Memory
Histories, Theories, Debates
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Memory
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The idea of memory runs through contemporary public life at high voltage, generating polemic and passionate debate in the media, in the spheres of politics and in the academy. Yet although the contemporary “presentness” of memory is evident, how this is to be understood remains a matter of dispute. It is not clear what meanings attach themselves to the generic conception of memory itself; and while in the academy there is a common belief that memory is “everywhere,” what this means remains an open matter. Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates constitutes one collective response to the contemporary salience of memory and to the controversies it has activated. Our purpose is to guide readers through the interdisciplinary fields of memory research. In doing so we aim to bring out into the open what, intellectually and politically, is at stake in contemporary debate.

The Politics of Memory

As we demonstrate in the chapters that follow there have been many divergent currents that have fed into the present preoccupation with memory. We can take here, as one starting point, the various investigations into the phenomenon of postmodernism that began to cohere in the 1980s. From this theoretical moment there emerged the notion that what most characterizes the times in which we live is a social amnesia, in which we, as modern subjects, are cut off from the pasts that have created us. In this account, the current fascination—or even obsession—with memory is ineluctably associated with the idea of its absence, atrophy, collapse, or demise. One version of this approach proposes that historical consciousness has been eroded by the recycling...
and commodification of the past characteristic of late capitalism; another is that organic memory has been destroyed by the transmissions of new media technologies. To think in these terms leads one to conclude that “real” memory is not so much “everywhere” as it is “nowhere.” Indeed, many argue that it is precisely because memory is in jeopardy that the present critical hyper-activity has occurred. Whether the fragility of memory defines the epistemic imperative of the age is a question that has come to shadow current preoccupations, in a range of different areas of inquiry. This argument, in its many particulars, is a theme addressed in the chapters here. However, if it is true, or partially true, we need to know concretely how this collapse in memory operates, in what domains of subjective and social life, and with what consequences. To make such a notion work we have to break open the capacious category of memory and disinter its complex, shifting meanings. Only through careful sifting of concrete evidence, working close to the ground, can the larger claims of systemic forgetting be assessed.

If arguments concerning the atrophy of memory provide one route into the field of contemporary memory debate, it could be equally effective, conceptually, to start from a contrary premise: not that memory is no longer possible, but rather that we are witnessing an unprecedented politicization of memory, such that public engagement with memory is taking on new and more complex forms. If we follow this perspective, emphasizing the imbrication of memory with political imperatives (widely understood), we would be obliged to think at a different level of abstraction. We would need to move from the high level of generality on which the premise of the decline of memory is based to lower, more concrete levels of analysis, closer to the historical “real,” taking us to particular arenas, moments, and conjunctures. It moves us from the general—the absence of memory—to the concrete: to historically specific formations of remembering and forgetting, in which each is articulated in the other. To think like this highlights, for instance, how specific acts of forgetting—purposeful or involuntary—inform and reorganize the terrain of politics itself. And it allows us to think as well more carefully about the complexities of temporality, and about the heightened perceptions of the workings of the past-in-the-present.

These conceptualizations of memory—its decimation or disappearance, on the one hand, and its presentness and politicization, on the other—need not necessarily function as contraries, for work at a lower level of abstraction necessarily depends on broader, general categories. But these conceptualizations do point to different theoretical priorities. As editors, our inclinations lean more to the “presence” than to the “absence” of memory, though differing emphases occur across the chapters collected here. It seems to us that what—subjectively—most drives investment in the study of memory, in the academy and in allied domains, is less the notion of the impossibility of memory than the conviction that memory has become the site of, or the sign for, many intersecting issues: the temporal imaginings of past, present, and future; subjectivity and identification; the passage from the inner life to the outer world; even the politics of being in the world and of recognition.
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Whether it is wise for memory to be assigned such inflationary properties is a conceptual, strategic question that a number of contributors discuss. We need to ask as well why, at this point in history, such inflation in the category of memory has occurred. Yet whatever the appropriate methodological protocols, the fact that memory has become the theoretical medium for these varied concerns is clearly the case. Notwithstanding these difficulties, there is, we believe, much in the contemporary investigation of memory that is vital intellectually, and that carries too an engagement with pressing political realities. That we believe this to be so accounts for this book.

Invariably the relations between the practices of memory and the practices of politics are compacted and difficult to unravel. The injunction to “remember,” determined in every instance by the social locations of those involved, inevitably raises important questions of ethics. One of our aims is to critically address the memory–politics nexus, demonstrating the diverse ways in which memory works both in the public sphere and in everyday life. As we have implied, what constitutes the formal domain of politics is itself in question, partly as a consequence of the operations of memory. Theorizations founded on an expansive conception of politics—understood as the politics of culture, of everyday life, of sexuality, of ethnicity, of the self, and so on—draw in part on notions of memory in order to signal the means by which transactions between public and private, external and internal, occur. Memory and forgetting are frequently invoked, in public life, to acknowledge and indict diverse acts of violence, present and past, perpetrated by states, groups, and individuals. The politicization of memory is to a degree driven by the sufferings attendant upon the making of the modern, globalized world, encompassing instances where memory, as a site of social practice, has intensified. In the afterlife of collectively experienced catastrophes—slavery, the Holocaust, and many genocides; wars, and ecological disasters; forced migrations and the fact of becoming a refugee or an “illegal”; the damage done to the self by acts of sexual violence and by torture—the medium of memory has seemed to offer the possibility not only that an element of selfhood can be reconstructed, but also that a public, political language can be fashioned in which these experiences, and others like them, can be communicated to others.

Yet this mobilization of memory as politics requires critical engagement. Identities, individual and collective, are formed and re-formed through narrative, in history, and through adversity. No simple call to “remember”—charged as that imperative now finds itself, with the power to heal and to restore, or to stoke the fires of deadly conflicts—can leapfrog over the complexities of history, of politics, and of speaking positions. Neither can remembrance turn back the clock by inserting lost times into the present. Memory is active, forging its pasts to serve present interests. Whether embedded within nationalist struggles, for instance, or in the daily rituals of home-making in new lands practiced by the migrant, memory’s activities in the present belie the apparently simple, reified, and knowable past evoked by the call to remember.
Yet the politicization of memory continues apace. As a result, the coordinates of memory are themselves in the process of transformation. Memory, from this perspective, is defined less by its loss than by its overdetermined presence, always working in conjunction with its dialectical other—no memory without forgetfulness, no forgetfulness without memory—such that the social relations of memory are activated in new ways in the social landscapes of our times. Memory, in this scheme of things, is not an impossibility, but a pre-constituted, actually-existing site of conflict, in which many contrary forces converge and in which the interactions between memory and forgetting are contingent as much as they are systemic. In whatever guise it is manifest, the politics of memory is always overdetermined and unstable, the consequence of incessant human intervention.

The contemporary public prominence of memory has brought with it diverse attempts to conceptualize memory beyond the realm of the personal. Readers will be familiar with those terms—including “public,” “social,” “cultural,” and “collective”—that have been appended to memory in order to enhance understandings of its wider scope and dynamics. Indeed, recently, a veritable international, cross-disciplinary industry has emerged as scholars vie to produce the most complete, coherent, or convincing taxonomies and definitions of these “types” of memory. Alongside this, there are those who insist that true memory is personal memory and that the expansion of the concept of memory beyond the personal constitutes a weak metaphor at best, and a metaphor strained to its breaking point by the freight it is currently asked to bear. In our view, however, these efforts at producing abstract definitions may miss the point. For what they fail to register is the mutual implication of the high voltage public life of memory with the many controversies concerning memory in the abstract. For us, there is no way of thinking about memory outside its histories and politics—histories and politics that inform understandings of memory inside the academy as well as outside. Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates strives to shed light on how understandings of memory are formed—and are being formed—in circumstances that are themselves historically, intellectually, and politically charged and, indeed, that are changing as we write.

Pedagogy

The more immediate inspiration for this book is pedagogic. We are conscious that those who are preoccupied with the public and private aspects of memory seek to make sense of the specialized philosophies that underpin even the most commonsense recourse to memory. Yet as anyone coming to the study of memory for the first time will know, the intellectual field is vast, drawing from many different specialisms. To make headway it is necessary to be conversant with a number of disciplines and to work across different disciplinary boundaries. Many of the field’s formative texts and theories are dispersed or buried in particular philosophical debates whose precepts are far from immediately clear.
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This is not an easy terrain to navigate. The purpose of this book is simply to provide a map or a series of linked maps of intellectual debate, such that what might otherwise appear to be a daunting morass of competing positions begins to assume overall shape.

This putatively innocent objective, however, has many ramifications. Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates is a big book, pulling together a wide range of contemporary research of different kinds. From the beginning we found it impossible to make any formal distinction between memory and its theorizations, for the category of memory itself is notoriously fissile. One of the aims of the collection is to communicate the range of analysis encompassed by the idea of memory, in different disciplines and within differing theoretical traditions. It reviews debates conducted in the humanities, in the social sciences, and in the sciences (in cognitive psychology and in neuroscience), and provides analytical and historical depth across a number of specialized fields of inquiry. The variety of topics addressed, and the consequent scale of the book, are testimony to the plurality of phenomena that memory signifies. Even so, this book is not comprehensive, nor could it be. It reflects our own location, both in the wider sense of the north European provenance of the editors and, in terms of intellectual or disciplinary affiliation, in our training in the humanities. Thus while we have attempted to reach outward, in time and space, and in drawing in work from the sciences that is foreign to us, the core of our concerns derives from these locations, and bears their impress. The issues discussed here are urgent to us; but this first person plural, we hope, has a wide embrace.

The intellectual pluralism that underwrites this volume itself represents part of a larger argument. If the study of memory is to fulfill its promise, it must necessarily remain an open project, whose theoretical boundaries can accommodate competing paradigms. The present volume is a collaborative one in the deepest sense, offering a spectrum of opinion rather than attempting to marshal a single overarching thesis. It is constituted by many voices and in many contrasting registers which work—we hope—to dissolve orthodoxy and programmatic proclamation. The individual contributions, commissioned specifically for this volume, endeavor to draw out complexity and contradiction in the theorizations of memory that they discuss, highlighting those areas where theory falters, or reaches an impasse, such that these moments of fracture might serve as the catalyst for new lines of inquiry. Each chapter aims to reprise a particular debate or issue while in the same moment carrying forward the arguments by indicating where, and how, new thinking might happen.

Histories, Contexts, Faultlines

In planning the volume, and in briefing our contributors, one of our objectives was to emphasize three clusters of problems: first, the histories of memory; second, the theoretical contexts, or provenance, of the dominating categories employed in the interpretation of memory; and third, the faultlines, or points of breakdown, in current theorization.
The emphasis on history reminds us of the multiplicity of operations that, through time, the idea of memory has signified. Memory in one situation may not equate to memory in another. It allows us to link theorizations of memory to larger historical transformations (the coming of the book, or of the moving image, for example). It alerts us to the specificity of memory formations, and of their conjunctural conditions of existence. And it enables us to see the formation of the field of inquiry, as a process rather than as a number of discrete, ready-made philosophical positions. After all, history, it can be said, offers the means by which we can grasp the memory of memory, such that we can appreciate the contingency of the theorizations that dominate our own times.

The idea of theoretical contexts refers more specifically to the conceptual representations of memory. Against too easy an eclecticism we are keen to advocate a methodological pluralism which—while still remaining plural—at the same time respects the theoretical integrity of the paradigms from which we draw. We might cite here, particularly, the case of Walter Benjamin, regularly conscripted to the arena of memory research, and indeed to many other strands of critical inquiry, but often without sufficient grasp of the specificity of his concepts and of their valence within his larger epistemology. A similar point could be made about the appropriation of many other figures too. To say this stands as a plea, within the pedagogy of memory research, for a more self-reflective understanding of the provenance of the intellectual paradigms that we employ and, too, for a measure of caution when we endeavor to transport the concepts formed in one theoretical moment to another. The interdisciplinarity of the study of memory, welcome and necessary though it is, creates pitfalls as well as possibilities.

The idea of faultlines designates those ruptures or contradictions that run through memory research, between and within disciplines, and that represent the range of contentions that characterize the unfinished epistemological organization of the field of inquiry. One such faultline, for example, we have already alluded to: the tendency of memory research to expand its reach to a point where not only is memory “everywhere” but it comes to designate well-nigh “everything.” While there is common accord that discrimination is called for, in order to demarcate what is, and what is not, memory, there is little consensus on how such demarcations might be conceptualized. It’s not only that this remains unreconciled: there is no consensus about how conceptually the issue could become reconciled. Around this, as in many other of the faultlines which run through the field, contention accumulates.

A second faultline that recurs concerns, as we’ve suggested, the question of collective memory and its various cognates, social memory, cultural memory, and public memory. Though it is now widely—though by no means uncontroversially—accepted that memory’s purchase extends beyond the bounds of the individual, the question of how the social dimensions of memory are to be theorized continues to provoke debate. The extension of concepts borrowed from psychology or psychoanalysis, though potentially very rich, nonetheless remains problematic. Meanwhile, a focus on “mediated” memory—on the
role of media in transmitting memory beyond the individual—risks misconstruing the media, in all their complex forms, histories, genres, and technologies, simply as “memory.” This blurs the distinctions, not only between individual memory and public discourses, but also between specific processes of production, distribution, and reception. How, exactly, are we to distinguish between public or social memory, on the one hand, and other modes of public discourse, narrative, and practice on the other? These questions, too, remain unresolved.

These tensions and dislocations are there for all to see, in these and other issues, in the field of memory research. Indeed, we might say that it is these faultlines that constitute the evolving, dynamic field of inquiry itself.

Structure of the Volume

Much of our argument is condensed in the conceptual organization of the book, whose structure implies that there is no singular, clear-cut phenomenon that we can designate as “memory.” Memory has signified, and continues to signify, different phenomena in different historical situations, and within different theoretical or disciplinary paradigms. The memory that is the object of the investigations of the cognitive scientist has a conceptual provenance and history distinct from the memory discussed by anthropologists or theorists of digital media. This emphasis on the multiplicity of memory practices represents a founding precept of our collection.

The volume is divided into three overall parts: “Histories,” “How Memory Works,” and “Controversies.” The short opening section of three chapters offers a snapshot of the discontinuous histories of memory and demonstrates the degree to which theorizations of memory work within a dense web of thought and speculation. We can see too, at different historical moments, the modes in which memory itself has been differentially valorized. The period of high modernity, particularly, witnessed a proliferation of writings about memory—writings that still have a powerful gravitational pull on the contemporary world and that, in some respects, we still internalize as “ours.” Researchers today continue to be intrigued by themes such as amnesia, haunting, or re-remembering. At the same time, however, it’s also the case that much that preoccupies us—the relationship between subjectivity and space, say—was central to the theorization of memory in earlier epochs, even if differently nuanced. This historical perspective allows us to grasp more clearly the extent to which our own theorizations, which feel so much to be the product of our own times, represent a beguiling combination of the new and the old.

“Imagining Modern Memory,” the second section of this opening part, foregrounds those thinkers who remain powerfully influential today, reconstructing a network of theoretical genealogies and demonstrating the continuities and discontinuities between modern and contemporary perceptions, preoccupations, and politics. We indicate, for
instance, that contemporary writing on memory-objects is shadowed by the musings of earlier generations on mass commodification and fetishism, to be found in Walter Benjamin’s reflections on the waning of the aura and of Erlebnis (lived experience) in high modernity, for example, and in the work of Siegfried Kracauer and of the Frankfurt School more generally.

Yet to organize discussion of modern memory genealogically, as we do here, also highlights distinct patterns of theorization that persist to this day. If the Frankfurt traditions represent one tendency, another can be identified in the psychoanalytical traditions of Freud and his followers, and perhaps a third in the lineage which moves from Bergson to Deleuze. There are of course important transactions between these distinct conceptual formations. But the incommensurabilities are as evident as the commanalities, suggesting that the field of study represents more a congeries of competing paradigms, in which dialogue across each paradigm is difficult to sustain.

In the second and third parts the focus of the volume shifts rather more from the past to the present, setting out to reveal the ways in which memory—and theories about memory—have come to permeate all levels of our understandings of contemporary experience. Part 2, “How Memory Works,” comprises a series of sections that take the reader from discussion of the inner self, via subjectivity and the social, to the issue of public memory. Each of these sections engages with the politicization of memory, both in the formal domain of state policy and public life and in the inner regions of domesticity, private life, sexuality, and the psyche.

In the third part of the volume, “Controversies,” we review some of the defining areas of memory research where political issues are closest to the surface. Here the authors engage with a—necessarily partial—range of historical and contemporary questions that have been central, formative even, in the development of memory research. The chapters focus on concrete instances, comprising different historical moments and mnemonic practices and drawing from different conceptual paradigms. Expectations of what memory means and what it might offer are confounded at every step.

We are aware that the concept of trauma could well have provided one general or framing theory by which to approach these issues, and readers may be surprised that it isn’t more conspicuous in the pages that follow. The instances analyzed here—slavery, the Holocaust, sexual abuse—have all been theorized as traumatic: indeed they have done much to develop and bring to prominence trauma theory as a key framework within memory studies. Yet without denying the significance of the connections between memory and trauma, we are less sure about the viability of elevating trauma into a general theory, applicable across time and space to very different formations of memory activity, an uncertainty that Catherine Merridale, in particular, explores in her chapter on memories of the Soviet epoch. At this theoretical moment it may be wiser for the concept of trauma to be adopted critically, self-reflectively, and with an element of caution. There are a number of reasons for this. The emphasis of trauma studies has
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undoubtedly expanded our understanding of the unspeakable and unrepresentable registers of individual and collective suffering. Yet as Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer argue in their chapter, the focus of trauma theory on unspeakability and silence as the manifestation of a “true” or “complete” witnessing is not without risks. For, in their words, those silences can be “so open to interpretation and projection that . . . they preclude therapeutic listening in favor of ascription and appropriation” by any external political force. That which trauma theory posits as truth, in exceeding the bounds of narrative sense-making, certainly carries a politics. But the scope for political discrimination from such a perspective, discrimination that could determine where such a politics might lead, remains profoundly circumscribed.

Too often the effect of starting out from an insistence on trauma has been to pit traumatic memory against history. The emphasis of this book, on the contrary, is to propose that memory research constitutes not a rejoinder to historical (and other) inquiry, but its—awkward—ally. If traumatic memory and history are polarized, this in turn can obscure the politics of remembering. That the politics of memory, in the instances we address here, extend beyond trauma theory is demonstrated here in Stephan Palmié’s chapter on slavery, where he argues that histories of slavery, and accounts of slave memory, “aim to fashion, authorize, and motivate specific definitions of moral community in the present.” Our purpose is to encourage multiperspectival, interdisciplinary research in these most fraught of areas and to demonstrate that in the politics of memory—in academic research and in the wider public sphere, in these instances as well as more generally—meanings remain perpetually in tension and open to question. They acquire their power, though, when articulated to an ethics of the present.

Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates is, we believe, greater than the sum of its parts. Its purpose is to bring together, in a single volume, as many different facets of contemporary memory analysis as is practicable, in order to allow the reader to range across the varied dimensions of current scholarship. It will be open, we imagine, to a wide range of readings. In this way, we hope it will play a part in furthering research in the areas discussed here as well as in new fields that await investigation.
PART 1

Histories
I. EPOCHS
1. How to Make a Composition

Memory-Craft in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages

Mary Carruthers

The so-called “arts of memory,” *artes memorandi*, which were taught commonly in the curricula of dialectic and rhetoric for roughly two thousand years between the fourth century BCE and the sixteenth century CE, belong to a different psychological country from that of the modern Western, post-Enlightenment “memory” that is the concern of most of the rest of this volume. Of course, there are also complex medieval attitudes and practices regarding history and commemoration of the dead, but it is not with these that the *artes memorandi* are concerned. Academic redefinitions and reclassifications of the old natural and philosophical sciences, especially during the seventeenth century, absorbed much of the craft of memory into the teaching of logic and restricted the mental activity of memory to the retrieval of experiences and previously learned data. Issues of accuracy and completeness of retrieval, of full iteration, became determinant in defining the role of memory: where earlier scholars had understood positive qualities of composition and invention, later ones understood negative ones of failure and error. Rhetoric (and rhetorically conceived poetic theory) was dropped from the rational sciences altogether, answerable only to issues of style, sensibility, and taste. In earlier times, *ars memorandi* was thought of primarily as a practical instrument of rational investigation and discovery, or “invention,” useful for a wide variety of purposes and—by the thirteenth century—addressed to a greatly varied audience.

The role of memory before this modern reorientation (and conceptual improvishment) occurred is demonstrated in two ancient literary moments. In Greek legend, memory, or Mnemosyne, is the mother of the Muses. That story places memory at the beginning, as the matrix of invention for all human arts, of all human making, including the making of ideas; it memorably encapsulates an assumption that memory
and invention—what we now call creativity—if not exactly the same, are the closest thing

to it. In order to create, in order to think at all, human beings require some mental tool
or machine, and that machine lives in the intricate networks of their own memories. The
requirement of memory for making new thoughts is at the heart of this traditional story.

The other significant ancient moment links memory to prophecy. In the book of
Ezekiel, the prophet, a priest who lived in the exiled Jewish community in ancient Babylon
(early sixth century BCE), has a series of visions of the nature and habitation of Divine
majesty. That habitation is the destroyed old citadel and temple of Jerusalem as described
in I Kings 6. Ezekiel’s prophecy consists in reconstructing in exact detail the precincts of
Solomon’s Temple, which no longer existed. The angel who guides him carries a rod with
which he measures off all the visionary buildings through which they walk (this angel
appears again in the Apocalypse of John, for the Heavenly City was regarded as a “remem-
bering”—in the medieval manner—of the old Temple). Ezekiel is told that this exercise
for his recollective memory is for the sake of the future: through their activity of remem-
bering the Temple and its offices, God will forgive the sinfulness of Israel and restore the
Israelites to their home (Ezek. 43:1–12).3

The Latin word *inventio* has given rise to two separate words in modern English. One
is our word “invention,” meaning the “creation of something new” (or at least different).
These creations can be either ideas or material objects, including works of art, music, and
literature. We also speak of people’s having inventive minds, by which we mean that they
have many creative ideas and are generally good at making, to use the medieval English
synonym of composition. The other modern English word derived from *inventio* is “in-
ventory.” This word refers to the storage of many diverse materials, but not to random
storage: clothes thrown into a closet cannot be said to be inventoried. Inventories must
have an order. Inventoried materials are counted and placed in locations within an overall
structure that allows any item to be retrieved easily and at once. This last requirement
also excludes inventories that are too cumbersome or too indistinct to be useful; consider,
for example, the difficulty of locating one’s automobile in a vast parking lot.

Whereas we now think of memory simply as reiteration and repetition, such rote
memorization was regarded in the Middle Ages as a necessary but strictly foundational
structure laid down in childhood. The true force of memory lay in recollection or *memo-
ria*, which was analyzed as a variety of investigation, the invention and recreation of
knowledge—indeed the very principle whereby new understanding is created by human
minds. To achieve this power, people educated themselves by building mental libraries.
This meant mastering the basic principles of memory training: the need for *divisio*, the
need to make a clear, distinct location for each piece of memorized content, and the need
to mark items uniquely for secure recollection.

In the late fourth century, the Christian patriarch Jerome wrote to a correspondent
that “by means of careful reading and daily meditation, he should make himself into a
library for Christ.”4 Two centuries later Cassiodorus (d. 590) described a blind Greek
scholar named Eusebius, who had come to Cassiodorus’s monastery at Vivarium. The man had been blind since childhood, yet “he had hidden away in the library of his memory [in memoriae suae bibliotheca] so many authors, so many books, that he could assuredly tell others who were reading in what part of a codex they might find what he had spoken of.” What impresses Cassiodorus is not that Eusebius knew a great many texts by rote but rather that he could tell someone immediately where to go in the Bible for any citation sought. The example of the early Christian Scriptural expositor Didymus of Alexandria was also known to Cassiodorus, a man whose commentaries were renowned for their subtlety and comprehensiveness, yet who had been blind from birth. Commenting is a skill that depends on more than rote memory, for one cannot just recite words endlessly and identically if one is also commenting on them. One must be able to stop, go to something else, and then take up again where one left off, to go back and forth in the text, to bring in other matters—in short, to compose. There are examples of scholars from the late Middle Ages as well, including Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham, whose reading and compositional habits make clear that the goal of making a working library of one’s memory was by no means dimmed in an age when written books were far more plentiful, at least to scholars.

But how did they manage to do it? It is clear that, while the accomplishment of men like Didymus and Eusebius is the occasion of near-incredulity for Cassiodorus, it is not the fact of their having such rich and accessible memories that amazes him, but the fact that they accomplished this feat without eyes to see the books they read. The blind Eusebius is able to tell a questioner precisely where to locate the text he desires. This seemingly pointless, if wondrous, accomplishment should indicate to us in fact the key to Eusebius’s success. His memory was designed in accordance with some basic principles of locational memory taught in ancient and medieval schools. To provide some context for these rules, it is helpful to know how the brain was thought to work in the dominant psychology of the time.

In ancient theory, best described in Aristotle’s little psychology treatise De memoria et reminiscientia, a memory was regarded as the end product of sensory perception, and thus as a product of an animate body. To be useful for invention, particular memories must be retrievable instantly and securely. To distinguish among them, to be able find one among all the others, a uniquely marked mental “location” was the key.

Figure 1 shows a diagram of brain function in a mainly French-language manuscript made in England in the late fourteenth century. The various activities involved in thinking are drawn as cellae, compartments linked to one another by channels. It is important to understand that this drawing is a diagrammatic representation, not an anatomical drawing; it was drawn in order to make the functional relationships clear, but the first three activities shown in this diagram as sequential were actually thought to occur nearly simultaneously. The sources of this psychology are medical traditions deriving from Galen, which had located most thought-making and experiential awareness in the brain (not
shared with the heart, as Aristotle had said), and also medieval commentaries on Aristotle’s psychology, both in Arabic and in Latin, by Ibn Sinha, Ibn Rushd, Albertus Magnus, and Thomas Aquinas. The diagram accompanies a short treatise on the brain’s physiology, which quotes Thomas Aquinas.

First, impressions are received from the various senses in the sensus communis or fantasia, located in the forward part of the brain. The various sense impressions are then brought together mentally by the image-forming ability, imaginatio or vis formalis, the ability to form an image from many sensory data. So, raw sense data were thought to be
transformed by the actions of both fantasia (fantasy) and vis formalis (the power of making forms) into images having formal properties that are perceptible and useful to human thought. The Aristotelian criterion of similitude, “likeness,” must be understood in this context—mental images have “likeness” not as exact duplication, but in the way that a schematic drawing can be said to be “like” the object it represents. It is equally important to notice that the resulting mental image was considered to be composed of input from all five of the senses. In the context of thinking, the Latin word imago at this time was not limited solely to the visual sense, though it is also true that the visual was regarded as the primary instrument of knowing for most people.

In the process of being perceived as a complete image, sensory experience is also responded to, an activity known as estimation, or vis estimativa. This is a kind of judgment, but pre-rational, an immediate “gut” reaction that accompanies the perception of the image. The example to demonstrate estimation in ancient philosophy is how a lamb knows to fear a wolf even though it has never seen one before. Mental images (imaginines or phantasmata) are thus constructed by the mind from all the materials of sensation, and they have two characteristics: “likeness,” and also a “feeling” that marks them emotionally. There is thus, in this psychology, no such thing as a completely neutral or objective experience, since all the images with which we think are already colored with some feeling before we can “know” them.

These imaginines are made present to the mind as the materials of understanding through the activity called cogitatio, “cognition, thinking”; and from them, concepts, ideas, and thoughts are constructed. All thoughts must therefore be understood in terms of images, and the other name for cogitation in this picture is vis imaginativa, or “the ability to imagine.” Notice, in this psychology, how imagination is coterminous with all the procedures of rational thinking. Thoughts as mental images are finally stored and recalled in the memory, vis memorativa, the final stage of this constructive process. But the path between memory and thought-making is two-way, because memories must be recalled as well as stored. So a sort of valve was thought to exist that would allow mental imaginines to pass into memory, and also to be recalled as needed during cogitatio. This was called the vermis, the wormlike creature drawn in the diagram between cogitatio and memoria. It had been observed that people often lower their heads in order to think and raise them when trying to recollect something. This was taken as evidence for the action of the vermis—opening as needed for recollection, and closing for concentrated thinking once one had received from memory the materials one needed.

