SEVENTY YEARS have passed since the end of the Asia-Pacific War, yet Japan remains embroiled in controversy with its neighbors over the war’s commemoration. Among the many points of contention between Japan, China, and South Korea are interpretations of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, apologies and compensation for foreign victims of Japanese aggression, prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the war’s portrayal in textbooks. Collectively, these controversies have come to be called the “history problem.” But why has the problem become so intractable? Can it ever be resolved, and if so, how? To answer these questions, author Hiro Saito mobilizes the sociology of collective memory and social movement, political theories of apology and reconciliation, psychological research on intergroup conflict, and philosophical reflections on memory and history. The history problem, he argues, is essentially a relational phenomenon caused when nations publicly showcase self-serving versions of the past at key ceremonies and events: Japan, South Korea, and China all focus on what happened to their own citizens with little regard for foreign others. Saito goes on to explore the emergence of a cosmopolitan form of commemoration taking humanity, rather than nationality, as its primary frame of reference, an approach increasingly used by a transnational network of advocacy NGOs, victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings, historians, and educators. When cosmopolitan commemoration is practiced as a collective endeavor by both perpetrators and victims, Saito argues, a resolution of the history problem—and eventual reconciliation—will finally become possible.

“The History Problem is a powerful analysis of how commemoration and the controversies that arise from it overflow the so-called container of the nation-state. Memory, Saito demonstrates, is a transnational, even cosmopolitan issue. As a result, only the kind of multidirectional analysis Saito provides is adequate to memory’s complexities, which are of glaring importance in world politics. This book thus makes a crucial and nuanced contribution to the fields of memory studies, international politics, and the historiography of Northeast Asia.”
—JEFFREY K. OLICK, University of Virginia

“Hiro Saito offers a timely and well-researched analysis of East Asia’s never-ending cycle of blame and denial, distortion and obfuscation concerning the region’s shared history of violence and destruction during the first half of the twentieth century. In The History Problem Saito expertly introduces the central ‘us-versus-them’ issues and confronts readers with the multiplicity that binds the East Asian countries involved to resolve how these problems are mutually constituted across borders and generations. He argues that the inextricable knots that constrain these problems could be less like a hangman’s noose and more of a supportive web if there were the political will to determine the nature of peaceful coexistence. Any hope, he explains, lies in increasingly profuse public efforts for which national leaders are encouraged to lend cosmopolitan efforts at engagement. Besides all levels of those issues will benefit from Saito’s local command of the post-1945 terrain as well as his thoughtful suggestions for cooperation and reconciliation.”
—ALEX DODGEN, University of Connecticut

“The History Problem is a study of how memory and history are used to construct narratives that are then treated as if they were the ‘real’ history. Saito shows how these narratives are mutually constituted and how they are sometimes cited to support one’s claims but not those of the other party. He argues that unless a cosmopolitan frame of reference is adopted, the history problem will not be resolved. His analysis is timely and important.”
—TIMOTHY J. CURRAN, University of Michigan

“Saito’s book will be essential reading for those interested in the region’s history and the present political climate. It is a useful resource for students and scholars in political science and international relations.”
—JORDAN B. JONES, University of Washington

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THE HISTORY PROBLEM
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The Politics of War Commemoration in East Asia

Hiro Saito
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Preface

The Asia-Pacific War ended more than seventy years ago. Yet, to this day, the war continues to haunt Japan’s relations with its two most important neighbors, South Korea and China. Can the three countries ever resolve the dispute over how to commemorate the war, and if so, how? This question motivated me to write this book.

I have no experience of the war, and I did not hear about it firsthand when I was growing up. My father was born after the war, and my mother was still a small child when the war ended. They have no memory of it. But they once told me that my paternal grandfather, a carpenter, had been conscripted as a technician to support Japanese troops in Manchuria, while my maternal grandfather, an elementary school teacher, had been spared from military service. This secondhand story about my grandfathers was my only point of personal, albeit indirect, connection with the war.

Growing up in Japan, however, I was exposed to many illustrated books and movies about the war at both home and school. I still remember learning about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki through *The Angry Bodhisattva* (*Okorijizō*) and *Barefoot Gen* (*Hadashi no Gen*), the bombings of Tokyo and other major cities through *The Glass Rabbit* (*Garasu no usage*) and *Grave of the Fireflies* (*Hotaru no haka*), and the Battle of Okinawa through *The Tower of Lilies* (*Himeyuri no tō*) and *Tsushima Maru*. These books and movies made deep impressions on me because many of them depicted the suffering of children of my age. And yet, the war felt like a remote past, for I was sheltered in postwar Japan’s economic prosperity.

I developed a strong interest in the war or, more precisely, its commemoration, only in fall 2001. I had just entered the doctoral program in sociology at the University of Michigan when the 9/11 terrorist attacks happened. I was shocked by the inhumane nature of the attacks, as well as by the US government’s aggressive response. The US government did not appear to care about collateral damage to civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq. I saw a parallel between those civilians and the ones in Hiroshima and Nagasaki—all victims of a strain of American nationalism that did not recognize the humanity of people in “enemy countries.” So, I decided to write a historical critique
of American nationalism, examining how people in Japan had coped with the atomic bombings.

But I soon realized my naiveté. Many Japanese citizens commemorated the atomic bombings to articulate Japan’s victim identity in nationalist terms, discounting the sufferings that the Japanese military had inflicted on people in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, while the US government waged war in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s, Japanese prime minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō repeatedly visited the Yasukuni Shrine, the sacred site for Japanese nationalism, causing an uproar in South Korea and China. The controversy was further intensified by the nationalist history textbook promoted by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform that glorified Japan’s past aggression as a heroic act of self-defense against the Western imperial powers. I was therefore disappointed with both Japanese and American nationalism.

As I researched more, however, I found that A-bomb victims had critiqued nationalism in the Japanese commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War, and they had spearheaded the effort to commemorate victims of Japan’s wartime atrocities. They were able to do so because their sense of victimhood was fundamentally cosmopolitan, recognizing the suffering of war victims irrespective of nationality. This led me to delve deeply into how other actors in Japan, including but not limited to activists, politicians, historians, and history teachers, tried to commemorate foreign war victims. Specifically, these investigations enabled me to discern the history of transnational interactions between Japan, South Korea, and China that had injected cosmopolitanism into Japan’s official commemoration at various times. This transnational perspective also helped me probe how nationalist commemoration in Japan was connected with its counterparts in South Korea, China, and even the United States.

Thus, I began to understand how multiple entangled factors had rendered Japan’s dispute with South Korea and China seemingly unresolvable: the contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, the tension between commemoration and historiography, Japan’s dual identity as perpetrator and victim, negative feedback loops of nationalism in the region, and so on. I was aware, of course, that numerous books had already been written about Japan’s dispute with South Korea and China, but I decided to write this book because I felt the itinerary of my personal and intellectual biography could provide a unique perspective. Above all, I felt the urge to share the results of my research and reflections with people in East Asia and beyond—scholars, educators, students, and concerned citizens—to
reexamine the causes of the dispute and explore the possibilities for resolution from the vantage point of the seventieth anniversary of the war’s end.

I was able to complete this book only because I received generous support from various mentors, colleagues, and institutions along the way. To begin with, I would like to thank Azumi Kōya and Mark Gould, my advisers at International Christian University and Haverford College, respectively. With Kōya’s encouragement, I decided to go to the United States for graduate school. Mark also provided me with excellent foundations in social theory when I attended Haverford as an exchange student, and these theoretical foundations continue to help me analyze the complex realities of the contemporary world.

At the University of Michigan, I started thinking and writing about the politics of war commemoration under the guidance of three historical and political sociologists, Julia Adams, Michael Kennedy, and Howard Kimeldorf. They decisively influenced my theoretical, methodological, and professional orientations. The University of Michigan indeed offered the right graduate education for me—interdisciplinary and international. John Campbell, a political scientist, shared with me his detailed knowledge of Japanese politics, while Ram Mahalingam introduced me to cultural psychology, a key to understanding commemoration that is simultaneously collective and individual. I would like to thank Julia, Michael, Howard, John, and Ram for supervising my research. I am also grateful to the university and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation/American Council for Learned Societies for providing me with fellowships and other resources to complete my graduate studies.

While an assistant professor at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, I was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship from the Social Science Research Council and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science in 2011–2012. This fellowship allowed me to spend a year at the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo, collect primary and secondary materials for the book project, and produce the first draft of the manuscript. I am grateful to Suehiro Akira and Ishida Hiroshi, then directors of the institute, as well as Thomas Blackwood and Tanabe Shunsuke, for hosting me as a visiting research fellow. I also would like to thank Aoki Yoshiyuki, who was a doctoral student at the university, for translating Korean newspaper articles into Japanese.

In addition, I was fortunate to receive a postdoctoral fellowship from the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations at Harvard University in 2013–2014.
The fellowship gave me the time and resources that I needed to prepare the manuscript for submission. At Harvard, I was fortunate to befriend two young historians, Mimaki Seiko and Tim Yang. I am grateful to them for reading the entire manuscript and helping me clarify my argument. I would also like to thank Thomas Berger, Alexis Dudden, Fujihira Shinju, and Susan Pharr for their generosity in spending an afternoon participating in intense discussion of the manuscript and offering me many insightful comments.

While a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard, I also had the chance to participate in the Next Generation Japan Leadership Program organized by the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation. Participation in the program helped me carefully consider policy implications of my argument. Discussion sessions including Victor Cha, Chris Nelson, Sheila Smith, and Scott Snyder particularly broadened my perspective on the history problem vis-à-vis other issues and dimensions of international relations in East Asia.

Moreover, at various stages of writing this book, I received comments from David Johnson, David Leheny, Ivo Plsek, and Franziska Seraphim. Their comments were demanding but tremendously useful in refining my argument. I am particularly grateful to David Johnson for being such a wonderful mentor and colleague, along with Hagen Koo, at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. I would also like to acknowledge generous support from my editors: Susan Campbell and Kim Greenwell; Pamela Kelley at the University of Hawai‘i Press; Michael Bohrer-Clancy at Westchester Publishing Services; as well as helpful feedback from the two anonymous reviewers of the University of Hawai‘i Press. Their comments and editorial guidance made a big difference.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents, Saito Hideo and Fumiyo, and my wife, Miki. My parents not only exposed me to many illustrated books and movies about the Asia-Pacific War when I was a child, but also supported my decision to study abroad. My wife also taught me an important lesson while I was completing the final version of the manuscript—we can hope for a peaceful world only if we are peaceful ourselves, and the practice of peace begins with our daily life.

So, I dedicate this book to people in East Asia and elsewhere who wish to make the world a more peaceful place.
THE HISTORY PROBLEM
Introduction

In March 1976, Kurihara Sadako, a poet who had survived the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, published “When We Say ‘Hiroshima’” (Hiroshima to iutoki).1 The poem asked A-bomb victims, as well as the Japanese people as a whole, the following: “When we say ‘Hiroshima,’ / do people answer, gently, / ‘Ah, Hiroshima’?” Instead of such gentle expression of understanding, Kurihara heard “echoes of blood and fire” and angry voices against Japan for its past wrongdoings: “In chorus, Asia’s dead and her voiceless masses / spit out the anger / of all those we made victims.” But why was the anger of those outside Japan still so resonant thirty years after the Asia-Pacific War had ended? Kurihara’s answer was that it was because the Japanese had failed to adequately remember and atone for the atrocities that they had committed in the Asia-Pacific, while dwelling on their own victimhood. She pleaded, “We first must / wash the blood / off our own hands,” so that others might eventually extend solidarity to Japan’s A-bomb victims in their common pursuit of world peace.

In spite of Kurihara’s plea, “echoes of blood and fire” continue to haunt Japan’s relations with its neighboring countries. Especially with South Korea and China, Japan has been embroiled in intense controversies over the commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War. To name but a few points of contention: interpretations of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, apologies and compensation for foreign victims of Japan’s past aggression, prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and Japanese history textbooks. Collectively, these controversies have become known as the “history problem” (rekishi ninshiki mondai) in East Asia.

The history problem escalated to an unprecedented scale in 2005, the sixtieth anniversary of the Asia-Pacific War’s end, when Prime Minister
Koizumi Jun’ichirō visited the Yasukuni Shrine that honors war dead as well as wartime leaders who were prosecuted as war criminals. In the same year, the Japanese government approved a highly nationalistic history textbook produced by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho wo Tsukurukai) for use in junior high schools. Responding to these events, the governments of South Korea and China strongly criticized the Japanese government, and dislike of Japan among South Koreans and Chinese spiked. The Chinese reaction was particularly intense, as large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations caused damage to the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai and Japanese-owned stores in major Chinese cities.

Although the history problem temporarily calmed down after successors of Koizumi refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, it remains a formidable obstacle in Japan’s relations with South Korea and China. Opinion polls in 2014 showed that about 70 percent of South Koreans and more than 80 percent of Chinese viewed Japan negatively. In August 2015, the media and citizens in the two countries also made critical remarks on the statement that Prime Minister Abe Shinzō issued on the eve of the seventieth anniversary of the war’s end. In turn, the percentage of Japanese who did not feel friendly toward South Korea and China exceeded 60 percent and 80 percent, respectively, according to the 2014 government opinion survey.

In fact, the history problem has become potentially more explosive thanks to its intersection with the growing territorial disputes over Dokdo/Takeshima and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, amid the changing balance of power in the region. In August 2012, for example, South Korean president Lee Myung Bak visited Dokdo/Takeshima after the Japanese government refused to discuss compensation for South Korean victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. Lee’s government also launched a campaign to publicize the territorial dispute as part of the history problem—Dokdo symbolizing the Korean nation victimized by Japan’s past aggression. Moreover, when the Japanese government proceeded to officially own the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in September 2012, the Chinese government cancelled events to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of normalization between the two countries. Chinese citizens, too, staged anti-Japanese demonstrations in major Chinese cities in mid-September, marking the anniversary of the Mukden Incident, Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, which had taken place in September 1931.
As evinced by these events, the territorial disputes are inextricably tied with memories of Japan’s past aggression for many South Koreans and Chinese. The disputes have also been stimulated by the rising stature of South Korea and China in international society. No longer weak, as they once were in the aftermath of the Asia-Pacific War, the two countries have become more confident and assertive toward Japan, and national pride has increased among their citizens. The Japanese government, in turn, has emphasized the importance of patriotism to its citizens to compensate for the economic and political stagnation since the 1990s. Most recently, Abe Shinzō’s government reinterpreted Article 9 of the constitution to expand Japan’s military capability in September 2015, stirring anxiety among people in South Korea and China who still remember Japan’s past wrongdoings. Thus, whether and how the governments and citizens of the three countries can resolve the history problem has crucial ramifications for the future of East Asia.

But how did the history problem become such a point of contention in Japan’s relations with South Korea and China? Can the three countries resolve the history problem and, if so, how? This book aims to answer these questions, crucial for the governments and citizens in East Asia whose activities are increasingly intertwined at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The History Problem as a Collision of Nationalist Commemorations

In essence, East Asia’s history problem is a set of complexly entangled controversies over how to commemorate the Asia-Pacific War. But “the Asia-Pacific War” is itself a complicated term. Historians who adopt the term disagree whether it should refer only to the Asia-Pacific theater of World War II (1941–1945) or include the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). Some Japanese historians also advocate “the Fifteen-Year War” (1931–1945) as an alternative term to capture the connection between the Mukden Incident in Manchuria (1931–1933), the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Asia-Pacific war theater. Others think that “the Greater East Asia War” (1941–1945) is historically most accurate because the term was used by Japan’s wartime government. Above all, people outside Japan understand the historical period differently in terms of their own sense of temporality based on histories of resistance against imperial aggression and fights for independence that preceded and followed “the Asia-Pacific War.”
In this book, I use “the Asia-Pacific War” in a broad sense, to refer to the Mukden Incident, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Asia-Pacific war theater. This is because when people both inside and outside Japan speak of Japan’s “past wrongdoings” (kako no ayamachi), they often refer to events that happened between 1931 and 1945, such as the invasion of Manchuria, the Nanjing Massacre, and the military “comfort women” system. Thus, using either “the Asia-Pacific War,” in the narrow sense, or “the Greater East Asia War” would leave out important points of contention from my analysis of the history problem. I also prefer the broad version of “the Asia-Pacific War” to “the Fifteen-Year War” because the former better captures the geographical scope of the history problem. Of course, “the Asia-Pacific War,” even in the broad sense, risks downplaying the South Korean perspective on the history problem that includes Japan’s colonial rule (1910–1945), but I believe that this risk is minimal so long as Japan’s wartime atrocities against Koreans are fully understood as coterminous with its colonial rule.

Just as “the Asia-Pacific War” is a complicated term, the “history problem” is a complex phenomenon and hard to pin down because it consists of multiple controversies dealing with diverse issues, ranging from the Yasukuni Shrine to history textbooks, that have political dynamics and historical trajectories of their own. In this sense, it may be more appropriate to translate rekishi ninshiki mondai as “history problems” in the plural. Nevertheless, these multiple controversies are historically homologous—tracing back to Japan’s actions during the Asia-Pacific War—and inextricably entangled to form a more or less bounded domain of public debates and policy problems.

Moreover, the controversies are structurally homologous in the sense that they pertain to commemoration, an act of remembering the past to construct what sociologist Maurice Halbwachs called “collective memory.” On the one hand, collective memory is internal and psychological, consisting of mnemonic schemas or tacit understandings of what to remember about the past and how to remember it. On the other hand, collective memory is external and material, encoded in mnemonic objects that include, but are not limited to, archives, memorials, museum exhibits, and history textbooks. A variety of commemorations, such as anniversary celebrations and memorial ceremonies, aim to align participants’ mnemonic schemas with mnemonic objects surrounding them in order to institutionalize a certain form of collective memory of their purportedly shared past.

In this process of constructing a collective autobiography, however, commemoration eliminates ambiguities from historical facts. As philosopher
Tzvetan Todorov observed, “While history makes the past more complicated, commemoration makes it simpler, since it seeks most often to supply us with heroes to worship or with enemies to detest.”\textsuperscript{14} Even though commemoration oversimplifies and even distorts, it is indispensable to social life because only through it can people appropriate something as vast and complex as history in order to articulate their collective identity. As a result, when different groups come into contact with each other, they are likely to notice disjunctions in how they commemorate the past. These disjunctive commemorations can then become sources of controversy and even conflict between the groups precisely because the foundations of their collective identities are at stake. In this sense, a history problem is not unique to East Asia but commonplace around the world.

But controversy and conflict over commemoration of the past become intractable when they intersect with nationalism, a political doctrine and cultural idiom that divides the world into discrete national communities.\textsuperscript{15} When people commemorate the past according to the logic of nationalism, they focus on their conationals, whether heroes or victims, without sufficient regard for foreign others. This exclusive focus on conationals manifests most clearly in nationalist commemoration of an armed conflict, which often elevates fallen soldiers to immortal heroes of the nation while disregarding what these soldiers might have done to foreign others—the moment when one’s own nation becomes sacred above all else, as political scientist Benedict Anderson pointed out.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, nationalism excludes foreign others from commemoration in another sense: the principle of national sovereignty prohibits foreign others from participating in the process of shaping the content of commemoration. When a government plans a memorial ceremony for war dead at a national cemetery, for example, it typically does not allow foreign governments to influence the content of the ceremony. History education is another example wherein national sovereignty over commemoration continues to be asserted, authorizing only historians who are citizens of a given country to write “national history.” Indeed, nationalism was the most dominant logic of commemoration during the twentieth century—to the extent that Max Weber once defined the nation as a “community of memories”—and much of the historical and sociological research on collective memory assumed the nation as a unit of analysis.\textsuperscript{17}

By doubly excluding foreign others from the content and process of commemoration, the nationalist logic prompts people to embrace a certain version of the past as a foundation of their national identity. Not surprisingly
then, if nationalist commemorations confront one another, intense controversy can result. A collision of contradictory versions of the past, each predicated on the negation of the foreign other, is a recipe for escalating mutual distrust and denunciation. This is how a historical problem, which is rather commonplace in itself, becomes an intractable point of contention in intergroup relations. Put another way, East Asia’s history problem is not primarily about scholarly, historiographical disagreement among historians in Japan, South Korea, and China over the evidential validity of historical materials and the plausibility of historical interpretations; rather, it is about emotionally charged disagreement between the governments and citizens in the three countries over how to construct autobiographical narratives as foundations of their national identities.

This fundamentally relational nature of a history problem calls into question the orthodox explanation of East Asia’s history problem, popular outside Japan as well as among left-leaning Japanese. This orthodox explanation attributes the history problem squarely to Japan—the seeming inability of its government and citizens to acknowledge their country’s past wrongdoings—by showing how the Japanese government was dominated by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) during much of the postwar period. As the result of this nationalist domination, the orthodox explanation goes, the Japanese government not only refused to commemorate foreign victims but also justified the war as a heroic act of self-defense against Western imperial powers. While I agree that the orthodox explanation has much merit, I also argue that it fails to fully explain the dynamic and trajectory of East Asia’s history problem. For example, when Japan normalized its relations with South Korea and China in 1965 and 1972, respectively, government leaders on both sides in each instance decided to prioritize political and economic interests over issues of apology and compensation. Similarly, a downward spiral of mutually reinforcing criticisms between Japan and its two neighbors intensified the history problem in the early 2000s.

Thus, I argue that the cause of the history problem cannot be attributed to Japan alone and that it needs to be carefully examined in terms of Japan’s interactions with South Korea and China, as political scientists Thomas Berger, Yinan He, and Jennifer Lind have each demonstrated in recent work. To understand the evolution of the history problem, then, it is crucial to trace how nationalist commemorations in Japan as well as in South
Korea and China have interacted with one another to produce mutual antipathy rather than affinity.

**Cosmopolitanism as a New Logic of Commemoration**

By itself, the interaction of nationalist commemorations does not adequately explain the dynamic and trajectory of East Asia’s history problem, especially in recent decades. This is because nationalism is no longer the only logic of commemoration available today. As sociologist Ulrich Beck and his colleagues have argued, cosmopolitanism, an orientation of openness to foreign others, is increasingly institutionalized in a variety of human practices in the contemporary world, thanks to the globalization of human-rights discourse and the growing sociocultural interactions across national borders. Cosmopolitanism presents a new logic of feeling, thinking, and acting that takes humanity, rather than nationality, as a primary frame of reference. Drawing on the logic of cosmopolitanism, people can doubly include foreign others in commemoration: they remember what happened to foreign others as members of humanity, but they also invite those others to contribute to shaping the content of commemoration. As Beck put it, cosmopolitan commemoration involves “acknowledging the history (and the memories) of the ‘other’ and integrating them into one’s own history, . . . where the national monologues of victimization that are celebrated as national memory are systematically replaced by transnational forms and forums of memory and dialogue, which also enable the innermost aspects of the national realm—the founding of myths—to be opened up to and for one another.” Cosmopolitan commemoration thus allows people to extend identification beyond national borders and engage in transformative dialogues with foreign others that critically reflect on the nationalist biases in their version of history.

Cosmopolitan commemoration has been promoted most systematically by United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Currently, UNESCO runs the World Heritage site program. Launched in 1972, the program aims to preserve natural and cultural sites around the world as shared heritage for humanity as a whole. While cultural sites consist mostly of ancient castles, temples, and monuments, they also include sites related to slavery, the Holocaust, the atomic bombing, and other forms of extreme human suffering. UNESCO also established the Memory of the World Programme in 1992 to protect historic documents,
relics, and works of art as focal points for remembering world history. This program also includes projects to preserve historical documents related to negative aspects of world history, such as the Holocaust. These two UNESCO programs encourage people around the world to commemorate events that happened to foreign others as fellow human beings. Along with UNESCO, other United Nations (UN) organizations have promoted cosmopolitanism for more than half a century, because political leaders espoused it as a new principle for creating a more peaceful world in the aftermath of World War II, which had brought so much suffering to millions of people. Since cosmopolitanism, embodied by human rights and other UN conventions, has been adopted by national governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around the world, the horizon of commemoration appears to be extending beyond national borders.

Consistent with the worldwide trend, the Japanese government began to incorporate cosmopolitanism in its official commemoration in the early 1990s. When the LDP, a defender of nationalist commemoration, was temporarily ousted from power, non-LDP prime ministers such as Hosokawa Morihiro of the Japan New Party and Murayama Tomiichi of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) officially apologized for Japan’s past wrongdoings. Concurrently, Japan’s Ministry of Education approved history textbooks that expanded descriptions of Japan’s colonial rule of Korea, “comfort women,” and the Nanjing Massacre, among other negative aspects of Japan’s past. These gestures of contrition expressed the cosmopolitan logic of commemoration and, during the last few decades, Japan’s official commemoration has come to exhibit a complex mixture of nationalist defiance and cosmopolitan contrition. Even Koizumi Jun’ichirō, whose visit to the Yasukuni Shrine sparked so much controversy in the early 2000s, followed Murayama’s precedent and officially offered “sincere apologies” for victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings.23

Cosmopolitan commemoration, however, is not replacing nationalist commemoration in a zero-sum manner. Instead, the relationship between the two is open-ended because nationalism continues to operate as a central organizing principle in the contemporary world. As Ulrich Beck and Natan Szaider put it, “Cosmopolitanism does not only negate nationalism but also presupposes it.”24 While UN organizations promote human rights, national governments are still responsible for implementing them in education systems and other societal institutions. Similarly, even though membership in humanity is emphasized, national citizenship continues to structure access
to socioeconomic resources and political rights. Since both nationalism and cosmopolitanism are legitimated, this creates what sociologists call an “institutional contradiction,” wherein contradictory but equally legitimate logics clash with each other. This institutional contradiction serves as a focal point of political struggles for the legitimate commemoration, and these struggles are likely to be intense and protracted because all sides, subscribing to nationalism and cosmopolitanism differently, have reasonable claims to legitimacy.

Put another way, the dynamic and trajectory of the history problem cannot be attributed simply to particular groups, such as the LDP, that promote nationalist commemorations, for the problem is built into the very “institutional environment” in which these groups operate. The crucial questions, therefore, are how different groups organize and justify their own commemorations by drawing on nationalism and cosmopolitanism, and why some commemorations achieve dominance over others. In short, how does the politics of commemoration play out?

**Toward a Field Theory of the History Problem**

Politics has been a central concern in the sociology of collective memory since Barry Schwartz, Robin Wagner-Pacifi ci, and Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, among others, pioneered research on “difficult pasts.” These sociologists focused on “morally ambiguous” events that divided members of society, ranging from the Vietnam War to the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, and examined how different groups mobilized to legitimate their versions of the past. Although much of the research on difficult pasts took the nation as the unit of analysis, a growing number of sociologists, historians, and cultural theorists have recently adopted transnational perspectives. They have argued that commemorations of difficult pasts, most notably the Holocaust, now travel across national borders through multiple media of communication and influence each other in various directions. In this regard, East Asia’s history problem exemplifies the politics of commemoration at the transnational scale, where disjunctive commemorations of the Asia-Pacific War—the difficult past—in Japan, South Korea, and China interact with one another, competing for legitimacy.

To analytically disentangle the politics of East Asia’s history problem, I propose to use field theory. Originally developed by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, field theory was imported into collective memory studies by American sociologist Jeffrey Olick, who sought to emphasize the
heterogeneous and dynamic nature of collective memory. According to Olick, constructing collective memory occurs in multiple fields—artistic, social, political, and so on—each with its own distinct rules of engagement. Actors compete to legitimate their own commemorative positions by deploying different strategies and mobilizing different amounts of resources at their disposal. While different fields produce different collective memories, they are also interdependent: dynamics and trajectories of fields are shaped both internally and externally. Moreover, relations among fields are structured hierarchically: the political field tends to dominate other fields because its struggles revolve around the government, which has the power to define an official commemoration as a parameter for struggles in other fields. To put it in Bourdieu’s own words, the government is able to “exercise power over the different fields” because it “establishes and inculcates . . . social frameworks of perceptions, of understanding or of memory” among citizens. The political field is therefore “a sort of metafield” in relation to other fields of collective memory.

By building on field theory, I conceptualize East Asia’s history problem as a political field wherein relevant actors compete over the legitimate commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War. Here, I limit “relevant actors” to those who consciously try to influence Japan’s official commemoration, that is, those who participate in politics in the conventional sense that their actions are explicitly oriented toward the government. The Japanese government is the most important actor in this field because it has the power to define Japan’s official commemoration, the focal point of political struggles. In international contexts, the commemorative position of the Japanese government has been the target of criticism from the governments and citizens in South Korea and China. In domestic contexts, too, various NGOs and political parties have pressed the Japanese government to accommodate and sanction their commemorative positions. Although artists, writers, and ordinary citizens commemorate the Asia-Pacific War in fields other than politics, they remain outside the scope of this book, unless they participate in political struggles over the history problem.

In addition, commemorative positions of the Japanese government and other relevant actors can be identified in terms of the spectrum ranging between nationalism and cosmopolitanism—the two logics of commemoration available in the institutional environment. While some actors might subscribe exclusively to either nationalism or cosmopolitanism, most actors are likely to combine the two logics differently to articulate their commem-
orative positions. At the concrete level, some of these commemorative positions can be labeled as “evasion,” “denial,” “pacifist,” and so forth, as Japanese sociologists Hashimoto Akiko and Tsutsui Kiyoteru have done; however, these labels or “frames” pertain to commemorative practices specific to either situations or issues, and they are ultimately derived from combinations of nationalism and cosmopolitanism as culturally deeper logics of commemoration.

I also propose to combine field theory with social movement studies to analyze how relevant political actors influenced Japan’s official commemoration. According to sociologists Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam, this combination extends Bourdieu’s field theory, which mostly takes the individual as a unit of analysis, by incorporating the mechanisms of mobilization of collective actions. In fact, although not using field theory, several sociologists have recently attempted to introduce social movement studies into collective memory studies. Following their lead, I borrow two major analytical concepts from social movement studies—mobilizing structures and political opportunities—to strengthen my field analysis of East Asia’s history problem.

Mobilizing structures refers to organizations and their networks that provide human and financial resources for actors to mobilize collective actions and promote their commemorative positions. In the case of the history problem, mobilizing structures consist of political parties and NGOs. These are organizational vehicles that enable relevant political actors to advance their commemorative positions. If a political party promoting cosmopolitan commemoration is weak, for example, Japan’s official commemoration is unlikely to incorporate the logic of cosmopolitanism. Mobilizing structures are not static, because some organizations exit the field and others enter, and networks of these organizations change over time.

Moreover, when and how nationalism or cosmopolitanism is incorporated into Japan’s official commemoration depends on political opportunities available for proponents of respective logics of commemoration. Political opportunities have two components: access to the government and the relative significance of the history problem in policy debates. If a ruling party that supports nationalist commemoration is ousted from power by an opposition party whose commemorative position is more cosmopolitan, this means a lost political opportunity for proponents of nationalist commemoration and, conversely, a newly gained political opportunity for proponents of cosmopolitan commemoration. In addition, when there are policy issues
more urgent than the history problem, such as an economic crisis or a large-scale disaster, political opportunities for changing Japan’s official commemoration decrease for both incumbents and challengers.

In this book, then, I use field theory to examine how relevant political actors, equipped with various mobilizing structures, have promoted their commemorative positions and made use of political opportunities to influence Japan’s official commemoration. I argue that such a field analysis allows me to combine the strengths of two different approaches in existing research on East Asia’s history problem. On the one hand, international-relations scholars such as Thomas Berger, Yinan He, and Jennifer Lind have made an important contribution by reconceptualizing the history problem as a relationally constituted phenomenon at the international level. Such an international perspective is particularly useful in the contemporary world, wherein more and more commemorations of the past traverse national borders through transnational media networks. This focus on international relations also mitigates the tendency among sociological studies of collective memory that take the nation as a unit of analysis. On the other hand, historians have paid careful attention to public commemorations in civil society. Carol Gluck, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, and Franziska Seraphim, for example, argued that the evolution of the history problem cannot be fully explained without reference to multiple, competing commemorations in Japanese civil society and growing transnational NGO networks seeking to address Japan’s past wrongdoings. Indeed, political struggles over historical injustices around the world have begun to involve nongovernmental actors because NGOs and individual citizens are increasingly defined as legitimate stakeholders in international relations. Field theory can combine these two approaches by taking into account interactions between governmental and nongovernmental actors in shaping Japan’s official commemoration.

To examine the content of Japan’s official commemoration, I break it down into three dimensions. The first dimension consists of *speech and action* by Japan’s prime ministers, as well as by other relevant ministers, as representatives of the Japanese government. Speech includes official statements on important anniversaries and remarks made by government officials during Diet sessions and news conferences, and action includes visiting memorials and attending ceremonies. The second dimension is *compensation policy*. Laws that define which groups of people are eligible for compensation express the government’s commemorative position: the function of compensation is fundamentally symbolic of whose suffering deserves to
be recognized. The third dimension is education, by which the Japanese government legitimates a certain version of the past and disseminates it among Japanese citizens. Even though the Japanese government does not produce its own history textbook, it regulates history education and textbooks through the legally binding Course of Study (gakushūshidō yōryō) and textbook inspection. While these three dimensions are not exhaustive, they nonetheless constitute the core of Japan’s official commemoration.

To understand how the three dimensions of Japan’s official commemoration evolved, I focus on the mediating role of political parties, because the Japanese government is ultimately controlled by politicians that Japanese citizens elect. While NGOs in Japan could press the government by submitting petitions and signatures, for example, their actions have little direct influence on Japan’s official commemoration, because their demands have to be translated by the ruling party engaged in political struggles with opposition parties. Take, for example, the Japan Bereaved Families Association (Nihon Izokukai) and the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations (Nihon Hidankyō). These two NGOs tried to influence Japan’s official commemoration throughout the postwar period, but their original demands always had to be processed by their respective political representatives, the LDP and the JSP, which had organizational dynamics and political calculations of their own. Similarly, the governments and citizens of South Korea and China pressed the Japanese government through meetings, statements, and protests, but the effects of these actions were always refracted through the political dynamics inside Japan. Struggles among political parties in Japan thus decisively shape the evolution of Japan’s official commemoration.

For the analysis of the mediating role of political parties, I have examined mainly the proceedings of the Japanese National Diet sessions (kokkai kaigiroku) between 1945 and 2015. Diet proceedings document not only speech and action by prime ministers and other cabinet members expressing Japan’s official commemoration but also debates between ruling and opposition parties trying to represent competing commemorative positions by referring to petitions and requests relayed from their constituencies. Diet proceedings are therefore crucial texts that contain “traces of interactions,” so to speak, through which relevant political actors in the history problem have tried to influence Japan’s official commemoration.

Moreover, to clarify interactions among relevant political actors, I complemented Diet proceedings with four more sources. First, news articles published by Asahi shinbun and other major newspapers document
commemorative positions and actions of relevant political actors, both inside and outside Japan. Second, pamphlets, books, reports, and statements published by government ministries, political parties, and NGOs in Japan elaborate on their commemorative positions. Third, Japanese translations of primary historical documents produced by governments, NGOs, and citizens in South Korea and China shed light on their commemorative positions. Finally, scholarly literature on East Asia’s history problem available in English and Japanese provides summaries of the public debates on the Asia-Pacific War, as well as scholarly interventions, at different points in time.

**Organization of the Book**

Based on my field analysis of the data, I argue that the history problem escalated not simply because conservative politicians and NGOs in Japan, aligned with the nationalist logic of commemoration, prevented the Japanese government from fully expressing contrition toward South Korean and Chinese victims according to the logic of cosmopolitanism. The history problem was also aggravated by the very proponents of cosmopolitan commemoration, such as left-leaning politicians and NGOs in Japan, that pressed the Japanese government for greater contrition, for they based their commemoration on the Tokyo Trial, which had judged Japan as solely and entirely guilty for the Asia-Pacific War. As a result, even though they succeeded in injecting cosmopolitanism into Japan’s official commemoration, they galvanized Japanese conservatives to reject the cosmopolitan commemoration by denouncing the Tokyo Judgment as “victor’s justice,” and instead justify Japan’s past aggression as an act of self-defense. The Japanese proponents of cosmopolitan commemoration also allowed South Korea and China to maintain nationalist commemorations of their own that glorified their resistance against Japanese aggression and blame Japan alone for the history problem, consistent with the Tokyo Judgment.

I also argue, however, that a crucial corrective has emerged over the last two decades in the form of joint historical research and education projects that promote mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations and reciprocate cosmopolitanism in commemorating the Asia-Pacific War. This growing transnational network of historians and educators began to critically reassess the Tokyo Judgment that had fueled nationalist resentments in Japan and justified one-sided criticisms of Japan by South Korea and China. Indeed, the joint projects have shown the potential to push Japanese
citizens to fully commemorate the suffering of South Korean and Chinese victims by confronting the real magnitude of Japan’s past wrongdoings, as well as to encourage South Korean and Chinese citizens to reflect on their own nationalism and commemorate the war, including Japanese victimhood, from a more cosmopolitan perspective.

The following chapters offer a field analysis of how the history problem evolved in East Asia from 1945 through 2015. Chapter 1, “Cross-National Fragmentation,” looks at the period between 1945 and 1964, when the history problem did not yet exist as such because Japan had no diplomatic relations with South Korea and China. During the Occupation led by the United States, the Tokyo Trial prosecuted Japanese leaders for waging a war of aggression against the Allied powers. The Japanese government officially acknowledged its past aggression when it signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951, thereby accepting the Tokyo Judgment. Nevertheless, conservative politicians controlling the Japanese government openly rejected the Tokyo Judgment as “victor’s justice.” They instead justified Japan’s past aggression as an act of self-defense and, together with the Japan Bereaved Families Association, honored Japanese war dead as martyrs at the Yasukuni Shrine. Moreover, after the LDP came to power in 1955, the Japanese government increased its control over history education through the Course of Study and textbook inspection. The LDP thus enjoyed robust mobilizing structures and monopolized political opportunities, successfully framing Japan’s official commemoration in nationalist terms. But, at the same time, opposition parties such as the JSP and the Japan Communist Party actively commemorated Japan’s past aggression against Korea and China. Moreover, A-bomb victims and affiliated NGOs began to adopt cosmopolitanism to commemorate all war victims irrespective of nationality, though they initially paid little attention to foreign victims of the Asia-Pacific War. Since these political parties and NGOs were outnumbered by the LDP and its supporters, however, they did not influence Japan’s official commemoration.

Chapter 2, “The Growth of Transnational Interactions,” examines the period between 1965 and 1988, when the history problem emerged after Japan normalized its diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1965 and China in 1972. After normalization, Japanese A-bomb victims and affiliated NGOs began to commemorate foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings by extending the cosmopolitan logic that they had previously used for commemorating all war victims. The South Korean and
Chinese governments also pressed the Japanese government to correct nationalist biases in Japanese history textbooks and demanded that Japanese prime ministers refrain from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, where Class A war criminals were enshrined. Given these growing transnational interactions, the Japanese government expressed remorse for its past aggression on several occasions, revised the Course of Study to increase descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings, and provided relief for South Korean A-bomb victims. These actions injected cosmopolitanism into Japan’s official commemoration, though the LDP continued to possess robust mobilizing structures and monopolize political opportunities to defend the nationalist logic of commemoration. Moreover, the South Korean and Chinese demands for a greater degree of cosmopolitan contrition on Japan’s part were coupled with surging nationalist sentiments of their own. In South Korea, ethnic nationalism was energized by the country’s economic success and the democratization movement in the 1980s, and in China, the Communist Party began to promote patriotic education to manage social instabilities created by the Cultural Revolution and economic reforms in the late 1970s. Hence, nationalist commemorations in the three countries were set on a collision course.

Chapter 3, “Apologies and Denunciations,” illustrates how the history problem fully developed between 1989 and 1996, when a major realignment of relevant political actors occurred leading up to the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end. First of all, the death of Emperor Hirohito in January 1989 prompted some politicians and A-bomb victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to offer explicit apologies to foreign victims of Japan’s past aggression, wartime atrocities, and colonial rule. Around the same time, Japanese and South Korean NGOs expanded the transnational network to help former “comfort women” demand apologies and compensation from the Japanese government, while Japanese NGOs helped Chinese victims file compensation lawsuits against the Japanese government and corporations. At this historical juncture, the LDP was ousted from power in July 1993. This allowed non-LDP prime ministers to apologize for Japan’s past wrongdoings more decisively than did their LDP predecessors. Thus, political parties and NGOs supporting South Korean and Chinese victims finally gained a political opportunity to introduce cosmopolitanism into Japan’s official commemoration. Nevertheless, the LDP remained the largest political party in the Diet. This persistent dominance of the mobilizing structures for nationalist commemoration undercut the political opportunity for non-LDP
prime ministers and forced them to compromise cosmopolitanism with nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration. This compromise intensified the history problem by galvanizing nationalists in Japan as well as in South Korea and China. Japanese nationalists criticized the Japanese government for failing to honor Japanese war dead enough, whereas South Korean and Chinese nationalists criticized it for failing to commemorate South Korean and Chinese victims enough. As a result, the first serious attempt to incorporate cosmopolitanism into Japan’s official commemoration resulted in a negative spiral of mutually reinforcing nationalist commemorations.

Chapter 4, “The Coexistence of Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism,” examines the period between 1997 and 2015, when changes in both domestic and international situations of the three countries made the history problem more complex. The LDP returned to power, but it formed the coalition government with other small parties, while the JSP, a longstanding supporter of cosmopolitan commemoration, was disbanded. Various new actors also entered the field of the history problem, complicating the landscape of mobilizing structures and political opportunities available for nationalist and cosmopolitan commemorations. Perhaps the best-known new actor was the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, an NGO that promoted “healthy nationalism” in history education by cooperating with LDP members who wanted to reduce descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in history textbooks. At the same time, historians and educators in the three countries initiated joint historical research and education projects to critically reflect on nationalist biases in historiographies and textbooks, and even the LDP-led coalition government launched bilateral joint historical research projects with South Korea and China to prevent further escalation of the history problem. Thus, even though the LDP tried to exploit its access to the government and other political opportunities to strengthen nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration, its action was moderated by its coalition partner Kōmeitō and constrained by pressures from South Korea and China. This made up for the decline of mobilizing structures and political opportunities available for proponents of cosmopolitan commemoration. Nationalist commemorations in the three countries continue to fuel the history problem, but they now coexist, in a complex manner, with mutual cosmopolitan commemoration initiated by governmental and nongovernmental joint projects.

The foregoing field analysis reveals one striking pattern in the evolution of the history problem: most of the relevant political actors defined their
commemorative positions, explicitly or implicitly, in reference to the Tokyo Trial. Thus, chapter 5, “The Legacy of the Tokyo Trial,” explores why the trial became such a key reference point by critically examining ramifications of its three major problems. First, the trial had elements of victor’s justice because it prosecuted Japan alone for the Asia-Pacific War. This created ambivalence and even resentment among Japanese citizens, keeping them from fully confronting Japan’s past wrongdoings. Second, the trial did not recognize Japan’s victimhood vis-à-vis war crimes of the Allied powers, giving Japanese citizens an excuse for reclaiming and dwelling on their own suffering. Third, the trial blamed only a small number of government leaders for the war and practically absolved Japanese citizens. This government-centered view of war responsibility deprived Japanese citizens of opportunities to critically reflect on their share of war guilt. The first and second problems with the trial, in particular, fueled the Japanese nationalist commemoration by breeding resentment, on the one hand, and justified the South Korean and Chinese nationalist commemorations by identifying Japan as the absolute perpetrator, on the other. All three problems then combined to prevent the majority of Japanese citizens from fully commemorating the suffering of South Korean and Chinese victims according to the logic of cosmopolitanism. The Tokyo Trial therefore needs to be critically reassessed, so that citizens in the three countries can disentangle nationalist commemoration from its problematic legacy and move toward a resolution of the history problem.

Such a critical reassessment of the Tokyo Trial, however, is impossible without historians capable of generating what philosopher Paul Ricoeur called “an open dialectic” of historiography and commemoration, which guarantees historical facts and interpretations, as well as national identities, to remain open to dialogues and revisions. This open dialectic manifests in the growing joint projects by historians in Japan, South Korea, and China who successfully produced reports and teaching materials that critiqued nationalist commemorations in the three countries. But to what extent can historians actually influence the dynamic and trajectory of the history problem? Chapter 6, “The Role of Historians in the History Problem,” explores this question. Simply put, historians in East Asia have been unable to effectively intervene in the history problem because no adequate mechanisms are institutionalized through which their critique of nationalist commemoration can move the contents of official and public commemorations in a more cosmopolitan direction. This situation is largely engineered by the
governments of Japan, South Korea, and China, which control history education through curricular guidelines and textbook inspection. The governments also maintain the education systems that force students to memorize “historical facts” for examinations instead of cultivating skills to critically evaluate historical materials. The future of the history problem therefore depends on whether the three countries can create mechanisms to mobilize historians’ critical reflections for critiquing nationalist commemorations and supporting mutual cosmopolitan commemoration.

In the “Conclusion,” then, I explore how mutual cosmopolitan commemoration, supported by historians’ critical reflections, might facilitate reconciliation in East Asia. To this end, I expand on the “pragmatic” approach to the history problem advocated by political scientists. Jennifer Lind, for example, has cautioned against demanding more apologies from Japan because this strategy risks triggering backlashes from nationalists in Japan, galvanizing nationalist sentiments in South Korea and China. Similarly, Thomas Berger has argued that the pursuit of reconciliation over the history problem is not unconditionally desirable, and that any successful reconciliation will require many conditions, including “a degree of reciprocity.” I propose to refine the pragmatic approach by anchoring it in principles articulated by pragmatist philosophers, such as John Dewey: a future-oriented, problem-solving approach to the past and reciprocal recognition of humanity among relevant actors. Here, how the governments and citizens in Japan, South Korea, and China should commemorate the past is fundamentally tied with the problem of what kind of international relations they envision for the region’s future. Moreover, while reconciliation requires perpetrators to move away from denial toward admission of their guilt, this in turn requires other parties to affirm the perpetrators’ humanity and thus acknowledge the inhumanities that they, too, suffered in the past conflict. How to facilitate such reciprocal recognition of humanity—mutual cosmopolitan commemoration—is one of the most urgent tasks confronting the governments and citizens in the three countries today.
The focus of the history problem, the Asia-Pacific War, was not a single, clearly bounded event. Instead, it evolved through a series of armed conflicts between Japan and China that began with the Mukden Incident in September 1931 and eventually led to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. Japan then proceeded to war with the United States and other Allied powers in December 1941 and quickly advanced to the Pacific and Southeast Asia. But the tide of war began to turn at the Battle of Midway in June 1942, and Japan was increasingly overwhelmed by the Allied powers. By the end of June 1945, the Allied powers had defeated Japanese troops on the Okinawa Islands; the Potsdam Declaration was issued on July 26, demanding that the Japanese government “proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces.”\(^1\) The Japanese government rejected the ultimatum, and the Allied powers responded with further military actions. The United States dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, respectively. On August 8, the Soviet Union also broke the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact to attack Manchukuo, the Kuril Islands, and South Sakhalin. These military actions finally led the Japanese government to accept the Potsdam Declaration on August 14. The next day, Emperor Hirohito read the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War in a radio broadcast, officially surrendering to the Allied powers.\(^2\)

The Japanese government immediately ordered civilian bureaucrats and military officers to destroy classified documents. The Army Ministry followed the order most thoroughly. They destroyed not only classified documents at the ministry but also army-related documents at the municipal
level. The Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also destroyed a large number of classified documents. The destruction of war-related documents continued until the Allied powers arrived at Atsugi Naval Air Base on August 28.

After the Allied powers occupied Tokyo on September 8, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) Douglas MacArthur ordered the arrest of forty-three Japanese civilian and military leaders for crimes against peace, commonly known as Class A war crimes. The Allied powers also arrested people suspected of conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity, Class B and Class C war crimes, respectively. During the Occupation, more than ten thousand Japanese were either arrested or indicted for these three types of war crimes. In January 1946, SCAP proceeded to enact the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in preparation for prosecuting Class A war crime suspects.

In the meantime, SCAP implemented policies to demilitarize and democratize Japan. In October, SCAP released communists and other activists who had been imprisoned by the Japanese government, purged militaristic teachers from schools, and encouraged women’s political participation and the formation of voluntary associations. In December, SCAP terminated government sponsorship of Shintoism and ordered the Japanese government to suspend from school curricula moral education (shūshin), Japanese history, and geography—three subjects that had played a central role in inculcating nationalism in Japanese citizens. SCAP also purged from public office, corporations, and universities war crimes suspects, militarists, and those who had collaborated with the wartime government.

Concurrently, SCAP pressed the Japanese government to create a new constitution. Since the Japanese government, headed by Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō, was hesitant to make a significant departure from the pre-war Imperial Constitution, SCAP intervened and handed out its own draft to the Japanese government in February 1946. The Japanese government used the SCAP version to draft a new constitution and presented it to the public in April. The new draft constitution included many important changes from its prewar counterpart: the emperor was divested of political power, basic human rights and equality of the sexes were guaranteed, and war as a sovereign right was renounced, to name but a few. In the midst of these profound transformations under the Occupation, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, also known as the Tokyo Trial, opened on May 3, 1946.
The Tokyo Trial and the Reverse Course

The Tokyo Trial seated eleven judges from eleven Allied powers: Britain, British India, the United States, the Republic of China, France, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Philippines, and the Soviet Union. The same eleven countries also sent eleven prosecutors with support teams. Twenty-eight Class A war crime suspects were tried, including Tōjō Hideki, the former prime minister who had made the decision to enter war with the United States in December 1941; Itagaki Seishirō, an army general who was involved in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937; and Matsui Iwane, another army general who had directed the attack on Nanjing in December 1937. These and the other twenty-five Class A suspects were defended by a team of Japanese and American attorneys.7

A focal point of the Tokyo Trial was the category of crimes against peace, or Class A war crimes, defined as acts of planning, conspiring, and executing an aggressive war. Whereas the Nuremberg Trials determined that a war of aggression was a punishable crime under international law, the eleven judges of the Tokyo Trial were still divided over the issue.8 Toward the end of the trial, however, the judges from Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the Philippines, and the United States formed a majority accepting the Nuremberg Trials’ position; three judges, from British India, France, and the Netherlands, dissented.9

The Japanese defendants pleaded not guilty to all charges. Kiyose Ichirō, a chief defense attorney for Tōjō Hideki, justified the Asia-Pacific War as an act of self-defense. Kiyose argued that the Chinese military had been responsible for the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and that Japan had begun the war with the Allied powers because “Japan had no other choice but [to] exercise its right to self-defense, simply to survive the impossible situation.”10 Tōjō, too, justified the war as an act of self-defense and stated that he had made the right decision, both legally and morally.11

Along with crimes against peace, the Tokyo Trial prosecuted violations of war conventions (e.g., abuse of prisoners of war) and crimes against humanity (e.g., killing of civilians). The prosecutors submitted a number of testimonies about Japan’s wartime atrocities against civilians across Asia, such as Japanese troops executing people in Singapore, and forcing local women to serve as military “comfort women” in the Dutch East Indies.12 Among these atrocities against civilians in Asia, the Nanjing Massacre was the most extensively investigated at the trial because the prosecutor from the Republic
of China brought a large amount of evidence and many testimonies. Although people in Japan had not been informed of the massacre during the war because of government censorship, the evidence and testimonies were so overwhelming that the defendants and defense lawyers managed to make only brief counterarguments.13

On November 4, 1948, Chief Justice William Webb of Australia handed out the 1,445-page judgment. The Tokyo Judgment accepted that the leaders of the Japanese government had conspired for aggression, rejecting the argument that Japan had only exercised its right to self-defense. The judgment also accepted Japan’s conventional war crimes against the Allied powers.14 Seven defendants, including Tōjō, were sentenced to death. Sixteen were sentenced to lifelong imprisonment, including Kaya Okinori, who would later become a minister of justice. Two defendants, including Shigemitsu Mamoru, a future minister of foreign affairs, were sentenced to imprisonment for multiple years. Two other defendants died during the trial, and a third was taken out of the trial because he became mentally ill. In addition to the majority opinion, Delfin Jaranilla of the Philippines filed a separate opinion criticizing the sentences as too lenient. William Webb also hinted at the emperor’s war responsibility in his separate opinion, though he agreed with the majority about the legal basis for prosecuting crimes against peace. Radhabinod Pal of India, Henri Bernard of France, and B. V. A. Röling of the Netherlands filed dissenting opinions. While Pal rejected the legal basis to prosecute crimes against peace, Bernard and Röling accepted it but disagreed with the majority about its justification. Bernard also questioned the tribunal’s decision not to indict Emperor Hirohito.15

Although the Tokyo Trial exposed Japan’s war crimes, it did not prosecute all Class A war crime suspects. Originally, SCAP had planned multiple rounds of international military tribunals. But the trial exposed significant logistical problems and disagreements among the Allied powers.16 By the late 1940s, the Cold War had also intensified between the United States and its Western allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, on the other. SCAP therefore shifted its policy focus from thorough demilitarization and democratization to swift reconstruction and remilitarization of Japan as an ally in the fight against communism. As part of this “reverse course,” SCAP released nineteen Class A war crime suspects—including Kishi Nobusuke, who later became a prime minister—from Sugamo Prison on December 24, 1948, one day after seven
Class A war criminals were executed. Moreover, SCAP made only microfilms of the trial records available, and only at select places, such as the Library of Congress—a stark contrast to the proceedings and judgment of the Nuremberg Trials, which were published in forty-two volumes in Germany.

