MIGRATIONS AND IDENTITIES

Series Editors
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This series offers a forum and aims to provide a stimulus for new research into experiences, discourses and representations of migration from across the arts and humanities. A core theme of the series will be the variety of relationships between movement in space – the ‘migration’ of people, communities, ideas and objects – and mentalities (‘identities’ in the broadest sense). The series aims to address a broad scholarly audience, with critical and informed interventions into wider debates in contemporary culture as well as in the relevant disciplines. It will publish theoretical, empirical and practice-based studies by authors working within, across and between disciplines, geographical areas and time periods, in volumes that make the results of specialist research accessible to an informed but not discipline-specific audience. The series is open to proposals for both monographs and edited volumes.
In Memoriam,
Édouard Glissant
Stuart Hall
Acknowledgements

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Introduction: Creolizing Europe: Legacies and Transformations

Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez
and Shirley Anne Tate

‘The whole world is becoming an archipelago and becoming creolized’.

Édouard Glissant, ‘The Unforeseeable Diversity of the World’

'creolization' in political, economic, cultural and theoretical terms,\(^1\) has been underestimated in these writings.

*Creolizing Europe* aims to reverse this tendency by critically interrogating creolization (see in this volume Spivak; Hall; and Vergès) as the decolonial, rhizomatic thinking necessary for understanding the social and cultural transformations set in motion by trans/national dislocations, a Glissantian analytics of transversality and what Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez (2011; and in this volume) terms ‘transversal conviviality’. In this sense, Stuart Hall’s chapter on ‘Créolité and the Process of Creolization’ sets out the theoretical orientation that guides this volume in his challenge to seek out creolization’s applicability outside of the Caribbean. Gaytri Chakravorty Spivak’s ‘World Systems and the Creole, Rethought’ also addresses the limitation in grasping the theoretical and policy implications of the proposal of creolization. Discussing creolity rather than kinship as a model for comparativist practice, Spivak suggests that we start with Dante’s understanding of popular Italian as varieties of Creole and his choice of an aristocratic (‘curial’) political Creole as ‘Italian’, as this will enable us to perceive the beginnings of European nationalisms as grounded on a creolized understanding of themselves while asserting kinship. Engaging with the French-Reunion politics of remembrance, Françoise Vergès’s chapter on ‘Creolization and Resistance’ discusses the persistence of politics of oblivion in the former metropoles of colonial power. Her discussion on the *Maison des civilisations et de l’unité réunionnaise* argues for a need to imagine a postcolonial museography for a society still undergoing creolization.

Departing from these theoretical insights, *Creolizing Europe* engages in an interdisciplinary, transnational dialogue between the social sciences and humanities as it juxtaposes US–UK debates on debates on ‘hybridity’ and ‘mixing’ (see in this volume Tate, Klesse and Erel), ‘mixedness’ (see in this volume Klesse; and Erel) and the ‘Black Atlantic’ (see in this volume Patel) with Caribbean and Latin American (see in this volume Moreno and Saldivar) theorizations of cultural mixing in order to engage with Europe as a permanent scene of Édouard Glissant’s (1981, 1990, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 2002) creolization (see in this volume Murdoch; Gutiérrez Rodríguez; and Almeida and Corkill). This last is important given the political changes multicultural societies have undergone particularly since 9/11 (Gilroy, 2004; Lentin and Titley, 2011), articulated in increasingly restrictive immigration policies and calls for ‘integration’ allied with ‘failure of multiculturalism’ discourses. Such a context leads to urgency in revisiting once again the decolonial potential of creolization which we have seen historically in the locations of its emergence.

\(^{1}\) For further elaboration, see Gordon 2009; Gordon and Roberts 2009; Monahan 2011.
The historical dimension

The term ‘Creole’ was applied in areas of European colonial overseas expansion. A list of localities where people, at one time or another, have been called ‘Creole’ (or called themselves thus) would have to include not just the Caribbean and much of Latin America, but also parts of the south-eastern USAs (and Alaska), several island groups off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Africa, a number of mainland regions on that continent (including Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Mozambique) and a few pockets in the former Portuguese and Dutch colonies in Southern Asia (Knight, 1997; Spitzer, 2003; Eriksen, 2003; Palmié, 2006). Yet the common point of reference in the contemporary literature on creolization tends to be the Caribbean.

The term ‘Creole’ first appears as ‘criollo’ in the documentary records of the Iberian colonization of the Américas as a Portuguese term whose genealogy is still being debated. By the second half of the sixteenth century the term began to designate fairly consistently the modification that Old World life forms were perceived to undergo upon becoming ‘native’ to the Américas. What it certainly did not imply at this time were notions of explicitly ‘racial’ or ethnic difference or mixedness. What early usages of criollo tend to connote is a sense of alterity from the metropolitan world brought about by the indigenization of self-identified peripherals (Arrom, 1951). This is also the sense that such terminology continued to carry in its translation into English and French in the second half of the seventeenth century as a referent to New World-born Europeans and Africans (Palmié, 2007; Stephens, 1983). Thus there was a differentiation between the ‘creolized population’ and the first-generation European colonizers. By the end of the eighteenth century, and especially upon the founding of the first Latin American nation states in the early nineteenth century, the semantic cargo transported by the term criollo in continental American Spanish began to diverge dramatically from the older meanings it continued to hold in Spain’s remaining Caribbean colonies.

Latin American criollismo mutated into an ideology of exclusion by the early twentieth century. On this basis a citizenship model of insiders and outsiders to the nation was developed, serving to demarcate supposedly

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2 Stephens suggests that the first appearance of the term ‘Creole’ was in Portuguese (crioulo). Yet, the first use of the term is documented in Spanish. The Spanish colonizers born in the Américas were named ‘criollo’ (Stephens, 1983, 28–39). Further, Arrom (1951, 175) notes that the etymological root of ‘crioulo’ and ‘criollo’ lie in in the verb ‘criar’ (to raise, nourish, create) and noun ‘cria’ (infant, baby, person without family) and that the ending –oulo or –olo refers to a diminutive, which leads him to the conclusion that the term was originally used to refer to children born in exile, and later on to adults.
Creolizing Europe

‘non-Creole’ collective identities and exclude them from citizenship rights, as was the case for the indigenous and African heritage populations. Such postcolonial ideological elaboration of the concept of ‘criollismo’ was characteristic of mainland Ibero-America and the Hispanic Caribbean (Alberro, 1992). This model introduced an ethnic and racialized social order and socio-economic structure in which ‘criollo’ meant the ‘new elites’, largely descendants of White Spanish colonizers. In this context, cultural mixing was inscribed in power asymmetries as the economies of mainland Latin America and the Hispanic Caribbean were in the hands of the ‘criollos’ (Buisseret and Reinhardt, 2000).

Due to the near-genocide of the Caribbean’s indigenous populations at the hands of the Spanish, colonialism’s demand for plantation labor was met initially by indentured labor from Europe, then several centuries of African enslavement, with post-abolition indentured laborers mainly from the Indian subcontinent and China (Mintz, 1985). Plantation slavery, along with maroonage and subsistence farming, created transcultural contact zones where cultures met, clashed and grappled with each other, often in highly uneven relations of power (Ortiz, 1995; Pratt, 1992). The articulations of new cultural and social forms were intrinsically linked to histories of struggle against slavery and for independence in mid-seventeenth-century Anglophone Caribbean plantation societies (Brathwaite, 1971; 1974). In the French Antilles it was not the white elites but the African-descent population who were the point of reference for the process of creolization (James, 2001 [1938]). In the Caribbean context, creolization was founded on the necessity to survive the plantation system and was carried forward in the face of suffering by the affective and creative potential of agents to recuperate loss and re-create social identity.

Creolization

It is this aspect of power asymmetries that Stuart Hall (1993; and in this volume) discusses as emblematic of the process of creolization in the Caribbean. For him this process represents the primal scene of tragedy in the matrix of cultural contact and negotiations between what he termed présence africaine, présence européenne and présence américaine. These represent the productive antagonisms of racial oppression, imperialism and indigenization in which the Caribbean was formed. It is in this conjunctural axis that we discuss ‘creolizing Europe’, focusing particularly on Hall’s (2003, 31) assertion that creolization ‘always entails inequality, hierarchization, issues of domination and subalternity, mastery and servitude, control and resistance’. Needless to say, Hall’s approach to creolization is inspired by Glissant.

As early as his writings in the 1950s, Glissant embraced the visionary and revolutionary spirit of decolonization. In 1958, when he was awarded the
renowned French literary Prix Renaudot for his novel *Le Lézarde*, Glissant was already part of a group of well-known decolonial African and Caribbean intellectuals writing in French and English (for further discussion, see Dash, 1995; Vergès, and Murdoch in this volume). As a member of the ‘Fédération des étudiants d’Afrique noire en France’, the ‘Société Africaine de culture’ and contributor to the journal *Présence africaine*, Glissant actively participated in debates on an independent future for African and Antillean states. In 1956, he attended the First International Congress of Black Writers and Artists, in Paris, and, with other Antillean intellectuals and writers such as Albert Béville, Cosnay Marie-Joseph and Marcel Manville, he founded the ‘Front des Antillais et Guyanais pour l’autonomie’, in 1961, supporting the decolonization of the Antilles and French Guyana.

Drawing on this legacy but setting a rather different accent, the Martinican intellectuals Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau and Rafaël Confiant developed the concept of ‘creolité’ (creoleness) to emphasize the quality of existence established by the process of creolization. In their 1989 publication *Éloge de la Créolité* (translated in 1990 as *In Praise of Creoleness*), they established the concept of ‘créolité’ as a point of departure for thinking creoleness. Drawing on the work of Aimé Césaire and Édouard Glissant, Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant (1990,10) sought to elaborate an ethics of vigilance, ‘a sort of mental envelope in the middle of which our world will be built in full consciousness of the outer world’. Through the concept of *creolité*, they tried to capture the specificity of Caribbean people, who were not Europeans, Africans or Asians, but Creoles (Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant, 1990). Thus, they introduced a vision of diversity, which, although based on the intellectual tradition of the Negritude movement, went beyond it by creating a space for what they described as a ‘kaleidoscopic totality’, the ‘nontotalitarian consciousness of a preserved diversity’ (28). This perspective introduces us methodologically to what Glissant (1996) calls an ethnographic ‘poetics of relation’ and an ‘analytics of transversality’. However, this approach has not been without critique.

For example, the eminent Guadeloupean writer Maryse Condé has identified the limitations of *creolité*, as it has not taken into account other historical creoles, such as those to be found on the west coast of Africa (see, for further discussion, Cottenet-Hage and Condé, 1995; Kemedjio, 1999). From Spanish Caribbean and Latin American and Anglophone Caribbean perspectives, we could also note that the concept of *creolité* is specific to the French Caribbean context. Thus, we need to consider the modern and historical usages and meanings of creolization, as without this we risk the erasure of historical semantic and regional differences (Palmié, 2006; Knörr,
Considering this historical background, it is interesting that the term has reappeared in recent years.

Glissantian creolization is useful for understanding contemporary European societies because of its focus on the analysis of power asymmetries. As Glissant notes, creolization must not be confused with métissage, the mechanical act of cultural mixing. Rather, creolization engages with the 'unforeseeable' ('l’inattendue') (Glissant, 1996), ‘le différance que se mette au contact et que produise l’imprévisible’ (Glissant, 2010). Creolization is an outcome of racialized living together which goes beyond racial coding through the contact of different affects, desires, energies and intensities that break the established normative order of the governance of diversity. It is this break through the analytics of transversality that produces transversal conviviality that challenges the normative power of the One (Gutiérrez Rodríguez in this volume). Thus, creolization, as decolonial rhizomatic thinking, engages with an ethics of conviviality. Therefore, its interest is not in accommodating cultural differences under a hegemonic order because of its departure from a racialized understanding of conviviality itself. Thus, while Sidney Mintz (1998) counters celebratory approaches to cultural mixing that flatten the historical specificity of creolized nations, Glissant is interested – as we are in this volume – in the potential of creolization for challenging occidental notions of identity and belonging that reproduce the Self/Other binary. In the postcolonial context, the ‘Other’ is constructed as inferior to the hegemonic White, Male, European Self and this was foundational to the establishment of the racial social classification system sustaining the coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000) that still persists.

In our contemporary times of economic crises, austerity measures and cuts in public spending affect, in particular, poor white people, post/migrants and refugees. The cuts in health care for undocumented migrants in Spain; the July 2013 discussion in the UK that people who stay longer than six months in the country should pay for National Health Service (NHS) care to stop ‘health tourism’; and the deportation of undocumented migrants throughout Western Europe represent the tip of the iceberg of responses to Europe’s ‘exteriority’ (Dussel, 1995). Here those coded as non-citizens are removed from the realm of human and citizenship rights. It is in this context that the decolonial epistemological move that Glissant and Hall propose through creolization becomes a vital resource for analyzing European societies.

5 English translation (Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez: EGR): ‘the difference that comes into contact and produces the unforeseeable’.

6 Creolization ‘had been historically and geographically specific. It stood for centuries of culture building rather than culture mixing or culture blending, by those who became Caribbean people. They were not becoming transnational; they were creating forms by which to live’ (Mintz, 1998, 119).
Translating creolization to Europe

The differences embedded in the concept of creolization show the necessity for resisting ahistorical and solely celebratory uses of this term. Indeed, to French Antillean cultural critics, créolité and creolization are distinct notions. Glissant favors creolization over créolité because the former refers to an ongoing process which always leads to unknown consequences that cannot be foreseen. As the organizers of documenta 11 Platform 3 note, there

is a productive experience of the unknown, which we must not fear. Talking of this experience, Glissant harks back to the plantation, a gouffre-matrice, one of the ‘wombs of the world’. Today’s world is again experiencing the chaos of the plantation, especially in the context of globalization. (Enwezor et al., 2003, 15)

Glissant elaborates a theory of creative disorder that transcends the battle lines of center and periphery, North and South, dependence and independence.

In the European context, we need to relate creolization to the colonial past and the transformation of societies produced through postcolonial migratory, diasporic and exilic movements. Thus, creolization frames a space in which national rhetoric about identity and community are contested and challenged. This leads us then to think more broadly of moments of cultural mixing and transversal conviviality. In this sense, Glissant (1997a; 1997b; 2002; Glissant and Chamoiseau, 2009) describes Europe as inevitably inscribed in the project of creolization. Following Glissant’s (1997a; 1997b; 2002; Glissant and Chamoiseau, 2009) observation of the ‘irreversible creolization of the world’, what do we mean by ‘creolizing Europe’? Instead of the cultural fusion of multicultural and hybridity discourses, Creolizing Europe means living with cacophonies, irritations and discordances within the raced intersectionalities of everyday life. Thus, creolization is not just a ‘syncretic process of transverse dynamism that endlessly reworks and transforms the cultural patterns of varied social and historical experiences and identities’ (Balutansky and Sourieau, 1998, 1). Rather, creolization speaks about the creation of new articulations not inscribed in any hegemonic script. It is the creation of a new vocabulary that transcends the normative order still invested in recreating the colonial gaze. In this sense, Glissant speaks of the languages of the ‘creolized streets’ of Rio de Janeiro, Mexico, the Parisian suburbs or Los Angeles (Schwieger Hiepko, 1998). For him these spaces show the speed of cultural innovation and creativity. He notes that not all of these cultures and subcultures last, but they leave affective traces in their communities. For Glissant, the moment of creolization is not fixed by geography as we live in a world in motion where languages, identity and cultures are in a constant state of flux. It is this flux that Creolizing Europe
interrogates as it continues the Glissantian project of decolonizing and deconstructing a Europe that refuses to attend to the unforeseen.

In her chapter, ‘Are We All Creoles? “Sable-Saffron” Venus, Rachel Christie and Aesthetic Creolization’, Shirley Anne Tate goes beyond the debate of hybridity by discussing the aesthetics of creolization. Introducing the cultural politics of beauty into Glissantian creolization she shows that aesthetics has the potential to take us beyond a simple métissage to enable us to see how a nation understands itself. Christian Klesse’s chapter, ‘Queering Diaspora Space, Creolizing Counter-Publics: On British South Asian Gay and Bisexual Men’s Negotiations of Sexuality, Intimacy and Marriage’, discusses the rather troublesome experience of ‘multiculturalism’ in queer spaces. Going beyond the analysis of ‘mixedness’, Klesse highlights the potential of queer diaspora counter-spaces. Also, Umut Erel’s chapter, ‘Creolizing Citizenship? Migrant Women from Turkey as Subjects of Agency’, drawing on life-stories of migrant women from Turkey in Germany and Britain, proposes to reconceptualize migrant women’s citizenship by inquiry of the potential of creolizing citizenship. In his chapter, ‘Re-Imagining Manchester as a Queer and Haptic Brown Atlantic Space’, Alpesh Patel seeks to re-invoke and rework the term ‘Black Atlantic’ by suggesting the ‘Brown Atlantic’ as an actual and imaginary space that recognizes the specific colonial and postcolonial legacies that the United Kingdom and North America share. In ‘Comics, Dolls and the Disavowal of Racism: Learning from Mexican Mestizaje’, Mónica Moreno Figueroa and Emiko Saldívar Tanaka explore the limits and potential of creolization by contrasting it with discourses of mestizaje (racial and cultural mixture) in Mexico. Arguing that the Mexican case can offer a mirror and some interesting lessons to processes of mixture and diversity to Europe, they examine the politics of public recognition of racism. Tracing colonial poetics within contemporary Europe, H. Adlai Murdoch’s ‘Continental Creolization: French Exclusion through a Glissantian Prism’ examines the ways in which migrant Caribbean diasporas inscribe critical paradoxes of migrancy and citizenship within France, concentrating on displaced inhabitants of French Caribbean overseas departments who were made citizens of France in 1946. Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez’s chapter, ‘Archipelago Europe: On Creolizing Conviviality’, continues this discussion by focusing on conviviality. She examines the epistemic and ethical underpinning of the project of creolization through the example of ‘Latinizing Manchester’, discussing the potential of cultural and social urban transformation through the example of the Spanish and Latin American diaspora. The implications of the European colonial project in tracing new cartographies and phenomena is addressed by José Carlos Pina Almeida and David Corkill’s chapter, ‘On Being Portuguese: Luso-tropicalism, Migrations and the Politics of Citizenship’, inquiring about the limits of this concept in the understanding of the impact of Portuguese colonialism on its former colonies. Critically discussing Gilberto Freyre’s work on luso-tropicalism, it contrasts creolization with the politics of miscegenation within imperial and fascist expansionist projects.
While some of the chapters keep a critical distance to Glissant's concept of creolization (Almeida and Corkill; Moreno and Saldivar), all chapters contribute to a further thinking of *Creolizing Europe*. They engage with Édouard Glissant's approach to creolization through the analytics of transversality which is echoed in different locations, affects, politics and practices of transversal conviviality. Thus, all of the chapters explore the usefulness, transferability and limitations of creolization for thinking post/coloniality, raciality and its intersectional otherings not only as historical legacies but as immanent to and constitutive of the ongoing transformations of European societies.

**Works Cited**


I begin with two apologies. First, for the schematic nature of my presentation. I am trying to map together a different number of areas in order to pose some basic questions about the process of creolization. This inevitably means that I cannot go into the complexity and detail which each of them deserves. Second, an apology for obliging Derek Walcott to listen to yet another exercise in ‘cultural theory’, which I know he thinks is a tremendous waste of time.

I want to think about the passage from Édouard Glissant quoted in the notes prepared by the Documenta 11 team for this Platform, to the effect that ‘the whole world is becoming creolized’. What can such a statement mean, and what are its conceptual implications? I explore these questions in the context of the themes proposed in the notes: ‘Can the concept of créolité be applied to describe each process of cultural mixing, or is it peculiar to the French Caribbean? Does it constitute a genuine alternative to the entrenched paradigms that have dominated the study of postcolonial and postimperial identities?’ Do ‘créolité’ and ‘creolization’ refer to the same phenomenon, or does ‘creolization’ offer us a more general model or framework for cultural intermixing? Should ‘creolization’ replace such terms as hybridity, métissage, syncretism? In short, what is its general conceptual applicability?

Obviously, Glissant’s remark that the whole world is becoming creolized is a metaphorical, or better, a metonymical, statement. That is so to say, it depends on the extension or expansion of a specific concept to other historical situations, other historical moments, other kinds of society, other cultural configurations. This can be a dangerous exercise, because it means mapping a concept across a number of conceptual frontiers; and the question is, at the end of this process, what relationship does the expanded concept have to the original? Has it moved so far as to have destroyed all the richness and specificity present in its first, more concrete, application? This is certainly the critique of ‘creolization’ offered today by some Caribbean scholars, who say that its ubiquitous application has eroded its strategic conceptual value. Of course, it is impossible not to generalize concepts in theoretical work. The issue is, what is the appropriate level of abstraction, and what is gained/lost in the process of generalizing it? I have tried to be aware of these traps in the exercise undertaken below.

I will try to stage this argument over two sessions. In the first, I want to ask whether notions of ‘Creole’ and ‘créolité’ can be expanded from their meanings and conditions of existence in the French Antilles to other parts of the Anglophone Caribbean. And, in tomorrow’s session, I want to follow this by locating the question of ‘creolization’ in the wider processes of globalization. In general, I would describe my approach as a strategy of ‘conjectural theorization’.

We need to clear the ground by drawing some distinctions between the different meanings of these terms. First, the term ‘Creole’ itself. Its most common usage is as a way of describing the vernacular form of language which has developed in the colonies and become the ‘native tongue’ of the majority of its inhabitants, through the combining of elements of European (mainly French) and African languages. Though the term originally had as strong a connection with Spanish (criollo), it has acquired, historically, particular resonances for the French colonial world. In ‘Free and Forced Poetics’, Glissant describes Creole as ‘an idiom based on a French-derived vocabulary and an original syntax mixing African structures with speech habits from the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Norman sailors’ (Glissant, 1976, 9). In the French sugar colonies – including the French Antilles, French Guiana and, as Françoise Vergès (1999, 4) argues, places like Réunion in the Pacific Ocean (an island with a history similar to the Antilles and, like the others, part of ‘Les Veilles Colonies’ [the Old Colonies]) – Creole was long considered a debased, corrupted ‘patois’ or ‘bad French’ spoken by ‘the natives’. It long retained this association with the ‘native’ and the ‘abjected’. This is, indeed, how Europeans for many years regarded all the vernacular idiolects of native speakers in the Caribbean. More recently, however, as part of a concerted struggle for recognition against a former imperializing hegemony, Creole has come to be acknowledged as having many of the characteristics of a so-called proper language in its own right, as well as being powerfully expressive of local conditions – and thus, as
the créolité theorists argue, capable of sustaining a distinctive ‘vernacular’ literature of its own.

The term ‘Creole’ has also been used sociologically, to refer to an identifiable fraction of colonial society, and this terminology is more common in the French territories than in the Anglophone Caribbean. It is still widely used in this sense in Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana and Haiti, as it is in Réunion and indeed in some of the African Francophone countries. In a looser sense, ‘Creole’ has also been used to refer to the traditions of early French and Spanish settlers in the Gulf States of the USA. It is worth noting that, in the Anglophone Caribbean islands, the term is much more common in St Lucia and Dominica, where the French influences remain strong, than in, say, Jamaica, where it is rarely used, except in an academic – and often pejorative – sense (e.g., ‘Creole nationalism’). Elsewhere, the two places where it is to be found are Guyana and Trinidad, where it has a quite different meaning. There, it signals the difference between those of ‘Indian’ and ‘African’ descent. Guyanese talk about ‘Indians or Creoles,’ and by Creoles they mean ‘blacks’ (whatever their actual skin color), descendants of Africans born in Guyana, whereas ‘Indians’ refers to the indentured population from Asia. These examples suggest that ‘Creole’ remains a powerfully charged but also an exceedingly slippery signifier. It seems impossible to freeze this term in its meaning, or to give it any kind of fixed or precise racial referent.

Originally, Creoles were, of course, white Europeans born in the colonies, or those Europeans who had lived so long in the colonial setting that they acquired many ‘native’ characteristics and were thought by their European peers to have forgotten how to be ‘proper’ Englishmen and Frenchmen. Shortly thereafter, the term came also to be applied to black slaves. The distinction in any eighteenth-century plantation document listing the slaves employed on an estate or owned by a particular slaveholder marked the distinction between ‘Africans’ and ‘Creoles’; and much hung on it in terms of how well ‘seasoned’ to local conditions the slave was, how far already acclimatized to the harsh circumstances and rituals of plantation life. ‘Africans’ were slaves who were born in Africa and transported to the colonies; ‘Creoles’ were slaves born in, and thus ‘native to’, the island or territory. The essential distinction is between those from cultures imported from elsewhere and those rooted or grounded in the vernacular local space.

Originally, the term ‘Creole’ in the Caribbean context had both a white and a black referent. It was applied to both native-born white and black populations, and only subsequently did it acquire the more specific, contemporary meaning of ‘racial mixing’ – or as the Oxford English Dictionary puts it, ‘the result of inter-cohabitation between two “races”’. It was never historically, and is not today, fully fixed racially. This is a critical point in the argument, because in recent times it has come primarily to signify, as the dictionary suggests, ‘a person of mixed European and African blood’, with the emphasis on racial miscegenation. But its primary meaning has always
been about cultural, social and linguistic mixing rather than about racial purity. However, ‘Creole’ seems to have been subject to the same semantic slide or struggle for appropriation and transcoding as other related terms, like ‘hybridity’. Some theorists, like Robert Young, have, until recently, insisted that the term ‘Creole’ refers to racial categories and cannot help being drawn back to its inscription in racial theory (Young, 1995). However, contemporary theoretical usage has in fact emphasized the hybridity of cultures rather than the impurity of breeding and miscegenation, attempting to dislodge the term from its biologized and racialized inscription.

In his book, *The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica, 1770–1820*, Edward Kamau Brathwaite discusses the creolization process which, at the beginning of his argument, primarily relates to white settlers who had become adapted or indigenized, and is later extended to include native-born black slaves and their descendants (Brathwaite, 1971). Towards the end of the book, Brathwaite projects the process forward into the present. He discusses the possibilities that are open to blacks now (i.e., at the time of writing, the middle of the twentieth century), who could, if they chose, become part of a not yet completed creolization process. It is clear that, at this point in his career, Brathwaite saw creolization as a kind of continuum: a process involving, at different historical moments, different groups, always in combination, in a society which is the product of their entanglement. The argument is about their mutual implication in a process of ‘indigenization’.

Writers like Édouard Glissant use the term ‘Creole’ in a broader sense, to describe the entanglement – or what he calls the ‘relation’ – between different cultures forced into cohabitation in the colonial context. Creolization in this context refers to the processes of ‘cultural and linguistic mixing’ which arise from the entanglement of different cultures in the same indigenous space or location, primarily in the context of slavery, colonization and the plantation societies characteristic of the Caribbean and parts of Spanish America and Southeast Asia. In Glissant’s terms, slavery, the plantation and the tensions and struggles associated with them were necessary conditions for the emergence of Creole. This process of cultural ‘transculturation’ occurs in such a way as to produce, as it were, a ‘third space’ – a ‘native’ or indigenous vernacular space, marked by the fusion of cultural elements drawn from all originating cultures, but resulting in a configuration in which these elements, though never equal, can no longer be disaggregated or restored to their originary forms, since they no longer exist in a ‘pure’ state but have been permanently ‘translated’.

Mary Louise Pratt calls such sites of entanglement ‘contact zones’ – ‘social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash and grapple with each other often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination’ (Pratt, 1992, 4). This qualification is critical. Contrary to simpler versions of the colonizer/colonized paradigm in its truncated binary form, this ‘grappling’ process is always a two-way struggle as well as always reciprocal, and mutually constituting. The colonized refashions the colonizer
Creolizing Europe
to some degree, even as the former is forced to take the imprint of the latter’s cultural hegemony. This does not mean that in Creole societies cultural elements combine on the basis of equality. Creolization always entails inequality, hierarchization, issues of domination and subalternity, mastery and servitude, control and resistance. Questions of power, as well as issues of entanglement, are always at stake. It is essential to keep these contradictory tendencies together, rather than singling out their celebratory aspects. As James Clifford persuasively argued, every ‘diaspora’ carries profound costs (Clifford, 1997).

However, the vernacular or indigenous ‘ground’ which emerges out of this collision of cultures is a distinctive space – the ‘colonial’ – which makes a whole project of literary expression and creative cultural practices possible – ‘the good side’, if you like, of creolization and the essence of the argument about créolité. But there is always also ‘the bad side’: questions of cultural domination and hegemony, of appropriation and expropriation, conditions of subalternity and enforced obligation, the sense of a brutal rupture with the past, of ‘the world which has been lost’, and a regime founded on racism and institutionalized violence.

I would argue that the process of creolization in this sense is what defines the distinctiveness of Caribbean cultures: their ‘mixed’ character, their creative vibrancy, their complex, troubled unfinished relation to history, the prevalence in their narratives of the themes of voyaging, exile, and the unrequited trauma of violent expropriation and separation. These are all, also, in different ways, what I would call translated societies – subject to the ‘logic’ of cultural translation. Translation always bears the traces of the original, but in such a way that the original is impossible to restore. Indeed, ‘translation’ is suspicious of the language of the return to origins and originary roots as a narrative of culture. Its modalities are always more multiple – a ‘traveling’ conception of culture, to borrow Clifford’s term (Clifford, 1997): a narrative of movement, of ‘transformations’, rather than of ‘roots’ or return. Translation is an important way of thinking about creolization, because it always retains the trace of those elements which resist translation, which remain left over, so to speak, in lack or excess, and which constantly then return to trouble any effort to achieve total cultural closure. No translation achieves total equivalence, without trace or remainder. This is the logic of ‘différance’ in the Derridean sense: of a kind of difference which refuses to fall back into its binary elements, which cannot be fixed in terms of this or that pole, but remains unsettled along a spectrum, and which has what Derrida calls the ‘play of différance’ as one of its consistent effects.

Heuristically, I have tried elsewhere to think of the process of creolization in the Caribbean in terms of three ‘presences’: présence africaine, présence européenne, and présence américaine (Hall, 1990). Présence africaine is the subterranean trace or voice of ‘Africa’ – that ‘Africa’ which is ‘alive and well in the diaspora’. It refers to that submerged element which was rarely allowed to speak in its own voice. For centuries, it could only express itself by indirect
means, through what Henry Louis Gates calls the strategies of ‘signifying’ (Gates, 1988): by detour, evasion, mimicry, by subverting the cultural dominant from below, by appropriation, translation, and expropriation. Its subterranean rhythms have continued to surface – in surprising, often transformed, ways. As the West Indian novelist George Lamming put it, ‘Africa invades us like an invisible force’ (Lamming, 1960). This is the presence which has been, until quite recently, almost impossible to hear in the Caribbean on its own terms. The ‘rediscovery’ of this voice – its return to the surface, in societies like Jamaica in the 1960s and 1970s – constituted the basis of a cultural revolution, which made the place, self-consciously, for the first time, a ‘black society’.

Présence africaine only sometimes appears as a set of literal ‘survivals’. Its broader, more ubiquitous ‘presence’ is in and through its many translated forms (i.e., creolized). And it is not always africaine in the geographical sense. There are other powerful ‘presences’ which belong to the same pole of ‘the below’, the excluded majorities, which are not African. Most significantly, there is the powerful presence of the East Indian communities, the survivors of that ‘second slavery’ called indenture, which is central to the story of rural labor and identity in the Caribbean; as well as the Chinese and other minorities, who belong, for the purposes of this argument, to the experience of dispossession associated with présence africaine; though the relation between these minorities is also a deeply troubled one (the designation ‘African’ being itself one of the principal sources of antagonism).

Présence européenne, by contrast, is the voice that speaks all the time, the one we can never not hear. It is the colonizing voice which everywhere until recently confidently assumed its own ascendancy. Nevertheless, culturally speaking, it is no purer than présence africaine. Insofar as it has become ‘indigenized’ within Caribbean society, and is not simply an external noise beamed at the region from outside, it too is consistently translated. It has been subject to the ‘tropicalization’ of having to exist alongside a set of very different cultural impulses in the intimacy of a very different, ‘undomesticated’, native space. What is more, this présence européenne is also internally diverse. It derives from the influence of the French, British, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish empires, which struggled for ascendancy in the Caribbean, each of which inflects the way in which it combined with présence africaine across the region. Today, it ‘speaks’ with a richly demotic American accent.

However, the crucial element that distinguishes creolization belongs with the third presence – présence américaine. I mean by this, not the region’s big cousin in the North, which is a cultural, economic, military and indeed imperial force of its own right in the Caribbean of yesterday and today. I am referring to an older concept – ‘America’ as the New World – a sort of ‘primal scene’ of the encounters between different worlds for which the Caribbean has historically provided the crucible. Early woodcuts, like Jan van der Straet’s engraving of Amerigo Vespucci’s arrival in the New World,
Europe Encounters America, do indeed represent the encounter as the prelude to a rape: ‘America’ signified here as a native woman, ‘surprised’ in her hammock in the primeval forest by the Spanish male conquistadors. However, the colonizers – always men – have their feet firmly planted on terra firma, bearing aloft the insignias of power – the standard of Their Catholic Majesties of Spain surmounted by a cross. The primal scene, then, is a ‘scene’ of violent expropriation and conquest as well as the ‘site’ of a tabooed desire, where the scandal of ‘cultural miscegenation’ between these worlds is staged. It occurs at a liminal distance from all the sites of origin. It represents the disruptive force of ‘the local’ – the vernacular, the indigenous, the ‘native ground’ – with which they are all required, in one way or another, to come to terms.

In most of the Caribbean islands, after the first century of conquest, all the social forces which created plantation societies came from ‘somewhere else.’ They did not ‘originally’ belong. They were ‘conscripted’, whether they wanted to be or not, to a process of indigenization. We must think of this emerging colonial space as constituting a distinctive ‘third space’ – a space of unsettledness, of conquest, of forced exile, of unhomeliness. This aspect is often missing in our accounts of creolization; creolization as the process of indigenization, which prevents any of the constitutive elements – either colonizing or colonized – from preserving their purity or authenticity; the critical interruption of hybridity, the rupture which breaks or interrupts the lines that connect the different présences to their originary pasts. This is the New World as the necessary site of dis-placement, of diaspora. Viewed as a potential space of intense and original creativity, this Creole or diasporic third space is an example of what George Lamming has recently called ‘the premature global character of its [the Caribbean’s] formation’ (Lamming, 2002): a symbolic anticipation, avant la lettre, of the very diasporic public sphere described by Okwui Enwezor, which – under the much transformed circumstances of transnational, transcultural, postcolonial and global developments – Documenta 11 is trying to represent.

To define the distinctiveness of any one of these creolized societies in the Caribbean, all these different elements must be present. What differentiates one from another is the ‘logic’ of their combination. The foregrounding of one element over another in the ‘set’ is what defines Caribbean cultural particularity. Think of the different ways in which ‘présence africaine’ appears in, say, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Cuba. It is as if the three ‘presences’ form a sort of Levi-Straussian combinatory which, without pushing the structuralist language too far, gives a ‘deep variant structure’ to the culture. Run the combination one way, and – as it were – you get Cuba. Inflect the elements differently and you suddenly see Martinique, Jamaica, Dominica, Grenada. All three elements are always present in each; but they are never actively combined or dynamic within the culture in the same proportions. It is a question of accentuation. Cultural change is thus a matter of de- and re-accentuation within the combinatory. For example,
the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s to which I earlier referred marked the decisive, dramatic, epochal shift of accent from the European to the African pole. This is to think the distinctiveness of Caribbean societies in terms of the way in which similarity and difference are, as it were, differently combined under the pressure of colonization, post-plantation and postcolonial society at the level of the deep structure of the culture. There is no perfect or completed model of this process. Everything is a variant. Everything is still in trans-formation.

This ‘cultural model’ gives us a different perspective on the thematics of créolité. The characteristics Glissant lists include multiplicity of sources; the acceptance of dissemination and the movement as against any idea of a closure or a teleological return to the beginning; a resistance to notions of cultural authenticity; a preference for the languages, the imagery, and the strategies of exile, displacement, of voyaging, migrations and returns. For Glissant, it is marked by entanglement. But it would be strange to describe the thematics of Caribbean vernacular culture without also including the notions of trauma, rupture and catastrophe: the violence of being torn from one’s historic resting place, the brutal abruptly truncated violence in which the different cultures were forced to coexist in the plantation system, the requirement to bend and incline to the unequal hegemony of the Other, the dehumanization, the loss of freedom. So there are also, always, within créolité, the recurring tropes of transplantation and forced labor, of mastery and subordination, the subjugations of plantation life and the daily humiliations of the colony; as well as the whole range of survival strategies – mimicry, signifin’, vernacularization, substitution of one term by another, the underground, subversive, rhythmic ‘rereading’ of an overground, dominant harmonics. ‘Language’, George Lamming recently reflected, ‘is a source of control. Language is also a source of invention’ (Lamming, 2002).

Créolité, in its narrower sense must be understood as a specific discourse, arising from a certain critically self-conscious Francophone reading of, or a theoretical reflection on, the broader processes of creolization we have just described. It has been philosophically elaborated in the French Caribbean, where writers and literary theorists like Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant have reflected on what we might call the literary and artistic consequences of the creolization process (Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant, 1989). The créolité theorists argue that creolization has produced, not the debased, hybrid, vulgar, vernacular culture incapable of sustaining great work of literature and art, but a potential new basis from which a popular creativity which is distinctive, original to the area itself, and better adapted to capture the realities of daily life in the postcolony, can be, and is being, produced. Créolité is thus, for them, the existential and expressive basis for cultural production – for writing, poetry, music, art. It has the status of a literary programme or philosophical ‘manifesto’, a call to arms for creative practitioners and intellectuals, almost an appendix to the project of national
self-constitution. Créolité references the construction of a literary or artistic project out of the creolizing process. However, I would argue that it is the cultural process of creolization which provides the necessary conditions of existence for the créolité programme.

Since the conditions of creolization exist everywhere across the region, we would therefore expect to find aspects of créolité elsewhere in the Caribbean, even if called by another name. Heather Smyth has recently reminded us that the literary preoccupation in the Caribbean with creolization has produced several versions or models, including ‘Wilson Harris’s study of syncretism; Édouard Glissant’s Antillanité; the créolité of Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau, Raphaël Confiant; Antonio Benítez Rojo’s *The Repeating Island*; and Edward Kamau Brathwaite’s work on creolization’ (Smyth, 2002). Though few artists and intellectuals outside the French Caribbean call this phenomenon créolité, its underpinning conditions are certainly not limited to the French context. However, this fact may require us to modify the strict protocols of créolité which the Francophone intellectuals deploy. I want to give three brief examples.

First, there is the project of what has been called ‘nation language’, very much associated with the work of the poet, historian and critic Edward Kamau Brathwaite. We have already referred to Brathwaite’s seminal historical work on creolization. An important milestone in this debate was Melville J. Herskovits’ 1941 book *The Myth of the Negro Past*, the first major anthropological text which ran against the grain of orthodoxy – namely, that everything of the African past was destroyed in the Middle Passage – and began to talk seriously about African survivals. Extraordinarily important work has been done since then on African survivals in such areas as Caribbean religion, religious practices, and folklore; in music, musical form, and dance; in daily life, social customs, and rituals, as well as in language itself. Its effect has been to shift the balance towards the study of how ‘Africa’ survived as a subterranean force in Caribbean culture. Brathwaite has made a critical contribution to this project.

In both his historical and critical writing and his poetic practice – a major body of work – Brathwaite has highlighted the need to challenge the hegemony of the language of the colonizer, which he calls a ‘prison language’, and return to the inspiration of ‘nation language’. ‘Nation language’, he argues in *History of the Voice*,

is the submerged area of that dialect which is much more closely allied to the African aspect of experience in the Caribbean. It may be in English: but often it is an English which is like a howl, or a shout, or a machine-gun, or the wind or a wave. It is also like the blues. And sometimes it is English and African together. (Brathwaite, 1984, 13)

In his poetic work Brathwaite has explored this subterranean vein, focusing on the force of oral tradition, the spoken rather than the written, ‘as
much on sound as on song’. His experimentation with sound, rhythm and
the structure of the poetic line has sought to destroy the tyranny of the
pentameter and other classic English literary cadences, and to intrude the
acoustic and the oral elements into poetry. He charts how, for younger
poets, nation language has become ‘the classical norm’: coming ‘out of the
same experience as the music of contemporary song: using the same riddims
[rhythms], the same voice-spreads, syllable clusters, blue notes, ostinado,
syncopation and pauses’ (Brathwaite, 1984, 46).

Ostensibly, Brathwaite’s practice seems to – and has been read as if it
does – stem from and lead remorselessly back to an African source. His
perspective is certainly ‘Afrocentric’ rather than Creolist in emphasis. But this
may be to misread a necessary re-accentuation for a wholesale substitution.
Although his argument begins with the significance of pre-transportation
ancestral African culture for the Caribbean, by the time Brathwaite gets
to the end of the argument, he has to recognize that its ‘survival’ in the
Caribbean can only happen as a consequence of multiple translations in the
New World itself, and their reshapings in the conditions of the plantation,
the colony and postcolony. They surface in the form of, not the repetition of,
a set of traditional inherited forms, but in combination with other factors,
and as a continuum. When he specifies ‘the ancestral’, he includes not only
Shango and Anansesem, and of course Kumina, but also ‘Spiritual (Aladura)
Baptist services, ground nations, yard-theatres, ring games, tea-meeting
speeches etc.’ – typically Caribbean events and occasions. His concluding
summary points, it seems, towards the Creole as we tried to define it here.

In the same way as we have come to accept the idea (and reality) of
Caribbean speech as continuum: ancestral through creole to national
and international forms, so we must be able to begin to recognize and
accept the similarly remarkable range of literary expression within the
Caribbean and throughout Plantation America. To confine our definition
of literature to written texts, in a culture that remains ital in most of
its people proceedings, is as limiting as its opposite: trying to define
Caribbean literature as essentially orature – like eating avocado without
its likkle salt. (Brathwaite, 1984, 49)

In my second example, I want to be impertinent enough to speak briefly
about Derek Walcott’s project in his presence. Walcott’s project, if I may so
describe it, is certainly not a Jamaican one, like Brathwaite’s. Further, we
know that they have in fact clashed publicly on the very question of the
use and abuse of ‘nation language’. Walcott’s ‘project’ belongs to St Lucia,
which is interestingly poised between different versions of the dominant
colonizing presence, France and England, instead of, as in Jamaica’s case,
Spain and England. Whereas in Jamaica, the local languages were often
described as ‘patois’, St Lucia has a fully formed, recognized, French-based
Creole. Walcott, however, has said that he has tried to write in Creole, but
the writing for which he is best known is not in Creole or in patois, and he has actually spoken in important debates as to why that would seem to him an intolerable limitation. Indeed, one might say that the one aspect which most distinguishes this supremely important body of Caribbean work is its absolute mastery of the complexities of English – of English prosody, English rhythms, English writing, including not only contemporary practitioners, but the whole lineage of literature in the English language. So, at last we find a non-creolized Caribbean poet. Derek Walcott, we might say, gets the Nobel Prize for Literature for an outstanding literary performance, but not because he is a poet of creolization or a practitioner of créolité.

However, I want to suggest that, if you read the settings and situations, or look at the imagery, of Walcott’s poetic work, lyric, epic or narrative; or if you consider the structures of feeling at work in the text; if you look, above all, at the rhythms of the language, and the rhythmic structures, of the work; if you consider its imaginary universe; if you think of the ways the heightened diction dips into the rhythm and intonation of the spoken vernacular; or of the ‘spoken’, conversational opening of his great epic poem Omeros itself; if one confines oneself to the first six or eight lines – you need to go no further than that; or if you think of the whole project of the poem – remapping the departures and returns of Caribbean history and the Antilles onto the Aegean and the Odyssey; you will see that Walcott’s poetic practice constantly struggles to harness these rich poetic resources into the service of forging a distinctively Caribbean ‘voice’ for a highly Caribbean imaginary. His poetic sentences move continuously in and out of the cadences, the stresses and inflections, if not of the strictly syntactical form, of the vernacular. Omeros, despite its classical connotations, is not written in the pentameter, but deliberately departs from it, adopting – and adapting freely – instead, the terza rima from the model of Dante’s Divine Comedy: Dante, a master in his own time of the vernacular, who is also, to our surprise, quoted admiringly by a very different kind of poet – Edward Kamau Brathwaite (‘it all begins with Dante Alighieri …’). Musing on the question of language in the largest sense, Walcott has written, in his poem A Far Cry from Africa:

I who have cursed
The drunken officer in British rule, how choose
Between this Africa and the English tongue I love?
Betray them both, or give back what they give?
How can I face such slaughter and be cool?
How can I turn from Africa and live?

George Lamming, who quotes this passage in The Pleasures of Exile, is right to insist that this ambivalence is a major source of Walcott’s creative energy. That ambivalence is also dead-center to the creolizing project. This, then, is not the performance of a ‘Creole poet’. But to say that Walcott’s work exists
or could have been produced outside of the context of a creolized culture seems to me untenable. *Omeros* is, without question, a great poem of the creolizing imaginary.

For my third example in this thought-experiment, I want to take the model of Rastafarianism. Here at last we find a cultural phenomenon which insists on tracing everything back to its ancestral African roots, and which does want to make the return journey. The return journey is not only, for Rastafarians, the essence of their spiritual and political ‘programme’; their world view is predicated on the myth of the redemptive return. This is one of the most profound mythic structures of the New World. One cannot understand the culture of the plantation Americas – before and after Emancipation – without the redemptive promise of a return to the Promised Land: though it is translated as ‘Africa’ and the release from the bondage of slavery in Babylon by Rastafarians, whereas it symbolized the escape from servitude and Freedom to the enslaved, who often found its promise in borrowed, translated, Christian language of the only book slaves were encouraged to read – The Bible. In fact, the one may well have been modeled on the other in the mythic imagination. Both have deployed this idea as a vehicle for expressing the resistance to bondage, ‘suffering’, and the profound hope for Freedom and liberation. The same idea is at the center of Garveyism, which had a significant relationship to the emergence of Rastafarianism in the early years of the twentieth century. It constitutes a profound trope throughout the New World.

Rastafarianism in its many forms has had a massive impact on Anglophone culture in the Caribbean, above all in Jamaica, where it was the motor of the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s to which I have referred. So, here, you might think, is – at last – an example of a truly non-creolized alternative, a viable alternative cultural strategy. The Rastafarian version is predicated on a notion of ‘roots’, whereas creolization deploys the logic of ‘routes’. From within the imperative of the Rastafarian or an Afrocentric world view, creolization is a disaster, because it weakens by an intolerable ‘mixing’ or hybridity the purity of faith and ‘tribe’, and the commitment to a redemptive return.

The essence of returning to Africa is condensed, for Rastafarians, in their belief in the divinity of Haile Selassie, the former ruler of Ethiopia and, at the time, emperor of the first independent black African state. Selassie is revered as Jah – the Lion of Judah, King of Kings. Selassie was an important symbolic figure for a Pan-African perspective, since he was the king of the only independent black society on the continent – Ethiopia. Of course, people of African descent in the Caribbean came from many places in Africa, especially on the west coast of the continent. The one place they didn’t come from was Ethiopia! There are instructive stories about Rastafarians who in the 1970s did actually attempt to return to Ethiopia, and who had a hard time being either recognized or accepted by the Ethiopian people. This is not to deny that Ethiopia has an important symbolic function
in Pan-Africanism and in the re-identification with Africa, and a significant
religious impact on Jamaican society, especially in the form of a variety
of Ethiopian and Coptic-based churches and sects. Many sacred African
texts have been absorbed into the Rastafarian belief system, But the sacred
book, their most sacred source of interpretation (or, as they would put it,
‘reasoning’), is the Bible, originally introduced to Christianize the slaves by
European missionaries, which the Rastafarians have wholly appropriated
by the textual strategy of inversion – reading the Bible backwards, against
the grain; reading it upside down; reading it according to an alternative
code; translating it metaphorically from its meaning as the story of God’s
Chosen People (the Jews) to the story of the enslavement and the dreams
of freedom of Jah’s ‘chosen tribes’, and their long servitude in the ‘Babylon’
of slavery and colonialism.

Rastafarianism has had a profound impact on popular culture, especially
through music. If you ask about reggae’s sources, I think most Europeans,
who love reggae music, think it derives from the rediscovery of an original
African rhythm. Certainly, some aspects of reggae are based on the
Persistence into the present of submerged traditions of African drumming
and other rhythmic patterns in Jamaican folk culture. But another aspect
of reggae combines this with a whole range of other more recent, musical
and rhythmic influences. Its worldwide interest, which imagined it as a
triumph of the ‘folk’ over modern commercialism, was sustained on the
back of an incredible technological revolution. This was a ‘folk music’ [sic]
produced by small commercial companies in backyard fit-ups of the modern
recording studio and mixing desk, augmented by the wonders of modern
sound amplification through its sound systems, transported worldwide via
the transistor set, the vinyl and CD revolutions, and universally copied
with the help of the latest recording devices by ‘Rastas’ and ‘rude boys’ in
Handsworth, Birmingham, or Atlantic Avenue, New York, living with their
own, diasporic versions of ‘Babylon’. So even this example, which looks at
first sight as if it were grounded in an authentic African source and the
return to origins, turns out, when examined more closely, to be another
variant in the long and complex creolization repertoire.

I am fully aware of the synoptic and superficial level at which I have been
obliged to approach this complex problem. My primary purpose here has
been to open up the interrogative space around the question of the process
of creolization. I am aware that, in stressing the common features of the
way the process has unfolded in the Caribbean, I have tended to lose sight
of what is specific to each of these variants: specific to place, to history, and
especially to the forms of the culture itself. I have not dealt with the question
of the creolization of the Indian Ocean, which have many similarities; or
of the African city, where there is colonization but no plantation society,
and the economic exploitation of labor in a colonial context but no chattel
slavery, but where, nevertheless, something like the same creative ‘third
indigenous space’ has emerged.
Nor have I considered whether ‘Creole’ is an appropriate term to apply to the vibrant and hybrid black British cultural forms which have arisen in Britain in the wake of the postwar migrations. Without ignoring the specificities which remain critical, my provisional conclusion is that there is something quite distinctive, throughout these and other colonial settings, where different cultures were brought together and forced to coexist under the brutal impact of colonization, slavery and transportation, which produced a specific cultural model: and the heart of that model is the process of creolization. This is to be understood, not by going back to and disentangling mythic origins, but by analyzing the ways in which creolization is a historical and an ongoing process, and moreover the one which produced the Caribbean and Caribbean people as distinctively ‘modern’, albeit modern in a peculiarly ‘colonial’ or ‘postcolonial’ way. Despite the humiliations and the suffering which slavery and colonization entailed, creolization remains the only basis in the present of creative practices and creative expression in the region. Whether creolization also provides the theoretical model for wider processes of cultural mixing in the contemporary post global world remains to be considered.

**Works Cited**


Chapter 2

World Systems and the Creole, Rethought*

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

What follows is a proposal of creolity rather than kinship as a model for comparativist practice. The original proposal was made to Professor Wai Chi Dimock, whose paper is discussed in the body of the chapter. I am a Europeanist (as is Professor Dimock), and I was thinking of Dante and Latin when I crafted this proposal rather than Caribbean-based creolization theory. Having said that, such theory has much to tell us about Dante and Latin itself as well as how it is that a world system such as knowledge, can be altered through the insertion of the question of ‘Creolizing Europe’.

Why should these thoughts be at all useful in thinking of ‘Creolizing Europe’ today? First, because in Dante’s understanding of popular Italian as varieties of Creole and his choice of an aristocratic (‘curial’) political Creole as ‘Italian’ we can situate our own project of Creolizing Europe within the beginnings of European nationalisms and nation states. Second, through literature’s capacity to inaugurate an ‘experience of the impossible’ (both Freud and Derrida insisted on this, in different ways), our general discussion may give us a way of thinking outside of the requirements of activism in terms of indentitarian politics which tend towards essentialization rather than thinking and acting beyond this in terms of Glissantian creolity.

It must be a Glissantian creolity though that acknowledges the place of capital and class in any theorization as well as a particular view of imperialism. I stumbled on the idea that imperialism was an ‘enabling violation’ at least thirty years ago. Subsequent work willy-nilly located our class, now global, as the beneficiary, not only by birth, but other circumstances as well. I have never been able to think of descriptive arguments for counter- or alternative-modernities as anything but specific to this amorphous ‘class’. Globality and the creolity which this necessitates can save us if we assert that everything now is what ‘modern’ (not counter-, not alternative-) is, and live up to the task of disciplinary revision. This task is not an easy or straightforward one but we must remember that not every ‘European’ invented the steam engine, not every ‘American’ the telephone. This speaks to the necessity for epistemological alliances, a joining of worlds which were hitherto separated by class, geography and sensibility. Capital is the mysterious often invisible motor of difference and we must fight its implacable choices epistemologically, often at the micro-level of detail.

