample, 53% of the mothers worked in the public sector (often as teachers – 10.5% in all) or mid-level healthcare and social workers (10.3%); 42% of the fathers worked in the public sector. Managers and high-level intellectual occupations are overrepresented – 34% of the fathers of our sample. White-collar workers (12% of the fathers) and blue-collar workers (15% of the fathers) are underrepresented, whereas these three categories represented, respectively, 10%, 15%, and 40% of the fathers of French people in their thirties at the same time.

This breakdown, which is the reverse social stratification of the general population, was (remarkably!) confirmed at the WSF in Dakar. In that case, too, executives and high-level intellectual occupations (43.3%) and mid-level professions (26.48%) were predominant; among those, teachers (19.47%), healthcare and social workers (12.81%) were the most numerous. Working class categories were very much underrepresented: 5.4% white-collar workers, 3% blue-collar workers, 1.45% farmers, and 5% artisans, shopkeepers and small businessmen (15.37% without job). Of course one might reasonably conclude that the method actually discourages those with the least cultural and social capital, who are probably less inclined to agree to fill out a questionnaire, but this bias is not enough to explain such a strong contrast nor does it invalidate the observation that the alter-global population is well integrated in the workplace. These trends can be explained in two ways. On the one hand, the effects of the form of action itself: a forum is similar to an academic conference where people come to learn and discuss – and already, one must know its existence, contrary to a demonstration, for example, which one can cross by chance. It can be intimidating to those without (rightly or wrongly) political or intellectual competence, a fortiori if it stands in a place dedicated to knowledge, such as a university as was the case in Dakar. On the other hand, this strong social selectivity induced by the “forum form” has probably increased over the 10 years of experience, as we shall see later.

The activists’ social circles also appear to be very socially committed. Less than 20% of participants at the second ESF and the Evian No-G8 declared that neither their colleagues nor their family or friends were “rather active
activists”; 34% of them declared that two or three of these three social circles were (Fillieule and Blanchard, 2008). Furthermore, 54% of the respondents talked about politics often or very often with their colleagues at work, 65% at home with their families, and 80% with their friends. Among their social relations, 36% were active and 12% very active in the alter-global movement (Fillieule et al., 2004). The osmosis appeared even stronger in 2011: 66.8% of the friends of WSF participants, 71.5% of their colleagues, and 31.6% of their families were either very or rather active.

The “middle class radicalism” (Cosgrove and Duff, 1980) of alter-global activists can be explained by their interest in politics and a feeling of political competence nurtured by their very high level of education and highly qualified jobs, often linked to professions involving social control (healthcare, teaching, social work). They have a very critical attitude towards institutions: 70% of the attendees at the second ESF did not trust regional authorities, 82% national ones, 72% political parties, 76% European authorities, 62% the UN. They were less suspicious of municipal authorities (50% trust them) and the degree of confidence increased with the proximity of the institution: 54.5% trust trade unions, 77% NGOs, 90% grassroots associations (Gobille and Uysal, 2005: 115). The degree of distrust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.3</th>
<th>Change in the participants’ occupational situation (2002-2011) [in %]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemaker</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working population</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid cases</td>
<td>2429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Andretta & Sommier 2009: 116; in comparison, at the same period students represented 6.6% of the European population and retirees 21.5%  
** For 2011, calculated using a binary method (yes/no) in which some respondents checked several categories, therefore no total %  
*** Aggregation of full time (34%), part time (9.5), temporary basis 5.5), self-employed (19), investments/savings (1.7), volunteer (17.8%); unweighted data  
**** Aggregation of 47% who said they worked full time, 11.69% part time and 8% unstable employment
was higher at the 2005 WSF: 82.1% distrusted banks and 81.6% international companies, but 35% trusted trade unions, 58.3% NGOs, and 70.6% social movements (Ibase). These results are, to say the least, as expected within an activist arena like the GJM and therefore have little to teach us.

The widespread distrust of institutions and their representatives does not, however, lead to a loss of interest in politics or a withdrawal from public life; on the contrary, 76% of the participants at the second ESF declared they systematically voted in elections and 11% often did so (respectively 65.1% and 15.5% of attendees in Dakar). 18% currently belonged to a party and 16.2% had done so in the past, but the percentage was higher among more active activists (respectively 31% and 19.8%). 78% positioned themselves on the left (31% of them on the far left), only 3.4% of them in the center or on the right. 18% refused to declare their position. The tendency was the same among participants at the 2005 WSF, although the categories were different: 60.1% left; 19.8% center-left; 4.5% center; 0.6% center-right; 1.6% right, and 13.4% No position (source: Ibase). Here, too, the question itself and the comparison are of only limited interest, as the meaning of the terms “left,” “far left,” “right,” etc. varies from one country to the next.

The high degree of social integration and political participation of alter-global activists validates the theory of Sidney Tarrow (2001), who describes them as “rooted cosmopolitans.” Indeed, the ability to project oneself into transnational issues and events presupposes solid resources and national roots. The French researchers developed Tarrow’s idea by assessing these cosmopolitan aptitudes using three indicators: multilingual skills, experience of living abroad and the number and type of ties kept up with foreigners. From all of these points of view, the participants in the second ESF are very specific about their relationships with the world: 76% speak one or more foreign languages besides French (33% one, 30% two, 9% three). To the question “Do you have ties in other countries?” 34% gave a positive answer for professional reasons, 45% gave a positive answer for family reasons, and 76% gave a positive answer for friendship reasons. 37% of them had lived abroad, 19% for a year or less, 18% for two or more years, 72% for professional reasons, 14% for personal reasons, 6% due to exile or emigration, and 4% to travel. 23% went to other countries to engage in political activism: 17.7% sometimes and 5% often, 70% to Europe (Gobille and Uysal, 2005: 115ff).

From a sociographic standpoint, certain changes can be discerned over the long term: the ratio of male to female activists has grown consistently

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8 In 1996, only 37% of French people declared they could speak a foreign language.
higher, the average age of activists is higher and there are comparatively fewer student activists. The median age was 25 in Florence, 35 in Paris, 31 in Athens, and 40 in Dakar, and the percentage of student attendees dropped from 53% in 2002 to 12.5% in 2011. This overall evolution was particularly pronounced at the last WSF, whereas the 2005 WSF was an exception to the rule – young people and students were particularly overrepresented and far more numerous than at previous forums: 31% of attendees were under age 25 in 2003 and 37.4% in 2004. The absence of quantitative surveys between 2008 and 2011 makes it difficult to interpret the shift: was the last forum unusual or did it merely accentuate earlier trends? Although the indicators of membership in professions and organizations are few and far between and hence hard to compare, they may perhaps provide a key to interpretation or at the very least a plausible hypothesis. But interpreting them makes the problem of survey comparability even more acute.

1.3 The evolution of the multi-organizational field of alter-globalism: a delicate comparison

Knowing that activist groups attract different audiences, one might think that these sociographic changes partly reflect the evolution of the multi-organizational field (Curtis and Zurcher, 1973). Monitoring at three ESFs from 2002 to 2006 already revealed the increased professionalization of alter-global activists, along with a higher percentage of males from one event to the next. As we noted earlier (Andretta and Sommier, 2009: 119), “while the gender of professional activists was very balanced in 2003, the number of males in positions of responsibility had jumped significantly four years later, bringing the ESF back to the usual unequal division of political labor between genders (60% men versus 40% women).” The same trend was found at the WSFs: unsurprisingly, the farther the activists had to travel from home to attend the Forum and therefore the higher the cost of their activism, the more pronounced the gender gap became. Activist employment in the private sector has clearly declined, whereas there has been a spectacular increase in jobs in NGOs, which rose from 1.2% in 2002 to

9 When we consider the country of permanent residence of the professional activists, we notice a great disparity between countries, ranging from 48.5% of men in Greece (the only country where professional activists are predominantly feminine) to 71% in Italy, 63.6% in Germany, 58% in Belgium, France, and Spain, and 55% in Great Britain.
30% in 2011 (see Table 4). Does the growth of employment in NGOs indicate professionalization of the GJM? It is difficult to determine the number of employees of organizations due to variations in the formulation of survey questions (when they are known, which is not the case for the Reese surveys). At the second ESF, 21% (420 people) of organization members declared they were paid-staff members or members of the leadership; the figure was 38% (326 people) at the fourth ESF, an increase of 17%. “Ordinary” activists without responsibilities or mandates represented respectively 79% and 62% of the sample (Andretta and Sommier, 2009: 118-119). Leaders and paid-staff members accounted for 48.1% at the 2007 WSF and 66.1% at the 2007 USSF (Reese, 2011: 69) – sizable figures that can perhaps be explained by the number of participants who came as representatives of their organization (77.4% and 68%, respectively). At the last WSF, 21.35% stated they were currently paid staff members of an organization and 13.31% had been previously.

Table 1.4  Attendees’ employment sectors (2002-2011) [in %]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>25.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.82 (5.75 in informal sector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associative sector</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>30.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed professionals</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>11.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>12.9 (students make up more than 40.8%)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total of people in employment only N = 1,215
N.B. For 2011, the binary method (yes/no) was used to calculate the numbers for each sector and some respondents checked several choices, hence no total in terms of %.

10 For the 2003 WSF, the question was formulated as follows: “Are you, or have you ever been, a permanent and/or paid staff member of an organization?” For the 2011 WSF: “Are you or have you ever been a paid staff member of an organization?” (Note that the question is more restrictive than the previous ones because it excludes leaders who are not necessarily paid.) But for the 2006 WSF: “What is your position in this group?” with 5 possible choices: member of the leadership, paid staff member, voluntary activist/campaigner, ordinary member, not actively involved in the group.
Over the 10-year period under study, a cluster of indicators appears to confirm the growing presence of seasoned participants increasingly supervised by their organizations. Over the long term, aside from 2007 (80.4%), the percentage of first-time participants dropped by half, from 60.7% in 2005 to 33% in 2011. All of the audiences declared in steadily larger numbers that they were members of a group, even in 2007: 78% in 2003, 80.4% in 2005, 85.1% in 2007 and 94% in 2011. At the 2011 WSF, nearly 70% even declared they had come on behalf of an organization, which paid the travel expenses of 44% of them.

To examine further the hypothesis of a changing organizational balance, which would explain the professionalization or even the gradual “NGOization” of the alter-global movement glimpsed at the fourth ESF, it would be necessary to reconstruct in minute detail the multi-organizational field from one event to the next. On the crucial question regarding membership in an activist organization, however, the possibilities for comparison are discouragingly limited. The fourth ESF survey, directed by D. Della Porta, framed one question differently from the way it was asked in other inquiries (“Have you ever been involved in any of the following kinds of voluntary/campaign groups?”). As a result, it cannot be compared because taking part in an event in no way signifies belonging to a group.\textsuperscript{11} Reese and Ibase show little interest in this problem and base their approach on a typology that notably contrasts NGOs with SMOs (social movement organizations). The interest of this opposition in the case of GJM would deserve a thorough discussion that this chapter does not allow (a social movement is often composed of formal organizations such as NGOs, interactions, and networks of individuals)\textsuperscript{12}. At this point we will just mention that the interpretation is difficult insofar as the authors give no explanation of the principles that have guided their typology (see Table 5).

Consequently, there is little benefit to be gained from this comparison, except to point out the decline in the participation of trade unions and unaffiliated individuals, on the one hand, and the increased number of political parties and religious groups on the other. A valuable comparison would require working from strictly identical empirical protocols. For now, to chart the evolution of the GJM “multi-organizational field,” we will once again use the comparable surveys conducted by the French teams (see Table 6). They reveal notable changes. The alter-global groups in the true sense

\textsuperscript{11} Unsurprisingly, the results are consistently much higher than when the question pertains to activist affiliations.

\textsuperscript{12} On this discussion, see for example Diani, 1992.
appear to have diminished considerably, as their membership has fallen from 1st place in 2003 to 4th place in 2011. Human rights organizations are now in first place, having nearly doubled from 16% to 28.6%. Four other groups show significant increases: peasant groups, with five times more members; feminists were three times more present in 2011 and even more when they are aggregated with the “women’s associations” category (16.4%), which was added to neutralize the negative effect feminist activism sometimes has; neighborhood associations and religious groups, with twice as many participants. Keeping in mind the growth of the NGO sector and the number of paid organizational staff members mentioned earlier, there are indeed convergent signs of a gradual “NGOization” of the GJM, perhaps accentuated by the effect of the location of the 2011 WSF, with the preponderance of human rights associations acting as a source of job creation as much as of activism in Africa. The rise of transnational aid organizations and human rights defense organizations, however, had already been noted by Byrd et al. (2010) over the period 2003-05. Further investigations are necessary to confirm this NGOization and to see if it refers to the same phenomena as those studied by Lang (2013): professionalization, institutionalization, and bureaucratization.

Even if those surveys had followed an identical protocol, the comparison would have soon revealed the limits of the INSURA method. Indeed, alter-global events primarily mobilize a local population and hence take place in a given socio-cultural space and a particular political and historical context.
Table 1.6  Present memberships (2003-2011) [in %]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>No-G8 2003*</th>
<th>ESF 2003*</th>
<th>WSF 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GJM</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade union</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants, anti-racists</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.78 (+ 14.31 peace-building, post-conflict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.6 (with youths)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity, social aid</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squatters</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminists</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21.61 (+ 16.37 women’s associations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (neighborhood associations, resident rights)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed, without house</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay and lesbian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to education</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>18.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperatives, tontines, microcredit</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>13.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.7 (but not comparable)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Fillieule and Blanchard 2008

For example, 80% of the respondents at the 2005 WSF came from Brazil and 8.8% from the rest of Latin America;13 83% of those at the second ESF were French, which no doubt explains the overrepresentation of attendees from the public sector (46% of the participants were public sector employees), the choice of “defending public services” as a mobilizing topic and the presence of trade unions and the French Communist Party. The data collected at the WSF in Dakar shows more balanced results with 50% of the participants

13 The interpretation of the results is therefore quite different when they are broken down into sub-populations. For example, the overall percentage of participants with a master’s degree or a PhD is 9.8%, but 9.9% among Latin Americans, 10% among Brazilians, and 29.4% among the individuals from other countries.
from Africa (28% from Senegal), 32% from Europe (20% from France), and 12.5% from the American continent.

The fact that the participants at so-called “global” events mainly come from the host country is clearly reflected in the affiliations claimed at the 2005 WSF in Porto Alegre (Ibase data). The affiliations refer in large part to specifically Brazilian issues: 23.9% belonged to groups from “areas of action” including education (21.9%), social aid (19.5%), anti-discrimination (18.7%), arts and culture (18%), public organization/participation (17.3%), HESCR (human, economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights) (15.7%), environment (15.2%), agriculture and land issues (14.5%), defending and promoting rights (advocacy), and 14.1% public policies/public budget. And no doubt researchers show sensitivity to the local prism by focusing on what appear to be key issues, a fortiori when they are citizens of the country hosting the event, or by totally ignoring others. Thus ethnic composition is totally absent from European surveys but central to Anglo-Saxon questionnaires, whereas some contain special items such as the categories of “arts and culture” (18.7% of the organizations) or “Public policies/Public budget” (14.1%) shown by Ibase in its study on the 2005 WSF in Porto Alegre; or those of “cooperatives and tontines” and “right to education” adopted by the researchers who went to Dakar in 2011.

It is therefore a delicate matter to infer any change at all in the overall GJM from the comparison of events that take place, under the same label, in extremely different locations, and therefore do not imply the same costs or the same issues, depending on the group. Does the increase in the number of members of religious groups attending the last two World Social Forums express their growing involvement in the GJM or simply a greater degree of religious affiliation among African participants than Europeans?14 Is the increase in peasant organizations more than a mere artifact masking varying degrees of mobilization depending on the continent? Indeed, it is quite possible that some participating groups use GJM events to put forward national demands through the “boomerang effect” described by M. Keck and K. Sikkink (1998). A transnational activist event like the WSF necessarily gives rise to intense strategies on the part of associations to ensure their legitimacy in the eyes of their sponsors as well as their competitors; “naturally international” NGOs will come in search of local grassroots

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14 Religious beliefs have not always been surveyed in the questionnaires, and when they have been, it was through noticeably different questions. At the 2003 WSF, 75% of participants declared they were unbelievers and 54.6% of those at the USSF in 2007, but 28% at the WSF held the same year and 30% at the last WSF.
constituencies, “as close to the field as possible,” whereas the ability for national groups to attend is an appreciable opportunity to stand out and “rise above” the others.

1.4 Conclusion

Finally, the absence thus far of any analytical assessment of the various surveys is perhaps due to modesty. The portion of common questions that are worth comparing (and above all likely to be compared) is essentially limited to the most basic data: sex, age, diplomas, and the overall volume of organizational affiliations. Others (political self-positioning, degree of trust in institutions or “solutions” recommended to achieve the goals of the cause such as “reform” or “abolish” capitalism) yield anticipated results. Hence there is not much to say about them,\(^\text{15}\) except to emphasize the aspect of self-presentation and playing the activist role expected at mobilization events, which the method and the situation necessarily generate. Only in-depth, face-to-face interviews outside the context of such events would provide a clear picture of the activists' world of values. On the other hand, the comparison clearly fails on two essential points: professional affiliations and the type of organizational memberships, which seemed to interest only the French teams.

Beyond what the INSURA method can (or cannot) say, these problems of comparison (and hence the low degree of cumulative survey results) also testify to the assumptions made by many researchers when conducting their studies that create an enchanted vision of this “new” cause shared with the activists. These assumptions fall into two categories:\(^\text{16}\) first, that the GJM is unified, therefore authorizing discussion of a single alter-global movement as a homogenous whole, regardless of the type of event or where it is held; second, that the GJM is truly “global,” i.e. freed from “cumbersome” national features to express an “international civil society.” Such assumptions are implicit in surveys providing only aggregated data that does not distinguish varying results according to the national origins of the attendees or fail to take the precaution of pointing out method biases. They are obviously less frequent in research such as surveys at local forums (like Bramble

\(^{15}\) That is the reason why we did not use them, or the questions on Internet.

\(^{16}\) In fact three categories, when we add the assumption about the “radically new” nature of the GJM, which we will not discuss here. Regarding these three assumptions and their implications for the research undertaken, cf. the introduction to Sommier et al., 2008.
in Australia) or the anti-summit in Genoa with only Italian respondents (Andretta et al., 2002). Should the survey focus therefore be strictly local? We think not.

In addition to taking traditional methodological precautions, there are three ways to employ the INSURA method in working with data from the “global” mobilizations of the GJM that do justice to the extreme heterogeneity of the audiences and how the cause is used. They also indicate avenues for future research if the surveys are used again or even systematized. One of them (Sommier, forthcoming) consists in monitoring the morphology of a national delegation over time, from one mobilization episode to another, thereby confronting the transnational assumption head-on. This approach notes the specificities of a particular population (e.g. the rooted cosmopolitans) and maps the changes in the transnational involvement of movement families in a given country. The two dimensions – individual and organizational – are interwoven. Indeed, it would seem that the increased age and feminization of French participants at WSFs reflect a shift in the center of gravity of the multi-organizational field from the original social issue to growing advocacy.17 Two other interpretations of the survey results at “global” events have already succeeded in making a genuine contribution to our knowledge. They both emphasize the plurality of WSF audiences. The first breaks down attendees into sub-samples, based either on the geographical distance separating the participant’s country of origin from the event location,18 or on his/her degree of involvement,19 thus linking the individual to the collective or the micro- and meso-sociological levels. The

17 If this hypothesis were to be confirmed, it would indicate rampant “NGOization” of the global justice movement in France, in line with the overall changes in “forum”-type events, notably expressed in the change of name from altermondialisme to GJM. On this point, cf. Sommier et al., 2008.
18 Connections with an organization are obviously more frequent among the non-local protest participants, as the surveys conducted by Fisher (2005) clearly show: 47.4% of them heard about the event from an organization (versus 30.5% for the local ones); 51.8% came to the protest with an organization (versus 22.8%), and about 31% received organizational support to attend the protest events (versus 5.2%). This was also true at the Anti-G8 event in Evian: 49% of the foreign activists belonged to one of the groups organizing the event, compared with 39% of the Swiss and French. “59% of the foreigners asserted that an organization was behind their decision to participate, compared with only 39% of the Swiss and French activists; moreover 42% of them came directly with their organizations, versus 24% of the French and the Swiss” (Agrikoliantsky and Gobille, 2009: 152). Cf. the chapter devoted to Latin Americans in the present volume.
19 Fillieule et al. (2004) divide the anti-G8 population into four groups: the uncommitted (23%); the mono-committed (98%), particularly present in young, politicized GJM organizations; those involved in 2-6 organizations (49%) and those involved in 7 or more organizations (9%), with a broader range of commitments among the 21 types proposed.
second gauges the effects of the repertoire of available actions on the form of activist involvement. It is thus care to avoid considering different WSF episodes as equivalent, by measuring the impact of “forum”-type events on the form of activism. The article by Agrikoliansky and Gobille (2009) is noteworthy in that it compares two events held close together in time and space based on similar survey protocols. On the one hand, the social forums give priority to “forms of actions combined with intellectual know-how” and encourage “aptitudes for consultation and dialog with public authorities, especially the municipalities” that host the events; on the other hand, the more confrontational forms such as anti-summits attract “young, macho activists” (2009: 164). The authors offer an interesting hypothesis to explain the evolution of WSFs: after initially contributing to the emergence of the GJM, the counter-summits declined under the effects of police repression in favor of more controlled and controllable social forums which attract a less confrontational public; in the process, they lost the support of the younger, more radical elements (who perhaps turned to other types of struggle such as the indignados and Occupy movements). Clearly, these approaches do not invalidate the INSURA method itself but merely its routine use and they invite researchers to show some sociological imagination (Wright-Mills, 1959) and depart from the method’s fetish for scientism.

20 On this question, cf. Chapter 3 by J. Siméant in the present work.
2 Activist encounters at the World Social Forum

Nationalism and sovereignty in an internationalized event

Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle

Abstract

Expressions of nationalism and defense of sovereignty were many at the World Social Forum in Dakar. In this historically international and internationalist event, nationalist symbols and slogans – Brazilian flags, Palestinian keffiyeh, T-shirt “Guinea is back,” Congolese hymns – seem to be ordinary activist repertoires as long as they are not contested by other groups of participants. Why and how do nationalism and sovereignty become legitimate repertoires of internationalized activist claims? Our main hypothesis is that the World Social Forum is a delocalized place of encounters where people often gather around basic national ties as well as around some common causes based on “working misunderstandings” (M. Sahlins). Disconnected from their own territories, these claims benefit from this distance and match the diverse expectations of the participants: nationalist intellectuals from the South, anti-imperialist activists from the North, and politicians from everywhere invest nationalist symbols and discourses for their own purposes and along their own schemes.

Flags, costumes, songs – national symbols are plentiful at World Social Forums, in their grand marches, the crowds amassed in front of podiums and the workshops. “Country tents” are mounted in the middle of activist stands, where “compatriot” militants gather among themselves – Congolese, Brazilians, or Moroccans.1 In Dakar in 2011, those symbols sometimes accompanied fiery nationalist speeches (concerning the Western Sahara or Ivory Coast, which was in crisis at the time), generating controversies over the legitimacy of such issues at an alter-globalist site. At the meeting of the International Council of the WSF to assess the Dakar event just after it ended, Gus Massiah, one of the movement’s historic figures, denounced

1 I would like to thank the whole research team for sharing information, observations, and analysis throughout the survey as well as the participants at the conference “Enquêter sur (et dans) des événements militants internationaux”, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, April 13, 2012
the violence displayed over the issue of the Western Sahara and asked that “tents” for national delegations be prohibited at future forums. He also condemned the presence of political leaders, now a routine occurrence, which in his view is contrary to the “spirit” of the WSF. Nationalists and state representatives would thus no longer be welcome at WSFs. What accounts for the profusion of nationalist symbols, practices, and discourses and the controversies they engender in a cosmopolitan forum aspiring to carry on the legacy of internationalism?

By nationalist symbols, discourses, and practices, I mean the traditional forms of sociability of the citizens from the same country, as well as the activation of national stereotypes in “encounters” with others and, of course, nationalist claims. The latter are sometimes accompanied by sovereignty claims, defending states and leaders of the global South and celebrating the nation-state. I argue here that the proliferation of these nationalist and sovereigntist registers refers not only to an ideological discourse that is more or less debated within the open space of the alter-global movement, but also to the specific social dynamics of this type of internationalist “event” which is first and foremost a space of cosmopolitan encounters. It is these encounters, both familiar and novel, that dictate the production of nationalist discourses, which are discourses on oneself for oneself and for others. The study of “long-distance nationalism” by Benedict Anderson begins with an evocative statement made by a British politician and thinker in the 1860s: “Exile is the nursery for nationalism,” indicating the extent to which nationalisms have historically depended on leaders in exile and travel has revealed and promoted the feeling of national identity (Anderson, 1998: 59). In this case, nationalist causes are shaped by processes of internationalization within the WSF and reconfigured by its space: geographical distance euphemizes and lends them enchantment and, at the same time, they are strongly determined by the prevailing social and political dynamics in the national space concerned. To see how nationalist discourse is produced via this internationalizing process, we must view the WSF as a space of encounters and examine the social interactions that take place within it.

The WSF has already been studied as both a cosmopolitan and colonial “contact zone” (Alvarez et al., 2008; Chase Dunn et al., 2009; Conway, 2011, 2012; Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011). These research works mainly analyze the structurally asymmetrical relationships between participants from the North and the South. Their purpose is to highlight the material and symbolic inequalities within a space intended to combat them and note whether those with the fewest resources are able to make their voices...
heard. Without denying these asymmetrical relationships, in this chapter I will focus instead on the productivity of encounters between participants who share certain alter-globalization codes but sometimes have divergent expectations and perceptions of such an event. I maintain that these misunderstandings are precisely what enable them to unite around common causes, particularly nationalist causes supported by some and unfamiliar to others. WSF participants from diverse backgrounds come together to join in shared activist practices, even if their objectives and expectations are different. The concept of the “working misunderstanding,” first employed to think about “colonial encounters” (Bayart, 1993; Marshall, 1981) and other postcolonial situations such as tourism (Chabloz, 2007; Doquet, 2005), is useful for analyzing these cosmopolitan activist encounters. It provides a unified way to think about unequal positions, how stereotypes are activated in international contexts and the diverging and even contradictory expectations and interests and converging practices that form the core of such encounters and the assessment of alter-global events. Such a forum can therefore be grasped as an event in itself, producing new interactions and practices, and also as a projection of local social worlds.

To explore national and nationalist practices more specifically in this context, I also refer to research on social relationships within internationalized spaces (international institutions or transnational networks). The few sociological studies we have pertaining to the diplomatic profession emphasize the need to consider international space as a social space in which the expectations of several social (and professional) circles are intertwined (Ambrosetti, 2010; Barnett, 1998; Buchet de Neuilly, 2009; Kingston de Leusse, 1998): those of direct interlocutors (the people with whom one negotiates), those in the national delegation and those at the national headquarters. The diplomat’s task is to play on these different expectations in an ongoing process of constructing what is all too often taken for granted: “the national interest.” This understanding of international space can be transposed to the WSF. The participants construct a discourse and adopt practices they deem suited to their multiple audiences and interlocutors, their own convictions and those to whom they will be held accountable for their activities. The nationalist discourses formulated at the WSF, whether in favor of decolonizing the Western Sahara (presented as the “last African colony”) or demanding “Neither military intervention

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2 This expression was the title of a workshop listed in the program of the WSF in Dakar, but finally canceled after rather violent conflicts erupted at the start of the workshop.
nor secession, but rather negotiated solutions” in Ivory Coast, are forged at the point where these diverse constraints come together: the intersection of anti-imperialist discourse (the crucible of alter-globalization), pacifism and a taste for “militant exoticism” and activism on the part of participants from the North. Sometimes such discourse takes on nationalist issues and registers that are by no means consensual at these forums (particularly regarding sovereignty and violence) and arouse heated debate. The relationship between internationalized social practices and the nation-state is also at the heart of thinking about how international organizations work and how the state relates to international civil servants (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Haas, 1992). Contrary to realist and functionalist theories, the (historical) sociology of international organizations shows that the strength or weakness of relationships between national and international spaces depends on the political situation and how institutionalized the international organization has become as much as on the leeway and ability of experts and international civil servants to negotiate with their national government. These studies demonstrate very clearly that loyalty to the nation-state does not dissolve in the international space of these institutions. What is particularly interesting in our case is that it does not dissolve in activist international spaces either: the ordinary forms of sociability in international situations even help to blur the boundary line between state and non-state sectors.

The eleventh WSF generated an unusual amount of controversy over nationalism and the role of states, due especially to the visibility of nationalist discourses (Saharawi and Moroccan, Ivorian, Venezuelan). I have therefore decided to explore the social processes at work at this internationalized event that account for the abundance of such practices and discourse.

2.1 Internationalized nationalism and sovereignty

The relationships of social forum participants with their home countries and governments are not simple or homogeneous. As a meeting place and an experience of expatriation for non-Senegalese participants, the Forum encouraged national sociabilities that challenged the opposition between state and social movement and cemented some forms of national identification. On the other hand, there was much less consensus regarding sovereignty claims, revealing a more ambivalent North-South divide concerning nationalist claims, as we shall see.
Expatriate sociabilities and ordinary nationalism

Being uprooted from their countries of origin often allows expatriates to bond very quickly, a phenomenon intensified by the more or less brief length of these social relationships (Wagner, 2007). The feeling of sharing the same values brings people even closer to their compatriots at social forums, as it does during humanitarian missions (Dauvin and Siméant, 2002). Along with the experience of cosmopolitan encounters, powerful national sociabilities are maintained in a more or less organized way, which helps to reproduce “ordinary nationalism” (Martigny, 2010) but at a distance. The gatherings of compatriots at the WSF in Dakar varied significantly, depending first on whether these national practices were decided and planned beforehand or improvised on site; whether they brought together people who traveled as a group (and stayed together) or individuals who normally lived far apart; and whether or not they included public authorities. The latter appeared to play an active role in organizing and supervising the national sociabilities and their presence helped to blur the boundaries between the state and “social movements,” despite constant challenges from the alter-global movement.

Many participants came in national “delegations”. One of them – the French CRID (Research and Information Centre for Development) – even proudly proclaimed itself the “biggest delegation” at the WSF. The Venezuelans clearly formed a delegation: during the opening march they paraded behind a huge flag and portraits of Hugo Chávez, the Venezuelan president; they often took part as a group in workshops and ultimately flew home together, dressed in identical athletic outfits decked out in their national colors (obviously benefiting from a diplomatic privilege negotiated with the Senegalese government). Above all, they seemed to be totally loyal to the Chávez regime. The Brazilians also seemed to have come as a group with funding from Petrobras, the Brazilian national oil company. The French participants were grouped together with the CRID; they shared the same housing and all their activities outside the Forum were planned from breakfast meetings to evening gatherings. The organization of participants into national groups also seems to have applied to

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3 Observations at Dakar Airport, February 11, 2011.
4 The five Venezuelans interviewed during the survey were members of a branch of Chávez’ party and indicated an event linked to the political itinerary of the president as their “first mobilization.” All five of them voted for the party in power in the last national elections.
a portion of Moroccan attendees, who were financed by the government and whose presence was obviously intended to destabilize the Saharawi militants. The homogeneity of this delegation was a subject of debate and was not confirmed by the answers of the Moroccan participants interviewed during our survey.\textsuperscript{6}

Participants with fewer organizational resources met at the Forum and organized joint activities for specific purposes, such as the Cameroonian in Nairobi in 2007, who gathered under the same flag for the opening ceremony. This was even more evident in the case of Congolese from the Democratic Republic of Congo, who came together under the “Congolese” tent in Nairobi and in Dakar. Those who frequented the tent expressed the desire for an opportunity to get together “among compatriots”, away from the centrifugal forces at work: those of northern donors who required their southern partners to participate in their workshops and those of the vast, chaotic Congolese political space causing dispersion, exile, and immigration. In Dakar, the nationalist symbols at the Congolese tent were highly traditional: a banner bearing a flag and the inscription “Republic of Congo” with “WSF” underneath; a map of Congo recalling the unity of the different regions and a patriotic song from the 1960s, with the eloquent title: “Our Congo will always be united.” At the social forum in Nairobi, the discourse in the Congolese workshop was similarly patriotic. It should be noted, however, that tensions and conflicts surfaced at meetings attended only by Congolese, when the participants were not seeking to represent Congo but rather to talk among themselves. Such situations arose, for example, during an evening reception organized by the Congolese at a Nairobi hotel, and at another organized by the French ambassadress to Kenya.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{6} Among the 29 Moroccans interviewed, twelve stated they voted for the opposition, six for the party in power; only one mentioned the Saharawi cause as his first rally and the underlying reason for his involvement. Those who seemed very active in this cause (there were five of them) were thoroughly integrated in specific associations and organizations. One Spanish-Moroccan was a member of the “Royal Consultative Council of Saharan Affairs,” another was a member of the “Forum of Support for Tindouf Separatists,” and yet another mentioned the Green March for the liberation of the Sahara (1975) as his first mobilization. The involvement of the two others was less clear.

\textsuperscript{7} “Notre Congo sera toujours uni et gardera toujours son unité [Our Congo will always be united]... Kivu, Katanga, Kasaï, Kinshasa, Équateur, Orientale, Bandundu, Bas-Congo qui forment le Congo,” Video recording, February 9, 2011.

\textsuperscript{8} See the contributions of Alphonse Maindo, Nathanaël Tsotsa, and Thomas Atenga in Pommerolle and Siméant (2008b).
Nationalism and blurring the divide between the state and social movements

Incidentally, ordinary forum sociabilities disregard and even challenge commonly accepted cleavages (between social movements and the state or defenders of the South against imperialists of the North). Official and unofficial encounters between government representatives and WSF participants underscore the vagueness of boundary lines separating states from social movements and the NGO world or between civil servants and activists (they are often both simultaneously), despite the militant language used to reinforce them. National loyalties linked to the converging interests of “alter-globalists” seeking funding and state recognition and diplomats or political leaders seeking NGO support are thus also maintained at WSFs, sometimes at the expense of or along with other loyalties. For instance, after initially announcing they would not accept the invitation from the French ambassador in Senegal because their foreign “partners” were not invited, the members of CRID later changed their minds and took part in large numbers. At the embassy event, the ambassador emphasized the “French values” defended by the Forum, the proximity of alter-global ideas to those of the government, and finally, the community of interests and values of the NGO activists in attendance and the embassy: they were all working together as “development partners for the benefit of the Senegalese people.” The boundary was thus drawn between those who give and those who receive, between NGOs and governments in the North and the populations of the South.

The Brazilians also broke an alter-global taboo by setting up their delegation in a tent financed by Petrobras, a nationalized oil company. In this case, they were criticized more for commercializing the Forum than for demonstrating nationalism. Their large, air-conditioned tent adorned with green plants at the entrance was singled out because it reflected Petrobras’ financial power. On the other hand, there was ideological controversy over the Brazilian government model, but the presence of officials from the country where the WSF originated went unchallenged.

The relations between official authorities and NGO representatives seem to have been marked by the relationships experienced at home between governmental and non-governmental actors. When the Cameroonian ambassador to Senegal received some ten compatriots who had come to

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9 30% of Europeans and 21% of Africans surveyed are state agents.
10 Observations and audio recording, February 9, 2011.
11 See Chapter 7 by Isaline Bergamaschi, Tania Navarro, and Héloïse Nez.
take part in the WSF, he offered to give each member of the delegation 70,000 CFA francs (140 US dollars). The practice of redistribution among those claiming to be part of “civil society” is commonplace in Cameroon and always triggers debate, as it did in this instance among the delegates: some, particularly the least socialized in forum practices, were tempted to accept the offer, but in the end they all rejected it. These moments of conviviality reanimate a feeling of national affiliation, even when it is expressed by contradiction and refusal. Here again, the “long-distance nationalism” is produced through ordinary practices.

**Nation-state, sovereignty, and North-South divisions**

Beyond the encounters between NGO and government actors, opinions differ considerably on the role of the state and national governments in solving the issues raised at the Forum, depending on the national identity of the participants (determined here by continent). Interviewees from the South seem more inclined than those from the North to prefer the framework of the nation-state to guard against the effects of neoliberal globalization. This recourse to sovereignty is echoed in the more legitimist relationships between militants in the South and their governments.

In answer to the question about which level of political authority should remedy the ravages of neoliberal globalization, African interviewees were overrepresented among those in favor of “strengthening national governments;” 60% of them “agreed” or “totally agreed” with this opinion, compared with 40% of Europeans.12 The breakdown of the European replies was the reverse of the Africans: those who “totally agreed” were underrepresented and those who “disagreed” were overrepresented.13 Slightly more than 60% of American interviewees (mainly South Americans in fact) agreed with this solution. The reply concerning “strengthening national governments” was the only one among the proposed choices that resulted in a real division among nationalities: the other levels and types of political authority were supported by the participants, all nationalities combined, but to different degrees: slightly more than 50% of the participants agreed or totally agreed

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12 These calculations were made on the sample of interviewees, excluding the individuals that did not respond regarding their nationality and those from Asia and Oceania (these groups were too small to permit significant bivariate analysis). All the following calculations with nationality as a variable were carried out this way.
13 On the other hand, there is no observable link between the opinion concerning strengthening national governments and two other general characteristics of the persons interviewed: sex and level of diploma (having or not having obtained a college or university degree).
on strengthening regional organizations, and slightly more than 60% agreed with the idea of strengthening the United Nations. The rate of agreement is even more noticeable for non-governmental solutions: continental and international civil society or local solutions received 80% approval no matter which continent the interviewees came from. So it is indeed the question about the role of the state that differentiates European, African, and American participants, with the latter two groups unhesitatingly in favor of strengthening it.

Trust in the state or the belief that it could be a solution, which is expressed by the interviewees from the South, is echoed in their more legitimist attitude towards their own national governments. A solid link can be observed between nationality and voting for the party in power. While most interviewees said they had voted for opposition parties, the percentage varied widely depending on their continent of origin. Africans were underrepresented among those who said they voted for an opposition party and overrepresented among those who voted for a party in power or did not answer the question. Almost 70% of all interviewees who voted for a party in power in the last national election were Africans and 28% of African respondents voted for a party in power.14 The percentage of American survey respondents (i.e. mostly South Americans) who declared they voted for a party in power was even higher at 32%.15 The legitimism of the African and South American interviewees can be explained in various ways: the low rate of demonstrations in Africa by a more repressive context and a less frequently used repertoire;16 the legitimist attitudes in some Latin American countries by close ties between ruling parties and alter-global movements.

14 We can perhaps help clarify the link between these two variables by noting that there is also a connection between 1) educational level and votes (those without college or university diplomas are overrepresented among interviewees who said they voted for a party in power and underrepresented among those who said they voted for an opposition party) and 2) the level of diplomas and nationality: Africans are underrepresented among those with college or university degrees (67% compared with 87% and 89% of the American and European interviewees, respectively).

15 Unlike the other two continental groups, the European interviewees are underrepresented among those who voted for a party in power and very overrepresented among those who said they voted for an opposition party: the latter represented 81% of the European interviewees.

16 Indeed, a significant link can be observed between nationality (measured by continent) and the fact of having taken part in a demonstration (an event) against one’s government policy during the previous year. Africans are overrepresented among those that did not respond to the question (20%) and above all underrepresented among those that had taken part in such a demonstration (48% of the African interviewees stated they had demonstrated against their government, compared with 60% of Americans and more than 73% of Europeans). Furthermore, greater reluctance to demonstrate was reflected in a reduced tendency to demonstrate against
(Smith and Wiest, 2012). Similarly, when survey respondents defend the nation-state framework and sovereignty, they may well be referring to very different experiences of the state: a state that inspires pride and a readiness to join in its struggle in the case of Latin America or a state that, despite its institutional weaknesses, is still viewed as a sphere of protection by Africans. In Nairobi, too, African participants expressed the least criticism of their own leaders; they did so only in discussions among themselves and refused to allow anyone else to engage in it (Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011).

The ideas supported by a number of Africans and Americans (above all Latin Americans) in the International Council regarding alliances between the WSF and political leaders were thus consistent with the practices and opinions of the participants from those continents. The opinion voiced by Gus Massiah in the International Council of the WSF seems to have been in line with that of European survey respondents but it met with strong resistance from the representatives of the other two continents present at the meeting. Divergent views on this topic as on others did not keep forum participants from coming together around shared activist causes and practices, even if they meant different things to each group. That is what we are going to explore now, by observing the internationalized production of nationalist causes within the alter-global space.

2.2 The misunderstanding that produces nationalist commitments

Alter-global space, made up historically by, among others, organizations that originated in anticolonial and Third World struggles at least in France and elsewhere in Europe (Sommier, Fillieule, and Agrikoliantsky, 2008), claims to have directly descended from these causes: the issue of a people’s right to self-determination when those peoples are ‘oppressed,’ ‘colonized,’ or ‘anti-imperialist’ therefore has a rightful place in the World Social Forum. The nationalisms authorized to express themselves were those of the South, as evidenced by the absence of flags of northern countries at the WSF in Dakar or their removal when they were displayed, and by the visibility of other targets (FMI, etc.) and less frequent use of this repertoire in general. See Chapter 3 by Johanna Siméant in this book.

17 See Chapter 7 by Isaline Bergamaschi, Tania Navarro, and Héloïse Nez.
18 See Introduction.
19 At a meeting to set up an international ATTAC network, ATTAC France was criticized for unfurling the only national banner at the opening march. It was suggested that the banner be
strictly nationalist slogans and attributes of the South: T-shirts with ‘Guinea is back’ or ‘Ivory Coast is back’ printed on the back and Brazilian flags worn like scarves or capes. In the latter case, it was unclear whether the flag was a reference to the site of the first World Social Forums, the country of the Workers’ Party and its former president, Lula, or the home of a football team revered across the world. The nationalist signifier manifestly carries a positive charge, allowing each individual to invest it with his or her own militant, political, and/or sports club imagery.

Nevertheless, apart from a very small number of consensual issues, not every cause or cause supporter enjoys the same degree of legitimacy. Such legitimacy has to be re-negotiated at each forum, depending on the particular concrete interactions and confrontations that take place during the event.

In Dakar, all the participants, except for the Senegalese, were of foreign origin. Those who defend national causes at WSFs are therefore doing so from abroad, like the exiles that Anderson considered the main promoters of nationalisms. Being far from home makes them the sole experts and spokespersons for their cause. This allows them to construct a selective discourse, suited to an ill-informed audience eager for “good causes” to endorse during the Forum period. The distance that enables interaction with activists from diverse countries also internationalizes national causes and makes them resonate with the creed of alter-globalization.

Shared repertoires and activist enchantment

Some nationalist discourses generate broad consensus, not least because they have few spokespersons present to defend them. In Dakar, this was true of the Palestinian cause, which attracted such wide support it was virtually a metonym for alter-globalism: the Forum’s grand concert was dedicated to it and, as a French pro-Palestinian activist noted with satisfaction, there were keffiyehs “everywhere, in the demonstrations, on stage, etc.,” not to mention around the neck of a Senegalese attendee and hanging at the entrance to the stand run by the French association “Survie.” Workshops devoted to

cut in order to remove the name of the country (observations by Hélène Baillot, quoted in this book). Furthermore, French and European flags were visible only on the brochures and posters for cooperation projects financed by these donors.

20 The concert brought together militants (like the rapper Didier Awadi) and more consensual performers like the Senegalese star Youssou N’Dour who drew a wide audience.
the cause were less popular.\textsuperscript{22} That did not keep Palestinian speakers from addressing forum participants at the opening and closing ceremonies or the sole Palestinian identified at the International Committee meeting from being applauded – even before he spoke. The legitimacy of the Palestinian cause is simply indisputable and in fact seldom discussed at the Forum.

Other discourses generate more debate and they are produced not through the use of consensual symbols but by various expectations converging in shared activist practices. Traveling to a WSF from far away requires an individual investment that promises to be remunerated in diverse ways, especially communing in a surge of united militancy – even if the cognitive, emotional, and material interests and investments of each participant differ implicitly. Concrete encounters between activists from Latin America, Europe, and Africa take place through familiar practices commonplace in the alter-global world: lectures, exhibition stands, speeches, and occasionally petitions or demonstrations (which happened in Dakar during the opening ceremony and protest marches against migration policies). Sharing a common repertoire allows individuals to make demands as a group, even though those demands may not be understood by everyone in the same way. Ivorian nationalist activism, especially the signing of a petition \textit{Non à toute intervention militaire en Côte d’Ivoire} (No to military intervention in Ivory Coast) passed around on the last day of the WSF, was a good example of how effective a “working misunderstanding” can be in an international event.\textsuperscript{23} At the time, the situation in Ivory Coast was explosive: the “international community” was threatening to intervene militarily following the contested election results between the outgoing president, Laurent Gbagbo, and his challenger, Alassane Ouattara, the acknowledged winner. Despite the extremely divided situation, pro-Gbagbo militants, who were not overtly taking sides, mobilized to circulate a petition against outside intervention, emphasizing the rejection of imperialist interference.

Wearing brightly colored T-shirts bearing the messages mentioned earlier, several dozen Senegalese students from the university, recruited for the day by their sociology professor, stopped participants along the campus lanes. The petition, which insisted on the need to guarantee peace in Ivory Coast and avoid any violence or international involvement

\textsuperscript{22} Observations from workshops on the flotilla to Gaza and the Russell Tribunal on Palestine, February 8, 2011 (Isabelle Sommier).
\textsuperscript{23} This reflection was suggested by Johanna Siméant at the seminar of the Dakar WSF research group.
(particularly by the French), called on “people of culture and science in Africa, the West and the World” to join a more or less prestigious group of signatories, without any explicit reference to a political party. A few of those names might have alerted the signers, had they not been uninformed and/or only too happy to take part concretely in a struggle against imperialism and in favor of peace.\textsuperscript{24} The initial signatories included Calixthe Beyala, a French-Cameroonian writer who was very involved with the Gbagbo camp; at the bottom of the distributed text, the list of speakers at workshops to be held the same day were just as clearly politically oriented – but they were unknown to the general public.\textsuperscript{25} Ivorian websites were thus able to announce: “More than 6,000 democrats signed a petition for the cause of peace in Ivory Coast.”\textsuperscript{26}

At the Forum, the visible promoters of the Ivorian – in fact pro-Gbagbo – “cause” played on the general misunderstanding and distance from the actual situation by qualifying the terms of the conflict and providing unverifiable “proofs” of the rightness of their cause. Using the same wording as the petition, the Ivorian representative who spoke at the opening ceremony of the Forum after the representatives of Egypt and Tunisia, asserted his refusal to see Ivory Coast become “the prey of imperialists, war makers and arms dealers.” He spoke of young people, the African intelligentsia, a possible reunification between North and South, and ended with a few statements redolent of the nationalism expressed by the nationalist leader and first Ivorian president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny: “(...) Let us fraternize, let us rediscover our role as the engine of the economy, of development and of a higher standard of living for Africa in general (...).”\textsuperscript{27}

The call for Ivorian fraternity was much less peaceful and far more radical in the workshops organized on the last day of the Forum. In a tent crowded mostly with students, the atmosphere was tense as “patriotic” militants spoke one after another in a loop, defending the Gbagbo camp without ever attacking their adversaries head-on. They distributed proofs of their just cause in the form of reconstructed reports of the presidential election on November 28, 2010 showing the “fraudulent total” and “real total” of votes received by the candidates in certain regions. Speaking at a distance of

\textsuperscript{24} Among them, the author of these lines... and at least two colleagues!