Memory-images were considered to be most like letters on a written surface, impressed in loci, or “places,” in the brain. Each bit of information, encoded as a seeable image, occupies a particular place; it can therefore be uniquely addressed and so recalled. The various technical memory systems are basically addressing and filing schemes that enable textual information to be recalled in a manner that frees one from the simple reiteration of rote learning and allows one both to recall particular information instantly
and to manipulate, shuffle, collate, and concord it freely. In short, they provide one with a “random-access” memory. The ability only to reproduce items in a series was not thought to be recollection at all, but an adjunct ability of little intellectual value.7

The length of a particular memorized section is set by the requirements of human working memory, which seems to be able to manage seven plus or minus two items at any one time.8 The medieval masters recognized this limitation of human memorative power and refer to one conspectus, or “look,” of the mental eye as measuring the length of one material division stored for recollection. So, there are Seven Wonders in the ancient world, Seven Virtues, Seven Capital Sins, six wings of the seraph diagram, each with five feathers (Figure 2). In memorizing a long text, one was taught to divide it into segments short enough to be easily recalled in one mental conspectus, and then to lay each segment away together with its address in the order of the whole text. Any readily reconstructable order will do, but the most common are numbers and alphabets. The address provides the mnemonic hook that draws in the particular content of the segment. Quintilian describes the result: “However large the number [of these segments] our memory requires, all are linked one to the other [in their order] like dancers hand in hand, and there can be no mistake since they join what precedes to what follows.”9 Because human long-term memory is virtually limitless in its capacities, an enormous amount of information can be stored in this fashion—indeed, one’s entire education can be laid away, readily inventoried in the storehouse of memory.

In Western memory training, a fundamental distinction was also made between memoria verborum, or verbatim word-for-word memorization, and memoria rerum, or remembering the chief words and ideas of a text, its substantive matters. This was also called remembering sententialiter or summatim. Either method was considered to be a legitimate type of memorization, leaving the choice (after elementary schooling in the subject) up to each individual’s discretion, ability, and needs. In the curriculum of the trivium, verbatim memorization was particularly associated with initial schooling in reading—that is, with grammar. It was instilled through the common exercise of recitatio or recitation, as indeed it is to this day. Memoria rerum was learned in the two subsequent studies, dialectic, or the study of the “topics” and “seats” of argument and the relationships of propositions, and especially, the study of rhetoric, the invention of new compositions. It was especially to the investigative and inventive tasks of dialectic and rhetoric that mnemonic techne was addressed. Thus, as grammar provided the foundation upon which the trivium built, so memorized texts were thought to provide the exemplars and the materials for new composition.10

Because memoria is to such an important extent the basis of an art of composition, the primary goals when preparing material for memory are flexibility, security, and ease of recombining matters into new patterns and forms. Basic to this are the paired tasks of division and collection. A fourth-century Roman grammarian, Julius Victor, whose work was especially influential in the earlier Middle Ages (and who, in turn, was most indebted
to Quintilian), wrote that *memoria* is “the firm mental grasp of words and things *for the purpose of invention*” (my emphasis). To ensure this security, matter is first cut up and arranged in *divisiones, discretiones, or distinctiones* (the terms are synonymous), segments arranged in a readily recoverable order, such as by numbers. In this way, error is avoided, for if the pieces are securely bound sequentially (and designated one, two, three, etc.), none can be overlooked or forgotten. Each segment should be short (*brevis*), no larger than what your mental eye can encompass in a single gaze. By building chains of such segments in one’s memory, a very long work—such as all of the Psalms or the whole *Aeneid*—can readily be retained and securely recovered, either in its original order or rearranged and extracted to suit a new composition, simply by rehearsing various numerical sequences. Such mnemonically effective means of enumerating the “brief” segments of a long work is, of course, the principle behind numbering by chapter and verse, such as the divisional scheme imposed upon the Bible, reference to which can be found in the commentaries of Augustine and Jerome.

Thus, to divide matter into *distinctiones* in order to preach is not so much a device for objective classification as a means for easily mixing and mingling a variety of matters and for knowing where you are in your composition. A simple, rigorous ordering scheme is critical to the practice of oratory, for it cues the way of a speaker’s principal (or starting) points, in a manner similar to that of any outline, but with the greater flexibility needed for extempore delivery. It enables a speaker readily to enlarge a point, to digress, and to make spur-of-the-moment rhetorical “side trips” of all sorts, because one can always be sure of where one is in the composition—not in the manner of a parrot (which, reciting mindlessly, never knows “where” it is) but in the manner of a pilot who understands his location relative to his goal from distinctive markers in the water and on the horizon.

The complementary principle to dividing and marking is collecting into a pattern. Each new composition can also be conceived as a place, into which culled and recollected matters are gathered. The very concept of reading in Latin is based upon the notion of “gathering,” Latin *legere*, “to read” having as its root meaning “to collect up, to gather by picking, plucking, and the like.” The Greek verb *lego* had a similar range of meaning, from “to lay” something down to “to lay [things] in order,” hence “to gather, pick up,” “to relate,” “to speak purposefully.” The name of one venerable and essential type of ancient and medieval encyclopedic literature puns upon these closely allied verbs: the *florilegium*, or “flower-gathering,” a collection of sayings, maxims, and stories collected from earlier works, sometimes quoted exactly (though in mnemonically “brief” segments), often just summarized. The best known of these through much of the Middle Ages was Valerius Maximus’s *Dicta et facta memorabilia*, but there are many other examples. Indeed, the premodern encyclopedia itself is a variety of memory-book, the flowers of one’s reading gathered up in some orderly arrangement for the purpose of quick, secure recollection in connection with making a new composition.
The schemes used for organizing memory varied greatly. One could choose among using an architecturally modeled plan and section of a large though entirely literary building (for example the Temple), the feathers on the six wings of a seraphic angel (as in Figure 2), a five-story, five-room section of a house, a world map, a columnar diagram, the stones in the wall of a turreted castle tower, the rungs of ladders, or the rows of seats in an amphitheater. Gardens were also popular, the medieval sort of garden, with orderly beds of medicinal plants and fruit trees, separated by grass and surrounded by a wall. Undoubtedly, gardens became popular with monastic and later writers because of The Song of Songs, a preeminent text for mystical meditation. Various other Biblical structures were often used too: the Tabernacle described in Exodus, Noah’s Ark in Genesis, Solomon’s Temple, the Temple citadel envisioned by Ezekiel, the Heavenly City of the Apocalypse. We now would never think to organize an encyclopedia of knowledge on the plan of Noah’s Ark, but for a clerical audience to whom this text was as familiar as the order of the alphabet is to us—why not? It provides a simple, clearly arranged composition site, containing many useful compartments with a straightforward route among them, and thus can serve as a foundational map to use in arranging one’s subjects and materials, gathering them into the location of a new composition from the networks of one’s knowledge, including of course all one’s experience of books, music, and other arts. Thus, in the course of an ideal medieval education, in addition to acquiring a great many segments of Scriptural and classical texts, one would also acquire an extensive repertoire of picture-schemes in which to put them, both to lay them away and to collect them in new arrangements on later occasions.

I now want to look briefly at two such dispositive schemes. Figure 2 shows one version of the seraph image (also called the Cherub, for complex exegetical reasons), drawn in a manuscript made at the Cistercian abbey of Sawley in England in about 1190. This figure was initially the summary picture or diagram for a famous homiletic text called “A Tractatus upon the Six Wings” (De sex aliis) that was widely, but wrongly, attributed to Alan of Lille. The work is more probably the composition, around 1170, of Clement, Prior of a foundation of Augustinian canons at Llanthony in Gloucestershire. The text of On the Six Wings begins with a meditation on the divine throne vision from Isaiah 6, copied from Hugh of St. Victor’s commentary on Noah’s Ark. The second half of the treatise concerns the seraph drawing itself. It gives a terse, at times almost notational, exposition of the legends on the various wings and feathers of the angelic creature and was clearly written in conjunction with the drawing.

It is often assumed that a picture such as this was made after the composition was completed, essentially as a help for students and unlearned audiences. But when one reads On the Six Wings, it is clear that as a whole this text could be of little use except to someone who already knew enough about the subject to be able to amplify its extreme meagerness. In other words, it is useful not to a beginner but to one already adept—not to a student but to a teacher, specifically a confessor, a chaplain, a preacher, people whose
FIGURE 2. The Seraph (or Cherub) figure, used in recollection. Cambridge, Corpus Christi College MS 66, p. 100; English, c. 1190; from Sawley Abbey (Cistercian), but probably made in Durham. (Reproduced by permission of the Master and Fellows of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.)
offices required their being able to speak ex tempore and flexibly to various audiences on
the large topic of penitence. On the Six Wings is not truly a sermon (as it is now classified)
but an *ars inveniendi*, in which the seraph or cherub device itself is what is essential, while
the accompanying words serve as its brief *aide-memoire*. Indeed, the picture was soon
separated from the treatise and often occurs alone, suggesting that the text was thought
to be unnecessary to its function.

To use such a compositional device as the Seraph/Cherub, a person would need to
internalize the picture, remembering the *divisiones* of the subject, as major headings of
“wings” and sub-headings of “feathers.” With this figure in mind (literally) one could
readily have the gist of as many as thirty sermon-meditations, nearly a whole Lent’s worth,
on the general topic of penitence. Each preacher would readily be able to adapt the scheme
to the specific occasions of his own speaking. Adapting and amplifying an exemplary
scheme, after all, is the way most medieval sermonizing was done.

Figure 3 reproduces an opening in one of the earliest and best manuscripts of the
fully glossed Psalter, presented there with the commentary of Peter Lombard. This man-
uscript was made in Paris around 1170 for Herbert of Bosham, secretary to Thomas Becket,
Archbishop of Canterbury. The pages clearly measure out the psalm texts in brief, *conspec-
tus*-length *divisiones*, each in a large script. The commentary, in a different script, sur-
rounds these pieces of text, punctuated and rubricated so that its subjects can readily be
identified. Surrounding the main commentaries are margins of yet other commentary,
and in the outermost margins, brackets indicate the sources of the texts: Augustine, Cassi-
odorus, Jerome, and Ambrose. The page is indeed an early version of hypertext, its links
and networks securely fashioned for ready reference and recollection.15

But were they so used? The evidence is largely indirect, in accounts of the reading
and composing habits of medieval scholars. For instance, in 1330 the Franciscan friar
William of Ockham, isolated from the intellectual community of Western Europe by Pope
John XXII for his teachings challenging papal power, was banished to the Franciscan
convent in Munich. There he spent the rest of his life. Having been a member of university
communities at Oxford, Paris, and in Italy, where he had access to the best libraries in
Europe, Ockham found his isolation at Munich distressing, not least because there he had
virtually no books, nor means of obtaining them, for the Pope had stipulated that nothing
was to be sent to him, nor was he to have visitors. Ockham’s situation as a scholar is an
extreme case that demonstrates quite clearly the necessary role that memorial training
and transmission continued to play in both education and scholarly dialogue throughout
the Middle Ages, even as the number of books multiplied greatly.16

While at Munich, Ockham composed a dialogue on the limits of papal power, a work
which continued the debate that had gotten him into trouble in the first place. In the first
part of this dialogue, the master (Ockham himself) tells the pupil that he needs various
books and materials he cannot get, a theme sounded frequently throughout the work. For
example, he complains in the prologue to the third part of not having the books he wants:
“I can in no way introduce [my subject] beyond the preface since I am unable to come by precisely the books I consider necessary.”17 To which the pupil responds that he is sure this fear will not restrain his master. And it did not.

The master counsels his disciple to extract and memorize material from a wide variety of sources; indeed, if he himself had not done so when he had the opportunity, he would now have no hope of access to even the most fundamental texts, the Bible and the collections of canon law. The pupil asks how one gets knowledge of subjects like imperial rights and papal powers. Ockham replies, “Complete knowledge about them—which you recall is to be drawn out of books of sacred theology and of both kinds of law, that is, canon and civil, and of moral philosophy, and from the histories of the Romans, and especially of the emperors and of the greatest pontiffs and of other peoples—should be most patiently extracted and solidly built up. By which means alone I have hope of obtaining the Bible and the books of church law.”18

Ockham did not educate himself with the idea that he might one day be exiled, nor as a student was he the captive of provincial schools and, in consequence, deprived of ready access to libraries. His whole scholarly life until 1330 was spent in the greatest of European universities, his circle the most academic of the time. And still it is clear that he read to memorize and that in composing he drew extensively on the resources of his mental library. He asks those with access to a full library to complete and fill out his work. He apologizes for only skimming the surface in his analyses and expositions of his subject, for if he had the latest material he would be able fully to expand what he had earlier stored in his memory. This incomplete and prefatory work composed from memory fills five hundred and fifty-one folio-sized manuscript pages with material that is certainly not of an elementary nature.

Ockham’s situation was by no means unique in the later Middle Ages. In 1382, the dissident theologian John Wyclif was condemned for twenty-four of his opinions and exiled from Oxford, where he had taught and lived for many years. He was confined to the small parish of Lutterworth, some eighty miles to the north. Here he continued a prolific schedule of writings, despite the fact that he had no library except perhaps for some books brought to him by those few friends who dared to visit. His writings from this period, which include many sermons, an extensive commentary on parts of the Gospels, and a great number of polemical works, are filled with quotations from a variety of sources, too many to possibly be accounted for by the few books he had available. As with the exiled Ockham, Wyclif evidently was forced to consult principally the library of his own memory.19 And it is also evident from the extent of his citations that his mental library was of remarkable scope. Undoubtedly, the bulk of these citations appear to modern scholars to be of the length and type found in florilegia. Indeed, this fact confirms what we know from other sources about the manner in which students were taught to memorize their reading, as sets of extracts, marked and coded in readily recoverable mental files with cross-references, each the length of a single glance of the mind’s eye. Out of
FIGURE 1.3 (opposite and above), Psalm 58, from the glossed psalter of Herbert of Bosham, Cambridge, Trinity College MS. B. 5.4, fols. 146v-147; made in Paris, c. 1170. (Reproduced by permission of the Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge.)
the multitude of such basic divisiones and summaries in their memories, major portions of philosophical tractati were composed by university theologians like Ockham and Wyclif.

Medieval accounts of the actual process of composing new work are scattered and few, but they also exist, providing additional insight concerning how scholars were taught to read and to design their minds in order to retain and recollect what they had read—how the library of one’s memory was accessed and investigated. Most frequently invoked is the image of a written page, rectangular in form, laid out in lines and columns, written upon as though with a mental stylus, in the manner of a material book, complete with rubrics and punctuation, glosses keyed to texts, and even marginal notes and markers. In antiquity, Quintilian counseled that grammar students learning to read should always memorize their textual passages using the same wax tablets on which they had previously written them out, as though following the tracks (vestigia) of a hunted animal: “He thus pursues his memory along a trail, as it were, and sees in his mind’s eye not only the pages but almost the actual lines: and so, when he speaks, he is almost in the position of a person reading aloud.”20 Designed memory is thus described as most closely resembling rectangular written pages, even (and this is most remarkable) at a time when books were written onto scrolls, and not in codices.21

This pedagogical advice has had a long duration in the West. In the twelfth century, the Parisian master Hugh of St. Victor counseled his novices that “it is of great value for fixing a memory-image that when we read books, we strive to impress on our memory through the power of forming our mental images not only the number and order of verses or ideas, but at the same time the color, shape, position, and placement of the letters, where we have seen [the extract] written, in what part, in what location (at the top, the middle, or the bottom) we saw it positioned [on the page], in what color we observed the trace of the letter or the ornamented surface of the parchment.”22 Two and a half centuries later, similar advice was given by another French school master, Jacques Legrand: “One best learns by studying from illuminated books, for the different colors secure recollection of the different lines [of text] and consequently of that matter which one wants to learn by heart.”23 Advice somewhat like this can be found as early as Quintilian (c. 35–c. 100), who counseled that a student should always learn text from the same wax tablet upon which he had written it, so that, in recollecting it, he will see the material in his mind almost as though he were reading it aloud.24

The model of the page of memory was not confined, of course, to novices or grammar students, as is shown by two accounts of the composing habits of mature scholars, two of the greatest medieval authors of all, Thomas Aquinas and Dante Alighieri. Both accounts emphasize that composing is itself the end product of the deliberate, concentrated, meditative reading that could make one’s memory into a proper library. Thomas Aquinas is described by his biographer, Bernardo Gui, as dictating his works to his secretaries “as if a great torrent of truth were pouring out of him from God. Nor did he seem to be searching for things as yet unknown to him; he seemed simply to let his memory pour...
out its treasures. . . . When perplexed by a difficulty he would kneel and pray and then, on returning to his writing or dictation, he was accustomed to find that his thought had become so clear that it seemed to show him inwardly, as in a book, the words he needed.” When Thomas dictated, his words “ran so clearly that it was if the master were reading aloud from a book under his eyes.”

Thus the page of memory serves also as the page on which one creates new composition. Dante’s use of the trope that the mind is a book occurs almost everywhere in his work, but one occasion is perhaps particularly revealing. At the beginning of his Vita nuova, he wrote that “In that part of the book of my memory before which little can be read is found a heading in red ink that says: Incipit vita nova. Under which rubric I discovered written the words that it is my intention to assemble in this little book, and if not every one, at least their substance.” Dante then describes words written in his memory under large paraphs (¶). Indeed, he presents himself in this work both as the scribe and commentator of previously existing poems that he had also composed. For Dante, the author was also the reader, rememberer, editor, and re-author of his own ongoing text, and in the process of composing his work Dante saw it in his mind in visual form, written upon his memory as pages with text, rubrics, and punctuation.

Thus the ornamentation of a European manuscript book was thought to be integral to its usefulness to readers. The drawings, the colors, the punctuation divisions, the differences in script between main text and gloss, indeed the array of the whole page was instrumental to its reading. But not solely or even primarily as an aid to understanding the contents. Indeed, as many historians have pointed out, the decoration of the pages in some late medieval devotional books has nothing whatsoever to do with their content and can even seem to quarrel with it. The page decoration of manuscript books has instead to do with dividing and arranging the matters on the page for recollective meditation; it is punctuation of a sort, providing readers with tools that answer to their needs for thinking. And the most compelling proof that this was so is not only that several people at the time commented exactly on this usefulness but that the most accomplished and creative authors of the time composed their new works in their minds’ eyes by making use of organizational schemes that imitated the decorated pages of their books.
2. The Reformation of Memory in Early Modern Europe

Peter Sherlock

Future and past, like hills that hid our view,
Are leveled now, and nothing still remains
Whereupon hope or memory may lean,
Their variation leading men astray,
Thinking “What have I been?” “What shall I be?”
As if their lives were but an empty game.

Petrarch, *The Triumph of Eternity*.1

Europe witnessed a revolution in memory during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By the eighteenth century, the ancient “arts of memory” were archaic. The explosive power of print had made it possible both to archive and to multiply knowledge cheaply and efficiently in books. Oral testimony was increasingly displaced by written records. New bureaucratic structures designed to record information on ever-greater numbers of individuals abounded. Scientific discoveries forced a reappraisal of the very nature of the universe, including time as well as space. Most potently of all, social memory was hotly contested as polemists sought to shape and legitimate the new identities created by renaissance and reformation. By the time the Enlightenment spread through Europe’s intelligentsia, accompanied by novel economic and political formations, the European sense of the past was profoundly different from that of medieval Christendom.

Kerwin Lee Klein has sounded a warning-note to all who use the term “memory,” for it has come to encompass an impossibly wide range of practices and experiences.2 It is worth noting how the term memoria and its derivatives were actually used in early modern Europe. On the one hand, the term was used to describe the mental process of recollection, especially in pedagogical and scientific contexts. On the other, it described the fruits of the labor of remembrance, including
literary genres such as *ricordanze* and *mémoires*. The most common use of the word *memory* revolved around the relationship of the living and the dead. A third use, a survival from earlier centuries, was as a way of referring to the retrievable past, embodied in phrases such as “time out of mind” or “beyond the memory of man.” Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, significant transformations occurred in the meaning and function of memory in all these areas. In what follows I first trace the decline of the arts of memory and the rise of empirical scientific method. I then turn to consider the impact of the Reformation and Renaissance on memorial practices, especially the commemoration of the dead, before examining how time itself was reconceived.

The medieval arts of memory began to wane with the rise of humanism and the invention of moveable type. Some humanists distanced themselves from the locative mnemonic techniques of their predecessors. In his *De ratione studii* of 1512, Erasmus wrote, “Though I do not deny that memory can be helped by places and images, yet the best memory is based on three most important things, namely study, order, and care.” This reluctance to persevere with the arts of memory contrasts with the tradition exposed by Frances Yates. Sixteenth-century Neoplatonists such as Giordano Bruno and Giulio Camillo sought to unify form and content by codifying all knowledge in complex memory-palaces, which in themselves represented and revealed the order of creation. Mnemonic practitioners effectively possessed the power both to name and describe experience, and to shape the conceptual frameworks in which it was interpreted. But the static and eternal schemes proposed by the mystical followers of Hermes Trismegistus and the disciples of Marsilio Ficino could not easily survive the disenchantment of the world. The scientific revolution pushed away from ancient cosmologies that linked symbols used in mnemonics with heavenly bodies, and its practitioners rejected the idea that there were predetermined, magical correspondences throughout creation.

The value of committing works to memory for the purposes of recollection and organization was less necessary in a world in which the exact information could be quickly gleaned from a printed book that was cheap enough to be purchased for individual use. Moreover, the profusion of shared knowledge engendered by printing impossibly broadened the material with which scholars might engage. Some of the patterning of the old arts of memory survived, in genres such as commonplace books, or in the division of the Bible into chapters and verses. Nevertheless, by the late seventeenth century, in the wake of the empiricist turn of philosophy, memory—the mental organization and recollection of information—was no longer such a virtue in the world of learning.

Francis Bacon’s groundbreaking work on scientific method displayed a new attitude toward memory. Bacon’s theory of knowledge looked toward the discovery of the new and unknown, rather than the reception and fuller understanding of past truths. As a result, one’s memory no longer needed to be trained to recall and organize long-standing theories and beliefs about the world for the purposes of invention, as had long been the case. Instead, the memory of past discoveries was merely one—highly unreliable—link in
the objective exercise of reason and experimentation. Bacon’s empirical method sought to test all knowledge by inductive processes free from assumption:

And my evidences concerning the Interpretation of Nature encompass two generic parts; first, how to draw out or raise Axioms from Experience; second, how to deduce or derive new Experiments from Axioms. The former is also divided in three ways; clearly in three Ministrations; the Ministration to the sense; the Ministration to the Memory; and the Ministration to the Mind, or Reason.8

The “Ministration to the Memory” was a crucial stage, allowing data gleaned from experiments to be recorded and re-recorded, so that reason might be exercised to discover the underlying principles at work. Bacon, however, did not advocate the storage of such information in what he saw as the unstable palaces of the mind. Instead, the scientist was to create tables and graphs with the material reassurance of accuracy and that could be consulted by others.

In this new process of interpretation, memory was displaced by reason.9 Old classifications were abandoned and new ones invented to accommodate a potentially infinite corpus of knowledge, decentering memory. No longer was the mind the means of sorting information, although it might preserve a record of progress from ignorance to enlightenment.10 For later philosophers such as John Locke, memory was not understood as the simple recollection of data; rather, the recollection was marked with a tag that the information had been previously encountered and was now being re-called or even re-lived.11 Descartes and his contemporaries sought objectivity in the tabula rasa of the mind unencumbered by memory, though they were fully aware that memory itself was necessary to the unhindered exercise of reason and the free association of ideas. What distinguished the seventeenth-century philosophers from their predecessors, however, was the active will to forget as well as to remember, to interrogate the mind in order to ensure that all thinking was inductive, built up from experience, rather than based upon assumptions and preexisting universal theories. As Descartes put it, memory was “often unreliable, and in order not to have to squander one jot of our attention on refreshing it while engaged with other thoughts, human ingenuity has given us that happy invention—the practice of writing.”12

These changes to the understanding of memory were accompanied by changes in its function and content, prompted for the most part by the trauma and division of the Reformation. As Protestants and Catholics battled for the hearts, minds, and lands of Europe in the sixteenth century, and as Europe descended into the Thirty Years’ War in the seventeenth, even time itself was contested. While East and West had long been divided on the question of the date of Easter, that ultimate memorial event in Christendom, matters were considerably worsened by the confessionalization of new astronomical observations and their implementation in the calendar. Pope Gregory XIII instituted a new
calendar in 1582 that began on January 1, not March 25, and repressed ten days to correct the accumulated errors of the Julian calendar. Lutherans and others rejected the changes, and in areas such as the Holy Roman Empire this caused chaos. Regime change meant a change of date, a change in the conception of time.13 All such debate was overshadowed by the heightened apocalyptic discourse that preoccupied many Europeans from the late fifteenth century. The past was interrogated by those desperate to find clues about the end of time. History was raked over and reread in the light of the Revelation of St. John. The findings explained—or perhaps created—dramatic outbursts of possessions, exorcisms, witchcraft, and other signs and wonders that were taken as heralds of the last things.14 In this turbulent world, memory provided a guide to the future.

One of the most prominent examples of the forging of a new, reformed memory was the Elizabethan English martyrologist John Foxe, whose legendary Actes and Monumentes went to four editions in his lifetime. Foxe constructed a new version of history, depicting the gradual corruption of true Christianity in England by Roman influence from apostolic times to his present and thereby demonstrating the truth and necessity of Protestant reformation. At the same time, his narrative histories of the Marian martyrs, published with dramatic images, helped to create a new, independent, and anti-papal English identity. Foxe’s account was based on oral and written testimony that he painstakingly collected and historical research assisted by the burgeoning antiquarian movement. His work was so effective in shaping English sentiments about the Reformation, Mary Tudor’s reign, and Roman Catholicism because it tied a diverse set of memories down into a single, though voluminous, text. Everything the English needed to know about their religious history could be found, read, and seen in one place. Foxe did not simply create a record of what happened, but found a way in the medium of the printed book to dictate precisely how memory should be interpreted by succeeding generations.15

Protestant ideology required more than the reinterpretation of the past. It also demanded deliberate forgetfulness. Evangelicals rewrote history and memory as part of the campaign to lead people into Protestant truth. This could take the form of widespread, bureaucratic, and authorized erasures of the names and images of saints from books and churches. Thus Thomas Becket’s feast day and very name were scraped out of hundreds of manuscripts in Henry VIII’s England, to remove any memory that an archbishop had once challenged a king, while his shrine at Canterbury was dismantled to forbid even the possibility of physical pilgrimage in his honor.16 In other places, forgetting was the result of violent, sometimes brutal protests. In Münster in 1534 the brief reign of the Anabaptists saw the destruction of virtually all church furnishings, stained glass, and tombs, expunging the perceived idolatry of the past in preparation for the expected Apocalypse.17 Read in the best possible light, the destruction of imagery and the reshaping of the past were designed to transfer Christians’ attention from the active memory of the dead toward charity for the living. As Ulrich Zwingli put it, true images were not the dead, but the poor, and money fruitlessly expended on the dead could support them instead.18
The most profound change to memory introduced by Protestant reformers was the declaration that Purgatory did not exist. In their eyes, nothing could be done by the living for the salvation of the dead, whose fate rested in God’s hands alone. Martin Luther’s attack on the corruption that so often accompanied the sale of indulgences led to a reappraisal of the whole relationship between the living and the dead. For centuries, the primary way of remembering the dead was to pray for their souls. The popular economy that had been shaped around the doctrine of Purgatory rewarded the living for their intercession on behalf of the dead. In so doing, the living themselves completed charitable works that added to their own rewards, and kept them ever mindful of the inevitability of death. As Jonathan Finch puts it, in late medieval culture “the living were not encouraged to remember the dead, but to remember to pray for the dead.”