What you read below are the epistemological choices of an old-fashioned literary critic, a self-styled soldier. For a long time it has seemed clear to me that the idea of one normative language and many ‘natural’ ones – for Dante ‘Latin’ as normative and ‘Italian’ as ordinary – was a much more powerful idea than the accident of there being many languages. My language and a foreign language was not necessarily the irreducible binary opposition. When Ibn Rushd was translating Aristotle, he was not translating from a foreign language, because to earn the right to translate was for him to make the language of the original his own. Marx was catching the tail-end of this idea in his injunction about how to learn a foreign language (as a model for revolutionary practice) in ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’. The revolutionary ‘makes the spirit of the new language his own and produces in it freely only when he moves in it without recalling the old and when in it he forgets the language rooted in him’ (Marx, 1973, 107). I felt that it would be good if we thought of the great order of the literary as a kind of virtual and inaccessible normativity, and of our own methodological attempts as varieties of Creole, testifying to their practical usefulness as we creolize writing. Revising, I consulted the basic texts of the contemporary debate on creolity (Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant, 1993; Condé, 1995; Glissant, 1989; 2003).¹ The entire debate is worth contemplating. Here I will content myself with citing Édouard Glissant, the initiator of the movement. Glissant’s word for what I am seeking to describe is ‘relation’. To generalize this notion, he writes, among a thousand provocative things, for example:

let us try to recapitulate the things we don’t yet know, the things we have no current means of knowing, concerning all the singularities,

¹ I am grateful to Brent Hayes Edwards for his help.
all the trajectories, all the histories, all the denaturations, and all the syntheses that are at work or that have resulted from our confluences. How have cultures – Chinese or Basque, Indian or Inuit, Polynesian or Alpine – made their way to us, and how have we reached them [...]. No matter how many studies and references we accumulate (though it is our profession to carry out such things properly), we will never reach the end of such a volume; knowing this in advance makes it possible for us to dwell there. Not knowing this totality does not constitute a weakness. [...] Relation is open totality; totality would be relation at rest. Totality is virtual. (Glissant, 2003, 153–154, 171)

My affinity with Glissant’s thinking should be immediately clear. Glissant’s work is particularly useful as an antidote to the understandable but unfortunate comparativism that wants to begin with the ‘fact’ that ‘literatures the whole world over were formed on the national model created and promoted by Germany at the end of the 18th century’ (Casanova, 2005, 78). Here too I concur with Édouard Glissant’s wisdom, warning non-Europeans from joining in this contrived collectivity: ‘if one is in too much of a hurry to join the concert, there is a risk of mistaking as autonomous participation something that is only some disguised leftover of old alienations’. He gives an astute account of the kind of comparativism the enthusiasts of world literature would require: ‘in order to “comprehend” and thus to accept you, I have to bring your solidity to the ideal scale which provides me with themes for comparisons and, perhaps, judgments. I have to reduce’ (Glissant, 2003, 120, 190).

An unintended consequence of work such as Dimock’s can be to give support to such ‘interaction, out of which ghouls of totalitarian thinking might suddenly reemerge’ (131). I hasten to add that I have a great deal of sympathy with Professor Casanova, from whom I cited that symptomatic sentiment about the originality of the German eighteenth century. I caution her simply because I have learned the hard way how dangerous it is to confuse the limits of one’s knowledge with the limits of what can be known, a common problem in the US–European academy.

We cannot not want to tie up all the loose threads in any world. Yet today more than ever that desire must be curbed, for everything seems possible in the USA and the European Union. So-called globalization seems to offer global possibilities of redress – preserving ‘cultural intangibles’ in the sphere of entertainment as capital establishes the same system of exchange all over the world. If, however, we want to preserve the dignity of that strange adjective ‘comparative’ in Comparative Literature, we will embrace creolity. Creolity assumes imperfection, even as it assures the survival of a rough future. In the creolization of the world’s past comparativists of all stripes can hang out together.
Hanging out together

I habitually attend to the ‘good’ Euro–US comparativists who are proposing solutions confronting the discipline. I was therefore delighted, in 2005, to be asked to respond to a paper by Wai Chee Dimock, like me a westernized Asian comparativist. In the spirit of establishing alliances, I sketched out first the broad points of solidarity between Dimock and myself and then pointed to some suggestions for the kind of future work that can arise out of this undertaking, creolizing Europe’s benevolent multiculturalism in this sphere.

First I found common ground in our reaction to the encyclopaedist and cartographic work of Franco Moretti: ‘I would like’, Dimock wrote, ‘to caution against what strikes me as [Moretti’s] overcommitment to general laws, to global postulates operating at some remove from the phenomenal world of particular texts’. This resonated with what I had written in Death of a Discipline, although I was, admittedly, a little stronger: ‘The world systems theorists upon whom Moretti relies […] are […] useless for literary study that must depend on texture’ (Dimock, 2006, 90). Thanks to initiatives such as Dimock’s, we can begin to emphasize the altogether obvious point: in order to do distant reading one must be an excellent close reader, as we see in Glissant’s meditation on creolization as a poetics of relation. Close reading for distant reading is a harnessing of aesthetic education for its own counter-example. In the intervening years, what I have noticed is that the followers of Moretti often categorize by subject matter, but that was not part of that evening’s discussion. Here let me relate it to the tradition of controlling through power/knowledge that was sublated in the European Enlightenment, accessing a ‘world’ through capitalist imperialism. If, in other words, you want to control the biodiverse wealth of the world’s literatures by placing them in one system of general equivalence to create literary monoculture this is tied to the organization of wealth as such in the economic sphere. That this sort of system of general equivalence is amenable to fundraising perhaps reflects this.

I also attempted to find common ground in Dimock’s idea that ‘the epic is a cross-over phenomenon’. I wanted to take this past simply noting the kind of intertextuality where a modern text clearly alludes to an ancient one, ‘encoding the temporal within the lexical’, to quote Dimock. I suggested, as an example of this, that Maryse Condé’s slim novel – in spite of the use of ‘epic’ to suggest heft-Heremakhonon deploys epic time in the management of narrative time. Clearly, with the disappearance of robust orality, the epic tendency could not just shrivel. Rather than call deliberately large-scale narrative undertakings ‘epic’ by a species of descriptive metaphor of size and complexity, we could call Condé’s attempt to train the memory of the reader by the impersonal heterogeneity of ‘historical’ times a displacement of epic play. Although I did not mention this at the time, you can see
that this training is an aesthetic education in the ‘contemporaneity’ of globalization. *Heremakhonon*, with its rich epic dimension – loosely named ‘Africa’, ‘Islam’, ‘decolonization’ and the like (unitary names suppressing the plural epic as monoculture does biodiversity) – can then open the door closed by Aristotle when he compared the slim tragedy to the massive performative epic (Aristotle, 1991, 115–117). It is a large and generic door, closed when history, tied to the self-determination of the individual, began to be written on a gradual incomprehension of the miraculous *mnemic* scripting of orality. To say that the timing of a text such as Conde’s is heterogeneous, many-leveled, is to learn to read its epic dimension and give witness to the acknowledgement of the closure of the performative in favor of individualism tasting culture as entertainment – epic to novel.

Dimock does not suggest, as do I, that in such use of narrative time, literature touches orature, but her argument can clearly take it on board. What in the more expanded argument confronts the scandal of Africa in globalization can here take a more teacherly stance. Comparative Literature has never treated the techniques of orature except formulaically. Is there another way? Compromised performatives to performance? Strict historico-theoretican intervention, comparativist deep language-learning, interdisciplinarity with a race-sensitive performance studies?

**An earlier version**

For her distant reading, Dimock turned to anthropology as a model in an earlier version. My response was composed with reference to this earlier version of Dimock’s essay.² The phrase ‘literary anthropology’ was used in its initial paragraphs. I did, of course, most heartily endorse this move, because it is ‘thicker’ than cartography. Here I would like to elaborate a little, and, again, I feel confident that Dimock’s approach can take this on.³ I should mention that it is not really ‘literary anthropology’ (her chosen more conservative term in this earlier version, giving way to ‘fractal logic’ in the published text) that Dimock uses as her model but perhaps a sort of well-meaning solidarity tourism with which the humanities help control the damage of globalization. Here is an extended quotation from the object of my response: ‘I was in Beijing a few weeks ago,’ she had started,

and was struck by a phrase that seemed to come up again and again even in the handful of articles that I happened to be reading: ‘literary anthropology’. This is not a phrase we use very much in this country;

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² The following is an extended quotation from that early unpublished version, including the subtitle ‘Set and subset’.

³ I have discussed this part of my response with Professor Rosalind Morris.
in fact, with the exception of Wolfgang Iser, I don’t recall seeing it anywhere else. I (would?) like to borrow it as a preface to this talk, as a summary and apology for the very immodest claim that I seem to be making: namely, that in order to think about the epic and the novel in conjunction, we need an analytic frame that has to be measured in terms of continents, an analytic frame that reflects, not the life of a single nation, and not the life of a single language, but something like the life of the species as a whole, in all its environments, all its habitats across the planet.

‘Anthropology’ is probably the right word for this kind of undertaking. Of course, as we know, the discipline has its own internal problems, not least of all being its long history of entanglement with colonialism and indeed racism of various sorts. But, as a discipline adjacent to and yet not reducible to literary history, it does serve as an interesting heuristic partner. One of the most important differences, it seems to me, is that anthropology is, by and large, an empirical discipline, and brings with it a self-consciousness about what we might call the conditions of its empiricism: the size of the sampling population, the scope of the claim that flows from it, and the extent to which it can be said to constitute a unit of analysis. It is this self-consciousness that allows anthropology to operate on two alternating and complementary registers, bouncing one off against the other: one macro and the other micro, one, much larger than the scale of literary history, and the other, much smaller. The smaller scale is obvious enough: anthropology is a study of local knowledge, it is dedicated to a self-contained population, a subset of human beings. But this subset matters, I think it is fair to say, because it is a subset, because there is a larger set to which it belongs. This larger set answering to the name of the ‘human’ is the implicit but also indispensable ground of anthropology. It becomes a discipline at all because this larger set is a meaningful set, a meaningful unit of analysis. And the database that goes with it is coextensive with the life of the species as a whole. It extends to every part of the planet where human beings happen to be. It is this relation between set and subset and the coextension of the former with the bounds of the human that I’d like to map onto our own discipline. There is no reason why literary history should not be construed as being parallel to anthropology in this particular sense, committed both to a local population and to an unlocal idea of species membership. There is no reason, in fact, why it should not work as a switch mechanism between these two, between a subset of human expression, and a species-wide definition of the set. The term that I’d like to propose for this switch mechanism is the term ‘genre’. I have kept my earlier comments because, although Dimock has now jettisoned literary anthropology and taken on fractal geometry to explicate Lévi-Strauss on kinship, her presuppositions about the relationship of literature to culture remain unchanged.

My point, which I keep repeating, is that I am one of ‘them’ – big names
thinking to respond to a ‘crisis in Comparative Literature’ rather different from the one that René Wellek – de facto founder of the discipline in the USA – was responding to: Pascale Casanova, Didier Coste, David Damrosch, Wai Chi Dimock, Franco Moretti (Wellek, 1963, 282–295). I also repeat my interested difference, to which it is not necessary to give a violent name. It is, thus, that I suggest creolity, mindful of the much greater violence in the ‘value-added’ testing of teachers, where teaching is commoditized in terms of customer data, in terms of which teachers, in the USA at least, are judged and sacked. Such ‘testing’ defeats the power of teaching by controlling through systematization, which I have connected to capitalism above. My difference from these named critics, therefore, is that they all want to classify in a cruder and less informed way than the old literary historical and generic classificatory attempts. The earlier attempts were based on the intimacy of ‘close’ reading. One can analogize with a more intimate style of testing teaching – a consideration beyond the scope of this chapter.

Dimock’s insistence on close reading is faithful to Kant. In an appendix to *The Critique of Pure Reason* on the regulative use of the ideas of pure reason, Kant speaks of the making sense-perceptible of three basic ideas of conceptualizing logic. When doing so, Kant says, the investigating subject, the philosopher, takes the concept as a perspective, as on a hill, and sees a horizon, as a circle. The subject continues to develop the concept and finds more and more circles appear, newer horizons. When the case won’t fit a circle, the seeker pushes the figure until it becomes an ellipse, and a parabola, and perhaps all the figures of geometry as a circle bent out of shape (Kant doesn’t list them), until he (always a he in Kant, of course) comes upon the asymptote: two parallel lines running side by side, meeting only at infinity. You never get to empirical particularity when you are making logic palpable, says Kant (2000, 112 ff.), for the entire exercise is still only analogical. A merely reasonable system, such as the kind of analogical classification envisaged by distant reading or value-added teaching tests, in other words, will not yield the singular, always universalizable but never the Rosen universal. The biopolitics of globalization imposes such a system on all of us.

I will now make a tiny suggestion that will, at first, seem contrary to Dimock’s conclusions in favor of an expanded Comparative Literature. But, in fact, it will lead to further work that can only secure her general argument, her claims to the world. Here is the point at which we turn to Dante and Latin, to understand that we cannot turn the past into an image of ourselves as we try to expand Europe’s reach. I will unpack some generalizations I have made earlier.

I would suggest that Latin is not a ‘foreign’ language to Dante. The conversation between Virgil and Dante is in Latin, not in a foreign language. When Dante (1996) wrote *De vulgari eloquentia*, in Latin, he referred to it as the language with a grammar. All the various speeches that together
make up ‘Italian’ are simply vulgar (popular) speech – Latin Creole, as it were – *mutatis mutandis* in the spirit of Proust’s Marcel:

> those French words which we are so proud of pronouncing accurately are themselves only ‘howlers’ made by Gaulish lips which mispronounced Latin or Saxon […]. The corrupt pronunciation whereby our ancestors made Latin and Saxon words undergo lasting mutilations which in due course became the august law-givers of our grammar books. (Proust, 2003, 139; 2004, 330)

In the Latin Middle Ages, even Provençal is not a foreign language but another Latin Creole. Out of all the ‘Italian’ Creoles, Dante chooses curial Florentine, the most elegant version of his beloved Tuscan, as the one most worthy. It is not too far-fetched to say that for Dante Latin is *sanskrit* (refined) – and vulgar speech (all those ‘Italians’) – is *prakrt* (natural). If we look at playwrights such as Bhasa (fl. third century AD) or Kalidasa (fl. fifth century AD), we find them using Sanskrit and at least three Prakrts (the vulgar eloquence out of which the languages of North India consolidated themselves into my mother tongue Bengali in the late eleventh century).

I would, therefore, like to place this within a more general phenomenon of creolity rather than take Aristotle’s casual mention of foreign words as my model as it was Dimock’s. (Indeed, the passage on the capacity of the epic to extend its own bulk has nothing to do with foreign words and large kinship structures at all.) Aristotle was not keen on the epic, as the close of the *Poetics* will show. And in translations other than Else’s, in the old Loeb bilingual edition (no time to go buy the new now), for example, γλοττου is translated ‘rare words’ rather than ‘foreign’ (Aristotle, 1991, 84–85, 94–95). My own inclination would be to follow the ‘wordy’ authorized by the *Greek–English Lexicon*. The *Poetics*, as I insist, is as much a creative writing lesson as it is literary theory. Aristotle is cautioning future writers of tragedy against ponderous language.4 The epic can get away with heavy language. It is a vulgar narrative form. Be sure not to use such stuff in tragedy, drama with a socially therapeutic mission. I think it is not a good idea to draw a foreign language rule for works that are ‘epic’ in a sense rather far from Aristotle’s day. On the other hand, creolity, as I have sketched it above, is about the delexicalization of the foreign. (To lexicalize is to separate a linguistic item from its appropriate grammatical system into the conventions

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4 ‘Among the *constraints* on plot that Aristotle lists are the following. Note that they are all phrased negatively – i.e., as constraints. […] All of these *constraints* are rooted in the fact that intersentence coherence in Indo-European languages is achieved primarily by tense’ (Becker, 1995, 32–33; first emphasis mine). Here is an ‘anthropologist’ who has spent his intellectual life upon the relationship between languages. Worth listening to as we comparativists move out on to what is, for us, and wrongly, uncharted seas.
of another grammar.) The stream of lexicalization – creolity – will yield us a history and a world.

Dimock was conscientious enough to look up two specialist books on Dante, Latin and Italian, in response to my gentle nudge. I am grateful to her for this. My point, however, was not to check up on scholarship, especially from the late fifties, when some of the allochthonic metropolitan concepts we carry around, in this volume, for example, had not yet reared their teratological heads. The point is to imagine a time when the name ‘Italian’ is shaky – to imagine a different mindset – dare I say episteme? This is why I quoted Proust, to be helped along in the task of imagining – an epistemological performance repeatedly called for in global ‘contemporaneity’. I quote myself quoting Rilke, in a piece where I wrote of the Indic episteme (structure of feeling?) that gives us avatar, as not grasped by experts or filmmakers.5

It is within this general uneven unanticipatable possibility of avatarana or descent – this cathectic by the ulterior, as it were – that the ‘lesser’ god or goddess, when fixed in devotion, is as ‘great’ as the greatest: ein jeder Engel ist schrecklich. How did Rilke know? Perhaps ‘culture’ is semi-permeable by the imagination?

Dimock’s work invites us to look beyond Latin into the word ‘genre’. Speaking from within the creolity of my first language, let me point out that the Indo-European cognates in Sanskrit yield us both gnosis and genesis, and, in Sanskrit we find jnana – gnosis, but also jati and jnati, nation and kin. All these words are related to the word for knee, janu, genoux, use of gender (another genre word) as rape, kneeling into forcible entry, to engender the model of family: father, mother, competitive patricidal brothers, sisters emerging as support. No kinship system, alas, is composed only of cousins, as Dimock would have it. Yesterday I listened to my dear old friend Lord

5 And, indeed, to be fair to the experts, they take the mindset for granted. Max Müller had figured out what Rilke imagined in his notion of henotheism (Müller, 1882, 277 and passim). When Pulgram (one of Professor Dimock’s sources) writes: ‘[Dante’s] prescription for the creation of a volgare illustre (so called of course not in the sense of ‘vulgar’ but only in opposition to learned Latin) […] runs counter to what one would consider the normal formation of a literary standard language’ (Pulgram, 1958, 55), he is commenting on Dante’s poetics of creolity, although he would be scandalized to be told so, which went counter to scientific linguistics. When he writes of ‘a new written language in Italy [around AD 800], which one can no longer call Latin, but at best Neo-Latin, or Italian’ (ibid. 411), or says that the stiff written Italian of the early nineteenth century was ‘another Classical Latin’ (ibid. 64), he is using that epistemic presupposition without theorizing it. What is over against the mother tongue is not a foreign language but a learned language. As for Cecil Grayson, Dimock’s other source, his work on Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472) conveys his sense of the culture/nature/culture relationship, as historically conceived, between Latin, ‘Italian’ and Italian (Alberti, 1964).
William Wallace of Saltaire deliver to us his response to the question posed by the Catholic Conference of Bishops and the Archbishop's Conference of the Church of England: is there a ‘European’ war? What we heard was a model of trusteeship, of protecting non-European peoples as they make the transition into modernity, not the white man’s burden, Wallace insisted. This fraternocracy takes us on to the family tree, which Nietzsche and Foucault had revised. I feel such a strong bond with Dimock’s work that I would ask her to rethink family as creolity. Dimock has loosened the concept of family a good deal in the second version. I am grateful for this, but I would ask her to give it up altogether. ‘Rhizome’ is a good choice, and to see how one can leave family behind via the rhizome’s dismantling of the root I invoke creolity again. There is a short checklist in my postscript. The French postcolonials mentioned there go a long way with the rhizome, away from ‘the family of man’.

In order to get away from the family romance, Dimock goes to fractal geometry. I am as suspicious of humanists metaphorizing the latest developments in science through their pseudo-popularizing descriptions as I am of non-specialists offering Mesopotamia as evidence. I will not call the repeatable universalizable difference in singularity a ‘strange attractor’ from chaos theory as does the self-help book that I use to keep my blood pressure under control (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, 240). This sort of irresponsible analogizing leads to pretentiousness in our students. Do we really need fractal geometry to tell us ‘the loss of detail is almost always unwarranted?’. I keep insisting on learning languages, the old access to literary detail, rather than analogizing from descriptions of fractal geometry or chaos theory. What warms the cockles of my old-fashioned heart is that Dimock will not give up close reading, however far she fetches to justify it within the current rage for filing systems.

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6 The Family of Man exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, New York (MoMA) (Exh. #569, January 24 to May 8, 1955) was composed of 503 photographs grouped thematically around subjects pertinent to all cultures, such as love, children, and death […]. The photographs included in the exhibition focused on the commonalities that bind people and cultures around the world and the exhibition served as an expression of humanism in the decade following World War II (www.moma.org/learn/resources/archives/archives_highlights_06_1955). The professed aim of the exhibition was to mark the “essential oneness of mankind throughout the world.” During the time it was open, The Family of Man became the most popular exhibition in the history of photography (http://spartacus-educational.com/USAPfamily.htm). We cannot go back to that cold war sentimentality, or today’s conservative non-specialist ‘Confucianism’ in the name of rethinking the discipline!
Caution: learned language in Mesopotamia’s
class-gendered male past!

Let me end on a cautionary note about harnessing Mesopotamia as the model of the literary. As a modernist, I too feel, like Dimock, the need to approach the medieval and ancient world. If I remind ourselves that a string quartet and a spider must not be conceptually related because they both have eight legs, it is because I too have indulged in making preposterous connections. As I have tried to point out in the cases of Aristotle and the epic, and Dante and Latin, people in different historical periods think differently, they inhabit different epistemes. To think ‘creolity’ is to supplement activist exigencies, as I said in my opening remarks. We cannot take the English word ‘foreign’ as a felicitous synonym for the word γλώττον spoken by Aristotle to his students and use it to construct a world-system. This is a lesson for ‘Europe’ as it consolidates itself, and a support for our confidence in history as creolizing. (There is evidence that Aristotle thought he was himself a ‘stranger’ because he was from Stagira, whereas Plato was a citizen of Athens. How does ‘foreign’ figure here?) We cannot read if we do not make a serious linguistic effort to enter the epistemic structures presupposed by a text. Aristotle and Dante are far enough from us Modernist enthusiasts, but Mesopotamia is quite another story. The responsibility of the comparativist entails a greater familiarity with the language(s) and patterns of thought of that remote theatre than our elation at finding ‘foreign’ elements everywhere – that allows us to repeat what may be a bit of a literary-critical cliché – the epic as world-system.

Some years ago, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York had an extraordinary exhibition, the ‘Art of the First Cities’. The exquisite objects gave us a glimpse of a comparativism before the letter, a world system before our world. I remember reading of an extraordinary linguistic phenomenon in that distant world:

[At the Old Babylonian Schools] the students were not simply learning the technique of calligraphy but were also studying Sumerian, a language that had long ceased to be spoken and that bore no resemblance to the Akkadian they spoke at home. [...] The language was long dead and was a typical ‘nonmother tongue,’ taught by old men to young boys who would hardly ever get to use it outside the school environment. (Aruz and Wallenfels, 2003, 455)

How would a simple idea of ‘foreign’ be negotiated in this space? And yet, reproductive heteronormativity is still at work. ‘Old men’ to ‘young men’. Creolize it. Let in the slave women, make an intended historical mistake to enable ‘the experience of the impossible’. It is such remote ‘classical’ examples that give us an underived ‘Creole’, undoing the binary between
native and foreign. This is a Creole asymmetrical with a singular interest, not authenticated by identities. Counter-intuitive, perhaps, but give it a shot.

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Chapter 3

Creolization and Resistance

Françoise Vergès

L’esclave de l’esclavage est celui qui ne veut pas savoir.


Opacities can coexist, converge, weaving kinds of fabric whose true meaning would be related to the interweaving of this weft and not to the nature of its component threads.

Édouard Glissant, Poétique de la Relation (1990).¹

At the 2007 conference ‘Creolizing Europe’ at the University of Manchester, I worked through the notion of creolization to discuss the project I was then working on, the Maison des civilisations et de l’unité réunionnaise (MCUR), a museum that was scheduled to open in Reunion Island. Rewriting this contribution, with the distance that a series of events has produced, I approach the question differently. Indeed, in the meantime, there was an important crisis in the French overseas departments and the museum project I had worked on was brutally stopped. In December 2008 and January 2009, there were strikes throughout the French ‘outre-mer.’ The most important one happened in Guadeloupe under the leadership of a new public figure, Elie Domota, who was able to articulate the society’s long discontent and

Creolization and Resistance

...to mobilize practically the entire population with the movement,^2^ Liyannaj Kont Pwofitasyon (LKP), an alliance of unions, associations, artists, and intellectuals.\^3\ The strikes constituted the greatest mobilization since the 1970s and many intellectuals participated in the debates. History did not seem to stammer, it looked as if there was hope. Ideas developed by anticolonial thinkers and activists in the French post-colonies, by Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon and Édouard Glissant on economic exploitation, alienation and postcoloniality were reinterpreted in the light of social, cultural and economic mutations although the territories were still caught in the web of dependencies on France and the continuous absence of real power of decision, the impotence of local politicians, the lack of justice, the rate of youth unemployment. The États généraux de l’outre-mer (EGOM)^4\ – a large consultation initiated by the French government – and local political contradictions impeded the momentum of a new postcolonial political movement, one that sought to imagine what kind of relationship could be possible between postcolonial territories and the French Republic. The populations contributed to the EGOM hoping that their voices would finally be heard. Yet, the end of 2009 was frustrating. Everything seemed to go back to business as usual, what Glissant et al. called a ‘collective irresponsibility’ (Breleur, 2009, 6). Political energy was focused on local and national elections. According to Domota, the local politicians and the governmental tactic was to pretend that the Liyannaj Kont Pwofitasyon movement did not exist. The most visible decision by the government was to declare 2011 ‘the year of the outre-mer’ during which cultural expressions of the French overseas territories would be presented in France. In March 2010, the project of the MCUR was stopped by the newly elected conservative majority at the Regional Council, documentation and information were erased from the Council webpage, the team was disbanded and I was fired. I had been, for the year preceding the election, the target of personal, sexist and vicious attacks that aimed to negate my credentials and construct me as not a ‘true Reunionnese’, a cosmopolitan person of dubious origins, a woman who got the job through personal connections. The project came under heavy attack by the local conservatives and an alliance of diverse groups, from local socialists to people who clung to French assimilation policies, and the project became, through my person, the focus of anger and resentment. If a certain amount of métissage and multiculturalism has been allowed to sell Reunion to tourism and to enrich French culture, echoing the discourse of colonial exhibitions, there were some borders...

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^2^ Taken from ‘Site officiel du collectif d’organisations syndicales, associatives, politiques & culturelles de Guadeloupe’: www.lkp-gwa.org (no longer available).

^3^ Taken from ‘Site officiel du collectif d’organisations syndicales, associatives, politiques & culturelles de Guadeloupe’: www.lkp-gwa.org (no longer available).

that could not be breached: the hegemony of European time, a European-biased cartography, marginalization of the vernacular and of the African and Malagasy presence. The project had sought to break these proscriptions and to present creolization as a discursive strategy of resistance. It became a threat to the local ‘whitened’ petite bourgeoisie which found allies among French civil servants, artists and cultural actors. These events were followed in 2011 by the ten-year anniversary of the Taubira Law, voted into being on May 10, 2001 recognizing the slave trade and slavery as a ‘crime against humanity’. Meanwhile, the objective of ‘the year of the outre-mer’ was clarified by its curator, Daniel Maximin. The year was to show ‘the ancient place of these regions in the history of France, their established presence within the Republic and citizenship, and the creation of singular identities’. The history of race thinking, colonized citizenship and regimes of exclusion were deeply marginalized to support a more harmonious narrative. It may come as a surprise to see the reconfiguration of colonial discourse (‘what the colonies bring to France’) by a Guadeloupean poet who celebrates, in the same sentence, resistance. But resistance is connected to the Republican ethos, to a common and shared source of references. What is forgotten is conflict and dissidence and the long and difficult struggle to construct solidarity between colonizers and colonized. It may also come as a surprise to see that assimilationist and pro-French claims are still operative, but that will be to underestimate its strength.

Several years after the longest social mobilization in the French overseas departments, with the end of the museum project, the increasing emergence of ‘blackness’ in hexagonal France, the entry of Aimé Césaire in the Pantheon, the debate on national identity, I need to explore the notion of creolization from a new viewpoint. Creolization is a subversive concept if it remains continuously linked to the subterranean struggle and resistance of populations confronted with brutal and raw power, with monolingualism and mono-culturalism. Creolization must valorize vernacular practices and solidarity among the oppressed. Its roots in slavery and plantation economies imply an ethics of responsibility for fragile lives, seeking common ground rather than egotistical profit. In this contribution, I wish to discuss and challenge the notion of creolization, to explore its expression in the Indian Ocean on Reunion Island and to ask if the notion can help us question the foundations of ‘Fortress Europe’, the Europe which is currently advocating a xenophobic identity, which targets ‘Others’ and tries to reconstruct a re-encharmed and fantasmatic space, a pure and humanist Europe devoid of contradictions, tensions and conflicts but which has already been mixed and creolized. Creolization remains a useful notion but it must be thought in connection with emergent social movements: movements against neo-liberal

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economy, the plight of refugees, the social revolutions in the Arab world and elsewhere, and the demands for multiple narratives. Creolization as a notion that radically queries the ideas of unique roots, of a unique identity, must thus be linked to the notion of sustainable economy, of social justice, and respect for the vernacular. The tension between roots and the vernacular resides in the fact that the latter is the product of cultural and social friction and negotiation between members of a community. It is alive and dynamic, it is connected to the social and cultural terrain but not to roots.

Postcolonial France is experiencing deep mutations. However, I must clarify what I mean by ‘France’. Critical social scientists continue to link French thought and history with hexagonal France, so that the borders of French thought are those of the hexagon. The ethno-centrism of French feminism is barely studied, though the absence of race thinking among colonial French thinkers is acknowledged, the alterity which exists within the French imaginary and society since the country launched itself in the slave trade and colonial slavery remains marginal. Yet, creolization is historically linked to slavery and the contact zones it created. Most French postcolonial thinking focuses on the youth in the hexagon and ignores the situation of post-slavery overseas territories. The latter are extremely diverse. It is impossible to confuse Guyana with Martinique, Mayotte with Guadeloupe, Reunion with Guyana. Each has its own history, language, imaginary, myths, religious practices and each belongs to a specific region: South America for Guyana, the Caribbean for Martinique and Guadeloupe, the Indian Ocean for Mayotte and Reunion. This singularity, fragmentation and regionalization add to the heterogeneity of the notion of creolization. Further, each region has always been a place of peculiar encounters and exchanges, and the local dynamics must always be connected with regional and global dynamics. Finally, as these territories still belong to the French Republic, they experience the weight of French assimilation policies. Nonetheless, the last decade’s orientation to European culture has been challenged by regional affiliations in terms of cultural expressions, work, identification processes and personal relations to Brazil and Surinam for Guyana; South Africa, India and China for the Indian Ocean regional powers: Reunion and Mayotte; North America and other Caribbean states for the French Antilles. Thinkers on creolization must pay attention to the variety of its expressions, musical, poetic, culinary. They must trace its susceptibility to ethnicization since it tends to be associated with groups which usually are ‘blacks’ and descendants of slaves. Thus, there are groups which refuse to be called Creole and who reject creolization for fear of seeing their culture absorbed. Bushinenge communities in Guiana refuse to call themselves Creoles (the latter being descendants of slaves); they are

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6 An example is the work of the association depatater (‘two feet on the ground’ in Reunionnese Creole). Taken from www.depatater.org. Accessed January 24, 2015.
descendants of maroons, their native language is not Creole and they are not concerned with the same narrative of slavery and its abolition. Rather, their history is connected to escape, settling and negotiating their sovereignty with the French colonial power. Also, as creolization tends to be connected with diasporic experience, dispersal and the critique of ‘roots’, it can look suspicious to groups which fight for recognition of ‘identity’. For instance, in French Guyana, indigenous groups do not necessarily share the aspirations of the descendants of slaves constituting the Creole community who live in the littoral zone, who in turn do not necessarily share the aspirations of the descendants of maroon communities (Bushinenge), who live in the interior. Creolization as a common horizon is not obvious and we need, in light of current tensions and contradictions, to insist on its history of resistance. In the case of French Guyana, creolization must coexist with the indigenous struggle for land rights and respect for their customs. Otherwise, creolization runs the risk of becoming bland and acceptable to the world of liberalism. Processes and practices of creolization emerge and develop in diverse situations, creating their own expressions, and this diversity demonstrates the fluid and problematic character of the notion.

Creolization

The term ‘creolization’ has been borrowed from linguistics to describe phenomena of cultural translation born out of the world of the slave trade and slavery. There is now an extensive literature on creolization (Vergès and Marimoutou, 2005; Stewart, 2007; Cohen and Toninato, 2010; Gallagher, 2011; Lionnet and Shih, 2011), though one may distinguish between those who insist on the historical terrain and those who choose to focus on the outcomes, regardless of their foundations. THINKERS OF BOTH APPROACHES CONCUR THAT IN CREOLIZATION, THE ‘OUTCOME IS NOT PREDICTED. HETEROGENEITY AND UNPREDICTABILITY CHARACTERIZE THE PROCESS OF CREOLIZATION’. TO ÉDOUARD GLISSANT, ‘CREOLIZATION REQUIRES THAT HETEROGENEOUS ELEMENTS THAT ARE PUT INTO CONTACT VALORIZE EACH OTHER, THAT THERE IS NOT DEGRADATION OR DIMINISHING OF THE BEING, IN THE CONTACT AND MIXING’ (GLISSANT, 1996, 18). Creolization occurred under a situation of severe constraints, under the yoke of slavery, colonialism and racism, in situations of deep inequalities, of forced circumstances and of survival strategies. In sugar colonies, because work was hard and plantation owners requested young men, slaves were largely men. Creolization was a creation of a world of men, of a majority of men enslaved

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7 On maroon societies in French Guyana, see Price, 1996.
8 My translation. ‘La créolisation exige que les éléments hétérogènes mis en relation “s’intervalorisent”, c’est-à-dire qu’il n’y ait pas de dégradation ou de diminution de l’être, soit de l’intérieur, soit de l’extérieur, dans ce contact et dans ce mélange.’
by a minority of men. These elements: deportation, forced exile, a world of men, a deeply unequal and violent society, institutionalized racial hierarchy – contributed to the creation of Creole worlds, plural, since no Creole society is exactly similar to another. Creolization was an unexpected, unpredictable consequence of the colonial slave trade and slavery. It was not a return to ‘roots’, a re-creation of a lost world, but a new creation. Slavery encouraged the breaking of social ties and loyalties. Historians have shown that people would capture a friend, a neighbor, as a means of exchange against a family member, or would sell individuals they wanted to banish, to exclude. In Madagascar, captives who were sold into overseas slavery lost their rights to affiliation, to the clan, to their names. Cleansing ceremonies existed throughout Africa and Madagascar for individuals who had escaped slavery and were able to return to their families. Slaves who marooned themselves and reconstructed villages and kingdoms in the mountains of Mauritius, Jamaica, Reunion Island, were agents of creolization. They did not merely translate ‘European’ ideas about freedom and equality into ‘Creole’, but rather they invented heterogeneous practices and processes of freedom and equality. They proposed practical ideas: what to do when a group does not have access to power, to education, to social mobility, to political representation, when the system of exploitation transforms them into disposable bodies and there is a wish to create new common bonds. In doing so, they threatened the colonial order and undermined the hegemony of European culture. Their language (Creole) was not written, their histories were not told, their deeds unacknowledged, their memories not commemorated. Europe sought to erase their history and presence and yet they were able to create forms that have survived to this day. The idealization of the ‘encounter’, of the contact-zone as a site of intercultural creative practices masks the terrain upon which these encounters occur: a terrain of conflicts, violence, war and resistance. Thus, ‘banal invocations of hybridity in which everything becomes equally and continuously intermixed, blended into an impossibly even consistency’ (Gilroy, 2000, 275), conspire to mask the brutality of a politics that marginalizes the vernacular and maintains hegemonic cartographies of power.

Creolizing today could mean inventing new forms of radical subaltern heterogeneity. Creolizing Europe would mean undermining the hegemonic space from within. Not a nativist nostalgia, but a radical critical position and practice, no mere cultural translation but political practices and movements.

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9 In French colonies, male slaves outnumbered female slaves. Plantation owners wanted men to work in the sugar cane fields and slave traders usually transported ships comprising two-thirds male slaves and one-third female slaves. I have looked at this disparity for Reunion Island and have been surprised that historians and anthropologists interested in the processes of creolization have never reflected on its impact (Vergès, 2007).
Beyond the emptiness of declarations about the values of multiculturalism, a form of soft management of diversity, Creolizing Europe would lead to the invention of a new radicalism, whose inspiration could be found in subversive anti-slavery politics. Creolization thought – that is, thought founded on the ideal of creolization – is open-ended. The ‘tendencies toward maturation and saturation are understood as quite possibly going side by side, or interweaving’ (Hannerz, 1992, 266). According to anthropologist Ulf Hannerz (1992, 264), ‘Creole cultures are intrinsically of mixed origin, the confluence of two or more widely separate historical currents which interacts in what is basically a center/periphery relationship’.

In his article, ‘The World in Creolization’, which concludes, ‘we are all being creolized’, echoing Glissant’s assertion ‘The entire world is being creolized’, Ulf Hannerz (1987, 550) talks of creolization as an ‘ever cultural work in progress’. Glissant (1996, 19) spoke of ‘something that is absolutely unpredictable’. Born in the ‘periphery’, Creolization allows it ‘to talk back’, Hannerz (1992, 265) wrote. Heterogeneity and unpredictability characterize the process of creolization. To Glissant (1996, 18), ‘creolization requires that heterogeneous elements that are put into contact valorize each other, that there is not degradation or diminishing of being, in contact and mixing’. However, where Hannerz defines ‘Creole cultures’ without reference to the history of slavery and colonialism and neglects the work of Caribbean thinkers, Glissant (1996, 18) anchors the notion of creolization in the ‘womb of the plantation’. To him, the notion of creolization cannot be appropriated or uprooted from its terrain, a world of inequalities, of slavery and colonization. As an expression of groups which experienced brutal exploitation, creolization reflects an ethos of resistance. Creolization can thus become ‘a tool capable of challenging nationalist projects, forging a more supple theory of non-essentialist identity formation and transnational belonging’ (Ahmed et al., 2003, 279). If the outcomes of creolization are unforeseeable and if current contacts could be said to lead to processes of creolization, one must be aware that creolization is not the only foreseeable outcome of a contact-zone. Practices of ethnic differentiation and desire to maintain or reinvent one’s own ‘tradition’ can coexist alongside creolization.

Creolization is a process and practice among other processes and practices of negotiation when living in a world of contrast and differences. An example can be found in *maloya*, the music created in Reunion by African and Malagasy slaves and enriched by Indian indentured workers. Creole language necessarily carries, in the heterogeneity that presided over its development, the mark of languages, dreams, imaginaries, which were there at the very start; delivered unconsciously, subterranean, cryptic. But they burst forth again, in one way or another, in the everyday exchange of words, in poetic speech, in the lyrics of ségas and maloyas, both hybrid musical forms born during slavery and enriched during the era of indenture, in proverbs, word-play, riddles. Heterogeneity is a fact, transformed by the encounter of the imaginaries that produce the imaginary of the place; it
bursts forth in crossings and appropriations. One legend, *Granmèr Kal*, is built from an amalgamation of myths from India, Madagascar and Africa in the popular memory of Reunionnese oral traditions. This memory is linked to the apprehension that slaves hold for the master and his powers, and to a specific perception of the supernatural. It bursts forth in a maloya by Firmin Viry where the heroine of an Indian epic, Sità in the *Ràmàyana*, transformed into a female plantation worker, meets an ancient French romance. It bursts forth in street theater which mixes sacred spaces with profane spaces, as in the *jako*,¹⁰ which brings into its dance style and repertoire of movements practices that are reinterpretations from Dravidian India and Mozambique. It bursts forth in the *narlon*¹¹ – Tamil or Malabar theater – where what was ritual in the original context becomes theatrical spectacle in the site of a *terukkutu*¹² gathered in the unconscious. It bursts forth no doubt without the knowledge of the performers themselves, who have left the origins aside, but it is there, always present and immediately to hand. The vernacular remains the terrain of creolization though we should remain suspicious of any romanticized idea. The vernacular is not a pure field, people are influenced by new forms brought by new commodities of globalization, by television and films and a desire to imitate what is presented as desirable – Bollywood forms, reinvented traditions. The vernacular is subject to transformations and mutations. It is in the field of resistance to uniformity that the vernacular preserves its creativity. It is its opacity – that is, its capacity to protect and safeguard this creativity in front of the avidity of consumer culture and its goal of transforming everything into a commodity – that Glissant saw as the ‘garant’ of the process of creolization.

**Opacity and the vernacular**

In the French-speaking world, the work of Édouard Glissant on creolization has been central. It was in *Le Discours Antillais* that Glissant (1981) explored the notion of opacity and creolization, which he then developed further in successive writings. Texts in *Le Discours Antillais* were the results of the proceedings of workshops and seminars held during ten years in Martinique and of conferences given between 1978 and 1979. For him, ‘Creolization as an hypothesis emphasizes that it is henceforth pointless to glorify “unique”

¹⁰ A street theater character who usually appears on January 1. *Jako* is an acrobat in monkey/jaguar costume, most likely the product of the mixing of Indian and Mozambican practices.

¹¹ Song and dance theater originally from the south of India and creolized by Indian indentured laborers. It has been practiced for a long time on religious occasions, marriages and other festive events. The repertoire is borrowed from major Hindu myths.

¹² Vernacular form of theater played in Tamil Nadu.
origins which the race would protect and propagate [...] To assert that peoples are creolized, that métissage has a value, is to deconstruct the category of “creolized” that would be seen as halfway between two “pure” extremes’ (Dash, 1995, 148). Glissant rooted his theory in the Caribbean before extending it to the world with his notion of ‘Tout-monde’. The region, Glissant (1989, 561) wrote, ‘has always been a place of encounter, of complicity, a “preface” to the American continent’. It is a ‘sea which diffracts’ and the reality of the region ‘illustrates naturally the idea of the Relation, without implying any situational advantage in regard to other regions of the world’ (561). Antillean history, which has been relegated to a marginal representation, must be recovered, and the psychic disorder and cultural malaise produced by assimilation must be countered by that of the Relation. Creolization as a poetics of Relation counters the devastation produced by the abstract discourse of European universalism which assigned rigid roles to colonized peoples. To Glissant, postcolonial policies in Martinique have added to the destructive impact of slavery. He observed the consequences of material and intellectual consumerism which made things worse with its illusory promise of a good life. Yet he also observed an element of Martinican society which he analyzed as being a deep form of resistance, as an opaque, hidden secret life. In other words, if at first sight the comedy of alienated identities and the world of consumerism could make one think that nothing is happening one must go further, look for the vernacular and its capacity to absorb imported practices, distort them and invent new expressions, but one must leave behind the salons of assimilated Martinicans. Hence, the ‘term of creolization can be applied to the recent situation of the world, that is to say to a situation in which a finally recognized “totality earth” allows in this totality (in which no organic authority exists anymore, in which everything is archipelago) most distant and totally heterogeneous elements can be related to each other in a totally unsuspected way’ (Glissant, 1996, 22). Creolization is resistance if it is kept as a process, open to new challenges and new elements.

Glissant’s thinking was deeply anchored in anticolonial thought and activism. He was present at the Congress of Black Writers and Artists in 1956 and in 1959. Between 1959 and 1965, the French government placed travel restrictions on him as a result of his political activities, forbidding his return to Martinique and preventing him from going to Algeria. In 1967, when he finally could return to his native land, he founded a private secondary school, l’Institut Martiniquais d’Études, which proposed an alternative methodology. Glissant, as Césaire and Fanon had done before, revisited Martinican history (local, regional and global) to underline the destructive aspects of French colonialism, with its promise of Republican assimilation that imprisoned the Creole societies in an ever-delayed promise of becoming fully French. French post-slavery societies were sites of non-productive communities: ‘dispossession, lack of technological responsibility, absence of control over the everyday and the circuits of economy deprive the Martinican community
of its opportunity to evolve, of its own consciousness and personality’ (Dash, 1995, 114). Material and intellectual consumerism have tamed the populations. Powerlessness in these territories has created ‘deviation in behavior, such as an impulse to violence, depression and forms of hysteria’ (116). ‘If you tell a Martinican bourgeois that he is not French, he has a fit of hysteria [...] because he is still reconciled to the idea that one can have access to a universal by progressive steps, and French civilization is one of the steps’ (Clark, 1989, 600). To speak French ‘is more important than to say some thing’, Glissant (1981, 85) wrote, echoing Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon’s analysis of the Martinicans’ alienation. What could be done? Not much it seemed, as Glissant even expressed ‘doubt about the literary enterprise in the face of terminal cultural assimilation’: ‘in the horrorless horror of successful colonization. What can writing accomplish? It can never retrieve anything’ (Dash, 1995, 117). Revolts then? But revolts were hindered by the belief in the French promise of equality and fraternity. Liberation from slavery had not even been won by the slaves. The ‘Negro knows nothing of the cost of freedom for he has not fought for Liberty and Justice, but these were always white liberty and white justice; that is, values secreted by his masters’, Fanon (1967, 221) wrote. When, in December 1959, riots broke out in Fort de France, Frantz Fanon wrote in *El Moudjahid* that ‘Martinicans can be treated by France as rebels. They are discovering the existence of a rebel spirit, of a national spirit’, but, in private, he derided the Martinicans. ‘One of these days,’ he said to a friend, ‘it will be by kicks in your arse that France will force you to take your independence. And you will owe it to Algeria, our Algeria’. Fanon analyzed the riots as the expression of sexual fantasy: ‘One makes love to a shadow, soils the bed and the next morning everything is back in order again and soon forgotten’. In 1974, years later, Glissant made a similar analysis of local riots, which he saw as impulsive, spasmodic and not leading to a collective consciousness. The problem has long been the difficulty of inhabiting a territory suffused by Creole vernacular practices and expressions yet deprived of the ability to create a collective Nous (Dash, 1995, 121). ‘There is an artificial, folkloric Nous created by the metropolitan administration, an aberrant Nous created by elected representatives of the people’ (121). Collectivity is ephemeral. Yet Glissant saw the victory of assimilation as artificial. ‘Colonization has therefore not been successful as it appears at first sight. The irresistible mimetic impulse comes up against areas of resistance for which the difficulty is that nothing in a literally fragmented situation can link them together’ (145). *Opacity* is the marker of the Creole vernacular. One must look for the subterranean, for the pays reel, its capacity to hide and safeguard practices of creolization.

The 2009 strikes offered the opportunity to observe in which ways creolization intervened in a struggle. Union delegates spoke in Creole, people were
speaking freely in the streets. They felt liberated. The figure of the maroon was once more invoked. Though maroonage was not a ‘definitive escape since the slave could not leave the country, it invented a new way to move in the island: being free despite slavery, invent new routes, transform the country’ (Bourgault, 2011, 37).

In March 2009, Édouard Glissant et al. published *Manifeste pour les ‘produits’ de haute nécessité* [Manifesto for the products of high necessity] (Breleur et al. 2009) arguing that the legitimate demand for better purchasing power could not be understood without an articulation with a new poetics. In other words, in time of distress and crisis, a poetics is needed that elaborates on the notion of ‘needs’, that questions consumerism and its discourse on ‘satisfaction’ and fulfillment. The social demands could not exhaust what was expressed in the chant that accompanied the month-long strike ‘La Gwadeloup sé tan nou! La Gwadeloup sé pa ta yo!’ [Guadeloupe is ours! Guadeloupe is not yours!] It was about a poetics of living, of living well on that small island, which had known colonization, slavery, colonialism and a postcolonial form of dependency. Hence, besides the ‘necessary products of living’ (*les produits de première nécessité*), products of high necessity appeared equally important: political responsibility, criticism of the free market, a radical contestation of contemporary capitalism, rethinking work as a site of self-accomplishment and social invention (Breleur et al., 2009). Yet, just as the amount of despair, of resentment among the populations of the Antilles was underestimated by the French State, the hopes of intellectuals and activists were hindered by social and economic reality. To Patrick Chamoiseau, the ambivalence of this ‘post-capitalist movement’ rested in the tension between the illusion that consumption gives meaning to life and the desire to go beyond consumption as giving meaning (Chamoiseau, 2011 [2009], 155). The poetics of chants, dance, gestures, reactivation of tradition, were the expressions of a fraternity, of an aspiration to new relations on the island and between the island and France that did not find their place within the local political parties that negotiated the aftermath of the social movement with the government. There were many obstacles to a radical movement. Chamoiseau (155) argued that there had not been enough engagement of local intellectuals, too much cowardice, a lack of democratic culture inherited from slavery and the fear of a future without France. To the poet and writer, the total dependency of the political discourse on the economy (unemployment) immobilized politics. Poverty, precarious lives, subjection to France and drugs have constructed a frightening environment and it was not totally surprising that things returned to normality. Chamoiseau (176) turned to the figure of the warrior (a maroon for our times, I will say) who knows that ‘things are unstable, who enters in a process of permanent humanization, who rejects the old concepts’. Chamoiseau’s warrior is a kind of ‘sage’ whose weapons are patience and resilience, a kind of ‘monk warrior’ who meditates, invents new concepts but seeks not to use violence. The war he wages promises to be
long and difficult but the old weapons of violence and counter-violence have proven to bring more misery. Within this reconfiguration, creolization, he remarked, opens us up to the unpredictable and unforeseeable interactions at work (181).

Once again, the subterranean vernacular is shown as the veritable terrain of resistance. Yet, what Chamoiseau and others do not quite explain is the role of creolization during a struggle, how creolization can be invoked and summoned to give hope, courage, and meaning. It seems to me that Chamoiseau touches upon important aspects when he points to the cowardice of Antillean intellectuals and the world that capitalist consumption has created, where one thinks one will find blissfulness and meaning. Either creolization is about a dream – a never attained horizon – or it can offer concrete answers to current contradictions. Demands for social measures weighed heavily upon cultural desires in a world where two discourses tried to impose themselves as summarizing our lives: economy and morals – the free market and the politics of charity and pity. Creolization must then affirm its roots in the slaves’ struggles for universal rights and a world beyond race.

It is important to bring back the slave as a political figure – not just as the figure of suffering, exile, deportation, but as a figure that radically contests with ‘his’ and ‘her’ life an economic, cultural and political system that fabricates fragile and precarious lives for profit. If, as Glissant reminds us, the plantation is the womb of creolization, we need to bring back the plantation as a site of economic and political power. The slaves challenged an economy based on a geopolitics of brutal exploitation, on the transformation of the human body into a mere object, on laws and regulations that justified the racialization of work, that gave to a minority the right to punish, maim and torture enslaved women, children and men. How can Reunion help us to look further at creolization as resistance?

India Oceanic creolizations

Reunion Island and more generally the southwest islands of the Indian Ocean are much less known than the Caribbean as a site of creolization. Reunion is both more assimilated and more mixed than the French Antilles. A movement like Negritude could not have happened there, because of the mixing (no ethnic community dominates) and the weight of the ideology of whitening. Here, creolization must be thought within the millenary history of exchanges and encounters in the Indian Ocean. Exchanges, encounters, commerce, new languages and cultures, all took place in the Indian Ocean long before the arrival of the Europeans. There were cosmopolitan cities, genuine global towns where Jews, Armenians, Arabs, Indians, Chinese, Malagasy rubbed shoulders, prefiguring (as evocative singular figures rather than models), contemporary global cities. If the arrival of the Europeans
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profoundly changed the Indian Ocean world, it did not destroy it completely. The decolonization period, followed by the construction of nation states, consolidated the nationalization of space. In recent years, transnational and transcontinental exchanges have undergone a renewal. They are uncovering new routes and itineraries. A new cartography is being drawn with the emergence of new global cities like Johannesburg, Dubai and Singapore. The Indian Ocean is a space without any precise supra-nationality or clearly delineated territory. It is a cultural space overarched by several chronotopes, where temporalities and territorialities are constructed and deconstructed. It is an ocean linking continents and islands, a space which is Afro-Asiatic, Muslim, Christian, Animist, Buddhist, Hindu and creolized. An ocean of trade winds, monsoons and cyclones.

Reunion, on the Asia–Africa axis, has been a crossing point of different economies and world-cultures. It is a space shaped by the successive territorial claims which intersect and destroy each other, get mixed up and reordered. Their dynamics are controlled by negotiation, as things necessarily get lost or are relinquished. There is no creolization without some form of loss, just as it cannot happen without inequality because creolization demands or requires room to maneuver where tensions and conflicts are resolved without being dissolved. Something has to be given up to find space for the other, for the stranger.