\textsuperscript{25} Among those present was Geneviève Bro Grebe, coordinator of the women patriots who was arrested a few weeks later by the French and Ivorian authorities, along with Laurent Gbagbo.

\textsuperscript{26} Cf. Fernand Dindé’s blog and the Radio Djibi TV website: www.djibitv.com/photo/8365/Plus+6000+d%C3%A9mocrates+pour+la+paix+en+C%C3%B4te+d%E2%80%99Ivoire (accessed on April 4, 2013).

\textsuperscript{27} Audio recording, February 6, 2011.
several thousand kilometers from where the conflict was taking place, they with no one to contradict them, the activists did not shy away from providing material evidence to bolster their discourse. While the WSF participants were not necessarily fooled about the hidden agenda of these nationalist delegations, they were nevertheless thrilled, by signing a petition and meeting militants, to have first-hand contact with local causes and see the embodiment of struggles they were familiar with – and supported – often from afar. Such encounters became a kind of enchantment, facilitated by the misunderstanding maintained by each of the protagonists. Similarly, the enthusiasm over Egyptian or Tunisian participants, observed on several occasions, was genuine, and for many participants, the joy of experiencing together the fall of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (which took place during the event) apparently remains one of their most cherished memories of the Forum. This empathy for revolutions in the making and the causes of the South thus enables promoters of nationalist causes to interact with sympathizers around objects produced by and for this internationalized space, a sort of euphemized, internationalized nationalism.

**Reciprocal legitimizing**

The internationalized space of the Forum is also a place where nationalist causes can attract outside support and join forces with other causes. Testifying to a sort of universality or at least to recognition from outside the country, this international connection allows nationalist causes to shed their overly local connotations (isolationism, exclusion of others) and adopt the internationalist register that fuels alter-global discourse. In Dakar, as at

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28 The opinions of the workshop participants were far from unanimous and the discussions were heated, particularly between the Senegalese and Ivorian organizers. Similarly, at the Assembly of Social Movements, a speaker who introduced himself as an Ivorian, reminded the audience that the “socialism” various speakers were calling for could also be claimed by a president designated as a murderer (he was referring to Laurent Gbagbo, member of a socialist party). Finally, the political preferences of the ten Ivorian respondents to the questionnaire were quite varied: five said they voted for an opposition party and two for the party in power; four said they belonged to a party in the ruling coalition, one to an opposition party.

29 At a meeting of ATTAC International, the participants suggested avoiding the topic of Ivory Coast, after observing the partiality of the Ivorians who were present (observations by Hélène Baillot, February 10, 2011).

30 On the enchantment of the tourist encounter maintained by these multiple misunderstandings, see Chabloz, 2007.

31 These historic moments were recalled several times at the International Committee meeting, and considered to have significantly “politicized” the forum.
the Nairobi WSF, international recognition was achieved by “africanizing” nationalist causes or claiming they were identical to those of other African participants. Though there was widespread agreement on the Palestinian cause, it was nevertheless regularly tied to the struggles of Africa and Africans as the title of a workshop organized by a University of Dakar teacher indicates: “Africa-Palestine, let us resist together.”32 Academics helped in large part to link (African) nationalist causes to each other, among them Malick Ndiaye, a professor who coordinated the Ivory Coast workshops, and two Ivorian professors who were outspoken defenders of the Western Sahara cause (i.e. the Moroccan side). The political and NGO affiliations of these two individuals highlight the kind of relationships – by no means fortuitous – that are forged at these international events. Both men belonged to a pro-Gbagbo political party and one of them mentioned the patriotic youth demonstrations in 2002 as his first mobilization experience. They came to Dakar on behalf of (and funded by) the Friends of the Moroccan Sahara Association.33 One of them gave a manifestly pro-Moroccan talk on the Western Sahara at a workshop officially devoted to “the trade union movement in the face of the crisis of capitalism” but visibly on the side of the Moroccan nationalist cause.34 Defending the integrity of African territories and state sovereignty, he praised the Moroccan model of Saharawi territorial development: “When you fly over Laayoune [the main city of the region], the area is so lit up it looks like New York,” he said at the workshop. The previous day, he had taken part in setting up the “World Federation of Friends of the Western Sahara” and was elected its president. These pan-African nationalist networks are reminiscent of the ones created by the independence movements in the 1950s; in reality, they are closer to the pro-government, pro-sovereignty tendency that developed after independence than to the radical movements, which were soon supplanted following the end of colonization.

32 In Nairobi, at a workshop on “Memories of struggle,” a Palestinian delegate who had spoken on the stage at the opening ceremony stigmatized Israel by evoking the Falachas, the Ethiopian Jews who, she said, had been taken by force to Israel and now suffered real discrimination in that state where “racism is a central concept” and which, again according to her, “rejects black blood.” Observations by the author, January 21, 2007.
33 Apart from these shared characteristics, the two men had very different profiles: one was a young evangelist who had always lived in Ivory Coast, whereas the other was older, a Muslim, and had often spent time abroad.
34 Workshop on the Democratic Organization of Labor – Morocco, “The trade union movement in the face of the effects of the crisis of capitalism,” Faculty of Medicine, Amphitheatre 2, UCAD, February 9, 2011, observed by Raphaël Botiveau.
As we saw with the Ivorian petition, the participants from the North are asked to support a given cause. Their support is conditioned, however, and may be disqualified in the debates opposing nationalist militants of the South. International legitimacy is not automatically granted and has to be negotiated at the time of each interaction, in accordance with various attributes. For example, a Spanish EU parliamentary representative, who defended the Saharawi cause in Dakar, was accused by the National Council of Moroccans of Senegal of violating international law, attacking Moroccan sovereignty and engaging in “paternalistic behavior.” He was also accused of interference and partiality by another Spaniard, who introduced himself as “President of the Association of Moroccan-Spanish Friendship.” He had dual citizenship and was living in Laayoune, and therefore considered himself more legitimately positioned to talk about the cause and defend “negotiated solutions” (the position of the Moroccan government).

The limits of misunderstanding

The principle of the WSF as an open forum guaranteeing free speech explains why it is so easy for causes to develop and thrive at these events, even if based on misunderstandings. Yet such causes cease to be “operational” when one of the groups involved thinks that the rules of the Forum have been flouted. In the end, nationalist controversies, like all the others, are an occasion to up hold what are considered the basic principles of the Forum and a struggle over who has the legitimacy to defend them (Haeringer and Pommerolle, 2012).

The eruptions of physical violence between Saharawi and Moroccan participants were the most visible transgressions of the accepted standards of debate within a social forum. These intense debates emerged in Dakar because of its geographical proximity with Morocco and the involvement of both governmental-supported delegations and Saharawi activists. In that sense these interactions were exceptional but express well the importation of national causes in an internationalized context and the limits of its efficiency. These violent debates occurred during a workshop organized during a workshop organized

35 Press release dated February 9, 2011, collected at the WSF.
36 Comments of Spanish and Mexican interpreters after the workshop in which this European parliamentarian had spoken (Observations: Lisbeth Gasca Agudelo, February 7, 2011).
by the Saharawi delegation, which was finally canceled, as well as during the opening march, in a workshop on Tunisia and in front of the Moroccan tent, making this nationalist antagonism especially visible.\textsuperscript{38} The fact that WSF security agents and the police were called in indicates that these interactions were out of control and the shared rules were seen to have been seriously violated.\textsuperscript{39} In a more subtle way, the practices of certain “nationalist” delegations included infiltration (in the workshops, on the platforms) and sometimes hijacking or diverting the discussion. Playing on the openness of the Forum, Venezuelans and Saharawi especially took over debates that were not necessarily their own. This happened in the case of the small Saharawi delegation in Nairobi: during the “Africa Night” grand concert, they took advantage of the organizers’ inattention to bring on stage Saharawi musicians who were not on the program. In Dakar, Moroccan participants, hostile to Saharawi claims that prevailed here and there, voiced nationalist arguments in workshops devoted to other topics and blatantly ignored the Maghreb Social Forum Charter, which had prohibited the presence of national flags in anticipation of such nationalist outbursts.\textsuperscript{40} Even more systematically, the Venezuelans were observed unilaterally taking the floor or harassing the organizers until they were given permission to speak in defense of the Bolivarian revolution and President Chávez.\textsuperscript{41}

Some of these practices were viewed as overstepping acceptable standards within the WSF and a rebuke was issued to the organizers who were accused of allowing a “Moroccan delegation full of cops” to enter the Forum grounds. The accusation, made by a Moroccan participant at the International Council meeting, seems to have been shared (as demonstrated by the numerous critical reports on violence committed against the Saharawi at the WSF).\textsuperscript{42} It should...
perhaps be noted that in this case the speaker was a member of the CADTM (Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt), an organization highly critical of the African Social Forum and of the main IC leaders. It was therefore also a question of seizing an argument to oppose these alter-global leadership bodies. In reply, another Moroccan speaker minimized the government’s presence and recommended that participants “trust the North Africans to manage this by themselves.” International space allows nationalist visibility but not protests or sanctions, which fall within the national purview.

2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I set out to explain how nationalist and occasionally pro-sovereignty registers and practices, sometimes considered exclusive or at least territorialized, are produced in a context that purports, on the contrary, to be inclusive and transnational. In addition to revealing the extremely diverse nationalist repertoire (separatist for the Saharawi, patriotic and partisan among the Ivorian participants at the WSF, nostalgic among the Congolese, strictly symbolic among the few Palestinian attendees, etc.), I have sought to work on two main assumptions of the sociology of transnational movements and activist events. First, I have attempted to show, along with other researchers (Tarrow, 2005; Wagner, 2007), that the material conditions of internationalization and the criteria for recognition as a militant or professional are negotiated at least partly in a delimited local/national space (e.g. through the “national delegation”). Nationalist discourse within the international confines of the WSF will therefore reflect the expectations forged by the various participants in their space of national identity. Above all – and this is the second hypothesis developed here – I have underlined the internationalized process whereby a national register is produced. As Anderson demonstrated, the nationalist register emerges and is confirmed through contact with others: symbols and slogans are always the product of an adaptation to what are believed to be others’ expectations or understanding. The resulting nationalist statements are vague enough to ensure the support of actors whose intentions and interests may conflict. Because of its objective to change the system while in the existing order (Teivanen, 2011), forum rules tend to create an open space where different causes can come together without forming a unified movement. This facilitates the working misunderstandings that make the Forum first and foremost a place to affirm or reaffirm a shared sense of belonging to an internationalized activist world.
3 Mapping a population and its taste in tactics

Johanna Siméant, with Ilhame Hajji

Abstract
This chapter intends to study the relation that participants to World Social Forums have to protest practices, both on how they have an experience of them, and on an evaluative aspect. World Social Forums, compared to more local forums, raise important methodological difficulties to carry on such investigations, as the diversity of protest practices and traditions of participants is huge. Johanna Siméant explores professed forms of political protest and how this latter is linked to a number of variables, then follows that with an examination based on a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), more consistent with a multifactorial conception of commitment than a ceteris paribus model, which would be unwieldy in an international militant event. MCA, and its ability to condense information, enables a full, visual, and summarized view of a population and its diversity, and allows polarities within it to emerge rather than to be posited; it is then possible to draw up a hierarchical classification, which, projected onto a factorial map, makes it easier to identify affinities between modes of action and sub-groups within the population participating in this militant event. Here, MCA and Ascending Hierarchical Clustering seem particularly adapted to surveying internationally diverse populations.

3.1 What do we know about how familiar alter-globalization activists are with protest practices?

The question of the activist preferences of participants at Social Forums has been scarcely studied. What are the “tastes in tactics” of alter-globalization protesters (Jasper, 1997)? What can be learned from Tilly’s central demonstrations (1986, 1995, 2006) about the importance of repertoires in mediating the possibilities, constraints, and actual practices offered to protesters? If repertoires are still tied to national contexts and the hypothesis of a third “transnational repertoire” (Cohen and Rai, 2000: 15) must therefore be viewed with caution, how can one do a serious study of the relationship
between alter-global activists and their protest practices without turning a blind eye to the divisions within the population of those same people when they come together at global events from nearly all over the world?

Despite the fact that alter-globalization activists are considered a very politically active population, their relationship to protest practices, whether professed or judged in terms of ethics and efficiency, is one of the least developed quantitative aspects that have been studied. For instance, the work drawn from most DEMOS surveys conducted in European Social Forums (ESFs), particularly those held in Florence and Athens, scarcely examined this aspect at all. At most, participation in an alter-globalization-type event during the previous year is mentioned. Whether from a quantitative or a qualitative angle, this question remains underdeveloped compared to the question of the relationship to deliberative practices and democratic participation (Della Porta 2009a and 2009b). Although the DEMOS survey included a set of questions covering the relationship to these democratic practices; this aspect appears to have been underexploited in the published work drawn from the database resulting from the survey. Even in the work focusing more on participation and its determinants (Saunders and Andretta 2009), participation seems to be disconnected from its concrete manifestations.

There are two exceptions to this general trend, which pertain to events held in 2003: an article following a survey conducted during the Evian G8 summit (Fillieule et al., 2004), and a chapter discussing the data collected during the ESF held in Saint-Denis, France (Coulouarn and Jossin, 2005). Both the article and the chapter raised a series of questions on the protest practices used by the respondents by asking them whether they had ever resorted to various types of practices in order to make themselves heard and whether they would be prepared to do so. What is interesting in this formulation is that it avoids purely abstract judgments on the practices by asking the participants if they had actually engaged in them or would be willing to use them. The list included 14 items: petitions, demonstrations, study groups, product or country boycotts, leaflets, strikes, symbolic actions, traffic obstruction, occupation, resisting law-enforcement authorities, fasting/praying, damage to property, hunger strikes, and physical pressure.

These two studies (N=2280 at the G8 and N=2198 at the ESF) provided a hierarchy of protest practices very closely associated with their overall population (even though the G8 population seems somewhat more radical and protest-oriented):

- Of the respondents, 90% to 92% stated that they had previously participated in a strike or demonstration.
- Between 52% and 74% of the respondents stated that they had previously taken part in study groups, boycotts, symbolic actions, strikes, and leaflet distribution.
- As for traffic obstruction, occupation of buildings, and resisting law-enforcement authorities, between 32% and 48% of respondents at the G8 and between 26% and 40% of those at the ESF stated they had taken part in these.
- Between 2% and 11% of respondents claimed to have participated in fasting or group prayer, hunger strikes, physical pressure on a person, or damage to property.

The research work done on the demonstrators at the G8 has provided an indicator of activists' protest potential by cumulating their answers to the protest items.² This has made it possible to distinguish four protest-potential quartiles and to display the associated sociographic properties, underscoring the population's predominantly male character and the fact that it is those who have conventional political skills who are most inclined and able to express themselves (Fillieule et al., 2004). It is among these groups, too, that the greatest number of the movement’s leaders are found.

Coulouarn and Jossin, taking up the distinction of action agendas proposed by Uehlinger (1988) and Fuchs (1991), posit three types of agenda:

- A demonstrative agenda, “legal and non-violent,” grouping those who refuse to engage in “any actions covered by the confrontational and political-violence agenda.”
- A confrontational agenda, “illegal and non-violent,” designating “those who only refuse to use means of action from the political-violence agenda.”
- The political-violence agenda (illegal and violent): “those who state that they have engaged in or are prepared to use at least one of two modes of action from the political-violence agenda.” (Coulouarn and Jossin, 2005: 144)

² Assigning a value of 2 for effective participation and a value of 1 for potential participation.
 Appropriately, they distinguish judgment on illegal and violent practices, and show that a practice does not have to be considered efficient to be practiced. Jossin and Coulouarn then examine the composition of the three groups most marked by the use of these practices and by the rejection of such practices. Gender appears as a clear differentiating factor in using violent and illegal practices. Otherwise, those included in the political-violence group are characterized by a slightly lower education level and by a larger share of unemployed persons. This group shows a stronger relationship to union movements and to extreme left/right-wing positioning. It seems more strongly marked by a preference for radical change ideologies. The demonstrative group appears closer to the NGO world. Finally, identification with the alter-globalization movement is also a factor in acceptance of violent or illegal means of action.

There are two problems in this study, which happens to be one of the very few available: on the one hand, there is a prejudicial error where absence of response is aggregated with refusal to practice a particular mode of action; the other problem is that the three groups were posited *a priori* instead of bringing out the potentially different ways the world of these practices is structured, depending on the respondents. What, for instance, is said about variations in the attraction to protest practices depending on the nationality? Can it be linked, as Cohen and Valencia (2008: 54) think, to *power distance* understood as the extent to which “members of a culture expect and accept that power is distributed unequally in society”? It is true, for instance, that though a march is considered routine and conventional in the sociology of social movements, partly because the history of this sociology is influenced by its Western origin, it might be considered far more contentious in some African countries. This question, which may be of lesser importance in European social forums, becomes particularly acute in a world social forum. We will try to show that if nationality counts, it also has to do with other classical parameters such as education level and gender.

Those questions are difficult to answer, given the small number of studies raising it in situations of multinational and multilingual surveys. In fact, the only data collected at World Social Forums related to protest *practices* is whether or not respondents had taken part in a demonstration in the previous 12 months (Reese et al., 2008): 16.8% of respondents at the 2005 WSF stated they had not taken part, versus 34% at the 2007 WSF (80.4% of attendees in 2007 were first-time participants at a social forum).

We thus have either rich, qualified work covering a relatively limited geographical area in which the national-origin issue is scarcely considered, or work covering a more multinational population but which gives little
indication of what characterizes potentially very diversified relationships to protest practices. Can we even assume that participating in a demonstration or a strike has the same meaning in very distant contexts? If not, to what does this diversity in protest practices refer and how can it be explored? The question is therefore not only to determine the “tastes in tactics” of alter-globalization protesters, but also to understand how theses tastes related to their social characteristics?

This is the issue that we have chosen to address by raising this question on the population surveyed at the WSF, which implies to explain how we carried out this survey.

### 3.2 Familiarity with protest practices among the respondents at the Dakar WSF

When developing the questionnaire, we reproduced the questions used by Sommier and Agrikoliansky (2005) and Della Porta (2009), themselves inspired by the questions used in the World Values Survey3, regarding familiarity with a number of protest practices and how they are judged. We added four practices that were not included in this analysis:
- participating in a “national day of mobilization,” a form of mobilization not always directly related to protest that seemed to us particularly supported by activists in the countries of the South, especially in the development-aid sector;
- “supporting an organization financially”;
- “responsible consumption (local, fair, organic products)”;
- “boycotting elections”.

Along with the four additional items, certain formulations were not reproduced in exactly the same way: for instance, we distinguished group prayer and religious gatherings, on the one hand, and fasting and hunger strikes on the other, whereas fasting and hunger strikes were two distinct categories in the previous survey. Finally, we added participating “in other symbolic actions” to account for other potentially corresponding practices.

Table 3 below gives the outcome of the frequency distribution of participation in these practices among the surveyed population:

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3 The problem of the WVS is however that its exploitation (more than the questionnaire itself) often tends to overemphasize the effect of national cultures.
As in the ESF and G8 surveys, petitions and demonstrations are at the top of the scale at 74%, but exceeded by participation in study or discussion groups. The first, and foreseeable, observation is the strong difference between those answers and the general population of a country, as the population surveyed here shows a stronger familiarity and positive judgment towards modes of protest.4

Participation in a national day of mobilization and financial support to an organization are practices claimed by two-thirds of the sample, along with participation in other symbolic actions. Leaflet distribution and strikes, as well as other symbolic actions, are claimed by more than half of the respondents but in a lesser proportion than in the European surveys.

The three practices that were claimed by 32% to 48% of the G8 respondents and by 26% to 40% of the ESF respondents (traffic obstruction, occupying buildings, and resistance to law-enforcement authorities) declined in this sample to 28-29%, with traffic obstruction at a much lower rate.

On the other hand, use of group prayer and religious gatherings is claimed by 34% of the respondents.

Finally, only five practices, down from seven in the preceding surveys, are claimed by more than 50% of respondents.

However, 33% of respondents in Dakar indicated they had not participated in an alter-globalization event in the previous ten years, which is one of the lowest rates ever in these surveys (to be compared with 80% of participants at the Nairobi WSF who indicated they had never participated in a social forum (Reese et al., 2011). This general result has to be nuanced by nationality, however: first-time participation is significantly related to the fact of being African.5 But, again, regarding participation in a demonstration in the previous year, respondents indicate a rather high level of participation.

4 Despite the differences in formulation, one could compare the very small number of persons answering they would refuse to sign a petition (4.6%) or participate in a protest (2.8%) to the answers given in the World Values Survey (waves 5 and 6, between 2005 and 2014), with people answering that they would never attend peaceful demonstrations (between 26.3% in Mali, 30.5% in France and Germany and 47.8 in Nigeria) or sign a petition (between 10.3% in France, 24% in Mali, 32% Germany, and 67.8% in Nigeria). Those countries (in Western Europe and Western Africa) have been chosen to provide a minimum comparability with the population of the WSF in Dakar. Senegal was not surveyed in the WVS.

5 P-value = 1.787441 ×.
Table 3.1  Have you taken part in the following events in the past twelve months?  
\((n = 1069)\) [in %]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Protests/events in your country against your governments’ policy?</td>
<td>58.19</td>
<td>26.29</td>
<td>15.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Protests, movements against international or regional institutions (G20, IMF, etc.)</td>
<td>30.31</td>
<td>37.79</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Local or regional social forums on continental themes</td>
<td>46.21</td>
<td>31.99</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What can account for the differences in familiarity with protest practices and in how they are judged? We have chosen in Table 3 to systematically produce cross-tabulations between the results of this table and three variables: 1) nationality (grouped by continent and concentrating on the three continents that showed sufficient numbers to make these calculations), 2) gender, and 3) education level, grouped into lower than a high school diploma and equal to or higher than a high school diploma.

This makes it possible to reflect on the properties of modes of action by distinguishing those that seem particularly linked to one or several of the three variables. We can therefore distinguish:

- “gendered” modes of action: responsible consumption appears as significantly linked to women, and resisting law-enforcement authorities to men, as well as petitions, damage to property, physical pressure on a person, boycott of products/countries or elections, hunger strike/fasting;

- modes of action related to education level: petitions, responsible consumption, other symbolic actions, strikes, leaflets, boycott of products/countries, group prayer or religious gatherings, resistance to law-enforcement authorities, traffic obstruction, occupation of buildings, hunger strikes/fasting, as well as demonstrations, day of mobilization, refusing to pay taxes, physical pressure on a person; 6

- nationality-related modes of action: petitions, demonstrations, strikes, leaflets, boycott of products/countries, group prayer or religious gatherings, resistance to law-enforcement authorities, traffic obstruction, occupation of buildings, hunger strikes/fasting, refusing to pay taxes, exercising physical pressure on a person, as well as boycott of elections, are linked to the nationality of the persons using it. However, it

6 The last case is complex, because graduates tended to say either that they have practiced it or that they are opposed to it, whereas those with lower education levels were found more often in the no-reply category.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes, I have</th>
<th>No, But I would be ready to do it</th>
<th>No, And I refuse to do it</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Participate in discussion or reflection groups</td>
<td>75.12</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>17.40</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Sign petitions</td>
<td>74.37</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. Participate in a protest | 74.09 | 7.48 | 2.81 | 15.62 | / | Yes | YES |
r. Participate to a national day of mobilization (Women's day, fight against Aids, etc.) | 69.69 | 12.63 | 2.15 | 15.53 | / | Yes in NR/ Dip- |
p. Support financially an organization (contributions, donations…) | 64.17 | 13.47 | 2.71 | 19.64 | / | / | / |
|q. Responsible consumption (local, fair, organic products) | 60.06 | 13.84 | 4.86 | 21.23 | YES | YES | YES |
s. Participate in other symbolic actions | 58.09 | 13.28 | 2.25 | 26.38 | / | YES | / |
g. Participate in a strike | 57.81 | 15.72 | 8.14 | 18.33 | YES | YES | / |
m. Distribute leaflets | 53.13 | 14.69 | 7.11 | 25.07 | YES | YES | / |
f. Boycott certain products/shops/countries | 45.93 | 18.43 | 14.13 | 21.52 | Yes | YES | YES |
e. Participate in group prayer or religious gatherings | 33.96 | 12.25 | 29.37 | 24.42 | YES | YES | YES |
k. Oppose and resist police forces | 29.45 | 26.66 | 21.33 | 22.54 | YES | YES | YES |
l. Participate in traffic obstruction (sit-in, blocking of trains, etc.) | 29.19 | 24.13 | 21.7 | 24.98 | YES | YES | YES |
j. Participate to sit-ins of buildings (factory, school, etc.) | 27.78 | 30.50 | 19.93 | 21.80 | YES | YES | YES |
a. Boycott elections | 24.32 | 19.18 | 34.05 | 22.45 | Yes in NR/ F-has done | / | / |

Table 3.2  Hierarchy of recourse to protest practices and link with three variables (chi²): gender, education level, nationality
h. Participate in a hunger strike or a fast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes, I have</th>
<th>No, But I would be ready to do it</th>
<th>No, And I refuse to do it</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12.72</td>
<td>29.28</td>
<td>31.43</td>
<td>26.57</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F- has done</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>10.01</td>
<td>30.12</td>
<td>33.96</td>
<td>25.91</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes in NR/Dip-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Refuse to pay taxes, bills from state companies</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>55.29</td>
<td>27.97</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Cause damage to material goods (riots)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes in NR could refuse/Af</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Put physical pressure on someone</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>60.71</td>
<td>26.94</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“*Yes*” indicates a significant Pearson chi². More precisely, “*YES*” indicates a P Value ≤ 1.675116-10; “*Yes*” indicates a ≤ 0.03040304 P Value and/or concentrated in only one part of the numbers table. We obviously did not indicate the calculation of the chi² when the contingency table contained a ≤ 5 value (case of those from the American continent—the lowest number—refusing to participate in a day of mobilization, to support an organization financially, or to participate in other symbolic actions), even though a link was observed in the rest of the table. Yes in NR/Dip- means that the link is real between the fact of saying yes and of having a low educational background.
is important not to have a binary reading of this link among variables. In the case of violence against persons, for instance, Europeans are overrepresented among those who claim they are opposed to physical violence against persons, and Africans are overrepresented in no-reply to this question;

- **modes of action related to education level AND gender:** responsible consumption, resistance to law-enforcement authorities, as well as petitions, boycott of products, shops, or countries, hunger strike/fasting, physical pressure;

- **nationality AND gender-related modes of action:** not as clear, but boycott of elections and damage to property;

- **nationality AND education-level-related modes of action:** strikes, leaflet distribution, group prayer/religious gatherings, traffic obstruction, occupation of buildings, as well as demonstrations, hunger strikes, refusing to pay taxes, physical pressure;

- **nationality AND education-level AND gender-related modes of action:** responsible consumption, resistance to law-enforcement authorities, as well as petitions, boycott of certain products/shops/countries, hunger strikes/fasting, physical pressure.

On the other hand, several modes of action come up as neutral under the variables used so far: participating in study or discussion groups, participating in a national day of mobilization (for women, against AIDS, etc.), supporting an organization financially. These are the three modes of action that we had added, all of which have a very low confrontational dimension. That these modes of action should appear here as scarcely divisive is an interesting result in itself for alter-globalization forms of mobilization; they are undoubtedly better channels for adapting forms of mobilization to forms of protest. We can see here that they can be appropriated as cutting across a variety of activist sensitivities in the realm of alter-globalization, and that they also refer to practices peculiar to the development-aid sector and to perceived traditions from the South (promotion of tontines, in particular): mobilizing does not always mean protesting, and this is probably one of the best working misunderstandings in World Social Forums – even if it is deplored by some radical activists who stigmatize WSFs in Africa as “NGO fairs.”

Another significant aspect has to do with different activist traditions, although, again, such observations would need national contextualization:

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members of trade unions make better judgments on the utility of violence\(^8\)

There is also a role of identification with the alter-global movement, but
only in one case, between identifying strongly with the alter-global move-
ment and having a positive appreciation of the efficiency of responsible
consumption.

Here we rapidly encounter the limits of bivariate analysis: some variables
are linked together, but the link takes a different meaning according to
the nationality of the people surveyed. A good way to control these effects
and gain access to the real groups of individuals behind the abstraction of
variables that take different meanings in different contexts is through MCA
and Ascending Hierarchical Clustering.

3.3 Using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and
Ascending Hierarchical Clustering to study populations
“in a situation of militancy”\(^9\) in an international event

We would like here to underscore the advantages of using MCA, among
the various methods of multivariate analysis, for populations engaged in
an activist practice, particularly in an international context.

We know, as Julie Pagis reminds us in her article on those involved in
the political events of 1968, that “factorial [analysis] makes it possible to
avoid pre-establishing asymmetry between variables to be explained and
(potentially) explanatory variables, and misunderstanding the direction
of causalities by leaving more room for the interpretation of correlations”
(Pagis, 2011: 6). This is doubly interesting in the case of surveys on an activist
event. Indeed, “studying populations in a situation of militancy poses specific
problems. It is not in fact possible here, as in general population surveys, to
determine the social factors of political commitment through indicators (…).
What is being measured through the answers of the politically committed
refers, in fact, as much to a series of explanatory features of commitment as
to the possible outcome of secondary, sometimes powerful socialization within
activist groups” (Fillieule et al., 2005: 16).

This is precisely what might complicate a logistic-regression analysis,
which conversely makes using MCA so interesting for exploring a popula-
tion surveyed while a collective action is taking place, because we are not
reasoning ceteris paribus here and are suspending unequivocal reasoning

\(^8\) Chi\(^2\) <5%.

\(^9\) We borrowed this expression from Fillieule et al. 2004: 16.
on the direction of causality. We also know that MCA, considered one of the most powerful tools in survey processing, is inspired from the French school of data analysis (Benzecri, 1992), and was the method preferred by Pierre Bourdieu (1984) because it makes it possible not only to represent complex data sets but also to represent polarities within a social space, and in doing so, to map the social space. According to the principle of descriptive statistics, one of its advantages is to condense information by making factors emerge that summarize the greatest amount of information and provide a graphic representation, for instance on two dimensions (the number of factors is not always limited to two), of the whole set of variables under consideration. We therefore get new variables, combinations of variables informing the research theme and summarizing the initial set.

Moreover, the problem of commensurability of the sociographic characteristics of individuals becomes less troublesome if MCA is used on the basis of answers to certain questions like those concerning the use of practices, and then characteristics related to nationality, education level or others are projected onto a factorial map. This makes it possible, thanks to the nationality variable, to achieve a better grasp of the meaning of this data depending, in particular, on the national context.

MCA is consistent with a relational conception of social practices and allows the emergence of families of practices that are more or less associated. Given the topics we are working with here, the idea will be to identify affinities and oppositions among the surveyed individuals in terms of protest practices they say they have used, they reject, or they could resort to.

MCA is an intermediate step of our study to obtain a typology. After determining and visualizing the proximities and oppositions between levels of the different nominal variables, it is possible to define typical profiles (clusters) of activists, who will be identified through their sociographic characteristics and some of their opinions on the effectiveness of these practices. One of the main MCA results, which is to reduce the number of dimensions and summarize them on 2 (or 3) dimensions of the graph (factorial axes), will enable us to map the different groups of activists through a clustering that will be a function of the factorial axes. The clusters will be established on the basis of the Ascending Hierarchical Clustering method.

To study the relationship to protest practices through MCA, we selected the following 14 actions:

The set of observations is described by a set of nominal variables. We left out two variables that seemed particularly “amorphous” in Table 2: “participating
in a national mobilization day” and “supporting an organization financially.” Otherwise, practices referring to violence were grouped together. “Participating in other symbolic actions,” a question that yielded very few results during the survey and in fact seemed to have been misunderstood, was also left out.

The “Yes” variable was established by combining “Yes, I have” and “No, but I would be prepared to do it.”

The asterisks indicate variables for which we factored in no-replies. Indeed, we had the feeling from the start of the survey that we should not leave out the NRs, some of which are “very telling” (in particular for a number of illegal and violent practices, likely to generate a considerable amount of self-censorship).10

The plot of the 14 protest actions studied on the first 2 dimensions (Axes 1 and 2) concentrates a significant percentage of inertia (36% of explained variance).11

---

Table 3.3 The 14 MCA variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boycott elections</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group prayer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycott products</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunger strikes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of premises</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to law-enforcement authorities</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstruction of traffic</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaflet distribution</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal to pay taxes</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible consumption</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of violence</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are potentially three levels, where “x” is the active variable:

- Y_x = yes to x
- N_x = no to x
- NoReply_x = non-response to x

10 We maintained several forms of non-response (NR), in particular for actions that were either violent or showed significant chi-square with the 3 variables: gender, education level, and nationality. Then, for the purposes of legibility, finding that in the exploratory MCAs the NRs for responsible consumption and hunger strike were very close, we decided to keep only one of the two, and we did the same for obstruction and resistance. One of the effects of the fact that we maintained a number of NRs was also to maintain the greatest number of individuals for the MCA.

11 In MCA, we often have low percentages of explained variance.
Figure 3.1  Multiple Correspondence Analysis. Projections on the first 2 dimensions of the active variables concerning protest practices

Axe 1 - 27.04 %
Axe 2 - 9.36 %
It was decided during the analysis to retain certain actions even if there were few replies concerning one of their characteristics (less than 5% of the sample). The consequence of this decision is that these actions condition the two axes significantly because of their low numbers in one of the forms of reply, and are very distant from the center of gravity on both axes because of their disparity. This latter effect could be designated as a low-numbers effect. We shall see that this effect makes it possible to indicate a form of scale in protest practices, which we shall itemize when describing the axes. This effect will not impair the clustering that will follow MCA, which constitutes one of the main objectives of the analysis.

Axis 1, which concentrates more than 27% of the information (a good result in MCA), places the respondents who categorically refuse to use certain practices, even those considered most moderate or routine, in opposition to those who explain that they have used (or would be prepared to use) protest practices, even those seen as involving the most physical violence, illegality (refusing to pay taxes, participating in traffic obstruction, occupying premises, etc.), or putting oneself at risk (hunger strikes).

A look at the contributions of each form of reply to the axes shows that the respondents are increasingly hostile to:

- strikes
- traffic-obstruction actions
- occupying premises
- resistance to law-enforcement authorities
- signing petitions
- boycotting products
- participating in a demonstration
- distributing leaflets
- participating in a hunger strike
- refusing to pay taxes
- responsible consumption
- boycotting elections

Conversely, they are increasingly favorable to:

- traffic-obstruction actions
- resistance to law-enforcement authorities
- occupying premises
- participating in a hunger strike
- refusing to pay taxes
- use of violence

For the latter, the contributions are less significant. These latter actions involve the average respondent, which is why they are close to the center of the graph.
There are two interesting observations at this stage on Axis 1, which we could call “Practice of recourse to protest:”

- The exception to this No-Yes polarity is recourse to group prayer and religious gatherings. This variable behaves very differently from the others, perhaps because it is not perceived of as part of the protest range.

12 The squared cosines are used to measure the good quality of the projection. A low squared cosine means that the interpretation is not particularly relevant. On the other hand, a high one means a good projection of the information, and consequently a relevant interpretation.
A no-reply to the violence-related questions does not behave like the other NRs that were tested. It is remarkably close to favorable recourse to violence and is therefore a very telling NR, because it is more indicative of self-censorship than of disapproval or a feeling of incompetence (something we could already suppose at the frequency-distribution stage, but more intuitively).

Finally, this close-up makes it easier to visualize proximities among certain forms of protest practices: we have a set that is relatively marked by closeness among judgments favorable to hunger strikes, traffic obstruction, resistance to law-enforcement authorities, occupation, election boycott; and another set that is more marked by judgments favorable to product boycott, petitions, strikes, demonstrations, responsible consumption, and leaflet distribution. Similarly, in the lower right-hand quadrant, a first set is marked by proximities among judgments favorable to recourse to group prayer and unfavorable to recourse to violence, election boycott, hunger strikes, and refusal to pay taxes; and a second set marked by judgments hostile to obstruction, resistance to law-enforcement authorities, and occupation.

Axis 2, which concentrates 9% of the information, tends to oppose two different forms of negative judgment of recourse to forms of protest action: one side, above, shows judgment explicitly unfavorable to forms of protest that could be considered the most acceptable and most conventional (demonstrations, petitions, responsible consumption, strikes), and the other, below, shows a set of negative judgments of forms of protest considered among the most radical, whether from the point of view of violence or illegality (refusal to pay taxes, violence, occupation). (Here, NRs behave in a way close to negative judgment, and refer to resistance and refusal to pay taxes.) Proposed name for Axis 2: "Legitimacy of protest practices."

Axis 2 opposes two forms of refusal to engage in the actions under consideration. On the one side, the contributions increasingly indicate:

- refusal to participate in demonstrations
- refusal to sign petitions
- refusal to practice responsible consumption
- (agreement with use of violence)
- refusal to participate in strikes
- refusal to distribute leaflets
- agreement with refusal to pay taxes
On the other side, depending on the contributions, respondents are increasingly hostile to:

- not paying taxes
- using violence
- traffic-obstruction actions

On both axes we have to consider the squared cosines which emphasize the good or bad quality of the projection. Axis 1 is better identified than Axis 2 according to the squared cosines. Consequently, we have to moderate our conclusions about Axis 2. These last conclusions refer to what we called the low-numbers effect in the above graph, and as we thought, it is conditioning the MCA.

Although we have reached our objective of providing a two-dimensional graphic representation of the 14 dimensions under consideration, this is still only one step on our way to establishing a hierarchical clustering that will allow groups to emerge that are statistically differentiated by their relationship to protest practices, which can then be characterized in terms of other variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.5 Significant contributions from forms of reply to Axis 2</th>
<th>Significant contributions to Axis 2, upper quadrants</th>
<th>Squared cosines</th>
<th>Type of action</th>
<th>Significant contributions to Axis 2, lower quadrants</th>
<th>Squared cosines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N_Demonstrations*</td>
<td>16.92*</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>N_Refusal to pay taxes *</td>
<td>4.24*</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N_Petition*</td>
<td>13.27*</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>N_Violence</td>
<td>3.94*</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N_Responsible consumption*</td>
<td>9.83*</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>N_Obstruction of traffic</td>
<td>3.45*</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y_Violence*</td>
<td>9.74*</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>N_Resistance to law-enforcement authorities</td>
<td>2.95*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N_Strikes*</td>
<td>7.76*</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N_Leaflet Distribution*</td>
<td>5.43*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y_Refusal to pay taxes*</td>
<td>4.11*</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* contribution greater than relative weight
To get an idea of affinities among the respondents’ answers and a number of properties that characterize the respondents, we retained the following illustrative variables:

**Table 3.6  The 27 illustrative MCA variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Meaning/translation</th>
<th>Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>How the questionnaire was administered</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIEU_PASSATION</td>
<td>Place where it was administered</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manif_Gouv</td>
<td>Demonstration against government policies</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manif_Institutions</td>
<td>Demonstration against institutions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum_Loc_Reg</td>
<td>Local or Regional Forum</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classes_d_age</td>
<td>Age categories</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croyance</td>
<td>Belief</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplôme</td>
<td>Degree/Diploma</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS_8</td>
<td>Professional activity by groups</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffBE</td>
<td>Perceived effectiveness of boycotting elections</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffPETI</td>
<td>... of petitions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffMANIF</td>
<td>... of demonstrations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffDOMM</td>
<td>... of damage to property</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffPRI</td>
<td>... of praying</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffBOYCPDT</td>
<td>... of boycotting products</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffGREV</td>
<td>... of strikes</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffGREVF</td>
<td>... of hunger strikes</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffOCCUP</td>
<td>... of occupying premises</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffRESIST</td>
<td>... of resisting law-enforcement officers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFENTR</td>
<td>... of traffic obstruction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffTR</td>
<td>... of distributing leaflets</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffPRESS</td>
<td>... of putting physical pressure on someone</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFIMPO</td>
<td>... of refusing to pay taxes</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EffCONSE</td>
<td>... of responsible consumption</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These illustrative variables, which by definition are not factors in plotting factorial maps, are all of the nominal type. We kept no-replies for each of them.
3.4 Ascending Hierarchical Clustering, composition of groups of participants, and “bringing real people back in” through paragons

To get the best possible summarization of our study, we decided to accept the partition of the sample into nine categories, obtained through a procedure that maximizes variance among groups and minimizes intra-group variance.

Table 3.7 Clustering (=partition) of the 587 observations into 9 clusters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster number &amp; name given</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - Deferential Senegalese</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - African Legitimists</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - Villagers who do not put themselves at risk</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - Senegalese Muslims prepared to make their voices heard</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - Senegalese people active in the public sphere</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - NR (Non-Response) on Taxes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - French, non-violent and believers</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 - Alter radicals</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - (Latin American) men favorable to violence</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 9 clusters can now be projected on the MCA.

What can we say about these nine emerging clusters? How could they be named? National characteristics emerge strongly in this clustering, favored by the fact that we could reason by continents, and that the two main national groups present at the WSF were French and Senegalese, which allows a finer grain of description. Light can also be shed on each category by illustrating it with an individual who is statistically identified as its first paragon, i.e. an individual located at its statistical center of gravity. The length of the questionnaire makes this individual portrait possible, using variables that, although not used in the construction of the paragon, give flesh to it and illustrate what the people characterized by their tastes in tactics are socially.

Cluster 1: Deferential Senegalese. Located in the extreme upper right-hand quadrant of the factorial map, this is a group of individuals characterized

13 Proposed by SPAD.
Figure 3.2  Multiple Correspondence Analysis. Projections on the first 2 dimensions of the 9 clusters, according to the active variables concerning protest practices

Class = Category
Figure 3.3  Close-up of the MCA. Projections on the first 2 dimensions of the 9 clusters, according to the active variables concerning protest practices.
by their explicit hostility to many protest practices, including, in particular, petitions (77.4% versus 5.6% in the sample), strikes (90.3% versus 10%), demonstrations (61.3% versus 3.6%), resistance to law-enforcement authorities (90.3% versus 28.5%), police-obstruction actions (90.3% versus 30%), occupying buildings (83.9% versus 25.9%), and even boycotting products (64.5% versus 17.6%), hunger strikes (90.3% versus 44.3%), and leaflet distribution (45.2% versus 9.7%). It stands out, unlike the next three groups (2, 3, and 4), in its explicit condemnation of violence (96.8% versus 70.9%). Sociographically speaking, it includes a majority of Senegalese (67.7% versus 23.7%), with a low education level (54.8% versus 18.6%), believers (90.3% versus 56.6%), and Muslims (58.1% versus 8.6%), most often farmers, merchants, and craftsmen/women and heads of small businesses\(^{14}\) (22.6% versus 5.1%). As for their opinions on the effectiveness of protest actions, these are persons who judge that it is not at all effective to go on strike (61.3% versus 3.6%), sign petitions (54.8% versus 5.8%), resist law-enforcement authorities (71% versus 18%), demonstrate (35.5% versus 3.1%), participate in a traffic-obstruction action (67.4% versus 18.4%), occupy buildings (61.3% versus 15.7%), boycott certain products (45.2% versus 9.7%), participate in a hunger strike (58.1% versus 25.4%), boycott elections (74.2% versus 37.8%), refuse to pay taxes (58.1% versus 25.4%) (in fact they do not resort to the latter three practices), distribute leaflets (29% versus 7.3%), practice responsible consumption (19.4% versus 4.7%), exercise physical pressure (77.4% versus 57.8%). They do, however, judge as altogether effective to participate in group prayer or religious gatherings (48.4% versus 21.8%), even though they do not indicate that they themselves take part in these actions. In addition, these are persons who have not participated in a demonstration/event against their government in the previous 12 months (58.1% versus 28.6%).

\(^{14}\) Which had been grouped into a single category.

Individual 202 [first paragon of the cluster] answered an administered questionnaire in French. She is a 59-year-old Senegalese woman, Muslim, member of the RCPDC (Réseau des radios communautaires pour la paix et le développement en Casamance – Network of community radios for peace and development in Casamance). She came with her organization and was financed by World Education Senegal (WES). She had not taken part in any demonstrations in the year prior to the WSF, and she participated in many WSF activities, including “women, peace, and development” meetings. She is a member of the PDS, the party then in power in Senegal. She refuses all protest practices except for group prayer, financial support to an organization, responsible consumption,
and other symbolic actions – she might possibly distribute leaflets. She always votes. As for her occupation, she indicated: “Small farmer, works at the radio.” Her husband is a school teacher. She lives in a large village.

Cluster 2: African Legitimists, marked more by their mistrust of responsible consumption practices. Located in the upper right-hand quadrant of the factorial map but closer to the center, this group is also characterized by its hostility to certain protest practices: responsible consumption (93.3% versus 6.3%), boycotting products (50% versus 17.6%), resistance to law-enforcement authorities (53.3% versus 28.5%), and traffic obstruction (50% versus 30%). This category is therefore less hostile in general to all forms of protest, but uncomfortable with certain forms of illegality. This group is mostly made up of Africans (40% versus 1.6%) whose education level is equal to high school or lower (36.7% versus 18.6%), in which the French are underrepresented (3.3% versus 25%), and who have no professional activity (30% versus 14.1%). As for their opinions on the effectiveness of protest actions, these are persons who judge that it is not at all effective to practice responsible consumption (19.4% versus 4.3%), participate in a traffic-obstruction action (40% versus 18.4%), boycott certain products (30% versus 11.7%), go on strike (20% versus 6.5%), resist law-enforcement authorities (36.7% versus 18.6%). They also consider it “not very effective” to occupy buildings (23.3% versus 8%).