This reverse course in SCAP’s policy accelerated after the Korean War broke out in June 1950. SCAP pressed the Japanese government to establish the National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai) in August 1950, so that Japan could defend itself while US troops moved out to the Korean Peninsula. During the buildup to the Korean War, SCAP also purged communists from public office, newspaper companies, and corporations, as well as suspended the communist newspaper *Akahata*. Moreover, SCAP began to allow former war crime suspects, militarists, and collaborators to return to public office in June 1951. Against the backdrop of the reverse course, Yoshida Shigeru’s government signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty on September 8, 1951, by officially accepting the Tokyo Judgment as a condition for regaining Japan’s independence.

**Rejection, Acceptance, and Critique of the Tokyo Trial**

Domestically, Yoshida’s government rejected the Tokyo Judgment and used the rejection as the basis for justifying the release of war criminals. As Minister of Justice Ōhashi Takeo stated, “The Military Tribunal for the Far East and other tribunals by the Allied Powers were not carried out according to Japan’s domestic law. Therefore, those acts that were judged war crimes according to the tribunals and international law can no way be regarded as crimes as far as Japanese law is concerned.” The release of war criminals was widely supported by Japanese citizens. Former war crime suspects created the Aid Association for War Criminals (Sensō Jukeisha Sewakai) in May 1952 to lobby the government to recommend the prompt release of war criminals. The Japanese Red Cross, religious organizations, and other NGOs also supported the release of war criminals. When the National Rally for the Release of All War Criminals in Sugamo was held in November 1953, approximately thirty million signatures had been collected in support of war criminals.

With independence regained, Yoshida’s government first ended the purge of war criminals, militarists, and collaborators from public office, allowing Hatoyama Ichirō, Kishi Nobusuke, and Shigemitsu Mamoru, among many others, to return to influential positions in politics. The Diet also
adopted three resolutions between June 1952 and August 1953 that recommended clemency, reduced sentences, and parole for war criminals. Conservative politicians supported these resolutions most actively. For example, Tago Kazuomi, a member of the ruling Liberal Party (Jiyūtō), advocated the release of war criminals by arguing that the Tokyo Judgment was “persuasively objected by Justice Pal of India. All the defense attorneys also argued that the tribunal was unfair . . . and destined to add more wrongs to the wrongs of the war.” Hitotsumatsu Sadayoshi, a member of the Progressive Reform Party (Kaishintō) led by Shigemitsu Mamoru, also argued that war criminals were in effect “patriots” (aikokusha), and that the government should save “those who had sacrificed their lives and fought for our country but were given the bad name of war criminal because Japan lost the war.”

The conservative attacks on the Tokyo Trial intensified when Hatoyama Ichirō became prime minister in December 1954. Hatoyama not only wanted to change the postwar constitution that he thought had been imposed by the Allied powers but also appointed as ministers several former war criminals and purgees, such as Shigemitsu Mamoru (minister of foreign affairs and vice prime minister) and Shōriki Matsutarō (chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission). To be sure, these politicians had been critical of the military leaders during the Asia-Pacific War, but they nonetheless rejected the Tokyo Trial. Shigemitsu, in particular, publicly criticized the Tokyo Trial over and again because he was “firmly convinced that those who are called ‘war criminals’ are, in fact, victims of the war.” A war criminal was “something that the victors made up one-sidedly,” and it was yet to be determined “whether the Greater East Asia War was really a war of aggression according to the international law.” Moreover, Shigemitsu thought that the war was justifiable not only because it had been an act of self-defense, but also because it had benefited Asian countries: “I feel very happy that Asian countries attained the right of self-determination and gained independence after World War II. Japan should be satisfied with this outcome of the war that it participated in.” Thus, even though the Japanese government accepted the Tokyo Judgment to regain independence, it was politicians in government that most openly denounced it. This contradiction, which historian Yoshida Yutaka called the “double standard” in addressing international and domestic audiences, was going to define the government’s commemorative position for the following decades.

In contrast, members of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) commemorated foreign victims actively. Since communists had opposed Japan’s
imperialist expansion prior to the Asia-Pacific War, many of them had been tortured to death or imprisoned. JCP members therefore felt that it was crucial to vigorously criticize Japan’s war crimes to prevent postwar Japan from regressing into its prewar state. JCP members were also the most internationally oriented among Japanese politicians at the time because they maintained solidarity with other communist countries, including the People’s Republic of China, which had suffered greatly from Japan’s past aggression. During the Diet session in April 1952, for example, JCP member Katō Mitsuru expressed his objection to the release of war criminals by citing graphic details of Japan’s war crimes from the Tokyo Trial:

In Nanjing in December 1937, even after the battle ended, the Japanese army killed about 95,000 Chinese citizens, women, and children by committing every conceivable atrocity under the command of Matsui Iwane: execution, decapitation, cutting out a tongue, burning to death, hollowing out eyes, beating and kicking to death, raping as an individual and as a group, raping a dead body, and so on. . . . The Japanese imperialists killed ten million Chinese, more than one million Filipinos, and committed all sorts of atrocities in Vietnam, Malay, Indonesia, Burma, New Guinea, and elsewhere.27

From the JCP’s perspective, the release of war criminals would amount to forgetting Japan’s war crimes and evading its war responsibility.

The JCP was also opposed to signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty because the treaty excluded the People’s Republic of China from its signatories. JCP member Hayashi Hyakurō argued that a “peace treaty” without China would not bring peace in the real sense: “If we want to rebuild Japan as a peace-loving and democratic nation in Asia, we should offer atonement and apologies for China, the country that we victimized most severely, and build friendly relations with the Chinese people. I believe this is the most urgent task for the government in its attempt to settle legacies of the Asia-Pacific War.”28 Thus, JCP members, who completely accepted the Tokyo Judgment, strongly protested against the conservative government.

The JSP, the largest opposition party in the postwar period, took a somewhat different position than the JCP on both the release of war criminals and the Tokyo Trial. Representing the JSP, Taman Hirofumi supported the release of war criminals “by considering the plight of families of war criminals . . . and especially the fact that many of the Class B and C war
criminals have turned out to be wrongly convicted. Taman did not endorse the release because he rejected the Tokyo Trial, as his conservative counterparts did, but because he felt sympathy for the wrongly convicted Japanese soldiers and their families. From the JSP’s perspective, clemency, reduced sentences, or parole for the wrongly convicted was not meant to absolve Japan of its war crimes. As another JSP member, Ōno Kōichi, put it, “We must express our remorse (kaigo) and repentance (kaihsun) for the mistakes, the atrocities that we committed against people in Asia,” and such remorse and repentance was the precondition for the release of war criminals.

At the same time, the JSP took a critical stance toward the Tokyo Trial. JSP member Furuya Sadao argued that he could never accept the act of prosecuting only Japan’s war crimes, especially when he considered the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, “the most atrocious acts in human history. Since these atrocities have not been prosecuted, we the Japanese people cannot accept the fact that Class B and C war criminals, prosecuted for far less atrocious acts, are still imprisoned.” Another JSP member, Aono Takeichi, went so far as to suggest that the US generals, officers, and pilots should be prosecuted by an international war tribunal for their “inhumane act of atomic-bombing.” In this regard, the JSP was different from the JCP, which uncritically accepted the Tokyo Judgment. The JSP accepted the judgment but explicitly argued that the trial had serious flaws, including the failure to subject the Allied powers to the same standards of criminal justice.

But the position of JSP members also differed from that of conservative politicians. Although members criticized the unfairness of the Tokyo Trial, they did not deny Japan’s war crimes as the conservatives did. Instead of entirely discrediting the trial for failing to prosecute war crimes committed by the Allied powers, JSP members called for a fairer international tribunal that would prosecute war crimes on both sides. The JSP thus occupied a middle ground between conservative politicians and the JCP.

In summary, after Japan regained independence in 1952, roughly two different commemorative positions on the Asia-Pacific War emerged through the debates surrounding the Tokyo Trial. The first, dominant position was taken by conservative politicians who embraced the nationalist logic of commemoration and refused to remember the suffering of foreign victims of Japan’s past aggression. In contrast, the opposition parties, such as the JCP and the JSP, commemorated foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings by
adopting the cosmopolitan logic, though they adopted different positions on the Tokyo Trial. These proponents of cosmopolitan commemoration, however, were outnumbered by the conservatives. The latter seized the political opportunities after SCAP’s reverse course, gained access to the government, and promoted nationalist commemoration by rejecting the Tokyo Trial as invalid and justifying Japan’s past aggression as an act of self-defense.

**Nationalist Commemoration of War Dead**

In addition to the Tokyo Trial, Japanese politicians debated how to provide relief for soldiers who had served in the Japanese military during the Asia-Pacific War. In prewar Japan, the military had enjoyed a privileged position. Originally, the Meiji government had established military pensions in 1875, nine years before it had established less generous pensions for civilian bureaucrats. The military pensions also had been deeply rooted in the logic of nationalism, since they had been called *onkyū*, meaning “bestowed favor” in Japanese. Sacrifices for the nation—ultimately centered on the emperor, the human deity and sovereign—had been defined as worthy and deserving favors from the government. SCAP regarded the military pensions as the mechanism that had facilitated prewar Japan’s militarism, and it suspended them as part of its effort to demilitarize Japanese society.\(^{34}\)

The suspension of the military pensions forced injured veterans and bereaved families into economically dire situations. The number of bereaved family members was particularly large, for about 2.3 million soldiers and civilian personnel in the military had been killed during the war. To ameliorate their worsening economic situations, bereaved families formed associations at the prefecture level and then proceeded to create the Bereaved Families Welfare Association (Izoku Kōsei Renmei) at the national level in November 1947. At first, SCAP hesitated to authorize the establishment of the association because it feared that the association would interfere with demilitarization. SCAP, however, approved the association after stipulating three conditions—namely, that the association should include in its membership bereaved families of civilians who sacrificed their lives for public good; define mutual assistance as its main purpose; and exclude government officials, purgees, and former military personnel from its board of directors.\(^{35}\)

Upon SCAP’s approval, the association proceeded to lobby politicians and the Ministry of Welfare, and both houses of the Diet responded in May
1949 by adopting resolutions that requested the government to provide pensions, condolence money, and social welfare relief for bereaved families. The association also succeeded in electing its president, Nagashima Ginzō, to the House of Councillors in June 1950. At its first national meeting in Tokyo in February 1951, the association adopted a resolution declaring that “we bereaved families are war victims who suffered most. Our family members died in the line of duty for the country (kokka). Naturally, the government should compensate (hoshō) bereaved families.” After the meeting, association members submitted petitions to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and house speakers, requesting pensions and other forms of relief.

In response, Yoshida’s government proposed the Bill on Relief for Injured Veterans and Bereaved Families (Senshōbyōsha Senbotsusha Izoku Engō Hōan) in March 1952. The bill proposed to provide pensions and condolence money for veterans and bereaved families while limiting eligibility to those who had been officially employed by the government. Ōishi Buichi of the ruling Liberal Party explained the spirit of the bill: “It is natural for the government to provide for bereaved families and injured veterans who showed the highest level of patriotism and died for our country, whether war was won or lost.” Put another way, the bill was meant “to give thanks and condolences to those who had sacrificed their lives for Japan during the war.” This justification of the bill, to honor sacrifices for the Japanese nation, departed from the 1949 Diet resolutions that had critically probed the government’s responsibility for injured veterans and emphasized antiwar sentiments among bereaved families.

The JSP opposed the bill for two reasons. First, the JSP argued that “relief” (engo) implied governmental paternalism and should be replaced with “compensation” (hoshō), which included the Chinese character meaning “to atone” (tsugunau), to clearly define fallen soldiers, bereaved families, and injured veterans as victims of the war that the Japanese government had started. Second, the JSP criticized the scope of the proposed pension scheme. The JSP argued that too few funds—about 2.6 percent of the 1952 budget—were allocated to welfare of injured veterans and bereaved families. JSP member Oka Ryōichi cited the example of West Germany, where 24 percent of the 1951 budget had been used to compensate war victims, including civilians, and urged Yoshida’s government to spend the similar amount. Moreover, the JSP suggested that pensions be offered not only to bereaved families of fallen soldiers but also to those of technicians and students who had been killed while mobilized for military-related services.
The JCP raised similar criticisms, but it also went further than the JSP by associating the bill with Japan’s ongoing rearmament. As JCP member Kanda Asano put it, “By limiting the coverage to military personnel that had received direct payment from the government, this bill aims to facilitate Japan’s rearmament. The coverage should be expanded to include all war victims, at least returnees from former colonies, sailors, technicians, mobilized students, female volunteer corps, and those who lost their breadwinners to the atomic bombings.” She also questioned why former colonial subjects, such as Koreans, who had been mobilized for war efforts as Japanese citizens, fell outside the scope of the bill simply because they lost Japanese citizenship after the war. Thus, the opposition parties argued that all war victims, both military and civilian, should be compensated because they had suffered from the wrong war that the government had started.

Yoshida’s government gave the opposition parties a concession: to base the proposed bill on “the spirit of government compensation” (kokka hoshō no seishin), if not “government compensation” per se. The opposition parties still objected, but Yoshida’s government successfully passed the bill in April 1952 and proceeded to submit another bill, proposing to create an additional pension scheme for professional military personnel, including former Class A war criminals. Specifically, the new bill proposed to reinstate the military pensions that SCAP had suspended during the Occupation and to create a two-tiered pension system for two groups of military-related personnel, professional and conscripted. Again, the JSP and the JCP opposed the government’s proposal. JSP member Naruse Banji argued, “The government should compensate all victims of the war in a fair and reasonable fashion. In fact, ordinary citizens suffered most. . . . Professional soldiers were not the only victims. . . . It is extremely hard for me to understand why Class A war criminals, who were responsible for the war, will receive pensions, whereas many other war victims will receive nothing.” JCP member Iwama Masao also criticized the comeback of “militarism” lurking behind the proposed bill, which he argued was “written by those who intend to make Japanese people forget the tragedy of the war and wage another one.” Despite the strong opposition, Yoshida’s government managed to pass the bill in August 1953 as well as extend pension eligibility to bereaved families of war criminals who had been executed or died while serving their sentences.

In the midst of political struggles over war-related relief, the Bereaved Families Welfare Association became the Japan Bereaved Families Association (Nihon Izokukai) in March 1953 and began to promote nationalist
Cross-National Fragmentation, 1945–1964

agendas more explicitly than before. Although the association had previously defined its purpose as “to make efforts to create a peaceful Japan, prevent war, establish perpetual world peace, and therefore contribute to welfare of humankind,” it eliminated these words from its new statement of purpose.\textsuperscript{49} Instead, the association defined one of its principal goals as “to honor war gods” (\textit{eirei no kenshō}) and “memorial services for war dead” (\textit{irei ni kansuru jigyō}).\textsuperscript{50} Thus, having succeeded in restoring material privileges—pensions—for military-related personnel who had died for the nation, the association now aimed to restore a symbolic privilege for the military war dead. To this end, the association began making efforts to rehabilitate the status of the Yasukuni Shrine, the center of nationalist commemoration in prewar Japan.

In prewar Japan, the government-owned Yasukuni Shrine had enshrined fallen soldiers as “war gods” (\textit{eirei}) according to Shintoism: the shrine had functioned as the most sacred site of Japanese nationalism to give ultimate, religious meaning to sacrifices for the nation. The shrine had been not only nationalist but also militarist, because it honored soldiers, not civilians. The shrine’s militarist nature also had manifested in its administrative structure in prewar Japan: army and navy generals had controlled the shrine as agents of Emperor Hirohito, the human deity of Shintoism. Precisely because the Yasukuni Shrine had served as the religious center of prewar Japan’s nationalism and militarism, SCAP eliminated government sponsorship of the Yasukuni and other Shinto shrines in December 1945. This separation of religion and state was confirmed by the new constitution that took effect in May 1947. During the Occupation, prime ministers and imperial family members also suspended their visits to the shrine.\textsuperscript{51} The Yasukuni Shrine was thus stripped of the special status it had enjoyed in prewar Japan.

As soon as the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed, however, Yoshida Shigeru made a prime ministerial visit to the shrine. After the treaty took effect and Japan officially regained independence, Emperor Hirohito also paid his first postwar visit in October 1952, cheered by about three thousand members of bereaved families.\textsuperscript{52} Because of the constitutional separation of religion and state, Yoshida’s government did not try to restore government sponsorship of the Yasukuni Shrine, but it did provide special treatment for the shrine. When annual spring and fall festivals to honor war gods were held at the shrine, the government arranged extra train rides and offered discounted fares to help bereaved families come to Tokyo. The government—the Ministry of Welfare in particular—also
covertly helped Yasukuni priests enshrine war dead by providing the names of fallen soldiers and the times and places of their deaths. Especially after the newly created LDP took control of government in November 1955, the shrine began to enjoy unofficial government sponsorship to a greater extent. In April 1956, for example, the Ministry of Welfare issued a directive to guarantee financial and logistical support for the shrine to identify fallen soldiers and enshrine them as war gods.53

The Ministry of Welfare actively supported the Yasukuni Shrine because it oversaw the Division of Returnees Support (Hikiage Engokyoku), which dealt with issues regarding returnees from abroad, war criminals, bereaved families, and injured veterans. In fact, staff in this division had been recruited from the former Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy. These bureaucrats, many of whom had participated in the administration of the shrine in prewar Japan, were eager to support the shrine, albeit unofficially. They even took the initiative to press Yasukuni priests to enshrine those who had been charged with Class B and C war crimes. In addition, after all war criminals had completed their sentences in Sugamo Prison in March 1959, the Ministry of Welfare sent the shrine “deity enshrinement documents” (saijin meihyō) for deceased Class B and C war criminals. Yasukuni priests then covertly enshrined 346 Class B and Class C war criminals in April 1959.54

Bereaved families also increased their efforts to reinstate government sponsorship for the shrine. In March 1956, the Japan Bereaved Families Association created the Sub-Committee on Government Sponsorship of the Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni Jinja Kokkagoji ni kansuru Shōiinkai). Between 1959 and 1960, the association collected about three million signatures in support of government sponsorship for the shrine and lobbied six prefectural and 345 municipal councils to adopt resolutions endorsing renationalization of the shrine.55 Then, in September 1961, the association submitted petitions to speakers of both houses of the Diet, requesting them to promptly create a government commission to consider reinstating government sponsorship for the shrine.56

Through these lobbying activities, the association strengthened its connections with the government. To begin with, Takahashi Ryūtarō (1953–1961), a former minister in Yoshida’s government, became the first president of the association. Then, in March 1953, the association also obtained the right to use the government’s property, the building near the Yasukuni Shrine that had been reserved for professional soldiers in prewar Japan. The second president, Yasui Seiichirō (1961–1962), was an LDP member, and the third
president, Kaya Okinori (1962–1977), another LDP member, had been prosecuted as a Class A war criminal but later became minister of justice in Ikeda Hayato’s government. Moreover, during Ikeda’s tenure as prime minister, the government resumed awarding decorations to veterans in April 1964 to “offer sincere thanks to those who sacrificed their precious lives for the country and honor their accomplishments.”57 Then, in August 1964, Ikeda’s government held the National Memorial Service inside the property of the Yasukuni Shrine. In the same year, the Association of Diet Members of Bereaved Families (Ikazoku Giin Kyōkai) also adopted a resolution to demand renationalization of the shrine.58

While lobbying politicians with another campaign that accumulated more than six million signatures in 1964, the Japan Bereaved Families Association held its first liaison conference with the Yasukuni Shrine in January 1964, to coordinate their efforts to reinstate government sponsorship for the shrine.59 After the conference, Yasukuni priests submitted a petition for renationalization to the prime minister and speakers of both houses. Thus, from the early 1950s through the mid-1960s, the LDP and the Japan Bereaved Families Association combined their mobilizing structures to consolidate the LDP’s monopoly of the government and promote nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration by honoring Japanese soldiers without regard for the suffering of foreign victims.

Reinserting the Nationalist Logic into Education

After the end of the Occupation, the conservative government also tried to revitalize nationalism in Japanese education. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru criticized the postwar education system because he felt that it failed to “cultivate love of the nation” (aikokushin) and educate young patriots willing to fight for their country.60 Amano Teiyū, minister of education in Yoshida’s government, similarly advocated greater emphasis on patriotism in education on several occasions.61 In essence, these conservative politicians disliked the 1947 Basic Act on Education (Kyōiku Kihonhō), which defined the purpose of Japanese education in predominantly cosmopolitan terms: “We have established the Constitution of Japan and declared our determination to create a democratic and cultured country and contribute to world peace and welfare of humankind. Realization of this ideal depends fundamentally on the power of education. We shall educate human beings who revere the dignity of the individual as well as seek truth and peace ardently while vigorously promoting the creation of universal and unique culture through
education.” Here, the Basic Act on Education promised a significant departure from the prewar education system based on the Imperial Script on Education, which had promoted the education of “imperial subjects [who] in a time of crisis shall bravely and loyally shoulder the divine imperial destiny.”

The conservative attacks on the Basic Act on Education increased after Hatoyama Ichirō became prime minister in December 1954. His minister of education, Kiyose Ichirō, a former defense lawyer for Tōjō Hideki, openly criticized the act, which he felt “connects the individual to the world directly, but it totally lacks a concept of the nation that mediates the two.” Then, in February 1956, Hatoyama’s government submitted to the Diet a bill to set up the Ad Hoc Council on Education to review the postwar education system based on the act by arguing that the education system had been “reformed too rapidly in the peculiar situation under the Occupation and, as a consequence, it is incompatible with the reality [of Japanese society] in more than a few respects.” When explaining the motivation behind the bill, Kiyose stated that he had no problem with moral principles that the basic act promoted, except that “when I read the act, I cannot help wondering, ‘Where on earth does it mention loyalty to our Japanese nation?’”

The bill, however, was heavily criticized by the JSP for “trying to place education under government control.” The bill passed the House of Representatives in March 1956, but it was discarded at the House of Councillors because Hatoyama’s government focused on two other education-related bills during the 1956 Diet session: the Bill on Local Administration of Education (Chihō Kyōiku Gyōsei Hōan) and the Bill on Textbooks (Kyōkasho Hōan). The Bill on Local Administration of Education aimed to replace the Act on Boards of Education that had been created during the Occupation to decentralize and democratize the process of education policy making. Specifically, the bill proposed to replace local election of board members with appointment by municipal heads because the LDP wanted to keep supporters of the JSP and Japan Teachers Union (JTU) from taking control of local boards of education. In April and May 1956, JTU and other education-related NGOs issued joint statements against the bill. In addition, approximately five hundred thousand teachers across Japan cancelled classes to protest what they saw as a regression to prewar Japan’s governmental control of education. In the end, the LDP used its numerical majority in the Diet to push through the bill in June 1956 in the midst of angry cries and fistfights with the JSP and other opposition parties.
Concurrently, the LDP tried to modify the process of textbook inspection with the Bill on Textbooks. The government had monopolized the production of school textbooks in prewar Japan, but the government monopoly was abolished in 1949 and replaced by the government-administered system of textbook inspection. This encouraged teachers to produce textbooks of their own in collaboration with university professors and textbook companies. Under the reformed system, textbook selection also happened at the school level, allowing teachers to participate in the selection process. In early 1955, however, Hatoyama’s Japan Democratic Party (Minshutō) began to criticize textbooks of JTU members by publishing a series of pamphlets, *The Problem of Worrisome Textbooks* (*Ureubeki kyōkasho no mondai*). Then, after the creation of the LDP in November 1955, attacks on “biased textbooks” (*henkō kyōkasho*) culminated in the Bill on Textbooks, which proposed to increase the government’s prerogative in textbook inspection and to authorize a board of education to select textbooks uniformly for schools in its district. The bill was therefore designed to reduce the influence of JTU members in the production and selection of school textbooks.

Given the strong opposition from the JSP and the JTU, Hatoyama’s government gave up the Bill on Textbooks because it judged that passing the Bill on Local Administration of Education was more important. The Ministry of Education nonetheless proceeded to use its budget and discretionary power to expand its staff to conduct textbook inspection within the Textbook Department of the Division of Primary and Secondary Education in late 1956. Then, in July 1957, the ministry issued an administrative directive, declaring that a board of education should have the authority to select textbooks for schools in its district. Moreover, when the Course of Study for elementary and junior high schools was revised in 1958, the ministry made it legally binding to require textbook writers and teachers to conform more closely to the ministry’s curricular guidelines. A board of education was also legally authorized to select textbooks for its district in December 1963 when the LDP succeeded in creating the Act on School Textbooks for Mandatory Education.

The growing governmental control over education affected textbook writers who were critical of Japan’s actions during the Asia-Pacific War. One of these writers was Ienaga Saburō, a history professor at Tokyo University of Education. His struggle with textbook inspection began in 1955, when he submitted his draft high school textbook *New Japanese History* (*Shin nihonshi*) for textbook inspection. Although his draft textbook was
approved, textbook inspectors required Ienaga to respond to a total of 216 suggested revisions: for example, “Replace the sentence ‘the Japanese military occupied Beijing, Nanjing, and Hankou in succession and expanded the battle line across China’ with ‘the battle line expanded across China’”; “Delete the figure with the caption ‘women and children running in confusion in Hiroshima after injured by the atomic bombing’”; “Delete the figure with the caption ‘workers opposing Japan’s rearmament.’”79 After incorporating the majority of the suggested revisions, Ienaga’s draft textbook was approved for use at high schools. But Ienaga had to go through another round of textbook inspection immediately because the Course of Study for high school was revised in 1955. This time his draft textbook did not pass inspection. The Ministry of Education explained the rejection as follows: “Since the author [Ienaga] has too much enthusiasm for critical reflections in light of historical facts, this textbook strays away from the educational objective of Japanese history, to make students recognize the efforts of their ancestors, strengthen their awareness as the Japanese people (nihonjin to shite no jikaku), and cultivate abundant love for the Japanese nation.”80 After learning the reason for the rejection, Ienaga revised and resubmitted his textbook, which was approved in 1959.

With another revision of the Course of Study in 1960, however, Ienaga’s draft textbook was rejected again. After Ienaga revised and resubmitted his textbook, the Ministry of Education approved it on the condition that Ienaga should respond to nearly three hundred suggested revisions. For example, the ministry requested Ienaga to “delete the word ‘hopeless (mubōna)’ from the phrase ‘hopeless war’ because it seems unreasonable to blame Japan alone for the Asia-Pacific War in light of the worldwide situation at the time,” and to “qualify the word ‘war criminals (sensō hanzainin)’ by explaining how the Tokyo Trial was conducted one-sidedly by the victor countries.”81 This prompted Ienaga to file a lawsuit in June 1965. Ienaga and his lawyers did not challenge the required revisions per se but the constitutionality of textbook inspection itself. They argued that textbook inspection violated Articles 13, 23, and 26 of the Japanese Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of scholarly research and education, as well as Article 10 of the Basic Act on Education, which prohibited the government’s “illegitimate control” (futōna shihai) of education.82 Put another way, what came to be known as the Ienaga Textbook Lawsuit questioned the nationalist logic at a fundamental level—namely, the very institutional arrangement that authorized the government to exercise control over the education of citizens and...
promote nationalism in history education. Soon after Ienaga filed a lawsuit against the government, university professors in education and history, schoolteachers, and lawyers met in Tokyo in August 1965 to discuss strategies to support his lawsuit, and they proceeded to create the National Liaison Council for Textbook Inspection Lawsuits (Kyōkasho Kentei Soshō wo Shiensuru Zenkoku Renrakukai). This was the beginning of the long battle that Ienaga and his supporters were to fight in the coming decades.

During this period, then, conservative politicians tried to exploit the political opportunity—their monopoly of the government—to reinsert the logic of nationalism into the postwar education system; however, their success was compromised because the JSP, the JTU, and other opposition parties and NGOs had sufficient mobilizing structures to resist the education-related bills proposed by the conservative government. The opposition emphasized the evils of war in pacifist terms and criticized the government’s education policy as a regression to prewar militarism. To be sure, the opposition failed to stop the government from strengthening its control over education, but it nonetheless succeeded in preserving the Basic Act on Education that institutionalized cosmopolitanism.

Imperfect Cosmopolitan Commemoration in Hiroshima and Nagasaki

In postwar Japan, cosmopolitanism manifested most clearly in the commemoration of the atomic bombings. When people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki began holding peace memorial ceremonies in 1947 and 1948, respectively, they commemorated the atomic bombings as epoch-making events and urged the whole of humanity to strive for world peace in light of the worldwide threat posed by potential nuclear war. The 1947 Peace Declaration of Hiroshima City called out, “Let us eliminate fear and crimes from the earth, so that we can establish genuine peace. Let us realize the ideal of world peace by renouncing war forever.” Similarly, the 1948 Peace Declaration of Nagasaki City promised to “establish eternal peace on earth by pleading to the entire world, ‘No more Nagasaki.’” This cosmopolitan orientation was partly induced by the censorship during the Occupation. Since SCAP did not allow Japanese citizens to criticize the United States for the atomic bombings, A-bomb victims had to use the universalistic language that transcended nationality. This cosmopolitan frame was also facilitated by emerging worldwide antinuclear and peace movements. In March 1950, for example, the World Peace Council released the Stockholm Appeal, which collected more
than five hundred million signatures around the world to demand an absolute ban on nuclear weapons. Japan contributed about 7.4 million signatures, and the A-bomb poet Tōge Sankichi wrote the poem “The Call” (Yobikake) to support the Stockholm Appeal.87

A-bomb victims and their supporters not only commemorated the atomic bombings but also lobbied municipal and national governments. In August 1952, about 250 A-bomb victims in Hiroshima City formed the A-Bomb Victims Association (Genbaku Higaisha no Kai) to request free medical examinations, welfare support, and subsidies for treatment of diseases related to the atomic bombing, among other forms of relief.88 While the Diet debated the Bill on Relief for Injured Veterans and Bereaved Families in 1952, Nitoguri Ikkō, a former speaker of the Hiroshima City Council and chair of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Reconstruction Committee, testified in front of the House of Representatives Welfare Committee. There he requested that committee members consider expanding the scope of the bill to include civilians who had been killed by the atomic bombings while being mobilized for military-related services.89

The JSP supported A-bomb victims most actively. In February 1952, JSP member Oka Ryōichi relayed petitions from Hiroshima to the Diet and urged the government to protect “A-bomb orphans” (genbaku koji), children who had lost their parents to the atomic bombing, “as part of the attempt to reconstruct Japan as a peaceful nation, as the first and only victim of atomic bombs on earth.”90 In April, another JSP member, Aono Buichi, argued that the Bill on Relief for Injured Veterans and Bereaved Families should encompass civilian victims of indiscriminate aerial bombings, especially those who had suffered from the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.91 JSP members regularly chaired the Welfare Committee in the Diet and invited people from Hiroshima to testify about their economic and health situations.

Then, on March 1, 1954, the Lucky Dragon 5 Incident (Daigo Fukuryūmaru Jiken) occurred near Bikini Atoll, where the crew of a Japanese fishing boat was exposed to the fallout of a hydrogen bomb. The crew suffered from acute radiation sickness, and the tuna that they brought back to Japan showed high levels of radiation. The shock of the Lucky Dragon 5 Incident reverberated across Japan to the extent that all forty-six of the country’s prefectural councils passed antinuclear resolutions between March and October 1954. A nationwide campaign to collect signatures against nuclear weapons began in August 1954 and accumulated more than thirty million signatures within a year.92 In response to the nationwide antinuclear
movement, the House of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution
to ban the use of nuclear weapons in April 1954. During the Diet session,
filled with passionate speeches and loud applause, JSP member Kinoshita
Yū endorsed the resolution enthusiastically: “We the Japanese people estab-
lished the so-called ‘peace constitution’ in light of our deep remorse (fukai
hansei) for our past wrongdoings. . . . Since we are also the only people who
experienced atomic bombings, I believe it is our duty to adopt a nuclear-
related resolution of this kind.”

The nationwide antinuclear movement culminated in the World Confer-
ence against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in August 1955. Representa-
tives of fourteen countries and those of forty-six prefectures of Japan attended
the conference in Hiroshima, which opened with testimonies from A-bomb
victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Core participants of the world confer-
ence proceeded to create the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen
Bombs (Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgikai) to continue their antinuclear
campaign and started collecting signatures to request government compen-
sation for A-bomb victims. The second world conference in Nagasaki in
August 1956 adopted a resolution to demand government compensation for
A-bomb victims. After the conference, A-bomb victims created their own
national-level association, the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb
Sufferers Organizations (Nihon Gensuibaku Higaisha Dantai Kyōgikai)
to organize victims across Japan to lobby the Japanese government more
effectively.

To support A-bomb victims, JSP published An Outline of the Bill on
Relief for Patients of A-Bomb Diseases (Genbakushō kanja engōhōan yokō),
proposing to make the government pay for medical treatment of those affected
by the atomic bombings. Similarly, Hiroshima and Nagasaki Cities jointly
proposed a draft bill regarding government relief for A-bomb victims in No-
vember. Then, in early December, the Japan Council against Atomic and
Hydrogen Bombs met with Diet members and submitted a petition to Prime
Minister Hatoyama Ichirō and speakers of both houses, requesting govern-
ment relief for A-bomb victims. These lobbying activities led the JSP and
the LDP to jointly propose a resolution asking the government to provide
medical treatment for A-bomb victims “from a humanitarian standpoint”
(jindōjō no kenchi kara). After the resolution was unanimously adopted
at the House of Representatives, Ishibashi Tanzan’s government proposed the
Bill on Medical Care for A-Bomb Victims (Genshi Bakudan Hibakusha
no Iryōtō ni kansuru Hōritsu) in February 1957. Since the bill had broad
support, it passed both houses quickly and took effect on April 1. The newly created act was to issue “health record books” (hibakusha kenkō techō) for A-bomb victims. Owners of these health record books were designated as “official A-bomb victims” and entitled to free medical checkups twice a year. They were also eligible for free medical treatment fully funded by the government if their symptoms met the criteria of “official A-bomb patients” (nintei kanja). Although the act made the government responsible for providing medical treatment of A-bomb victims, this responsibility was defined as voluntary.

This definition of the government’s responsibility was challenged in April 1955, when a team of lawyers from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai) helped three A-bomb victims file a lawsuit against the Japanese government—the so-called A-Bomb Trial (genbaku saiban) began. Originally, the lawyers tried to seek compensation from the US government, on the grounds that it had violated the Hague Convention prohibiting the use of inhumane weapons; however, the American Bar Association denied any legal basis for such compensation.98 After the lawyers realized that it would be too difficult to pursue a lawsuit against the US government, they decided to target the Japanese government by advancing the following argument: the United States had violated international law by using the inhumane atomic bombs; however, the Japanese government had signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 to renounce all compensation claims, including those of A-Bomb victims, against the United States; thus, the Japanese government should compensate A-bomb victims on behalf of the US government.99

Concurrently with the A-Bomb Trial, the JSP pressed the LDP government to expand relief for A-bomb victims. In November 1959, the JSP submitted a bill to expand the Act on Medical Care for A-Bomb Victims into the Act on Relief for A-Bomb Victims (Genbaku Higaisha Engohō), comparable to the Act on Relief for Injured Veterans and Bereaved Families. Although Kishi Nobusuke’s government refused to provide compensation for A-bomb victims, it agreed to expand the coverage of the existing act for A-bomb victims in July 1960 to subsidize medical treatment of diseases that were not directly related to the atomic bombings, as well as to provide monthly allowances for A-bomb victims during their medical treatment.100
offer compensation for A-bomb victims. They challenged the logic of nationalism in Japan’s compensation policy that recognized only those who had sacrificed their lives for the nation through military service. The opposition’s challenge ultimately failed, however, because the LDP, given its robust mobilizing structures and control of the government, defended the existing compensation policy.

While politicians and NGOs debated government compensation for A-bomb victims, people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki gradually consolidated the cosmopolitan logic of commemoration. In February 1963, four Japanese Buddhist monks embarked on the “Hiroshima-Auschwitz Peace March.” They walked from Hiroshima to Auschwitz and visited twenty-four countries to deliver the message “no more Hiroshima, no more Auschwitz.” In April 1964, forty A-bomb victims also began the “Hiroshima-Nagasaki World Peace Pilgrimage.” They visited a total of 150 cities in eight countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, to appeal for world peace. This universalistic frame of commemoration, however, had one fundamental flaw: it failed to encompass foreign victims who had suffered from Japan’s past wrongdoings. This was a self-serving kind of cosmopolitanism, induced largely by the fact that Japan had no official diplomatic relations with South Korea and China, its two closest neighbors, which had suffered greatly from Japan’s past aggression.

**Postwar Japan’s Relations with South Korea and China**

Japan’s relations with China faced, first of all, the obstacle of Cold War geopolitics. After Japan signed the peace treaty, as well as the bilateral security treaty, with the United States in San Francisco in 1951, the United States demanded that Japan recognize Taiwan as the legitimate China. The US Senate even argued that the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty should be contingent on Japan’s recognition of Taiwan. Given the strong pressure from the United States, Yoshida Shigeru’s government decided to normalize its relations with Taiwan. In turn, Taiwan agreed to renounce its compensation claims against Japan, even though Chiang Kai-shek had initially intended to pursue compensation for war-related damages. In April 1952, Japan and Taiwan signed a peace treaty to normalize their relations, locking Japan into the US Cold War strategy in East Asia.

In response, China’s prime minister Zhou Enlai issued a statement in May 1952, criticizing the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the US-Japan Security Treaty, and the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty. Zhou, however, directed his
criticism against the United States rather than Japan. To be sure, Zhou did criticize the Japanese government for going along with the United States: “After signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Yoshida’s government immediately released eighty-eight diabolic Japanese war criminals whose hands were all tainted with blood of the Chinese people. This shows that reactionary rulers of Japan have no sense of remorse and atonement . . . and plan to resume their imperial rule of China and Asian peoples.” Zhou nonetheless criticized the United States as China’s real enemy by attacking the San Francisco Peace Treaty as the US government’s attempt to rearm Japan and wage a war of aggression against Asian peoples. Zhou also carefully distinguished the Japanese people from the Japanese government, even praised “the Japanese people’s resistance against the illegitimate San Francisco Peace Treaty [and] the imperialist occupation by the United States,” and went on to express “the Chinese people’s unlimited solidarity and enthusiastic support for the Japanese people’s struggle.”

Zhou’s statement illustrated the benign commemorative position that the Chinese government took toward Japan’s past aggression. While condemning prewar Japan’s militarist government, high-ranking government officials in China, most notably Mao Zedong, described ordinary Japanese citizens as victims of militarism. Instead, the Chinese government held the Kuomintang responsible for the Chinese people’s suffering. For the Chinese government, resistance against US dominance in East Asia was more important than commemoration of Japan’s past wrongdoings.

For the Japanese government, in turn, economic relations with China were more important than war commemoration. From the late 1940s through the mid-1950s, Japanese politicians and businessmen created various associations to promote trade with China as a way to boost postwar Japan’s economic development: for example, the Association of Diet Members for the Promotion of Japan-China Trade (Nitchū Bōeki Sokushin Giin Renmei) in 1949, the Japan-China Friendship Association (Nitchū Yūkō Kyōkai) in 1950, the Committee for the Promotion of Japan’s International Trade (Nihon Kokusai Bōeki Sokushin Iinkai) in 1952, and the Union for Japan-China Trade (Nitchū Yushutsunyū Kumiai) in 1955. These efforts resulted in a series of nongovernmental trade agreements with China in the first half of the 1950s, but Japan’s economic relations with China remained limited and fragile. Economic relations between the two countries began to improve only in 1960 when Ikeda Hayato, who was keen to pursue economic development, became prime minister. The Chinese government, too, was
eager to strengthen economic cooperation with Japan since it had suffered substantial economic losses during the Great Leap Forward movement of the late 1950s. China’s relations with the Soviet Union also began to deteriorate around the same time, thus making rapprochement with Japan more desirable for the Chinese government.109

While Japan-China relations were largely confined to the economic dimension, some NGOs in Japan tried to commemorate Japan’s past wrongdoings against China. The Japan-China Friendship Association, for example, commemorated the “misery that the Chinese people suffered from aggressive policies (shinryaku seisaku) of Japanese militarism” and sought “to correct the Japanese people’s mistaken view on China” that had facilitated Japan’s past aggression.110 When Yoshida Shigeru’s government signed the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty, the association also issued a statement criticizing the treaty for “denying Japan’s war responsibility to the Chinese people.”111 Such cosmopolitan commemoration of Chinese victims, however, was rare in Japan at the time.

In the meantime, Japan had more issues with South Korea in terms of war commemoration, even though Japan and South Korea had no official diplomatic relations. Soon after Japan surrendered to the Allied powers in August 1945, Koreans formed associations to demand compensation for their military and labor services during the war from the Japanese government and corporations, and South Korea’s transitional government set up a committee to deal with compensation claims against Japan in August 1947.112 Then, in September 1948, an association of former soldiers and laborers demanded that the Japanese government compensate three billion yen for unpaid military and labor services.113 The South Korean government, headed by Syngman Rhee, a longtime pro-independence nationalist, also submitted to SCAP multiple survey reports on South Korea’s compensation claims against Japan. The amount of total compensation that Rhee’s government demanded exceeded thirty billion yen, covering damages that Korean people had suffered during the war as well as during “Japan’s colonial rule, a coercive act against the will of the Korean people, which violated principles of justice, fairness, and mutual benefits.”114 In addition, Rhee’s government sought to participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference as a member of the Allied powers.

In August 1947, however, the Allied powers decided that South Korea had no compensation claims against Japan and should be satisfied with various facilities and goods that Japan had left behind. (The Japanese
government and citizens had lost ownership of their properties in Japan’s former colonies upon their surrender to the Allied powers.) This decision was coterminous with the increasingly lenient position of United States in regard to Japan’s responsibility for compensating war-related damages: the US government judged that it made more strategic sense to quickly rebuild Japan as its ally in the Cold War, rather than impose a large amount of compensation that would hinder Japan’s reconstruction efforts.\textsuperscript{115}

The Japanese government, too, rejected South Korea’s compensation claims. Japanese returnees from Korea even argued that the Allied powers should compensate them for their confiscated private properties, arguing that such confiscation violated the Hague Conventions.\textsuperscript{116} After Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, these returnees began demanding that the Japanese government should compensate them instead. The logic of their demand was similar to the claim that A-bomb victims made: because the Japanese government had renounced compensation claims against the Allied powers, it should now take responsibility for compensating Japanese returnees from Korea and other former colonies.

Thus, when the Japanese and South Korean governments began the first round of normalization talks in Tokyo in February 1952, they had radically different views on the issue of compensation. While the South Korean side was determined to press its compensation claims, the Japanese side argued that the annexation of Korea had been legal at the time and demanded compensation of confiscated private properties that had belonged to Japanese citizens.\textsuperscript{117} Japan and South Korea could not resolve their differences during the next two rounds of normalization talks. Then, during the third round, one of the Japanese representatives, Kubota Kan’ichirō from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remarked, “Even though I admit there was a negative aspect to Japan’s colonial rule of Korea, it is undeniable that Japan also did good things for Korea.”\textsuperscript{118} This angered the South Korean side, but the Japanese government refused to retract Kubota’s comment. As a result, the normalization talks broke down in 1953.

The normalization talks resumed in 1960, however, when certain key political developments occurred in both South Korea and Japan. In August 1960, Yu Bo Seon became president of South Korea and adopted a new policy toward Japan. Instead of demanding compensation for Japan’s past wrongdoings, the South Korean government began to consider accepting economic aid from Japan in lieu of compensation. The policy shift was prompted by two significant changes in South Korea’s economic situation
in 1957: US economic aid to South Korea began to decrease, and North Korea launched a five-year plan to industrialize its economy. Under these changed conditions, the South Korean government began to view Japan as an important economic partner. This view was consolidated after Park Chung Hee seized control of the government through a military coup in May 1961. In Japan, too, Ikeda Hayato, who became prime minister in July 1960, was eager to stimulate Japan’s economic growth by exporting goods and services to South Korea. In fact, the Japanese government had already begun to develop this economic approach to compensation of war-related damages in the 1950s, when it had negotiated peace treaties with Southeast Asian countries such as Burma, Indonesia, South Vietnam, and the Philippines. The Japanese government provided these countries with “compensation” for Japan’s past wrongdoings in the form of goods and services produced by Japanese corporations.

Moreover, the Cold War escalated in Asia in the early 1960s. North Korea signed a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union and a friendship and mutual assistance treaty with China in 1961. As the United States was increasingly involved in the Vietnam War, it wanted more stable relations between Japan and South Korea, its two allies in East Asia. From the US perspective, Japan’s economic aid to South Korea would not only help the United States financially but also induce South Korea to send its troops to Vietnam. The combined threat of North Korea and pressure from the United States thus moved Japan and South Korea to compromise over the issue of compensation.

During the final stage of normalization talks, the Japanese and South Korean governments agreed that the former should offer grants and soft loans instead of compensation to the latter, and that normalization of their relations should resolve all issues of compensation between the two countries. But opposition parties and university students in South Korea protested against normalization in March 1964. The opposition criticized the terms of normalization for essentially abandoning any demands for apology and compensation from Japan. Protests in Seoul between March 25 and 27 drew forty thousand to sixty thousand participants daily, and university students continued to organize protests until early June, when Park’s government declared a state of emergency to suppress the protests.

Similarly, opposition parties in Japan pressed the LDP government to confront Japan’s past wrongdoings. To be sure, when Minister of Foreign Affairs Shiina Etsusaburō visited South Korea in February 1965 to conclude
negotiation talks, he offered his “deep remorse (fukaku hansei) for the unfortunate period in the long history of the two countries.” But JSP member Hosokako Kanemitsu had already urged Ikeda himself—as prime minister of Japan—to offer an apology to South Korea: “If you want to establish friendly relations with Korea . . . you should first of all apologize. . . . It is not shameful to apologize for the wrongs that Japan committed. In fact, it is shameful not to.” JCP member Kawakami Kan’ichi also demanded that the Japanese government apologize to South Koreans: “It goes without saying that Japan committed all sorts of atrocities to the Korean people over a long period of time—aggression, oppression, extortion, and enslavement. Today, the Japanese government should reflect on its responsibility for these acts, offer an apology to the Korean people, and set an example of righteousness for the Japanese people.” Nevertheless, these criticisms were voiced by only a minority of Japanese politicians. As a result, the Japanese and South Korean governments proceeded to finalize the terms of normalization in Tokyo in December 1964, officially prioritizing economic interests over questions about the past.

After the Asia-Pacific War, Before the History Problem

During the immediate postwar period, the history problem did not really exist. Not only did Japan lack diplomatic relations with South Korea and China, but also discussion of Japan’s past wrongdoings was deliberately suppressed by the governments of the three countries based on their economic interests and political calculations. Furthermore, the United States reversed the course of its policy objectives during the Occupation and allowed Japan to evade its past wrongdoings. The cross-national fragmentation of commemorations and the reverse course thus provided political opportunities for conservative politicians who consolidated their power by creating the LDP and mobilizing support from the Japan Bereaved Families Association and other constituencies. Using their robust mobilizing structures, conservative politicians seized the political opportunities to dominate the government and promoted nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration. As a result, prime ministers engaged in speech and action rejecting the Tokyo Judgment, injured veterans and bereaved families were honored through government compensation, and the textbook-inspection process tried to minimize descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings.

The JSP and the JCP, by contrast, adopted the logic of cosmopolitanism to commemorate foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. Yet, the
opposition parties had weaker mobilizing structures and few political opportunities to inject cosmopolitanism into governmental speech and action, compensation policy, and education, though they did moderate the degree of nationalism that the conservative politicians were able to institutionalize in Japan’s official commemoration. Moreover, while the JSP worked with A-bomb victims, who began to articulate the logic of cosmopolitanism to commemorate all war victims irrespective of nationality, their cosmopolitan commemoration was imperfect, because it failed to encompass foreign victims of Japan’s past aggression. Nevertheless, the imperfect cosmopolitanism that characterized the early commemoration of the atomic bombings was to play an important role in commemorating South Korean and Chinese victims after Japan normalized its relations with South Korea and China in 1965 and 1972, respectively. At the same time, normalization was also to expand Japan’s interactions with South Korea and China in both governmental and nongovernmental arenas, setting in motion the development of the history problem.
On June 22, 1965, the Japanese and South Korean governments signed the Treaty on Basic Relations. The treaty dodged fundamental disagreements over how to interpret past relations between the two countries. First, the two sides agreed to disagree about the interpretation of the treaty’s second article, which read, “All treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void.” The Japanese side interpreted this to mean that the 1910 Japan-Korean Annexation Treaty had previously been valid, only becoming null and void when the Republic of Korea was founded in August 1948, whereas the South Korean side interpreted it to mean that the treaty had been never valid.

Second, both governments evaded Japan’s responsibility for its past wrongdoings when they signed the Compensation and Economic Cooperation Agreement along with the Treaty on Basic Relations. This agreement authorized the Japanese government to substitute economic aid for compensation for the damages that South Koreans had suffered from Japan’s wartime atrocities and colonial rule. With this economic aid, the agreement stated that the “problem concerning property, rights and interests of the two Contracting Parties and their nationals (including juridical persons) . . . is settled completely and finally.”

Opposition parties in Japan continued to criticize the terms of normalization. JSP member Yokomichi Setsuo pointed to the protests in South Korea and accused Satō Eisaku’s government of substituting economic aid for compensation: “If Prime Minister Satō’s government intends to apologize for the damages and pains of thirty-six years of Japan’s colonial rule,
the Korean people might not have opposed the economic aid.”³ Another JSP member, Narazaki Yanosuke, also challenged the government’s interpretation of the treaty’s second article for ignoring the history of the Korean people’s struggle for independence.⁴ Opposition parties in South Korea similarly rejected the second article, since “it provided a basis for requiring the South Korean side to completely renounce its compensation claims . . . and for retrospectively accepting Japan’s imperialism.”⁵

As problematic as the normalization treaty was, it did open doors of interaction between the two countries. Specifically, normalization facilitated the formation of a transnational network of NGOs trying to address the plight of South Korean A-bomb victims.

**Commemorating the Double Tragedy of Colonial Rule and the Atomic Bombings**

South Koreans began to learn about A-bomb victims in March 1965, when a broadcasting station in Seoul reported that there were about two hundred A-bomb victims living in South Korea.⁶ Then, in May, the Korean Residents Union in Japan (Mindan) sent delegates to investigate conditions of South Korean A-bomb victims. While in South Korea, the delegates requested the South Korean government and the Red Cross Society to conduct a comprehensive survey of A-bomb victims. In response, the South Korea Red Cross Society began a survey in August and found at least 426 A-bomb victims.⁷ The media coverage of the survey encouraged South Korean A-bomb victims to form an association to seek relief for their medical and economic conditions. In July 1967, they established the South Korean A-Bomb Victims Association. By the end of the year, a total of 1,857 victims had joined.⁸

First, the association sought medical and economic relief from Park Chung Hee’s government, as well as requesting that the Japanese and US governments provide funds and construction materials for hospitals and rehabilitation centers for South Korean A-bomb victims. Moreover, the association asked the Japanese government, specifically, to compensate the physical damages that its members had suffered from the atomic bombings. The association justified the claim by arguing that South Korean victims “had been taken away by the Japanese imperialists and then struck by the atomic bombings during the forced labor.”⁹

These activities by South Korean A-bomb victims were reported regularly by the Hiroshima-based newspaper *Chūgoku shinbun*. One of Japan’s major national newspapers, *Asahi shinbun*, also published an extensive
report on South Korean A-bomb victims in March 1968. The report presented the victims as embodying the history of Japan’s colonial rule and urged Japanese citizens to “do something about the deep wounds of the atomic bombings that we inflicted on them.” As more and more people in Japan came to learn about A-bomb victims in South Korea, they began to organize relief activities. In December 1967 and August 1968, high school students in Hiroshima and businessmen in Nagasaki, respectively, organized fundraising drives for South Korean A-bomb victims. In August 1968, the National Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons (Kakuheiki Kinshi Heiwa Kensetsu Kokumin Kaigi) also decided to provide relief for South Korean A-bomb victims.