From the 1520s, the first generation of reformers could agree that, whatever the fate of the soul after death, the dead were cut off from the aid of the living and intercession for the dead was not meaningful. Across the sixteenth century, wherever Protestants held sway, such prayers were silenced, and the memory of the dead was left in limbo. The purpose of the *ars moriendi*, or art of dying, was translated into the art of living well; the once-perilous moment of death became less important in the economy of salvation. Consequently, preachers gave doctrinal instruction to their flocks at funerals, focusing on the edification of the living as they prepared for death, rather than exhorting their hearers to work for the improvement of the estate of the dead.

The Protestant relegation of Purgatory to the dustbin of history had only limited impact in Catholic regions of Europe. In Spain, bequests for masses for the dead actually increased in the wake of the Council of Trent. The obligation of the living to the dead found revived expression in the balance of memory and hope required by a belief in Purgatory—a belief promoted by the Inquisition. The shock of reformation nevertheless shook, if it did not shatter, extant ways of remembering. Perhaps the displaced energies once directed to interceding for the dead found new life in other practices based on the belief that supernatural bodies and effects could intervene in the natural world. Witchcraft, demonology, and the appearance of ghosts became other ways of negotiating the tension between life and death, this world and the next, in both Protestant and Catholic societies. It is no surprise that witch-hunts found their most intense expression in the Holy Roman Empire, where from the earliest days of the reformation neighbors lived cheek by jowl with those of different religious views. Surely there had to be an outlet for the displaced energies of the mass, intercession with the saints, and above all, the need to remember, encounter or even reconjure the dead in the midst of the living.

Monuments were one of the most prominent media in which shifting attitudes toward the memory of the dead were registered. In the fifteenth century it was commonplace for epitaphs to begin with the phrase *orate pro anima*—“pray for the soul”—or suchlike, and end with *cujus anime propicietur deus*—“on whose soul may God have mercy.” In northern Europe, where monumental brasses were an affordable and popular
form of memorial, images of the dead might be surrounded by petitions that the living too could use to aid their passage through the afterlife, such as “Jesus remember me,” or “Jesu mercy Lady help.” Across the sixteenth century, as these desires were repressed by Protestant doctrine, English monuments turned away from prayer as the principal way of remembering the dead. In its place, visitors were exhorted to praise God for the fruitful lives of the dead, and learn from their example. Epitaphs transformed “pray for the souls” into “give thanks for the souls,” while “on whose souls may God have mercy” became “whose bodies and souls God send a joyful resurrection.” Protestant memorials justified their very existence by the use of biblical texts such as “the memorial of the just shall be blessed, but the name of the wicked shall rot” (Prov. 10:7). A similar emphasis appeared on Lutheran epitaph monuments in sixteenth-century German territories. Several of these included a portrait or half-effigy of the deceased, in the case of scholars and clergy depicted still preaching to the congregation, which was accompanied by a scene (usually derived from the Bible) and an inscription. The response of the monumental tourist was no longer prayer motivated by the fear of death and Purgatory, but respect for the virtuous example and didactic power of the dead in the hope of resurrection to eternal life.

Although tombs in societies such as pre-Reformation England were largely focused on the remembrance of the dead and their hope for the prayers of the living, this was not always the case elsewhere in Europe. Well before Luther and his followers called for a revision of the memory of the dead, many Italian tombs were far more concerned with expressing social status, identifying the key characteristics of each individual’s or family’s contribution to their social group. As Andrew Butterfield puts it when speaking of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Florence, monuments “are typically directed toward the public, corporate, and social commemoration of excellence and virtue. Funerary monuments are constructed to confer fame on exemplary individuals.” The tombs of several European monarchs, emperors and popes demonstrate an obsession with the declaration of worldly power and a determination to secure an enduring presence in popular and elite memory alike. Henry VII’s sepulchre at Westminster Abbey, built in a specially constructed chapel adorned with images of the brand-new Tudor dynasty, was lavishly crafted by Pietro Torrigiano in the second decade of the sixteenth century. It presents the Tudor king as a virtuous man and wise ruler—his effigy is not in armor, unlike those of many of his predecessors—but no mention of God is made in the epitaphs. In 1502, the Habsburg emperor Maximilian commissioned what was to be Europe’s largest ever effigial monument at the Hofkirche in Innsbruck. Although the monument was never graced with Maximilian’s body and took some seventy years to approach a satisfactory form, it still powerfully foregrounds the emperor’s effigy on a sarcophagus illustrated with scenes from his life. All around are Maximilian’s ancestors, relations, and heroes, in oversized statues. While the emperor is shown kneeling, perhaps piously, there is no question that he is the culmination of centuries of work by Europe’s greatest families and that his own legacy is sufficient proof of his fame. Even the papacy adopted these principles of fame at
all costs. When Sixtus IV died in 1476, he was buried in the Vatican in a lavish bronze tomb fashioned by Antonio Pollaiuolo. The pope lies at rest surrounded not by angels, weepers, or intercessors, but by images of the seven virtues and the ten liberal arts.

At the turn of the sixteenth century, then, the desire for perpetual memory could easily outweigh religious concerns, which, in the case of tombs, were no doubt expressed elsewhere in the church buildings that housed them. By the end of the century, where Protestants had succeeded in overthrowing the cult of the dead, the Renaissance concepts of fame provided alternative means of remembering and honoring the dead. This new emphasis on fame was based on ancient, pagan examples, and largely avoided explicitly Christian notions of the afterlife, while the metaphysical understanding of death found new expression in the popularity of ambiguous phrases such as *memoriae sacrum*, “sacred to the memory.”

Florentine humanists had begun to elaborate new forms of public memory in civic funerals in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Expressions of grief or the fear of death were repressed beneath the decorum of solemn ritual. Petrarch criticized traditional Mediterranean practices such as weeping and the tearing of clothes. Coluccio Salutati advocated the replacement of emotive display with the reinvention of eulogy, a verbal tribute to honor the dead and express the values and identity of the living. Renaissance men were to subdue private distress and the trauma of loss in the interests of public image. The city-state warranted a broader memory that celebrated the contribution of its citizens to its fame and thereby preserved their identity. The anguish of separation might be keenly felt by individuals, but it found expression in personal media such as letters, poetry and music. Grief could be overcome by public memorials.

Petrarch and his successors sought to recast memory, not as a practice about recalling the past, but as a way of projecting the self into the future. Renaissance writers literally saw with their own eyes the enduring fame of the ancients, preserved in the physical ruins of the Roman Empire, and even more in the survival of ideas and ideals through their writings. Indeed, much of Petrarch’s inspiration was derived from his belief that he had discovered and handled Cicero’s own manuscripts in Verona. These objects demonstrated the veracity of Horace’s observation that through writing, one’s identity and very thoughts could be received by future generations. Even pagan writers could achieve a kind of afterlife. Petrarch’s response was not only to remember and idolize the Classical world, but also to seek that kind of enduring fame for himself. His success in achieving what one might term future memory is evidenced in his influence over the revival of the ancient idea of fame. His *Trionfi*, praising Fame over Death, Time over Fame, and Eternity over all, were translated into languages as diverse as Czech, Polish, French, and English.

The desire to recover and relive ancient ideals also involved the purification of memory. The scholarship practiced by the fifteenth century’s new breed of intellectuals focused on removing accretions of error and obtaining the original version of documents as far as possible. Humanists sought truth, recovering as never before an accurate rendition of
history. The most prominent example of the renewal of memory in this vein was Lorenzo Valla’s famous denunciation of the Donation of Constantine as a forgery on philological grounds. Valla would go on to suggest that Cicero could not have been the author of the rhetorical treatise *Ad herennium*, which incorporated one of the most famous essays on the arts of memory. Yet the purity of scholarship mingled with nostalgia for ancient glory, respect for long-held traditions that also shaped identity, and the desire to claim links of blood, culture, and descent with the world of the Trojans, Greeks, and Romans. On the whole, the fifteenth-and sixteenth-century historians of Florence presented a foundation myth designed to emphasize its direct inheritance of the mantle of Rome, thus making the city the modern center of ancient renewal and rewriting memory in the service of identity. The English sustained this habit well into the seventeenth century, continuing to believe, despite mounting evidence to the contrary, that the Tudor and Stuart monarchs were descendants of a whole series of historical and mythological figures, ranging from King Arthur to the Emperor Constantine to the Trojans, Noah, Adam and Eve, and through Saxons and Danes to the Nordic god Wotan. When Polydore Vergil pointed out that there was no evidence for the traditional British histories, he was condemned by later generations as a biased and heretical Roman Catholic adherent to papal deceit.

The new emphasis on fame and the desire to find genealogical links to the past led to an increase in the production of family histories from the fifteenth century onward. The collection of family memory in a single place, such as commonplace books, heraldic pedigrees, ricordanze and mémoires, was a potent way of identifying a unit to which allegiance was owed. The scale of this unit, and the kind of allegiance owed, could vary. In northern Italian city-states such as Venice, patrician memory and honor was interwoven with communal identity, and the city-state itself preserved the fame of its most celebrated families. In Florence, however, the relatively large oligarchy, including merchants as well as knights, made it difficult for the city to commemorate so many lineages. As a result, ricordanze were especially popular here, and citizens were required to show allegiance to God and the family first, rather than to the governing class as a whole. In England such matters were also complex, for this kingdom included the feudal system of monarch and nobles and an increasingly large number of “new men” who came to prominence through the acquisition of wealth. By the early seventeenth century it was commonplace for families that had effectively purchased their nobility or gentility to pay a herald to fabricate an ancient genealogy, accompanied by supporting documents such as deeds, monuments, and portraits. Families rewrote their histories to give themselves credibility: Catholic grandparents became neo-Protestant, while mercantile great-grandparents were converted into knights descended from companions of William the Conqueror in 1066. The public face of family memory mattered if one’s identity was to be accepted in the present and future.

While heralds and their ilk might engage in myth-making, a new breed of historical writing also sprung up as a result of humanist scholarly endeavors. What distinguished
these histories from the earlier criticisms of accepted historical “facts,” from the ongoing process of compiling chronicles of events, and from the attribution of historical origins to mythic figures of symbolic importance, was the attention to the genesis of a society. We have already encountered John Foxe’s attempts to link the Church of England with apostolic, anti-Roman origins. In England, the flowering of historical scholarship from the late sixteenth century saw scholars investigate the origins of central pillars of English culture and government: John Selden and Robert Cotton pursued the legal system, William Somner the language (including Anglo-Saxon), and topographers such as William Camden the division of the land itself. In a related development, astronomy, archaeology and history were brought together to date the very origins of the universe itself. Thomas Lydiat used ancient manuscripts, the physical evidence of the Arundel marbles, a Puritan expression of Protestant doctrine, his own astronomical calculations, and protracted debates with Scaliger and Kepler to divide history into brackets of 592 years (the period it takes for the lunar and solar calendars to reconcile). Lydiat’s work allowed Archbishop James Ussher to give an exact date to creation itself, and the result (October 28, 4004 BCE) entered into popular memory through chronologies and genealogies attached to printed editions of the Bible. Although Lydiat’s 592-year period never took off as a historical division, the numerically tidy century was increasingly used as a means of dividing up the past into regular portions.

As humanists revived the concept of fame and projected memory into the future, the past was reconceived through the process of periodization. While the Renaissance constructed the myth of the Dark Ages and invented the idea of the medieval period as a thousand-year-long interruption between more enlightened societies, early modern Europeans also began to punctuate the past with moments of significance that could be periodically commemorated through ritual performance. The first centenary ever celebrated in European history, for example, occurred in 1617 when a group of German states staged a series of rituals and lectures for the one hundredth anniversary of Luther’s publication of his theses in Wittenberg. As Charles Zika puts it, in the early seventeenth century, European intellectuals, bureaucrats, and clerics discovered that “the past, re-presented as history, could become an important resource in the structuring of social discipline within the early modern state.” One purpose of the 1617 centenary was to forge unity and a common identity amid the ideologically disparate Protestant states within the Holy Roman Empire. Memory here was deliberately put into the service of politics and religion—and it was relatively successful. The sesquicentenary was celebrated in 1667, and thenceforth, “Reformation Day” was celebrated in Saxony on October 31. Roman Catholics were not to be left out; since 1300 the Papacy had instituted a Holy Year celebrated at varying intervals, and in 1617 a special Holy Year was declared as an occasion of repentance for the centenary of schism.

In England the traditional Catholic annual cycle of holy days was largely lost, and gradually replaced by a new calendar based on recent historical events, not the feast days...
of long-dead saints. As David Cressy has shown, three occasions were instituted by the Elizabethan and Jacobean governments in the month of November to celebrate God’s providence in preserving the Protestant regime from harm: the anniversary of Elizabeth’s Accession Day in 1558, the defeat of the Armada of 1588, and the deliverance of King and Parliament from the Gunpowder Plot of 1605. The celebration of the latter was provided for by parliamentary statute in 1606, an act repealed only in 1859. Bonfire night lasted well into the twentieth century in those nations once part of the British Empire, while the effigy of the Pope is burned to this very day in the Sussex town of Lewes. All these officially sanctioned events were the subject of conflicting memories during the seventeenth century as the seismic events of British history created alternative meanings and made them available for the expression of diverse allegiances. Memory might be manipulated by bureaucrats and courtiers, yet popular culture could easily take new directions when gathered around a commemorative bonfire. Elsewhere in Europe, the legacy of division engendered by the Reformation was thinly papered over at the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, and social memories multiplied as identities sought expression and grief was released or repressed. Even those with the utmost power might find themselves required to go back on earlier memorial efforts. When he came to collect together the commemorative medals issued during his long reign, Louis XIV chose to omit an example from 1693 that celebrated the destruction of Heidelberg, for he perhaps realized that the incident would detract, not add to, his fame and glory.

In the eighteenth century, the reformation of memory was played out to its logical conclusion as it was taken up in the revolutionary projects of the Enlightenment. The European desire to observe and catalogue all the world filled encyclopedias. These attempted to abstract knowledge into alphabetical order and into schemes based on an apparently objective view of the natural realm, while ignoring the necessary repression of other memories and traditions in the worlds previously unknown to the European imagination. History became increasingly secular, as providence was removed from causal theory and as the divisiveness engendered by religious difference was blamed for war, trauma and death. Finally, as the American and French Revolutions turned the world upside down once more, time was reformed again, and, in the case of the French, begun again from a new year zero.

Every society reconstructs the past in the present. In early modern Europe, these reconstructions were directed toward the future and the afterlife as much as toward the past. The reformation of memory was most pronounced in the changing relationship of the living and the dead. Dante Alighieri’s *Commedia divina* had exquisitely mapped out the afterlife and the three realms of Heaven, Hell, and Purgatory, each with its own layers and places. This late medieval vision of the afterlife was very much a memory-theater, arranged to aid the penitent Christian in his or her devotions on behalf of the dead and in the preparation for death itself. Dante’s vision would, in some places, be torn asunder by the Protestant rejection of Purgatory, and in others at least questioned. Meanwhile,
the emergence of fame as a commodity opened up new ways of living after death, in the hearts and minds of future generations as well as in the supernatural realm.

In identifying the early modern reformation of memory, this essay challenges the presumption of modern memory studies that premodern societies were inhabited by a "natural," living form of collective memory, expressed ritually, orally, and visually, rather than closeted into static memorials or books. Jacques Le Goff argues that at the Enlightenment the West moved from a nostalgic view of the past (in which the modern world attempted to reflect the ancient) to a progressive one (in which the present, through history, criticized the past). Memory is seen as an uncritical, unconscious recollection of the past whereas history is argumentative and analytical; a history of memory should thus highlight how memory has actually been constructed, controlled, and obliterated whether intentionally or not. In pre-Enlightenment Europe, however, memory was far from natural. Seventeenth-century society was both nostalgic for and critical of the past; it employed empirical method but still conceived of the world in metaphysical terms; and history and collective memory were often one and the same. In fact, memory and history were intertwined, contested, and dangerous, as the past was used to legitimize the present and shape that most uncertain of prospects, the future. Early modern Europe was replete with deliberately created memories and invented commemorations, designed as responses to the Reformation with its attendant loss of an established narrative for the past and to the beginnings of the disenchantment of the world. If in our postmodern world memory has replaced history as the dominant mode of interaction with the past, perhaps we twenty-first century folk have returned to a seventeenth-century moment when the modernist divide between history and memory had yet to be created, and when the future was a more hopeful place.
3. Memory, Temporality, Modernity

Les lieux de mémoire

Bill Schwarz

The traces left by past events never move in a straight line, but in a curve that can be extended into the future.

Marc Bloch, *Strange Defeat*

“She wanted to have no past.” These words, with no hint of equivocation, come from D. H. Lawrence’s *Women in Love*, first published in 1921. They tell us of the reveries of Ursula Brangwen, whom, at the start of the novel, the narrator portrays as a decidedly “modern girl,” and who is later attired in canary-yellow stockings, thus proving the point. Lawrence continues:

She wanted to have come down from the slopes of heaven to this place, with Birkin, not to have rolled out of the murk of her childhood and her upbringing, slowly, all soiled. She felt that memory was a dirty trick played upon her. What was this decree that she should “remember”? Why not a bath of pure oblivion, a new birth, without any recollection or blemish of past life?

These are striking formulations, in which memory, far from functioning as a mental resource, is revealed to be only a “dirty trick.” For sure, Lawrence was no fan of Proust. We find in the novel none of the complex, lyrical evocations of lost times that could be characterized as Proustian. Whether Ursula proves as single-minded in her quest for oblivion as this passage suggests is not my concern here. What is of interest, however, is the self-consciously declarative tone of the statement: “She wanted to have no past.”
This passage can be read, and I assume mostly is read, as a reflection on a peculiarly modern sensibility, in which past and present are strictly differentiated, and in which the past functions as a burden on present and future. Ursula wishes to be free from both the past and its memories in order to fashion herself anew and to be able to live fully in the present. This desire to flee from the past, and to transcend the incubus of memory, has many corollaries in the aesthetic and philosophical imaginations of high modernism. On the other hand, though, there are many contrary manifestations in modernist thought in which memory, in a variety of conceptualizations, comes to be located as the means for salvation from a world in which no other access to the past exists and in which history has become the vehicle for pain and trauma, transmuting—as some believed, Joyce among them—into a nightmare. Writing retrospectively, this is the argument deployed by Andreas Huyssen whose purpose is to recuperate Baudelaire, Proust, Freud, and Benjamin in order to subvert, as he sees it, the amnesia of the postmodern present. Yet if this polarity—memory as destruction, memory as salvation—has some heuristic value, the permutations we confront, thinker by thinker, text by text, are endlessly complex and subtle, as the chapters that follow demonstrate, so much so that the initial polarities turn out not to be as polarized after all.

With this in mind it may prove more fruitful, in addressing the capacities of modern memory, to turn attention away from these functional arguments and to position memory more specifically in terms of temporality. Put simply, my argument is that issues of temporality provide a necessary context for unraveling the enigmas of modern memory. For underwriting the great classics of modernist thought is a perception of temporal dislocation, in which the connections between past and present become a source, not of succor, but of heightened anxiety, and in which the sensation of the loss of the past predominates. Memory, for good or ill, has become the category, peculiarly overdetermined and difficult to disentangle, in which these anxieties meet and are condensed.

From this perspective it’s less the functions of modern memory that prove critical than it is memory’s perpetual dysfunctions.

History

To pose the question of the relations between memory and modernity or to offer (as we do in this volume) the familiar sequence “antiquity, medieval, early modern, modern,” inescapably presents modern memory not only as a conceptual issue, but as one that is historical too. If modern memory represents a distinct formation—assuming, in other words, that people came to remember differently from hitherto, and that the great theorists of modern memory were in part reflecting on phenomena that themselves were historically new—this would be of great interest to historians. After all, the relations between past and present, memory, temporality itself all underwrite the processes of the
historical imagination. In principle, it would seem, historians have much to offer on contemporary memory debates. This leaves open, though, the question of what kind of historical inquiry can best reach that which we, as historical actors, experience as the temporal dislocations of modern life, for which memory has come to function as the synecdoche.

When we invoke history two immediate difficulties appear. First, as an intellectual discipline history itself is a sign of the modern. The temporal plotting we employ—antiquity, medieval, modern—attests to a sequential, future-driven conception of historical time that is itself a product of modernity. In its earliest theorizations, historical time was largely teleological; if it was felt that the past was slipping away, ever more difficult to reach, the grand narratives ordained by history promised, as recompense, a grander future. The intellectual practice of history, in its emergent forms, was in part devised as a counter to the wayward, indeterminate workings of modern memory, striving to establish the principles of historical time as the definitive component of temporality. In this scheme of things, subjective time, the time of the everyday and of the self, memory included, could appear only as dysfunctional, working to interrupt the clear geometrical abstractions of the time of history. If the hope of history, as a peculiarly modern form of reasoning, was that it might rationalize the relationship between past and present, overcoming sentiment by recourse to science, it could only do so by excluding or trivializing the various temporalities that appeared as dysfunctions. History itself, as well as promising much, may also be part of the problem.

It’s also apparent that, despite the claims made for the rational properties of histories, historians themselves were and are as much enmeshed in the temporal dislocations of modern times as anyone else. Formal historical inquiry represents, among other things, one way in which the imaginings of lost times are dramatized, debated and brought to life. In the rendezvous between history and memory, history is no innocent party. Indeed fixations with the past, obsessions with lost times and even, as a corollary, the belief that the enchantments of the past have been destroyed in the present are all occupational hazards for the historian. In this sense, historical knowledge can work as another means by which the temporal dislocations of modern life are mitigated in the imagination, acting as a kind of intellectual reparation.

Yet if in the founding grand narratives of the modern world memory can only be grasped as dysfunctional, dislocating the given patterns of history, from a contrary viewpoint it is precisely those forms that appear most dysfunctional that provide the most fruitful means for thinking the connections between historical time and the time of the interior life. It’s for this reason, in current debates, that the high modernist moment is accorded a privileged role, for from the late nineteenth century a powerful motif in the aesthetic of modernism turned on conceptions of temporality that, in many different variations, sought to break with the teleologies of homogenized, linear time—or of “empty” time, as Benjamin has it—in which history was conceived simply as the means
for the realization of modernity. In many respects the encounter between history and memory brings us to the limit case of conceptions of historical time, and requires a profound reappraisal of the given protocols of historical knowledge.

**The End of the Past, the End of History**

My aim, here, is a deal more modest: simply to plot the ways in which the problem of temporal dislocation—and of its synecdoche, memory—have been worked through in three historical accounts of modernity. In doing so, I draw attention to the contrary elements that occur in these histories. On the one hand, in each, history appears as “the sign of the modern,” and the impress of a sequential teleology is evident; on the other, interwoven into each account is a sense also of emotional or psychic loss, in which attachments to the past can no longer be sustained. I’ll look briefly at J. H. Plumb and Carl Schorske, neither of whom is generally cited in the field of memory studies, and in more detail at Pierre Nora, whose work on memory is well known. These are historians, as readers who know their work will appreciate, of radically distinct temperaments. However, their varied intentions and politics notwithstanding, there occur unexpected formal affinities in the means by which they imagine the relations between past and present. We confront in each, respectively, the end of the past, the end of history, and the end of memory. Where does such interpretation leave us?

Plumb, a historian of Hanoverian England and a figure whose life was deeply institutionalized in the mores of ancient Cambridge, doesn’t usually appear in contemporary reflections on the dispositions of the modern world. Yet in March 1968 he delivered a series of lectures a long way from his usual locale, in New York, which were published the following year as a book entitled *The Death of the Past*. The title conveys the basic thesis with admirable economy. Plumb draws a sharp distinction between “the past” and “history.” “Man,” he says, employing an anthropological terminology that even then was outmoded, “has used the past in a variety of ways.” Principally the past, in the past, functioned as a daily “theatre of life,” in which the hopes of the present were given sustenance by elaborate reconstructions of mythical pasts, where good and evil took on palpable, allegorical form. “The more literate and sophisticated the society becomes,” Plumb contends, “the more complex and powerful becomes the uses to which the past is put.” The earliest manifestations of written history and of genealogy were, he claims, ultimately conducted for instrumental ends, in order to further specific interests in the present.

The critical turning point in the making of a modern historiography appeared uniquely in “Western societies,” as he has it, during the Renaissance, when the return to the past first began to evolve into the rational, falsifiable explanation of human action:
From the Renaissance onwards there has been a growing determination to try and understand what happened, purely in its own terms and not in the service of religion or national destiny, or morality, or the sanctity of institutions; indeed to try and bring to the human story both the detachment and insight and intellectual comprehension that natural philosophers have brought to their study of the external world.

The force of these new powers of critical reasoning served, in turn, to dissolve the power of the past. Though this is not, in Plumb’s view, the decisive factor in the destruction of the past—he identifies the deeper causes in the dynamics of an “industrial society” that possesses “no sanction in the past and no roots in it”—in intellectual terms these new modes of reappropriating the past, based on reason, were critical. When the past, displaced by the intellectual practice of history, comes to lose its authority it becomes, he tells us, merely “a matter of curiosity, of nostalgia, a sentimentality.”

As much as any modernist who preceded him Plumb, despite his antiquarian instincts, was captivated by the ruins of the past, which he perceived to be all around him:

The great Christian past, with its nineteenth-century variations—for they were no more than variations—on that old majestic theme of man’s fall and salvation, has collapsed. Rubble, broken arches, monuments crumbling to dust, roofs open to the sky litter this world of thought and loom forebodingly against the horizon. A strange collection of men walk amidst the debris, some full of lamentation, calling for urgent repairs, for an immediate restoration of the old house of the intellect; others climb on to a prominent broken pillar and in self-confident voices explain it all away; others are blind and stumble over the ruins not knowing what has happened. . . . Can this litter of a dead past be cleared away?

All that can remain from this catastrophe, he concludes, is the resourcefulness of the individual, reasoning human mind.

These were urgent issues, he insisted, because men and women need to possess a temporal grasp of the worlds they inhabit. His privileging of a historical understanding of the past derived most of all from his conviction that history, as critical practice, serves no vested interests and thus carries with it, if not emancipatory possibilities, then—in his characteristically more tempered sensibility—a notion of what it “may be imprudent to do.” Despite this overly genteel justification for the study of history, the death of the past, for Plumb, creates the conditions for a more deeply democratic civil society:

The past is always a created ideology with a purpose, designed to control individuals, or motivate societies, or inspire classes . . . The future of history and historians is to cleanse the story of mankind from those deceiving visions of a purposeful past. The
death of the past can only do good so long as history flourishes . . . The past has only served the few; perhaps history may serve the multitude.

It’s instructive, looking back from our vantage today, that within this theoretical framework there is no explicit attention to memory. Yet it is evident that Plumb’s conception of the past is, in part at least, a metonym for memory itself. “And for a past that lives,” he asks, “what is time?—an irrelevance.” Memory in premodern times binds the past to the present (if we can employ these terms) and is, for Plumb omnipresent, a lived relation that requires no reflection or abstraction precisely because it is naturalized, imbricated in the very mentalities of everyday life. It—memory—is in this reading a function of peculiarly premodern societies, authentically organic as the modern relationship between past to present can never be. Thus when he invokes “the past” what Plumb refers to is not the inchoate, protean accumulation of all that has ever happened, but more properly what Eric Hobsbawm, following a similar line of argument, calls “the social mechanisms that link one’s contemporary experience to that of earlier generations.” With this in mind there can be no doubt that, following Plumb’s model, if in the pre-Enlightenment epochs memory operates as the overriding “mechanism” by which “the past” enters the present, then memory can only be understood as the disreputable and damaging precursor to reasoned historical scholarship.

That Plumb’s Cambridge refinement should find itself, providentially, translated into the universal expression of the ideal modern historian, levitating above the profanities of everyday life, is not a happy resolution. But still, I’ve always found The Death of the Past an unsettling polemic, whose images stay in the mind, and that anticipates—in its relaxed, self-consciously erudite manner—many later explorations whose theory is more heavily freighted.

Carl Schorske is a very different sort of historian: New World rather than Old, Jewish, committed to a peculiarly U.S. tough radical populism, and profoundly knowledgeable about the practices of high modernism, which have occupied his professional writings over the past half century. His most famous book, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna, is a wonderfully illuminating, landmark study of the influence of modernism on the twentieth century. But it is in modernism, for Schorske, that what he identifies as the intellectual collapse of our own times can be located, for it was modernism that functioned as both cause and effect of the end of history.