• Individual 461 [first paragon of the cluster] answered an administered questionnaire in French. He is a 53-year-old man, Muslim, from Niger, member of the NGO Aghir In’Man (“soul shelter” in Tamashk, the Tuareg language) in which he volunteers and on behalf of which he came to the WSF. He is member of a party, the African Modern, and deputy mayor of his town. He indicates he would refuse to boycott elections, cause damage to goods, go on hunger strikes or fasts, oppose police forces or use physical pressure on someone, practice responsible consumption, or refuse to pay taxes. He asked to annotate the questionnaire to explicitly condemn violent practices. He has already participated in a national day of mobilization, supported an organization financially, distributed leaflets, gone on strike, taken part in group prayer and marches, and signed petitions. He had never participated in such a gathering against globalization before. He belongs to the union of miners in Niger, and his first significant mobilization was against the exploitation of uranium in Niger between 2006 and 2008. He votes for an opposition party in Niger. He has a diploma marking the completion of primary school. He is a worker in radioactivity sampling: Niger is the place of uranium extraction through the French company Areva, and here this man seems to confirm the complex link that some activists can
have to powers that are at the same time objects of critique, employers and providers (Siméant, 2013a and 2014). His father was a stockbreeder, like his grandparents, both of them nomads. He comes from a small town.

Cluster 3: Villagers who do not put themselves at risk. Located in the upper right-hand quadrant of the factorial map but even closer than the previous two to the center and Axis 1, this group is characterized above all by its hostility to distributing leaflets (100% versus 9.7%), as well as to occupation and obstruction actions (48.6% versus 25.9%). Sociographically speaking, this group has few emerging characteristics that would allow its characterization, other than the fact that individuals living in a capital city are underrepresented in it (31.4% versus 50.8%, which might explain their poor familiarity with practices such as traffic obstruction and leaflet distribution). These are persons who judge that it is not at all effective to distribute leaflets (54.3% versus 7.3%). Four practices that they do not resort to seem ineffective to them: boycotting elections (57.1% versus 37.8%), refusing to pay taxes (42.9% versus 25.4%), signing petitions (31.4% versus 13.8%), and demonstrations (17.1% versus 5.6%). On the other hand, they judge participating in group prayer to be very effective. In addition, these are persons who have not demonstrated against their government’s policy in the previous 12 months (48.6% versus 28.6%).

• Individual 8 [first paragon of the cluster] answered an administered questionnaire in French. He is a 42-year-old man, Muslim, from Morocco, indicating that he has come on behalf of “Moroccan civil society” although he indicates no membership in any group. A doctor in pharmacy, he comes from a small town and his parents and grandparents were peasants. He indicates he has an elected position in his town and that he is member of the “popular movement party” in Morocco (a party that has ministers in the government). Although he has already taken part in marches, strikes, or occupations and even resisted police forces, which doesn’t exactly match the portrait of the class, he is extremely cautious. He votes for the party in power, and indicates that in the past year he has not participated in any protests against his government (but against globalization). Very significantly, this first paragon came from Morocco, a country whose activists at the WSF showed very strong self-censorship (when they were not harassing the Sahrawi activists demanding independence) – and in which power has shown a strong ability to co-opt many forms of protest, the development industry therefore becoming a sort of niche for those not wishing to pay too heavy a price for dissent.15

15 On this point, see Vairel (2011) and Cheynis (2005).
Cluster 4: Senegalese Muslims prepared to make their voices heard. Located in the lower left-hand quadrant of the factorial map, yet quite close to the center, this group, like cluster 1, is made up of believers (92.7% versus 56.6%), Muslims (70.7% versus 28.6%), Senegalese (46.3% versus 23.7%), or from another African country (36.6% versus 18.6%), with a low education level (39% versus 18.6%). Although they are hostile to boycotting products (75.6% versus 17.6%), refusing to pay taxes (82.9% versus 45.8%), occupying buildings (56.1% versus 25.9%), and to hunger strikes (75.6% versus 44.3%), its members are favorable or have resorted to group prayer (82.9% versus 55.9%), resistance to law-enforcement authorities (87.8% versus 70.9%), and leaflet distribution (100% versus 90.3%). Management-level and higher professions are underrepresented in this group. These are persons who seldom express their opinion on the efficiency of protest actions (many NRs); at most, they judge as not at all effective to boycott products (29.3% versus 11.7%) or occupy buildings (29.3% versus 15.7%), and altogether effective to participate in group prayer or religious gatherings.

- Individual 82 [first paragon of the cluster] answered an administered questionnaire in French during the opening march of the forum. She is a 57-year-old woman, Muslim, member of a women’s GIE (Groupement d’Intérêt Economique, economic interest group, a typical organization in Senegal, on the borderline between activism and community group), on behalf of which she came. She describes her family, networks, and friends as very committed to activism and members of the socialist party. She has a diploma marking the completion of primary school and is a midwife. She shows hostility towards boycotting products, violence, refusing to pay taxes, and hunger strikes, but indicates a high level of practices with which she agrees. She always votes, and declared she had voted for an opposition party in the last elections. Her husband is a nursing assistant, her father was a worker in Dakar harbor (known for his tradition of protest), her grandparents were peasants, with a grandmother who also was a midwife. She lives in a large village.

Cluster 5: Senegalese people active in the public sphere. Located in the lower right-hand quadrant of the factorial map, this group is characterized by its opposition to the protest practices most marked by use of violence or illegality. Unlike Cluster 4, it practices responsible consumption, but not resistance to law-enforcement authorities. On the other hand, it is a group that practices or judges favorably leaflet distribution (100% versus 90.3%), group prayer (70.3% versus 55.9%), and responsible consumption (97.8% versus 92%). This is a group made up of believers (78% versus 56.6%), mostly Senegalese (40.7% versus 23.7%), Muslims (44% versus 28.6%) or Christians (31.9% versus
21.6%). They are persons who judge that it is not at all effective to participate in a traffic-obstruction action (49.5% versus 18.4%), resist law-enforcement authorities (46.2% versus 18.1%), occupy buildings (37.4% versus 15.7%), refuse to pay taxes (42.9% versus 25.4%), damage property (70.3% versus 51.4%), boycott elections (55% versus 37.8%), participate in a hunger strike (35.2% versus 20.4%), or exercise physical pressure (68.1% versus 57.7%). On the other hand, they judge altogether effective to sign petitions (40.7% versus 30.3% though they do not practice this) and to participate in group prayer or religious gatherings (35.2% versus 21.8%). As in some of the categories previously described (Clusters 1 and 3), these are persons who have not demonstrated against their government’s policy in the past 12 months (41.8% versus 28.6%).

\* Individual 550 [first paragon of the cluster] answered an administered questionnaire in French. He is a 60-year-old man from Senegal, indicates he belongs to the Muslim religion although he wouldn’t define himself as a believer. It is not the first time he has participated in such an event. He came on behalf of the Confédération des Syndicats autonomes du Sénégal and belongs to the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). He is a member of the Parti Africain pour l’Indépendance et la Démocratie (African Party for independence and democracy, a small organization) and recalls May 68 in France as the first significant mobilization in which he took part. He says he would refuse to boycott elections, cause damage to goods, participate in hunger strikes, occupations, and tax boycotts or oppose police forces; but he has already taken part in marches, strikes, and group prayer, boycotted products, signed petitions, and opposed police forces. He always votes and indicates support for an opposition party. He has spent one year in the US for his studies, three months in Russia, has graduated from the university and speaks more than two international languages. He is an engineer, teaches at a university, his wife is a teacher, his father was an officer in the French army and his mother a qualified midwife. He is a typical representative of the well-trained, urban Senegalese bourgeoisie owing part of his knowledge – and critical attitude – to his link to the former colony.

Cluster 6: NR (Non-response) on Taxes. This group is located in the lower left-hand quadrant of the factorial map, not far from the center. It comprises primarily all the persons who did not reply to the question on refusal to pay taxes (100% versus 2%) and who did not indicate their occupation (25% versus 5.4%). It follows that these are persons who did not give their opinion on the effectiveness of this action (91.7% versus 17.9%).

\* Individual 321 [first paragon of the cluster] answered a self-administered questionnaire in French. This 34-year-old woman from France defines
herself as an atheist. She works both as a freelance journalist and a trainer in an organization for reproductive rights. Her partner is an employee; her parents were farmers and her grandparents workers and farmers. She lives in Paris and explains she is mostly interested in WSF debates on violence against women. Not only did she not answer the question about refusing to pay taxes as a form of protest, but she also put a question mark next to that question. She says she always votes and voted for an opposition party. Her first significant mobilization was in support of undocumented migrants in France in 1997. She has been a candidate for the Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste (the New Anticapitalist Party) of which she is still a member.

Cluster 7: French, non-violent, and believers. This group is located in the lower right-hand quadrant of the factorial map. It comprises persons who, although they are clearly opposed to boycotting elections (100% versus 46.3%) and to using violence (100% versus 70.9%), are on the other hand favorable to a whole set of protest practices, in particular those most characteristic of the non-violent resistance agenda: occupying premises (96.7% versus 74.1%), traffic obstruction (93.5% versus 70%), boycotting products (97.8% versus 81.1%), resistance to law-enforcement authorities (87% versus 70.9%, which should be understood here as non-violent resistance as sometimes suggested by annotations), responsible consumption (100% versus 91.9%), and hunger strikes (68.5% versus 55.7%), as well as leaflet distribution (100% versus 90.3%), strikes (98.9% versus 90%), and petitions (100% versus 94.4%). Sociographically speaking, this is a group comprising mostly French citizens (53.3% versus 25%) with a high education level (72.8% versus 56.7%), working at management level or in higher professional positions (55.4% versus 43.4%), and who identify with Christianity (30.4% versus 21.6%). The Senegalese are underrepresented in this group (7.6% versus 23.7%). Their opinions on the effectiveness of protest actions are consistent with the spirit of non-violence: they are persons who judge that it is not at all effective to boycott elections (64.1% versus 37.8%), damage property (71.7% versus 51.4%), or exercise physical pressure on a person (73.9% versus 57.7%). On the other hand, they judge as quite effective the actions of boycotting products (44.6% versus 28.3%), occupying premises (47.8% versus 31.7%), traffic obstruction (42.4% versus 27.4%), distributing leaflets (45.6% versus 30.5%), resisting law-enforcement authorities (42.4% versus 28.6%), participating in a strike (39.1% versus 26.2%), participating in a demonstration (43.5% versus 30.3%), participating in group prayer (26.1% versus 15.8%), signing petitions (46.7% versus 34.9%), participating in a hunger strike (44.6% versus 34.8%), and responsible consumption (31.5% versus 22.8%). [Paragon 987 or 496]
Individual 987 [first paragon of the cluster] answered a self-administered questionnaire in French in a workshop on “économie solidaire” (solidarity economy). She is a 69-year-old Frenchwoman, from a small town in the north of France, a region known for its strong Catholic presence, and a member of the CRID. She came with her organization Les Amis de la Vie (the association of the friends of the left-wing Catholic weekly La Vie (Life)). She has a master's degree and was a trainer for teachers in the civil service before she retired. She has been a volunteer for the Comité Catholique Contre la Faim et Pour le Développement (CCFD, a major Catholic organization for development), Ritimo (a French network of information on Third World and international solidarity), and Artisans du monde (craftsmen of the world), a French fair trade organization. Her husband was the principal of a middle school. Her father was a physician. This Catholic woman describes herself as a believer who goes to church every week and prays every day. She has never been a member of a party but considers the Socialist Party and the Greens as the two with views closest to hers. She always votes. She has already signed petitions, participated in marches and strikes, responsible consumption, and group prayer. She would be prepared to engage in a fast or hunger strike. She refuses to boycott elections or products, use violence, or, in this case, oppose the authorities or the police. The first mobilizations she indicates as important for her were protests in the 1990s in Germany against Third World debt (marking the beginning of the Jubilee campaign).

Cluster 8: Alter-radicals. This group is located on the left-hand side of the factorial map, just below Axis 1, farther from the center than the previous group. Like the previous group, it comprises persons hostile to using violence (98.4% versus 79.9%), but its members are favorable to boycotting elections (100% versus 53.7%), which is the main characteristic that distinguishes it from the previous group. They also share a whole series of protest practices reflecting the agenda of non-violent resistance: occupation (96% versus 74.1%), boycotting products (99.2% versus 89.1%), traffic obstruction (91.2% versus 70%), refusal to pay taxes (74.1% versus 52.1%), resistance to law-enforcement authorities (88% versus 76.9%), leaflet distribution (100% versus 90.3%), hunger strikes (73.6% versus 55.7%), and strikes (98.4% versus 90%), responsible consumption (99.2% versus 92%), and petitions (100% versus 94.4%). Its members are non-believers (51.2% versus 38.7%), of the higher social categories (55.2% versus 43.4%), and with a high education level (65.6% versus 56.7%). The Senegalese are underrepresented in this group (11.2% versus 27.3%). As for their opinions on the effectiveness of protest actions, these are persons who judge many of them to be quite effective: boycotting
elections (27.2% versus 14.6%), resisting law-enforcement authorities (40% versus 28.6%), occupying premises (43.2% versus 31.7%), refusal to pay taxes (36% versus 26.1%), traffic obstruction (36% versus 27.4%), group prayer (although they do not practice them) (22.4% versus 15.8%), hunger strikes (42.4% versus 34.2%), boycotting products (36% versus 28.3%). They are also persons who in the previous 12 months participated in demonstrations against their government (73.6% versus 62.7%), against international or regional institutions (45.6% versus 34.6%), and in local or regional social forums focused on continental themes (56.8% versus 48.6%).

- Individual 61 [first paragon of the cluster] answered a self-administered questionnaire in French. This 27-year-old Frenchwoman lives in Senegal where she works for an NGO defending the rights of handicapped persons, after graduating from the university. She defines herself as an atheist. She also is a member of Survie (Survival), a French association very critical of the French policy in Africa. She sometimes votes. She has never been member of a party but feels closest to the Greens and the New Anticapitalist Party. Her first significant protest was again the National Front in France in 2002; she expresses an affinity with the protest practices described in the cluster above. On the 19 actions described she indicates that she has practiced 13 of them, would practice 3 of them, and only opposes damage to goods, prayer, and violence against persons. She has spent one year in Senegal, one in the UK for her studies, and 6 months in Malawi for an internship. Her father was a sports teacher, her mother a secretary, her grandparents shopkeepers on one side and primary school teachers on the other side. Her partner, in Senegal, is a craftsman. She is interested in the issue of access to land, particularly for women. She considers her situation satisfying morally but not materially. She identifies closely with the alter-global movement.

Cluster 9: (Latin American) men favorable to violence. This group is strongly characterized by its use of violence\textsuperscript{16} (it is the only category favorable to it) (99.2% versus 28.3%), as well as the protest practices under consideration with the exception of prayer. It is a group of persons who define themselves as non-believers (55.4% versus 38.7%) and state no religion (70.8% versus 49.7%), mostly from the Americas (20.8% versus 13.1%, that is, in our sample, from Latin America), and more male than female (65.4% versus 56.4%). They judge the following actions as quite or altogether effective: damaging property (25.4% versus 8.9%), resisting law-enforcement authorities (41.5% versus \textsuperscript{16} On the style of “Porto Alegre men,” also mentioned here by Julie Castro, see Eschle and Maiguashca (2010: 34).}
versus 23%), exercising physical pressure on a person (16.9% versus 6.3%), occupying premises (46.9% versus 29%), and traffic obstruction (43.8% versus 28.8%). Nonetheless, there are also persons among them who judge that it is not effective to damage property (21.5% versus 13.6%) or exercise physical pressure (20.8% versus 11.4%). They qualify as altogether effective strikes (62.3% versus 47.9%), boycotting products (48.5% versus 36.8%), refusal to pay taxes (23.8% versus 15.8%), and hunger strikes (25.4% versus 17.7%). In the previous 12 months, they participated in demonstrations against their government’s policy (76.9% versus 62.7%) and/or against international or regional institutions (45.4% versus 34.6%).

Individual 788 [first paragon of the cluster] answered a self-administered questionnaire in Portuguese. This 31-year-old Brazilian man comes from São Paulo as a journalist in alternative media (like his partner) and came to cover the forum. Defining himself as agnostic, he is a former member of the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores), the party of former President Lula and then President Roussef. He evokes the mobilization for Lula’s election in 2002 as his first significant mobilization. He has spent one year in Bolivia and has an undergraduate diploma. His father was an engineer, his mother a nurse, one of his grandfathers was a worker and the other an accountant.

3.5 Conclusion

We hope this work has shown that the statistical mode of reasoning specific to MCA is perfectly consistent with a sociological type of reasoning that is closer to the science of investigation than to modeling (Passeron, 1991). Moreover, using Ascending Hierarchical Clustering and knowing the details of the paragons makes it possible to go back to real individuals enhanced with the characteristics identified in the questionnaire, even if those characteristics have not been statistically measured until then. Furthermore, MCA, combined with Ascending Hierarchical Clustering, appears as a way to control the meaning of sociographic variables, recontextualized through the groups emerging from the analysis.

Beyond the inherent interest of using MCA for multinational populations in a situation of activism, we believe we are in a position to draw the following conclusions:

- Participants at world social forums continue to have extremely differentiated relationships to action, notably to practices that include some form of violence or confrontation, which are still shunned by a majority of participants from the South. The differentiation in relationships to
protest practices reflects in particular national origins, which in turn are characterized by a set of properties that mean different things in different contexts. Indeed, participating in the same event does not imply that the same repertoire of collective action goes without saying for all the participants – practices that are routine for some may on the contrary be experienced as repellent by others.

- On the specific question of the feeling of competence and legitimacy in using protest practices, especially violent ones, it is essential to pay attention to the no-replies in the surveys, as the statistic behavior of certain no-replies shows their affinity with a favorable perception of use of violence. However this should not be read as a univocal interpretation of Non-responses as meaning always a lack of feeling of competence and legitimacy: in some cases, this would mean self-censorship and in others, it may actuality reveal the problem of dualistic framing of questions and activists’ sense of the complexity of political contexts; as activists often have a very nuanced understanding of tactics and strategies that are not well captured in binary sorts of choices. That is why it opens the question of seizing (through statistics regularities for instance) what specific non-responses could mean concerning specific questions and contexts.

- If we assume that participating in the same event involves very different relationships to legitimate forms of practice, it would explain why certain practices owe their success to the fact that they cut across several registers of action: these would include, for instance, national days of mobilization, responsible consumption, etc. The success of these practices is also due to the effects of the development-aid and NGO sector, which are major actors in financing the world of alter-globalization and tend to make a distinction between mobilization and protest.

Here again, Charles Tilly’s attention to repertoires of collective action helps us understand that not all activists are equally familiar with protest practices, what they consist of or what they basically mean.
4 Women’s issues and activists at the World Social Forum in Dakar

Julie Castro

Abstract
In this chapter, Julie Castro looks at gender at the WSF in Dakar. Combining a locally grounded approach with the results of the collective research, she portrays the whole range of actors of the women’s cause (transnational, but also international and local organizations). She then analyzes the weight, spaces, tensions, and blind spots of the women’s cause in Dakar, and shows that it was shaped by broader trends that structure the contemporary Senegalese society, notably the development industry and the remoralization of the public sphere.

Women were unquestionably present at the World Social Forum (WSF) in Dakar in February 2011 and in large numbers. Numerous women’s organizations, dressed in identical T-shirts or outfits made from fabric bearing their NGO logo, were visible in the ranks of the Forum opening march. The banners and signs they carried were sometimes obviously made for events at home: for example, one of them said “APROFES Parité homme/femme. Instrument de défense nationale” (men-women parity, an instrument of national defense), referring to demonstrations prior to the 2010 law that introduced male-female parity in all partially or totally elective institutions; another read “les femmes comptent pour la paix en Casamance” (women count for peace in Casamance). There were also broader slogans, such as “No to impunity and violence against women and girls,” “Women, the backbone of Africa,” “Women, the drivers of development in Africa,” “Women, a positive force ignored in Africa,” and “Women, a vector for peace in Africa.” The percentage of women attendees remained high in the days that followed, as shown by the results of the quantitative survey: 43% of the survey respondents were women. Among them, the African contingent was as large as the European contingent: 41%. Next came the

1 I wish to thank Emmanuelle Bouilly for her acute reading and constructive critique of the first drafts of this chapter.

2 APROFES: Association pour la Promotion de la Femme Sénégalaise (Association for the Promotion of Senegalese women), based in Kaolack and set up in 1987.
contingent from the Americas with 14%, whereas the number of women from other continents was less than 2%. If we compare the participation of African men and women, we observe that the number of African women was proportionately smaller than that of their male counterparts, who represented 58% of the male respondents. Generally speaking, the WSF in Dakar was strongly marked by African attendees, who accounted for half the participants, male and female combined.

This massive presence of women was not peculiar to Dakar. Women have made up half or more of the participants at World Social Forums from the outset (Eschle and Maiguashca, 2010; Masson, 2003). The virtual absence of African women was notable at the first events, however, reflecting the weakness of the WSF’s ties to Africa in general. To remedy that situation, the WSF was held in Africa for the first time in 2006, initially “on tiptoe” because the Forum that year was polycentric, taking place simultaneously in Bamako, Karachi, and Caracas, and then on equal footing in 2007 in Nairobi. In Bamako as well as Nairobi, African women took part in the forums in huge numbers (Latourès, 2007).

In any case, the presence of women, even in massive numbers, in no way guarantees that women’s issues will be highlighted at WSFs. Leaving aside the question of their number to focus on the women’s rights movement itself, what do we observe? Activists and academics are unanimous: from the beginning, women’s rights have been marginal, if not marginalized, in alter-global social forum debates, meetings and assemblies as a whole. Yet “from the official standpoint, the alter-globalization movement has been above reproach: feminism is a stakeholder in the issues it defends and the WSF platform makes it a cross-movement topic that must be taken into consideration in every area” (Lamoureux, 2004: 171). Gender and diversity have appeared as an overarching theme of the WSF since 2002 (Conway, 2007). Nevertheless, “even if there is no formal hierarchy among the various struggles, anticapitalism is largely the core component and the other dimensions are often viewed merely as harmful consequences of capitalism” (Lamoureux, 2004: 181). The topics discussed thus concern primarily the “effects of the processes of economic, political, cultural, and social globalization on the living conditions of women evolving in a variety of contexts” (Latourès, 2007). According to the dominant view, women are “victims of globalization and not (...) actors likely to intervene in it” (Lamoureux, 2004: 180). In other words, capitalism is considered above all to aggravate

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3 Hereafter, I will use the expression “women’s rights” to refer both to self-identified women’s movements and those that describe themselves as feminist.
the dynamics of patriarchy. There is no place for gender understood as a
category of analysis (Scott, 1986) or for the notion of “intersectionality”
(Dorlin, 2009): alter-global movements thus appear to “resist linking class,
genre and race in a structural manner” (Masson, 2003: 102). The first texts
to discuss the importance of women’s issues in the forums were written
by activists and published starting in 2003 (Karadenizli, Allaert, de la
Cruz, 2003; Masson, 2003; Salazar, 2004; Bjork, 2004; Duddy, 2004). They
were followed by academic publications often by researchers who were
themselves directly involved in women’s issues organizations taking part in
alter-global forums. In 2004, the journal *Recherches Féministes* brought out
a special issue entitled “Féminisme, Mondialisation et Altermondialisation”
[Feminism, Globalization and Alter-globalization]. Four articles in the issue
examined the relationship between women’s movements and alter-global
movements, alternating discussions on the ideological dimensions (the
compatibility and possible convergences between feminist and alter-global
analyses) with studies on the dynamics of the marginalization of women’s
rights observed at alter-global forums (Druelle, 2004). In 2005, an article by
Catherine Eschle discussed this issue in the journal *Signs*. It was followed by
a special issue of *Journal of International Women’s Studies*. The issue, entitled
“Introduction to women’s bodies, gender analysis, feminist politics at the
Forum Social Mundial” (Roskos and Willis, 2007), was devoted entirely to
analyzing the marginalization of women and feminism in the WSF pro-
cess. In 2008, Lilian Mathieu tackled the issue in the form of a chapter in
a collective work on the alter-global movement in Europe (Mathieu, 2008).
The first book to deal exclusively with the relationship between feminism
and alter-globalization was co-authored in 2010 (Eschle and Maiguashca,
2010). The following year, three texts appeared on this issue: the first, in
France, in an overview of the journal *Les cahiers du féminisme* (Joanny,
2011); the second in a book on “others,” i.e. concerning the production of
certain illustrations of otherness in the discourses emanating from the
WSFs (Conway, 2012); the third in the form of a chapter of *Handbook of

In this nascent literature, we can distinguish two trends in the way
women’s issues are discussed within alter-global forums. The first, which
predominates in the English-speaking works, is in line with the thinking
on the transnationalization of women’s movements. These articles, which
account for a growing portion of feminist studies (Naples and Desai, 2002;
Moghadam, 2005; Basu, 1995), are part of a wider field – the study of the
transnationalization of causes and social movements – which has also been
expanding rapidly since the early 1990s (Siméant, 2010). They put feminist/
women’s organizations that participate in social forums and belong to the broader group of transnational feminist networks at the heart of their analyses (Moghadam, 2005; Basu, 2010). Alter-global forums are viewed as “sites to introduce transnational feminism” and considered by some authors, incidentally, as the main spaces of protest against neoliberal globalization invested by feminist/transnational women’s movements (Desai, 2005: 349). For others, women’s rights in the WSF represents a specific sector of “transnational feminism” arising from the intersection of alter-global and transnational feminist spheres called “feminist antiglobalization activism” (Eschle and Maiguashca, 2010: 4). In all these cases, the sort of transnational feminism discussed in these works designates de facto a particular organizational form – NGOs – and a particular level of action – the transnational level. Though “this focus of scientific literature on the NGO form” indeed “corresponds to an effect of real history,” it nevertheless leads to a number of biases: it tends to hide “the substratum” of transnational mobilization and “generate a kind of blindness with regard to the actors viewed empirically, as well as their practices and their social inscriptions” (Siméant, 2010). Local women’s/feminist organizations are mostly left aside, despite their considerable numerical presence at the various world social forums.

The second trend, this time among French-speakers, seeks to make the transnational character an area for questioning rather than a self-evident analytical category, and draws attention to the particular historical configurations that made it possible (Sommier, 2008: 16). Thus they recall the historicity of the forms of transnational political action (Tarrow, 2000), which preceded the “transnational turn” reached in the sociology of mobilizations. Even more, they underscore the fact that “alter-global mobilizations (...) continue to be characterized by strong national roots” (Sommier, 2008: 18). The crucial role played by woman’s organizations at the national level, all organizational forms combined, is brought out by Lilian Mathieu (2008) in the analysis of the differentiated inclusion of women’s issues in two European alter-global forums.

These developments invite us at the very least to widen the spectrum of the actors involved and take transnational NGOs, local organizations, and other types of organizations into consideration – for example, UN Women at the Dakar forum, which played a considerable role. But is it enough to make a statement on the marginalization of women’s issues within the WSFs? Certainly not, because beyond the question concerning the types of actors to take into account in the analysis, a whole set of new questions arises. What in fact should be observed in order to assess the importance given to women’s rights in an event like the WSF: the workshops and activities
organized by women's/feminist organizations? The role played by women's organizations in the coordinating bodies? The inclusion of gender issues in WSF activities that are not labeled “gender” or “women” or, in other words, how the WSF is “engendered”? The issue is at first methodological, of course, as dozens of workshops are held simultaneously at WSFs. But it goes further than methodology, because even if a collective survey were tasked with exhaustively monitoring all these aspects of the WSF, the question remains of how to interpret the various data collected. Disagreement on this issue is immediately apparent. Let us consider, for example, the question of physical spaces dedicated exclusively to women's issues within WSFs: are they an achievement of women's issues, which they strengthen, in continuity with the praxis of support groups and spaces introduced by the second wave of feminist movements? Or do they represent the sidelining or sectorization of women's issues, and hence illustrate their marginalization? Another example: the number of workshops that tackle gender issues head-on or more laterally. Clearly, this reflects the overall weight given to these issues. But it may simply be the effect of weak, depoliticized mainstreaming, which has been summed up as “transforming one of the two sexes into a social sector in which the living conditions and mode of integration into the whole needs to be reformed, while disregarding the fundamentally political dimension of the relationship between the sexes” (Hirata and Le Doaré, 1998: 24). From this point of view, should the dissemination of a certain depoliticized discourse on gender be considered a positive achievement of women's rights? The answers to these questions appear to depend on the options of the actors present.

The assessment of the importance of women's rights in the WSF thus raises a host of questions that are already caught up in methodological, epistemological, and political issues. Indeed, the answers suggest groups of different actors, bring into play different conceptions of collective action and also reveal different political aims (improving the living conditions and status of women versus calling into question the systems that impose their subordination and gender hierarchies). While it is impossible to adopt an outside position to grasp and assess the importance of women's issues in a WSF (Harding, 2003), it is nevertheless possible to bring out some of the stakes, which is the task I have set for myself in this chapter. To do so, I will adopt an overview of the forum as a circumscribed space-time, and women's issues as a particular configuration arising from the movements and organizations that are present (with or without local ties).

This study will be divided into two parts: the first part will be devoted to the actors of the women's movement present at the WSF in Dakar. I
will begin by examining the issue of how to identify them – as women’s movement activists or as feminist activists – and the issues raised by that distinction. I will go on to present the different types of actors: NGO or international, transnational or local organizations: all types of actors involved in women’s rights in Dakar will be considered. As far as possible, I will evoke the trajectories of these different types of actors and, where relevant, supply information on the history of their involvement in previous WSFs. Part II will propose different perspectives on women’s issues in WSF, looking at the issue of physical spaces, the strategies adopted by women’s issues’ activists (some seeking to “engender” WSFs, others pursuing different objectives), and finally the tensions and blind spots, i.e. the issues and topics adjacent to or part and parcel of women’s issues that were not or only very marginally discussed during the event in Dakar. The data that will be mobilized for the study comes from several sources: the results of the collective survey conducted during the WSF; the observations carried out during the forum; an overview of press articles and activist texts pertaining to the WSF in Dakar and available online.

4.1 Transnational, but not only: the actors of women’s issues in Dakar

Women’s movement or feminism?

In the survey administered during the WSF, two identifications were possible: activists could call themselves members of a “women’s association” or of a “women’s rights and feminist group”. Identifying with the feminist cause is indeed problematic on the African continent (Latourès, 2007; Tripp et al., 2008) and more broadly in the Muslim world (Badran, 1994), as well as in Asia, in the former Soviet territories, etc. (Basu, 2010). In many societies, the “feminist” label is used by its detractors to denounce anti-male and/or anti-family positions (Antrobus, 2005: 144). And this is not merely a common sense view: feminism has also been challenged by women’s issues activists and scholars themselves. By the way, West Africa has been the source of the most virulent criticism of the categories used by Western feminists to describe African realities; these feminists are considered exogenous to the realities of the continent and helping to reproduce forms of epistemological domination (Cornwall, 2005). From “STIWAism” (Social Transformation Including Women in Africa) proposed by Ogundipe-Leslie (1994), to “motherism” opposed by Acholonu (1995) to the “anti-mother,
anti-child, anti-nature and anti-culture” stance of feminism, as well as Walker’s “womanism” (Walker, 1983) and its rejection of conflictual separatism between men and women, there is a whole current of African literature that challenges the categories and presuppositions and ultimate refutes its identification with “feminism”.

In practice, many women’s issues activists said they belonged simultaneously to the two subgroups. More exactly, 73% of the members of women’s associations also declared they belonged to a women’s rights/feminist group; the opposite was less commonplace, with only 56% of the members of a women’s rights/feminist group stating they were also members of a women’s association. These survey results suggest it is necessary to soften the sometimes rigid distinction between movements that defend strategic interests on the one hand, and those that defend practical interests on the other (Molyneux, 1985). Indeed, these categories are not mutually exclusive, and an organization can simultaneously carry on activities coming under both options. Moreover, shifts can occur: a women’s movement may shift its discourse towards more radical demands, or the reverse. Finally, we should also take into account the possible dissociation between identifying with the feminist cause (largely shared by the members of the women’s associations surveyed) in an activist context, on the one hand, and speaking out as a feminist in a public sphere that tends to delegitimize any discourse and any person advocating feminism, on the other.

The activists

Let us now turn to the women’s issues activists who were present in Dakar and see what sort of profiles emerge from the survey results. Unsurprisingly, women predominated numerically in both groups, with a significant link between the fact of being a woman and belonging to one of these two groups: they represented 63% of the activists in the women’s rights and feminist groups and 70% of the activists in women’s associations. A significant link was also noted between the feeling of having been personally subjected to discrimination relating to gender or based on the sexual preferences in one’s life and membership in a women’s rights or feminist group. On the other hand, there was no significant link between the fact of having suffered discrimination – of any kind – during one’s life and belonging to a women’s association. This gap in relation to discrimination can be linked to different ways of presenting and experiencing oneself, which can be themselves the product of interventions and policies. For instance, through their promotion of testimony, NGOs have imported new technologies of
the self (Nguyen, 2002). Moreover, the explicitly feminist current attaches great importance to topics linked to discrimination based on gender and sexual preference. “Coming out” and victim testimonials are encouraged and viewed as militant acts and as steps towards reconstructing self-esteem.

The women’s issues activists had often been or were still engaged in other causes, and this tendency was characteristic of the WSF as a whole: a very large percentage of the participants in Dakar were “hyper-militants,” combining several types of commitment either sequentially or simultaneously. In terms of sector of activity, the two most frequently found among women’s issues activists reflected the high number of women working in general: employment in the public sector ranked first (around 27%); followed by the associative sector (about 26%). The other sectors accounted for 15% of the activists. From the standpoint of socio-professional category, 37% of the activists in women’s associations were in management and the liberal professions, 27% in mid-level occupations and the other profiles covered less than 15% of the activists. The percentage of executives and liberal professions was even higher among the activists in women’s rights and feminist groups, with 45% in management and liberal professions, followed by 27% in mid-level occupations.

Where did the women’s issues activists come from? Among the self-proclaimed “women’s rights and feminism” group, 55% came from the African continent, 22% from Europe, 16% from the Americas (with the other continents accounting for less than 5% of the activists). Senegalese activists were by far the most numerous at round off to 27 of the members of this rights group, followed by French (12%) and Brazilians 5%. Among the activists in women’s associations, the proportion of Africans was higher still at 64.5%, followed by the European (16.5%) and American (12%) contingents. The most represented nationalities were, in descending order, Senegalese (35%), French (8.5%), and Malian (5%)

The women’s issues militants present in Dakar very often came on behalf of an organization – 79% representing the members of women’s associations and 78% representing the members of women’s rights and feminism groups – thus, more often than the other militants at the forum (the average for the forum as a whole was 69% of survey respondents who declared

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4 From this standpoint, the women’s movement is no different than the other causes, since 25% of the total number of survey respondents were working in the public sector and 25% in the associative sphere.

5 These proportions are virtually identical to those measured for the total survey population: 43.5% were managers or in liberal professions and 26.5% had mid-level occupations.
they had come on behalf of an association). Moreover, 40% of the women’s issues activists were currently or had been employees of an organization. About half of them had their travel expenses to Dakar paid for by their organization. This is in line with the overall tendency of the forum, as the rate of travel financing by organizations, all causes combined, was in the vicinity of this figure.

To sum up, the women’s issues activists were primarily – but not exclusively – women, in large part from the African continent and often “hyper-militant” (involved in other causes in the past or at present). More than half of these women were employed in the public or associative sector and more than 60% were engaged in high-level or mid-level occupations. Slightly less than 80% of them had come to the forum in Dakar on behalf of an organization, and 40% had previously been or were at the time employees of an organization.

The women’s issues organizations

The transnational women’s organizations present in Dakar grew out of global conferences on women that succeeded each other from 1975 to 1995, as well as parallel NGO forums and continental and regional preparatory meetings held upstream from these events. Transnational feminist networks became involved in large part in the alter-global sphere starting in the early 2000s. At the time, transnational feminism was in a period of crisis, divided by serious tensions between “the supporters of a pragmatic approach and those who favored a ‘radical’ approach and critique” (Druelle, 2004). Some activists worried that the principle of introducing a new global economic order, put forward at the first three global conferences on women, was being sidelined. Noting the coincidence between the rise of neoliberalism, with the implementation of structural adjustment programs starting in 1982 in the South and analogous policies in the North, and the abandonment of the demand for a new world order at the international conferences on women, they denounced the depoliticization of the women’s movement and the risk of being “hijacked” by the United Nations systems. In this context of crisis within the transnational women’s movement, the emergence of the alter-global movement was perceived by certain feminist organizations as an opportunity to re-radicalize and re-politicize women’s issues (Druelle, 2004).

The two most influential transnational women’s organizations in the WSF are, according to Valentine Moghadam (2005), the World March of Women (WMW), and the Articulación Feminista Marcosur (AFM). Both were present in Dakar. In truth, the organization most discussed in the
literature is the World March of Women, which the same author claims represents “the main expression [of] global feminism,” understood here as “women's discourse and movement aimed at advancing the condition of women through improved access to resources, equal measures to achieve equality between men and women and the empowerment of women within national boundaries using transnational forms of organization and mobilization” (Moghadam, 2000: 62). Originating in discussions between a northern movement (the Fédération des femmes du Québec) and other women’s organizations at the NGO forum organized within the framework of the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 (Giraud and Dufour, 2010), the WMW began taking part in international alter-global forums from the very first forum in Porto Alegre in 2001 (Lamoureux, 2004). The group soon joined the International Council of the WSF (Decarro, 2003), and played a very active role in the Assemblies of Social Movements, which take place at each forum. The AFM, on the other hand, was the fruit of inter-NGO dialogs organized prior to the World Conference on Women in Beijing.6

WMW activists like those in the AFM belong to the privileged social classes and have a very extensive social network, particularly at the international level (Eschle and Maiguashca, 2010: 72). Finally, these two organizations were largely responsible for setting up the Feminist Dialogues, a high point for the discussion of women’s issues at WSFs, which I will come back to later.

Other transnational networks were also present in Dakar. Among them, DAWN (Development Alternatives for Women in a New Era) and WIDE (Women In Development Europe), both of which came into being in the wake of the World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985 (Bereni, 2008), have been participants in the alter-global movement since the “Battle of Seattle” in 1999 (Moghadam, 2005: 13). The networks of WLUM (Women Living Under Muslim Law) and of WILDAF (Women in Law and Development in Africa) also took part in the WSF in Dakar.

These are the transnational organizations that showed the greatest perseverance in attempting to “engender” the WSF. Thus they quickly joined the forum bodies: as I mentioned earlier, the WMW became a member of the WSF International Council, followed soon after by DAWN and the AFM. In 2003, there were six feminist organizations in the International Council. Their active participation at this level widened the scope of demands and included in them the reform of the operating mode of WSF coordinating bodies. In 2005, the WMW drew up a document aimed at combating the

 &Itemid=112, consulted on January 19, 2013.
marginalization of women's organizations and their concerns, notably by promoting a parity policy within the WSF. These requests, which also included specific proposals pertaining to the WSF organization and the operation of “leadership” bodies, were not implemented (Conway, 2012: 121).

In Dakar, the women’s movement also included in its ranks UN Women, a new institution that had just launched its activities. As part of the overall reform of the United Nations initiated in 2005, this composite entity was formed by merging existing UN bodies such as the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), the International Institute Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and the Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues (OSAGI). In Dakar, UN Women attracted attention by the size of its tent, its visibility and logistics reflecting its status as an international institution (large, colored signs, a special area for viewing institutional films), and the variety of gender-related activities held there.

What about African organizations? Some that had arisen from UN Conferences on Women were present, such as AAWORD (Association of African Women for Research and Development). This organization was created in Dakar in 1976 at the first African Regional Conference on Women (Drueelle, 2004) in response to the experiences of participating in the World Conference in 1975 and the conference organized in 1976 at Wellesley College (which brought together researchers and activists of the women's movement) (Tripp et al., 2008). Subsequently, AAWORD took part in the consultative process of “civil society” organized around UN conferences, and in the critique of Western feminist imperialism (Drueelle, 2004) in Copenhagen in 1980. With the stated objective of “decolonizing research on African women,” it played a pivotal role in women’s issues in Dakar, as I will show later on.

Senegalese NGOs accounted for the largest number of organizations at the WSF. It is necessary here to highlight the decisive weight of development – understood here as a set of historically situated discourses and practices organized in the form of an indirect, private government (Mbembe, 2000) notably embodied by NGOs – in the evolution of African women’s movements starting in the 1970s, with the arrival of “gender-related” funding. To be sure, women’s movements were already in existence on the continent, notably at the grassroots level, including in national struggles for independence.

The book by Ester Boserup, which came out in 1970, was the first to link women’s issues to those of development. It played a considerable role in launching the institutionalization of gender in development programs.
Later on, single-party regimes often attempted to co-opt the women’s movements by setting up an institutional network headed by African First Ladies. Organizations financed by development programs, which were sometimes co-opted by the ruling elites, began appearing in the 1970s. The situation changed radically in the early 1990s, when Africa experienced the combined effects of a wave of political liberalization, an influx of funding from international donors to “civil society” rather than to national bodies, and the inability of governments to implement essential social policies due to drastic budget cuts imposed by structural adjustment programs. These shifts led to the rapid growth of national NGOs, many of which took up gender issues. Thus, the 1990s saw myriad new organizations spring up along with the “NGOization” of already existing ones eager to qualify for gender-related financing, such as the FNGPF (National Federal of Groups to Promote Women) in Senegal. The World Conferences on Women, particularly the one held in Beijing in 1995, also encouraged the creation of grassroots organizations. Continental events led to similar dynamics: for example, the Africa-wide United Nation’s Women’s Conference, held in Dakar in 1994, gave rise to new networks introduced on the national scale.

Behind the effect of institutional formatting – in the form of NGOs – and their common dependence on donors, African women’s organizations are quite heterogeneous. They focus on different issues, with some concentrating on economic aspects (micro-credit, income-generating activities, etc.), and others on achieving broader inclusion and representation of women, in political life for example. Their relationship with the base is often ambivalent. The NGOs set up in the 1990s were more expertise-oriented and relied largely on educated, urban elites. When they came under strong criticism within national public spheres, some tried to reconnect with grassroots movements and thereby recapture their legitimacy (Pommerolle and Siméant, 2008a). Conversely, movements with strong local roots developed strategies to link up with national and international networks. Let us take for example APROFES (Association for the Promotion of Senegalese Women). Located in Kaolack, this NGO is characterized by a local base and numerous ties to national and transnational networks. It exemplifies a fringe of Senegalese women’s movements that succeeded in avoiding centralization and “going through the elites” in Dakar that often prevails.

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9 Ibid., 67-68.
10 Ibid., 87.
in NGOs. Its participation in the network of Siggil Jigeen, one of the most active women's issues organizations in Senegal, based in Dakar, gave it a solid connection to the national level (Sievking, 2008). APROFES played an important role in supporting women's issues at the WSF in Dakar, where it joined with a northern organization called the CADTM (Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt) to organize the forum of African Women's Struggles, held only a few days before the WSF. The final declaration of the women's assembly borrowed heavily from the one articulated by this forum.

4.2 Strategies, tensions, and blind spots around women's issues in Dakar

Weight and space

Women's issues ranked high on the list of causes represented in Dakar. More than a quarter of survey respondents had been or were currently members of a “women's rights and feminist” movement, and 20% of a “women's association.” The “women's rights and feminist” group was the fourth most represented, and “women's associations” the ninth. The three most represented causes – in descending order: defense of human rights, humanitarian/development aid/international solidarity, and people mobilized “against neoliberal globalization,” reflect the importance of certain organizations – in this case, human rights, humanitarian and international solidarity – in the genesis of alter-global movements (Fillieule, Agrikoliantsky, and Sommier, 2010). This ranking of causes also reveals that other spheres which played a significant role in generating alter-global movements had few representatives in Dakar: trade unions, the landless movement, and the radical left.

As in previous forums, the large presence of women at the event in Dakar contrasted sharply with female representation on stage at the assemblies and in the coordinating bodies. Male elites and more broadly modes of male interaction in the forum leadership and organization – sometimes summarized in the expression “Porto Alegre men” (Eschle and Maiguashca, 2010, 34) – were still predominant in Dakar. In this regard, the alter-global movement is in no way an exception to the rule. As certain authors have noted, “Sexism does not end at the door to activist meetings” (Roux, 2005). The phenomenon affects all militant movements, even those that are critical of the sexual division of labor, including activist labor, and more broadly of gender hierarchies (Fillieule and Roux, 2009). Among the thirteen
committees in charge of preparing the WSF, one was called “Gender and Fairness.” It was tasked with “facilitating the consideration given to gender in the WSF, (...) strengthening women's participation in the scientific and cultural program of the WSF [and helping] to ensure that gender is taken into account in the preparatory process [sic] and in the activities organized during the Forum.” The objectives were therefore rather classical, combining reinforcement of the role of gender as a theme with increased participation of women in the WSF organization and activities.

The central space of the Dakar forum (both geographically, because it was situated very close to the epicenter of the site, and metaphorically for women's issues) was definitely the “Women's Village.” Faced with considerable logistical problems that marred the first day of the forum – the rooms planned for workshops were not available or did not exist, women's movement activists (especially AAWORD members), supported by the “Gender and Fairness Committee,” quickly set up a large red tent called “Women's Village.” Although it was strategically located on the campus and in the forum, the tent's very poor acoustics prevented much of the audience from following the discussion. In practice, the tent allowed a large number of activities to take place, hence creating a geographical concentration of gender-related activities. The UN Women's tent, mentioned earlier, was just a few steps away from “Women's Village,” thereby strengthening the effect of concentration. It contrasted sharply with the surrounding stands of Senegalese women's associations, which were far more makeshift and much less well equipped. The structural inequalities between the different types of women's organizations present in Dakar were thus clearly in view.