While Japanese citizens began to take action for South Korean A-bomb victims, Japanese A-bomb victims and opposition parties stepped up their efforts to press the Japanese government for compensation. Specifically, the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations argued that the Act on Medical Care for A-Bomb Victims was inadequate because it provided only medical relief. Since A-bomb victims suffered from chronic diseases that often made it difficult for them to hold regular jobs, the confederation demanded that the government provide A-bomb victims with not only medical but also economic relief. In October 1966, the confederation also published a pamphlet that demanded a “relief act” (engobō) for A-bomb victims, comparable to the Act on Relief for Injured Veterans and Bereaved Families.

Satō Eisaku’s government responded by proposing the Bill on Special Measures Concerning A-Bomb Victims (Genshi Bakudan Hibakusha ni tai-suru Tokubetsusochi ni kansuru Hōan) in March 1968, offering monthly allowances for A-bomb victims with certain medical and economic conditions. The government, however, continued to insist that relief for A-bomb victims should be understood as voluntary, and that “compensation” (hoshō) should be offered only to military-related personnel. As Muranaka Toshiaki, an official of the Ministry of Welfare, repeatedly argued, “We think that compensation should be given only to those who had been employed by the government, such as those who served in the military. It is therefore inappropriate to apply the compensation scheme to A-bomb victims who had no employment relations with the government.” While opposition parties criticized the government’s continuing refusal to compensate A-bomb victims, they eventually accepted the bill by adding a resolution to increase allowances in the future. The bill passed the Diet in May 1968. Because it fell
short of providing government compensation, however, Japanese A-bomb victims and opposition parties continued to press the government.

Then, in the late 1960s, the two parallel movements by Japanese and South Korean A-bomb victims began to intersect. First, in October 1968, Japanese police arrested Son Gwi Dal, a female South Korean A-bomb victim who entered Japan illegally to seek medical treatment. The arrest of Son prompted the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations to lobby politicians to allow her to stay in Japan. Son was deported to South Korea in November, but people in Hiroshima formed the Japan-South Korea Council for A-Bomb Victim Relief (Hibakusha Kyūen Nikkan Kyōgikai) in October 1969, invited South Korean A-bomb victims to Japan for medical treatment, and conducted a survey of A-bomb victims in South Korea. In February 1969, the Japan-South Korea Council for A-Bomb Victim Relief also organized a signature-collection campaign requesting the Japanese government to issue health record books to non-Japanese citizens. Then, in May 1969, Motoshima Yuriko, a member of the Democratic Socialist Party—a centrist party created by the former right-wing faction of the JSP—brought up the issue of South Korean A-bomb victims for the first time in the Diet. She suggested that foreign A-bomb victims should be able to receive the same treatment as their Japanese counterparts. Observing these events, Hiraoka Takashi, a Chūgoku shinbun reporter who was to later become a mayor of Hiroshima City, noted in August 1969, “Korean A-bomb victims embody the double tragedy, Japan’s colonial rule and the atomic bombings. . . . Confronting the fact that Japanese A-bomb victims were also perpetrators [from the Korean perspective] shall produce a new philosophy of Hiroshima.”

The movement to support South Korean A-bomb victims accelerated in December 1970 when the police arrested Son Jin Du, another South Korean A-bomb victim who had entered Japan illegally to seek medical treatment. He was imprisoned first but transferred to a hospital after he became ill. While at the hospital, Son applied for a health record book. Although his application was rejected, his Japanese supporters helped him file a lawsuit at the Fukuoka District Court in October 1972 to revoke the rejection. Meanwhile, journalists, university students, and workers in Osaka and Kobe created the Association of Citizens to Support A-Bomb Victims in South Korea (Kankoku no Genbaku Higaisha wo Kyūensuru Shimin no Kai) to provide relief for South Korean A-bomb victims. The National Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons also sent doctors to South Korea to
examine medical conditions of A-bomb victims in September 1971 and created a medical center for A-bomb victims in Hapcheon, South Korea, in December 1973.21

Concurrently, the South Korean A-Bomb Victims Association increased its lobbying activities. In August 1971, the association sent a petition to Prime Minister Satō Eisaku requesting that the Japanese government treat South Korean A-bomb victims as equal to their Japanese counterparts. Then, in August 1972, Shin Yong Su, the association president, met with Deputy Prime Minister Miki Takeo in Tokyo to hand another petition to Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. In the petition, the association demanded that the Japanese government compensate South Korean A-bomb victims because they had suffered from the atomic bombings while they had been “forcibly mobilized by prewar Japan’s imperialism for military service, labor, and voluntary corps, among other activities.”22 Other NGOs in South Korea, especially Christian NGOs, also joined the lobbying activities. Korean Church Women United, for example, began to work with the South Korean A-Bomb Victims Association in spring 1974, after its members had participated in the World Day of Prayer in Hiroshima and learned about the plight of South Korean A-bomb victims.23 Supporting the association’s petition in 1971, Korean Church Women United sent its own petition to Prime Minister Tanaka in July 1974 requesting that the Japanese government provide South Korean A-bomb victims with the same relief being offered to their Japanese counterparts.24 The group also asked its sister organization in Japan to write a similar petition to the prime minister.25

Opposition parties in Japan, too, rallied behind South Korean A-bomb victims. JSP member Ōhara Tōru argued that the Japanese government should provide relief for South Korean A-bomb victims “from a humanitarian standpoint (jindōtekina kantenkara) since Japan had mobilized Koreans, and Japan also had more experience of providing relief and medical treatment for A-bomb victims,” even though he felt that the United States should be held primarily responsible because it had dropped the atomic bombs.26 Kōmeitō member Kashiwabara Yasu made a similar point: “The Japanese government argues that the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and South Korea has resolved all issues regarding compensation. Even if that is legally the case, I think we, as human beings, should do something humanitarian for South Korean A-bomb victims.”27

Then, in March 1974, the Fukuoka District Court ruled that it was illegal to reject Son Jin Du’s application for a health record book since the
Act on Medical Care for A-Bomb Victims had no citizenship or residency requirement. Following the ruling, Shin Yong Su visited Tokyo in July 1974 and applied for a health record book. Tokyo governor Minobe Ryōkichi, known for his liberal orientation, agreed to issue a health record book to Shin. This was the first time a South Korean citizen had obtained a health record book since the 1965 normalization. In March 1978, the Supreme Court also upheld the ruling of the Fukuoka District Court and stated, “The Act on Medical Care for A-Bomb Victims has a characteristic that amounts to government compensation (kokka hoshōteki hairyo) since it aims to provide relief for the exceptional war-related damages [of the atomic bombings] based on responsibility of the government as an actor that carried out the war.”28 Given this ruling, the Japanese government began to issue health record books to foreign A-bomb victims, though it also issued the so-called 402 Directive to invalidate these health record books once their holders left Japan.29

In response to the Supreme Court ruling, the LDP also sent its delegation to meet with members of South Korea’s ruling Democratic Republican Party in July 1978 and began negotiations over the issue of South Korean A-bomb victims. In June 1979, the two ruling parties reached a three-part agreement: Japan should accept South Korean doctors seeking training in the medical treatment of A-bomb victims, send Japanese doctors to South Korea to provide this same training there, and invite South Korean A-bomb victims to Japan for medical treatment.30 When finalizing the agreement in October 1980, however, the Japanese government agreed to honor only the third part of the original agreement, and even then, the South Korean government was expected to cover the costs of sending A-bomb victims to Japan. The agreement was also set to expire in five years.31

Although the 1980 agreement fell short of what South Korean A-bomb victims and their supporters had hoped for, the 1965 normalization treaty stimulated transnational interactions at both governmental and nongovernmental levels. In particular, Japanese and South Korean NGOs formed a transnational network to demand that the Japanese government recognize the suffering of South Korean A-bomb victims. This demand was coupled with a demand for the commemoration of what had brought Koreans to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the first place—Japan’s colonial rule and forced labor for the war effort. Put another way, the mobilizing structures for cosmopolitan commemoration expanded to the transnational scale, while the commemoration of the atomic bombings became more inclusive by
encompassing foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. Thus, A-bomb victims and the opposition parties and NGOs that supported them began to challenge the LDP government to incorporate cosmopolitanism in Japan’s official commemoration. This challenge was reinforced by normalization of Japan’s relations with another important neighbor, China.

The Normalization of Japan-China Relations

Throughout the 1960s, Japan and China made little progress toward normalization because of the Cold War that turned “hot” in Vietnam. The Japanese government allowed the US military to use bases inside Japan to send troops, weapons, and provisions to support South Vietnam, whereas China supported North Vietnam, led by the communist leader Ho Chi Minh. As Japan became more firmly incorporated into the US Cold War strategy in Asia, its relations with China suffered in turn. In November 1964, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, *People’s Daily*, criticized Prime Minister Satō Eisaku for his pro-American and anti-Chinese diplomacy and accused him of conspiring to “control Taiwan as a stepping stone to reach Southeast Asia and reestablish the once debunked ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.’”32 In June 1965, the Chinese government also criticized the normalization treaty between Japan and South Korea by characterizing it as “a strategy of the U.S. imperialism aiming to divide Korea forever, forcibly occupy South Korea, and use Japan and Park’s government to wage an aggressive war.”33

While the Vietnam War continued, more and more governments began to recognize the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate China. Given the worldwide trend to recognize China rather than Taiwan, 379 Diet members in Japan, including members of the LDP, formed the nonpartisan group Diet Members for the Promotion of Japan-China Normalization (Nitchū Kokkō Kaifuku Sokushin Giin Renmei) in December 1970. The JSP also sent its delegation to China in November 1970 and created the National Council for Japan-China Normalization (Nitchū Kokkō Kaifuku Kokumin Kaigi) in February 1971.34 Satō’s government, however, was reluctant to pursue normalization with China because a sizable number of LDP members still supported Taiwan. Satō also rejected the idea of apologizing to China for Japan’s past wrongdoings: “In Japan, some people still feel that Japan has to bow its head to China. But I think those violent and atrocious acts by the Japanese military ceased to matter when the war ended.”35
A breakthrough came in July 1971 when the US government admitted that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had visited Beijing, and announced that President Richard Nixon was scheduled to visit China the following year. In September, the UN General Assembly also voted to recognize China and expel Taiwan. In the midst of rapidly changing international relations, Tanaka Kakuei became the new prime minister on July 7, 1972, and designated normalization with China as one of his highest priorities. Tanaka pursued normalization with China primarily to satisfy the LDP’s constituencies, including businesses eager for China’s huge market potential.36

Prior to the negotiations, the Chinese government had already decided not to pursue compensation from Japan, on condition that the Japanese government expressed remorse for its past wrongdoings. The government’s decision was based on several considerations: China should be as generous as Taiwan, which had renounced its compensation claims in the 1952 Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty; the renunciation of compensation claims should be used as leverage to make Japan recognize China instead of Taiwan; and China should follow Chairman Mao Zedong’s teaching by distinguishing Japanese citizens from the small group of Japanese militarist leaders who had started the war.37 The last point was reiterated by Premier Zhou Enlai during his welcome speech for the Japanese delegation on September 25, 1972.38

At the first round of negotiations the next day, the Japanese side stated that China had no compensation claims against Japan in the first place, as the Taiwanese government had already renounced them in 1952.39 Zhou angrily responded, “We are willing to renounce compensation claims for the sake of friendly relations between the Japanese and Chinese peoples. But we cannot accept your position that the issue of compensation is already resolved because Chiang Kai-shek renounced compensation claims.”40 At the second round of negotiations on the same day, Zhou also criticized Tanaka’s speech at the welcome banquet, where Tanaka had used the expression “Japan caused much inconvenience to China” (tadai no gomeiwaku wo okakeshita) to refer to the Second Sino-Japanese War.41 For Zhou, the expression was too casual to address the “extremely horrendous calamity that the Chinese people suffered from the aggression by the Japanese militarists.”42

In the end, the Japanese government agreed to insert the following sentence in the Joint Communique on September 29, 1972: “The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches
itself (fukaku hanseisuru).” In the Joint Communique, the Japanese government also recognized the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate China. In turn, “in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples,” the Chinese government renounced “its demand for war reparations from Japan.” People’s Daily celebrated the normalization by emphasizing the importance of extending sympathies and goodwill to Japanese citizens who had been victimized by their militarist leaders.

Opposition parties celebrated the normalization as an important step toward peaceful international relations in Asia, but they also criticized the way Tanaka Kakuei’s government dealt with Japan’s past wrongdoings during the normalization negotiations. JSP member Nishiura Kan’ichi argued that Tanaka needed to offer atonement for “the atrocious acts that the Japanese military committed against the Chinese people during the Greater East Asia War . . . especially the Nanjing Massacre, which was comparable to Auschwitz, the enormous atrocious act that Nazi Germany committed against the Jewish people. . . . Do you not think you should express apologies for those atrocities as a premise of the normalization negotiations?”

Kōmeitō member Watanabe Ichirō also emphasized the importance of offering an apology for the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities, for “the Chinese people are extremely angry because the Japanese government has never apologized since the end of the war.”

In fact, prior to the 1972 normalization, Japanese citizens had already begun to publicly discuss Japan’s past wrongdoings in China and elsewhere against the backdrop of the growing anti-Vietnam War sentiments. For example, the most prominent anti-Vietnam War NGO network, Citizen’s League for Peace in Vietnam (Betonamu ni Heiwawo! Shimin Rengo), demanded that Japanese citizens understand their own past as perpetrators and stop victimizing Asian people again through the military alliance with the United States. Perhaps the most important outgrowth of anti-Vietnam War sentiments was a series of articles called “Travels in China” (Chūgoku no tabi) that Honda Katsuichi published in Asahi shinbun in August 1971. Honda was motivated by his earlier experience of reporting the Vietnam War and encouraged by American journalists who had exposed their own military’s atrocities in Vietnam. Based on his fieldwork and interviews, Honda detailed the atrocities committed by the Japanese military against civilians in Manchukuo, Nanjing, and other places.

Around the same time, various eyewitness accounts of the Nanjing Massacre appeared in magazines: to name but a few examples, “Testimo-
nies of Atrocities by Photographers” (Satsuriku no genba wo shōgensuru jūgun kameraman) in Asahi Weekly Entertainment in January 1971, “I Witnessed the ‘Tragedy of Nanjing’” (Watashi wa ano Nankin no Higeki wo mokugekishita) in Circle in November 1971, and “The Cold-Blooded Termination Operation: The Nanjing Massacre” (Reikokuna minagoroshi sakusen: Nankin Daigyakusatsu) in Mainichi Sunday in November 1972.50 In addition to these journalistic accounts, Hora Tomio, a history professor at Waseda University, pioneered academic research on the Nanjing Massacre by publishing The Nanjing Incident (Nankin Jiken) in 1972 and two volumes of primary historical materials in 1973.

Japanese A-bomb victims also joined the growing commemoration of Chinese victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. In July 1970, the Committee for the Commemoration of Chinese Prisoners (Chūgoku jinfuryo Junansha Irei Jikōinkai) in Nagasaki requested that the city government officially commemorate thirty-three Chinese prisoners who had died as the result of the atomic bombing.51 In May 1972, the A-bomb poet Kurihara Sadako also wrote the poem “When We Say ‘Hiroshima’” (Hiroshima to iutoki), which urged Japanese A-bomb victims and citizens to commemorate foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings instead of dwelling on their own victimhood.52 Moreover, in 1974, Maruki Iri and Toshi, A-bomb victims and painters famous for The Pictures of the Atomic Bombing (Genbaku no zu), began to paint The Picture of the Nanjing Massacre, for they felt that “without confronting the war crimes that we, the Japanese people, had committed, our call for peace and pacifism cannot be authentic.”53 These commemorations by Japanese A-bomb victims confirmed that they had begun to transcend the self-serving type of cosmopolitanism. As historian James Orr pointed out, Japanese victim consciousness indeed contained “the desire to identify with Asian victimhood rather than deny it.”54

In the meantime, the Japanese and Chinese governments tried to negotiate a peace and friendship treaty by building on the 1972 Joint Communiqué, but domestic and international political situations interfered. In Japan, Tanaka Kakuei resigned from the post of prime minister in September 1974 after being suspected of receiving illegal monetary contributions from the American aerospace company Lockheed. With the arrest of Tanaka in July 1976, the LDP had to focus on regaining trust from Japanese citizens.55 Around the same time, the Chinese government was going through intense power struggles between Deng Xiaoping and his rivals after the deaths of the two founding fathers, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, in 1976.56
In addition to these domestic political situations, the Japanese and Chinese governments had conflicting diplomatic calculations. The Chinese government proposed to include in a peace and friendship treaty an article to oppose imperialism in the region, trying to counter the threat of the Soviet Union. The Japanese government resisted the Chinese proposal since it did not want to jeopardize negotiations with the Soviet Union over the disputed sovereignty of Kuril/Northern Islands.57

The negotiations finally began to make progress in 1978. Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo had been keen on signing a peace and friendship treaty, and the United States had supported it to contain the threat of the Soviet Union in the region.58 Chinese politics was also stabilized in 1977 when Deng Xiaoping began to consolidate his power, and the Chinese government wanted better relations with Japan, given the escalating tensions with Vietnam and the Soviet Union.59 Although the Japanese government was still reluctant to include an article to oppose imperialism, it decided to compromise with the Chinese government by adding another article to clarify that “this treaty has no bearing on each party’s relations with other countries.”60

The Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in August 1978 was decidedly forward-looking and made no reference to the Asia-Pacific War. People’s Daily celebrated the treaty by calling on the Japanese and Chinese peoples to “maintain friendship for generations to come” and downplayed Japan’s past wrongdoings: “Japan and China are neighboring countries with a long history of friendly exchange. During the first half of this century, a war broke out between the two countries, which inflicted enormous damages to the Chinese people as well as to the Japanese. But, the period of war was such a short time in light of two thousand years of history of relations between the two countries.”61 When Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping came to Japan in October 1978 and met with Emperor Hirohito, he also emphasized the importance of future peace and friendship between the two countries.62

In summary, the Japan-China normalization injected a small degree of cosmopolitanism into Japan’s official commemoration, as “deep reproach” was expressed in the 1972 Joint Communique. This shows that even the LDP, a proponent of nationalist commemoration, could adopt cosmopolitan contrition when doing so was politically opportune. The normalization also prompted Japanese citizens to commemorate Chinese victims of Japan’s wartime atrocities, though it did not transform Japan’s official commemo-
ration significantly because the LDP as well as the Chinese government prioritized geopolitical and economic interests over historical issues.

**Pursuing Government Sponsorship for the Yasukuni Shrine**

While the normalization processes facilitated the commemoration of South Korean and Chinese victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings, the LDP and the Japan Bereaved Families Association continued to work together to defend nationalist commemoration at the Yasukuni Shrine. In February 1966, the Ministry of Welfare sent the Yasukuni Shrine deity-enshrinement documents for the fourteen Class A war criminals. After meeting with officials from the ministry in May 1967, Yasukuni priests decided to enshrine the Class A war criminals. The shrine’s board of directors approved the decision in January 1969, but the ministry and the shrine agreed not to publicize it. Then, in June 1969, the LDP submitted the so-called Yasukuni Shrine Bill (Yasukuni Jinja Hōan) to reinstate government sponsorship for the shrine.

All the opposition parties, however, denounced the bill by arguing that government sponsorship of the Yasukuni Shrine was unconstitutional according to the principle of separation of religion and state. The JSP, for example, condemned the bill as an attempt to “affirm and glorify the imperialist war of aggression under the name of the emperor and designate the Yasukuni Shrine as a place to honor war dead of future wars of aggression. . . . The bill fails to examine Japan’s war responsibility for Asian peoples, who were the worst victims of Japan’s past aggression.” Given the strong criticisms and the tight schedule of the Diet session, the bill was discarded in August 1969, when the session was adjourned for a summer recess. The bill met the same fate when the LDP resubmitted it in 1970, 1971, and 1972.

When the LDP submitted the bill for the fifth time in May 1973, the Japan Bereaved Families Association and the Yasukuni Shrine stepped up their lobbying activities. In March 1974, the association organized a rally near the shrine and demanded that the LDP push through the opposition to pass the bill. Meanwhile, the chief Yasukuni priest, Tsukuba Fujimaro, submitted to Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and speakers of both houses a petition requesting the passage of the bill. The LDP responded by using its numerical dominance to pass the bill at the House of Representatives in May 1974, while all the opposition parties boycotted the vote in protest.

The opposition parties, as well as Buddhist and Christian NGOs, strongly criticized the LDP’s move. The most damaging criticism, however,
came from the House of Representatives Legislation Bureau, which firmly stated that government sponsorship of the Yasukuni Shrine would be unconstitutional unless the shrine changed almost all of its current practices to eliminate religious elements. Furthermore, even though the bill was sent to the House of Councillors, the ongoing session was to be adjourned in fewer than ten days. Given such a short window of opportunity, the LDP could pass the bill only if it completely ignored the opposition parties again. The LDP’s political calculation was complicated by the upcoming election for the House of Councillors. Not only was the LDP reluctant to galvanize supporters of the opposition parties at this time, but also the Diet customarily did not extend deliberation on a bill to the next session when an election was forthcoming.

In the end, the LDP did not try to push the bill through the House of Councillors and, as a result, the bill was discarded in June 1974, for the fifth time. But the LDP still struggled in the July election of the House of Councillors and barely secured the house majority. Besides, the Yasukuni Shrine became reluctant to support the bill because they were worried about the bill’s ramifications: “If the Yasukuni Shrine Act is created according to the House of Representatives Legislation Bureau’s position, the Yasukuni Shrine will surely regress into an amorphous organization devoid of gods and spirits (shinrei fuzai). . . . If we rush and end up enacting a bad law that will destroy the Yasukuni Shrine’s original form, we will regret forever.”

The LDP and the Japan Bereaved Families Association therefore decided to suspend their campaign to reinstate de jure government sponsorship for the shrine. Instead, they decided to pursue de facto government sponsorship in the form of an “official visit” (kōshiki sanpai) to the shrine by a prime minister and, ultimately, by the emperor. Such visits would symbolically mark the shrine as the national memorial to honor war dead for their sacrifices for the Japanese nation. As a first step in this new direction, Prime Minister Miki Takeo visited the shrine on August 15, 1975, the thirtieth anniversary of the Asia-Pacific War’s end. Miki’s visit was significant because it was the first time any prime minister had visited the shrine on this anniversary, the most important day in Japan for commemorating the war. But Miki was careful to state that he visited the shrine as a “private person” (shijin), not as prime minister, in order to avoid potential criticism from opposition parties and non-Shinto religious organizations.

Miki’s cautious approach, however, frustrated some LDP members. Yagi Ichirō, for example, said to Miki, “I believe it is proper for the prime
minister, a representative of the Japanese people, to officially visit Yasukuni for war gods who died for the country. You should pay an open, official visit.” In June 1976, the Japan Bereaved Families Association, the Yasukuni Shrine, and veterans’ groups also formed the Association to Honor War Gods (Eirei ni Kotaeru Kai) to advocate an official visit to the shrine. The association created local branches in all forty-eight prefectures and lobbied prefectural councils to adopt resolutions requesting the government to move toward an official visit. Thirty-seven prefectures and 1,548 municipalities adopted such resolutions. In April 1978, LDP members also created the Council of Diet Members to Honor War Gods (Eirei ni Kotaeru Giin Kyōgikai) to promote an official visit. These efforts finally paid off on August 15, 1978, when Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo visited the shrine with other members of his cabinet and signed the shrine’s guestbook as “Prime Minister.”

Around the same time, the Yasukuni Shrine selected Matsudaira Nagayoshi as new chief priest. Matsudaira was a former navy officer and more nationalistic than his predecessor, Tsukuba Fujimaro, who had been cautious not to implement the 1969 decision to enshrine the fourteen Class A war criminals. Under Matsudaira’s leadership, the shrine finally and covertly enshrined the Class A war criminals as war gods and “martyrs” (junansha) in October 1978. Matsudaira wanted to enshrine the Class A war criminals because he thought that “unless we reject the Tokyo Trial historical view (Tokyo Saiban shikan) that regarded Japan as solely and entirely wrong, we can never reconstruct Japan spiritually.” He also justified the enshrinement by referring to the 1953 reform of the Act on Relief for Injured Veterans and Bereaved Families that had granted pensions to bereaved families of war criminals: “The Tokyo Trial was not based on a valid international law. Then, the Japanese government officially decided to treat those who had been prosecuted as war criminals as the same as other war dead by the domestic law. So, there was no problem in enshrining them.”

The enshrinement of the Class A war criminals was reported by Asahi shinbun in April 1979. Opposition parties responded by demanding that Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi refrain from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. JSP member Yamahana Sadao criticized Ōhira, who was a Christian, by quoting a Christian priest: “The enshrinement of Class A war criminals leads to the denial of war responsibility.” When Ōhira disregarded the opposition and went ahead with his visit, JCP member Yamanaka Ikuko argued, “Your action absolves the Class A war criminals, the leaders of the
aggressive war (shinryaku sensō) that killed tens of millions of people in Japan and Asia. I have to say your action amounts to affirmation of the aggressive war.” Ōhira counterargued that they had to wait for “history to hand its judgment” since there were competing interpretations of the “Greater East Asia War.”

After the enshrinement of the Class A war criminals became public knowledge, Emperor Hirohito stopped visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, though he continued to send his representative (chokushi) to annual festivals. In contrast, Ōhira and members of the Council of Diet Members to Honor War Gods continued to visit the shrine. When Ōhira suddenly died of a heart attack in May 1980, the LDP exploited the public’s sympathy to win a landslide victory in elections of both houses of the Diet. Encouraged by the election results, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō visited the shrine eight times during his tenure between July 1980 and November 1982—the highest frequency of Yasukuni visits among LDP prime ministers. LDP Diet members also launched the Association of Diet Members for Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine Together (Minnade Yasukuni Jinja ni Sanpaisuru Kokkaigiin no Kai) in March 1981, and 197 out of the 259 association members visited the shrine during its annual spring festival in April.

Thus, despite the normalization with South Korea and China, the LDP continued to promote nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration. While the LDP failed to renationalize the Yasukuni Shrine due to the lack of political opportunity, it pursued an official visit to the shrine and reinforced the nationalist logic of commemoration, justifying the Asia-Pacific War as a heroic act of self-defense.

**Growing Tensions between Domestic and International Demands**

In addition to the promotion of the official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, the LDP tried to reduce descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in Japanese history textbooks for junior high and high schools; those descriptions increased throughout the 1970s because Ienaga Saburō had won his case at the Tokyo District Court in July 1970. The LDP began to criticize history textbooks by serializing *Textbooks Today* (*Ima kyōkashowa*) in its official newsletters in January 1980. LDP minister of justice Okuno Seiryō also publicly criticized existing textbooks for their “inadequacy in cultivating love of the country,” and in June 1981, the LDP decided to create a new law that would further strengthen the power of the Ministry of Education to regulate the contents of history textbooks.
These attempts to promote nationalism in education affected the 1982 cycle of textbook inspection for high schools: textbook inspectors recommended that authors of Japanese history textbooks should replace the expression “aggression” (shinryaku) toward China with “advancement” (shinshitsu) and use more conservative terminology to describe the Nanjing Massacre. One of the textbook inspectors, Tokinoya Shigeru, justified the recommendations as follows: “I was troubled by the inconsistency, where the author [Ienaga Saburo] uses ‘aggression’ only to describe Japan’s acts toward China while using ‘advancement’ to describe the Western Powers’ acts toward Asia and China. . . . Since historical interpretations of the Nanjing Massacre became more diverse after Mr. Suzuki Akira’s *A Myth of the Nanjing Massacre* won the Fourth Ōya Souichi Nonfiction Award, the author can no longer assert his interpretation that the Japanese military committed systematic atrocities immediately after occupying Nanjing.”

After the inspection, two out of the ten Japanese history textbooks for high schools adopted the recommendations and replaced “aggression” with “advancement.”

Soon after major Japanese newspapers reported the changes recommended by the Ministry of Education, newspapers and broadcasting stations in South Korea and China began to criticize the Japanese government for trying to distort history. Minister of Education Ogawa Heiji rejected the criticism by stating that inspection of history textbooks was a “domestic issue” and not the concern of foreign countries. But the criticisms from South Korea and China continued. NGOs in South Korea organized meetings and demonstrations against the recommended changes, pressing Chun Doo Hwan’s government to protest. The Chinese government told the Japanese embassy in Beijing that the recommended changes contradicted the spirit of the 1972 Joint Communiqué and the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the two countries. The Chinese government also refused to proceed with Ogawa’s scheduled visit to Beijing.

Suzuki Zenkō’s government initially tried to defend the recommended changes. When JSP member Doi Takako asked whether the government was trying to deny the “obvious historical fact that Japan waged a war of aggression (shinryaku sensō) against China,” Hashimoto Hiroshi from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “We humbly recognize that such a historical view is held by people in China,” and indicated that Japan did not have to adopt the same view. Ogawa also argued, “The nature of the war that Japan waged against China is open to diverse interpretations and judgments. I do
not think it is necessary for the Japanese government to issue a statement officially acknowledging that it was a war of aggression.”97 These attempts to defend the recommended changes were consistent with the LDP’s long-standing rejection of the Tokyo Trial. Explaining why the number of victims of the Nanjing Massacre was removed from the textbooks, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi argued, “Even though the Tokyo Trial stated that 200,000 people were killed in Nanjing, I do not know whether we can establish a historical fact solely based on that statement. History is far more complicated, and it will take us a long time to learn what really happened.”98

International criticism continued, however, and prompted the Japanese government to issue a statement, promising to “listen carefully to the criticisms of the textbooks from South Korea and China, among other countries” and “modify the current textbook inspection criteria so as to promote friendship with neighboring countries in Asia.”99 The Japanese government then incorporated the so-called Article on Neighboring Countries (kinrin shokoku jōkō) into inspection criteria to encourage textbook writers to include descriptions of foreign victims of the Asia-Pacific War.100 As a result, the international criticism abated, and descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in history textbooks increased during the 1980s.101

Frustrated with this sequence of events, the National Council for the Defense of Japan (Nihon wo Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi) announced its plan to produce a new history textbook that could “make children proud of being Japanese” as an alternative to the existing history textbooks marred with “masochistic tendencies.”102 The council then submitted its draft history textbook for high schools, New Japanese History (Shinpen nihonshi), to the 1985–1986 cycle of textbook inspection. This history textbook discussed myths of the imperial family extensively, praised the Imperial Rescript on Education in prewar Japan, and downplayed Japan’s past wrongdoings. The draft textbook stated, for example, “The battle over Nanjing was extremely intense. The Chinese government argues that the Japanese military committed atrocities against the Chinese people at the time. . . . But a controversy exists over truths of the event, and it is yet to be settled.”103 After inspecting the draft textbook, the Ministry of Education required the council to make about eight hundred revisions. After the council completed the required revisions, the ministry provisionally approved the textbook in May 1986.

Again, the Japanese government received strong criticisms from South Korea, China, and other Asian countries. The South Korean and Chinese
governments, in particular, demanded further revisions of *New Japanese History*. In response, the Ministry of Education required the council to go through four additional rounds of revision regarding its descriptions of Japan’s past aggression, wartime atrocities, and colonial rule.  

This action on the ministry’s part pacified the international criticism but also galvanized some LDP members to form the Association for the Nation’s Basic Problems (Kokka Kihon Mondai Dōshikai) in August 1986. Association members criticized the government for accommodating foreign demands and argued, “Interpretations of history differ across countries. . . . By demanding changes in Japanese history textbooks, China and South Korea are interfering with Japan’s domestic affairs.”

In spite of the controversy over history textbooks in the 1980s, the LDP stepped up its effort to legitimate an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. The Council of Diet Members to Honor War Gods, the Association of Diet Members for Bereaved Families, and the Association of Diet Members for Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine Together joined forces to press Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro to officially visit the shrine. While Nakasone visited the shrine on annual festivals as well as on the anniversary of the Asia-Pacific War’s end, he was careful not to refer to his visits as “official” and avoided spending government funds to pay visit-related expenses.

To finally make an official visit on the fortieth anniversary of the war’s end, Nakasone created the Commission on Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Cabinet Members (Kakuryō no Yasukuni Jinja Sanpai Mondai ni kansuru Kondankai) in August 1984. The commission published its final report on August 9, 1985, concluding that an official visit was possible within the framework of the constitution. In addition, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujinami Takao issued a statement on August 14, explaining that Prime Minister Nakasone’s official visit should not be interpreted as validating Japan’s past aggression; on the contrary, Fujinami argued, “We are deeply aware that we caused great pains and damages to many people in the world, especially in Asia. Our determination not to repeat such an act . . . guides our official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. We will continue to make efforts to help other countries understand the intention of our official visit, to honor war dead and pray for world peace.”

Despite these efforts to preempt international criticism, the Chinese government still warned of possible consequences of Nakasone’s planned visit: “If Prime Minister Nakasone and other cabinet members visit the Yasukuni Shrine, their act will harm feelings of people around the world,
especially Chinese and Japanese people who suffered greatly from militarism, for the shrine honors war criminals like Tōjō Hideki.” Nakasone proceeded with his visit on August 15. As Japan’s prime minister, he used government funds to pay offerings for the first time. After his visit, Nakasone held a press conference and stated, “Of course, it was an official visit. I am convinced that the majority of Japanese citizens support a prime minister’s official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. . . . My visit will never resurrect prewar militarism, extreme nationalism, and national Shintoism. I will make efforts to help foreign countries understand the true intention of my visit.”

Galvanized by Nakasone’s action, university students in Beijing protested against “Japanese militarism” and “visits to the Yasukuni Shrine” on September 18, the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden Incident. Protests spread to other major cities and continued until October. Opposition parties in Japan also strongly criticized Nakasone’s official visit. JSP member Doi Takako spearheaded the criticism as follows: “In the past, Japan inflicted enormous damages on China and the whole of Asia. Victim countries will never forget it. So, what will they think of an official visit to the shrine that honors those who were prosecuted and punished as war criminals?” In November and December, Japanese bereaved families critical of Nakasone’s official visit also filed lawsuits arguing that his official visit had violated the constitutional separation of religion and state.

While exploring how Nakasone could continue his official visit without incurring international and domestic criticism, some LDP members considered the possibility of removing the Class A war criminals from the shrine. For example, Itagaki Tadashi, an LDP member and son of Itagaki Seishirō—one of the seven executed Class A war criminals—tried to contact bereaved families of the other Class A war criminals, hoping that they might agree to remove their family members from the Yasukuni Shrine. When Itagaki talked to Tōjō Teruo, a son of Tōjō Hideki, in November 1985, however, the latter argued that such a move would mean accepting the “victor’s justice” of the Tokyo Trial and, thus, he could not allow it for the sake of his father. Yasukuni priests also categorically rejected the possibility of removing the Class A war criminals on religious grounds, insisting it was “impossible to remove a person who has been already enshrined as a god.”

In the end, Nakasone decided not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine again. To explain the decision, Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotōda Masaharu issued
a statement on August 14, 1986: “Since the Yasukuni Shrine honors the so-called ‘Class A war criminals,’ the last year’s official visit drew criticisms from people in neighboring countries who had suffered enormous pains and damages from acts of our country in the past. This will risk causing misunderstandings and distrust between Japan and neighboring countries... and will not serve our national interests and, ultimately, the wish of war dead, to promote friendship with other peoples.”

By the mid-1980s, then, the Japanese government had to negotiate the opposing demands: that is, South Korean and Chinese calls to commemorate how they had suffered from Japan’s past wrongdoings, and nationalist insistence inside Japan that the government reject such foreign demands. As a result, even though the LDP had sufficient mobilizing structures and controlled the government, its attempt to strengthen nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration—through prime ministers’ actions and history education—did not succeed. In fact, thanks to the international pressure, Japan’s official commemoration became less nationalist, in that a prime ministerial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine was suspended. Instead, it became more cosmopolitan because the government introduced the new textbook-inspection criterion to increase descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in history textbooks.

New Developments in Japan’s Relations with South Korea and China

Notwithstanding the controversies over Japanese history textbooks and the Yasukuni Shrine, Japan’s relations with South Korea and China continued to develop. In January 1983, Nakasone Yasuhiro visited South Korea as soon as he was appointed prime minister, because he wanted to underscore the importance of Asia for Japan’s diplomacy. Nakasone also succeeded in inviting South Korean president Chun Doo Hwan to Japan in September 1984—the first time any South Korean president had visited Japan. At the welcome dinner party for Chun, Nakasone expressed his “deep regret” (fukai ikan) for “serious damages that Japan inflicted on your country and people” and stated Japan’s determination not to repeat the past wrongdoings. Similarly, Emperor Hirohito expressed his “regret (ikan) for the unfortunate past” between the two countries.

Around the same time, Japanese and South Korean NGOs continued to cooperate in pressing the Japanese government to offer relief for South Korean A-bomb victims. Japanese NGOs formed the Hiroshima Committee for Providing Medical Treatment for South Korean A-Bomb Victims in
Japan (Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryo Hiroshima Jikkoiinkai) in August 1984 to raise money for South Korean A-bomb victims to travel to Japan and stay in hospitals for an indefinite period for medical treatment. The South Korean A-Bomb Victims Association and its Japanese supporters also contacted the Human-Rights Protection Committee of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations in April 1986 and requested the federation's help in lobbying the Japanese government. After the federation conducted an investigation in South Korea, it submitted a report to Nakasone’s government, requesting the extension of the 1980 agreement, wherein the Japanese government had promised to invite South Korean A-bomb victims for medical treatment in Japan.

The transnational network of NGOs, however, could not change the Japanese government’s position. The 1980 agreement expired in 1985, and the Japanese government took no further action to address the situation of South Korean A-bomb victims. To mobilize more support for South Korean A-bomb victims, Japanese NGOs organized a two-day symposium, to which they invited Shin Yong Su and two other A-bomb victims from South Korea. At the symposium, South Korean A-bomb victims, Japanese journalists, and representatives of major Japanese NGOs supporting A-bomb victims gave presentations and exchanged opinions. At the end of the symposium, the participants adopted a joint resolution to press the Japanese government to take appropriate action for South Korean A-bomb victims: “When we think about Japan’s ‘negative history (fu no rekishi)’ vis-à-vis the ‘Hiroshima-Nagasaki’ experience, we cannot but feel the great weight of our task as Japanese citizens. . . . This problem [of South Korean A-bomb victims] is a very serious one—part of ‘unfulfilled responsibility for the war’—that the Japanese government must resolve as soon as possible.”

After the symposium, the Japanese participants created the Citizen Council for South Korean A-Bomb Victims (Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai Shimin Kaigi) to help South Korean A-bomb victims obtain compensation from the Japanese government. Along with these NGOs, opposition parties also rallied behind South Korean A-bomb victims and demanded that the Japanese government resume medical treatment of South Korean A-bomb victims at Japanese hospitals.

In addition to the A-bomb victims, there were many other victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings in South Korea, and they had been dissatisfied with the way both the Japanese and South Korean governments had dealt with the issue of compensation. After the 1965 normalization, Park Chun Hee’s
government created a law in January 1971 to provide compensation for those who had lost financial assets, as well as for military-related personnel who had died during the war; however, this compensation scheme excluded injured veterans, bereaved families, and other types of war victims. Moreover, while Park’s government had created a committee to process compensation claims by eligible South Korean citizens, the procedure had been not only complicated but also short-lived, as it was effective for only eleven months. After all, Park’s government spent less than 6 percent of the three hundred million US dollars that it had received from the Japanese government in lieu of compensation for war-related damages. To protest against the narrow coverage and limited amount of compensations, South Korean war victims formed the Association of South Korean Victims and Bereaved Families of the Pacific War in April 1973 and lobbied Park’s government to expand the compensation scheme.

This discontent among South Korean victims intersected with growing nationalistic sentiments from both below and above. From below, as sociologist Shin Gi-Wook pointed out, the democratization movement in the 1980s drew on the ethnic-nationalist concept of the “Korean people” in order to articulate its democratic, popular demands against military dictatorship. South Korea’s economic success and hosting of the 1988 Summer Olympics also stimulated national pride. From above, Chun Doo Hwan’s government significantly revised its official history textbook in 1982 to include extensive descriptions of the Korean independence movement and resistance against Japan’s colonial rule. This new history education aimed to emphasize the legitimacy of the current government as a culmination of the long struggle of the Korean people, appeal to ethnic-nationalist sentiments among citizens, and deflect the discontent in the contentious civil society. As part of this legitimation effort, Chun’s government also began the construction of the Independence Hall of Korea in anticipation of the fortieth anniversary of the country’s liberation: completed in 1987, the hall commemorated the history of the Korean nation by highlighting the brutalities of Japan’s colonial rule and wartime atrocities vis-à-vis the heroism of the Korean resistance. On the forty-first anniversary of liberation in August 1986, Chun also delivered a speech stating, “We still cannot calm our anger at the past aggression by Japanese imperialism. The foreign oppression not only gave us our greatest pain and shame but also became the root cause of our divided nation.”

Similarly, relations between Japan and China were characterized by the growth of positive interactions in conjunction with the surge of nationalist
commemoration in China. On the one hand, once the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was ratified in 1978, the bilateral relations made rapid progress. In December 1979, Prime Minister Ōhira Masahiro visited China and announced the Japanese government’s plan to provide China with official development aid (ODA), a total of 330.9 billion yen, to help finance China’s developmental projects between 1979 and 1984. Ōhira’s visit was reciprocated by Hua Guofeng’s visit to Japan in May 1980, the first such visit by any Chinese premier. The Japanese and Chinese governments also signed a series of agreements on steel mills, fisheries, natural resources, infrastructures, and soft loans to facilitate the development of the Chinese economy.

In addition, more and more municipalities in Japan and China began to sign friendship agreements to facilitate civic exchanges. Between 1978 and 1988, the number of sister-city agreements increased from two to 115, including Tokyo-Beijing and Hiroshima-Chongqing. Along with municipal-level interactions, cultural and educational exchanges were promoted based on the Agreement for the Promotion of Cultural Exchange in December 1979 and the Agreement for Cooperation in Science and Technology in May 1980. Given these agreements, Japanese and Chinese sports teams competed at friendly matches, museums loaned artifacts to each other, and exchange programs for students and researchers were established—in the name of the promotion of friendship and mutual understanding between the two countries.

On the other hand, the Chinese government started “patriotic education” in the early 1980s, as the country was going through significant social changes. The Cultural Revolution had caused the Chinese people’s trust in the Chinese Communist Party to decline. Then, Deng Xiaoping took over the party leadership and began to implement economic reforms. But the economic reforms that introduced market principles into China undermined existing economic and social structures, creating a greater desire among people for a Western-style liberal democracy, especially university students. To contain these destabilizing consequences of the Cultural Revolution and economic reforms, the Chinese government tried to strengthen people’s loyalty to the party. In 1981, People’s Daily began to publish a number of articles about various patriotic educational programs across the country and, in July 1982, called for a nationwide campaign for patriotic education in the article, titled “Love the Communist Party of China, Love the Socialist Fatherland, Love the People’s Liberation Army.” Deng’s gov-
ernment also expanded on its assertive response to Japanese history textbooks in 1982 and recommended that patriotic education should be strengthened.\footnote{134}

Moreover, the Chinese government constructed the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, the Museum of the Criminal Evidence of Unit 731 Bacteria Troop, and other museums across China in 1985 in order to commemorate Chinese victims of Japan’s past aggression and celebrate China’s victory over Japan on the fortieth anniversary. The growing commemoration of Japan’s past wrongdoings departed from the earlier, more benign commemorative position of the Chinese government. This change reflected the government’s decision to designate reunification of China as one of its main policy goals in January 1980. Accordingly, China’s official commemoration shifted the blame for the suffering of the Chinese people from the Kuomintang to Japan.\footnote{135} Moreover, the government significantly increased descriptions of Japan’s wartime atrocities, especially the Nanjing Massacre, in national history textbooks in 1986.\footnote{136} Then, to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese government opened the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression near Marco Polo Bridge in July 1987.

Concurrently, the Chinese government began to support public commemorations of the Nanjing Massacre and Japan’s wartime atrocities.\footnote{137} During the early 1960s, historians at Nanjing University, given the strong interest among local residents, had already conducted two years of interviews with survivors of the massacre and produced a document.\footnote{138} The Chinese government, however, had not allowed the document to be published, not only because the government’s commemorative position toward Japan was benign, but also because the government was unwilling to revisit the history of a weak China humiliated by foreign powers.\footnote{139} But in the 1980s, government research institutions collaborated with history professors in Nanjing to organize scattered historical materials in local and national archives, and they produced a series of publications on the Nanjing Massacre.\footnote{140} With regard to other wartime atrocities, too, scholars, museum curators, writers, and journalists across China began to conduct and publicize their historical research along the lines of the Chinese government’s official commemoration.\footnote{141} Thus, under Deng’s leadership, the Chinese government began to direct public commemorations of the Asia-Pacific War to garner popular support for the Communist Party as a savior of the Chinese people from the Japanese aggressors.
The Beginning of the History Problem

During the period between 1965 and 1988, Japan’s official commemoration came to adopt the cosmopolitan logic in a limited way. Japanese prime ministers expressed “deep regret” and “reproach” for Japan’s past wrongdoings against South Korea and China. The compensation policy for A-bomb victims was partially extended to South Koreans. Descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in history textbooks also increased, and the textbook-inspection criteria were modified to take into account foreign perspectives. These small changes were driven primarily by transnational interactions: the Japanese prime ministers’ contrite speech acts took place when meeting with leaders of the South Korean and Chinese governments, and criticisms from South Korea and China prompted the changes in Japanese history textbooks. Similarly, the compensation policy for A-bomb victims was initiated by Japanese and South Korean NGOs supporting South Korean A-bomb victims.

These changes remained small because the mobilizing structures of cosmopolitan commemoration, including the JSP and NGOs affiliated with A-bomb victims, were much weaker than their nationalist counterparts. Although the proponents of cosmopolitan commemoration succeeded in stopping the Yasukuni Shrine from being renationalized, they were unable to make Japan’s official commemoration decisively more cosmopolitan because they lacked direct access to the government. The LDP, backed by the Japan Bereaved Families Association and other conservative NGOs, continued to single-handedly control the government and defend the nationalist logic of commemoration, rejecting the Tokyo Judgment. Nevertheless, these small changes demonstrated influences of transnational interactions on Japan’s official commemoration. Despite its robust mobilizing structures and political dominance, the LDP government—a defender of nationalist commemoration—had to incorporate cosmopolitanism into Japan’s official commemoration. Put another way, the transnational interactions added an international dimension to political opportunities, constraining the LDP government’s attempt to maintain its nationalist commemoration.

Most significant changes during this period, however, happened at the subterranean level rather than at the official level. Japanese A-bomb victims and affiliated NGOs began to articulate the cosmopolitan logic of commemoration more forcefully than before by encompassing foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. Concurrently, nationalistic sentiments began to develop in South Korea and China, partly engineered by the govern-
ments and partly springing up spontaneously from citizens. This growth of nationalism in the two countries fed into, as well as was fed by, their commemorations of Japan’s past aggression, wartime atrocities, and colonial rule. These subterranean changes did not yet influence Japan’s official commemoration, but they were ready to galvanize the history problem in East Asia. At this juncture, two historic events happened that changed the dynamic of the history problem at both domestic and international levels: the death of Emperor Hirohito and the end of the Cold War.
Emperor Hirohito became seriously ill in September 1988, prompting television programs and newspapers to report his condition daily, including changes in his temperature and pulse. When the emperor fell into critical condition on January 7, 1989, all the broadcasting stations in Japan began airing special programs on the history of “Shōwa,” his reign since 1928. The special media coverage continued through January 8 when the emperor died.

Ever since SCAP and Japanese leaders had shielded the emperor from prosecution at the Tokyo Trial, it had been taboo to openly question his responsibility for the Asia-Pacific War. The special programs that aired between January 7 and 8, too, focused on positive aspects of the emperor’s reign. Nevertheless, the emperor’s imminent death had prompted a small number of Japanese citizens to critically revisit the Shōwa period. In 1988, NGOs across Japan organized symposiums and seminars to explore the emperor’s war responsibility. These NGOs included pacifists critical of the emperor’s role in the war, activists who questioned Japanese mass media for emphasizing positive aspects of the emperor’s reign, as well as Christians who feared that funeral ceremonies following the emperor’s death would marginalize non-Shinto religious minorities in Japan.¹

Among these critical voices, one in Nagasaki City stirred a nationwide controversy. At the Nagasaki City Council in December 1988, JCP member Shibata Sunao asked LDP mayor Motoshima Hitoshi, “Do you think we could have avoided the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki if the emperor had decided to end the war sooner?” In his response, Motoshima acknowledged that the emperor could have done so and stated, “In light of
my experience of serving in the military and involving in military education, I think the emperor shares war responsibility (sensō sekinin).” Moto-shima’s statement infuriated his fellow LDP members and right-wing organizations. The LDP Nagasaki Prefectural Association immediately demanded that Motoshima retract his statement. Members of right-wing organizations also came to Nagasaki City Hall en masse, used loud speakers to denounce Motoshima, and sent him several death threats.

Yet, Motoshima maintained his position. After barely surviving an assassination attempt, he spoke at the 1990 Peace Memorial Ceremony and called for “apologies” (shazai) to “Korean and Chinese people who were forcibly taken to Japan, treated inhumanely under Japan’s brutal colonial rule, and killed by the atomic bomb.” This was the first time either Nagasaki or Hiroshima City had officially commemorated foreign A-bomb victims in relation to Japan’s past wrongdoings. In August 1991, Hiraoka Takashi, a former Chūgoku shinbun reporter newly elected as Hiroshima City mayor, followed Motoshima’s example and stated, “Japan caused enormous sufferings and sorrows among people in Asia-Pacific through its colonial rule and war. We are sorry for it (moushiwakenaku omou).” In his 1991 peace declaration, Motoshima went further to commemorate Japan’s past wrongdoings in greater detail: “Our country had forcefully annexed Korea, waged the Fifteen-Year War in China, and fought the Pacific War that led to the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and, eventually, Japan’s defeat. We must reflect on these wars with the feeling of remorse from the bottom of our heart. We must also pray for both Japanese and foreign victims and think about how we can offer atonement.”

Importantly, it was not only the critically minded mayors, Hiraoka and Motoshima, who transformed the official commemoration of the atomic bombings. The transformation was also prompted by residents in the two cities that had participated in the transnational network to demand that the Japanese government commemorate South Korean and Chinese victims. Such demand was intensifying as the fiftieth anniversary of the Asia-Pacific War’s end approached. For example, NGOs supporting A-bomb victims organized multiple symposiums on Japan’s past wrongdoings in Hiroshima in summer 1990, one year after the emperor’s death. One of the symposiums was hosted by the Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikin) affiliated with the JSP. At the symposium, Iwamatsu Shigetoshi, a Japanese A-bomb victim from Nagasaki, bowed his head and offered a “deep apology”
(fukai owabi) to foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. He explained that he had come to realize that “without thorough self-criticism of Japan’s atrocious crime, the invasion of the Asia-Pacific, our antinuclear movement would be a sham.”

The death of the emperor thus reinforced the commemorations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki that tried to atone for Japan’s past wrongdoings. At the same time, these cosmopolitan commemorations of foreign victims were stimulated by the end of the Cold War that created the optimistic atmosphere for greater international cooperation as well as complicated Japan’s relations with South Korea and China.