Yet, the capacity to accept new forms coexists with a difficulty to inhabit the land. The celebration for touristic and republican purposes – ‘Look, the French Republic has succeeded here: people with different religions coexist, thanks to the republican doctrine of neutral citizenship!’ – masks a profound unease. Solidarity exists but mostly within the family or community, the solidarity across communities needs to be built, and the difficulty remains of imagining a common future within a shared territory. Reunion literature is a case in point. Postcolonial critic and poet J.-C. Carpanin Marimoutou (2004) has argued that it is ‘impossible’ fully to inhabit the territory because of French linguistic policies (Reunion Creole is not taught, not valorized and regularly attacked by conservative forces, teachers and the middle-class: French is the language of success, Creole of exclusion). The project of giving in the same movement a literature to a language and a language to a literature is viable only if there is a serious politics of languages. ‘Literature’, Marimoutou (2004) writes, ‘must have an audience, it cannot be addressed to a minority of activists or sympathizers’. Literature goes back, in its encounter between history and place, to the inventory of its phantoms and fantasies. A ‘central question’, Marimoutou writes, is language: ‘in a situation of diglossia, writing is a performance against diglossia’. The literature of Reunion, he argues, has always said one thing: there ‘is no history because there is no place’. Or, more precisely:

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Creolization and Resistance

‘there is no appropriation of history because the place is uninhabitable’; there is ‘no tongue nor language which can really convey this history or this place, because neither tongue nor language are inhabited by the place or this history, nor really do they live here in fact’ (Marimoutou, 2004, 21).

Reunion poetry is haunted by the idea of trying to make the space habitable, taking account of history, speaking this place and this history, as it dreams of the missed meeting between the ‘white’ and the maroon.15 Boris Gamaleya’s (1973) epic poem Vali pour une reine morte has sought to anchor Reunion literature in the land, making the maroon the figure of the ancestor, but his proposition has yet to be followed (Gamaleya, 1973). In Reunion, the figure of the maroon is not fully celebrated. The local historian Prosper Eve has played down its importance, arguing that it was mainly ‘petit maroonage’ (short term escapes) and that slaves largely sought to take pride in their work and to establish good relations with their owners, rejecting outright rebellion (Marimoutou, 2004, 21).

This is where the challenge lies: to take charge of the place and the history though its languages and history. Where is the fiction in trying to come to terms with the history and the place, unless it is through traces, through ghosts? How can one live in a land of migrants? How can one live when one is a migrant (Vergès and Marimoutou, 2005)? Reunion is a world quick to imitate, but which creolizes the imitated thing to make something else of it, which (re)invents the quotidian. This is a dynamic of alterity where we see no alienation or submission, rather a creativity of a world subject to continual conflicting inputs. A society always has recourse to imitation. All social groups and individuals are constituted by a network of borrowings, debts and creations. Yet, the work of Pier Larson (2009) has questioned the ways in which creolization has been thought in the Indian Ocean. African and Malagasy slaves did not seek ‘sociocultural integration into the societies of their forced migration’ but rather to maintain ‘separated identities’, Larson (2009, 19) convincingly argues. The emphasis on ‘hybridity and cultural mixing has marginalized “enslaved persons”’ ancestral languages from colonial histories’ (19). Larson (19) insists on the ‘simultaneous processes of ethnic distinction’ and creolization, as ‘Francophone créolité and Malagasy identity were entangled with each other, sometimes mutually constituting’, he writes. Missionaries, traders, slave owners and colonial administrators came to acknowledge the importance of the Malagasy language for the imperial project and either published dictionaries and manuals or learned enough Malagasy to be able to trade and be obeyed. Megan Vaughan’s (2005) argument, shared by many postcolonial thinkers of the Indian Ocean, including myself, that Creole languages are composed of African-derived grammar and European-derived vocabulary must be amended. This should not be seen as the classic opposition between historians and cultural studies

scholars but as a need to clarify the historical and cultural context within which creolization occurs. Larson’s insight can be applied to other sites of creolization, such as French Guyana, where Guyanese Creole coexists with the languages of the Bushinenge, descendants of maroon communities established in the eighteenth century, fleeing the harsh conditions of slavery in the Dutch colony of Surinam (Hoogbergen, 1990; Price, 1996; Dupuy, 2002).

The current situation in Reunion echoes Chamoiseau’s remarks on Martinique and Guadeloupe: fear, consumerism, the cowardice of local intellectuals and artists, paternalism, the dependency of political and union leaders on France, the legacy of assimilation policies, and I would add the impact of the ideology of whitening. In Reunion Island, vernacular cultures, identities and history have long been repressed, dismissed, rejected, derided. It is an island whose traces, signs are misread by the Other, the French, who yesterday sought exoticism, and today seek a pacified multiculturalism, a new form of exoticism. Indeed, Reunion can work as a site of ‘good diversity’ as opposed to ‘bad diversity’ resonating with the official representation of young blacks and Muslims as refusing to ‘integrate’ in the French suburbs. Reunion was proud of being ‘the colony which colonizes’, an objective that served to justify its role in the colonization of Madagascar (the Reunion white elite was instrumental in lobbying for the colonial conquest of the island and sent poor Reunionnese to settle there). They returned to the land of a majority of Reunionnese’s ancestors brought as enslaved persons to play the colonizers. This was an ironic twist of history and the symptom of the attraction of colonialism’s policies of spoliation (the colonized stealing from other colonized). After years of neglect, the island is often cited for its exemplary multiculturalism – this was where the first mosque was built (before Paris’s mosque), where Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Afro-Malagasy and Christian temples, churches and rituals coexist. Local music is celebrated in the French media. Yet, in the discourse in the courts, in the media, in the universities, in the hospitals, the division between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ continues to trap the protagonists into a binary confrontation.

Post-1946, local struggles for social equality led to the emergence of a middle class. Four generations already have had access to education. The development of public services offered jobs to the children of poor families. Since, in the overseas departments, all civil servants benefit from privileges inherited from colonial times – higher salary and lower taxes than in France for the same job, as well as other important benefits inherited from colonialism – private property and other forms of consumption became accessible. Consumption and assimilation to what was fantasized as ‘being like the French’ were now the goals of the middle class. Within a few decades, the island has gone from being dominated by an economy inherited from the plantation economy where sugar cane reigned to an economy of services with an unemployment rate of 36.5 percent (men: 39.6 percent, women: 45.1 percent), and with 60.8 percent of the under twenties being
unemployed, or one young person out of two. Exports are less than 10 percent of imports. The population tripled while the economy crumbled.\textsuperscript{16}

New cultural identities have been reclaiming the colonial categories to transform, subvert and modify them to their own ends. These new identities serve to diversify the nomenclature of society by calling for a unique origin and a special place in the historical narratives of Reunion Island, and in its contemporary society. To be of African (Kaf), Indian (Malbar), Chinese (Sinwa) or European (Pti Blanc) descent, takes on a new dimension, with each ethnic group laying claim to its own history as part of Reunionese history, through recalling the impact of slavery and of the colonial order in their lives.

The rapid growth of communications and the accelerating access to consumer goods, along with the disappearance of scandalously visible poverty, have inevitably produced the illusion that all this had come to pass without friction. The subversive dimension of the social and cultural struggles that brought about a better life has been quickly forgotten. The cloud of amnesia has obscured and personalized social difficulties and conflicts. The lower middle class, the children of farm workers, shopkeepers, laborers, clerks, quickly wanted to forget, in the rush to the ‘metropolis’, where they came from, as they grasp the secondary signs of Frenchness – cars, holidays in Mauritius, contempt for the poor – while at the same time being unaware of cultural and intellectual movements in the region or in Europe. This social class can be compared to the postcolonial middle classes which have, consciously or not, taken part in what Sarat Maharaj (2001) calls \textit{multicultural management}, which accepts a little cultural difference but not too much, and especially if it is well-framed by a strict separation between the social and the cultural, the cultural and the political. The ‘we’ to construct would avoid cultures of recrimination, the mythologization of history, self-referenced identity or the fundamentally static notion of identity and instead choose responsibility, the present, the heterogenous and creolization. This is a ‘we’ which remembers the past but is not enclosed there; it is situated in a genealogy of struggles for justice, equity and democratization.

The joys and celebrations of the incredible diversity of Reunionese society need to be tempered with a reminder of the presence of a xenophobic, reactionary racist undercurrent. Those who share such ideology realize that they can no longer impose their own domination on society using former patterns of respect and power for ‘white Christians’. They have incorporated populist touches into their discourse, adding in doses of ‘color’ to their line-up. For all that, they remain entrenched in their convictions: they are afraid of change, afraid of others and afraid of the future.

Slavery and colonial orders encouraged groups to be separated. Everyone

who arrived and continues to arrive on this island has experienced a phase of rejection. The Creole language is an archive of these stigmatizations. The creolization ‘machine’, the processes through which the foreigner to the island’s culture becomes Reunionese, has never been free of tensions and conflicts. Two positions – either blissfully celebrating miscegenation, or actively denying it through highlighting the contradictions – share the same degree of blindness, which consists of believing that a society can exist without conflicts and breakdowns.

The end of the MCUR project reminded us that cultural projects and notions are sites of political conflict and that the discourses of multiculturalism, diversity and mixing in liberal democracy often hide a project of disciplining groups. The Reunion case shows that a precise analysis of political and cultural forces must be undertaken to situate when and where the notion of creolization remains radical and subversive. In other words, we must remind ourselves that if creolization is a productive experience of coexisting opacities, and if ‘the plantation is one of the wombs of the world’ (Dash, 1995, 176), violence, brutality, inequality, conflict and resistance have been inseparable from the process. Drawing from the processes of creolization in the Antilles and Reunion helps us understand the possibilities and pitfalls of the politics and culture of creolization when applied to xenophobic European policies. If creolization serves a policy of ‘soft multiculturalism’, which offers a space to play out differences and alterity while not addressing the issues of social justice and equality, then creolization will be emptied of its capacity to challenge xenophobia. On the other hand, if it constructs a terrain on which practices of resistance to uniformity and racism can be deployed, on which a debate on what unites a diversity of forms, what constitutes a common ground, then creolization can be deployed as a radical alternative.

Creolizing fortress Europe?

Creolization is subterranean, and its ‘unity is submarine’, as Edward Kamau Brathwaite (1974) has written. Its vernacular runs counter to the hegemony of the single roots, single language or single origins. Creolization is not the only model of cultural contact, and is not looking to set itself up as such. It is one of the products of different globalizations, and as such it offers a contribution to the debate on pluralism and equality. For us it represents the moorings which, going out from the island, attaches us to other islands and continents, even though we do not know what will emerge from current globalization.

This is what was lost in Reunion where the petty bourgeoisie chose the current form of French assimilation that allows an expression of regional culture insofar as it does not challenge the superiority of French language
and culture. Yet, multitudinous trajectories construct the landscapes of the ever-present past.

The case of Reunion can help us to think how creolization can remain subversive. Increasing disparities and increasing inequalities in societies worldwide can accommodate an ideology of cultural pluralism. For creolization to present an alternative, it must remain faithful to its history of resistance and finding a common ground that goes beyond national borders, policies of assimilation and a universalism that crushes any expression of alterity. Creolization, we saw, occurred in situations of asymmetry between linguistic and cultural forms, it was the expression of the oppressed who took what they recognized as worthwhile in the ideas of the oppressors but turned these forms around to serve their goals of justice and dignity. Creolization was knowledge from below, an alternative epistemology to European domination. It can still play this role either in the postcolonial world or in Fortress Europe.

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Chapter 4

Continental Creolization:
French Exclusion through a Glissantian Prism

H. Adlai Murdoch

Wat a joyful news, Miss Mattie
I feel like me heart gwine burs
Jamaica people colonizin
Englan in reverse.
By de hundred, by de tousan
From country and from town,
By de ship-load, by de plane-load
Jamaica is Englan boun.
Dem a pour out a Jamaica
Everybody future plan
Is fe get a big-time job
An settle in de mother lan.
What a islan! What a people!
Man an woman, old an young
Jus a pack dem bag an baggage
An tun history upside dung!
Some people doan like travel
But fe show dem loyalty
Dem all a open up cheap-fare-to-Englan agency.
An week by week dem shippin off
Dem countryman like fire,
Fe immigrate an populate
De seat a de Empire.
Oonoo see how life is funny,
Oonoo see de tunabout?
Jamaica live fe box bread
Out a English people mout’.
For wen dem ketch a Englan,
An start play dem different role,
Some will settle down to work
An some will settle fe de dole.
Jane say de dole is not too bad
Because dey payin she
Two pounds a week fe seek a job
Dat suit her dignity.
Me say Jane will never fine work
At de rate how she dah look,
For all day she stay pon Aunt Fan couch
An read love-story book.
Wat a devilment a Englan!
Dem face war an brave de worse,
But me wonderin how dem gwine stan
Colonizin in reverse.

Louise Bennett, ‘Colonisation in Reverse’ (1966)

Introduction

This chapter examines the ways in which migrant Caribbean diasporas inscribe critical paradoxes of migrancy and citizenship in contemporary Europe, concentrating on displaced inhabitants of French Caribbean overseas departments who were made citizens of France in 1946. The resulting diasporic intersections give rise to critical transformations of Frenchness and Caribbeanness engendered by the pressing presence in the metropoles of communities spawned by these migration-based demographic shifts. This French Caribbean-derived metropolitan community has become virtually 1 percent of the French hexagonal population, and their cultural and identitarian hybridities increasingly destabilize our current notions of nationality and belonging.

As the formerly colonizing metropolitan sites themselves became subject to massive postcolonial migration movements after 1945, embodying what Homi Bhabha (1994, 216–217) calls ‘the new international space of discontinuous historical realities’, the resulting shifts in population structure made plain the need to redefine and reinscribe former colonial European metropoles through the growing ethno-cultural prism of their newly arrived populations – Caribbean, African, South Asian – and the patterns
of exchange, transformation and alternative cultural production with which they increasingly inflected these European sites. In this complex interplay between center and periphery, the tensions and teleologies of these competing, contradictory forces of universalism and fragmentation would render traditional French and European definitions of identity increasingly amorphous, protean and plural, resulting in ‘new structures for group identification and collectivity’ (Slemon, 2001, 102). This leads us to posit a new set of sites and strategies outside the ‘traditional’ location of the periphery, relocating both the boundaries of the postcolonial experience and the functional framework of the process of ‘creolization’, historically read and defined as purely a temporal and locational product of the colonial encounter.

**Creole and creolization**

In etymological terms, the word ‘Creole’ is inscribed as an inherently unstable category, embodying the ambiguities and essentialisms of its origins in the colonial period. Indeed, we find it inscribed in terms that stress both its grounding in ethno-cultural mixture and the absence of any specific racial reference, used to define second-generation persons born outside their ‘continent of origin’, whether it be Europe or Africa. In this way, a person designated as Creole, or criollo (to cite the word’s origins in the mixtures that became part and parcel of Spanish colonial praxis) could be white or black, colonizer or colonized, but of key importance is the play of difference that the term implies, rendering a Creole subject or culture the product of myriad ethnic and cultural encounters and intersections.

The arc of signification of the term ‘Creole’, then, implies a certain fluidity that posits a continuum of ethnic hybridity and doubleness as its basic context, providing a network of pluralisms upon which traditional readings of Creole phenomena are constructed. But from a global perspective, the phenomenon of creolization arose as much out of wars, conquests and population shifts as from the effects of the colonial encounter. Since colonialism – particularly in its Western expansionist guise that peaked around the end of the nineteenth century – has impacted in one way or another the attributes and characteristics of both center and periphery, colonially driven patterns of creolization arguably lie at the center of a globalized contemporary network of cultural crossings and ethnic intersection that are one of the principal markers of modernity itself. These crossings, the product, in Salman Rushdie’s phrase, of the ways in which ‘the empire writes back to the centre’, draw on post/colonial migration and its attendant demographic changes to inscribe a double time of cross-cultural encounters, an interpenetration of populations and practices once driven by the colonial metropole’s centrifugal force(s) but now (re)turning to the center in a reverse flow of ethnicity, subjectivity and culture.
Now if, as Balutansky and Sourieau, the editors of the recent volume *Caribbean Creolization*, have suggested, creolization is defined as ‘a syncretic process of transverse dynamics that endlessly reworks and transforms the cultural patterns of varied social and historical experiences and identities’, this notion of change works with multiplicities of history, culture and identity to ‘undermine any academic or political aspiration for unitary origins or authenticity’ (Balutansky and Sourieau, 1998, 3). This allows us to posit the abrogation of continental notions of false universalism and new juxtapositions and interactions of signification that give rise to contested contexts of identity, interstitality and difference that reflect the increasingly composite nature of contemporary metropolitan populations.

By the same token, longstanding metropolitan myths of an uncomplicated, undifferentiated ‘Europeanness’ – or, more specifically, Frenchness in this case – undergirding assumptions of (supra)national identity are forced to take account of this increasingly insistent doubleness that bridges both the cultural and the ethnic domains of metropolitan life. Ultimately, the basic definition of the composition of the nation state must be revisited and redefined, as the colonially driven tensions and insularities of empire at work in the periphery are increasingly superseded by a constantly metamorphosing metropolitan perspective. This positions a reductive posture of sameness and singularity to adopt a growing awareness and acceptance of otherness, predicated on an intermingling of ethno-cultural communities and a praxis of cosmopolitan empathy through an active engagement with difference.

**Caribbeanness and the Continent**

In a word, then, any reconsiderations of the complexities of creolized Caribbean and European identities will bring into play important concepts of location, migration, and cultural cross-fertilization in order to interrogate rigid assumptions of identity and place. Such a pluralist, historically inflected vision of Caribbean epistemology was in fact instantiated by one of the French Caribbean’s major contemporary literary and cultural theorists, the late Édouard Glissant of Martinique. While there have been major literary and critical movements that have both preceded and arisen out of his writing, the body of Glissant’s work easily stands alone, with major cultural, critical and philosophical implications for the ever-evolving of French metropolitan subjectivity. We will seek to disentangle the intersection of creolization and an increasingly transcultural Europe shortly, but for now it bears repeating that Glissant practiced a discursive positionality grounded in historical and contemporary patterns of migration and *mondialisation*, and their undergirding of the Glissantian principles of relation and creolization.

Long a towering figure in the world of arts and letters, Glissant’s unassailable global stature was confirmed in the decade before his death in
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2011 by the coalescence of a number of associated events. The Prix Édouard Glissant was created in 2002 at the Université Paris 8 (Vincennes-Saint-Denis) with the co-operation of l’Agence universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) and the Réseau France Outre-mer (RFO), asserting his stature as a leading French public intellectual. The foundation of the Institut du Tout-monde in Paris in 2007, and the increasing publication of English-language translations of his work (translations of L’Intention poétique and La Case du commandeur have recently appeared), mark his emergence, beyond the French-speaking world, as an internationally recognizable literary figure. He also took a leading official role in setting up a Centre national pour la mémoires des esclavages et de leurs abolitions for the French state. Of a piece with these efforts are some of his more recent public pronouncements, like ‘Manifeste pour refonder les DOM’ (2000), ‘Quand les murs tombent: l’identité nationale hors-la-loi’ (2008), ‘L’Intraitable beauté du monde’ (2009), and ‘10 mai: mémoires de la traite négrière, de l’esclavage, et de leurs abolitions’ (2010), which addressed contemporary issues of identity and transnationality. Such documents do seem to make it clear that, even in this most late stage of his career, Glissant had not entirely abandoned the activist and oppositional politics that characterized his earlier career, most notably in the 1950s and 1960s, when he was forbidden by Charles de Gaulle from leaving France between 1961 and 1965.

Critical work on Glissant often divides his writing into two periods: before and after the publication of Le Discours Antillais in 1981. In the first period one might claim that he focuses mainly on Martinique and its social, political and cultural paradoxes, while in the second he extends his vision, via the concept of the ‘Tout-monde’, to the postcolonial world as a whole. His crosscultural poetics, then, initially articulated in Le Discours Antillais but greatly expanded in his Poétique de la relation, writes identity out of a historically and culturally grounded Antillean experience. The larger theoretical concept of ‘relation’ (la Relation), inscribes a non-hierarchical principle of mutuality, a relationship based on recognition of and respect for the Other as different from oneself. On a larger scale, the concept presupposes and valorizes a praxis of natural openness to other cultures. As Celia Britton explains:

Glissant’s theoretical work [...] is all underpinned by la Relation. The starting point for this concept is the irreducible difference of the Other; ‘Relation’ is in the first place a relation of equality with and respect for the Other as different from oneself. It applies to individuals but more especially to other cultures and other societies. (Britton, 1999, 11)

Glissant envisions the poetics of relation as intrinsically intersectional and composite. While, on the one hand, it is ‘forever conjectural and grounded in no fixed ideology’, on the other, it also inscribes a space beyond the strictures of language and geography, since it is at the same time ‘latent,
open, and multilingual in intent’ (Glissant, 1997, 44). Ultimately, this poetics of relation becomes a means towards establishing a signifying framework that emphasizes coexistence and connection as a means towards thwarting difference and oppositionality.

From a Glissantian perspective, creolization almost always leads to unknown and unforeseeable consequences. Creolization emphasizes mobility and flux, subverting fixed and separate patterns of identity formation. It is to this end that Glissant supplanted the singular figure of the root by the rhizome as a pluralist spatio-cultural construct grounding the Caribbean heritage of creolization. The rhizomatic framework enables this last category to assume the plural, protean properties of its hybrid heritage, as its insistence on fragmentation and doubling explodes metropolitan concepts of rootedness and monoculture through the intrinsic diversity of its structure. Thus, instead of the self-reflexive notion of one root – grounded in singularities of nationality, language, and ethnicity – the rhizomatic, multiple-rooted identity will reflect a pluralized, inchoate world of migrant subjectivities in the chaos-monde. As Michael Dash puts it:

Relation [...] is opposed to difference and, more than in his previous essays, Glissant ranges beyond the Caribbean to describe a global condition. Indeed, one could say that he sees the entire world in terms of a Caribbean or New World condition. The world, for Glissant, is increasingly made up of archipelagos of culture. The Caribbean has become exemplary in this creative global ‘chaos’ which proliferates everywhere. (Dash, 1995, 22–23)

Such linkages allowed Glissant to avoid – indeed, to overcome – the inherent clichés and limitations of an anticolonialist theoretical position. If we are to understand the transformative processes currently driven by migratory and diasporic movements in Europe, clarifying the Glissantian vision of the intersection of relation, creolization and opacity will be of key importance in elaborating their material, symbolic and analytical frameworks and the corollaries attendant upon these categories.

As the relational discourses of Poétique de la relation gave way to the broader visions of the ‘Tout-monde’, Glissant’s framework for Caribbean creolization gradually gave way to a broader articulation of global intersectionality. As the basis for his conjunction of historical, social and spatial systems, it is the random, unpredictable concatenation of cultural patterns and praxes that gives rise to a Caribbean framework of creoleness. By scaling this vision to the ‘global village’, Glissant inscribes a discursive simultaneity of sameness and difference:

The creolization that is taking place in neo-America, and the one gaining strength in the other Americas, is the same as the one operating across the world [...] the world is creolizing, which is to say that as the cultures
Continental Creolization of the world come into sudden and violent contact today they change and [...] abandon with difficulty something that they had held on to for so long, which is that identity is only valuable and recognizable if it excludes all other possible identities. (Glissant, 1996, 15; my translation)

It is this iteration of identitarian relationality, Glissant argues, already extant in the Caribbean region, that increasingly undergirds the multiple contacts and inflections of the world’s cultures. In these contemporary encounters between peoples, cultures and ethnicities, characterized by ‘macroclimates of cultural and linguistic interpenetration’ (Glissant, 1996, 19; my translation), he locates a creolization that actively contests the implicit binaries and hierarchies of the French colonial model of assimilation.

Given this intersubjective framework, Glissant sought to subvert and overturn metropolitan concepts of singular origin by supplanting the traditional figure of the root by the pluralist spatio-cultural construct of the rhizome, inscribing the latter as a grounding figure for the Caribbean heritage of creolization through the intrinsic diversity of its structure. Rather than singularities of nationality, language and ethnicity, then, the rhizomatic, multiple-rooted identity will reflect a pluralized, inchoate world of migrant subjectivities. Glissant always stressed the role of spatiality – of place, of location – over temporality, and in an interview entitled ‘Europe and the Antilles’ he explained the phenomenon thus:

We must have the courage to admit that identity conceived as a rhizome or as a form of relation is neither an absence of identity, a lack of identity, nor a weakness. It is a vertiginous inversion of the nature of identity [...] My own place which is inexorable, incontournable, I relate it to all the places of the world, without exception, and it is by doing so that I leave behind single-root identity and begin to enter into the mode of rhizomic identity, that is to say, identity-as-relation. (Hiepko, 2011, 259–260)

What undergirds Glissant’s discursive undertaking, then, is the translation of the colonial experience of the periphery into a framework for transnational articulation that places a national identitarianism that draws on the singular strands of hexagonal history into question.

Such patterns are arguably also implicitly present in the global demographic and cultural shifts produced by colonialism and its aftermath, particularly their ongoing and interrelated patterns of migrancy and movement. Put another way, given the increasing porousness and fluidity of national borders, particularly in Europe, and their plural corollaries of ethnicity, language and nationality, the easy categorizations of race, class and nation to which we have become accustomed are being forced to give way to the recognition of ‘multiple subject positions’ as being more reflective of the postmodern condition of incessant fragmentation, mobility, doubling and displacement. On the other hand, with the forces of globalization
leading to ever-increasing patterns of heteronomy and assimilation, and as the flows of people and technology and the commodification of culture result in a conjunction of cosmopolitanism and deterritorialization in which social identity is bound up with shifting simultaneities of migrancy, belonging, citizenship, labor and ever-increasing numbers of (mainly third world) refugees, the postcolonial metropolis is increasingly being feted as a transactional cosmopolitan space where the empire writes back to the center. This engenders a locational paradox in which, as Françoise Vergès (2002, 356) writes, ‘There is now a pastoral of postcolonialism in which the city is the locus of transnational politics’. Within such a contested framework of cultural exchange, it is becoming increasingly clear that, both for les français de souche and their perceived Others, the possibility of allowing for new categories of Frenchness is an increasingly contested proposition.

**Difference, exclusion, immigration, identity**

If French colonialism and the *mission civilisatrice* were grounded in a praxis of enforced racial hierarchies, this praxis of hierarchy and exclusion, and their corollaries of difference, are precisely the attitudes that continue to bedevil the ‘postcolonial’. As Étienne Balibar (1984, 1745) points out, ‘Racism in France is essentially colonial, not in terms of a ‘leftover’ from the past but rather in terms of the continuing production of contemporary relations’. Put another way, France’s increasingly diverse postwar population – catalyzed early on both by the return of over a million *pieds noirs* from the nascent Algerian nation followed by a large influx of labor from the DOM of the periphery – drew on the hybrid cultural forms emerging from these new demographic patterns, along with their corollaries of polymorphous positionality, defying nationalist singularities in favor of multiple attachments. In this way, as Adrian Favell (2001, 94) suggests, these new citizens, marked and defined by their ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic difference from the metropole, put paid to ‘the French post-revolutionary idiom’ with its emphasis on ‘republican citoyenneté and intégration’.

The traditional model of an all-inclusive, indeed, all-encompassing vision of *francité*, predicated as it is on a delegitimation of ethnic identity and the assumption of assimilation, continues to fall by the proverbial wayside.

On the other hand, the hexagonal perspective is also marked by the paradoxical fact that, by and large, the term ‘immigrant’ is not taken, for example, to refer to other Europeans like, say, the Portuguese, who presently constitute the predominant immigrant group in France. Rather, as Winifred Woodhull (1997, 32) succinctly points out, ‘it refers to the influx of non-Europeans, some of whom are not immigrants at all. These include people from France’s overseas departments in the Caribbean (Martinique and Guadeloupe), as well as from former French colonies such as Vietnam,
Senegal, Cameroon, and the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia). Thus, the very range of application and pejorative tenor of the French term *immigré(e)* implicitly incorporates all minority groups, regardless of demographic origin, into its folds. For example, as Freedman and Tarr (2000, 2) point out, ‘a woman who was born in France, has been brought up in French society and has French nationality, but whose grandparents originally migrated to France from Vietnam, for example, will still find herself labelled as an “immigrant.” The same is true of ethnic minority communities in France originating from Martinique and Guadeloupe, even though these are still French territories. Such patterns of difference and discrimination speak to an implicit, insistent whitening of the French state in discursive and ethno-cultural terms.

Such a phenomenon does not occur in a vacuum, to be sure, and in fact it denotes a willful blindness towards the long-established presence of black peoples on French soil. In an insightful essay, Tyler Stovall has outlined the basic tenets of this process:

> the historical context is crucial. In order for ideas of French national identity to take on a racialized character two particular developments were essential. One was the conclusive triumph of Republican values and institutions in France, emphasizing the global significance of Revolutionary ideology. The other was the creation of a significant nonwhite presence in France, a presence of both actual individuals and cultural representations of the Other. World War I brought about both developments, leading to an understanding of whiteness as a muted but nonetheless real part of French national identity during the early twentieth century. (Stovall, 2004, 53)

Much of this implicit inscription of whiteness as an integral part of France’s national identity was in turn predicated on France’s centuries-long colonial encounters in the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb. Many of its racially based colonial hierarchies were, in a sense, imported into the hexagon’s vision of itself. Stovall continues:

> As relations in colonial society became more complex, the initial contrast between conqueror and conquered gave way to an understanding of race as a more important marker of the boundaries between colonizer and colonized. The best example of this was the debate over métissage in the colonies [...] they were a source of danger precisely because they threatened the racialized boundary between colonizer and colonized. In contradiction to doctrines of universalism, therefore, the rejection of the métis was predicated upon a definition of Frenchness as whiteness, as discussions of the amount of white versus native blood in their bodies demonstrated. (Stovall, 2004, 55)
Colonialism, then, and its corollaries of slavery and racism, have played a major role in the varied theoretical and discursive frameworks that have created the fundamental concept of what it means to be black in modern Europe. Also coming under this rubric was the ever-increasing contingent of Antillean and sub-Saharan subjects moving to the metropole.

By navigating between these interrelated axes of transportation and displacement, it is possible to trace the presence of blacks on French soil all the way back to Roman times. Given this extended presence, it would be reasonable to conclude that France’s black cohort had achieved de facto integration within France’s vaunted universalist ethos. But, in fact, the opposite was the case, as Stovall succinctly explains:

Most of France’s black history has centered around two essential themes: (1) Colonial encounters and representations, from the slave trade and Caribbean plantations of the 17th and 18th centuries to the colonization of sub-Saharan African in the 19th and twentieth; and (2) Postcolonial migrations and settlements, primarily (but not only) during the twentieth century and especially after 1945. (Stovall, 2006, 202)

What arises clearly from this discursive framework is rather a stigmatization of the black presence in material terms, with blacks continuously corralled and categorized into stereotypes that extend and exacerbate their inscription in otherness, alterity and non-belonging. In other words, even as France itself evolved from a monarchy to a republic in which its people assumed the rights and responsibilities of citizens, and extolled the color-blind nature of French national identity, the continued denigration of blacks and other populations of color – ranging from the hundreds of thousands of non-white workers from China, North Africa and Indochina who arrived in France during World War I, to the post-departmental and postcolonial Antillians and Africans who arrived after World War II – engendered material conditions that literally mimicked the racial hierarchies, stereotypes and exclusions that marked and grounded France’s colonial adventure. As Stovall (2004, 54) puts it, ‘the very nature of Frenchness was conditioned by race’. Given the pressing paradox of an imperial republic, then, any implicit creolization of the fundamental framework of French national identity flew in the face of the ongoing, insistent whiteness on which this identity was predicated, as populations and cultures from both center and periphery were thrown together in the maelstrom engendered by migration, post/colonialism and departmentalization.

In an important way, several key discourses of the nation – the philosophical, the cultural, the economic – worked in tandem to inhibit the implementation of a universalist France of equal rights and opportunities. Given this critically intersecting network of signification, nationalism, history, culture, even, or perhaps, especially literature, converge to give rise to a valorized inscription of identitarian Frenchness that functions within a
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doubled framework of discourse and representation. In representing identity and its attendant hierarchies in this way, long-standing stereotypes are not contested, but rather confirmed, in a discursive matrix that ultimately implicates the state itself. As Stuart Hall explains:

> Identities are therefore constituted within, not outside representation [...] because identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally constituted unity. (Hall, 1996, 4)

Clearly, despite the demonstrable presence and influence of a variety of immigrant groups on French soil, particularly from the onset of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the integrationist model could be upheld by falling back on the ‘whitening’ effect of European arrivants from the southern boundary of Europe, from countries like Italy, Greece and Spain. Their capacity to ‘pass’, effectively veiled their presence in comparison to the more visible presence of arrivants from North Africa and the former African and Caribbean colonies. In other words, ‘identity’, as a defining category, remained predicated on an all-inclusive sameness even as it was made to confront a fracturing and fissuring into ‘identities’ with the intersection of myriad ethnicities and cultures on French soil in the postcolonial era.

Colonialism, creolization and opacité

If Glissant’s discursive praxis actively contests patterns of othering, domination, appropriation and exclusion, then his work would stand in contradistinction to the metropolitan discourses we have been discussing. Indeed, nationalism and colonialism are precisely the values he holds in his sights, as Michael Dash (1995, 148) points out: ‘Glissant’s vision is different from earlier nationalisms and counter-discursive ideologies because it not only demystifies the imperialistic myth of universal civilization but also rejects the values of hegemonic systems’. In this way, Glissant arguably formulates those principles ‘of openness, of errance and of an intricate, unceasing branching of cultures’ (Dash, 1995, 147) that, in their contradistinction to metropolitan stigmatization of its minority peoples, would ultimately put this policy into question.

But, in a key sense, it is precisely this question of minority peoples and cultures, and their inscription and/or exclusion, which is at issue in the formulation of contemporary French identity. Indeed, given the
post-revolutionary precepts that are at the core of the republic, there are no minorities in France, only French citizens. The ironic décalage between this claim and the trenchant paradoxes of material reality are insistently pointed to by Françoise Vergès, 'The French republican doctrine has always been extremely reticent to admit that race has played a role in the making of the Republic. It was as if admitting the role of race meant admitting the existence of “race”' (Vergès, 2010, 95). And yet, from a historical perspective, France is in fact a nation shaped by patterns of political fragmentation and ethnic and cultural pluralism it has continually sought to efface, from the acquisition of the duchy of Brittany in the late Middle Ages to the return of Alsace-Lorraine by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. In these terms, the implicit whitening of the nation state, already referred to, became a means of forging national identity and national unity, achieved in part by papering over their tensions and fissures, such as those that ultimately joined Alsace-Lorraine and Corsica to France. Reading such patterns and praxes from the perspective of the nascent nation state, one can see clearly the instantiation of Renan’s (1990, 11) paradoxical dictum that, ‘Forgetting […] is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation […] Unity is always effected by means of brutality’. Carefully crafted national discourses, then, usefully and simultaneously engendered both superficial simulacra of sameness within the nation state, and discursive representations of difference and alterity that enabled and rationalized the colonial project among the state’s others in the periphery.

But such deliberate acts of forgetting persist and multiply, and the postcolonial French nation has seen its share of them in the last several years. On the political side, these unspoken tensions, and the unacknowledged, unaddressed colonial traces that lay at their core, erupted in the contested, controversial Law of February 23, 2005. In this remarkable legal document, the government, in Article 1, ‘exprime sa reconnaissance aux femmes et aux hommes qui ont participé à l’œuvre accomplie par la France dans les anciens départements français d’Algérie, au Maroc, en Tunisie et en Indochine ainsi que dans les territoires placés antérieurement sous la souveraineté française’.1 Article 4 goes even further, insisting that ‘Les programmes scolaires reconnaissent en particulier le rôle positif de la présence française outre-mer, notamment en Afrique du Nord, et accordent à l’histoire et aux sacrifices des combattants de l’armée française issus de ces territoires la place éminente à laquelle ils ont droit’.2 Interestingly, while there was little

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1 ‘seeks to recognize the women and men who participated in the task accomplished by France in the former French departments of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Indochina as well as in those territories formerly under French sovereignty’. My translation.
2 My translation: ‘scholarly programmes in particular should recognize the positive role of the French overseas presence, particularly in North Africa, and should give to the history and the sacrifices made by the armed forces of France stationed in
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question that the demand to recognize the ‘positive role’ played by French colonialism amounted to a tacit, if not an overt, denial of the racist crimes of the colonial era – including such occulted events as the racially driven repression and massacre of Algerian protesters in Paris on October 17, 1961 – protests and accusations of historical revisionism were undertaken only by ‘left-leaning’ scholars, writers and activists until the law’s repeal by President Jacques Chirac at the beginning of 2006. In a case such as this, where willful blindness clearly trumps presumptions of insight, it is this perverse determination not to see that undergirds Vergès’s (2010, 94) telling observation that ‘It is within the French national body that we now observe the frame of French colonialism, the effect of postcolonial amnesia, of the return of the repressed [...] the spectres of the colonial politics of race and gender, inhabit the contemporary French Republic’. Arguably, then, both whiteness and its mission civilisatrice are implicitly valorized within a postcolonial temporality of discursive rationalization.

But francité, by its very nature, excludes the ethnic and cultural claims of certain categories of citizens born on French soil, and, again, only the willfully blind would have no expectations of consequences. The suburban riots of 2005 are a case in point. In a key way, the economic, social and racial causes of this uprising are directly reflective of the burgeoning diversity of France’s population, emblematically embodied by the minority youth of the banlieues – and the refusal to recognize the implications of this pluralistic demographic shift for the discursive articulation of a wider, more inclusive vision of francité. As Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (2006, 51) points out, ‘encounters with daily instances of discrimination point to the unfulfilled promises of equality. The youths face inequality at school, segregation in housing, and discrimination in access to employment’. In other words, given the failure of the French political powers that be to integrate their Muslim and black populations into the larger framework of the French economy and culture, or to give them leave to voice specific identitarian claims, the unacknowledged racism that is the double marker both of the metropolitan majority and of the minority populations of color of the ‘cités’, bridged the double bind of exclusion and intégrisme that constitutes the core of the national framework.

France’s minority populations are effectively targeted and stigmatized, made subject to a discursive metropolitan network whose multiple sources reflect the range of the commitment to preserving the mythologized status quo of the integrated, universalist nation. These sources, ranging from politics to the media to the religious establishment, engage in clear patterns

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of persecution and pathologization of the periphery of French citizenry, as Silverstein and Tetreault point out:

In addition to drawing on this previous history of violent confrontations, the November 2005 disturbances responded to the symbolic violence perpetrated by politicians and journalists against young French citizens in cités who are repeatedly and mistakenly described as ‘foreigners’ (étrangers) and pathologized and demonized for their purported unwillingness to ‘integrate’ into French society. Since the 1980s right-wing and centrist politicians have deliberately blamed French children of immigrants for their purported failure to integrate as a means of mobilizing conservative voters and deflecting responsibility for social inequities [...] [this] is taken by many residents of the cités as yet another example of French society’s rejection of cultural and religious diversity and the hypocrisy of a Republic that would claim to treat all of its citizens equally. (Silverstein and Tetreault, 2006)

As this analysis makes clear, it would not be unreasonable to claim that the praxes of segregation, exclusion and hierarchical division associated with France’s colonial encounter as it was practiced in the periphery have returned to the metropole with a vengeance. As these colonially driven perceptions persistently and paradoxically divide the universalist nation against itself, they explain Vergès’s (2010, 94) point that ‘To the disenfranchised youth of France (both in the Hexagon and overseas territories), discrimination against their parents, against themselves, the perception that they remain “second-class citizens” [...] all could be explained by “slavery, racism and the legacy of colonialism”’. Intriguingly, however, these problems are not limited to France’s socioeconomic and socio-cultural periphery, but indeed assail its geographical periphery as well.

**DOMiens, citoyens?**

It will come as no surprise that most across-the-board comparisons have shown that these supposedly equal territories are marked by a tangible series of ongoing economic disadvantages by comparison with France. And, indeed, the ethnicized framework of the nation state described above encounters even greater challenges when forced to confront and inscribe the unprecedented patterns of creolization spawned in the wake of France’s Caribbean colonial presence. Notwithstanding the act of departmentalization of 1946 that made citizens of the inhabitants of the DOMs, and set in train the instantiation of metropolitan social safety nets like the *salaire minimum de croissance* (SMIC) [minimum wage] and the *allocation familiale*, these territories continue to be marked by a persistent set of ongoing economic disadvantages by comparison with the mainland. In
large part, unemployment has long remained at around 25 percent to 30 percent, compared with a rate of about 8 percent for the metropole. Departmentalization has also produced a modernized société de consommation, as domestic production has all but disappeared and over 90 percent of all goods consumed in the DOMs are now imported from France. Their elevated prices and the high cost of living across the board reflect the costs of transatlantic shipping, insurance and the like. Here, patterns of capital repatriation, increasing unemployment, conspicuous consumption and decreasing indigenous business ownership tended to reinforce impressions of a generalized subservience to the metropole that arguably accompanies French overseas departmentalization in the Caribbean. Indeed, it was a concatenation of these systemic hierarchical discrepancies between metropole and DOM – highlighted by dramatic differences in salary and cost-of-living indices and precipitated by the intolerably high price of gasoline – that led to the forty-four-day general strike in Guadeloupe that ended on March 4, 2009 and the accompanying thirty-eight-day strike in neighboring Martinique that ended on March 14, 2009. The fact that Guadeloupe, with its sky-high unemployment rate, is one of the poorest corners of the national territory is a phenomenon that tends to go largely unnoticed in the hexagon, papered over as it is by discourses of equality and paradisiacal tropical splendor. Sparked by protests over the inordinately high cost of living and what the locals call in Creole pwofitasyon, or dehumanizing exploitation for profit, protests quickly became island-wide, bringing economic life to a screeching halt and leading to mass demonstrations, torched cars and trashed stores. Eventually, an agreement was signed between the Paris-based government and a coalition of unions and other labor and social movements. The draft agreement, reached early in the morning of March 11, 2009, called for a €200 ($250 US) monthly wage increase for 47,000 low-wage-earners, with smaller increases for those with higher incomes, retroactive to March 1. Major business owners had already agreed to lower prices on roughly 400 basic necessities by 20 percent one month after stores reopened. The strikes exposed long-simmering tensions between workers on the island and the békés, a wealthy white minority descended from slave-era colonists who continue to control key industrial and commercial areas as well as imports and prices. Indeed, according to a recent documentary, the békés of Martinique control 20 percent of the island’s GDP as well as 52 percent of the agricultural land and 40 percent of the commercial distribution rights.4

In a subsequent poll by BVA/Orange, 78 percent of respondents considered the Guadeloupe protesters’ demands ‘justified’. But it is events such as these exposing the unpalatable reality lurking beneath presumptions

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4 See television documentary, ‘Les derniers maîtres de la Martinique’, dir. Romain Bolzinger, TAC Presse; transmitted January 1, 2009 (Canal+); February 6, 2009 (Canal+ Antilles).
of republican égalité and intégrisme that lead Vergès (2010, 94) to declare that ‘French overseas territories and ‘banlieues’ have emerged as sites where French national identity, the myth of the Nation, national narrative and national culture are questioned from the viewpoint of a still unwritten story: the story of slavery and of the ‘republican colony’. Significantly, it is the circulation of these long-held perceptions in both the geographical and the socio-cultural peripheries, that a de facto condition of colonization is the iron fist lurking within the velvet glove of departmentalization’s promises and assertions of equality, that grounds the understanding of these events by these exploited and excluded communities. For example, in an article dated March 2, 2009 that appeared on the weblog Montray Kreyol, entitled ‘De-link the Martinican case from that of other French colonies’, the Martinican novelist Raphaël Confiant explained the perception of departmentalization as a two-edged sword; here, he emphasized the need to

get out of the ‘departmentalization-assimilation’ system which has certainly drastically improved the quality of life and mediated the installation of a quality infrastructural network over the last fifty years, but which has ruined our economy. Which has made it literally disappear. Which has transformed it into a ‘pretext-economy’, according to Édouard Glissant’s formula; i.e., functioning thanks only to massive financial transfers from the metropole.5

Similar assertions of the socio-cultural specificity of the periphery were made by Elie Domota (2011, 48), one of the principal organizers of the LKP economic resistance movement in Guadeloupe, in an interview marking the two-year anniversary of the uprising:

We are proposing to go well beyond a simple material and moral defense of workers’ rights, and forcefully to pose questions of social transformation. Whether we like it or not, given our history, and given what links us to France and Europe, there are questions to be resolved.6

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6 ‘Nous nous proposons d’aller bien au-delà de la simple défense des droits matériels et moraux des travailleurs, et de véritablement poser la question de la transformation
In this tacit recognition of the continuity of colonial hierarchies, which is simultaneously an acknowledgement of France’s lack of recognition of the porousness of any nationally grounded contemporary identitarian framework within a context of the pressing permeability of French and European national identities, an awareness of ongoing patterns of domination and submission is incontestably apparent, at least to the dominated. In the face of France’s refusal to countenance the contestation of its national framework by the antinomical forces of centralization and fragmentation set in train by the oppositional links between metropole and periphery, and exacerbated by creolization’s creatively unstable and mobile categories of subjectivity engendered in the aftermath of its colonial encounters, the ongoing transformation of the Hexagon into a contested site of subjective expression and pluralistic performance becomes an increasingly central — indeed, a largely unaddressed and unresolved — question.

Indeed, such claims of cultural autonomy, grounded in France’s historical relationship with its periphery and the conviction that similar hierarchies of domination and exclusion are at work in the present, have emanated almost ceaselessly from the geo-cultural boundaries of the French state. Prizewinning author Patrick Chamoiseau characterizes the broader stakes of the 2009 uprising in this way:

Martiniquais, Guadeloupéens, du fait de notre position dans la République, nous sommes non pas mal aimés, mais nous n’existons pas, nous sommes dans l’ombre, dans la cale du bateau […] ç’aurait été une erreur de rester sous-ordonnés, c’est-à-dire de rentrer dans un mécanisme qui est ordonné d’une administration à 7000 km, parce que c’est ce dont nous souffrons fondamentalement.7

In a sense, such pronouncements simply echoed and extended earlier ones. When Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy, (in)famous for his ‘racaille’ remark during the uprising in the banlieues, announced a brief visit to Martinique in late 2005, outraged public reaction included an open letter to Sarkozy in the newspaper Libération by Chamoiseau and Édouard Glissant entitled ‘De Loin’ and dated December 7, 2005. This public missive was clearly aimed at exposing the willful blindness of the neocolonial policies and discourses that still undergirded French national identity politics:

7 Chamoiseau, 2011, 163, 167: ‘Martinicans and Guadeloupeans, given our position in the Republic, it is not so much that we are unloved, but rather we do not exist, we are in the shadows, in the hold of the ship […] it would have been a mistake to remain subordinate, trapped in a mechanism run by an administration 7000 kilometers away, because this marks fundamentally the root of our suffering.’ My translation.
La Martinique est une vieille terre d’esclavage, de colonisation, et de néo-colonisation [...] Il n’est pas concevable qu’une telle Nation ait proposé par une loi (ou imposé) [...] à masquer ses responsabilités dans une entreprise (la colonisation) qui lui a profité en tout, et qui est de toutes manières irrévocablement condamnable [...] les communautés d’immigrants, abandonnées sans ressources dans des ghettos invivables, ne disposent d’aucun moyen réel de participer à la vie de leur pays d’accueil, et ne peuvent participer de leurs cultures d’origine que de manière tronquée, méfiante, passive.8

Clearly, then, these opposing views distinguish the state’s view of its history, its culture, and its intersecting communities from that of its most peripheral citizens.

However, Glissant’s principle of opacité holds great potential for reconfiguring contemporary France’s composite metropolitan society. Glissant draws on Caribbean principles and praxes of colonial resistance to inscribe opacité as a key counter to the universalizing assumptions of Western colonial culture. He indicates the advantages of this alternative approach over Westernized totalizing systems of thought and action in Poétique de la relation:

The thought of opacity distracts me from absolute truths [...] it relativizes every possibility of action within me [...] saves me from unequivocal paths and irreversible choices [...]. And so I can conceive of the opacity of the other for me, without reproach for my opacity for him [...]. We claim the right to opacity for everyone.9

Here, Glissant’s discursive critique underlines the extent to which Westernized totalizing thoughts and attitudes can converge to engender a univocal France, one marked by an implicitly uniform ethnicity as well. Recognizing the opacity of the other as a discourse of difference inscribes new paths and possibilities for relational identity by effectively contesting dominant

8 See Chamoiseau and Glissant, 2005: ‘Martinique is an ancient land of slavery, colonization and neocolonialism [...] It is inconceivable that the Nation should have sought by law [...] to hide its responsibilities in an undertaking (colonization) from which it profited, and which should be utterly and completely condemned [...] immigrant communities, abandoned in unlivable ghettos without resources, have no real means of participating in the life of their host country, and can only participate in their cultures of origin in a fearful, passive, and truncated way’. My translation.

9 Glissant, 1990, 206−207, 209: ‘La pensée de l’opacité me distrait des vérités absolues [...] elle relativise en moi les possibles de toute action [...] me garde des voies univoques et des choix irréversibles [...]. Je puis donc concevoir l’opacité de l’autre pour moi, sans que je lui reproche mon opacité pour lui [...]. Nous réclamons pour tous le droit à l’opacité.’
metropolitan assumptions and articulations of Frenchness through patterns of ethno-cultural intersection.

As he stresses the positive value of mixed, composite cultures, the valorization of communities grounded in diversity promotes ethnic formulations over national ones, in a dynamic, limitless multiplicity. Inscribing and expanding these multiplicities within the intersecting contexts of transnational communities inflected by migration holds intriguing implications for differential identity formation, as Mark Sebba and Shirley Anne Tate explain:

[W]e see identities as performed texts which are produced in talk and which are written in, into, and onto social reality by actors. They are constituted by social reality but also come to constitute that reality. These identities are never whole, complete or fully sutured and can therefore be subject to multiple readings and enunciations from different positions. (Sebba and Tate, 2002, 83)

Here, given the intricacies of a transgenerational migrant framework, identities are seen as texts of social practice that are reflective of the identifications that emerge from interactions between individuals. From a larger perspective, these (re)productions of global diasporic discourses of identity inscribe new positionalities and dimensions for reading transcultural encounters between various groups.

Devalorizing nationalité in favor of opacité allows us to find new ground for these composite cultures, their subversions of subjectivity and stereotype emerging from their differential inscriptions of meaning and identity in the newly multicultural, postcolonial metropole. As Glissant (1997, 193) himself observes, ‘The physical frontiers of nations have been made permeable to intellectual and cultural exchange, to mixed perspectives’. In this process, patterns of ethno-cultural difference located within and without national borders interact with and transform pre-existing designations of subjectivity, whether or not there is full and mutual recognition of the stubborn indicators of otherness. Celia Britton effectively explains the links that ground these concepts of relation, opacité, culture and resistance:

Accepting the other’s opacity means also accepting that there are no truths that apply universally or permanently. Relation and opacity work together to resist the reductiveness of humanism [...]. In this sense, opacity becomes a militant position [...] opacity is also a defense against understanding [...]. The right to opacity, which Glissant claims is more fundamental than the right to difference [...] it is a right not to be understood. (Britton, 1999, 19)

10 ‘Les frontières physiques des nations ont été rendues perméables aux échanges culturels et intellectuels, aux métissages des sensibilités.’
Here, Glissantian thought reformulates the perception and the definition of the human, grounded in the idea that it is precisely the limits of the known that open up new horizons, leading to the limitless boundaries of the unknown. In this *schéma*, humanity is bounded by a sense of acceptance which is no longer grounded in transparency, but in an *opacité* seen as fundamentally subjective or cultural. In pursuing this train of thought, Britton (1999, 19) explains that ‘understanding appears as an act of aggression because it constructs the Other as an object of knowledge’. In other words, difference as resistance should be allowed to assume its own subjectivity.

**Conclusion**

If, for Glissant, an inscription in the composite provides a direct link to the phenomenon of creolization, he extends this idea significantly when he (1996, 22) claims that ‘I think that the term creolization applies to the world as it is today [...] where there no longer is any “organic” authority and where all is archipelago’. In this way, Glissant appropriates the driving principle behind the relationality of *la densité irréductible de l’autre* [the irreducible density of the other] to inscribe *opacité* both as a key armature of subjective resistance and as a counter to the universalizing assumptions of Western colonial culture. Such a vision disturbs longstanding and overarching concepts of nation and nationality, relegating them instead to secondary or, indeed, tertiary status as strategies of identity, subjectivity and belonging. From this perspective, their corollaries of artificial borders are abandoned in favor of the complexities of composite cultures and communities where intersecting pluralisms of language, food and music engender creative patterns of performance that go well beyond spaces of national belonging, dis-locating a metropolitan legacy of false universalism and flagrant exclusion, and rendering identity a shifting term in a network of multiple relations with Others who constitute it.

Opacity, as a strategy of understanding and (non)-recognition, assumes its full force within a resistive framework that contests colonial corollaries and their related hierarchies of domination and submission, as Patrick Crowley explains:

> The West, though understood as a project, can also be understood, specifically and historically, as colonial France which took overseas a version of Enlightenment thought that was instrumentalized and pressed into the service of power. The light of reason or, in Glissant’s view, the false light of universal models, informed, for example, the thinking of many

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11 ‘Je pense que le terme de créolisation s’applique à la situation actuelle du monde [...] où il n’est plus aucune autorité “organique” et où tout est archipel.’
ethnologists, cartographers, teachers, administrators and urban planners who sought to ‘understand’ the non-European. (Crowley, 2006, 107)

By elaborating on this critically paradoxical perspective that acknowledges the limits of the knowability of the Other even as it presents these twin tensions as an opportunity for the extension of the ethno-cultural framework, he traces a network of progressive opacities whose material and symbolic value is the potential that it poses to rethink both individual and group subjectivity.