Of the twelve main topics at the Dakar forum, only three referred explicitly to gender issues. The first topic discussed the issue of discrimination relating to sexual orientation and gender; the sixth was committed to “a world freed from capitalism principles and structures, patriarchal oppression, any form of domination by financial authorities, transnational and unfair systems of trade, neocolonial domination and domination by debt”; the last called for “new forms of subjectivity and epistemology opposed to racism, Eurocentrism, patriarchy and anthropocentrism.” Furthermore, relatively few sessions or workshops dealt specifically with gender or women during the forum. Of the 470 self-organized activities that took place January 7-9, only 33, i.e. 14%, were concerned with “gender,” or more exactly, in the overwhelming majority of cases, with “women” (one term or the other appeared in the title of the activity). Finally, of the 38 assemblies of convergence that took place during the last two days of the forum, two were directly linked to women's issues: the first, entitled “Women and
Development," was organized by French international solidarity associations, whereas the second – the “Assembly of Women’s Convergence,” was organized by the heavyweights of transnational feminism and other alter-global organizations particularly active in women’s issues: respectively World March of Women, Articulación Feminista Marcosur, Women’s International Democratic Federation, Femnet for the women’s organizations, and Vía Campesina and the Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt for allied organizations. Although these figures conceal the possible use of gender as a category of analysis in the other activities and assemblies, they nevertheless suggest the continuing prevalence within the forum of reluctance to think about how relationships of race, class, and gender are intertwined and essentially part of every topic.

What were the highlights for the women’s movement at the WSF in Dakar? First, it should be pointed out that at WSFs, semi-autonomous events are organized around women’s issues: “the most common practice is to hold the women’s forum as a semi-autonomous event during the WSF. That is what happened at the Summit of Peoples in Quebec in 2001. It was also the case at the third Social Forum in Porto Alegre in 2003 and at the European Social Forum in Paris in the autumn of 2003. Usually, the women’s forum takes place on the day preceding the official opening of the WSF, so that women who take part can also participate in other WSF events” (Lamoureux, 2004: 179). These semi-autonomous events have been given different names over the years, and the WMW and the AFM have been the most active in organizing them. The first was planeta FEMEA in Porto Alegre in 2002 (Conway, 2012), which originated in the World’s Women’s Planet tent set up by the Brazilian delegation for the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 (Forsyth, 2005: 780). Next there was a European assembly for women’s rights at the European Social Forum in 2003, organized by the WMW, which drew about 3,500 participants (Conway, 2007). Then, in 2004, the first Feminist Dialogue of the WSF took place on the initiative of South Asian and Latin America women activists at the forum in Mumbai (Roskos and Willis, 2007: 6). This event has continued to be held at virtually all the subsequent forums; scheduled a few days before the start of the WSF, it is considered a highlight of the women’s rights movement. The AFM plays a crucial role in its organization (Conway, 2007). In Dakar, contrary to the previous versions, the Feminist Dialogue (called Inter-movement Feminist Dialogue) for

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12 www.radiofeminista.net/feb07/notas/feminist_charter.htm
once took place *during* the forum. But it turned out to be a very marginal event: organizational problems had kept it from being held in the originally planned space; only a handful of militants were gathered together, sitting on the ground in a tent near the building where the session was supposed to take place, which looked unoccupied and therefore displayed no sign indicating the topic discussed.\(^\text{13}\) No African women activists attended. At the WSF in Bamako in 2006, on the other hand, the *Feminist Dialogue* was a key event for the women’s movement, attracting a crowd of more than 350 participants (Latourès, 2007). The only semi-autonomous event in Dakar devoted to women’s issues was the forum on African Women’s Struggles mentioned earlier. It was organized in Kaolack a few days before the WSF by APROFES, the Social Forum of Kaolack and the CADTM. With about 600 participants, according to the organizers, and a plenary session followed by five workshops, this forum ended by a declaration using “feminist” language and devoting a large part of the discussion to “intersectionality,” entitled the “Final Declaration of the Forum on African Women’s Struggles.”\(^\text{14}\) The Women’s Convergence Assembly held at the end of the forum was expected to adopt a joint declaration, based on the declaration of the forum of African Women’s Struggles and “The Letter of Solidarity with the Struggle of the Women of the World” which had been drafted during the WSF and signed by some thirty organizations.\(^\text{15}\) There were no significant divergences between the two texts and some organizations were in fact signatories of both. The session was nevertheless repeatedly disturbed by Moroccan militants who vehemently refused to have the Sahrawi women’s right to self-determination mentioned in the final declaration. Instead of a common declaration, the Women’s Convergence Assembly concluded with a letter made available to the organizations for signature, testifying to the relative weakness and lack of cohesiveness of the women’s movement in the face of the dissension aroused by the Sahrawi question.

**Strategies and practices**

I will come back only briefly to the various strategies implemented by the women’s movement activists to try and “engender” the WSF. First, because


they have been discussed at length in the works cited in introduction; second because they were in no way specific to the Dakar forum; finally, and above all, because I would like to give more emphasis to the strategies that were not part of the women's movement, in other words, those that were not pursuing objectives related to gender equality or women's status and living conditions, but which nevertheless reveal facets of the militant work of women's issues activists. In Dakar, the strategies alternated between a centrifugal tendency – strengthening the movement through semi-autonomous events – and a centripetal tendency, marked in particular by the intervention of women's issues activists in other WSF spaces (like the intervention of the WMW in two other convergence assemblies: the Assembly of Social Movements in which it took part at every WSF, and the assembly to unite struggles against militarization with those in favor of decolonization).

For African women's movements, the WSF constituted a space with multiple resources, which they tried to seize in several ways. The Senegalese women's organizations, which were massively present in Dakar, stood out by the diversification of their activities at the forum, often combining the sale of products at stands with prospecting organizations seen as potential donors, and participating in the activities of the forum itself. The daily newspaper *Flamme d’Afrique*, published throughout the forum, noted that:

> We toured the dozens of stands set up on the grounds of Cheikh Anta Diop University, on the new campus hosting the tenth World Social Forum, to find the groups led by women's organizations. We counted a good twenty of them occupied by associations, federations, non-governmental organizations, cooperatives and other women's networks – stands that attracted visitors as much by the display of products as by the ideas upheld by their occupants. But when one looked closely at these stands, one realized that the women's organizations that occupy them were not there solely to engage in commerce. To be sure, the loincloths, shoes, chains, necklaces, pottery and other fruits and transformed products were the attractions, but they were not the essential part, as several stand occupiers gave us to understand.¹⁶

In another edition, the same newspaper related the comments of Senegalese activists who explained that they took advantage of the forum to identify

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and seek out new donors: “Beyond the small purchases that participants might make, her organization is expecting opportunities for much more significant business. ‘We already had two contacts with a Belgian and a Cameroonian,’ Mrs. Dramé confided. The African Network of Women Workers emphasizes such contacts because the organization needs to be restructured.” The WSF thus represented a chance to make contact with current or potential donors, which have become critically important since available funding declined in the late 2000s when donors went back to delivering funds to governmental agencies (Tripp et al., 2008: 73). The usual practices of the development world were also on view at the forum, e.g. the distribution of per-diems during a workshop on HIV/AIDS. While these practices and strategies, so widespread in the sphere of development, occurred at most of the earlier WSFs, they were stepped up in Dakar by the strong “NGOization” of Senegalese and more broadly African civil society.

Another aspect of action that was invested in Dakar can be read between the lines of a report by the Gender and Fairness Committee. Along with the traditional aims mentioned above, the committee also wished “to ensure that the concerns of ordinary, especially rural, women [are] taken into account.” Furthermore, the committee should “encourage the appropriation of World Social Forum issues by women, women’s organizations and grassroots social movements” so that “these women, the women’s organizations and the grassroots movements [have] a good understanding of the issues of the World Social Forum and [mobilize] to ensure their concerns are taken into account.” These words echo the divide already mentioned between expertise-oriented national NGOs, led by educated elites, and grassroots movements in rural regions, as well as the low level of identification of the women’s movement activists at Dakar: only 60% of them identified themselves “very much” with the alter-global cause, 29% “quite a bit,” and 11% “a little.” Actually, not only women’s movements tend to avoid alter-global discourse: more broadly indeed, “within the WSF, the ‘social movements’ tendency remains (...) largely organized and defended by non-African delegates” (Pommerolle and Siméant, 2008a). Facing this situation, the Senegalese women’s movement activists involved in the alter-global spheres reacted by using the WSF to “raise the awareness” of local women’s movements.

Finally, we might note that the mobilization of African women, massively present at the opening march of the forum and consistently in attendance

throughout the forum, is reminiscent of an old tradition of using women as a “strategic reserve” in national political life. Under single-party regimes, African women's movements were largely co-opted by authorities, which did not hesitate to use them for political ends (Sow, 1997; Tripp et al., 2008). The forms and repertoires of action available to women's movements thus remain marked by their historical trajectories (Tripp et al., 2008: 59), and these large-scale practices definitely left their imprint on the forum as a whole.

Tensions, dissensions, and a blind spot

Finally, I would like to discuss the tensions and dissensions that arose in Dakar as well as a topic that was – significantly I thought – virtually absent from the WSF. The women's movement has its share of disagreements and tensions: between “femocrats” singing the praises of mainstreaming and radical feminists calling for a structural transformation of gender relationships; between militants seeking the abolition of female genital mutilation and activists denouncing Western imperialism at work in criticizing these practices; fault lines run through the WSF just as, more generally, they run through the women's movement as a whole. In my view, there is one point worth emphasizing with regard to the forum in Dakar: the failed rendezvous with the radical fringe of African feminism represented by the African Feminist Forum. This forum, launched in 2006 in Accra and numerically dominated by English-speakers, assumes and claims a feminist identity and proclaims itself radical in the sense that it seeks a fundamental transformation of relationships between women and men.20 Defining itself as an autonomous space dedicated to internal reflection and strengthening the movement, “a space in which African women could celebrate their feminist identity without recourse to apology, qualification or compromise,”20 it declares its solidarity with marginalized women (African lesbians, sex workers, women with disabilities) and stands ready to counter the rise of religious, ethnic, and cultural fundamentalisms.21 One of the objectives established at the first forum was to join the dynamic of WSFs, which was the case in Nairobi with the Feminist Dialogue during which the charter of feminist principles for African feminists was officially launched.22

19 See the online article consulted on May 13, 2013: www.opendemocracy.net/5050/jessica-horn/tales-of-lionesses-third-african-feminist-forum.
months before the WSF in Dakar, a new edition of this forum took place in the same city, to the great regret of certain African feminists such as Amina Mama, who said with regard to Dakar: “As a feminist – 30 years I’ve been involved with this – it concerns me that there’s still a parallelism going on. At times I felt as if I was in a time warp. I think that social movements have to take this up more seriously.” And although French speakers are in the minority within the African Feminist Forum, at least three – all Senegalese – participated actively in the WSF in Dakar.

This failed rendezvous illustrates the tensions that arise around the possibility of a radical feminist discourse in the Senegalese public sphere that I previously mentioned when discussing the auto-identification of women’s issues organizations as women’s movement or feminists. Other elements point to the same dynamic: let us take the example of the Yewwu Yewwi movement, which arose in the early 1980s. Calling explicitly for the abolition of patriarchy and the radical questioning of gender hierarchies, this movement was the crucible of a whole generation of women’s organizations, some of which, like the Siggil Jigeen network mentioned earlier, are seen today as spearheading the women’s movement in Senegal (Kane and Kane, 2012). Yet these “daughter” organizations did not assume a feminist identity but instead chose to align themselves with the women’s movement. They are constantly forced to deal with the increased risk of seeing their discourses disqualified for calling into question traditions or religion (and hence considered illegitimate by an ever-growing fringe of citizens), and the need to give substance to the discourses and programs of their donors or partners. And while their discourse might occasionally take on radical accents and they even call themselves feminists within the space of the WSF, they are more interested in dialog and concerted negotiation with the religious or “traditional” authorities at events organized on the local level (Sieveking, 2008). Thus, it appears that the “local associations of women develop their repertoires of action under the impact of resources and constraints at various levels, both local and national as well as international” (Lacombe et al., 2011). For them, the WSF has certainly represented the combination of a series of opportunities (to prospect for new donors, generate revenue, create ties at the international level, etc.) and constraints (the risk linked to publicly exposing their allegiance to discourses that are robbed of legitimacy due to their exogenous, imported character, and therefore qualified as unsuited to the realities of “Africa” or Islam at the national level).

Another difference from Nairobi: the virtual absence of the LGBT movement in Dakar. Of the 1,069 people surveyed, only 57 had been or were currently actively committed to the LGBT cause. More than half of them stated they were activists for women's movements (42 for women's rights and feminist groups, 34 for women's associations). During the forum, the only workshop devoted entirely to LGBT issues drew an audience of less than a dozen people, seated directly on the ground in a tent without any banner or panel to identify the topic discussed. No Senegalese attended and the discussions took place in English, the only language shared by all the participants in the workshop. In a country that criminalizes homosexuality, the question of the visibility of the LGBT cause was especially sensitive. And homophobic discourse was indeed not absent from the WSF: in the opening march, a popular Senegalese rap group, surrounded by a dense crowd of dancing militants from all over the world, slipped homophobic words in Wolof in between refrains calling for the abolition of Third World debt.24 A scandal had already shaken the public sphere in 2008, when a local newspaper had printed photos of a homosexual wedding said to have taken place in Dakar. An international conference on HIV/AIDS held in the Senegalese capital where homosexual practices in Africa were widely discussed triggered a surge of homophobic discourse in the press. This case raised once again the question of the hostility provoked by the visibility and voice given to homosexuality in a society in which a multitude of forms of silent accommodation prevail (Broqua, 2007). In this regard, the WSF in Dakar definitely tended to adopt a low profile.

More broadly, the women’s issues in Dakar also highlighted the moralizing discourses driving numerous contemporary West African societies, fuelled by the intersection between at least two phenomena that expanded rapidly at the end of the 1980s: the renewal of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa (Soares and Otayek, 2007; Saint-Lary and Samson, 2011) on the one hand, and the revival of traditionalist discourses (Foucher and Smith, 2011: 30) on the other. Rooted in a context marked by a profound, uninterrupted economic crisis since the 1970s, the dismantling of the state under the effect of structural adjustment programs and massive, unchecked urbanization, the support those discourses enjoy within the population is all the greater as development has obviously failed. They actually give a privileged position to women and their behavior, either by elevating them to the rank of

24 One of the artists behind the idea for the caravan, Fou Malade, who joined the “Y’en a marre” movement (We’re fed up) and is among its leaders, has since taken highly virulent official positions against homosexuality. I wish to thank Emmanuelle Bouilly for pointing out these facts.
guardians of “tradition,” or by enjoining them to embody Islamic renewal. Recent research has brought out the consequences for women of this moral renewal of the public sphere and subtly analyzed the different forms of their commitment to these new forms of Islam (Schulz, 2012; Masquelier, 2009). In Dakar, some debates have been indeed caught in the crossfire of sharp criticism opposing “tradition” or “Islam” to the demands and actions in favor of women’s rights. An article in Flammé d’Afrique recounts one of these episodes:

Amphitheater I of the Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, shortly after 10 a.m. On the stage, two ladies and four young men, facing an audience that appeared totally disinterested in whatever they were babbling about. Some were busy with their cell phones, whereas others kept leafing through notebooks and books, revising of course but against a background of whispering. We therefore assumed that they were there just to take a break between classes. Imagine our surprise when the issue came up of early marriage in the Casamance region, based on a project under way in Ziguinchor. The project, called “Women have the right,” is run by the University of Ziguinchor and implemented by students with funding from the Italian NGO COSPE (Cooperation for the Development of Emerging Countries). A young girl of 14, required by her father to enter a forced marriage with her uncle, had repeatedly run away the day before the ceremony was to be celebrated until she was finally saved by the project. The student project leaders raised the father’s awareness about the risks to the girl’s immature body, with the added weight of Senegalese law, which prohibits marriage for young girls before age 16. Moreover, the girl must consent to the marriage and it is prohibited if they are related. The statement of these legal arguments from Senegal’s Family Code, particularly its sociological aspects (age and kinship) caused an outcry from the young people present in the hall. Almost all of them were from Casamance or Fouta; we then realized that contrary to what we had supposed, they were not there by chance and they were listening. Abdoulaye Sy, a first-year student in English, a newcomer from his home community of M’Boumba in Fouta, did not understand why one should not marry off very young girls since, in any case, they would end up pregnant: “At that age, they say we shouldn’t marry them, but we can see that they all have boyfriends.” He took this position despite the explanations of Mrs. Sarr Géneviève, the law professor supervising the young people in the project, who countered with the argument of consent. But Abdoulaye had fixed ideas. Along with him, by the way, several other young people
including Anzoumana Diedhou, a first-year student in English, defended marriage between relatives. “I am *djola* (people of Casamance). When you give your daughter to someone else, for example to a *samba*, who is not going to respect you, it is better that he be a relative...,” he said, putting an end to the argument. What may surprise more than a few in this case is the fact that young people are the ones defending these traditions. But Abdoulaye Sy from Fouta continued to wonder “if others have the right to judge one’s culture.”

In this chapter, I proposed an analysis of women’s issues as a particular configuration deploying itself within a specific and circumscribed space-time. I described its activists, organizations, spaces, tensions, and blind spots. As at previous WSF events, the gap between the numerically massive participation of women and the limited place reserved for their cause was very visible in Dakar. Activists indeed adopted several strategies to counter this marginalization: participation in WSF organization (Gender and Fairness Committee), organization of semi-autonomous events or spaces, strategies for speaking at key forum activities (co-organization and speeches at the assembly of social movements, for example), etc. Nevertheless, my aim here has not been to assess the progress of women’s issues within the WSF dynamic. Rather, I tried to highlight the fact that the dynamics that are shaping the women’s issues within the WSF exceed, by far, women’s issues themselves and require a more grounded approach. In particular, it appears that the connection between African women’s movements (the trajectories, topics, and strategic options at once highly differentiated and yet all marked by development) on the one hand, and the alter-global sphere on the other is by no means obvious. To study women’s issues in Dakar required to question this link rather than take it for granted and examine how African women’s movements seized the forum space to deploy various strategies, only some of which related to women’s issues. Indeed, in a context marked by strong “NGOization” of civil societies and their extreme dependence on donors from the North, continental women’s movements strove not only to “engender” the WSF in Dakar, but also to grasp – in multiple ways – a new space full of opportunities, while dealing with the moral tensions that traverse Senegalese society today, aimed particularly at issues of gender and sexuality.

25 Consulted on May 13, 2013 at the following address: http://africansocialforum.org/actualo/images/docs/flammes/fsm/dakar/FLAMMEDAFRIQUE03.pdf.
Division of labor and partnerships in transnational social movements

Observations of North-South and South-South interactions at the World Social Forum

Hélène Baillot, Isaline Bergamaschi and Ruggero Iori

Abstract

This chapter explores the asymmetries – of power, of access to resources and leadership – at work between and amongst transnational social movements. On the one hand, the purpose of this chapter is that of analyzing the actual structures of inequality that emerge among the members of the alter-globalist movements. On the other, it investigates the explicit strategies deployed by the movements themselves in order to deal with, and tackle, these inequalities between participants. By looking at the 2011 WSF of Dakar, the chapter offers an analysis of the “division of labor” – i.e. the distribution of social roles – within the alter-globalist movement, and of the interactions between activists and organizations from the North and the South. In order to achieve this goal, it considers the cases of North-South partnerships between European and African organizations, as well as cases of South-South cooperation by looking at the forms of engagement between Latin American activists and their African counterparts.

This chapter is based on a twofold hypothesis: first, that the alter-globalization movement continues to be permeated by unequal access to resources and responsibility, and second, that the boundary between North and South is one of the main dividing lines within the movement (Smith, 2002; Pommerolle and Siméant, 2008b; Baillot, 2010). These inequalities are clearly revealed in sociological analyses of how North-South networks and partnerships between activists actually work and of major international activist events aimed precisely at displaying the truly global, representative character of the movement.

Slightly less than half of the activists interviewed at the World Social Forum in Dakar belong to a transnational network (45%). In all, 37% (380 respondents) declared they were members of a North-South international network and 16% (145 respondents) a South-South network. What does
“becoming internationalized” mean for an organization or an activist from the North? Does it mean the same thing for a militant from the South? What can a sociological analysis of the actors tell us about the way in which forms of domination are reconfigured in transnational networks? We find these questions particularly relevant because this aspect is so frequently eluded in the discourse produced by alter-global militants.

In scholarly work, few attempts have been made in this direction, but in our view they have not been entirely successful (Smith, 2002; Kwon, Reese and Anantram, 2008; Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011). In a recent article, Janet Conway (2011) uses the notion of “contact zone” to highlight the influence of (post-)colonial identities and inequalities at work in international social events such as the WSF. The article does not specify, however, how the identities and social roles determined by the categories of “North” and “South” are actually constructed. Rather than analyze what Conway calls the “coloniality of power,” we prefer to study the North-South division of activist labor, its resilience and manifestations. This chapter will thus examine the categorizations of “North” and “South” and how they were reproduced, negotiated and perhaps called into question at the WSF in Dakar.

Our approach here is both qualitative (interviews, workshop observations) and quantitative (statistics derived from survey questionnaires collected during the event). We will begin by examining how activists present themselves and how “partnerships” between organizations of the North and South are managed within the alter-global constellation (Sommier, Fillieule, and Agrikoliansky, 2008). We will show how the asymmetries and inequalities between Forum participants are manifested according to the participants’ continent of origin, using the examples of CRID, ATTAC, and CADTM, three French organizations and networks that helped to create the

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1 The CRID, or Centre de recherche et d’information pour le développement (Center for Development Research and Data), founded in 1976, is a French federation of 53 international solidarity associations representing Christian, Third World, alternative media, and post-1968 anti-imperialist leftist movements including the CIMADE (a French NGO focused on migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers), the CCFD (Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development), Secours Catholique (Caritas), and Peuples Solidaires (ActionAID).

2 ATTAC, or Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and for Citizen’s Action, created in France in 1998, is now an international network present in 40 countries. Its original aim – to introduce a tax on financial transactions – fits into a broader perspective of regulating and controlling “globalization.”

3 CADTM, or the Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt, founded in Belgium in March 1990, is a single-issue association seeking total and unconditional abolition of the debt of the countries of the South. Today it is an international network comprising forty member organizations.
alter-globalization movement. We will then analyze South-South interaction, one of the striking features of the 2011 WSF event. We will examine the forms of legitimation, the resources, and the methods adopted to build these partnerships, which claim to be both alternative and horizontal. Our findings show that hierarchical ranking has also affected so-called South-South cooperation, which has consequently had trouble establishing itself as a more horizontal, egalitarian alternative, particularly for African activists.

5.1 Acting “on behalf of” or acting “with.” Methods of North-South cooperation at the Forum

In this first section, we will reconstruct the approaches to the division of labor between activists of the North and South and the dynamics of internationalizing the networks and organizations under study here. What are the various methods used in North-South cooperation within the alter-global movement? How can we account for the inequalities between their participants?

How do North-South asymmetries manifest themselves in international activist networks?

On Sunday evening, February 6th, the CRID organized a welcome party to mark the opening of the Forum. The reception, which was planned from France, was held in one of the comfortable hotels in the tourist district of Ngor, where the French delegation was staying. After an introductory speech by the president of the CRID, highlighting the “French” delegation in Dakar, the other members were invited to introduce themselves. The French associations were the first to address the group after the president. When it came turn for the partner organizations of the South to speak, time was almost up and the CRID’s Director General tried to speed up the pace. One after another the “partners” went before the microphone to quickly state their organization’s name and country of origin: “Asia... Latin America... go ahead.” The African members were the last to go on stage in a room that was by then almost empty. Outside, around the pool, the buffet was being served.

The second example testifies to a more diffuse form of domination. It is 5 p.m. on February 10th. Twenty-five militants belonging to the ATTAC

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4 The choice of French-speaking organizations is justified by the fact the WSF was held in Dakar, where the French delegation was the second largest, after the Senegalese.
International network were meeting under an open tent to discuss the events of the WSF. One militant from ATTAC France expressed her pleasure at the progress made by the organization: ties between the partners had been strengthened along with the group’s visibility by running a common stand and demonstrating together during the Forum’s opening march. A member of ATTAC Burkina Faso raised a delicate point. There was indeed an ATTAC stand that had been manned by numerous Forum participants, but the name “ATTAC France” was printed in large characters on the banner of their shared tent. Murmurs could be heard throughout the tent. Several members of the French branch, clearly embarrassed, apologized: they had recycled used material without paying attention to the name. To solve the problem, it was suggested that the word “France” be cut out of the banner. The logo and the single name ATTAC would symbolize the network’s new international character.

These anecdotes may seem trivial but they are symptomatic of the problems that arise in transnational activist organizations. The way such networks operate is often very different from the image and angelic principles of equality, solidarity and common cause associated with them. In practice, they are marked by profound inequalities in the information, resources and responsibilities given to the participants. What we see emerging here are elements of an international division of labor between activists of the North and the South.5

The actions, words, and experiences of participants in international militant networks are permeated by North-South inequalities, which are apparent in several revealing mechanisms. In strictly quantitative terms, we observed that the “bulk of the troops” representing the three networks and organizations at the WSF were from the North. The French part of the CRID delegation was twice as large as that of the southern partners: 320 French members compared with about 150 partners. The CRID thus gave the impression it was truly and officially a “French” delegation, which pleased the organization, even though it repeatedly emphasized the importance of its foreign partners. The overrepresentation of members from the North was not always quite so pronounced: only some 30 of the 150 CADTM delegates in attendance at Dakar came from Europe.

From a more qualitative standpoint, the organization and proceedings of the workshops tended to reflect and consolidate existing inequalities. This was evident in concrete, logistical procedures, which, though seemingly unimportant, actually make up the day-to-day work of militants. For

5 On the division of activist labor, see Sawicki and Siméant, 2010.
example, the ATTAC Africa members had drawn up a mailing list called “the ATTAC Africa list.” The members of the ATTAC France network distributed the same list under the same name because they wanted to focus more on African topics. In the eyes of the African activists, the two lists interfered with each other and “severely impeded [their] work,” which is why several of them asked to have the French list eliminated. The ATTAC Africa list also created problems from a more symbolic point of view. One of the ATTAC Burkina activists explained that, “for communication to take place, we need a relationship between ATTAC Europe and ATTAC Africa, not between a country and a continent. ATTAC France was the first, but we don’t want a leader. Today, ATTAC Germany has more members than ATTAC France.” In the case of the CRID, the logistical skills of its delegations were highly valued amid the widespread disorganization of the Forum; their workshops were planned a month before the Forum by one or more French organizations, with the CRID overseeing coordination and preparatory meetings. During the feedback phase after the return from Dakar, many French participants emphasized that they felt like they were taking part in “a forum within the forum.” The CRID’s foreign partners were less enthusiastic, however: in the “evaluation” forms distributed by the CRID at the end of the Forum, they criticized the highly centralized preservation of an exclusive inner circle of Franco-centric activists.

Observations of the workshops also revealed a North-South division of discourse. The Western members adopted an academic, “scientific,” or expert form of discourse, even though the content was often political. The participants from the South talked about specific examples, usually derived from their home country or even their personal experience. This occurred in the workshop on the volatility of commodity prices, co-organized by the association *Les Amis du journal “la Vie”* in which several, mostly older CRID members sporting badges on their T-shirts took part. The workshop, organized in French, resembled a summer university seminar with its standardized discourse and diligent note taking. The non-French-speaking partners of the organizing associations remained on the sidelines; the Senegalese activists took the floor to provide concrete examples. The audience was enthusiastic and responded with hearty applause.

The division of activist labor into “expertise” and “testimonials” is a pattern in the North-South asymmetries within militant movements.

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6 Observation at the WSF of the meeting of ATTAC groups on February 10th at 5 p.m.
7 *La Vie* is a left-of-center Catholic weekly founded in France in 1945.
Does it stem from the participants’ profiles? A sociological analysis shows that even when participants from southern countries possess considerable social capital (compared with the population of their home countries), they are still at a disadvantage compared with their counterparts from northern countries, which may explain why they have fewer responsibilities in the network in general and in forum organization in particular.

Table 5.1 Profile of the actors from the West (North American, Europe) and the South (Latin Americans, Africans, Asians) present at the Forum according to their membership in a North-South transnational network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Members from the North who belong to a North-South network (N = 156) %</th>
<th>Members from the North who do not belong to a North-South network (N = 206) %</th>
<th>Members from the South who belong to a North-South network (N = 202) %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>University-level studies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s or doctoral degrees</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesmen, shopkeepers or small employers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers or liberal professions</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-level occupations, technicians or foremen</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar workers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar workers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural workers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social background (according to the father’s occupation)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesmen, shopkeepers or small employers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers or liberal professions</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-level occupations, technicians, foremen</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working classes</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluency in a foreign language</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience abroad</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Read as follow: 75% of the respondents from the North belonging to a North-South network declared they had received a graduate degree, compared with 60% of the respondents from the North that do not belong to a North-South network and 42% of the respondents from the South belonging to a North-South network.

Activists from the North belonging to a North-South network form an elite within the Forum: 89% of them have studied at the university level and have a college diploma. They are better educated than Western respondents that do not belong to a North-South network. From an occupational standpoint, managers and liberal professions appear to be overrepresented in this group compared with those who do not belong to a North-South network (58% versus 46%). Access to a World Social Forum through membership in a North-South network is not reserved for the affluent classes: 31% of the respondents come from the working classes.\(^8\) The Western members of North-South networks, like the rest of the northern participants, show a strong tendency towards internationalization, demonstrated by their linguistic capital and experiences abroad. Nearly two-thirds have already lived in a foreign country, most of them for over a year.

We find the same characteristics, but to a lesser extent, among the militants of the South that belong to a North-South network. Among this population, the managers and liberal professions make up 46% of the activists, and mid-level occupations 31%. Furthermore, 71% have studied at university and 42% have a graduate degree. They also tend to be internationalized: 53% speak at least one foreign language, two-thirds speak two or more. Half of them have had the experience of living abroad. These survey respondents therefore also have substantial educational, economic, and linguistic capital. They nevertheless differ from their northern counterparts in several ways. First of all, fewer of them continued their studies beyond the undergraduate level (42% compared with 75% of the northerners). Second, fewer southern activists work as managers or in the liberal professions than the northern participants in North-South networks (46% versus 58%). Finally, whereas the majority of activists from the North come from middle or upper class backgrounds (58%), those from the South generally come from working class backgrounds (54%); more specifically, 21% declare their fathers are farmers, 18% white-collar workers and 15% blue-collar workers.

Though the sociological profile of activists from the North and South is an important aspect, it is not enough to explain the continuing division of labor between network members, with the least attractive tasks assigned to those from the South. To find a fresh perspective and new insight to help us understand North-South asymmetries within the alter-global

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8 10% did not reply. We included white-collar, blue-collar and agricultural workers in the working class category. We did not include the mother’s occupation in the analysis due to the very high percentage of no-replies (40-60%).
movement, we will step back for a moment and examine the causes and logic of internationalizing activist organization.

**Understanding North-South modes of cooperation. A look at the internationalization strategies of the networks and organizations**

The North-South division has been a characteristic of, and challenge for, the WSF and the transnational activist movement in general. “While the WSF is in general seen and projected as a ‘project of the South’ (primarily since its formal founders were a group of eight Brazilian organizations and its first meetings were held there),” Jai Sen, an activist and writer of Indian origin, reminds us that “we also need to recognize all its roots, some of which lie in the internationalist North, and not politically romanticize it as exclusively being ‘an arrow from the South’” (Sen, 2013). Like international organizations or businesses, transnational social change groups “work within institutional structures and cultural frameworks that inhibit efforts to fundamentally alter structural power relations,” and the North-South divide has been a major obstacle to the movement’s transnational organization (Smith, 2002: 506 and 508).

Sharing values and a common cause is a core principle of many international solidarity organizations. Yet the phenomenon of NGOs’ and association’s internationalization must also be seen from the angle of political economy, i.e. as one effect among others of competition and changing sources of funding (Siméant, 2005). Internationalization is one of the strategies available to associations to remain viable in the face of competitors or even to get ahead of others by operating on a transnational scale. This is the case for certain actors in the French world of anti-establishment organizations such as the CRID or the CCFD: following the internal repositioning of French associations in the field of development during the 1990s, these groups decided to invest their time and energy at the international level in the struggle “for an alternative world” (Agrikoliansky, 2005).

The transnational strategies of NGOS and international solidarity organizations were also prompted by financing needs. Since the 1990s, European and multilateral institutions have become increasingly substantial donors to NGOs to help them promote “international civil society”9. At the same time, the organizations are more and more systematically required to demonstrate partnerships with actors in the South to obtain public funding. For example, half of CADTM financing in 2009 came from subsidies provided by the

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9 On the impact of funding structures and opportunities on NGOs’ strategies, see Lang 2013.
Belgian Directorate-General of Development Cooperation (DGDC), which reports directly to the country’s Ministry of Development Cooperation since 1998. The DGDC focuses on four types of action: funding partners in low-income countries; raising the awareness of the Belgian population about development problems; offering services to support organization work or local partners; and personnel cooperation (providing development workers, scholarships, internships). Hence, having partners established in the South has become an indispensable ingredient in the development strategies of certain Belgian organizations. One fifth of CADTM funding received from the DGDC is allocated exclusively to “strengthening the network.” The CRID delegation, whose participation at the WSF was financed in large part by the French Development Agency (AFD), has had to meet similar conditions in terms of its composition and representation. Thus, the number and role of partners at the WSF was repeatedly underscored at internal meetings in France because they were key factors in presenting the organization and becoming eligible for funding: the phrase “the CRID derives its legitimacy from its partners...” became a leitmotiv.

For many organizations of the South, setting up partnerships with northern NGOs is the only way of obtaining financing, in the absence of subsidies from their own governments.\(^\text{10}\) Of the African respondents belonging to a North-South network,\(^\text{11}\) 68% declared that all or part of their travel expenses had been funded. For 47%, financing is an essential dimension of North-South collaboration. Opportunities for training, travel, and attending meetings are eagerly sought after. According to the African respondents, the main activities of the network are: the exchange of information (79%), travel (69%), training (67%), and awareness campaigns (70%). Slightly more than half the southern participants declared they had come to the Forum to make contacts (53%).\(^\text{12}\)

North-South partnerships should not be viewed solely in terms of the dispossession or dependence of southern actors. Indeed, even when such partnerships are unequal, they still afford African participants considerable opportunities and resources, which can be reinvested in the activist field at home, as Jean-François Bayart’s notion of “extraversion” (1999) emphasizes.

\(^{10}\)Smith (2012: 512) has also shown that the scarcity of resources, knowledge base, and social capital in the global South is an important aspect of the North-South divide within transnational social movement organizations.

\(^{11}\)They represent 47% of the members of a North-South network and 33% of the African survey population (N=177).

\(^{12}\) Compared with 42% of the African respondents that do not belong to a North-South network. Chi-Square Test significant at a threshold of 5%.
Partnerships also appear to be a route to emancipation, first by overcoming national or continental boundaries (funding from “parent” organizations is mainly intended to pay for airfare to attend international meetings). For example, the airline tickets of the CRID delegates from the South and most CADTM delegates to the Forum in Dakar were largely financed by the AFD and the Belgian DGDC, respectively. The example of Samir, a young student activist in ATTAC Togo, demonstrates the multiple opportunities that open up for individuals who “go into” international activism: participation in a militant event offers a chance to meet others, make contacts and thereby generate new opportunities for funding, travel, and further encounters. During the year 2009, Samir attended the ATTAC-Europe meeting in France, a European Union conference in Brussels, the Conference on Climate Change in Bangkok, and the Conference of African Environment Ministers in Addis Ababa, as well as meetings in Montreal, Mexico, and Dakar to prepare the 2011 WSF. Without a doubt, Samir is now a member of the “jet set” of the global justice movement (Sulmont, 2004). Indeed, he fits the bill perfectly: he has solid university training, speaks fluent French, and demonstrates consummate skill in militant rhetoric. This example is a reminder that making connections at the international level requires certain faculties, whether financial, social, or cultural, which are not available in equal measure to everyone in the transnational activist world. Participating in the WSF hence appears as a learning process (Sen, 2013), especially for those who have the skills to learn.

This trend is confirmed by a comparison between the African survey respondents belonging to a North-South network and the other African militants that took part in the Dakar Forum. The percentage of managers (or liberal professions) and mid-level occupations (41% and 32%) in the first group is higher than in the second group of activists (31% and 21% respectively). Among the Africans belonging to a North-South network, 68% have at least a college degree, 59% speak one or more of their country’s languages, including an international language (Spanish, English, Portuguese, Arabic, French, or Chinese) and 53% have already lived abroad.

Furthermore, playing a dual role (Agrikoliansky et al. 2004; Agrikoliansky and Sommier, 2005), which is quite common among transnational militants, is essential for the southern partners and carries more than financial benefits. By belonging to several organizations, they can “shop around” among northern “parent” organizations for the best offer, i.e. the one that will give them the most advantages. For example, at the ATTAC debriefing after

13 Chi-Square Test significant at a threshold of 1%.
the Forum, the problem of the group’s relationship with the CADTM came up. A member of ATTAC Germany expressed a desire to see ATTAC Africa members become more involved in the activities and marches organized by the ATTAC network. An activist from ATTAC Burkina Faso explained: “You’re wondering why ATTAC Africa members were not with you? It’s because they were with the CADTM, because they have a very well organized network. They even stay at the same hotel.” Indeed, for the opening march, a large majority of ATTAC Africa members from partner organizations in Togo, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, and Morocco had joined up with the members of the CADTM, an organization to which they also belong. About 150 of them were gathered together at the end of the march, galvanized by hip-hop songs from the album Globalisons les résistances and chanting slogans shouted out by a member of ATTAC Burkina. The ranks of the CADTM had thus swollen during the opening march, at the expense of the ATTAC network.

Many northern militants are conscious of the asymmetry existing within North-South networks and they are counting on the situation to evolve: a transnational network can only be built over the long term. This is the view shared by the members of CADTM Belgium, who have adopted a pro-active approach, through their international secretariat, to encourage training for members from the South.

Not all the organizations manifest the same degree of lucidity about the tendencies towards inequality that threaten to undermine them. The survey shows that the steps taken by members of North-South networks have yielded mixed results: 43% of the militants of the South think the North-South network to which they belong does not operate in an egalitarian fashion. Among them, 38% go as far as to say there is a major contradiction between the principle of equality invoked by the organization and the way it functions in practice.

5.2 South-South interactions at the WSF: another kind of cooperation?

So-called South-South cooperation was one of the salient themes of the WSF organized in Dakar. In 2009, the CACIM (India Institute for Critical Action: Centre in Movement) hoped that Dakar would be “a New Bandung of the
People.” In an interview with *Femmes d’Afrique* in Dakar, Demba Moussa Dembelé (Reality of Aid), a member of the Senegalese organizing committee of the WSF, supported South-South cooperation insofar as “it calls into question the traditional type of cooperation, which is merely an instrument of domination by the Western powers” (Bach, 2011). Did the WSF in Dakar signal the burgeoning of a “different kind of cooperation,” an alternative that could overcome the limits of North-South cooperation? Or, on the contrary, did it reproduce the same pitfalls, first and foremost the asymmetry between participants according to their region of origin? Our analysis is based on a sample of 145 respondents belonging to a South-South network.

**South-South networks: more inclusive, more participative?**

Membership in an international network, whether North-South or South-South, appears to be socially selective. The middle and upper classes are overrepresented in these networks in relation to the total African survey population: they make up two-thirds of the African members of international networks compared with half of the rest of African population interviewed at the Forum.

The sociological profile of the African members of South-South networks appears to rank higher on the social scale than that of their counterparts in North-South networks. In terms of social background, the activists whose fathers are managers or exercise a liberal profession are more numerous in the South-South networks (27% versus 18% of the African members of North-South networks, most of whom come from the working class). They are also better educated than those belonging to North-South networks: 53% of those in South-South networks have graduate degrees compared with 40% of those in North-South networks. 56% of them are engaged in management or a liberal profession versus only 41% of those in North-South networks, whereas the latter are found more frequently in mid-level occupations (31% versus 23%). Similarly, the African members of South-South networks have a privileged situation in their organizations, since at the time of the survey they were more frequently salaried employees of an organization (49%) than their counterparts in North-South networks (37%).

16 76% (N=110) came from Africa, 21% (N=31) from Latin America, and 2% from Asia and the Middle East (N=4).
17 Chi-Square Test significant at a threshold of 1% in both cases.
18 Chi-Square Test significant at a level of 1% in both cases.
The South-South networks therefore appear to be more selective, less inclusive and less accessible to African militants. This has not kept the members of South-South networks from participating more actively in the WSF: with higher qualifications, they are perhaps more at ease in public speaking, argumentation, and debate at an international event. For example, at a workshop on ties between social movements and political parties, organized by the Secours Catholique but moderated by African and Latin American “partners,” members of Senegalese far left parties, the Maghreb Social Forum, and the Frantz Fanon Circle demonstrated their erudition in references to literary and militant texts. Due to the topic, the workshop attracted left-wing and far left intellectuals from North

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Militants belonging to a North-South network (N = 214)</th>
<th>Militants belonging to a South-South network (N = 110)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University-level studies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s or doctoral degree</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural workers</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesmen, shopkeepers, small employers</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and liberal professions and foremen</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-level occupations, technicians</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar workers</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar workers</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Employed by an NGO (currently or in the past)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social background (according to the father’s occupation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesmen, shopkeepers, small employers</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and liberal professions and foremen</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-level occupations, technicians and foremen</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working classes</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Read as follows: 40% of the African respondents belonging to a North-South network declared they had received a graduate degree compared with 53% of the African members of a South-South network.

and sub-Saharan Africa engaged in political and trade union struggles. This politicization generated complicity between the African and Latin American participants. It enabled the African participants to do more than merely offer testimonials as victims or project beneficiaries (which they tend to do in North-South workshops) and assume a more militant role, expressing broader, more universal aims (i.e. not rooted exclusively in their daily reality and environment).

The specificity of South-South interactions also hinges on the resources mobilized by certain southern militants that have helped to create the image of a South united in solidarity opposite the “North.”

A South united in solidarity? Shared identity as a method of legitimation

Some southern activists attempted to assert a shared identity. The topic of Afro-descendants was widely exploited by several Latin American delegations, which gave them a connection to a forum in Africa. The historical and cultural link between the two continents served as a slogan for Colombian, Venezuelan, and Brazilians in the workshops.

It was February 7, 2011, in a workshop entitled “Migration is a Human Right,” co-organized by the CCFD. A Colombian activist said he was very happy to be there, to share with Africa, and added: “We Latinos, we have the privilege of having an African culture in our countries. It is the result of a crime against humanity and slavery that brought over twenty million people, but it is also a source of great cultural richness.” In several activities, the Latin Americans addressed the African public as “hermanos, hermanas” (“dear brothers and sisters”), and referred to Africa as “mama Africa.” A sort of brotherhood was professed and exalted. All the Latin American participants we interviewed said it was their first trip to Africa. An Afro-Venezuelan participant claimed to have had a mystical experience when he visited Gorée with his delegation prior to the start of the Forum. Similarly, cultural heritage was used to build a common identity in mobilizing festivities and emotions. Venezuelan, Brazilian, and Senegalese percussionists gave performances on the first and last days of the WSF: it was a genuine process of “festive diplomacy” that attracted an audience that extended beyond Forum participants.

19 On this topic, see the chapter by Bergamaschi, Navarro, and Nez in this book.
20 An island off the coast of Dakar and symbol of the deportation of African slaves to the Americas.
21 Conversations with a Venezuelan militant. With Héloïse Nez.
22 On the role of emotions and “affective reactions that predispose those who experience them to become involved or support a particular cause,” we might mention the work of Christophe Traïni on “devices for raising awareness” (Traïni, 2009:23).
When the Latin Americans were not claiming a common identity, they sought to generate complicity with the African public by highlighting shared experiences: migration, racism, racial discrimination, and the injustices suffered by black populations outside Africa. In the workshop on migration organized by the CCFD and led by its Latin American partners, a Brazilian anthropology professor in jeans and a black shirt with African print introduced himself as a “son of the diaspora” and went on to give a lengthy description of the situation of the sixty million blacks in Brazil and the “chromatic division” of wealth in the country. In some of the North-South workshops mentioned earlier, the role of bearing witness was often reserved for African speakers and audience members to inform or raise the awareness of the Europeans in attendance. In the CCFD workshop, however, the testimonial role was embraced by a Latin American speaker and directed to a predominantly West African audience (Malian and Burkinabe) to create a feeling of kinship. In his speech, he relied much more on his own experience of discrimination and poverty than on scientific or statistical expertise, an approach he claimed was necessary in view of the opposition between the developed world (in this case France) and developing countries. By addressing the audience in French, he transformed what would normally have been an obstacle (his mediocre ability to speak French) into an asset: “I don’t speak the language of Molière but I am happy to use the language of the street, because my French is not academic and I can speak with everybody, taxi drivers and others.”

The interaction observed during this workshop was interesting in several respects. The Africans who were present were a “captive” audience: they were partners mobilized by the CCFD, each one wearing a little blue scarf draped over the shoulder bearing the emblem of the host organization. The initial atmosphere – scholarly and studious – gradually loosened up and the audience expressed their approval of the speakers in a variety of ways (laughing, nodding, throat-clearing, applauding, and expressing thanks at the end); they took notes constantly and asked a lot of questions about various aspects of political, economic, and social life in Latin America. A great deal of South-South interaction was also driven by issues concerning the South as a mirror of the North, the uniqueness of the South in relation to the North (Europe, United States) and criticism of the North. Such discussions ended up producing a uniform image of the South characterized by weak institutions, informality, lack of coordination of initiatives, etc. During the workshop on the link between political parties and social movements, a Colombian militant asserted that activism today must look to Latin America and Africa for critical mass and innovative capacity
because “in Europe, people have become conservative. Their struggle consists in protecting the welfare state and entitlements acquired in the past.” At the end of the workshop on ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas), representatives of various southern countries identified with the topic of Western anti-imperialism. Several Venezuelan workshop organizers talked about the attempts fomented by the US government to destabilize the Chávez regime. The workshop ended with a long pro-government speech by an Ivorian participant who drew an implicit analogy between French neocolonial interventionism in Ivory Coast and American imperialism in Latin America. The mobilizing effect of his words was in direct proportion to the superficial nature of the analogy: the audience improvised and chanted a slogan: “Solidaridad con la Costa de Marfil!” (“Solidarity with Ivory Coast!”). All the same, the need to respect the specificity of national struggles and trajectories (i.e. political experiences in Latin America and the “Arab Spring”) and avoid imposing models of activism was asserted several times during the workshops and discussions between southern activists.