Since the onset of the modernist period, “modern,” he writes, works as a concept that “has come to distinguish our perception of our lives and times from all that has gone before, from history as a whole, as such. . . . The modern mind has been growing indifferent to history because history, conceived as a continuous nourishing tradition, has become useless to it.” The initial perpetrator of this repudiation of history he takes to have been Nietzsche, to whom the world presented itself only as “ubiquitous fragmentation.”
And for all Schorske’s regard for, and understanding of, the great modernist figures of the early twentieth century, none appears to escape his censure, for the gravitational pull away from history was, he maintains, a collective one.9

In some fine pages he connects his own political biography to this larger prohibition to thinking historically. In the years following the Second World War, he explains, the optimism of his generation, which had lived through the New Deal and the defeat of fascism, fell apart. Just when faith in the historical imagination and, Schorske adds, in the Enlightenment principles that make it possible, were most needed, they were—across the intellectual culture as a whole—jettisoned. Liberals and radicals, “almost unconsciously . . . adapted their world-views to a revolution of falling political expectations,” and we have since been living the consequences.10 Thus in Thinking with History, effectively a sequel to Fin-de-Siècle Vienna, he argues that the “ahistorical” properties of modernism have continued to feed into the epoch of the postmodern: “Postmodernism, to be sure, has found uses for elements in the past in its own constructions and deconstructions. But even as it consigns modernism to the past, it reaffirms as its own modernism’s rupture from history as a continuous process, as the platform of its own intellectual identity.”11

The contention that we live in an ahistorical age is a common one, even though the shape of the argument shifts from protagonist to protagonist. Like Plumb, Schorske appears to address the matter of memory indirectly. Yet it is clear that though he was convinced that the intellectual authority of historical time was on the wane, this was due only to the fact that consciousness of internal, subjective time was moving to the fore. Or as he put this, there had occurred “the turn from Marx to Freud,” from a temporality that was “public and sociological” to one that was “private and psychological.”12 Modern, or postmodern, time may have turned its back on history; but “private” or “psychological” time, the time of Freud and Proust, which today we would designate as memory, is deemed to be dominant.

In reading Plumb and Schorske together we can see some common patterns emerge. First, they both radically counterpoise memory to history, such that any conceivable coexistence between the two becomes difficult to imagine. For Plumb, when the-past-as-memory dies, history comes to life; while for Schorske, when history dies, memory comes to life. Neither contemplates the possibility that, for all the necessarily distinct, respective properties of memory and history, each can work with (or live with) the other.

Second, it’s revealing the degree to which current debates on the identification of modern memory work from an evolutionary, sequential temporal plotting. This way of thinking is pronounced in Plumb. He conceives, for example, of the arrival of modernity as having imposed a radical, sequential break with prior forms, and implies too that there exists a teleology that stretches into the future, bringing with it, as he supposes, emancipation from unreason. But in so doing he imposes a strict notion of temporality that carries the imprint of the grand narratives of modernity, in which history, upper case, predominates and all alternative conceptions of temporality, mnemonic time included,
disappear from view. If Schorske provides a mirror-image of this schema, it is also a deal more nuanced. Yet even so, the transformation he depicts is essentially an unambiguous reversal, from history to memory. For all the craft of his concrete case studies, the more general notion of dehistoricization operates at a high level of abstraction and works to totalize the transformations he identifies.

For both Plumb and Schorske the specifically modern experience of temporality is sharply distinguished from prior systems—though as both Mary Carruthers and Peter Sherlock suggest in the previous chapters in this volume, there is no reason to think that memory in premodern times ever existed free of mediation. For Plumb premodern subjects inhabited a world that was essentially timeless, where memory was barely differentiated from consciousness itself. For Schorske the coming of modernity separates humans “from history as a whole, as such,” while history itself is no longer conceived as “a continuous nourishing tradition.”

What is clear, however, is that whether optimistic or pessimistic, both sides in this debate acknowledge that modern life has broken attachments to the past and that new ways need to be invented to revivify what has been lost. How this basic theme is played out in theoretical discussion is confusing. The same presentiment can be ascribed, as Richard Terdiman has indicated, to there being too much memory, or too little; to there being too much history, or too little; to there being memory rather than history; or history rather than memory. Whatever the take, though, the problem has a common provenance: the difficulties that prevent modern subjects from connecting with their pasts and inhabiting time in such a way that “life” itself (in Nietzsche’s terms) is enhanced rather than diminished.

The End of Memory

In these terms, Pierre Nora’s thesis on the end of memory is both important and revealing. As we shall see, his basic historical concepts are pitched at a high level of abstraction, and they are organized within a relatively uncomplicated narrative of modernization. At the same time he sees modernization above all else as a process of temporal dislocation, in which the past progressively disappears from the present, moving ever further away from human consciousness. The domain in which this occurs is what Nora categorizes as modern memory. Indeed, it seems as if the entire plight of contemporary life comes, in his depiction, to be signified by memory. Much of this I find unpersuasive. But Nora is an unusually self-conscious historian epistemologically and even when his historical conclusions are at their most extravagant he can be a nimble thinker, ducking and weaving when required: as an advocate for history, he knows well enough the artifice by which historical knowledge works.
Nora is perhaps the most celebrated historian of memory. Under his direction, between 1984 and 1992 there appeared, in the original French, seven volumes of his influential *Les lieux de mémoire*, comprising essays by a multitude of authors; when these were reprinted in three paperback volumes in 1997, the new edition comprised nearly five thousand pages. The planned English translation, in seven volumes (three under the title *Realms of Memory* and four as *Rethinking France*), which conceptually recasts the original, is still underway. The initial publication itself was received as an intellectual media-event, drawing into its slipstream academics, public and political figures, and, through the press and television, the wider public, the very ambition of the project creating its own momentum. Nora, a man poised in the liberal-conservative center of the political spectrum, has been a well-connected figure of authority at the heart of the Parisian intellectual scene for many years: historian, publisher at Gallimard, founder and editor of *Le débat*, founder, with his brother-in-law, the historian François Furet, of the Saint-Simon Foundation, member of the Academy. Insofar as French intellectual culture has moved to the right over the past decades, in the view of one commentator at least, Nora’s prominence not only illuminates this wider shift, but has been decisive in it—a transformation particularly evident in the national historiography, with both Nora and Furet in the van. It was in Nora’s role as an editor at Gallimard in the mid-1990s, for example, that he refused to publish Hobsbawm’s *Age of Extremes* on the grounds that French public opinion had become too hostile to the traditions of Communism for the book to be well received.

Various commentaries to the project have appeared in the Anglophone world, seeking to make sense of what is a vast, complex work, though there is little consensus about the major propositions. More interestingly, perhaps, none has felt obliged to reflect on the provocations of Nora’s prose: this is writing that is knowingly epistemological, delighting in aphorism and epigram; while drawn to paradox, it is punctuated by flamboyant declamation that, to the insular eye, is often as obscure as it is sweeping. Public historians in the Anglophone tradition generally learn to hone their narrative skills. Nora doesn’t do narrative, choosing instead a more analytical, synchronic approach. While its stylistic virtuosity is impressive, its explanatory power remains open to question. It is best read as a symptomatic text, bringing to the fore, for our own times, a modernist melancholia in which the degradation of memory is the defining feature of modern life. Indeed, for all the high-wire conceptual acrobatics of his work, it is the melancholia that registers most powerfully, for it is enmeshed in his historical method. It’s not simply that the theme of loss runs through every page of his historical interpretation, explicitly and unapologetically. His is a perception of loss that carries with it no hint of acceptance or mitigation: whatever psychic properties this may entail, its political articulation can only be one of reaction.

The reputation of *Les lieux de mémoire* rests on its analysis of memory. However, the books are as much about the symbolic making of the French nation as they are about
memory, understood more broadly. Essentially, the authors concern themselves with exploring different facets of the French past through the lens of memory. Such studies, by their nature, present a myriad of different phenomena, all of which they take to qualify as *lieux de mémoire*, which literally we can understand as the locations of memory. Alongside the monuments and the familiar symbols of French nationhood we find chapters devoted to historians, novelists, and painters; to songs and conversations; to forests, coastlines and the natural landscape; to the regions and to idea of the hexagon as an imaginative means for figuring the territory of the nation; to the Tour de France; to war memorials; to memoirs; to religion; to the concept of generation; and to much, much more. Whether in the colossal three-volume edition, or in the seven separate volumes, this is history in monumental mode and, notwithstanding Nora’s own stated hope that it should be encountered as a multivocal history, the final result is far from being any kind of open text: the tight explanatory structures of Nora’s own paratexts—his prefaces, general introductions, introductions, conclusions that punctuate the range of case-studies—set out to supply an uncompromisingly didactic means by which the whole project should be read.

*Les lieux de mémoire* is a work of classification, in the grand Durkheimian manner, elaborating a vast inventory of the symbolic systems that have generated the meanings of French national life, investigating the “unconscious organization of collective memory.”19 It relies on a method of working, tantalizingly close to variants of classical structuralism, that endeavors to uncover the categories of “intelligibility” that organize the symbolic field in the historical present.20 In so doing, Nora sought also to develop what he termed “a general concept of memory within the field of historiography.”21 At various points through the volumes he set out to clarify his principles of classification in order to determine why certain phenomena had been included and others excluded and to explain the differing operations of *les lieux* (“internal” to memory or “exterior,” “imposed” or “constructed,” “dominant” or “dominated,” material or non-material and so on). These work to greater or lesser effect, and some—despite numerous readings—I am still baffled by. But as Nora himself contends, the challenge that he and his collaborators faced derived not from their initial theoretical approach but from the intervention of what he believed to be a profound historical transformation that radically altered the very dispositions of memory itself.

The argument is this: during the 1970s, and in the years that followed when *Les lieux de mémoire* was being drafted and published, France itself, as a coherent historical entity, began to unravel. “The dissolution of the unifying framework of the nation-state has exploded the traditional system that was its concentrated symbolic expression.” The “classical model” of France as a given network of memories collapsed. “There is no commemorative superego: the canon has vanished.” Where once there had been “order and hierarchy,” now there was simply an absence, lacking any “central organizing principle.”
Memories of the nation, with no internal gravity to give them structure, had simply become “infinite.” In this situation memory no longer possessed the capacity to give life to the national past, and thus the present was sharply cut adrift from all that had preceded it. This argument is marshaled to greatest effect in Nora’s *envoi*, published at the end of the final volume, where his tone becomes conspicuously more caustic. It was not only, as he imagined it, that his historical method had become superseded by historical events, his neostructuralism unable to engage with a situation in which “no central organizing principle” pertained. It was also that his own *magnum opus*, in the moment of its public consumption, had undergone an unwelcome transubstantiation and, subject to the thrall of a new system of memory, had itself ceased to be received as history and had become *un lieu de mémoire*. It was subsumed by what it had set out to critique. In doing so it confirmed for Nora his conviction that in contemporary times the prospect of ever reaching the past had become all but a cognitive, intellectual impossibility.

In order to understand the import of this reading, and how Nora at this point is conceptualizing *les lieux*, we need to step back and review the larger thesis that his volumes propose, looking particularly at the issue of temporality.

The conceptual architecture of Nora’s investigations derives from what he identifies as a single overarching paradox. In contemporary times memory is dead. But simultaneously, he believes, memory is omnipresent, the phenomenon of modern memory itself revealing the dominating episteme of the age. “Memory is constantly on our lips because it no longer exists.” How is this paradox to be explained?

In the narrative construction of a work of this scale, authored by many hands over a long period, there inevitably occur not only important shifts in argument and nuance, but also competing angles of vision, double-exposures, retakes and so on. There are, equally unsurprisingly, a number of shifting, ambiguous formulations in the contributions by Nora himself. Yet notwithstanding the complexity of these many volumes, the larger arguments depend on a relatively simple, and familiar, historical schema. Indeed, it’s possible, without undue damage, to tabulate the basic temporal phases that underwrite Nora’s reading of the evolution of modern memory (see Table 1). A tripartite temporal division is evident. The least investigated appears in the table as “Premodern,” which, for the most part, precedes the Revolution of 1789. The operations of memory in the premodern epoch register, for Nora, as what he calls “real” memory: intimate and “spontaneous,” imbricated in lived experience such that memory itself exists free from mediation. It is, precisely, immediate with experience. It is essentially collective, most commonly based on rural custom. And it allows the past to be “inhabited” in the present. Whether premodern formations of memory ever worked in this way remains in doubt, as I suggested earlier. The critical issue, however, is that, from this point on, modern memory, whether in actuality or in its potential, begins the process of turning inside-out the practices of “real” memory. Memory, real memory, dies at the outset of modernity. But in its place emerge new institutions devoted to recovering what has been lost, creating new, ersatz
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>TABLE 1. The temporalities of Pierre Nora’s <em>Les lieux de mémoire</em></strong></th>
<th><strong>Premodern</strong></th>
<th><strong>Modern</strong></th>
<th><strong>Postmodern</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Memory (3): Institutions</strong></td>
<td>Community, collective (peasant, rural, custom).</td>
<td>Nation, nation-state, collective: particularly, the church, school, family, government.</td>
<td>Civil society, “minorities,” the individual. Driven by the mass media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Memory (4): Selfhood</strong></td>
<td>Awareness of self through community.</td>
<td>Awareness of self through history.</td>
<td>Awareness of self through memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Past</strong></td>
<td>Simultaneity of past and present; “inhabiting” the past.</td>
<td>Continuity of past-present; tradition lived and sustained. Acceleration of historical time.</td>
<td>“Disappearance of historical time.” Past irrevocable; past-present discontinuous; the past no guarantee of the future; tradition as “unsettling.” Only possible to “commune” with the past. Past becomes only the past.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>History</strong></td>
<td>Collective memory evolves into written record of the past.</td>
<td>Memory-history. Rise of critical history; scholarly construction of memory. History itself a means for the mediation of memory, and for the disenchantment of the world (<em>Annales</em> school). History prevails over memory.</td>
<td>Severing of history and memory; democratization of history. Emptying of historical knowledge. Historian becomes a lieu de mémoire. Memory prevails over history.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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memory-forms—performed rather than lived, mediated rather than unmediated—that replicate, at varying removes, what had once been vital and replete.

It is these emergent institutions, in which modern memory accretes and crystallizes, that Nora dubs les lieux de mémoire. When I first came to read Nora I was, I expect like many readers, unsure about his evaluation of les lieux. Did these function only as simulations of prior forms that had been properly organic, representing the pains of loss and inducing the characteristic reflexes of disenchantment with the modern world? Or did they possess a more positive social role, enabling new relations of social solidarity to be created? The answer, for a time at least, was both.

Nora endeavors to convey the doubleness of modern memory, caught between life and death, in the following passage:

*Lieux de mémoire* arise out of a sense that there is no such thing as spontaneous memory, hence that we must create archives, mark anniversaries, organize celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and authenticate documents because such things no longer happen as a matter of course. When certain minorities create protected enclaves as preserves of memory to be jealously safeguarded, they reveal what is true of all lieux de mémoire: that without commemorative vigilance, history would soon sweep them away. These bastions buttress our identities, but if what they defended were not threatened, there would be no need for them. If the remembrances they protect were truly living presences in our lives, they would be useless. Conversely, if history did not seize upon memories in order to distort and transform them, to mold them or turn them to stone, they would not turn into lieux de mémoire, which emerge in two stages: moments of history are plucked out of the flow of history, then returned to it—no longer quite alive but not yet entirely dead, like shells left on the shore when the sea of living memory has receded.

Or as he continues: “The lieux of which I speak are hybrid places, mutants in a sense, compounded of life and death, of the temporal and the eternal.”

Yet looking back from his own standpoint of the late twentieth century, the systems of memory inaugurated by the French Revolution, and consolidated during the Third Republic, attain for Nora—compared at least to the poverty of the present—a measure of authentic grandeur. When Bastille Day was declared a national holiday in 1890, for example, Nora claims that it became “an official” lieu de mémoire. But in terms of the everyday practices of memory it also represented what he calls “a genuine return to the source,” reproducing something akin to a living memory. The early years of the Third Republic occupy a key location in his larger analysis. During this period the memory of the nation’s history became “the nerve of the social and political bond,” generating an epic “grand narrative” that took on life as “an absorbing family saga starting with Vercingetorix.” Indeed, the national story assumed a status he regards as “sacred.” This symbolized...
what he defines as “the classical model of national commemoration.” In sum, in a characteristically Norian construct, nineteenth-century France exemplifies the idea of the “memory-nation,” in which the relation between past and present, though attenuated, could still be felt in the experiences of everyday life. Following closely from Halbwachs at this point, he argues that the collective sense of the French past, reproduced in church, school, and family, operated as a unitary field-force in which social and political divisions—clerical and anticlerical, conservative and radical—were contained:

At one time, the Third Republic seemed to draw together and crystallize, through history and around the concept of “the nation,” one tradition of French memory. Throughout this period, history, memory, and the nation enjoyed an unusually intimate communion, a symbiotic complementarity at every level—scientific and pedagogical, theoretical and practical.

It’s apparent that the memory that haunts the pages of Les lieux de mémoire, and that which the book mourns above all else, is that of old, centralized France, later evoked through those emblematic figures of provincial life, the postman and the schoolteacher, each indicative of the reach of the state into private life.

Behind these memories of the “memory-nation” lies too the sociological reality of an extensive peasant-rural sector that remained dominant well into the twentieth century, and that in turn functioned as the source for the strategic power of the idea of the longue durée in the imagining of the French nation and in the makings of its memories. “Think . . . of the irrevocable breach,” Nora instructs his readers, “marked by the disappearance of peasant culture, that quintessential repository of collective memory.” That “irrevocable breach” represents in Nora’s theorization of memory the foundational historical event from which all else follows.

In this depiction, the memory formations of nineteenth-century France simultaneously were rich in affect and contained as well the forces that were to bring about their undoing. The mediations by which modern memory was articulated—the dependence on the written word and its archives—worked to deepen the gap between memory and human experience: in consequence, he claims, memory was always in danger of losing any real connection to the past, driven instead exclusively by the concerns of the present. For Nora, memory in this period hovered on the brink of the collapse of the connection between signifier and signified, “between act and meaning,” such that the past becomes only the past, with no effectivity on the present. In modern life the past was slipping away from the present.

This is how Nora describes les lieux in formal terms. Alongside this he also supplies a more diachronic argument. In the modern epoch he indicates that these locations of memory were essentially contradictory, combining vestiges of “real” memory with simulacra that represented nothing more than themselves. Although generally implicit, there
is evidence to suggest that his conception of modern France opens—following convention—with the Revolution and (less conventionally) comes to an end in the 1970s. Through these years, he argues, there existed a number of forces that worked to counter the components of “real” memory within each lieu de mémoire and to abet the dominance of their simulacra. In Nora’s portrayal incremental, evolutionary, quantitative change turns into a transformation decidedly qualitative, in which les lieux lose any semblance of existing as institutions that carry even the remnants of spontaneous memory. They become merely instigators of what he names as “patrimonial” memory or, to use the common English equivalent, heritage. These quantitative shifts, he indicates, accumulated in particular moments: in the last third of the nineteenth century, in the 1930s and finally in the 1970s. For this reason, in Table 1, it’s necessary not only to be aware of the contradictions internal to each lieu, but also of the fact that Nora proposes that there exists too a tendential historical process by which les lieux de mémoire become progressively emptied of “real” memory altogether. In Table 1, I’ve indicated this schematically by distinguishing between lieux I and lieux II. Thus the closer we come to the contemporary period the more that Nora is adamant that les lieux exist only in this second, degraded, meaning.

Nora doesn’t choose to use the term postmodern. I’ve adopted this in the table only as a convenient tag. He is precise enough, though, to insist that 1975 marks the critical, defining moment when “real” memory finally dies and when a new “outbreak” of patrimonial memories was unleashed on the French nation, bringing its very existence into question. He identifies three elements that composed this conjunctural transformation. The first was the oil crisis of 1974, which put an end to the thirty years of accelerated growth that France had undergone, but which signaled too the coup de grâce for the traditions of the rural nation. In 1945, he points out, some half of the population had still been engaged in agriculture; thirty years later, this fell for the first time to below ten per cent, “a fateful threshold,” finally breaking the inherited components of “collective memory.” This element in the conjuncture represented, as Nora sees it, the historic ending of the longue durée of peasant France. Second, he views the arrival of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing at the Élysée Palace in 1974 as marking the termination of the Gaullist era—by which he means the period dominated by both the Gaullists themselves and the Communists—and also (due to Giscard’s divorce from the imperatives of the “old France”) as reinforcing what Nora chooses to call “the implantation of the imaginary.” And third, following closely in the footsteps of François Furet, he cites as critical the exhaustion of the revolutionary idea that required of the French that they remodel their collective relationship to the national past.

These might not seem to be exactly commensurable historical events. But by braiding them together Nora creates a narrative in which the moment of the 1970s is truly overdetermined, a condensation of distinct historical times that, in their combination, produces a cataclysm within the nation. The vision is apocalyptic. Everything becomes unhinged.
Behind the conjuncture of the mid-seventies lie deeper, tectonic shifts. The consequences of decolonization had, he insists, undermined the rationality of the West, and spelled the end of European hegemony. The processes of “internal decolonization” had given voice to new social groups: to “minorities,” whom, in a Borgesian summation, Nora names as “Jews, royalists, Bretons, Corsicans, women.”

Nora implies that much of what occurred in the seventies had been anticipated in 1968—even though he asserts that in ’68 “nothing tangible or palpable occurred at all,” that it was only “a mere symbolic resumé,” celebrating nothing more than the end of revolution. But since then the cataclysm has gathered pace. Everything now appears to be on the point of death: memory, history (both historical time and the practice of writing history), the past, the nation, Europe, revolution, politics, literature. The unexamined first person plural—denoting, I can only assume, an abstract collective of Frenchmen—have come to experience their past as “other”: indeed, in this scenario they themselves—this abstract “us”—have been rendered “other.”

As he concludes, the bitterness apparent, “we know” that the past “is no longer ours.”

The sign of this epistemic collapse is memory. It is in memory that the destruction of the cultural authority of France and Europe is to be located. From this point on all the deathly, ersatz qualities that had haunted les lieux de mémoire from the start come fully into their own. The properties of French nationhood, once there for all to see, have become dispersed, infinite and uncontrollable. Memory invades the social formation, dissolving the inherited structures of social solidarity; this memory is atomized, civic in provenance rather than that stipulated by the nation-state, and individual rather than collective. Precisely because the past has no hold on the present the compulsion to commemorate is everywhere. Memory itself generates only a vortex of empty signifiers in which nothing can be signified. The “fetishism of signs” is complete, and all are “enslaved to memory.”

In such extreme circumstances Nora invests great intellectual and moral value in a revamped historical practice that can counter the depredations of contemporary memory. This has to be a history that recognizes—he is explicit in his deference to Proust at this point—that modern life is formed by a “sense of loss, of tearing apart, and of permanent separation,” and must work to create in the imagination a restorative harmony of a society otherwise ravaged by its disconnection to the past. And as history is brought “back to life” so too—tenuously—is France, as a “nation without nationalism,” and defined as a “reality that is entirely symbolic,” thereby rejecting “any definition that would reduce it to phenomena of another order.”

“Phenomena of another order”: this might seem an opaque formulation. Yet I read this as meaning a France that cannot be understood as an expression of a “partisan” politics, allied to either the historic Gaullist or Communist traditions. Undoubtedly,
Nora's history is explicitly nationalist, envisaged as a means to resurrect the idea of French nationhood. But he is determined to represent the politics of his historiography as if it's entirely devoid of political investments and as if it's no longer encumbered by the detritus of past political battles. Paradoxically, the destruction of the old France that Nora proposes took place in the 1970s also brought with it, in his terms, an opportunity. *Les lieux de mémoire* is written on the back of Furet's maxim that “The French Revolution is over,” and in the conviction that the political traditions of right and left have become extinct.

Politics, in this scheme of things, is—among much else—effectively dead. Nora’s vision of a France resurrected, abetted by a suitably knowing history, is one in which affiliation to the nation transcends every conceivable social division. *La France est morte! Vive la France!*

Many readers will not be as exercised by the fate of the traditional nation-state as Nora; and many more, I imagine, will hardly be persuaded by a nationalist politics that masquerades as being no politics at all. But the principal issue lies less in his stated commitments than in the matter of location and perspective. What looks like a calamity from Nora’s location, at the apex of the French cultural system where many privileges accrue, may elsewhere be welcomed. The weakening of European hegemony, internal decolonization and the increased political authority of those dubbed “minorities,” the erosion of the centralizing powers of the French state, the democratization of history: to believe these signal a new nihilism is evidence only of a deep conservatism. Nora feels that his erstwhile possession of the past (his past) has been appropriated by others, and in the process he experiences himself as “other”—as “other,” that is, from his old French self.

Nora tells a powerful story. His is the grandest of grand narratives—grander than any of the reflections to be found in Plumb or Schorske—in which an entire mental universe implodes in 1975, or thereabouts, when everything that he valued began to die. For all his coquetting with conjunctural explanation, his entire analytical procedure works at a high level of abstraction. In essence the triptych premodern–modern–postmodern, does the bulk of his theoretical work for him. In this schema modernity functions as a long interregnum, between the premodern (when past and present were lived as one) and the postmodern (when the relations between past and present are finally broken). His only hope, in the postmodern present, rests on a revivified historical practice that takes as its premise the disconnection between past and present and seeks to assemble a new national story capable of operating effectively in public life.

In the end, though, while *Les lieux de mémoire* is an analytical history it represents at the same time a compulsive, extended enactment of a familiar set of anxieties about the temporal dislocations of modern life. Even while Nora berates deracinated historical explanation, his own narrative relies on a one-dimensional, teleological account of modernization, which culminates in what was destined to occur long ago: the end of memory. His recourse to Proust, in the hope of fashioning a historical narrative that can repair the pains of loss and separation, is no more than gestural. Any sense of determinate levels of...
abstraction is abandoned in favor of the grandiose epigram, exemplifying not so much historical explanation as the author’s irrepressible melancholia. Everything becomes memory, everything a lieu de mémoire, with no possibility for historical discrimination. The collapse of memory brings all else in its train. The misfortunes of France, as Nora believes them to be, become identified with the misfortunes of memory, tout court. It is in this sense that Les lieux de mémoire is indeed a symptom, demonstrating the degree to which memory still has to carry the burden of a historical practice incapable of engaging with what historians should be most qualified to understand: temporality itself.
II. IMAGINING MODERN MEMORY
4. Bergson on Memory

Keith Ansell-Pearson

Memory. Term used for a variety of systems in the brain with different characteristics. In all cases, however, it implies the ability to reinvoke or repeat a specific mental image or a physical act. It is a system property that depends on changes in synaptic strengths.

Gerald Edelman, *Wider than the Sky: The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness*

In this chapter on Bergson and memory I shall focus on two key questions that Henri Bergson sought to establish as the foundation for a philosophical treatment of memory. First, what is the relation between past and present? Is it merely a difference in degree, or is it possible to locate the difference between them as one of kind? If we can do the latter, what will this reveal about memory? Second, what is the status of the past? Is it something merely psychological, or might it be possible to ascribe an ontological status to it? In other words, what is the reality of the past?

*Matter and Memory* (first published in 1896) is widely recognized as Bergson’s major work. William James, a great admirer of Bergson’s work, described it as effecting a revolution in thought comparable in significance to Kant’s Copernican revolution in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Although the text fell into neglect in the second half of the twentieth century, it exercised a tremendous influence on several generations of French philosophers, including Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Ricoeur, and Gilles Deleuze. In addition, there have been important engagements with the text, and with the phenomenon of Bergsonism, in the writings of critical theorists such as Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and Max Horkheimer. If Bergson’s texts are being rediscovered today this is largely as a result of the influence of Deleuze’s writings on current intellectual work. The current interest being shown in Bergson is not, however,
confined to fashionable developments in continental philosophy. Bergson is gaining a renewed presence in psychology and the philosophy of mind. I shall devote most of this chapter to an explication of the main ideas we encounter in Bergson’s text. In the final section I shall say something on the reception of Bergson’s ideas in some key strands of twentieth-century thought.