Ultimately, all cultures are formed, and are informed, through or with the influence of other cultures. If creolization excludes no one, then there can be no ‘pure’ original that can be used to rationalize or justify an attitude or a positionality of domination, marginalization or exclusion. As Glissant (1997, 194) writes in Traité du Tout-monde: ‘J’appelle créolisation la rencontre, l’interférence, le choc, les harmonies et les disharmonies entre les cultures, dans la totalité réalisée du monde terre’. By mediating and catalyzing a broader vision of ethnic engagement with an almost infinite range of peoples and cultures, the pluralities that inhere in this system of thought work to assure the existence of a principle of exchange that itself also contributes to establishing a framework for resistance in critical post/colonial and post/ national contexts. In this way, intersectionality – and its raft of implications and corollaries – is increasingly privileged as undergirding new and infinite possibilities for diversity and transformation on both the individual and the communal levels.

If the simultaneity of sameness and difference within these linkages allows Glissant to avoid the implicit binaries of responding to an anticolonialist theoretical position, the creative possibilities of this position assume even greater import in the urban, post/colonial spaces of contemporary France, where migrant, transnational identities continue steadily to emerge from the sterile hollowness of assimilation and integrationism. Forced to confront, to recognize, and even to exist alongside the persistent traces of an atavistic metropolitan colonial mentality, these displaced identities are simultaneously mediated by a pattern of cultural and psychological syncretism, engendering a process described by Kobena Mercer (2003, 255) as one which ‘critically appropriates elements from the master-codes of the dominant culture and creolizes them’ (emphasis in the original). This psychosocial phenomenon repositions the universalist binary of self and other, and plays a key role in the reshaping of urban France through plural encounters that ground and enable new, hybrid forms of identity that challenge the implicit singularities of francité. As a result, this new category

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12 ‘What I call creolization is the encounter, the interference, the shock, the harmonies and disharmonies between cultures, in the fully realized totality of our material world’. My translation.
of subject – particularly given their location in the historically determinant post/colonial metropole – appropriates ‘these new political and cultural formations’, as Avtah Brah (1996, 209–210) puts it, so as ‘continually [to] challenge the minoritising and peripheralising impulses of the cultures of dominance’. Finally, if, as Homi Bhabha (1994, 213) claims, ‘double-lives are led in the postcolonial world, with its journeys of migration and its dwellings of the diasporic’, the challenge posed by this vision will require us to think of identity in new ways, leading ultimately to the global de-territorialization of nation, subjectivity and identity. This new way of thinking and envisioning Europe, yet to be fully realized, is the core of Glissant’s legacy.

Works Cited


Chapter 5

Archipelago Europe: On Creolizing Conviviality

Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez

l’Europe se créolise. Elle devient un archipel. Elle possède plusieurs langues et littératures très riches, qui s’influencent et s’interpénètrent, tous les étudiants les apprennent, en possèdent plusieurs, et pas seulement l’anglais. Et puis l’Europe abrite plusieurs sortes d’îles régionales, de plus en plus vivantes, de plus en plus présentes au monde, comme l’île catalane, ou basque, ou même bretonne. Sans compter la présence de populations venues d’Afrique, du Maghreb, des Caraïbes, chacune riche de cultures centenaires ou millénaires, certaines se refermant sur elles-mêmes, d’autre se créolisant à toute allure comme les jeunes Beurs des banlieues ou les Antillais. Cette présence d’espaces insulaires dans un archipel qui serait l’Europe rend les notions de frontières intra-européennes de plus en plus floues.1

Le Monde (February 4, 2011)

1 English translation (EGR): ‘Europe is getting creolized. It has become an archipelago. It has several languages and very rich literatures that are interlinked and mutually influence each other. All the students learn them, they speak several of them and not only English. And then, Europe is composed of several regional islands, becoming more and more vibrant, more and more present in the world such as the Catalan, Basque or even Breton islands. Without counting the present populations from Africa, the Maghreb, the Caribbean, each drawing on centuries and millennia old cultures, some remain amongst themselves, others become immediately creolized like the Young Beurs or Antillians of the suburbs. This presence of spaces configured by islands in the archipelago that will be Europe renders the notion of intra-European borders increasingly fluid.’
Introduction: ‘L'imprévisible’: the philosophy of the unforeseeable

In 2011, Édouard Glissant shared with the journalist Frédéric Joignot his observation on the fluidity of Europe’s borders and its Archipelagean Becoming. Bringing Europe closer to the epistemic grounds of ‘Antilleanity’ (Glissant, 1981; Wynter, 1989), Glissant discusses this latter not as a Caribbean singularity but as a forceful episteme (Wynter, 1989), through which the world can be thought in the Gestalt of creolization. This understanding of creolization introduces us to a notion of ‘living together’ departing from a critical race and decolonial perspective (Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 2010). Although creolization emerges within the semantic context of racial classification, it goes beyond it by opening the possibility of thinking the fuzziness and uncertainty of mixing. As Glissant (1996, 18–19) notes in Introduction à une poétique du divers:

La créolisation exige que les éléments hétérogènes mis en relation ‘s’intervalorisent’, c’est-à-dire qu’il n’y ait pas de dégradation ou de diminution de l’être, soit de l’intérieur, soit de l’extérieur, dans ce contact et dans ce mélange. Et pourquoi la créolisation e pas le métissage? Parce que la créolisation est imprévisible.

Creolization represents the ‘unforeseeable’, a new way of thinking. It engages with new ways of understanding the world as relational and interconnected. Although creolization emerges from the specific historical context of the Caribbean, marked by colonialism, slavery, indentured labor and imperialism, for Glissant it represents a universal proposal for ‘Tout-monde’ (Glissant, 1997a, 2010). Translated to the European context, Glissantian creolization invites us methodologically into an analysis of the ‘poetics of relation’ and the conceptualization of ‘transversal’ Becomings (Glissant, 1990, 1997b), as well as contributing to theorizing an ethics of conviviality.

This chapter discusses the epistemological implications of Glissantian creolization in Europe. It first explores the relationship between creolization and the Caribbean philosophical framework of ‘Antilleanity’. In order to

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3 English translation (EGR): ‘Creolization requires that the heterogeneous elements set in relation “inter-valorize” themselves, that means that there should not be any degradation or diminishing of the Being coming from the inside or the outside, while they are in touch and in a process of mixing. And, why is creolization not “métissage”? Because creolization is unforeseeable.’
understand the context of the translation of this concept to Europe, it then looks at current political debates in Europe on cultural mixing, focusing in particular on the discourse on integration in Germany and the United Kingdom. Third, the chapter addresses the limits of integration by drawing on interviews on ‘making homes’, conducted with members of Spanish and Latin American networks in Manchester between 2010 and 2013.\(^4\) Let us first move to considering Antilleanity.

‘Antilleanity’: an epistemological model for creolizing Europe?

As an expression of ‘Antilleanity’, creolization denotes a Being and Becoming in the World characterized by Du Boisian (2005) ‘double consciousness’. This consciousness derives from the experience of oppression, on the one hand, but, on the other, it is also driven by the struggle for liberation. As Glissant (2008) stresses in his struggle for the acknowledgment of slavery in France and the commemoration of the abolition of slavery (\textit{Manifeste pour l’abolition de tous les esclavages}), creolization emerged within the colonization of the African continent, the enslavement and forced displacement of its people, and loss of social identity. Glissant (1997b, 17) argues in the \textit{Poetics of Relation} that this has led to a long history of oppression in the Antilles, as for ‘more than two centuries whole populations have had to assert their identity in opposition to the processes of identification or annihilation triggered by […] invaders’.

Glissant defines the epistemic matrix underpinning this process of colonization as the ‘Philosophy of the One’. This philosophy has evolved on the grounds of the ‘duality of self-perception’, which he sees articulated in Mediterranean myths:

Mediterranean myths tell us, thinking about One is not thinking about All. These myths express communities, each one innocently transparent to self and threateningly opaque for the other. They are functional, even if they take obscure or devious means. They suggest that the self’s opacity for the other is insurmountable, and, consequently, no matter how opaque the other is for oneself (no myth ever provides for legitimacy

\(^4\) The interviews were conducted in the research project ‘Latinizing Manchester’, which was part of the research network, ‘Diasporic Pathways for Aspiring Cosmopolitan Cities’ at the University of Manchester. We conducted fifty interviews with individuals and organizations forming part of Spanish and Latin American networks in Manchester, Liverpool and Hebden Bridge. For further information on this network, please consult (archived page) https://web.archive.org/web/2011105011428/http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/ricc/projects/researchprojects/index.html.
for the other), it will always be a question of reducing this other to the transparency experienced by oneself. Either the other is assimilated, or else it is annihiliated. That is the whole principle of generalization and its entire process. (Glissant 1997b, 49)

The perception of colonized regions and their people as the ‘Other’ of Europe (Spivak, 1987; Dussel, 1995) was grounded on this ‘principle of generalization’ operating on the epistemic grounds of the ‘duality of self-perception’. Despite anticolonial struggle attempting to put an end to this system of devaluation, this pattern of thinking persists. As Glissant writes, most:

of the nations that gained freedom from colonization have tended to form around an idea of power – the totalitarian drive of a single, unique root – rather than around a fundamental relationship to the Other. Culture’s self-conception was dualistic, putting citizens against barbarians. Nothing has ever more solidly opposed the thought of errantry than this period [colonization] in human history when Western nations were established and they then made their impact on the world. (Glissant, 1997b, 14)

The project of creolization aims to decolonize this pattern of thinking. Opposing a model of identification based on dichotomies, creolization recognizes the limits of a model defined as the ‘Philosophy of the One’ (Glissant, 1997b, 47–49). Thus as Glissant (47–49) notes, decolonization ‘will have done its real work when it goes beyond’ the limitation imposed by the colonizers. In particular, Martinique and the other French Antilles needed to face the effects of the French model of assimilation. Thus, ‘Antilleanity’ denotes resistance to French imperialism, and goes beyond mere ‘opposition’.

Going beyond the French imperative of assimilation imposed on the population of the Antilles during colonial times (Wynner, 1989) and still present in state programmes in Europe on migration (Chamoisseau and Glissant, 2005), Glissant proposes that we think identity formations beyond mimesis or opposition. Emulating the colonizer or the hegemonic Self, or accentuating a counter-identity to this, reinforces the duality of self-perception. As he notes, ‘the duality of self-perception (one is citizen or foreigner) has repercussions for one’s idea of the Other (one is visitor or visited; one goes or stays; one conquers or is conquered)’ (Glissant, 1997b, 17).

extended through a relationship with the Other’. The ‘Other’ is not presented in fixed opposition to the Self, but as an ‘aesthetic constituent’ (Glissant, 1997b, 129) of the relational character of our Being.

This idea of identity challenges any notion based on the assumption of a single root (‘racine unique’) by emphasizing the experience of ‘transphysics’, the emergence of a paradoxical state of a subject which remains-in-place (rester au lieu), while branching out in different directions. It is this ‘specific oikumene of the Antilles’, its diasporic nature (Wynter, 1989, 638), that nourishes the knowledge, imaginary and subjectivities shaped within the context of the Antilles. Departing from this premise, creolization foreshadows an understanding of the world as a ‘kaleidoscopic totality’ (Glissant, 1997b). Thus, it relies on ‘multiple, rather than singular, roots and foundations that, when taken as a whole, aim at the dual objectives of liberation and of setting foundations for freedom beyond the trappings of the dialectics of asymmetrical recognition’ (Gordon and Roberts, 2009, 6). As such it outlines a perspective that invites us to understand society as an ensemble of continually changing transversal social relations. As an expression of ‘Antilleanity’, creolization opposes the politics of assimilation by asserting ‘the need to recapture but also transcend a vanished unrecorded history’, by creating a ‘mode of imaginary’, ‘a sense of cultural identity’ emerging out of the struggle against a ‘present governing order of discourse and its related episteme of a global order of knowledge’ (Wynter, 1989, 638). Interrupting this global order of knowledge, presupposed by the epistemic grounds of the ‘Philosophy of the One’, creolization insists on the interrelational, interconnected and interdependent character of our Being, opening the space for thinking about the ethics of conviviality.

The ethics of conviviality: cultural mixing and reversing integration

Departing from a planetary humanist vision, based on the relational and transversal character of a living together, creolization derives from ordinary encounters and practices as well as emotional networks of support, fueled through human needs, desires and affects. In my ethnographic research on ‘Latinizing Manchester’, everyday encounters reveal the complexity of interdependent social relations. People are constantly in touch with each other, although these encounters do not always happen on a voluntary basis. Encounters happen on the basis of the social organization of needs, relying on the work, services and products, provided and delivered. This societal network of interdependent relationships, characterized by neighborhood, friendship and kinship models of relationality, emerges within the logic of social (re)production (Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 2010). This means that relationality cannot be thought outside of the circuits of production and
consumption. It is in this context that interdependencies are created, conditioning the relational character of our Being. Yet, as Glissant concedes, relationality is also created through the poetics of relation, the numerous creative and affective crossings within which our lives meet and evolve.

In current official political, media and scholarly debates and governance directives on migration, this sense of being that people create through everyday connections is ignored. Instead, the matrix of the ‘Philosophy of the One’ is steadily revived through the rhetoric on integration, operating with the dichotomy of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. On this basis the nation’s Other is imagined as circumscribed by impenetrable ethnic, racial, national or religious boundaries and constructed as impediments to national social cohesion. For Glissant

on peut se métisse sans toucher a quelque sort – métissage peut être mécanique – petite pois blanc & petite pois noir – pratiqué de manière mécanique – l’idée que le colonisateur et la culture du colonisateur est supérieur s’est maintenue pour longtemps. Autant que cet idée est maintenue, le métissage ne peut pas qu’être mécanique.⁵

Glissant develops here the concept of creolization in opposition to a notion of cultural mixing (‘métissage mécanique’) which reinforces the assumption of society as organized by sealed ethnic and racial units. As he emphasizes, the notion of ‘métissage’ relies on the perception of cultural differences fixed in space and time, reproducing a normative script of racial and ethnic classification. Current state discourses on diversity and integration in Western Europe operate within this paradigm.

As Glissant and Chamoiseau noted in their open letter in 2005 to the French Minister of Internal Affairs, Nicolas Sarkozy,⁶ models of living together in migration societies in Western Europe are organized around two dominant paradigms: (a) the French model of ‘integration’ and (b) the British model of ‘communitarism’. While the French model sets a universal notion of ‘citizen’ as the organizing principle of political and social integration, the British model is rooted in a liberal understanding of personal freedom, acknowledging the individual’s right to cultural difference

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⁵ This is an extract from two radio programmes, ‘Itinéraire, territoire et histoire’ and ‘Odysées immigrées: créolisation et décolonisations’, broadcast on June 18 and July 16, 2010 on the French radio station Aligre FM. This extract is from the second programme. See www.edouardglissant.fr/mediatheque.html. English translation (EGR): ‘one can mix without being touched at all – mixing can be mechanical – white peas & black peas – it can be practiced in a mechanical manner – the idea that the colonizer and its culture is superior holds on for a long time. As long as this idea persists, mixing can’t be other than mechanical’.

and its expression. This particular perspective has informed multicultural agendas in the 1980s and 1990s in the United Kingdom.

Numerous studies have demonstrated (Lash and Featherstone, 2002; Gilroy, 2004; Parekh, 2005; Lentin and Tetley, 2011; Ahmed, 2012), how multicultural politics articulated by anti-racist groups aiming at transforming society and working towards social justice in the United Kingdom and the USA in the 1970s, have been transformed into devices for managing diversity in institutions in the 1980s and 1990s. In the United Kingdom, anti-racist struggles in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s represented the driving force pushing multiculturalism onto the political agenda. Its institutional translation onto local council agendas resulted in more or less radical local policies and strategies of black and minority ethnic (BME) inclusion (Parekh, 2005). In other European countries, ‘multiculturalism’ has played a rather insignificant role in state politics.

For example, in Germany multiculturalism has been mainly a marginal topic on the state agenda. However, in her speech to the Christian Democratic Youth (Junge Union) in Postdam on October 16, 2010, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel conceded that the ‘concept of Multikulti has failed, it absolutely failed.’ Interestingly, Merkel avoided spelling out the concept of multiculturalism by using the abbreviation ‘Multikulti’. Defining ‘Multikulti’ as ‘happily living side by side’, she concludes that ‘Multikulti’ has never worked in Germany. She goes on to suggest that the multicultural lens focusing on the promotion (‘fördern’) of migrants needs to change to that of requesting (‘fordern’) migrants to integrate into German cultural values, laws and rules. Merkel’s speech is quite paradoxical especially if we consider that ‘multiculturalism’ was never on the German government’s agenda and that this country only officially recognized its long-standing history of immigration in 2005. Yet, her speech is symptomatic of the shift from multiculturalism to integration within the EU region.

In 2008, the European Immigration and Asylum Pact (EIAP) established a five-year programme for the justice, freedom and security sector. This pact instituted ‘immigration control’ (security), ‘economic immigration’ (migration management) and ‘integration’ as necessary priority targets for the consolidation of EU migration and asylum directives. ‘Integration’ in

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8 In 2004, the German government passed the Zuwanderungsgesetz (Immigration Act) that came into force in January 2005. This Act represented the first official recognition of Germany as a ‘pluri-cultural’ society.
9 This pact is based on a previous communication, ‘A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools’ (European Commission, 2008) and the ‘Policy Plan on Asylum: An Integrated Approach to Protection across the EU’ (European Commission, 2007).
this context refers to the imperative of ‘cultural assimilation’. Interpellating post/migrants and refugees as ‘culturally different’ and imagining the nation in monocultural/monolingual terms, integration demands that these groups succumb to a national dominant culture. Thus, post/migrants and refugees are subjected to a disciplinary agenda of national domestication through integration programmes that are forcefully monitored by language and citizenship tests (Ha, 2010).

Integration programmes disregard the fact that people form part of a society in the moment at which they enter. The idea of a fragmented compartmentalized society in which people and collectives live in cocoons, which inform integration discourses and policies, does not correspond to social realities. People are relational beings immersed in webs of affective, pragmatic and productive relations. It is in this regard that Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller (2004) suggest that we understand connections to places and people through ‘Ways of Being’ and ‘Ways of Belonging’. The first asserts a more spontaneous connection that people establish through ordinary practices while the second refers to the conscious identification with systems of beliefs and values. Discourses on integration obfuscate the social dynamics of creating ties. Further, the perception of the migrant and refugee as being ‘unable to integrate’ erases the fact that European colonialism and imperialism spread languages and cultural codex as well as artistic, intellectual, legal and governance traditions to the colonized territories. Thus, most postcolonial migrants arriving in Europe speak one European originated language (for example, English, French, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese or Italian).

While the ‘integration’ rhetoric has become the dominant explanatory model for addressing ‘social cohesion’ in Europe, its institutional translation has regional specificities. Germany has followed EU initiatives by establishing a National Integration Plan, with integration offices, officers and programmes (see discussion in Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 2010). Other EU countries, like Spain, have adapted the integration agenda to regional needs. This has led to different outcomes – for example, in Catalonia or the Comunidad de Madrid in regard to the pursuit of the cultural and political agenda (Gil Araújo, 2010). Despite the British anti-racist movement’s (1970s–1980s) critique of the ‘integration’ paradigm and the current official representation of the United Kingdom as a ‘multicultural nation’, as exhibited in the closing event of the 2012 London Olympics, ‘integration’ has found its way back onto the UK state agenda.

When we consider current political migration discourses in Britain, the tension between integration and multiculturalism becomes apparent. For example, this was reflected in the British Prime Minister David Cameron’s ‘immigration speech’ on April 14, 2011.10 Addressing two different

communities of ‘immigrants’, the ‘rooted communities’ and the ‘newcomers’, he differentiated between those who are either ‘integrated’ or ‘unwilling to integrate’ by focusing on the economic contribution of different groups. For example, the ‘teachers from all over the world […] inspiring our young people’; or the doctors and nurses ‘from Uganda, India and Pakistan who are caring for our sick and vulnerable’; or the ‘entrepreneurs from overseas who are not just adding to the local economy but playing a part in local life’; but also the new immigrants ‘on occasions not really wanting or even willing to integrate’.11

Whilst acknowledging migrants’ contributions to society, this multicultural-integrationist approach ignores the fundamental character of contemporary societies as creolized. Instead, it paradoxically insists on society as divided into compartments. Disregarding peoples’ connections, affective ties, intellectual and creative relations, state programmes on ‘integration’ reduce people to targets of control and management. In times of public spending cuts, precariousness of labor, extending poverty and rising antimigrant nationalism in Europe, we need an approach that acknowledges peoples’ strategies and pathways for ‘making homes’.

Making homes: Latin American/Spanish networks in Manchester

Stories of ‘making homes’ complicate political discourses on ‘integration’. These discourses, based on Émile Durkheim’s (orig. 1893, 2013) concept of ‘social integration’,12 conceive society as divided into different entities. As such the stress is on ‘living in parallel societies’ or ‘the lack of social cohesion’. This perspective can only be produced if people’s everyday practices and connections are disregarded.

Integration rhetoric tends to ignore the creolized fabric within which we live. The state’s integration perspective has no interest in people’s activities, or their affective and cognitive ways of making sense of and connecting to the world they inhabit. Converting people into ciphers of control and management, integration overlooks the fact that society is made and transformed by our activities and networks. Narrations of post/

12 Émile Durkheim’s (2013) concept of ‘social integration’ was based on his study of middle European societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Durkheim develops his paradigm of ‘integration’ within an analysis of industrial societies in Europe. Attending to the impact of industrialization on social relations, in particular on the system of affiliation and kinship, Durkheim is concerned with the loss of solidarity structures. He considers that society needs to have organizations that guarantee ‘social integration’ in order to stabilize the social order.
migrants’ ‘making homes’ in the host country reveal the tension in which individuals find themselves, when attending on the one hand to the claims of ‘integration’, and, on the other, to their own ways of ‘making homes’. In contrast to an abstract notion of ‘integration’, stories of ‘making homes’ evidence a complex understanding of the spatial and affective dimensions of subjects’ relationships to the places they frequent and inhabit. People start to feel at home in the environment in which they live, when they know where to shop, when they finally have a job, when they know which school or nursery their children can attend, when they sit in a café with friends or as one of our research participants from the research project *Latinizing Manchester*, Carmen, told us, when you know how to navigate the city on a bicycle.

Finding their way around new places was an immediate concern for all the research participants. One of them, Pablo, who lived in Asunción, Paraguay and Madrid, Spain before settling in Manchester in 2007, told us about his Facebook page ‘ComeToManchester’. The idea for this project emerged in 2009, after he noticed the increase in Spanish speakers arriving in the city. Most people he met were young and interested in learning English. The Facebook page ‘CometoManchester’ provided this group of users with information on language schools and accommodation. In the last two years, however, the use of the page has expanded as Latin Americans used the site in search of jobs, English courses and/or accommodation.

Since 2008, Spain has been experiencing an acute economic crisis and working conditions have worsened dramatically for nationals and migrants alike. A study conducted by Colectivo Ioé in 2012 reveals that in 2011 21.8 percent of the migrant population worked in precarious conditions as compared with 11.8 percent of the Spanish population. In terms of unemployment in Spain in the same year, Spanish citizens had a rate of 18.4 percent, African migrants 39.1 percent, other non-EU residents 49.3 percent and Latin Americans 28.5 percent (Colectivo Ioé, 2012). Since this study was conducted, the total unemployment rate has skyrocketed to approximately 27 percent in February 2013.13 The average salary in the Spanish population has increased by 0.8 percent and the average salary in the migrant population has decreased by 10.6 percent. Amongst young people, the unemployment rate for Spaniards (46 percent) and migrants (49 percent) is almost the same. The poverty rate in migrant households is 31 percent, while it is 19 percent in Spanish households under 65 years; 6.7 percent of the Spanish population live in extreme poverty as do 10.8 percent of non-EU migrant households (Colectivo Ioé, 2012). This desperate situation might explain why,

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after decades of high immigration, Spain has begun to experience a decrease in immigration and an increase in emigration.\textsuperscript{14}

Contrary to numerous media reports on the ‘brain drain’ of highly skilled young Spaniards, our study \textit{Latinizing Manchester} argues for a more heterogeneous picture of current Spanish emigration. It is not only Spaniards who are leaving the country: the highest emigration is of Latin American migrants. During our research we met dual Spanish citizens with a Latin American background. For them returning to their or their parents’ country of origin is not an option. Instead they opt to continue their journey to other countries in Western Europe. Very often this journey, as in the case of other Spanish migrants, leads to France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland.\textsuperscript{15} This development is also noticeable if we consider the figures for Spanish nationals registered in the 2011 census of Spaniards residing abroad \textit{Censo de Españoles Residentes Ausentes} (CERA).\textsuperscript{16} A close look at these figures reveals an increase in Spaniards living abroad. For example, between 2008 and 2011, the Spanish population in Switzerland increased by 6.9 percent (70,532 to 75,354); in Germany by 6 percent (83,041 to 88,248) and 16.4 percent in the United Kingdom (46,646 to 54,321). There has been a similar movement of Spaniards emigrating to Ecuador, Argentina, Cuba, Peru, Bolivia and Brazil in the same period of time.\textsuperscript{17}

More recent figures (González Enríquez, 2012) on the Spaniards registered abroad (PERE) published by the \textit{Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas} (INE) (2013) confirm this trend. In 2012, 157,933 Spaniards were registered abroad, representing an increase of 6.3 percent on the previous year. Of these newly registered citizens, 43,671 were born in Spain. In total, 1.9 million Spaniards are registered abroad, but 1.25 million of them were not born in Spain. Of the total figure, 1.21 million Spaniards abroad reside in Latin America, while 656,841 live in Western Europe. The highest increase in Spanish immigration

\textsuperscript{14} In 2011, 457,650 people emigrated to Spain (42,127 were returning Spaniards), while 507,740 left Spain (González Enríquez, 2012). In 2010, Spain took in 90,489 migrants. These figures do not just include the number of Spaniards leaving the country: in 2011, of the 507,740 emigrants, only 62,580 were Spanish citizens. The largest group leaving the country were former migrants.


\textsuperscript{17} In Ecuador, the number of Spaniards registered in the CERA increased from 2,884 (2008) to 7,236 (2011). This represents a 150 percent increase. In Peru, the number of Spaniards increased by 54 percent, from 6,903 (2008) to 10,600 (2011). Meanwhile, between 2008 and 2011, in Bolivia, the number of Spaniards increased by 46 percent, from 2,647 to 3,876, and in Brazil by 30 percent, from 67,128 to 87,128 (\textit{La Vanguardia}, January 22, 2012).
in the previous year has been to Ecuador (51.6 percent), Chile (16.42 percent),
Peru (13.81 percent) and Colombia (12.06 percent) (PERE, 2013), but France
and Germany have also had a noticeable increase. Argentina, France,
Venezuela and Germany have the largest numbers of Spanish nationals.

If we take into consideration Carmen González Enríquez’s (2012)
observations regarding the figures based on the residential categories
(Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales) and the local registration figures
of Spaniards abroad (Padrón de Españoles Residentes en el Extranjero), both
statistics reveal that the highest number of Spaniards living abroad were
not born in Spain. As she argues, this has to do with the ‘ius sanguini’
and ‘ius solis’ principles to which Spanish citizenship is tied. This means
that it is not only citizens with Spanish ancestry who can apply for Spanish
citizenship: the children of migrants born in Spain are also Spanish. Also,
nationalization laws for Latin Americans in Spain enable them to apply for
Spanish citizenship after being resident for two years. This has created a
diasporic and creolized Spanish population.

The current migration of Spaniards to Latin America and other European
countries reveals the intricate character of a creolized Europe, and Spain
in particular. In Latinizing Manchester, we encountered a high number of
Spanish-Latin Americans, mainly Ecuadorian-Spanish, Peruvian-Spanish and
Colombian-Spanish. Similar observations have been recorded by studies on
Latin American networks in the London region (see McIIwaine, 2011; Martin
Rojo and Marquez Reiter, 2011). These communities are also increasing in
the north of England, and particularly in the Greater Manchester area.
Though Latin American and Spanish migrants opt primarily for London
as their first destination, the precarious working and living conditions
they encounter in the south drive them to consider the north as an option.
Manchester cannot offer the employment opportunities in the service and
hospitality sectors as does London. Nonetheless, Manchester is an interna-
tional transportation hub and has a local labor market based on expansive
health, education, entertainment, media and football industries offering new
arrivals some job opportunities.

Migration from Spain and Latin America to the United Kingdom and
particularly to the north-east of England is not new. Immediately after the
Spanish Civil War, some Spanish exiles found refuge in Britain.18 In the late
1950s and 1960s, they were followed by a labor migration (Pozo-Gutiérrez,
2009). Yet, the traces of this migration that settled in the north of England,
predominantly in the Liverpool and Manchester areas, seem to have been
erased from local history.19 It would not be until the 1980s that a new Spanish

18 See, for example, the Basque Children of ’37 Association (www.basquechildren.org)
and International Brigade Memorial Trust (www.international-brigades.org.uk).
19 In an interview with Instituto Cervantes representatives in Manchester, we were told
that the first Instituto Cervantes initiative was created at the beginning of the 1990s
immigration to the United Kingdom was triggered through study exchange programmes such as ERASMUS and romantic liaisons, predominantly of Spanish women with British citizens (Bravo-Moreno, 2006). Some of the research participants that we met in different cultural events in the Instituto Cervantes or the Cornerhouse in Manchester, and at a Spanish ‘parents–toddlers’ group, evidence this migration background. Despite this mostly professional migration in the 1980s and 1990s, current Spanish migration to Manchester is more heterogeneous.

During our study we met people from different professional and working backgrounds, from a fifty-year-old builder to a twenty-year-old hairdresser, as well as lawyers, doctors and entrepreneurs. Some of the Latin American migrants we met told us about their entrepreneurial ventures in Spain. Two of the participants owned call centers that they needed to close immediately after the first impact of the global economic crisis. Remigration represented one of the options for coping with the crisis. Returning to their country of origin was not an option as they felt at home in Spain. Their affective and in some cases material ties to Spain persist. Also, some have acquired Spanish citizenship and are now dual citizens. Thus, the question of belonging and settlement has been complicated through the experience of migration. They have become ‘creolized’ citizens, coping like other Spanish citizens with the disastrous effects of the crisis. On arrival in Manchester, this group of migrants has needed to start anew. Due to the lack of awareness of this migration, the support service in place for migrants provided by the city council is limited. Advocacy groups such as the Latin American Support Group or Migrants Supporting Migrants20 in Manchester are working towards establishing public awareness of this migration and working with local authorities in producing information and services for these new arrivals in Spanish.

Yet, as the example of Pablo’s Facebook page ‘CometoManchester’ demonstrates, Spanish and Latin American migrant networks rely first on other migrant and diasporic networks in the city. Being new to the city brings people of different social and cultural backgrounds closer. As Oihane from the Basque Country told us, she finds it, ‘a bit easier to make the connection to people who are not British. I find it easier with foreigners’. Viviana from Venezuela spells out the fact that this connection is related to the experience of becoming migrants: ‘I connect with other migrants because we share something even the difficulties with language, or being cut off’.

While these feelings of proximity relate to everyday fleeting encounters or the engagement with local networks, the workplace is one of the main spaces in which connections to the city are established. The strategy of branding Manchester as the ‘cosmopolitan hub’ in the north of England

since the late 1990s (Peck and Ward, 2002) has attracted investment to the transport, education, health and entertainment sectors. The expansion of the International Airport, increasing rail connections to London and the flourishing leisure industry connected to football, music, weekend events and festivals has put Manchester on an international map. This has attracted international capital, professionals, students as well as international workers for low-paid jobs in the entertainment, hospitality and cleaning industries, mainly from Africa, South Asia, Latin America, South and Eastern Europe. Most of the newly arrived Latin American and Spanish migrants found a job in one of the numerous ‘Latino’ establishments: Spanish, Brazilian and Mexican restaurants or salsa clubs. For example, a Brazilian participant who works in the kitchen of an Argentine restaurant told us that his colleagues come from ten different countries, amongst them Argentina, Colombia, Poland, Rumania, Nigeria and São Tomé.

Also, when it comes to the sharing of leisure and sacred spaces, our research participants reported frequenting bars and dance locations along with migrants from different backgrounds. In a visit to the Portuguese Church, we encountered Portuguese and Brazilians alongside Lusophone migrants from Angola and Mozambique.21 Despite the sharing of workplaces, sacred, educational and leisure spaces between European and non-European migrants, it is worth reiterating that the European Economic Area (EEA) migrants hold a privileged legal status in comparison to non-EEA migrants. Also, white Western Europeans are not targets of racist attacks and discourses or policies preventing them from entering or settling in Europe. The divide between EEA and non-EEA migrants is indicative of the unequal treatment EU migration policies established between these two groups in matters of employment, health, education and family reunification rights.

For example, the requirements for non-EEA citizens seeking to study or work in the United Kingdom have increased in the last few years because of the government’s five-tier points system for immigration. More recently, in order to regulate the settlement of families, new measures have been introduced increasing the income threshold and asking spouses to complete English tests prior to their arrival in the country (Travis, 2011). As Carmen, a Spanish citizen married to a Mexican citizen, told us, migration rules can produce desperation and separation. She told us how, despite her husband being invited as a visiting professor by one of the universities in the northwest, he and her child, both Mexicans, ran the risk of not getting their visas extended as they were required to have private health insurance. As a Spanish citizen, Carmen did not need to fulfill this requirement. Thanks to a support network they were able to obtain private insurance.

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21 For further discussion of the role of sacred spaces in migration networks, see Evans et al., 2011; Liebelt, 2011; Souza, Kwapong and Woodham, 2012.
After studying in Manchester and returning to Brazil, which led to the loss of her five years’ work visa, Zurema encountered several hurdles in her attempt at settling anew in Manchester. At the moment of our interview, she was applying for citizenship. She shared the following observations with us:

For each visa you have different difficulties. The highly skilled migrant visa is very difficult to get. You have to collect many papers. But the fees are also very high. If you apply with a solicitor or without it is a different thing. If I remember it right I spent £1,000 for the residency, or £1,500, with a solicitor that will be another £1,000. For all the documents you also have to spend a lot of money. Money is an issue. For the residency alone I spent £2,000. And for the citizenship by the end of the year I will have to spend another £2,000.

Denise, a successful Brazilian entrepreneur, told us how after living thirteen years in the United Kingdom she is still struggling to be recognized as an entrepreneur as she needs to reach the capital threshold of £250,000. She decided to apply for a skilled migrant visa and enrolled in MA studies to fulfill the points’ system requirements. At the time of the interview, she had a residency permit for two years. Other research participants being made aware of these potential difficulties have obtained their residency permit before arriving in the United Kingdom. Octavio, a Mexican man who worked in the tourism industry in Cancun and who was married to an English woman from the northwest of England, started to work immediately after his arrival in a factory in order to acquire an independent visa.

Thus, the experiences of ‘making a home’ in Manchester are severely curtailed by migration policies which privilege EEA nationals. Most migrants are not able to work in the sectors they were employed in previous to their immigration to the United Kingdom. Both EEA and non-EEA migrants experience devaluation of their educational qualifications and experiences. Their university degrees are often not recognized by the state, and their lack of English proficiency as well as familiarity with local employment networks determined their access to precarious and low-paid work sectors such as cleaning, caring, hospitality and catering services. EEA citizens do not struggle as do non-EEA migrants with visa requirements and the threat of being forced to leave the country if they lose their residency status or become ‘undocumented’.

As the examples of Spanish and Latin American networks in Manchester have shown, creolization does not only articulate ‘rhizomatic’ forms of belonging, emerging from different affective, pragmatic and material ties to places and social networks. Rather, creolization is experienced in a context where people are subjected to remnants of colonial practices of racial classification (Quijano, 2000, 2008). As such, while creolization entails going beyond a racial matrix of social stratification, it emerges within the dynamics of racialization. Stories of ‘making home’ evolve within the
juncture of subjugation by and liberation from governance technologies and practices operating on the basis of the ‘citizen’/‘migrant’ divide. At the same time, stories of ‘making home’ tell us about the creolized fabric of our everyday encounters. As some of our research participants told us, this view is often missing when Europe is imagined as the primary locus of immigration. As our research participants remind us, if we consider European migration to the Américas, a missing but significant link for the conceptualization of creolizing conviviality is uncovered.

**Creolizing conviviality**

Engaging with the idea of creolizing Europe means that we set Europe in relation to its colonial, slavery and imperialist past. It also means challenging the myth of ‘ethnic’ and ‘racial’ purity evoked in numerous historiographies of modern nation building (cf. Bhabha, 1990; Anderson, 1991). As I previously mentioned, migration policies continue to operate on the basis of a territorializing logic incessantly reinstating the territorial borders of the nation and the inscription of the national community as based on a ‘single’ ethnic, racial and cultural root. The research participants in Latinizing Manchester contest this perception of Europe by recalling the connections between Europe and the Américas. The perception in official discourses of Europe as the center of international migration begins to crumble, not only when the colonization of the Américas is considered but also when the emigration by Europeans to the Américas in the seventeenth, eighteenth and the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries is recalled (Altman and Horn, 1991; Baines, 1995; Moch Page, 2003).

As Zurema (see above) reminds us, this part of history cannot be ignored when it comes to understanding conviviality in Brazil, and particularly in São Paolo:

> If we see São Paolo, the way that São Paolo has been populated, the way relationships went in terms of cosmopolitanism is very different from the way that Manchester has done. For example, we have the biggest Japanese colony outside Japan, the biggest Syrian-Lebanese colony, the biggest Jewish community. There are of course Portuguese, Spanish people, there are indigenous people in São Paolo, there are black people. But when people relate to each other the reference is not, oh, you are Italian, you are Russian, you are French, you are Jewish. You are here. It is a city of twenty million people. At the end of the day you are in the middle of an unknown place. While in Manchester I see this in a rather different way. You can see the Pakistani people living in Manchester, they have maybe been living there for 100 years, three generations. They will still be Pakistani people. They won’t be British.

Zurema tells us about migration as a normalized process – in fact, the founding ‘myth’ of a Eurocentric discourse of modern nation state building
in Brazil. European migration to Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was linked to a process of modern nation-building in these countries, presupposing Europe as the cradle of modernity (Germani, 1966; Marschalck, 1976). Industrialization, technological advancement and political progress were associated with economic, political and intellectual developments mainly in England, France and Germany. Without going in detail into the complex relationship between modern nation state building and migration in this region, European migration was foundational for the process of colonization of the Cono Sur in the nineteenth century, contributing to the whitening and Europeanization of this territory. Yet, as Zurema reminds us, this project was criss-crossed not only by other migratory movements from Asia and the Middle East but also by the Présence africaine and américaine (Hall, 2003) of the Afro-descendent and indigenous populations. Despite this country’s admission of its pluricultural heritage, the logic of ‘interior colonialism’ (González Casanova, 1996) favoring the white European-descendent population, marginalizing the Afro-descendent population and excluding the indigenous population, still prevails in Brazil (Telles, 2006). Nonetheless, as Zurema points out in comparison to Britain, Brazil ambivalently acknowledges its multicultural, multiracial and multilingual heterogeneity, while Europe neglects its own history of colonialism, slavery and imperialism. Thus, immigration to Europe is perceived as a unique process detached from any historical connections and devoid of the memories of its own histories of intercontinental emigration throughout the last centuries. Despite multicultural politics, insisting on the pluri-cultural/lingual composition of the nation, this historical background is omitted from official representation of the nation, contributing to a vacuum in peoples’ knowledge about their connections to former European colonies.

As the narratives of the research participants illustrate, diasporic groups contest foundational myths of the nation based on an ‘imagined homogenous community’, very often thought as monolingual/mono-cultural. Further, diasporic groups remind us of the historical connections to their former colonized territories, which have led to the movement of Europeans to the African, Asian and American continents. Thought from this angle, creolization is not just related to the Caribbean nor is Europe’s creolization a recent one brought about by post-1945 immigration. Rather, as Glissant asserts, creolization represents the basic foundation of all societies. It defines the condition of existence of ‘Tout-monde’.

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22 Brazil did not abolish slavery until 1888. Initially, the Portuguese authorities promoted miscegenation as a way of ensuring a Portuguese presence in underpopulated regions. But, fearing the increasing black population, Brazil subsequently opened its doors to white immigrants, who were given preference over black people in jobs, housing and education (cf., Twine, 1997; Telles, 2006).
Conclusion

As the conversations with the research participants exemplify, our connection to places and people are shaped by accidental, undomesticated and dispersed encounters. Considering the spontaneous and relational character of our lives, but also our emotional and material dependence on others, makes us realize that we constantly transgress the imagined boundaries set by mono-cultural/monolingual prescriptions. Relationalities are guided by needs, feelings, affects and desires that bring us together in unexpected ways. It is in this regard that our relationships unfold in transversal ways, converging and diverging at different points.

Creolization is informed by transversal vital forces moving us in different directions and embracing the principles of interconnectedness and interdependence (Glissant, 1996). Attending to the rhizomatic movement of our lives, the concept of creolization proposes an ethics of ‘living together’ driven by the unexpected and resulting from the multiple encounters and connections in our lives (Glissant, 1997b, 15). Creolization speaks about an affective being in the world – the sensibility that nourishes the potential of conviviality. In this sense, creolization stands at the heart of a political and ethical project of conviviality.

Works Cited


Comment raised by Glissant in an interview with Sophie Haluk for the French radio programme ‘Odyssées immigrees: créolisation et décolonisation’ (n. 5, above). English translation (EGR): ‘Creolization is the movement of the world – why would you like to go against the movement of the world? The movement of the world is first to create a kind of being and collective – which are not based on affiliation, legitimation and the unique root – sure, the whole movement is a liberation movement and not a movement of oppression.’

Creolizing Europe


Chapter 6

Are We All Creoles? ‘Sable-Saffron’
Venus, Rachel Christie and
Aesthetic Creolization

Shirley Anne Tate

Introduction

In ‘We are Creoles’, Édouard Glissant (1989) asserts that the world is permanently changing and creolizing itself. Édouard Glissant sees creolization as a contact of cultures that does not produce a simple métissage. Rather, creolization is a poetics of relation, which, as an ongoing process, is impossible to stop, has no morality, eludes capture and produces unexpected results (Perina, 2009). However, Glissantian creolization overlooks aesthetic creolization in terms of the racialized cultural politics of beauty. Developing a discussion based on aesthetic creolization will be the focus here to enable an assessment of whether or not England has gone beyond simple métissage and is being creolized at the level of such cultural politics.

The crowning of twenty-year-old black ‘mixed race’ Rachel Christie on July 20, 2009 as ‘Miss England’ brought home to the metropole the peculiar racialized cultural politics of beauty instantiated in Caribbean Creole societies during slavery and colonialism. What could Glissant’s ‘we are Creole’ mean in aesthetic terms? Did Rachel Christie as Miss England signal a nation that was Creole, that is, one that went beyond métissage to proclaim itself as ‘post-race’? Or were we seeing a creolization where a racialized poetics of relation enables the continuation of white racial
hegemony through the beauty pageant as a micro-strategy of aesthetic domination? These questions necessitate that we read ‘race’ as a technology which fixes the body as Other back into Glissantian creolization from the vantage point of Charles Mills’s (1997) *Racial Contract*.

Whilst drawing on Glissant’s insights, what will be argued from the vantage point enabled by Mills is that there is a racialized aesthetic poetics of relation in England. This ensures that only that black beauty which is recognized by the nation, that is a ‘mixed race’ one, can be validated. However, it is a validation with provisos which seeks to affirm the nation as creolizing in its present and possible futures. This affirmation aims to take the nation beyond ‘race mixing’, beyond *métissage*, as here we see a previously racially Othered and troubling body representing the very nation from which it has long been held apart. However, using the ideas of condensation and recycling (Ford, 2010), Christie’s body is revealed to be encoded as black through genealogy as well as ‘Venus’ through discourses on hypersexualization, animality and the black woman’s body as spectacle. Within the Miss England beauty pageant her body is codified through an aesthetic poetics of relation where her negation as ‘the English Rose’ maintains white aesthetic, cultural, social, political and moral hegemony as in colonial times. Let us now turn to look at the aesthetic poetics of relation forged during slavery and colonialism in the Black Atlantic diaspora in which *métissage* marked societies and bodies.

**An aesthetic poetics of relation and creolization**

Glissant (September 21, 1928–February 3, 2011) was an iconic figure in theorizing Antillean creolization and in developing an alternative system of thought from the continental. He coined this ‘the archipellic’ as he developed his approach to identity-as-relation and rhizomic identity (Murdoch, 2013). His work before *Discours Antillais* focused on Martinique and its social, political and cultural problems. *Discours Antillais* (1981) fleshed out concepts like creolization and *antillianité* and after this he developed his idea of *Tout-monde*, which demonstrated his vision of awareness of the postcolonial world in a phenomenological sense (Murdoch, 2013). Glissant (1989) claims that the world is in a permanent state of flux as it changes and creolizes itself (Perina, 2009). He views creolization as a contact of cultures which does much more than produce a simple *métissage*. Creolization is a poetics of relation which writes identity out of a historically, socially and culturally grounded Antillean experience – *antillianité*.

As an ongoing process creolization occurs through relation as ‘it inscribes a non-hierarchical principle of unity, a relation of equality with and respect for the other as different from oneself […] and a natural openness to other cultures’ (Murdoch, 2013, 875). Glissant locates the Caribbean archipelago as a zone of diversity which separates it from continental thought based on the
One of universalism. Further, as a process which produces something new no matter how fleetingly established, creolization seeks not to be universalized as essentialisms so often are but solely ‘brings into Relation’ hitherto disparate constituencies (Glissant, 1997, 90). Relation as a new dimension which allows subjects to be in several locations at once, both rooted and open, produces new identities through errantry which is a psychic mode of affirming identities, as opposed to exile, which has the potential to erode one’s identity (20). Here errantry includes the collective and the individual in knowing that ‘the Other is within us and affects how we evolve as well as the bulk of our conceptions and the development of our sensibility’ (27). It is this impossible simultaneity of the same/Other in identifications that we see in creolization’s poetics of relation. The Other, so much a part of our identifications, is multiple and takes us beyond indentifications that seek to show the origins, the ‘roots’, the two that make the one, as is the case in métissage. Instead, creolization moves us to ‘a new and original dimension allowing each person to be there and elsewhere’ (34). In other words, Glissant’s creolization enables us to identify and disidentify with the Other in order to emerge as Others of ourselves. We, therefore, leave behind ‘philosophies of the One in the West’ and enter into repetition ‘an acknowledged form of consciousness both here and elsewhere. Relentlessly resuming something you have already said’ (46). Creolization does not entail loss of identity, or renouncing of the self, but a distancing from fixity.

If we go back to Glissant’s creolization as a contact of cultures that goes beyond métissage and its distancing from fixity, we could say that in such a world beauty would be multiple and not based on politically, socially or culturally constructed ideal types. Sadly, we do not occupy such a world as we can see in the norms that deny beauty’s social construction, its racialization and the existence of a white beauty hegemony which defies democratization. Such beauty denials enable us to see that the body is the object of power/knowledge (Foucault, 1995). Beauty discourses are regimes of truth socially constructed through meditations on the body which have occupied European thought for centuries and ensure that at any particular time only some beauty will be given recognition.

The racialization of beauty, one could claim, reached its zenith with African enslavement in the Americas and the Caribbean. One of the technologies essential for its institutionalization was the construction of the beautiful/ugly binary and its correlations with inferiority of mind or character (Nuttall, 2006). Therefore, within the Black Atlantic diaspora’s racialized aesthetic hegemony beauty has been constructed since colonialism, slavery and empire as an attribute that pertains to some bodies rather than others (Figueiredo, 2003; Nuttall, 2006; Tate, 2009; Pinho, 2010). The white body is beauty while all other beauties have been disavowed and placed as ugly. Beauty is racialized, political and profoundly ideological as has been recognized by numerous black anti-racist and black feminist writings
Are We All Creoles?

(Weekes, 1997; Banks, 2000; Rooks, 2000; Taylor, 2000; Hill Collins, 2004; Cooper, 2004; Hobson, 2005; Hunter, 2005; Craig, 2006; Tate, 2007; 2009).

Such work reminds us that history still haunts the present even if we see ourselves engaged in Stuart Hall’s (1996) resignification of blackness through recognizing and deconstructing artefacts from past ideologies of racism in contemporary times. Two artefacts which are still read on the bodies of black women are ugliness and hypersexuality. This can be seen, for example, in the construction of the ‘Sable Venus’ and its ‘mixed-race’ counterpart the ‘Saffron Venus’ in the Caribbean which enabled the normalization of ‘the English Rose’ as its aesthetic relational binary.

In Western art, Venus has been most frequently represented by white females as in Boticelli’s Venus, read as an ideal of beauty (Nelson, 2010). Therefore, to attach the words ‘Hottentot’, ‘black’, ‘sable’ or ‘saffron’ as prefixes to ‘Venus’ is an ironic gesture which substitutes a grotesque, racially Othered body for the expected white female body (Nelson, 2010). ‘Venus’ is not a positive appellation but places ‘sex worker’ onto black women’s bodies and engages ‘white moral, sexual and racial superiority’ (Yancy, 2008, 95). The fragility, whiteness and asexual feminine beauty of the English Rose were discursively constructed through its binary, the Sable-Saffron Venus, during slavery and colonialism in the English-speaking Caribbean.

*The Voyage of the Sable Venus from Angola to the West Indies* by Thomas Stothard is the best-known pro-slavery image focused on the Caribbean. The Sable Venus’s toned muscles marked her as a laborer, her collar made her a slave, while her nakedness illustrated her availability for sex. Further, as ‘sable’, she was animalized. This racial Othering was typical of white discourses on African women whose bodies were consumed in sex, domestic, care and field work on Caribbean plantations. Her eighteenth-century representation in the poem *The Sable Venus: An Ode*, by Isaac Teale (1765), on which the painting and its engraving by William Grainger is based (Smith McCrea, 2002), articulates the common sense at the time of black women as willing and submissive sexual partners, as well as erasing the brutal fact

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1 O Sable Queen! Thy mild Domain  
I seek and court thy gentle reign  
So soothing, soft and sweet.  
Where meeting love, sincere delight  
Fond pleasures, ready joys invite,  
And unbrought raptures meet.

Do thou in gentle Phibia smile,  
In artful Benneba beguile,  
In wanton Mimba pout  
In sprightly Cubas eyes look gay  
Or grave in sober Quasheba  
I still find thee out[.]
of slavery and the horrors of the slave trade in the Caribbean itself (Bush, 1990; Mohammed, 2000). The Ode ends with all of Jamaica, including ‘the people of quality’, from Port Royal, Spanish Town and Kingston, coming to greet the Sable Venus on her arrival in the island and the poet declaring his utter devotion to her whether she appears as ‘gentle Phibia’, ‘artful Benneba’, ‘wanton Mimba’, ‘sprightly Cuba’ or ‘sober Quasheba’. The people of quality in Jamaica would, of course, have been slave owners whose first sight of her would have been on the slave blocks as she was put up for sale.

Though an English-Jamaican creation, the Ode was widely circulated and no doubt had an impact on eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century pro-slavery mindsets. The Sable Venus was also imprinted on the bodies of black ‘mixed race’ women, so-called ‘saffron’ by Bryan Edwards.2 The Saffron Venus is visible in paintings of the era such as the pro-slavery painter Agostino Brunias’s (1728–96) work *West India Washer Women* (c.1773–75) (Figure 1).

Saffron Venus is naked to the waist as are the Sable Venuses who surround her, wears the head-wrap of a slave and reveals muscular arms and legs, rounded stomach and pert breasts to her audience. She stands above the other women with whom she does not engage, which gives the impression that her lighter skin color and white father place her above them. Again, muscle shows that she is a slave, while nakedness locates her in the space of savagery rather than that of refined nude irrespective of her being ‘mixed race’. ‘The nude’ and ‘the naked’ have often been applied to the female body in Western art with the former being associated with ‘the beautiful’ through the heterosexual male gaze (Nelson, 2010). ‘The naked’, though, is aligned with hypersexuality, immorality and the pornographic, as it highlights the process of undressing and the social and biological body (Nelson, 2010). What we see in both the Sable and Saffron Venuses is lack of contrived womanly innocence or nature as a veil, which mark nudes like Botticelli’s Venus as artistic, non-pornographic and thus not a moral threat to the white body politic. There was no moral threat felt by the depiction of naked black women’s bodies as they merely occupied their natural space of hypersexual, enslaved, masculinized labor that could be used and discarded at will.