On other occasions, cooperation between governments and social movements of the South was perceived and promoted as a source of alternatives to the North-South system. During the workshop on ALBA, a Senegalese militant called for greater cooperation between Casamance and Venezuela – “close to each other in blood and skin” – at the governmental and social movement levels. He recommended, for example, the creation in Dakar of an “organization to defend the left-wing South” in which “ambassadors of the South (Brazil, Cuba, India, Russia) would come together (...) against the IMF and the World Bank.”

Nevertheless, despite calls for unity and common cause, our observation of the WSF in Dakar reveals that the fragmentation of the South also engendered a hierarchical order among participants.

A fragmented South: controversies and hierarchical effects

The expression “South-South cooperation” should not obscure the fact that the South is increasingly fragmented. Determining who belongs to the South and who is or is not authorized to speak on its behalf was an issue in discussions held in Dakar.

ALBA, launched in April 2005 by Cuba and Venezuela, was conceived as a regional alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) promoted by Washington.
Between heads of state: some of the remarks made by Lula, the former president of Brazil, at a meeting on February 7th held in the Place du Souvenir, irritated the Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade (a long-standing opponent of the Socialist party), who refused to be lectured by “emerging” Brazil.24 Between militants: the possibilities for stepping up exchanges between movements and countries in the South aroused debate because some were suspected of being exploitative relationships. In Dakar, Demba Moussa Dembelé, a member of the Senegalese WSF Organizing Committee, and Ndiahkate Fall, secretary of the Union of Peasant Groups of Méckhé (UGPM), expressed their concern and issued a warning about the seizure of land accompanying Chinese intervention in sub-Saharan Africa (Bach, 2011). Similarly, in several workshops, Senegalese participants sharply criticized the attempts to import an agricultural system based on Brazilian latifundios in northern Senegal. The criticism then took on an anti-imperialist tone (calling the system an imposed model, poorly adapted to African realities), similar to the tone used in condemning the practices of the countries and multinational companies of the North, and the Senegalese government was also blamed for its weakness in the face of such practices.

The fact that certain countries are considered to be “emerging” in global economic and institutional arenas has had echoes and repercussions in the world of transnational activism. According to Fatima Mello, the transformation of Brazil from a country receiving aid into a donor country has led to changes (and greater fragmentation) within national social movements (Mello, 2011: 2). In addition, due to their country’s new international status, some Indian activists feel they have been invested with special mission within the alter-global movement “to influence economic policies in favor of promoting alternatives that would serve the interests of peoples.”25

Other participants acquire a feeling of superiority. Rabia Abdelkrim Chikh (ENDA)26 thinks the World Social Forum in Mumbai in 2004 was “the best organized of all” and members of the Indian organization CACIM have called into question the ability of Africans to mobilize and organize. For example, they accused Kenya, the host of the WSF in 2007, of lacking a “culture of mobilization,” expressed doubts about the suitability of the African continent for organizing WSFs and expressed “various concerns” when the international committee announced that Senegal had been chosen to

24 Le Quotidien, February 8, 2011, p. 12.
26 The Environment and Development of Developing Countries is an NGO founded in 1972 and based in Dakar, Senegal.
host the WSF in 2011. By doing so, they reproduced towards Africans the lack of trust in Indian capacities that South American organizers expressed when it was announced that the 2004 WSF would be hosted by India (Sen, 2013). In Dakar, the Venezuelan delegation’s youth movement representative declared that if “it was hard in Caracas because it rained a lot,” “it’s worse here,” not due to the weather but to lack of organization; at the end of the Forum, incidentally, his delegation called for “stronger, better organization of the event” in the future.

In the same vein, during more informal discussions at the Dakar WSF, South American participants were rather pessimistic about the social movement in Africa: a Colombian participant and the LGBT representative from the Venezuelan delegation said they were shocked by the lack of civil society mobilization, the ignorance, the “manipulation of minds,” and the “mental colonization” prevalent in Senegal. On the sidelines at the workshop entitled “Facing the Challenges of the Present and the Future: How Well is the World Social Forum Doing?” held on the last day of the Forum, a South African activist attributed the poor organization of the 2011 Forum to the apathy of Senegalese civil society, in contrast to the involvement of the Kenyan organizers in Nairobi in 2007. His comments bring out the cleavages between countries and civil societies on the African continent along two main dividing lines already observed at the 2007 WSF in Nairobi (Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011): the first contrasts South Africa, the regional economic and political giant, also known for its dynamic social movements and ability to mobilize its trade unions, with the economically “least advanced” African countries that are dependent upon international aid and in a situation of extraversion, such as Senegal. The second distinguishes between English- and French-speaking countries and movements, which promote different conceptions and practices of collective action and establishes a hierarchy between them.

More egalitarian networks? Division of labor and feeling of equality in South-South networks

South-South activities and networks are finding it hard to challenge the division of activist labor and overcome the stumbling blocks traditionally associated with North-South interaction. In certain concrete “cooperation” situations they reveal an inability to eliminate entirely the (real or supposed) inequalities between their material conditions and those of African

participants. This was the case, for example, with a professor of Spanish at Cheikh Anta Diop University, who gave valuable support to the Venezuelan ambassador to Senegal, but whose role at the Forum was confined to logistics (preparing, running, and tidying up the stand) and translating from Spanish to French at workshops. At the press conference organized by the Venezuelan delegation on the last day of the Forum, two Senegalese and a Cape Verdean expressed their desire to see the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) provide more funding and called for greater collaboration and “strengthening of capabilities.” Such appeals to Latin America reflect the fact that South Americans continue to be perceived much the same way as northern organizations and activists – namely, as potential donors. They also indicate the prevalence of old reflexes and the assimilation of the distribution of roles and ways of being and interacting acquired in North-South cooperation, particularly in the sub-Saharan context. In some workshops, by the way, African militants referred to Latin America as part of the North and, in the course of a conversation with a Mexican member of the survey team, southern activists told her they consider her as being from the West.

These observations appear to be confirmed by the analysis of the replies to quantitative survey questions concerning the feeling of equality in network operation. Among African members of North-South networks, 60% declared the network functioned in an egalitarian manner, 26% thought that it tried to do so but sometimes failed, and 14% stated there were major contradictions between the organization’s principles and its actual practices. The percentage of Africans that felt their South-South network operated in an egalitarian way was slightly lower (55%) than for the North-South networks: 30% thought the South-South network tried to work in an egalitarian manner but did not always succeed perfectly, and 15% that its *modus operandi* was clearly non-egalitarian. African activists are thus more inclined to point out inequalities in the workings of South-South networks. In any case, the survey results do not indicate that the African members experience South-South networks as operating in a more egalitarian fashion.

A separate study would be required to interpret these results in depth. There are, however, a few hypotheses that might explain this result. It is possible that African activists interiorize their domination, which would lead them to view the asymmetries between northern and southern militants in activist networks as normal; or they may be reluctant to criticize partnerships that provide resources (see paragraph below). It is also possible that the inequalities in South-South networks are felt more strongly than in North-South networks because the South-South networks create higher
expectations regarding equality, and/or that the organizations of the North are more concerned about euphemizing the asymmetries between participants through various devices and procedures intended for that purpose.

Table 5.3  Perceived feeling of equality in transnational network operation by the members, according to geographical origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of a North-South network</th>
<th>The network operates in an egalitarian manner %</th>
<th>The network tries, not always successfully, to operate in an egalitarian way %</th>
<th>There are strong contradictions between the principles of equality and the actual operation of the network %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activists of the North</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activists of the South</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- African activists</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of a South-South network</td>
<td>- African activists*</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*We would note the low number of respondents in these categories and/or the high rates of no reply. Consequently, these results should be interpreted with caution.


South-South partnerships do have a specific feature, however. Indeed, the possibilities open to African activists through participation in a North-South or South-South network are not identical: in this case, membership in a North-South network appears to offer greater professional and financial opportunities (training, travel and meetings, funding). Thus, South-South cooperation between social movements may in fact be different and more balanced for the participants – because it is less rooted in donations and the financing dimension – but at the same time paradoxically seem less attractive and advantageous to sub-Saharan African movements with few other sources of funding.

Based on the experience of the Dakar WSF, this chapter has presented a picture of the many ways in which the asymmetries within the alter-global movement are expressed according to the origins of the activists. An international division of labor between northern and southern participants is emerging in transnational activist networks and generating criticism of European organizations. This process becomes clearer (which does not mean legitimated) when we take into account the logistical issues that have prompted the actors to adopt internationalization strategies.
In our study, we have pinpointed certain specific features of South-South interaction, particularly in their legitimizing discourse, the way they present themselves, and the mechanisms of participation. Although so-called South-South partnerships claim to be more representative and better able to speak for the South, they are more selective with regard to African activists and they are seen by their African members to be egalitarian in their operations than North-South networks. Northern organizations often plan the activities to stage encounters between movements and participants of the South. In addition, hierarchies and asymmetries exist between several “Souths:” between the aid-dependent South and the “emerging” South; between Latin America and Asia, on the one hand, and Africa on the other, as well as between activists on the African continent. Thus, there does not appear to be any evidence that South-South networks operate in a more inclusive, horizontal way than North-South networks.

All these elements recall the extent to which the distinction between “North” and “South” is central to the functioning and structuring of the alter-global movement and that these categories and their operating modes are now being reconfigured. They are an invitation to pursue the analysis of this long-neglected aspect of activist movements in greater depth.
Making waste (in)visible at the Dakar World Social Forum

A Goffmanian perspective on a transnational alter-global gathering

William Herrera, Alice Judell and Clément Paule

Abstract

In this contribution, we look at waste management techniques at the Dakar 2011 World Social Forum and the different tactics deployed to preserve the façade of a clean, environmentally conscious, and organized transnational alter-global gathering. By using a theatrical metaphor, we take into account the way in which organizers of the Dakar WSF have attempted to present this international alter-global event to activists, media and other participants, the ways in which they have tried to guide and control the impression formed on the event, and the types of activities and techniques employed to sustain their performance before participants.

“Prepare yourself for chaos,” said a seventy-year-old German activist when he learned that, like most activities planned for the day, the classroom where he was supposed to attend a workshop on the “Jasmine revolution” was occupied by Senegalese first-year university students who were in the middle of their first-semester law examination. The unavailability of classrooms and the absence of updated information on campus at the Université Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD) of Dakar for the activities of the first

1 This type of comment (or other kinds of remarks, such as “It is a very irresponsible attitude by the organizers, the trip to come here was very expensive!” – Herrera’s field notes on February 6, 2011), were quite common from the early hours of the Dakar World Social Forum as tensions arose days before between the UCAD Board of Education and the WSF Local Organizing Committee preventing access to over 100 rooms throughout the campus for workshops. These remarks were later on reinstated by the Working Group in charge of the evaluation of the Dakar Forum Event: “Dakar was a disaster for the individuals that participated; they spent a lot of resources to get there and were lost most of the time. The forum failed for those thousands of individuals. Networks fared much better, because of word of mouth or self-organization.” At the same time, the participants’ improvised self-organizing abilities were praised, particularly in this chaotic context. WSF International Council, Evaluation Dakar Forum Event, in: http://openfsm.net/projects/ic-methodology/wsf11-evaluation-synthesis.
The day of the 2011 World Social Forum (WSF) created feelings of confusion and discomfort among participants. These feelings would worsen on the second day, as most classrooms were still unavailable for WSF activities. By the third and fourth day, it was the arrival of dozens of Senegalese street vendors on the campus main arteries that caught the attention of participants. Wooden statues, T-shirts and other local items contributed to a colorful, Senegalese-impregnated décor. By the fifth day, the forum was reaching its climax; the Assembly of Social Movements gathered together most of the participants and representatives of local and international organizations, where they tried to plan the next stages of their respective transnational mobilizations. Parallel to this fervent activist activity, disposal piles grew near the borders of the UCAD campus, far away from the main stages of the WSF.

While some authors consider the World Social Forum and its regional manifestations as a laboratory to explore transnational activism (Smith et al., 2007; Agrikoliansky and Sommier, 2005), we can also view the WSF as a material and symbolic universe in itself with its own practices and representations of social and militant activity. In line with this perspective, in this contribution we will be looking at waste management techniques at the Dakar 2011 World Social Forum and the different tactics deployed to preserve the façade of a clean, environmentally conscious, and organized transnational alter-global gathering. Using Erving Goffman’s theatrical metaphor (Goffman, 1959), we will take into account how the organizers of the Dakar WSF attempted to present this international alter-global event to activists, media, and other participants, the ways in which they tried to guide and control the impression formed at and of the event, and the types of activities and techniques employed to sustain their performance before participants.

Few insights can be extracted on the way the specific issue of waste disposal was handled, actually used and sometimes criticized by multiple actors intervening as spectators, performers, or directors of what could be considered the World Social Forum as a “public stage” of the alter-

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2 For a general presentation of the WSF as a public stage of the Global Justice Movement or alter-global movement, see Rucht (2011: 19). “Major gatherings such as congresses, jamborees, and mass protests, whether contentious or not, help to create and sustain social movements. In such gatherings, the adherents of a social movement physically meet with two aims: They first send a message to the outer world, making it aware of their existence, worldviews, demands and activities. To this end, slogans are formulated, keynote-speakers selected, journalists invited, and media-oriented events staged to demonstrate the strength and vitality of movement. Gatherings thus serve primarily as public stages. Less obviously, these gatherings also aim at strengthening internal bonds by permitting activists to talk to one another, exchange experiences, bridge cleavages, and express solidarity.”
global movement. In this case, to analyze waste management practices in an activist space, we need to consider the local material conditions that play a role in the development of this transnational contentious gathering (Pommerolle and Siméant, 2011). Also, we strongly believe that the lack of attention and research on waste, in other words its invisibility, should be taken into account. As Honor Fagan puts it: “[waste] is usually invisible (mostly hidden), deemed unproductive and certainly not well researched” (Fagan, 2002: 5).

Nevertheless, studying waste management practices may allow us to unveil some hidden aspects of the WSF. The sociology of social movements should also have alternative entry points to their object of study. Indeed, bins, waste dumps, and waste-related objects are not noble per se, but in contrast to the official and overconstructed face of activist activities, they are still especially invested by activism at large. Observing waste enables us to shed light on these dichotomies. We should also keep in mind the hard challenge posed by waste management in a context where the resources are scarce and also unequally distributed between the heterogeneous landscape of organizations participating in the event. Thus, the difficulties encountered by the organizers will not be considered here as failures or flaws, but rather as revealing some asymmetries, which contribute to shape the WSF.

6.1 Waste management as stage-setting for a transnational alter-global event

First, one should look at the way the façade of the WSF was designed through the example of waste management conceived as a specific scene of the global staging of the alter-global movement. Therefore our analysis will focus on three main points: after a brief overview of what seems to be a public issue in Dakar, we will try to describe how the waste problem was conceived and integrated into the staging of the WSF. Finally, we will illustrate how waste management was actually set up within the UCAD campus according to our observations during the investigation.

3 “Sociology treats ‘waste’ as if it was literally immaterial, as if it existed in a world apart from the one we inhabit in our daily, routine lives” (O’Brien, 1999).
4 Our sincere thanks to Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle and Johanna Siméant for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
5 For this contribution, we rely on some tools of the ethnographic approach as a way to examine international activists and local organizers in action and to explore the dispositions, incentives, and skills these groups of actors attach to waste management practices, which is a
while, several lines of research regarding the global and local dimensions of the event’s organization will be discussed.

Waste management remains a recurrent problem not only in UCAD, but also in the city of Dakar as a whole. In the first decade of the 21st century, several actors shared this policy sector, among them two departments of the central state – the Ministry of Environment (Ministère de l’Environnement) and the Ministry of Culture, Gender and Quality of Life (Ministère de la Culture, du Genre et du Cadre de vie) –, private companies, and local authorities. A multi-million-dollar project financed by the World Bank and implemented by an Italian company started in 2005 to improve the situation in the Senegalese capital but was abruptly ended by the government in 2007. Recent attempts to reform its governance led to the foundation of a new public-driven organization created in 2006: the APROSEN (Agence Nationale pour la Propreté au Sénégal). Then, a consultation process led to the creation of a public-driven company in the summer of 2011, the SOPROSEN (Société pour la Propreté du Sénégal), which was empowered with responsibility for waste management throughout the country. But this structure coexists with regional-level agencies, like the Entente Cadak-Car, which was operating across the entire provincial territory.

This institutional turmoil was punctuated by recurrent struggles such as the conflict between local authorities and the state over the devolution of powers in this specific policy area. We should also mention the 2010 controversy over the contract binding the French firm Veolia and the Dakar town hall, denounced as unfair by 19 Senegalese companies. The waste management market in Dakar was valued at 10 billion CFA (about 15 million euros) in 2010. But one should also note the mobilizations of waste workers, especially during the WSF where they complained about their wages and status within the reform. Furthermore, the FUTN union (Front Unitaire des Travailleurs du Nettoiement) threatened to strike if the authorities ignored their claims. Thus, the organizing committees of the upcoming WSF in Dakar faced a complex situation with fickle support from the central authorities. This set of constraints has to be kept in mind to understand the local context in which WSF organizers had been working during the months of preparation for the event. But we should point out that this issue may

particular aspect of activist life in a World Social Forum. In this way we try to address the “double absence: of politics in ethnographic literature and of ethnography in studies of politics” pointed out by Javier Auyero (2006: 258). For this kind of approach in the study of social mobilization, see also Wolford, 2006. For a discussion on the ethnographical approach in the study of social mobilization, see Combes et al., 2011.
also have been a critical one for local authorities, since it was an element at
the core of the university’s reputation and by extension the renown of the
entire capital city and even the country. In fact, a large part of the Senegalese
economy relies on tourism, which is why the image of Dakar – along with
other priorities like security – had to be preserved.⁶ Thus, it should be seen
not only as a matter of staging the event – conceived as a purely autonomous
scene produced by and dedicated to foreign activists – but also as a way to
enclose it in the country.

Organizing a WSF is a complex, multi-leveled process in which various
actors at the international, regional, and local levels have to cope with a
number of logistical aspects in keeping with the internationally agreed
organization standards issued by the World Social Forum International
Council (IC) and the local resources available. In order to handle the
multiplication and diversification of “social forums” around the globe, the
IC adopted in 2008 the Guiding Principles for Organizing a World Social
Forum Event⁷ as a means to set standard rules for designing and organ-
izing this particular kind of activist performance. Among these jointly-
declared principles, which include those of “participation” and “equality of
access,” there are specific criteria for the choice of “the venue”, as special
consideration needs to be given to “transportation to and from the venue,
environmental conditions – plastic bags and bottles, overuse and misuse of
paper, use of recyclable materials and so on, and levels of cleanliness and
hygiene. It would be highly desirable to make the space for the duration of
the event into a ‘common’, to which not just the organizing committee but
all the participating organizations have a responsibility in manner of use,
maintenance, and upkeep.”⁸

For organizers, particularly at the international level, the tangible aspects
of setting up a World Social Forum are critical in order to show consistency
in activist conduct between proclaimed principles and actual practices. For
instance, throughout the preparation and evaluation of the two previous
WSF editions in Nairobi and Belem, there were debates on how to set up the

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⁶ Touristic, economic, and commercial dimensions were also a part of the first World Social
Forum organized in the African territory. In Nairobi in 2007, the organization of the World
Social Forum was seen as an “economic opportunity” to promote local tourism for authorities,
entrepreneurs – represented by Kenyan and transnational firms which partly financed the
alter-global event – and local craftsmen (Pommerolle and Haeringer, 2012).

⁷ Adopted in a plenary session of the IC on September 24, 2008 in Copenhagen. These Princi-
bles are constantly being adapted in accordance with changing WSF organizational practices.

⁸ Guiding Principles for Holding WSF Events, available at: www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/
forum’s physical space and what this symbolizes in terms of the “alter-global ethos” (Audrain et al., 2008: 151). In Nairobi in 2007, scholars have pointed out that one of the main controversies throughout the event concerned the “commercialization” of the WSF, which in the eyes of international and local activists was perceived as a deviation from the “true nature” of World Social Forum space (Pommerolle and Haeringer, 2007). Furthermore, in 2009, the issue of the impact of this kind of event on the local environment was central in the discussions on how to preserve the façade of the event: “To avoid the contradiction of not respecting the environment in the Amazonia and be free of media criticism, the Organizing Committee and the IC should insert in the discussion of Methodology the impact of holding a WSF in Belem (airline travel, local pollution generated by transportation, trash produced by participants, impact on climate, reduce the usage of plastic and paper, and other environmental issues).” These concerns were followed up during the evaluation of the Belem WSF: “It’s important to ensure the coherence between theory and practice concerning ‘sustainability’. Issues related to waste disposal and recycling, resources conservation, transportation, territory planning, and others should be considered more seriously.”

References to these “principles” were very common during the preparatory stages of the 2011 WSF, for which a subcommittee dedicated to waste was specifically constituted within the logistics committee. Reports of the preparatory meetings and seminars show that organizers were quite aware of the waste situation in UCAD and Dakar: “an ongoing effort to raise awareness regarding waste during the Forum is expected, to avoid its formation and to plan its sorting and disposal. The SOC [Senegalese Organization Committee] has been integrating garbage collectors and recyclers in the logistics committee in order to develop alternative options.” In this sense, the infrastructure and hygienic aspects of the organization were a key part
during the meetings held between the *Local Organization Committee* (LOC) and the Dakar authorities.\(^\text{12}\)

Waste management at the Dakar WSF had visible aspects (and other less visible as we shall see in the last section of this chapter) throughout the UCAD campus. During our fieldwork, we immediately encountered the “green garbage bins” which had been put up by the organizers in several areas of the campus. Here, let us take a walk through the main scenes of the event to describe briefly the impression given by the official waste system during the 2011 WSF. After entering the campus, the bins did not actually appear until we arrived in the surroundings of UCAD 2, the area of the university campus where most tents and villages of organizations and the press were concentrated. Then there were bins scattered in the alleys, which led to the roundabout between the Grand Podium and the Library, which was partially transformed into a Press Center. A few bins had also been set up in the surroundings of Brazil’s pavilion, which had its own system of waste disposal with black bins though without recycling instructions, and between the FST (*Faculté des Sciences et Techniques*) and the FSJP (*Faculté des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques*). But they had become few and far between compared with UCAD 2 near-military checkering and did not last the entire event. Furthermore, there was also a difference between UCAD 2, where bins were often paired with sorting instructions, and other areas, where they were put up as a single unit. Workshops and activities were most often organized in those areas, although the cancelations and disorganization could lead the participants to wander around other places less “prepared”. We also noticed that forum bins were not very visible during the opening day, and then their number grew quickly on the second and third days of the event to stabilize until the end of WSF.

Such observations led us to suggest that the concept of a *sensitizing device* proposed by Christophe Traïni (Traïni, 2010) might be useful to underline the role of material things and the layout of objects in the staging of the event. One should highlight the distribution of green garbage bins mostly in the UCAD 2 area, where the majority of organizations had set up their tents during the WSF. We will deal with this issue later (see last section of this chapter), but at this point we should nonetheless draw attention to several points. First, let us take a look at the color of the objects: these bins were similar to several others we had encountered in the city,

\(^{12}\) “Note de rencontre avec la Mairie de Dakar,” August 31, 2010. A few informal interviews with Senegalese students and waste collectors revealed that the big alleys and the space dedicated to the tents had been cleaned up two months before the event.
but it seems they had been painted green for the occasion. Then, the presence of paper sheets indicated which objects should be recycled or not: on one hand, non-plastic items, and on the other, those made of plastic or aluminium. The standardization of these objects shows how organizers had been trying to convey techniques to sensitize the audiences regarding waste management.
Finally, certain organizations and their stands played an important part in reinforcing this environmentally friendly impression of the WSF stage, like the Dakar-based ENDA (Environnement et Développement du Tiers-Monde), one of the leading organizations concerned with waste management. It soon became clear as the forum unraveled that the Dakar WSF was to be a major space of dissemination for ENDA’s network. The leader of ENDA Maghreb, Tawfik Ben Abdallah, was one of the key members of the organizing committee, and will continue to be so, as the next WSF was in Tunis, home of ENDA Maghreb. ENDA, through an impressive web of different centers of activism, was thus at the core of organizing the forum. The headquarters of most of ENDA’s branches are in Dakar, and this organization has increasingly played a significant role in African alter-global movements. ENDA’s presence was visible throughout the forum, from the opening march with hundreds of banners to UCAD, with tents and material resources displayed across campus. Topics such as sustainable development, access to land, and waste management are at the core of ENDA activism.

ENDA Ecopole, one of the major branches of the regional NGO, is specifically concerned with waste and recycling practices, and has been involved with the Dakar dump for decades. During the Dakar WSF, ENDA Ecopole highlighted the concern given to waste management during the preparation phase. Its stand was one of the most visible ones upon entering the formal grounds of the WSF. Not only was the stand very colorful, but also clean and well equipped. The inside of the tent was covered with educational posters on electronic waste and the Mbeubeuss dump of Dakar; they had publications (free and for sale), and at least one member of the organization was present at all times. Thus, this organization could not be ignored as a part of the staging at the core of this paper. Indeed, ENDA Ecopole had planned to organize two workshops on waste management. However, only one entitled Electronic Solidarity and Waste Platform (Plateforme Solidarité Numérique et Déchets) occurred on Wednesday, February 8th. It took place at the local UCAD Internet cafe, where all modern technologies and comfort were available (computers, sound system, projectors, seats and tables for all participants, air-conditioning, etc.). Many different speakers (from Senegal, France, and Colombia) were scheduled, including representatives from the Senegalese government, UCAD, NGOs, and waste-pickers. As the workshop was focusing on electronic waste and reducing the digital gap, there was a strong normative conflict among the various speakers. On the one hand, there were the representatives of formal institutions, such as the government and UCAD, who advocated the formal establishment of the Mbeubeuss dump, waste disposal, and recycling practices, the fight
against illegal import of waste and the reduction and better management of waste. On the other hand, there were the representatives of the pickers, and waste-related NGOs such as ENDA Ecopole, who advocated maintaining the status quo, i.e. protecting the waste-picker profession and empowering local actors in waste management processes. However, what was striking was the common stage face they all shared. As performers, they tacitly agreed to hold a common ground on the idea that they were all working together. The mise-en-scène of the representative of the Mbeubeuss Pickers’ Union, with a very emotionally and politically driven speech, added to the construction of a common ideology of waste. One of UCAD representatives mentioned the case of the campus, and the problems encountered in waste management and treatment, but this was the only link that was made in a four-hour workshop between waste in general and waste at the WSF.

The next morning, ENDA Ecopole organized a visit of the Mbeubeuss dump for partner NGO members, journalists (BBC Africa and Croatian television), and two researchers (including one of the authors of this contribution). The visit or more precisely tour of the dump was very well orchestrated. Not only did the participants have to follow unquestioningly all instructions (such as the prohibition of photographs or video recording and the strict requirement to stay on the path planned for the tour), but the discourses of both the Pickers’ Union representative and the members of ENDA Ecopole were identical to those of the workshop and previous journalistic visits of the dump. The analysis of both the workshop and the Mbeubeuss tour demonstrates a strong inclination on the part of NGOs and their partners to set forth and transpose a particular discourse on waste. This discourse is not, however, linked to any practical organizational matters, such as the management of waste at the forum. There is a gap between the staged discourses on waste and the actual presence of its performers within an activist forum, where waste also matters. This gap reflects one of the broader debates within the transnational environmentalist movement(s). For many years, deep ecologists have tried to prove that nature and the environment should be at the top of all political agendas. Development advocates, on the other hand, have argued that some forms of environmentalism harm the poorer of the world (Wenz, 2007). Thus social justice movements and environmentalism have clashed over issues such as waste management, with the former arguing against the dispossession of waste-pickers and the latter arguing for the formalization of dumps.

13 Video dated from 2008 from the Canadian International Development Research Centre, accessible on web.idrc.ca/fr/ev-133936-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html.
This gap often represents the overwhelmingly present divide between the North and South discourses of transnational environmentalism: it involves not only the question of historical responsibility for pollution, but also the present cases of “individual lifestyles of activists being at variance with ecological principles” (Kothari, 1996: 159). Furthermore, as these seemingly contrary ideologies of social and environmental justice on the one hand, and deep ecology on the other, reach a common ground, the issue of the place of ecology in social movements has become primordial. Indeed, environmental issues in a broader sense were at the center of most debates during the Dakar WSF. However, as justly pointed out by Kothari more than a decade ago, there is still a disconnect between transnational ecological discourse and practice (Kothari, 1996).

6.2 Audiences

This second section will look at the actual settings and audiences of the WSF regarding waste uses and management. Here we use the terms “settings” and “audiences” as Goffman defines them, i.e. the public and the place where human action takes place (Goffman, 1959: 22). However, the forum form also implies that the actors/performers and the public are part of the same group, the audience in general terms. Also, as we will explain further in the next section, the formal setting or stage where the interactions take place is well defined and exclusive. The allocated space for the forum, the visible and legitimate stage for interaction, is itself divided into defined stages and audience terrains.

With regard to these basic assumptions about waste in the forum, garbage-related objects, whether bins, disposal piles, and handicrafts made of recycled waste or stray waste can be considered as props: they are part of the décor, the setting. Within the material culture of protest, these objects are used to enact and convey diverse social meanings (O’Brien, 1999). The particular use of special World Social Forum bins, made of half barrels and painted green with black writing, illustrates this argument. In a sense, the participants at a forum will adapt their actions regarding waste, and especially waste disposal, to the setting they are in. On stage, they tend to follow the rules of the land, that is, to use the bin-props that are available. Backstage they are more likely to follow and use other rules and props when it comes to waste. The idea here is not to generalize about behavior or modes of action, because of the immense diversity of participants and stages within the forum setting, but rather to shed light on some patterns detected
while observing relationships to waste. As soon as the “official” WSF bins appeared on the forum as well as paper signs indicating the “proper” fates of different types of waste – also known as recycling –, it was observed that participants tended to follow (without question) the instructions. Whether or not the waste was to be “properly” disposed of and recycled was not a preoccupation; the concern was rather to follow the rules of waste disposal.

Normatively, bins are used to dispose of waste and garbage, and these were the appropriate/legitimate purposes planned for these objects. In this sense, bins were mostly found at strategic places such as food outlets, resting spots (stairs, building entrances, grassy areas, etc.), or next to major stands or alleyways. What was not planned was the possibility for alternative or, in other words, inappropriate/illegitimate, uses of these green metallic containers. Here, bins are not only part of the décor, but can be considered as props, tools to carry out human interactions. In this particular case, several alternative uses were observed. The first, and quite frequent one, was the use of bins as seats during workshops or performances. The immense lack of material resources and organization at the forum led to a scramble for any piece of furniture (or, as in the case here, non-furniture) by the participants and organizations present. One of the representatives of the small French NGO Solidarité had to stay permanently at her stand during the first two days in order to secure her one and only chair and some planks of wood.14

Another alternative use of bins was as blocking material. During the second and third days of the forum, the local student movement of ‘non-oriented’ alumni grew in both visibility and importance. They were protesting against the lack of student positions at the university where the forum took place.15 Their arguments were therefore outside of the forum sphere but better heard within it. While marching, they used the bins and waste that were available to blockade the main alleys leading to the library. The use of these bin-props, objects branded WSF, was a very material demonstration of improvised and unforeseen protest at this “activist theater” (Audrain and Pommerolle, 2008: 180). Not only did these young protesters integrate

14 Informal chat between Alice Judell and Maëlle Bouvier from Solidarité.
15 Cf. Herrera and Paule’s field notes on February 8, 2011. The first student protest during the WSF took place around 2 p.m. while we were looking for the site of a conference that we never found. We were asking for directions from students or lost fellow activists when we heard some sort of crowd roaring inside the campus. A few minutes later, we were able to locate about 30-40 students who were demonstrating in the big alley in front of the library and heading to the University Rectorate. Followed by a European journalist with a video camera, the group was asking for “orientation” and described itself as a group of alumni prevented by the university administration from registering as proper students.
the forum’s stage to further their message, but they also used the available props, its material symbols.

Another use of the bins was as a souvenir. During the forum, all forum-branded objects, such as T-shirts, bags, banners, and bins, were very much sought after by mostly local but also international participants at the forum. On the third day of the forum, one of the authors was able to purchase a WSF bag at a recently opened, informal stand behind UCAD 2. The vendor had many WSF-branded objects and was turning a large profit. The sale of bins was not witnessed, but during the days immediately following the forum, some participants and locals took bins, whether to use them as flowerpots or fire barrels or simply as souvenirs. Later on, after the forum, the bins were piled up in corners of the campus, but also reused as garbage cans for other events within the university. Indeed a Google conference took place several days later and the bins were reused for that event.

Illustration 6.2  Bins piled up after the WSF

Other spaces in the forum setting were allocated to exhibitions and the sale of handicrafts made from or inspired by waste-related objects, reinforcing a material culture of protest specific to the African alter-global movement, which was manifest at the Dakar WSF. Let us note here that the use of

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Post-WSF observations by the authors.
recycled plastic containers to make African-style masks illustrated two processes that were present at this forum. The first relates to the social and material construction of African identity and unity at the forum using symbols of “Africa” as it is perceived in the rest of the world – such as the “voodoo” myth of the African mask. The second is related to waste and to the fight for the preservation of an informal economy based on garbage as it takes place in most African dump sites today (see section 1 on the Mbeubeuss dump). Also the presence of artifacts made of recycled objects demonstrates the importance of informal economies in tourism-related trade. Indeed, handicrafts made from informally recycled waste have become a souvenir trade throughout most of the African continent. This denotes the intention of organizers and participants to place the importance of informal and solidarity-based economies dependent on recycling and waste at the center of the forum (both geographically and thematically).

While the audience itself – in other words, the participants – at the WSF was highly diverse and prompted by varied motives, the state of the global environment represented a recurring feature of interest. Indeed, in relation to the environmental issue, the statistical data collected throughout the forum for this project indicates that almost one quarter of all participants questioned declared that they were or had been an active or passive member of an environmental group or organization. However, when asked which debate or topic they considered the most compelling so far at the WSF, only 35 interviewees out of 1,070 mentioned the environment. More surprisingly, only one participant mentioned waste management as an issue in a comment on electric and electronic waste management. Thus, although the state of the environment seemed to be an important preoccupation during the staging of the WSF, pollution and environmental degradation appeared to be treated as a secondary matter at the individual level for the participants responding to the survey. Moreover, the total absence of comments on waste management at the forum in the questionnaires collected could indicate that the fate of waste immediately after consumption was taken for granted (the act of disposing

17 Out of 1,070 participants questioned, 150 declared they were active members of an environmental organization, 58 passive members, and 38 declared having been members in the past.
18 The broader environmental issues were mentioned as “climate change(s)”, “sustainable development”, “ecology”, “environment”, “environmental justice”, “pollution”, “desertification”, “biodiversity”, “climate”, “CO2”, “Rio +20”, “climate justice” and “waste.”
19 It should be noted that this participant filled out the questionnaire during the aforementioned workshop by ENDA, and declared himself as working for the Institute for Environmental Sciences of Dakar.
waste in a bin and/or separating waste into different bins) as an on-stage rule, but the ultimate destiny of waste produced by the WSF after it left the stage did not seem to be of interest. In other words, even if the analysis of the statistical data collected does not allow us to go further on this matter, we submit the hypothesis that waste management can be viewed as a “suppressed activity” in the Dakar WSF activist space, as opposed to

Illustration 6.3  African masks made from recycled waste on display at the center of UCAD 2 main roundabout

Photo by Alice Judell
other “manifest activities” such as the eagerly-awaited Assembly of Social Movements. This management of activities – whether they are manifest or suppressed – allows us to go through the looking glass by questioning the invisible backstage of the forum related to the visible on-stage activist space.

6.3 Backstage tactics and the boundaries of an institutionalized activist space

Alongside the fervent activist activity during the six days of the WSF, disposal piles grew on the edges of the UCAD campus, particularly in three areas that went unnoticed by most participants: near UCAD 2 where most of the organization tents were set up, between students’ residences behind the Faculté de Lettres et Sciences Humaines (around the Hallway of Death – le Couloir de la mort20) and behind the Faculté de Sciences et Techniques. However, the main areas seemed relatively clean in spite of the mass presence of activists, street vendors, and UCAD students. Waste management techniques during the WSF worked in such a way that most of the trash collected from garbage bins was later piled up essentially in these “invisible” places where individual garbage collectors would select certain items before burning the disposal piles.

We mentioned earlier that by arranging green garbage bins along specific areas of the UCAD campus and stressing recycling practices, organizers sought to establish the initial ideal setting for this type of transnational gathering in order to raise awareness about waste disposal21 as a routine during the event. Nevertheless, at the Dakar 2011 World Social Forum, some aspects of militant activity were accentuated, such as workshops, assemblies, and protest marches, while others were “suppressed,” such as drinking beer or


21 Goffman mentions the importance of the “initial definition of the situation” projected by an individual, which tends to provide a “plan for the cooperative activity that follows.” In this case, the cooperative activity relied on the use by WSF participants of green bins to throw away garbage and even to sort garbage into specific bins for plastic or non-plastic objects. In the end, even if the recycling practices were not always respected, the content of the bins would be mixed up later on “backstage” as plastic and non-plastic waste were a part of the same disposal piles.
waste management techniques.\footnote{It was rare to see participants drinking beer on the main stages of the WSF, even though it was a common “activity” which took place in the less visible refreshment areas.} Broadly speaking, the spatial dimension of the WSF offered us a few examples of this division, as some places were actually excluded from the physical stage, such as the so-called “refugee camp,” which gathered various caravans of participants coming from nearby African countries. This appellation was used by the travelers themselves to denote the harsh conditions – extreme exposure to the sun, lack of latrines and sanitation, etc. – they were experiencing in the football field belonging to the Ecole Supérieure Polytechnique (ex-ENSUT) where many of the tents were set up. Thus, while some caravanners and fellow activists criticized the lack of preparation and poor organization of the WSF, some of them denounced this \textit{relegation} as politically motivated. Furthermore, they stigmatized northern NGOs for renting expensive hotel rooms, holding private events and excluding \textit{de facto} less endowed participants. In stark contrast to the caravanners, another example of backstage tactics drew our attention: the majority of Brazilian participants had been gathering in
Dakar’s Goethe Institute where they organized their workshops and other activities. Thus they did not experience the same level of chaos and disorientation that shaped the first few days for most WSF participants. Moreover, they remained quite secluded during most of the week, as the Institute was located outside the campus area. Both of these examples highlight the different uses of the backstage and how it shaped the boundaries of WSF. On the one hand, the “refugee camp” was relegated to the southern end of the campus as the only option offered to the travelers by the organizing committee, generating exclusion and resentment towards what appeared to be the showcase of the event. On the other hand, some participants chose to organize themselves in havens, far from the widespread chaos on the main stage. Thus, backstage tactics should be seen not only as a covert means of exclusion, but also as a technique used by participants with a larger set of resources who could afford to leave the scene.

The map below shows the distribution of the areas where manifest and suppressed activities took place during the Dakar WSF. The white rectangles and grey circles represent the visible areas: the former indicate the main stages for activist performance, while the latter designate leisure areas where participants ate local dishes or enjoyed a traditional Toubá coffee. The black dotted lines mark the back region or backstage areas of this transnational gathering where suppressed aspects of WSF activity were concentrated. In this scenario, hiding waste in backstage areas served as a tactic to control the impression the participants receive of the WSF, among other stage management techniques during activist performances (workshops, assemblies and any other kind of activist encounter).

These aspects were concealed to most participants as a technique employed by the Local Organizing Committee to guide and control the façade of a clean, well-organized space. In other words, waste was hidden so that the audience would not be able to see the treatment of this aspect of WSF activity in comparison with the treatment one would expect from the organizers of a World Social Forum, especially in view of the aforementioned Guiding Principles for Organizing WSF Events. Indeed, to render the waste management techniques visible would have given an inconsistent impression of what a WSF should be. By making waste invisible, organizers set

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23 According to Goffman (1959: 114), the back region is the “place, relative to a given performance, where the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course.”

24 The Guiding Principles, along with the WSF Charter of Principles from 2001, are one of the texts often invoked to remind organizers of the specificity of a social forum and to maintain, in Goffman’s terms, “regional behavior” at an activist alter-global transnational gathering. Political
the stage for a type of information game by concealing elements of the transnational activist event such as waste and disposal piles and revealing legitimate elements of *décor* like garbage bins and leaving free areas for participants’ artistic expression out of waste and recycled material such as sculptures.

By stocking trash at the ends of the places where the activist performance was presented, waste management practices formed the *boundaries* of the activist space. However, our focus here was not to analyze the indigenous scientist Lilian Matthieu (2012: 89) emphasizes that invoking a set of texts is a practice that marks out the boundary of "social movement space" – in this case alter-globalization space.
debate on the WSF as being an “open space” in the sense of allowing different kinds of organizations to join the alter-global organizational dynamic. In this chapter, we have seen the WSF from two angles: first as a space that physically constrains the participants to elaborate their performance and second, as an institutionalized activist space with a set of practices, roles, and representations that are continuously transmitted, reproduced, and improvised in the alter-global transnational arena, from social forum to social forum, as a result of interactions mostly between the WSF IC and Local Organizing Committees. By examining the concrete aspects of waste management at the Dakar World Social Forum, we see how in the end local material conditions and activists’ practices are used to mark out the “material space of mobilization” (Combes et al., 2011: 21), confining and authorizing activists’ actions and their representations of those actions, which are at the core of sustaining and perpetuating the alter-global ethos.
Latin Americans at the World Social Forum in Dakar

The relationship between the alter-global movement and the institutional sphere

Isaline Bergamaschi, Tania Navarro Rodríguez and Héloïse Nez

Abstract
This chapter aims at examining the discussion about transnational social movement’s relationships to politics during the World Social Forum (WSF) held in Dakar, Senegal, in 2011. We make the assumption that Latin American participants pushed towards the movement’s increased politicization, by reason of their considerable connection to conventional politics. This chapter is based on research that involved different empirical materials: a field observation (workshops, presidential declarations, assemblies and social events) during the WSF in Dakar and quantitative data of Latin American participants’ careers.

The relationship between the alter-global movement and politics has been a constant topic of debate within the movement since it first emerged at the end of the 1990s.1 In scholarly works, the issue has been examined mainly from the standpoint of the forms of organization used to coordinate heterogeneous actors at social forums (Sommier, 2003; Della Porta, 2004: 49-77; Aguiton and Cardon, 2005; Agrikoliansky, 2007: 33-54). At the heart of these reflections lie the opposing notions of the “forum as an open space” and the “forum as a movement,” which arose in discussions among militants concerning Article 6 of the Charter of Principles of the World Social Movement (WSF): “The meetings of the World Social Forum do not deliberate on behalf of the World Social Forum as a body. No one, therefore, will be authorized, on behalf of any of the editions of the Forum, to express positions claiming to be those of all its participants. The participants in the Forum shall not be called on to take decisions as a body, whether by vote or acclamation, on declarations or proposals for action that would commit all, or the

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1 We would like to thank Julie Pagis, Johanna Siméant, and Isabelle Sommier for their extremely helpful comments on an early version of this text. Our discussions with Nicolas Haeringer, a member of the International Council of the WSF, have also nourished and stimulated our thinking.
majority, of them and that propose to be taken as establishing positions of the Forum as a body.” By rejecting a centralized body and enshrining the prohibition against any attempt to speak on behalf of social forums, the network thus became the accepted form. Since then, however, competing organizations have gradually entered into a power struggle to define the relationship between social movements and institutional politics: “Once it became a space to discuss and develop proposals, the social forum ratified a specific type of division in the relationship between civil society and national political spaces, in which the preferred instrument was to engage in effective lobbying to make political parties officially support the demands and proposals produced in forum debates” (Aguiton and Cardon, 2005: 19).

Our aim here is to explore this issue by analyzing the recurrent debates and tensions within the alter-global movement over developing ties with political parties and “friendly” governments, allowing heads of state to attend social forums or endorsing an ideology and concrete alternatives to capitalism.

At the 2011 WSF in Dakar, these topics were mainly promoted by the Latin American participants who raised the issue of the relationship with political institutions, i.e. political parties and governments, in clear-cut terms. We therefore chose to study this group in particular, in the same way that researchers studied African participants at the 2007 WSF in Nairobi (Siméant and Pommerolle, 2008). It may seem rather strange a priori to take Latin Americans as our focal point when this WSF was organized in Dakar and thus rooted in Africa, especially in view of the fact that the “revolution” in Tunisia was the dominant news story in February 2011. Moreover, Latin Americans are by no means a homogeneous group nor do they present themselves as a “bloc” within the WSF. Studying this subgroup nevertheless offers the advantage of raising questions about the relationship between social forums and politics. First, it allows us to examine the ties between social movements and institutional politics, since some left-wing Latin American governments – with significant national variants – claim to support alter-global, anti-imperialist, and anti-liberal values and projects (Hugo Chávez’ Venezuela) or are offshoots of the social and labor movement (Evo Morales in Bolivia and Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, known as “Lula,” in Brazil). It also highlights the question as to whether current government authorities should take part in the alter-global movement, since the Latin Americans were the only group in Dakar with heads of state participating in the forum (Morales and Lula) and several Latin American delegations were partly financed by political and/or government organizations. Finally, by concentrating on the Latin American actors, we can analyze the evolution of international alter-globalization in the debates over the leadership and orientations of the
movement, with the Brazilian participants claiming paternity and leadership of the world social forums born in Porto Alegre in 2001. Our article therefore aims to analyze the discussions held at the 2011 WSF in Dakar concerning the alter-global movement’s relationship with politics in order to test the hypothesis that the Latin American participants are seeking to establish ties between the world social forums and the sphere of institutional politics. We draw upon the assumption that the ways through which these activists create and maintain ties are related to their understanding of the state as well as their position in the public space (national or international).

Our method is based on observing participants and processing statistical data. For six days at the WSF, we observed several workshops organized by Latin American actors as well as large WSF assemblies (such as the Assembly of Social Movements) and broader debates on changes in the alter-global movement. In particular, we monitored the activities of the Brazilian and Venezuelan delegations in planned workshops listed in the official forum program and festive events or improvised initiatives like the press conference held by the Venezuelans after the Declaration of the Assembly of Social Movements. We continued our observations after the forum at the meeting of the International Council of the World Social Forum on February 13th in Dakar and the feedback session organized by ATTAC France and the CRID (a group of French international solidarity associations) on February 27th in Paris. In addition to these observations, we analyzed the questionnaires administered within the framework of the forum, combining levels of analysis in order to study a regional population: we compared the three main continental “blocs” (Africans, Europeans, and Americans); we analyzed the Latin Americans as a subgroup within the American bloc and compared them with the total survey population (85 Latin Americans out of a total of 1,069 interviewees); we studied the differences within the Latin American subgroup, particularly the Brazilians who were the most heavily represented (47 interviewees). While the quantitative study has its limits, due to the reduced size of our sample, its chief purpose is to test the hypotheses developed from our observations and support them with data.