Bergson’s approach to memory was highly innovative. He was one of the first thinkers to show the importance of paying attention to different types of memory (episodic, semantic, procedural), and he sought to provide a sustained demonstration of why memory cannot be regarded as merely a diluted or weakened form of perception. Bergson is close to Freud insofar as both are committed to the view that a radical division must be made between memory and perception if we are to respect the radical alterity of the unconscious. Bergson calls memory “a privileged problem” precisely because an adequate conception of it will enable us to speak seriously of unconscious psychical states. In this respect Bergson anticipates the arguments Freud put forward four years later in The Interpretation of Dreams. In his text of 1966, Bergsonism, Deleuze contends that Bergson introduces an ontological unconscious over and above the psychological one and that is this that enables us to speak of the being of the past and to grant the past a genuine existence. The past is not simply reducible to the status of a former present, and neither can it be solely identified with the phenomenon of psychological recollection. However, as one commentator has rightly noted, Bergson’s conception of the unconscious does not concern itself with the problems of psychological explanation that so occupied the attention of Freud.

Bergson always sought to think time in terms of duration (durée), the preservation or prolongation of the past, entailing the coexistence of past and present. He insists that a “special meaning” is to be given to the word memory. In one of the finest essays ever written on Bergson’s text, Jean Hyppolite notes that the new sense memory comes to have in Bergson consists in conceiving its operation in terms of a synthesis of past and present and with a view to the future. This goes against the prevailing conception that conceives memory as a faculty of repetition or reproduction, in which the past is repeated or reproduced in the present and is opposed to invention and creation. For Bergson memory is linked to creative duration and to sense. As Bergson notes, if matter does not remember the past since it repeats it constantly and is subject to a law of necessity, a being that evolves creates something new at every moment.

But just how are we to draw this distinction between past and present? Following Bergson we can note that nothing is less than the present moment, if we understand by this the indivisible limit that separates or divides the past from the future. This, however, is only an “ideal” present; the real, concrete, “live” present is different and necessarily occupies a tension of duration. If the essence of time is that it goes by, that time gone by is the past, then the present is the instant in which it goes by. However, we cannot capture this present by conceiving it in terms of a mathematical instant (as a point in time).
Bergson’s thinking is focused on the problem of how to draw a distinction between past and present while recognizing the indivisible continuity of durational time. He claims that while the distinction we make between our present and our past is not arbitrary, it is “relative to the expanse of the field that our attention to life can embrace.” If memory is a form of duration, then it is one with the impetus of consciousness itself (understood in the broad sense that Bergson gives to it as that which is bound up with discernment), and what in fact needs explaining is forgetting. Bergson’s problem, then, is how to account for the distinction between past and present in the context of our recognition of the indivisibility of duration. Later philosophies of temporality, including the work of Martin Heidegger and Gaston Bachelard, criticized Bergson for conceiving duration as cohesion and so failing to develop an account of the separations and ruptures of time, including the ecstasies of past, present, and future. However, as Jean Hyppolite points out, Bergson’s second major work, Matter and Memory, was precisely an attempt to raise this problem and to resolve it. In his Huxley lecture of 1911 on life and consciousness Bergson makes it clear that consciousness is both memory (the conservation and accumulation of the past in the present) and anticipation of the future.

Bergson’s treatment of memory is not without difficulties or problems. But it is a valuable resource for mapping memory, and in this chapter I wish to explicate its novel and distinctive features. As we shall see, Bergson’s presentation contains some highly unusual and unorthodox aspects, at least when one first encounters them and struggles to give them a sense.

Matter and Memory

In Matter and Memory Bergson seeks to establish the ground for a new rapport between the observations of psychology and the rigors of metaphysics (by metaphysics Bergson means that thinking that endeavors to go beyond the acquired and sed imented habits of the human mind, which for him are essentially mechanistic and geometrical in character). His argument on memory is not advanced in abstraction from consideration of work done on mental diseases, brain lesions, studies of the failures of recognition, insanity, and the whole pathology of memory. He poses a fundamental challenge to psychology in seeking to show that memories are not conserved in the brain. We have to hear him carefully on this point. In not wishing to privilege the brain as the progenitor of our representations of the world Bergson shows that he has an affinity with phenomenological approaches. He conceives perception and memory, for example, in the context of the lived body, conceives of cognition as fundamentally vital, not speculative, and grants primacy to action or praxis in our relation to the world.

Bergson’s argument rests on two hypotheses being put to work: pure perception and pure memory. Imagine a perception without the interlacing of memory (impossible but
helpful). Imagine a memory that is not actualized in concrete and specific memory-images and thus not reducible to our present recollection: less impossible perhaps but equally helpful. The central claim of the book is that while the difference between matter and perception is one of degree, the difference between perception and memory is one of kind. Regarding the first: unless we see it in this way the emergence of perception out of matter becomes inexplicable and mysterious. Regarding the second: unless we see it this way then memory is deprived of any unique and autonomous character and becomes simply a weakened form of perception (indeed Locke called it a “secondary perception”).

Bergson’s argument for the autonomy of memory is twofold. It is, first, a thesis on the active character of perception, the interest of which is vital and not speculative. In cases of failed recognition it is not that memories have been destroyed but rather that they can no longer be actualized because of a breakdown in the chain that links perception, action, and memory. Second, Bergson’s argument is an argument from the perspective of time conceived as duration: Bergson posits that independent recollections cannot be preserved in the brain, which only stores motor contrivances, since memories are in time, not in the brain, which is seated in the present. Since memories concern the past (which always persists and exists in multiple modes), an adequate thinking of memory must take the being of memory seriously.

It is as if Bergson is saying: Memory is not in the brain but rather in time, but time is not a thing, it is duration, hence nothing can be in anything. Hence his argument, curious at first, that when there takes place a lesion to the brain it is not that memories are lost, simply that they can no longer be actualized and translated into movement or action in time. Memory and psychological recollection are not the same. As Edward Casey has noted, the language of containment has taken a deep hold over our thinking on memory, whether it is the brain or the computer that provides the container that cribs and confines memory; but it is this language that Bergson attempted to expose as fundamentally flawed and to move beyond.

Bergson is concerned with the relation between the mental and the cerebral and is keen to make such a distinction, simply because our psychical life, while bound to its motor accompaniment, is not governed by it. Rather, he argues that there are diverse tones, rhythms, and intensities of mental life. Our psychic life is lived at different tensions relative to the degree of our attention to life. Thus the relation of the mental to the cerebral is neither a simple nor a constant one. A psychical disturbance is to be explained on the basis of this conception of life: a disease of the personality can be understood in terms of an unloosening or breaking of the tie that binds psychic life to its motor accompaniment, which involves an impairing of attention to outward life. Bergson thus resists interpretations of disorders like aphasia in terms of a localization of the memory-images of words. Bergson is not, of course, denying that there exists a close connection between a state of consciousness and the brain. His argument is directed against any reified treatment of the brain in separation from the world it is a part of and from “life”
treated as a sphere of praxis or activity. He thus argues against the idea that if we could penetrate into the inside of the brain and see at work the dance of the atoms that make up the cortex we would then know every detail of what is taking place in consciousness. The brain is in the world, not in the head, and it’s only a small part of the life of the organism, the part that is limited to the present.

Bergson’s starting point is to criticize the notion of some detached, isolated object, such as the brain, as the progenitor of our representation of the world. The brain is part of the material world. Thus, if we eliminate the image that is the material world we at the same time destroy the brain and its cerebral disturbances. The body is in the aggregate of the material world, an image that acts like all other images, receiving and giving back movement. The body is a center of action and not a house of representation. It exists as privileged image in the universe of images in that it can select, within limits, the manner in which it shall restore what it receives. The nervous system, Bergson argues, is not an apparatus that serves to fabricate or even prepare representations of the world. Its function, rather, is to receive stimulation, to provide motor apparatus, and to present the largest possible number of such apparatuses to a given stimulus. The brain is thus to be regarded as an instrument of analysis with regard to a received movement or an executed movement. Its office is to transmit and divide movement. Let us posit the material world as a system of closely-linked images and then imagine within it centers of action represented by living matter—that is, matter that is contractile and irritable. Around these, there will be images that are subordinated to each center’s position and variable with it. This is how we can understand the relation between matter and its perception and the emergence of conscious perception. Matter, therefore, can be approached in terms of the aggregate of images; the perception of matter is these same images but referred to the eventual (possible or virtual) action of one particular image, my body. It is not, therefore, a question of saying simply that our perceptions depend upon the molecular movements of the cerebral mass; rather, we have to say that they vary with them, and that these movements remain inseparably bound up with the rest of the material world. We cannot conceive of a nervous system living apart from the organism that nourishes it, from the atmosphere in which the organism breathes, from the earth which that atmosphere envelops, and so on.

Bergson insists: “There is no perception which is not full of memories.” With the immediate and present data of our senses we mingle a thousand details out of our past experience. Why does he use the hypothesis of an ideal perception? He comes up with the idea of an impersonal perception to show that it is this perception onto which are grafted individual accidents and which give an individual “sense” to life; owing to our ignorance of it, and because we have not distinguished from it memory, we are led to conceive of perception mistakenly as a kind of interior, subjective vision that then differs from memory simply in terms of its greater intensity. At the end of chapter 1, Bergson turns his attention to memory and insists that the difference between perception and memory
needs to be made as a difference in kind. He fully acknowledges that the two acts, perception and recollection, always interpenetrate each other and are always exchanging something of their substance as by a process of endosmosis. So, why does he insist on drawing the difference as one of kind? He has a number of reasons: first and foremost, to make the difference between past and present intelligible and to ascribe a genuine ontological character to the past (the past is real in its pastness); to develop an adequate understanding of the phenomenon of recognition (in what situations does my body recognize past images?); and finally, to explain the mechanism of the unconscious.

So, what is Bergson going to claim about memory? First, that in actuality memory is inseparable from perception; it imports the past into the present and contracts into a single intuition many moments of duration, “and thus by a twofold operation compels us, de facto, to perceive matter in ourselves, whereas we, de jure, perceive matter within matter.”14 Second, while the cerebral mechanism conditions memories, it is not sufficient to ensure their survival or persistence.

**The Types of Memory**

In the opening argument of chapter 2, Bergson addresses what he regards as the two main types of memory. Only the second, what he calls independent recollection, can be called memory proper.

The essential dimension of the body is activity, specifically adaptation in the present (solving a problem, overcoming an obstacle in the environment). It is only in the form of motor contrivances that the action of the past can be stored up. Past images are preserved in a different manner. The past survives, then, under two distinct forms: in motor mechanisms and in independent recollections. Both serve the requirements of the present. The usual or normal function of memory is to utilize a past experience for present action (recognition), either through the automatic setting into motion of mechanism adapted to circumstances, or through an effort of the mind that seeks in the past conceptions best able to enter into the present situation. Here the role of the brain is crucial: it will allow only those past images to come into being or become actualized that are deemed relevant to the needs of the present. A lived body is one embedded in a flux of time, but one whose constant movement within the dimension of the past and along the horizon of the future is informed by the requirements of the present. If the link with reality is severed, in this case the field of action in which a lived body is immersed, then it is not so much the past images that are destroyed but the possibility of their actualization, since they can no longer act on the real: “It is in this sense, and in this sense only, that an injury to the brain can abolish any part of memory.”15

Let’s consider in a little more detail how Bergson conceives the contraction of the past taking place as a way of addressing the present. Here I draw on the helpful account
provided by Patrick McNamara. When a level of the past gets contracted the contraction is experienced by present consciousness as an expansion, simply because its repertoire of images and moments of duration are increased and intensified. Memory enables us to contract in a single intuition multiple moments of time. In this way it frees us from the movement of the flow of things and from the rhythm of mechanical necessity. The activation of memory involves a series of phases. First, there is a relaxation of the inhibitory powers of the brain; this is followed by a proliferation of memory-images that can flood the cognitive system; and then, finally, there takes place a selection phase in which the inhibitory processes are once again called upon. The proliferation of images opens up a plurality of possible states of affairs and possible worlds; the process of actualization, however, requires that contraction take place in order to contextualize a cue and provide an adequate response to the problem in the environment that has been encountered. What is selected may not, however, be the “best match or the most optimal solution to a current perception.” Bergson does not subscribe to a straightforwardly Darwinian model of the selection process at work in memory.

Bergson’s theory of memory rests on understanding these contractions and expansions in relation to the syntheses of past and present. However, our grasp of this theory remains inadequate so long as we do not appreciate its addition of a third term, that of pure memory. Bergson provides in fact a tripartite theory with a “pure memory” advanced alongside those of habit- and representational-memory. How do we arrive at this third term of memory?

When we learn something a kind of natural division takes place between the contractions of habit and the independent recollection of events that involve dating. If I wish to learn a poem by heart I have to repeat again and again through an effort of learning, in which I decompose and recompose a whole. In the case of specific bodily actions and movements habitual learning is stored in a mechanism that is set in motion by some initial impulse and that involves releasing automatic movements within a closed system of succession and duration. The operations of independent recollection are altogether different. In the formation of memory-images the events of our daily life are recorded as they take place in a unique time and providing each gesture with a place and a date. This past is retained regardless of its utility and practical application. The past is preserved in itself and, at the same time, contracted in various states by the needs of action that are always seated in an actual present. This repetition of memory-images through action merits the ascription of the word memory not because it is involved in the conservation of past images but rather because it prolongs their utility into a present moment. The task of this kind of memory is to ensure that the accumulation of memory-images is rendered subservient to praxis, making sure that only those past images come into operation that can be coordinated with a present perception, and so enabling a useful combination to emerge between past and present images: “Thus is ensured the appropriate
reaction, the correspondence to environment—adaptation, in a word—which is the general aim of life.”18 Without this coordination of memory-images by the adaptive consciousness the practical character of life would be distorted and the plane of dreams would mingle with the plane of action (in fact, as Bergson fully concedes, the planes do communicate and cannot be treated as isolable dimensions of consciousness and unconsciousness; the issue is rather to be approached in terms of different tensions and situations of lived time).

The pure past—by which is simply meant the preservation of the past independent of its actualization in a present—is inhibited from freely expressing itself by the practical bent of our bodily comportment, “by the sensory-motor equilibrium of a nervous system connecting perception with action.”19 Not only is there more than one kind of memory, but memory-images enjoy more than the one kind of existence, being actualized in multiple ways: “Memory thus creates anew the present perception, or rather it doubles this perception by reflecting upon it either its own image or some other memory-image of the same kind.”20 Our life moves—contracts, expands, and relaxes—in terms of circuits and it is the whole of memory that passes over into each of these circuits, always in a specific form or state of contraction and in terms of certain variable dominant recollections: “The whole of our past psychical life conditions our present state, without being its necessary determinant.”21 We shift between virtual and actual states all of the time, never completely virtual or completely actual.

Bergson holds that perception and memory interlace and that all memories must become actualized in order to become effectively real.22 Personal recollections make up the largest enclosure of our memory. He writes: “Essentially fugitive, they become only materialized by chance, either when an accidentally precise determination of our bodily attitude attracts them or when the very indetermination of that attitude leaves a clear field to the caprices of their manifestation.”23 The pathology of memory has its basis in an appreciation of the vitality of memory. Memory, Bergson argues, has “distinct degrees of tension or of vitality.” Pathology confirms this insight: “In the ‘systematized amnesias’ of hysterical patients,” he writes, “the recollections which appear to be abolished are really present, but they are probably all bound up with a certain determined tone of intellectual vitality in which the subject can no longer place himself.”24 He further notes that there are always dominant memories for us, which exist as “shining points round which the others form a vague nebulousness.”25 These shining points get multiplied to the extent to which our memory is capable of expansion. The process of localizing a recollection in the past does not consist in simply plunging into the mass of our memories as into a bag in order to draw out memories closer and closer to each other and between which the memory to be localized may find its place. Again, he finds helpful the pathology of memory:

In retrogressive amnesia, the recollections which disappear from consciousness are probably preserved in remote planes of memory, and the patient can find them by
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an exceptional effort like that which is effected in the hypnotic state. But, on the lower planes, these memories await, so to speak, the dominant image to which they may be fastened. A sharp shock, a violent emotion, forms the decisive event to which they cling; if this event, by reason of its sudden character, is cut off from the rest of our history, they follow it into oblivion.26

In short, Bergson has posited an assemblage made up of three components: pure memory, memory-images, and perception. The latter is never simply a contact of the mind with a present object but is impregnated with memory-images; in turn these images partake of a pure memory that they materialize or actualize and are bound up with the perceptions that provide it with an actual embodiment.

Perception and Memory

It is necessary to dispel a number of illusions that shape and govern our thinking about memory, a key one being that memory only comes into existence once an actual perception has taken place. This illusion is generated by the requirements of perception itself, which is always focused on the needs of a present. While the mind or consciousness is attending to things, it has no need of pure memory, which it holds to be useless. Moreover, although each new perception requires the powers afforded by memory, a reanimated memory appears to us as the effect of perception. This leads us to suppose that the difference between perception and memory is simply one of intensity or degree, in which the remembrance of a perception is held to be nothing other than the same perception in a weakened state, resulting in the illegitimate inference that the remembrance of a perception cannot be created while the perception itself is being created or be developed at the same time.27

It is by recognizing the virtual character of pure memory that we can perhaps better appreciate that the difference between perception and memory is one of kind and not merely degree. Memory is made up of memory-images but the recollection of an image is not itself an image (it is closer to a concentrated act of intellectual effort). Bergson insists that “To picture is not to remember” (Imaginer n’est pas se souvenir).28 As a recollection becomes actual it comes to live in an image, “but the converse is not true, and the image, pure and simple, will not be referred to the past unless, indeed, it was in the past that I sought it.”29

Bergson’s claim is that at every moment of our lives we are presented with two aspects, even though the virtual aspect may be imperceptible owing to the very nature of the operations of perception:

Our actual existence, then, whilst it is unrolled in time, duplicates itself all along with a virtual existence, a mirror-image. Every moment of our life presents two aspects, it
KEITH ANSELL-PEARSON

is actual and virtual, perception on the one side and memory on the other. Each moment is split up as and when it is posited. Or rather, it consists in this very splitting, for the present moment, always going forward, fleeting limit between the immediate past which is now no more and the immediate future which is not yet, would be a mere abstraction were it not the moving mirror which continually reflects perception as a memory.30

It is because the past does not simply follow the present but coexists with it that we can develop an explanation of paramnesia or the illusion of déjà vu, in which there is a recollection of the present contemporaneous with the present itself. The illusion is generated from thinking that we are actually undergoing an experience we have already lived through when in fact what is taking place is the perception of the duplication we do not normally perceive, namely, of time into the two aspects of actual and virtual. There is a memory of the present in the actual moment itself. I cannot actually predict what is going to happen but I feel as if I can: what I foresee is that I am going to have known it—I experience a “recognition to come,” I gain insight into the formation of a memory of the present (if we could stall the movement of time into the future, this experience would be much more common for us; we can note that current empirical research on the phenomenon of déjà vu focuses on the regions of the brain involved in producing it and explains it in terms of gaps in our attentive system).

This difference between past and present can be explained in the following terms: our present is the “very materiality of our existence” in the specific sense that it is “a system of sensations and movements and nothing else.”31 This system is unique for each moment of duration “just because sensations and movements occupy space, and because there cannot be in the same place several things at the same time.”32 One’s present at any moment of time is sensory-motor, again in the specific sense that the present comes from the consciousness of my body: actual sensations occupy definite portions of the surface of my body. The concern of my body, manifest in the consciousness I have of it, is with an immediate future and impending actions. By contrast, one’s past is “essentially powerless” in the specific sense that it interests no part of my body conceived as a center of action or praxis. No doubt, Bergson notes, it begets sensations as it materializes, but when it does so it ceases to be a memory and becomes something actually lived by passing into the condition of a present thing. In order for such a memory to become materialized as an actual present I have to carry myself back into the process by which I called it up, “as it was virtual, from the depths of my past.”33 Bergson insists that this pure memory is neither merely a weakened perception nor simply an assembly of nascent sensations. When conceived in terms of the latter, memory becomes little more than the form of an image contained in already embodied nascent sensations. Let us once again clarify the difference between the present and the past: it is because they are two opposed degrees that it is possible to distinguish them in nature or kind.
Bergson’s innovation, then, is to suggest that a recollection is created alongside an actual perception and is contemporaneous with it: “Either the present leaves no trace in memory, or it is twofold at every moment, its very up-rush being in two jets exactly symmetrical, one of which falls back towards the past whilst the other springs forward towards the future.”\(^{34}\) The illusion that memory comes after perception arises from the nature of practical consciousness, namely, the fact that it is only the forward-springing jet that interests it. Memory becomes superfluous and without actual interest: “In a general way, or by right, the past only reappears to consciousness in the measure in which it can aid us to understand the present and to foresee the future. It is the forerunner of action.”\(^{35}\) Because consciousness is bound up with an attentiveness to life, to action, it “only admits, legally” those recollections that provide assistance to the present action.\(^{36}\) This explains Bergson’s interest in the anomalies (illegalities) of the life of \(\text{é}r\text{érit}\), such as deliriums, dreams, hallucinations, etc., which, Bergson insists, are “positive facts” that consist in the presence, and not in the mere absence, of something: “They seem to introduce into the mind certain new ways of feeling and thinking.”\(^{37}\)

The past can never be recomposed with a series of presents since this would be to negate its specific mode of being. To elaborate an adequate thinking of time, including the time of the present, requires that we make the move to an ontological appreciation of the past. Psychological consciousness is born and emerges into being only when it has found its proper ontological conditions. On this movement Bergson writes:

Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period of our history, we become conscious of an act \(sui\ generis\) by which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first, in the past in general, then, in a certain region of the past—a work of adjustment like the focusing of a camera. But our recollection still remains virtual.\(^{38}\)

In short, we cannot reconstitute the past from the present but must make the move into the past itself as a specific region of being. The past will never be comprehended as something past unless we follow and adopt the movement by which it expands into a present image, and this movement by definition is something virtual: “In vain do we seek its trace in anything actual and already realized; we might as well look for darkness beneath the light.”\(^{38}\) Bergson contends that this is, in fact, one of the chief errors of the school of associationism, which dominated the study of memory in the second half of the nineteenth century: “placed in the actual, it exhausts itself in vain attempts to discover in a realized and present state the mark of its past origin, to distinguish memory from perception, and to erect into a difference in kind that which it condemned in advance to be but a difference of magnitude.”\(^{40}\) What is in need of explanation is not so much the cohesion of internal mental states but rather “the double movement of contraction and expansion by which consciousness narrows or enlarges the development of its content.”\(^{41}\)
Associationism conceives the mechanism of linkage in terms of a perception remaining identical with itself; it is a “psychical atom which gathers to itself others just as these happen to be passing by.” In Bergson’s model of recollection, however, the linkages and connections forged by the mind are not simply the result of a discrete series of mechanical operations. This is because within any actual perception it is the totality of recollections that are present in an undivided, intensive state. If in turn this perception evokes different memories, it is not by a mechanical adjunction of more and more numerous elements which, while remaining unmoved, it attracts round it, but rather by an expansion of the entire consciousness which, spreading out over a larger area, discovers the fuller details of its wealth. So a nebulous mass, seen through more and more powerful telescopes, resolves itself into an ever greater number of stars.

The first hypothesis, which rests on a physical atomism, has the virtue of simplicity. However, the simplicity is only apparent and it soon locks us into an untenable account of perception and memory in terms of fixed and independent states. It cannot allow for movement within perception and memory except in artificially mechanical terms, with memory traces jostling each other at random and exerting mysterious forces to produce the desired contiguity and resemblance. Bergson’s theory of memory in terms of pure memory, memory-images, and actual perception, is designed to provide a more coherent account of how associations actually take place and form in the mind.

We find ourselves, largely out of force of habit, compelled to determine or ascertain the place or space of memory: Where is it? How can the past, which has ceased to be, preserve itself if not in the brain? Bergson is not denying that parts of the brain play a crucial role in our capacity for memory and in the actualization of memory. But memories cannot be in the brain (except habit-memory), because the brain occupies only a small slice or section of becoming, namely, the present: “The brain, insofar as it is an image extended in space, never occupies more than the present moment: it constitutes, with all the rest of the material universe, an ever-renewed section of universal becoming.” Moreover, the difficulty we have in conceiving the survival of the past—which has ceased to be useful but not ceased to be—comes from the fact that we extend to the series of memories, in time, that obligation of containing and being contained which applies only to the collection of bodies instantaneously perceived in space. The fundamental illusion consists in transferring to duration itself, in its continuous flow, the form of the instantaneous sections which we make in it.

Our reluctance to admit the integral survival of the past has its origin in the very bent of our psychical life—“an unfolding of states wherein our interest prompts us to look at
that which is unrolling, and not at that which is entirely unrolled." As Deleuze points out in Bergsonism, the question "Where are recollections preserved?" involves a false problem by supposing a badly analyzed composite. Why suppose that memories have to be preserved somewhere? Furthermore, a fundamental feature of Bergson’s novel empiricism is to insist on their being different “lines of fact”; as Deleuze insists, whereas the brain is situated on the line of “objectivity,” recollection is part of the line of “subjectivity.” It is thus “absurd to mix the two lines by conceiving of the brain as the reservoir or the substratum of recollections.” For Bergson memory is primarily affective, and as soon as we attempt to isolate the affects of memory, setting out time in space and confusing the different lines of fact, they become lifeless.

Reception and Influence

As Deleuze has noted, Bergson’s principal philosophical themes, such as intuition as a method and philosophy as a rigorous science, are echoed in phenomenology, and he was read by several leading figures in this influential school of thought. Although there are no references to Bergson in the work of Husserl he was aware of Bergson’s contributions and, in spite of their differences in method and ultimate theoretical commitments, there are parallels between the two thinkers in how they conceptualize time and memory. Important engagements with Bergson’s thinking on time and memory can be found in the work of Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre, each one of whom made a seminal contribution to phenomenology. The main criticism made of Bergson by the likes of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre is that he is unable to adequately account for the intentional structure of consciousness and, as a result slides back into a pre-phenomenological realism. In his study of 1953 a young Jean-François Lyotard argued that phenomenology separates itself from Bergsonism on the question of time by replacing a flowing time in consciousness with a consciousness that positively constitutes time for itself. This critique of Bergson has been challenged in recent theoretical work, in which he is seen as having closer affinities with post-phenomenological notions of agency and subjectivity to be found, for example, in the work of poststructuralist figures such as Derrida and Deleuze. Bergson’s work, especially Matter and Memory, is seen as containing valuable resources for calling into question the primacy of the “For-Itself” and its idealistic stress on the unitary and transparent character of self-consciousness (this move is prefigured in the work of Levinas; Sartre’s reading of Bergson was effectively challenged by Hyppolite in his essay of 1949). On this point Levinas wishes to go as far as underlining the importance of Bergsonism “for the entire problematic of contemporary philosophy” on account of the fact that it is no longer a thought of a “rationality revealing a reality which keeps to the very measure of a thought.” In effecting a reversal of traditional philosophy by
contending the priority of duration over permanence, Bergson has provided thought with “access to novelty, an access independent of the ontology of the same.”

Walter Benjamin is one thinker to have appreciated the rich character of Bergson’s treatment of memory and its significance for our understanding of certain critical aspects of modernity. In his essay “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” first published in 1939 in the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, in which he develops a wide-ranging treatment of Proust, Freud, Baudelaire, Poe, the disintegration of the aura, and the shock experience, he situates Bergson’s text in the context of attempts within philosophy to lay hold of the “‘true’ experience” in opposition to the manufactured kind that manifests itself in the “standardized, denatured life of the civilized masses.” For Benjamin, Bergson’s “early monumental work,” as he describes it, towers above the body of work associated with the philosophy of life of the late nineteenth century—he mentions the work of Wilhelm Dilthey—on account of its links with empirical research and the richness of its account of the structure of memorial experience. Bergson’s text needs to be taken to task, however, on account of its failure to understand its own historical conditions of possibility and reflect on its historical determinations. On this issue Benjamin goes on to note some important differences in the figuration of the experience of memory we find in Bergson’s text and in Proust’s great modern novel, À la recherche du temps perdu. Benjamin contends that Bergson’s conception of durée is estranged from history, and this point informs Horkheimer’s critical engagement with Bergson. Horkheimer acknowledges that he owes “decisive elements” to Bergson’s philosophy for his own thinking, but argues that Bergson offers a metaphysics of time that privileges an interior spiritual world, rests on a disavowal of human history, and suffers from a “biological realism.”