As black and naked, the Saffron Venus is visible to the voyeur’s eye as a ‘mixed-race’ woman whose very embodiment speaks of the hypersexuality

2 Bryan Edwards (1793, 26) states: ‘I shall therefore conclude the present chapter by presenting to my readers, a performance of a deceased friend, in which the character of the sable and saffron beauties of the West Indies, and the folly of their paramours, are portrayed with the delicacy and dexterity of wit, and the fancy and elegance of genuine poetry’, before then reproducing in full Teale’s ‘The Sable Venus: An Ode’, written in Jamaica in 1765, in which Teale, his teacher, names him as being the audience for the poem. The poem can therefore be seen to be about colonial racial hygiene, as it was about the folly of miscegenation.
of her mother, the sexual entrapment of her father and her own ‘hot constitution’ (Mohammed, 2000) because of her ‘black blood’. These paintings and others like them as artefacts of colonial visual culture were sites where ‘raced’ identities were constructed. They assembled what the English Rose was not by reinforcing the privilege of the white colonial female body as worthy of being covered and protected. Nakedness represented female sexuality as primitive and pathological – thus, the naked/nude binary took part in creating the English Rose/Sable-Saffron Venus divide which was
Figure 2 Rachel Christie, Miss England 2009
Courtesy of photoshot.com
linked to relations of domination in the colonies and the metropole. This was the case even when the white female body was liminal and nearer to the primitiveness of the black body in the perceived threat it posed to colonial white male identity (Gilman, 1985).

The two paintings *The Sable Venus* and the *West India Washer Women* construct the white woman’s identity in her absence due to the racialized corporeal schema which governs the artists’ representations of black women’s bodies. Even if we were to look at these paintings as early forms of ‘negrophilia’, described by Nelson (2010) as the social and cultural phenomenon of white fear/desire for the black body, we could not see them as positive or affirmative. In depicting primitivity, hypersexuality, sexual availability and enslavement, these paintings (re)produced blackness as infrahuman and located the white female body as beautiful, civilized, even if not rational and intelligent because that was the preserve of white men.

The construction of the Sable Venus and her ‘mixed-race’ counterpart the Saffron Venus in the Caribbean in opposition to the English Rose already places beauty as racialized and incapable of being judged without the intervention of racialized ideology. Even Immanuel Kant’s (1914, 88) reflections on beauty as a judgement of taste in the *Critique of Judgement* show that taste is itself racialized, as are judgements of beauty and perfection because beauty norms are ‘racially’ differentiated.

In England today, where we have aspirations of racial equality institutionalized in law and bureaucracy overlaying the reality of racial inequality, it can only be expected that white aesthetic domination will remain. This means that those individuals who possess characteristics that are seen as white will be considered beautiful. However, the Black Atlantic diaspora has shown that there will always be creolized discourses and practices on beauty which contest the white hegemonic ideal as has been the case in, for example, Rastafarianism (Barrett, 1977), Afro-Brazilian aesthetics (Pinho, 2006; 2010; Nuttall, 2006; Caldwell, 2007), Black Power (Banks, 2000; Craig, 2006) and Jamaican modern blackness (Mohammed, 2000; Tate, 2009). However, within the Black Atlantic, the prevalent fallacies that beauty is white and that all black women want to be white still persist. These fallacies resist aesthetic creolization through keeping white aesthetic domination in place. However, does a black Miss England (Figure 2) mean we are all creoles now?

**Does a black Miss England mean we are all creoles?**

There have been black beauty pageants in England for at least half a century. They and the Caribbean Carnival were started by Marxist, anti-racist, anticolonialist activist Claudia Jones in the face of struggle against detractors who felt that carnivals and beauty contests were trivial because of the larger issues of rights (Davies, 2008). However, ‘Jones clearly felt that Caribbean traditions had much to offer the world in terms of creating a culture of
human happiness over the ignorance and pain of racism, and indeed that it was a people's culture that provided them with the basis for freedom' (Davies, 2008, 174). Beauty pageants, therefore, are not apolitical spaces, as Claudia Jones knew. Instead, they are political building blocks for the nation as they illustrate how it imagines itself and wants to be seen on the world stage. Choosing the ‘face of the nation’ continues to be deeply political whether we are in the Caribbean or England, as through the prism of aesthetics it points to the continuation of class, ‘race’ and ethnic hegemonies or their dismantling.

What has been argued above is that there is an aesthetic poetics of relation in the Black Atlantic in which the Sable-Saffron Venus/English Rose binary and its accompanying ideology of white beauty–morality and black ugliness–depravity continue to resist Glissantian creolization and to frame quotidian interactions. This binary still frames who can occupy the space of Miss England, which body will be validated, given admission to the community of the nation as its representative, as its ‘face’. In order to excavate Rachel Christie’s Daily Mail interview for this binary, I will use Kianga K. Ford’s (2010) idea of ‘condensation’ and ‘recycling’. Condensation derives from Sigmund Freud’s discussion of dreamwork in which the impermissible can come into representation by disguising the significance of its representable elements so that the objectionable racist contents remain obscure and its manifestation is made more or less benign. Thus, condensation allows racist ideas or thoughts to continue to exist in a less obviously offensive form (Ford, 2010). Recycling in daily practice does not produce exactly the same object though it may be constituted by the same material and may renew the effectiveness of existing racial texts (Ford, 2010).

Both condensation and recycling enable us to note that Antonio Gramsci’s cultural hegemony is at play in an aesthetic poetics of relation as opposed to the oppression of naked domination. This could indeed account for Rachel Christie’s choice as Miss England 2009 because hegemony itself is unstable. However, although Gramsci’s hegemony is unstable, the aesthetic poetics of relation in the Black Atlantic is marked by ‘race’ domination and a white-raced consensus has been built around the impossibility of black beauty which is difficult to subvert in states which operate within and through the Racial Contract. The excavation of the interview will show that Christie’s impact on the English national affective terrain was not one of ‘negrophilia’ but ‘negrophobia’ based on anti-black stereotypes. These stereotypes illustrate that the English nation is not creolized in Glissant’s terms, as it is not beyond métissage because its cultural, political, institutional and psychic space is occupied by the epistemology of ignorance gleaned from colonialism.

We can see this if we turn to the Daily Mail interview on July 25, 2009 by Francis Hardy, ‘I won Miss England to prove that being black is NEVER an excuse for failure says Linford Christie’s niece’. Hardy (2009) orients us as readers to a deciphering of Christie as Miss England which
show her lack of fit as the English Rose, the face of the nation, because of class, ‘race’ and hypersexuality. The interview constructs her genealogy as black Jamaican as Linford Christie’s niece and this sets up the impossibility of her Englishness. Linford Christie OBE is still the only British man to have won gold in four major athletics championships: the Olympics, the Commonwealth Games, the World Championships and the European Championships. He has recently been in the public eye as the ‘spokes-body’ for Kleenex Pockets, an ultra-thin pack of tissues designed to fit into men’s trouser pockets. The campaign tagline, ‘I’ve got a tiny packet’, is written across Christie’s trademark impressively muscled upper body. ‘Tiny packet’ makes us remember that Linford is known for his ‘lunchbox’ from his heyday as a sprinter because of the bulge apparent in his lycra shorts. His lunchbox and now his tiny packet allude to the diminishing of black men to just their genitals instituted during colonialism and slavery. Linking Linford and Rachel as kin starts a chain of racialized associations in which hypersexuality and the body as spectacle become the focus.

Though still linked to the United Kingdom through her white mother and place of birth, her genealogy is also constructed as a subaltern one because of class, drugs, jail time and Irish Catholic descent. She is the daughter of a white Irish Catholic mother and a working-class black Jamaican-descent father who served time in jail because of drugs, and later died in a street drugs fight. Her parents’ status meant that she lived a life of poverty on a London ‘sink’ council estate. Her black ‘mixed-race’ background continues to be presented as a source of dysfunction and family trouble, which is a familiar trope born from the United Kingdom’s informal anti-miscegenation regime (Christian, 2008). Another part of her story is a familiar trope for explaining black underachievement. Her lack of academic ability made her turn to her athletic capabilities, eventually becoming a fitness instructor and Olympic hopeful. Again, the national narrative is that of the only possibility of black success lying within sport – as for her uncle Linford Christie – or, because she is a woman, modelling. Further, her body is placed in the masculinized black woman’s space of ‘the body as machine’ in the focus on her athletic abilities, her kinship with Linford Christie and the comparison to another black athlete, Dame Kelly Holmes. We are also oriented to her body as spectacle in the focus on her height, her turn to modelling and the article’s comparison of her with Naomi Campbell. It is this latter comparison alongside the stress on her as black which reveals the turn to the Venus trope even though the word is never mentioned.

Naomi Campbell has long been the Black Venus for Dolce & Gabbana, and, for example, she was featured in their 2011 Animalier eyewear campaign. The animal print swimsuit and glasses remind us that Naomi was called ‘Black Panther’ in her supermodel heyday. Naomi also has another place in the English imagination, as seen in the Cadbury Dairy Milk Bliss advertisement, in 2011, which saw the chocolate bar surrounded by diamonds and the words ‘Move over Naomi, there’s a new diva in town. I am the world’s
most pampered bar, now in three new flavours'. After much public outrage, and the model’s threat to sue Cadbury, the advertisement was removed. The company apologized after initially saying that it was just a tongue-in-cheek play on her reputation for tantrums; the Advertising Standards Authority threw out complaints that the advertisement was racist. Comparing Rachel to Naomi is not a compliment but rather another reminder of her blackness, Otherness and her body’s location as spectacle.

On the surface, however, we could say that the article attempts to construct a ‘post-race’ perspective on black experience, as we can see in its headline and in the extracts of the interview with Rachel Christie chosen for inclusion. In insisting that ‘race’ should not be an excuse for failure, while acknowledging the continuation of institutional racism in sport and society more generally, her words could be read as showing that she has lost some sense of the impact of white power. This is so as she relates success to ‘post-race’ ideas of the necessity for hard work but also to a middle-class habitus based on consumption and comportment:

You hear black kids say: ‘I can’t do anything with my life. I live in a ghetto’. I say: ‘Well, get off your backside and get out of it. Stop making your ethnicity an excuse’. I want to show them you can do anything you want, whatever your colour. I don’t like hearing: ‘I can’t do this or that because I’m black’. They should stop behaving in a way that stereotypes them. If you come across as smart, if you dress nicely and speak well, it shouldn’t make a difference if you are black or white. Maybe some people have experienced racial discrimination. Not me.

This ‘not me’, ‘maybe some people have experienced [it]’ denial of racism, the focus on the Protestant ethic and insistence on the existence of a meritocracy, places Christie within the ‘post-race’ English mindset and, as such, ideologically, she can represent the nation as Miss England. However, ‘race’ still halts her progress to the location of the English Rose as she recognizes when she asserts habitus as being more significant than ‘race’ – ‘it shouldn’t make a difference if you are black or white’. The ‘shouldn’t’ rather than ‘wouldn’t’ signifies that she knows that ‘race’ affects one’s life chances. ‘Shouldn’t’ locates her within a ‘third-space’ errantry as she speaks back to the English nation using its sentiments of twenty-first-century assimilative tolerance which nonetheless assert the impossibility of ‘race’ equality. In Glissant’s terms, she is saying that as a nation we have not yet moved beyond métissage to creolization. Further, she places her entry to and winning of the Miss England pageant as being political in that she wanted to show black youngsters what was possible. Thus, she outlines her own particular group of interest as the black English and thus achieves what Hall (1996, 27) calls a ‘re-epidermalization, an auto-graphy’ of herself as black on her own terms.

Her auto-graphy as black English creates a disturbance in the national skin as her body does not have the mimetic quality of going towards
whiteness, even as Miss England, because she is ‘mixed race’. The continuing significance of the one-drop rule or hypodescent (Zack, 1993; Ifekwunigwe, 1999) stops this possibility of extension. This very impossibility enables a reading of her black ‘mixed-race’ body as displacing the eye of surveillance through Bhabha’s (1994) mimicry. That is, her body disrupts the state narrative of tolerance and national ‘post-race’ pretensions because as black it produces the necessity for narratives of origin and essential difference. These narratives keep embodied memories and epistemologies of ‘race’ power in play as an integral aspect of identifications that arise in the rupture produced by her body. As such, her body refuses whiteness and insists on different categories of recognition as English. However, this refusal is returned to us as a casting out of the body of the nation, as abjection, through the careful construction of her lineage as black in the article.

If we think about her as an inheritor of slavery’s Sable-Saffron Venus positioning in the twenty-first century, she has already been placed as the binary of white beauty and femininity. We can see this subaltern sexualized location in the descriptions of her that the interviewer uses and in the question of virginity that she was asked. For example, we are told that her ‘voice is soft and low but her resolve is steely’. At the same time as she is feminized through her voice she is masculinized because of her resolve. We are also told that she used to be a tomboy and reminded throughout of her athletic ability. The interviewer’s question of whether or not she lost her virginity to her ex-boyfriend was not answered but seems peculiarly out of place. This is especially so as Christie presents herself as someone who aims for respectable married status, as should any English Rose. Indeed, one can only assume that the specter of the Sable-Saffron Venus and its impossibility of English Rose status underlie such a question. Christie’s refusal to answer shows her critique of the hypersexualized space of the Venus as an affective body in a nation in which ‘race’ stubbornly refuses to go beyond métissage, to be creolized. The continuation into the twenty-first century United Kingdom of Sable-Saffron Venus points to the necessity to think through the cultural politics of beauty within the Racial Contract as this impacts on the possibility of aesthetic creolization.

Aesthetics, the Racial Contract and the poetics of relation

Both globally and within particular nations, then, white people, Europeans and their descendants, continue to benefit from the Racial Contract, which creates a world in their cultural image, political states differentially favouring their interests, an economy structured around the racial exploitation of others, and a moral psychology (not just in whites sometimes in nonwhites also) skewed consciously and unconsciously toward privileging them, taking the status quo of differential racial
entitlement as normatively legitimate, and not to be investigated further. (Mills, 1997, 40)

The Racial Contract produces an epistemology of ignorance in which ‘white is right’ and equates with dominance so that thoughts on beauty and its representations are already skewed towards whiteness. The denial that beauty is racialized means that beauty is de-politicized unless we subscribe to black anti-racist aesthetics (Taylor, 2000; Hobson, 2005; Hunter, 2005; Tate, 2009). If we look solely at skin we see how problematic such an assumption of de-politicization is, as our skin is a key interface between the self and the Other, between the psychic, biological, political and social (Tate, 2009). Didier Anzieu (1990, 63) uses Freud’s insight on the ego as having a bodily nature to coin the term ‘the skin ego’ as ‘the ego is the projection in the psyche of the surface of the body, namely the skin’. For Anzieu, the skin ego encompasses the skin’s impact on the mind and as a surface on which signs are written, speaks of the impact of culture on the psyche (Tate, 2009). If the Racial Contract already designates that ‘white is right’ then black women are placed within an aesthetic poetics of relation in the Black Atlantic where they continue to risk being exiled from themselves, their skin ego, if they unquestioningly accept white beauty as the ideal. This psychic domination has been critiqued repeatedly by black anti-racist aesthetics (Taylor, 2000) and it is certainly not part of the creolization that Glissant envisaged.

This is so, as, for Glissant (1997), exile has the potential to erode one’s identity. We can see exile as a mechanism of power within the Racial Contract that encourages us, through its hegemonic beauty ideals, beauty practices and discourses on beauty, to reproduce its racial epidermal schema and to forget longstanding alter/native Black Atlantic beauty models such as those produced through Rastafarianism, Black Power, Afro-Brazilian aesthetics and Black ‘punnany power feminism’ (Sharpley Whiting, 2007; Lee, 2010). Glissant (1997, 20) opposes exile with ‘errantry’ as a psychic mode of affirming identities. Errantry is not apolitical but is a ‘will to identity’ as one is ‘no longer traveller, discoverer or conqueror’. As is the case for black anti-racist aesthetics, errantry would mean that in terms of beauty black women would develop alter/native beauty ideologies, practices and judgements of taste and beauty not based on a white standard but acknowledging that this, through relation with the Other, is one among many other beauties. In such an aesthetic poetics of relation, where beauty is democratized, errantry includes the collective and the individual in knowing that ‘the Other is within us and affects how we evolve as well as the bulk of our conceptions and the development of our sensibility’ (Glissant, 1997, 27). Thus, our ‘race’ sensibility in the Black Atlantic develops within Homi Bhabha’s (1990, 211) ‘third-space’ that is not an identity but rather about identification, ‘a process of identifying with and through another object, an object of otherness’. Within ‘third-space’ errantry, Black Atlantic discourses,
ideologies and practices of/on beauty speak back to the constructions of Sable-Saffron Venus as Other, thus, also enabling black beauties to emerge.

Admitting both the black and white Other into beauty identifications through critique acknowledges the black diasporic condition and takes us beyond a creolization that seeks to show the origins, the ‘roots’, the two that make the one, as in métissage, to ‘a new and original dimension allowing each person to be there and elsewhere’ (Glissant, 1997, 34). In other words, Glissant’s creolization enables us to identify and disidentify with the black/white Other in beauty terms. This process of identification/disidentification as a part of the aesthetic poetics of relation in the Black Atlantic also extends the ethical obligation to produce a limitless array of discourses on, and practices of, black beauty. ‘Third-space’ errantry is thus not rendered apolitical, but holds fast to the decolonial imperative of liberation from the Racial Contract and the racialized aesthetics of its epistemology of ignorance which keep white domination in place.

In the aesthetic poetics of relation enabled by third-space errantry in the Black Atlantic diaspora we are continually called on to inhabit ‘black’ anew in a present-future which is not ‘post-race’. Here black women leave the past of métissage and the Sable-Saffron Venus behind as a haunting memory of identification exile from themselves. They, therefore, leave behind ‘philosophies of the One in the West’ which locate beauty on white bodies. Such is the work of an aesthetic poetics of relation that does not seek assimilation or annihilation of the Other as during plantation slavery but rather acknowledges blackness as performative and permissive of a variety of cultural forms, practices, ideologies and bodies without forgetting the politics of domination within which it is formed. The Black Atlantic diaspora’s transnationalism has led to a universalization of black beauty ideologies, politics and practices that removes it from the realm of a creolization which solely ‘brings into Relation but not to universalize’ (Glissant, 1997, 90). Rather, we are now in a time of black beauty’s multiple identifications and practices which we can recognize from the Caribbean, Brazil and the USA to the United Kingdom.

Rachel Christie as Miss England ruptures the aesthetic politics of the Racial Contract and makes us wonder if we are now at a point in England in which black beauties are possible. The report of her triumph in the Gleaner newspaper in Jamaica was about a Jamaican heritage woman winning the Miss England contest. In the times of the legendary Jamaican poet, Dr the Honorable Louise Bennett Coverley (1919–2006), this would have been seen as emblematic of ‘colonisation in reverse’, where because of the impact of the

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3 Wat a joyful news Miss Mattie,  
I feel like me heart gwine burs  
Jamaica people colonizin  
Englan in Reverse
migration, settlement and Englishness of the Jamaican heritage population, England has been creolized. Indeed, it could be taken as evidence for the assumption that it has been creolized to such an extent that black beauty has now become part of the norm. Further, black beauty could even be seen to have trumped the white ideal and black ‘mixed-race’ beauty could perhaps now be envisioned as one of the English beauty ideals especially if it exhibited straighter hair and lighter skin.

Beauty pageants have the function of choosing a beauty which stands in for the nation (Rowe, 2009). As such, there is a mimetic connection between whoever wears the Miss England crown and England’s social skin. In Christie’s case, if we think this mimetic creolization as a possibility then we exist within Glissant’s exile. Further, if we do not think through ‘third-space’ errantry with the materiality of the racialized body, then we subject ourselves to that epistemology of ignorance which refuses the continuing significance of white privilege. To be clear, the question we should ask here is, ‘if she was darker skinned, had locks and facial features which have been discursively constructed to appear more black, would she have become Miss England?’ If we answer honestly then we would have to say, ‘no’. She won because the ‘black mixed-race’ beauty stereotype from slavery and colonialism persists and in its persistence places other black beauties as ugly through its continuing valorization of those bodily characteristics considered as white.

She was Miss England 2009 even though she is not the stereotype of the English Rose and racial inequality persists in England, as we saw in the police shooting of Mark Duggan, which sparked the Tottenham uprisings in August 2011. We could see her crowning as a counter strategy of a state that is in conflict with itself because it has overlain the continuing Racial Contract with a bureaucracy of racial equality and a discourse of assimilative tolerance in an attempt to present itself as ‘post-race’. This could account for the paradox of Rachel Christie within the continuing aesthetics of white iconicity. However, to crown her as Miss England does not in fact disturb the status quo on this reading because of the beauty hegemony constructed since colonial times. Rather, her very body acts to highlight its lack of fit in a space that has always already been defined as that of the English Rose, as white.
Black bodies have a disruptive impact at the level of the nation, whether it is as inner city ‘rioters’, muggers, single mothers or Miss England. As Miss England, Christie’s body was symbolically charged. It produced a new affective relational politics which challenged the nation to go beyond asserting English métissage to embracing racial equality. Christie’s story, her body itself, stakes a claim in the national narrative, but it is a story of racism, sexism, poverty and achievement in spite of ‘race’ or, indeed, perhaps within the parameters produced by the Racial Contract’s possibility of ‘entry but only so far’. Her interviewer reflected white fear of her choice as Miss England. Paradoxically, though, he also showed white condescension, as in placing her in the position of non-academic, athletic, from a problem family, poor and hypersexual Sable-Saffron Venus, he ensured that the English Rose was kept firmly in place in readers’ minds as that which Rachel Christie was not and could not become.

Conclusion – creolization and affective bodies

Time has not meant the dissipation of the affective impact of such connections within the English national psyche as set into play by Rachel Christie. The English racial nomos (Gilroy, 2004) keeps in play multiple memories of and on the black woman’s body, its deviant sexuality and its location as spectacle. As black, Christie never displaced the English Rose but rather showed her lack of fit in a role which was always already designated as white. As a nation, England is not yet at the point of the emergence of a new aesthetic poetics of relation which enables beauty decolonization. However, if we look at this in terms of the rupture of white beauty’s hegemonic hold on the imagination, identifications, practices and ideologies of black beauty, we can say that within black communities that moment has long been upon us. It is the white imagination which has to be decolonized in terms of the aesthetics of the Racial Contract so that the status quo of white beauty as iconic can be delegitimized in order to produce an aesthetic creolization of England.

Works Cited


Chapter 7

Re-imagining Manchester as a Queer and Haptic Brown Atlantic Space

Alpesh Kantilal Patel

Introduction

Its reputation once based on its image as a thriving industrial center, Manchester, England has become just as well known for giving rise to punk and ‘new wave’ music in the 1980s and for being the post-millennial, commercial epicenter of gay life in the north-west of England. In 2003, Manchester was deemed the most ‘bohemian’ and ‘creative’ city, according to the ‘Boho (or Bohemian) Britain Index’ of forty UK cities. The Boho Index uses three indices – ethnic diversity, proportion of gay residents, and number of patent applications per head – as key indicators of the city’s economic health, and Manchester scores high in all these areas.¹ For instance, the city is home to a number of higher educational institutions, including Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) and the University of Manchester, the largest university in the United Kingdom. Moreover, Manchester’s Gay Village, named for its many gay bars, shops and restaurants, enabled it to become the first British city to host Europride in 2003. Finally, Manchester has a diverse ethnic population, evidenced most conspicuously

in the commercialized spaces of Chinatown and the Curry Mile, an area of
the city named for its large number of South Asian restaurants and shops.

In its strategic plan for the city center for the 2004–2007 period, Manchester City Council proudly boasts that Manchester topped the list
of the Boho Index in 2003 (Manchester City Council and Manchester City Centre Management Company Ltd, 2003, 6). Urban geographer Steve Quilley (91) further notes that since at least the early 1990s those involved
in ‘all aspects of urban regeneration’ adhered to a ‘Manchester script’ that
characterized the city as ‘post-modern, post-industrial and cosmopolitan’.
As I have argued elsewhere (Patel, 2009), the aforementioned Curry Mile is
relatively absent visually and textually in the city’s marketing in comparison
to the Gay Village. The two spaces are produced as mutually exclusive not
only by the city’s marketing but the marketing of the restaurants and bars
of the two spaces, as well. The Gay Village is given a ‘gay’ (white, middle-
class and male) identity, while the Curry Mile is given an ‘ethnic’ (South
Asian and heterosexual) one. In this chapter, I recount my own experiences,
with close attention to haptic, or embodied, visuality to conceptualize how a
queer-identified subject of South Asian descent can re-imagine urban space
in Manchester by exploring creolization as a theory, method and a practice.

Dominique Chancé’s (2011) overview of the genealogy of the concept
of creolization is instructive. She writes that it can only be explained
through paradox. Indeed, borrowed from linguists to describe specific
Creole languages and increasingly used to explore cultural formations
beyond language in the Caribbean, creolization eventually detached itself
from linguistic approaches and began to refer to a broader set of socio-
cultural processes (Chancé, 2011, 262). Drawing on the scholarship of Stuart
Hall, Françoise Lionnet and Shu-mei Shih (2011, 25) astutely note in their
introduction to The Creolization of Theory that what is at stake in any
expansive use of creolization are issues of power and entanglement that
must be carefully delineated. Wary of the ‘playful bricolage’ to which the
loose use of the concept can lead, Lionnet and Shih (24) call for the use of
creolization so that it ‘militates against the neutralization and obfuscation
of power dynamics’. Indeed, implicit in the anxiety registered by Chancé
above is the potential for the term to be de-politicized.

In that vein, Lionnet and Shih (30) conceptualize ‘creolized theory’ as
one that registers the ‘epistemological entanglement between the knowledge
systems of colonizer and colonized’ and works against the abstract univer-
salizing tendencies of dominant Euro-American theoretical models such as

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2 It is perhaps not surprising that, to be viable, anthropologist Stephan Palmié argues
for the concept to remain specific and regionalist in his 2006 essay ‘Creolization and
its Discontents’ (Palmié, 2006). However, I would extend the concept of region so it
is always already a transnational one.
structuralism and poststructuralism. To begin to conceptualize how I might rework urban space, I attempt to creolize British sociologist Paul Gilroy’s already creolized theory of the Black Atlantic to theorize a Brown Atlantic – the geographical area conceptually bound by British colonialism – to which both film scholar Jigna Desai in her 2004 book Beyond Bollywood and queer and South Asian cultural studies scholar Gayatri Gopinath in her 2005 book Impossible Desires loosely refer.

More specifically, I theorize a queer and ‘Desi’ Brown Atlantic drawing as much on theories of intersectionality and contemporary reworkings of haptic (or embodied) visuality and space as my own experiences. ‘Desi’ is a Hindi word meaning ‘from my country’ that is often colloquially used by many Western-based subjects of South Asian descent in the metropolitan areas of the USA and England to refer to themselves. It is particularly appropriate to adopt, given my focus is on the geographical and conceptual space bound by the colonial legacies of the South Asian subcontinent, the USA and the United Kingdom. That is, my own ‘roots and routes’, as Gilroy (1993a, 133) pithily refers to his Black Atlantic model, approximates the space of analysis I have heretofore outlined as part of the Desi Brown Atlantic: I am a UK-born, US-raised and – at the time of the writing of most of the larger project to which this chapter is connected – a Manchester-based subject, whose family emigrated originally from Gujarat, India. At the same time, my identification as ‘queer’ has added traction to a simplistic mapping of my personal history onto the Desi space I have otherwise sketched out.

Finally, I explore the limits and possibilities of cosmopolitanism implicated in the notion of the Black/Brown Atlantic by theorizing embodiment as part of my queer Desi Brown Atlantic. I am less interested in exploring cosmopolitanism as an intellectual or ethical attitude, as has been recently explored (Brennan, 1997; Cheah and Robbins, 1998; Tomlinson, 1999), than as a powerful mode through which to consider if my creolized and embodied

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3 The authors further make the distinction between theory with a big ‘T’ and theory with a little ‘t’ – the latter referring to theories that particularize the universalizing tendencies of the former. I do not mobilize these distinctions in this chapter given that I am ostensibly reworking a theory with a little ‘t’: Gilroy’s ‘Black Atlantic’ concept, which draws upon and makes more specific Michel Foucault’s universalizing theories of heterotopia and discourse.


6 The Global Commission on International Migration notes that the government of India puts the size of the diaspora at more than 20 million, with more than 2 million South Asians in the USA alone. www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/main/site/policy_and_research/gcim/rs/RS2.pdf.
queer Desi Brown Atlantic can itself creolize the civic cosmopolitanism of Manchester. Building a critique of Manchester’s cosmopolitanism entails a creolizing of methods in theorizing a queer Desi Brown Atlantic so as not to fall foul of Glissant’s usage of contemporary creolization to refer to globalization (Chancé, 2011, 265).

**Brief note on (creolizing) methods**

Lionnet and Shih (2011, 28) write that ‘encounters as situations that produce the possibility of theory or a method can itself be characterized as creolization’. I explore how an ‘encounter’ between my creolized queer Desi Brown Atlantic theory and my multi-sensory descriptions of my own experience at a queer Desi club party in Manchester as a form of practice is itself an act of creolization that brings into focus the aforementioned embodied aspect of my theory and the manner in which my body can creolize cosmopolitan queer space. By offering my own personal narrative as data I do not mean to present it as autobiographical fact or as singularly authentic. I consider it as the kind of ‘self-fictions’ Nancy Miller has theorized (Moxey, 1994, 138). In his ‘autobiographical’ sketch, *Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes*, French philosopher Roland Barthes rigorously refused to revert to an underlying reality or essence by revealing the construction of subjectivity itself as a product of language (in my case, transcriptions of my embodied experiences). He wrote that ‘[t]his book consists of what I do not know: the unconscious and ideology, things which utter themselves only by the voices of others. I cannot put on stage (in the text), as such, the symbolic and the ideological which pass through me, since I am their blind spot’ (Barthes, 1977, 152; emphasis in original).

The evidence I present can be further characterized as documentation of ‘small acts’, which Gilroy (1993b) notes are those practices that fall beneath the threshold of hegemonic nationalist and diasporic discourses, or as ‘ephemera as evidence’, as theorized by performance studies and Latino queer studies scholar José Esteban Muñoz (1996). The latter refers to forms of evidentiary material that are the only forms available for difficult-to-document sub-cultural spaces and identifications, like queer Desi, and therefore fall outside of traditional, scholarly analysis – what Muñoz (1996, 7) facetiously refers to as rigorous, or ‘rigor-mortis’. In particular, Muñoz (1998, 433) notes that queer cultural production often leaves traces that are fleeting and, therefore, resist typical scholarly textualization.

**Creolizing theory: towards a Desi Brown Atlantic**

As noted previously, Paul Gilroy’s intercultural theorization of the Black Atlantic that is not tethered to identitarian notions of ethnicity or
nationalism in his, now epochal, 1993 book *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* can be considered a creolized theory. Gilroy draws on Michel Foucault’s theories of genealogy, discourse and heterotopia, but through the specific optic of theories of black identity. He famously invokes the metaphor of slave ships ‘in motion across the spaces between Europe, America, Africa, and the Caribbean’ to theorize black diasporic identities and to ‘focus attention on the middle passage’ (Gilroy, 1993a, 4). Gilroy refers to this ‘middle passage’ as the ‘Black Atlantic’ that he argues avoids the implications of the classical notion of ‘diaspora’. According to Gilroy, in an interview with philosopher Thomas Lott, the latter assumes an ‘obsession with origins, purity and invariant sameness’ (Gilroy, 1993a, 56–57). Instead, the Black Atlantic is a theoretical model that underscores identity as always in flux. In this way, it dovetails with Martinican author Édouard Glissant’s description of creolization as being characterized not by stability but by change (Chancé, 2011, 262–7).

The poststructuralist underpinnings of Gilroy’s Black Atlantic have allowed it to be reworked and adopted by other scholars to theorize other discursively defined spaces – such as the ‘Lusophone Black Atlantic’, the geographical area bound by the slave routes between Portugal, Brazil and Africa. Indeed, the ‘Brown Atlantic’ that I have previously invoked is a space defined by British colonialism. Gopinath (2005, 70) writes that ‘[s]uch a mapping of South Asian diasporic movement suggests the differences and similarities between the experiences of racialization of South Asian immigrations in North America and the UK’. The Brown Atlantic can refer to a much more diverse group of South Asian populations who live outside of, but trace their ancestry to, the South Asian subcontinent – such as those

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7 Of course, the genealogy of diaspora is already deeply intertwined with that of Gilroy’s Black Atlantic. Cultural studies scholar Stuart Hall has theorized ‘diaspora experience’ in a manner that addresses the implications of fixed origins and destinations which Gilroy references. Hall defines ‘diaspora experience’ as determined not through ‘return’ and ‘not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of “identity” which lives with and through, not despite, difference’ (1990, 235). Explaining further the distinction between ‘diaspora’ and ‘Black Atlantic’ in an interview with Lott, Gilroy says: ‘Very often the concept of diaspora has been used to say, “Hooray! We can rewind the tape of history, we can get back to the original moment of our dispersal!” I’m saying something quite different. That’s why I didn’t call the book diaspora anything. I called it *Black Atlantic* because I wanted to say, “If this is a diaspora, then it’s a very particular kind of diaspora. It’s a diaspora that can’t be reversed”’ (Lott, 1994, 56–57). As American literature scholar Jonathan Elmer (2005, 161) suggests, Gilroy’s *Black Atlantic* has proven to be influential in academic scholarship not necessarily for sharpening the concept of diaspora but for loosening the structures that define it.

8 I am referring to the exploration of the Lusophone Black Atlantic by the Centre for the Study of Brazilian Culture and Society, King’s College, London. See the Centre’s homepage: www.clba.kcl.ac.uk/index.html. Accessed September 26, 2011.
who are products of the migration of Indian indentured labor to former British colonies in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, given that one of the most salient criticisms of Gilroy’s model as noted by African and African American studies scholar Paul Tiymbe Zeleza (2005, 37) and postcolonial and African diaspora scholar Laura Chrisman (2000, 12–18) is that it slips into homogenization of inter-regional diasporas – and thereby conflates the diverse genealogical histories of various black diasporas within the ‘Black’ of his Black Atlantic – it is important to be specific about which part of the Brown Atlantic I plan to explore. As noted in the introduction, I limit my focus in this chapter to a sector that I refer to as ‘Desi’ – the space bound by the colonial legacies of the South Asian subcontinent, the USA and the United Kingdom.

**Queer Desi**

I deploy Desi in much the same way as does the BBC television programme ‘Desi DNA’. The producers of ‘Desi DNA’ ironically appropriate the concept of ‘DNA’ to underscore that Desi is crystallized through a matrix of socio-cultural determinants that is not always reducible to genealogy or biology. That is, rather than merely apply Gilroy’s concept to yet another geographical space, I aim to theorize a Desi Brown Atlantic that is intersectional with identity categories beyond race, class and nationality. More specifically, I filter Desi through the ‘intersectional’ framework theorized by African American feminist legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw in the late 1980s. Intersectionality is a syncretic method that allows Crenshaw to consider a nexus of different identity categories in order properly to theorize violence against women of color. Arguing that identity politics ‘frequently conflates or ignores intra group difference’, Crenshaw (1994, 94) points to the importance of considering constructions of gender, race, ethnicity and class as constitutive of each other. More specifically, an intersectional framework, then, would aid in uncovering the structures that might otherwise obscure the manner in which other categories of identity are linked to the Desi Brown Atlantic.

Theorizing Desi as intersectional can be tantamount to a Sisyphean task, resulting in a never-ending chain of ‘supplemental’ identifications. French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1973, xliii, 88) refers to that which always

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9 The former British colonies to which I am referring are: Mauritius, the Caribbean (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana), Fiji and South Africa. See Shri J.C. Sharma (Minister of External Affairs, Government of India), Inaugural Address, delivered at the ‘Indian Diasporic Experience: History, Culture and Identity’ conference, January 22–24, 2002, Henchandacharya North Gujarat University. Reprinted on the Centre for Indian diaspora and Cultural Studies, Hemchandracharya North Gujarat University website: www.ngu.ac.in/center/dias/index.htm. Accessed September 26, 2011.
escapes signification as the ‘supplement’. Significantly, Derrida notes that the supplement ‘is in reality différence, ‘the simultaneous process of difference and deferral, which prevents the definitive closure of Desi. For instance, the implicit ‘etc.’ at the end of any listing of categories of intersecting identification to which Desi is attached functions as a supplement, which ‘adds itself [...] and] is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude [...]’. But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace, and is therefore never fully able to deliver on its promise of inclusivity (Derrida, 1976, 144–145).

In this context, creolization itself is a process that adds only to replace. It is this supplemental nature of the concept that Glissant implicitly brings to the fore as a core concern for him. For Glissant, creoleness (as opposed to creolization) is not just essentializing but effectively veils the supplementarity embedded within creolization as a concept. Rather than attempt to categorize, sanitize and contain the supplementarity of Desi, I embrace the epistemological paradoxes it unearths by highlighting the tensions, or the production of innumerable Derridean supplements or creolenesses, inherent in Desi.

To accomplish this, I specifically filter Desi through one intersectional node in this chapter: queer Desi. That is, I risk essentialism per film theorist Stephen Heath’s (1978, 99) well-known phrase, ‘the risk of essence may have to be taken’. Heath’s call to ‘risk’ essence, though, ‘can also operate as a deconstructionist strategy’, as queer and gender studies scholar Diana Fuss (1989, 19) points out. Queer and Desi as two overlapping and, at other times, competing sets of supplemental identifications can highlight rather than subsume the complexities of the broader spectrum of identifications connected to both. I do not mean to imply that each categorical identification, all of which are illimitable per Derrida’s supplement, can be explored in equal measure. Instead, a macro-queer Desi framework ensures that the broadest range of identifications connected to Desi are always considered. However, in the end, any case study necessarily will home in on more specific, or micro, intersectional combinations. In other words, though queer Desi is a conceit to ensure Desi remains in a state of creolization or under erasure per Derrida, in this chapter I present a case study that homes in on queer and Desi, by drawing on my lived experiences regarding the intersections and antagonisms between the two in the context of the aforementioned ‘cosmopolitan’ city of Manchester.

**Embodied queer Desi Brown Atlantic**

My description of a visit to Club Zindagi (or ‘life’ in Hindi), a queer Desi club party on Canal Street in Manchester, where I lived from autumn 2005 to summer 2008, will tease out how vital embodied visuality not only is to the creolized queer Desi Brown Atlantic theory I have heretofore put together but also to creolizing Manchester’s cosmopolitan queer urban space.
Samosas, pakoras, and salads are served free of charge at midnight to all partygoers at Club Zindagi. The smells of these traditional South Asian foods evoked nostalgic feelings for my mother’s Gujarati dishes, which she cooked at least five times a week while I was growing up in Florida and California. The rush of emotions summoned by the pungent aromas is both liberating and jarring, co-mingling memories of growing up in a domestic space marked by South Asian-ness as heterosexual – I refer to the domestic space in which I grew up and in which I was culturally groomed by my parents to expect to have an arranged marriage, for instance – with the current space marked by South Asian-ness as homosexual in which I found myself. In fact the visceral sensory knowledge that the smells evoked was more exhilarating and potent than the actual experience of being in this space with other queer-identified South Asians and their friends.

As film studies scholar Laura Marks (2002, 96) writes, ‘smell has a privileged connection to emotion and memory that the other senses do not. We smell, we feel the jab of emotional memory’. Her theorization of ‘haptic visuality’ refers to a specific mode of reception of cinematic images in which vision is located in the body. Drawing on Viennese art historian Alois Riegl’s scholarship, Marks argues that though a cinematic image might be classed as optical in terms of form, it can still be received in an embodied manner: ‘haptic images invite a multi-sensory, intimate and embodied perception, even when the perceptions to which they appeal are


11 Marks (2000, 1) arrives at her theory of haptic visuality through a careful investigation of the avant-garde film and video of Canada-, North America- and, to a lesser degree, UK-based artists, whom she further describes as ‘intercultural’ or ‘between two cultures’. (How these artists describe and identify themselves is less clear.) She notes how these films challenge the often facile categorization of cultural anthropologists who evacuate the sensuous potential of engaging with the most visual of objects in Western cultures and displace or ascribe ‘the fullness of sensory experience only to “non-Western” cultures’ (208) by inviting ‘an intimate, sensuous, and memory-based relationship’ (82).
vision and hearing alone’ (Marks 2002, 133). She further (2004, 82) writes that the intercultural films she explores ‘invite an intimate, sensuous, and memory-based relationship’.

Marks’s theorization of intercultural films can be applied to thinking about the embodied memories of the space of a club party I describe through montage – a term employed to describe a technique used in films to put together scenes that are not necessarily temporally synchronous. For instance, it has parallels to the manner in which I am juxtaposing my memories of embodied images – culled over time in the space but necessarily chronologically presented here – of a club party. Importantly, French sociologist Henri Lefebvre (1991, 40) implicitly extends Marks’s theorization of haptic visuality to space by indicating that ‘social practice presupposes the use of the body’ including the ‘sensory organs’. It is this use of the body that both senses the creolization of and creolizes Manchester’s urban space as it moves through it.

**Creolizing Manchester’s urban space**

In addition to the aforementioned aromatic atmosphere, the music of Zindagi parties is decidedly different from anything playing at the gay club above which Zindagi was held, or any other place in Manchester’s Gay Village. It is instructive to note that the Gay Village was a disconnected series of buildings with darkened windows and a clandestine ethos as recently as the early 1990s; now wide-open windows punctuate the contemporary promenade of glossy bars and clubs (Campbell, 2004). The windows promote an atmosphere of voyeurism which transforms the space into what Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 493) would refer to as a ‘striated’ one that relates to a ‘more distant vision, and a more optical space’.13 The windows heighten and keep at bay the object of one’s desire, or effectively delay gratification and the eventual break of the voyeuristic gaze via touch per Freud’s theory of the fetish (Freud, 2001, 155).14 My point here is not to elide the vast theoretical chasm between Freudian psychoanalysis and Deleuze and Guattari’s work,

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12 In his 1901 book *Late Roman Art Industry*, Riegl describes Persian textiles (amongst other things), the sight of which elicits for him a tactile, bodily response as opposed to the strictly ‘optical’ character of Late Roman art. Riegl (1988 [1902], 190) specifically borrows the term from physiology (haptein, to fasten) to avoid constructing as oppositional the tactile and visual, and to underscore that haptic is much more expansive than merely touch.

13 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) are careful not to imply a facile dichotomy of the sense organs by noting that the ‘eye is not the only organ’ to produce striated, or optical, space. Nonetheless, it is not accidental that vision is used to describe striation.

14 Freud’s theory is based on the maintenance of distance between the object of desire and the viewing subject, and only broken by touch.
but to note an interesting connection between the two in terms of how power is primarily intertwined with visuality, and potentially unravelled only by the other senses.\textsuperscript{15} Given the latter, I explore in more detail the role embodiment can play in creolizing the Gay Village via my description of the music played at the club and the nostalgia it evoked:

A mixture of contemporary pop hits, bhangra music, and Bollywood music was playing. The most salient in my memory were the old Bollywood tunes from the 1970s and 1980s, many of which I had not heard since the early to mid-1980s during my childhood in Anaheim, California, to where my family had immigrated when I was four years old from the United Kingdom, where I was born. During this period in California, my memories of Bollywood music are largely restricted to those my parents played in my dad’s stalwart midnight blue Datsun 510. Memories of my family’s weekly trips to Brea Mall in Anaheim, the car trips we took to visit relatives in Santa Rosa, California, and, the month-long cross-country trip we took from California to move to Florida in the summer of 1984 all came back to me quite vividly.

In Florida, my parents continued to take car trips, often to visit relatives in Chattanooga, Tennessee and Beaufort, South Carolina, for instance, but I had less exposure to Bollywood music as I got older, as I often skipped out on these car trips partly to spend time with my own friends, but also because I was increasingly feeling ill at ease with my Gujuratiness. In fact, the ‘silence’ of Bollywood music in my life coincided with my growing awareness of my homosexuality. So the rush of emotions I felt hearing these old tunes at Club Zindagi was bittersweet, to say the least.

Much like my experience of smells described earlier, my experience of these sounds unlocked memories, all of which felt out of time and place in the queer-identified space in which I stood. The smells and sounds took me back to familial scenes through a nexus of emotions associated with different periods of my life – from the heavily heteronormative, South Asian-inflected

\textsuperscript{15} Psychoanalysis does not offer the immersive and fluid understanding of subjectivity that Deleuze and Guattari do. Drawing on Frantz Fanon’s writings of his difficulty in enacting a racial subjectivity, they argue in \textit{Anti-Oedipus} that psychoanalytic and colonial discourses collectively ‘participate in a double ideological operation where each serves effectively to conceal the political function and purpose of the other’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 170), as summarized by queer and gender studies scholar Diana Fuss (1994, 33). Fuss powerfully pushes Fanon’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s arguments forward to illustrate that colonial domination works through institutionalization of both misogyny and homophobia in tandem with the castration of black male sexuality. Fuss’s point implicitly suggests the difficulty of enacting a queer Desi subjectivity.
upbringing in California and Florida to my adult life in New York, which was marked more by my identification as gay. Indeed, nostalgia becomes an important part of the moment of creolization of queer urban space. Marks (2000, 201) notes that ‘nostalgia, then, need not mean an immobilizing longing for the past: it can also mean the ability of the past experiences to transform the present’. In many ways, the multi-sensory experience of being at Zindagi felt more liberatory than the moment of initially ‘coming out’ did for me that was always tinged with a residual guilt and anxiety precipitated by what I felt was a certain requisite disavowal of my family and ethnic ties. Boundaries between what seemed two quite disparate worlds dissolved and seemed to blend increasingly more seamlessly.

British sociologist Avtar Brah’s (1996) theorization of diasporic spaces is instructive in further describing my own visually embodied experience of a diasporic connection to the South Asian subcontinent. She rethinks the notions of a ‘home’ in diasporas as more of a ‘homing desire’ [where] diaspora refers to multilocationality within and across territorial, cultural, and psychic boundaries’ (Brah, 1996, 197). The ‘homeland’ as I experienced it was not necessarily and simply Gujarat, India, where my parents were born; Wednesbury, England, where I was born; California and Florida, where I grew up; or New York, where I lived for eight years prior to my arrival in Manchester. Not entirely geographical and definable by static borders, the entire concept of a ‘home’land became more protean and spatially and temporally mobile, often occupying simultaneously multiple locations and times.

In contrast to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) theorization of striated space, haptic, or ‘smooth space,’ which is moved through by constant reference to the immediate environment – such as walking through an expanse of sand or snow – suggests the intimate and embodied manner in which subjects can traverse space and thereby is instructive in further theorizing my experience of queer Desi Brown Atlantic as felt. Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 493) argue ‘that the eye itself can perform a nonoptical function’, and thereby produce smooth, or haptic, space. Indeed, my descriptions above illustrate how the visual can elicit a ‘nonoptical function’, and thereby produce a smooth space that is critical to conceptualizing a creolized and creolizing queer Desi Brown Atlantic.

16 Though many of the examples of smooth space they give are rural, they also note that, ‘even the most striated city gives rise to smooth spaces’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 500).
Towards a conclusion

At Club Zindagi, the queer Desi variant of the Brown Atlantic I experienced not only blurred my genealogical history but also collapsed and intermingled my past and present memories in connection to my identifications as Desi and queer as *felt*. In particular, the sights, tastes and smells of various South Asian foods and sounds of Bollywood music triggered my embodied experience of a Brown Atlantic and resulted in the production of a particularly smooth/haptic space in which my subjectivity became less tied to any singular identity. My body became part of its milieu in the spirit of the fluidity of the classical model of the Black Atlantic, though with a much more intimate and nuanced understanding of queer sexuality and embodiment than the latter might suggest in its strictest interpretation.

Lionnet and Shih (2011, 2) conceptualize creolization as ‘simultaneously descriptive and analytic’. They write that it ‘emerges from the experiential but provides a theoretical framework that does justice to the lived realities of subaltern subjects, connected to those realities’. In this way, the importance of linking my own experiences with and through my theory of a queer Desi Brown Atlantic took on greater significance in considering the possibility of its creolized/creolizing potential in terms of Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic. Perhaps most importantly, haptic visuality aids in making felt the notion of cosmopolitanism embedded within my Brown Atlantic; and how a specifically embodied queer Desi Brown Atlantic could critique, re-imagine and creolize the city of Manchester’s civic queer cosmopolitanism in a deeply personal manner. Indeed, creolization is simultaneously a way of rethinking theoretical models; a method that permits the free commingling of theory with practice and the conceptual with the experiential; and is suggestive of how urban space can be powerfully re-imagined and felt. It demands attention to all of the innumerable creolenesses it incessantly produces; this chapter is a modest account of just one of these.

Finally, in the context of an increasing embrace of homosexuality by a post-national European Union – if even inconsistently across its constituents – this chapter cautions against the bifurcation of queer and racialized subjectivities as evidenced in the case of Manchester. Jasbir Puar has referred to the collusion between normative queer agendas and the state as ‘homonationalism’ in her 2007 book *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*. In that same year, Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodriguez and Margaret Littler, in their introduction to the groundbreaking international conference ‘Creolizing Europe’ at the University of Manchester, underscored that present-day Europe continues to operate under an ideology that refuses to see racialized difference.17 Along the same lines, in 2014, Fatima El-Tayeb (2014, 9) notes that ‘Europe, in its national and postnational variations, is

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17 See also this book’s introduction by Gutiérrez Rodriguez and Tate.
maintaining a normalized, Christian(ized, secular) whiteness through an ideology of colorblindness that claims not to “see” racialized difference. Littler, Gutiérrez Rodriguez, and El-Tayeb all suggest that the creolization of theory is important as it questions Europe’s dominant, internalist narratives.18 This chapter frames how queer, racialized subjectivities can creolize the homonationalism and ‘colorblindness’ of Europe’s queer cosmopolitanism through an attention to the lived experience of the haptic body and the metaphoric currents of the Brown Atlantic.

Works Cited


18 El-Tayeb further writes (2014, 11), ‘according to Glissant, the Caribbean became a center of relational identities and situational communities exactly because their inability to claim the “sacred roots” of these territories excluded its inhabitants from a world order in which both dominance and resistance were built on notions of sacred land’.


—— (1988) [1902] ‘Late Roman or Oriental?’, trans. by Peter Wortsman, in G. Schiff, German Essays in Art History (New York: Continuum).


Chapter 8

Queering Diaspora Space, Creolizing Counter-Publics: On British South Asian Gay and Bisexual Men’s Negotiation of Sexuality, Intimacy and Marriage*

Christian Klesse

Culture is the precaution of those who claim to think thought but who steer clear of its chaotic journey. Evolving cultures infer Relation, the overstepping that grounds their unity-diversity.

Édouard Glissant, Poetic Intention (2010), p. 1

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1 Italics in the original.
Glissant’s notion of creolization seems one of the most interesting and successful attempts at moving beyond the binary model of thinking so engrained in the ways we perceive the world.


**Introduction**

In this chapter, I deploy a queer diaspora framework, public sphere theory and a creolization perspective to understand the narratives and opinions of British South Asian gay and bisexual men on key queer tropes of sexuality, intimacy, non-monogamy and marriage. The recent increase in cultural, social and political organizing among British South Asian lesbian, gay male, bisexual, transgender and queer people, I argue, results in the formation of discursive spaces that allow for the articulation of complex narratives on intimacy, sexuality, cultural or religious values and citizenship that creolize queer thought and politics. I conceive these spaces as part of a larger process towards the formation of queer diasporic counter-publics. A creolization perspective is helpful for refining diaspora theory, because it endorses a rhizomatic understanding of connection, privileges ‘routes’ over ‘roots’ and avoids categorical rigidity and singularity, which have been common features of certain multicultural orthodoxies (Glissant, 2010b). Creolization focuses on multiple ‘point(s) of entanglement’, which allows for the conception of inter-related and ‘situational’ communities. It highlights frictions, but does not resolve tension into ready-made assumptions of ‘possible’ or ‘impossible’ identities (El-Tayeb, 2011, 172).

The chapter will first develop a queer diaspora framework as a conceptual tool for reading respondents’ comments on sexuality and sexual politics. Diaspora theory has frequently advocated hybridity as the concept most suitable for interpreting processes of cultural mixing. I argue here that creolization is a preferable alternative, because it avoids some of the shortcomings of the hybridity model. This is then followed by an argument that a dialogue between diaspora and public sphere theories can be helpful for understanding British South Asian gay and bisexual men’s ideas on relationality. Again, creolization provides an important perspective here, because it highlights the multiple connections around which these negotiations take place, captures the extent to which they are constructed across power relations and sensitizes the analysis for the transformative force of contemporary queer British South Asian cultures.²

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² This chapter engages with narratives of British South Asian men who participated in a qualitative multi-method research into discourses on non-monogamy in gay male and
Towards a queer diaspora framework

In *Impossible Desires*, Gayatri Gopinath (2005) turns her attention to popular culture (and to a lesser extent political organizing) to trace alternative discourses of belonging in the imaginary and material relations within queer South Asian diaspora space. Gopinath’s suturing of ‘queer’ to ‘diaspora’ combines two interrelated epistemological strategies, that is, the ‘queering of diasporic studies’ and the ‘diasporizing of queer studies’ (cf. Braziel, 2008). It entails the queering of diasporic studies in that ‘it recuperates those desires, practices, and subjectivities that are rendered impossible and unimaginable within conventional diasporic and nationalist imaginaries’ (Gopinath, 2005, 11). Alternately, it entails the diasporization of queer studies in that it ‘situates the formation of sexual subjectivity within transnational flows of culture, capital, bodies, desire, and labor’ (13). Gopinath’s concept of a queer South Asian diaspora aims to critique the lasting legacy of coloniality and to challenge Western-centric definitions of modernity and ethno-centric LGBT rights discourses which identify ‘progress’ in white queer bodies, white queer politics and Euro-American liberal democracies. Since September 2001, culturalist racist stereotypes about South Asians have been expanded by (and partially reframed within) an aggressive Islamophobia which frequently conflates South Asianness with Islamic religious extremism, gender inequality and homophobia (cf. Puar and Rai, 2002; Puar, 2005; 2007; Arondekar, 2005; Bhatachharyya, 2008; Haritaworn, Tauqir and Erdem, 2008). These developments provide the backdrop to an increased interest in Muslim non-heterosexualities.