The Changing Structure of International Political Opportunities

Prior to the end of the Cold War, the Japanese government had tried to strengthen Japan’s position in world politics, given its growing economic power. In this regard, Nakasone Yasuhiro’s contrite gestures toward South Korea and China—the expression of “deep regret” and the suspension of a prime ministerial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine—had been motivated by his nationalist ambition to remove the history problem as an obstacle preventing Japan from becoming a regional leader.

Continuing the effort to increase Japan’s international influence, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki showed further contrition when South Korean president Roh Tae Woo visited Japan in May 1990: “By sincerely reflecting on the fact that people in Korea experienced enormous sufferings and sorrows because of our country’s acts during a certain period of the past, I would like to clearly express my apology (owabi no kimochi).” Kaifu’s word choice suggested a more explicit acknowledgment of Japan’s past wrongdoings than his predecessors. Prime Minister Nakasone and Emperor Hirohito, for example, had used only the word “regret” (ikan) during President Chun Doo Hwan’s visit to Japan in September 1984. During the summit meeting, Kaifu also promised to offer four billion Japanese yen to subsidize medical treatment for South Korean A-bomb victims as well as to assist with the construction of a medical center for A-bomb victims in South Korea.

Kaifu’s government found another opportunity to raise Japan’s international standing in August 1990 when the Iraqi military invaded Kuwait. While the UN Security Council condemned Iraq’s aggression and imposed economic sanctions, Iraq continued to occupy Kuwait. In response, the United States deployed its troops into Saudi Arabia and called for a coalition force to drive Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. The United States first re-
quested that the Japanese government provide financial support for the UN coalition force and deploy the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). But the majority of Japanese citizens did not support sending troops overseas because Article 9 of the constitution, renouncing war as a sovereign right, had become integral to postwar Japanese identity as a pacifist nation. Many LDP members, too, were unsure about overseas deployment of the SDF because of the constitutional restrictions. Kaifu’s government therefore decided not to send the SDF but to offer 13.5 billion dollars to support operations of the coalition force.

This prompted the United States and the UN coalition force to criticize Japan for trying to buy out the lives of its troops. This international criticism shocked LDP members, who had opposed the SDF’s overseas deployment on constitutional grounds. Since LDP members feared that Japan would lose its international standing, they eagerly sought a way to authorize the SDF to join peacekeeping operations after the Gulf War. In October 1990, Kaifu’s government submitted to the Diet the Bill on Cooperation for the UN Peacekeeping Operations, also known as the PKO Bill, to authorize the SDF to join UN peacekeeping operations outside Japan.

The JSP and the JCP denounced the bill as a violation of the constitution. The LDP was unable to overcome the determined opposition because it had lost the majority in the House of Councillors during the 1989 election. Instead of creating a new law, Kaifu’s government decided to rely on the existing law and authorized the SDF to be deployed to the Gulf region in April 1991. This action drew strong criticism not only from the opposition parties and antiwar NGOs in Japan, but also from other Asian countries along the route that the SDF had to take to arrive in the Gulf region. Indeed, the year 1991 marked the fiftieth anniversary of Japan’s attacks on the Allied powers in Southeast Asia and on Pearl Harbor. To pacify criticisms from abroad, Kaifu visited member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from late April through early May. In Singapore, Kaifu gave a speech, expressing his “strong feeling of remorse (kibishiku hansei) for our country’s act that caused unbearable suffering and grief among many people in the Asia-Pacific region.” Prime Minister of Singapore Goh Chok Tong, however, expressed his concern about the growing role of Japan in the region. Former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew also argued that many people in Asia did not want Japan to join peacekeeping operations because allowing the overseas deployment of the SDF was “like
giving a chocolate filled with whisky to an alcoholic”—that is, like giving more military power to a country unapologetic for its past wrongdoings.\textsuperscript{15} In addition, though acknowledging Japan’s effort to join international peacekeeping, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry expressed concerns, given Korean people’s “tragic experience [of Japan’s aggression] in the past.”\textsuperscript{16}

Despite these criticisms, the Japanese government proceeded to deploy the SDF to the Gulf region and tried again to pass the PKO Bill in 1992, when the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia was established to manage a transition from civil war to democracy. Since peacekeeping operations in Cambodia were unlikely to involve combat, Kōmeitō and the Democratic Socialist Party, though previously opposed to the 1990 PKO Bill, agreed to support the LDP this time. The other opposition parties, however, continued to criticize the bill. JSP member Itō Masatoshi faulted the LDP government, now headed by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, for having offered “neither apologies nor compensation for people that Japan victimized through its colonial rule and war of aggression. Such a country sending troops abroad is unacceptable for international society, which includes Asian peoples.”\textsuperscript{17} JCP member Kodama Kenji similarly criticized Miyazawa’s government for “sending our country’s troops to Asia again, even though the Japanese government has not apologized for the war of aggression or resolved postwar disputes.”\textsuperscript{18} In the end, the PKO Bill was passed in June 1992 with the support from Kōmeitō and the Democratic Socialist Party.

The controversy surrounding the PKO Bill showed that the structure of political opportunities had changed in the post–Cold War period since it increasingly acquired an international dimension. In the immediate aftermath of the Asia-Pacific War, conservative politicians in power had been able to promote nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration without worrying about reactions from abroad. This had begun to change after the normalization of Japan’s relations with South Korea and China, and the end of the Cold War accelerated the internationalization of political opportunities. The LDP thus faced a difficult dilemma: if it wanted to boost national pride by raising Japan’s international standing through peacekeeping operations and other means, it had to make more contrite, cosmopolitan gestures toward other countries or at least tone down its nationalism. This dilemma deepened when “comfort women” (ianfu) became a diplomatic issue with South Korea in the midst of the national debate on the SDF’s overseas deployment.
The “Comfort Women” Controversy between Japan and South Korea

“Comfort women” were those who had provided “sexual services” to the Japanese military during the Asia-Pacific War. The military originally had set up “comfort stations” (ianjo) to prevent Japanese soldiers from raping Chinese women and contracting sexually transmitted diseases. The military had entrusted private contractors to recruit comfort women and manage comfort stations. Comfort women had been recruited from both Japan and its colonies, such as Korea and Taiwan. Some women had agreed to work at comfort stations, whereas others had been forced by deception or coercion. After Japan had started war with the Allied powers in December 1941 and occupied Southeast Asia, the military had increased its involvement in recruitment, with methods that became increasingly coercive. By 1942, about four hundred comfort stations had been set up across Asia.19

Comfort women first became widely known in South Korea in January 1990, when Yun Jeong Ok, an English professor at Ewha Womans University, serialized her reports in the newspaper The Hankyoreh. Then, in October, a total of thirty-seven women’s associations, including Korean Church Women United, submitted a petition to the Japanese government. In their petition, the associations demanded that the Japanese government should (1) acknowledge the fact that the government forced Korean women to serve as comfort women for the Japanese military, (2) offer an official apology, (3) investigate all facts related to the military-administered system of comfort women, (4) erect a memorial for victims, (5) compensate former comfort women and their bereaved families, and (6) incorporate facts about comfort women in Japanese history education so as not to repeat the same wrong in the future.20

In November 1990, these women’s associations formed the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan.21 In December, JSP member Shimizu Sumiko, one of the contacts for the Korean Council, asked how the Japanese government was going to respond to the petition. An official from the Ministry of Labor refused to admit government involvement, citing a lack of evidence: “Our ministry has no documentation about Korean comfort women in the military. We also checked with people who used to work at the Ministry of Welfare . . . but they told us there was no government involvement.”22 According to the government, private contractors had been solely responsible for recruiting comfort women and setting up comfort stations.23
In the meantime, the Korean Council conducted anonymous interviews with former comfort women as part of its campaign to demand compensation from the Japanese government. Then, in December 1990, former comfort women, former soldiers who had served in the Japanese military during the war, and bereaved families—thirty-five South Korean plaintiffs in total—filed a joint lawsuit against the Japanese government at the Tokyo District Court. All of the plaintiffs were members of the Association of South Korean Victims and Bereaved Families of the Pacific War. With the help of Japanese lawyers from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, they demanded that the Japanese government should offer apologies and compensation for the damages that they had suffered. The Japanese government, however, continued to argue that all issues of compensation had been resolved upon the 1965 normalization, and that no evidence had been found to demonstrate government involvement in the recruitment of comfort women and management of comfort stations.

Then, on January 11, 1992, Asahi shinbun reported as top news that Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki of Chūō University had found a document at the Ministry of Defense Library indicating military involvement in the recruitment of comfort women. The document was titled “On Recruiting Women for Military Comfort Stations” (Gunianjo jūgyōfutou boshū ni kansuru ken). In this document, the Japanese military gave its troops an order to cooperate with local police to oversee private contractors and prevent them from using certain methods of recruitment, such as kidnapping, that could harm the reputation of the Japanese military. The news came five days before Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi was scheduled to visit South Korea, and was immediately relayed to South Korea through major television and radio programs. This fueled the growing redress movement in South Korea. On January 15, a day before Miyazawa’s visit to South Korea, about three hundred protesters, including members of the Association of South Korean Victims and Bereaved Families of the Pacific War, gathered in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul and demanded apologies and compensation from the Japanese government. In Japan, too, women’s associations issued a statement calling for government compensation for former comfort women and a Diet resolution to offer an apology.

At the press conference on January 17, President Roh Tae Woo stated that the future of Japan–South Korea relations should be built on Japan’s “correct understanding of and sincere remorse for its past history,” and Miyazawa expressed his “sincere apology” (chūshin yori owabi) for former
comfort women who had suffered from the “hardships beyond words” (*hit-suzetsu ni tsukushigatai shinku*). Nevertheless, Miyazawa did not promise to compensate former comfort women but only to investigate historical facts regarding the issue. Miyazawa’s apology without a promise of compensation only angered South Korean protesters. As one of the former comfort women, Kim Hak Sun, put it, “Simply apologizing means nothing. I would like the Japanese government to fulfill its responsibility for compensation.” JSP chairman Tanabe Makoto also criticized Miyazawa’s apology as inadequate by arguing, “Apology without compensation is hypocrisy. Compensation without apology is strategic calculus. I propose that we discuss how Japan should compensate and apologize to war victims, including former military comfort women and forced laborers.”

In the face of the international and domestic criticisms, Miyazawa’s government investigated archives of the various ministries and found 127 documents related to comfort women. These documents showed government involvement in the selection of private contractors and hygienic inspection of comfort stations, among other activities. The government continued to collect historical materials both inside and outside Japan and also interviewed sixteen former comfort women in Seoul. In light of the discovered documents and interviews, Kōno Yōhei, Miyazawa’s chief cabinet secretary, issued the so-called Kōno Statement in August 1993. He acknowledged that the government had been involved, directly or indirectly, in the establishment and management of comfort stations and that, in many cases, women had been recruited against their will. He then went on to state: “The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. . . . We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.”

Thus, in the early 1990s, the Japanese government began to commemorate Japan’s past wrongdoings in greater detail, even though the LDP, the longtime supporter of nationalist commemoration, continued to control the government. This change was caused by the growing pressures from the transnational network mobilized for comfort women and other foreign victims, as well as by the growing constraint of the international dimension of political opportunity. Just as the mobilizing structures and political opportunities for cosmopolitan commemoration expanded at the transnational
level, an important political change occurred, pushing Japan’s official commemoration further in the direction of cosmopolitanism: the LDP’s loss of power.

A New Opportunity for Cosmopolitan Commemoration

While facing the controversies over Japan’s past wrongdoings, Miyazawa’s government was struggling to cope with the worst economic recession since 1945. The LDP was also hit by a high-profile scandal in October 1992, when the Tokyo District public prosecutor’s office exposed illegal dealings among the LDP, the Tokyo Sagawa Express Corporation, and Japanese yakuza. This was considered the biggest political scandal in postwar Japan in terms of the amount of illegal monetary dealings and the number of politicians involved. Dissatisfied with the way the LDP had tried to downplay the scandal, opposition parties tried to force Miyazawa out of his office. Even though the LDP had a majority in the House of Representatives, a vote of no confidence was adopted in June 1993, since younger, reform-minded LDP members went along with the opposition.37 Instead of resigning, Miyazawa dissolved the House of Representatives.

In response, LDP members who had directly or indirectly supported the vote of no confidence left the LDP and formed their own political parties. But the LDP did not lose any more seats at the election in July. Instead, the JSP suffered a considerable loss, decreasing the number of its seats from 137 to 77, because many voters decided to give the newly formed parties a chance, rather than continuing to support the existing opposition.38 Then, after the election, eight opposition parties agreed to form a coalition to secure the majority in the House of Representatives to oust the LDP from power. These parties included the JSP, Kōmeitō, the Democratic Socialist Party, Sakigake, the Japan Renewal Party (Shinseitō), the Japan New Party (Nihon Shintō), the Socialist Democratic Federation (Shakai Minshu Rengō), and the Democratic Reform Party (Minshu Kaikaku Rengō).39 On August 9, 1993, Japan New Party chairman Hosokawa Morihiro became the first non-LDP prime minister since 1955, heading the eight-party coalition.

As soon as Hosokawa became prime minister, he began revising Japan’s official commemoration. At a press conference on August 10 to outline his policy plans, Hosokawa stated that the Asia-Pacific War “was a war of aggression (shinryaku sensō), and I see it as a mistaken war (machigatta sensō).”40 To be sure, LDP prime minister Nakasone had already admitted in December 1985 that the war was a “mistaken war that Japan should not have
started” and that Japan had committed “aggression” against China. However, Hosokawa was the first prime minister to clearly state that Japan had waged a war, not simply an act, of aggression. Moreover, at the National Memorial Service for the War Dead on August 15, Hosokawa extended his “condolences to war victims and their bereaved families beyond national borders—to those in neighboring Asian countries and around the world.”

Again, this was the first time any Japanese prime minister had commemorated foreign victims at the National Memorial Service. Doi Takako, JSP chairperson and speaker of the House of Representatives, also delivered a speech reinforcing Hosokawa’s statement: “We have not yet obtained reconciliation with Asian peoples who suffered enormously from our past mistake.”

The LDP immediately criticized Hosokawa for defining Japan as the sole perpetrator in the Asia-Pacific War. On August 11, LDP members from the Association of Diet Members for Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine Together, the Association of Diet Members for Bereaved Families, and the Council of Diet Members to Honor War Gods went to the prime minister’s office to demand that Hosokawa retract his statement. These three associations also held a joint meeting on August 13 in which they accused Hosokawa of accepting the “Tokyo Trial historical view” that had held Japan solely and entirely guilty of the war. At the joint meeting, representatives of the Japan Bereaved Families Association and the Association to Honor War Gods also requested that the LDP “establish a correct historical view” and fight against “the historical view poisoned by the Tokyo Trial.”

The three associations of the LDP Diet members then proceeded to create the History Investigation Committee (Rekishi Kentō Iinkai), defining its purpose as follows: “We cannot overlook the rampage of the one-sided, masochistic historical view in the name of remorse for the war, exemplified by Prime Minister Hosokawa’s statement on ‘war of aggression’ and the intention of his coalition government to ‘express an apology for Japan’s war responsibility.’ We are convinced that it is our urgent task to establish the Japanese people’s own historical view based on undistorted historical facts.”

Beginning in October, the committee began to hold monthly seminars to examine historical facts and interpretations of the Greater East Asia War by inviting university professors, journalists, and writers critical of the Tokyo Trial as guest speakers.

In the face of strong criticism from the LDP, Hosokawa modified the wording of his first keynote address in the Diet on August 23, 1993. Instead
of “war of aggression,” Hosokawa used “act of aggression” (shinryaku kōi) when offering his apology to foreign victims, and effectively retreated to the position, previously held by Nakasone, that not all of Japan’s acts had been aggressive.\textsuperscript{46}

Nevertheless, LDP members kept criticizing Hosokawa. In early October, the LDP bombarded him with questions about his statement almost daily at Diet committee meetings. LDP member Ishihara Shintarō, for example, argued that Hosokawa was mistaken in apologizing for the Asia-Pacific War. Ishihara insisted that Japan had no need to apologize to Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States—the imperial powers that had “engaged in aggressive acts. Colonialism was obviously an aggression and troubled people in Asia, and they ruled their colonies longer than Japan did.” Ishihara continued, “We should apologize to Asian people, but not to the imperial powers we fought against in Asia. . . . If we are to apologize to the Allied powers, our apologies will have to be mutual. Japan suffered, too. Many civilians were killed by indiscriminate bombings, and 300,000 people have died from the atomic bombings so far. But I have never heard of the US government apologizing for these damages.” In his defense, Hosokawa argued that his previous statement on Japan’s “war of aggression” was supported by the Tokyo Judgment that Japan had accepted as part of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Ishihara responded by dismissing Hosokawa’s argument as an “extremely ridiculous and masochistic way of thinking.”\textsuperscript{47}

Another LDP member, Itagaki Tadashi, attacked Hosokawa’s defense of the Tokyo Judgment, arguing, “The so-called Tokyo Trial historical view presents Japan as solely and entirely wrong. I think this has severely poisoned the Japanese people’s historical view. . . . What we should do now is to move away from the Tokyo Trial historical view that SCAP tried to relentlessly inculcate in the Japanese people.”\textsuperscript{48} By rejecting the Tokyo Trial historical view, Itagaki offered his positive appraisal of what Japan had done in Asia: “You repeatedly said Japan invaded Asia, but really, Japan did liberate Asia. Without the Greater East Asia War, could Asia have been liberated from colonial rule [by the West]?”\textsuperscript{49} Although Hosokawa did not agree with Itagaki that the Asia-Pacific War was a war of liberation, he eventually conceded, “I do not think that the Tokyo Trial was entirely right, either.”\textsuperscript{50}

In spite of these criticisms, Hosokawa continued to steer Japan’s official commemoration away from the logic of nationalism that the LDP had promoted since the 1950s. When Hosokawa visited South Korea in Novem-
ber 1993, he expressed his “heartfelt remorse” (kokoro kara hansei) and offered a “deep apology” (fukaku chinsha) by acknowledging that Japan’s colonial rule had forced Koreans to “adopt Japanese names, work as ‘comfort women’ and forced laborers.”51 When Hosokawa visited China in March 1994, he repeated his “deep remorse and apology” (fukai hansei to owabi) for Japan’s “acts of aggression and colonial rule that brought unbearable sufferings and pains to many people.”52 At the same time, however, Hosokawa followed the LDP government’s precedent, to decouple apology from compensation for foreign victims, by insisting that the issue of compensation had been resolved upon normalization of diplomatic relations.53

While Hosokawa was promoting cosmopolitan commemoration of foreign victims, disagreements among his coalition partners grew. In January 1994, the Political Reform Bill proposed by Hosokawa’s government was rejected in the House of Councillors because the JSP, one of the coalition partners, voted against it. Hosokawa was then suspected of illegal monetary dealings, including illegal contributions from the Tokyo Sagawa Express Corporation. The LDP criticized Hosokawa so relentlessly that the Diet deliberation was temporarily halted. Hosokawa saw no way out of this difficult situation and resigned on April 8, 1994.54

The eight parties initially agreed to maintain their coalition and selected Japan Renewal Party chairman Hata Tsutomu as prime minister. But Hata’s coalition government was even more fragile than Hosokawa’s. The JSP left the coalition when it became clear that three of the coalition members—the Japan Renewal Party, Komeitō, and the Democratic Socialist Party—were scheming to limit the JSP’s influence. After the LDP and the JSP joined forces to submit a vote of no confidence to the House of Representatives, Hata resigned in June 1994. At the time of Hata’s resignation, the LDP was still the largest party in the Diet, though it did not have the majority in the House of Representatives.

To return to power, the LDP made deals with the JSP and the New Party Sakigake. The JSP agreed to form an alliance with the LDP after the latter offered Murayama Tomiichi the post of prime minister.55 Thus, on June 30, 1994, JSP chairman Murayama became prime minister by forming the three-party coalition government. For the first time since 1955, the government was headed by the political party that had pressed for cosmopolitan commemoration throughout the postwar period. This newly gained access to the government presented the best political opportunity for proponents of cosmopolitanism to change Japan’s official commemoration.
Now, as part of the government, the JSP began to pursue its longstanding policy goal, to provide government compensation for A-bomb victims.

**A-bomb Victims as a Focal Point of War-Related Compensation**

The issue of compensation for A-bomb victims had been gaining momentum in the Diet since the late 1980s. In December 1989, the JSP and five other opposition parties had succeeded in passing the Bill on Relief for A-Bomb Victims (Genbaku Hibakusha Engo Hōan)—“based on the spirit of government compensation (kokka hoshō no seishin ni mottozuki)” —in the House of Councillors for the first time, though it had been discarded in the House of Representatives because the LDP had refused to extend deliberation on the bill to the next Diet session. In December 1993, however, Hosokawa’s coalition government had established the Project Team on the Act on Relief for A-Bomb Victims (Hibakusha Engohō ni kansuru Purojekuto Team) by appointing Morii Chūryō, a JSP member from Hiroshima Prefecture, as project leader. The JSP also had produced its own report proposing to define relief for A-bomb victims as “government compensation.”

Then, a week after Murayama became prime minister, the project team published its final report endorsing a new act on relief for A-bomb victims based on the “spirit of government compensation,” comparable to the Act on Relief for Injured Veterans and Bereaved Families.

After taking office, however, Murayama took a cautious approach to the issue of compensation for A-bomb victims: “I am really concerned about the situation of A-bomb victims. But government compensation poses a fundamental problem in terms of equality between A-bomb victims and other civilian victims. So, we need to think about this issue carefully among members of the coalition government.”

Murayama and other JSP cabinet members became cautious because the LDP was against government compensation. In fact, the LDP had opposed all sixteen versions of the Bill on Relief for A-Bomb Victims that the JSP had previously submitted to the Diet.

The LDP’s strong opposition was based on the fact that the entire post-war framework of commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War depended on how to deal with the issue of A-bomb victims. First of all, if the nature of relief for A-bomb victims was defined as compensatory, the government would have to accept its responsibility for having started the Asia-Pacific War that had led to the atomic bombings. This would require the government to commemorate the war as wrong for having harmed the lives of Japanese citi-
zens. Such commemoration would be unacceptable for the LDP, as well as for the Japan Bereaved Families Association, because they perceived the war as a heroic act of self-defense. Second, the government’s compensation scheme for war-related damages was predicated on a distinction between military-related and civilian populations. Throughout the postwar period, the government had limited compensation to former military-related personnel and their bereaved families as a way to honor their sacrifices for the country. If the government granted compensation to A-bomb victims who were civilians, this would legitimate compensation claims from many other civilian victims, such as those who had suffered from aerial bombings of major Japanese cities by the Allied powers. Last but not least, the government treated Japanese and foreign A-bomb victims equally, so long as the latter resided in Japan. This was an exception to the government’s compensation scheme that required citizenship as part of its eligibility criteria. If the government compensated A-bomb victims—both Japanese and non-Japanese—that could open the doors to compensation claims by a wide variety of foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. This was why the LDP was determined to stop the JSP’s attempt to provide government compensation for A-bomb victims.

In the end, the JSP accommodated the LDP’s demand, given the latter’s numerical dominance: the LDP had 228 and 109 seats in the Houses of Representatives and Councillors, respectively, whereas the JSP had 77 and 73. When Murayama’s coalition government submitted the Bill Regarding Relief for A-bomb Victims (Genshi Bakudan Hibakusha ni taisuru Engo ni kansuru Hōritsuan) in November 1994, it included in the bill the phrase “government responsibility” (kuni no sekinin), instead of “government compensation” (kokka hoshō). Minister of Welfare Ide Shōichi offered the following definition of government responsibility: “If we use the phrase ‘government compensation,’ people will likely interpret it as referring to compensation based on the government’s responsibility for having started the war. According to such an interpretation, there would be various problems, such as an inequality between A-bomb victims and other civilian war victims. In light of these considerations, we agreed not to include the concept of ‘government compensation’ in the bill.”

Some of the opposition parties immediately challenged the proposed bill. Yamamoto Takashi, a member of the Japan New Party, criticized the JSP for giving up its longstanding commitment to government compensation for A-bomb victims. He also rejected the phrase “government responsibility” as
vacuous because it “best exemplifies the JSP’s compromise [with the LDP]. The phrase makes no sense at all. The government was already responsible for implementing the existing two acts [regarding A-bomb victims].” Kat-suki Kenji of the Democratic Socialist Party also wondered what the JSP would do for other civilian war victims: “In the past, the JSP argued that the government should compensate civilian victims because the government had mobilized almost all civilians for the war. The JSP even proposed bills to compensate civilian war victims. . . . Are you going to give up the Bill on Relief for Civilian Victims of Wartime Disasters (Senji Saigai En-go Hōan)?” In response, Murayama conceded that the JSP had to give up its commitment to compensation of civilian war victims because the JSP was now part of the coalition government and had to make compromises with its coalition partners.

Thus, even though the JSP finally gained access to the government, it was unable to change the nationalist logic of postwar Japan’s compensation scheme, partly because its mobilizing structures had weakened, and partly because its control of the government was compromised by the LDP, a powerful coalition partner. But the political struggle over Japan’s official commemoration was not over yet. It only intensified as the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War approached.

**Ramifications of Compromised Apologies and Compensation**

When the LDP, the JSP, and the New Party Sakigake formed a coalition government in June 1994, they agreed to adopt a resolution on the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end. But the three parties had very different ideas about the resolution. The JSP wanted to frame the resolution in terms of apology for Japan’s past wrongdoings, whereas the LDP wanted a more forward-looking resolution to emphasize Japan’s determination to strive for peace while minimizing references to the past.

To promote their own version of resolution, LDP members created the Association of Diet Members for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the War’s End (Shūsen Gojūnen Kokkai Giin Renmei) in December 1994. In its statement of purpose, the association emphasized the importance of remembering that “peace and prosperity that our country enjoys today is built on two million war dead who sacrificed their precious lives for defending Japan and peace of Asia in the time of the national crisis.” Association president Okuno Seiryō also stated that it was senseless for Japan alone to apologize when the United States and Russia did not apologize for the atomic bombings and
the invasion of Manchukuo, respectively. The association included two LDP members of Murayama Tomiichi’s cabinet, Hashimoto Ryūtarō (minister of international trade and industry) and Tamazawa Tokuichirō (director general of defense). Nearly half of the LDP Diet members had joined the association by March 1995.

Concurrently, the Japan Bereaved Families Association lobbied prefectural councils to adopt resolutions to honor and thank war dead rather than to apologize for Japan’s past wrongdoings. By March 1995, eighteen prefectural councils adopted such resolutions. The association also launched the Citizen Committee on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the War’s End (Shūsen Gojūshūnen Kokumin Iinkai) with other NGOs to collect signatures supporting the LDP version of resolution to emphasize Japan’s determination to strive for peace.

Given the dominance of the LDP within Murayama’s coalition government, the LDP’s position was favored in the Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned from History (Rekishi wo Kyōkun ni Heiwa eno Ketsui wo Aratanisuru Ketsugi) submitted to the House of Representatives in early June 1995. The proposed resolution stopped short of offering an “apology,” though it incorporated the JSP’s position commemorating Japan’s past wrongdoings. Specifically, the resolution stated,

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, this House offers its sincere condolences to those who fell in action and victims of wars and similar actions all over the world. Solemnly reflecting upon many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression in the modern history of the world, and recognizing that Japan carried out those acts in the past, inflicting pain and suffering upon the peoples of other countries, especially in Asia, the Members of this House express a sense of deep remorse. . . . This House expresses its resolve, under the banner of eternal peace enshrined in the Constitution of Japan, to join hands with other nations of the world and to pave the way to a future that allows all human beings to live together.

The resolution passed the House of Representatives in June, but 241 out of 502 House members boycotted the vote, including fifty LDP members and fourteen JSP members. LDP members boycotted the vote because they were opposed to any resolution regarding the Asia-Pacific War, whereas JSP
members did so because they felt the resolution did not go far enough in
acknowledging Japan’s past wrongdoings.

Since the Diet resolution only expressed “deep remorse,” Murayama
decided to offer his own official apology as Japan’s prime minister. He con-
sulted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in drafting his statement and
persuaded LDP members in his cabinet to approve it. Given the unani-
mous approval by his cabinet members, Murayama issued the following apol-
ogy as Japan’s official position on August 15, 1995:

Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to
war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through
its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffer-
ing to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian
nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I re-
gard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and ex-
press here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt
apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning
for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.

In response to Murayama’s apology, government officials across the Asia-
Pacific issued generally positive statements. Australian prime minister Paul
Keating, Philippine president Fidel Ramos, and White House press secre-
tary Mike McCurry, among others, welcomed Murayama’s apology and
stated that it would improve Japan’s relations with former enemy countries
in the region. South Korea and China, however, expressed more cautious
reactions. South Korea’s Foreign Ministry planned “to carefully observe
whether Japan’s subsequent attitude will support Prime Minister Muraya-
ma’s apology.” China’s Foreign Ministry pointed out that “there are still
people in Japanese politics and society who do not adopt the correct atti-
dute toward the history problem,” though it praised Murayama’s action for
“expressing deep remorse for Japan’s past colonial rule and aggression and
offering an apology to Asian peoples.”

In addition to the official apology, Murayama and other JSP cabinet
members planned to create a fund for a wide variety of victims of Japan’s
past wrongdoings, whereby the government and the public would each take
responsibility for a half of the fund. For the JSP members, this plan was
meant not to evade the Japanese government’s war responsibility but to ex-
press genuinely nationwide atonement for foreign victims by enlisting Japa-
nese citizens. In the end, however, they judged that their plan was infeasible both politically and financially. Instead, they decided to focus on former comfort women, since this issue had become the center of international controversies in the early 1990s.

In December 1994, a subcommittee within Murayama’s coalition government released the “First Report on the So-called Wartime Comfort Women Issue,” recommending the establishment of a fund based on contributions from both the government and citizens to offer nationwide atonement for the suffering of former comfort women. But the report was strongly criticized by the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs and the majority of LDP members. They insisted that all issues of compensation had been resolved upon normalization of diplomatic relations. Confronted with the strong opposition, the JSP again compromised with the LDP. Instead of mandating the government to contribute half of the fund as originally proposed, the JSP and the LDP decided to hold the government responsible for the expenses associated with managing the fund, such as staff salaries and advertising costs. Japanese citizens, in turn, would be responsible for making actual monetary contributions to be used as “atonement money” (tsugunai kin) for former comfort women.

In June 1995, Chief Cabinet Secretary Igarashi Kōzō announced the government’s plan for the Asian Peace and Friendship Fund for Women (Josei no tameno Ajia Heiwa Yūkō Kikin). Igarashi explained that the purpose of the fund was “to offer a heartfelt apology for our country’s act that inflicted incurable pains on many women and deeply wounded their honor and dignity.” He then summarized the main goals of the fund as follows: the fund was to collect donations from the public to offer nationwide atonement for former comfort women as well as to take responsibility for providing medical and welfare relief for them through government funding; when carrying out the fund’s activities, the government must clearly express remorse and apology for former comfort women and collect historical materials related to comfort women and use them for history education. The fund was officially renamed the Asian Women’s Fund (Ajia Josei Kikin) and launched in July. Promoters of the fund, including well-known university professors and former Diet members, published a call for monetary contributions from Japanese citizens in major national newspapers.

In their call, the promoters frankly admitted disagreements among themselves. Some insisted on government compensation, whereas others thought such compensation would be difficult from a legal point of view.
Nevertheless, the promoters were “unanimous on one point: we have to act as soon as possible because little time is left for aging victims.” They continued:

We demand that the government should make every effort to uncover historical facts and offer a heartfelt apology, so that victims of the “comfort women” system can regain their honor and dignity. . . . But the most important thing, we believe, is that as many Japanese citizens as possible will face the suffering of the victims and express atonement from the bottom of their hearts. . . . Prewar Japan created “wartime comfort women.” But Japan is not a country owned solely by the government. Japan is a country created by every citizen who inherits the past, lives in the present, and envisions the future.

The promoters thus called for “atonement by the whole of Japanese citizenry” (zenkokuminteki tsugunai).80

Within a year, the Asian Women’s Fund collected about four hundred million yen from Japanese citizens. The fund then began negotiations with five governments that officially acknowledged the existence of former comfort women in their countries: the Netherlands, the Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan. The fund planned to offer two million yen for each former comfort woman, as well as different amounts of medical and welfare support according to living standards of different countries. In addition, members of the fund planned to deliver atonement money with a “letter of apology” (owabi no tegami) signed by Japan’s prime minister, which included the following statements: “I, Japan’s Prime Minister, offer a heartfelt apology and express remorse for all former military comfort women who suffered great pains and incurable physical and mental wounds. We shall not evade our responsibility for the past and the future. Our country must embrace moral responsibility, take our apology and remorse seriously, and confront our past and teach it to future generations.”81

From the very beginning, however, the Asian Women’s Fund received heavy criticism from both Japanese and foreign NGOs that supported former comfort women. The most intense criticism came from South Korea. All prominent women’s NGOs in South Korea, including the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan and the Korean Church Women United, rejected the fund. The Korean Council president Yun Jeong Ok criticized it as the Japanese govern-
ment’s “attempt to evade its responsibility for the crime [the comfort women system] by asking Japanese citizens to contribute donations. . . . The fund will not resolve the victims’ resentment (han). It will not liberate Japan from the crime that its government committed, either.”82 Then, in December 1995, Japanese and foreign NGOs organized an international conference, where they rejected atonement money from Japanese citizens and demanded government compensation.83 In short, instead of resolving the controversy over former comfort women, the Asian Women’s Fund galvanized it.

Growing Strains in Japan’s Relations with China

Relations between Japan and China, by contrast, were friendly on the surface. After the Chinese military suppressed the democratization movement in June 1989, the United States and many other countries, especially in Western Europe, condemned the Chinese government and imposed sanctions. The Japanese government, too, suspended its loans to China but made an effort not to isolate China in international society. In August 1989, only two months after the Tiananmen Square protests, the Japanese government resumed its loans to China and, a month later, delegates of the Alliance of Diet Members for Japan-China Friendship visited Beijing.84 Then, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki visited China in August 1991, reciprocated by General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in April 1992. These diplomatic exchanges between the two countries culminated in Emperor Akihito’s visit to China in October 1992 to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of normalization.

On these occasions, both the Japanese and Chinese sides minimized references to their past conflict and emphasized the importance of future cooperation. At the welcome dinner for Emperor Akihito on October 23, 1992, President Yang Shangkun stated, “I regret that the modern history of China-Japan relations had an unfortunate period from which the Chinese people suffered greatly. It will serve best interests of the peoples of both China and Japan if we remember the past to draw lessons from it.”85 He then devoted much of his speech to reviewing friendly relations between the two countries over the past two decades. Emperor Akihito responded by expressing his “deep sorrow” (fukaku kanashimi) over the unfortunate period and mentioned the Japanese people’s efforts to build a peaceful country based on their “deep remorse” (fukai hansei) for the war.86 Furthermore, when Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihito met with President Jiang Zemin in
Seattle in November 1993, Jiang praised Hosokawa’s apology for Japan’s past aggression as an “excellent attitude toward history” and stated, “Even though we had an unhappy period in our long history of friendly relations, our relations will improve if we take a forward-looking attitude.”

By the mid-1990s, however, the Chinese government had changed its commemorative position toward Japan. When Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi visited China in May 1995, Jiang Zemin stated, “It is unacceptable that some people in Japan had a wrong understanding of the Asia-Pacific War.” Here, Jiang referred to the LDP members who had mobilized against Hosokawa’s statement on the “war of aggression.” But his strongly worded statement also reflected the Chinese government’s campaign for patriotic education that had intensified since the Tiananmen Square protests. In July 1989, right after the government suppressed the protests, the National Education Committee had launched the “Three Love Education Program” to counteract the democratization movement by emphasizing love for the Communist Party, the socialist fatherland, and the People’s Liberation Army. Over the following years, the Chinese government had issued multiple directives to strengthen patriotic education. As part of the patriotic education campaign, Chinese history textbooks came to emphasize national humiliation brought by Western imperialism and the eventual triumph of the Chinese people. Among the imperial powers that had humiliated the Chinese people, Japan was marked out as the paradigmatic devil that had been historically inferior to China.

Concurrently, in anticipation of the fiftieth anniversary of China’s victory over Japan, the Chinese government built new war-related museums and renovated the existing ones: the September 18th Historical Museum, to commemorate Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, was opened in 1991, and the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall was significantly expanded in 1995. Then, on September 3, to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Japan’s official surrender on the deck of the USS Missouri—and thereby China’s victory over Japan—President Jiang gave a speech at the Great Hall of the People: “The Japanese military killed and injured thirty-five million Chinese people. More than three hundred thousand people were killed in the Nanjing Massacre alone. . . . There is a discourse in Japan that not only denies the war of aggression and colonial rule but also glorifies them. . . . Japan can only win trust from Asia and international society, as well as prevent another tragedy in history, only if the country learns from the history,
atones for its crimes of aggression, and maintains the path of peaceful development.”

While the Chinese government was promoting patriotic education, Chinese citizens also began to seek individual compensation for war-related damages from the Japanese government. This redress movement had already emerged in September 1988 when two hundred residents in Shandong Province had submitted a petition to the Japanese embassy in Beijing, demanding compensation for the atrocities that the Japanese military had committed in their village in 1944. Then, in March 1991, activist Tong Zeng submitted to the National People’s Congress a petition arguing that since the 1972 Joint Communique had discarded only the Chinese government’s compensation claims, Chinese citizens still retained individual compensation claims against Japan. Tong’s petition was rejected at the 1992 congress, but three years later, when the 1995 National People’s Congress was held at the height of celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of China’s victory over Japan, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that individual Chinese citizens still retained compensation claims for their war-related damages. The Chinese government thus changed its position on compensation to accommodate the growing demand from its citizens and align it with the nationwide campaign for patriotism that singled out Japan as the worst imperialist aggressor.

Given the government’s permission and the help of Japanese lawyers, a total of ten Chinese former forced laborers and bereaved family members filed compensation claims against the Japanese construction company Kashima at the Tokyo District Court in June 1995. The Chinese plaintiffs demanded that Kashima offer apologies and compensation for forcing them and their family members to work under abusive conditions at Hanakoka Mine during the war. In August, four Chinese former comfort women also sued the Japanese government, demanding apology and compensation. In the following months, more Chinese people came forward to file lawsuits against the Japanese government and corporations, including victims of the Nanjing Massacre, the 731 Unit, and indiscriminate aerial bombings.

Thus, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War did not bring closure to the history problem between Japan and China. Rather, the history problem began to simmer, as more and more Chinese victims filed compensation lawsuits, supported by the Chinese government, which increasingly commemorated the Chinese people’s struggle against Japan’s
imperialist aggression as the most important historical episode in modern Chinese history. Put another way, the growing pressure from China in the mid-1990s further constrained political opportunities for proponents of nationalist commemoration inside Japan. But this changing structure of political opportunities at the international level galvanized Japanese nationalists, who perceived their government as giving in to foreign pressures.

**Nationalist Counterattacks: Educational Implications of the History Problem**

Just as the history problem was deepening in East Asia, Murayama Tomiichi resigned from the post of Japan’s prime minister in January 1996. He decided to resign partly because he felt his government had fulfilled its historic mission to offer apologies and relief to Japan’s foreign victims. Besides, friction within his own JSP had intensified since it lost a substantial number of seats in the House of Councillors in July 1995, and this had made it difficult for Murayama to lead the coalition. Upon Murayama’s resignation, the coalition of the JSP, the LDP, and the New Party Sakigake chose LDP chairman Hashimoto Ryūtarō as prime minister. Hashimoto had served as president of the Japan Bereaved Families Association between 1993 and 1995 and joined the Association of the Diet Members for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Asia-Pacific War’s End. Given his strong commitment to honor Japanese war dead, Hashimoto visited the Yasukuni Shrine in July 1996, for the first time in the twelve years since Nakasone Yasuhiro had suspended a prime ministerial visit in response to strong criticisms from South Korea and China.

Soon after Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement requesting that the Japanese government consider “feelings of the governments and peoples that suffered from Japan’s imperialist aggression in the past.” More than a dozen South Korean Congress members also protested in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul, arguing, “Prime Minister Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine amounts to the second act of aggression that ignores victims and bereaved families who suffered from Japan’s atrocities during World War II.” Similarly, China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement to reiterate the official position: “The Yasukuni Shrine honors militarist leaders, such as Tōjō Hideki. Prime Minister Hashimoto deeply hurt feelings of Chinese and other Asian peoples who had suffered greatly from Japan’s militarism.”
Hashimoto argued that his visit was not an official one but only “personal” (shiteki), motivated by his wish to pray for war dead, including his cousin and some former neighbors who were enshrined. He also insisted that his personal visit had nothing to do with either the Japanese government’s official position on the Asia-Pacific War or Class A war criminals. To mitigate the international criticisms, however, Hashimoto decided not to visit the shrine again during his tenure. In addition, Hashimoto could not afford to let the controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine sidetrack his coalition government’s policy agenda to cope with the worst economic recession since 1945. The recession affected the country at large, creating widespread feelings of national crisis. According to government statistics, the percentage of Japanese citizens who thought the country was headed in the wrong direction increased from 31.4 percent to 72.2 percent between 1990 and 1997. The number of suicides also jumped from 24,391 in 1997 to 32,863 in 1998 and continued to exceed 30,000 annually. The severe economic recession, the growing feeling of anomie, and the seeming incompetence of the government made many people lose confidence in Japan’s future, and the 1990s were later called “the lost decade.”

While Hashimoto’s government was busy implementing political reforms to meet the unprecedented economic and social challenges, conservative politicians tried to undo the logic of cosmopolitanism that had been partially incorporated into Japan’s official commemoration. In fact, nationalist counterattacks had already begun in August 1995, when the LDP’s History Investigation Committee published *The Comprehensive Evaluation of the Greater East Asia War (Daitōa Sensō no sōkatsu)*. This edited volume collected transcriptions of seminars between October 1993 and January 1995, wherein LDP members had engaged in discussions with nineteen guest speakers, including Tanaka Masaaki, the author of books denying the Nanjing Massacre, and Nishio Kanji, who was later to become the first president of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform. In the edited volume, the guest speakers and LDP members justified the Asia-Pacific War as Japan’s act of self-defense against Western imperial powers, and they argued that Japan had helped Asian peoples gain independence from their colonial rulers after the war. Moreover, they rejected the Tokyo Trial as “victor’s justice” and criticized postwar Japanese education for propagating the masochistic, Tokyo Trial version of history. As Itagaki Tadashi put it in the volume’s epilogue, “I cannot but feel overwhelmed by the critical situation
of the Japanese people’s historical view shaped by the Occupation policies and leftist-biased postwar education. I must say this kind of education is wrong because it fails to cultivate in next generations pride in their country and joy of being Japanese.”

This growing concern about the education of Japanese youth was perhaps most systematically articulated by Fujioka Nobukatsu, a professor of education at the University of Tokyo. In April 1994, he began serializing articles in *Social Studies Education* (*Shakaika kyōiku*) to outline what he called the “liberal historical view” (*jiyūshugi shikan*), and in June 1995, he launched the Liberal History Research Group (*Jiyūshugi Shikan Kenkyūkai*). The purpose of liberal history was to write a new history of Japan by rejecting the two types of historical interpretation that had dominated postwar Japan: “the Tokyo Trial historical view that describes Japan as the only bad guy and the Pro-Greater-East-Asia-War historical view (*Daitōa Sensō kōtei shikan*) that asserts Japan committed no wrongs.” According to Fujioka, these two ideologically charged historical views—describing Japan as categorically either right or wrong—prevented Japanese citizens from developing a more mature historical view. As Fujioka put it, liberal history was “liberal” in the sense of being “free from all ideologies,” so that “if something is proven to be a fact, practitioners of liberal history should be ready to accept it, whether they like it or not.” At first glance, Fujioka’s manifesto of liberal history simply sought a more empirically rigorous approach to the history of the Asia-Pacific War. But, in reality, his liberal historical view attacked only “the Tokyo Trial historical view that denied anything national” and instead advocated “healthy nationalism” as an essential ingredient for history education in Japan.

While members of the LDP and the Liberal History Research Group began to mobilize their counterattacks against the greater degree of contribution adopted by the Japanese government, the Ministry of Education announced the results of the latest round of textbook inspection in June 1996: all history textbooks approved for junior high schools now included descriptions of comfort women and expanded descriptions of atrocities that Japanese troops had committed during the Asia-Pacific War, such as the Nanjing Massacre. This significant change in history textbooks happened not only because of the efforts by non-LDP prime ministers and NGOs commemorating foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings, but also because of Ienaga Saburō’s lawsuits against textbook inspection. In January 1984, Ienaga had filed his third lawsuit after his draft history text-
book for high schools had been rejected during the 1982 cycle of textbook inspection. This time Ienaga and his lawyers had focused on eight items that the Ministry of Education had disapproved, six of which had pertained to the Asia-Pacific War: (1) Japan’s aggression against China, (2) the Nanjing Massacre, (3) the Korean people’s resistance against Japan’s colonial rule, (4) the Japanese military’s wartime atrocities, (5) Unit 731 and its biological experiments, and (6) the Battle of Okinawa. In October 1993, the Tokyo High Court had ruled that, among the eight items in Ienaga’s textbook, descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre and rapes of Chinese women (as part of the Japanese military’s wartime atrocities) had been illegally disapproved in the textbook-inspection process. Ienaga then had appealed to the Supreme Court and argued that the Ministry of Education had exceeded its prerogative by having disapproved the other items, whereas the ministry had decided not to contest the high court’s ruling. This led to the 1995–1996 cycle of textbook inspection for junior high and high schools permitting increased descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings.

The results of the 1996 textbook inspection, however, prompted Fujioka Nobukatsu to submit an open letter to the Ministry of Education, demanding that the descriptions of comfort women be removed. In his letter, Fujioka stated that the descriptions were misleading because they gave the impression that the Japanese military had forcibly drafted women to work at comfort stations, even though facts about comfort women were still disputed among historians. He concluded his letter by mentioning cases of students who had internalized the masochistic historical view: “Some junior high school students think Japan is the most evil country in the world. There are also female students who feel ashamed about being Japanese. The unbalanced and masochistic history education is a serious crime.” Then, in December 1996, Fujioka and other university professors and writers formed the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (JSHT).

For these LDP politicians and conservative intellectuals, the history problem was no longer simply about the past but also about the future of the Japanese nation because it concerned the hearts and minds of younger Japanese citizens. Moreover, they regarded Japan’s domestic problems—the economic recession and social anomie—as coterminous with the history problem. They felt that the domestic problems could be overcome if Japanese citizens became more patriotic and willing to contribute to their country. They then placed the blame for the perceived lack of patriotism squarely on the “masochistic” Tokyo Trial historical view that the Allied powers had
imposed on Japan during the Occupation. To combat this historical view as a root cause of the domestic and international problems facing Japan, they targeted history education as the key for reinvigorating patriotism and thereby overcoming the problems.

**Growing Cosmopolitanism and the Escalating History Problem**

During this period, Japan’s official commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War became more cosmopolitan, though the logic of nationalism remained dominant. Since political opportunities increasingly acquired an international dimension in the post–Cold War period, even the LDP government had to adopt contrite gestures, precisely because doing so was necessary to remove the obstacle of the history problem from its nationalist quest for making Japan a regional leader. Moreover, the LDP lost its monopoly access to the government, and this created a political opportunity for the two non-LDP prime ministers, Hosokawa and Murayama, to promote the cosmopolitan logic of commemoration. Murayama in particular offered a decisive apology in August 1995, and his government created the Asian Women’s Fund to provide relief for former comfort women.

Coterminous with the changing structure of international relations and Japanese politics was the growth of the transnational network consisting of Japanese NGOs and South Korean and Chinese victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. While the transnational network had originally emerged to provide relief only for South Korean A-bomb victims, it expanded to include more actors, such as former comfort women and forced labors, and gained momentum in the early 1990s. The expanded mobilizing structures for cosmopolitan commemoration exerted indirect influence on Japan’s official commemoration even when the LDP still single-handedly controlled the government, and especially when the JSP headed the ruling coalition. By making the suffering of foreign victims widely known, the transnational network also helped, in conjunction with Ienaga’s textbook lawsuits, to make history education more cosmopolitan, that is, to increase descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in history textbooks.

These attempts to promote cosmopolitanism in Japan’s official commemoration, however, were compromised by the LDP. Given the power asymmetry between the JSP and the LDP, the former was unable to fully exploit the political opportunity—access to the government—to significantly alter Japan’s official commemoration. Put another way, due to the JSP’s weak position, the growth of mobilizing structures for cosmopolitan commemo-
ration at the transnational level was not effectively translated into Japan’s official commemoration. Thus, the resultant compromise of nationalism and cosmopolitanism in Japan’s official commemoration contributed to the history problem’s full development. On the one hand, South Korean and Chinese victims and their Japanese supporters felt that the Japanese government did not go far enough in adopting cosmopolitanism, and they continued to demand apologies and government compensation. On the other hand, conservative politicians and NGOs felt that Japan’s official commemoration went too far in the cosmopolitan direction, disrespecting Japanese war dead who had sacrificed their lives to defend Japan. Galvanized by the growing South Korean and Chinese demands for apologies and compensation, these proponents of nationalist commemoration began to openly challenge the evidential bases of the victims’ demands and raised the stakes of the history problem by focusing on its educational implications for future generations.
The Japa nese Society for History Textbook Reform (JSHT), launched in January 1997, attacked postwar history education for forcing Japanese citi-zens to lose national pride: “Especially the modern historiography treats the Japanese people as if they were criminals who must continue to atone and apologize forever. This masochistic tendency became even stronger after the Cold War ended. Right now, history textbooks in Japan present the propa-gandas of the former enemy countries as historical facts.”1 JSHT members also met with Minister of Education Kosugi Takashi, trying to persuade him to reject masochistic tendencies—the increased descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings—in history textbooks.2

The LDP, too, challenged the history textbooks that had been approved during the 1996 textbook inspection. In February 1997, eighty-seven relatively young LDP members established the Association of Young Diet Members for Examining Japan’s Future and History Education (Nihon no Zento to Reki-shi Mondai wo Kangaeru Wakate Giin no Kai). Nakagawa Shōichi became president of the association, while Abe Shinzō, a future prime minister, served as chief secretary. According to Nakagawa, members of the association were motivated by their shared concern that “Japanese children are now using his-torically inaccurate, anti-Japanese textbooks. Can these children really carry the future of Japan on their shoulders?”3 In order to examine “how Japanese textbooks should be written for the sake of the Japanese people,” the association organized seminars for Diet members by inviting a total of eighteen guest speakers, three of whom were JSHT members.4
This collaboration between politicians and nongovernmental actors distinguished the latest wave of nationalist attacks on history education from the earlier waves, where the LDP had either acted alone (the mid-1950s) or had failed to coordinate its action with the textbook-reform movement led by the National Council for the Defense of Japan (the mid-1980s). Thus, after the fiftieth anniversary of the Asia-Pacific War’s end, JSHTTR and the LDP joined forces to undo cosmopolitanism that had been incorporated into Japan’s official commemoration.

JSHTTR’s Campaign against the “Masochistic Historical View”

Conservative politicians and NGOs were galvanized most by the issue of comfort women. In the mid-1990s, the dispute between the Japanese government and former comfort women attracted worldwide attention, as it was increasingly framed as a human-rights violation in conjunction with awareness of violence against women during the Yugoslav Wars and civil wars in Rwanda, Cambodia, and East Timor. In January 1996, UN special rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy submitted an addendum report on comfort women to the Commission on Human Rights. In her report, Coomaraswamy recommended that the Japanese government should acknowledge, apologize to, and compensate former comfort women, as well as punish those who had been involved in the management of comfort stations. Given the growing concern for women’s human rights worldwide, Japanese NGOs organized an international symposium in Tokyo in 1997 by inviting forty guests from twenty different countries. Symposium participants then established the Violence Against Women in War Network-Japan and began advocacy activities to support three groups of female victims around the world: former comfort women during the Asia-Pacific War, women living near US military bases, and women living in countries involved in armed conflicts. Then, in June 1998, another special rapporteur, Gay McDougall, submitted a report, “Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict,” to the Commission on Human Rights. In the appendix of her report, McDougall argued that the Japanese government should do more than simply set up the Asian Women’s Fund to atone for having forced “over 200,000 women into sexual slavery in rape centres throughout Asia.”