It is interesting to note that the critical reception of Bergson we find in the work of critical theorists such as Horkheimer is similar to that we find in phenomenology, namely, that his thinking on memory is seen to grant too much importance to its contemplative aspects over its critical and intentional ones. For phenomenologists this manifests itself in an alleged failure to account for the synthesizing powers of an intentional subject (Bergson grants intention to memory itself over and above the subject; the subject is implicated in memory; “subjectivity is never ours, it is time . . . the virtual,” as Deleuze puts it). For critical theorists, by contrast, it reveals itself in the failure to provide a constructivist, and activist, account of history and historical agency (Bergson is oblivious, Horkheimer says, to the meaning of theory for historical struggle). To what extent these criticisms are fair, and to what extent they have been called into question by more recent intellectual developments, are questions that cannot be treated here. I would simply point out that Bergson set himself a specific task in Matter and Memory: taking the psychology of his day to task on account of what he regarded as its inadequate and impoverished approach to the life of memory, a task that, to a large extent, he fulfilled, and admirably so, and it is necessary to respect the integrity of his project (which is not to say that all kinds of critical questions cannot, and should not, be asked of it). It is quite clear that
Bergson’s heart lies not with contemplation but with creative action. His complaint is there is too much contemplation in philosophy. In his prescient final text, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, published in 1932, Bergson pays homage to those great spiritual and ethical leaders, from Christian saints to social revolutionaries, who have brought something dynamically new into existence and helped to push humanity forward.

In terms of recent work in psychology and the philosophy of mind, Bergson’s work has been positively received in some quarters and is seen to provide a set of rich resources for thinking memory beyond simple-minded mechanical models of mind and memory. The neurologist Oliver Sacks often cites Bergson’s ideas in support of his call for a neurology of identity, which would move away from a rigid physicalist paradigm, centered on notions of algorithm and template, that supposes notions of rigid cerebral localization and a rigidly programmed cerebral machine, toward a neurology able to match the “richness and density of experience,” what he calls its sense of scene and music, its “ever-changing flow of experience, of history, of becoming.” More substantially, Patrick McNamara puts Bergson’s ideas on mind and memory to instructive and productive use in his important study *Mind and Variability: Mental Darwinism, Memory, and Self* (1999), while the attempt by Israel Rosenfield in his *The Invention of Memory* (1988) to expose the view that we can remember because we have fixed memory images permanently stored in our brains for what it is—a myth (that of localization)—continues the work Bergson began over a century ago. This is echoed in McNamara’s more recent study, as when he writes for example: “The representational-instructionist view of memory is still what I would call the modern standard view of the nature of memory. It and its related ‘trace theory’ of how the brain ‘stores’ memory constitute the background assumptions of much of modern research into memory.” In his book *Memory, History, Forgetting*, one of the most important studies of memory in recent years, Paul Ricoeur acknowledges the original and innovative character of Bergson’s thinking on memory. For Ricoeur, Bergson is the philosopher who best understood the close connection between the “survival of images” and the phenomenon of recognition. Furthermore, with this insight into the survival of images, which require that we acknowledge that memory has the character of endurance, Ricoeur believes that Bergson’s thinking holds the resources required for understanding the working of forgetting, even if Bergson himself was only able to think this in terms of effacement. It is the self-survival of images that can be considered as a figure of fundamental forgetting. Ricoeur poses the question, “On what basis, then, would the survival of memories be equivalent to forgetting?” His answer is to propose that forgetting be conceived not simply in terms of the effacement of traces, but rather in terms of a reserve or a resource: “Forgetting then designates the unperceived character of the perseverance of memories, their removal from the vigilance of consciousness.” On this conception forgetting can be understood not simply as an inexorable destruction, but as an immemorial resource.
Bergson’s great text is significant for a number of reasons, including its attempts to
demonstrate the ontological status of the past, to provide a genuinely dynamical model
of memory’s operations, to show the virtual character of (pure) memory, and, finally, its
advancement of the argument that memory is not simply the mechanical reproduction of
the past but sense. Without memory life is, quite literally, devoid of meaning. Matter and
Memory is a text we are still catching up with.
5. Halbwachs and the Social Properties of Memory

Erika Apfelbaum

In 1924, the French social scientist Maurice Halbwachs published *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (*On Collective Memory*). Its publication was immediately seen by his contemporaries as a major event, its importance acknowledged even by those who did not fully share his theoretical views. Prophetically, the historian Marc Bloch saw the analyses presented by Halbwachs in this book as a major contribution to the developing discipline of social science. Halbwachs, in delineating the social and collective dimensions of individual memory, tracing their dialectical links in the process of elaboration and transformation, in addition to analyzing the mechanisms and modes of dissemination of collective memory, laid the theoretical foundations for a comprehensive approach to the study of the social sciences, providing an integrated perspective from which to conceptualize the historical, social, and individual components of human behavior. In his later writings, too—his posthumous volume on collective memory particularly—Halbwachs elaborates on these early themes. In particular, he expands the scope of history beyond its traditionally narrow focus on facts and the feats of individuals. In placing collective memory at the very core of the historical development of humanity, Halbwachs brings an innovative approach to historical research, initiating a true paradigm shift in the dominant conception of the discipline.

Only two decades after their publication, however, his writings, despite their importance, had fallen into oblivion, their theoretical orientations and approaches ignored and unexplored for almost half a century, even within the social science community. Social psychologists, in particular, ignored the fundamental and seminal value of Halbwachs’s analyses, even during the “crisis of social psychology” that profoundly unsettled the discipline in the 1970s, rendering the quest for alternative formulations especially urgent. Despite Halbwachs’s analyses
offering the basis for such an alternative and facilitating the reorientation of the discipline toward a more integrated, complex, sociohistorical view, social psychologists have never made a genuine effort to revisit them. In sociology, a slowly developing interest in Halbwachs is limited by a view of his work that sees it as a simple and direct offspring of the Durkheimian tradition, when, in reality, his intellectual and personal bonds with the Durkheimian group notwithstanding, Halbwachs always had certain theoretical reservations about that tradition, seeing it from a somewhat unorthodox angle.

Today, among social scientists, it is the historians who have reestablished the strongest links with Halbwachs, acknowledging his seminal importance, so that he is currently regarded as a major inspiration. Yet even as late as the 1970s, when Pierre Nora first launched the history of mentalities, Nora was convinced that this new historical orientation sprang directly from contemporary intellectual preoccupations, and it is only relatively recently that he has been able to recognize and acknowledge the theoretical debts his own work owes to Halbwachs’s conceptions of history as a historian of memory.

**Halbwachs: A Scholar Shaped by Three Wars**

Halbwachs was born in 1877 in Reims, into an unstable world undergoing deep social and political change. His Alsatian family had found refuge in the area when the Franco-Prussian war ended in 1871 and Alsace-Lorraine was annexed by Germany, obliging its inhabitants to choose between French and German citizenship. Halbwachs’s family opted to retain its French citizenship, although remaining deeply committed to Germanic culture—his father, indeed, taught German—and, given the importance attributed at the time to patriotism and nationalistic sentiment, this must have led to the family feeling like expatriates in their own country, and to Halbwachs himself gaining early experience of geographical and cultural uprooting. This in turn sensitized him to the way one’s personal life and sense of social integrity are influenced by changing geopolitical configurations, and affected his approach to the issue of memory. This was particularly so in regard to his insistence that the development of subjective memory carries the impression of external social relations.

After Halbwachs’s family moved to Paris, where they settled in the cosmopolitan Montparnasse area, he spent his high school years at the prestigious Lycée Henri IV, studying literature and winning a place, in 1898, at the Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS), coming in third in his group in the competitive entry examination. For the next three years he was exposed to the school’s uniquely rich intellectual atmosphere; ENS remains to this day an exclusive educational institution, producing many members of the French intelligentsia and political elite, bonded for life by their experiences at the school. In Halbwachs’s day, the school was predominantly socialist, strongly influenced by the charismatic Lucien Herr, the institution’s librarian and a steadfast defender of Dreyfus. Halbwachs was an active member of the socialist students’ group.
Another early influence on Halbwachs was the philosopher Henri Bergson. In the preface to Halbwachs’s posthumous volume *La mémoire collective*, his brother-in-law, Jean-Michel Alexandre, recalls that Halbwachs was “subjugated by Bergson’s teachings,” but in 1901, after graduating in philosophy, Halbwachs abandoned both it and metaphysics in favor of a more positivist orientation to social issues. This shift toward a social science perspective was determined in part by his encounter with the Durkheimian group, to whose journal, *L’Année Sociologique*, he became a regular contributor.

Students (*normaliens*) received a salary during the three years they spent at ENS; in return, they owed the state ten years’ work as civil servants in public education. Halbwachs settled this debt by teaching in various *lycées* while preparing his doctoral dissertation to be presented as a *thèse d’état*, at the time an essential step, consisting of two pieces of original work, toward appointment as a full professor at a French university. The first of these theses concerned the expropriation and cost of land in Paris at the end of the nineteenth century, and it attracted the attention of the socialist politician Jean Jaurès. His second thesis was a study of social statistics, a kind of ethnographic essay on the standards of living of the working class. Both these topics—his concern with statistics and his ethnographic perspective—are clearly at odds with Durkheimian orthodoxy; despite his strong affinities with the Durkheimian group, he remained aloof from them philosophically, and his writings reflect this. The most recent generation of Durkheimians, revisiting Halbwachs’s writings, tends to ignore this lack of orthodoxy and hence to deny the originality of Halbwachs’s positions and their divergence from Durkheim’s epistemological choices. In reality, however, Halbwachs’s analyses are much closer to the social-psychological perspective strongly advocated by certain members of Durkheim’s own group, such as Celéstin Bouglé, Dominique Parodi, and Paul Lapie, but because Durkheim was strictly opposed to the development of an independent social psychology, these dissident scholars remained almost clandestine within the group; Halbwachs himself kept his distance.

In 1913, having successfully submitted his *thèse d’état*, Halbwachs became eligible for a university chair, but the outbreak of the First World War—even though he was exempt from military service because of weak eyesight—meant that his nomination was delayed. Accordingly, during the war years, he continued teaching in Nancy’s high school and at the university there. His daily correspondence with his wife, Yvonne Basch—daughter of Victor Basch, the president of la Ligue des Droits de l’Homme—details his guilt at living such a sheltered life while so many of his acquaintances and colleagues faced the hardships of the front. Nancy was so close to the war’s battlefields that Halbwachs was able to observe these conditions rather like an entomologist, although he never referred to these events in his writings. It is, nevertheless, difficult to escape the conclusion that these years played their part in the elaboration of his theoretical system and in the conceptions of memory and memorialization he was later to produce. Indeed the lack of direct reference
to the events he witnessed during these war years can perhaps be interpreted as attributable to his adherence to the values of rigorous, positively oriented scholarship.

At the end of the war, Halbwachs finally won his appointment—to the University of Strasbourg. France, having won the war, reclaimed Alsace and, German scholars having been obliged to surrender their chairs there, Alsatian scholars were encouraged to apply to fill the resulting vacancies in order that the repatriation process should be facilitated and that a certain sociohistorical continuity should be promoted in the region. In the attempt to ensure that French scholars were not overrepresented in this process (which could easily have been perceived as colonization), Alsatian scholars, Halbwachs and Marc Bloch among them, were favored. One consequence of the process was the removal of many old habits and paralyzing traditions; the university became open to fresh ideas and provided a stimulating intellectual environment from which a truly collective spirit emerged. Halbwachs was thus enabled to engage in pan-Germanic activities consistent with the profound beliefs he had inherited from his family.

While Halbwachs was appointed to the chair of sociology and pedagogy left vacant by the German social scientist Georg Simmel, Charles Blondel was nominated for Strasbourg’s chair of psychology. It is instructive to examine the theoretical development of these two scholars, juxtaposed in this manner, because throughout their respective academic careers they were both deeply involved in theorizing the articulation between individual and collective behavior. The two men had been fellow students at the ENS, studying under and influenced by Bergson and subsequently redirected toward a more positivist perspective by Durkheim. Young, ambitious, and brilliant scholars, they were both naturally attracted to the newly emerging social sciences, particularly those questions of collective behavior that lay at the heart of contemporary social issues. Unlike their predecessors in this field, such as the criminologist Gabriel Tarde or the essayist Gustave Le Bon, Halbwachs and Blondel began to elaborate a fresh theoretical framework for understanding the underlying motives and sociological determinants of human social activity, with the aim of breaking away from the then dominant nature-oriented explanatory models. Each thus directly challenged current scientific orthodoxy and authority, which viewed these matters largely from a medical perspective.

Over the years, however, the epistemological positions of these two men diverged, to the point where, eventually, they took up almost opposing stances. While Halbwachs consistently explored the dialectical relations between individual activity and sociohistorical dimensions, Blondel—while acknowledging the impact of society on human activity—paid only lip service to its influence, ultimately falling back into a more traditional explanation of human behavior based on innate disposition rather than social forces.

The divergent positions taken up by the two men on the question of suicide provide an illustration of this difference. Halbwachs set out to show how, given particular circumstances, external sociological factors—political upheavals, changes in social policy, and so on—can disrupt people’s lives so profoundly that the resultant personal disturbance can
lead to suicide. Blondel recognised that such circumstances may indeed produce some personal imbalance, but, according to him, “normal” people resist such influence, and it is only when there is some kind of preexisting pathological disposition that people are driven to suicide. Deviant conduct, therefore, for him, is inherent in certain personalities. This more traditional explanation proffered by Blondel may be consequent upon his proximity, both ideological and strategic, to the mainstream, more conservative theoretical position held by the medical community. Halbwachs, given his more overtly socialist orientation, was more easily persuaded to adopt an explanation that emphasized the social rather than the personal, though his own experiences of uprooting may also have informed his emphasis on the sociohistorical.

While the two men’s theoretical and epistemological divergences increased over the years, however, their academic careers continued along parallel tracks, unfolding in similar ways: Halbwachs replaced the Durkheimian Célestin Bouglé in the chair of social economics in 1935; Blondel was given the chair of experimental psychology in 1937. In 1939 Halbwachs was granted the chair of epistemology, a year after Blondel had inherited the chair of psychopathology from Georges Dumas, and while Halbwachs was working on collective memory, Blondel published _La psychologie collective_. In addition, when, in the late 1930s, Halbwachs applied for an unoccupied chair at the prestigious Collège de France, he was in direct competition with both Blondel and the French sociologist and nephew of Durkheim, Marcel Mauss. This race involved competition between three related yet divergent conceptions of the social sciences. Blondel, the most conservative of the three, defended the biological model favored by the medical community; Mauss was regarded as the direct inheritor of Durkheim’s position; Halbwachs defended the social determinist viewpoint and proposed the adoption of an unorthodox social-psychological perspective. The outcome of this competition would thus have provided an interesting indicator of the epistemological preferences of the scientific community of the time; unfortunately, when the election took place, Blondel had just died and Mauss was prevented from remaining in the academic world by the Vichy anti-Jewish laws. Halbwachs was consequently left as the only contender for the chair; he was appointed but never occupied the post. Taken as a hostage as a result of his son’s Resistance activities, he was arrested, deported to Buchenwald, and died of exhaustion there in 1945. The writer Jorge Semprún, a former Spanish minister of culture who had been a student of Halbwachs at the Sorbonne, was himself an inmate of Buchenwald, and in his novel _L’écriture ou la vie_, he recalls the Sunday meetings of Halbwachs, the French sinologist Henri Maspero, and other intellectual inmates, and describes the last few hours of Halbwachs’s life.11 Halbwachs therefore never taught at the Collège de France, nor did he have the opportunity to train students who might have taken up and expanded his propositions and analyses; his ideas, as a result, were never disseminated to a wide audience and rapidly fell into oblivion.
When, shortly after the Second World War, the social sciences, which had been slowly gestating throughout the first half of the twentieth century, finally gained recognition in academia, Halbwachs was no longer alive and thus unable to defend his conception of them. Furthermore, the social sciences, directly reflecting the changing concerns of post-war society, took an altogether different theoretical turn: the race for progress that characterized the second half of the twentieth century implied a radical break from the traditions of the past. The words of the revolutionary song “The International,” which involved making the past a tabula rasa, became the rallying cry for a majority in the postwar generation, and the epistemological choices of the social sciences reflected this trend, conceptualizing a society unencumbered by the complexities of history, as if subjects evolved in a vacuum with no significant historical and genealogical inscription in the world. This new vision was less accommodating to the cultivation of the past implied by Halbwachs’s concerns with memory and sociohistorical perspective, and with no intellectual followers to investigate his theories and carry on his analyses, his ideas were quickly forgotten.

Now that memorializing is once more in vogue and has become an important part of the ethos of our times (for reasons that are outside the scope of this study), Halbwachs’s work is more relevant than ever, providing a theoretical framework able to make sense of phenomena that might otherwise challenge the capacities of the social sciences.

Contextualizing Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire

Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire was published in 1924 and was thus conceived, elaborated, and written in the wake of the First World War. Even though Halbwachs never explicitly mentions this major historical event in the book, we know from his correspondence with his wife how much thought he was devoting to it. He had witnessed its damaging repercussions and seen its physical casualties.

As he observed the difficulties experienced by war veterans on their return from the front—their struggle to restore “normal” social bonds, their problems in reestablishing communication in their home environments, their reluctance to recount their traumatic wartime experiences—Halbwachs could not fail to notice the long-term disruptive psychological effects of trauma on communication and hence to question the complex relations between uprooting, interpersonal exchanges, and the processes of memorization. Similarly, the state’s provision of various forms of commemoration, and their contribution to the establishment of official history, must have inspired Halbwachs to examine the way collective memory shapes the content of memory while safeguarding the integrity of each individual memory. Indeed much of Halbwachs’s analysis is devoted to the way in which memory as well as interpersonal bonds are constructed, mediated, and shaped in the context of broader, external sociohistorical factors. The geographical and cultural
uprooting he had personally undergone (and experienced vicariously, courtesy of his in-
laws’ immigration from Hungary), contributed to his understanding of the complexities
involved in the process of memorialization and the dialectical relations existing between
individual and collective memory:

The individual calls recollections to mind by relying on the framework of social mem-
ory. In other words, the various groups that compose society are capable at every
moment of reconstructing their past. But, as we have seen, they most frequently
distort that past in the act of reconstructing it. There are surely many facts, and many
details of certain facts, that the individual would forget if others did not keep their
memory alive for him. But, on the other hand, society can live only if there is suffi-
cient unity of outlooks among the individuals and groups comprising it. 15

The necessity by which people must enclose themselves in limited groups (families,
religious groups, and social classes, to mention just these) . . . , is opposed to the
social need for unity. . . . This is why society tends to erase from its memory all that
might separate individuals, or that might distance groups from each other. It is also
why society, in each period, rearranges its recollections in such a way as to adjust
them to the various conditions of its equilibrium. 16

His experiences were certainly important enough for Halbwachs to use them as a
framework in presenting his analysis of memory. In introducing the problematics of
memory, Halbwachs recounts the following anecdote: A century and a half before, a
ten-year-old girl was found wandering through the woods near a small town in France.
She could speak, but was unable to give any clear account of who she was and what had
happened to her. She vaguely recalled having traveled across a wide expanse of water, and
her story was eventually pieced together: she must have been a slave somewhere in the
Caribbean colonies in the service of a woman whose husband later threw the girl out of
the household. At an age when she would normally have had quite clear recollections of
past events, this uprooted child was unable to remember distinctly her earlier life experi-
ences. Halbwachs raises the following question—and as he does so, shifts attention from
the Antillean girl to what he takes to be a more generic “he”: “What will this child be
able to retain if he is abruptly separated from his family, transported to a country where
his language is not spoken, where neither the appearance of people and places, nor their
customs, resemble in any way that which was familiar to him up to this moment?”17 In
other words, here he quite clearly indicates the heuristic importance he attributes to ab-
normal and extreme situations, such as enforced uprooting, as a means of unraveling and
analyzing the normal processes of memory and memorialization as well as those of the
construction of identity: “In order to retrieve . . . uncertain and incomplete memories it
is necessary that the child, in the new society of which he is part, at least be shown images
reconstructing for a moment the group and milieu from which the child had been torn.”18
So far, this examination has restricted itself to the extent to which Halbwachs’s conceptions of memory were influenced by events that he himself had witnessed, or that he himself had directly experienced. They are also to be viewed, however, in relation to the newly developing social sciences, which themselves have been shaped by the wider sociopolitical French milieu and the ongoing epistemological debates concerning nature and nurture and their respective effects on human activity. In other words, the social science issues are located at a meeting point of two contemporary preoccupations: on the one hand, the need to account for the “social disorders” disrupting French society; on the other, the concern of the medical community to find a relevant theoretical explanation for individual disorders and, more particularly, for the perplexing affliction of hysteria, a malady diagnosed mainly in women that had attracted the attention, in the mid-nineteenth century, of the French neurologist and professor of anatomical pathology at the Salpêtrière Hospital Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–93) and, a little later, of the Austrian neurologist and father of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud (1856–1939).

Large migrations of populations from rural to urban settings, the consequence of industrialization, disrupted traditional social networks and limited their control over their members; in other words, as people moved away and were cut off from their communities and their territorial, cultural, and social roots, they began to exist as individuals, as separate autonomous entities. It therefore became increasingly urgent to study the changing relations between subjects and their environment. Moreover, these ongoing social upheavals threatened the stability of society itself; finding new ways to manage socially uprooted individuals and controlling their behavior as they became erratic and formed “crowds” became the urgent social question of the late nineteenth century. Early social scientists such as Gustave Le Bon and the criminologist Gabriel Tarde began to address these issues. Halbwachs and Blondel inherited these concerns as they explored the social and collective determinants of individual activity. Halbwachs’s systematic approach to these issues led to the modern formulation of the (social) psychological mechanisms of collective behavior.

Simultaneously, the scientific community was divided over the origins of hysteria: Was it attributable to innate disposition or was it socially induced? Heated debates took place between the “alienists”—a word used to designate the psychiatrists of the time—of the two major psychiatric schools: Charcot and the French physician and neurologist of the Nancy school, Hippolyte Bernheim (1840–1919). The medical community was, at this time, the major scientific authority, a body to whom early social scientists turned to find their explanatory models; the outcome of these debates was thus important to them as they tried to account for the unstable behavior of individuals when in a crowd. Le Bon, for instance, describes the activity of an individual in a crowd in terms of suggestibility, contagion, hypnosis, and irrationality, even though, in the alienists’ debate, it was the social explanation of hysteria that eventually prevailed.
When Halbwachs and Blondel undertook to explore collective behavior, they both tried, initially, to break away from the view that reduces the individual to his personal determinants and attempted to trace the sociological determinants of human activity. Over time, however, Blondel grew to favor the idea that the individual was, in the main, responsible for his or her behavior, while Halbwachs continued to explore, in increasing depth and detail, the multilayered sociological, historical, and environmental determinants of human behavior.

The Social Conceptions of Halbwachs

At the heart of Halbwachs’s thought is the idea that no one human being ever lives in total isolation; all human activity is socially determined or—to use contemporary terminology—socially constructed. For Halbwachs, social interchanges are existentially vital to who we are and to who we become, to the way in which we process our past and remember and evaluate our experiences. He would no doubt have agreed with the position of psychologist Guy Saunders, who claims that communication is so vital to sustaining one’s sanity that to be deprived of a narrative context for the self can be even more harmful than sensory deprivation.22

For Halbwachs, recollections (les souvenirs)—what we retain in memory of our past experiences—are not just simple imprints; they are truly active selections and reconstructions of this past. Individual experiences, even of the most private, personal, and intimate nature, are the result of an ongoing dynamic social process; they are inscribed in a given physical, sociohistorical environment, stored in memory and recollected through continuous interchanges with significant others or significant groups. Among these groups, the first with whom we are in contact are the members of our immediate family—“the greatest number of our memories come back to us when our parents, our friends, or other persons recall them to us”—but as we grow up, as we go to school, to church or to the workplace, we associate with other groups and take part in various friendships or participate in public life: “Yet it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories.”23 In general, we are affiliated with several groups simultaneously, but the pattern of these affiliations changes over time.

Each of these groups has its own set of codes and customs, and its own history; in other words, it has its own particular collective memory, which serves as a reference to define what is important and meaningful for this particular group. This collective memory provides the frame within which (or against which) individuals try to make sense of their own personal experiences. Individual and collective memory are thus dialectically related; our experiences and private recollections are continuously evaluated and shaped by confrontations with collective memory, which confer legitimacy on our memory: “I have
shown that memory is a collective function. . . . If recollections reappear, this is because at each moment society possesses the necessary means to reproduce them. 24 What is important in one group may well be unimportant in another, so that individual memory must, to a certain extent, adjust to the sometimes contradictory demands of the various groups to which the subject is affiliated. Memory is, consequently, flexible and multilayered, a shifting terrain in which recollections’ relative importance and position depend on changing group affiliations. This means that, in order to be kept alive, individual recollections must be shared at an interpersonal level:

All memories, however personal they may be and even if witnessed by only one person . . . are linked to ideas we share with many others, to people, groups, places, dates, words and linguistic forms, theories and ideas, that is, with the whole material and moral framework of the society of which we are part. A memory occurs to us . . . because we are surrounded by other memories that link to it. . . . These memories are reference points in space and time; they may be historical, geographical, bibliographic, or political notions or everyday experiences and familiar ways of seeing. These references enable us to determine with increasing precision the contours of a previously isolated past event. 25

This in turn implies that there cannot be too large a discrepancy between the conceptual background of one who tells the story and the one who listens to it; they must share a common background in order for the story to resonate for the listener.

A case in point is the attitude of political exiles from various countries of South America interviewed by my colleague Ana Vasquez. They hardly ever mentioned the torture and humiliations to which they had been subjected in Chilean or Argentinean jails. 26 When I later extended my work and explored the realities of dislocation of people caught in various forms of political disruption, who had faced massive violence or genocide such as the Holocaust, the Armenian massacres at the hands of the Turks in 1917, or the more recent Rwandan killings, I encountered the same reluctance—or, more properly, the inability—to recount these dreadful experiences unless there was some kind of state discourse that allowed people to couch their personal experiences within a collective narrative of events. For instance, it was only after it seemed possible that Chile’s president, Augusto Pinochet, might be indicted for crimes against humanity that a number of Chilean exiles started to speak about their torture. Luis Vargas, a Chilean exile who escaped to France from Pinochet’s jails in 1973, commented, after Pinochet’s indictment: “It wasn’t that I wanted to forget, but I didn’t have the words to say this, neither in Spanish nor in French, to recount the torture to my kids. It is difficult to explain, in France, that one has been tortured.” 27

Halbwachs claimed that if we were haunted by past events or by memories that cannot be shared because they are meaningless to others, we risk being thought to be
hallucinating: “Affective memories, which seemed the most important, were in reality only recovered and given value through a series of reflections that drew on shared points of reference (in space and time).” There is, then, no alternative to forgetting, or—if this is impossible—to becoming silent and alienated from one’s own experience and environment. This claim, which Halbwachs develops in *On Collective Memory* (1925), is today more topical and accurate than ever. It perfectly captures the sense of alienation reported by survivors of mass violence and genocide, as well as by the victims of torture or sexual abuse each time they confront the reluctance or inability of people from “outside” to listen to what they have experienced; they are forced to bury the memory of their experiences, to exist in a no-man’s-land of silence characterized by a deep sense of dissociation between the individual’s private and public persona. A few years ago, Simone Weil, commenting on her experience in the death camps, said: “I have always been willing to speak, to bear witness, but no one was willing to listen. . . . And the foolishness of some of the questions, the doubt which sometimes met our narrations . . . led us to choose carefully our interlocutors.” The legal theorist Martha Minow similarly observed that the clandestine nature of torture and abuses by repressive governments “doubles the pain of those experiences with the disbelief of the community and even jeopardy to the victim’s own memory and sanity.”