We will begin this chapter by showing the specific position of the Latin American participants at the Dakar WSF on the issue of the relationship of the alter-global movement to politics using our observations in the field and then propose factors to explain this Latin American specificity by combining our forum observations with a study of the questionnaires.

2 The testimonials of Latin American participants given in Spanish and Portuguese during these activities or short interviews were translated into French by the authors.
7.1 The singularity of the Latin Americans’ relationship to politics

The Latin American participants adopted a specific position at the Dakar WSF on the ties they maintained or wanted to develop with political parties and governments in power in certain Latin American countries as well as on the participation of two heads of state in or on the sidelines of the social forum. Both positions generated considerable debate, notably within the Forum Organizing Committee. During the workshops, the issue of ideology was also discussed more directly by the Latin American participants than by the actors from other continents.

Ties to political parties and “friendly” governments

The Charter of Principles of the WSF stipulates: “neither party representa-
tions nor military organizations shall participate in the forum” (Article 9). Yet certain political parties played a major role in the emergence of the first forum in Porto Alegre in 2001, starting with the Workers’ Party (PT). The PT was not officially among the organizers but its militants often wore several different hats both within the party and among the social organizations in the Brazilian Organizing Committee, i.e. small organizations with influence in Brazilian civil society such as the United Workers’ Central (CUT) and the Rural Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) (Aguiton and Cardon 2005). Since then, governments have openly financed the event or their national delegations, e.g. the Brazilian government through its state-owned company Petrobras, which had a stand at the Dakar WSF and paid for the travel expenses of several participants. The issue of relationships with political parties has become more acute since the arrival of leaders in Latin America who are “friendly” or ideologically close to the movement – mainly Chávez, president of Venezuela from 1999 to 2013; Lula, president of Brazil from 2002 to 2010 (succeeded by Dilma Rousseff, also from the PT); Morales, president of Bolivia since 2005; Rafael Correa, president of Ecuador since 2006. As one Ecuadorian participant put it at a workshop on the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA),3 “Latin American activists are the only participants at the WSF who are proud of their governments

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3 ALBA, launched in 2005 by the signing of a “commercial treaty of peoples” between Cuba and Venezuela, was presented as an initiative in favor of socialist regional integration and an alternative to other regional alliances based on free circulation and free trade agreements with the United States (notably FTAA, the Free Trade Area of the Americas).
and their heads of state.” This remark shows how much these militants wanted to be viewed as representatives of the entire continent, excluding Latin Americans led by presidents and regimes further removed from the alter-global movement. In the workshops, some activists recommended maintaining a critical distance from these governments, asserting that social forums should remain spaces strictly reserved for civil society, while others insisted on the need to support them in order to build bridges with the social movement.

This debate arose on several occasions in Dakar, for example in a workshop on “The Present and the Future of the World Social Forum” organized by the CACIM (India Institute for Critical Action: Centre in Movement) on February 7th. Though the topic of discussion was progress and changes within the alter-global movement, a Chilean participant raised the issue of developing ties between social forums and the institutional sphere, pointing to the importance of “progressive” governments in Latin America “from Lula to Evo Morales.” In general, the activists in Dakar who defended a rapprochement with institutional politics systematically referred to Latin American experiments, distinguishing the more radical path (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador) from the reform path (Brazil). In this workshop, a North American activist, citing the figures on poverty reduction in Brazil and Venezuela, regretted the refusal to establish strong links with electoral politics: “We must work with political parties. It’s true that the US social forum is a success, but the process that has been the most successful in the United States today is still the conservative process.” A German participant retorted that a network organization allowed for “different levels of expectations” regarding such ties, whereas if the forum worked closely with institutional organizations, it might exclude “people coming for the first time” and less politicized partners such as NGOs. The American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein maintained: “We cannot achieve social transformation through electoral politics,” whereas the Bolivian president, invited to address the participants at the end of the WSF opening march, defended a diametrically opposed position: “Our experiment in Bolivia has been on how to move from these social, trade union, community, and intellectual struggles to an electoral struggle to take back political power, and now it is we – the poor and the marginalized – who govern.” In his speech, Morales insisted on the far-reaching effects of this shift “from resistance to the conquest of power,” underlining the structural transformations achieved, for example, by electing a constituent assembly, including water as an inalienable human right in the Constitution and the “nationalization of hydrocarbons.”
At the WSF in Dakar, the workshops organized and/or led by Latin Americans dealt with more political topics, such as the one-day workshop featuring Latin American and African partners of the Secours Catholique (a French international solidarity NGO), member of Caritas who discussed the “relationship between social movements and political parties.” The debate focused on the weakness of political parties in Africa in contrast to their importance in effecting social change in the experience of Latin Americans. A speaker from Cameroon provided a broad overview of African political evolution from “confiscated independence” to political “party fragmentation” brought about by democratization, which has kept “social projects” from emerging. She went on to talk about the “Latin American model” and how it might be a source of inspiration for others. That idea was taken up by a Moroccan activist who asserted that, although “revolutions cannot be exported” and “each movement must create its own path,” Latin America represents “a school, an incubator for the social movement.” A far-left activist lamented the prevalence of associations over political movements in Senegal, which he explained by the fact that such movements have to appear apolitical in order to be recognized. A Colombian militant, a member of Polo Democrático Alternativo (a far-left coalition), declared “structural change is only possible if the parties survive.” The Brazilian speaker, who claimed to belong to the eco-socialism movement, emphasized the urgent need to turn to parties and governments to “formulate public policies of sovereignty, local authority, regional autonomy, and a new orientation of ownership.” He reminded the audience that Cuba was “the only revolution” and that “the other progressive governments came to power through elections.” The Colombian moderator concluded the workshop by asserting “the need for a body to centralize the struggle” and a “meeting of social movements and political parties” because “Internet and symbolic declarations are not enough; concrete action is necessary.” Our observation of this workshop clearly shows the different positions within the social movement regarding institutional politics in various contexts in Africa and Latin America, with certain Latin American countries viewed by African activists as “models” for the political outcome of the social movement. During the morning session of this workshop, which mainly attracted Europeans and Latin Americans, some Latin American participants nevertheless adopted a critical attitude.

4 Another topic raised by the Latin Americans at the WSF concerned Afro-descendants. This was an area of action for the “revolutionary” governments (the Venezuelan delegation, for example, included a representative of organizations of Afro-descendants) and represented a privileged way of integrating Latin American activists in a forum organized in Africa.
towards their own country's political experiments. The difference in the social movement activist’s receptiveness of institutional politics, from different or same countries, reveals how the relationship to politics is an individual process related to the history of states’ construction as well as individuals’ experiences concerning institutional politics.

Debates over the presence of heads of state at the WSF

Since the early years of the alter-global movement, heads of state have sometimes attended or expressed their views at the WSF, under varying circumstances and in different ways (see box). Some members of the movement, particularly the 2011 WSF working and evaluation groups organized after Dakar, saw the participation of political leaders as an intrusion in contradiction with the WSF Charter. In Dakar, the refusal to allow Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade to inaugurate the event was believed to be one of the reasons for the organizational problems that plagued the 2011 edition (the withdrawal of promised funding and the lack of available university classrooms to hold activities) (Scerri, 2012: 4). But apart from possible tensions with the authorities of the organizing host country, the Latin Americans were distinguished by the presence of two heads of state, thus reactivating the controversy surrounding the participation of government authorities in the WSF. The presence of Lula did not generate as much debate among forum participants as that of Morales, because the former president of Brazil spoke outside the WSF grounds, whereas the current president of Bolivia gave the final speech at the opening march of the social movements, which carried strong symbolic significance.

Presence of Heads of State at World Social Forums

2003 (Porto Alegre): Hugo Chávez (President of Venezuela); Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, known as “Lula” (President of Brazil, elected but not yet officially sworn in)
2005 (Porto Alegre): Chávez; Lula (for an informal meeting with some movements)
2006 (Caracas): Chávez
2009 (Belem): Chávez, Lula, Fernando Lugo (President of Paraguay), Evo Morales (President of Bolivia) and Rafael Correa (President of Ecuador)
2011 (Dakar): Morales (closing address of the march on the first day of the Forum), debate between Lula and Abdoulaye Wade (President of Senegal), organized outside the WSF site

Though Morales, a former Bolivian trade union leader, introduced himself in his speech as “a student of these forums, which are a major social movement event in the world,” since he was “still, symbolically, a trade union leader,” his presence was not appreciated by everyone. “A head of state should not have been allowed to speak at the beginning of the Social Forum,” declared Gus Massiah, a member of the WSF International Council, at the evaluation meeting organized by ATTAC France and the CRID in Paris following the return from Dakar. At the International Council meeting on February 13th, Massiah, a leading figure in the French alter-global movement, asked to have the WSF Charter include a stipulation that no heads of state shall be allowed to participate in the WSF in the future. The problems of translating certain parts of Morales’ speech – “I would like more presidents to emerge from the ranks of alter-global/social movements” was translated as “I would like more presidents to come/take part in the forums” – also testifies to the tensions among WSF organizers. Morales’ translator was Christophe Aguiton, a militant from ATTAC France, who declared later on at the CRID evaluation session organized in Paris on February 23rd that he was firmly opposed to having the Bolivian president come to the WSF.

Ideology and the reference to “revolutions” in Latin America

In addition to the presence of heads of state, references to political leaders and to their institutional achievements were rejected on the whole in the WSF events in Dakar. At the workshop on “The Present and the Future of the World Social Forum,” held on the last day, the use of the word “socialism” and mention of the experiments carried out in Venezuela and Bolivia – described by a Colombian speaker as “authoritarian” experiments – made the participants uneasy. Initially, the declaration of the “World Water Assembly” held on February 10th was to contain a direct reference to the role of Morales in the “water war” in Bolivia, which ended with the 2003 victory of demonstrators in Cochabamba and El Alto over the public authorities engaged in privatizing the public utility for the benefit of multinational corporations. In the end, however, Morales’ name was removed from the text following protests by several participants against mentioning a political leader by name.

Furthermore, the Venezuelan delegation expressed regret that the Declaration of the Assembly of Social Movements did not refer more widely to the processes of change under way in Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Brazil,
which had been initiated and developed alongside the social forums. At a press conference organized on the last day of the WSF, one of the delegates openly criticized the lack of concrete proposals resulting from the social forum: “It is not enough to criticize capitalism, it is necessary to construct alternatives, which we are doing in these Latin American countries; it is necessary to support this movement.” The first version of the delegation's press release was entitled “Venezuela’s position on the Declaration of the Assembly of Social Movements at the World Social Forum, Dakar, 2011.” A few paper copies of the release, distributed to the audience just before the press conference, stated:

The World Social Forum was born in Porto Alegre (...). South America is not a small event in the history of the World Social Forum. It is the center of an agenda of political resistance to global capitalism (...). South America feels that the World Social Forum has made an enormous mistake in neglecting these processes under way and that this strategic mistake is almost a betrayal. The basic problem is conceptual: the groups that converge upon the World Social Forum are farther and farther removed from concrete politics (...). We cannot forget that in South America paths have been opened up for the concrete construction of a better world.

This radical position did not enjoy a consensus among the Venezuelan delegates and it set off a lively debate just before the press conference. It was not reported to the Organizing Committee either in Dakar or afterwards, nor was it included in the final press release published by the Venezuelan delegation in their press at home, where the statement read: “The different organizations that made up the Venezuelan delegation (...) subscribe to the final declaration of the 2011 Dakar World Social Forum and express to the whole world their commitment to build a more just society.” All this would suggest that the loud message was not directed to a particular audience in Dakar (the International Council or other civil society organizations) but rather to the power circles of Caracas and that it was primarily intended

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6 The Declaration of the Social Movements Assembly contains two references to Latin American political and social experiments, which emphasize their diversity without naming any country in particular and recall that they are part of much broader progress achieved over the last ten years.

7 Emphasis added.

to show the Venezuelan government that the colors of the revolution were being flown abroad. A careful look at the delegation’s final press release tends to support this hypothesis. The content reiterates the values, aims, and heroes of the “Bolivarian” revolution, which were not widely shared by the WSF participants either as a whole or in their diversity. It states that the WSF brings together “the sons and daughters of the fatherland of Simón Bolívar” and that “the person and the government of Hugo Chávez are a vector and a reference on our continent and in the rest of the world in search of a new model of civilization” — a position that was far from generating consensus in Dakar or within the alter-global movement or the International Council of the WSF.

But the criticism expressed was intended first and foremost at pointing out the limitations of the Declaration of the Assembly of Social Movements, which invites the “social movements around the world” to “defeat the capitalist system” without defining an alternative to the dominant production model. During the WSF, the issue of concrete alternatives and the ideologies that could support them was raised above all by the Latin American participants. Representatives of the indigenous movement in Latin America showed it was necessary to construct an alternative development paradigm to replace productivism, based on “buen vivir” (good living). This concept, presented as an outgrowth of the worldview of indigenous communities, is promoted by the current governments of Ecuador and Bolivia as a new development model, characterized by the search for a more equitable balance among people and in their relationship with “mother earth” (“tierra mama,” “madre tierra”). While there may be connections between this notion and the idea of “décroissance” (de-growth), which has developed more in France and Europe, the Dakar WSF was not really conducive to in-depth study of concrete alternatives in that direction. In the workshops and assemblies, there was also talk of “female socialism” (socialismo femenino), “eco-socialism,” and “reinvented socialism.” These

9 This hypothesis coincides with the theory put forth by Fabrice Andreani regarding the position adopted by Chávez and Morales in the international climate negotiations (Andreani, 2012: 63).
10 “Declaración de la delegación venezolana en el Foro Social Mundial Dakar 2011,” op. cit.
11 On this vision of development claiming to draw on indigenous cosmology, see, on the Bolivian experience: Ranta-Owusu, 2008.
12 These values may seem to be in contradiction with the oil revenues that serve as the main mode of financing the revolution and socialist development to which the Venezuelan and Bolivian governments are committed. On the limits and ambiguities of the involvement of these governments in the fight against global warming, see Andreani, 2012: 69.
direct references to a new conception of socialism, promoted mainly by
the Venezuelan militants, were usually rejected by the WSF participants,
particularly the members of the International Council, who did not trust
the personality of Chávez (unlike Morales, he did not start out in the labor
movement but in the army). Their rejection did not stem, by the way, from
a serious analysis of the process of transformation under way in Venezuela,
even from a critical perspective. A Latin American activist summed up the
situation at the meeting of the International Council following the WSF:
“One topic did arise: ideology. It is something that has to be discussed; it is
a fundamental issue, because for ten years people have been saying another
world is possible, but what kind of world? Anything’s possible!” The call to
organize “a day of global action against capitalism on October 12th, where
in every possible way we will reject the system that destroys everything in
its way,” launched in the Declaration of the Assembly of Social Movements,
does not really answer this question.

7.2 Explaining Latin American singularity: a specific militant
profile

Why did the Latin American participants adopt their singular position
in favor of a closer partnership between social forums and the sphere of
institutional politics? We will explore two main hypotheses here: the first
directly concerns their relationship with institutional politics, which would
appear to be closer as a result of their militant and political practices (past
and/or present affiliation with a political party, position as elected official,
voting) than that of participants from other continents; the second pertains
to their sociological profile, which is marked by a high socio-cultural level
and internationalization – characteristics they shared with participants
from other continents but with added experience in organizing World
Social Forums. The Latin American participants seem not only to be highly
politicized activists in their home countries but to have long-standing
experience in international activism, which prompted them to advocate
a more political view of WSFs in the Brazilian tradition – especially as
Brazilians were heavily represented among the Latin Americans present in
Dakar. To test these hypotheses, we will look at the replies to the question-
naires, combining three levels of analysis. First, we will distinguish three
main continental blocs, analyzing the replies of American, European, and
African participants (respectively 131, 338, and 531 interviewees) (cf. Table
1). Then we will examine the subgroup of Latin Americans (85 interviewees)
Chart 7.1  Breakdown of the survey population by group and regional sub-group
(n = 1000)

NA = North America
SA = South America

Chart 7.2  Breakdown of the Latin American survey population by nationality (n = 85)
within the American bloc, comparing their replies with those of the North Americans (46 interviewees) and above all with the total survey population (1,069 interviewees). Finally, we will show that a further analysis can be carried out within the Latin American group, but only for the Brazilians (47 interviewees), as the number of the other nationalities was too low to be treated statistically (cf. Table 2). After Brazil, the countries with the most attendees were Argentina (10), Venezuela (7), and Colombia (6). While in all there were participants from 14 Latin American countries at the WSF in Dakar, the presence of other nationalities was not very significant: together they represented only 18% (15) of the Latin American interviewees. South America, especially Brazil, was therefore overrepresented among the Latin American participants at the WSF in Dakar, which had an impact on their relationship to politics.

More politicized than the average activist

To analyze the participants’ relationship with institutional politics, we selected three variables for comparison: involvement in a political party, experience as an elected official, and voting. When our sample is divided into three continental blocs, we observe that the Americans stand out by their experience with partisan activism: 54% declare they are or have been members of a political party, which is the case for only 33% of the Europeans and 44% of the Africans. A closer look reveals that more Americans and Africans (30%) continued to be involved in partisan activity at the time of the WSF in Dakar, compared with only 16% of Europeans. Within the American group, the specificity of the Latin Americans is unquestionable: 59% (48 interviewees) declared they are or have been members of a political party, compared with only 44% of the North Americans (20 interviewees) and 41.5% of the total American survey population. Among the participants actively involved in political parties at the time of the WSF, 27 were Latin Americans, a percentage (33%) well above the survey population as a whole (24%). In the case of the Brazilians, this partisan commitment concerns more than half of the sub-sample (24 interviewees in 47), mainly in the Workers’ Party (16). These figures show a stronger relationship between social movements and political parties in Latin America, but they may also

13 To construct the sample of Latin Americans, we have given priority to nationality rather than to selecting questionnaires filled out in Spanish and Portuguese, because the criterion of language did not allow us to single out Latin Americans – the questionnaires of our sample were, by the way, filled out in several languages (40 in Spanish, 39 in Portuguese, 4 in French, and 2 in English).
reveal a selection process: as traveling to a forum in Africa was costly for activists from Latin America, in all likelihood the expense was assumed by a political party that favored its own members.

The differentiation of American participants, notably Latin Americans, based on their experience of partisan activism is confirmed when we observe the trends by bloc and subgroup among those that declared they had never had any involvement with a political party. Among the Europeans, 67% of the interviewees stated they never had any partisan experience, whereas among the group of Africans and Americans, the trend was respectively 56% and 46%. More precisely, 56% of the North Americans declared they had never been members of a political party, which was the case for only 41% of the Latin Americans. Involvement in a political party on the part of the subgroup of Latin Americans was almost exclusively on the left of the political spectrum. When they were not members of a party, the Latin Americans nevertheless declared they felt ideologically close to a left-wing party. With regard to their protest practices, these active militants expressed less reluctance to engage in violence and claimed to have taken part in a broader repertoire of actions (except for group prayer) to demonstrate against government policies or regional and international institutions.14

Chart 7.3  Interviewees who declared current or previous membership in a political party

Although they are closely tied to political parties by partisan affiliation or ideological proximity, only 7% of the Latin Americans declared they had

14  Cf. the contribution of Johanna Siméant and Ilhame Hajji in this book, chapter 3.
run for elective office or assumed a political function. From this standpoint, they resemble the overall survey population: 75 Latin American interviewees (93%) were not currently holding or had never held an elective office, compared with an average of 88.5% for the total sample. The percentage of American participants (95%) that were not currently or had never been elected officials was even slightly higher than those from Europe (84%) or Africa (89%). There were proportionately more Africans in elected office at the time of their participation at the WSF in Dakar (7%), compared with Americans (2%) and Europeans (3%). However, the percentage of Europeans who had run for office but were not elected was higher (8%) than that of Americans (1%) and Africans (2%). Experience as an elected official can nevertheless be linked to the age of the participants: Europeans were overrepresented among attendees aged 60 or above, accounting for 23% compared with 7% for the Americans and 5% for the Africans.

Thus, what distinguishes the Latin Americans present at Dakar is not holding an elected office, but rather their involvement in a political party and the practice of voting. The same percentage of Americans and Europeans (88%) declared they had voted in the last elections, compared with 75% of Africans. This trend is confirmed when we look at the participants who declared they always vote, whether in national/federal or local elections (72% of the Americans and Europeans, 63% of the Africans). However, when we focus on the subgroup of Latin Americans, the specificity of their voting practice stands out more clearly: virtually all the Latin Americans declared they voted in the last elections (76 interviewees, i.e. 92% of the sample), which is a higher percentage than in the North American subgroup (82%) and in the overall survey population (81%). This particular trait is reinforced when we look at those who stated they always vote in elections (85% of Latin Americans compared with 50% of North Americans and 67% of the total survey population). The nearly universal practice of voting among Latin American participants can be explained by the high proportion of Brazilians in the sample, for whom voting is mandatory: 42 Brazilians in 47 declared they had voted in the last elections and 43 stated they always vote.

The tendency of Latin American participants to vote for the party in power (34 interviewees) or for an opposition party (45) depends in large part on the national context. The ties between WSF participants and parties in power were particularly close in the cases of Brazil and Venezuela: 16 of the Brazilian interviewees belonging to a political party were members of the Workers’ Party (PT) currently in power and 5 Venezuelans were members of Chávez’ United Socialist Party of Venezuela.
(PSUV). We also observed in the field a close relationship between Brazilian and Venezuelan activists and their governments and the parties in power, which determined how their delegations were funded, presented, and organized. The Brazilians were partly financed by the state-owned company Petrobras. When the WSF ran into organizational problems on the campus, the Brazilian delegation held its workshops at the Goethe Institute, away from the rest of the forum, in order to comply with one of the conditions laid down by their sponsor. The Venezuelan delegation arrived at and departed from the Forum like a sports team at an international competition, dressed in jogging outfits in their country’s colors (violet, red, and yellow), identical to the one worn by Chávez in television appearances or at events abroad.
Trained, highly internationalized activists

From a sociological standpoint, the Latin American activists appear to be endowed with a considerable amount of educational capital and they stand out in particular by their high level of internationalization, which partly explains their visibility and their specific positioning at the forum. When the survey population is analyzed by continent, the Americans often occupy an intermediate position between the Africans and the Europeans. That is the case, for example, for those belonging to an organization they represented at the WSF (72% of the Americans – midway between 65% of the Europeans and 80% of the Africans); in their professions – the Americans tended to occupy a position between the Africans, who were overrepresented in handicrafts and commerce or among those without an occupation, and the Europeans, overrepresented among executives and scientific professions; and for their education level: 87% of the American respondents to the questionnaires had a college or university background, between the Africans (67%) and the Europeans (90%).

When we examine more specifically the subgroup of Latin Americans, they appear to be highly educated, on a par with the Europeans: 91% went to college or university (53 interviewees at the most advanced level of higher education and 21 at a lower level), compared with 81% of the North Americans and 77% of the total survey population. This was especially the case with the Brazilians within the Latin American sample: 42 interviewees in 47 went on to higher education, including 28 at the most advanced level. A high percentage of the Latin Americans who went to Dakar were college or university graduates. Two-thirds (50 interviewees, i.e. 77%) speak two or more languages, proportionately less than the North Americans (32 interviewees, i.e. 84%), but more than the survey population as a whole (44%). These polyglot militants with their college and university degrees have qualified jobs: university professors (15 interviewees), mid-level professionals in healthcare and social work (13), professions in the media, the arts and entertainment (9), elementary and secondary schoolteachers (8), and liberal professions (7). By the way, more than half the Latin Americans (59%, i.e. 50 interviewees) declared that their current occupation corresponded to their expectations, a percentage that is still below that of the Europeans (72%) but far superior to that of the Africans (49%).

While the Americans are often positioned midway between Europeans and Africans, they nevertheless stand out for their participation in
international activist events. It is true that the WSF in Dakar was the first international activist experience for 43% of them, a higher percentage than among the African participants (37%) and especially the Europeans (24%). But among those who had participated in more than ten alter-global rallies or antiglobalization demonstrations during the ten years prior to the WSF in Dakar, more than half were Americans (53%), a higher percentage than among the Africans (28%) or Europeans (19%). This difference becomes especially obvious when we observe the trends within the subgroups of the American continent: the WSF in Dakar was the first experience of this kind for 11% of the Latin Americans (9 interviewees) compared with 26% of the North Americans (12 interviewees) and 33% of the total survey population. Among the Latin Americans with experience in alter-global events during the ten years prior to the Dakar WSF, 33 took part as event organizers, 40 as speakers and 35 as ordinary participants. Compared with the total survey population, the Latin Americans had distinctly more experience as speakers and organizers of this type of mobilization, which may explain their visibility at the WSF in Dakar and their professional approach to social forum organization.

Indeed, the percentage of Latin Americans with experience at international activist events stems in particular from the high proportion of Brazilians in the sample. Their presence in large numbers explains the advocacy of a more politicized conception of the WSF, closer to the first forums organized in Porto Alegre than to the world of NGOs and donors at the African events.

Behind the debates concerning the Forum’s relationship with politics lay a conflict over who should lead the alter-global movement. The prevalence
of the Brazilians was challenged by the participants from other continents – notably Africans –, which could be explained by the ambivalent position of a major emerging power like Brazil claiming to speak on behalf of the South. The huge Petrobras stand set up on the WSF grounds, a material embodiment of the pervasive Brazilian presence and the close ties of the Brazilian delegation to their country’s government (cf. photo), revealed the Brazilians’ superiority to local actors and organizations and offended the sensitivities of environmental organizations. Later on, the working group in charge of evaluating the 2011 WSF concluded that the presence of Petrobras had “a negative impact on outside perceptions of the Forum.” At the International Council meeting on February 13th, the Brazilians proposed to organize the next WSF at Porto Alegre, pointing to the disorganization of the event in an African context and arguing that they already benefited from the approval of all the elected officials in the municipal council as well as their experience. At the sub-continental level, a widening gap could be observed between the member countries of ALBA and the others; and competition between the Brazilian and Venezuelan delegations manifested itself in the Assembly of the Social Movements. These conflicts over the leadership of the alter-global movement are a reminder that the Latin American group was not a bloc within the WSF in Dakar, even though similarities can be noted in their relationship to politics.

7.3 Conclusion

This study of the Latin American groups at the Dakar WSF shows that the relationship of the alter-global movement to politics is still being debated within the social forums. As recalled by Jai Sen, an Indian activist and writer reflecting on the history and evolution of the global justice movement, the WSF has periodically and increasingly been criticized for being “a talk shop (…) removed from the real world, that has diverted people who are concerned and looking for ways to resist, from more militant and radical politics.” Because its organizers have put the focus on “deliberation rather than on action or (…) prefigurative politics,” they have lived out “the change and social relations that you want to see taking shape in society” (Sen, 2013: 484).

Whereas the organizers of this international event in Africa held a number of workshops and discussions on the topic of development and NGO actions, the Latin Americans championed a different conception of social forums by openly asserting the need to establish a close relationship with political parties and governments with a similar ideology. In the activities they organized or in which they participated, the Latin Americans often
freed themselves from the thinking and structuring characteristic of development projects – the dominant and sometimes inescapable form of action (notably in sub-Saharan Africa) – and instead centered their contributions on the topic and specific examples of social and political mobilization.\textsuperscript{16} While they promoted a strategy of forging stronger relationships with the institutional political sphere in order to have a direct impact on national public policies, the position adopted by the Latin Americans nevertheless remained a minority view in the Dakar debates, which calls into question a broader rapprochement between the alter-global movement and institutional politics, except for a few, specific national configurations.

Our analysis of the Latin American group at the WSF in Dakar also shows the connection between the position of participants who favor closer ties between social forums and the institutional political sphere and their individual sociological and activist profiles. The Latin Americans who were able to make the journey to Africa are highly politicized militants, who maintain strong ties (through voting or activism) with left-wing political parties and governments in power. The position they advocate concerning cooperation with the institutional political field is directly related to this activist experience. Furthermore, they are strongly internationalized militants with solid experience at international activist events and a significant amount of cultural and educational capital. These militants, Brazilians for the most part, promote a conception of social forums closely linked to political organizations, as they were during the early years of alter-global movement organization in Porto Alegre. Thus the specific relationship with politics advocated by Latin Americans in Dakar raises the issue not only of close cooperation between social forums and institutional politics, but also of continuing Brazilian leadership of the alter-globalization movement.

\textsuperscript{16} In its final release, disseminated to the national media, the Venezuelan delegation condemned, for example, “the infiltration of right-wing organizations that seek to diminish the revolutionary and anti-establishment nature of the Forum; in particular, the non-governmental organizations whose reputation has been tarnished by advocating neoliberal politics and ambiguous political positions,” in “Declaración de la delegación venezolana en el Foro Social Mundial Dakar 2011,” op. cit.
Abstract
How do groups and organizations matter in a WSF? This chapter examines the cleavages and polarities of participating groups, and then shows how the central organizations in Dakar were characterized by a strong connectivity of northern organizations, mostly represented beyond Africa, whereas participants were rather “troops and grassroots providers,” without benefiting from such a connectivity. If this chapter does not lead to an iron law of Western domination in global forums, it does show how, in WSFs, organizations with very different attraction capacities interact, therefore contributing to explain the polarities of global activism.

What does a small Senegalese association like Jang Jup Teki (in Wolof: “Learn and succeed in rectitude”), have in common with Caritas, a huge international Catholic solidarity organization, and the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), France’s main trade union? These organizations share few if any similarities in terms of size, financing, activity, international reach, or number of employees. Yet all three of them, as well as myriad others, sent members to represent them at the World Social Forum (WSF) in Dakar.

One of enduring legacies of resource mobilization theory has been its insistence on the central role of organizations in mobilizing people. Looking at the groups to which mobilized actors belong gives us a better understanding of the underlying organization of mobilizations – how “organizations matter” (Fisher et al., 2005), how they lay the foundations for mobilizations through the resources they pour into them and how they influence the types of action in which the participants engage (Saunders and Andretta, 2009). The part played by organization employees and their ability to finance activists’ travel expenses is a core aspect of activist gatherings. It increases significantly when the mobilizations, such as WSFs, are international in scope. Dana Fisher shows that this role becomes even more crucial when the mobilizations take place in distant locations, where different languages and practices require interpreters, intermediaries, and brokers.
This material dimension is just as important as ideology. Studying these organizations means, of course, examining their ideological differences, their differentiating or even opposing activist traditions. These ideological divergences may in fact be partly related to differences in wealth and type of organization. For example, the tension between organizations that identify with social movements on the one hand and NGOs on the other, is well-known. They adopt different organizational tones and criticize each other. One side accuses the other of moderating their actions in order to keep their jobs and in deference to international donors, or on the contrary of engaging in radical protest that is unlikely to improve the situation of the disadvantaged.

In short, understanding the role of organizations presupposes studying the relationships between them. This implies first of all a theoretical space that allows us to grasp the affinities and competition between organizations, based in particular on the notion of a multi-organizational field (Curtis and Zurcher, 1973). Here we have drawn in particular on the survey conducted by Olivier Fillieule and his co-authors (Fillieule et al., 2004), which examined the membership groups of participants surveyed at the G8 summit in Evian and revealed the divisions within this organizational space.

Such an approach also implies gaining a better understanding of the more or less central role of organizations and families of organizations – and the factors that contribute to this position: is it due to the intersecting nature of the ideological topics they manipulate? The amount of resources they have amassed? The extent of their international presence? Here again the international dimension, a core feature of WSFs, complicates the issue: does the reconstructed space of relationships between organizations express international hierarchies (in which northern organizations dominate?) or is it merely a distorted version combined with national hierarchies? How is this space connected to – or disconnected from – national activist spaces?

This chapter aims to take a close look at these questions. We will begin by examining the importance of organizations at the WSF in Dakar and revealing their role in the mobilization. As in Chapter 3, using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and Ascending Hierarchical Clustering, we will demonstrate the national and socio-demographic polarities that run through this world of organizations. Next, through a logistic regression, we will test the relationships among organizations, showing how the organizational core in Dakar was characterized by the strong central position and connectivity of the organizations mainly represented
in the North, whereas the organizations most frequently represented on
the African side provided sizable activist troops without benefiting from
similar connectivity. While one cannot automatically deduce Western
domination of the alter-global movement from this demonstration, it does
show how organizations with very different capacities to attract members
interact and coexist, pointing to opposing tendencies within international
alter-globalization.

8.1 Between material support of mobilization and ideological
indicators: a forum portrait through organizations

In Dakar, belonging to an organization was a good indicator of whether or
not people could get their bearings amid the chaos. The program of WSF
events was not very reliable and planned workshop locations often had to
be changed at the last minute. The individuals most able to find their way
through the masses of people and activities were not only those with cell
phones, sometimes equipped with a local SIM card: they were also par-
ticipants backed by wealthy and/or organized groups. Whether they were
Malian women seated on the university steps waiting for their “manager”
to come back and tell them where to go next or participants at workshops
run by a German foundation that withdrew to comfortable, air-conditioned
offices, far from the tumult on campus, the ability to navigate without
wasting a considerable amount of time and energy depended directly on
organizational support.

When asked the question “Did you come on behalf of an organization?”
69.5% of survey respondents answered in the affirmative. And they did not
come to the WSF alone: 56% said they had come with their organization
(compared with 14% who came on their own and 17% with colleagues). In
contrast, a minority of respondents (18.9%) claimed not to belong to any
organization (when all survey questions providing some indication on this
point were combined).1 This latter population tended to be made up of
somewhat younger, Senegalese women, with slightly less education than
the general population of survey respondents. In our survey, individuals
declared on average that they currently belonged to four organizations (one
as a passive member, three as active members) – and had previously been

1 Respondents might well say that they did not “belong” to an organization or forget to check
the box and at the same time say they were employed by or volunteers for an organization.
members of another organization. In addition, 38% of the respondents stated they were currently working as volunteers in an organization and 25.7% had previously done so.

As Dana Fisher (Fisher et al., 2005) has shown, organizations play an especially important role in paying for the travel expenses of international activists: 60.6% of survey respondents who stated they had come on behalf of an organization indicated that the organization had financed their trips (we should keep in mind that 23% said they were from Dakar and therefore had fewer problems finding funding). But the role of organizations was not limited to supporting international activists who traveled from afar. It also mobilized people who came to Dakar without feeling they were “representing” an organization when, in fact, an organization had financed their journeys (in the case of 9.3% of respondents)! This point reveals the role of organizations in the development world, which tend to mobilize “bases” that are sometimes quite remote from the causes they advocate. Similarly, of the 162 participants residing in Dakar and its suburbs, 66% also came on behalf of an organization, 50% “with” an organization, and 25% with travel expenses paid by their organization. The material role of organizations is thus expressed not only in the “sociology of the plane ticket” but also in the “sociology of the bus ticket.” It is this same sociology of the bus ticket that explains how participants were able to come from other regions of Senegal and from neighboring countries on buses such as the Malian caravan that arrived during the night of February 5-6, 2011.

Who are the organizations to which WSF participants belong, the ones on behalf of which they say they came? Among the names indicated by the 726 people who provided this information, the following stand out (they were mentioned at least three times) from the multitude of small organizations: they offer a glimpse of the organizational and ideological world of this WSF, clearly marked by its twofold French-Senegalese dimension and by the influence of Catholic organizations.

But what does it mean to come on behalf of an association? What degree of involvement or even professional activism does it indicate? Two questions – one regarding volunteer participation in organizations and the other

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2 These averages should be taken with caution, however, especially in the case of organizations operating on the African continent that adapt to international funding opportunities by switching from a “women’s rights” agenda to a “post-conflict” or “education and development” program. In talking with African survey respondents to whom we administered this questionnaire, we noted that some of them checked 3 or 4 boxes for an organization of this type.

3 The travel expenses to the forum of 44% of survey respondents were paid in full by an organization.
Table 8.1  Names of organizations on behalf of which respondents attended the
WSF in Dakar, mentioned 3 or more times (n = 726)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of organization</th>
<th>Times mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caritas/Secours catholique*</td>
<td>22 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité Catholique Contre la Faim et pour le développement (CCFD)</td>
<td>15 (2.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTAC*</td>
<td>14 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDA</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Aid*</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babels</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADTM*</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congad, Peuples solidaires</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance internationale des habitants, CNTS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGT, Solidaires, Association des femmes de la Médina (AFEME), Amis de la vie, MAAYA, YMCA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USOFORAL, UNSAS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Réseau Interact, Amnesty International, Artisans du Monde, Collectif Equitess, CSA Sénégal, Confédération Française du Travail (CFDT), Association culturelle d’autopromotion éducative et sociale (ACAPES), Via Campesina, USDS, Ritimo, Siggil Jigeen, Punto Rosso, No Vox, Mouvement de la paix, Justice et paix, Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW), CRID</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates that it may be the local chapter of an international organization or that it was the only name of the organization mentioned: e.g. “ATTAC” or “ATTAC Togo”

on the contrary concerning employee status in the organization – help to answer that question.

Among the 6.8% of respondents indicating they were (38.1%) or had previously been (25.7%) volunteers in an organization, 542 people specified the name(s) of these organizations. Here are the most frequently mentioned names, which indicate the organizations that rely most heavily on volunteers.

This cloud gives a good idea of the dominant lexicon in the text corpus of organization names (we have used the language in which the names of organizations were indicated):

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4 It should be kept in mind that these are the most salient organizations and that many of the organization names mentioned once or twice refer to small national or local organizations (e.g. Fédération sénégalaise des associations de personnes handicapées, Association pour le bien-être des populations de Fass, etc.).
A counterpoint to this volunteer work is salaried membership in organizations – a phenomenon found more frequently among Europeans. Slightly more than 20% of the respondents are currently employed by organizations (nearly 13% were in the past), which means that one third of our sample has at some point worked in the associative world (furthermore,

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5 Word cloud produced using WordItOut software.
6 There is a significant link between the fact of being employed by an organization and being European (p-value = 0.002780455).
we know that 30% of the workforce at the WSF were salaried staff in the associative sphere. Of the 157 names of organizations that respondents declared as their employers, the following were mentioned more than once:

- The Christian and/or Third World branch of alter-globalism: Secours Catholique – Caritas France (10), Justice et paix (3), ATD Quart Monde (2), Worldvision (2), CRID (2), Emmaus (2).
- Large NGOs of the South such as ENDA (5), based in Senegal, which was one of the mainstays of WSF organization, or Action Aid (3), an international network based in South Africa.
- The Trade union branch: the French CFDT (2) and the Italian CGIL (2).
- Finally, the Fondation Rosa Luxembourg, with ties to the German party Die Linke, which had just inaugurated its regional office for West Africa in Dakar, or Etiquess, a French collective in favor of sustainable development supported by a general council, also had 2 salaried representatives among those surveyed at the Forum site.

If we compare the organizations distinguished by the presence of salaried employees with those that stand out by the number of their volunteers, we observe three characteristic groups in the alter-global world:

- Organizations represented chiefly by employees, which is particularly the case of certain northern trade unions.
- Organizations represented more by their volunteers: ATTAC, Amnesty International, CCFD Terre Solidaire, Babels (the network of volunteer translators and interpreters), Red Cross, Peuples solidaires, CADTM, Scout movements, Survie, Mouvement de la paix, CIMADE, as well as Senegalese associations.
- And finally, a very small number of associations that are strongly represented by both types of members: Caritas/Secours Catholique, ENDA and Action Aid. The thoroughly central role they play in WSFs is thus explained by their ability to position themselves at the interface of the world of salaried associative staff, especially in the development sphere (and hence the national and international funding that supports it) and mobilization on behalf of the interests of the South. This is particularly typical of ENDA, which was the central Senegalese organization, whose members, like Taoufik Ben Abdallah, were key organizers of the WSF in Dakar. ENDA is at the same time a very large development organization, and a small but active part of it is composed of activists with a long history in the African radical left.
This analysis based on the organizations named by respondents gives us a good idea of the “heavyweights” in the alter-globalization movement, but it does not offer a clear picture of the relative weight of the main organizational categories. This information was provided by another survey question in which participants were asked to indicate the type of organizations to which they currently or previously belonged.

Table 8.3  Current or former membership in organizations, as a % of survey respondents at the WSF in Dakar (n= 1069)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Ex-member</th>
<th>Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian /Development aid / International solidarity</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against neoliberal globalization</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s rights &amp; Feminism</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental/Antinuclear/Sustainable development</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to education, Education for all</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiracism /Immigrants/Right of asylum</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s associations</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifist / Anti-war</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth movements (e.g. scouts), Students</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents’ rights, Community struggles, Squats</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace-building &amp; Post-conflict</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-AIDS</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organizations and communities</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-colonialism</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Africanism</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants / Farmers</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative media</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal / Social help</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed or homeless people and undocumented people’s organizations</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer rights</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperatives, Tontines, Microcredit</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maoists</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchists / Autonomists</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trotskyists</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Are there any groups in the following list that you belong to now or belonged to in the past?”
The first group of organizations, which includes nearly or more than 1 activist in 5, involves human rights, political parties, international solidarity (humanitarian or development aid), anti-neoliberal economic globalization, women’s rights and feminism, environmental and anti-nuclear issues and right to education. This confirms the influence of this central branch in the alter-globalization movement.

The second group of organizations encompasses between one sixth and one tenth of the respondents. It is made up of women’s associations, pacifists, antiracists and defense of foreigners, youth movements, trade unions, residents’ rights, peace-building and post-conflict, anti-AIDS and personal aid, religious organizations, anticolonialists, Pan-Africanists, peasants, and alternative media.

As one can already sense, this overview does not present the full picture of extremely varied national and continental activist traditions. How are we to grasp the links between these organizations and the national and social spaces to which the survey respondents belong?

8.2 Organizational space and social space

To understand more fully the space formed by these organizations and the oppositions that arise between them within the activist universe, it is particularly useful to perform a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), consistent with a relational conception of social space. As described in Chapter 3, MCA not only helps to represent complex data sets but also to seize and represent polarities within a social space, and in doing so, to map the social space. According to the principle of descriptive statistics, it condenses information by making factors emerge that summarize the greatest amount of information and provide a graphic representation, through factors, of the whole set of variables under consideration. Here we propose a comprehensive overview of the memberships in organizations by projecting them as illustrative variables onto an MCA of the socio-demographic properties of the survey respondents. The first two axes contain 23% of the information. We then classified them in an ascending hierarchy, through a statistical procedure that maximizes variance among groups and minimizes intra-group variance, resulting here in nine profiles.

8 Sex, nationalities grouped together by continent while nevertheless distinguishing two dominant nationalities (French and Senegalese), occupational categories, age groups, religion, educational level.
9 Proposed by SPAD.
This MCA concentrates 23% of the information. Axis 1 opposes French, and more broadly Western, respondents, age (≥ 60), indicating no religion, to Senegalese Muslims, with little education (≤ high school diploma), unemployed. Axis 2 contrasts young people under age 30 who are college students and usually unemployed during their studies, at the bottom of the factorial map, to a population between 45 and 59 years of age, with an educational level below or equal to a high school diploma, defined more by their occupation (farmers).

Let us now project the memberships in groups as illustrative variables onto this MCA.

The projection of organizational memberships reveals very clearly the affinities between national origin, socio-demographic characteristics and belonging to specific groups.

From the standpoint of significant illustrative memberships, Axis 1 is characterized first by the opposition between:

- On the left-hand side of the factorial map, salaried employees of organizations who belong in particular to associations involving international solidarity, antiracists, human rights, antiglobalization, and environmentalists, as well as pacifists, anarchists, and alternative media. This portion of the axis is also more significantly driven by

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10 Our interpretations are based on significant contributions and squared cosines.
volunteer members, a proof that the cleavage is defined less by the material dimension of their ties to the association than by the idea of active participation, which is meaningful for the respondents.

– On the right-hand side of the factorial map, organizations of women, Pan-Africanists, and the anti-AIDS struggle, medical and personal aid, as well as cooperatives and youth organizations, and people who are far less frequently organization employees or volunteers.

Axis 2, again from the standpoint of these significant memberships, contrasts:

– In the upper quadrants of the factorial map, survey respondents belonging mainly to women's and feminist associations and trade unions who more often received funding to attend the Forum. In particular, we find people belonging to associations of consumers, Pan-Africanists, cooperatives, peasants, human rights, etc. There are more volunteers, members of organizations working to promote health, education, and pacifism.
In the lower quadrants of the factorial map, survey respondents characterized first as not belonging to organizations or as not indicating the name of their organization, except youth organizations in the main.

The lower right-hand quadrant of the factorial map is marked by young Senegalese defined first by their membership in youth organizations. In the upper right-hand quadrant, we find once again a Muslim, Senegalese population, with little formal education, made up of peasants, employees, and manual workers who are mainly members of associations of peasants, women, consumers, Pan-Africanists, health, education, and anti-AIDS as well as religious organizations. One can also observe the influence of small Maoist organizations typical of the background of Senegalese activists.

The affinities between national and organizational memberships underscore the importance of not thinking abstractly about what it means to belong to an organization and instead trying to specify the meaning of the organizational memberships according to these parameters. Here we propose to rank them in an ascending hierarchy (as we did in Chapter 3 on protest practices) based on this population. This yields 9 clusters that make it possible to refine the observation of affinities between groups and nationalities as well as the results, through comparison of the MCA above.

These clusters, together with the MCA, give us a clearer grasp of the various activist populations that coexist within the Forum. But how can we go beyond noting these categories of organizational membership to grasp the relationships between the organizations themselves?

### 8.3 Understanding the affinities between organizations

The notion of a multi-organizational field (Curtis and Zurcher, 1973) has long demonstrated the advantages of analyzing a space of organizations to show how they are interrelated. The aim here is not to base our reasoning on the cleavages that oppose one organization to another but rather on the ties that can help us understand which organizational memberships are best explained by others.

11 We would remind the reader that the clustering process is carried out by minimizing variance among potential groups and minimizes intra-group variance, based on variables that create the most distance, whether active or illustrative in the MCA. Charts showing the significant modalities for each class can be found in the appendix.