JSHTTR counterargued that these criticisms were based on inaccurate historical facts. For example, Coomaraswamy’s report cited Yoshida Seiji’s
1983 book *My War Crimes: The Forced Draft of Koreans* (*Watashi no sensō hanzai: Chōsenjin no kyōsei renkō*), wherein Yoshida, a former soldier, testified how he had forcibly taken Korean women from Cheju Island in 1943. The JSHTCR vice president Fujioka Nobukatsu rejected Coomaraswamy’s report by quoting Hata Ikuhiko, a Japanese history professor who had conducted interviews with residents of Cheju Island and questioned the credibility of Yoshida’s testimony. In fact, Yoshida himself admitted that he had deliberately fictionalized his testimony. Fujioka thus ridiculed Coomaraswamy’s report as follows: “Yoshida’s testimony was contradicted by all his military colleagues, dismissed by residents of the Island . . . and even the author himself admits it is a fiction, but it is cited in the report submitted to the United Nations commission and used as a basis for prosecuting Japan. And, in South Korea, Yoshida’s book is translated and accepted as entirely true.”9

Fujioka also questioned the credibility of former comfort women’s testimonies by pointing out how they had changed over time.10 To be sure, Fujioka deliberately inflated the significance of inaccuracies to discredit the entire issue of comfort women as historically untrue. Nevertheless, NGOs that supported former comfort women did make problematic factual claims. Yoshimi Yoshiaki and other Japanese historians who conducted research on Japan’s war crimes agreed that Yoshida’s book was not reliable enough to be used as historical evidence for the forced draft of Korean women to comfort stations.11 Japanese historians also warned that another book that Coomaraswamy extensively cited in her report, *The Comfort Women* by journalist George Hicks, lacked sufficient scholarly rigor: Hicks, too, cited Yoshida’s book and made various factual errors.12 Similar evidentiary problems were found in McDougall’s report, in which her estimate of the number of comfort women who had died during the Asia-Pacific War relied on an unfounded story told by LDP member Arafune Seijūrō in 1965.13 In addition, while South Korean NGOs and newspapers repeatedly stated that two hundred thousand Korean women had been forcibly drafted to serve as comfort women as part of the female volunteer corps (*teishintai*), Yoshimi cautioned against both overestimating the number and conflating comfort women and female volunteer corps.14 Japanese historians like Yoshimi were worried that historical inaccuracies such as these were providing JSHTR with ammunition to reject the issue of comfort women. In the heat of the controversy, however, their cautious and critical voices were not taken seriously.
JSHTTR employed a similar tactic against the Nanjing Massacre, another high-profile Japanese wartime atrocity that came to be widely known beyond East Asia after Iris Chang’s *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* was published in 1997. Chang’s book argued that the Japanese military had killed about three hundred thousand Chinese civilians in Nanjing through the government’s genocidal program. It also criticized Japanese history textbooks for making no reference to the Nanjing Massacre. In response, Fujioka and another JSHTTR member, Higashinakano Shūdō, coauthored *Study of the Rape of Nanking* (*Th e Rape of Nanking no kenkyū*) in 1999. In their book, Fujioka and Higashinakano claimed to have found nearly 170 inaccuracies in Chang’s book and questioned its credibility. They concluded that *The Rape of Nanking* was an attempt to continue the propaganda war initiated by the Chinese Communist Party during the Asia-Pacific War: “The Tokyo Trial imposed on Japan the stigma of war-criminal country, and the tendency to one-sidedly prosecute Japan’s past is becoming more pronounced in Japanese history textbooks in the post-Cold War period. . . . If *The Rape of Nanking* succeeds in consolidating the image of the war-criminal Japanese people, we are afraid, Japan will never be able to recover.”

While Fujioka and Higashinakano overemphasized the inaccuracies in Chang’s book in order to discredit the Nanjing Massacre, Chang did make numerous errors and unwarranted arguments, being neither trained as a professional historian nor fluent in Chinese and Japanese languages. For example, Kasahara Tokushi, a professor of modern Chinese history at Tsuru University and one of the most respected experts on the Nanjing Massacre, was troubled by Chang’s inability to “understand the importance of critically evaluating the credibility of primary materials. She is eager to uncritically cite the statistics on victims of the Nanjing Massacre submitted to the Tokyo Trial to support her argument [even when no systematic survey was carried out at that time]. This shows that she is an amateur in historical research.” Kasahara and other Japanese historians were worried that JSHTTR would exploit many flaws in Chang’s book to discredit the Nanjing Massacre as a fabrication, when the large number of testimonies by former soldiers as well as research by historians in the 1980s had led many Japanese citizens to accept the massacre as a historical fact.

While trying to discredit the historical validity of comfort women and the Nanjing Massacre, JSHTTR proceeded with its most important objective:
writing new history textbooks. To this end, JSHTR first teamed up with Fusōsha, a publishing company known for its conservative orientation, to produce draft history and civics textbooks for junior high schools. As they worked on these drafts, JSHTR established branches in all forty-eight prefectures to advertise the textbooks in October 1999. Then, in April 2000, JSHTR submitted its draft textbooks, *History of the Japanese People (Kokumin no rekishi)* and *New Civics (Atarashii kōmin)*, to the textbook-inspection process. They also established the Liaison Council for the Improvement of Textbooks (Kyōkasho Kaizen Renraku Kyōgikai) in cooperation with other nationalist NGOs, including the Japan Council (Nippon Kaigi), a successor of the National Council for the Defense of Japan, which had produced *New Japanese History* in 1985. Together, they began lobbying local boards of education to adopt JSHTR’s history and civics textbooks. In the meantime, LDP members in municipal councils formed associations to support JSHTR’s activities.18

In December 2000, the Ministry of Education asked Fusōsha to make 137 and 99 revisions to JSHTR’s history and civics textbooks, respectively, as preconditions for approval. Many of the required revisions concerned sentences that downplayed Japan’s past wrongdoings and overemphasized patriotism. The sentences marked for required revision included “Japan annexed Korea legally according to the international law at the time”; “The Tokyo Trial accepted that the Japanese military had killed more than 200,000 Chinese people during the Battle of Nanjing in 1937. . . . Since many questions about the incident remain unresolved, however, there is still controversy today. The Nanjing Incident was nothing like the Holocaust, even if there had been some killings”; and, “Kamikaze soldiers did not hesitate to sacrifice their lives for Japan.”19 After JSHTR made the required revisions, the ministry—now reorganized and renamed as the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology—approved its history and civics textbooks in April 2001.

The 2000–2001 textbook inspection not only approved JSHTR’s history textbook but also reduced descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in history textbooks that other companies produced. Prior to this inspection cycle, all the seven textbook companies had included descriptions of comfort women in their history textbooks for junior high schools, but four of them deleted the descriptions. Similarly, two of the four textbook companies that had discussed the “Nanjing Massacre” in previous editions of their history textbooks decided to use the phrase the “Nanjing Incident,” down-
playing the magnitude of the event. These changes reversed the trend of history textbooks set in 1997, when the Supreme Court had ruled it illegal for the Ministry of Education to disapprove descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre, the Japanese military’s violence against Chinese women, and Unit 731 in Ienaga’s draft textbook. This rolling back of textbook descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings was linked to the LDP’s efforts to intervene in the textbook-inspection process beginning in the mid-1990s. In June 1998, Minister of Education Machimura Nobutaka had argued that “many history textbooks overemphasized negative aspects of Japan’s history especially after the Meiji period. That is why the Textbook Inspection Commission is now examining ways to help textbook editors find a better balance [between positive and negative descriptions of Japan’s history].” Then, in January 1999, the Ministry of Education had requested chief editors of textbook companies to revise their history textbooks to have a “better balance.” The Association of Young Diet Members for Examining Japan’s Future and History Education also had asked chief editors to come to LDP Headquarters and subjected them to two hours of criticism regarding descriptions of comfort women and other “biases” in their history textbooks.

Proponents of cosmopolitanism were galvanized by the results of the 2000–2001 textbook inspection. Japan Teachers Union chairman Toda Tsunami issued a statement criticizing JSHTK for endorsing the “Greater East Asia War and failing to recognize the pains that Japan’s colonial rule and war inflicted on Asian peoples,” and twelve NGOs, including the Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21 (Kodomo to Kyōkasho Zenkoku Netto 21), held a joint press conference criticizing the Japanese government for approving JSHTK’s history textbook. Similarly, Nobel laureate Ōe Kenzaburo and other writers submitted a joint statement to the government. In their statement, they argued that the latest round of textbook inspection forced textbook companies to reduce descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings, and that JSHTK’s history textbook lacked sincere remorse for the Asian victims of the Asia-Pacific War.

The South Korean and Chinese governments also joined the ensuing controversy over JSHTK’s history textbook. In May 2001, South Korean president Kim Dae Jung demanded that the Japanese government make twenty-five revisions in JSHTK’s history textbook and another ten revisions in the other seven history textbooks. Kim’s government criticized JSHTK’s textbook particularly for making no reference to comfort women and showing no remorse for Japan’s colonial rule. China’s Foreign Ministry, too,
demanded eight major revisions in JSHTR’s textbook, including descriptions of Manchukuo, the Nanjing Massacre, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Tokyo Trial. Given these domestic and international criticisms, less than 0.05 percent of the junior high schools in Japan adopted JSHTR’s history textbook. With such a low adoption rate, the latest round of textbook controversy subsided, at least temporarily.

A Downward Spiral of Nationalist Commemorations

While JSHTR’s history textbook rocked Japan’s relations with South Korea and China in spring 2001, Koizumi Jun’ichirō was newly elected as LDP chairman. During his campaign for the chairman position, Koizumi had already promised to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, distinguishing himself from the other candidates, including Hashimoto Ryūtarō, who had declined to make the same promise. After Koizumi took office in April 2001, he announced his plan to visit the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, the anniversary of the war’s end: “I believe that Japan’s peace and prosperity today was built on the invaluable sacrifices made by war dead. I would like to visit the Yasukuni Shrine to offer my utmost respect and thanks to them.” In response, the South Korean government expressed concerns regarding both Koizumi’s planned visit to the shrine and the official approval of JSHTR’s history textbook. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan also warned of the potential ramifications of Koizumi’s visit and asked the Japanese government to “consider feelings of the victim nations seriously” and “confront its past history.” Opposition parties in Japan, too, criticized Koizumi’s planned visit for attempting to justify the war of aggression and undermining Japan’s relations with Asian neighbors. Even the chairman of the LDP’s coalition partner Kōmeitō, Kanzaki Takenori, pointed out that the prime minister’s official visit to the shrine would violate the constitutional separation of religion and state, and he suggested that Koizumi “should take caution and avoid creating unnecessary tensions with Asian neighbors in light of the history of controversies over the enshrinement of Class A war criminals.”

In the end, Koizumi chose to visit the Yasukuni Shrine on August 13, 2001, two days prior to the anniversary of the war’s end. After his visit, Koizumi issued a statement to express his remorse for damages and pains that Japan’s “colonial rule” and “aggression” had inflicted on its Asian neighbors. He also stated that he had avoided the anniversary to prevent people both inside and outside Japan from misunderstanding his true intention, to thank
war dead for “Japan’s peace and prosperity” and “pray for peace,” rather than to honor Class A war criminals and justify Japan’s past aggression.35

Nevertheless, Koizumi’s visit drew heavy criticisms from both his supporters and his critics. Chief secretaries of prefectural LDP associations expressed their disappointment with Koizumi for not honoring his original promise to visit the Yasukuni Shrine on the anniversary.36 The nonpartisan Association of Diet Members Who Support Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (Koizumi Sōri no Yasukuni Jinja Sanpai wo Jitsugensaseru Chōtōha Kokkaigiin Yūshi no Kai) also criticized Koizumi for giving in to pressure from South Korea and China and pressed him to honor his promise the following year.37 On the other hand, Koizumi was denounced by left-leaning Japanese NGOs that had opposed his visit. These NGOs created the Asian Association of Plaintiffs against Prime Minister Koizumi’s Unconstitutional Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (Koizumi Shushō Yasukuni Sanpai Iken Ajia Soshōdan) and filed five different lawsuits against Koizumi between October and November 2001. The plaintiffs, including members of the Association of South Korean Victims and Bereaved Families of the Pacific War, argued that Koizumi’s visit had violated the constitutional separation of religion and state as well as caused them psychological pain.38 Furthermore, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing “deep regret for Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, the symbol of Japan’s militarism,” which enshrined “the war criminals that destroyed world peace and inflicted indescribable damages on neighboring countries.”39 China’s Foreign Ministry issued a similar criticism, though it did recognize the changed date of his visit—August 13 rather than 15—as evidence that the Japanese government had considered the feelings of its neighbors. But the People’s Congress dismissed the changed date as “trivial,” compared with “the fundamental issue of how Japan should understand its history of aggression.”40

Despite these criticisms, Koizumi continued to visit the Yasukuni Shrine annually, and the controversy over his visit began to intersect with the changing landscape of world politics. For example, after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, led to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Koizumi’s government deployed the SDF to support the US-led coalition and created laws to specify what the Japanese government and the SDF could do if Japan became involved in an armed conflict. In late 2004, Koizumi’s government also pushed UN reforms to expand the membership of the Security Council, so that Japan could become a new council
member. South Korea and China, however, did not support Japan expanding its military capability and gaining greater influence in international society: the two countries did not trust Japan because they were not convinced of the sincerity of Japan’s contrition for its past wrongdoings.

The growing tensions in the region reached a new level of intensity in spring 2005. First, in late February, the Shimane Prefectural Council proposed a bill to designate February 22 as a day to celebrate the incorporation of the disputed island, Dokdo/Takeshima, into Japan’s territory. This galvanized South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun to criticize Japan at the memorial ceremony celebrating the March 1st Movement, the demonstration against Japan’s colonial rule that had taken place in 1919: “Although the South Korean government has refrained from fueling the people’s anger and hatred, South Korea alone cannot solve the history problem. . . . Japan should investigate historical truths and truly express remorse and offer apologies and compensation. That is the universal formula for solving a history problem.” Then, in late March, UN secretary general Kofi Annan stated that Japan could become one of the new permanent members of the Security Council. Annan’s statement prompted Chinese citizens to launch petition campaigns against the UN reform and vandalize Japanese stores. The anti-Japanese sentiments in China escalated in early April, when the Japanese government approved the new edition of JSHTR’s history textbook. On April 9, approximately ten thousand protesters gathered in Beijing and broke windows of the Japanese consulate, Japanese restaurants, and buildings that housed Japanese companies. The protests spread to other major cities, such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Shanghai. On April 16, more than ten thousand protesters attacked the Japanese consulate and restaurants in Shanghai. The anti-Japanese protests continued in China until late April.

These strong reactions from South Korea and China were coterminous with growing nationalist commemorations in the two countries. The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan continued to criticize the Asian Women’s Fund for “trying to drive a wedge between the Korean Council and former comfort women” and refused to meet with the fund’s representatives. In fact, Usuki Keiko, one of the fund’s promoters and also president of the Association for Exposing Japan’s War Responsibility, was denied entry to South Korea because she was planning to meet with former comfort women there. When representatives of the fund finally managed to meet with seven anonymous former comfort women in South Korea and provided each of them with a letter of apology, atone-
ment money, and medical and welfare relief, South Korean NGOs and mass media denounced them as traitors to the Korean nation. These anti-Japanese sentiments, widespread among South Korean citizens, were reinforced by history education centered on the struggle of the Korean people under Japan’s colonial rule; for example, South Korean history textbooks positively described all forms of resistance against Japanese imperialism while negatively presenting all of Japan’s colonial policy. Between 2004 and 2005, the National Assembly also passed bills to authorize the government to investigate acts of collaboration under Japan’s colonial rule and confiscate properties owned by those who were judged as pro-Japanese collaborators.

Similarly, the Chinese government continued to promote patriotic education by defining Japan as the worst enemy in modern Chinese history. In 2001, for example, the Chinese government published new standard history textbooks for mandatory education that expanded descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre, and gave teachers the following instructions: “By showing pictures of the Nanjing Massacre and making students read diaries by the Japanese soldiers, the barbarity of the Japanese empire’s aggressive war against China must be exposed. . . . Students must be taught to relive the unspeakable tragedy and acquire deep resentment and intense hatred toward Japanese imperialism.” Indeed, many of the Chinese citizens who staged anti-Japanese protests in 2005 were younger generations who had been exposed to patriotic education in primary and middle schools since the 1990s. The commercial growth of print and digital media also fueled both nationalistic and anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese citizens, frequently ignoring the official distinction between “evil Japanese fascists” and “innocent Japanese people.”

Since the logic of nationalism dominated Japan, South Korea, and China, citizens in the three countries came to commemorate the Asia-Pacific War very differently. According to an opinion survey that Asahi shinbun, Dong-A Ilbo, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences jointly conducted in March 2005, 66 percent of the Japanese regarded the Yasukuni Shrine as a place to commemorate war dead, whereas 61 percent and 59 percent of South Koreans and the Chinese, respectively, regarded it as a symbol of militarism. Moreover, 43 percent and 48 percent of South Koreans and the Chinese, respectively, thought that an apology from Japan was the key to solving the history problem, whereas only 13 percent of the Japanese shared this opinion.
As the history problem escalated, Koizumi issued an official statement on August 15, 2005, the sixtieth anniversary of the Asia-Pacific War’s end by reaffirming Murayama’s apology ten years earlier: “In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Sincerely facing these facts of history, I once again express my feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology, and also express the feelings of mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, in the war.”52 Koizumi’s apology, however, did not help repair Japan’s relations with South Korea and China. Only after Koizumi’s successor, Abe Shinzō, refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine was the Japanese government able to stop criticisms from the two countries. The two successive LDP prime ministers, Fukuda Yasuo and Asō Tarō, also did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine out of consideration for diplomatic relations with South Korea and China. This shows that the LDP government recognized the constraint imposed by the international dimension of political opportunities, and it was once again willing to moderate its pursuit of nationalist commemoration.

The Compromise of Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Education

While the controversies raged over the Yasukuni Shrine and JSHTR’s history textbook, Koizumi’s government also tried to reform the Basic Act on Education to emphasize patriotism in school curricula. This move toward reform had begun in August 1999, when Obuchi Keizō’s government had created a new law to formally define Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem, respectively.53 Obuchi had also established the National Commission on Educational Reform in March 2000, and the commission’s final report in December 2000 had emphasized the importance of “educating the Japanese people in the new era” and recommended that the Japanese government and citizens should debate how to reform the Basic Act on Education for the new century.54 In March 2003, the Central Council for Education, too, had recommended that the act be reformed to put greater emphasis on the cultivation of “love for the country” (kuni wo aisuru kokoro).55

The recommended reform gained momentum in 2005. In May, Koizumi’s government submitted a bill to privatize the postal service, and the House of Representatives passed the bill in July. However, the bill was rejected at the House of Councillors in August when a significant number of LDP members voted against it. Koizumi promptly dissolved the House of
Representatives, and the election held in September propelled the LDP to a landslide victory, thanks to popular support for Koizumi’s reform-minded gestures. After the 2005 election, the coalition of the LDP and Kōmeitō began to discuss the content of a bill to reform the Basic Act on Education.

At first, the LDP and Kōmeitō disagreed over how to include patriotism in a bill. The LDP insisted on the phrase “to love the country” (kuni wo aisuru), whereas Kōmeitō wanted to moderate patriotism and suggested another phrase “to value the country” (kuni wo taisetsuni suru). In April 2006, the LDP and Kōmeitō reached an agreement to adopt the phrase “to love the country,” provided that the “country” should be understood as excluding the government, and that other phrases be included to express the importance of respecting other countries and contributing to international society. Koizumi’s government then submitted a reform bill to the House of Representatives in May 2006.

Opposition parties objected to the bill for different reasons. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) agreed with the government on the principle of patriotism but argued that the phrase “to love Japan” (nihon wo aisuru) was better because the word “country” in the government’s proposal had a connotation of prewar Japan’s ultranationalism. The communist and socialist parties were squarely opposed to the idea of legally specifying inculcation of patriotism as an educational objective. Specifically, they criticized the proposed reform of the Basic Act on Education as a step toward a future revision of Article 9 of the constitution to allow Japan to engage in war again.

While the 2006 regular session of the Diet was ending in June, the government and the opposition parties remained locked in heated debate. The coalition of the LDP and Kōmeitō therefore voted to extend deliberation to the next Diet session.

Then, during a summer recess, the LDP elected Abe Shinzō as new chairman. Abe had been more vocal about his nationalistic sentiments than his predecessor Koizumi. For example, Abe had felt that “it was a shame that the Diet passed the ‘apology’ resolution on the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end” because he did not think that Japan should apologize to the Asian countries that it had invaded. After Abe was sworn in, he promised to reform the Basic Act on Education as soon as possible and emphasized the importance of “cultivating in next generations confidence and pride as the Japanese,” given that “our country has the world-class natural environment as well as long history, culture, and traditions.” When the Diet resumed deliberation on the reform bill in October, however, Abe’s
government and the opposition parties could not work out a compromise. In the meantime, teachers’ unions and antiwar NGOs across Japan held demonstrations against the proposed reform, under the slogan “Stop the Deformation of the Basic Act on Education” (Kyōiku Kihonhō Kaiaku Hantai). Given its majority in both houses of the Diet, Abe’s government pushed the reform bill through the Diet in December 2006, while the opposition parties boycotted the vote in protest.

The emphasis on patriotism notwithstanding, the new Basic Act on Education retained cosmopolitanism. The preamble of the new act, for example, introduced “inheritance of the tradition” into the purposes of Japanese education, but it reaffirmed the cosmopolitan objective to “contribute to world peace and welfare of humankind.” The second article also introduced a new emphasis on the “cultivation of respectful attitudes to the tradition and the culture, as well as love of our country and native land that have produced them,” but again, this was coupled with the commitment to cultivate “attitudes to respect other countries and contribute to peace and progress of international society.” Thus, while the LDP finally succeeded in institutionalizing patriotism as a goal of Japanese education, it had to simultaneously reaffirm the cosmopolitan principles in the old Basic Act on Education. The process and outcome of the reform thus confirmed that, even for conservative politicians, the choice was no longer simply how to defend nationalism but how to combine it with cosmopolitanism.

**Joint Historical Research and Textbook Projects**

Indeed, cosmopolitanism expanded in the field of the history problem at large because more and more historians and educators joined the transnational network of NGOs supporting cosmopolitan commemoration. In fact, transnational projects by historians in East Asia had already begun to emerge in the early 1980s. After the 1982 textbook controversy, Japanese historians had formed the Comparative History and History Education Research Group (Hikakushi Hikaku Rekishi Kyōiku Kenkyūkai) in Tokyo in December 1982. Since August 1984, the research group had organized the East Asia History Education Symposium every five years by inviting South Korean and Chinese historians to exchange interpretations of historical events in the region. Moreover, in December 1997, the Japan History Education Research Group (Rekishi Kyōiku Kenkyūkai) and the South Korea History Textbook Research Group began holding joint symposiums on Japanese and South Korean history textbooks. They tried to understand how Japanese
and South Korean historians interpreted the history of relations between the two countries differently, as well as explore the possibility of creating common teaching materials. Then, in June 2000, the Japanese and South Korean research groups jointly published *Perspectives on Japanese and South Korean History Textbooks* (*Nihon to Kankoku no rekishi kyōkasho wo yomu shiten*), a collection of research reports by symposium participants. In addition, professors of history and history education from Japan and South Korea organized a joint symposium in Tokyo in December 2001, criticizing JSHT’s history textbook as “inappropriate as a history textbook that should seek historical truths and facilitate mutual understanding and peaceful cooperation.”

In contrast, it was difficult for historians in Japan and China to organize similar joint projects given the Chinese government’s policy. In 1994, Murayama Tomiichi’s government tried to start joint historical research with the Chinese government, but in fall 1995, the Communist Party’s propaganda department, the State Education Commission, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences reportedly issued a secret directive to ban Chinese historians from participating in research projects sponsored by the Japanese government. Although the Chinese side later retracted the directive, it still demanded that the Japanese side “should not engage in free exchange with Chinese research institutes and scholars. . . . Since Japan’s aggression toward China is an objective historical fact, there is no need for joint historical research to create a new historical understanding or reevaluate existing ones. . . . The problem is that Japanese people do not sufficiently acknowledge and feel remorse [for Japan’s past aggression].”

In July 2001, however, a small but important development occurred in Beijing. At the international symposium on Japan’s militarism organized by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Japanese participants proposed creating a forum for exchanging historical views and collaborating on historical education through the nongovernmental channel. The Chinese Academy welcomed the proposal and organized the Forum on Historical Understanding and Peace in East Asia in Nanjing in March 2002. At the forum, participants from Japan, South Korea, and China agreed to jointly produce a history textbook.

To implement the joint history textbook project, participants from the three countries held the first editorial meeting in Seoul in August 2002. The Japanese side consisted of university professors, high school history teachers, and members of Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21 and
the Asian Network for History Education in Japan—NGOs that had been demanding more extensive coverage of Japan’s past wrongdoings in Japanese history textbooks. The South Korean side consisted mostly of university professors and high school teachers affiliated with NGOs that had investigated historical facts about Japan’s wartime atrocities; for example, the Council for Correcting Japanese Textbooks (later renamed Solidarity for Peace in Asia and History Education) and the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. The Chinese side consisted of members of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, university professors and doctoral students in history and history education, and researchers at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, who specialized in the Second Sino-Japanese War and Japan’s wartime atrocities in China.69

Throughout the duration of the project, participants critically examined their textbook drafts. Their discussions became heated at times because the participants had different educational backgrounds and understandings of what historical research should be.70 Given these differences, the participants strongly disagreed with one another over the section on the Nanjing Massacre. The Chinese side originally submitted a draft that contained graphic pictures and descriptions of rapes, looting, and atrocities to illustrate how three hundred thousand people had been massacred. The Japanese side argued that students could not properly understand both the massacre and the Second Sino-Japanese War unless the textbook described the sequence of events that had led the Japanese military to Nanjing in the first place. Eventually, the editorial board decided that it was more constructive to develop a comprehensive picture of the Nanjing Massacre based on historical evidence than to pass down the Chinese government’s official commemoration to the next generation. The editorial board therefore decided not to present three hundred thousand as the correct number of dead, but to cite the various numbers of dead estimated at the Nanjing Military Tribunal and the Tokyo Trial and to provide detailed descriptions of historical contexts that had led to the massacre.71

Another point of contention was how to describe civilian victims of the Asia-Pacific War. At first, the Japanese side presented a draft chapter that discussed the bombings of Chongqing by Japan and the atomic and fire bombings of Japanese cities by the Allied powers as examples of large-scale damages to civilian populations. The South Korean and Chinese sides responded by expressing the following concerns: first, it might not be appropriate to categorize Chinese and Japanese victims as the same type of
victims of indiscriminate bombings; second, in countries that had suffered from Japan’s aggression, some people might think positively of the atomic bombings as bringing an end to the war; third, the Japanese side, for its part, might risk downplaying Japan’s war responsibility by emphasizing the inhumane aspects of the atomic bombings. In the end, the editorial board decided not to use the pictures of dead bodies that the Japanese side had originally submitted, but to focus on detailed descriptions of the capabilities of the atomic and fire bombs, and print Japanese survivors’ testimonies of the bombings.72

After three years of discussion, the editorial board published the joint history textbook, *A History to Open the Future*, in May 2005, in three different languages and countries. The editorial board noted that the textbook was meant to offer a counterpoint to the nationalist commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War in Japan—specifically, JSHTN’s history textbook that “justifies Japan’s war of aggression and colonial rule, distorts historical facts, look down on Asia from a Japan-centered xenophobic perspective, and promotes narrow-minded nationalism.”73 Between 2005 and 2007, about 79,000 copies of the joint history textbook were sold in Japan, 65,000 in South Korea, and 130,000 in China.74 After the publication of *A History to Open the Future*, the project continued and published the second and expanded edition of the textbook in September 2012.

In addition to *A History to Open the Future*, other joint history textbooks and teaching materials came out of similar collaborative activities by Japanese and South Korean NGOs in the mid-2000s: for example, *Gender in the Modern History of Japan and Korea (Jendā no shiten kara miru Nikkan kingendaishi)* by the Japan-South Korea Joint Commission for History Teaching Materials in 2005; *Confrontation of Japanese and Korean Histories (Mukaiau Nihon to Kankoku no rekishi)* by the History Educationalist Conference of Japan and the South Korea National Associations of History Teachers in 2006 and 2015; *A History of Japan-Korea Relations (Nikkan kōryū no rekishi)* by the Japan History Education Research Group and the South Korea History Textbook Research Group in 2007; and *Learn and Connect: A Modern and Contemporary History of Japan and South Korea (Manabu tsunagaru Nihon to Kankoku no kingendaishi)* by Japan-South Korea Team for the Production of Common History Teaching Materials in 2013.75

Along with these joint projects by NGOs, the governments of Japan, South Korea, and China also began to organize joint historical research projects in response to the escalating history problem. First, the Japanese and
South Korean governments launched the Joint Historical Research Project in May 2002, based on the agreement that Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō and President Kim Dae Jung had made during their summit meeting in October 2001. Between May 2002 and March 2005, the members of the project had meetings in both Japan and South Korea and published a final report in June 2006.\(^7^6\)

Mitani Taichirō, cochair of the project and professor of Japanese politics and diplomacy at the University of Tokyo, explained that they hoped to create “an academic community of historians that transcends national borders through the joint historical research project [because] the problem of history textbooks is rooted ultimately in various controversies over the history of relations between Japan and South Korea.” At the same time, however, he recognized that the creation of such a transnational academic community was difficult, “particularly in the discipline of history because every country has a tradition of national history . . . [and] the discipline of history contributed to the formation of nationalism.”\(^7^7\) Bearing this out, several South Korean members expressed their frustration with the Japanese side in the final report. In particular, they questioned why the Japanese side refused to discuss the issue of history textbooks even when it had motivated the joint historical research project in the first place. They also noted that both the Japanese and South Korean sides failed to adequately address nationalist biases in their own versions of history. Jeong Jae Jeong, a history professor at Seoul City University, observed, “Every commission member felt pressured to speak on behalf of his government . . . and this increased distrust and misunderstanding between the two sides.” Kim Hyeon Gu, a professor of history education at Korea University, was also disappointed that “neither side could move away from self-centered nationalism in any significant way.”\(^7^8\)

Although the project members were frustrated, they nonetheless agreed to continue the dialogue. The Japanese and South Korean governments then launched the second round of the joint historical research project in June 2007. This time the governments expanded the project by creating a new subcommittee on history textbooks. This new subcommittee was also the largest, consisting of twelve members.\(^7^9\) They held multiple meetings in Japan and South Korea between June 2007 and November 2009 and published a final report in March 2010. Again, Japanese and South Korean project members had strong disagreements over the interpretation of various historical events. The debates of the subcommittee on history textbooks were
so intense that one of the South Korean members later reflected, “Since both sides engaged in criticisms that came close to personal attacks, we could not have scholarly debates,” while another noted that “committee members were unable to have constructive discussion because they lacked mutual trust.”

Despite these problems, the Japanese and South Korean governments agreed in December 2011 to organize the third round of the joint historical research project.

Concurrently, the Japanese government started a similar joint project with China. At the height of anti-Japanese sentiments in China in April 2005, Japan’s minister of foreign affairs, Machimura Nobutaka, met with his Chinese counterpart, Li Zhaoxing, in Beijing, and they agreed to pursue a joint historical research project. After Abe Shinzō became prime minister in September 2006, he immediately visited Beijing to repair Japanese relations with China. During the summit meeting, Abe and Chinese president Hu Jintao agreed to proceed with a joint historical research project, and the two governments launched the Japan-China Joint Historical Research Project in December by commissioning a total of twenty historians.

The project was cochaired by Kitaoka Shin’ichi, a professor of diplomatic history at the University of Tokyo, and Bu Ping, a professor of modern Chinese history at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who had also participated in the production of *A History to Open the Future*. Between December 2006 and December 2009, project members held multiple meetings to discuss their research papers and exchange comments on the history of Japan-China relations. Then, in January 2010, the Japanese and Chinese governments published a final report of the joint historical research project.

The final report adopted a “parallel history” format: for each historical event or period, two different papers were presented—one by a Japanese historian and one by a Chinese historian. Despite this parallel-history format, papers written by Japanese and Chinese historians converged on the interpretation that Japan had waged a war of aggression against China. Another convergence was found in the research on the Nanjing Massacre. As Shōji Jun’ichirō, a historian at the Ministry of Defense, recounted, all members of the subcommittee on the modern-contemporary period agreed that it was more important to examine how and why the massacre occurred than to argue over the number of dead. In other respects, however, the Japanese and Chinese versions of history remained divergent. The Japanese participants tended to describe Japan’s aggression against China in terms of a
nonlinear and contingent sequence of events that resulted from a complex interplay between geopolitical situations and decisions made by Japanese government officials. Their Chinese counterparts, on the other hand, tended to see Japan’s aggression in terms of a linear and deterministic sequence of events originating from the Meiji Restoration.85

Moreover, the final report did not publish two components of the joint project: papers on the contemporary period (after 1945) and comments on all the papers. Originally, the Japanese and Chinese sides agreed to incorporate these two components in the final report. The Chinese government, however, reportedly intervened during the final stages of the project. After the Japanese and Chinese sides had negotiated for over a year, the latter eventually agreed to publish all but the six papers on the post-1945 period and the participants’ comments. Throughout the negotiations, China’s project leader Bu repeatedly told the Japanese side that they wanted to publish all the outcomes of the joint project, but it was difficult for them to do so because of “various pressures.”86

In January 2010, the Japan-China Joint Historical Research Project finally published its report with twenty-four papers on the history of relations between the two countries from the seventh century to 1945. Both Kitaoka and Bu evaluated positively the final outcome of the project because they believed that both Japanese and Chinese members managed to reach “the level of proper scholarship where both sides can say, ‘Even though I cannot agree with the other side’s opinion, I can at least understand how the other side came to such an opinion.’”87

Thus, despite their shortcomings, the joint projects promoted the logic of cosmopolitanism: the process of constructing historical narratives incorporated foreign perspectives, and the content of historical narratives focused on transnational interactions. Specifically, the fact that the national governments of Japan, South Korea, and China supported the joint projects demonstrated the degree of institutionalization of cosmopolitanism. Although national governments had previously focused on nation-building, they now began to operate as vehicles for “cosmopolitan nation-building” by combining nationalism and cosmopolitanism.88

New Dynamics in Domestic and Regional Politics

While these joint historical research projects were making progress, the LDP decisively lost an election for the House of Representatives in August 2009. In place of the LDP, the DPJ became the largest party in the Diet and formed
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a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party and the People’s New Party (Kokumin Shintō) in September 2009. Overall, the DPJ was less nationalistic than the LDP, partly because many of its founding members came from the JSP, the New Party Sakigake, and Japan New Party—namely, the political parties that had played a key role in increasing cosmopolitanism in Japan’s official commemoration in the early 1990s. DPJ members had not only strongly criticized Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine but also actively supported government compensation for former comfort women. In December 1999, for example, the DPJ had published the Draft Bill for Promoting a Resolution of the Problem of Victims of Wartime Forced Sex (Senji Seiteki Kyōsei Higaisha Mondai no Kaiketsu no Sokushin ni Kansuru Hōritsuan). This draft bill had held the Japanese government responsible for providing former comfort women with apologies and compensation to “restore their honor.” In November 2001, the DPJ had submitted the bill to the House of Councillors jointly with the JCP and the Social Democratic Party; however, it had been discarded because the LDP had opposed it by arguing that all issues of compensation had been resolved upon the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

After the DPJ took control of the government, former comfort women and their supporters hoped that the bill would pass the Diet. However, the coalition government headed by DPJ chairman Hatoyama Yukio faced many difficulties from the beginning. Hatoyama’s changing position on relocation of the Futenma Air Station for the US Marine Corps frustrated the US government, Okinawa Prefecture, and one of the coalition partners, the Social Democratic Party. Hatoyama’s illegal dealings in campaign finance also undermined his credibility. Since these difficulties were more urgent for the DPJ than compensation for former comfort women, the DPJ did not submit the bill to the Diet.

Furthermore, the DPJ faced growing diplomatic tensions with South Korea and China over Dokdo/Takeshima and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, respectively. In fact, ever since Japan surrendered to the Allied powers in 1945, the Japanese government had continuously engaged in territorial disputes over the islands with the two neighboring countries. For example, during the normalization talks between Japan and South Korea in the 1950s, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry responded to Japan’s claim over Dokdo/Takeshima by arguing, “Dokdo was the first victim of Japan’s aggression against Korea. With the defeat of Japan, it came back to us. It is the symbol of our independence. . . . Remember, if Japan tries to take over
Dokdo, it means another round of Japan’s aggression against Korea.”95 The Japanese and South Korean governments had continued to dispute their sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima until June 1965 when they had finally agreed not to resolve the dispute with the normalization treaty.96 The issue of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, by contrast, had not interfered with Japan’s normalization talks with China because Zhou Enlai had already decided to defer discussion of territorial claims over the islands.97 And yet, the negotiations of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship had been almost derailed in April 1978 when Chinese activists critical of Deng Xiaoping had landed on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to disrupt the signing of the treaty.98 While the Japanese and Chinese governments had signed the treaty by agreeing not to engage in a diplomatic dispute over the islands, fishermen and activists in both Japan and China had continued to assert their claims over the islands.99

Then, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands exploded in September 2010, when the Japan Coast Guard arrested the captain of a Chinese fishing boat near the islands: the fishing boat was operating inside territory claimed by Japan and collided with two Japanese patrol boats.100 In the end, the Japanese government, headed by DPJ chairman Kan Naoto, released the Chinese captain.101 This action prompted LDP members to criticize Kan for undermining Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and exposing the lives of Japanese citizens to security risks.102 Nationalist NGOs in Japan, most notably the Do Your Best Japan! National Action Committee (Ganbare Nippon! Zenkoku Kōdō Inkai), also voiced their criticism of Kan’s government and organized multiple protests between early October and December in Tokyo and Osaka.103 Former and current members of the Diet and municipal councils joined these protests, calling on Japanese citizens to defend the islands against “China’s aggression.” In turn, anti-Japanese protests broke out in multiple cities in China in mid-October, attacking Japanese department stores and restaurants, burning Japanese flags, and calling for the boycott of Japanese products.104

Although these anti-Japanese protests in China had subsided by November, they flared up again in summer 2012. This new round of disputes was set in motion by Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō, who declared in April 2012 that his prefectural government planned to legally purchase the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Ishihara’s plan collected nearly one billion yen of monetary donations. Realizing that Ishihara’s plan was on course to become reality, DPJ prime minister Noda Yoshihiko decided that it would be better
if the Japanese government, rather than the Tokyo metropolitan government, owned the islands. After Noda’s government purchased the islands on September 11, the Chinese government responded by sending six patrol boats—the largest number ever—to the islands, as well as cancelling events to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the 1972 Japan-China normalization. Moreover, Chinese citizens began to protest against Japan on September 15, and these protests spread to nearly one hundred cities on the eve of the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden Incident. This cycle of anti-Japanese demonstrations was much larger and more violent than those in 2005 and 2010.

Concurrently, the South Korean government pressed the Japanese government over the issue of comfort women. In October 2011, the South Korean Constitutional Court ruled it unconstitutional that the South Korean government had not taken appropriate action toward Japan with regard to individual compensation claims of former comfort women and A-bomb victims. Given the court ruling, Lee Myung Bak’s government brought up the issue of compensation with Noda’s government, but the latter maintained that it had been already resolved upon the 1965 normalization. Then, in December 2011, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan erected a statue of “13-year-old Comfort Woman” as a “symbol of sadness and anger” in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul. When the Japanese government requested that the statue be removed, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry rejected the request, stating, “The statue embodies the victims’ wish for Japan’s responsible action and restoration of their dignity” and “Japan needs to make an effort on the issue of comfort women.”

Increasingly frustrated with the Japanese government’s refusal to negotiate the issue of compensation for former comfort women and other South Korean victims, Lee made the first presidential visit to Dokdo/Takeshima on August 10, 2012, in spite of the Japanese government’s protest, where he erected a monument with the Korean-language inscription, “Dokdo, the Republic of Korea, President Lee Myung Bak, Summer 2012.” On August 14, a day before the anniversary of Korea’s liberation, Lee also stated that he would welcome Emperor Akihito to South Korea only if the emperor were prepared to “offer sincere apologies to those independence activists who died in their struggle against Japan’s colonial rule.” Then, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry distributed to its embassies and consulates 3.5 million copies of a pamphlet in ten different languages, which presented
Dokdo/Takeshima as “the first victim of Japan’s past aggression” and criticized Japan for “continuing its unjustifiable behavior.”

While Japan’s territorial disputes with South Korea and China deepened, the DPJ began to lose popular support because Noda’s government passed the bill to raise consumption tax from 5 to 10 percent in August 2012, while Japanese citizens were still grappling with the aftermath of the triple disaster—the earthquake, tsunami, and the nuclear accident—of March 11, 2011. Dissatisfied with the DPJ, Japanese citizens handed the LDP the majority in the House of Representatives in December 2012. This allowed the LDP to form a coalition government with Kōmeitō and its chairman, Abe Shinzō, to become prime minister again. The LDP and Kōmeitō went on to win the House of Councillors election in July 2013 and secured the majority in both houses of the Diet.

During his first term as Japan’s prime minister, between 2006 and 2007, Abe had worked hard to repair Japan’s relations with South Korea and China that had been damaged by Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. However, Abe had always maintained strong nationalist sentiments. In fact, Abe’s “greatest regret” (tsūkon no kiwami) during his first term was being unable to visit the shrine. Although he did not immediately visit the shrine after taking office in December 2012, he sent offerings to the shrine on annual festivals in April and October 2013, and his cabinet members visited the shrine.

Around the same time, South Korea and China also chose new political leaders who were more assertive toward Japan than their predecessors. In December 2012, South Korea elected Park Geun Hye, a daughter of Park Chung Hee, for president. When Park attended a ceremony commemorating the March 1st Movement in 2013, she characterized the relationship between South Korea and Japan as “victim and perpetrator” and demanded that Japan “squarely face its past and take responsibility,” so that the two countries could become partners. Moreover, in November 2012, the Eighteenth Central Committee voted in Xi Jinping for general secretary of the Chinese Community Party. In his speech to the assembly, Xi repeatedly emphasized the greatness of the Chinese people, signaling more assertive foreign policy. This was evinced by a significant increase in the number of Chinese boats and jet fighters entering Japan’s territories during 2012.

Park and Xi introduced a new dynamic into East Asia’s history problem by joining hands to press Japan. First, Park visited Beijing in June 2013 for a summit meeting with Xi. This was the first time any South Korean
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The president had visited China before Japan, indicating Park’s intention to strengthen South Korea’s relations with China. At the summit meeting, she requested Xi to build a memorial in Harbin for Ahn Jung Geun, a Korean independence activist, hailed as a national hero in South Korea for his 1909 assassination of Japanese prime minister Itō Hirobumi. Xi promised cooperation, and the Chinese government built a memorial hall, not simply a memorial, inside the Harbin Station in January 2014. On November 23, 2013, the Chinese government also unilaterally declared it would expand its Air Defense Identification Zone to include the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Partly responding to the increasing assertiveness of South Korea and China, and partly acting out his personal belief in the importance of love for the country, Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine on December 26, 2013. He justified his visit as an act to “honor war dead who sacrificed their precious lives for our country . . . and to renew my commitment to the renunciation of war (fusen no chikai),” whereas the South Korean and Chinese governments immediately issued statements to “strongly protest and criticize” his action. Opposition parties in Japan, too, criticized Abe’s action for escalating tensions in Japan’s relations with South Korea and China. DPJ member Okada Katsuya pointed out that the two countries criticized Abe’s visit because “the Yasukuni Shrine enshrines Class A war criminals and promotes a particular historical view . . . [that] justifies the Greater East Asia War as a war of self-defense and liberation of Asia.” JCP member Kasahara Akira also asked Abe, “Are you aware of this historical view that the shrine defends, and you still visit the shrine?” Instead of answering the questions in a straightforward manner, Abe indicated his defiance of the Tokyo Judgment: “It is true that the defendants were judged guilty of crimes against peace at the Tokyo Trial . . . but the sentences handed out at the trial are not valid according to our domestic law.”

In the end, Abe did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine again because the US government pressed him to make efforts to maintain friendly relations with South Korea and China for the stability of the region. Soon after Abe’s visit to the shrine, the US government expressed its disappointment with his action “that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbors.” President Barak Obama also organized a trilateral meeting between Park, Abe, and himself during the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in March 2014. Abe then briefly met with Xi in Beijing in November 2014 during the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit and
Chapter 4

held another brief talk with him during the Asian-African Conference in Jakarta in April 2015.\textsuperscript{125} Thus, just as during his first term as prime minister, Abe chose to compromise his own nationalistic sentiments in favor of Japan’s economic and geopolitical gains.

To prevent the history problem from negatively affecting Japan, Abe also decided to issue an official statement to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War. To this end, in February 2015, he created the advisory panel (21-seiki Kosó Kondankai) to reflect on the history of the twentieth century and to envision a new world order and Japan’s role in the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{126} Based on the advisory panel’s final report, Abe held a press conference on August 14, 2015, and read out a statement that had been officially approved by his cabinet. His statement exemplified the mixture of nationalist defiance and cosmopolitan contrition, consistent with the trajectory of Japan’s official commemoration since the 1990s. At the beginning of his statement, Abe narrated the history of modern Japan by positively evaluating the Russo-Japanese War as a historic event that “gave encouragement to many people under colonial rule from Asia to Africa,” on the one hand, and by clearly acknowledging “Japan took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war,” on the other hand.\textsuperscript{127} Similarly, he implicitly warned against South Korea and China by stating, “We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize,” while simultaneously emphasizing, “We have the responsibility to inherit the past, in all humbleness, and pass it on to the future.”\textsuperscript{128}

Although the governments and citizens in South Korea and China were critical of Abe’s statement, no huge controversy erupted, unlike in 1995 and 2005. For example, at a memorial ceremony celebrating the seventieth anniversary of Korea’s liberation, Park expressed her disappointment with Abe’s statement, but she also took note of his commitment to the historical view articulated by the previous cabinets, including Murayama’s.\textsuperscript{129} Similarly, while China’s Foreign Ministry stated that Japan should have made a “clear statement on its war responsibility” and offered a “sincere apology” to victims, it nonetheless toned down the statement by choosing not to use the phrase “strongly dissatisfied,” the ministry’s official expression of diplomatic protest.\textsuperscript{130}

In fact, in early November 2015, Abe, Park, and China’s premier Li Keqiang held a trilateral summit meeting in Seoul. At the meeting, the three leaders agreed to strengthen regional cooperation on security, economic, en-
environmental, and other issues facing East Asia and international society. After this meeting, the Japanese and South Korean governments also began negotiations to resolve the issue of former comfort women. These negotiations led to an official agreement on December 28, 2015, wherein “Prime Minister Abe expresses anew his most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. . . . To be more specific, it has been decided that the Government of the ROK [Republic of Korea] establish a foundation for the purpose of providing support for the former comfort women, that its funds be contributed by the Government of Japan as a one-time contribution through its budget . . . for recovering the honor and dignity and healing the psychological wounds of all former comfort women.” While it remains to be seen whether this agreement will resolve the issue of former comfort women “finally and irreversibly” as the two governments intended, the escalation of the history problem seems to have stopped, at least temporarily, as 2015 came to a close.

The Future of the History Problem

During this period, the history problem peaked once in the early 2000s, when Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine intersected with JSHTR’s history textbook and the changing landscape of world politics. It then escalated again in the early 2010s, when commemorations of Japan’s past wrongdoings combined with the territorial disputes over Dokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. But the history problem had deescalated somewhat by the seventieth anniversary of the Asia-Pacific War’s end, and the governments of Japan, South Korea, and China began to take steps to improve their diplomatic relations and promote trilateral cooperation.

Importantly, Japan’s official commemoration during this period consolidated the trajectory that had emerged in the 1990s: the coexistence of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. To be sure, the LDP regained control of the government and tried to use this political opportunity to reinvigorate nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration; for example, Koizumi and Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings were reduced in history textbooks, and the government continued to deny compensation to South Korean and Chinese victims. At the same time, however, even Koizumi and Abe reaffirmed Japan’s remorse and apology in their official statements. The new Basic Act on Education also maintained cosmopolitan principles, and the LDP government initiated the joint
historical research projects with South Korea and China. This was partly because political opportunities for nationalist commemoration came to be constrained by the growing scrutiny from the governments and citizens in South Korea and China, and partly because the logic of cosmopolitanism had been already institutionalized in Japan’s official commemoration during the previous period. As a result, the best the LDP could do was to compromise, not replace, cosmopolitanism with nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration. In this respect, the LDP turned into a mobilizing structure of both nationalist and cosmopolitan commemorations.

And yet, the future of East Asia’s history problem is still uncertain, because the LDP-led coalition government is still unwilling to decisively incorporate cosmopolitanism in Japan’s official commemoration, whereas South Korea and China continue to use nationalism as the dominant logic of commemoration. Given the latest dynamic and trajectory of the field, what actions can Japan, South Korea, and China take to move toward resolving the history problem? The next two chapters will prepare the ground for answering this question by unpacking the most important findings of the field analysis.
CHAPTER 5

The Legacy of the Tokyo Trial

The preceding chapters have analyzed how East Asia’s history problem evolved through continuous struggles among relevant political actors competing for the legitimate commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War. These actors included the government, political parties, and NGOs in Japan; the governments, NGOs, and victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings in South Korea and China; and historians and educators from the three countries. They defined their commemorative positions by drawing differently on nationalism and cosmopolitanism and tried to influence Japan’s official commemoration by exploiting available mobilizing structures and political opportunities. I argue that one of the most important findings of this field analysis is a striking commonality between proponents of nationalism and cosmopolitanism: both used the Tokyo Trial as a reference point to articulate their commemorative positions.

Conservative politicians in Japan consistently rejected the Tokyo Trial. In the immediate postwar period, Yoshida Shigeru, Hatoyama Ichirō, and other conservative leaders treated the trial as invalid on a variety of policy issues, including the release of war criminals and compensation for injured veterans. This rejection of the trial was perpetuated by LDP politicians, including Abe Shinzō, who labelled the Tokyo Judgment as “victor’s justice” and insisted that “Class A, B, and C war criminals were not really criminals.” Similarly, conservative NGOs that worked with the LDP, such as the Japan Bereaved Families Association and JSHTTR, rejected the “Tokyo Trial historical view” that blamed Japan alone for the Asia-Pacific War. Nationalist commemoration in Japan was thus consistently based on the rejection
of the Tokyo Judgment and, by the same token, the justification of Japan’s past aggression as a heroic act of self-defense.

Proponents of cosmopolitan commemoration, by contrast, accepted the Tokyo Judgment. Between the mid-1940s and the 1950s, the JSP and the JCP urged the conservative government to commemorate foreign victims of Japan’s past aggression by referring to war crimes that the Tokyo Trial had exposed. Left-leaning NGOs also pressed the government to compensate A-bomb victims based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which had accepted the judgment—since the Japanese government had started the war leading to the atomic bombings, it should take responsibility for A-bomb victims. Murayama Tomiichi’s official apology in 1995 was also consistent with the trial that had prosecuted Japan’s aggression.

Outside Japan, too, the governments and citizens of South Korea and China defined their commemorative positions in reference to the Tokyo Trial. They criticized Japanese prime ministers for visiting the Yasukuni Shrine where fourteen wartime leaders, prosecuted as Class A war criminals at the trial, were enshrined. South Korea and China also blamed the history problem squarely on Japan, consistent with the Tokyo Judgment that had defined Japan as solely and entirely guilty of the Asia-Pacific War.2

Thus, the relevant political actors in the field of the history problem each defined their commemorative position, explicitly or implicitly, in relation to the Tokyo Trial. The possibility of resolving the history problem therefore depends on understanding why the trial became such a key reference point for the relevant political actors and entangled multiple threads of controversy over Japan’s past wrongdoings. In this chapter, then, I first situate the debates among the political actors, illustrated in the preceding chapters, within the wider context of how ordinary citizens, intellectuals, and historians in Japan grappled with the problematic legacy of the trial. I then illuminate how that legacy came to fuel nationalist commemorations both inside and outside Japan, while preventing the full realization of cosmopolitan commemoration.