It is striking that while there is a significant amount of research available on Islam and homosexuality (which often samples large numbers of South Asian research participants) (Yip, 2004; 2005; 2007; Minwalla et al., 2005; Siraj, 2006; Abraham, 2008; Haritaworn, Tauqir and Erdem, 2008; 2014; Jaspal and Cinarella, 2010; Jaspal, 2012), there are much fewer publications on diasporic South Asian sexualities which do not foreground religion or look into other significant religions in South Asia or South Asian diasporic formations (Bhugra, 1997; Awan, 2003; Gopinath, 2005; Page and Yip, 2012). In sum, the analysis of diaspora needs a queer perspective as much as queer critique is dependent on an engagement with the question of diaspora, in order fully to grasp the effects of racism, colonialism and the neo-imperial world order on contemporary sexualities. A focus on the dynamics and

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*bisexual social movement spaces (1997–2003). I conducted forty-four interviews with roughly half the sample consisting of gay men and the other half of bisexual men and women. I further organized four group discussions. Here, I present data gathered in a focus group with a support group for South-Asian gay and bisexual young men (nine participants). I further draw on individual interviews with three British South Asian gay men.*
terms of creolization is conducive for achieving such a fusion of perspectives. Yet, before I develop this argument in closer detail later, it appears necessary to problematize the diaspora concept even further.

Etymologically, the term diaspora is derived from Greek and signifies ‘scattering’ or dispersion from a center. The concept was originally deployed to signify Jewish dispersal after the Babylonian exile. It has subsequently been applied to many dislocations, migrations and resettlements (Cohen, 1997). Avtar Brah (1996) uses a diaspora framework to theorize the history of settlement of migrants from South Asia in the United Kingdom, a history which has been profoundly shaped by colonial power relations (Hesse and Sayyid, 2006; Sayyid, 2006). She advances the notion of ‘diaspora space’, which in distinction to one-dimensional models of diaspora ‘includes the entanglement, the intertwining of the genealogies of dispersion with those of “staying put”’ (Brah, 1996, 209). Brah’s careful reflections reveal her wariness to avoid nationalist or ethnicist interpretations which may result from treating diasporas as sociological entities on the basis of the attribution of common origin (cf. Anthias, 1998). This is why she likes to see the concept applied to ‘forms of relationality within and between diasporic formations’ (Brah, 1996, 183) and ‘the configurations of power which differentiate diasporas internally as well as situate them in relation to one another’ (183). This allows her to focus – among other issues – on women’s struggles in diasporic contexts.

Queer diaspora theories have revealed how sexual diversity unsettles the heteronormative orientation of many diaspora formations (Eng, 2001; Manalansan, 2003; Binnie, 2004; Gopinath, 2005). I use the term ‘queer diaspora’ to signify an elusive and inter-relational space which connects various cultural locations and identifications. I do not simply refer to a collective of queer-identified people. Gopinath (2005) has proposed queer diaspora as a methodology for making non-heterosexual desires and erotic or cultural practices intelligible, even if they are expressed in forms different from categorical enunciation or public manifestation. This resonates with my study, in which some research participants used a gay identity label, while others oscillated between different identities (such as, for example, men who have sex with men, bisexual, heterosexual or gay). Others, again, stressed fluidity, refrained from self-labelling or mocked the idea of sexual orientation. The multi-relationality of practices of identification inevitably involves practices of cultural mixing. The emergence of non-bounded, non-essentialist cultural practices has been theorized in manifold ways. In the following section, I argue that Glissant’s creolization perspective can do this in particularly effective ways. According to Glissant (quoted by Murdoch, 2013, 879), ‘[c]reolization is marked by the coming into contact of several cultures, in a specific world-space, and resulting in a new reality, one completely unforeseeable in terms of the sum total of the synthesis of these elements’.
Queer diaspora – from hybridity to creolization

Hybridity has been a popular concept in diaspora studies throughout the 1990s, where it has been applied to ‘all sorts of things to do with mixing and combination in the moment of cultural exchange’ (Kalra, Kaur and Hutnyk, 2005, 71). It has been celebrated by many for its potential ‘subversion of naturalized forms of identity centred on the nation’ (2). In this section, I argue that Glissant’s creolization theory is in many regards more dynamic and supple than most conceptualizations of hybridity, because it is not hampered (to the same extent) by biologic connotations, an implicit dualism or abstract idealizations.

Many scholars have been wary of the hybridity terminology, because its genealogy links it with biology and race science (Young, 1995; Werbner, 1997; Ifekwunigwe, 1999). In contradistinction, the primary point of reference of the term creolization has always been social, cultural and linguistic forms of mixing (around the concept Creole), rather than racial purity (Chaudenson, 2001; Sheller, 2003). For Glissant (2010b, 34), the formation of Creole languages within the slave labor plantation regimes of the Caribbean was the prime instance of creolization which then exploded into a multi-textured inter-cultural connectivity. Even if the term was later also used to signify ‘mixed-race’ populations, Stuart Hall (2003a, 29) argues that ‘it was never historically, and is not today, fully fixed racially’.

Édouard Glissant, who originally worked with the concept of métissage (hybridity) himself (see Glissant, 2010a), later abandoned it in favor of creolization, which he thought to be less constricted by an implicit dualism. ‘If we posit métissage as, generally speaking, the meeting and synthesis of two differences, creolization seems to be a limitless métissage, its elements diffracted and consequences unforeseeable’ (Glissant, 2010b, 34). In brief, creolization lends itself to the description of more complex cultural scenarios than hybridity. It points beyond closed models of multiculturalism towards a description of the ‘chaos’ of culture as ‘diversal’ or ‘multiversal’, envisioned in Glissant’s ‘poetics of Relation’ (cf. Noudlemann, 2013).

Some critics of hybridity argue that the concept does not help to uncover the unequal power relations which govern cultural mixing in neo-liberal postcolonial settings (Anthias, 1998, 575). While scholars like Homi K. Bhabha (1994) in his work on mimicry and the ‘third space’ have deployed the concept in insightful ways to describe the cultural power dynamics in colonial and postcolonial settings, other usages of the concept have been less

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3 Creolization and Relation are closely interconnected processes. ‘Relation envisages human reality (and in fact, the natural world as well […] as a dynamic network of connections and interactions between elements (especially communities and cultures) such that the elements are constantly changing in ways that are impossible to predict,’ explains Britton (2011, 670).
concerned with structural inequalities. In contradistinction, power relations are right at the core of the concept of creolization, due to its origin in the analysis of cultural dynamics around the slave trade and slave labor. ‘Creolization always entails inequality, hierarchization, issues of domination and subalternity, mastery and servitude, control and resistance. Questions of power, as well as entanglement, are always at stake’, argues Stuart Hall (2003a, 31) in his critical review of creolization theory.

However, it should be noted that Glissant’s later work, in which he moves on from his initial analysis of colonial/postcolonial culture in the Caribbean (Caribbeanness and Antillianité) towards more generalized claims about cultural dynamics on a world scale (creolization, Poetics of Relation, globalité, Toute-Monde, etc.) too, has been criticized for sidelining questions of oppression and power (Britton, 2013). While it is certainly true that some of Glissant’s later work is shaped by a higher level of generalization (due to his consideration of globality), his main concepts remain grounded in a material analysis of power relations. They grow out of and remain significantly inflected by their Caribbean origins (Murdoch, 2013). They are highly place specific, soaked not only with the poetics of landscape, but also loaded with the trauma of history, namely the middle passage and the terror of the plantation regime. In Poetics of Relation, Glissant locates the genesis of creolization (and subsequently Relation) explicitly in these violent histories, shaped by racial and geo-political domination. A concern with power and inequality is intrinsic and deeply engrained in Glissant’s poetico-conceptual language. His concepts are designed to counter and undo cultural power dynamics, also when applied to other ‘world’ cultural dynamics. Yet, even at his most universalizing moments, Glissant never gives up a concern with detail, specificity and particularity. For him, globality (mondialité), is ‘the finite, realized quantity of the infinite detail of the real’ (Glissant, quoted in Noudlemann, 2013, 870). This concern for singularity in multiplicity and for every detail (cultures, languages and communities) leads him to reject universalism and particularism at the same time, argues Claude François Noudlemann (2013, 871).

It is important to keep this insistence on both power and specificity in mind if we wish to counter the common tendency to deploy ‘creolization’ as a simple metaphor within a de-politicized narrative of ‘postmodern globalization’ (Gutiérrez Rodríguez and Littler, 2007; Cohen and Toninato, 2010). Some critics of this tendency also argue that ‘creolization’ has been so specific to particular historical and cultural configurations (that is, the plantation regimes of the French Caribbean), that it should not be applied elsewhere (cf. Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant, 1989; Enwezor et al., 2003). Postmodern usages lack sensitivity to detail and the brutality of the colonial context which has shaped the experience that some have described as creolization (Sheller, 2003). Those who have applied the concept elsewhere have frequently limited their application to African or Afro-Caribbean diasporic settings (Hall, 1993; 2003a; 2003b; Gilroy, 1987; 1993). While
ultimately remaining ambivalent, Hall (2003a) takes a less rigid position on this question. For him, processes of transculturation are central to the diaspora definition. He stresses affinities between the concepts diaspora, hybridity and creolization, all of which he has occasionally used in his work. He argues that theorizing always involves the reworking and abstraction of already existing concepts and he takes Glissant’s statement that ‘the whole world is becoming creolized’ as an indicator that at least one of the key theorists of creolization believed that the term could be deployed to understand other cultural configurations.

I agree with Hall – that any contextualized application of creolization theory should bring to the fore questions of power and inequality if it wishes to stay truthful to its original intention. I believe that creolization theories can be helpful tools for researching diaspora space in Europe, in particular because postcolonial conditions remain thoroughly overdetermined by the lasting legacies of colonialism (El-Tayeb, 2011). For example, I see a striking resonance between the emphasis on colonialism, slavery and violence at the heart of theories on créolité and creolization (Vergés, 2003; Hall, 2003a; 2003b) and the argument that a postcolonial framework (and the recognition of the violent histories of coloniality and racism) are vital for an understanding of the exclusivist dynamics which shape the current experiences of British South Asian settlers in the United Kingdom (Sayyid, 2006; Hesse and Sayyid, 2006).

Creolization theories have a stronger potential than most works on hybridity to bring to the fore these power relations. They may further help us to take account of subaltern agency which has given rise to various modes of resistance and contestation (Sheller, 2003). Glissant’s concepts of creolization and Relation also direct critical attention to questions of community attachment, boundary formation and exclusion. They, thus, create a space from which to question and challenge national rhetoric about identity and citizenship (Britton, 2011; Gutiérrez Rodríguez and Littler, 2007).

In the following section, I explicate these aspects of creolization and what they add to thinking about queer diaspora as I turn to the voices and narratives of the British Asian gay and bisexual men in my study. Here, I will argue that a queer diaspora perspective can gain from an alignment with critical work on the public sphere and counter publics (cf. The Black Public Sphere Collective, 1995; Warner, 2002; Plummer, 2003). The counter-public argument foregrounds the political nature of struggles around representations and highlights unequal relations in an over-arching ‘diaspora space’ (Brah, 1996) within which creolization enables the contestation and challenge of national and communal identities.
Queer South Asian diaspora and the creolization of the public sphere

The participants in my study articulate divergent views deploying ideas shaped by discourses around gay rights, gay liberation, various religious codes, culture, family, anti-racism or nationalism. It is difficult to identify such a thing as ‘community values’, which, as some researchers argue, provide normative guidance for queer people to construct their relationships (Weeks, Heaphy and Donovan, 2001). Mark Blasius (1994) hypothesizes a so-called ‘gay and lesbian ethos’, which is informed by community knowledge and enables gay men and lesbians to choose their lifestyle – based on autonomy, choice, informed consent and egalitarianism.

There are many problems with such a neat and idealistic narrative. There are no references to bisexuality, transgender, gender conflicts, intersectionality or people's multiple identifications and community affiliations. The strong emphasis on egalitarianism obscures the persistence of power relations in same-sex relationships. Ultimately, Blasius’s theory rests on a disavowal of differences both within and between different LGBTQ spaces (Young, 1997).

Many of the British South Asian participants problematized the notion of a universal ‘gay community’. As Irfan (an active member of Al-Fatiha UK, a mixed-gender social support and political campaigning group and a referent in my study) explains:

I don’t really feel I associate myself with any one particular community. [...] I’m sure everybody’s unique, but I feel very … I’m Asian and in a really white culture. I’m Muslim and in a Christian country. I’m gay and living in a heterosexual society. I’m Scottish and living in England. Erm … and even in my profession, 80 percent are female. So I’ve always really been in a minority. [...] I’ve never really had that sense of wanting to have to belong to some place. But belonging to a community? I would say that I feel I belong to the gay Muslim community, the gay Muslim Pakistani community. Yeah, I belong to the gay Pakistani Muslim community, as I do the straight Pakistani Muslim community, or the Muslim community, or the community of physiotherapists or, you know, to the community of men. But I’ve never really associated myself with the gay scene as such. [...] Being part of the community for me is not something important.

Irfan considers his ‘nominal’ membership in a range of partially overlapping communities, but he does not strongly identify with any one of them. In particular, he stresses his distance from the gay community which he explains with the strong Islamophobia he experienced as an out-Muslim gay man among gay people in commercial and political gay spaces (Puar, 2007; Haritaworn, Tauqir and Erdem, 2008). His points of reference are the gay
Muslim community or the gay Muslim Pakistani community. Irfan goes on to explain the ambivalent role of ‘communities’ in his life. He discusses in detail his difficulties with the Pakistani and the South-Asian communities in Britain. His major concern is what he perceives as a pronounced homophobia which pervades British South Asian diaspora space. It is only recently that he has found a place for himself in this context through his involvement with Al-Fatiha UK – a LGBTQI Muslim support group founded in 1998.4

Community has provided a powerful language for self-identification, belonging and solidarity. At the same time, it is evoked to legitimize social regulation (through appeals to morality), political censorship (for the sake of the common good) and exclusion (in the name of authenticity) (Young, 1990a; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). As a result of these paradoxes it is difficult to discard the vision of community altogether. In a discussion of black community discourses, Shirley Anne Tate (2007) shows that due to their performative nature community discourses produce their own kind of governmentality. This notwithstanding, Tate argues that for many a melancholic attachment to community remains inscribed into the production of black subjectivity – often in spite of the experience of exclusion. In my study, too, not all research participants rejected the idea of community in an outright fashion. Ali, for example, explains that, ‘at the end of the day I’d love to do a lot for the Asian gay community – for the gay community as a whole’, positing the Asian gay community as a substratum of a larger gay community. Religion, nationality and sexuality are the core ingredients of the community discourses deployed by most research participants (see Ali and Irfan above).5 Yet these appeals to community, too, are exclusive. It is not only that they are highly specific in terms of culture, ethnicity, nation or religion. Women, for example, do not figure at all in either Irfan’s or Ali’s community discourses. This mirrors a common androcentrism in gay male politics but is nonetheless striking at least in Irfan’s case, because at the time he was an active member of Al-Fatiha UK.

Since the term ‘community’ suggests shared interest and close affinity, it has a tendency to obscure antagonism, conflict, internal divisions, hierarchies and hegemonic domination (Sennett, 1970; Young, 1990b; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). I have argued elsewhere (Klesse, 2007) that the concept of multiple public spheres can avoid such shortcomings. Such a perspective can be derived from debates within feminist political theory (Young, 1990a; Fraser, 1997), queer theory (Berlant and Warner, 1998; Warner 2002) and Black and Asian cultural theory (The Black Public Sphere Collective, 1995; Gopinath, 2005). The notion of a public sphere emphasizes discursivity and

4 The group took on the name Imaan in 2004 (see Siraj, 2014).
5 References to cross-racial or cross-ethnic alliance-building, as it has been envisioned, for example, in 1980s anti-racist politics around the signifier ‘Black’, are rare and limited to research participants in their forties.
is more suitable for the analysis of conflicts bound up with diversity and multiplicity. Work on counterpublic currents is illustrative of this potential (Fraser, 1997; Warner, 2002; Plummer, 2003). The emphasis on discursivity does not have to imply a deflection from the body and various scholars have highlighted the gendered, sexualized and racialized nature of public sphere interaction. Yet how do we avoid the closure of the representations of counterpublics around hegemonic identities? Recognizing the creolized (and creolizing) nature of public sphere interaction prevents the conflation of the notion of publics with sealed-off ready-made identity-based collectivities. ‘[C]reolization, which overlaps with linguistic production, does not produce direct synthesis, but “resultants,” results: something else, another way’, argues Glissant (quoted in Murdoch 2013, 877). This perspective allows us to conceive a queer South Asian (counter)public sphere as the site of the construction (and contestation) of continuously emerging – and transforming – ‘situational communities’ (El-Tayeb, 2011).

The narratives presented by British South Asian gay and bisexual men in my study take recourse to a mix of multiple paradigms of cultural understanding and identification, ethical orientation and political analysis. At the same time, they are all too often aware that these frameworks are negotiated under conditions of unequal power. For these reasons, too, the discourses emerging from the formation of a British South Asian queer diasporic public sphere can be said to reflect the creolization of sexual cultures and politics in Britain as a diaspora space. The power dimension becomes most obvious in the discussions of racism in the gay male community.

The gay male scene, racism, alienation and self-organization

Many men who participated in the group discussion, like Wijaj, complained about the pervasive racism on the gay male scene.

And one thing that I noticed, coming out on the scene when I was about seventeen, is there’s a lot of like racism on the gay scene, you know, and it’s really … it’s really low-key, but there’s a lot of racism, [cross talking] you know, and, erm, what is beyond I think stereotype.

In the context of this discussion my position as a white researcher became an issue, too. For example, Wijaj directly addressed me to learn about my opinion on racism on the gay scene. Racism was cited as one of the major issues why many group members felt alienated in the wider white gay male scene. Such concerns with racism and ethno-centric hegemony are widely documented across various diasporic contexts (Gupta, 1988; Roy, 1998; Awan, 2003; Minwalla et al., 2005; Baddurudoja, 2008). It is also echoed in
the individual interview narratives. Ali explains his sense of alienation on
the gay scene with the metaphor of being 'out of place':

And none of those places, I couldn't really associate ... I never found ... it just ... I don't know. The Asian people are very bitchy. But so are the white people, bitchy as well. It's just that I feel ... I felt a type of racism to be honest. I don't mind going to a white club with a group of Asian friends. But just to go with like ... I just feel out of place. I feel so out of place. Plus the music I don't really enjoy myself. But at the end of the day ... It may be like that, but I still have white friends.

Ali emphasizes that he has white friends several times throughout the interview. In this way he makes clear that he does not want to have his comments understood as a kind of 'reverse racism':

I've got all my gay friends and everything, and, I don't know, with them, they're like Asian, that's the only problem ... as if they're like Asian people. They're white but they're Asian. They watch Asian films, they've got Asian interests. They've got Asian partners. And whereas white white guys, it's just like ... I don't know, they just look at you or they look at you really like dirty eyes, and like 'what are these Pakis doing here?' type of thing. I don't know, that's the thing that goes on all these like ... all these like Asian, Paki ... that's the ... they say 'what are you lot doing here? I know, you couldn't find a mosque or something to go to?' I've heard those comments actually in a club. And I don't know, I think that things pissed me off.

Ali makes a distinction between different kinds of white gay men. First, he refers to his 'gay friends'. It is interesting that 'gay friends' stands here metonymically for white gay friends, which may indicate Ali's sense of a conflation of gay identity with white values and culture. At the same time, Ali also highlights the mimicry of these (white) friends who strongly engage with Asian culture (Bhabha, 1986). Ali finds their identification with Asian-ness problematic and rather uncanny: 'they're like Asian, that's the only problem ... as if they're like Asian people'. He comments that their Asian interests also extend to an interest in Asian men as sexual and intimate partners. I read his statements as a repudiation of exoticization (an issue Ali took up later by complaining about white men's lack of respect for physical boundaries and 'transgressive touching' in public gay spaces). Ali complains about the fetishization of Asian culture and brown bodies, a process aptly theorized by Sara Ahmed (2000) as 'stranger fetishism' and metaphorized by bell hooks (1992) with the image of 'eating the other'. Second, there are those white men which Ali refers to as the 'white white guys' who articulate more aggressive forms of racism. Thus, Ali's discussion focuses
on differences and nuances within the performativity of whiteness.\textsuperscript{6} He emphasizes the simultaneity of various cultural dynamics: outright racism and exclusion as much as inter-ethnic interaction, conviviality, intimacy and sexuality. Yet none of these contexts is free of power imbalances, with power clustering in the hands of ethnically and racially hegemonic white subjects. The participation of British South Asian men in gay culture highlights its – all too often disavowed – creolized nature. Their stories of racism are striking reminders that inter-ethnic interaction in British queer diaspora space is over-determined by postcoloniality.

Some men in the focus group felt sad about the lack of connection among queer British Asians in mainstream scene spaces and highly welcomed the creation of independent social and cultural spaces for Asian gay men, lesbians and bisexuals as a response to racism and exclusion. In the group discussion and the interviews South Asian gay and bisexual men stressed the importance of groups and events such as Shakti, Club Kali, Al-Fatiha UK, several groupings run by the Naz-Project in London, and groups in other cities, such as Bradford and Birmingham. The organizational network of LGBTQI South Asian groups has evolved since the year 2000, when I conducted most of the interviews presented in this chapter (Safra Project, 2002; 2004; Kawale, 2004; 2005). Some of these groups are sponsored by the health sector. Rizwan, who is himself running a group for South Asian men as part of his HIV prevention work, sees the primary purpose of these groups as a self-help and a mutual learning process which can stimulate individual and collective cultural development. Other groups, such as the Muslim organizations Safra Project, Al-Fatiha UK (and its successor organization Imaan) are primarily directed towards educational work and policy development as forms of political activism. These developments attest to the growth of a network of support groups and/or forms of self-organization. They can be framed as an integral part of a wider Queer South Asian counterpublic across (British) diaspora space (Fraser, 1997; Warner, 2002; Gopinath, 2005).

Social and cultural events such as South Asian Gay and Lesbian club nights, which have drawn enthusiastic crowds in cities such as London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leicester, are an important part of this counterpublic (Dudrah, 2006; Bassi, 2006, 2008). Located at the fringes of the pink economy, these clubs have enabled the celebration and assertion of queer desire in a primarily British South Asian setting and provide multi-focal and sensual points of cultural identification. The significance of bhangra (both Old Skool and Post Bhangra) and integration of Bollywood clips into individual and collective dance performances at these events, align them with wider cultural trends among young second- and third-generation South Asians who have developed and recycled bhangra and

\textsuperscript{6} See Tate 2005; 2009 on the performativity of race.
bollywood (in combinations with other genres of music and film) as an important mode for self-expression (Kaur and Kalra, 1996; Dudrah, 2007; 2008). Popular culture, arts, as much as politics, in a more narrow sense, drive the consolidation of British South Asian queer counter-publics as sites of creolized practices. The aesthetics enacted and produced at British South Asian LGBTQ club nights mix musical styles and cultural references in an indulgence of queer adaptations (cf. Dudrah, 2006). These events are shaped by profoundly creolizing dynamics – thus, they provide multiple points of connection which foster inclusivity. The multi-referentiality of identifications and cultural codes (for example, music, film clips, dress, dance styles, gender presentation) creolizes South Asian queer communities in that it keeps boundaries fluid to a certain extent. Yet even fluid boundaries are subject to contestation. Community definitions are negotiated across a wide range of positionalities around gendered, sexual, racial, ethnic, religious, class-related and political perspectives. As we will see in the next section, the question of non-monogamy, too, plays a role in this contestation of community practices.

Non-monogamy and cultural or religious values

Non-monogamy was a contested issue in the discussion with the members of Matai. Many group participants valued committed long-term relationships which they saw as incommensurable with non-monogamy. Many considered non-monogamy to be the accepted norm, in particular with regard to periods in which a person may not have a steady partner. Others saw non-monogamy as the perfect solution, particularly for people with a high ‘sex drive’. While there seemed to be a consensus that non-monogamy would in principle be a valid option for the people who are ‘up for it’, the revelation by one man that he has been in a non-monogamous relationship himself appeared to be quite confessional in the group context. Ali told me that he had been teased by friends because of his open approach to sexuality. Reflecting on his experience of being in an open relationship with a now ex-partner/lover, he identifies the combination of closeness and freedom as the most significant enjoyment linked with this experience.

Christian: What were the things you enjoyed about it?

Ali: The things we enjoyed in an open relationship … you have like all the things you have in a relationship, such as like the closeness … but at the end of the day you can just sleep with anyone else you like. That’s the thing. You can have the physical aspirations with anyone you want. And the person is not going to question you about it. Because they themselves have the same situation and they respect what you’re doing. That’s the main thing. He never once questioned me like that.
about ‘you’re sleeping with this person – I don’t want you to do that’. He never tried to put a hold on me. He gave me as much freedom and I never questioned him about what he did.

One man in the focus group session cautiously suggested that non-monogamy would not be commensurate with ‘Asian values’ and that sleeping around was basically a ‘white men’s thing’

Aalim: Culture [is] part of it, it’s like … no one actually said no, my parents or any Asian people didn’t actually say to you, dictate to be in a monogamous relationship. Bless you! But that’s just what I assumed that I should be, and you know when people like sleep around and just fuck and chuck …? It just seems like … I know it seems like a really ignorant question, but that’s what a white man would be … to me. Does anyone else feel that? I didn’t know this had started happening until I came back to the scene.

Bikhu: I’m sure there’s plenty of Asian men that do exactly the same thing. But …

Fadi: I’m sure, no doubt … [laughter].

Although Aalim’s thesis did not find approval in the group, his argument points to the existence of anti-pornsicuity discourses which deploy the language of ethnic essentialism (Klesse, 2007). Non-monogamy is also cast as problematic in certain religious discourses, very similar to homosexuality (cf. Yip, 2004). In an individual interview, Irfan explained that his non-monogamous relationship with a white non-Muslim partner was initially complicated by a sense of guilt on his part which stemmed from his worry that non-monogamy would be at odds with his commitment to Islam. Irfan worked out a different position for himself as time progressed. He describes the empowerment which he experienced as a Muslim gay man through engaging with Al-Fatiha UK as a central step in this development. Self-organizing and the creation of support structures and political campaigning groups is an essential part of forming alternative public spheres (Fraser, 1997). These queer counter-publics provide support and a discursive repertoire on subjectivity and community for British South Asian LGBTQ people to negotiate conflicting values in a more confident and assertive manner (Minwalla et al., 2005; Siraj, 2006; 2014; Jaspal and Cinirella, 2010). These groups are sites which stimulate the creolization of discourses on identity, intimacy and sexuality across the boundaries of different public spheres and ‘communities’. This undermines any claim to universalism, whether uttered in the name of a ‘gay community’ or religious or cultural South Asian authenticity. We can also see this denial of universalism in terms of the participants’ views on marriage and coming out.
Creolizing marriage, family and coming out

Some controversy emerged on the question about the commensurability of religion and gay identity or gay life. The discussion was primarily played out with references to Sikhism and Islam. Wijai, for example, argues that there would be no place for him as a gay man in Sikhism and that religion is designed for male–female couples and families: ‘You cannot be gay and, you know, follow the Sikh religion’. Others oppose this view and argue that whether in Sikhism or Islam this would be a matter of interpretation. They follow a relativistic argument or a critical hermeneutics which questions the absolute authority of religious traditions by highlighting inaccurate readings or socio-cultural specificity (Jivraj and de Jong, 2004; Yip, 2005; Shannahan, 2011).

The most controversial and emotionally charged issue was the question of marriage. Many participants felt pressured by the expectation of their families to marry and have children. One participant asked how other group members felt about gay men who marry but continue to have gay sex. Wijai rejected such an approach as being utterly unethical. He thought it was wrong to subject oneself to the pressure to marry (even if the pressure was high – in particular on women), if marriage was not an aspiration of one’s own

Wijai: I think that’s really out of order. I think that’s a really bad thing, to have … to marry a woman, yeah, and for a woman to be heterosexual, and you to go and sleep with men afterwards. You know, I think that’s just … that just takes the whole edge off marriage. You shouldn’t be married to the woman. You shouldn’t have kids with her in the first place. You shouldn’t … if you want to be with a man, you should be with a man not a woman.

Labib: Sorry, can I just say … some men just like to go with a man and have sex and that’s it …

Wijai: Oh, as a release?

Labib: …it doesn’t mean anything.

Wijai later goes on to explain that although he has lived openly as a gay man for many years he would not rule out the possibility of entering a heterosexual marriage with a female partner of his choice.

Other discussants, too, argued that not only ethical but also authentic practices of ‘cross-orientation’ marriage would be possible, based on the belief that the question whom to chose as a life partner is not (only) decided on the question of sexual attraction. These positions call into question universalistic
views of marriage which place Western constructions of (sexualized) romantic love at the heart of their understanding. South Asian practices of arranged marriage, for example, tend to appeal to different traditions of emotionality (Ahmad, 2006; Chantler, 2011). Research participants draw upon these broader cultural repertoires to make idiosyncratic life course decisions. By articulating these approaches within a gay-affirmative strategy they creolize both South Asian marriage cultures and lesbian, gay and bisexual marriage and family practices. Others who did not see such kinds of marriage as an option often found themselves in a serious dilemma. Kifayat told the group that he only just managed to avoid being married off against his wishes. Some saw it as risky to refuse marriage, since this could be interpreted as a sign of being gay which would carry the risk of the breakdown of family relationships. In individual interviews, Ali and Irfan talked about having been threatened or physically abused by family members when they were suspected of being or were found out to be gay. Ali was severely beaten up by a group of relatives. One family member made an attempt to take his life. He explains that he was sent to a private psychiatric institution, where he received conversion treatment, including electroshocks. Some participants evoked the possibility of entering a ‘marriage of convenience’ with a lesbian woman as the most ethical approach to their dilemma. Same-sex marriage was welcome by many, but the group was to a stronger degree preoccupied with the question of heterosexual marriage.7

Rizwan has been married in the past. His ex-wife and son are currently living in Pakistan. He explains that although marriage is important to him personally, the wish to make his family happy provided an important motivation to get married.

Christian: And your family? Did they, although they knew that you were gay at the time, they still expected you … would have liked you to marry?

Rizwan: Yes, yes. I mean, the Islamic religion, parents … there are certain things that parents are expected to do within the Islamic religion. And one of them is they expect their children to be married before they die. So that’s what my parents wanted me to do. […] And, sort of, you know … and they got me married up and I wanted them to be happy. You know, but they got me married up …

Not only Islamic, but also hegemonic South Asian family values expect young people to get married. ‘Getting married is a family obligation or

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7 I conducted the research before the introduction of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, at a time when few people expected such laws to become realized in such a short time.
duty. To not marry is to “defy the expectations of family and community”, argue Gera Patel and Krishna Maharaj (2000, 14) (see also Page and Yip, 2012). In South Asian culture, the family is frequently positioned differently with regard to the public/private distinction, coming out and/or the refusal to marry may not only result in being ostracized within the family but also in the wider community (see also Siraj, 2006 and Safra Project, 2002, which address Muslim LGBT men’s and women’s marriage issues respectively). Yet some participants in the group discussion challenge the assumption that coming out has necessarily to result in the breakdown of family relationships (see Bhugra, 1997; Minwalla et al., 2005). Wijai emphasized that his family was accepting and highly supportive of his sexuality and identity:

Bikhu: But I mean … Ok, but there’s a lot of Asian people who have come out to their families.

Wijai: Well I came out to my family, not like to my dad or grandparents, but my brothers and sisters and … and they’ve all known about me and they’ve seen me go on the gay scene, and they’ve seen me with people, and, erm, we haven’t had much of a discussion about you know, boyfriends or … they know, you know … But the thing is they’ve been supportive. Like ‘if any time you change your mind, you know, we’ll be there to support you – but if you don’t we’ll be still there’ type of thing. So they’re like pretty cool about it.

Kifayat: I think the kids are more OK with it nowadays with younger people than the older crowd.

Two men in my study, Irfan and Rizwan, were engaged in educational work against homophobia. They did this as out-gay men and members of LGBTQ organizations.

The debate among British South Asian gay and bisexual men brought to the fore a set of quite distinctive concerns around marriage which went beyond one-dimensional demands for formal same-sex marriage rights common among other participants in my study (Klesse, 2007). These concerns reveal the multiplicity of cultural understandings of personal autonomy, the relevance of coming out, the nature of love, the purpose of marriage and the content and scope of family obligation. The focus group discussion with members of Matai, a London-based support group for gay and bisexual British South Asians, can serve as an example of a (queer) micro-public. Different ideas and values (derived from different religious and cultural traditions, identity narratives or social movement ideologies) are negotiated, which in turn produces a creolized discourse on sexuality and relationality. This entails novel and multiple identifications, the creation of complex and partially ambiguous community
affiliations, the contestation of cultural and religious values, innovative redefinitions of kinship and marriage and the re-envisioning of life course narratives.

**Conclusion. Beyond multiculturalism: the creolization of queer South Asian public spheres**

Gaytari Gopinath (2005, 20) uses the term ‘South Asian public cultures’ to name the myriad cultural forms and practices through which queer subjects articulate new modes of collectivity and kinship and reject the ethnic and religious absolutism of multiple nationalisms, while simultaneously resisting Euro-American, heteronormative models of sexual alterity.

In this chapter, I have brought her notion of ‘South Asian public cultures’ in dialogue with the ‘counterpublic’ concept which has inspired feminist, lesbian, gay, and queer political theory throughout the last two decades. Gopinath uses ‘queer diaspora’ primarily as an intellectual method rather than as a noun for an empirical entity. Thus her analysis tends to avoid drifting towards the romanticism that shapes some of the more celebratory texts on ‘counter-publicity’ and ‘counter-normativity’. Gopinath emphasizes that diasporic identities and desires emerge through fragile links established across uneven terrains shaped by power, violence and displacement. Here Gopinath’s public sphere argument further resonates with creolization theory.

The research participants articulate experiences which are distinctive to British South Asian gay and bisexual men. Yet even if it is possible to identify the salience of certain issues their narratives do not establish a unified discourse. The overt disagreements among participants in the group discussion on ethical, cultural, religious, political and relational values attest to the ‘unbounded’ character and the contested nature of (queer) diaspora space. Research participants defined their identities, fashioned their styles of intimacy and shaped their ideas on sexual politics by drawing on a wide range of discursive resources derived from gay rights or gay liberationist frameworks, secular or religious ethics or individualist or communal life course narratives. These positions are worked out in a diasporic setting and are sustained by an emerging British South Asian queer counter-public. The novelty of this discursive formation and the cultural practices they build upon can be interpreted through Glissant (2010b) as an effect of creolization. Deploying a creolization perspective diminishes the risk that the notion of public spheres may relapse into the generalizing assumptions which have
been characteristic of orthodox multiculturalisms (Holt, 1995). A creolization perspective prevents a closure of the concept of public spheres. It highlights a plurality of perspectives which allows for making visible internal differences and antagonisms.

I have turned to creolization because more than any other paradigm of mixing it foregrounds power, domination, agency and contestation. British South Asian research participants’ narratives unsettle taken-for-granted ideas on identity, sexuality and intimacy commonly promoted in British South Asian ethnic, national or religious or white mainstream British or European LGBTQ community discourses. In the face of white racism and hegemony in mainstream LGBTQ spaces they call into question the beneficial nature of a ‘gay community discourse’. Their voices echo complaints raised for many decades by sexual dissidents of South Asian origin residing in societies of the ‘West’ or the global North (Gupta, 1989; Ratti, 1993; Leong, 1996; Eng and Hom, 1998). Their criticism highlights the invisibility or non-intelligibility of South Asian ‘queer’ embodiment and subjectivity, the exoticization of brown bodies and the prevalence of racism in ‘gay spaces’ (Roy, 1998; Nasir, 2006; Baddrudoja, 2008). At the same time, they challenge the patriarchal and heteronormative character of mainstream and conservative South Asian diasporic cultures which render it difficult for non-heterosexuals, transgender people and gender-dissidents openly to express their identities or desires. Envisaging non-heteronormative sexualities and intimacies, they tread new and often risky territories. Their complex narratives on identity, desire, culture and politics show not only the ‘queering’ of diaspora or the ‘diasporization’ of queer thought and politics. They further attest to the creolizing nature of these processes and their potential to unsettle current orthodoxies on ‘gay space’, ‘British’ or ‘South Asian’ culture, sexual identity and orientation, the ‘nature’ of love, the purpose of community and queer kinship and families.

Works Cited


8 Such risks become evident in the talk of the gay and lesbian public sphere, or the black public sphere, or the South Asian public sphere or the queer South Asian public sphere, for that matter (Baker, 1995; Holt, 1995; Plummer, 2003).


Chapter 9

On Being Portuguese: *Luso-tropicalism, Migrations and the Politics of Citizenship*

*José Carlos Pina Almeida and David Corkill*

**Introduction**

Social sciences have borrowed the term creolization from linguists who tracked the emergence of new languages from two or more pre-existing languages. Although a fluid concept, creolization generally refers to the socio-cultural results of the interaction between African slaves, European settlers, Asian indentured workers and indigenous peoples. Cultural creolization, understood as the intermingling and mixing of two, or several, formerly discrete traditions or cultures, has been applied to societies such as Louisiana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Réunion and Mauritius (Spitzer 2003; Eriksen 2007). Ever since the word was coined by the Portuguese and Spanish explorers during the sixteenth century, *creole* (*crioulo* in Portuguese) and *creolization* have meant different things in different times and places (Stewart 2007). For example, today, while *crioulo* refers to the official language in Cape Verde, it has come to mean also Cape Verdean identity and culture.

If we think about this usage of creolization as identity and culture, Portugal has had a creolized past and continues to have a creolized present. However, in Portugal, the terms *miscigenação* and *mestiçagem* are more commonly used in preference to creolization to refer to cultural and racial
mixing and thhave been at the center of the debates on national identity for most of the twentieth century. As will be discussed in this chapter, much debate has been generated by Gilberto Freyre’s work on Luso-tropicalism, a term that has been employed to analyze racial and cultural mixing in the wider Portuguese-speaking context (Caldeira, 1993; Venâncio, 2000; Vale de Almeida, 2007), just as creolization has been used to analyze societies in the Caribbean and elsewhere. Creolization emphasizes constant contact, creative interplay and transformation in the societies, cultures and bodies that are its result (Hannerz, 1992; Boisvert, 2005), and one of the main ideas behind Freyre’s work on Luso-tropicalism was the appreciation and normalization of miscegenation (Venâncio, 2000). As Riesz (2000, 105) puts it, Luso-tropicalism is a ‘rehabilitation and appreciation of the indigenous and African contribution to the Brazilian nation and culture’, in what could be seen as a ‘contraposition to a colonial way of writing history which highlights the white and European contribution’. Of course, Luso-tropicalism erased the horrors of the slave trade in which Portugal engaged for centuries in order to build its Empire and metropole, as well as the racialized, gendered and classed relations within the coloniality of power.

Although Freyre’s work focused initially on Brazil, his work was used politically by António de Oliveira Salazar’s Estado Novo (New State) dictatorship (1926–74) in Portugal and has been employed as an important framework for analyzing Portuguese society and its relations with the Portuguese-speaking world (Castelo, 1998; Moreira and Venâncio, 2000). In fact, the idea of the Portuguese as a people with ‘a special vocation’ for contacts and mixing with other cultures remained a very strong feature of any discourse of national identity in postcolonial Portugal and was widely celebrated in Portugal throughout the twentieth century by both the Salazar regime and the democracy established following the 1974 revolution, which marked the end of the Portuguese Empire. The Estado Novo regime adopted the idea of the Portuguese as the most humane of colonialists and the myth of a non-racist culture to claim ideological legitimacy for colonialism. In the 1990s, the democratic regime celebrated the same history but this time as a meeting of cultures to reconstruct the nation as a historically humanist, universalist and non-racist one. As we will see in this chapter, Portuguese national identity was itself creolized through this Luso-tropical way of seeing Portugal and the world. This was especially useful in the context of growing immigration flows into Portugal from its former African colonies and the creation of a multicultural ethos in Portuguese society. It has influenced not only self-perceptions and ways of seeing the world but also the politics of nationhood and citizenship, and these have, in turn, influenced recent population flows into Portugal, Europe and the United Kingdom. In fact, immigration and emigration have been closely related in Portugal and many of those who migrated from former Portuguese colonies to Portugal became a significant part of recent migration flows from Portugal to Europe and, in particular, to the United Kingdom.
This chapter argues that in Portugal the debate has raged around luso-tropicalism and miscegenation rather than creolization. Moreover, the role of the state has been crucial under both dictatorship and democracy in popularizing luso-tropicalism and in reconstructing it within the national narrative. As a consequence, the lusotropicalist ‘ideology’ was responsible for a ‘multicultural blindness’ when Portuguese society became increasingly diverse during the 1990s. The tensions and contradictions between a racism-free ideological discourse and reality surfaced and brought renewed challenges to the understanding of postcolonial Portuguese society.

**Travel, race and empire**

The sixteenth-century voyages of the Portuguese, widely known in Portugal as the Discoveries, provided early experiences of radical cultural differences which had a profound impact on Western culture. It encouraged white Europeans to start a process of self-examination and initiated an extensive discourse – a cultural and scientific debate – about race (Lively, 1998). The term ‘discoveries’ is itself troubling as it denies the existence of indigenous people and deracines the colonial project. European racism was a reality even before it became known as such, as a result of the encounters with the Other – most often a dominated Other in the context of colonialism (Wieviorka, 1995). During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, racism developed as a legitimizing ideology for white European conquest and colonization. European scientists in the nineteenth century systematized and catalogued human beings into races, sub-races, types and sub-types, according to the results of measurements of skulls, length of arms, color of the skin, texture of the hair, shape of the lips, size of the nose, etc. (Anon. 1995 [1818]; Souta, 1997; Fenton, 1999).

In Portugal, as in European other countries, one of the main concerns of early twentieth-century anthropology was the racial definition of the Portuguese and a strong opposition to miscegenation in the colonies, an approach common among scholars such as Eusébio Tamagnini and Mendes Correia (Vale de Almeida, 2008). The rationale for colonialism was provided by Social Darwinism. The white man felt superior and had a scientific legitimacy to justify the domination of other peoples. In the colonial-political and cultural order the rulers were defined as representatives of a superior civilization. The Others were considered ‘backward races’, as defined during the Salazar era in the official discourse. Even if, to some, the color of the skin should be considered only a distinctive, rather than a hierarchical factor, it was said that ‘the historical fact is that the white race became civilised and the black race has not […] [the true concept should be] civilised races and races not yet civilised; races that progressed and races that stagnated’ (Camacho, 1936). The Portuguese state was therefore conceived, above all, as a civilizing state and that was to be Portugal’s historic
mission (Carneiro, 1949; Lencastre, 1932; Salazar, 1935). This was stated clearly in the Colonial Act, a document upon which relations between the metropole and the colonies were based during Salazar’s dictatorship. The second article proclaimed:

It is the organic essence of the Portuguese Nation to carry out the historical function of possession and colonisation of overseas domains and to civilise the [inhabitant] indigenous populations, exerting also moral influence. (quoted in Jesus, 1932)

In this context, notions such as purity were at the center of the public debates about the nation. Miscegenation overseas and some ‘mixed blood’ in the metropole were often viewed as undesirable consequences of the Portuguese Discoveries and colonial expansion, having ‘painful moral and social aspects’ (Corrêa, 1940: 224). Freyre’s thesis was not immediately accepted given the spread of the ideas about race described above. It was only later, as the need to legitimize the late colonial and imperial nature of Portugal became stronger after World War II, that the notion of Luso-tropicalism become politically very apposite for the regime (Almeida, 2005; Vale de Almeida, 2007).

**Luso-tropicalism and colonialism**

Freyre, a Brazilian sociologist, writing in 1931 about the example of the plantations in Brazil, presented his theory for the first time. That is, that the scarcity of white women created zones of interaction between winners and losers, masters and slaves. The relations between white men and black women were relations between ‘superior with inferior’. Nevertheless, it was the miscegenation that allowed the ‘correction of the social distance which otherwise would have been maintained’ between the casa-grande (the plantation great house) and the senzala (the slave hut) (Freyre, 1964). Freyre considered miscegenation to be pivotal in the democratization of the semi-feudal society created by the system of monoculture in Brazil (Freyre 1964: xxxiii–xxxiv).

Freyre presented his theory for the first time in the early 1930s and over the subsequent decades traveled and wrote about the Lusophone world, promoting the idea that Portugal was an exception as a colonial power. The Portuguese, according to him, were able to create a new civilization in Brazil, India, Timor and Africa, based not only on Christian values but on racial mixing. According to Freyre (1958, 33), the distinguishable characteristic of such ‘Lusotropical civilization’ would be its ‘singularly symbiotic character of the union of European with tropic’. The Portuguese in the tropics would have been neither a true European nor an orthodox imperialist. The Portuguese
became dark, tanned and brown like them and when he remained white he often became the procreator of brown offspring. He absorbed tropical values and peppered his own Lusitanism with Orientalisms, Africanisms and Americanisms. He thus gave his own and their civilisations a mestizo quality of which Manucline architecture and Indo-Portuguese art are examples. (Show, 1957, 403)

Their Europeanism was diluted, even in Europe, by admixtures with the Arab and Jew. This would explain the easier fraternization of the Portuguese with the Oriental, African and American peoples subject to his domination. To Show (1957, 386–387), that was one of the reasons why ‘one of the least populous nations of Europe would carry out a job [of slavery and colonialism] generally demanding highly populated homelands’.

During the early twentieth century, the European colonialists criticized the inefficiency of Portuguese colonialism and the Portuguese reacted to this as if miscegenation was a kind of a shame. However, these attitudes towards race and mixing evolved as Gilberto Freyre’s theory about the Portuguese presence in the tropics was eagerly appropriated by the dictatorship. Freyre (1958, 29) rejected the notions that Portuguese colonialism was inefficient and that miscegenation was shameful preferring to focus on what he called the ‘repugnant colonialism for the African peoples’ as practiced by the Northern Europeans. Luso-tropicalism would be the result ‘not of simple transference of means and values from one environment to another, but of integration’ (41) reflected in the ‘sensibility to the methods, techniques and values of the tropical peoples’ (21). To Freyre (29), the societies resulting from such ‘civilization’ would be ‘with all their imperfections, much more democratic, in their essential styles of human sociability, than the colonial societies, even when politically democratic dominated by northern Europeans or Anglo-Saxons in the tropics’.

He argues that the movements of Pan-Asianism and Pan-Africanism which represent reactions to the ethno-centric spirit of Europeans did not affect the Portuguese, because that ethno-centric basis ‘was nearly always exceeded or surpassed by the Christocentric spirit’ (Freyre, 1958, 19). In this kind of civilization, skin would have ceased to be an identifying factor. The mestizos and mulattos would have been incorporated into the Portuguese or Christian community as equals, not as inferiors. But, to Show (1957), miscegenation was not the only colonization technique of the Portuguese. Also evident was their mild treatment of the slaves, in which color, creed and class prejudices were absent. To him, this different Portuguese experience was the result of Muslim influences in Portuguese culture and ‘blood’. Despite the apparent contradiction between the claimed Christian values

1 The colonial war started in 1961, three years after Freyre’s paper was published. It lasted until 1974, leading to the end of the last and longest-lasting colonial empire.
and the acceptance of slavery, Show (1957, 400–401) considered the mobilization of mestizos, mulattos and aborigines a ‘revolutionary sociological action or reaction against conventions grounded on a biological basis’.

The myths of the Portuguese people and nation developed through luso-tropicalism were augmented further when Portuguese anthropologist Jorge Dias (1950) developed Freyre’s proposals in the 1950s. To him, a constant of Portuguese culture is ‘the profound humane feeling, based on an affective, amorous and kind temperament. To the Portuguese, the heart is the measure for all things’ (Dias, 1950, 34). This explained in his view why the Portuguese expansion was ‘more maritime and explorer than conqueror’ (15). Another constant would be the capacity of adaptation of the Portuguese to peoples, climates, cultures, languages etc. While the English remain English everywhere and the German when he is no longer German will hardly be German ever again, the Portuguese assimilated completely in terms of the saying: ‘In Rome be Roman’. As was said above, this romanticized slavery and colonialism, both of which were brutal racialized systems of societal, cultural, economic and political white hegemony.

The capacity to adapt, their human sympathy and their amorous temperament were seen as the keys to Portuguese colonization. The Portuguese assimilated, adapted. According to Dias (1950), they never felt repugnance towards other races and were always relatively tolerant towards other cultures and religions. While to Corrêa (1940), miscegenation was viewed as a historical accident in Portuguese expansion, to Freyre and his followers, it was at its core. Resuming the Arabic tradition by which one drop of Portuguese blood meant a new Portuguese, the Portuguese managed to create a ‘Pax Lusitana, different from the Roman and the British. A peace deriving solely from the singular Portuguese capacity to fraternise with the peoples of the tropics, to love tropical nature and tropical values, to dissolve amorously in this nature and values without the loss of a Christian sense of life’ (Show, 1957, 402). Portuguese miscegenation does not have an exclusive sensual explanation, although it is characterized by a strong sexuality.

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2 The literary work of the Jesuit priest António Vieira (1608–1697) reflected the contradictions of his time in Brazil, between the incompatibility of the colonial system and a fair government, the demand for freedom and the legal existence of slavery. Vieira advocated these principles but argued for social and institutional stability that in practice negated them (Palacin, 1986).

3 There is a famous a poem by Camões expressing his love for a slave:

Aquela cativa
Que me tem cativo,
Porque nela vivo
Já não quer que viva.

Pretidão de amor,
Tão doce a figura,
Portuguese expansion was mainly a *male adventure*, thus, mixing was also mainly of Portuguese men with black women. According to Dias (1950), the Portuguese have an inherited inclination to women of other *races* and are capable of showing great affection or profound love. These feelings are so deep that ‘the Portuguese do not like just some races, but all’ (Dias, 1950, 54).

Although contradictory and naive at times the notion that the Portuguese had created a hybrid civilization in the tropics through miscegenation was manna from heaven for the Portuguese New State’s propaganda machine (Castelo, 1998; Almeida, 2005). Salazar employed it to legitimize his colonialist ideology especially after the 1950s when anticolonial movements began to appear. As part of the ideological legitimization of the empire, the New State denied any ethno-centric definition of national identity. As late as 1967, in a context of increased international isolation due to the colonial war in Africa, Franco Nogueira, the Portuguese Foreign minister, was still presenting the Portuguese overseas policy as an example of success:

> Only *we*, before anybody else, took to Africa the idea of human rights and racial equality. *Only we* have practised the ‘multiracialism’, the most perfect expression of fraternity between peoples. Nobody in the world contests the validity of this principle but they hesitate in admitting that this is a Portuguese invention and recognising it, could increase our authority in the world. (quoted in Ferro, 1996, 177)

Salazar’s regime had celebrated the ‘Portuguese world’ in a major exhibition in 1940, when Portugal possessed an extensive colonial empire (Corkill and Almeida, 2009). In the double centenary commemorations of 1940,4 the *virtues of the civilizing race* were celebrated. In 1960, when Portugal commemorated Henry The Navigator, the imperialist nature of the regime was already subject to international criticism. Therefore, the emphasis of those celebrations changed to the missions and the scientific discoveries. In 1986, a large programme of commemorations started to celebrate the fifth centenary of the *Discoveries*. In the late 1990s, two major moments were celebrated, the fifth centenary of the *discovery of the maritime route to India* in 1998, and the *discovery of Brazil* in 2000. The very naming of these events

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*Que a neve lhe jura*
*Que trocara a cor.*

This poem has been read as an example of the Portuguese ideal of expansion. On the one hand, it expresses the acceptance of the slave as a woman; on the other hand, it is the valorization of a different type of beauty, expressing the attraction for the black color (Ribeiro, 1994).

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4 In 1940, Portugal celebrated a triple centenary: the foundation of the nation (1140), the restoration of independence (1640) and the peak of its overseas colonial expansion (1540). However, the emphasis was placed on the first two and the celebrations came to be known as ‘the double centenary’.
as ‘discovery’ negates the brutality of conquest, colonization and the traffic in humans and other merchandize. As part of the celebrations, Portugal organized a large international exhibition in 1998. Although the idea of a world exhibition in Lisbon arose from the National Commission for the Commemoration of the Portuguese Discoveries, the Portuguese exhibition had as its general theme ‘the oceans – a heritage for the future’. The main attraction in the Portuguese pavilion was a film of animated iconography based on the famous Japanese *Namban Screens*. It represented the meeting between the Portuguese and the Japanese in 1543 and transmitted the way the Japanese saw the Portuguese in those first meetings. *We were presented in the way the other saw us.* Some characters and scenes of Japanese paintings were chosen to reconstruct the history of a voyage from Lisbon to Japan. In these screens of the early seventeenth century, the Japanese painted with great detail everything that impressed them in their first contact with the Portuguese. It was said in the introduction to the film that there was an ‘astonished, amused […] look about this western people with strange habits – and big noses – that brought exotic animals, unknown objects like the glasses of some Jesuit priests or the guns that changed the course of Japanese history’.