12 For reasons of readability, and contrary to Chapter 3, we did not project the 9 clusters onto the factorial map.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster number, part of the sample</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Professions</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Majority Staff</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Modal org. Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Management and higher professional positions</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Mostly Women</td>
<td>A part of them retired</td>
<td>Mostly Volunteers (75%)</td>
<td>Masters’ or doctoral degrees</td>
<td>International solidarity or antiracism organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 (16.6%)</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Management or in intermediate professions</td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>35-44 mostly</td>
<td>Widely employed by NGOs</td>
<td>Masters’ or doctoral degrees</td>
<td>Human rights and international solidarity, health, peace, AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (12.5%)</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Intermediate professional positions</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>Mostly men</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Lower diplomas (under high school and undergrad.)</td>
<td>Nearly 10% have been in maoist organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 (12.3%)</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Mostly unemployed</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Undergraduates</td>
<td>Youth organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (10.7%)</td>
<td>Europe (non-French)</td>
<td>Management and higher professional positions as well as intermediate professions</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Mostly Women</td>
<td>22.12% over 60</td>
<td>Often salaried employees or organizations</td>
<td>Masters’ or doctoral degrees</td>
<td>Pacifist and environmental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster number, part of the sample</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Professions</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Majority Staff</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Modal org. Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (9.4%)</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Managers and high- and mid-level</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>30-60</td>
<td>Very often salaried employees of</td>
<td>Masters’ or doctoral degrees</td>
<td>Members of a party, often belonging to alternative media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>organizations (75%),</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (8.6%)</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Mostly unemployed</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Under 30</td>
<td>No volunteers</td>
<td>High school or below</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (7.2%)</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Employees and manual workers</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>45-59 for many</td>
<td>Not salaried in organizations</td>
<td>High school or below</td>
<td>Political parties, trade unions, women's associations and cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 (5.6%)</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Peasants and craftsmen</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>45-59 for many</td>
<td>Not salaried in organizations</td>
<td>High school or below</td>
<td>Women's or feminist organizations, cooperatives and religious groups, peasant organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An initial approach consists in testing the links between group memberships one by one in a logistic regression, after reducing the response variables to yes or no. Starting with the case of membership in a human rights group, here is how we proceeded:

Table 8.5  Explanation by logistic regression of membership in a Human Rights organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable: membership group</th>
<th>Odds ratio(^1^5)</th>
<th>Lower limit</th>
<th>Upper limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace and pacifism</td>
<td>3.765</td>
<td>2.380</td>
<td>5.955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International solidarity (Humanitarian and development)</td>
<td>1.904</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>2.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiracism and rights of foreigners</td>
<td>3.128</td>
<td>2.150</td>
<td>4.550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against neo-liberal globalization</td>
<td>1.890</td>
<td>1.309</td>
<td>2.729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Africanism</td>
<td>2.353</td>
<td>1.429</td>
<td>3.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to education</td>
<td>2.484</td>
<td>1.678</td>
<td>3.676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer protection</td>
<td>3.328</td>
<td>1.676</td>
<td>6.609</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reading: A participant who is a member of a “Peace-building, Post-conflict” organization is 3.8 times more likely to belong to a “Human rights” organization than if he/she were not a member.

We analyzed all organizational memberships in the same manner by observing the most significant coefficients. Furthermore, given the number of organizations involved, we decided to observe all groups to which at least 1 person in 5 belonged, with an R\(^2\) indicating a large percentage of explained variation and to observe the organizations – even small ones – with the highest odds ratios in explaining membership in other groups. Indeed, it was interesting to look at the organizations with limited memberships that occupied larger spaces in larger groups. Thus, belonging to a Trotskyist organization multiplied by 4.15 the probability of belonging to...

\(^1^3\) Belongs or has belonged: “yes” / “no reply” assimilated to a “no”. The following results were obtained with SPAD software using a binary logistic regression method for stepwise selection of variables.

\(^1^4\) Indicator of the percentage of variation explained by the model.

\(^1^5\) As a general rule, an odds-ratio significantly below 1 indicates a negative influence of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable, and an odds-ratio significantly above 1 indicates a positive influence. The confidence interval of an odds-ratio containing 1 indicates a variable of little interest.
an anti-neoliberal globalization organization and by 4.86 the probability of belonging to an organization of the unemployed or undocumented immigrants; membership in an LGBT organization increased by 9.1 the probability of belonging to anarchist or autonomist groups, etc. We carried out similar analyses for all the organizations that multiplied ($R^2 > 0.3$) the probability of belonging to another group. The combination of these two reasoning processes resulted the following graph:

**Figure 8.4 Links between organization memberships**

[Diagram showing links between various organizations such as Environment, Anti-racism, Development and humanitarian solidarity, Education, Human Rights, Against Globalization, Anticolonialism, Peasants, Antiracism, Human Rights, and so on.]

Reading: a link that starts from an organization indicates a strong explanation for membership in another organization; a link that arrives at an organization indicates it can be explained in particular by membership in another organization ($R^2$ of McFadden > 0.3). The figure in parentheses indicates the number of links. All families of organizations that include more than one survey respondent in 10 have been kept in the diagram and only the small organizations with strong explanatory power have been represented.

These activist affinities, which are statistically isolated, appear to be consistent with what we have learned about the alter-global world and activist tendencies using a more ethnographic approach: they reveal an anarchist, libertarian tendency that tends to find fulfillment particularly

16 We have not mentioned the good coefficients when they designate a redundancy: e.g. communists and Maoists, AIDS and healthcare, peace and pacifism, women and feminists, antiracism and human rights, etc.
in alternative media as well as the influence of former Maoists, particularly Africans, in large education associations and of Trotskyists in movements of the unemployed or specifically alter-global organizations. The branch encompassing human rights, alter-globalization, and international solidarity organizations obviously plays a central role, with the women's rights and environmental spheres of influence slightly less centrally linked, despite their ability to attract sizable troops.

This chart proves to be very similar to the diagrams proposed by Fillieule and Blanchard (2005: 164) and Sommier and Combes (2007), both of which insist on the centrality of the branch of environmentalists, international solidarity, human rights advocacy, and organizations specifically opposed to neoliberal globalization in the alter-global constellation.

This is by no means a neutral observation, in that it may give an advantage or disadvantage to national groups within the international activist space. Indeed, the hierarchy of organizational memberships is not the same in every country or continent.

In order to grasp more fully the role of these organizations in specific contexts, we now propose to switch back to the national level (or continental level for the Latin Americans). Here is how organizational memberships were distributed among the Senegalese, French, and Latin American participants at the Forum.

The contrast between the membership structures of these three populations is striking: whereas political parties, feminist or women's groups, and youth, peasant, and educational rights organizations dominate on the Senegalese side, memberships in international solidarity, human rights, antiglobalization and environmental organizations preponderate among French participants. The Latin Americans confirm the specificity of national configurations of organizations. In this case, the number of organizations that include more than one fifth of survey respondents among their members is greater (8 compared with 5 for the Europeans), and the role of religious organizations and communities testifies to the widespread influence of liberation theology on the continent.

If we compare this membership structure with Figure 2 above, we note that the associations which are most centrally positioned and form the core of the most dense relationships are those to which the French and Western participants in general belong – but not the Senegalese, except for associations promoting rights to education (which obviously benefit from the opportunities opened up by the “Education For All” campaign in Africa, which has channeled a portion of international public policy funding to this sector). One interpretation of the finding that Senegalese
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SENEGALESE</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>LATIN AMERICANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political party</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Humanitarian, development, international solidarity</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women’s Rights &amp; Feminism</strong></td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women’s associations</strong></td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>Antiracism, immigrant rights, right to asylum</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right to education</strong></td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>Against neoliberal economic globalization</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth movements (e.g. scouts), students</strong></td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>Environment, antinuclear, sustainable development</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Rights</strong></td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>Residents’ rights, community struggles, squats</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Against AIDS</strong></td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious organizations and communities</strong></td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>Women’s Rights &amp; Feminism</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cooperatives, tontines, microcredit</strong></td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>Pacifist / antiwar</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian, development, intal solidarity</strong></td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>Labor unions</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labor unions</strong></td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>Right to education, education for all</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace-building, post-conflict</strong></td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>Anticolonialism</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal / social aid</strong></td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>Peace-building, post-conflict</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.6  Organizational memberships as a % of Senegalese (n = 305), French (n = 208) and Latin Americans (n = 85) survey respondents at the WSF in Dakar
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SENEGAL</strong></th>
<th><strong>FRENCH</strong></th>
<th><strong>LATIN AMERICANS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Africanism</td>
<td>11.9 Others: Youth and students movements, Religious organizations and communities, Cooperatives, tontines, microcredit, Alternative media, Organizations of the unemployed or undocumented immigrants, etc., Against AIDS, Peasants / farmers, Women’s associations, Health, Personal / social aid, Consumer rights, Anarchists/ Autonomists, Communists, Pan-Africanism, LGBT, Trotskyists, Maoists</td>
<td>&lt;10 Residents’ rights, community struggles, squats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents’ rights, community struggles, squats</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>Alternative media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against neoliberal economic globalization</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>Against AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment, antinuclear, sustainable development</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>Youth movements (e.g. scouts), students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants and farmers</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>Organizations of the unemployed or undocumented immigrants, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: Health, Antiracism / immigrant rights / right of asylum, Pacifist / antiwar, Consumer rights, Anticolonialism, Alternative media, Organizations of the unemployed or undocumented immigrants, etc. Maoists, LGBT, Communists, Anarchists and Autonomists, Trotskyists</td>
<td>&lt;10</td>
<td>Women’s associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others: Anticolonialism, Personal / social aid, Peasants and farmers, Health, Pan-Africanism, Consumer rights, LGBT, Communists, Trotskyists, Maoists, Anarchists/ Autonomists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
activists were more isolated from the central networks might be that many participants were encountering the WSF for the first time\(^\text{17}\) and had not (yet) had a chance to develop as many network ties as other participants. One could speculate that if another WSF was held in Dakar or nearby, the network patterns would look more like those of the other national/regional groups. For instance, Byrd et al. found that over time the networks at the WSF changed as groups developed relationships and learned to use the forums to develop cross-cutting ties (Byrd, Scott, and Jasny, 2010).

This also helps us to understand why the Latin Americans appear to occupy a structurally intermediate position here: they are present in large numbers within the central constellation of alter-globalization organizations and at the same time, unlike Westerners, they can speak on behalf of the South. Thus we see more clearly how they came to think of themselves structurally as intermediaries between the African continent and Europe.\(^\text{18}\)

Finally, the importance of political party membership in the Senegalese activist space also underlines the effects of gaps or even misunderstandings between activists in international situations: what some individuals experience as their essential membership may very well be considered secondary by others. This is revealed, in particular, about the Senegalese: when activists acquire social capital materialized by membership in an association or even better the management of an association (e.g. a women’s organization), they may soon be encouraged to join a political party, especially the party currently in power, eager to strengthen its activities as a power broker. Conversely, other party memberships appear either as more central to the political identity of activists (the Workers’ Party, Trotskyist organizations, the Green Party, etc.) or as former memberships that were replaced by reinvesting in associative-type organizations.

Observing the diversity of organizational memberships within an international event therefore requires thinking about more than the importance and influence of organizations “in general.” In addition to raising the significant issue of material support for action, it also reveals how misunderstandings and gaps play out behind the main blocs of organizational memberships. The central position assumed by some organizations in the alter-global sphere can be accounted for by their “multi-purpose” role as employers and generalists, capable of capturing funds from the very development industry

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17 The number of persons saying they had never participated in such an event amounted to 51.2% of the Senegalese (compared with the general ratio of 33.1% in the global population).

18 As shown in Chapter 7 by Isaline Bergamaschi, Héloïse Nez, and Tania Navarro.
they criticize and supporting advocacy campaigns while at the same time attracting people who allow themselves greater freedom to engage in radical politics in other spaces. Finally, the unequal distribution of resources and know-how among organizations explains why some are in a better position to provide a base – quite often a base of women, young people and peasants of the South – at major international activist events.
9 Stepping back from your figures to figure out more

Ilka Vari-Lavoisier

Abstract
This chapter revisits learnings social scientists can draw from “no-replies.”
The uneven propensity to answer amongst the international population surveyed during the 2011 WSF discloses the extent to which interviewees evolve in different realms. Indeed, actors’ socialization shapes their linguistic, social and symbolic references. Our conclusions thus bring to the fore a decisive challenge that transnational mobilizations have to face: proposing sound and federative ways of describing the world.

9.1 Why and how to inquire about “no-replies”

Can any survey claim to have replies to all its questions? “No-replies” concern everyone who designs, processes, or analyzes a survey. It is one of the few topics that epidemiologists, psychologists, and sociologists could profitably discuss, as this complex issue is widespread in the social as well as medical sciences.

Early on, researchers realized the extent to which replies depended on questions – and even more on how those questions were formulated (Barr, 1972). This weakness has been well documented, but the cognitive mechanisms underlying the considerable variations in replies (e.g. depending on the order of the questions) are still poorly understood. Even today, a good deal of research work simply brushes aside “no-replies” (Kanas and Tubergen, 2009; Nagel, 2010). The limits of this practice are nevertheless obvious, not least because respondents who do not reply generally have particular characteristics that are likely to bias the results (Cheung et al., 2006; Kotaniemi et al., 2001; Smith et al., 1999). A sizable literature has developed to offset these pitfalls by “correcting” biases induced by no-replies after the survey. We might mention, among others, econometric techniques: Bayesian inference (Rubin, 1987; ) multiple imputation (King, et al., 2001), or latent variable analysis (O’Muircheartaigh and Moustaki, 1999, see also Graham, et al. 2012).

These efforts to “rectify” the results (Goyette and Mullen, 2006; Kreuter et al., 2010) are part of a statistical approach to no-replies. The main goal is
to produce estimates or imputations to “fill in” missing data with plausible values (Pilmis, 2006). Such practices seem questionable from the social science point of view and might raise legitimate doubts on the very possibility to surmise the answers of those who never answer questionnaires. Rather than “filling in” the holes, this chapter proposes to study what such holes disclose. In this respect, the WSF survey makes it possible to extend on the international scale, a fruitful reflection conducted at the national level. It sheds a different light on the assumption that “a simple statistical analysis of ‘no-replies’ offers information about the meaning of the question, as well as the category of people questioned, the category being defined as much by the probability of having an opinion at all as by the conditional probability of having a favorable or unfavorable one” (Bourdieu, [1972] 1979). How do such patterns evolve when the survey population is international and multilingual?

9.2 A panorama of “no-replies” in the WSF survey

The analysis of the “no-replies” in the WSF survey is promising because they concern few questions, and those questions prove to be of a particular type. On the whole, the questionnaires were filled out quite thoroughly, especially if researchers are interested in sociographic variables. The factual questions were answered by virtually all survey respondents, with a very low rate of no-replies (less than 3% for questions regarding age, sex, and level of education, less than 6% for the question about the feeling of belonging to a religion). Even the two questions pertaining to voting in elections were very largely filled in, along with the question about membership in a political party (with no-reply rates of less than 3.5% and 2.5%, respectively).

Survey-taking conditions were thus good enough to ensure that, despite the diverse languages and nationalities, the factual questions were clearly understood – and properly answered. The good response rates to the questions on political participation confirm that the survey teams succeeded in establishing a climate of trust conducive to receiving replies to such questions. Moreover, the context in which the survey was conducted was quite favorable, as the schedule of activities generally offered participants free time. Finally, the questionnaires were filled out more fully when they were administered by the survey team rather than self-administered, suggesting

1 “Are you (or have you ever been) a member or a political party (or of a youth political organization)?”
a positive relationship between researcher and survey respondent, or even the guiding role of the researchers.

The gaps become especially evident when we examine opinion questions as opposed to factual questions, according to the distinction proposed by Alain Desrosières (2005). Opinion questions were unevenly answered and sometimes generated high no-reply rates (more than 40% for certain items). This is not surprising as no-reply rates are usually unevenly distributed among questions. The resulting uneven distribution of bias (Groves, 2006) thus deserves a closer look. The excellent rate of replies to factual questions allows researchers to produce a detailed profile of survey respondents and therefore to elucidate the reasons why they avoid answering certain questions. Here we will analyze (1) whether or not the specificities of the non-respondents explain their no-replies; (2) to what extent the singular traits of the international population of respondents defy the traditional framework for analyzing no-replies; (3) what the no-replies reveal about the alter-global movement.

9.3 Do the conditions of participation shape the modalities of participation?

The database allowed us to compare the profiles of activists who came to the WSF from all over the world. It soon became apparent that this Forum was not a spontaneous gathering of individuals who had come on their own. Indeed the great majority of participants came on behalf of an organization2 (73.5% of survey respondents). Thus they did not come in a purely private context but within an organized framework to represent a structure or group (or at least they thought they were representing a structure). While the great majority of participants came on behalf of an organization, more than 60% of the total survey population also belonged to a structure involved in organizing the Forum. The event seems to have been orchestrated by and for a limited number of organizations (rather than individuals) – so much so that the Forum widely resembled a professional gathering designed by and for an associative sphere that used it as a platform for encounters, discussions, and meetings – in short, for work. Thus, nearly one third of the participants (30.6%) came to participate in meetings with their partners or donors (38% of those who came on behalf of an organization).

2 Question 8: “Did you come on behalf of an organization?” No/Yes.
Depending on the context, one and the same actor had to mobilize different roles from his/her repertoire of identities (Goffman, 1959), sometimes for strategic purposes (Siméant, 1994: 50). Taking part in a gathering as a professional rather than in a personal capacity and coming with one’s organization (55%) or with one’s colleagues (16%) rather than with acquaintances (3%) or as a family (4%) had an impact on the way participants approached the Forum. How did the conditions of participation shape the manner of participation? Did the professional dimension supplant the political dimension? How does the function of representation (coming on behalf of an organization) affect the representative? Is it a favorable context for expressing political opinions? Is coming on behalf of an organization compatible with publicly acknowledging one’s support for violent practices? This seems doubtful, based on comparison of the first cross-tabulations.

The individuals who came on behalf of an organization appear to display perceptibly different opinions from the rest of the participants. The “representatives” are more cautious and prefer petitions to sit-ins; they more readily condemn the use of violence or do not give an opinion. Do they really have different inclinations and are they less radical? (as Chapter 3 by J. Siméant shows). Or are their stated opinions modified by the situation? These individuals were surveyed at an event they were not attending in a personal capacity (and one of the very first questions in the survey reminded them of that fact). It is understandable that the replies reflected this difference. Indeed, there were significantly more no-replies among those who came to perform a representative function than among those who had come in a personal capacity.

In this context, the no-replies can be interpreted as compliance with a duty of discretion (Pilmis, 2006). Indeed, participants who came on behalf of an organization also gave fewer replies to specific questions about their political opinions. There is a clear gap between the few no-replies concerning participation in elections (only 4% of “no-replies:” more than 96% of survey respondents answered both questions on this topic)3 and the far greater silence on the next question concerning the party for which they voted (17% of “no-replies for the third question”).4 How can we explain the sudden drop of 13 points when the questions directly follow one another in the questionnaire? The duty of discretion remains

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3 Q22. “In general, do you vote in elections?” 96.8% of replies.
Q23. “Did you vote in the last national elections in your country?” 96.9% of replies.

4 Q24. “Did you vote for the ruling party (or a member of a ruling coalition) or an opposition party?” 83.2% of replies.
an avenue of analysis: of the 163 survey respondents who did not specify whether they voted for an opposition party or a ruling party, 77% came to the WSF on behalf of an organization. The representative function (coming on behalf of an organization) may hamper the inclination to express one’s own political opinions – especially if they are radical (as the charts below suggest).

These initial elements suggest that the fact of coming “on behalf of an organization” may dissuade participants from expressing their own personal political preferences. When it is a question of asserting one’s opinions to a third party, the context matters (Eliasoph, 1990). “No-reply” to specific questions regarding political preferences is a constant in surveys using questionnaires (Pilmis, 2006: 11). It is not always a neutral act to put forward publicly one’s own political tendencies. The distortions induced by social desirability are well-known (Grémy, 1987). Pollsters are familiar with the need to rectify the bias induced by reluctance to declare one’s political preferences, a fortiori if they are extreme. Here the no-replies regarding violent practices may be partially linked to this bias.

A no-reply is nevertheless a complex phenomenon and a closer analysis yields much more information. We therefore propose to show what this area of inquiry teaches us about the population of WSF participants, the workings of the WSF itself and the obstacles that its participants have yet to overcome.
9.4 When “no-replies” question the question

To understand the logic leading to no-replies, we sought to identify which types of questions more readily prompted no reply (cf. chart).

Illustration 9.2 Completion rates by question (N= 1069).

Illustration 9.3 Reponses and no-replies to three opinion questions (N= 1069).

“To which extent do you identity with” (Q3)

“Which political party did you vote for” (Q28)

“According to you, what should be done to control neoliberal globalization” (Q21)
Why do we observe such strong variations between questions and within questions? The gap seems significant enough to be heuristic: if we consider the last question (Q21), almost half of respondents did not answer at least one item (47.6% of the total sample). The last three questions were framed as indicated in the following chart:

What particular features explain why these questions were answered less often than the others? A classical point of view insists on the specific cultural capital required to form and then express a consistent opinion on political issues. Since the 1970s, authors have emphasized that the ability to formulate an opinion about political concerns is unevenly distributed among the population and hence among respondents (Converse, 1976; Bourdieu, 1979). In this perspective, the propensity to express a political opinion varies according to the respondents’ level of instruction, which led Pierre Bourdieu to conclude that the probability of answering any political question was comparable to the probability of going to a museum (Bourdieu, 1979). To sum up, these findings aim to account for, first, the different completion rates of factual questions and opinion questions (variations between questions); and second, it assumes that no-replies to political questions are due to lower levels of instruction (variations within questions).

Such an approach offers a consistent way to discriminate among more or less completed variables in our survey. We can actually draw a continuum of no-replies rates: lowest for the more factual questions (age, sex, and occupation), increasing for political questions, and reaching a peak for abstract questions. The difficulty of taking a stance on abstract matters (Lipset and Schneider, 1987) can be related to the “cognitive difficulty” of specific political topics (Converse, 1976). Discriminating among questions according to the effort required to produce an answer might partially explain why the most abstract questions triggered the highest no-reply rates. Nevertheless this perspective totally fails to account for differences of completion rates observed within one and the same question. If “political competence” matters, our data challenges the classical interpretation that conflates political skills with the level of formal instruction.

Within this atypical population – highly educated and committed – the traditional angles of analysis do not account for the strong variations observed. Inequalities seem to be polarized along other dividing lines. Nationality appears to be far more discriminating than educational or political capital. Thus we tried to predict the probability of (not) replying to Question 21 (“What should be done to control neoliberal globalization?”). Using three successive models, we were able to test the percentage of
dependent variation (level of instruction, social capital, and nationality). We can see that nationality alone explains a much greater percentage of the variations observed than the other two indicators we tested (4.8% compared with 1.8% for education and 3.7% for social capital; cf. table 9.1 for a detailed view of the proxies used).

Table 9.1  No-replies to the question (Q21): “What should be done to control neoliberal globalization?” (three simple linear regressions with one explanatory variable).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No-replies to Q21</th>
<th>Level of instruction</th>
<th>Social capital</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>1069</td>
<td>1069</td>
<td>1069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.0240</td>
<td>0.0620</td>
<td>0.1273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R-squared</td>
<td>0.0185</td>
<td>0.0368</td>
<td>0.0480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANOVA</td>
<td>66.42</td>
<td>171.53</td>
<td>303.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>4072</td>
<td>4183</td>
<td>4348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.5  Level of instruction, social capital, and political competence

The international survey population in 2011 enables a heuristic reexamination of Bourdieu’s seminal position that “political competence (…) is a function of a person’s level of education” (Bourdieu, 1979: 126; Laurison, 2007). In fact, the level of education in the case of the WSF survey by no means exhausts the question. In particular, because the level was notoriously high for the survey sample as a whole: 75.3% declared they had an undergraduate level (less than 7.6% of respondents stated they had left before completing secondary school, 15.8% declared a level of instruction below a high school diploma, 2.8% did not reply). In this respect, such high levels of instruction for the whole sample confirm the overselection of African activists who accede to the international spheres (Siméant, 2013a).

Of course the propensity to reply varies with the level of education, but this correlation does not hold automatically or for all the questions. The no-reply rate is thus lower among survey respondents who left at the end of primary school than the no-reply rate of respondents with a high school

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5 Only the 30 survey respondents who did not reply do not appear in the chart on the following page but they are included in all the subsequent calculations.
diploma (46.6%) or an undergraduate education (40.1%). This supports the idea that the significance of the level of education is not uniform across nationalities (as we saw in the Introduction and in Chapters 1 and 3). Does that mean we should reject the idea of political competence – or that such competence is distributed differently within this atypical population? What are the dividing lines among these generally highly educated survey respondents that would explain the difference in their replies to one and the same questionnaire?

Social capital also proves to be fundamental, but here too the specificities of the survey population tend to diminish the relevance of analyzing no-replies from this angle. A very high overall level on this point as well (and low variations in terms of social capital for the survey population) does not account for the strong variations in the no-replies observed. As our aim here is not to take a position in the abundant debates regarding social capital, we would therefore refer readers to the discussion proposed by Portes and Vickstrom (2011). Following these authors, I have adopted a classical definition of social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1986: 248).

We consider affiliations to institutionalized organizations as a proxy (imperfect but instructive) to test this hypothesis. Indeed, we observe a statistical link between the probability of answering abstract questions and the level of social capital (approximated on the basis of the number of associations in which the respondent is involved). This proxy of social capital is a much better predictor of the propensity to reply than the level of instruction. Yet the relation seems neither linear nor systematic (otherwise we would observe a positive slope assessing the increasing propensity to reply with the increasing number of non-profit organization affiliations declared). The model proposed below confirms that neither the level of instruction nor the social capital is significantly correlated with no-reply rates. Nationality definitely exerts the strongest effect.

The considerable disparities between nationalities suggest several avenues of analysis, and we propose to explore three of them here: (i) the feeling of political competence is unequally distributed within the various

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6 Thus the average number of associations to which the respondents currently belong (or previously belonged) is high and quite homogeneous: between 4.1 and 4.8 for all the respondents except Asians (7.1) and citizens of the Americas (5.8). The effect of selection (linked to distance in particular) no doubt played an important role: the Asians who came to Dakar were well-known as activists. The low numbers of the latter groups (22 and 131 of respondents, respectively) limit their weight in overall estimates.
nationalities surveyed; (2) the observed variations are linked to linguistic constraints inherent in administering questionnaires to such a diverse population; (3) nationality reflects something else, such as the respondents' world of political socialization.

9.6 Feeling of political competence and nationality

The uneven propensity to reply to abstract questions according to the nationality of the respondents reveals a definite cleavage between Europeans and nationals from other continents, especially Africa, who showed far less inclination to respond. At the very least, the data suggests that the
propensity to grasp this type of question and recognize oneself in the proposed responses is socially and also geographically situated. Although these disparities are seldom discussed, they reveal basic dynamics that shape transnational mobilizations.

Fighting against North-South inequalities does not mean we are totally free from them ourselves – on the contrary. The participants at this Forum revealed an unusually keen awareness of the international process of division of labor in which they are trapped. They always know that borders are not the same for all of them (Siméant, 2013a). This critical view of their own position seems to be confirmed when we look at respondents’ opinions on North-South inequalities (within established North-South networks). The participants who make the most critical assessment of their own South-North networks are mostly Africans.7 Though transnational movements may not exactly replicate world-system stratification (Smith and Wiest, 2005), they do not change out of the blue. When it comes to carrying out an assessment (not only of problems but of solutions as well), such inequalities may be part of an uneven feeling of legitimacy. The extreme interpretation of this idea is summed up by the terse statement that “Interest or ‘indifference’ towards politics (...) is commensurate with the reality of this power (...) indifference is only a manifestation of impotence” (Bourdieu, 1984: 405).

This formulation is too lapidary, although it is plausible that the feeling of having a legitimate and sound opinion on political matters is unevenly distributed among such a transnational population. The idea of political competence mostly emphasizes the way social stratification is reflected within polls. Here, the international scale merely modifies the dynamics of social stratification and thus calls for a pinch of sociological imagination to propose satisfying explanations. The WSF survey provides an unusual opportunity to assess the extent to which the cleavages between the dominant and the dominated may be polarized along different lines, depending on the scale at hand. We have underlined here the importance of national origins but we certainly need further investigation to understand how nationality is intermingled with other relevant forms of capital. These stimulating areas of research concerning the uneven distribution among nationalities of the feeling of legitimacy and other forms of immaterial capital seem to have been seriously neglected by the empirical literature. To what extent is this linked to the notorious difficulties involved in conducting surveys among multilingual populations?

7 60% of the most pessimistic opinions were expressed by African participants. Nevertheless, the headcounts are small (38 persons), thus limiting the reliability of this trend.
9.7 Conducting surveys in several languages: methodological challenges

“Cultural and organizational constraints weigh on surveys too” notably because “questionnaires rely on the cognitive and linguistic categories of respondents” (Desrosières, 2007). The discrepancies observed within national populations when it comes to designing surveys on political matters are merely wider and deeper in a plurinational population (Schwarz et al., 2010; Stoop et al., 2010; Thornton et al., 2010). Forty years of experience have made it possible to document the pitfalls of carrying out nationwide opinion polls – within populations that share the same language and a certain number of common references (cultural, political, etc.) (Fillieule et al., 1997). All these aspects help to explain why the problems are compounded by conducting surveys at international events (Siméant, 2013a).

In this respect our survey contributes to an ongoing reflection about cross-national data collection: for instance, the Gallup project deals with similar issues, but on a larger scale. The Gallup enterprise endeavors to conduct worldwide surveys and already covers more than 160 countries. Their way of dealing with the translation of subjective questions consists in favoring dichotomous response categories (Harkness et al., 2010: 535). In our view, this approach conflates errors of measurements and rules out any possibility of understanding them. Yet debates over suitable approaches illustrate the growing awareness of the caveats raised by translating questions, especially subjective ones. Conversely, we would argue in favor of protocols to cope directly with those difficulties instead of eluding them by oversimplification. For instance, an upstream “country-specific” analysis can be fruitful (Thornton et al., 2010). In this respect, the very process implemented by our research team to design the questionnaire is innovative and promising.

In designing the WSF questionnaire and more broadly putting together our multilingual survey team itself, we were aware of the difficulties involved in making the questionnaire accessible to speakers from all over the world. Before overseeing the translation into five languages, we first reduced the proportion of opinion questions in the questionnaire compared with the previous surveys conducted at alter-global gatherings (see I. Sommier’s contribution). The relevance of collecting factual information was widely confirmed by the survey results. The questionnaire was above all the fruit of a joint effort. From the outset, the team comprised French, English, Spanish, and Wolof speakers. The team’s Senegalese researchers and doctoral students were asked to collaborate at various stages and in
particular to give us their reactions to the questionnaire, its structure and its items. Their contributions certainly helped us make our questions more comprehensible, for example with regard to religious membership. Nevertheless, it was not always possible to find equivalent expressions for everything.

9.8 Insurmountable difficulties? Different worlds of meaning

Let us focus for a moment on one of the questions that received the most no-replies, which was formulated as follows: “In your opinion, what should be done to control neoliberal globalization?” The sharpest differences in attitude revealed by this question were those of the two largest sub-populations: Senegalese and French (who together made up 48.8% of our respondents). The phrase “control neoliberal globalization” is not commonplace in Senegal. Whereas the expression had been repeatedly employed at recent mobilizations in France and broadcast by the media, it was seldom used in West Africa. What can be grasped through qualitative studies is sometimes hard to objectify in quantitative terms. We are by no means in a position to offer proof here, but a small example based on the media in these two countries may help to illustrate our point. “Rue89” and “Seneweb” are online information sites that are very popular among young people in France and Senegal, respectively. A search for the expression “neoliberal globalization” yielded 254 hits at “Rue89” but only 6 at “Seneweb” (the most recent dated back to 2008 and two of the six results were from foreign sources). At the same time, “Seneweb” posted a very large number of articles on the WSF in February 2011 (5,330 results!), in which it talked more readily about the “struggle against capitalism” or “against imperialism” than against “neoliberal globalization.” This is not solely a question of methodological problems. The example suggests that some aspects of the diversity of WSF participants were irreducible. An expression that would have made more sense to Senegalese association members would no doubt have lost its force for French activists.

Senegalese and French WSF participants have been socialized in different political worlds and endowed with different linguistic capital. This does not involve mastering a foreign language, but a much more fundamental relationship to language. Politics is first – and perhaps above all – a way of talking about the world. Because our survey questions used categories or language and thought derived from the French political, activist, and cultural context, they had a different resonance for Senegalese participants, including those with equivalent social capital.
The case of West Africa is fascinating in this regard, because it was not necessarily relevant to translate the whole questionnaire into Wolof. Incidentally, few Senegalese participants (7%) wanted to reply to the survey in Wolof. While their choice of language may have been due to the nationality of the survey administrators, it may also have been linked to the fact that Senegalese political life often plays out in French at the national level (much less often at the local level). Newspapers are published in French and French is still the administrative language, the official language as well as the national language in a land where the Soninke refuse to speak Wolof. So much so that many socio-economic words and phrases do not exist in Wolof or in Soninke and political discussions in ethnic languages are sprinkled with French expressions. These French words and expressions are not those commonly used in the French media (in France, who knows the term délestage?). Clearly, it is not so much a question of the language (French, English, or Soninke) as of a world of meaning incorporated in political language (Eliasoph, 1990). Informal discussions, speeches, public meetings and debates, and the media contribute daily to the ongoing redefinition of political language and expressions that, brandished as banners, polarize discussions and even thinking.

9.9 Conclusion: what no-replies reveal

The WSF survey confirms that this type of event brings together actors caught up in diverging approaches stemming from material concerns. Those who were able to make the journey to Dakar were not necessarily the most radical: they were often those who belonged to organizations capable of financing their participation. This context shaped the profile that respondents wanted or decided it was wise to show survey administrators. These factors spurred us to analyze the no-replies more closely. The WSF survey made a major contribution on this point by showing how a transnational population defies the traditional analytic framing of surveys by questionnaires. Here no-replies cannot be explained by a lower level of formal education or less social capital. The inequalities among participants seem to be organized along different lines. More analyses – especially qualitative – would be necessary to understand more fully what “nationality” encompasses or perhaps even hides (as Chapter 3 demonstrates).

8 The term designates a power cut and is frequently used in Senegalese media (2,250 search results on “Seneweb,” 8 search results on “Rue89”).
the meantime, our analysis confirms the extent to which “transnational mobilizations also have a local dimension, which is geographically and socially situated” (Mayer and Siméant, 2004).

We wanted to analyze no-replies because no aspect of the WSF survey should be ignored. Thus, the distribution of no-replies can be interpreted not only from a methodological standpoint but also per se as information. It suggests the difficulties faced by participants at transnational mobilizations, particularly in developing a common language. The obstacles encountered at European social forums (Doerr, 2012) are compounded by the transcontinental dimension of a World Social Forum. The multiplication of transnational political platforms gives this linguistic issue greater importance. The way political debates are translated shapes the way people engage in politics on the supra-national scale (Doerr, 2008). Indeed, how to formulate the stakes of the struggle is in itself a challenge. Politics is a way of putting our experience into words; political socialization is also the convergence of ways of thinking and talking about the world.

No-replies tell us a great deal about the semantic dimension of politics

This reflection on national variations is essential: a growing body of evidence is shedding light on how national contexts affect respondents’ involvement in surveys. Psychologists are exploring how different socialization processes feed differences in “situated cognition” that shape attitudes towards surveys (Schwarz et al., 2010: 177). Using their own vocabulary, social scientists have noted that survey participation has “cultural and national” components (Stoop et al., 2010: 9). We propose instead to think in terms of framing. In this respect, the WSF survey has paved the way to understanding more fully how primary socialization shapes actors’ perceptions – and hence cognition of their environment. An interdisciplinary perspective would stand to gain by combining sociology, anthropology, and psychology.

Indeed, actors’ socialization shapes their social, symbolic, and linguistic references. Those dimensions are intermingled. “The content of a speech is inseparable from its form,” and this whole makes sense only in a specific social context (Eliasoph, 1990: 465). Groups have their own systems for describing their environment and an element can hardly be isolated from its context without affecting its very meaning. If questions concerning age or sex can easily be translated, a phrase like “neoliberal globalization” has a specific (and more meaningful) sense in the linguistic, social, and political realm of a given group. The short time period in which questionnaires are administered merely reinforces the role of predetermined categories.
In this context, political opinions, especially when publicly expressed, seem virtually inseparable from linguistic framings, which are themselves socially situated.

Here the social researcher can intervene as a “translator,” accounting for the way the actors’ expressions are shaped by the context (Eliasoph and Lichterman, 1989). The willingness of respondents from eighty-seven countries to participate in our survey is assessed by the time they devote to answering our questions, as well as by the average high rate of completion. The sparse no-replies are in themselves informative. They suggest that one of the ongoing challenges facing antiglobalization activists is a linguistic one: proposing sound, unifying ways of describing the world is crucial. No-replies, so unevenly distributed, are meaningful: they suggest that even if those participants wanted to meet – and actually did meet – they still have to develop a common language to denominate their environment, their enemies, and their goals. This challenge is in itself of paramount importance – once we acknowledge that people “do things with words” (Austin, 1975).
10 Conclusion

Johanna Siméant

We hope that the readers will use this book in multiple ways, as there are indeed different ways to read it.

Obviously the book intends to contribute to the literature on transnational moments in general, and alter-global movements in particular. It hopes to participate in the cumulativity, or at least comparativeness, of different surveys carried out about social forums and other transnational activist gatherings, about their composition and the diverse reasons of the participation there, a field well studied in particular by Donatella della Porta, Isabelle Sommier, and others. With other previous works, this book will have underlined the role of degree holding activists, and NGO employees, in the architecture of alter-globalism. It also confirms how groups and organizations matter (Fisher, 2005) in the general logistic of transnational activism and as providers of resources.

Maybe what could be the more specific contribution of our book, regarding the sociology of transnational social movements, lies in the attention paid to place, to the division of labor in activism, and to methodology.

The point here was not only to observe a WSF in an African setting (as already done by other scholars, Jackie Smith and her colleagues in particular, or ourselves). Of course understanding the diversity of the people gathered under the alter-global banner is important. But the issue is not only an ethical one, that of observing symmetry between activists from the North and from the global South. It is also to understand the material and intellectual conditions of the participation to such events in a situation which is also asymmetric: in terms of training of activists, of the resources they enjoy, and also of the issues that seem relevant to them. Here division of labor and place effects appear intertwined, as it is the very distance between activists coming from different national settings that worsens classical effects of division of labor in activist organizations, with the risk of not hearing so well all their voices, as, also, the issue of professionalization is particularly large in the NGO sector so active in Africa.

Observing that fact does not entail a pessimistic judgment about activists: it is also a way to understand what are the central positions in the alter-global world, assumed by some organizations that are simultaneously employers, generalists, able to obtain funds from the development industry, to lead advocacy campaigns and at the same time to secure a sometimes
more radical orientation, be it in their base or amongst their leaders. This also explains how it is possible to bring a base made up very often of women, young people, and peasants from the South at major international activist events. This central role of generalist organizations, such as Caritas/Secours Catholique or Oxfam, must be kept in mind to understand not only the material support for action, but also the misunderstandings and gaps played out between participants. Those misunderstandings should not however be considered only negatively; they are also *working misunderstandings* for action, as the study of relations between activist of different nationalities reveals. It explains how the same slogans can mean very different things; it also enlightens the paradoxes of the link between nationalism, anti-imperialism and internationalism. Paying attention to activist diversity also explains the central role of nationalities or geographical origins in WSF, such as Latin Americans in general and Brazilians in particular, not only because of their anteriority in the WSF process, but also as they comparatively benefit from more resources than their African counterparts, but are also in a position to speak on behalf of the global South, contrary to their northern allies.

Paying attention to place and space does not mean that all politics is always local politics, but rather that all politics should be localized, to understand which local effects come into play in any activist situation, be it local, national, or international. To start with the Senegalese example, the fact that the WSF was held in a moment of concern about the intentions of president Wade to turn for a third mandate also contributed to the audience and the ongoing structure of the movement “Y’en a marre,” who frontally challenged Wade, with the motto “Wade dégage” (Wade clear off!).

Another aspect of our book is to suggest different methodological endeavors to study transnational social movements, hence the use of Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and Ascending Hierarchical Clustering to study populations in a situation of militancy. This is by no way an attempt to suggest there should be any magic bullet in methodology, but it appeared to us as a very good way to suspend unequivocal reasoning on the direction of causality. MCA makes it possible not only to represent complex data sets, which is an issue when one deals with international populations, and doing so, to map polarities in a given situation. We were determined however to use the World Social Forum held in Dakar not only as an opportunity to “catch” a population, but also to examine the theatrical dimension of the event, hence to pay attention to the performance and representation issues at stake, as the Goffman inspired chapter proves. This is also a way to defend
the idea that quantitative analysis and thick ethnographic description can enrich each other.

The book, we hope, and if one agrees with a decompartmentalized conception of the social sciences, could therefore be a contribution in sociology to the study of transnational social movements but also to the general study of activism, to African studies, and to understanding how the industry of development transforms African societies and their relation to politics. It was not only an opportunity to study the alter-global movement. Recalling the material dimension of activism or the paradoxes and difficulties of transnational activist cooperation should by no means be considered as a way to blame the victim or to be suspicious about activists and how they muddle through the difficulties of acting together in contexts of inequality. Rather, we perceive it as a possible position of the social sciences: by explaining the pragmatic paradoxes in which activists are caught, this can give them an opportunity to appropriate this knowledge and de-dramatize what is so often the basis for conflicts between them.
Technical appendix: Surveying an international event through a multinational team

The quantitative part of our study is based on a survey of 8 pages and 56 questions; the English version is reproduced at the end of this appendix. Although heavily inspired both from questions used by Sommier and Agrikoliansky (2005) and Della Porta (2009), and for some of them from the World Values Survey, the conception of the questionnaire was also collective within the research team, in order to address issues relative to specific national contexts (for instance, what could be the questions measuring religious practice when comparing someone praying five times a day, like a pious Muslim, to someone going once a week to his place of worship – which in France would mean a strong adhesion to Catholicism?).

The questionnaire included a large biographical portion pertaining to the respondent’s international experience, funding of travel expenses, position in the organization, status as an employee (or not) of an NGO, etc. The multinational composition of the research team (48 researchers, from the final year of master's degree to academics, from 8 nationalities1), along with our attention to linguistic diversity, guaranteed not only the extensive reach of the study but also its acceptance by an activist audience sometimes eager to denounce ethnocentrism. It also gave rise to numerous heuristic debates over the coding of socio-professional categories, which corresponded to different realities depending on the nationalities surveyed.

To achieve a balance among respondents and keep away from highlighting English- and French-speaking participants, we conceived and distributed the questionnaire in five languages: English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Wolof (the national language of Senegal). This meant planning both self-administered and administered questionnaires (since speaking only Wolof is more or less equivalent to being illiterate and therefore being unable to even read Wolof).

Between February 6th (opening ceremony and inauguration march) and the 11th, the questionnaire was handed out to nearly 1,100 people: this meant that every member of the team had to administrate around 25

1 Mostly from France and Senegal, but also from Algeria, Italy, Australia, Mexico, Ecuador, and Colombia.
questionnaires in 6 days, which was the guarantee of a quality work as the questionnaire was particularly long (56 questions, 305 variables), and also allowed the team member to carry out their own research through interviews, observation, and ethnography.

The administration of the questionnaire was twofold, as it was a theoretical choice to avoid overselecting academically inclined participants at the event, and therefore we administered the questionnaire either at workshops or at other forum locations.

A selection was done of surveying 100 of the nearly 900 workshops in the program, trying to respect the thematic and geographic proportions in the sample. If a workshop was canceled the pollsters would call their referent to have another attributed. Once in the room or under the tent, in order to avoid the classical biases of selecting participants who the pollsters would feel close to (in terms of gender, race, class, age, etc.), each pollster had to use a set of random routines to select the persons to whom the questionnaires would be addressed. Choosing first a person waiting at the beginning, then the 5th nearest to the door, in the case of refusal his/her neighbor near the door, and that twice again. Once the workshop had begun, beginning with the second rank from the left, in the case of refusal his/her neighbor, and again in the case of refusal; then 4th rank on from the right, in the case of refusal his/her neighbor, and again in the case of refusal; then 6th rank in the middle, in the case of refusal his/her neighbor, and again in the case of refusal; then back to the 8th rank on the left, etc. Everyone had learned the same sentence in five languages to explain the survey to the interviewee: “Hello, I am participating in a collective research from the universities of Dakar, Paris Sorbonne, and Saint-Louis. Would you mind answering this questionnaire?” (if yes) “My questions will bear on your trajectory, your participation to the World Social Forum and social movements, your perception of social struggles.” Everyone had learned the same sentences in four languages at least.

Another part of the survey was directed to people outside the workshops, either in marches, resting places or small food shops. Another routine was adopted then to select the interviewees. During marches one had to select the 5th person counted before a banner, and then his/her neighbor if he/she refused to answer. For other places a route had to be chosen, the pollster had to stop after three drinking/eating places, to poll the person who had just paid, then his/her neighbor if he/she refused to answer, then to stop after three free rest places (under a tree, on a bank or stairs, or on the side of the road, interviewing the first person at the right of a group, and then the next; then stop after three activist stands, 3rd person on the left,
etc.; then stop after three sales outlets, poll the person who had just paid, and then back to the routine of the beginning. Pollsters had to present themselves with this sentence, memorized in the five languages: “Hello, are you here for the Forum?” (if yes) “I am participating in a collective research from the universities of Dakar, Paris Sorbonne, and Saint-Louis. Would you mind answering this questionnaire?” (if yes) “My questions will bear on your trajectory, your participation to the World Social Forum and social movements, your perception of social struggles.”

At the beginning of the interview, one had to follow the formulation of the questions strictly in the order of the questionnaire. Then, and only if the interviewee said he/she did not understand, the meaning of a question could be explained.

It is important to note that the opposition between surveying in and outside workshops is not exactly the same as between administered and self-administered questionnaires, even if people preferred to fill out the questionnaires in workshops in order not to bother others. But typically, a Wolof speaker would need to answer questions from a Wolof speaking pollster, talking discreetly. On the other hand, some people preferred to fill out the questionnaires themselves while having a drink outside, for instance.