**Postwar Debates on the Tokyo Trial and War Responsibility**

During the Occupation, the majority of Japanese citizens already had mixed feelings toward the Tokyo Trial. Take, for example, *Peace Declaration Chapter One: Reflections on the Tokyo Trial* (*Heiwa sengen dai 1-shō: Tokyo Saiban oboegaki*) published in April 1949 by Nomura Masao, an *Asahi shinbun* reporter who had covered the trial. Nomura praised the trial for “proving
that . . . a war of aggression is the biggest crime in the world and, therefore, leaders who plan and start it shall be sentenced to death by hanging.” At the same time, he recognized many difficulties of the trial, for “even the eleven judges could not reach consensus. . . . In fact, these difficulties in the Tokyo Trial are indicative of those facing the entire world today. The trial deals with all sorts of questions about war and peace. What exactly is a war of aggression (shinryaku sensō)? Can we really attain universal justice when only the vanquished are prosecuted?” Similarly, Takigawa Seijirō, a former defense attorney at the trial, acknowledged Japan’s wartime atrocities and urged Japanese citizens, especially critics of the trial, not to turn back to pre-war nationalism, though he thought of the trial as a “farce” whose storyline had been decided by the Allied powers. As political scientist Ōnuma Yasuaki pointed out, neither complete acceptance nor complete rejection of the Tokyo Trial was widespread in the immediate postwar period.

Concurrently, Japanese intellectuals debated war responsibility (sensō sekinin) more generally—how to distribute responsibility among Emperor Hirohito, politicians, intellectuals, and citizens—in conjunction with the Tokyo Trial. Their debates often used as their reference point Karl Jaspers’s The Question of German Guilt, which delineated four types of war guilt: criminal guilt of those who actually committed war crimes; political guilt of leaders and citizens who supported the war; moral guilt that individuals could only voluntarily feel by critically reflecting on their wartime behaviors; and metaphysical guilt in the eyes of God. Perhaps Tsurumi Shunsuke, a professor of philosophy at Tokyo Institute of Technology, was the best-known intellectual who drew on Jaspers to examine Japan’s war responsibility. Soon after the Occupation ended, Tsurumi observed, “Precisely because an examination of war responsibility as a legal issue is now concluded, I think that every one of us should examine our own war responsibility and give new directions to our morality (rinri). I doubt that the issue [of war responsibility] can be terminated simply by making Mr. Tōjō a scapegoat.” In January 1959, Tsurumi also published “The Problem of War Responsibility” (Sensō sekinin no mondai) to criticize the tendency among Japanese intellectuals and citizens to discuss war responsibility either in the legal-criminal or religious-metaphysical sense without adequately examining their political and moral guilt as individual members of prewar Japan.

While Tsurumi emphasized the moral perspective on war responsibility as a participant in the Asia-Pacific War, Maruyama Masao, one of the most prominent political theorists in the postwar era, discussed war responsibility
mostly in the political sense. Given his theory of ultranationalism, which explained Japan’s past aggression in terms of the emperor-centered polity that dominated individual psychological processes, Maruyama attributed war responsibility mostly to government leaders who had been closely associated with the emperor and practically absolved the majority of Japanese citizens of war responsibility. By contrast, Maruyama’s younger critic, celebrated writer Yoshimoto Takaaki, thought that older generations, including Maruyama, bore war responsibility in the sense of having failed to resist the emperor-centered polity. Nevertheless, Yoshimoto also failed to critically reflect on his own generation’s war responsibility because he ultimately attributed the Japanese military’s cruelty, and even the origin of the emperor-centered polity itself, to the impersonal “folk customs” of the Japanese people. Whether focusing on the emperor or the folk, much of the postwar debate on Japan’s past aggression did not adopt the moral perspective to probe into war responsibility of individual citizens, as Tsurumi tried to do by following Jaspers.

Tsurumi also brought another new perspective on Japan’s past aggression. In January 1956, he published “Intellectuals’ War Responsibility” (Chishikijin no sensō sekinin) and proposed the concept of the “Fifteen-Year War” that designated the 1931 Mukden Incident as the beginning of the war that had ended in August 1945. This was a significant departure from the concept of the “Pacific War,” popularized during the Occupation, that focused on Japan’s war with the United States, for the “Fifteen-Year War” foregrounded Japan’s victimization of China. Tsurumi further reinforced Japan’s identity as a perpetrator in the Asia-Pacific War by organizing the Citizen’s League for Peace in Vietnam with his colleagues, including the activist and writer Oda Makoto, and criticizing Japan’s complicity in the Vietnam War.

Ienaga Saburō, too, endorsed the concept of the Fifteen-Year War both in his history textbooks and through his textbook lawsuits in the 1960s. Two of Ienaga’s essays, “The Fifteen-Year War and Pal’s Dissenting Opinion” (15-nen Sensō to Pal Hanketsusho) in November 1967 and “A Tentative Argument on the International Military Tribunal for the Far East” (Kyokutō Saiban ni tsuiteno shiron) in August 1968, emphasized the continuity between Japan’s aggression against China and Japan’s war with the United States. Ienaga, however, also expressed ambivalence toward the Tokyo Trial: “Since the victors judged the vanquished, the former’s war crimes were exempted, and only the latter’s war crimes were prosecuted. . . . In this regard, it is difficult to deny that the trial was imperfect as a mechanism of
‘justice and fairness.’” Although Ienaga dedicated much of his career to exposing Japan’s war crimes, he was also deeply troubled by the failure to prosecute the atomic bombings by the United States and atrocities committed by the Soviet Union against Japanese civilians and soldiers.

Here, Ienaga’s discussion of Japan’s past wrongdoings vis-à-vis the Tokyo Trial was part of the incipient intellectual movement in the 1960s that began to connect discussion of war responsibility with a critical assessment of the trial. This movement was initiated by Takeuchi Yoshimi, a writer and China scholar, who published “Overcoming Modernity” (Kindai no chōkoku) and “On War Responsibility” (Sensō sekinin ni tsuite), in 1959 and 1960, respectively. By observing arguments advanced by Tsurumi, Maruyama, and others, Takeuchi argued,

In both German and Japanese cases, prosecutors argued that Germany and Japan had waged wars of aggression, and these wars were aggression against civilizations. The judgments supported this argument, but I am skeptical about them. At the same time, I cannot accept the argument that the plaintiffs and defense lawyers made at the Tokyo Trial—namely, Japan waged a war of self-defense, not of aggression. . . . I therefore conclude that the Japanese are responsible for the war of aggression [against Asian countries], but the Japanese should not be held responsible one-sidedly for the war between the imperial powers (tai teikokushugi sensō).

Takeuchi’s intervention notwithstanding, the debate on the Tokyo Trial among Japanese intellectuals remained limited, and it tended to be philosophical, lacking empirical investigation of the trial as a historical event.

Around 1980, however, the intellectual debate on the Tokyo Trial finally took off, as a growing number of legal scholars and historians began to study the trial empirically. In 1979, professors of law and history, librarians, and journalists in Japan created the Tokyo Trial Study Group (Tokyo Saiban Keiyūkai), which held meetings to discuss historical facts and implications surrounding the trial. Moreover, B. V. A. Röling, one of the eleven judges at the trial, published two edited volumes on the trial in 1977, and R. John Pritchard, a historian based in London, began to edit and publish the trial proceedings in 1981. These activities inside and outside Japan led to the International Symposium on the Tokyo Trial in Tokyo in May 1983 to mark the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Tokyo Judgment. This symposium enlisted nineteen participants, including some of the foremost
experts on the history of the Asia-Pacific War and international law, such as Awaya Kentarō, Ōnuma Yasuaki, Ienaga Saburō, R. John Pritchard, Richard Minear, and B. V. A. Röling.22

Reflecting on the two-day symposium, one of the organizers, Andō Nisuke, a professor of international law at Kobe University, summed up the task for Japanese historians and citizens in terms of going beyond the dichotomous view of the Tokyo Trial:

One position is to accept the majority opinion based on the prosecutors’ argument, and condemn the aggressive nature of the Japanese government’s action and the cruelty of the Japanese military’s behaviors. The other is to completely reject the majority opinion by invoking the defense team’s argument and, in particular, Justice Pal’s argument that the Japanese government and military merely engaged in unavoidable acts of self-defense, and Japan was therefore not guilty. However, I suspect that the truth lies in the middle of these two positions. . . . In short, what the Japanese should do is not to take the black-and-white, categorical approach toward the Tokyo Trial but instead to consider the entirety of the trial as objectively as possible and distinguish elements of the trial that we should use for future cases from those that we should not.23

Such rejection of the dichotomous view consolidated in the 1990s. Even Fujioka Nobukatsu and his colleagues in the Liberal Historical Research Group at least initially attempted to critique the dichotomy.24 In fact, while extremists on both the left and the right continued to adopt the dichotomous view, its rejection seemed to be firmly entrenched among younger generations of historians on both sides of the political spectrum. Take, for example, Ushimura Kei (born in 1959) and Higurashi Yoshinobu (born in 1962), two of the most prominent right-leaning Japanese historians in the younger generation. Ushimura is currently a professor at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies, and Higurashi is a professor at Teikyō University. Ushimura published Beyond the “Judgment of Civilization”: the Intellectual Legacy of the Japanese War Crimes Trials, 1946–1949 (“Bunmei no sabaki” wo koete: tainichi senpan saiban dokkai no kokoromi) in 2001, while Higurashi published International Relations of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial: Power and Norms in International Politics (Tokyo Saiban no kokusai kankei: kokusai seiji ni okeru kenryoku to kihan) in 2002. These works propelled Ushimura and Higurashi to the status of foremost experts on the trial in
Japan. Despite their differences, Ushimura and Higurashi shared the same position on the Tokyo Judgment: it was neither the “judgment of civilization” nor “victor’s justice.” Both Ushimura and Higurashi rejected the binary opposition in favor of a more empirically rigorous approach to understanding the trial in its full complexity and ambiguity.

Ushimura was particularly vocal in his criticism of “historically uninformed, narrow-minded nationalists who tried to argue that Japan was not guilty on all accounts.” Even though Ushimura took a sympathetic stance toward JSHTTR members, including his former teacher Nishio Kanji, he blamed older generations of Japanese intellectuals for having approached the Tokyo Trial historical view as a moral, rather than empirical, problem. He also criticized Japanese nationalists who refused to listen to criticisms from abroad. Instead, he insisted that it was crucial to approach the international controversy surrounding the Tokyo Trial with “empathy—an act of thoroughly placing oneself in the other’s position, no matter how difficult it may be.” Ushimura consistently promoted an empirically grounded approach to understanding both the history of the Asia-Pacific War and its divergent commemorations by different groups of actors.

While Ushimura and Higurashi represented voices from the right of the political spectrum, similar calls for a more rigorous approach were also heard from the younger generation of left-leaning Japanese historians. For example, Totani Yuma (born in 1972), a professor of history at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, published The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II (Tokyo Saiban: Dai Niji Taisen go no hō to seigi no tsuikyū) in both Japanese and English in 2008. She worked with Kasahara Tokushi and Yoshida Yutaka, two of the most prominent Japanese historians of Japan’s war crimes, and collaborated with an international team of scholars critically exploring the potentials and limitations of the Tokyo Trial as a model for international criminal justice in the contemporary world. In this regard, Totani followed in the footsteps of older left-leaning scholars in Japan, but she also tried to inject more empirical rigor into the debate and challenged the existing research on the trial by drawing on hitherto unused archival materials.

To be sure, historians have no authority to change the judicial judgment of the Tokyo Trial, but they can nonetheless problematize its historical judgment. As Paul Ricoeur observed, judges must decisively rule upon and close cases, something historians can never do. Historians must always submit historical facts and interpretations “to the critique of the corporation
of historians . . . to an unending process of revision, which makes the writing of history a perpetual rewriting. This openness to rewriting marks the difference between a provisional historical judgment and a definitive judicial judgment.” A critical reassessment of this kind offers a crucial first step in resolving East Asia’s history problem by helping to disentangle commemorative positions of relevant political actors from the problematic Tokyo Judgment.

**Beyond “Victor’s Justice”: Collectively Confronting the Imperial Past**

One of the most problematic elements in the historical judgment of the Tokyo Trial concerns “war responsibility,” that is, responsibility for causing the Asia-Pacific War. The Tokyo Trial historical view blames Japan solely and entirely for the wars with China and the Allied powers between 1931 and 1945 and presents Japan’s actions as self-propelled by taking them out of their specific historical contexts. From a long-term perspective, however, Japan’s actions were deeply embedded in the historical context of the Western imperial domination of Asian countries. At the 1983 international symposium on the Tokyo Trial, for example, Yu Xinchun, a Chinese professor of Japanese history at Nankai University, argued, “From the Chinese perspective, the victor countries—Britain, the Netherlands, France, and the United States—are all ‘thieves,’” though he pointed out that Japan had been the most horrible thief from the 1920s onward. Yu was disappointed with the limited scope of the trial, but he was also certain that “in the long run, humankind will surely put colonialism on trial.” From a short-term historical perspective, too, the Japanese government had not planned to launch attacks on the Allied powers when it invaded Manchuria in 1931. Japan’s act of entering war with the Allied powers was contingent on a nonlinear sequence of decisions that the Japanese government took by responding to the Allied powers’ economic sanctions and the changing political and military situation in Europe. In this sense, agency for causing the war was distributed among multiple actors—Japan, the United States, Britain, and so on—even though Japan no doubt had the largest share in this collective agency.

Yet, this collective distribution of agency vis-à-vis war responsibility was impossible because of the structure of the Tokyo Trial, whereby the victor countries prosecuted the vanquished. Collective distribution of the cause of the war would have risked allowing Japan to evade its responsibility and, more importantly, would have called into question the narrative of the “good
war,” which created positive identity for the Allied powers, especially for the United States. According to Röling, “a trial in which vanquished and victors should both be held in judgment” was impossible, given geopolitics and international laws at the time. Indeed, legal mechanisms to authorize such a trial still do not exist today. In essence, then, the Tokyo Judgment was itself a nationalist commemoration that eliminated ambiguities of the past and legitimated the particular version of the past that favored the Allied powers.

It is thus hardly surprising that the Tokyo Trial historical view made the majority of Japanese citizens ambivalent and angered Japanese nationalists to brand the judgment as “victor’s justice.” In fact, participants in the trial knew that the trial was unfair. In May 1946, Ben Bruce Blakeney, a defense attorney for the Class A war crime suspects, questioned why killing in war by the Allied powers was considered legal, whereas the same act by Japan was prosecuted as criminal. He then brought up the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and argued that if the Japanese generals who had planned the attack on Pearl Harbor were to be prosecuted for murder, the chief of staff who had planned the atomic bombing of Japan and the pilot who had dropped the bomb should be prosecuted as well. This problem of victor’s justice was most forcefully criticized by the Indian judge Radhabinod Pal in his dissenting opinion: “If it is really law which is being applied I would like to see even the members of the victor nations being brought before such tribunals. I refuse to believe that had that been the law, none of the victors in any way violated the same and that the world is so depraved that no one even thinks of bringing such persons to book for their acts.” Even Röling, who disagreed with Pal and firmly believed that the trial was an important milestone in the development of international law, admitted that the trial had elements of victor’s justice: “Of course, in Japan we were all aware of the bombings and the burnings of Tokyo and Yokohama and other big cities. It was horrible that we went there for the purpose of vindicating the laws of war, and yet saw every day how the Allies had violated them dreadfully.”

Nevertheless, the fact that the Tokyo Judgment had elements of victor’s justice does not justify the Japanese nationalist position that Japan, therefore, committed no war crimes. The two wrongs—the acts of aggression committed by Japan and the Allied powers—do not make a right. Instead, as philosopher Ashis Nandy pointed out, “Culpability, Pal sought to argue in his Tokyo judgment, could never be divisible and responsibility, even
when individual, could paradoxically be fully individual only when seen as collective and, in fact, global.”38 But elements of victor’s justice prevented such articulation of Japan’s share of war responsibility with the actions of the Allied powers.

Such distribution of war responsibility would also create a new set of challenges. To begin with, it would risk obscuring the legal and moral responsibility of Japan. This risk is compounded by the failure to adequately inform Japanese citizens of their country’s war crimes. During and after the Occupation, SCAP decided not to disseminate the trial proceedings widely, while Japanese newspapers focused on counterarguments that the defendants put forward.39 This allowed the majority of Japanese citizens to underestimate the extent of the suffering that Japan had inflicted upon people in the Asia-Pacific. As Totani Yuma pointed out, a large amount of the evidence for Japan’s wartime atrocities that prosecutors submitted to the tribunal still needs to be analyzed, and scholars have yet to tap into a vast corpus of “the records of national war crimes trials that individual Allied governments held in the Pacific region after the war. There were more than 2,200 trials against some 5,600 war crimes suspects at 51 locations in Australia, Burma, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and on other Pacific islands.”40 The idea of collective agency in causing the Asia-Pacific War thus risks letting Japan discount its war responsibility even further.

More importantly, collective distribution of war responsibility would challenge the former Allied powers to face up to their own history of imperialist aggression and colonial rule and to problematize their triumphant, nationalist commemorations. As John Dower and other historians have demonstrated, the Asia-Pacific War was a war between imperial powers embracing racist ideologies as well as between fascist and liberal-democratic countries.41 But it is difficult for the former Allied powers to admit the wrongs of their imperialist aggression because they have remained dominant over their former colonies since the war’s end. To be sure, at the 2001 World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in South Africa, some Western countries expressed “regret” for the fact that “colonialism has led to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and that Africans and people of African descent, and people of Asian descent and indigenous peoples were victims of colonialism and continue to be victims of its consequences.”42 However, the former imperial powers have yet to offer clear apologies and compen-
tion for their former colonial subjects who later formed their own independent nation-states. So long as the former Allied powers remain reluctant to fully confront their imperial past that contributed to an outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War, Japanese nationalists will continue to regard the Tokyo Judgment as victor’s justice, and the majority of Japanese citizens will likely retain their ambivalence toward it.

In fact, the Tokyo Trial’s failure to confront colonialism obstructed Japan’s commemoration of the suffering of Asians, most of whom had been colonial subjects in the first half of the twentieth century. As historian Awaya Kentarō has argued, since the Allied powers sought to maintain their colonial rule after the Asia-Pacific War, war crimes that Japan had committed against Koreans and other colonial subjects were not adequately prosecuted. As a result, many Japanese citizens forgot Japan’s prewar history as an imperial power vis-à-vis the wrongs that Japan had committed in the countries that it had invaded and occupied. This “amnesia” of Japan’s imperial past exacerbated the history problem because it prevented Japanese citizens from understanding the depth of anger that South Korean and Chinese citizens felt toward Japan’s past wrongdoings. Especially for South Koreans, Japan’s colonial rule is integral to their commemoration of the war. As Lee Jong Wong, a law professor at Rikkyō University, pointed out, “The history problem between the Korean Peninsula and Japan originates from the colonial rule, not from the war. This is one of the factors that has complicated the history problem between Japan and South Korea and delayed reconciliation—the question is whether or not colonial rule can become an object of compensation and apology.” China, too, suffered from imperialist aggressions by the West and Japan and, consequently, Chinese history education emphasizes the importance of building a strong Chinese nation in order to prevent another national humiliation. Put another way, the world-historical perspective on imperialism and colonialism is the key to helping Japanese citizens fully commemorate Japan’s past wrongdoings and understand South Korean and Chinese commemorations.

To effectively recontextualize Japan’s past aggression in the world history of imperialism and colonialism, I suggest that Japan’s official commemoration be revisited from its margins. Take, for example, Korean soldiers who fought in the Japanese military. After the war’s end, a total of 148 Koreans were prosecuted at war tribunals across the Asia-Pacific, and twenty-three of them were sentenced to death. When Japan regained independence in April 1952, twenty-nine Koreans were still serving their sentence at
Sugamo Prison, even though they had lost Japanese citizenship upon the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. After release from prison, these Korean veterans formed an association to seek relief from the Japanese government: even though they had fought for Japan, they were ineligible for military pensions because they were no longer Japanese citizens. Similarly, bereaved families of Korean soldiers received no relief from the Japanese government.

Opposition parties noticed this problem and occasionally pressed the government to provide pensions and other relief for former military-related personnel and their bereaved families, irrespective of citizenship. During the 1962 Diet session, for example, Ukeda Shinkichi of the Democratic Socialist Party argued, “Bereaved families of Japanese war gods receive relief from the government. Speaking of Koreans who fought and died as Japanese soldiers, by contrast, their parents, wives, and children who live in Japan receive no relief or pensions. I think this is a very serious problem.” Eventually, in June 2000, the Japanese government provided one-time condolence money for Korean veterans and bereaved families who had become permanent residents in Japan: 2.6 million yen for a bereaved family and four million yen for a severely injured veteran. The government, however, maintained that all issues of compensation had been resolved upon the 1965 Basic Treaty. Condolence money was therefore offered on the “humanitarian ground in light of the plight of aging Koreans who served in the Japanese imperial military.”

While the Japanese government treated South Korean veterans and bereaved families differently from their Japanese counterparts, the Yasukuni Shrine treated them as the same by honoring 21,181 Koreans as war gods. This angered South Korean bereaved families. In April 1978, a South Korean resident in Tokyo protested against the shrine, arguing, “My brother went to war only reluctantly. Even after South Korea became independent, my brother is still enshrined as a war god at Yasukuni. This does not let my brother rest in peace.” In response, the Yasukuni Shrine insisted that it was impossible to nullify the enshrinement: “When they died, they were Japanese. It is impossible for them to cease to be Japanese after they died. Since they fought and died, hoping that they would be honored at the Yasukuni Shrine, we cannot de-enshrine them simply upon requests from their bereaved families. It is also only natural to enshrine them because they willingly cooperated with the war effort and wanted to fight as Japanese.” JSP member Hirota Koichi clearly saw the contradiction in this: “These Koreans . . .
followed orders of the Japanese government and died in fighting. They are enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine. . . . But their families have received no compensation whatsoever because the Japanese government says they are not Japanese.”58 The government, however, continued to argue that the citizenship requirement made it impossible to apply the Military Pension Act and the Act on Relief for the Injured Veterans and Bereaved Families to foreign veterans and bereaved families.59

This contradiction in Japan’s nationalist commemoration has been increasingly exposed in recent years. After Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine in August 2001, bereaved families and war victims from both inside and outside Japan filed five different lawsuits to challenge the constitutionality of the prime minister’s visit. The lawsuit at the Tokyo District Court, for example, included 724 South Koreans as plaintiffs.60 At one of the court hearings, in February 2003, Kim Gyeong Suk, a former forced laborer and chairman of the Association of South Korean Victims and Bereaved Families of the Pacific War, forcefully criticized the contradiction: while the Japanese government offered no compensation for South Korean bereaved families, “the Yasukuni Shrine honors Korean war dead without asking permissions from their bereaved families. . . . Does Japan want to keep forcibly drafting our relatives even after their death?”61

Here, the focus on these South Korean veterans, bereaved families, and other marginalized victims can illuminate the real extent to which the Japanese government failed to recognize the suffering of foreign victims and, more importantly, how this failure angered the victims. It is difficult, however, to make Japanese citizens fully confront Japan’s imperialist past simply by collectively distributing the responsibility for the Asia-Pacific War between Japan and the Allied powers in light of the world-historical context of imperialism and colonialism. To be sure, such distribution of war responsibility can reduce the resentment toward victor’s justice among Japanese nationalists and ease the ambivalence among the majority of Japanese citizens. But the resentment and ambivalence runs deeper, for the elements of victor’s justice in the Tokyo Trial were reinforced by the failure to prosecute atrocities that the Allied powers had committed against Japan.

**Beyond Victim Consciousness: Doubling Japan’s Identity as Perpetrator and Victim**

Needless to say, Japan was a perpetrator in relation to South Korea and China. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians
suffered from the fire bombings and the atomic bombings, and atrocities were also committed against Japanese civilians fleeing Manchukuo and other former colonies. Nearly six hundred thousand Japanese soldiers were also forced to work at labor camps in Siberia after the end of the Asia-Pacific War, and approximately sixty thousand died in the camps. Nonrecognition of these Japanese casualties breeds a sense of injustice among Japanese citizens. In 2007, for example, DPJ member Matsubara angrily reacted to US House of Representatives House Resolution 121, wherein American politicians asked the Japanese government to apologize to former comfort women. Matsubara argued, “The United States has never apologized for the atomic bombings and fire bombings of Tokyo, killing innocent civilians systematically. But they ask us to apologize to former comfort women. Is this not a contradiction?”

Importantly, historians and educators in South Korea and China began to recognize Japan’s victimhood. *A History to Open the Future*, for example, included extensive descriptions of Japanese victims of the atomic bombings and other atrocities. This inclusion was a significant departure from mainstream history textbooks used in South Korea and China—none of the South Korean history textbooks prior to the 2000s had mentioned the atomic bombings, while some Chinese history textbooks had begun including only very short references to the events in the mid-1990s. The joint history textbook project therefore offered an important corrective to the nationalist commemorations in South Korea and China. Yao Bao, a history professor at Shanghai International Studies University, underscored the necessity of such a corrective: “When the victim accuses the perpetrator, the former should be careful not to exaggerate the latter’s guilt. . . . Many perpetrators are simultaneously victims. Those perpetrators sometimes suffer from more serious damages than some members of the victim country. . . . From the victim country’s perspective, this may serve justice. But, from the humanitarian perspective, members of the victim country should extend pity and empathy to the perpetrators to a certain extent.”

This recognition of Japan’s victimhood was perhaps most clearly expressed by Park Yu Ha, a professor of Japanese studies at Sejong University. In her 2005 book, *For Reconciliation*, she critically examined the nature of solidarity between Japanese and South Korean NGOs over various issues, such as apology and compensation for South Korean victims and JSHTR’s history textbook. Park’s inquiry was motivated by her uneasiness with the way Japanese NGOs “turned a blind eye to Korean nationalism when co-
operating with South Korean NGOs” and questioned whether Japanese NGOs in effect “helped Korean nationalism escalate and added fuel to the conflict by single-mindedly demanding Japan should apologize.” Specifically, she criticized the South Korean nationalist commemoration that dehumanized the Japanese other and pointed out the importance of recognizing how Japan, too, had suffered during the Asia-Pacific War:

The Soviet Army used more than 500,000 Japanese soldiers as forced laborers in Siberia after they had entered war with Japan at the final stage of World War II. The United States carried out the large-scale aerial bombing of Tokyo and killed 100,000 people over a single night. But these acts by the Allied powers were never officially prosecuted. In this regard, it is not surprising that many Japanese still believe that the Tokyo Trial was simply victor’s justice, and that Japan was a victim unfairly punished. A true critique must be based on universal values and therefore requires South Koreans to understand those feelings on Japan’s part.

Here, I agree with Park that it is crucial for relevant political actors in the history problem, especially those in South Korea and China, to fully acknowledge the problematic nature of the historical judgment of the trial. Such acknowledgement is likely to ease ambivalence toward the trial among Japanese citizens and help them become more willing to accept Japan’s fair share of war responsibility.

Of course, recognition of Japan’s victimhood is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it presents the risk of allowing Japan to evade its war responsibility. Many Japanese citizens actually did indulge in their own victimhood to discount the suffering that they inflicted on foreign others. On the other hand, recognition of Japan’s victimhood has the potential to not only help Japanese citizens lower their ambivalence toward the Tokyo Trial, but also allow them to mobilize their victim identity as a powerful psychological mechanism to generalize their experience and fully empathize with foreign victims. As former Hiroshima City mayor Hiraoka Takashi observed, the commemoration of the atomic bombings expresses the “human, primordial outcry” (ningenteki na kongenteki na sakebi) against the nation-state threatening to control commemorations in nationalist terms.

Indeed, the history of Japanese commemoration of the atomic bombings demonstrates the potential of victim identity to facilitate cosmopolitan
commemoration of foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. At the very beginning, people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki had the tendency to dwell on their own victimhood, and their attempts to commemorate the atomic bombings expressed an imperfect, self-serving kind of cosmopolitanism. But, at the same time, their commemorations already contained the seeds of genuine cosmopolitanism. A case in point was the “epitaph dispute” that occurred in 1952, when Radhabinod Pal, a former judge at the Tokyo Trial, visited the newly founded monument in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. The epitaph of the monument read, “Let all the souls here rest in peace; for we shall not repeat the evil.”69 After his visit, Pal remarked that while “we” apparently referred to the Japanese, the evil by those who had dropped the atomic bomb—Americans—was yet to be atoned. In response, Hiroshima City mayor Hamai Shinzō and the epitaph author, Saiga Tadayoshi, argued that “we” should include anyone praying in front of the monument, and therefore refer to the whole of humanity, in promising to renounce war and strive for world peace.70 As Hamai later recounted, Pal then agreed with him about the intention of the epitaph. According to Hamai, Pal stated, “I was just worried that Japanese citizens accepted the atrocious act by the United States, as Indians accepted violence and crimes by the British. But, if the evil refers to war, and if the epitaph expresses determination not to wage war again, that is a wonderful message.”71 Thus, both Hamai and Pal agreed that both Japan’s aggression and the atomic bombings by the United States were morally wrong.72 This universalistic impulse later allowed Japanese A-bomb victims to spearhead the efforts to commemorate South Korean and Chinese victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings.

Moreover, at its best, the commemoration of the atomic bombings articulates cosmopolitanism with world peace by rejecting war itself. As political scientist Fujiwara Kiichi argued, “Memory of the Holocaust raises a question about responsibility for standing up against murderers and destroyers. Memory of Hiroshima ethically questions war and demands absolute peace. The two episodes of wartime violence thus left two different lessons: responsibility for fighting a war and responsibility for eliminating a war.”73 The commemoration of the atomic bombings thus embraces the ethics of no war, as opposed to just war, by recognizing that even perpetrators can suffer because they are also humans. In this respect, the commemoration of the atomic bombings is radically cosmopolitan and demands that any critical reassessment of the Tokyo Trial ultimately question the very
existence of a war tribunal itself. This is why sociologist Ueno Chizuko, speaking at the symposium on “Hiroshima from the Feminist Perspective” in 2001, cautioned against being trapped by the concept of war crime: “When we define what a war crime is, we simultaneously define what is not a war crime. . . . I am concerned that prosecution of war crimes can justify some wars as legal.” For Ueno, the commemoration of the atomic bombings embodied the radical moral commitment to define war itself as a crime.

In summary, the failure of the Tokyo Trial to prosecute war crimes of the Allied powers contributed to the history problem. While nonrecognition of Japanese victims prompted many Japanese citizens to reclaim their own victimhood, this diverted their attention from foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings and suppressed the potential of Japan’s victimhood as a common denominator for extending empathy and solidarity to foreign others. In turn, the lack of recognition of Japanese victimhood at the trial facilitated nationalist commemorations in South Korea and China by depriving citizens in the two countries of opportunities to notice the complexity of the Asia-Pacific War, empathize with Japanese victims, and understand why Japanese citizens refused to see their country as the absolute perpetrator.

**Beyond the Government-Centered View of War Responsibility**

Addressing only the aforementioned two problems in the Tokyo Trial—failing to collectively distribute war responsibility among the imperial powers that participated in the Asia-Pacific War, and subjecting the Allied powers to the same standard of criminal justice and thereby recognize Japan’s victimhood—is, however, insufficient to move the relevant political actors toward resolving the history problem. Another major problem with the trial was the government-centered view of war responsibility that inhibited the active participation of Japanese citizens in discussion of Japan’s responsibility for foreign victims. By not indicting Emperor Hirohito, the symbol of the Japanese nation, the trial legitimated the historical view that only a small number of government leaders were responsible for Japan’s wrongful acts. Although some of the Allied powers, such as Australia, were initially keen to prosecute Hirohito, SCAP was opposed to it because it wanted to exploit the emperor’s symbolic authority to stabilize Japanese society while implementing reforms during the Occupation. In the end, the Allied powers agreed to suspend prosecution of the emperor and, as a result, the judges, prosecutors, and defendants framed trial proceedings to
shield the emperor from war responsibility. Here, exemption of the emperor from war responsibility had an important symbolic ramification: the innocence of the Japanese people, victimized by militarist leaders, was projected onto the innocent body of the emperor as a symbol of the Japanese nation.

This government-centered view of Japan’s war responsibility persisted throughout the entire postwar period. When South Korea and China criticized Japanese prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, they tended to target the Class A war criminals rather than Japanese citizens. This distinction between the guilty government and the innocent Japanese people facilitated normalization of Japan’s relations with neighboring countries in the short run, but it also ended up preventing the majority of Japanese citizens from critically reflecting on their own share of war responsibility. In reality, government officials had the power to start the war, but many Japanese citizens were also complicit in Japan’s aggression, albeit to different degrees, because they supported the government one way or another.

What is needed here is a concerted effort to carefully investigate and delineate shares of war responsibility among different groups of the Japanese, ranging from government officials to ordinary citizens. As Ienaga Saburō emphasized, “Documenting war responsibilities of ordinary Japanese citizens by making precise distinctions between different types of participation . . . is indispensable for preventing confusion and distortion in discussion of war responsibility.” Even though prewar Japan was not fully democratic, the Japanese government could not have carried out its imperial aggression without support from the majority of Japanese citizens. In this respect, the promoters of the Asian Women’s Fund took the right direction when they tried to justify the call for atonement money by stating, “Japan is not a country owned solely by the government but a country created by every citizen who inherits the past, lives in the present, and envisions the future.”

The very fate of the Asian Women’s Fund, however, shows how difficult it is to go beyond the government-centered view of Japan’s war responsibility. By collecting atonement money equally and voluntarily from all groups of Japanese citizens, the promoters ended up obscuring whether those who had a larger share of responsibility—contractors who had recruited comfort women, military officials who had helped manage the comfort women system, and soldiers who had used comfort stations—contributed atonement money. In a way, the promoters unwittingly reproduced the
slogan of “repentance by all one hundred million” (ichioku sōzange). This slogan was originally advocated by Higashikuninomiya Naruhiko, the first postwar prime minister, who argued, “Of course, the government made policy mistakes, but the declining morality among citizens also contributed [to the defeat]. . . . I believe repentance by all Japanese citizens is the first step in reconstructing our country.” Such a slogan was problematic because it distributed responsibility for Japan’s past wrongdoings equally among Japanese citizens, shielding relevant actors from their share of guilt.

In turn, NGOs supporting former comfort women continued to regard the Japanese government as the sole author of the military comfort women system. Take, for example, the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery in December 2000. This tribunal was organized by the Violence Against Women in War Network Japan in cooperation with NGOs from six Asian countries: the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery (South Korea), the Asian Center for Women’s Human Rights (the Philippines), the Shanghai Comfort Women Research Center (China), the Taipei Fund for Women’s Relief and Welfare (Taiwan), the Military Comfort Women Compensation Committee (North Korea), and the Indonesian Women’s Federation (Indonesia). The tribunal comprised four judges, from the United States, Argentina, Britain, and Kenya. During the five-day tribunal, former comfort women and Japanese soldiers were called upon to give testimony. The tribunal judged Emperor Hirohito, Tōjō Hideki, and other Japanese government leaders guilty of crimes against humanity such as rape and sexual slavery. The tribunal also called for the Japanese government to offer sincere apologies and compensation to former comfort women, fully investigate historical facts about the comfort-women system, and establish memorials, museums, and educational programs, among other things. Although the tribunal was an important achievement in exposing Japan’s past wrongdoings, it ended up reinforcing the government-centered view of war responsibility because it did not question Japanese citizens’ responsibility in the war crimes, not to mention local Korean complicity.

The government-centered view of war responsibility persists because the national government continues to play a central role in organizing commemorations and other social activities for citizens. For example, after his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine caused an international controversy in 2001, Koizumi created the Commission on Memorial and Other Facilities for Mourning War Dead and Praying for Peace (Tsuitō Heiwa Ken no tameno
In its final report, the commission recommended the creation of a new, nonreligious site of commemoration separate from both the Yasukuni Shrine and Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery, and argued that such a nonreligious site should permit people to pray for both military and civilian war dead, as well as for both Japanese and foreign victims of the past wars in which Japan had been involved. As critics pointed out, however, such a new site of commemoration, no matter how cosmopolitan it may be, would reproduce the government-centered war commemoration: “A new national memorial is expected to be non-religious, but its essence would be exactly the same as the Yasukuni Shrine’s. The creation of a new memorial by the government means that meaning of ‘life and death’ will continue to be defined by the government.” Here, the critics articulated the exact opposite of government-centered commemoration—namely, individual-based commemoration, where individuals as human beings would take the initiative to commemorate war dead, irrespective of nationality, as well as independent of governments. This may be the ultimate form of cosmopolitan commemoration, but such individual-based commemoration risks denying the historical fact that government leaders did bear the largest share of war responsibility. Moreover, East Asia’s history problem continues to be centered on Japan’s official commemoration, defined by the Japanese government. It is therefore neither desirable nor possible to make a complete break with the government-centered view of Japan’s war responsibility.

Thus, for relevant political actors in the history problem to go beyond the government-centered view of Japan’s war responsibility, they have to walk a fine line, distributing war responsibility among citizens without obscuring each citizen’s fair share. But walking this fine line is extremely difficult, and the failure to do so prevented Japanese citizens, especially those who had lived through the war, from discussing how they contributed to the actions of the prewar Japanese government. Since a large number of Japanese citizens did not accept their share of war responsibility, the mobilizing structures for cosmopolitan commemoration never became large enough to institutionalize a high level of cosmopolitanism in Japan’s official commemoration. But if they had done so, they could have contributed not only to making Japan’s official commemoration more cosmopolitan but also
to convincing South Korea and China of the depth and breadth of cosmopolitan contrition on Japan’s part.

The Role of the United States in the History Problem

The critical examination of the government-centered view of war responsibility also helps clarify the role of the United States in East Asia’s history problem. During the Occupation, the US government preferred attributing Japan’s war responsibility to only a small number of government leaders, while absolving both the emperor and the people. SCAP also censored criticisms of the Tokyo Trial not only by Japanese nationalists but also by leftist intellectuals who questioned the trial’s failure to prosecute Japan’s colonial rule of Korea and Taiwan. More importantly, the US Cold War policy had significant influence on the trajectory of the history problem. First, SCAP permitted Japan’s “amnesia” of its past wrongdoings by prioritizing reconstruction and rearmament of Japan over demilitarization and democratization, as well as by allowing former war criminals to return to power. Second, Japan and South Korea normalized their relations in the 1960s partly because the US government pressed the two countries toward greater cooperation given its geopolitical and economic needs at the height of the Vietnam War. Similarly, Japan was able to normalize its relations with China only after the US government changed its policies toward China and Taiwan in the early 1970s. Most recently, the US government put pressure on Abe to refrain from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, seek friendlier relations with South Korea and China, and reinterpret Article 9 of the constitution to expand the scope of overseas deployment of the SDF. Thus, the history problem in “East Asia” is transnational to the extent that it includes the United States as a relevant political actor.

The indirect but deep involvement of the United States in the history problem poses a formidable obstacle to any attempt to critically reassess the historical judgment of the Tokyo Trial. This is because such a reassessment would challenge the American commemoration of the “good war,” wherein the good United States triumphed over the evil Japanese empire. This good-war commemoration—coterminous with the Tokyo Trial historical view—was foundational to American identity as a champion of justice, democracy, and freedom throughout the entire postwar period. In a way, the A-bomb poet Kurihara Sadako foresaw the crucial role of the United States in the history problem. Although Kurihara’s famous 1976 poem opens with the
question, “When we say ‘Hiroshima,’ / do people answer, gently, / ‘Ah, Hiroshima’?,” the first thing readers hear—before the “anger” spit out by Asia’s dead and her voiceless masses—is “Pearl Harbor,” by the American voice.89

Indeed, for the sake of building their alliance, the governments of Japan and the United States treated the attack on Pearl Harbor and the atomic bombings as if they cancelled each other out. After returning from the United States in October 1975, for example, Prime Minister Miki Takeo emphasized the “forward-looking” (mirai shikō) nature of his meeting with US president Gerald Ford and argued that it was unnecessary to “bring up the past, such as the attack on Pearl Harbor and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.”90 Moreover, when JCP member Yoshioka Yoshinori argued that Japan should apologize to the United States on the fiftieth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Kaifu Toshiki’s government rejected the necessity of such apology because “apology for the attack on Pearl Harbor has never been an issue in Japan’s relations with the United States.”91 In turn, when President George H. W. Bush and President Bill Clinton justified the atomic bombings and rejected the necessity of offering apologies to A-bomb victims, the Japanese government remained silent, even though the JSP and the JCP demanded an official protest against the US presidents.92 As long as the Japanese and US governments refuse to fully confront the atrocities that they committed against each other, they are likely to perpetuate their respective nationalist commemorations: the attack on Pearl Harbor is justified as part of the war to defend Japan against the West, while the atomic bombings are justified to avenge Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and to save American lives.

Nevertheless, the disjunction between the Japanese and American nationalist commemorations did not develop into a history problem because the two countries avoided interfering with each other’s domestic commemorations. In the mid-1990s, however, the United States began to criticize Japanese commemorations of Japan’s past wrongdoings against South Korea and China, for a growing number of Asian Americans became interested and involved in East Asia’s history problem.93 Korean and Chinese Americans, in particular, actively commemorated Korean and Chinese victims and shared with other Americans their critical attitudes toward Japan’s official commemoration. For example, Korean Americans created the Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues in 1992 to lobby American politicians to press the Japanese government with regard to apologies and compensation for former comfort women.94 Chinese Americans also played a major
role in launching The Global Alliance for Preserving the History of WWII in Asia in 1994 to promote commemorations of Japan’s wartime atrocities and lobby politicians in the United States, Canada, and other countries.95

Typically, American citizens criticized Japan’s official commemoration by asserting their moral superiority. Take, for example, the exchange between Iris Chang and Saitō Kunihiko, Japan’s ambassador to the United States, on the PBS NewsHour program moderated by Elizabeth Farnsworth in December 1998. After criticizing the Japanese government for failing to apologize to Chinese victims of Japan’s past aggression, Chang said, “What I’m curious to know is can the ambassador, himself, say today on national TV live that he personally is profoundly sorry for the rape of Nanking and other war crimes against China, and the Japanese responsibility for it?” Saitō responded, “Well, we do recognize that acts of cruelty and violence were committed by members of the Japanese military and we are very sorry for that. . . . As to the incident in Nanking, we do recognize that really unfortunate things happened, acts of violence were committed by members of the Japanese military.” Then, Farnsworth asked Chang, “Did you hear an apology?” thus authorizing the Chinese American writer to determine the worth of Saito’s statement. Chang replied, “I don’t know. Did you hear an apology? I didn’t really hear the word ‘apology’ that was made.”96 The foregoing exchange illustrated not simply a lack of decisive apology on Japan’s part. It also exposed the assumption, shared by Farnsworth and Chang, that Americans had the moral authority to judge the worth of Japan’s official commemoration on behalf of Chinese victims.

This assumption about the moral authority of the United States is co-terminous with the US refusal to apologize to victims of the atomic bombings by justifying the act as a means to end the war and save “half a million American lives.”97 This justification is deeply anchored in the nationalist logic of commemoration that disregards how foreign others—the people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki—suffered. By refusing to confront the real human consequences of the atomic bombings, American nationalist commemoration eliminates the moral ambiguity of the bombings and protects the moral authority of the United States. Even though this nationalist commemoration has been challenged by critically minded American historians, it is still widespread among politicians and citizens in the United States.98

As Tzvetan Todorov pointed out, “Revisiting historical episodes in which one’s own group was neither 100 percent heroic nor the complete victim would be an act of higher moral value for writers of historical narratives.
No moral benefit can accrue from always identifying with the ‘right side’ of history; it can only arise when writing history makes the writer more aware of the weakness and wrong turns of his or her own community.”99 In this regard, Korean and Chinese Americans are prone to falling into the trap of nationalist commemoration because they can easily combine the “100 percent heroic” American narrative of the Asia-Pacific War with the Korean and Chinese narratives of “the complete victim.” For example, following the 2007 US House of Representatives House Resolution 121, Korean Americans and their supporters lobbied state legislatures in New York, New Jersey, and Illinois to adopt similar resolutions to condemn Japan for violating women’s human rights through military comfort stations. They also helped create memorials for comfort women in New York and New Jersey as well as erect a statue of a thirteen-year-old comfort woman—the same as the one in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul—in California in July 2013.100 Even though these resolutions and memorials express cosmopolitan commemoration based on human rights, they also risk doubling the logic of nationalism; that is, they commemorate Korean comfort women as complete victims from the American perspective, which assumes the United States to be the complete hero and moral authority, while ignoring atrocities that it committed against Japanese civilians. Similarly, the WWII Pacific War Memorial Hall, which opened in San Francisco in August 2015, appears to adopt a doubly nationalist commemoration, focusing on the suffering of Chinese victims and the heroism of American and Chinese soldiers.101 But, if Korean and Chinese Americans criticize Japan without critically reflecting on their own nationalism vis-à-vis the problems of the Tokyo Trial, they may very well add fuel to nationalist commemorations on all sides in East Asia, making the history problem intractable.

In short, there are both negative and positive aspects in the growing involvement of the United States in East Asia’s history problem. On the one hand, it may well make the problem even more protracted. Every time politicians and citizens in the United States call on Japan to apologize to victims of its past wrongdoings, they risk reinforcing resentment and ambivalence toward the Tokyo Trial among Japanese nationalists and citizens, thereby discouraging them from confronting Japan’s past wrongdoings against South Korea and China. On the other hand, if the American commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War moves in the direction suggested by Todorov, it will not only ease the ambivalence among Japanese citizens and encourage them to fully commemorate the suffering of South Korean
and Chinese victims; it will also set an example for the Japanese government to follow in confronting its “weakness and wrong turns” of the past. Thus, if the United States participates in the history problem in a self-critical and cosmopolitan manner, it can greatly help the governments and citizens in Japan, South Korea, and China to disentangle their nationalist commemorations from the Tokyo Trial and, instead, adopt more cosmopolitan commemorations toward each other.

**Toward a Critical Reassessment of the Tokyo Trial**

Simply put, East Asia’s history problem developed because the Tokyo Trial, a common reference point for relevant political actors in the field, was deeply problematic. As historian Alexis Dudden observed, the fundamental problem with any military tribunal is that “a legal order for a ‘correct’ history must silence other histories in order to declare the necessary guilt.” While the trial certainly played a crucial role in exposing Japan’s war crimes across the Asia-Pacific, the Tokyo Judgment was essentially a nationalist commemoration on the part of the Allied powers. Its problematic nature gave the Japanese government and citizens an excuse to discount their past wrongdoings and evade their war responsibility, while providing South Korea and China with a justification to blame Japan entirely for the history problem.

Thus, a critical reassessment of the Tokyo Trial is the key to challenging nationalist commemorations and resolving the history problem. First, elements of victor’s justice in the trial need to be critiqued in such a way that the responsibility for the Asia-Pacific War will be collectively and fairly distributed between Japan and the Allied powers in light of the world-historical context of imperialism and colonialism in the first half of the twentieth century. This critique will decrease the ambivalence that many Japanese citizens feel toward Japan’s war crimes and help them commemorate Japan’s past wrongdoings more decisively. Second, war crimes of the Allied powers vis-à-vis Japan’s victimhood need to be recognized. Such recognition will not only alleviate the sense of injustice among Japanese citizens but also allow them to draw on their own victimhood to empathize with South Korean and Chinese victims in a universalistic manner. In turn, recognition of Japan’s victimhood will help South Korean and Chinese citizens better understand Japanese commemorations of the war. Third, the trial’s government-centered view of Japan’s past aggression needs to be challenged to clarify each Japanese citizen’s share of war responsibility. This has the potential to make cosmopolitan contrition truly nationwide. Finally,
a critical reassessment of the Tokyo Judgment along these lines can be fa-
cilitated by the greater involvement of the United States as a relevant politi-
cal actor in the field of the history problem.

This critical reassessment is impossible without historians capable of
challenging nationalist commemorations, including the Tokyo Judgment it-
self. As historian Sven Saaler pointed out, “The writing of history is revision,
since historians continually re-evaluate sources in order to revise existing
theories or present new information or perspectives.” In this regard, his-
torians in Japan, South Korea, and China have a crucial role to play in the
history problem because they can generate an East Asian version of the
“historians’ debate” (Historikerstreit). As critical theorist Jürgen Habermas
argued, such a controversy among historians “only reflects the structure of
open societies. It provides an opportunity to clarify one’s own identity-
forming traditions in their ambivalences. This is precisely what is needed . . .
for the development of a historical consciousness that is equally incompat-
ible with closed images of history that have a secondary quasi-natural char-
acter and with all forms of conventional, that is, uniformly and pre-reflexively
shared identity.” While Habermas made these observations on the histori-
ans’ debate that took place in West Germany in the 1980s, his observations
captured the essence of historians’ debates anywhere. Indeed, a similar debate
began in East Asia at the transnational level in the form of joint historical
research and education projects. The emergence of these transnational proj-
ects created the possibility of problematizing nationalist biases in the “histori-
cal consciousness” of relevant political actors in the field. Chapter 6, then,
turns to a critical examination of this possibility and explores how historians
may be able to contribute to resolving the history problem.
At first glance, historians may not look like the best candidates for facilitating a resolution of the history problem. This is because historians have traditionally used the nation as a primary unit of analysis, helping to naturalize it as a primordial entity. They have also created professional associations and delimited their membership along national borders, consistent with the nationalist logic of self-determination; for example, when Japanese historians write about the history of Japan, they often talk among themselves without consulting with foreign historians who study Japan. This nationally bounded content focus and membership reinforces the logic of nationalism that divides the world into discrete nations. Thus, even though historians are not necessarily supporters of nationalism, they have participated in nation-building as authoritative narrators of national history.¹

But, at the same time, historians have regularly criticized nationalists for their tendency to simplify the past in order to create national myths and identity.² Historians are acutely aware that historical evidence is often incomplete to the extent that facts and interpretations of historical events are inevitably and inherently subject to controversy and future revisions. While nationalists often resort to emotionally charged commemoration to transform these open-ended historical controversies into immutable historical truths as foundations of national identity, historians contest such nationalist commemoration by exposing factual errors and unwarranted interpretations in light of available research.

In fact, over the last few decades, historians have become more critical of nationalism in the methodological sense, breaking away from the nationally bounded content focus and professional membership. Take, for example,
the recent growth of global and transnational historiography. Historians working in this new genre focus on economic, political, social, and cultural interactions that traverse national borders, challenging the idea of nation as a discrete primordial entity. Historian Eric Hobsbawm even suggested that any historiography should entail a global and transnational perspective: “Historians, however microcosmic, must be for universalism, not out of loyalty to an ideal to which many of us remain attached but because it is the necessary condition for understanding the history of humanity, including that of any special section of humanity. For all human collectivities necessarily are and have been part of a larger and more complex world.” Moreover, the norm has emerged that historians as well as history teachers should collaborate across national borders in writing history of past international conflicts, as evinced by the growing number of joint historical research and education projects in East Asia and other parts of the world. These joint projects represent the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism in historiography, which shifts a unit of analysis from the nation to transnational interaction while incorporating foreign perspectives into historical narratives.

In this chapter, then, I critically examine the potential for historians in problematizing nationalism and promoting cosmopolitanism in the politics of war commemoration. In recent years, the presence of historians in the history problem has increased, given that generations who did not experience the Asia-Pacific War became the majority in Japan, South Korea, and China—they learn about the war mostly from history lessons in school. In theory, then, historians who participate in joint historical research and education projects have the capacity to help these generations disentangle nationalist commemorations from the problematic historical judgment of the Tokyo Trial and move toward more cosmopolitan commemoration. But, at the same time, their actual influence on the relevant political actors in the field has yet to be systematically examined. To what extent did historians succeed in shifting governmental and public commemorations from nationalism to cosmopolitanism? What barriers did they encounter in trying to influence the dynamic and trajectory of the history problem?