When the new cycle of commemorations started, only ten years after the collapse of the colonial empire, the metaphor of the ‘meetings’ or ‘encounters’ replaced that of the ‘discoveries’. Portugal reconstructed its ‘collective memory in a way that allowed it to share it with the whole Lusophone world’ (Hespanha, 1999, 18). This was especially useful in the context of renegotiation of its semi-peripheric role in the world (Sousa Santos, 1992; Almeida, 2004). As part of the reconstruction of Portugal’s relationship with the Lusophone world, language has often been conceived as the spiritual union, which unites not only all Portuguese nationals and descendants but also all Lusophone-speaking people. This lay behind the creation of the CPLP (Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries – something akin to the Anglophone Commonwealth) and Lusophony itself.

**Nationhood, migrations and the politics of citizenship**

As a colonial power, under the general Luso-tropicalist narrative, Portugal created a supposedly inclusive model of citizenship as a way of integrating its colonial subjects. By the 1960s, students in the country’s schools and universities were being taught that Portugal was a pluri-continental country, bigger than Spain, France, Germany and Italy put together, where the sun

5 The word *Namban* means ‘the barbarian’ or ‘the savage’.

6 It represented the view of the Portuguese through Japanese eyes and is interesting because the Japanese were not subject to direct colonial rule.
never sets, in which other peoples were integrated based on multiracial and non-discriminatory principles, forming a part of the same unified pátria:

Many races – One Nation
Whites, blacks, yellows and mestizos
All are Portuguese (Serviços de Instrução de Moçambique, 1962, 7)

The nation and the empire were represented in moral terms. The non-racist, human, universal nature of the empire was expressed in the illustrations in the schoolbooks through, for example, the image of a mother figure of the nation embracing two sons, one black and one white. As part of this ideological discourse that legitimized colonialism, citizenship was supposed to be based on an all-embracing principle, including all imperial subjects irrespective of color. However, as Davidson (1988, 46) highlighted, ‘the authority and power were white, while the subservience and obedience were black’. In the colonies of mainland Africa a distinction was made between white settlers, assimilado, and the indigenous, ‘uncivilized’ population; furthermore, legal dispositions granted the control of the rights and labor of colonized peoples to the colonizers (Vale de Almeida, 2008). As Miles (1989, 111) argues, ‘racism became a relation of production, in which the white race was destined to rule politically and to organise and direct production, and the African race was destined to provide the labour power necessary to produce the surplus’. In the Portuguese Empire, given the lack of white men from the metropolis, the Cape Verdian mestizos were employed in the colonial administration. Portuguese citizenship was given to the Cape Verdians in 1914, within a policy of assimilation which educated them to do low-ranking jobs in the colonial administration in other parts of the empire (Querido, 1989). Cape Verde was seen as an extension of Portugal. Elsewhere, the indigenous code of 1954 clearly stated that in order to become assimilated and cease to be indigenous, thereby gaining access to Portuguese citizenship, one had to be over eighteen years old, able to express oneself correctly in Portuguese, be employed in a profession, dress in a proper European style, wear shoes and eat according to European manners. This arrangement had the gate-keeping function of safeguarding Portuguese citizenship as white. Thus, in practice, for example, the percentage of Angolans who were granted Portuguese citizenship under the indigenato law code never exceeded one per cent (Reiter, 2005).

As the Estado Novo regime claimed the Luso-tropical heritage to legitimize its overseas policy in the 1960s and early 1970s, 140,000 people were mobilized in order to fight the colonial wars in Africa. Also 700,000 people emigrated from Portugal mainly into Western Europe, many escaping compulsory military recruitment. This caused a shortage of the labor required for the public works programme and the construction boom in the Algarve which began in this period. This was resolved by the state using its colonial metropolitan status. In fact, we can trace the origins of the current
major immigrant communities in Portugal to the period of 1966 to 1973, during which a special department to support the process (CATU – Centre to Support Ultramarine Workers) was created. For that purpose a ship was chartered in 1967 to import workers from Cape Verde (França, 1992).

Immigration and emigration have always been closely related in Portugal. Under the New State, the attitudes of the dictatorship towards the emigration of many thousands of white Portuguese men to European countries such as France and Germany remained ambivalent, including a certain tolerance towards the numerous passadores who smuggled many thousands of Portuguese peasants across Spain and into France in the 1960s. The laws regarding emigration were restrictive. However, the family separation they provoked, by averting its eyes from the clandestine emigration, encouraged remittances. In this way the state ensured a steady flow of emigrant remittances into Portugal, which became particularly useful in a context of very costly colonial wars in Africa. In this period, emigration also acted as a 'safety valve' regarding aspirations for change (Pereira, 1981; Brettell, 2003).

In the postcolonial era, the re-imagination of a special relationship with its former colonial subjects, by which Lusophone citizens became 'more equal than others' (Marques, 2004), not only materialized in the creation of the CPLP, it also had practical effects on the nationality law (Ramos, 2000) and on the norms for granting citizenship or acquiring residency status. After the collapse of both the Salazar regime and the colonial empire in 1974, the 1981 Law of Nationality shifted from jus soli – granting citizenship to those born in Portuguese territory, including parts of Africa – to jus sanguini – which grants citizenship to people of Portuguese descent. Under this law, people from Portuguese-speaking countries benefited until 2006 from special conditions for the acquisition of Portuguese nationality, either because they had Portuguese ancestry or because of the other benefits included in the law such as a shorter period of residence in the country required. Data available on the naturalization processes received by the Portuguese border agency SEF (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras) show that, until 2006, around 90 percent of the cases were from people originally from the PALOP (Portuguese-speaking African Countries) and Brazil. In fact, in the 1990s,

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7 This term refers to the men who acted as ‘guides’ for many illegal emigrants in their long and dangerous voyages through Spain into France. Often a significant part of the journey was made on foot, out of view of the authorities. Portugal had a very restrictive law on emigration and it was a crime to leave the country without a passport. Many clandestine emigrants decided to leave the country to look for a better life and to escape the compulsory military service that could last for four years when the colonial wars in Africa escalated (Brettell, 2003).

8 The Lei Organica n.º 2/2006 introduced important changes to the rules of access to Portuguese nationality, making it easier for people born in the Portuguese territory as it granted citizenship ‘to people who have a strong connection with Portugal.’ As a result,
Portugal became one of the European countries with the biggest proportion of African migrants (from the PALOP) and South-American immigration (from Brazil) (Machado, 1997).

Regular and irregular immigration flows from African Countries such as Cape Verde and Angola into Portugal continued to increase, attracted by the modernization process of the 1980s and 1990s and the need for labor for the major construction works such as the Vasco da Gama Bridge or Expo ’98, among others. These African immigrants came to join those who were living in Portugal since the 1960s and 1970s, many of whom had Portuguese citizenship themselves. When the economy started faltering in the early 2000s, many joined the white Portuguese in the recent emigration flows from Portugal to the rest of Europe and in particular to the United Kingdom. Portugal functioned therefore as a springboard to other more economically attractive countries, where the wages are generally better (Almeida, 2007; Almeida and Corkill, 2010) and, to the United Kingdom, where a large Lusophone population has been settling since the early 2000s.

These recent flows can be compared in terms of numbers with those from the 1960s and 1970s. However, one fundamental difference is that many people that have been migrating recently were themselves originally African and Brazilian immigrants in Portugal. In the context of the Schengen Agreement and free movement within the EU, having a European nationality became a very important asset for those who wanted to live and work in Europe. In fact, previous research (Almeida, 2007) shows that a significant number of Portuguese nationals living in the United Kingdom are people born outside Portugal, or people that attained Portuguese nationality through descent, with Angola, India, Mozambique, Brazil, South Africa and China (Macau) being the leading countries of origin in this respect. There are also some interesting regional concentrations, such as people with African origins in the Manchester area, a small East-Timorese community in Crewe and a significant Indian and Mozambican-born population in Leicester (Bastos, 2008). Given the fact that Mozambique has an important Indian population and that Mozambique has traditionally been a point of passage in the migration from India (mainly Goa) to Portugal and the United Kingdom (Malheiros, 1996), it is possible that many of these Mozambicans may well be people with roots in India. The language, historical and colonial links with the United Kingdom and Portugal help to explain why this route might be used to gain entry into the EU by citizens from South Africa, India or Zimbabwe. Furthermore, some of these countries are traditional destinations for Portuguese emigration, which might also be an indication of mobility amongst the Portuguese diaspora, for example, second generation emigrants, a growing number of immigrants were granted naturalization, such as people from countries including Moldova, India, Ukraine and Russia that have sizeable immigrant communities in Portugal.
born in countries such as South Africa, Venezuela or France (Almeida, 2007). These flows have created an increasingly diverse Portuguese-speaking community in the United Kingdom. As in Portugal, the image of a wider Lusophone community with different peoples living in harmony is often reproduced.

**Luso-tropicalism and racism**

In the ‘age of migration’ (Castles and Miller, 1993) in which we live, Portugal became an immigration country in the 1990s, mainly from its former colonies, and began to experience growing diversity, caused mainly by global migration and from the fact that minority groups demanded more cultural and political recognition (May, 2001). In the postcolonial era, ‘the ideas of inherent ethnic and racial difference were “re-imported” into the colonial homeland […] and re-emerged when peoples of former colonies were incorporated into the economic and political systems of the colonial centre’ (Fenton, 1999, 46). As was the case elsewhere, racism became more visible as Portuguese society became more diverse. However, the lusotropicalist view of the nation has been reconstructed in postcolonial Portugal and an image of exception has been reconstructed by the Portuguese state (Almeida, 2005). Thus, the attitude of the state has been one of ‘multicultural blindness’ (Souta, 1997) presenting Portugal as an exemplary country in handling diversity through miscegenation and fusion with the Other. After the traumatic colonial wars and the decolonization process, Portugal initiated a period of soul-searching over its colonial past. In this process the state has also breathed new life into its colonial contacts and mixing with other peoples as one of the main heritages of the past, reproducing again the myths of the Portuguese as the most humane of colonialists and practitioners of a non-racist culture which is part of a wider Lusophone pattern of acceptance of multi-ethnicity and intermarriage. As immigration flows increased in the 1990s, many immigrant associations began to demand better living conditions for the recently arrived immigrants, who lived in ‘precarious situations, in a strange environment, making them targets of marginalization and intimidating actions provoked by their living conditions and because their costumes and skin are different’ (‘O regresso das Caravelas’, n.d.). In the same pamphlet, however, Fernando Dacosta, a Portuguese intellectual, expressed the general optimistic view about the future relationship between them and us because we are ‘miscegenated by heart, by skin, by freedom. The affection is mutual […] going beyond the government relationships or system conveniences. The language is our root of unity, of reunion’ (‘O regresso das Caravelas’, n.d.). This constant reaffirmation of the universalist and humanist character of Portuguese national culture creates a culture of denial, where prejudice and racism are perceived as non-existent problems in Portugal given its supposedly tolerant and
non-racist culture. Racism was rather perceived by the political elite as a form of social exclusion, typical of capitalist societies, which can be resolved satisfactorily at the economic level (Almeida, 2005).

Although this assumption that racism in Portugal is simply a contingent and eminently manageable problem of economic exclusion seems too optimistic, the myth of a racially democratic and humane Luso-tropical civilization remains a constant reason for celebration. However, for the majority of the twentieth century, the population in Portugal remained very homogeneous. It was, therefore, not difficult to claim a non-racist culture because the different Other remained something exotic and distant from the metropole. Hermínio Martins (1998, 99), wrote in 1971, during his exile in the United Kingdom, that Portugal

[i]s not a plural society because unlike other ex-imperial powers, it has not absorbed yet any significant fraction of its colonial or ex-colonial subjects and, therefore, hasn't diversified its ethno-cultural composition. Paradoxically, for an oceanic society, Portugal has been quite successful in the exportation of this ethno-cultural diversity.

Portugal, not only traditionally an emigration country but also pictured as one of the most homogeneous nation states, became a multi-ethnic country and, therefore, faces similar challenges to its European postcolonial neighbors, such as racism and nostalgia for the colonial past. The attitudes towards the Other inside national borders seem sometimes not to be as encouraging as the political correctness of the elite's representation of the nation suggests. However, when these Portuguese nationals born outside Portugal emigrate, they are no longer the Other. They become us as Portuguese emigrants and form part of the Portuguese diaspora. Symbolically, the term emigrante (emigrant) is, for the Portuguese, a core cultural meaning and one that is highly charged.

The history of contact initiated by the navigators and carried on by emigrants is seen by some as Portugal’s greatest asset and both discoverers and emigrantes have been widely celebrated in popular culture. They both contributed to spreading the language and to making Portugal a ‘major power’. The emigrant is also fundamental to the Portuguese culture and its ecumenical and racially tolerant world view. Throughout history, migrants have been navegadores (navigators), colonos (settlers) and emigrantes. Each was a symbol attuned to historical and politico-economic circumstances: the navegador in the age of discovery, the colono in the age of settlement, the emigrante in the postcolonial period (Brettell, 2003). The way they integrated and related with local societies also varied. Despite many similarities with the patterns of migration and settlement in other countries in Europe (Salt and Almeida 2006; Almeida and Corkill 2010), there are also significant differences. Just like the first-generation immigrants in France (Villanova, 2006) there are indications of obstacles to integration,
principally the inability to speak the host-country language. One of the major differences, however, is related to diversity within the community itself. In fact, Portuguese emigration in the 1960s to the rest of Europe was almost exclusively white. As seen above, the Portuguese community in the United Kingdom is increasingly diverse and this is related, at least in part, to the increasing diversity in Portuguese society brought about by migrant inflows which in turn were caused by the influences of Luso-tropicalism in the laws that rule nationhood and citizenship in Portugal. There is also some evidence that as they become us in the context of the diaspora, the tensions and contradictions of modern Portuguese society in dealing with diversity are also exported (Almeida and Corkill, 2010). This growing diversity both in the homeland and amongst the Portuguese diaspora is, therefore, an enormous challenge in a culture used to seeing itself as an example of universalism and humanism and accustomed to consider itself part of a Lusophone racism-free area.

Conclusion

The state in Portugal has promoted an image of exceptionalism regarding racial and cultural mixing through the idea of Luso-tropicalism. This negates past and present Portuguese racism while seeming to engage with a Glissantian creolization which goes beyond métissage while remaining firmly embedded within métissage itself. Luso-tropicalism then was a creolity which sought origins and remained wedded to essentialism. As such it could not erase the importance of racial difference and its structuration of societies both in the metropole and colony but was imbricated with it. Before 1974, luso-tropicalism as discourse was especially useful to the empire in claiming historical legitimacy. After the democratic revolution and the collapse of the colonial empire, it also became useful as part of the reconstruction of relationships with its former colonial subjects and in managing increasing population diversity caused by immigration flows from its previous African territories in the 1990s. In this context, Portugal maintained some exceptions in its nationality law, namely the requirement of a shorter period of residence in the country to citizens from Portuguese-speaking countries.

Ethnicity and racism became part of the public debates about the nation, largely contrasting the multicultural blindness of the state and the self-referential and self-congratulatory state representations of Portuguese culture, for example, in the World Exhibition, Expo ‘98. In this World Exhibition, as part of the celebrations of the fifth centenary of the Discoveries, several symbols recurrent to the maritime historical tradition were used. The ideological view of the past, which makes little or no reference to slavery, was reconstructed under the ‘politically correct’ theme of ‘The Oceans’ (Almeida, 2005).

As Portugal became an immigration country in the 1990s, it did not
stop being an emigration country. In fact, this status has been recently reinforced by large population outflows. These recent emigration flows from Portugal into the rest of mainland Europe and the United Kingdom have been comparable in numbers with the 1960s. One fundamental difference is that emigration from Portugal has not only been of white Portuguese as in the 1960s but also of many African-born people living in Portugal. They become part of the Portuguese ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1991) as many emigrate as Portuguese nationals and are included in the general term ‘Portuguese’. A significant proportion of these migrant workers consist of people who initially arrived in Portugal and then decided to move to another country, Portugal being a stepping-stone in migration to the European Union. Many were born in Portuguese territories before 1974 and have always had Portuguese citizenship. Others were granted Portuguese citizenship under Portuguese nationality laws. In the context of the Portuguese diaspora, this diversity is generally reduced to the category of ‘immigrant’ or ‘Portuguese’. The idea of ‘Portugueseness’ itself becomes creolized, transcending ethnic differences which, in many cases, belies the reality, as is also the case in Portugal. As emigrants, they are also viewed as followers of the Navigators’ tradition of reaching beyond the shores of a small country situated at the margins of Europe, contributing to Portugal’s greatness.

As the Portuguese case shows, the phenomenon of migration challenges traditional conceptions of citizenship and national identity (Castles and Davidson, 2000; Westwood and Phizacklea, 2000). In a context of an ‘integrating’ Europe, the traditional boundaries of the nation state and the assumption of exclusive membership of one country are also being challenged. Despite the reafirmation of the Luso-tropical myth of a non-racist universal culture, it is apparent that Luso-tropicalism has limits and inadequacies in any attempt to analyze postcolonial Portugal and that creolization expressed as mestiçagem is increasingly insufficient to analyze and understand Portuguese culture and society. Cultural and political exclusion in Portugal are expressed in ways that are not very different from other postcolonial countries. Much more research is needed to evaluate how this is expressed in the context of an increasingly diverse Portuguese diaspora and in particular in the United Kingdom, one of the most recent destinations of Portuguese emigration.

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Chapter 10

Comics, Dolls and the Disavowal of Racism: Learning from Mexican Mestizaje*

Mónica G. Moreno Figueroa and Emiko Saldívar Tanaka**

Introduction
‘Mestizaje’ and ‘creolization’ are parallel and competing terms. Both refer to processes and discourses of mixture, racial and cultural, emanating from colonial encounters in the Americas. Moreover, mestizaje also refers to nineteenth- and twentieth-century political projects with varying degrees of institutionalization. Mestizaje is an ambitious idea that aims to represent the inauguration of modernity to which the contact between Europe, America, Asia and Africa gave precedent. It is, simultaneously, a living and shifting process of racial miscegenation, cultural transformation and nation-building. Mestizaje has moved beyond the realm of linguistics, culture and identity of creolization, to include a top-down official political dimension that has rewritten national histories in order to cohere nation states in Latin America.

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* The order of the authors’ names is alphabetical and does not reflect any differences in work involvement or value.
** We would like to thank the editors of this volume, Encarnación Gutierrez Rodriguez and Shirley Anne Tate, Serge Gruzinski and Hettie Malcomson for their helpful suggestions.
The focus of this chapter is not to make yet another rhetorical comparison
of the differences or similarities of each term and propose either a new term
or emphasize the benefits or disadvantages of creolization against mestizaje
or vice versa (Kraidy, 2005; Cohen and Toninato, 2010; Baron and Cara, 2011;
Lionnet and Shi, 2011). While we favor mestizaje as it speaks to the Latin
American context and at least parts of the Caribbean experience, we want to
concentrate on the consequences of official processes of institutionalization
of mixture and offer this analysis to the propagators of a political project
of European creolization.

However, there are four assumptions around both terms that are worth
clarifying. First, we are particularly interested in exposing Europe to the
Mexican experience of mestizaje as in both contexts we are dealing with
local practices, identities and histories constantly encountering migrating
peoples from all over the globe. This is because, on the one hand, creolization
can be limiting. Creolization focuses on African and European presences on
Caribbean soil creating a distinctive colonial and postcolonial ‘third space’
(Hall, 2010). It presupposes a land empty of the Indigenous population
and does not include a history of Asian indentureship. Both these latter
groups figure far less in Anglophone and Francophone theorizations of
creolization than the master European and African signifiers. On the other
hand, historically, mestizaje concerns the interaction between Europeans
and Africans with the local Amerindian peoples (in a simultaneous Iberian
dialogue with Asia, see Gruzinski 2002; 2010). So, with mestizaje, rather
than the emergence of a new third space that becomes the creolized world,
we are dealing with strategies that have crossed the biological, cultural
and political arenas to deal with the local, the indigenous. This issue is a
shortcoming of the concept of creolization as it does not take into account
the Indigenous inhabitants, and even if the claim that all Indigenous peoples
disappeared was to be accepted, it is not methodologically and historically
viable to ignore the emptiness created by the Indigenous absence.1 In the
cases of Europe and Mexico and more broadly in Latin America, there has
been a continuous indigenous local presence that is essential for the new set
of relations that are being created. However, there are core distinct power
dynamics at play. Whereas in Latin America, the Indigenous peoples and
African slaves were at a clear disadvantage in relation to the colonial powers,
contemporary European local Indigenous peoples appear as powerfully
‘resisting’ the incoming waves of ‘others’ that threaten their core whiteness
and melancholic imperial past (El-Tayeb, 2011; McVeigh, 2010).

Secondly, it is clear to us that an analysis of the politics of knowledge
production and circulation in contemporary academia can offer a glimpse
into why some terms become more fashionable than others in specific
contexts. Addressing questions such as who gets translated into which

1 We would like to thank Serge Gruzinski for pointing us to this issue.
language, what gets circulated and who has the power to do so can help us situate the relevance and ‘fame’ of specific sets of ideas. We attempt this analysis well aware of the broader dynamics within which discussions and theories of both creolization and mestizaje are located.

Thirdly, while the context of this book is to discuss the possibility of the creolization of Europe, our contribution aims to problematize the celebratory tone of such an endeavor, especially if it is to be considered a political project. Such a proposal has resonances with, for example, the wariness some academics have about claims that the USA can learn from Latin American racially and culturally mixed societies and somehow guarantee social conviviality (see, for example, Wade, 2004, 355). There is much to learn from the Latin American experience, where the experiment of globalization and dealing with difference has been in the making for 500 years (Gruzinski, 2002).

Finally, beyond the demographic argument whereby mestizaje is more representative of a wider population and territory than creolization, it is important to highlight that both terms are being reproduced in very different kinds of contexts. While mestizaje first emerges in colonial settings which have over 200 years of postcolonial life, many Caribbean societies from where the notion of creolization emanates are still, or were, living under various forms of colonial rule into the twentieth century.

With these four assumptions in place, and acknowledging that each deserves its own investigation beyond this chapter, our interest here is to introduce and discuss mestizaje as a racial project as it emerged in Latin America during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and explore its potential lessons to the project of the creolization of Europe. The version of mestizaje we want to focus on was a response to dealing with difference and a way of imposing a homogenizing sense of nation to diverse groups. Such a version was in part only possible as a continuation of the colonial experience even if it simultaneously enters into conflict with the fluidity of mestizo creativity and the possibilities of cultural mixture (Gruzinski, 2002). Official mestizaje can speak to the project of creolizing Europe in two ways: on the one hand, there is an emerging institutionalization of ideas around cultural diversity that conceal social, political and economic inequality. In this process of formalizing the ways in which diversity is to be managed, Europe can learn from the mistakes and opportunities that official mestizaje brought to Mexico and various Latin American countries where similar policies were developed in the early twentieth century and whose consequences are deeply felt today. On the other hand, the racial project of mestizaje, paralleling what appears to be a project of creolization, had simultaneous logics of inclusion and exclusion operating under the

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ideal of national conviviality (Wade, 2005; Saldivar, 2008; Moreno Figueroa, 2010). We are not saying that the project of creolization aims to homogenize European populations going through processes of encounter, mixture and diversity. We also do not want to enter into a debate about which notion – creolization or mestizaje – better represents our current moment, as this would deserve a whole study in itself. Rather, we believe it is key to consider what has happened when the state – the racist state – intervenes in contexts that already have cultural and social experiences of mestizaje, of lived and everyday mixedness, precisely by trying to institutionalize and regulate such mixtures and encounters.

We will do this by exploring state, elite and public reactions to racists expressions in Mexico, a context which has taken the model of mestizaje to the level of official discourse emanating from its historical colonial experience and its nation-building process. Our focus is on how such public reaction reveals the contradictory nature of what a racist state and its institutions do and allow. We want to invite the reader to suspend the belief in creolization or mestizaje as avenues for a fairer society, and explore and learn from a context where the project is in operation and has specific problems of racism.

In what follows we first contextualize and explore two cases. Briefly, we start with the golliwog-Thatcher controversy in 2009 in the United Kingdom and then we move on to focus on the fictional comic character Memín Pinguín that raised another controversy around racism, within Mexico and with the USA, in 2005. We analyze its particularities and the ways in which the case was responded to, linking this to Mexico’s prevailing racial project. We then briefly expand on Mexico’s racial politics and the ways in which the discourse of official mestizaje has determined racial recognition in Mexico and warns us over a naive enthusiasm for creolization. Overall, by pointing out the difficulties of mestizaje in Mexico we offer some insights to consider the limits and possibilities of a project of creolization in Europe.

**Racist reactions and expressions**

In 2009, the BBC in the United Kingdom took the decision to dismiss Carol Thatcher from a television programme, ‘The One Show’, after she described French tennis player Jo-Wilfried Tsonga as a ‘golliwog’ in an off-air conversation.\(^3\) This event created an intense media debate and the assertion of an overall sense that there was a clear and effective public British recognition of what is (un)acceptable in terms of racist discourse and practice. Not only

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was Thatcher dismissed, but golliwog dolls were also removed from shops, including the famous Hamleys toyshop and a shop owned by the Queen.4

In the United Kingdom, it is widely accepted that anti-racism campaigning and critical academic thinking have made ‘the explicit espousal of racist belief a socially unacceptable activity’ (Pitcher, 2006, 536). This is witnessed by the extent to which ‘the demands of anti-racism have at some level been incorporated into the structures of the state, media and civil society’ (536). However, as Ben Pitcher (537) suggests:

the problem […] with winning the language war on the question of race is that now it becomes far harder than before to challenge racist discourses that are, accordingly, obliged to find expression through the language of multiculturalism and anti-racism.

While it is not the aim of this chapter to explore at depth the British golliwog example in its success in the recognition of, but failure in ending, racism, it certainly is a good starting point to discuss a similar tension between the disavowal and recognition of racism in Mexico in a comparable case, that of Memín Pinguín.5 Before entering into the detail of this case, we want further to emphasize why Memín Pinguín is relevant for the discussion of this collection. This case allows us to observe how racism operates in contexts where supposedly the acceptance of cultural and racial mixture, and even of multiculturalism, has been achieved. As stated above, we believe that the Mexican case can enlighten the project of creolization in Europe where some are betting on the belief that mixture and flux of cultures, accompanied by a politics of recognition, will effectively tackle racism. For example, Kristian Van Haesendonck (2012, 16) writes, ‘I critically adhere to the potential of the concept which is the best term available so far to describe the conflictive process of cultural mixing in Europe’. This author proposes a political project of creolization for the old continent, with his main thesis being that ‘the European Union does – up to certain point – have the power to propel or hinder creolisation in Europe through the power of laws and projects involving European citizenship, currency, mobility, and projects involving Europe’s cultural heritage’ (Van Haesendonck, 2012, 17). Although recognition is an invaluable step to dismantle the silence around

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5 Memín is a derivative of ‘Memo’, which is the short name for Guillermo (William in English). Pinguín derives from ‘pingo’, a term used to describe someone whose behaviour is characterized by childish naughtiness, and, while it could be associated with mischievousness, it has a generalized positive sense in terms of someone being charmingly roguish, playful, teasing. Q.v. ‘mischievous’, adj. (and n.), Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd edn (Oxford, 2002; online version 2011) www.oed.com/view/Entry/119303. Accessed March 4, 2015.
any form of oppression, it is not enough. We believe that both cases, the reactions to *Memín Pinguín* in Mexico and the golliwog doll in the United Kingdom, share something in common – that neither national context has successfully challenged racial privilege.

Mexico’s ‘raceless’ ideology may have overlaps with Europe’s current color-blind, post-multicultural racism. However, we are interested in exploring what are the specificities of the Mexican context that make racial disavowal possible, how that disavowal is related to discourses of mestizaje and what that has to say about the tensions within approaches to mixedness. Although we do not have the capacity to discuss whether or not particular European contexts lack the ability to rethink the past in relation to their own long history of globalization and imperialism, we see this as an opportunity for learning from the processes of negotiation that the Latin American mirror reflects. Our argument is that the Mexican project of modernity is based on the denial of racial purity and the celebration of mixture, as well as on a possessive investment in the ‘disavowal’ of racism. And, for ‘disavowal’, we refer to the affirmation that one (the people, the government, the media etc.) does not know, or have responsibility for, racism (that is, the refusal of its acknowledgement).6

We do, however, take on board a key lesson from the golliwog case, that recognition does not imply the end of racism. Those that insist that there is a strong correlation between racial and class-based discrimination are right. In this analysis, then, we are incorporating a perspective that considers ‘race’ as social and cultural capital (in the Bourdieusian sense: see Bourdieu, 1984), where whiteness is an esteemed good, while indigenousness, brownness and blackness have a negative value that regulates and explains the social distribution of wealth, power, social status and privilege. In addition, if we concentrate on the Mexican example, much of the specificity of the disavowal of racism relies on the discourse of mestizaje. In this way, exploring mestizaje as a key component of national identity, which has become structural to social life and organization as well as everyday lived experience, offers insights into the potential limits of a wider project of creolization in contemporary societies.

**Introducing *Memín Pinguín***

*Memín Pinguín* is a fictional character of a children’s comic of the same name, which first appeared in Mexico in the 1940s. It was created originally by Alberto Cabrera and later developed by Yolanda Vargas Dulché. *Memín*

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Pinguín was inspired by the characters in the 1886 novel Heart, by Edmondo De Amicis, and the American comedy short films Our Gang (1922–27), by Hal Roach (Monsiváis, 2008). The comic’s story develops around a series of adventures where Memín is the main character alongside his three best friends, Ricardo, Ernestillo and Carlangas. All seem to be around thirteen years of age (although it is not clear if Memín is actually younger) and they attend the same school. The comic’s website offers an overview of the characters, as follows. Ricardo is the rich boy of the group, blond, privileged and delicate. Ernestillo is a working-class boy, the son of a hard-working carpenter, is the best at school and the most cautious and sensible. Carlangas is an impulsive rough boy, constantly getting into trouble, apparently in response to his father’s absence. Memín is described as a boy that is always saying whatever comes into his head, which makes him imprudent and funny at times. He does not think through the consequences of his actions and is sometimes rather smug. He is also described as lazy, ignorant, naïve, nosy and selfish although accessible and kind to his friends (who are always hitting him on the head, but consider him their most loyal friend). Memín has a very strong relationship with his mother, Eufrosina, who is poor and supports herself and Memín by washing other people’s clothes. Physically, Memín is described on the website as more caricature-like than his friends, short for his age and bald. The webpage also mentions that, at times, Memín complains about his skin color, but suggests that this is ‘understandable due to the environment in which he lives, where his friends and almost everyone is always calling him “black”, but not with a racist meaning, it’s just that he is the “little black in the rice”’ (www.meminpinguin.com).

Sixto Valencia Burgos, the artist who drew the comic, mentions the character Ebony White, from the US comic The Spirit, as one of the main images he researched to come up with that of Memín (Espinosa, 2005). Overall, the representation of the character follows what has been called ‘darky iconography’, a wide-ranging remarkably pervasive form of representation of blackness where we can also locate the golliwog figure (Reese, 2008; Sterling, 2010). As Marvin Sterling succinctly puts it, such iconography has been globally recreated. ‘This character’s bulbous, whitened lips and hapless demeanor recall similar caricatures of blacks originally produced in the United States’ (Sterling, 2010, 40). However, its local reincarnation and appeal in Mexico ‘depend on erasures of provenance, on the sustained voicelessness of the “poorer people” who are both readily represented and underrepresented’ (Sterling, 2010, 40). While it might be risky to speculate here why this character emerges within a dominant racial discourse of mestizaje, it is not too far fetched to think about how the idea of blackness as the ‘only’ racialized position is so much easier to articulate in precisely

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the strongest historical moment of such a project in Mexico. As will be explained below, it was in the 1940s that the Mexican state’s intervention to integrate Indigenous, mestizo and white populations under a national banner, avoiding a public recognition of Afro-Mexican peoples, was at its peak. The lack of stereotypical visibility of Black peoples fitted perfectly into a paradigm that avoided explicit racial identifications of those considered the legitimate, or relevant, national population groups. In this context, and as a result of the specific historical development of the country, it might be feasible to consider that Afro-descendent people have no place in Mexico’s dominant national imaginary, making possible the emergence of a Black figure which is easy to adopt and project on to without any counterweights.

The controversy we want to focus on emerged in 2005, when the Mexican government released five commemorative stamps featuring Memín Pinguín to celebrate Mexico’s cartoon history. Like the golliwog row in the United Kingdom, this also created an intense debate within the media because of its racial and racist connotations, but had opposing consequences in terms of the commercial implications and social ‘lessons’: Memín Pinguín’s 750,000 issued stamps sold out within days and the seventh edition of the comic was reissued (Camacho Servín, 2005; Mateos-Vega, 2005). Furthermore, the debate included a fierce defense of the children’s character by the Mexican intellectual elite (Krauze, 2005; Poniatowska, in Palapa Quijas, Montaño Garfias and Mateos-Vega, 2005; Monsiváis, 2008) and a condemnation of the international commentary, mainly coming from the USA, which labeled the issuing of these stamps (and the government behind them) as racist. Thus the cases of Memín Pinguín and Thatcher’s golliwog doll bear witness to how Mexican racial disavowal and British racial recognition are both entangled in hegemonic discourses that allow for racist practices. These two cases raise an important consideration regarding the potential to undermine racism that a banner of creolization could promote.

Such consideration refers to the prevalence of the phenomenon of racelessness as a trend already being detected in various contexts, including the USA, Europe and Mexico, and the implications it has for tackling racism. Studies of racism in Mexico (and in other parts of Latin America) have started to grapple with the issue of public racial recognition in a context where racelessness prevails (Moreno Figueroa, 2010). David T. Goldberg’s (2002) concept of racelessness is useful here because it allows us to understand the processes of racial and racist normalization evident in the Mexican context, and also apparent in Europe (Lentin, 2008; 2012;

In his analysis of race relations in the USA, Goldberg (2002, 261) refers to racelessness as the absence ‘of formal racial invocation from state agency and state personality’, while at the same time certain dynamics of social, economic and political life are fashioned by racial understandings. This particular position of the state allows it to structure racelessness while denying its responsibility for the impact of such racial shaping. ‘Racelessness, in short, traded on the fact that race became so readily, one might say universally, assumed’ (Goldberg, 2002, 257). As Monica Moreno Figueroa (2010) argues elsewhere, the notion of ‘racelessness’ and Goldberg’s analysis of the USA is useful to frame Mexico’s racial discourse of mestizaje, the lack of public discourse on racism and its endemic denial that seems to be caught between a commitment to formal equality and the uncritical reproduction of state rationality regarding ‘race’. Marisol De la Cadena (2001, 16), and Alan Knight (1990) before her, argue that in Latin America it is common to confront ‘the relative ease with which pervasive and very visible discriminatory practices coexist with the denial of racism’. For De la Cadena, it is the racialization of Latin American culture that has enabled the ‘denied’ reproduction of racist practices. Here, discourse denies racism but upholds cultural differences. This is how we can explain that racist practices actively invade people’s lives despite the professed absence of racism in Mexican culture, the inclusiveness of mestizaje’s racial project. The effectiveness of these practices relies on their capacity to normalize certain social conditions as well as ways of thinking and acting. This is the core of the notion of ‘racelessness’ where it is possible to locate the figure of Memín Pinguín as loveable and unproblematic.

The analysis we want to put forward here, then, points out that the lack of racial recognition in Mexico is related to a conjuncture of factors including the complexity of everyday racism entangled with structural racial and class privilege and a state discourse favoring multiculturalism while simultaneously embracing mestizaje. Overall, the protracted separation of ‘race’, ethnicity and nation in social, governmental and academic discourse over the last century has created a situation where racism is not recognized institutionally or publicly, but is lived as individual experience and relegated to this realm. The process of ‘individualization’ of racism as a personal experience has been exacerbated by the banner of multiculturalism and the recognition of individual rights for Indigenous people, and more recently of Afro-Mexican groups. This trend, also present in Europe, appears as validating the variety of ethnic groups in the country while at the same time seems to be wanting to bypass the recognition of the institutionalization and everyday normalization of racism. The Memín Pinguín case exemplifies how practices of racism and racist comments are rife and usually go uncontested, or, at best, unrecognized. Also, it shows how a project that celebrates the multicultural origins of the nation not only feeds into and reproduces racist discourse, but is a racist project in itself.
**Memín Pinguín: the debate**

In 2005, the pervasiveness of racism in the Mexican political, intellectual and academic elites as well as within popular sectors came to public light with the unfortunate comments of the then President Vicente Fox about the Mexican population in the USA. Fox claimed that the Mexicans take the jobs ‘that not even the Blacks want to do’,\(^{10}\) generating a strong critique inside and outside Mexico. This was further accentuated when, as part of the celebration of Mexican cartoon history, the government approved the release by the Mexican Postal Service of five commemorative stamps featuring the character *Memín Pinguín*, which were regarded as fueling ‘racist stereotypes’.\(^{11}\)

The debate sparked the sale of all 750,000 stamps in a couple of days (some people taking advantage and reselling the five stamps for up to US$70 instead of their face value of US$3.25) and prompted the reissuing of the seventh edition of the comic (Camacho Servín, 2005, Mateos-Vega, 2005). What is interesting in these two events – the President’s comments and the stamps of Memín – was that while few raised their voices to defend or justify President Fox’s racist remarks, the spectrum of personalities that jumped to the defense of Memín was telling. While both incidents were brought to public attention in response to protests raised within the USA, largely by members of the African American community, only in the *Memín Pinguín* case, were Mexican intellectuals, along with the thousands of people that ran to buy the stamps, up in arms against US condemnation.\(^{12}\) The Mexican media and intellectual elite, from both ends of the political spectrum, tried to play down racism and explain Mexico’s non-racist national character, accusing the USA of being interventionist with its remarks.\(^{13}\) They tried to justify and defend Mexico’s racism in terms of either historical mestizaje (referring exclusively to the Indigenous population and excluding the Afro-Mexican population) or naive, harmless ignorance (Palapa Quijas, 2005).

So, for example, famous Mexican public figures, like historian Enrique Krauze (2005), defended these stamps and Memín as a ‘highly pleasing... 

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\(^{11}\) See n. 9, above.

\(^{12}\) Bobby Vaughn and Ben Vinson III (2008) find an interesting analysis of the connection between these two events.

\(^{13}\) Few raised the need to look beyond this event to the supporting social framework that keeps silencing the pervasive Mexican daily racism. See Katz, 2007.
image rooted in Mexican popular culture; while progressive novelist Elena Poniatowska remarked

En nuestro país la imagen de los negros despierta una simpatía enorme, que se refleja no sólo en personajes como Memín Pinguín, sino en canciones populares. Hasta Cri Cri creó su negrito sandía. En México, a diferencia de lo que sucede en Estados Unidos, nuestro trato hacia los negros ha sido más cariñoso. (Quoted in Palapa Quijas, Montaño Garfías and Mateos-Vega, 2005)

[In our country the image of Blacks awakens a huge sympathy, which is reflected not only in characters like Memín Pinguín, but also in popular songs. Even Cri Cri [a famous Mexican children's songwriter] created his 'little Black watermelon boy' song. In Mexico, in contrast to what happens in the USA, we have treated Blacks in a more kindly way.]14

Poniatowska’s remarks echo the dominant belief that Mexico’s treatment of Black people has been more benign and endearing than in the USA. This belief and common stereotype is made possible through the silencing in public discourse of the existence of Blacks, Afro-Mexicans or Afro-Mestizos. First, by the dominant idea that the Afro-descendent population in Mexico is not relevant as it has disappeared ‘thanks’ to the process of integration as part of the project of mestizaje. This process of invisibility has long since been denounced by, for example, anthropologist Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán’s (1972 [1946]) seminal work on the black population in Mexico in the 1940s. Secondly, the belief in a benign Mexican racism has been accompanied by a state policy that has hesitated in its recognition of Afro-descendent people. For example, the fact that during colonial times more slaves entered the country than Spanish is not widely known. While there are differing statistical population counts, the figures are telling. According to Robert V. Kemper (1995), during the 300-year colonial period, very few Spaniards moved to what was then Mexico, that is New Spain – from 250,000 to 300,000, although there was an average maximum of only 60,000 at any given time. The Aztec empire comprised twenty-five million people, a number that decreased dramatically from 1520 to 1650 owing to warfare and diseases, until its lowest point, of 3,300,000 Indigenous peoples, in 1570. However, the Indigenous population, composed of diverse linguistic and cultural groups, remained the largest percentage of the population of New Spain and its dependencies, followed by the castas or mestizo groups. Regarding those of African descent, Alan Knight (2002) claims that African slaves were the core of the colonial labor projects since they could guarantee a permanent and skilled labor force (see also Bennett, 2009).

14 Translations are the authors’ own.
So between 1521 and 1594 some 36,500 black slaves were shipped to Mexico, the first batch of 200,000 who would be imported throughout three centuries of colonial rule. Many – perhaps 40 percent in the 1570s – lived in Mexico City, where they graced rich households as servants and drivers; others became hacienda and mining foremen; while in coastal Veracruz and Guerrero, black and mulatto communities sprang up, where they have remained to this day. (Knight, 2002, 17)

Kemper (1995, 538) suggests that, by 1810, it was likely that just over 10,000 people of African descent lived in New Spain ‘although in the same year the census registered 600,000 people of afromestizo groups’ (Kemper, 1995, 538), signaling the growth of the mixed population. In any case, both authors, Knight and Kemper, stress the significant presence of people of African descent in New Spain.

An interesting element of the Memín Pinguín controversy is then how it disregards this historical context, and with this the possibility of discussing the presence of peoples of African descent in Mexico and, more importantly, their social conditions and continuous exclusion. In addition, there is no acknowledgement that the claims are not just coming from an abstract USA, but are being voiced by the African American community, via public figures such as Reverend Jesse Jackson, long-standing civil rights movement activist. So, when some have maintained that the problem generated around this case is due to US intervention threatening Mexican sovereignty, we can also see how we are confronted with a Mexican nationalist response that fails to acknowledge racism and dismisses the African American community and not only Bush’s administration, then in power.

This is clearly revealed in an article (2008) published by acclaimed leftist Mexican intellectual Carlos Monsiváis, who, while reflecting on this case, is outraged by the accusations coming from the USA, and denied the racist implications of Memín Pinguín (we will come back to this in more detail). Monsiváis is a highly regarded critic of the nation’s social, cultural and political life. Known as a chronicler of street life and popular culture, he gave voice to Mexico’s minorities and oppressed while challenging those who abused their power. He is known for his analytical and often satirical descriptions of Mexico City’s popular culture and has become an obligatory reference for any study of modern popular culture in Mexico. How then do we explain his failure to see that Memín was not only a medium through which the elite reproduced power and gender relations but also racial hierarchies? How could somebody known for his critical eye for understanding the subtle and unsaid so quickly dismiss the issue of race?

We need to consider carefully the implications of these intellectuals’

arguments and understand why they were not willing to engage with a rationale of ‘race’ and racism to explain the case. One first explanation can be that a key element of Mexico’s ideology of mestizaje is the denial of racism and that, since mestizaje departs from the idea of mixed origins, ‘race’ is not a relevant social category. Although we agree in principle with this explanation, in the following section we want to bring a more nuanced analysis to the table. We will revisit the meanings of mestizaje, mestiza identity and ‘race’ in light of the Memín event to draw further conclusions about the consequences of processes of institutionalization of racial and cultural mixture and, in that way, contribute to the debates about the project of creolizing Europe.

**Mestizaje as a ‘National Project’**

It is our argument that the reasons why issues of racism are easily dismissed in Mexico lie in the racial project of mestizaje, particularly the enactment of it that was coined after the Mexican Revolution (1910) as part of the nation-building project. It is this enactment with which people like Monsiváis, Krause and Poniatowska do not critically engage. As explained elsewhere, mestizaje is a multilayered term which describes both the biological and social and cultural ‘mixing’ of Spanish, African and Amerindian peoples, and an official discourse that emerges as a key component of the ideological myth of formation of the Mexican nation and its subject, the mestizo (Moreno Figueroa, 2010; 2011). Both categories – mestizaje and mestiza identity – are a direct consequence of the ways in which racial discourses developed in Mexico.16 Mestizo as the subject of mestizaje was then presented as the embodiment of the ‘promise of improvement through race mixture for individuals and the nation’ (Wade, 2001, 849). Moreover, in such a project of state formation, ‘Mexican’ is equivalent to mestizo. Identifying as mestiza or mestizo refers to those who represent Mexicanness and, therefore, those who are closer to the model of the ideal subjects of the Mexican mestizo nation. This correlation is quite similar to the ways in which whiteness, white bodies and national belonging in Europe are also framed (McVeigh, 2010; El-Tayeb, 2011). Mestizaje, as this ideological framework, boosts an implied rhetoric of inclusiveness while concealing processes of exclusion and racism ‘based on the idea of the inferiority of blacks and indigenous peoples and, in practice, of discrimination against them’ (Wade, 2001, 849). Mestiza is then seen as a term both relatively ‘neutral’ (that is, all Mexicans are mestizos) but also as highly ‘loaded’, as it implies possibilities of inclusion and exclusion to the national myth

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16 For a more detailed discussion, see Curiel, 2005; Gargallo, 2005; Ortiz Pinchetti, 2005; Vargas, 2005.
of a homogenous population. Moreover, it is the ideology coined by the liberal elites that created a sense of unity and belonging without the need for the recognition of Indigenous peoples and Afro-Mexicans. All other minorities that have migrated to Mexico throughout the colonial and postcolonial periods, and whose experiences are being recently documented, have also been excluded (Bonfil Batalla, 1993), such as Jews (Gleizer Salzman, 2000, 2013), Gypsies (Pérez Romero, 2001), Chinese (Hu-Dehart, 1980) and Lebanese (Páes Oropeza, 1984).

As Emiko Saldivar argues elsewhere, the racial project of mestizaje played important roles in the social formation of twentieth-century Mexico in the following ways. First, it became the cornerstone of national identity. Second, it facilitated a racial policy based on the assimilation and integration of the Indigenous and Afro-Mexican peoples (and other migrant groups) such that their specific problems, demands and presence were silenced. Third, it provided a way to forge ideas of equality while maintaining an economy based on dramatic inequality. Fourth, it justified differentiated development policies under the construction of economic regions based on ethno-racial groups. Fifth, ideas of mestizaje shaped new understandings of differences and how to relate to them (Saldivar, 2014).

With this background it becomes clearer how most of the arguments presented to defend Memín’s innocuous character and cartoon can be grouped in three recurring themes: (1) a patriotic defense against US intervention; (2) the ‘comforting’ commonsensical argument that Memín is part of Mexican popular culture; and (3) the assertion that ‘race’ is not the problem but class. All three themes constitute parts of the racial ideology of mestizaje of the early to mid-twentieth century with strong continuities and repercussions in early twenty-first-century Mexico. Also, these themes give clues of some of the consequences of the institutionalization of cultural mixture. We now turn briefly to discuss these three recurring themes.

‘Gringos – greens go home’: mestizaje against US intervention

The combination of national pride and anti-US sentiment has been part of the tense relationship between both countries, particularly since the Mexican–American War (1846–1848), when Mexico lost half of its territory. This event had a profound impact on Mexico’s national consciousness. While in the previous forty years of independence, since 1810, the country had

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17 ‘Gringo’ is a popular vernacular term use to refer to people from the USA and has now extended to most white foreigners. Folk etymology claims that people would say to the US soldiers in the Mexican–American War, “greens go home”, in reference to their uniform.
witnessed endless internal armed conflicts, which a weak central state had struggled to contain, following the Mexican–American War a new national sentiment emerged. After the ‘shared’ experience of the war, patriotic and nationalist feelings became popular among the Mexican elites. National symbols were used to create a sense of belonging and unity in a society profoundly divided owing to many years of conflict (Vieira Powers, 2002). It is in this period when the idea of the national subject overtook the criollo figure,18 and the racial and cultural concept of mestizaje and Mexicanness became popular. More importantly, Mexico used its ‘kinder’ treatment of Indigenous people and the early abolition of slavery as a central point of comparison between the USA’s racist segregationist culture and Mexico’s ‘inclusive and just’ mestizaje.

Mestizaje was also a racial counter-discourse, promoted by the ruling elites, to ideas of purity and ‘white’ hegemonic discourses emanating from European and US scientific racism, Social Darwinism and eugenics. This was an idea that took an important populist twist after the armed rebellion of the 1910s – what has been called the Mexican Revolution – by becoming, once again, a unifying force. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the racial ideology of mestizaje started being a reference for the Mexican elite’s efforts to achieve national unity and identity. It is at this same time that Gobineau’s (1816–82) racial theories where being discussed in his natal France and throughout Europe during the peak of scientific racism. Ana Maria Alonso (2004, 461) stresses how mestizaje in Latin America became a key example of nineteenth-century European theoretical discussions about hybridity. In the context of Spencerian sociology, which stated that ‘hybrid societies were unstable and disorganised’, questions about the impact of mixing on the ‘degeneration’ of the population and the status of Latin American societies in the international context had a huge influence on Mexican elites. Some of the precepts of racial thought during the government of Dictator Porfirio Diaz (1876–1911) were shaken during the revolution that followed his ruling period, as the armed rebellion challenged the old representations of the rural indigenous population. The rise of the masses called for new perspectives and analytical frameworks to explain new social dynamics and articulate old liberal agendas to emerging social actors. During the post-revolutionary period the state developed a political agenda based on ideas of social justice and economic growth. In order to achieve this, the state promoted the creation of a new citizen that would result from the process of mestizaje. This new citizen would be a member of the so-called ‘cosmic race’ proposed by the influential intellectual and then Minister of Education, José Vasconcelos (1948). Like Brazil’s idea of ‘racial democracy’ (Twine, 1998;
Motta, 2000; Telles, 2004), the mestizo project was seen as the representation of equality and justice in which the old caste-like system would be erased by the appropriate mixing of population favoring whitening processes and moving towards a class-based social organization. This race-based project was supposed to overcome the racist ideology that predominated before the Revolution. It is no wonder, then, that this context breeds a kind of national pride and claims of sovereignty, which while aiming to assert a position of unity also does not ‘let go’ of the injured past and at the same time obscure national dynamics of inequality that need addressing independently anyway.

**Neo-liberalism and the celebration of difference**

In the late 1980s, as the post-revolutionary state project became obsolete owing to new neo-liberal measures that prompted cuts in public and social spending, the national project of mestizaje came under scrutiny after demands for more democracy and social participation. In response, writers such as Roger Bartra (1987), Carmen Boullosa (1992) Carlos and Fuentes (1993), among others, revisited the founding idea of Mexico as the result of a traumatic event. For them, Mexico was not only the ‘hijo de la chingada’ – son of the raped indigenous women – but it represented the encounter of a rich mix of cultures, peoples and human complexities. With this position they were advocating a pluralistic understanding of contemporary Mexico. During a deep economic and political crisis, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–94) embraced pluralism as the central force for a ‘new-democratic’ and free-market Mexico. A series of legal reforms would grant political pluralism and the recognition of Mexico as a pluri-cultural nation. Nevertheless, as the Zapatista Indigenous uprising of 1994 made clear, these lukewarm concessions did not directly address the pressing poverty and lack of political recognition of the Indigenous population of the country. Moreover, the economic and legal measures to open the market to transnational investments have disenfranchised Indigenous peoples even more. The Zapatista uprising would bring about profound reconfigurations in the relations between Indigenous peoples, the state and society at large. It would also make visible the shortcomings of the mestizaje project, presenting alternative understandings of pluri-culturalism and multiculturalism, understandings that would connect social inequality with race and ethnic discrimination.

These events have brought significant changes in the politics and visibility of race and ethnicity in Mexico. For example, in the 2010 census, 19 percent of the population identified as Indigenous, a considerable increase from the 2000 census, where the total amount was 12 percent. Nevertheless, the *Memín Pinguin* incident is an important wake-up call of how recognition of differences, legally and socially, is not a bullet-proof antidote against racism. This takes us to the next point we want to elaborate on: popular racism.
Popular racism: mestizaje as the project of the ‘people’

To consider popular racism is to look at the ways in which a racial project takes hold in people’s imaginaries and everyday lives through its articulation with popular culture making the emergence of a character such as Memín Pinguín possible. The new project of official mestizaje that emerged in Mexico after the Revolution of 1910 had the mestizo subject at its center as the building force of its project of modernity and progress. Moreover, owing to the emergence of a new political elite (mostly from the mestizo ranks) and the clear claims for social justice, this new mestizo was portrayed as the embodiment of both the demand for social justice as well as for the political and economic modernization of the country. The most monumental examples of this are Diego Rivera's (1886–1957) murals. Out of the ashes of the Revolution, Rivera would produce the imagery that became not only the official image of the state but the murals were commissioned with the idea of educating and teaching the illiterate ‘masses’ about their national history.