The rapport that must exist between narrator and audience in order to establish communication is further assessed and explored in Halbwachs’s posthumous volume *La mémoire collective*. Narrator and listener must share a common interest, and possibly even belong to the same space and time; in short, they must share the same social, physical, and historical frame of reference. Halbwachs goes even one step further than this when he insists on the necessity of an “emotional community” for successful communication to take place. The psychiatrist Dori Laub takes up this notion, considering it a necessary condition to ensure a meaningful exchange. Having collected narratives from Holocaust survivors, he stresses the importance of creating a proper relation between interviewer and interviewee, a climate that makes possible for the interviewee “something like a repossession of the act of witnessing.” “A dialogical process of exploration” is necessary in order to repossess one’s life story and to “reconcile two worlds . . . that are different and will always remain so.”

Communication cannot exist without language:

People living in society use words that they find intelligible: this is the precondition for collective thought. But each word [that is understood] is accompanied by recollections. There are no recollections to which words cannot be made to correspond. We speak of our recollections before calling them to mind. It is language, and the whole system of social conventions attached to it, that allows us at every moment to reconstruct our past.
Halbwachs stresses the determining role that must be given to language in his social interactive constructivist view of memory and identity. Language serves as the vehicle connecting collective memory to individual memory, but it is itself limited in what it can express to the extent that it is socially constructed, shaped by the collectivity, its norms and representations. He goes as far as to say that what cannot be expressed through language cannot be recalled. Remember the comment “I didn’t have the words to say this” of the Chilean exile Luis Vargas. Words, and the common frameworks “from the world of freedom” (to quote an expression from Primo Levi), are obviously inadequate to grasp and convey the full impact of those encounters with human behavior that are radically alien to our common beliefs about human conduct, ethics, and morality. And yet the act of fixing the facts in words, of naming them with precise images, is a first attempt to make sense of the illogic of a violence unassimilable by any normal human cognitive capacity.

Survivors of mass violence, such as Primo Levi or Jorge Semprún, convinced that it is their duty to bear witness to their experience of the death camps, or the African writer Boubacar Diop, writing about the Rwanda massacres,\textsuperscript{34} have all come up against the same question: how to bear such witness, how to tell? Even the most rigorously documented narratives of historians “miss the essential truth of the experience,” according to Semprún.\textsuperscript{35} On the other hand, a number of scholars, such as the specialist in comparative literature Cathy Caruth, claim that the existential pathos of such experiences can be conveyed only through a sophisticated form of literary elaboration that may, in surprising and indirect ways, help stimulate the imagination of an unimaginable reality.\textsuperscript{36}

To sum up: interpersonal proximity, in particular emotional proximity, is a necessary condition at the interpersonal level to make communication possible, to establish meaningful dialogue, one that helps subjects to process their experiences into living memory and facilitates the storage and retrieval, rather than the repression and forgetting, of their memories. When, in situations of uprooting, for example, there is a major gap between two cultural backgrounds, it is often difficult to communicate successfully across cultural divides and grasp the full meaning of personal experiences deeply rooted in one of those cultures. Take, for instance, the following passage from Romain Gary’s autobiographical novel *Promise at Dawn* (*Promesse de l’aube*): “I have known in my life . . . great moments of happiness. Ever since childhood . . . I have loved cucumbers, either the Russian, the Polish or the Jewish kosher type, which we call in France cucumbers *a` la russe*. I often buy a pound at a time, then settle down somewhere in the sun, preferably on the ocean shore, or on the pavement, no matter where, and munch my cucumbers. Those are my only moments of bliss.”\textsuperscript{37} Unless one belongs to an Eastern European background, or has been raised by a Polish grandmother whose kitchen shelves are full of homemade *ogurkis* (dill pickles, Gary’s cucumbers *a` la russe*), it is difficult to grasp the moments of bliss experienced by the author as he eats; in Polish culture the word *ogurki* has a suggestive power similar to that conveyed by the *madeleine* in French culture.
Listening and hearing can take place only if certain conditions are met. First, the adequate language to convey experiences and recollections must be available: Hannah Arendt and Eva Hoffman convincingly illustrate the potentially destructive consequences of language’s incommunicability. Second, the content of that language must be consistent with society’s accepted frames of reference. A narrative that runs counter to dominant politics or ideology will prove hard to communicate.

The historical memory of a society, to use Halbwachs’s terminology, shapes its members’ autobiographical memory. For him, as I’ve written elsewhere, “personal experience and private recollections need to be couched in, or voiced within a collective, public chronicle” to be heard in a context of broad social meaning. In other words, our personal experiences gain their full meaning only within a broader social, cultural, or historical context. Public chronicles concerning the history of a given society and its official memorialization procedures determine what constitutes the legitimate content of traditions and social customs—the norms and limits within which the processing of memory and the construction of individual identity can most harmoniously take place. These official narratives, however, fluctuate over time as the result of what we call today the politics of memory.

We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives, and these are continually reproduced; through them, as by a continual relationship, a sense of identity is perpetuated. But precisely because these memories are repetitions, because they are successively engaged in very different systems of notions, at different periods of our lives, they have lost the form and appearance they once had. . . . Any such reconstruction of the past can only be approximative. The more written or oral accounts we have available the more this will be the case. [My italics.] Some examples may serve to illustrate these points. For many years, the official “silence” that prevailed in many countries about the fate of the Jews during the Second World War or about the Armenian massacres made it almost impossible for the survivors of these events to find a public forum in which to relate their experiences and to elicit the proper “echo” to help them work through the pain of their disrupted lives. The recent changes in France’s politics of memory concerning the Holocaust, such as the recognition in 1995, by President Chirac, of France’s responsibility for the deportation of its Jewish population, or the decision of Prime Minister Jospin in 2000 to give the official status of orphelin de deportation to the children of Jews who perished in the deportation from France, have been major steps toward restoring the personal integrity of those affected and raising their status from the demeaning category of “victim.” The struggle of a part of the black population in the United States to provide legal status to those who suffered as a consequence of slavery shares the same goal. Helping the second and third generations of North African immigrants to find their place in French society is at the heart of
the recent debate that has polarized Parliament concerning the way French colonial history is presented in schoolbooks. The consequences of France’s legal neglect of the Harkis population, the Algerians who fought alongside the French army, are superbly delineated by Zahia Rahmani in her recent novel *Musulman*, in which she describes how her own Algerian father ultimately committed suicide after being ignored and ostracized when he sought refuge in France at the end of the Algerian war.43

What is at stake here are the functions that a politics of memory can perform at the individual level, the way in which it may allow or prevent the reinscription of one’s personal experiences in the larger flow of history and, consequently, facilitate or hinder a person’s shedding of the anonymity of victimhood and regain a sense of historicity.44

Every time we situate a new impression in relation to the framework structuring our existing ideas the framework transforms the impression but the impression also in turn alters the framework. This creates a new moment, a new place, modifying our sense of time and space; it adds a new dimension to our group, which we now see in a different light. Hence the continual work of adaptation.45

It is no accident that an increasing number of states emerging from terrorist or dictatorial regimes have found it necessary to address their past in order to lay the foundations of true democracy. The responses to the near-continuous chain of genocide, mass violence and gross violations of human rights—what Ruti Teitel calls transitional justice46—have taken various legal forms. They may be geared primarily toward justice (as in the case of the Nuremberg trial or the Papon trial in France), or toward establishing truth (as in the various practices of the Truth and Reconciliation commissions); or they may, rather, aim at providing reparation or apology. Be that as it may, each of these various legal responses to collective violence provides an official narrative and a framework to account for past events. Public recognition of the facts legitimizes the social existence of victims; it provides the historical framework within which they feel entitled to speak up and to make their stories heard. What are today common legal practices at the highest international level, Halbwachs had already tackled, analyzed, and acknowledged as being factors decisive in the retrieval of a person’s integrity.

To return to the anecdote that opens Halbwachs’s explorations of memory in *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*: What exactly is he trying to demonstrate in depicting the amnesia of this ten-year-old Caribbean child, forcibly uprooted and separated from her physical environment? As he recounts her story, he makes sure that we are informed that the child is not mentally retarded, nor too young to accumulate memories. Her amnesia, her inability to recall what happened to her and where she comes from, Halbwachs suggests, is due not to a biological deficiency but rather to the child’s sudden separation from her habitus and geographical environment, to the deprivation of familiar landmarks, to the disorientation consequent upon uprooting. The broader theoretical implication is
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that the collective memory in which our personality is rooted has also, in part, physical foundations.

By means of this case, Halbwachs introduces yet another key concept, the notion of historical memory, to be named and developed in his posthumous work *La mémoire collective*, as well as in *La topographie légendaire des Evangiles en Terre sainte: Étude de mémoire collective*. In both of these books, Halbwachs deals with the long-lasting traces remaining deeply and permanently engraved, often without our realizing it, in traditions, institutions, and cultural heritage, as well as in the physical environment itself. While the collective memory of a given community refers mainly to its traditions, customs, idiosyncratic modes of functioning—in short to its common cultural background—historical memory deals with the long-term foundations of memory; it introduces the notion of duration and continuity in the cultural components themselves. Traces of the past are omnipresent, pervading every aspect of our environment; they can be found in the institutions that rule our society as well as in our daily physical environment. In the chapter devoted to religious institutions, Halbwachs stresses how much religious rituals are based on past events and therefore bring, so to speak, the past permanently into our present. An example is the celebration of the Epiphany, which, we tend to forget, is taken from an earlier pagan celebration, in which a king was chosen from among the poor population for one day, during which he could use his power *ad libitum*. Or to take another example, it is interesting to highlight how many of the public holidays in France commemorate religious events, and how often we are thus reminded of the Catholic past of a country that claims to be a secular state, a state, moreover, where the separation between church and state in 1905 remains to this day a major historical landmark defining the nation’s political and social practices.

History is traceable not only in our various institutions; it is equally deeply inscribed in space: in *La mémoire collective* Halbwachs devotes a chapter to the examination in the natural environment of the traces of a long-term collective past. He emphasizes the way in which, for example, the spatial disposition of cities carries the memory of successive periods of history.

For Halbwachs, each subject’s autobiographical memory is dialectically related not only to the collective memories of the various groups to which he or she is affiliated, but also to the broader historical memory of the society in which he or she lives. The traces of this past constitute the background foundation of the construction of one’s identity; they carry the notion of duration, stability, permanence, and a sense of rootedness vital to the maintenance of memory and identity. But the idea of permanence and duration contained in the notion of historical memory leads to a view of history different from that prevailing in Halbwachs’s time. Opposing a strictly chronological approach to history, focused mainly on facts and dates, he argues in favor of a different conception of the discipline: Looking at the historical memory inscribed in landscapes, in stones, in a myriad of various indices of our environment, demonstrates the continuing importance
of the historical legacy in the present-day functioning of society. Halbwachs links history and geography, opening up new areas for historical investigation. As Marc Bloch emphasized in his reviews of Halbwachs’s works, no society can develop without a historical consciousness, a collective memory of the past. In proposing this notion of historical memory, Halbwachs has pioneered a new method of studying history’s objects; historians of memory are all in his debt for his groundbreaking vision.

. . .

Halbwachs’s legacy reaches far beyond the mere issue of memory. His scrupulous and extensive exploration of the interpersonal dynamics of individual memory, as well as of its connections with the changing social and historical environment, is a plea for the social determination of human conduct. Human beings do not live in a social or environmental vacuum; they are subjected to broader social and historical constraints, such as traditions, rules, norms, as well as changing political imperatives. Loaded with long-term accumulated historical reminiscences—stones and landscapes retain the memory of historical pasts and ways of living—the physical environment itself contributes to the construction of each subject’s identity as well as to their constructions of memory. Halbwachs provides us with the theoretical tools to comprehend the complexities and fluctuations of the social conduct of individuals:

We can remember the past only on condition of retrieving the position of past events that interest us from the frameworks of collective memory. A recollection is the richer when it reappears at the junction of a greater number of these frameworks, which in effect intersect each other and overlap in part. Forgetting is explained by the disappearance of these frameworks or of a part of them. . . . But forgetting, or the deformation of certain recollections, is also explained by the fact that these frameworks change from one period to another. Depending on its circumstances and point in time, society represents the past to itself in different ways.48

As he proceeds with his systematic investigation he transcends sterile disciplinary divisions, paving the way toward an integrative view of the social sciences.
6. Memory in Freud

Richard Terdiman

When Freud set out to understand how memory worked in the psyche, he wasn’t thinking about whether his ideas harmonized with the historical and cultural complex we know as “modernity.” But the theory of memory that Freud developed puts his conception of memory at modernity’s heart.

In the modern period, memory seems caught in a distinctive form of crisis. We could think of modernity’s “memory” as involving two contrary mismatches between recollection and its object. Memory is either frustrated by insufficiency, or it is cursed with exaggeration: too little memory, or too much. Modernity is either haunted by the near-impossibility of determining a reliable past, or it is burdened by the compulsion to repeat a past we cannot shake off. Freud’s theory of memory lives in these twin, uncomfortable misfits between the recollecting faculty and the material it makes available to consciousness. This unhappy dialectic might be the dilemma upon whose horns modernity hangs us.

How does memory work in Freud? To begin with, it would be impossible to conceive the psyche if it did not incorporate a faculty for conserving and conceiving the past. From the beginning of his work Freud insisted that the therapy he theorized and the theory he practiced sought to understand memory. “A psychological theory deserving of any consideration,” he wrote in 1895, early in his career, “must furnish an explanation of ‘memory.’”1 And he recognized that such an explanation had been missing in psychology: “If anyone should feel inclined to overestimate the state of our present knowledge of mental life, a reminder of the function of memory is all that would be needed to force him to be more modest. No psychological theory has yet succeeded in giving a connected account of the fundamental phenomenon of remembering and forgetting.” (The Psychopathology of Everyday Life [1901]; SE 6:134).
Freud’s preoccupation with memory proliferated and pervaded his psychological theory, to the point where the individual almost seemed to have been reconceived as a cluster of memory operations and transformations. Freud represented desire, instinct, dream, association, neurosis, repression, repetition, the unconscious—all the central notions of psychoanalysis—as memory functions or dysfunctions. In his theory, the exercise of memory seeks to heal the same traumas whose capacity for disrupting our existence memory itself perversely sustains. This is memory’s paradox in Freud, and it may be irresolvable.

So memory came to stand both as the problem Freud sought to crack and as the key to his solution to it. In his attempt to unravel memory’s complications, he magnified its field, its centrality—and its ambivalence—more insistently and more powerfully than any other theorist in the modern period. In psychoanalysis the density and intensity of attention to the phenomena of memory, forgetting, false memories, and the like, are evidence of the power of the past. Memory names the mechanism by which our present is indentured to the past; or, to turn the structure around, by which a past we never chose dominates the present that seems to be the only place given us to live.

Yet the past is gone. It is always absent—this would seem its very definition. When we try to narrate our past, most often we either get it wrong or we lie. The past may determine the present. But the problem for cultural or psychological theory is to understand how in its absence and its impalpability it manages to do so. In Freudian terms, the constraints imposed upon us by the past seem “uncanny.” Freud’s objective could then be put this way: to discover how our past, despite being irretrievably absent, maintains the power of its presence; and, to the extent possible, to devise means for undoing this power.

Most of the time, the determinations of our past appear invisible. They constitute our reality while remaining mostly transparent. This can lead us to ignore them. But in those moments where some disturbance of this transparency becomes perceptible, then suddenly the past no longer “goes without saying.” As he developed the theory of psychoanalysis, these were the moments Freud’s attention detected and seized upon. In dreams, in “slips” or what he termed “parapraxes,” in hysteria, and in the other transference neuroses, the present unexpectedly stopped making sense and became inexplicable. To explain such anomalies Freud discovered he could invoke a covert persistence of the past and the determinations of a memory whose extent and intensity no one before him had conceived as so ubiquitous or so imperious.

Where, then, is this past? How can we gain access to it? And how can its power be managed? Early in Freud’s therapeutic work he decided to “start from the assumption that my patients knew everything that was of any pathogenic significance and that it was only a question of obliging them to communicate it” (Studies on Hysteria [1895]; SE 2:110). To achieve such communication, Freud’s method based itself upon dialogue. Consequently in psychoanalysis, recollection is not just individual; it involves a system of two people working together. But why should a memory that everything suggests is personal
require the midwifery of a psychoanalytic interlocutor to bring it to light? The answer begins with Freud’s assertion that forgetting is not a random result of erosion or entropy, but is purposeful conduct. But for Freud forgetting is a conduct performed without the knowledge of its actor. Freud conceives of forgetting as something we’ve learned to do in the service of some need. Thus it is a lived memory of a forgotten forgetting. Then the analyst’s intervention is necessary in order to bring this forgetting back to light, and make such troubling recollections accessible again.

How is this possible? Freud believed that such dialogic recollection could work because the therapist has a different memory and a different past from the patient’s and hence is not bound to the reproduction of the patient’s blockage, nor to the recollected forgetting that has determined it. Anamnesis, recollection, is dialogic because undoing the pattern of failure to remember, subverting the false stability of mnemonic blockage, requires the dynamism and the intervention of somebody else. Transference—to put the point in Freudian terms—can only make sense within a relation of difference.2

Freud’s own memory was excellent. “I am not in general inclined to forget things,” he wrote in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (SE 6:135). Yet Freud’s memory was subject to the same failures and mix-ups that everyone experiences. For example, the phenomenon he termed “cryptomnesia”—what we might translate as “forgetting with advantage.” With his customary candor, Freud recounted his own commissions of this lapse. For example he described how he had been brought by his friend Fliess to realize that he had completely blotted out the memory that Fliess had introduced him to the theory of “original bisexuality,” a theory that he then later played back to Fliess as if Freud had devised it himself.3 For most of us, lapses such as these function only as annoyances or embarrassments. But Freud hypothesized that they could be made intelligible.

The first significant result of his inquiry into ordinary experiences of memory loss and degradation was his essay on “The Psychical Mechanism of Forgetfulness” (1898), which became the opening chapter of The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Freud took many of the analyses of mnemonic lapses in this study from his own experience, including the classic case of his inability to recall the name of the painter of the Orvieto Last Judgment frescoes.4 The result of his investigations strengthened Freud’s conviction that such mental errors are always purposeful. So when Freud interpreted experiences of “forgetting,” he analyzed them not as simple memory drop-outs, but as blockages of recollection determined by the psyche’s need to not remember something troubling. We could say that these blockages then became memory-substitutes for unwanted recollections.

Memory lapses like the ones Freud analyzed in his work around the turn of the century gave a microcosmic but crucial glimpse of the general mechanism by which memory, seemingly a benign and neutral “archive” of our experience (SE 3:296), could turn pathological. Freud was explicit: “The example elucidated here [he is talking about his own inability to recall Signorelli’s name] receives an immensely added interest when we
learn that it may serve as nothing more or less than a model for the pathological processes
to which the psychical symptoms of the psychoneuroses . . . owe their origin” (SE 3:295).

This hypothesis has proven remarkably productive. Through its varied manifesta-
tions, psychoanalysis, along with a series of diverse interpretive systems inspired by it, has
been able to theorize entire areas of human phenomena that had seemed meaningless as
meaningful. Elements of behavior previously thought to be random or negative (for exam-
ple, the seemingly entropic disappearance of a memory trace) have been reconceived as
motivated, hence as comprehensible. This doctrine transforms forgetting from a flat ab-
sence into a rich positivity—into a version of remembrance. And it insists on the intimate
connection between the two, on their systematicity (see Psychopathology of Everyday Life,
SE 6:134). Before Freud, forgetting had seemed an event without a narrative, an inarticu-
late blank. But Freud insisted that in the psyche there could be no results without causes,
hence no denouements without stories. If forgetting resulted, there was a tale behind it.
At the same time, his theory offered an explanation of why the pertinent story about our
forgetting hadn’t been known to us all along—why it had, in effect, been forgotten.

To put his theory in motion, Freud projected a protagonist and a plot for the account
he was generating about forgetting. In effect he created a new narrative genre about the
process of the mind. The main protagonist in this narrative had emerged as early as 1895
in Studies on Hysteria, in Freud’s discussion of the analytic technique he had developed
in his work with hysterics. There, concerning the phenomenon of “pathogenic” forget-
ting, he wrote that such forgotten material “nevertheless in some fashion lies ready to
hand and in correct and proper order. . . . The pathogenic psychical material appears to
be the property of an intelligence which is not necessarily inferior to that of the normal
ego” (SE 2:287).

This new character was the unconscious, and the new story it wrote was the result of
what Freud termed repression. In the narrative of the psyche that Freud was composing,
these new entities functioned to withdraw from the ego’s possession important facts about
its perceptions, recollections, and behavior. In this new conception, the process of recol-
lection was crucially redefined, both in its necessity and its possibility. For while it now
appeared absolutely indispensable to recover the memories that the unconscious had
withdrawn from the accessible archive of memory, simultaneously and for the same rea-
son, this task of recovery emerged as profoundly problematic. For once we have an un-
conscious, where is our past? The paradox of Freudian construction of memory is that it
defined for this constitutive instance of our psyche—of our self—both an irreducible
presence and an infinite distance.

This paradoxical—we might say paralogistic—combination of presence and absence
frames a new situation for thinking. The modern world, many have argued, is constituted
by the ever-increasing mobility of everything that makes it up—not only material objects,
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but language itself. Indeed in modernity, language’s lability comes to seem the most characteristic condition of our existence; the sign becomes the model of everything that occupies our attention and furnishes our world. But once signs begin to float and flow, things become hard to restabilize. Where now is the “real”? This semiotic puzzle—for example, the deceptive verisimilitude, the apparent reality of our reference to or memories of the nonexistent—had occupied Freud as early as the 1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology. There he asked how we can tell the difference between a presence and an absence. How can we tell a memory of the past from an experience in the present? He wrote that we need “an external criterion in order to distinguish between perception [Wahrnehmung] and idea [Vorstellung]” or between “perception and memory” (SE 1:325; translation modified).

Freud might have solved the problem of how we distinguish these two types of experiences by collapsing objective and subjective reality into each other in some version of Idealism. Then all psychic representations would become equivalent to all others, and the materiality of the real object of perception—present in perception, absent in memory—would have been bleached out. But Freud was an uncompromising materialist—something that more recent Freudians, particularly of Lacanian stripe, have themselves sometimes repressed. In the face of his encounter with the mind-body problem, Freud concluded that not everything can be absorbed into the subjective paradigms of the psyche. Entities crucial for psychology nonetheless exist external to the psyche itself. These entities are things.

The consequences of Freud’s epistemological choice are considerable. “What we call things,” he wrote, “are externalities which resist thought” (Project for a Scientific Psychology; SE 1:334; translation mine) [Was wir Dinge nennen, sind Reste, die sich der Beurteilung entziehen]. The concept of such resistance is striking. As I suggested just above, it contrasts with familiar positions in our own period, characterized by the relative dominance of linguistic and semiotic paradigms, and—in the absence of extra-semiotic hors-texte—by the idea that the world somehow collapses into such paradigms. Freud’s stance is different. For him, ideas, memory traces, word- and thing-presentations, the imagined objects of instinctual drives, fantasies, hallucinations—such psychic phenomena can imitate, stand for, refer to, represent, even deny the world external to the self and independent of its mental presentations. But unlike what would be the case in some of the most familiar semiotic models of postmodernity, Freud was not willing to equate these representations with the world outside the psyche. He insisted upon confirming the irreducibility of the material objects that the psyche’s desires could evoke or react to, but not replace or control. This “resistance” of things is critical in unexpected regions of Freudian theory, as I will argue below.

But Freud’s refusal to blot the problem out by collapsing reality into the neurological presentations available within the psyche only deepened the psychological puzzle he was
setting for himself and for us. For in our experience—and particularly in the experience of the hysteric and neurasthenic patients Freud was working with throughout this period—the power of psychical presentations seemed to sweep away the reality of the material world. Neurotics do behave as if their memories were real, as if material reality were just an appearance and the mind’s phantoms and phantasms entirely determinant.

How could the difference between psychical and material reality be conceived in a way that granted each of these registers its requisite independence while still managing to leave conceptual room for the interactions and substitutions by which their distinction seemed constantly subverted? And in particular, how could we understand—and how alter—the spectral power of certain memory traces within the psyche, traces so powerful that they appear so fully to displace the products of immediate perception that, as we say, people under their influence “lose touch with reality”?

We could restate Freud’s perplexity this way: Where does the “reality” of our memory stop? When does recollection end and experience begin? In these questions lurks the problem of memory’s strange power. Psychoanalysis depends upon the subject’s memory for the cure. But as Freud’s therapeutic experiences began to suggest, subjects’ memories most often subjected them. The pertinence of this reversal of agency had arisen dramatically in Freud and Breuer’s early attempts to treat hysteria. Their diagnosis in the “Preliminary Communication” (1893) of the Studies on Hysteria concerning the etiology of this illness is justly celebrated: “Hystérics suffer mainly from reminiscences” (emphasis theirs; SE 2:7). Memory was their illness.5

In this construction, the seemingly secure materiality of a world of the here-and-now has been replaced by memory symbols whose power seems ineradicable and able to supplant even the most intense experiences in the present. The memory of what cannot be spoken still speaks, and it does so irresistibly. It imposes somatic avowal; the mind writes it upon the body.6 The idea here, that “truth will out,” may be familiar. Freud’s originality was to specify the source and the mechanism by which such involuntary re-materializations of the hidden occur. This source was the unconscious; the mechanism, the return of the repressed. In order to understand the extraordinary expansion of the memory function in psychoanalysis, we need to understand how, for Freud, these psychic agencies preserve and, at crucial moments, “betray” the past.

Conceptualizing this process and the consequences of this conservation and re-materialization of the past drove the mature theory of psychoanalysis toward a reconception of the nature of psychological “evidence” and of the paradigms necessary for its interpretation. Freud had to credit the seeming sovereignty of representations such as those which involuntarily “ooze out” in neuroses or are acted out in hysteria—and he had to credit these behaviors not as unintelligible aberrations, but as products of the regular functioning of psychic processes. “What is suppressed continues to exist in normal people as well as abnormal, and remains capable of psychical functioning” (Freud’s emphasis; Interpretation of Dreams [1900]; SE 5:608).
To the naïve observer, the memories that irrupt from we know not where to overturn our present seem intolerable. Their re-materializations violate the canons by which our world is supposed to be ordered and call out for normalization. Indeed, the psychoanalytic patient has entered treatment precisely to eliminate them. But Freud made it a principle to forestall taking the perspective of the treatment’s end—the suppression of pathological recurrence of these memory contents—in conceiving its material and its course. Epistemologically speaking, it was as if achieving control over these archaic contents required abandoning our everyday realist bias, and adopting the point of view of memory itself.

But what was the character of this “memory”? To understand Freud’s perspective, it is essential to abandon any “realist” notion of the memory that we can access as some form of reliable “storage”—memory as checked baggage which could be reclaimed at any time. Such a notion carries the implication that what went into the brain is stored someplace specific within it, and can be retrieved unchanged. Freud’s vision was contrary to such a notion. As he put it early in his career, “There is in general no guarantee of the data produced by our memory” (“Screen Memories” [1899]; SE 3:315).

For Freud the stakes in the tension between what we might term on the one hand literalist and on the other interpretive representations of the past were critical. And they arose at a crucial moment in the development of his paradigm—one that evokes a controversy still burning within Freudianism: the problem of “seduction theory.” Early in his career, in one of his most startling hypotheses, Freud speculated that what he was then calling “neurasthenia” (neurosis) resulted from an experience of childhood sexual molestation. In the course of therapy, his patients had regularly produced recollections of such experiences.

But in 1897 he began to be convinced that these accounts were likely to have arisen instead from what he termed “phantasies”—imaginary constructions, into whose formation the proportions of projection, invention, recollection, misrecollection, and reflexive reconstruction were simply undecidable. But if this was true, there was no master memory. In the revision of the theory entailed by Freud’s renunciation of belief in his patients’ remembrance of early molestation, the entire field of the diagnostic data of psychoanalysis was sweepingly reinterpreted; the very notion of “data” was radically transformed. The transformation that disbelieved the reality of early seduction of the child but credited the effect of the patient’s conviction concerning it unlinked the mnemonic representations elicited in treatment from literal reproduction of past experiences.