**Historians as Epistemically Oriented Rooted Cosmopolitans**

To answer these questions, it is first necessary to understand the unique potentials of historians to act as “epistemically oriented rooted cosmopolitans.” Typically, *rooted cosmopolitans* are those based in a single country but
endowed with openness to foreign others. They include immigrants whose biographies and social ties crisscross multiple nation-states, and activists who mobilize advocacy networks to address human rights violations in various parts of the world. These rooted cosmopolitans show that openness to foreign others is not merely an individual attribute but also a collective property sustained by transnational networks. As sociologist Craig Calhoun put it, cosmopolitanism is not “simply a free-floating cultural taste, personal attitude, or ethical choice” but is instead always embedded in specific networks of actors. According to this definition, historians, too, qualify as rooted cosmopolitans because they develop transnational social networks by organizing conferences and other professional activities to exchange methods, standards of excellence, and training programs, which are open to all nationalities.

More importantly, historians are epistemically oriented rooted cosmopolitans. Historians participate in the politics of war commemoration in the capacity of what sociologist John Meyer called “Others,” those who are defined as disinterested bearers of “truths” and authorized to act as consultants for other political actors pursuing self-interests. In this respect, historians form “epistemic communities” with regard to the history problem, that is, knowledge-based networks of “professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.” Put another way, historians are regarded as experts in providing reliable data and authoritative interpretations for relevant political actors in the field of the history problem to justify their commemorative positions.

Their epistemic orientations distinguish historians from other types of rooted cosmopolitans in the history problem. Perhaps the most visible type of rooted cosmopolitan is advocacy-oriented: members of Japanese NGOs supporting South Korean A-bomb victims, former comfort women, and other victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. They extended solidarities across national borders, shared information and resources at the transnational level, and coordinated their actions to press the Japanese government to adopt the cosmopolitan logic of commemoration. These advocacy-oriented rooted cosmopolitans, however, unwittingly intensified the history problem because they sacrificed historical accuracy for political expediency. Many NGOs in Japan and South Korea, for example, categorically defined the comfort stations as rape centers and the military comfort-women system as sexual slavery by following the UN special rapporteurs. As anthropologist C. Sarah Soh critically observed, such a categorical definition is “a political act
in support of the redress movement” and a “partisan prejudice” that elimi-
nates complexities of the system that operated different types of comfort
stations and depended on Korean cooperation.13 The advocacy-oriented
rooted cosmopolitans in Japan thus ended up perpetuating nationalist
commemoration in South Korea while galvanizing Japanese nationalists
to reject the claims by former comfort women as fabrications.

In contrast, historians acting as epistemically oriented rooted cosmo-
politans have the potential to generate a different effect on the history prob-
lem. As historian Kosuge Nobuko pointed out, “The method of history, to
interrogate historical materials (shiryō hihan), is best suited for correcting
misunderstandings and distortions of the past. . . . By interrogating histori-
cal materials and conducting empirical research, historians cannot but
become humble and accept scholarly asceticism [against indulging in ma-
nipulation of data and distortion of descriptions].”14 Historians are there-
fore capable of critically reflecting on nationalist commemorations and pre-
venting historical inaccuracies and problematic interpretations from fueling
the history problem. Indeed, joint historical research and education projects
by historians in Japan, South Korea, and China have shown their potential to
generate mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations and promote the
cosmopolitan logic of historical research.

Nevertheless, not all joint projects are equally effective in critiquing na-
tionalist commemorations. The processes and outcomes of the governmen-
tal and nongovernmental joint projects show that the latter tend to be more
successful in promoting the logic of cosmopolitanism.15 The nongovernmen-
tal joint projects, most notably the History to Open the Future project,
allowed historians from Japan, South Korea, and China to criticize each
other’s nationalist biases. They not only incorporated dialogues with for-
eign historians more effectively into the process of historical research but
also shifted content focus from the nation to the interaction of nations.

The governmental joint projects, by contrast, appeared to have diffi-
culty facilitating mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations. In
fact, the Japan-South Korea Joint Project was severely constrained by Japan’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had long resisted revisiting the 1965
Basic Treaty between Japan and South Korea. The ministry feared that any
reinterpretation of historical events mentioned in the treaty, such as Japan’s
1910 annexation of Korea, would pave the way for new compensation claims.
One official in the ministry was reported to have said, “There is no room
for a joint historical research project to reinterpret the 1965 Basic Treaty.
Since reinterpretation of the 1965 Basic Treaty could lead to reigniting the problem of compensation, the possibility of scholarly agreement between Japanese and South Korean sides is extremely small.\textsuperscript{16} Similar constraints were also found in the Japan-China Joint Project, where Chinese historians were restricted by their government in publishing the results of the joint project.

I argue that the differences between the nongovernmental and governmental projects derive from the different frames of identification that they support. In general, two different frames of identification are available for participants in a joint project. The first is a nationally bounded frame, such as “Japanese,” “South Korean,” and “Chinese.” The second is a nationally unbounded frame, that is, “historian.”\textsuperscript{17} The nongovernmental projects foregrounded the nationally unbounded frame of identification—the historian who is concerned about the escalation of the history problem—and this framing allowed the participants to suspend their national identifications to a significant extent. The governmental projects, however, foregrounded the nationally bounded frame and positioned participants as representatives of their countries. For example, the Japanese participants in the Japan-South Korea and Japan-China Joint Projects were selected by the Japanese government without consultation with professional associations of historians, and these joint projects were all managed by foreign ministries of respective governments.\textsuperscript{18} This kind of structural constraint made it difficult for the participants to be open to foreign perspectives and dialogically transform their original positions.

The different processes and outcomes of the nongovernmental and governmental projects also appear to depend on the dispositions of participants—on the degree to which they were already open toward foreign others. For example, the Japanese participants in the History to Open the Future project included many left-leaning historians, such as Kasahara Tokushi, who had actively engaged in the social movement against conservative politicians and NGOs. The History to Open the Future project was, in some respects, an outgrowth of the existing transnational network of advocacy-oriented NGOs that had pressed the Japanese government regarding apology and compensation for foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. The dispositions of participants can also partially explain the struggle of the Japan-South Korea Joint Project, to which the Japanese government appointed Furuta Hiroshi, a history professor at Tsukuba University known for his belief in the Japanese people’s superiority over
Koreans. In turn, the Korean side included Lee Man Yeol, a chair of the National History Committee, who insisted that “any research on Korea must presuppose love for Korea. . . . Only with very strong love for Korea, Japanese historians can begin to understand Korean history correctly.” These two historians with strong nationalist dispositions sat on the same subcommittee and contributed to spreading distrust among other participants. The dispositions of participants therefore constitute another mechanism that can either facilitate or forestall mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations because they situationally influence interactional dynamics among historians. In short, due to the more open dispositions of participants, nongovernmental projects tended to be more successful than their governmental counterparts in incorporating foreign perspectives according to the logic of cosmopolitanism.

Nevertheless, nongovernmental projects have limitations, given their overlap with advocacy-oriented activities. Take, for example, the History to Open the Future project. Overall, the Japanese participants in this trilateral project refused to shy away from criticizing nationalist biases in South Korean and Chinese versions of history, and the South Korean and Chinese participants were willing to include descriptions of Japan’s victimhood and question official versions of history promoted by their own governments. The Japanese participants nonetheless sacrificed scholarly rigor for advocacy when they agreed to the first sentence in *A History to Open the Future*’s chapter 3, section 2.1, on the Second Sino-Japanese War: “On July 7, 1937, the Japanese military started the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in the vicinity of Beijing.” This sentence came under heavy criticism from the community of Japanese historians who, based on available evidence, had concluded that the Japanese military had not plotted the incident. Some Japanese historians also thought that *A History to Open the Future* as a whole was academically disappointing, and others saw it with suspicion because many of the Japanese participants were left-leaning and previously involved in advocacy activities for foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings.

In fact, one of the Japanese participants, Saitō Kazuharu, was very much aware of the danger of “facile border-crossing (*an’ina ekkyō*), a failure to critically examine the nature of dialogue and solidarity, [which] may lead the joint history textbook to disseminate wrong understandings.” Put another way, the danger was that if the Japanese side simply expressed “facile” solidarity with the South Korean and Chinese sides and allowed problematic historical facts and interpretations, “the ultimate mission for the joint his-
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tory textbook project . . . to overcome narrow-minded nationalism” on all sides would be compromised. In turn, the potential of governmental joint projects to facilitate mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations cannot be dismissed too hastily, for it was the Japan-China Joint Project that ended up resolving the conflict regarding the description of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident: in its final report, both Japanese and Chinese historians agreed that the battle between the Japanese and Chinese militaries at the Marco Polo Bridge was started accidentally. This prompted Saitō to acknowledge that “on this point [regarding the Marco Polo Bridge Incident], the governmental joint project overcame the obstacle that the nongovernmental joint project could not.”

Mutual Criticism of Nationalist Commemorations

Observing these joint projects in East Asia, Falk Pingel, a member of the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Germany, offered the following reflection: “In East Asia, only Japanese textbooks are accused, while South Korean and Chinese textbooks are exempted from critical discussion. Reform is one-sidedly demanded on the Japanese side, and it seems impossible to establish open relationships for mutual criticism and critical self-reflections on one’s own history.” Pingel’s observation serves as an important reminder that facile solidarity on Japan’s part could defeat the very purpose of any joint project—to problematize all relevant nationalist commemorations—but it also underestimates how much historians in Japan, South Korea, and China already engaged in mutual criticism of nationalist biases. For example, Kasahara Tokushi, one of the Japanese participants in the History to Open the Future project, has been vocal about factual errors and nationalist commemorations in history textbooks used in China. While Kasahara acknowledged that Japanese citizens failed to commemorate the Nanjing Massacre adequately, he also urged the Chinese side to “reconstruct ‘their affective and somatic memory’ from the higher perspective of human history,” to pursue more scholarly rigor and move away from politically and ideologically motivated historical interpretations.

Chinese historians also began to establish a critical distance between themselves and the Chinese government’s official commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War. For example, after the first edition of *A History to Open the Future* was published in 2005, the Chinese participants received many criticisms from inside China for not specifying three hundred thousand as the number of Nanjing Massacre victims. Nevertheless, they maintained that
the estimated number of dead varied according to different sources. As Cheng Zhaoqi and Zhang Lianhong, both of whom had participated in the trilateral project, explained, historical research on the massacre has become less emotional in recent years, and Chinese historians have increasingly recognized that more evidence is needed to estimate the number of dead accurately.

These changes in attitude among Chinese historians were confirmed by Bu Ping, the director of the Center for Modern History within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who had participated in both the History to Open the Future project and other bilateral historical research projects. At an international symposium in Tokyo in April 2008, Bu observed, “Previously, Chinese historians conducted China-centered research and their knowledge of historical materials and research available outside China was inadequate. But this situation is changing. . . . Although many Chinese believe shared historical understanding and reconciliation are impossible, we must make an effort [to achieve them].” Moreover, after the 2010 final report of the Japan-China Joint Project was criticized for not stating “more than 300,000” as the definitive number of victims of the Nanjing Massacre, Bu defended the report as the result of “the attitude to base [interpretation] strictly on historical materials,” emphasized the importance of “pooling archival materials and information” between the Chinese and Japanese sides, and reiterated his belief that a “historical view can, and should, transcend national borders.”

Similarly, at the eighth Forum on Historical Views and Peace in East Asia, held in Tokyo in November 2009, Cao Yi, a researcher at the Museum of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, observed that the Chinese commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War began to go beyond “anger and other feelings associated with being the victim,” given the recent efforts to systematically collect data on Japan’s wartime atrocities. He then went on to suggest, “China should transcend the facile commemoration of the war motivated by anger toward the aggressor and by the interests of the Chinese people. It will be more rational, though painful, to adopt geographically wider and temporarily longer perspectives in reexamining the history, the reality of Sino-Japanese relations, and the war and its commemoration. But this is exactly what we should aim for.” These statements from Cao, as well as Bu, Cheng, and Zhang, show that Chinese historians have recently gained greater freedom to conduct research, despite the Chinese government’s patriotic education and censorship.
In South Korea, too, NGOs that participated in the History to Open the Future project organized a forum in November 2005 to critically reflect on the textbook that they had just produced. At the forum, various participants pointed out that the textbook might have overemphasized Japan’s imperialist aggression, leading South Korean students to believe that Japan is an evil country, and that it could have also included more descriptions of Japanese people’s suffering during the war as well as positive aspects of Japanese history.34

In fact, a small but growing number of South Korean historians began to counterpose their critical reflections to nationalist commemorations in their country. In April 2002, the South Korean monthly journal Contemporary Criticism published three essays critically examining South Korean nationalism with regard to Japanese history textbooks. Ji Su Geol criticized ethnic-nationalist biases in research on modern and contemporary Korean history, while Yun Hae Dong advocated that the national history textbook should be replaced with a new system allowing the production of multiple history textbooks. The journal editor Lim Jie Hyeon, a history professor at Hanyang University, was perhaps most critical: “The South Korean government’s national history textbook and JSHTTR’s history textbook clash with each other because they emphasize ethnic identities of South Korea and Japan, respectively. On the epistemological dimension, they are rooted in the same soil—namely, ethnic nationalism.”35

As a member of the Conference of Japanese and South Korean Historians (Nikkan Rekishika Kaigi), Lim was also troubled by the tendency to draw the line between victims and perpetrators along national borders. For him, the task of historians was to articulate “an approach that challenges dichotomous thinking, ‘Our ethnic group (minzoku) is the victim, and the other ethnic group is the perpetrator.’”36 Lim therefore insisted, “The asymmetry in historical experience of imperialism and colonialism should not be used simply to criticize the nationalist historiography of Japan while helping to legitimate the nationalist historiography of South Korea. . . . Deconstruction of nationalist historiography cannot be confined within a single country but needs to be carried out simultaneously within East Asia as a whole.”37 Another conference member, Ahn Byung Jik, a professor of history at Seoul National University, was also concerned that “the South Korean memory of Japan’s colonial rule is too rigid and self-contained. A prerequisite for reconciliation [between South Korea and Japan] is to open
up the memory. . . . For the purpose of reconciliation, it is not helpful to force one particular historical view.”

Some South Korean historians even tried to critically reflect on the issue of comfort women, perhaps the most explosive element in the South Korean nationalist commemoration. One of them was Lee Yong Hoon, a professor of economic history at Seoul National University. He was a long-time critic of the South Korean government’s history textbooks, which had contained many overblown sentences, such as “Imperial Japan oppressed and exploited our people in a thoroughly atrocious fashion that has no comparable examples in world history.” During a television debate in September 2004, Lee stated that no historical evidence had been found to support the widely held belief that the Japanese military drafted Korean women as “volunteer corps” to serve in comfort stations. He also argued that South Koreans should criticize not only Japan but also Koreans who helped the Japanese military to recruit comfort women, and Korean soldiers who used comfort stations. After the television debate, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan condemned Lee for “making statements that only the most extreme right-wing person in Japan is capable of making” and demanded his public apology to former comfort women and his voluntary resignation from the university. A similar controversy erupted in December 2006, when Ahn Byung Jik also stated on television that no historical evidence existed for the forcible recruitment of Korean women, and that Koreans played an important role in recruiting comfort women. He also revealed that he had left the Korean Council’s publication project collecting the testimonies of former comfort women because he had felt that other project members had been “more interested in fighting against Japan than in learning about the historical facts.” Just like Lee, Ahn was subjected to heavy criticism from NGOs and citizens in South Korea.

Although these episodes demonstrated that the issue of comfort women was still highly charged with nationalist sentiments in South Korea, they also showed that it had become possible to raise critical questions about the South Korean nationalist commemoration that depicted Japan as solely and entirely guilty for making the Korean people suffer while accepting Korean victims’ testimonies as objective historical truths. In fact, the sixth volume of the Korean Council’s publication project in 2004 dropped the title “Forcibly Dragged Away Korean Military Comfort Women.” The publication team decided to forgo the prevailing one-dimensional representation of
Korean comfort women as forcibly drafted, in favor of historical descriptions that highlighted the complexity of the comfort-women system, its multiple methods of recruitment, and different types of comfort stations.42

**Limited Influence of Historians on Governments and Citizens**

Thus, historians in Japan, South Korea, and China have begun to engage in mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations. But how much historians can actually influence the governments and citizens in the three countries is another matter. In this respect, Bu Ping made an astute observation when he defended the Chinese side’s decision not to publish some of the papers and memos that the Japan-China Joint Project had produced. Bu argued, “The history problem between China and Japan has three dimensions: political judgment, popular sentiment, and scholarly research. . . . These three dimensions are partially overlapped, though never perfectly. If a problem happens on one dimension, that would affect the other two dimensions. That is, if we want to overcome one dimension of the history problem, we have to take into consideration the other two.”43 Put another way, even when historians—epistemically oriented rooted cosmopolitans—mobilize mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations, their criticism does not directly translate into changes in governmental and public commemorations, because the latter two have their own dynamics. Thus, while historians in East Asia have produced a variety of joint research reports and common teaching materials, they have had only a limited impact on commemorations of the Asia-Pacific War in their respective countries.

I argue that this limited impact of the “historians’ debate” on the history problem stems from at least four institutional factors. The first factor is the absence of institutional mechanisms that authorize historians’ critical reflections to influence governmental commemorations. As Hatano Sumio, a historian of international relations who participated in the Japan-China Joint Project, observed, “The first objective of the project, from the Japanese government’s perspective, was to delegate the history problem to experts and ‘depoliticize’ it, so that it will not interfere with Japan’s relations with China regarding such important issues as trade, investment, natural resources, and food security.”44 Similarly, another participant, Kawashima Shin, a historian of modern and contemporary China, thought that joint projects by historians would have only a “very limited contribution to resolving the history problem because their objective is mainly to prevent politicization of the problem.”45 Since governmental joint projects
are “depoliticized”—ceremonially treated as “venting mechanisms” for the history problem—they are unlikely to transform the existing official commemorations.

At the same time, the role of historians can be politicized in spite of the rhetoric of depoliticization. When Prime Minister Abe Shinzō tried to defend his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013, he insisted that it was not politicians but historians who should decide on the interpretation of Japan’s acts in the Asia-Pacific War: “Politicians must be humble (kenkyo) about the issue of historical view. Governments must not determine a particular historical view as a correct one. This issue is up to historians.”46 Similarly, when revisiting the 1993 Kōno Statement that apologized for the military comfort-women system, Abe’s cabinet secretary, Suga Yoshihide, stated, “Our cabinet members agree that this issue [of comfort women] should not be turned into a political and diplomatic problem . . . and I hope that more scholarly research will accumulate.”47 Abe, Suga, and other conservative politicians, however, were most likely to welcome only the kind of historical research that would discount Japan’s past wrongdoings. Thus, when the Cabinet Office established a five-member commission to examine how the Kōno Statement had been created, Hata Ikuhiko, known for his conservative orientation, was appointed as the only historian.48 Hata’s appointment was in effect political, to support the position of Abe’s government, in the guise of “disinterested expert.”49 Here, historians are not really “depoliticized” but are part and parcel of the politics of war commemoration, exploited by politicians in power who seek to legitimate their commemorative position as “rational.”

The second factor is the existence of mass media as a mechanism that mediates the influence of historians’ debate on public commemorations. As historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki pointed out, “Today, more than ever, we learn about the past from a multiplicity of media,” such as newspapers, television programs, and movies.50 Indeed, the majority of citizens in Japan, South Korea, and China are likely to learn most of the “facts” about the Asia-Pacific War from media rather than from historians and their scholarly output. But media companies constantly put spin on historians’ debate, given the political orientations of their readers and viewers. For example, when Murayama’s government was preparing the Asian Women’s Fund in August 1994, Asahi shinbun reported that the government planned to provide former comfort women with one-time “sympathy money” (mimaikin) collected from Japanese citizens, as well as published reactions from supporters of
former comfort women criticizing the government for trying to evade its responsibility. According to Wada Haruki, one of the promoters of the fund, this news report downplayed the extent of intended “atonement” (rather than “sympathy”) within Murayama’s government, undermined the ongoing efforts by some cabinet members to push for government compensation, and created distrust between the government and former comfort women and their supporters.51 In South Korea, too, mass media rarely presented information and interpretations that would contradict the stereotype of unapologetic Japan.52 Similarly, Chinese mass media lashed out against JSH-TR’s history textbook in 2001 but failed to report that only 0.039 percent of junior high schools adopted the textbook.53 The escalation of East Asia’s history problem thus owed no small part to the mass media in the three countries that circulated sensational but misleading and even distorted information about Japan’s past wrongdoings and the Japanese government’s actions.54

The third factor is the weak institutional boundary of history as an academic profession. As sociologists Andrew Abbott and Thomas Gieryn illustrated, any “experts,” ranging from nuclear physicists to historians, constantly engage in “boundary work” to distinguish themselves from “non-experts” and defend their “jurisdictions,” that is, their cognitive authority over certain kinds of activities.55 Such boundary work may include the establishment of professional associations, codification of standard training programs, and legitimation of certain methods of collecting and analyzing data. History, however, is one of the fields in the humanities and social sciences where the distinction between experts and non-experts is highly ambiguous; for example, many local historical societies are organized by amateur historians, and there is a long tradition of memoirs that people narrate as historians of their own lives. Ultimately, as historian James Banner put it, “all humans [are] acting as historians when chronicling and understanding their own biographies, evaluating the meaning of the pasts they think relevant to their lives.”56 Since narrative is constitutive of representation of the past, the distinction between professional and amateur historians, both of whom use narrative, is more continuous than discrete.57 This makes history a most democratic discipline in the humanities and social sciences, but it also prevents professional historians from effectively intervening in the history problem by correcting factual inaccuracies and unwarranted interpretations contained in official and public commemorations.

The weak authority of historians in Japan manifested most clearly in the way that the nationalist commemorations of comfort women and the
Nanjing Massacre escalated in the 1990s. The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, for example, claimed that the Japanese government forcibly drafted Korean “female volunteer corps” into the military comfort women system, with two hundred thousand Korean women forced into such work. But even the most sympathetic Japanese historians, including Yoshimi Yoshiaki, as well as some South Korean historians, disagreed with the Korean Council’s claim. These historians pointed out that female corps and comfort women had been recruited separately, recruiters had included Koreans, and the estimated number of Korean comfort women was excessive.\(^{58}\) These Japanese historians also suggested that testimonies should be carefully evaluated, as some former comfort women had changed details of their testimonies over time. But the Korean Council refused to change its claims and even denounced seven former comfort women who received atonement money, medical and welfare relief, and a letter of the Japanese prime minister’s apology from the Asian Women’s Fund. The president of the Korean Council, Yun Jeong Ok, even argued, “By receiving the money that does not accompany the admission of guilt, the victims [the seven former comfort women] admitted that they had volunteered to become prostitutes.”\(^{59}\)

In the case of the Nanjing Massacre, too, Iris Chang’s *The Rape of Nanjing* galvanized the American public, especially Chinese Americans. But Japanese and American historians who specialized in modern and contemporary Chinese history criticized Chang’s book for its numerous inaccuracies and careless handling of historical evidence. David Kennedy, a professor of history at Stanford University, doubted the validity of Chang’s claim that the massacre had been a systematic genocidal program comparable to the Holocaust, while Joshua Fogel, a professor of history at the University of California–Santa Barbara, criticized Chang’s book for failing to carefully consider the credibility of the interviews and documents that she presented as “historical evidence,” as well as for misrepresenting the massacre as completely forgotten by Japanese citizens.\(^{60}\) Kasahara Tokushi also requested Chang, face-to-face, to be more careful about interpreting available archival materials.\(^{61}\)

Despite various problems in Chang’s book, the left-leaning publishing company Kashiwa Shobō planned to translate it into Japanese because the company believed that details of the Nanjing Massacre should be more widely known in Japan. When Kashiwa Shobō asked Chang to correct various errors and inaccuracies in her book, however, she agreed to make only
about a dozen small revisions. Moreover, Chang refused Kashiwa Shōbō’s proposal to pair the Japanese edition of her book with an anthology of commentaries critically evaluating the evidence and arguments presented in the book.\(^62\) In the end, Kashiwa Shōbō gave up the Japanese translation of *The Rape of Nanking* because the company feared that the book’s serious flaws would only give Japanese nationalists more ammunition to discredit the Nanjing Massacre as a fabrication.\(^63\) Instead, Kashiwa Shōbō published *Thirteen Lies by Deniers of the Nanjing Massacre* (*Nankin Daigyakusatsu hiteiron jūsan no uso*)—written by a group of prominent history professors who specialized in research on Japan’s wartime atrocities in China, such as Fujiwara Akira, Kasahara Tokushi, and Yoshida Yutaka—as a “counterpoint to the Nanjing Massacre denial in Japan revived by many factual errors in Iris Chang’s book.” But Chang never retracted her claim that at least three hundred thousand Chinese had been massacred inside the city walls of Nanjing as part of Japan’s genocidal program.

Conservative NGOs in Japan, most notably JSHTR, seized upon these problematic claims made by the Korean Council, Chang, and other advocates of South Korean and Chinese victims. They invoked their own, equally problematic version of objective truth to justify the Asia-Pacific War as a heroic act of self-defense. In fact, they even challenged professional historians who defended the historical facticity of the comfort-women system and the Nanjing Massacre. In particular, one of the JSHTR’s members, Fujioka Nobukatsu, declared that “the age of experts is over” and argued, “Ordinary people have misunderstood that only historians, experts of history, can understand how to interpret the history. But history is an academic discipline examining facts that are the closest to ordinary people’s common sense and, therefore, ordinary people are allowed to evaluate historical research in light of their common sense. . . . Even amateurs can refute historians’ distorted arguments if they use their sound reason.”\(^64\)

Thus, with regard to comfort women and the Nanjing Massacre, non-historians brushed aside questions raised by professional historians. Yun Jeong Ok was not a professional historian but a professor of English. Neither was Iris Chang a professional historian but a journalist. Two of the founding members of JSHTR, Fujioka Nobukatsu and Nishio Kanji, were not professional historians, either. They were both university professors, but they specialized in curriculum studies and German literature, respectively. Another JSHTR member, Higashinakano Shūdō, was also a university professor, but his specialty was Japanese intellectual history. Above all,
Kobayashi Yoshinori, at one point the most popular JSHTTR member because of his Sensōron comic book series, was a cartoonist who had majored in French literature in college. Nevertheless, the problematic factual claims made by Yun, Chang, and the JSHTTR members overwhelmed the cautious and reflective voices of Japanese historians who had dedicated their careers to studying Japan’s past wrongdoings.

After all, the ambiguous distinction between professional and amateur historians is only part of a larger, more fundamental problem of the relationship between historiography and commemoration as two overlapping modes of representing the past—this is the fourth institutional factor that limits the influence of historians. For a long time historians and scholars of collective memory have debated on the relationship between “history” and “memory.” At first, many historians and sociologists drew a sharp distinction between the two by defining history as “rational” and “objective” vis-à-vis memory as “irrational” and “subjective.” More and more historians, however, began to realize a variety of epistemological (and political) limits of their scholarship, given controversies over historical representations of the Holocaust, postmodernist challenges to “objective historical facts,” growing awareness of the existence of “subaltern history,” and acceptance of oral history and other new methods. As a result, most historians and scholars of collective memory now accept historiography and commemoration as simply two different modes of narrating the past, where one has no epistemological superiority over the other.

In this respect, historiography and commemoration form what Paul Ricoeur called a truly “open dialectic,” because their opposition can never be transcended into a synthesis of higher truth about the past. Put another way, they form a dialogical, symbiotic relationship, where they mutually constitute and transform each other. As historian Aleida Assmann explained, “Historical scholarship depends on memory not only for oral testimony and experience, but also for criteria of meaning and relevance; on the other hand, memory depends on historical scholarship for verification, substantiation, and falsification.” It is therefore difficult for professional historians to invoke their cognitive authority to bring closure to the history problem because politicians and citizens have their own memories whose criteria of epistemological validity are different from those of the historians. Worse, historians are likely to be overwhelmed by memories of traumatic events, such as wartime atrocities, as in East Asia’s history problem, for commemorations of traumatic events tend to be so emotionally charged that people
can often over-identify with victims and become unable to notice inconsistencies, omissions, and contradictions in available evidence.\textsuperscript{69}

The difficulty that historians face is further compounded by the heterogeneity of historiography vis-à-vis commemoration. As the term “historians’ debate” suggests, controversy, not consensus, is the norm for historians. When different historians maintain competing interpretations of the same historical event, these interpretations can be used by competing groups of political actors to legitimate their preferred commemorative positions. In such a situation, historians are unable to arbitrate competing commemorations. On the contrary, they are likely to exacerbate the competition by lending credibility to each of the commemorative positions.

\textbf{East Asia’s History Education Problem}

Furthermore, the limited effect of historians’ debate on governmental and public commemorations is aggravated by two characteristics of history education in East Asia that prevent younger generations from developing the competencies to critically reflect on the history problem. The first is the heavy focus on memorization. Since entrance exams for secondary and higher education are extremely competitive and based mostly on multiple-choice questions, Japanese, South Korean, and Chinese students are required to absorb large amounts of knowledge from elementary through high school. As a result, history education at primary and secondary levels forces students to memorize dates of important historical events and names of prominent historical figures in preparation for exams. Such memorization-based history education tends to create the impression that history is a field with clear, distinct answers, appropriate for multiple-choice questions, misleading students to accept a certain version of the past as an objective truth. Students are thus deprived of opportunities to develop the cognitive skills necessary to weigh conflicting historical evidence and adjudicate between competing interpretations—the very cognitive skills required to deal with the history problem.\textsuperscript{70}

Especially in Japan, these shortcomings in history education are magnified by the limited coverage of modern and contemporary history in primary and secondary education. Japanese history textbooks devote considerable space to ancient history prior to the 1868 Meiji Restoration but provide only brief coverage of the twentieth century when Japan committed aggression and atrocities against South Korea and China. Lessons on the twentieth century are also typically offered at the end of the school year,
when both teachers and students are busy preparing for graduation ceremonies and entrance exams, ensuring students get only quick and superficial exposure to the historical period. In fact, the Japanese government deliberately limited the teaching of modern Japanese history in schools precisely because the historical period was central to the history problem. In August 2005, for example, Machimura Nobutaka, then minister of foreign affairs and former minister of education, admitted that the Ministry of Education advised schools to minimize the teaching of modern Japanese history so as to prevent some “Marxist-Leninist teachers”—JTU members in particular—from inculcating in students self-hatred toward Japan.71

Machimura’s position, however, not only reflected the LDP’s long-standing aversion to the JTU, but also pointed out an important problem with the pedagogical tendency among history teachers in Japan. For JTU teachers, “Never send our children to the battlefield again!” was their most important slogan, consistent with the Tokyo Trial historical view that allowed no justification for Japan’s past aggression.72 Accordingly, JTU teachers strongly criticized the conservative government for promoting the nationalist commemoration that presented Japan’s past aggression as a heroic act of self-defense. At the same time, JTU teachers, and Japanese teachers in general, were trained in the existing Japanese education system, where history education was anchored in memorization. As a result, they did not always provide their own students with the kind of history education that would encourage critical evaluation of historical evidence and interpretations. Although education reforms during the Occupation changed the emphasis in history education from emperor-centered nationalism to pacifism, the basic structure of history education in Japan—the emphasis on memorization—did not change.

Postwar history education in Japan was therefore torn between two diametrically opposing forces: the conservative government promoted nationalist commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War, whereas JTU teachers promoted the Tokyo Trial historical view that judged Japan as solely and entirely guilty of the war. To preempt controversies over how to teach modern Japanese history, the Ministry of Education decided to reduce the coverage of the twentieth century in history textbooks and emphasize the chronological, empiricist approaches in history curriculum.73 Since history education in Japan continues to downplay the modern period and emphasize memorization, the majority of Japanese citizens are ill-prepared to engage in constructive debates on the Asia-Pacific War among themselves or with South Korean and Chinese citizens.
The situation of history education is not much different in South Korea and China, either. Since South Korean students have to amass large amounts of knowledge to compete for admissions to universities, history education in the country is focused on memorization. Similarly, while school curricula in China are heterogeneous across provinces and rapidly changing in recent decades, Chinese history lessons also heavily focus on memorization of historical events, as well as emphasize their moral-ideological implications. The education systems in Japan, South Korea, and China thus share the tendency to present students with versions of the past as objective truths, rather than as provisionally settled interpretations open to future revision. As educational researcher Edward Vickers cautioned, “The prospects for implementing a pedagogy that truly encourages a critical approach to the past are likely to remain poor” in East Asia. If younger generations in the three countries continue to be taught memorization-based history lessons, the history problem will retain the risk of escalating into an intractable conflict over incommensurable versions of the past.

Ultimately, however, the fundamental problem with history education in East Asia is not the focus on memorization per se, but the ability of the governments to control the content of history lessons via textbook inspection. In Japan, South Korea, and China, teachers can use only history textbooks that are approved by their ministries of education. Under these textbook-inspection systems, textbook writers and publishers have the formal freedom to decide on the structures and contents of their history textbooks. Given the legally binding curricular guidelines, however, many textbook writers and publishers are forced to exercise self-censorship. After all, the governments have the power to require revisions according to the curricular guidelines and thereby exert significant control—almost censorship—over history textbooks. As a result, history textbooks decisively influence citizens’ historical views, as Ienaga Saburō recognized: “No bestseller can beat a textbook. You can stop reading other books if you do not like them. But you have to read a textbook, whether you like it or not, in order to graduate from school. For this reason, I think that a textbook is a more effective means than a public-security law for the government to influence the minds of citizens.”

Specifically, the Japanese government has insisted that history textbooks include only “facts,” not interpretations or disputes. Take, for example, the government’s counterargument against Ienaga’s lawsuit. At the Tokyo High Court in 1980, the government accused Ienaga of “making no distinction between history and history education. . . . At the level of compulsory
education, history education does not reach the level of specialized scholarship. Its aim is to provide students with basic historical knowledge that Japanese citizens should possess. . . . History textbooks should be written based on doctrines widely accepted in academia . . . and textbook writers should take into consideration developmental stages of students.”81 The government thus argued that historians’ debate should not be imported into history education because the latter’s ultimate goal is to educate members of the Japanese nation, not to train historians.

The government’s counterargument, however, suffered from two serious problems. First, as Tōyama Shigeki, a history professor who supported Ienaga, pointed out, “Foundational historical questions, which require comprehension of complexly intertwined historical facts, necessarily lead historians to exercise their own historical judgments. With respect to these questions, disagreement among different doctrines is especially strong.”82 Put another way, if history textbooks are to include only descriptions of the past where historiographical debates are already settled, they cannot but become short because they are unable to provide details of important historical events, many of which are still contested—indeed, Japanese history textbooks are very thin. By demanding that students be taught only already established historical facts, the government kept Japanese citizens from developing the competencies to interpret the difficult past critically and independently.

The second and more serious problem is that the Japanese government assumed that students are not mature enough to work through conflicting interpretations. Again, Tōyama argued in defense of Ienaga:

We should not make children and adolescents fear disagreement. We would like students to know that they can examine and refine their own ideas by having dialogues with other people who have different ideas. If there are only citizens who uncritically obey the government’s decisions, democracy will be destroyed. The Ministry of Education argues that students in elementary, junior high, and high schools have no competence to make their own judgments. But this argument is based on the wrong understanding. If we carefully prepare teaching materials, students will show the astonishing ability to form their own judgments.”83

Tōyama thus criticized the artificial separation between history and history education as the government’s attempt to deploy history education to pro-
duce obedient citizens. Nagahara Keiji, another history professor and supporter of Ienaga, even more forcefully criticized the separation as reminiscent of the prewar system that had promoted “patriotic-spiritualistic history education by decoupling history education from history.”

Even though Ienaga’s lawsuits helped increase descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in history textbooks, they ultimately failed to eliminate the system of textbook inspection itself. Moreover, by resorting to lawsuits, Ienaga and his supporters created the paradoxical situation wherein historians are forced to give up their professional authority to adjudicate competing historical judgments among themselves, and instead allow judges, who are not experts of history, to write official history in the form of judicial judgments. Ienaga was indeed aware of this paradoxical situation and the negative implications that his lawsuits created. This is why, after the Supreme Court’s ruling in August 1997, Ienaga stated, “I hope that the textbook-lawsuit movement will develop to eventually abolish the system of textbook inspection itself. I really hope that the next generation will do it.” Here, Ienaga’s long struggle and lasting hope is also relevant to historians and educators in South Korea and China, where the writing of textbooks is even more heavily regulated by the governments.

Given their power to define and impose legitimate versions of the past, then, the governments in East Asia remain the most important actors driving the dynamic and trajectory of the history problem, despite the growing role of mass media in recent decades. So long as the governments in Japan, South Korea, and China control history textbooks via their curricular guidelines and inspection systems, officially approved history textbooks continue to teach nation-centered histories: history textbooks in Japan provide descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings only in minimal amounts, whereas history textbooks in South Korea and China promote patriotism based on legacies of anti-Japanese resistance. In the meantime, since none of the teaching materials produced by nongovernmental joint projects have been able to pass governmental inspection, they are used in schools only as informal supplemental materials, thus failing to fully import historians’ critical reflections into history education. In short, as Kosuge Nobuko observed, “One of the most urgent tasks in the process of resolving the history problem and moving toward reconciliation is ‘to historicize history (rekishi no rekishika).’ The problem in East Asia is the politics that does not permit the historicization of history and the plurality of historical interpretations, that is, the politics that supports and reproduces stereotypes about former enemies.”
**From Historians’ Debate to Cosmopolitan Commemoration**

In theory, historians have the potential to influence the dynamic and trajectory of East Asia’s history problem for two reasons. One is their unique status in the field of the history problem. Even though historians can engage in advocacy activities and act like any other political actors in the field, they mostly act as “disinterested others” who provide historical materials for other political actors to articulate their commemorative positions. Another reason is the demographic shift in the region. Since those who were born after the Asia-Pacific War are now the majority in Japan, South Korea, and China, their commemorations cannot but draw on evidence and interpretations put forward by historians. At this historical juncture, an increasing number of historians engage in joint research and education projects, forming a transnational epistemic community as an infrastructure of cosmopolitanism: they incorporate foreign perspectives into historical narratives and focus on transnational interaction as a unit of analysis. This growing historians’ debate at the transnational level presents the potential to problematize nationalist commemorations in Japan, South Korea, and China and move other political actors in the field toward more cosmopolitan positions.

In practice, however, the cosmopolitan potential of the historians’ debate is constrained in various ways. First of all, no institutionalized channels exist for joint projects by historians to effectively influence official commemorations in Japan, South Korea, and China. Furthermore, the ability of historians to effectively influence the governments and citizens is undermined by two other factors. One is that scholarly output of historians is almost always mediated by mass media willing to sacrifice accuracy for sensationalism. Another is that the coexistence of historiography and commemoration as two overlapping and equally legitimate modes of narrating the past grants historians only weak authority over non-historians. Especially in East Asia’s history problem, which is concerned with extremely complex and emotionally charged historical events, historians themselves are embroiled in controversies over evidence and interpretations, and their historiographies can be easily brushed aside by nationalist commemorations. The potential for historians as rooted cosmopolitans is further curtailed by the disconnect between their debate and history education, engineered by national governments eager to deploy history lessons as moral education for their citizens.

Thus, the cosmopolitan potential of the historians’ debate to help citizens critically reflect on their nationalist commemorations has not been fully
realized in East Asia. As a result, Japan, South Korea, and China remain trapped in the history problem. George Santayana’s aphorism, “The one who does not remember history is bound to live through it again,” is justly famous, but remembering the Asia-Pacific War according to the logic of nationalism will likely contribute to repeating a similar tragedy in the future. To ensure that citizens in the three countries will not “live through it again,” is there any way to effectively deploy historians’ critical reflections to shift commemorative positions of relevant political actors in a more cosmopolitan direction? The next chapter examines this question.
Can East Asia’s history problem ever be resolved, and if so, how? This is the question that I set out to answer in this book. In light of the field analysis of the history problem, my answer is cautiously affirmative—yes, it can be resolved if the governments and citizens in Japan, South Korea, and China find a way to unleash the potential of the historians’ debate to promote the cosmopolitan logic of commemoration. My affirmative answer is cautious because nationalist commemorations, focusing on the suffering of conationals without sufficient regard for foreign others, persist in the region, overwhelm historians’ critical reflections, and threaten to prolong the history problem. My answer is also affirmative, however, because the region has witnessed the emergence of cosmopolitan commemoration based on the transnational network of concerned citizens, NGOs, and historians and educators who have come to recognize the suffering of victims of the Asia-Pacific War irrespective of nationality. Indeed, the logic of cosmopolitanism has gained significant ground in the field of the history problem, to the extent that it is now adopted in Japan’s official commemoration.

To be sure, nationalism remains the dominant logic of commemoration. This persistent dominance traces back to the immediate postwar period (1945–1964), when conservative politicians and NGOs in Japan acquired robust mobilizing structures through the LDP and the Japan Bereaved Families Association, and monopolized political opportunities to shape Japan’s official commemoration according to the logic of nationalism. Conservative politicians and NGOs continued to enjoy robust mobilizing structures during the next period (1965–1988), but their political opportunities decreased, mainly because the governments and citizens in South
Korea and China began to put pressure on the Japanese government. Concurrently, mobilizing structures for cosmopolitan commemoration expanded through the development of the transnational network of Japanese NGOs and foreign victims. Then, during the politically turbulent post–Cold War period (1989–1996) that saw the LDP’s temporary loss of power, non-LDP prime ministers, such as Hosokawa and Murayama, seized both domestic and international political opportunities to move Japan’s official commemoration in a more cosmopolitan direction.

The LDP came back to power during the most recent period (1997–2015) and joined forces with JSHTTR and other conservative NGOs to reassert nationalist commemoration. In the meantime, the power of the JSP, the JTU, and other longstanding mobilizing structures for cosmopolitan commemoration declined significantly. Nevertheless, the LDP could not make full use of the domestic political opportunities to reinvigorate nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration, not only because of the path dependence of cosmopolitanism institutionalized during the previous period, but also because of the decreasing political opportunities at the international level. South Korea and China continued to criticize nationalist commemoration in Japan, and the norm emerged to expect national governments to promote joint historical research projects and other policies consistent with the logic of cosmopolitanism. As a result, even LDP prime ministers had to compromise their nationalist defiance with cosmopolitan contrition in order to maintain Japan’s relations with South Korea and China. Despite the persistence of nationalist commemoration, the dynamic and trajectory of the field points to the continuing growth of cosmopolitan commemoration. This is why I am cautiously positive about a possible resolution of East Asia’s history problem.

But exactly how can cosmopolitan commemoration contribute to resolving the history problem and reconciling Japan with South Korea and China? First of all, I argue that cosmopolitan commemoration can help resolve the history problem if it is mutual, and that such mutual cosmopolitan commemoration is already embodied by the joint historical research and education projects. Although the existing joint projects are far from perfect, they have shown the potential to promote mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations and allow citizens in Japan, South Korea, and China to reciprocate cosmopolitan commemoration, wherein perpetrators and victims recognize humanity in each other, by going beyond the logic of nationalism that dehumanizes the foreign other. In this concluding chapter, I first
clarify what mutual cosmopolitan commemoration will entail and how it can help resolve the history problem. I then explore what concrete measures can be taken to effectively mobilize joint historical research and education projects—historians’ debate at the transnational scale—to facilitate mutual cosmopolitan commemoration and eventual reconciliation in East Asia.

Rethinking the Role of Apology in Reconciliation

As social psychologist Herbert Kelman observed, former enemies can move toward reconciliation if they manage to revise their previously incompatibile identities, but this “revision in the group’s identity and the associated narrative is possible only if the core of the identity remains intact.” Kelman and other social psychologists also suggested that one of the most effective ways to make perpetrators fully accept their guilt and responsibility is for the other parties to affirm the perpetrators’ humanity, especially when the perpetrators, too, suffered in the intergroup conflicts under consideration. For better or for worse, being simultaneously perpetrator and victim has become part and parcel of Japanese identity. This means that Japanese citizens will likely commemorate the suffering of South Korean and Chinese victims more extensively if their own dual identity as both perpetrator and victim can remain intact. Put another way, while Japan needs to embrace a greater degree of contrition first, South Korea and China will have to meet Japan halfway. This cosmopolitan commemoration on the part of South Korea and China has the potential to move Japan to fully accept its war responsibility because doing so will no longer threaten the core of Japan’s dual identity. Here, cosmopolitan commemoration needs to be envisioned as a collective endeavor.

To reciprocate cosmopolitan commemoration toward Japan, however, the governments and citizens in South Korea and China face a very difficult task: to work through negative emotions of anger, hatred, and vengefulness entangled in their commemorations of Japan’s past wrongdoings. As Paul Ricoeur observed, “There can be an institution of amnesty, which does not mean amnesia. I would say that there is no symmetry between the duty to remember and the duty to forget, because the duty to remember is a duty to teach, whereas the duty to forget is a duty to go beyond anger and hatred.” While Japan has the duty to remember the suffering of South Korean and Chinese victims and teach it to younger generations, South Korea and China can be said to have the duty to forgive, not by forgetting, but by
overcoming hostile emotions toward Japan and recognizing Japanese people’s humanity. Park Yu Ha suggested that such forgiveness is necessary not only for perpetrators but also for victims to be freed from past traumas, and that “this kind of forgiveness does not amount to the forgetting and concealment of the past but points to the new relationship [between perpetrators and victims] that enables a deeper gaze into history.” In essence, reconciliation presupposes reciprocity.

“Amnesty,” however, is usually granted in cases of domestic conflicts, such as civil war and violence against ethnic minorities, rather than in cases of international conflicts. Since Japan, South Korea, and China do not form a single polity, Ricoeur’s observation on amnesty can be simply imported metaphorically into the history problem in East Asia. Alternatively, amnesty can be understood in the performative sense of creating the reality it purports to describe. That is, reconciliation in the context of East Asia is not merely about restoring impaired relations; rather, it involves a performative act to create new relations and thereby build the transnational polity to come. In fact, given the rate of increase in economic, political, and social interactions between Japan, South Korea, and China, the governments and citizens in the three countries will need more channels of communication and mechanisms of coordination if they want to cope effectively with emerging transnational problems, such as environmental pollution. The extent to which the governments and citizens in South Korea and China are willing to grant Japan amnesty thus holds the key to reconciliation and the possible formation of the transnational polity bringing the three countries together.

To performatively facilitate reconciliation in East Asia, I suggest that apology on Japan’s part is crucial. This is not only because Japan bears the largest share of responsibility for the history problem but also because apology is a performative speech act par excellence, aimed at reestablishing a temporarily strained social relationship between members who belong to the same moral community. Japan’s apology to South Korea and China would therefore exemplify the cosmopolitan logic of commemoration that recognizes common humanity in foreign others by going beyond the logic of nationalism that would reject the necessity of remembering past wrongs inflicted on them.

Apology in the context of East Asia’s history problem, however, is extremely challenging because it necessarily involves “political apology,” a subset of what sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis called “Many to One apology,” wherein the government (a collective actor) apologizes to an individual that
it victimized through its past action. According to political scientists and philosophers, even though instances of political apologies have multiplied in recent decades, as redress movements based on human rights have proliferated around the world, they are far more likely to fail than succeed. This difficulty of political apology has been demonstrated by the recent history of Japan’s relations with South Korea and China. As Norma Field and Jennifer Lind documented, in so many instances, the apologies offered by the Japanese government escalated the history problem rather than helped relevant political actors move toward mutual cosmopolitan commemoration. This is primarily because no common understanding of the past exists to coordinate interactions between the Japanese government and South Korean and Chinese victims; for example, “historical facts” about Japan’s past wrongdoings, such as comfort women and the Nanjing Massacre, are still highly contested. A satisfactory apology is possible only if the perpetrator government and the individual victims agree on what wrong was committed—apology is first and foremost commemorative because it presupposes acknowledgment of a past wrong. Since such agreement is lacking, the Japanese government has been unable to script an apology capable of satisfying the victims.

In addition, it is difficult for a Japanese prime minister to anthropomorphize the government as a unified actor, given that the government is fundamentally fractured by multiple ministries and coalition partners. For example, the apologies by Japanese prime ministers in the 1990s were frequently met with opposition and even backlash from conservative LDP members in their cabinets. As a result, the Japanese government failed to achieve the status of unified actorhood, a precondition for an unequivocal political apology. Even if a prime minister succeeds in unifying the government, however, he or she will still face another difficult challenge: to make his or her apology emotionally satisfactory to victims. Especially with regard to traumatic events, victims often seek emotional closure, no matter how provisional it may be. And yet, no Japanese prime minister has ever offered an emotional apology by mobilizing his facial and bodily expressions or by holding a face-to-face meeting with victims. In fact, a political apology, typically delivered to the general public, tends to be impersonal and therefore unsuitable for bringing emotional closure to victims.

Here, the difficulty on the part of the government is compounded by the heterogeneity of audiences, ranging from foreign victims and their supporters to conservative constituencies inside Japan. This heterogeneity has
made the Japanese government’s apology vulnerable to denunciations from opposing sides. On the one hand, South Korean and Chinese victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings, as well as their Japanese and international supporters, rejected the government’s apology as inadequate because it was not accompanied by compensation. On the other hand, conservative politicians and NGOs criticized the government for giving in to foreign pressure even when there was nothing to apologize for. Contradictory reactions from the opposing audiences then bounced off each other in the public sphere, creating unexpected dynamics that damaged the relationship that the government’s apology originally intended to repair. The unexpected dynamics were also exacerbated by television, radio, and other forms of mass communication that mediated political apologies. Particularly in the transnational context, mass media plays a crucial role in influencing audiences’ perceptions because the majority of victims and their supporters are likely to hear the perpetrator government’s apology through media coverage.

Perhaps the most serious challenge in a political apology is the issue of compensation. As sociologist John Torpey observed, “Despite frequent claims that reparations would be good for all concerned, both perpetrators and victims, reparations politics makes claims on behalf of victims and is hence unavoidably partisan.” Indeed, the South Korean and Chinese demands for compensation for war-related damages triggered the vicious circle of mutually reinforcing nationalist commemorations because they reproduced the binary, partisan opposition between innocent South Korean and Chinese victims and the evil Japanese government.

Nevertheless, for the Japanese government’s apology to be convincing, it needs to be supported by compensation and other forms of material evidence. In fact, the primary function of compensation is to reinforce the sincerity of apology that a perpetrator tries to communicate to victims. Take, for example, Avi Primor, an Israeli diplomat who was involved in the Remembrance, Responsibility, and Future Fund that the German government set up to financially compensate former forced laborers and other victims of Nazi Germany. When interviewed by Funabashi Yōichi, Primor emphasized the symbolic function of monetary compensation as follows:

At the fundamental level, the aim of this fund is not simply to compensate victims of forced labor. Let’s say that there was a Russian who was captured by Nazi Germany and forced to work under incredibly inhumane conditions for five years. Now, he could receive fifteen thousand
Deutsche marks, approximately five to six thousand U.S. dollars, from the Fund. Is this all he could get for five years of forced labor? Everybody would think it’s so little. . . . But this is really not about financial compensation but about symbolic recognition—that’s the crucial thing.  

The Japanese government, however, has failed to support its apologies with sufficient material evidence. Even though the government offered relief for South Korean A-bomb victims and former comfort women, it refused to call it “compensation” (hoshō), thus compromising its function to symbolize recognition. To be sure, the government finally agreed to provide one billion Japanese yen for former comfort women in South Korea in December 2015, but it has also actively diminished another form of material evidence—descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings in history textbooks—by tightening the textbook-inspection criteria between the late 1990s and 2015.