The ‘education of the masses’ became a central task for the post-revolutionary state, well into the 1980s. Public education was a vital force in the expansion of the federal state into the most remote and isolated parts of Mexico. Official education was also accompanied by the profound belief that the ‘masses’ not only needed to learn to read, write and build a patriotic spirit, but it was also important to educate them with ‘modern’ values to leave behind their ‘religious and local fears’. This ‘moral education’ of the masses was undertaken by the growing cultural industry, especially radio, the film and television industries and the press. Memín Pinguín was very much part of such efforts. According to Monsiváis, the comic created in 1947 became one device for such moral and civic education. The 372 chapters of the comic have been republished and re-edited several times, having sold twenty-five million copies monthly in 1978 (Palapa Quijas, 2005). The story told by the creators and publishers of the comic (Editorial Group Vid), is very much embedded in this education effort. For example, Manelick De la Parra, general director of the publishing company, and son of the original script writer of the comic Vargas Dulché, recalled in an interview how in the 1950s Memín was a means to learn how to read: ‘Sí logró que por curiosidad, niños y adultos, aprendieran a leer para saber qué le pasaba a Memín’ [Out of curiosity, he got both children and adults to learn how to read to find out what was happening to Memín] (Palapa Quijas, 2005).

Another aspect of this popular racism is evident through the overwhelming support for the stamps shown by the massive turn-out in post offices throughout the country on the day they went on sale. ‘Since the World Cup in 1986 we had never seen this many people’, affirmed a post office employee (quoted in Camacho Servín, 2005). This support is further expressed in a sense of historical continuity rooted in the access to the comic. As one man said after enduring an hour-long line to acquire the
famous stamps, 'Mi abuela leía Memín, mi mamá también; yo lo leí, crecí con él y ahora también mi hijo’ [My grandmother used to read Memín, my mother too; I read it, I grew up with him and now my son does too] (quoted in Camacho Servín, 2005).

So, what is it about Memín Pinguín that makes the comic so popular? An element that contributes to this popularization is precisely the normalization of racism within the comic. The ways the Black body is addressed and how it comes to embody the figure of the ‘good but foolish’ Black, much in line with the famous US ‘picaninny’ figure:

Picaninnies had bulging eyes, unkempt hair, red lips, and wide mouths into which they stuffed huge slices of watermelon. They were themselves tasty morsels for alligators. They were routinely shown on postcards, posters, and other ephemera being chased or eaten. Picaninnies were portrayed as nameless, shiftless, natural buffoons. (Pilgrim, 2000)

We can see this normalization in the Mexican public surprise when the subject of Memín Pinguín being a racist comic arises again in the USA in 2008 when members of the African American community complained that the supermarket chain Wal-Mart was selling it. De la Parra, director of the Memín publishing company, said:

Es increíble que protesten contra Memín Pinguín, personaje que lucha contra la discriminación y que resalta la belleza espiritual por encima del aspecto físico, pero no dicen nada contra algunas de las películas de Eddie Murphy que se venden también en Wal-Mart y que, éssas sí, ridiculizan a los afro estadunidenses con personajes que se convierten en mujeres de más de 400 kilogramos de peso. Tenemos tres años de vender las historietas de Memín Pinguín en Estados Unidos y nunca habíamos tenido problemas. Pero, al parecer, algunos tienen sus motivos políticos y se empeñan en ver racismo donde no lo hay. (Manelick de la Parra, quoted in Arceo, 2008)

[It is incredible that people protest against Memín Pinguín, a character who fights against discrimination and highlights spiritual beauty over physical appearance, but they don't say anything against some of Eddie Murphy's films, which are also sold at Wal-Mart and that really ridicule African Americans, with characters that become women weighing 400 kilos. We have been selling Memín Pinguín comics for three years and we never had problems before. But, it seems, some have political motives and are adamant about seeing racism where there is none.]

This intervention is interesting as it reveals the extent of the public invisibility and related lack of sensitivity towards racism. One of the key points here is de la Parra’s assertion that Memín is a character who does not comment on
or care about physical appearance and fights against discrimination. And we may concede that, yes, of course he does not comment on his physical features, as he has to be continuously dealing with his animalistic and buffoon-like portrayal and the condescending way he is set up in particular social and power dynamics within the comic. So, for example, in an episode (‘El Estrelló’, Memín Pinguín 6) where Memín and his group of three friends are on a school trip to Teotihuacan (a key archeological site in Mexico), we see Memín embellished by the backdrop of the pyramids while saying that he feels ‘Teohaticano’ (Vargas Dulché, 2012), which is some sort of combination of being from Teotihuacan but also being Haitian. He is then put on the spot, as he usually is throughout the comic. When Memín asks about how to produce a report about the visit, his friend Carlos calls him ‘zoquete’ (dumb) because he doesn’t understand what he has to do and thinks it is very difficult. Carlos then ‘kindly’ encourages him to do the report saying that he cannot believe he is such a brute. But there is no comeback, no challenge of the implication and reaffirmation of hierarchies, either from Memín or from the teacher, who has been listening to this exchange.

‘Race’ is not the problem, but class …

Furthermore, and as Monsiváis (2008, 2) correctly points out, Memín is inextricably ‘linked from its beginning to the observation of poverty or wealth that destroy families and forces single mothers to wash huge piles of someone else’s clothes so they can give some education to their children’. It is to this consideration of class-but-not-race that we turn our attention now. In his article reflecting on the debate around Memín Pinguín, Monsiváis (2008) claims that class was the real issue. This argument is not unique to Mexico and can be seen in the cases of Brazil, Britain and elsewhere where notions of ‘race’ have become so mainstream giving the ‘illusion’ that only class matters. While the cartoon emphasizes the prominent lips of the character, he says that, really,

[L]a mirada no es racista. El tema central del cómic no es la epidermis ‘quemada’ sino la clase social. Memín es objeto de burla pero no de

19 This fortuitous allusion to Haiti could be read in reference to this country’s visibility in the media after the 2010 earthquake. Reinforcing, once again, the idea that ‘blackness’ is something foreign while in tension with the presence of Memín in Mexico.

20 Moreover, it is worth noticing that this correlation between class and race has been a common view since the 1997–2010 British Labour government’s Communities Minister John Denholme made such a claim for the UK situation in 2010. See ‘Time for new approach to race relations, minister urges’, Guardian (January 14, 2010) www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/14/john-denham-race-relations?intcmp=239. Accessed March 24, 2012.
exclusión, y los chistes son los previsibles. ¿De dónde vienen, entonces, las acusaciones de ‘racista’? (Monsiváis, 2008, 3)

[The gaze is not racist. The central theme of the comic is not the ‘burned’ skin but social class. Memín is ridiculed but not excluded, and the jokes are the predictable ones. Where then do the accusations of ‘racist’ come from?]  

For Monsivaís, the accusations of racism at the heart of the stamps controversy come mainly from ignorance about the history of the comic as a complex and popular product of Mexico’s cultural industry that values the portrayal of what it means to be a ‘good son’. Monsivaís argues that what gives strength to the comic is the fact that it is constructed in the genre of melodrama and its soap-opera-like feeling. Memín ‘is strictly a quaint, charming fact’ (Monsivaís, 2008, 3) and, as such, he gathers around him, for Monsivaís, the really pressing issue of class distinctions. For example, in an episode when Carlos, Memín’s friend, is urged by his rich father to leave his poor mother to come and live with him, Monsivaís interprets Carlos’s rejection of this proposal as honoring the tradition of the pleasure of suffering, and of course, the idealization of the mother.

What Monsivaís misses in his insightful commentary is that in his interpretation of popular class and gender relations as melodramatic there is also a clear racial construction of social relations. As described above, Memín ‘el negrito’ [the little Black one] and his mother stand out as different from the rest. The wealthy (Ricardo and his family) are always portrayed as whiter, and the ‘popular’ characters (Carlangas and Ernestillo) are mestizo (interestingly, there are no Indigenous characters, possibly because the comic is supposed to represent urban mestizo Mexico where, the stereotype goes, there is none).

For Monsivaís, the accusation that the comic is racist is a continuation from President Fox’s comment that the Mexicans in the USA take the jobs ‘that not even Blacks want to do’, but, more importantly, he insists that this accusation of racism is just ‘la gana de transferir el racismo propio a la sociedad ajena’ [the desire to transfer racism to somebody else’s society] (Monsivaís, 2008, 3). While it is clear that Monsivaís wants to make a point about the interference of the Bush administration (and the African American community via Jesse Jackson), from whom the strongest criticisms to the printing of the stamps emerged, he misses the point and the opportunity to critique some internal issues about the multiplicity of

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21 The idea that ‘race’ is a concept imported from outside is common among Mexican intellectuals. See, for example, Vieira Powers, 2002; Moreno Figueroa, 2008; Lomnitz, 2010.
forms of racism in Mexico. Is it really possible to argue, as he does, that 'Los lectores mexicanos de hace sesenta años o del año pasado no habrían tolerado un cómic abiertamente racista' [The Mexican readership from sixty years ago or from last year wouldn’t have tolerated an openly racist comic] (Monsiváis, 2008, 3). It is our argument that this assumption is wrong. The Mexican readership has not realized that the comic is racist and, yes, they have tolerated it (very similar to the reactions and controversy around the comic book Tintin in Belgium). Monsiváis’s naive analysis is remarkable. For example, he argues that while in the Our Gang films racism is evident in the exceptional treatment of the ‘negrito’, this is not the case in the comic where Memín ‘is a strictly a quaint, charming fact. He is not the inferior one; he is simply the different one, that’s it’ (Monsiváis, 2008, 3). What does it mean for someone to be described as a quaint, charming piece of data? Simply being the different one? How can we critically accept that ‘difference’ when invoked in relation to racial issues is exempt from value?

In Monsiváis’s understanding, the fact that Memín is constantly bullied and his best friends, while making degrading remarks about his body, his features and his intellectual capacities, are not excluding him, is quite telling about the ways in which racism is lived in Mexico. Monsiváis’s (2008, 3) definition of racism is tidy: ‘racism, amongst other characteristics, is the accumulation of discriminatory actions that are justified and demanded by prejudice, and is the operation of choosing subjects to be ridiculed’. While we would not have any disagreement with this, to then insist that the Memín comic is not racist, and that the issue is class unrelated to racism, is debatable. Here, we are not talking about a segregationist context where racism works radically to exclude Black people from mainstream life. On the contrary, in Mexico we are encountering a ‘raceless’ situation where the joke, the friendly banter, the fun, can be accomplished without major consequences. This means that the premise of saying or doing this ‘con cariño’ (with kindness) establishes a status quo where racism can be slipped underground and the ways in which it is related to other forms of exclusion such as sexism or class distinctions are rendered invisible. It is what Mary Jackman (1994) calls domination without an expression of hostility.

Most class-based analyses start from the idea of ‘conflict’, that is, that society is organized around class conflict. Such work fails to recognize that long-term discrimination, especially along the lines of class, gender and race, do not show open conflict: on the contrary, the elites are very invested

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22 Paradoxically, in the same publication where Monsiváis (2008) defended Memín Pinguín against US intervention, other academics wrote incisive analyses of the same event and the overall situation of racism in Mexico and Latin America more generally. See Vaughn and Vinson III, 2008; Velázquez Gutiérrez, 2008.

in avoiding it. As Jackman (1994, 8) points out, ‘When a relationship is regularized and institutionalized, it is simply a case of “c’est la vie”’. Personal acts of aggression are not required to claim one’s due as a member of the advantaged group: ‘benefits simply fall into one’s lap’. Given that racism in Mexico has been normalized through the ideology of mestizaje, benign depictions of discrimination and racial hierarchies are seen as part of the given, the status quo, making it easy to oversee the intrinsic relationship between racial and class discrimination. Both of these, together with gender discrimination, are the cement, the stickiness, that keeps in place a system of privilege and domination that benefits only a few. The elites do so by either playing down the existence of domination and the privilege and benefits that this brings to them or disguising these relationships with expressions of love and care for the dominated group and the appreciation of ‘their exotic culture’. ‘The everyday practice of discrimination’, writes Jackman, ‘does not require feelings of hostility, and, indeed, it is not at all difficult to have fond regard for those whom we subordinate, especially when the subject of our domination accedes to the relationship compliantly (Jackman, 1994, 10). Consequently, Krauze can justify Memín Pinguín as a ‘highly pleasing image’, a remark that is validated by the overwhelming popular support for both the comic and the stamps. Mestizaje and more recently multiculturalism are the sugar coating that makes both elites and dominated peoples believe that they are all united under the harmony of diversity and recognition. This is, indeed, a particularly relevant warning to be taken into account when observing developments towards the institutionalization of a discourse of inclusion in Europe that does not challenge its underlying racist assumptions about difference under its obligation ‘to find expression through the language of multiculturalism and anti-racism’ (Pitcher, 2006, 537).

Conclusion

One of the key aspects of mestizaje and creolization projects, and later multiculturalism, is their take on difference. For Édouard Glissant, whose notion this book aims overall to address, creolization moves away from ‘pure extremes’ or ‘unique origins’ to focus on the possibilities of interrelation, hybridity and openness. (Glissant, in Dash, 1995, 148; references omitted). He has a vision of global creolization and, in J. Michael Dash’s (1995, 148) words, ‘His vision of an inexhaustible hybridity is an ideological breakthrough’. Dash (148) argues that it is due to moving away from ‘ideas of cultural purity, racial authenticity and ancestral origination, [that] Glissant provides a way out of the temptation to relapse into identitarian thought’.

24 See also De la Cadena, 2008 for an illustrative example of these phenomena in Mexico.
With all the caveats mentioned at the start of this chapter, this is nonetheless a similar proposal to that of understanding an everyday lived mestizaje experience, a historical racial, cultural and political process, alongside its official companion. For Mexico, the goal of official mestizaje was the fusion of differences and diversities into one unit, responding to a particular modernization project where assimilation and homogenization were important. Multiculturalism, on the other hand, stands for the recognition and celebration of diversity, responding to what David Harvey (1989) has called the ‘postmodern condition’, where flexible accumulation depends also on the creation of diverse niches of consumption. However, following Grassin’s theory of creolization, this emerges in contrast to multiculturalism. He goes further to claim that

What distinguishes creolisation from multiculturalism is that it is not a combination or a mixture of identities; it even goes beyond *metissage* and hybridization to open up on a still-to-be-known consciousness of man in his social, historical, economic, artistic evolution. (Grassin, 2012, 112)

Much is being written, said and done under these three understandings of diversity and how to deal with it. In Mexico, the ‘issue of diversity’ or ‘la cuestión indígena’ [the Indigenous issue] has informed public policy, national agendas and social resistance. In the last three decades, ideas about Indigenous peoples have shifted from being a ‘problem’ that had to be assimilated to greater tolerance and recognition. This is a trend of visibility which has also been extended, not without problems, to Afro-Mexicans. Although this shift represents important and profound changes for Mexico, there is a persistent continuity in both ways of approaching difference: the belief that it is in the ‘managing’ of difference that we can find an answer to racism. As Moon-Kie Jung (2009) correctly points out, difference is not a synonym for inequality or domination, and racism is not a problem of recognition, sympathy or hostility. This has become particularly evident in the aftermath of the wider effects of the civil rights movement, postcolonialism and the considerable gains in the recognition of legal rights for Indigenous and Black peoples and other minorities. In these instances racism is far from being eradicated.

This analysis has raised important questions about the possibilities and limits of both the project and current processes of creolizing Europe. By bringing attention to a historical context that has embraced mixing and mestizaje, integration, pluri-culture and multiculture, albeit with different degrees of success, we have signaled how issues of difference, inclusion and racism keep shifting their grounds. An exercise in imagining effective political interventions that aim to work towards an inclusive Europe, be it creolized or mestiza, needs to bear in mind the workings of privilege and the pervasiveness of racism. This chapter has addressed some of the problems that can arise when the state intervenes in the regulation of
difference. The experience of official mestizaje reveals its failure when confronted with an event like the *Memín Pinguín* controversy. However, simultaneously, the experience of official mestizaje also demonstrates its strength in concealing the workings of racism under an apparent national unity. Memín and the golliwog doll remind us first of the fragility of initiatives to manage difference and secondly of how the political embrace of inclusiveness and respect remains to be re-imagined and effectively implemented.

**Works Cited**


Chapter 11

Creolizing Citizenship?
Migrant Women from Turkey as Subjects of Agency

Umut Erel

Introduction

The notion of creolization explores cultural and linguistic mixing that stems from the encounters of cultures in the same location. It is usually taken to refer to historical colonial and postcolonial experiences in the Caribbean and Latin America. The historical experience and contemporary legacy of creolization in Latin America and the Caribbean is intricately bound up with slavery, settler colonialism, racialized and gendered violence. While the question of how far the term can be applied to other social, geographic and historical contexts is contested (Hannerz, 2002; Hall, 2003a; 2003b; Palmié, 2006; Knorr, 2010), I take some inspiration from the analytical aspects of the concept for exploring the European context of the early twenty-first century. Creolization as transculturation produces an ‘indigenous vernacular space, marked by the fusion of cultural elements drawn from all originating cultures, but resulting in a configuration in which these elements, though never equal, can no longer be disaggregated [...] but have been permanently “translated”’ (Hall, 2003a, 31). One analytic aspect of the concept of creolization that I am particularly interested in here is the way in which cultural mixing is understood as productive of notions of belonging to the new locality: ‘creolization was always linked with indigenization’ (Knorr, 2010,
While Knorr suggests that creolization encompasses both ethnic and trans-ethnic identifications, and therefore tends to be inclusive (737), I deviate from Knorr who argues for reserving the notion of creolization only for the constitution of finite, distinct, Creole ethnic groups. Instead, the analytic potential of the concept of creolization is that it challenges assumptions of ethnic and cultural boundedness (Hall, 2003a; 2003b). Hannerz (2002, 14) proposes that the concept of creolization is particularly suited to ‘integrate cultural with social analysis’. However, when exploring the concept of creolization in the context of migration to Europe, it is important to be clear that any appreciation of the productive, culturally and socially democratizing aspects of creolization cannot be abstracted from the realities of oppression, violence and genocide.

Drawing on Gutiérrez Rodríguez and Littler’s (2007) suggestion that ‘[i]n the European context we need to relate creolization not only to the colonial past, but to the transformation of societies through postcolonial and other migrations, diaspora and exile’, I want to look at how the postcolonial and other migrants who arrived in the mid- to late twentieth century in Europe created a ‘creolized understanding of citizenship’ often against the backdrop of racist subjection and exclusion. Increasingly, European governments conceptualize the citizenship of immigrants within a neo-liberal paradigm of ‘responsibilizing’ individuals into proving their economic and cultural capital, which for racialized migrants is narrowly understood through notions of linguistic and cultural assimilation to the country of residence. Therefore, discourses of citizenship and discourses of creolization at first glance appear as unconnected, perhaps even referring to opposing intellectual and political projects. Yet, the notion of citizenship is contested and there are political and intellectual projects of mobilizing it as an inclusive, increasingly democratizing practice. Mobilizing the notion of creolization for debates on citizenship can help to challenge restrictive, ethnically bounded notions of citizenship through more complex notions of culture as contested, rather than an ethnically bounded precondition of belonging. On the other hand, by bringing together debates on citizenship and on creolization, we can also identify some limits of the notion of creolization. By creolized understandings of citizenship I mean that migrants and non-migrant national citizens have produced new cultural and social forms of belonging in Europe. When migrants challenge nationally and ethnically exclusive understandings of legitimate participation and belonging in a society, claiming recognition for their cultural, social and political participation and struggling for substantive rights (for example, of residence, family re-unification, labor market access, access to services), this undermines ethnically exclusive, nationally bounded notions of citizenship. Migrants struggle to change the meanings and substance of citizenship, at the same time broadening understandings of who constitutes a legitimate subject of citizenship. These acts of making new subjects of citizenship and claiming recognition for new forms of political, social and cultural participation can
be thought of as creolizing existing notions of citizenship. However, this has
not translated into political recognition of the social and cultural mixedness
of the people living in Europe. There is still ‘a substantial investment’ in
a narrative of European identity ‘in which Europe appears as a largely
homogeneous entity, entirely self-sufficient, its development uninfluenced
by outside forces or contact with other parts of the world (Hall, 1991).
Accordingly, within this narrative, European racial and religious diversity
is less a reality than a threat to the continent’s very essence’ (El-Tayeb,
2011, xvii). For this reason, national and European governments and public
discourses actively mis-recognize this de facto creolization of the citizenry
which remains defined as nationally bounded. In Europe, creolization
‘frames a space, in which national rhetoric about identity and community
are contested and challenged’ (Gutiérrez Rodríguez and Littler, 2007, 7).

This chapter draws on life stories collected in research conducted in
Germany with women from Turkey. I discuss some instances in which
migrant women from Turkey in Germany question the hegemonic normative
understanding that only unequivocal, unambiguous ethnic belonging should
give legitimacy to rights claims and belongings. They challenge the implicit
or explicit logic that the embrace of an ethnic majority culture should serve
as a condition for social, political and cultural participation in the societies
in which they live. In this sense, the analytic concept of creolization can help
us to understand the uneasy and contested process through which migrant
women make a home for themselves in their societies of residence, in the
process transforming themselves, but also the very notions of citizenship.
The transformatory potential of migrants creating new forms of cultural
belonging and the contestations this involves can usefully be understood as
creolization, yet there are also limits to how useful the notion of creolization
is for understanding these struggles around belonging and participation.
While creolization can help us understand processes of cultural identification
and contestation, often at the heart of debates of who can be a legitimate
citizen, it has limited applicability for understanding how such cultural
struggles around belonging and recognition are translated into rights-claims,
both in terms of formal and substantive rights. In the following, I describe
some of these processes of creolization in which migrant women engage:
‘in various social relationships they contest ethnically bounded notions of
belonging and rights as the basis of citizenship. These engagements do not
neatly fit within mainstream’ conceptualizations of citizenship. Instead, the
migrant women engage in ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin, 2008) which challenge
and transform existing notions and theories of citizenship. In this chapter, I
suggest that one way in which academic debates on inclusive citizenship can
connect effectively with political debates on citizenship practices is by taking
seriously, and making relevant, migrant women’s experiences of citizenship
across different social sites and relations. This should point out where
migrant women’s practices already challenge reductive and exclusionary
understandings of citizenship through claiming belonging to the societies
of residence themselves and creolizing notions of citizenship. These migrant women claim the right to have rights which goes against the grain of the self-understanding of the German nation state which views the unity of an ethnically homogeneous population, territory and culture as its mainstay. The very existence of these migrants within the borders of Germany renders paradoxical the view that the social cohesion of the population is based on its cultural homogeneity. European debates on migrants always remain stuck at the moment of arrival which ignores that these ‘migrants’ have by now long been European. This is reinforced by ‘an often unspoken but nonetheless seemingly very precise, racialized understanding of proper Europeanness that continues to exclude certain migrants and their descendants’ (El-Tayeb, 2011, xii). By claiming visibility as ethnic Others who bring in new cultural and linguistic elements, migrant women go against the grain of normative expectations of ethnic and cultural assimilation. It is this struggle to claim the right to cultural and ethnic difference at the same time as legitimacy of belonging and rights claiming which I suggest constitutes a creolized vision of new possibilities of citizenship.

Nationally bounded versus creolized visions of citizenship

There is a disjuncture between academic debates attempting to mobilize ‘citizenship’ as a momentum concept to democratize a widening range of social relations (Lister, 2008), attentive to the rights claims of culturally and ethnically diverse and mixed groups on one hand and current governmental attempts in much of Europe where citizenship is increasingly constructed as a privilege of those seen legitimately to belong to the nation. Such governmental policies suggest that migrants have to prove their capacity culturally to assimilate and economically to contribute to the nation in order to attain the privilege of entering the country, achieving rightful residence and formal citizenship through successfully completing citizenship tests or integration classes.

Citizenship is a contested concept promising equality and inclusion, while it also constructs boundaries and contains inherent exclusions and hierarchizations based on ethnicity, racialization, class, gender, ability and their intersections (cf. Erel, 2009). The notion of citizenship ‘can at any stage of social development be invoked by those excluded, if the rights of citizens come to be seen as merely privileges lacking legitimation’ (Bauböck, 1991, 15). While formal citizenship is undoubtedly significant, I refer to citizenship in its wider meaning, as ‘membership in the community’ (Marshall, 1953), yet the very concept of ‘community’ is in question. On one hand, the boundaries and basis for making communities are defined and negotiated within ethnicized and gendered power relations and hierarchies, on the other hand various overlapping or competing constructions of community lay claim to bestowing the rights of citizenship.
Most debates about citizenship are structured by an ethnically bounded, dichotomizing logic: on the one hand, there are the migrants and their interests; on the other hand, there is the receiving society and its interests. Advocates of migrants’ inclusion may argue that the interests of the societies of residence and the migrants’ interests converge in certain respects, but even in these discourses the epistemological basis for distinguishing these interest groups on the basis of nationality and/or ethnicity is taken for granted (cf. Carens, 1995). Thus, such accounts weigh up the benefits and costs of immigrants to a society. In these approaches, migrants remain marginal to conceptualizations of citizenship. Academic debates on citizenship tend to exclude migrant women by focusing one-dimensionally on migrants generically defined as male (e.g. Bauböck, 1991; Mackert, 1999), or by focusing on the citizenship of women nationals (e.g., Phillips, 1995; Appelt, 1999).

Migrant women are often not seen as fully competent participants in the national cultures of the societies of residence. The recognition of and valuing of their marginalized cultural identities is an important aspect of ‘full citizenship’ as it ‘involves a right to full cultural participation and undistorted representation’ (Pakulski 1997, 8). When migrant women struggle for cultural recognition, they contribute to enacting a creolized vision of citizenship by contesting their symbolic exclusion. These cultural contestations challenge public understandings of who is an ‘ideal’ or ‘normal’ citizen (Stevenson, 2001, 4) based on ethnically bounded notions of entitlements and belonging. By doing this, migrant women are not simply looking for inclusion into pre-existing concepts of citizenship. Instead, their ‘acts of citizenship’ transform forms (orientations, strategies, technologies) and modes (citizens, strangers, outsiders, aliens) of being political by bringing into being new actors as activist citizens (claimants of rights and responsibilities) through creating new sites and scales of struggle’ (Isin, 2008, 39). It is through these ‘acts of citizenship’ that migrants are culturally and socially creolizing the societies in which they live. They contest ethnically bounded, ‘pure’ notions of belonging as preconditions for becoming political and rights-claiming subjects. Acts of citizenship take place within a range of relationships, sites and scales and citizenship cannot be viewed only as the relationship between individual and state. These acts of citizenship can indeed creolize European national identities.

Three moments in migrant women’s citizenship

Becoming subjects with agency is the first moment in migrant women’s citizenship practices. On the one hand, the migrant women become subjects with agency in constructing knowledge about themselves and the world they live in from their standpoint, in the process negotiating and contesting representations of themselves as culturally overdetermined, passively oppressed by the assumed patriarchal practices and values of
their ethnic group and incompetent and un-entitled to participate in and shape their societies of residence. On the other hand, the things they do to negotiate their ethnic and gendered positioning, be it in the sites of education, work, gender, sexuality, family or political activism constitute ways of making themselves (cf. McIlwaine and Datta, 2006; Haritaworn, 2009a; 2009b). Becoming a subject with agency is not a once and for all achievement but an ongoing process (cf. Hall, 1987). Indeed, the migrant women continuously make themselves through daily practices. Secondly, the women also substantiate their capacities of political, caring, ethical, working and cultural subjectivity in relation to others. Whether the form of subjectivity they articulate is ‘political’ or ‘cultural’, ‘working’ or ‘caring’, ‘ethical’, ‘sexual’ etc. depends on the circumstances and sites. These are not neatly delineated from each other and, indeed, the women articulated political subjectivities in the settings of education or work and vice versa while also articulating cultural subjectivities or caring subjectivities in their political activities (see below, section on intersectionality). Thus, the ‘etc.’ points to the multiplicity and open-endedness of articulating particular subjectivities. The conception of citizenship practices foregrounds the multiplicity of sites and relations in which questions pertaining to citizenship such as belonging, legitimacy of entitlements and participation are negotiated. By bringing to the fore aspects of their subjectivities which are normatively assumed to be outside of particular relationships (like politicizing work relationships, highlighting cultural inequalities in the care of their children, challenging sexual hierarchies in political organizations) the migrant women actively challenge and reshape normative understandings of what constitutes the substance and boundaries of work, caring, political activism, for example.

A third moment is the constitution of the women as rights-claiming subjects. It is this latter moment which is most usually associated with citizenship. This view posits citizenship primarily as a status. Rights-bearing subjects claim their rights vis-à-vis the state and it is this relationship which bestows the identity of ‘citizen’. Status matters, of course. Stratified statuses of residence or citizenship have far-reaching implications for the ways in which migrant women have access to education, work, choices about their sexual identities and family life and opportunities for social and political activism. Yet, we must consider the process of (1) becoming subjects with agency, which includes developing knowledges about themselves and the world in which they live which are often, though not necessarily, critical of dominant forms of knowledge and (2) becoming political/ cultural/ working/ caring/ sexual subjects in conjunction with (3) the status of rights-claiming subjects. Formal citizenship remains an empty promise if it does not take into account and enable migrant women’s capacity for becoming political subjects. All these three moments feed into and articulate each other.

Let me clarify the interrelatedness of these aspects through an example. Birgül, who did not hold formal German citizenship, was repeatedly faced with the undermining of her ability to work as a doctor because of the
difficulties of obtaining and renewing work, professional and residence permits. It is this experience of lack of status which propelled her into becoming a political subject through establishing anti-racist campaigns. When, as a non-citizen, she was refused permission to open a surgery, she took the matter to court. She successfully argued that the law foresees health provision for the population (Bevölkerung), not just the nation (Volk). This population encompasses migrant women from Turkey, and Birgül argued that access to a female, Turkish-speaking gynaecologist should form part of their entitlement to healthcare. This can, of course, be read as an instance of Birgül’s rights-claiming, in the sense that she claimed her right to open a surgery while she was a denizen rather than a formal citizen. Yet, I think such a reading would be limited. It misses out on the way in which she becomes a political subject. As a political subject she does more than gain the right to practice her profession in a setting of her choice. She questions the nationally bounded provision of healthcare. This is an act of creolizing citizenship: she points out that gender, ethnic, linguistic and cultural sensitivity matter to migrant women’s health. Birgül’s act went beyond rights-claiming to visioning a creolized substance of citizenship, that is, cultural and gender-sensitive provision of local health provision. Her act of citizenship, furthermore, creolized the subject of rights, that is, envisioning an ethnically heterogeneous population rather than the ethnically homogeneous nation as the subject of rights. Birgül’s act took place although – indeed because – she did not hold formal citizenship, yet, it constitutes a creolization of citizenship.

I do not suggest here that the formal rights of migrants are not important. They clearly are. What I am suggesting is that for a fuller understanding we need to explore acts of citizenship as bound up in all three moments of becoming subjects with agency, substantiating their capacities and becoming rights-claiming subjects. While the notion of creolization is perhaps most readily understood as constitutive of the moments of becoming subjects with agency and substantiating their capacities, these three moments are interrelated. Indeed, becoming subjects with agency and substantiating their capacities are preconditions for making rights claims. In this way, creolizing citizenship entails an inversion of ethnically bounded visions of citizenship as conditional on a subject committed to an ethnically and culturally homogeneous population as sovereign. Another example comes from migrant women’s mothering practices. By demanding respect for their practices of education, family relations, sexual identities and political activism, they create a social consciousness that the exclusions they experience are unjust, thus, transforming our notions of justice and creating new notions of rights. By accepting or even fostering multiple, hybrid and cross-ethnic identifications of their children the women practically challenge the idea that mothers are simply transmitting an ethnically bounded culture. They transform the notion of migrant mothering from one that is mainly defined as recipient of (integration) services into one where mothers are actively creating resources
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for multiple and cross-ethnic identification. For instance, Pinar actively built a cross-ethnic family of choice with her South African friend. She had an explicitly bi-cultural orientation where she wanted her daughter to understand German as well as Turkish cultural practices. However, for her the main value she wanted to transmit to her daughter was not an ethnic identity per se but the value of cultural pluralism and the ability to live with ethnic difference. This is an instance where the creolization of ethnic identity and cultural capital is key to Pinar’s sense of her own agency, but also part of her caring capacity. This vision of bringing up a creolized citizen was bound up with Pinar’s teaching her daughter not only Turkish but also English; moreover, she brought multicultural educational materials from South Africa and Britain to Germany to support her daughter’s ability to access multiple identifications. When mothers enable themselves and their children to develop creolized-resistant perspectives to the homogenization of national and ethnic groups this does not only take place within the home but also transforms institutions such as nurseries or schools. Thus, Pinar actively engaged in creolizing such educational institutions’ position from viewing multilinguality or multiple ethnic identifications as problems to be remedied to acknowledging multilingual education as a right. This is another instance of migrant women creolizing acts of citizenship. Thus, our thinking about citizenship needs to link the moments of becoming a subject with agency, substantiating capacities and becoming rights-claiming subjects.

Becoming subjects with agency

While migrant women’s structural positioning through migration and labor market legislation, class, education, racialization and other aspects has often restricted their choices they have also taken initiatives to widen such choices. For some of the women, migration constituted a conscious choice to escape particular forms of gendered control and stigmatization – for example, as divorcée or single woman, enhancing their possibilities of supporting their children and themselves economically and of exploring sexual identities. Both in the process of migration and post-migration, the women developed self-conscious strategies for different aspects of their lives. An important strategy was the construction of self-knowledges and self-presentations challenging the parameters of regulating practices and knowledges. In this way the women became agentic by naming and locating situations of domination and re-interpreting or refusing stereotyped gendered and ethnicized identity ascriptions. These were important for constructing subjectivities that negotiated and at times transgressed and resisted fixed ethnicized gender norms. They questioned and went beyond dominant racist and Orientalist representations. These practices of creating new forms of self-knowledge in resistance to racist representations are a key aspect of migrant women creolizing citizenship.
Migrant women’s agency in achieving their aims in terms of migration, education and professionalization had important effects in changing their everyday lives. The transformation of their everyday lives meant they experienced new situations that required them to re-conceptualize their social position and relations. At times this enhanced the women’s vulnerabilities. Indeed, agency and victimization should not be seen as opposites, but rather as dynamically related so that victimization at times propelled women to action. At other times the women were attacked and victimized because of their activism through which they sought to substantiate their capacities in multiple sites of citizenship.

**Substantiating capacities**

While there are multiple sites of citizenship in which migrant women can and do substantiate their capacities, for the sake of space I will only look at the examples of caring and political subjects here. The ways in which women imagine and make new forms of family relationships give a more complex picture of their experiences and subjectivities than Orientalist representations allow. Again, it is an important instance where migrant women’s struggle for self-representation and the social relations and family practices they represent are being creolized. That is, they invent new forms of ‘doing family’ against the grain of normative ideas of ‘good mothering’, of both the places they come from and where they live. By developing ways of caring from a distance, they challenge stereotypes of migrant families as solely ‘traditional’. In migration, women re-conceptualize mothering and daughtering practices to encompass multiple social relations of other mothers. They also challenge normative notions of ‘good mothering’ based on physical proximity. Rebuilding the relationship between family members, once they were reunited, meant negotiating linguistic and cultural difference and diversity among family members (cf. e.g., Hill Collins, 1990; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 1997; Erel, 2002; Phoenix, 2011).

The elaboration of intergenerationally shared meanings is a key element in the transmission of identities which reference ethnically specific cultural resources. This process involves a transformation, not only of the children’s’ identifications but also the mothers’. Mothering can entail a conscious project of constructing alternative ‘families of choice’, and elaborating new ethnic identities; in this way, mothering is an often unacknowledged practice of cultural creolization. Whether part of a deliberate project or not, cross-ethnic relations with co-parents, peers, or cross-ethnic identifications through media and sub-cultures form an important part of elaborating the mothers’ and children’s ethnic identities. These cross-ethnic relations and identifications are not limited to the binary opposition of Germanness–Turkishness, but implicate other ethnic minority identities also. Whether mothers view cross-ethnic identifications or alliances with suspicion, or
foster them, they form an important part of the transmission and transformation of cultural identities. While research often remains focused on exploring the extent to which mothers transmit an ethnically specific identity to their children in migration (cf. Küçükcan, 1999), a nuanced exploration of their mothering practices reveals that the cultural identities mothers and their children elaborate are indeed often instances of creolization of cultural forms from the country of origin, as well as ethnic minority and majority cultural forms they engage with in the countries of residence (Tsolidis, 2001; Ganga, 2007). Furthermore, migrant mothers’ struggle against the pathologization of their family forms and mothering practices, which creolize the cultural understandings and practices of doing family and motherhood, in the process challenge normative models of mothering in Europe and their societies of residence.

While mainstream citizenship studies privilege national and ethnic forms of belonging, migrant women are located in various communities, based on gender, ethnic, class, cultural, educational or political commonalities, sometimes across national borders. These communities may be cross-cutting, and are never ready-made, but negotiated and changing. Moreover, migrant women also participate in constructing new communities and new political subjects. The women play an active role in organizing and articulating their subject positions and political views, sometimes as women of Turkish background and sometimes as migrant women; or they may choose a universalized, gender- or ethnicity-neutral epistemological and political stance. While migrant women’s political projects and identifications vary, the countries of residence are a central site for articulating these political projects. Against the backdrop of multiple practices of exclusion from the state and society of residence, they engage in creolizing these societies. Some of them articulate their belonging as bi-cultural, hybrid or outside of national parameters. Others claim a right to belong and contest the national logic of legitimacy. Moreover, there are strategies of creating cross-ethnic communities of belonging, such as the identities of migrant, black or women of color. A further important element of belonging is the construction of ‘elsewhere’ in the imaginary space, a utopian space that promises recognition of the multiply-subjected facets of their subjectivity (Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 1999). All of these practices of belonging, however, coexist with an engagement with the society of residence. This takes place on the personal level of friendships or love relationships as well as more public levels such as that of work, political activism, cultural and social activities. The migrant women position themselves towards ethnically, socially and politically diverse groups in the country of residence. While negotiations of the national identity of the country of residence are central instances of contention and sources of recognition, their meaning and articulation vary.

The legal and institutional normalization of national-ethnic identities posits migrants as marginal to society. When migrants do not hold formal citizenship of the country of residence, for instance, they are excluded from
participating in elections which continues to be seen as the key mode of political participation. Yet, migrant women participate in a range of other social and political activities in organizations focusing on migrant women, as well as other groups. It is important to recognize migrant women’s organizations’ role as articulating migrant women’s voices collectively, often struggling to challenge mainstream discourses and policies. Yet it is also important to recognize that migrant or ethnic minority women’s organizations and interests are not homogeneous, either. They can foster different political projects, which may be competing or conflicting. In addition, within migrant women’s organizations, class, sexuality, ethnic hierarchies, as well as educational hierarchies, create internal hierarchies that affect the capacity of individual women to participate in decision-making and representation. A further reification of hierarchies can take place when functions of community representatives become professionalized, so that the split between voluntary and paid work strengthens social divisions of class, ethnicity and education and institutionalizes differential power in decision-making and representation.

While the professionalization of migrant women as mediators, social or educational workers can have empowering effects on the individual women and, moreover, allow them to represent certain interests and voices of migrant women that find no other advocates, it may at the same time dis-empower and marginalize others, such as women with less cultural and social capital, working-class women and ethnically marginalized women. This dilemma of representation cannot be solved within a framework of group representation that neglects intra-group differentiation. Therefore, in order to further the potential of theoretical debates on citizenship I suggest that we examine multiply marginalized identities as analytically central to evaluate the impact of democratizing policies, which I will turn to below in terms of claiming rights.

Rights-claiming

The socially constituted sites of power relations are multiple and should all be included in a project of theorizing and realizing citizenship as progressively democratizing. Migration and residence rights are central for such a democratization, as they have implications, among others, for migrant women’s legal status, access to social services and provisions and the ability of migrants to participate in formal politics, thereby intervening in the formulation of the boundaries and substance of citizenship at the formal level. As these issues have been discussed by other authors (Bauböck, 1994; Carens, 1995; Hayter, 2004; Bosniak, 2008; Rigo, 2008), I want to point out two other aspects where we need to extend our notion of rights to do justice to migrant women’s transformative practices, acknowledging that the things they say and the things they do about citizenship create new, ‘creolized’
forms of belonging. For example, in terms of work and skills recognition as well as intimate and sexual citizenship.

**Work, skills and intimacy**

Migrant women create new practices that call for new or extended rights of citizenship. One site for this is that of work and here I focus on the aspect of skilled work. Skill is not simply an attribute of a person but is socially constructed, including through gendered and ethnicized identities. Current migration policy in Europe, which dichotomizes skilled migrants as desirable and easily integrated and unskilled migrants as only temporarily admissible, undesirable and threats to social cohesion, is problematic. It neglects the ways in which migrants who do not fit into the strict criteria of what it means to be ‘skilled’ are effectively de-skilled, thus rendering them less-‘competent’ citizens, both through misrecognizing their cultural capital and limiting their opportunities for economic participation (Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 1999; Bauder, 2003; Kofman and Raghuram, 2005). It is important to create opportunities for recognizing migrants’ skills or needs for re-skilling. This is particularly relevant for migrant women who may be marginalized from male-centered social capital that could provide an alternative source of validating their skills. Furthermore, such opportunities for recognizing skills or re-skilling need to take account of migrant women’s caring responsibilities, both for children who are co-resident and for transnational family members. Current policy emphasis on migrants’ proving their economic self-reliance makes it more difficult for migrant women, in particular those with caring responsibilities, to realize their skills. Yet, this would require a radical change in current policies of migration as well as recognition of skills. The recognition and realization of the skills and qualifications of migrant women is hindered by the categorizations of entry and residence rights, so that undocumented migrant women have no access to labor markets where they can realize their skills, but are instead employed in the informal economy. In Germany, ethnic niche economies are not well established. However many migrant women are also de-skilled through the restrictions of residence and work permit legislation, which, at least initially, limits their labor market access to the informal labor market. A further obstacle to the realization of migrant women’s skills and qualifications is nationally defined and bounded credentialism (Bauder, 2003; Riaño and Baghdadi, 2007). National laws and professional bodies need to establish clear and viable pathways for recognition of skills and re-skilling, and the financial burden for this should not fall on migrants alone. The expectation of economic self-reliance on migrants (in particular when they apply for formal citizenship) poses a considerable obstacle to their ability to re-skill. Policy measures should be introduced to remove this obstacle both to enable the migrants to realize their occupational aspirations and
for society to tap into this pool of potential skills. The German debates on the recruitment of skilled migrants make a clear distinction between the welcome, needed professionals and the unwarranted migration of the undocumented and asylum-seekers. Such a dichotomization into ‘useful’ and ‘abusive’ migrants, apart from its racist import, problematically misrepresents both groups. On the one hand, those with skills and qualifications are not by virtue of their skills protected against de-qualification and discrimination. On the other hand, those who are undocumented, refugees or admitted outside of the skilled migration routes are not necessarily unskilled. The policies for the incorporation of both groups need to take the migrants’ own interests and articulations of agency more into account instead of constructing a national interest, to which migrants are external, either as valuable resources or simply superfluous or, worse, detrimental sources of risk. This requires analysts to deconstruct the notion of unity between a nationally and ethnically homogeneous subject of citizenship, the state and national economy. If migrants’ interests in realizing their migration and professional projects are seen as one aspect of citizenship, rather than as an externality, this would undermine the current logic of professional and national exclusion. Such an analytic and political move would constitute one step in creolizing notions of citizenship.

A conception of citizenship as a struggle for increasing the scope for democratizing a range of social relations needs to address the issue of intimate (Plummer, 2003) and sexual (Richardson, 2000) citizenship. We need to conceptualize transnational intimate and sexual citizenship rights. While even nationally bounded intimate and sexual citizenship can be said to be still very limited, the transnational dimension is crucial. For many women, migration constitutes one way of coping with problems in their intimate relations or initiating changes to do with sexual citizenship. Thus, one important aspect of intimate citizenship is the right to a family. Migration is a strategy for many women (and men) to be able to support their families economically. Becoming single mothers can be a motivation to migrate in order financially to support themselves and their children. In this sense, the (social, economic and sexual) opportunities to realize a ‘right to a family’ (Ann Orloff and Renee Monson, ‘Citizens, Workers, or Fathers’ (2002), p. 68), quoted in Kershaw, 2005, 111) are internationally stratified. Migration is one strategy for women to realize this right in the face of structural constraints that may make it difficult for them to ‘choose’ their family forms and sexual identities, practices, relations and representations. Therefore, ‘transnationalizing’ their intimate and sexual citizenship through migration is a strategy, albeit not necessarily a conscious or explicit one, for creating choices. Yet, as research on long-term separations from family members, the difficulties of caring from a distance and the difficulties of realizing one’s choices of intimacy in the countries of residence against a backdrop of intersecting racist, sexist, heterosexist and heteronormative power relations makes clear, migration may enable some choices, but also
creates new problems, often involving great emotional and relational cost to the migrants and their families (Phoenix, 2011; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 1997; Parreñas, 2005). However, intimate and sexual citizenship rights are not sufficiently enabled through international regulations and law. As mothers, migrant women are also ‘cultural workers’ in the sense that they validate the identities of their children against a backdrop of racist marginalization in wider society where children do not experience the validation of their identities in the public realm (Hill Collins, 1990; Kershaw, 2005). Yet, as said above, migrant women do more than validating publicly marginalized ethnic minority identities. They co-construct new meanings and modes of ethnic identity and belonging. In this sense, their mothering is not only a caring activity but also an epistemological intervention that questions, re-articulates and creolizes ethnic boundaries and the ‘ethnic’ interpretation of cultural resources and practices. This connects the intimate aspects of mother–child relationships with interventions in the public realm, including the initiation of multilingual, multicultural or intercultural practices in educational institutions, as said above.

Transnational intimate and sexual citizenship rights should enable migrant women to make substantial choices about how to organize their intimate lives. As it stands, immigration legislation regulates and constrains partnership choices, often taking the most restrictive gendered and sexual norms as their basis. German immigration legislation only acknowledged same-sex partnerships in 2001, without, however, equalizing the conditions with heterosexuals; nor are gender and sexually specific grounds for asylum fully institutionalized or realized. For migrant women from Turkey, socially grounded choices about sexual identity, or marital status, such as being lesbian, bisexual, transgendered, single, or being a divorcée, are constrained and stratified according to class, education and the rural–urban divide. Furthermore, ethnic minority people are marginalized within the social, political and cultural representation of sexual minorities. Similarly, heterosexual migrant women who are single by choice or divorced, or lesbian single mothers, are bracketed out of the representation of migrant communities, as well as that of the ethnically dominant group.

Transnational mothering practices form one way in which migrant women try to combine their economic and emotional care for their children. These practices are often a consequence of the combined constraints of poor working conditions and migration regulation. Thus, to realize migrant women’s intimate and sexual citizenship rights, legal obstacles such as age restrictions on the immigration of children and spouses should be revoked. Moreover, improvement in the provision and quality of affordable childcare facilities is needed that takes account of the widespread full-time employment and unsocial hours of migrant women’s work. This would be particularly important for single mothers, who cannot or do not want to rely on familial help with childcare. Therefore, concepts, demands and policies of intimate and sexual citizenship need to take into account that migrant
women’s mothering practices also rely on social mothers, often in transnational contexts, and thus our thinking about citizenship responsibilities and rights needs to evolve to validate these ‘othermothers’ practices of care, too. Thus far, I have argued that creolizing migrant women’s citizenship has implications for their caring, working and sexual citizenship. Indeed, it is important to recognize that these are not discrete sites of citizenship but intimately co-constituted and therefore call for an intersectional analysis of citizenship practices.

Analysing citizenship practices intersectionally

An intersectional point of view emphasizes that the social locations of gender, class, sexuality and ethnicity mutually constitute each other and that the power relations around these social categories are experienced as intermeshing. Migrant women take different social and political views, actively resisting some power relations, sometimes tacitly or actively participating in others. Such contradictory positions of privilege and oppression as members of different social groups are, however, not as exceptional as some debates on multicultural citizenship suggest (cf. Green, 1995; Waldron, 1995). Recognizing the central role of boundary-making processes for the constitution of groups of citizens and within these groups has implications for debates on citizenship. Research should not treat the experience of multiple-group identities and multiple exclusions as exceptional but rather as central for theorizing. As citizenship becomes increasingly employed as a concept for understanding global relations (Isin and Turner, 2008; Parekh, 2008), we need to acknowledge the multiple social divisions implicating even those who are, within a nationalist methodological paradigm, seen as unproblematically positioned at the center. An intersectional epistemology, thus, is necessary not only for understanding the experiences of those who are subjected in multiple power relations. Crucially, it is critical for scrutinizing the interstices of multiple power relations and how individuals and groups are implicated in them (Crenshaw, 1991; Erel et al., 2011).

Gendered and ethnically differentiated citizenship has often been conceptualized through the notion of multicultural group rights. Yet, the rights of women and of ethnic minorities have been viewed as distinct. This leaves migrant women in a problematic position as the intra-ethnic differentiation of gender or the intra-gender differentiation of ethnicity (and others such as class, ability, sexuality) are not fully taken into account. Migrant women’s experiences of intermeshing social divisions of ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality, ability and age structure their citizenship status and practices. I suggest that taking agentic aspects of migrant women’s citizenship practices as a starting point is more productive than viewing migrant women as a particular group whose experiences and practices fail to fit into pre-existing categorizations of citizenship rights, capacities,
statuses and practices. By taking migrant women’s citizenship practices as a starting point for understanding citizenship practices more widely, we can begin to think beyond neatly bounded categories of, for example, ‘women’ and ‘ethnic minorities’. A perspective that recognizes how migrant women creolize citizenship can explore the fluidity of cultural practices. This calls for research that pays attention to the ways in which migrant women subvert ethnic boundaries and privileges while remaining alive to gendered, ethnicized and classed power relations and inequalities.

Conclusion

Migrant women’s life-stories reflect on their position near the boundary of nations. Yet, migrant women contribute to contesting these very boundaries, in the process creolizing citizenship. As Hall (2003b, 197) points out, migrants ‘participate in the wider cultural life, transforming it and themselves simultaneously in the process’. Taking inspiration from the concept of creolization can add a more nuanced understanding of the processes of subordination, domination and contestation of belonging through which migrant women transform citizenship. According to Hall (2003a), in the Caribbean the notion of creolité as a programme for cultural production served as a call to arms for national self-constitution. It is not my intention here to call for a creolized nationalism of migrants in Europe. However, I suggest it is important that researchers recognize migrant women’s productive agency in re-constituting themselves as subjects with agency who seize the right to transform practices and theories of citizenship. I have argued here that this challenge to transformation of citizenship is one aspect of creolization. In the three moments I describe as constitutive of citizenship transformations, migrant women first initiate and participate in a politics of cultural and social self-representation, through becoming subjects with agency. This challenges racist and Orientalist forms of knowledge about them and the social relations they engage in. It is an instance of creolizing the notion of who is able to be a subject of citizenship by transgressing ethnically bounded notions of subjecthood. Citizenship encompasses contradictory moments of closure and regulation as well as of inclusion, rights claiming and widening democratization. It is a key mode of conferring recognition on migrants not only as belonging to the nation of residence but also as political, social and cultural subjects, capable of contributing to making and thinking about citizenship. The second moment of migrant women’s citizenship, where they substantiate their capacities to be caring, cultural, sexual, working (etc.) subjects draws our attention to the importance of connecting the cultural and social aspects of creolization. By engaging with the European societies of residence, and claiming their self-representation, migrant women challenge nationally bounded understandings of what it
means to be ‘a mother’, ‘a skilled worker’, ‘politically active’ in a range of social sites and relationships. Their experiences and practices do not quite ‘fit’ with nationally bounded notions of capacities, however, but, claiming them anyway, migrant women transgress ethnic and national boundaries and alert us to the fact that these social sites themselves cannot be neatly delineated. We need to become aware that there is a politics in caring activities and that the question of which skills and cultural capital count is socially constituted on the basis of ethnicized and gendered hierarchies. It is by taking the experiences and self-representations of migrant women seriously as creating knowledge and inspiring theory that research itself can become creolized, recognizing the importance of epistemologies that take account of the experience and constitution of multiple boundaries of class, gender, ethnicity, nationally and transnationally. Finally, by claiming rights, migrant women enact citizenship, drawing attention to injustices and inequalities. The notion of creolization is perhaps most readily recognized in the moments of becoming subjects with agency and substantiating their capacities, as they contain a cultural politics of knowledge. However, this latter moment of rights-claiming might instead draw attention to how struggles for migrants’ rights can enhance ideas and practices of creolization, testing its scope for interrogating not only the cultural, but also the social and formal politics. In the current era of globalization, migrants are often subjects of a globalization from below while at once being subjected to violent exclusions and subordination. Thinking citizenship through notions of creolizing Europe can help us to hold together these contradictory, unfinished processes as encompassing ‘both flows and power’ (Hall, 2003, 197).

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