Each anonymous questionnaire was stamped as “self-administered” (if the person had filled it out alone) or “administered,” mentioning the workshop where it had been collected (which authorized specific exploitations), if it included annotations (this often happened in self-administered questionnaires, the usual mode of administration in workshop, where people sit, take notes...).

Each evening, every pollster (including the editors of this book) gave back their questionnaires, indicating his/her name, the proportion of administered and self-administered questionnaires, the total number of persons solicited (in order to estimate the response rate, which was 73%), and indicated the difficulties and reactions to the survey, which were analyzed during the collective evening debriefings.

We would finally like to underline the value of multinational research teams combined to a lack of more plentiful funding, which obliged us to keep the division of labor to a minimum within our research group. These moments of scientific and communitarian utopia, marked by shared enthusiasm, helped to create a really committed research team, in which everyone had done some coding... A good way of keeping in mind all the steps of the scientific approach!

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2 In order to poll people who identified with the WSF even if not being in the workshops.
General data on participants

- 1,069 questionnaires coded for 1,100 questionnaires obtained and 1,506 persons contacted
- 24% administered and 75% self-administered questionnaires (info lacking on 1% of the questionnaires)
- Languages: English 17.5%, Spanish 8%, French 67%, Portuguese 4.5%, Wolof 2.5%
- Gender: 56.5% men, 40% women (info lacking on 3.5% of the questionnaires)
- Age: average age 40 years, median age 38 [17;80] 1st quartile = 28 years. 3rd quartile = 52 years
- Nationalities: French (20%) and Senegalese (28%) in majority, all other countries between 0.2 and 4.5%. Continents: Africa 50%, Europe 32%, Americas 12.5%, Asia 2.25%, Oceania 0.25%, No reply 3%
- Professions and occupations:
  - 39.5% managers and liberal professions (many managers in associations and teachers)
  - 24% mid-level occupations
  - 17.5% teachers
  - 47% work full-time
  - 11.5% work part-time
  - 8% in precarious employment
  - 16% pupils or students
  - 9.5% retirees
  - 6.5% unemployed
  - 1.6% at home
- Education: 77.5% university degrees (52.5% with a master's or a doctoral degree)
- Organizations: A majority of interviewees (69.5%) declare they have come on behalf of an organization
- Identification with the alter-global movement: A lot 51%; moderately 31%; a little 14%
- Religion: 60% of the interviewees declare they belong to a religion, mostly Islam (34%) and Christianity (22.5%). 64% the interviewees say they are believers, 9.5% agnostics, and 20% atheists and non-believers.
Appendix to Chapter 8 on groups and organizations: Clusters obtained by Ascending Hierarchical Clustering

Tables of the significant modalities for each cluster. The active variables are underlined; the others are illustrative. Group memberships are transformed in a binary variable: Yes (is or has been a member) / No (or no answer).

Cluster 1 / 9 (number of people: 166 – Percentage: 17.03)
Cluster 1 is made up almost entirely of French participants working in management and higher professional positions with a high level of education, indicating no religion, very often volunteers (75%), particularly in international solidarity or antiracism organizations. It is made up primarily of women and marked by widespread lack of membership in the organizations to which African activists most typically belong (AIDS, Pan-African, youth, education, etc.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Characteristic modalities</th>
<th>% of the modality in the cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member of a Pan-Africanist group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>97.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>95.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a peasant group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>93.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of an aid group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>93.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a women’s group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>92.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a group against AIDS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>91.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of group for the right to education</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>86.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a youth group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>83.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Upper cycle of higher education</td>
<td>79.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer in an organization</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>75.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Managers and liberal professions</td>
<td>69.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>69.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>60.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of an international solidarity group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>40.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of an antiracist group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>≥ 60</td>
<td>30.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cluster 2 / 9 (Number of people: 92 – Percentage: 9.44)
Cluster 2 is made up almost entirely of Latin American managers and high- and mid-level professionals, with a high level of education, indicating no religion, very often salaried employees of an organization (75%), members of a party, age 30-60, and often belonging to alternative media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable /abbreviation</th>
<th>Characteristic modalities</th>
<th>% of the modality in the cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationality by continent</td>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>97.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>76.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Upper cycle of higher education</td>
<td>66.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Managers and liberal professions</td>
<td>58.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a party</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>54.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>[30;44]</td>
<td>46.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried in an organization</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>[45;59]</td>
<td>38.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Mid-level occupations</td>
<td>38.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of an alternative media</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cluster 3 / 9 (Number of people: 104 – Percentage: 10.67)
Cluster 3 (10.7% of the sample) is made up almost entirely of very well-educated Europeans (non-French), working in management and higher professional positions as well as intermediate professions. Women form the majority of this population. They do not specify any religious affiliation and tend to belong to pacifist and environmental organizations, often as salaried employees, though there is also a small percentage above age 60.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable /abbreviation</th>
<th>Characteristic modalities</th>
<th>% of the modality in the cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationality by continent</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a Pan-Africanist group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>94.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of an AIDS group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>93.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of group for the right to education</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>87.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>77.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Upper cycle of higher education</td>
<td>73.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>54.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Managers and liberal professions</td>
<td>49.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the organization</td>
<td>No name given</td>
<td>45.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried in an organization</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>45.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cluster 4 / 9 (Number of people: 84 – Percentage: 8.62)
Cluster 4 (8.6% of the sample) does not indicate any profession. This population consists of very young Senegalese with at best a high school diploma. They are not defined by any organizational membership, whereas membership in a human rights, antiracist or antiglobalization organization or volunteer work for an organization correlates negatively with being part of this group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable /abbreviation</th>
<th>Characteristic modalities</th>
<th>% of the modality in the cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Mid-level occupations</td>
<td>37.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a pacifist group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>32.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of an ecologist/anti-nuclear/sustainable development group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>31.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>≥ 60</td>
<td>22.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cluster 5/9 (Number of people: 70 – Percentage: 7.18)
Cluster 5 (7.2% of the sample) is made up of employees and manual workers. They are mostly middle-aged Muslims and Senegalese, whose organizational memberships are mainly in political parties, trade unions, women's associations, and cooperatives.
Cluster 6 / 9 (Number of people: 162 – Percentage: 16.62)
Cluster 6 (16.6% of the sample) is made up of Africans with master’s or doctoral degrees, working in management or in intermediate professions, age 30-44, who tend to be strongly committed to Christianity. They are, in fact, the “international Africans” at forums, a population widely employed by NGOs that promote human rights and international solidarity or focus on health, peace, AIDS, media, etc.
### Cluster 7 / 9 (Number of people: 122 – Percentage: 12.51)
Cluster 7 (12.5% of the sample) is made up primarily of Senegalese, Muslim men, who have fewer diplomas than the preceding group, tend to work in intermediate professional positions and have been more influenced by Maoism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable /abbreviation</th>
<th>Characteristic modalities</th>
<th>% of the modality in the cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>94.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>86.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>71.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the organization pay for the trip to the WSF?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>63.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Mid-level occupations</td>
<td>52.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>[30;44]</td>
<td>45.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>[45;59]</td>
<td>38.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>1st cycle of higher education</td>
<td>35.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Baccalaureate, end of high school</td>
<td>31.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a Maoist group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Cluster 8 / 9 (Number of people: 55 – Percentage: 5.64)
Cluster 8 (5.6% of the sample) is made up of middle-aged Muslim Senegalese with little formal education. They belong to women's or feminist organizations, cooperatives, and religious groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable /abbreviation</th>
<th>Characteristic modalities</th>
<th>% of the modality in the cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Peasants and craftsmen</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried in an organization</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>90.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of an organization</td>
<td>Name given</td>
<td>81.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Baccalaureate, end of high school</td>
<td>78.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>58.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>54.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a women’s group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>45.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a feminist group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>[45;59]</td>
<td>38.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a cooperative/</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>34.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>microcredit/ tontine group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>30.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a peasants’ group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cluster 9 / 9 (Number of people: 120 – Percentage: 12.31)
Cluster 9 (12.3% of the sample) includes those identified in the lower right-hand quadrant of the factorial map: young, unemployed Senegalese Muslims, who are typically members of youth organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable /abbreviation</th>
<th>Characteristic modalities</th>
<th>% of the modality in the cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>None (stay at home, unemployed, etc.)</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>&lt; 30</td>
<td>98.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a worker’s union/ trade union</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>95.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried in an organization</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>94.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a peace building or post-conflict group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>91.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a pacifist group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>89.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a women’s group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>88.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of an antiracist group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>87.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a feminist group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>84.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of an international solidarity group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>82.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a human rights group</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>80.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the organization pay for the trip to the WSF?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>69.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a party</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>69.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>56.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>55.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer in an organization</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>46.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>1st cycle of higher education</td>
<td>45.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of an organization</td>
<td>No name given</td>
<td>44.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of a youth group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>40.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Questionnaire for participants to the Dakar World Social Forum

Researchers from the Cheikh Anta Diop (CREPOS, Dakar), Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (CESSP and CEMAF, Paris), and Gaston Berger (Saint-Louis) universities are carrying out a research on participation in the World Social Forum. This survey will complete the current knowledge on social movements and the global justice movement – especially in Africa. If you wish to contact us to share questions or reactions, you can email at enquete-fsm-dakar@bbox.fr.

We thank you for helping us fulfill this task and for offering us approximately 30 minutes of your time to fill out this questionnaire.

THE DATA WILL BE REGISTERED AND TREATED ANONYMOUSLY.

Date/time of distribution: ___/___/____ o’clock ___/___/2011
Place: 1☐ Opening ceremony 2☐ In a workshop
3☐ During a march 4☐ Outside the workshops
(organization stalls, snack bar, other...).

1) Have you taken/ did you take part in global justice, or anti-neoliberal globalization mobilizations in the past ten years (before this World Social Forum)? If yes, how many times?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Times</th>
<th>Once and 5 times</th>
<th>Between 2 and 10 times</th>
<th>Between 5 and 10 times</th>
<th>More than 10 times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes, as organizer</td>
<td>1☐</td>
<td>2☐</td>
<td>3☐</td>
<td>4☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Yes, only as participant</td>
<td>1☐</td>
<td>2☐</td>
<td>3☐</td>
<td>4☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Yes, as contributor</td>
<td>1☐</td>
<td>2☐</td>
<td>3☐</td>
<td>4☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1☐ No, I have never taken part in this kind of event
2) If yes, did at least one of these events take place in a country different from your own? (two possible answers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Once</th>
<th>Between 2 and 5 times</th>
<th>Between 5 and 10 times</th>
<th>More than 10 times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes, but on the same continent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Yes, but on another continent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) To which extent do you identify with:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification Type</th>
<th>Greatly</th>
<th>Reasonably</th>
<th>Partially</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. The global justice movement as a whole</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. A particular branch of this movement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. An organization/group in particular</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4) In regards to your participation in the Forum (multiple choices possible):

1. I have participated in the preparation of the Forum as organizing member/by participating on a regular basis to preparatory meetings (local/national/international)
2. I have participated from time to time to preparatory meetings (local/national/international)
3. I contribute to and/or participate in the organization of a conference
4. I have chatted/been in contact on a regular basis through the mailing lists
5. I participate as a volunteer to the material/practical organization/logistics
6. I came to gather information in the workshops and conferences
7. I came to make some contacts
8. I am speaking at a workshop
9. I wish to contribute to the discussions
10. I came to represent my organization
11. Other: Please clarify ...............................................................
5) Are you a member of one (or more) of the organizations/groups that have taken part in the preparation, and/or participate in a conference (plenary, seminary, or workshop) of the World Social Forum?
   □ NO    □ YES (If yes, which one(s)?)

6) In the following list, are there groups in which you are or were involved in the past?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Yes, I have taken part but no longer do so</th>
<th>Yes, I currently take part and consider myself an active member</th>
<th>Yes, I currently take part and consider myself a passive member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Women's rights and feminism</td>
<td>1 ☐</td>
<td>2 ☐</td>
<td>3 ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Women organizations</td>
<td>1 ☐</td>
<td>2 ☐</td>
<td>3 ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Pacifism/anti-war</td>
<td>1 ☐</td>
<td>2 ☐</td>
<td>3 ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Peace building, post-conflict</td>
<td>1 ☐</td>
<td>2 ☐</td>
<td>3 ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Humanitarian/development aid/international solidarity</td>
<td>1 ☐</td>
<td>2 ☐</td>
<td>3 ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Defense of human rights</td>
<td>1 ☐</td>
<td>2 ☐</td>
<td>3 ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Ecologist/anti-nuclear/sustainable development</td>
<td>1 ☐</td>
<td>2 ☐</td>
<td>3 ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Peasants</td>
<td>1 ☐</td>
<td>2 ☐</td>
<td>3 ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. LGBT</td>
<td>1 ☐</td>
<td>2 ☐</td>
<td>3 ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Antiracism/defense of immigrants/right of asylum</td>
<td>1 ☐</td>
<td>2 ☐</td>
<td>3 ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Anticolonialism</td>
<td>1 ☐</td>
<td>2 ☐</td>
<td>3 ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Fight against AIDS</td>
<td>1 ☐</td>
<td>2 ☐</td>
<td>3 ☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Residents' rights, neighborhood struggles/ community struggles, squats</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Cooperatives, tontines, microcredit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Youth movements (e.g. scouts), student movements</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. Fight against neoliberal economic globalization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. Pan-Africanism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| r. Workers' unions  
*If yes, please indicate which one (as well as the country)* | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| s. Unemployed or homeless people and undocumented people's organizations | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| t. Religious organizations and communities | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| u. Alternative media | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| v. Right to education, education for all | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| w. Personal aid/social aid | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| x. Trotskyites | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| y. Communists | 1 | 2 | 3 |
z. Anarchists/ Autonomous
   aa. Maoists
   ab. Healthcare
   ac. Consumer rights

   ad. Other types of organizations/groups? Which one(s)?
   ........................................ 1 2 3
   1 I do not take part in any organization/group

7) With whom did you come to this World Social Forum?
   1 Alone  2 With close friends  3 With acquaintances / neighbors
   4 With work colleagues  5 With my family
   6 With my organization/group/movement

8) Did you come on behalf of an organization?  1 YES  2 NO
   If yes, which one? ............................................

9) Did this organization pay for your trip?  1 YES  2 NO

10) If not, how was your trip paid for?
    1 By another organization (Name: .....................................)
    2 I paid for the trip myself

11) Are you, or have you been, a salaried employee of an organization?
    1 YES, I have (Please indicate in which organization: .....................................)
    2 YES, I am (Please indicate in which organization: .....................................)
    3 NO

12) Are you, or have you been, a volunteer member of an organization?
    1 YES, I have (Please indicate in which organization: .....................................)
2 □ YES, I am (Please indicate in which organization: ............................................................)
3 □ NO

13) Do you take part in an international network of organizations? (multiple choices possible)
1 □ YES, a North-South network (Please indicate which network....................................)
2 □ Yes, a South-South network (Please indicate which network.................................)
3 □ NO

14) If yes, within that/these network(s), which are the main activities that link these organizations/groups/networks?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>North/South network</th>
<th>South/South network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Information exchange via Internet</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Trips, meetings, gatherings with the partners of the network</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Financing or funding</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Training</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Awareness campaigns, advocacy</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15) If yes, do you have the feeling that the network(s) in which you take part

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling</th>
<th>North/South network</th>
<th>South/South network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. ... work(s) on an egalitarian basis when it comes to speech, responsibility sharing, financial resources management</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ... intend(s) to work on an egalitarian basis but do(es) not always succeed</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. ... there is a strong contradiction in this/these network(s) between the working principles and inequality in practice.

16) Have you taken part in the following events in the past twelve months?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Protests/events in your country against your governments’ policy?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Protests, movements against international or regional institutions (G20, IMF, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Local or regional social forums on continental themes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17) Do you have the feeling that you have been personally discriminated during your lifetime? (whether due to your origin, real or supposed, your physical appearance, your religion, your gender, your sexual preferences, your political views, or other)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discrimination</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18) Do you have/hold the political refugee status?  1 □ YES  2 □ NO

19) How would you define the degree of activism/militancy of the people in your circle?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activism Level</th>
<th>My close friends</th>
<th>My parents</th>
<th>My acquaintances/colleagues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very activists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite activists</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not really activists</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all activists</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20) During this WSF, to which action(s) do you plan to participate or have you already participated? (multiple choices possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To the conferences, plenaries, seminaries or workshops</td>
<td>To the assembly of social movements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 □ To the events preceding the WSF, parallel or partially associated gatherings (Please clarify .................................................................
.................................................................)
4 □ To marches or protests  5 □ to meetings with your “partners” and /
or “sponsors”
6 □ To festive events (parties, concerts, etc.)
7 □ Others (Please clarify .................................................................
.............)

21) According to you, what should be done to control neoliberal globalization?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Strengthen national governments</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
<td>3 □</td>
<td>4 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Strengthen regional (African Union, Europe...) or sub-regional (ECOWAS...) organizations</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
<td>3 □</td>
<td>4 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Strengthen the United Nations</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
<td>3 □</td>
<td>4 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Build new institutions that implicate/involve civil society at the continental and international levels</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
<td>3 □</td>
<td>4 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Develop and encourage local initiatives</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
<td>3 □</td>
<td>4 □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22) Are you, or have you been, a member/adherent of a political party (or a youth political organization)?

1 □ YES, I am currently member/adherent to a party
2 □ YES, I have been member/adherent to a party but no longer am
3 □ NO, I have never been member/adherent to a party

A) If yes, could you indicate which one(s)? (Please indicate the country: e.g. Grünen, FRG)

..........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
B) If you are not member/adherent of a party, to which party do you feel closest, or least distanced?
........................................................................................................................................

23) Have you been elected to carry out a political mandate?
  1□ YES, I am currently carrying out a mandate; please indicate which type ......................
  2□ YES, I have been elected in the past; please indicate which type of mandate: ................
  3□ I have been candidate but was not elected; please clarify: ...........................................
  4□ NO, I have never been a candidate to a political election

24) What is the first significant/striking political mobilization in which you took part? (Please indicate the name, date and country, for example “May 68 in Senegal”)
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
25) The following list contains some activities/actions that can be used to protest or raise awareness on particular claims/interests. Could you tell us, for each of the following activities, if...

A) you have used them for one reason or another
B) you consider that these activities are in general efficient to raise awareness on particular claims/interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A)</th>
<th>B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, I have done it</td>
<td>No, but I would be prepared to</td>
<td>No, and I refuse to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Boycott elections</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Sign petitions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Participate in a protest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Cause damage to material goods (riots)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Participate in collective prayers or religious gatherings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Boycott certain products/shops/countries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Participate in a strike</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A)</td>
<td>B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, I have done it</td>
<td>No, but I would be prepared to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>Participate in a hunger strike or a fast</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Participate in discussion or reflection groups</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j.</td>
<td>Participate in sit-ins of buildings (factory, school, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k.</td>
<td>Oppose and resist police forces</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l.</td>
<td>Participate in acts that block traffic (sit-in, blocking of trains, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m.</td>
<td>Distribute pamphlets</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.</td>
<td>Put physical pressure on someone</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o.</td>
<td>Refuse to pay taxes, bills from state companies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A)</td>
<td>B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, I have done it</td>
<td>No, but I would be prepared to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p.</td>
<td>Financially support an organization (contributions, donations...)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q.</td>
<td>Activist/militant consumption (local, fair, organic products)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r.</td>
<td>Participate in a national day of mobilization (Women's day, fight against AIDS, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s.</td>
<td>Participate in other symbolic actions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
26) Did you vote during the last national elections in your country?
   1☐ YES  2☐ NO

27) Generally, during elections (national/federal or local), do you vote?

   Always  Often  From time to time  Rarely  Never  I do not have the right to vote

   1☐  2☐  3☐  4☐  5☐  6☐

28) The party for which you voted was...
   1☐ A party in power (or member of a coalition in power)
   2☐ An opposition party

29) Do you use the Internet...

   Every day  At least 3 times a week  Once a week  Less than once a week  Never

   1☐  2☐  3☐  4☐  5☐

30) If yes, do you connect/go online...

   At home  At work  In an Internet cafe/cybercafe  At your neighbors'/friends'/family's house

   1☐  2☐  3☐  4☐

On your mobile phone 5☐  Other 6☐ (Please clarify............................)

31) If yes, do you use the Internet to...

   a. ... find general political, social, or economic data
   b. ... animate a blog or a website
   c. ... post comments on a website

   Very often  Often  From time to time  Never

   1☐  2☐  3☐  4☐
d. ... connect to social networks (Facebook, etc.)
   1 □  2 □  3 □  4 □

e. ... participate in forums or chat lists on activist subjects (international network)
   1 □  2 □  3 □  4 □

e. ... other activist activity (please clarify)
   1 □  2 □  3 □  4 □

32) How old are you?  ! _ ! _ ! years old

33) Are you....
   1 □ a woman  2 □ a man

34) ou say that you personally belong to a religion?
   1 □ No  2 □ Yes Please indicate which religion (the denomination and possibly the brotherhood or designation: e.g. Tijane Muslim, Reformed protestant)
   .................................

35) Would you would define yourself as...
   1 □ A believer  2 □ A non-believer  3 □ An atheist  4 □ An agnostic

36) If you belong to a religion...
   a. Do you go to your place of worship
      1 □ Every day  2 □ Every week  3 □ Less often  4 □ Never
   b. Do you attend large religious gatherings
      1 □ Several times a year  2 □ Less often  3 □ Never
   c. Do you pray
      1 □ Every day  2 □ Every week  3 □ Less often  4 □ Never
   d. Do you have the same religion as your parents?
      1 □ Yes  2 □ No
      2 □ My parents didn't share the same religion; I have one of the two religions
37) About your nationality/citizenship, do you hold...
1 □ One nationality/citizenship that has always been the same
2 □ One nationality/citizenship that has changed during my lifetime
   (e.g. you have obtained a new nationality after emigrating)
3 □ a double nationality
4 □ stateless person status

38) What is your nationality/citizenship?
1 □ Senegalese (if double nationality, indicate the other nationality
   ........................................)
2 □ From another African country; please indicate which one (s)
   ........................................
2 □ Other; please indicate which one(s)
   .................................................................

39) What are your parents’ nationalities?
   Mother .................................................. Father ..................................................

40) Has at least one of them changed nationality during their/his/her
    lifetime? 1 □ YES 2 □ NO

41) Have you lived, continuously or not, in a country different from the
    one you currently live in?
   1 □ YES, less than a year 2 □ YES, more than a year 3 □ NO

42) If yes, in which country/countries, and for which reasons (professional,
    affective, exile/emigration, trip...)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Different continent than mine</th>
<th>Same continent as mine</th>
<th>Indicate country/countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, work</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exile</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trip, tourism</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>1 □</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
h. Internship 1 2
h. International solidarity

43) Have you had relationships in other countries than the one you currently live in? If yes, which type(s) of relationship?

a. Professional bonds
   Many A few Very few None
   1 2 3 4
b. Family bonds
   1 2 3 4
c. Friendship bonds
   1 2 3 4
d. Economic and financial bonds (money transfers, investments...)
   1 2 3 4

44) How many languages do you speak (national languages from your country and foreign languages)?

45) More precisely...
   1 I speak only one language
   2 I speak several languages from my country and one international language (Spanish, English, Portuguese, Arabic, French, Chinese)
   3 I speak a foreign language
   4 I speak two or more foreign languages

46) Which level of education have you reached?
   1 I have never been schooled (or my schooling ended early)
   2 End of primary school diploma
   3 Short secondary studies (junior high school), short professional traineeship (2 to 4 years)
   4 Baccalaureate, end of high school (around 18 years old)
   5 1st cycle of higher education
   6 Upper cycle of higher education

47) Were you a student at...
   1 Religious education schools (if yes, please clarify, e.g. Quranic school, Catholic high school)
   2 Private non-religious education
   3 International schools or high schools
48) What is (was) your profession/occupation? (Give a precise description, for example “primary school teacher” instead of simply “teacher”)

………………………………………………………………………………………………………

49) What is your current professional status?
1 □ Student/secondary school/primary school
   If you have a job as well, please indicate which one:
   …………………………………………
2 □ Stay-at-home, unpaid work for family reasons, housework for close relatives
3 □ Unemployed or job searching
4 □ Precarious job (short-term contract, temporary work...)
5 □ Retired
6 □ Full-time job  7 □ Part-time or periodic job

50) What is (or was) your main sector of activity?
1 □ Employed in the public sector  2 □ Employed in the private sector
3 □ Employed in the associative sector  4 □ Employed in the informal sector
5 □ Agriculture  7 □ Independent/ liberal occupation (Please indicate, if appropriate, the number of employees that you have!_!_!_!)
8 □ Other. Please clarify ………………………………………………………………

51) Does your current professional situation meet your expectations?
1 □ Yes  2 □ No, I consider that my education could let me hope for better
3 □ No, my situation satisfies me morally but not materially
4 □ No, my situation satisfies me materially but not morally
5 □ No, my situation is neither morally nor materially satisfying

52) What is (was) the profession/occupation of your spouse or partner? (Give a precise description, for example: “primary school teacher” instead of simply “teacher,” and the sector of activity (public, private, associative, independent). If several occupations (or spouses), please indicate the highest paid.)

……………………………………………………………………………………………………… sector of activity
53) What is (was) the profession/occupation of your parents? (As for you, please give a precise description indicate the sector of activity as well (public, private, associative, independent)
   a. Your father.............................................................sector of activity:.......... 
   b. Your mother............................................................ sector of activity:......... 

54) What is (was) the profession/occupation of your grandparents? (As for you, please give a precise description indicate the sector of activity as well (public, private, associative, independent).
   a. Your grandfather on paternal side................................sector of activity:........... 
   b. Your grandmother on paternal side............................sector of activity:......... 
   c. Your grandfather on maternal side.............................sector of activity:........... 
   d. Your grandmother on maternal side............................sector of activity:......... 

55) Where do you live? 
   A) In which country? .......................................................... 
   B) In what type of town or village do you live? 
   1☐ National/economic capital (Please indicate the name of the city 
      ..........................................................) 
   2☐ Large regional city (Please indicate the name of the city. 
      ..........................................................) 
   3☐ Small town (Please indicate the name of the town 
      ..........................................................) 
   4☐ Large village  5☐ Small village 

56) Until now, which debate or controversy has appealed to you most in this Forum? 
   ................................................................................................................. 
   ................................................................................................................. 
   ................................................................................................................. 
   ................................................................................................................. 

WE WARMLY THANK YOU FOR ACCEPTING TO ANSWER OUR QUESTIONS !
Editor’s biographies

Johanna Siméant is Full Professor of Political Science at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University and honorary member of the Institut Universitaire de France. Specialized in political sociology, her main topics of study are protest, activism, and international mobilization. She now works on protest and activism in Mali. A member of the editorial board of the social sciences journal Genèses, she also is a former member of the EB of the Revue Française de Science Politique. She has published La cause des sans-papiers (Presses de Sciences-Po, 1998), La grève de la Faim (Presses de Sciences-Po, 2009), Contester au Mali (Karthala, 2014), and, with Pascal Dauvin, Le travail humanitaire (Presses de Sciences-Po, 2002). She has co-edited, with Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle, Un autre monde à Nairobi, Le Forum Social 2007 (Karthala, 2008); with Marc Le Pape and Claudine Vidal, Crises extrêmes (La Découverte, 2006), and with Pascal Dauvin, ONG et humanitaire (L’Harmattan, 2004), and has published several articles in journals such as Mots, the Revue Française de Science Politique, Sociétés Contemporaines, Le Mouvement social, Cultures et Conflits, Critique Internationale, Raisons Politiques, Politix, Genèses, Politique Africaine, Sociologie du travail, Review of International Political Economy, Humanity, Social Movement Studies, and the Journal of World System Research.

Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle is Senior Lecturer in Political Science at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University. She works on collective action and political reforms in Africa, with a focus on Cameroon and Kenya and has published articles in journals like African Affairs, Africa Today, the Journal of World System Research, Critique internationale, or Politique africaine, whom she is a former co-editor-in-chief. She is currently the director of IFRA, a French research Institute, in Nairobi (Kenya).

Isabelle Sommier is Full Professor of Political Science at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University. She has published on social movement theory, political violence, radicalization and terrorism. She conducted two surveys on GJM activists, one during the protest against the G8 summit in the spring of 2003 and one during the European Social Forum held in Paris that same year. She has also been involved with a European survey on the GJM (the Demos project, 2004-08, under the direction of Donatella Della Porta, covering five countries).
Other authors

Hélène Baillot, PhD candidate in Political Science at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

Isaline Bergamaschi, Assistant professor of Politics, Universidad de los Andes (Bogota).

Julie Castro, PhD candidate in Anthropology at the Ecole des Hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS).

Ilhame Hajji, Assistant engineer in statistics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

William Herrera, PhD candidate in Political Science at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

Ruggero Iori, PhD candidate in Sociology at the Université Versailles St-Quentin-en-Yvelines.

Alice Judell, PhD candidate in International Relations at the University of Sydney.

Tania Navarro, PhD in Political Science at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Lecturer in politics at the Université of Amiens.

Héloïse Nez, Assistant professor of Sociology, Université of Tours.

Clément Paule, PhD candidate in Political Science at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

Ilka Vari-Lavoisier, PhD candidate in Sociology at the Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS Paris).


Index

Author’s names

Abdelkrim Chikh, Rabia 126n, 131
Acholonu, Catherine Obianuju 96
Agrikoliansky, Éric 14, 21, 23, 24n, 39n, 40, 50, 63, 103, 116, 122, 124, 138, 157, 221
Aguton, Christophe 157-158, 160
Alberoni, Francesco 23
Allaert, Bénédicte 93
Alvarez, Rebecca 42
Ambrosetti, David 43
Anantram, Kadambari 116
Anderson, Benedict 42, 51, 58
Andreani, Fabrice 166n
Andretta, Massimiliano 21, 23-24, 30, 32, 39, 60, 179
Antrobus, Peggy 96
Audrain, Xavier 142, 148
Austin, John L. 216
Bach, Linda 126, 131
Badran, Margot 96
Baillot, Hélène 115
Bandy, Joe 15
Barnett, Michael 43-44
Barr, Rebecca C. 201
Basu, Amrita 93-94, 96
Bathily, Abdoulaye 152n
Bayart, Jean-François 28, 30-32, 39n-40
Bennett, Michael 43-44
Berruyer, Olivier 217
Boserup, Ester 101n
Bourdieu, Pierre 28, 30-32, 39n-40
Brdurcic, Anis 93, 99, 101
Buddy, Janice 93
Duff, Andrew 30
Dufour, Pascale 100
Eliasoph, Nina 205, 214-216
Eschle, Catherine 88n, 92-94, 100, 103
Favre, Pierre 21, 24
Fagan, Honor 139
Fillieule, Olivier 21-24, 30, 39, 39n, 50, 60-61, 69, 103, 116, 180, 195, 212
Finnemore, Martha 44
Fisher, Dana R. 21, 23-25, 28n, 39n, 179, 182, 217
Forsyth, Tim 105
Foucher, Vincent 111
Fuchs, Dieter 61
Gieryn, Thomas F. 19
Giraud, Isabelle 100
Gobille, Boris 28, 30-31, 39n-40
Goffman, Erving 14, 138
Goyette, Kimberly A. 201
Grémy, Jean-Paul 205
Groves, Robert M. 203
Guidry, John A. 18n
Haas, Peter M. 44
Haeringer, Nicolas 56, 141n-142, 157n
Harding, Sandra 95
Harkness, Janet A. 212
Hewitt, Lyndi 93
Hirata, Helena 95
Jasper, James M. 59
Joanny, Sophie 93
Johnston, Hank 15-16
Jossin, Ariane 60-62
Kanas, Agnieszka 201
Kane, Hawa 110
OBSERVING PROTEST FROM A PLACE

Kane, Oumar 110
Karadenizli, Maria 93
Karides, Marina 23, 93
Keck, Margaret E. 16, 37
Kingston de Leussé, Meredith 43
Kotaniemi, Jyrki-Tapani 201
Kothari, Smitu 147
Kwon, Roy 16, 116

Lacombe, Delphine 110
Lamoureux, Diane 92, 100, 105
Lang, Sabine 35, 122n
Latourès, Aurélie 92, 96, 106
Laurison, Daniel 208
Le Doaré, Hélène 95
Lichterman, Paul 216
Lipset, Seymour Martin 207

Maiguashca, Bice 88n, 92-94, 100, 103
Marcus, George E. 12
Martigny, Vincent 45
Masquelier, Adeline Marie 112
Masson, Sabine 92-93
Mathieu, Lilian 93-94
Mazie, Steven V. 14
Mbembe, Achille 101
Mcdonald, Doug 26
Mello, Fatima 97
Moghadam, Valentine M. 93-94, 99-100
Molyneux, Maxine 97
Muller, Ann L. 201

Nagel, Ineke 201
Naples, Nancy A. 93
Nepstad, Sharon E. 16
Nguyen, Vinh-Kim 98
Nkinyangi, John A. 152n

O’Brien, Martin 139n, 147
Ogundipe-Leslie, Molara 96
Oliver, Pamela 15
Otwak, René 111

Pagis, Julie 169
Pilims, Olivier 202, 204-205
Pommerol, Marie-Emmanuelle 12, 14, 23, 42, 46n, 50, 56, 102, 108, 115-116, 132, 139, 141n-142, 148, 158
Portes, Alejandro 209

Rai, Shirin M. 59
Ranta-Owusu, Eij 166n
Reese, Ellen 19, 21-28, 30, 33-35, 62, 64, 116
Roskos, Laura 93, 105
Rothman, Franklin D. 15
Roux, Patricia 103

Rucht, Dieter 13, 138n
Sahlins, Marshall D. 17, 41
Saint-Lary, Maud 111
Salazar, Martha 93
Samson, Fabienne 111
Saunders, Claire 60, 179
Sawicki, Frédéric 118n
Scerri, Andy 163
Schneider, William 207
Schulz, Dorothea E. 112
Schwarz, Norbert 212, 215
Scott, Joan W. 93
Sen, Jai 23
Sieveking, Nadine 103, 110
Sikkink, Kathryn 16, 37
Smith, Jackie 11, 15-16, 23, 50, 115-116, 122-123n, 125n, 138, 201, 211
Smith, Étienne 111
Soares, Benjamin 111
Sommier, Isabelle 14, 23-25, 30, 32-33, 38n, 50, 63, 94, 103, 116, 124, 138, 157, 195, 207, 221
Sow, Fatou 109
Stoop, Ineke 212, 215
Sulmont, Rémi 124

Tarrow, Sidney G. 12, 15, 31, 58, 94
Teivainen, Teivo 58
Thornton, Arland 212
Tilly, Charles 59, 90
Traîni, Christophe 22n, 143
Tripp, Aili Mari 96, 101-102, 108-109

Uehlinger, Hans-Martin 61
Uysal, Ayse 28, 30-31

Vairel, Frédéric 83n
Valencia, José 62
Vickstrom, Erik 209

Wagner, Anne-Catherine 45, 58
Walker, Alice 97
Waterman, Peter 23
Wenz, Peter 146
Wiest, Dawn 50, 125n, 211
Willis, Pat 93, 105
Wolford, Wendy 140n
Wood, Lesley J. 16n, 158
Woods, Patricia J. 14
Wright-Mills, Charles 40

Zurcher, Louis 32, 180, 190
Concepts and notions

Anarchist and autonomous movements 186, 188-189, 194-197
Anticolonialism and struggles for independence 50, 55, 101, 162, 187, 194, 196-197
Ascending Hierarchical Clustering 59, 69-70, 78, 89, 180, 191, 218, 227
Audiences 13, 22, 24, 32, 34, 39, 43, 51, 54, 104, 112, 119, 128-130, 144, 147-151, 154, 162, 165, 221
Boycott 60-61, 63, 65-66, 68, 71-75, 77, 79-90
Colonialism, neocolonialism, and postcolonialism 11, 19, 42-43, 104, 116, 130
Consumer rights 186, 197
Cooperation 15, 115, 117-134
Cooperatives, tontines, microcredit 36-37, 68, 102, 107, 186, 189, 192, 196-197, 229-232
Cosmopolitanism 15, 31, 39, 42-43, 45
Debt (Third World) 58, 87, 103-105, 111, 116
Division of labor 12, 15, 17, 20, 103, 115-136
Ecologist, environmental and antinuclear movements 20, 28, 36-37, 137-156, 175, 186-188, 194-198, 228-230
Economic crisis, structural adjustment 99, 102, 111
Education as right to education, education for all 36-37, 182, 186, 189, 193-196 as educational background of surveyed individuals 13, 27, 30, 49, 62-71, 82-87, 121, 173, 177, 181, 188, 190-192, 202, 207-209, 214, 225, 227-232
Farmers, peasants, agriculture (issue or occupation) 29, 36-37, 81-86, 120-121, 127, 131, 186-199
Global South 18, 42, 123-124, 217-218
Globalization 12-13, 16, 48, 92-94
Health 186-191, 194, 197
Homosexuality / LGBT movements 36, 109, 111, 132, 186, 194, 197
Humanitarian organizations and missions 36, 45, 103, 186-187, 193-196
Hunger strike 60-61, 63, 65, 67-68, 71-89
Internationalization 15-18, 42, 58, 121-122, 134, 167, 173
Language 13-14, 23-25, 31, 47, 82, 85, 111, 120-121, 124, 129, 169, 173, 179, 183, 202, 212-216, 221-222, 225
Legitimation and legitimacy 17-18, 23, 37, 41, 48-49, 51-52, 54, 56, 75, 78, 82, 90, 97, 102, 110, 117, 123, 128, 134, 147-148, 155, 202, 211
 Maoists 186, 189-191, 194-195, 231
Maoists 186, 189-191, 194-195, 231
Medias 23, 81, 86, 137-138, 142, 146-148, 173, 177, 213-214 as alternative medias 89, 116, 186-192, 195, 197, 228, 230
Multi-organizational field 32 sq, 180, 190
Nationalism 15, 17-18, 41-58, 218
Networks 11, 13, 15, 18, 22, 34-94, 99-100, 102-103, 107, 15-135
Non-violence 19, 60-61, 78, 86-87
No-replies 65, 68, 71, 75, 77, 90, 121, 201-226
Observation and ethnography 12-14, 18, 137-156, 194, 219, 222
Occupation of buildings 60-61, 65, 71-72, 74-75, 79, 83, 85, 87, 98, 265
Occupational situation of the surveyed sample 28-32, 55, 62, 81-89, 173, 188, 191-192, 225
Pacifism and anti-war organizations 44, 186-197, 228-229, 232
Pan-Africanism 14, 55, 186-187, 189-190, 193-194, 197, 227-228, 231
Paragons 78-89
Petitions 52-56, 60, 64-66, 68, 71-87, 204-205
Political competence 13, 29-30, 75, 96, 207-211
Political participation 31, 49, 82-88, 171-172, 202, 204
Poverty 16, 129, 146, 161
Professionalization 16, 32-35, 126, 184-185, 188-192, 217, 228, 230, 232
Quantitative methods as Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) 13, 59, 69-90, 180-181, 187-190, 218
as regression (logistic and linear) 69, 180, 193
Refusal to pay taxes 65, 67-68, 71-89
Repertoires of collective action 17, 40-41, 49-54, 58-59, 90, 109-110, 170, 204
Representation and staging 102, 118, 123, 137-151, 204, 218
Residents' rights, neighborhood struggles/community struggles, squats 36, 186-187, 194, 196-197
Responsible consumption 63, 65-66, 68-69, 71-77, 79-82, 84, 86-87, 90
Social capital 29, 120, 123, 198, 208-210, 213-214
Sovereignty and sovereignism 17, 41-49, 162
States and governments 42, 44-50, 55-58, 65, 102, 108, 111, 123, 130-131, 140, 145, 158, 160-166, 172, 175-177
Third World & Third Worldism 50, 58, 87, 103, 105, 111, 116, 185
Tourism 43, 141, 150
Trade unions, Workers' unions 16, 19, 28, 30-31, 34-36, 55, 69, 82, 85, 103, 124, 128, 131-132, 140, 146, 161, 164, 179, 185-187, 189, 192, 196, 229-230, 232
Trotskyism 186, 193, 195, 197
Unemployed or homeless people and undocumented people's organizations 186, 194-195, 197
Violence 42, 44, 56-57, 61-62, 68-76, 79-81, 84, 86-91, 170, 204
Vote 31, 46, 49, 51, 53, 60, 82-88, 157, 171-172, 204-206
Women 32, 65, 81, 91-113, 181, 188, 191, 199, 218, 225
Women organizations 35-36, 81, 84, 91-113, 186, 189-191, 198
Youth and student movements 36, 132, 186-187, 189-191, 195-197, 232

Organizations, places and public persons' names

AAWORD (Association of African Women for Research and Development) 101, 104
Abdelkrim Chikh, Rabia 126, 131-132
ACAPES (Association culturelle d'autopromotion éducative et sociale) 183-184
Action Aid 183-185
Addis Ababa 124
AFD (Agence Française de développement / French Development Agency) 123-124
AFEME (Association des femmes de la Medina / Association of the Women from the Medina, Dakar) 183
AFM (Articulación Feminista Marco-sur) 99-100, 105
African Network of Women Workers 108
Aghir In'Man 82
Aguiton, Christophe 164
ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America / Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) 130, 160
Alliance internationale des habitants (International Alliance for Inhabitants) 183
America 88, 92, 98, 120, 128, 130, 157, 177, 188, 192, 195, 209, 225
Amis de La vie 87
Amnesty International 183-185
APROFES (Association pour la Promotion de la Femme Sénégalaise / Association for the Promotion of the Senegalese Woman) 91, 102-103, 106
AREVA 82
Argentina 168-169
Artisans du monde (Craftsmen of the World) 87, 183, 185
Asia 12, 19, 48, 96, 105, 117, 120, 126, 135, 209, 225
ATD Quart-Monde 185
Athens 25, 32, 60
Atlanta 25, 27
OBSERVING PROTEST FROM A PLACE

Genoa 21, 24-26, 39
GEW (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft / Education and Science Union) 183
Green Party (France) 87-88, 189, 198
Greenpeace 184
Guatemala 168
Guinea 17, 41, 51
Honduras 168
Houphouët-Boigny, Félix 53
Ibase (Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses) 21, 23, 25, 27-28, 31, 33-35, 37
India 122, 130-133, 176
ITUC (International Trade Union Confederation) 85
Justice et Paix (Justicia y Paz / Justice and Peace) 183, 185
Kaolack 91, 102, 106
Karachi 92
Kenya 14, 25, 46, 131-132, 141
Latin America 12, 17, 19, 23, 36, 39, 49-59, 52, 78, 88, 105, 115, 117, 120, 126-130, 133, 135, 157-177, 192, 195-198, 218, 228
Lugo, Fernando 163
Lula (Da Silva, Luis Inácio Lula) 51, 89, 131, 158-161, 163
Maaya 183
Maghreb Social Forum 57, 127
Malawi 88
Mali 64, 98, 129, 181-182
Massiah, Gus 41, 50, 164
Mexico 168, 221
Modem africain (Niger) 82
Montréal 124
Morales, Evo 158, 160-161, 163-164, 166-167
Morocco 55-56, 83, 125
Moussa Dembelé, Demba 126, 131
Mouvement de la paix 183-185
Mouvement Populaire (Popular Movement Party, Morocco) 83
MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra / Rural Landless Workers' Movement) 160
Mubarak, Hosni 54
Mumbai 105, 131
Nairobi 12, 14, 16, 25, 27, 46, 50, 55-57, 64, 92, 100, 109, 111, 132, 141-142, 158
Ndìaye, Malick 55
Netherlands 25
New-York 25
Niger 82
Nigeria 64, 142
No Vox 183
NPA (Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste / New Anticapitalist Party, France) 86, 88
Oceania 19, 48, 225
OXFAM 184, 218
PAID (Parti Africain pour l'Indépendance et la Démocratie / African Party for independence and democracy, Senegal) 85
Palestine 51-52, 55
Paraguay 163, 168
Paris 86, 105, 159, 164
PCF (Parti Communiste Français / French Communist Party) 36
PDS (Parti Démocrate Sénégalais) 81
Peru 168
Petrobras 45, 47, 160, 172, 175-176
Peuples solidaires 116, 183-185
Polo Democrático Alternativo (Colombia) 162
PSUV (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela / United Socialist Party of Venezuela) 172
PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores / Workers's Party, Brazil) 51, 89, 160, 171, 198
Punto Rosso 183
RCPCD (Réseau des radios communautaires pour la paix et le développement en Casamance – Network of Community Radios for Peace and Development in Casamance) 81
Réseau Interact 183
Ritimo (French Network of Information on Third World and International Solidarity) 87
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation 185
Roussef, Dilma 89, 160
São Paulo 89
Sarkozy, Nicolas 19
Sarr, Géneviève 112
Scouts 184, 186, 196-197
Siggil Jigeen 103, 110, 183
Socialist Party (France) 87
Socialist Party (Senegal) 84, 131
Solidaire (French trade union) 183-184
South Africa 132-133, 185
Survie 51, 88, 184-185
Sydney 25
The Hague 25
Togo 124-125, 183
Tunisia 53-54, 57, 158
INDEX

UCAD (Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar) 19, 55, 107, 133, 137-156
UGPM (Union of Peasant Groups of Méckhé) 131
UN (United Nations) 49, 99, 101, 206
UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) 101
United Kingdom 88
UNSAS (Union nationale des syndicats autonomes du Sénégal / National Union of Autonomous Labour Unions of Senegal) 183
Uruguay 168
USA (United States of America) 23, 25, 101, 129, 160-161
USDS (Union des Syndicats Démocratiques du Sénégal / Union of Democratic Labour Unions of Senegal) 183
USOFORAL (Comité Régional de Solidarité des Femmes pour la Paix en Casamance / Regional Committee of Solidarity of Women for Peace in Casamance) 183

Venezuela 17, 44-45, 57, 128, 130, 132-133, 158-169, 171-172, 175, 177
Via Campesina 105, 183
Wade, Abdoulaye 18, 131, 163
Wallerstein, Immanuel 161
Washington DC 25, 183
WES (World Education Senegal) 81
Western Sahara 41-43, 55
WIDE (Women in Development Europe) 100
WILDAF (Women in Law and Development in Africa) 100
WLUMI (Women Living Under Muslim Law) 100
WMW (World March of Women) 99-100, 105
Women's International Democratic Federation 105
Worldvision 185
Y'en a marre 18, 111, 218
YMCA 183
Ziguinchor 112