Given these difficulties surrounding a political apology in the transnational context, the Japanese government needs to do extensive preparation behind the stage if it hopes to offer an apology capable of satisfying South Korean and Chinese victims. To say the least, such backstage preparation requires agreement among different officials and ministries, as well as communication with multiple audiences and comprehension of their commemorative positions. But such backstage preparation has been lacking. The Japanese government, for example, was unwilling to collect information on how former comfort women and their supporters would react to the Asian Women’s Fund. As Totsuka Etsurō, a lawyer who provided legal support for former comfort women, recounted, “There was no prior, preliminary talk between the Japanese government and victims. The Japanese government unilaterally decided on a solution . . . and asked victims to accept it. . . . The government did not know how the victims would react because it had failed to listen to them carefully.” Without extensive communication with victims, the government may well aggravate the suffering of victims. As Kim Pu Ja, a professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and longtime supporter of former comfort woman, observed, “From the perspective of the Asian Women’s Fund, foreign victims are passive objects that should accept Japan’s concerns and opinions—their agency (shutaisei) is ignored. Is this not a reenactment of colonial relations?” Only with extensive background preparation can the Japanese government ever expect to deliver an apology that will fully recognize the suffering of victims.
Indeed, any successful apology requires the victim’s participation: a political apology, publicly offered, can be completed only when it is publicly accepted. As political scientist Victor Cha suggested, “Historical reconciliation is a two-way street. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition is the proffering of formal acts of contrition and evidence of attitudinal changes on the part of the aggressor. Such acts, however, produce no reconciliation without a willingness on the part of the victim to accept the apology and move on.” Here, reconciliation, initiated by apologies, is necessarily mutual and interactive. But this would require an enormous amount of work involving an enormous number of relevant political actors, ranging from government officials to victims and their supporters in Japan, South Korea, and China. I therefore suggest that the critics of the Japanese government need be more conscious of the difficulties inherent in political apologies and their fundamentally processual nature—as political philosopher Nick Smith pointed out, apologies are only “beginnings not conclusions” in the arduous pursuit of eventual reconciliation between perpetrators and victims.

After all, Japan has been asked to set a moral example for other countries, to apologize for its past wrongdoings that include the colonial rule of Korea. This is no ordinary task, as recognized by observers of East Asia’s history problem. For example, Kim Bong Jin, a South Korean professor at the City University of Northern Kyūshū, praised the 1995 Murayama Statement as being “groundbreaking as the first ever official apology for colonialism in the world,” even though he criticized the lack of adequate follow-up actions on the part of the Japanese government. Park Yu Ha also called for Japan’s apology for its colonial rule of Korea in the performative spirit: “If Japan volunteers to take responsibility for the problems that it caused as a former imperial power, Japan can show a good example to the Western countries that have not considered apologizing for their colonial rule.” Similarly, Ōnuma Yasuaki urged Japanese citizens to take on this extraordinary task: “Japan should not refuse to apologize to people in Asia because the Western countries have not. Instead, Japan should accomplish the difficult task of apology and atonement and, then, quietly question the Western countries whether they will do the same.”

When discussing “Japan’s apology,” however, it is critical to avoid limiting the subject to the Japanese government. East Asia’s history problem persists partly because the government-centered view of war responsibility has prevented Japanese citizens from examining their share of responsibility for
Japan’s past wrongdoings. In this respect, older generations of Japanese citizens who participated in the Asia-Pacific War owe apologies to foreign victims. If a large number of them had examined and accepted their share of war responsibility, they could have put more pressure on the government to incorporate cosmopolitanism in Japan’s official commemoration, and the governments and citizens in South Korea and China could have been more receptive to Japan’s apology.

However, most of the older generations, partial authors of Japan’s past wrongdoings, have passed away and shifted the burden of the history problem to younger generations of Japanese citizens who were born after the war’s end. What kind of responsibility do these younger generations have for Japan’s past wrongdoings? Do they also owe apologies to foreign victims?

**Commemorative Responsibility for the Future: A Pragmatist Position and Its Policy Implications**

I argue that younger generations of Japanese citizens, including myself, do have **commemorative responsibility**, to fully acknowledge Japan’s past wrongdoings and press our government to offer a satisfactory apology, even though we did not commit those acts. Here, I justify commemorative responsibility of younger generations based on pragmatist philosophy. As John Dewey stated, a pragmatist approach to the past means that “past events cannot be separated from the living present and retain meaning. The true starting point of history is always some present situation with its problems.” Ultimately, the past should not be commemorated for its own sake but for the sake of the future, immanent in present problem-situations confronting citizens. In short, younger generations of Japanese citizens do not have commemorative responsibility because they have inherited war guilt but because the “present situation”—the persistence of the history problem—demands commemoration of Japan’s past wrongdoings.

I therefore reject the essentialist position on commemorative responsibility advanced by Ienaga Saburō, who insisted that younger generations of Japanese citizens “automatically inherit responsibility for the war from their preceding generations by virtue of the Japanese nation’s continuity.” This essentialist position anchors commemorative responsibility in an extreme version of ethnic nationalism that presumes an almost metaphysical form of inborn national guilt. Ienaga’s argument for such a deeply ethnic-nationalist argument is ironic, given his own history of criticizing the Japanese nationalist commemoration of the Asia-Pacific War. But, at the same
time, the essentialist position does have a valid point. Seo Gyeong Sik, a Korean resident in Japan and law professor at Tokyo University of Economics, justified ethnic inheritance of war responsibility as follows: “Some Japanese ask why they have to be blamed for crimes that their grandfathers committed, but it is the Japanese people themselves that defend the ethnic-nationalist logic to define the Japanese in terms of blood.” Seo thus pointed out a self-contradiction among younger generations of Japanese citizens who refuse to inherit Japan’s war responsibility while uncritically accepting the jus sanguinis principle of Japanese citizenship that has marginalized Korean residents in Japan and repressed memories of Japan’s colonial rule of Korea. Seo’s point is well taken, but he still accepted the idea of inborn national guilt à la Ienaga and reproduced the logic of Japanese nationalism from which Korean residents continue to suffer.

In this regard, the pragmatist position is similar to a civic-nationalist position articulated by political scientists Ōnuma Yasuaki, Kwak Jun-Hyeok, and Melissa Nobles. They argued that even though younger generations do not inherit guilt, they inherit commemorative responsibility as part of their civic duties as citizens of a country that committed wrongs. For Ōnuma, younger generations cannot but inherit both positive and negative legacies from their predecessors, so long as they are citizens of the country; that is, younger generations of Japanese citizens inherited Japan’s postwar economic prosperity as well as commemorative responsibility for its past wrongdoings. But the pragmatist position is much more future oriented than the civic-nationalist position because it conceives of commemorative responsibility among younger generations as driven by what kind of future relations they want to establish with their foreign neighbors as much as by what wrongs their predecessors committed in the past. To be sure, this future orientation may be misleading at first, as former diplomat Tōgō Kazuhiko warned: “When the perpetrator speaks of ‘future orientation (mirai shikō),’ the victim can hear it as ‘let’s forget the past.’” But the pragmatist position does not justify forgetting the past for the sake of the future but demands the exact opposite, to remember the past for resolving the present situation with the history problem and thereby striving for a different future.

The pragmatist position thus overlaps partially with an ethical position advocated by Takahashi Tetsuya, one of the best-known leftist intellectuals in Japan. Takahashi argued that younger generations of Japanese citizens have an ethical responsibility to respond to the call from the Asian other. Since the Japanese self is constituted in relation to the Asian other, “it is
impossible to speak of ‘We the Japanese’ without facing the Asian victim.” Takahashi then elevated the Asian other’s demand on commemoration of Japan’s past wrongdoings to the level of the absolute and sacralized the other’s prerogative to offer forgiveness by drawing on Jacques Derrida’s argument: “One cannot, or should not, forgive; there is only forgiveness, if there is any, where there is the unforgivable. That is to say that forgiveness must announce itself as impossibility itself.” Here, Takahashi anchored commemorative responsibility among younger generations in the ethics of self-other relations, wherein the Japanese self must unconditionally respond to the Asian other’s call, and the other’s forgiveness constitutes the condition of both possibility and impossibility of reconciliation.

I am sympathetic to Takahashi’s ethical position, and I do agree with him that “the real key to disentangling the history problem is the question of how to meet the other, how to create the self-other relation.” But, at the same time, I think that his position is deeply problematic because it makes the other absolute and prioritizes the other over the self. Such ethical extremism risks providing complete moral immunity for the other even when he or she adopts the nationalist logic and refuses to reciprocate recognition of humanity to the self. The ethical position also ignores the fact that the relationship between the self and the other is fundamentally interactive and often mutually transformative, which renders the contents of commemoration, the terms of apology, and the conditions of reconciliation immanent within interactions among relevant actors.

The pragmatist position, by contrast, fully incorporates the interactive and immanent characteristics of self-other relations in concrete historical situations. Put another way, the pragmatist position does not prescribe specific conditions of reconciliation a priori—these conditions should be left to relevant actors to work out through their mutually transformative interactions. Perhaps the only condition that the pragmatist position demands is that, as critical theorist Axel Honneth noted, these interactions should be grounded in the taking of the attitude of the other, that is, in the reciprocation of recognition of each other’s humanity. The pragmatist position therefore serves as a principled justification for mutual cosmopolitan commemoration as the key to resolving the history problem in East Asia.

But what concrete measures can be taken to facilitate mutual cosmopolitan commemoration among younger generations in Japan, South Korea, and China? So far, political scientists have made several policy recommendations. To name but a few: political leaders in the three countries should
refrain from opportunistically exploiting the history problem to mobilize public support for their regimes; the Japanese government should institutionalize contrition consistently across different domains, ranging from official rhetoric to education; the Japanese government’s greater contrition, when it is expressed in good faith, should be reciprocated by the South Korean and Chinese governments; and the three governments should continue to support joint historical research and education projects.37

While all of these recommendations are important, I would like to emphasize the last one because the historical judgment of the Tokyo Trial served as a focal point of the history problem during the entire postwar period. On the one hand, Japanese nationalists articulate their commemorative position—Japan fought a just war for self-defense and liberation of Asia—by rejecting the Tokyo Judgment as victor’s justice. On the other hand, South Korean and Chinese nationalists blame Japan entirely for the history problem, consistent with the trial that judged Japan as solely and entirely guilty of the war. The majority of Japanese citizens, however, fall between the two extreme positions taken by nationalists in Japan as well as in South Korea and China. They rather believe that “reconciliation will not be achieved by the complete rejection of Japan’s past as an unmitigated disaster or by defending Japanese colonialism, aggressions, and the Pacific War as completely justifiable actions,” as Tōgō Kazuhiko and historian Hasegawa Tsuyoshi observed.38 Thus, many Japanese citizens, unlike Japanese nationalists, readily acknowledge Japan’s war crimes, but they are also troubled by the failure of the Tokyo Trial to prosecute war crimes committed against Japan, unlike South Korean and Chinese nationalists. Here, to reinforce cosmopolitan commemoration among the majority of Japanese citizens, historians in East Asia can, and should, continue their joint projects, to pool historical materials across national borders, reexamine the Tokyo Judgment, and problematize nationalist commemorations in light of newer and stronger evidence.

But simply carrying on with the existing joint projects will not help resolve the history problem, because historians’ debate is currently disconnected from governmental and public commemorations. To allow historians to effectively intervene in the history problem, I recommend the following changes pertaining to historical research and history education in East Asia.

First, the governments of Japan, South Korea, and China should increase their support for joint historical research, for governmental support
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is crucial for these joint projects to have any meaningful impact on the history problem. For example, joint historical research and textbook projects contributed to Germany’s reconciliation with France and Poland because they had both political and organizational support from the governments involved. Importantly, even though governmental support is essential, the governments do not always need to provide financial and human resources for joint historical research projects. A case in point is the Conference of Japanese and South Korean Historians. This conference was established in 2001 in response to the joint report by the Japanese and South Korean governments that had recommended the expansion of joint historical research. While the conference has been held annually since then, it has been organized by Japanese and South Korean historians independent of the governments. Thus, an expression of support by the governments could alone stimulate and legitimate joint historical research projects. Indirect governmental support of this sort could probably better facilitate cosmopolitanism among participants because the governments would not be able to constrain joint historical research projects by controlling the selection of participants and foregrounding the national frame of identification.

But a crucial question is whether politicians in East Asia are ready to incorporate outcomes of joint research projects by historians—even ones that contradict their own commemorative positions—into official commemorations. At present, politicians are not ready, opting to ignore historians’ critical reflections. In fact, LDP politicians recently became more vocal in criticizing historians who studied Japan’s past wrongdoings, prompting a group of historians in the United States and Europe to issue a statement of solidarity to stop “government manipulation, censorship, and private intimidation” and call upon the Japanese and other governments to “defend the freedom of historical inquiry.” In this regard, it is useful to reflect on the remarks that Richard von Weizsäcker made in summer 1995 when he toured in Japan. In one of his public lectures, Weizsäcker asked his Japanese audience, “Does the task of interpreting the past belong to historians alone? Or are we, political and intellectual leaders of Germany and Japan, also responsible for taking part in the task? I’m convinced that we are.” Of course, politicians lack professional skills to interpret the past in lieu of historians, but they do have an essential part in the history problem because they have the power to institutionally support historians’ debate. This governmental support is especially pivotal in East Asia, where the governments have traditionally
dominated the civil societies. A resolution of the history problem depends on courageous politicians who dare to subject the existing official commemorations to critical reflections offered by the transnational network of historians.

Second, I recommend that joint historical research projects be rethought in multilateral settings. Except for the History to Open the Future project and a few other projects, joint historical research in East Asia has been organized in terms of Japan–South Korea and Japan-China bilateral relations. As historian Yang Daqing argued, however, “Institutionally, participation in multilateral research or dialogue can be a valuable opportunity for socialization into international norms and practices on writing history. . . . The permanent solution to the history problem, if there is one, is the cultivation of a global citizenship. This requires an understanding of history based on humanist principles and values.” In this respect, multilateral collaboration is likely to be most effective if American historians are included, because the United States has a significant stake in international relations in the region. As Shin Gi-Wook pointed out, “The United States not only has a responsibility for helping resolve the disputes but also has a clear interest in ensuring that the peace and prosperity of a region so vital to its future is not undermined by controversies rooted in the past.” Since the United States is one of the relevant political actors in the history problem, historians’ debate in East Asia will benefit from participation by American historians who are willing to subject their country’s nationalist commemoration to critical reflections.

Third, I recommend that historians engage with the public more actively. Professional historians in Japan were overwhelmed by JSHTHR members and other “populists,” not only because the boundaries between historiography and commemoration are ambiguous, but also because many professional historians in Japan and elsewhere tend to confine their work to scholarly communities. No matter how historical research on Japan’s past wrongdoings makes progress, it is unlikely to reshape public commemorations without more historians sharing their findings with citizens. In a way, professional historians have the civic duty to help concerned citizens understand historical events that shaped the world in which they live.

At the same time, it is important to note that historians cannot, and should not, dictate how the governments and citizens commemorate the Asia-Pacific War. To begin with, historians disagree with each other over the reliability of evidence and the validity of interpretations: this fundamentally
provisional nature of “historical facts” vis-à-vis a lack of consensus disables historians from presenting the governments and citizens with “the correct way” of remembering the past. Perhaps more importantly, human beings cannot replace commemoration with historiography because the former is the only way to assign meaning to the past and appropriate it as the basis of collective identity. The best historians can do for the governments and citizens, therefore, is foreground the importance of careful examination of historical evidence and interpretations and thereby keep commemorations open to critical reflections and continuous revisions.

In turn, as Paul Ricoeur emphasized, “In the final analysis, the conviction of the citizen alone justifies . . . the intellectual honesty of the historian in archives.” It is therefore crucial to increase “historical literacy” among citizens. Here, I suggest that this historical literacy should emphasize a set of competencies for taking a reflective stance on one’s own commemorative position by critically examining available evidence and interpretations à la an amateur historian. As Tessa Morris-Suzuki pointed out, the crucial question is, “How can one mount an effective critique of the Society for History Textbook Reform [JSHTR] without reverting to a simple positivism which seeks to replace the Society’s ‘incorrect’ narrative of the national past with an authoritative, but still dubious, ‘correct’ alternative?” Thus, I recommend that history education in Japan, South Korea, and China be reformed in such a way that younger generations can not only learn history according to the cosmopolitan logic, but also acquire cognitive skills to critically evaluate evidence and construct interpretations by working through disagreements.

Once the existing memorization-based approach to history is replaced with a more dialogic one, younger generations of the three countries will become more capable of taking critical distance from nationalist commemorations than previous generations. As Tsuchiya Takeshi, a professor of social studies at Aichi University of Education, suggested, these cognitive skills are needed more than ever in an increasingly global world, especially in the region of East Asia marred with a difficult transnational past: “In a transnational, multicultural society that transcends the framework of the nation-state, history education must evaluate the ability ‘to interpret history and propose a future by taking into consideration the foreign other’s perspective.’ . . . Thus, as history education becomes more and more transnational, it will become crucial not to demand one correct answer but to create evaluation
criteria for the ability to consider multiple perspectives . . . and to revise and deepen one’s idea through dialogues with others.”

This “dialogic historical literacy” may look unrealistic in East Asia, where the governments deploy education systems as vehicles of nation-building. Yet, ongoing education reforms in Japan, South Korea, and China are conducive to such historical literacy. In Japan, the government has begun to shift the curricular focus away from memorization to problem solving since the late 1990s by revising the Course of Study to increase the weight of problem-solving learning activities to prepare younger generations for a complex, constantly changing global world. Similar education reforms have been carried out in South Korea and China as well. As part of this ongoing education reform at the regional level, history education can be made more problem-solving oriented à la pragmatism, so as to help students develop the cognitive and communicative skills necessary for debating historical interpretations with foreigners in a constructive manner. Ultimately, an ideal education reform will abolish the textbook-inspection process itself and fully expose students to multiple historical interpretations and conflicting evidence.

In addition to better historical literacy, younger generations of Japanese citizens need to acquire more knowledge of modern Japanese history, including Japan’s past wrongdoings. This is urgent because the current structure of Japanese history education, which downplays the modern period, has created a vacuum of historical knowledge in younger generations: JSHTTR and other conservative NGOs exploited this vacuum to persuade young Japanese citizens to accept their nationalist commemoration as a correct version of history. To prevent the nationalist commemoration from further encroaching on the hearts and minds of young Japanese citizens, history education in Japan needs to expand the coverage of the modern period.

To this end, I recommend that younger generations of Japanese citizens learn about not only the comfort women, the Nanjing Massacre, and other well-known atrocities in East Asia’s history problem but also about lesser-known but no less important ones. Take, for example, Koreans who moved to Sakhalin during Japan’s colonial rule. After the Soviet Union occupied Sakhalin, they could not return to Korea because the agreement between the Japanese and Soviet governments allowed only Japanese citizens to leave Sakhalin. The tragedy of these Koreans who could not be reunited with their families after the war can remind Japanese citizens of the legacy
of Japan’s imperialist past to the full extent. Another important tragedy is the Battle of Okinawa, which claimed more than ninety thousand civilian lives: Okinawa residents were treated as “second-class” Japanese and, during the battle, were killed not only by the Allied powers but also by Japanese troops. After the war ended, Okinawa continued to be occupied by the United States until May 1972, and today, the prefecture disproportionately shoulders the US military bases in Japan. Without reference to the modern history of Okinawa, it is impossible to understand the postwar trajectory of US-Japan alliance, including the recent reinterpretation of Article 9 of the constitution that expanded the scope of the SDF’s overseas deployment. Thus, looking at the war from the perspectives of marginalized groups can help younger generations comprehend the real extent of Japan’s past wrongdoings as well as the ramifications of the Asia-Pacific War on current international relations.

The key to fostering this kind of “cosmopolitan historical literacy” is the continuation and improvement of joint historical research and education projects: historians and history teachers should lead by example. To be sure, the existing projects, including the History to Open the Future project, have encountered many logistical and academic problems, as noted by many Japanese participants in the symposium on European and East Asian joint history textbook projects held in Tokyo in 2007. However, German and French participants reminded them that the European projects made progress over time through many trials and errors. A case in point is the Joint German-Polish Textbook Commission, founded by the West German and Polish UNESCO Commissions in 1972. West German and Polish historians discussed various events and episodes in history of German-Polish relations, including Nazi occupation and Polish resistance movements, and issued recommendations for history and geography textbooks in 1976. Although these recommendations initially drew strong criticisms from West German nationalists, most of them were eventually incorporated into sections on Poland in West German textbooks.

Indeed, joint historical research and education projects are supported by the worldwide trend in education systems that legitimate cosmopolitan schemas, which take humanity, rather than nationality, as a primary frame of reference through human rights education and emphasis on world citizenship. Summarizing results of these recent comparative studies, sociologist John Meyer observed that more and more education systems define the person as someone who “should be able to function as a supra-national citi-
zen, and reflect from a more universal point of view on local and national history. In other words, the individual student is to become a member of a newly-developing identity called ‘humanity.’” Further, this institutional trend has forced the Japanese and other governments to reshape education systems as vehicles of “cosmopolitan nation-building.” This means that national history persists as a school subject, but it can be taught legitimately only if it is accompanied by cosmopolitan perspectives. As suggested by one of the participants in the Japan–South Korea joint history textbook symposium, “If teachers cannot avoid making lessons centered on the history of their own country, it is important for them to link their history to universality and cosmopolitanism, so that they can relativize and objectify their history to go beyond prejudices.”

Realizing this kind of cosmopolitan education will take a lot of time and effort, but it will offer a most fundamental solution to the history problem by prompting younger generations in Japan, South Korea, and China to remember the Asia-Pacific War newly and differently, according to the logic of cosmopolitanism. As the UNESCO Constitution states, “Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.” While this may sound too idealistic at first, mutual cosmopolitan commemoration has already emerged through the joint historical research and education projects. The question is whether the governments and citizens in the three countries are willing to further it.

**Final Reflections**

In a way, this book is a response to a famous passage in the speech that Richard von Weizsäcker delivered on the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II: “Anyone who closes his eyes to the past is blind to the present. Whoever refuses to remember the inhumanity is prone to new risks of infection.” When people inside and outside Japan criticize the Japanese government for failing to adequately commemorate Japan’s past wrongdoings, they often quote this passage in order to denounce the persistence of nationalism in Japan’s official commemoration and urge Japanese citizens to fully commemorate the suffering of foreign victims. This denunciation is at the core of the orthodox explanation of the history problem that blames Japan alone, consistent with the Tokyo Judgment that held Japan as solely and entirely guilty. Yet critics rarely probe into three questions buried within Weizsäcker’s speech: Which inhumanity should be remembered, how
should it be remembered, and precisely how will remembrance of the past inhumanity prevent “future infection”?

Simply put, I have argued that the inhumanities on all sides in the Asia-Pacific War need to be commemorated. This commemoration of the inhumanities also needs to be mutually cosmopolitan, aided by a critical reassessment of the Tokyo Trial. Since the history problem is fundamentally relational, its solution also calls for a relational approach. Such mutual cosmopolitan commemoration has the potential to prevent “future infection” by bringing the governments and citizens of Japan, South Korea, and China together within the horizon of common humanity that transcends the logic of nationalism. As Shin Gi-Wook insisted, “It cannot and should not be expected that Northeast Asia will simply repeat or emulate Western Europe. The regions have distinctive histories, experiences, and memories and perhaps even different cultural modes of reconciliation. Accordingly, we must search for a Northeast Asian method or strategy.” Here, I put forward mutual cosmopolitan commemoration, supported by historians’ critical reflections, as a most promising and distinctly East Asian solution.

Of course, it is no easy task to further mutual cosmopolitan commemoration in East Asia. To say the least, the prospect of mutual cosmopolitan commemoration faces three formidable challenges today. The first is the growing tension over Dokdo/Takeshima and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. For many South Koreans and Chinese, these territorial disputes are intimately tied with their commemorations of Japan’s past wrongdoings. If nationalist sentiments in the two countries intensify over the disputed islands, they will feed into the history problem and diminish the possibility of mutual cosmopolitan commemoration in the region. Moreover, this intersection of the history problem and the territorial disputes can become diplomatically more troubling if Japan deploys the SDF for the purpose of collective defense and its military operations extend to the territories of South Korea and China.

The second challenge is how to increase cosmopolitanism in Japan’s official commemoration without galvanizing Japanese conservatives, who continue to dominate Japanese politics. Jennifer Lind recommended that “perpetrator countries wishing to reconcile with former adversaries should search for a middle ground that is contrite enough to placate former adversaries abroad, but not so much that it triggers backlash from nationalists at home.” But this balancing act is easier said than done because a compromise of nationalism and cosmopolitanism is characterized by what social
theorists Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot called “the monstrosity of composite setups,” where “the coexistence of objects of different natures makes several groupings equally possible and creates uncertainty about the nature of the test under way.”65 That is, the compromise tends to trigger controversy because respective proponents of the competing logics could always contest the compromise by criticizing it for failing to conform adequately to one logic or another. Japan will need to institutionalize a greater degree of cosmopolitanism in its official commemoration, but that will risk prompting Japanese conservatives to boost their nationalist commemoration, which in turn will likely invite denunciations from South Korea and China.

The third challenge is the entry of new actors to the field of the history problem. Such entry will change interactional dynamics, coalitions, and power relations among the existing actors. The growing involvement of the United States has already introduced greater complexity into the dynamic and trajectory of the history problem. Nationalist commemoration practiced by Korean and Chinese Americans can galvanize Japanese nationalists, though more communication between Japan and the United States may help critically reassess the Tokyo Trial as a root cause of the history problem. More importantly, North Korea’s entry to the field—whether by itself or as part of unified Korea—will be a game changer because Japan has not made any settlement with North Korea with regard to its past colonial rule and wartime atrocities. Thus, it remains fundamentally open-ended whether and how relevant political actors of East Asia’s history problem will be able to facilitate mutual cosmopolitan commemoration and eventually move toward reconciliation.

Having put forward my argument, I fully acknowledge that observers of the history problem, including myself, can never remain neutral. In fact, social scientists who offer empirical observations are part and parcel of the history problem because they provide policymakers, NGOs, and concerned citizens with languages and rationales for justifying their commemorative positions and framing their preferred solutions. In this regard, I present my own sociological analysis, too, on pragmatist grounds: the goal of this book is not to impose on the public a certain version of the history problem in the name of social science, but to empower the public, as social theorist Bruno Latour insisted by following John Dewey—namely, to help “modify the representation the public has of itself fast enough so that we can be sure that the greatest number of objections have been made to this representation.”66 Such a timely and candid dialogue between social scientists
and citizens is the key to collectively improving our “objective” understanding of the situation.

Put another way, my main goal has been to illustrate the incipient development of mutual cosmopolitan commemoration, facilitated by the transnational network of historians engaging in mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations. My purpose in doing so is to help the participants in the history problem become more reflexive and critical of their own activities and, if they wish, put into use my sociological analysis. Alternatively, they can object to my analysis and renew the search for a better understanding and solution of the history problem. Either way, I share a goal with generations of concerned citizens in East Asia and around the world who have grappled with the history problem—to let war dead finally rest in peace and create a more peaceful world, where people will answer, gently, “Ah, Hiroshima.”
Notes

Introduction

2. For detailed statistics, see *Asahi shinbun*, April 27, 2005.
6. Dokdo/Takeshima refers to a group of small islets in the Sea of Japan. Japan and South Korea have been disputing sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima since the end of the Asia-Pacific War. For the history of the territorial dispute, see Dae Song Hyeon, *Ryōdo nasbonarizumu no tanjō: “Dokdo/Takeshima mondai” no seijigaku* (Tokyo: Minerva Shobō, 2006); Alexis Dudden, *Troubled Apologies among Japan, Korea, and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), chap. 1. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located in the East China Sea. The islands were administered by the United States until 1971 as part of the occupied Okinawa Islands. Japan and China (and Taiwan) began to dispute sovereignty over the islands after the United States transferred its control of the Okinawa Islands to Japan. For the history of the territorial dispute, see Ukeru Magosaki, *Nihon no kokkyō mondai: Senkaku, Takeshima, hoppō ryōdo* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2011), chap. 2; Sheila Smith, *Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), chap. 4.
8. Ibid., September 16, 2012.
18 For detailed discussion of this orthodox explanation, see Philip A. Seaton, Japan’s Contested War Memories: The “Memory Rifts” in Historical Consciousness of World War II (London: Routledge, 2007).


34 Olick, *Politics of Regret*, 93.


For a summary of these contributions from international-relations scholars, see Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain, eds., *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010).


I draw on Berger’s *War, Guilt, and World Politics* and Lind’s *Sorry States* in delineating these dimensions of Japan’s official commemoration.


Lind, *Sorry States*.


Chapter 1: Cross-National Fragmentation, 1945–1964


4 For estimated numbers of people arrested for these three types of war crimes, see Hirofumi Hayashi, *BC-kyū senpan saiban* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005).


7 For the logistics of the tribunal, see Yuma Totani, *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008).


15 Ibid., 264–268.

16 Ibid., chap. 6.

17 House of Representatives Justice Committee, November 14, 1951.


20 House of Representatives Plenary Session, December 9, 1952.


23 House of Representatives Plenary Session, April 30, 1955; also see House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, December 5, 1955, and House of Councillors Budget Committee, December 8, 1955.

27 House of Representatives Plenary Session, April 15, 1952.
28 House of Representatives Disciplinary Committee, June 17, 1952.
29 House of Representatives Plenary Session, December 9, 1952.
30 House of Councillors Plenary Session, June 9, 1952.
31 House of Representatives Plenary Session, December 9, 1952.
32 House of Representatives Budget Committee, December 3, 1953.
33 For details of dynamics within the JSP during this period, see Jirō Yamaguchi and Masumi Ishikawa, eds., *Nihon Shakaitō: sengo kakushin no shisō to kōdō* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2003).
36 Ibid., 31–40.
37 Ibid., 41–42.
38 House of Representatives Plenary Session, April 3, 1952.
42 Ibid., April 3, 1952.
45 House of Representatives Plenary Session, April 3, 1952.
46 Ibid., March 2, 1953.
47 Ibid.
49 Nihon Izokukai, *Izokukai jūgonenshi*, 70.
52 *Asahi shinbun*, October 16, 1952.
53 “Yasukuni Jinja gōshijimu ni taisuru kyōryoku ni tsuite,” April 19, 1956, reprinted in Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan Chōsa oyobi Rippōkousakyoku,


59 Ibid.

60 *Mainichi shinbun*, September 1, 1952.

61 House of Representatives Budget Committee, February 6, 7, 9, and 12, 1950; House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, February 14, 1950.


65 House of Representatives Cabinet Committee, February 8, 1956.


68 Sengo Nihon Kyōiku,* Sengo Nihon kyōiku*, vol. 5, 10.

69 Ibid., 103–104.

70 *Asahi shinbun*, May 18, 1956.

71 Ibid., June 2, 1956.


73 These pamphlets, published in August, October, and November 1955, are reprinted in their entirety in Sengo Nihon Kyōiku, *Sengo Nihon kyōiku*, vol. 5, 236–316. The November issue was published under the name of the Liberal Democracy Party.

74 House of Representatives Education Committee, March 20, 1956.


For the history of Ienaga’s struggles against textbook inspection, see Yoshiko Nozaki, *War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan: The Japanese History Textbook Controversy and Ienaga Saburo’s Court Challenges* (London: Routledge, 2008).


Ibid., vol. 8, 236–284.


House of Representatives Welfare Committee, March 26, 1952.

House of Representatives Budget Committee, February 5, 1952.


House of Representatives Plenary Session, April 1, 1954.


Nihon Hidankyōshi, *Futatabi hibakusha*, vol. 1, 88–89.

Ibid., 91–92.

House of Representatives Plenary Session, December 12, 1956.


100 House of Representatives Plenary Session, July 15, 1960.
102 Chūgoku Shinbunsha, Hiroshima, 184.
115 Ōta, Nikkan kōshō, chap. 1.
116 Ibid., 66–68.
117 Takasaki, Nikkan kaidan, 32–35.
118 House of Councillors Fishery Committee, October 27, 1953.
119 Mouri, Nitchū kankei, 11–12.
122 Asahi shinbun, February 17, 1965.


3 House of Representatives Special Committee on the Treaty and Agreements between Japan and the Republic of Korea, October 28, 1965.

4 House of Representatives Plenary Session, November 9, 1965.


8 Junko Ichiba, Hiroshima wo mochikaetta hitobito (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2005), 45.


11 Takenaka, Misuterareta, 53.

12 Zaikan Hibakusha, Zaikan hibakusha, 206.


14 House of Representatives Plenary Session, April 2, 1968.


16 Takenaka, Misuterareta, 54.

17 Zaikan Hibakusha, Zaikan hibakusha, 205.


26 House of Representatives Social Labor Committee, October 11, 1972.


29 The Ministry of Welfare issued the directive on July 22, 1974; for the content of the directive, see Ichiba, *Hiroshima*, 346.


37 Ibid., 33.


44 People’s Daily, September 30, 1972.


50 For a more comprehensive list of publications related to the Nanjing Massacre, see Tokushi Kasahara, Nankin Jiken ronsōshi: Nihonjin wa shijitsu wo dou ninshiki shite kitaka (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2007), 109.


52 Sadako Kurihara, When We Say ‘Hiroshima’: Selected Poems (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Michigan, 1999), 20–21.

53 Asahi shinbun, November 9, 1974.

54 Orr, Victim as Hero, 175.


58 Tanaka, Nitchū kankei, 104–105.
66 Asahi shinbun, July 1, 1969.
68 In Japan, a bill is automatically discarded by the end of the Diet session during which it was submitted, unless Diet members vote to extend deliberation on the bill to the next session.
70 House of Representatives Cabinet Committee and Plenary Session, April 12 and May 25, 1974.
73 Masumi Ishikawa and Jirō Yamaguchi, Sengo seijishi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), 127.
77 Tanaka, Yasukuni no sengoshi, 144–145.
78 Ibid., 146.
79 Mainichi Shinbun, Yasukuni sengobishi, chap. 1.
81 Murai, “Sengo nihon no seiji to irei,” 302.
82 Asahi shinbun, April 19 and 20, 1979.
83 House of Representatives Cabinet Committee, April 20, 1979.
84 House of Councillors Plenary Session, April 27, 1979.
86 Tanaka, Yasukuni no sengoshi, 113.
87 Nihon Izokukai, Izokukai no yonjūnen, 136–137.
93 Ibid., June 28, July 15, July 21, and July 24, 1982.
94 Ibid., August 4, 1982.
96 House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, July 30, 1982.
97 House of Representatives Culture and Education Committee, August 6, 1982.
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102 Duan, “Kyōkasho mondai,” 70.

103 Asahi shinbun, May 24, 1986.

104 Duan, “Kyōkasho mondai,” 71.

105 Asahi Shinbun, August 1, 1986.

106 Nihon Izokukai, Izokukai no yonjūnen, 153.


110 Asahi shinbun, August 16, 1985.

111 Tanaka, Nitchū kankei, 142–145.

112 House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, November 8, 1985.

113 Tanaka, Yasukuni no sengoshi, 166.

114 Tadashi Itagaki, Yasukuni kōshiki sanpai no sōkatsu (Tokyo: Teitensha, 2000), 188.

115 Yomiuri shinbun, January 6, 1986.


118 Ibid.


121 The joint statement, as well as presentations at the symposium, is collected in Zaikan Hibakusha, Zaikan hibakusha.


123 Takasaki, Nikkan kaidan, 201–203.

124 For the history of reparations movement in South Korea, see Soon-Won Park, “The Politics of Remembrance,” in Rethinking Historical Injustice and


129 Mouri, Nitchū kankei, 113.


131 Ibid., 1094.

132 Ibid., 886–906.


137 For the history of commemorations of the Nanjing Massacre in China as well as in Japan and the United States, see Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the “Rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).


142 For discussion of international factors that affected Japan’s official commemoration, see Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “The Trajectory of Perpetrators’ Trauma: Mnemonic Politics around the Asia-Pacific War in Japan,” Social Forces 87, no. 3 (2009): 1389–1422.

Chapter 3: Apologies and Denunciations, 1989–1996


6 Asahi shinbun, August 5, 1990.


11 Both the Japanese original and English translation of the Japanese Constitution is available at the website of the National Diet Library, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html.

12 For a detailed sequence of events surrounding the PKO bill, see Yoshitaka Sasaki, Umi wo wataru Jiētai: PKO rippō to seijikenyoku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992).


16 Ibid., September 20, 1991.


19 Historians have offered varying estimates of the total number of “comfort women,” ranging from 20,000 to 200,000. For a comprehensive summary of the historical facts about comfort women, see Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Fumiko Kawata, eds., “Jūgun ianfu” wo meguru 30 no uso to shinjitsu

20 House of Councillors Budget Committee, April 1, 1991.


22 House of Councillors Foreign Affairs Committee, December 18, 1990.


36 “Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono’s Statement, August 4, 1993,” http://www.awf.or.jp/2/survey.html.

37 For a detailed sequence of political struggles that followed, see Masumi Ishikawa and Jirō Yamaguchi, Sengo seijishi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), 175–180.

38 Ibid., 179.


40 Ibid., August 11, 1993.


42 Asahi shinbun, August 16, 1993.

43 Ibid.


45 Ibid., 444.


47 House of Representatives Budget Session, October 6, 1993.

49 House of Councillors Cabinet Committee, November 9, 1993.
51 *Asahi shinbun*, November 6 and 7, 1993.
54 *Asahi shinbun*, April 9, 1994.
57 Ibid., 268.
71 Hatano, *Kokka to rekishi*, 181.
72 Murayama, *Murayama Tomiichi*, 20–23.
Asahi shinbun, August 16, 1995.
Ibid.
Ibid.
“Prime Minister’s Letter of Apology for Former ‘Comfort Women,’ ” http://www.awf.or.jp/2/foundation-03.html.
An excerpt from Yun’s speech in Kurume City, Fukuoka Prefecture on November 25, 1995, reprinted in Yun, Heiwa, 144–145.
Kazuko Mouri, Nichū kankei: senko kara shinjidaie (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), 120.
Yomiuri shinbun, November 19, 1993.
Mouri, Nichū kankei, 149.
220 Notes to Pages 95–99


95 Yoshikazu Shimizu, Chūgoku wa naze hannichi ni nattaka (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 2003), 166.

96 For a detailed sequence of interactions between Japan and China over war-related compensation, see Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future? (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), chap. 4.

97 For a list of lawsuits by Asian victims of Japan’s wartime atrocities between 1990 and 2003, see Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility, “Postwar Compensation Cases in Japan,” http://space.geocities.jp/japanwarres/center/hodo/hodo07.htm.

98 Murayama, Murayama Tōmiichi, 227–229.

99 Asahi shinbun, July 30.

100 Ibid., August 2, 1996.

101 Ibid., July 30, 1996; People’s Daily, July 31, 1996.

102 Asahi shinbun, July 31, 1996.


105 Rekishi Kentō inkan, Daitōa Sensō, 445.


107 Fujioka, Jiyūshugi shikan towa nanika, 179, 197.

108 Ibid., 139, 179.


110 Ibid., 197–198.

111 Compared with history textbooks used in junior high and high schools between 1983 and 1985, history textbooks between 1993 and 1995 increased the number of pages devoted to Japan’s colonial rule of Korea and aggression against China. For a detailed comparison, see Yoshifumi Tawara, ed., Kenshō 15-nen Sensō to chūkō rekishi kyōkasho: shinkyū kyōkasho kijutsu no bikaku (Tokyo: Gakushū no Tomosha, 1994).

Chapter 4: The Coexistence of Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism, 1997–2015

2 Details of the meeting are described in Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho wo Tsukurukai, ed., Atarashii Nihon no rekishiga hajimaru (Tokyo: Gentōsha, 1997), 111–123.
4 Nihon no Zento to Rekishi Kyōiku, Rekishi kyōkasho, 518.
12 For a critical assessment of Hicks’s book by Hata and Yoshimi, see Ikuhiko Hata, Ianfu to senjō no sei (Tokyo: Shinchōsa, 1999), 266–282.
15 Nobukatsu Fujioka and Shūdō Higashinakano. The Rape of Nanking no kenkyū: Chūgoku ni okeru “jōhōsen” no teguchi to senryaku (Tokyo: Shōdensha, 1999), 275.


18 For a sequence of these activities by conservative NGOs and politicians, see Yoshifumi Tawara, *Tettei kenshō abunai kyōkasho: “sensō ga dekiru kuni” wo mezasu “Tsukurukai” no jittai* (Tokyo: Gakushū no Tomosha, 2001), 54.


20 For details of these changes in history textbooks, see Tawara, *Tettei kenshō abunai kyōkasho*, 36–40.


22 House of Representatives Committee on Administrative and Fiscal Reforms and Tax, June 8, 1998.

23 Tawara, *Tettei kenshō abunai kyōkasho*, 41.


25 Ibid.


29 Ibid., September 3, 2005.


38 Ibid., October 11, 2001.


41 Ibid., March 1, 2005.
43 Asahi shinbun, April 9, 10, and 16, 2005.
45 Park, Wakai no tameni, 107.
51 For detailed statistics, see Asahi shinbun, April 27, 2005.
57 Yomiuri shinbun, April 13, 2006.
63 Ibid., November 17 and December 16, 2006.
65 For the history of the Comparative History and History Education Research Group, see “Invitation to Join the Group,” http://members.jcom.home.ne.jp/lerrmondream/hikakus.html.
68 For a detailed sequence of these events, see Yoshifumi Tawara, Abunai kyōkasho no! mou 21-seiki ni sensō wo okosasenai tameni (Tokyo: Kadensha, 2005).
69 For a comprehensive list of participants and their institutional affiliations, see Kazuharu Saitō, Chūgoku rekishi kyōkasho to Higashi Ajia rekishi taiwa: Nitchūkan sangoku kyōtsū kyōzai zukuri no genba kara (Tokyo: Kadensha, 2008), 20–27.
71 For a detailed sequence of exchanges over the Nanjing Massacre, see Saito, Chūgoku rekishi kyōkasho, 53–54.
72 For a detailed sequence of these exchanges, see Saitō, Chūgoku rekishi kyōkasho, 76–79.
74 Saitō, Chūgoku rekishi kyōkasho, 81.
75 For a list of other joint history textbooks and teaching materials, see Saitō, Chūgoku rekishi kyōkasho, 152.
78 “The Japan-South Korea Joint Historical Research Report.”
80 These statements were made at the international conference to reflect on the Japan-South Korea and Japan-China Joint Historical Research Projects in Seoul on September 10, 2010, reprinted in Tokushi Kasahara, ed., Sensō wo shiranai kokumin no tameno Nitchū rekishi ninshiki (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2010), 263–264.

81 Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko and President Lee Myung Bak made the agreement during the summit meeting on December 18, 2011. See the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/korea/visit/1112_pre/meeting.html.

82 For a sequence of the establishment of the Japan-China Joint Historical Research Project, see “Summary of the Japan-China Joint Historical Research Project,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/rekishi_kk.html.


84 For Shōji’s recollection of the subcommittee meetings, see Jun’ichirō Shōji, “‘Nitchū rekishi kyōdō kenkyū’ wo furikaette: sono igi to kadai,” in Sensō wo shiranai kokumin, 93–118.


86 For Kitaoka’s recollection of these negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese sides, see Shin’ichi Kitaoka, “‘Nitchū rekishi kyōdō kenkyū’ wo furikaeru,” in Sensō wo shiranai kokumin no tameno Nitchū rekishi ninshiki, ed. Tokushi Kasahara (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2010), 230–234.


92 Asahi shinbun, March 27, 2007.

96 Ibid., 127–129.
100 *Asahi shinbun*, September 8, 2010.
103 The committee is led by Tamogami Toshio, a former air force general known for his pro-military and nationalist statements. For a list of protests organized by the committee, see “History of Our Activities,” http://www.ganbare-nippon.net/report.html.
104 *Asahi shinbun*, October 17, 2010.
105 For the sequence of interaction between the Japanese and Chinese governments, see *Asahi shinbun*, September 26, 2012.
106 Ibid., September 15 and 16, 2012.
107 Ibid., August 31, 2011.
110 *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 17, 2012.
112 *Asahi shinbun*, September 1, 2012.
113 Kobayashi, *Seiken kōtai*.
114 *Asahi shinbun*, October 18, 2012.
115 *Sankei shinbun*, March 2, 2013.
Notes to Pages 125–131

118 Asahi shinbun, February 24 and March 24, 2014.
119 Ibid., December 26 and 27, 2013.
121 House of Representatives Budget Committee, February 12, 2014.
122 Ibid.
124 Asahi shinbun, March 27, 2014.
128 Ibid.
129 Asahi shinbun, August 15, 2015.
130 Ibid., August 16, 2015.

Chapter 5: The Legacy of the Tokyo Trial

1 Budget Committee, House of Representatives, October 6, 2006, and March 12, 2013.
2 The Chinese government in particular has embraced the Tokyo Trial as the basis of its official commemoration. See Nobuko Kosuge, Sengo wakai: Nihon wa “kako” kara tokihanatarerunoka (Tokyo: Chûô Kôron Shinsha, 2005), 170–172.
4 Nomura, Heiwa sengen, 4.
27 Ushimura, “Senso sekinin” ron, 221.
30 Hosoya, Andō, and Ōnuma, Tokyo Saiban, 364.
32 For elaboration of the collectively distributed concept of agency, see Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
36 Röling, Tokyo Trial and Beyond, 87.
40 Totani, Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 262.

43 Countries such as Australia and Canada have offered apologies and compensation to indigenous people who were victims of “internal colonialism.” However, these apologies and compensation are still delimited within national borders. Reconciliation between the former colonizers and colonized seems to be far more difficult at the international level.


49 In addition, 173 Taiwanese were prosecuted, and twenty-one of them were sentenced to death. See Hirofumi Hayashi, BC-kyū senpan saiban (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005), 152.

50 The Japanese government kept these Koreans by following the policy of the Allied powers. The South Korean government also had been indifferent to these Korean prisoners and taken no action to seek their release. See Aiko Utsumi, Kim wa naze sabakaretanoka: Chōsenjin BC-kyū senpan no kiseki (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Shuppan, 2008), 282–287.


52 House of Representatives Social Labor Committee, April 12, 1962.

Also see Utsumi, *Kim wa naze sabakaretanoka*, 382.


55 In addition, 27,783 Taiwanese are enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine. See Nobumasa Tanaka, *Yasukuni no sengoshi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002), 226.


57 Ibid.


67 Ibid., 276–277.


72 Precisely speaking, not all people in Hiroshima shared Hamai’s position, and some of them were quite critical of it. But the majority of Hiroshima residents accepted the epitaph along the lines of Hamai’s position. For the history of the epitaph dispute, see Yoshiko Ishida, “Ayamachi wa kurikaeshimasenukara: hibun ronsō no ayumi,” in *Nihon genbakuron taikei*, vol. 7, ed. Hiroshi Iwadare and Tatsumi Nakajima (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Center, 1999), 149–174.
74 Chizuko Ueno, Feminism kara mita Hiroshima: sensō hanzai to sensō toiu hanzai no aida (Hiroshima: Kazokusha, 2002), 36–37.
75 Awaya, Tokyo Saibanron; Hosoya, Andō, and Ōnuma, Tokyo Saiban; Ienaga, Sensō sekinin.
76 The exemption of Emperor Hirohito from war responsibility was engineered by both the Allied powers and Japan. See Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), chap. 15; John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), chap. 15.
82 Alexis Dudden, “ ‘We Came to Tell the Truth’: Reflections on the Tokyo Women’s Tribunal,” Critical Asian Studies 33, no. 4 (2001), 599.
84 “Final Report, December 24, 2002,” http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/tuitou/kettei/021224houkoku.html. The report also noted that “those war dead who harmed Japan’s peace and independence as well as violated ideals of world peace”—referring to Class A war criminals—should be excluded from the proposed new memorial.
86 Awaya et al., Sensō sekinin senso sekinin, 117.


90 House of Representatives Budget Committee, October 23, 1975.

91 House of Councillors Cabinet Committee, June 14, 1990.


96 The transcript of the exchange is archived at the website of PBS *NewsHour*, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec98/china_12–1.html.


100 For a list of resolutions and memorials in the United States, see *Yomiuri shinbun*, August 1, 2013.


102 Dudden, “‘We Came to Tell the Truth.’” 599.
Notes to Pages 154–157


Chapter 6: The Role of Historians in the History Problem


24 Ibid.


33 Ibid.


35 The arguments by Ji Su Geol, Yun Hae Dong, and Lim Ji Hyeon are summarized in Jong Moon Ha, “Kankoku ni okeru ‘kakoji seisan’ to sono seijiteki dainamikusu,” in *Higashi Ajia no rekishi seisaku: Nichūkan taiwa to rekishi ninshiki*, ed. Takahiro Kondo (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2008), 18–43.


37 Ahn’s statements are quoted and summarized in *Comfort Women*, 102–103.
42 Ibid., 103.
46 House of Representatives Budget Committee, February 12, 2014.
50 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Past within Us: Media, Memory, History (London: Verso, 2005), 15. As Barbie Zelizer argued, “Journalism constitutes one of the few institutions to encapsulate contemporary memory’s spread. . . . However, despite all of this evidence, journalism still remains largely unarticulated as an agent of memory.” See Zelizer, “Memory as Foreground, Journalism as Background,” in Journalism and Memory, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 45.


57 Hayden V. White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).


59 This statement by Yun at the international conference in February 1997 is reprinted in Park, Wakai no tameni, 108.


62 Yoshida, Making of the “Rape of Nanking,” 174–175.

63 Kashiwa Shōbō’s statement explaining its decision to indefinitely postpone a Japanese translation of Chang’s book is reprinted in Nobukatsu Fujioka and Shūdō Higashinakano, The Rape of Nanking no kenkyū: Chūgoku ni okeru “jōhōsen” no teguchi to senryaku (Tokyo: Shōdensha, 1999), 265–268.


For discussion of how observers tend to over-identify with victims of traumatic events, see Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Bernhard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser, and Piotr Sztompka, eds., Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Dominik LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), and Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

Takeshi Tsuchiya, Kaishakugata rekishi gakushū no susume: taiwa wo jūshi shita shakaika rekishi (Chiba: Azusa Shuppansha, 2011).

For a summary of Machimura’s statement on the television program Japan’s Future: Debate on Japan’s Place in Asia, 60 Years after the War (Nihon no korekara: sengo 60-nen jikkuri hanasō Ajia no nakano Nihon), see his official website, http://www.machimura.net/column_s/pages_0004.html.


Kazutaka Kikuchi, Higashi Ajia rekishi kyōkasho mondai no kōzu: Nihon Chūgoku, Taiwan, Kankoku oyobi zainichi Chōsenjin Gakkō (Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunka Sha, 2013), 348.
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78 Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States (Armonk, NY: East Gate, 2000).


80 For detailed discussion of how the Japanese government tried to defend its epistemology and textbook inspection, see Yoshiko Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan: The Japanese History Textbook Controversy and Ienaga Saburo’s Court Challenges (London: Routledge, 2008), chap. 5.


82 Shigeki Tōyama, Sengo no rekishigaku to rekishi ishiki (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968), 17–18.


86 Hideharu Konno, Rekishigaku to rekishi kyōiku no kōzu (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 2008), 252.

87 Nobuko Kosuge, “Kyōtsū rekishi kijutsu to wakai: Higashi Ajia ni okeru ‘rekishi no seijika’ to ‘rekishi no rekishika,’ ” Rekishi ninshiki kyōyū no chihei, 223.

Conclusion


4 For discussion of the relationship between memory and forgiveness, see Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).


12 To diagnose difficulties of a political apology, I draw on Jeffrey Alexander’s cultural-pragmatic approach that dissects a performative speech act in terms of six elements: collective representations, actors, audience, means of symbolic production, mise-en-scène, and power. See Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy,”


17 Asahi shinbun, December 29, 2015.


25 Yu Ha Park, “Mondai wa dokoni attanoka: Nihon no shien undō wo megutte,” in “Ianfu” mondai no kaiketsu ni mukete: hirakareta giron no


35 For a more general critique of the French tendency to absolutize the other, see Nancy Fraser, “The Uses and Abuses of French Discourse Theories for Feminist Politics,” *boundary 2* 17, no. 2 (1990): 82–101.


But the problem is that many government officials and politicians in Japan, South Korea, and China have difficulty supporting joint historical research projects, to begin with. Nishino Junya, a professor of political science at Keio University, therefore emphasized the necessity of strengthening networks of government officials and politicians in East Asia to help them build trust and deepen mutual understandings. See Junya Nishino, “Shinjidai Nikkan kankei no genjō to kadai,” in Nikkan shinjidai to kyōsei fukugō nettowāku, ed. Masao Okonogi and Yeong Seon Ha (Tokyo: Keiō Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2012), 177–200. While Nishino focuses on Japan–South Korea relations, his argument is applicable to Japan-China relations.


Shin, Park, and Yang, Rethinking Historical Injustice.


Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider, eds., History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories (London: Routledge, 2011).


63 Shin, “Historical Reconciliation in Northeast Asia,” 182.

64 Lind, *Sorry States*, 197.

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