This move created the interpretive field in which mature psychoanalysis functions. Such reconception of the status of the issues and the evidence to which the analyst must attend—now no longer concerned with establishing the factual accuracy of the memories produced by his patients, but rather seeking interpretation of the representations they offered—is crucial to the vision of psychoanalysis that underlies Freud’s radical resituation of the memory problem.
We can’t remember the future. Only our past can be invoked in recollection. But if
we can’t represent the directionality of memory’s determinations, there can be no possi-
bility of understanding how the past it carries forward with it has come to dominate our
present. Making sense of memory requires that this directionality be central within any
representation of memory’s activity. But then the theory of psychoanalysis runs into a
serious difficulty. When we come to psychology from the side of memory, it is memory’s
persistent persistence, the seeming inertia of its traces, that calls out for explanation.

The locus of memory in Freud’s topography of the psyche attempts to understand
this refractory fixity. He conceived the unconscious as the timeless and immutable portion
of the psyche. For psychoanalysis, the unconscious is memory’s fundamental repository.10
The memories to which psychoanalysis attends, the memories that define its theoretical
originality, are those that reside in this archive but have been subjected to repression.
Hence we have no direct access to them. They are recorded in the unconscious, but only
their derivatives, the “screen memories” and so on, are available to consciousness as part
of the tactics by which repression protects itself. So functionally, what psychoanalysis
means by memory—the traces of the past determinant for the pathologies that psychoan-
alytic therapy seeks to alleviate—is unconscious memory strictly defined, the memory of
the mysterious, timeless system UCS.11 And despite the paradoxical counterintuitive
essence of the position, Freud was undeviating in his doctrine that system UCS. conserves the past
literally, timelessly, and permanently.

There can be no doubt that Freud believed firmly in these characteristics of the un-
conscious, however difficult it may be for us to imagine how such a position could make
sense. He asserted his credo on the timelessness and permanence of the unconscious and
its memories from one end of his career to the other. From his essay “The Unconscious”
(1915): “The processes of the system UCS are timeless; i.e. they are not ordered temporally,
are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all” (SE 14:187).12
The repressed contents whose traces occupy system UCS. then appear as the source of the
pathologies that preoccupy psychoanalysis. The memories that are crucial for understand-
ing Freud’s conception of pathology become available only when they somehow pierce
through the boundary surrounding system UCS., where their ineradicable traces are lo-
cated. He understood their frustrating persistence in consciousness and in behavior as a
direct result of their permanence in the psyche. That is why it is so hard to change the
behaviors that they determine, why the psychoanalytic cure is so protracted.

This brings us to a fundamental and perhaps intractable problem in Freudian theory.
It arises in his unprecedented and counterintuitive insistence on the permanence and
ineradicability of memories in the unconscious. Many have argued that Freud’s concep-
tion of psychic contents turns from a model based upon the literalism of data to one
deploying the more supple practices of interpretation. But the timeless and immutable
inscriptions of the unconscious, the unchanging memory registrations of system UCS.,
create a tension within this understanding of Freud. How can we reconcile the paradigm
of protean interpretive mobility that is usually thought to define Freudian psychoanalysis with the quasi-positivist concept of the unconscious’s unchangeable register of every fact that has ever occurred in an individual’s experience?

In the past few decades, with Lacan particularly, structuralist and semiotic models have increasingly dominated conceptions of Freudian psychoanalysis. But Freud’s conception of an immutable unconscious memory, the refractory registrations of system Ucs. upon which he insisted, create a problem for such models. The almost effortless and mobile transfers of meaning that characterize semiotic systems don’t fit comfortably within the logic of memory as Freud conceived it, don’t cohere with Freud’s timeless and unchanging unconscious. For at the heart of a paradigm of luxuriant and seemingly boundless interpretation, the unconscious is a realm of facts. This projection of psychic fixity discomfits semiotic theories of the mind and memory.

So despite Lacan’s resonant assertion, the Freudian unconscious isn’t structured precisely like a language. Indeed, it rather functions as something like language’s contrary. For in the memory registrations of the timeless unconscious as Freud hypothesizes it, no content ever stands for any other. Instead, each stands uniquely and immutably for itself. This produces a puzzling result. In the unconscious, because there can be no change, there can be no signs. How can we make sense of this?

The tension here lies between two irreconcilable modes of being. Language and semiotics model the first of these modes. In it, existence is characterized by the mutability with which language accommodates transformations of the meaning-system in which it is embedded. Language can stand indifferently for whatever you like. And this compliance of the linguistic material, this unfixity defines the sign: it can be anything, and substitute for anything. But this description of the wanton lability of the semiotic—“compliance of the linguistic material”—is in fact Freud’s own characterization for the contents of consciousness (Psychopathology of Everyday Life; SE 6:222). And it invites confrontation with his directly contrasting evocation of the thought-resistant materiality of things (SE 1:334) that I mentioned earlier.

Here then is the principle that defines the tension in the Freudian model of memory and interpretation: Language is compliant; but things are resistant. By his own unvarying account, the contents of the Freudian unconscious resist change as if they were “things.” In the face of modernist and postmodern constructions of reality as a projection of language, Freud asserts a different understanding. At the heart of his model, the timeless unconscious hides a resistant materialist foundation that nothing seems able to alter. The contents of the unconscious cannot have the character of a sign because they do not have its mobility. It is not that the traces that occupy the unimaginable space of Freud’s system Ucs. can replace nothing else. It is rather that nothing can replace them. They cannot be signified; they are a memory that never forgets and thus is never altered. The past they carry is not past at all. This is what makes the issue of the cure so arduous for psychoanalysis.
The unconscious conserves everything. The problem lies in what happens to those ineradicable contents. In his essay “The Unconscious” (1915), Freud asked what occurs when an unconscious memory becomes conscious (see SE 14:174 and n. 29). The question is, how are unconscious traces transmuted into conscious signs? This metamorphosis is crucial. For clearly the remainder of the psyche manipulates its contents as if they were indeed semiotic elements. But this means that the contents of consciousness exist in a different ontological mode from those of the unconscious. If we can’t understand this passage from one mode of memory to another, the role and character of the unconscious becomes unfathomable. Then system Ucs., which Freud considered the “true psychical reality” (Interpretation of Dreams, SE 5:613), the heart of his model of the psyche and his most original contribution to our understanding of it, risks absolute incomprehensibility.

The split in the psyche is a chasm between the semiotic and its other. The question of this border is the question of psychotherapy itself. Freud himself was deeply troubled by it. Early in his career he evoked it thus: “It is . . . as though we were standing before a wall which shuts out every prospect and prevents us from having any idea whether there is anything behind it, and if so, what” (“Psychotherapy of Hysteria” [1895], SE 2:293). This is only an early member of a long series of images through whose figures Freud sought to describe what the mind was like behind this wall, to understand the unimaginable parallel universe of the unconscious, and to discover how this “internal foreign territory” of which he spoke in 1933 in the New Introductory Lectures could be understood (SE 22:57).

The paradox of the psychoanalytic cure now becomes apparent. The power of unconscious memories arises in the fact that we are not free not to live them. Clearly the unconscious memory traces at the source of a neurotic symptom produce “output” to the rest of the psyche. The problem is that they may produce only this. In the state in which they were laid down, they may be inaccessible to input, moderation, modulation, or diminution. Or if not, how could these modifications of unconscious contents happen? How can the unconscious be both changeless and changeable? To cure neurosis necessarily means acting upon the archaic registrations lying at its source, which the unconscious has integrally conserved. The problem is to imagine how this could occur. For if the unconscious is timeless and immutable, if memories are inexorably fixed, it would seem difficult to conceive how any activity taking place outside it could interrupt or modify them.

This puzzlement—indeed, this apparent contradiction in the model of unconscious memory that Freud devised and remained committed to—is at the origin of the growing pessimism he expressed toward the end of his career concerning the therapeutic ambitions of psychoanalysis itself. His theory itself entailed this reserve. It is particularly visible in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937). The editors of the Standard Edition take note of the gloom Freud expressed in the essay concerning the possibility of the cure (see SE 23:211). What is striking in the analysis offered in the essay is a convergence between the sources of Freud’s hesitations concerning its possibility, and an unconscious whose
difference from the other portions of the psyche is so radical that its contents exist in an alternate ontological mode.

Analysis can only cure by some form of memory displacement or substitution. Pathological memory determinations must be replaced by healthy ones. The formula in which Freud made this point is famous: “Where id was,” he wrote, “there ego shall be” (New Introductory Lectures [1933]; SE 22:80) [Wo Es war, soll Ich werden]. But when I asked earlier whether the contents of the unconscious (or the “id”) could be the object of replacement, could be substituted for and thus fulfill the function of signs, the response from within Freud’s system was disconcerting. Such a substitution appeared impossible if the timeless character of unconscious contents upon which Freud never ceased insisting was not to be fatally compromised.

The origin of neurosis in the changeless unconscious then appeared hermetically sealed off from any access to or treatment by the talking cure. In its struggle to overcome the source of pathology, psychoanalysis in effect attempts to oppose the force of matter with words, to set signs against materiality. It is not surprising that in the face of such a mismatch, in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” Freud substantially lowered the ambitions of the cure. In particular, with regard to the source of the symptom (what he called the “instinctual demand”), he made it clear that there was little prospect of the treatment’s eliminating it. “This,” he wrote, “is in general impossible.” Rather, he continued, “we mean something else, something which may be roughly described as a ‘taming’ [Bändigung] of the instinct. That is to say, the instinct is brought completely into the harmony of the ego” (SE 23:225).

But despite this substitute version of how the talking cure might cure, the problem may remain irreducible within Freud’s structure of the psyche. The cure projects something that psychoanalysis suggests may be impossible: replacement or extinction of an unconscious trace. The theoretical energy Freud devoted, from one end of his career to the other, to establishing the timelessness and the stability of the memories in the unconscious then rebounded at the moment of the cure to subvert any coherent account of its possibility.

In this way, the photographic, “eidetic” memory that Freud attributed to the unconscious and by which it achieves total preservation of the past mutates into memory’s nightmare. For what is repressed in the unconscious, what is denied entry into consciousness and cut off from development, nonetheless remains banefully active. In the unconscious, such memories become exempt from extinction. The unconscious is the unerring repository of our past; but its disheartening privilege is to conserve those contents most harmful to us (or at least to our conscious selves) in a place where their toxicity cannot diminish.

Such a conundrum embraces the extremes of Freud’s construction of memory, which span a range unprecedented in modernity. The conflict between memory as the absolute
reproduction of unchanging contents and memory as the mobile representation of contents transformed stresses and might really be said to construct Freudian analytic theory. On the one hand Freud’s insistence upon the absence of loss in the mnemonic world of the unconscious can be interpreted as a paroxysm of the reproductive model of memory—too much memory, to reproduce the first side of the modernist memory dialectic that I evoked at the opening of this essay. The totalizing retention and recovery of the past has never been conceived more radically than Freud did in his conception of the unconscious. On the other hand, we can’t recall these memories—too little memory, the other side of the dialectic with which I began.

To put this in the terms that Freud’s model constructs for us, Freud interprets the vertiginously changing manifestations and transformations of psychic contents as a form of continuous and uninterrupted recollection. This theory provides us with the most sophisticated paradigm of mnemonic representation yet devised. But we never get back to the real registration of our past. The extremes to which Freud felt it necessary to go in order to embrace the protean diversity and power of memory’s presence in our lives seem to have led him to a structure so internally stressed that it appears capable of no resolution at all. If so, psychoanalysis preserves the enigma of memory as tenaciously as any trace in the timeless and immutable unconscious that it conceives as the repository of memory to begin with.

In Freud memory thus lives in a contradiction framed by psychoanalytic topography. In “The Unconscious” (1915), he sought to understand how a relation between the two memory systems he had projected might be modeled (see particularly SE 14:188–89). The problem is not that such a relationship across the border between the unconscious and consciousness is impossible, since such passages must happen—they are the experience of every minute of our lives. The problem is that Freud was unable to give a coherent account of how this relationship occurs.

Existence does not depend upon our ability to theorize it in order to happen. But for Freud’s theory the difficulty remains. Whatever the eerie fixity of the registrations preserved in unconscious memory, in consciousness recollection exhibits a positively wanton disjunction from the veridical. There seems no seduction before which its representations will not yield. If the unconscious theorized by Freud contains an absolute, uncannily inert and stable record of the past, on its side consciousness exhibits a vertiginous representational mobility in the memories of which we are permitted awareness. The problem of characterizing memory mutates from fixity to fluidity, from absolute and inaccessible fact to ever-shifting fiction. I want to conclude this essay by examining these uncontainable and unpredictable remembrances of a memory we cannot remember.

In its protean volatility, conscious memory proliferates and diffuses extravagantly. The theory of memory thus reaches a critical pass. The psychic life we experience or can observe directly is a perpetual movement of transformations and substitutions—ordered, determined perhaps, but potentially interminable. As Freud put it in “The Dynamics of
“Unconscious impulses do not want to be remembered in the way the treatment desires them to be, but endeavor to reproduce themselves in accordance with the timelessness of the unconscious and its capacity for hallucination” (SE 12:108). But once we are willing to allow hallucination as a mode of meaning, then psychoanalysis has committed itself to resolving heroic problems in interpretation.

The untrammeled play of exchanges and transformations of meaning that psychoanalysis projects as the business of conscious memory subverts the coherence through time and the reality-check that memory was long supposed to provide. Recollection instead appears as a hypocritical counterfeit. Henceforth, in a vision that has had great influence since Freud’s own period, remembering means changing. “Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be” (“The Unconscious”; SE 14:171). Thus in the psyche, everything moves. Derrida emphasized this point: “The substitution of signifiers seems to be the essential activity of psychoanalytic interpretation.”13 In psychic material, things keep changing into other things. A readiness to perceive this constitutive lability and plasticity, to consider it as the zero-degree reality in the psyche, is fundamental to Freudian hermeneutics, to the scheme of psychoanalytic interpretation.

As I already suggested in mentioning Lacan above, reinterpretations of Freud along semiotic or Saussurian lines have preoccupied important strands of critical theory for decades.14 We have become familiar with the notion that the Freudian model of a seemingly uncontainable displacement of significations bears a persuasive similarity to the structures of sign generation and interpretation as they became conceptualized in the period when Freud’s own theory was being systematized (Saussure’s celebrated lectures took place between 1906 and 1911). It almost seems as if semiotics was dreaming up psychoanalysis at the same time as Freud himself.

The investigation of memory in Freud thus seems to swerve away from the character and practices of memory itself toward an account of the nature of Freudian interpretation. But this apparent inflection from the realm of memory to the realm of interpretation is not an inflection at all. The problems of memory and of interpretation in Freud are inseparable. Indeed, this coincidence may well be one of the most important characteristics of conceptions of memory in modernity, in which the subjective character of recollection underlines and foregrounds the subjectivity of all human beings and doings.

Still, how do these two registers—the mnemonic and the hermeneutic—unfold and intertwine in Freud’s theory? Freudian interpretation is fundamentally genealogical. It means excavating the successive strata of the psyche. And it believes that the contents thus brought to light can be made sense of. However arduous in practice, Freud thus conceives interpretation as a realist act. It then becomes simple to say how the problem of memory relates to the problem of interpretation. We need hermeneutics when memory in the mode of faithful reproduction fails: when the transparency of our access to the
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meanings transmitted to us from the past (“memory as checked baggage”) is troubled or interrupted.

Psychoanalysis then must reconstruct the meaning of an entity, the psyche, whose meanings are not given on the surface of its own recollection. But as Freud made clear in “Constructions in Analysis,” psychoanalysis can only do this as a reconstruction. It performs the interpretive equivalent of “reverse engineering”: given a product (the symptom), it seeks to understand how the product came to be, how it was made. It walks back up the chain of memories, of relations and transformations that in their accumulated effects produced the psyche it strives to understand.

The axiom of the interpretive system deployed in psychoanalysis is that some content is always remembered—retained, transferred, disguised—across even the most vertiginous mutations undergone by representations within the psyche. These transfers inevitably center in memory, instantiate its processes, and convey its materials. As for the interpretive activity of psychoanalysis, of course it has no other content than memories to work with. “We have to do our therapeutic work on [the present state of the patient’s illness], which consists in large measure in tracing it back to the past” (“Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through” [1914], SE 12:152). This hermeneutic exercise is a fundamental process of anamnesis, of recollection.

In this sense Freud’s attitude lies at the heart of modernity’s vision of the world as a deeply coded message awaiting decipherment. The disciplines that have arisen since the nineteenth century for understanding human behavior in its multiform aspects (among them sociology, anthropology, and—most consequential for us here—psychology) have all sought interpretation of mysteries in modern existence that refuse to give up their meanings to naı¨ve inspection. These emergent disciplines speculated upon hidden barriers to understanding. In effect each projected the same second-guessing of subjectivity or dethroning of consciousness that Freudian psychoanalysis practices.15

But here a problem arises. For once the rewriting of the object of interpretation begins, once transfer, transposition, what Freud termed Umsetzung (New Introductory Lectures [1933], SE 22:100–101) are accepted as legitimate for understanding the object’s real meaning, then it becomes difficult to see how to limit such revisions. The hermeneutics of suspicion maintains that things do not mean what they say. But then the difficulty becomes knowing whether they might not mean anything at all. The problem is that once you say that some meaning is transformed into some other meaning, the question arises of how you know where to stop.16

This problem underlies reflection throughout Freud’s career. He acknowledged it in a forthright and crucial passage in The Interpretation of Dreams: “The dream-thoughts to which we are led by interpretation cannot, from the nature of things, have any definite endings; they are bound to branch out in every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought” (SE 5:525). In one of his last essays, the difficulty that this boundlessness poses appears in the form of a deceptively simple question. Freud asked how we
could know when an analysis is finished. From the point of view of the theory and practice of psychoanalytic interpretation, the puzzlement implicit in the title of this celebrated paper—“Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937, *SE* 23:216–53) [*Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse*]—identifies a problem that may be incapable of solution within the hermeneutic system Freud devised. Indeed, no hermeneutics of suspicion may be able to resolve it.

Psychoanalysis combats the anguish of memory’s fallibility by offering the security of interpretation. Interpretation settles the seeming limitlessness of association; it claims to make sense of memories and make memory sensible. The uncontrollable exchange of *everything* that comes up in recollection finds its antidote in the projection of some *specific* thing that arrests the vertigo and aims to reestablish the present as a site of memory-stability. But what founds such restabilization itself? The chain of logic underlying the Freudian interpretive enterprise rests upon two principles whose function is to insure intelligibility and interpretive boundedness: that chance is not to be credited in psychic life, and that the unconscious memory is eternal. The first of these principles warrants the interpretive chain offered by the analyst; the second provides the ground legitimizing such chains. The past is thus recaptured for the present. And it is managed in such a way that its impenetrability for this present is resolved or at least diminished.

The problem is to find a foundation that could limit the slippage of significations in order to locate a point where meaning *stabilizes*, instead of simply repeating its protean referral to yet another substitute signifier in the chain of interpretive rewritings. If it is not to risk incoherence, every interpretive system must appeal to such a foundation. Freud concentrated upon three touchstones that might stabilize the profusion of memories-turning-into-other-memories that the patient’s associations present in psychoanalytic treatment: (1) the projection of an ultimate ground upon which all interpretations must be based; (2) the hypothesis of a general lexicon of psychic symbolism that could potentially make interpretation a version of “translation,” and provide an objective control upon it; (3) the hypothesis that interpretation can be verified by the patient’s reaction to it. Each of these principles or heuristics poses problems of its own, and Freud never settled on one to the exclusion of the others.17

This fundamental uncertainty concerning how to *end* interpretation—how to decide which memory in the seemingly endless chain of transformed recollections from the patient’s past is to be privileged above the others in determining that past’s *meaning*—turns the question of psychoanalytic interpretation into an endless argument. “Is there such a thing as a natural end to an analysis—is there any possibility at all of bringing an analysis to such an end?” Freud framed the question in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937; *SE* 23:219). His investigation found analysis stressed between postulates of absolute meaningfulness on the one hand, and absolute mobility of meaning on the other. Stated thus, the problem seems to take the form of a logical antinomy. Freud is forthright in declaring that the theoretical ideal of complete understanding cannot be achieved.18
The problem of memory might appear to have been forgotten in this discussion. But here it resurfaces strategically. Why does psychoanalysis take so long? This protraction in time is one of the aspects of Freudian psychology that everyone knows about. How can we—how does Freud—explain why this laborious process of analysis can last over many years? It is memory that foregrounds the crucial factor of time that might seem to have gone missing in this last portion of my discussion.

Memory is how the mind knows time and registers change. In a tantalizing note in “On Narcissism” (1914) Freud speculated that the two faculties—remembering the past and perceiving time—developed together in the psyche. He considered the faculty of self-observation that arises in consciousness as their common source: “I should like to add to this . . . , that the developing and strengthening of this observing agency might contain within it the subsequent genesis of (subjective) memory and the time-factor” (SE 14:96 n. 1). Memory is why psychoanalysis takes time.

Yet for all this apparent centering of psychoanalytic meaning in memory, memory’s contradiction subsists. Indeed it has only grown more anxious as psychoanalysis has forced our understanding of the presence of the past further and deeper than ever before. In psychoanalysis memory, while everywhere, is lost forever in an unconscious we can neither access nor change. And understanding, whose ambiguous but intimate links to the contents of the past conserved in memory this essay has sought to suggest, has become the most persistent puzzle of modernity. In Freud, memory has entirely filled the psyche. Yet it has disappeared within us. Psychoanalysis then seems a catastrophization of the mnemonic anxieties that preoccupy our age, a paroxysm of the crisis we experience in our vexed and unsettled relationship with the past.
7. Proust: The Music of Memory

Michael Wood

Memory is not inventive.

Marcel Proust, *The Fugitive*

“And no one will ever know, not even oneself, the melody that had been pursuing one with its elusive and delectable rhythm.” Underneath these words, probably written in 1909 and certainly part of a draft of what was to become *À la recherche du temps perdu*, Proust wrote “Finish there.” The melody is a missing memory; and memory itself, in Proust, repeatedly appears as a melody. The analogy helps us, I believe, to bring together the more obvious and the more elusive elements of Proust’s view of this subject, so central to his thought and writing, and especially to understand his sense of the role of memory in relation to chance, intelligence, and the power or impotence of the will.

What is the nature of the melody, and under what conditions do we fail to know it? In the quoted sentence the melody is a simile for “the beautiful things” we may one day write. They are already “inside us,” and whether or not we find an external shape for them is up to us. Gifted people remember such melodies vaguely, they are “obsessed by this blurred memory of truths they have never known,” but if they fail to act on their obsession they are only gifted, “they do not have talent.” “Talent,” Proust says, “is like a sort of memory which will enable them finally to bring this indistinct music closer to them, to hear it clearly, to note it down, to reproduce it, to sing it.” He adds that talent, like memory, weakens with time and that there comes a moment “when the mental muscle which brings both internal and external memories closer no longer has any strength left. In some this age lasts a whole life, from lack of exercise or a too quick self-satisfaction. And no one will ever know . . .”
What “finish there” means, perhaps, is that the book will be done by the time these words find their final place, the melody recovered and reproduced in full, but the story will end not on a note of triumph but on a reminder of how easily it could all have come to nothing, to less than the memory of a vanished tune. Proust was hoping, justifiably as it happened, that his talent would serve him long enough, but he was afraid of his frivolity, or what he called his mondanity, his worldliness. And characteristically, he wanted to turn this doubt itself into his material. “I need to show,” he wrote in a note that appears just above the long simile of the melody, “that when I am worldly I attach too much importance to the danger of worldliness, when my memory grows weak too much importance to the act of reconstruction.” The world is a danger and memory is endangered, but both are what we might call contextual fictions, enhanced by immediate pressures and preoccupations.

Proust uses two words for memory—souvenir to mean what is remembered and mémoire the capacity to remember—and the most difficult and interesting ideas in the passage about the melody are those of permanent forgetting, for the duration of “a whole life,” and of remembering what we never knew in the first place. The lost tune is lost time and talent is the long labor of putting together what we didn’t know we knew. Much of Proust’s mature theory of memory is here, but a famous key element appears to be missing. What about the concept of involuntary memory? Doesn’t Proust believe that conscious and willed attempts at remembering are precisely a form of losing life and time rather than finding them?

In a famous passage of À la recherche du temps perdu, Proust’s narrator says the flowers he now sees for the first time do not seem to him to be real flowers (de vraies fleurs). This may be, he speculates, because “reality is formed only in the memory” or because “the faith which creates” has dried up in him. The language and the logic suggest a radical subjectivity, a version of the philosophical skepticism that doubts the existence of the world outside the mind, and indeed the narrator courts these associations because of the coloring they provide and because the element of subjectivity is essential to him. But his claim is not a skeptical one.

He is not saying the flowers are not real in the accepted sense. He is saying they don’t feel real to him, that they do not provoke the full range of perceptual and imaginative experience that is supposed to result from the encounter of an actual person with an actual world, something that goes far beyond the intellectual acknowledgement that the realm of phenomena exists. This form of reality, he suggests, is mostly lost for the modern self, preserved if at all only in memory, and was probably always dependent on the mind’s ability to collaborate with the world, to imagine for itself what is already there. This is the implication of his use of the term faith.

What the narrator calls involuntary memory is always a recovery of reality in this sense. He argues that this rescue produces a vivid, initially inexplicable happiness, a delivery from time that is also a revelation of the essence of time; but he also offers details of
powerful instances where the rescue causes intense or protracted pain or a helpless, scarcely nameable distress. The difference between the argued cases and the unargued ones is left for us to resolve, and this is why Proust can insist on the absolute centrality of involuntary memory to his novel while one of his most subtle and distinguished critics can say the work “finally depends on a memory that is in no way the involuntary memory.” Or rather, this is why they can both be right. This essay seeks to place Proust’s theory of memory at the meeting point of these apparently conflicting assertions.

Beyond Recall

Most readers and critics have taken Proust’s word for the nature of involuntary memory, and the role it plays in his work, but there have been interesting and sympathetic resistances to his claims: chiefly because the claims are thought to undervalue the elements of will, choice, and work in Proust’s achievement, but also because the phenomenon of involuntary memory itself, while familiar and observable enough, is “oddly inert and unhelpful” as a guiding idea, is more like forgetting than remembering, or is not really a phenomenon of memory at all.

Proust certainly came to feel that involuntary memory was the key theoretical element in his novel, and his chief claim to conceptual originality. In a 1913 letter he asserts very firmly that Bergson doesn’t distinguish between the two modes of memory, although it has been suggested Proust was wrong about this. For Proust, involuntary memory “is the only true one, since voluntary memory, the memory of the intelligence and the eyes, yields us only imprecise facsimiles of the past.” We don’t recall the past, he says, until we stumble into a sensation, catch an old scent or the sight of an old glove. The old scent reminds us that life is beautiful, and we are enchanted; the old glove reminds us that we still love those who are dead, and we burst into tears. In both cases we have regained a reality we thought we had lost. Proust uses much the same terms in an interview from the same year, and adds that he believes “an artist should scarcely turn to anything except involuntary memories for his or her basic material.” It’s hard to tell how large a reservation lurks in that “scarcely,” what other forms of memory may be useful, or what else apart from memory. The artist should behave in this way first because the involuntary nature of such experiences is a proof of their authenticity, and second because these instants of resurrection “bring things back in an exact dose of memory and forgetting.” They bring back, we might say, forgottenness as well as what was forgotten.

In what is perhaps his earliest attempt at an evocation of an involuntary memory, in a draft fragment intended for his novel Jean Santeuil, Proust writes literally of the melody that later becomes figurative. His hero, listening to a pianist playing a waltz, feels a memory stirring inside him, probably “some forgotten melody” that contained the same musical phrase or the same chord. The melody struggles “in the depths of forgetfulness,” seeks
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to “return to life, to be heard and recognized,” but Jean can’t revive it. Then he realizes that it is not the phrase or the chord, not the music at all, that has half-caught his consciousness, it is the sound of the piano itself, which recalls that of his grandfather, who long ago used to play every evening when the boy dined with him. Jean has never thought of the sound since, the narrator says, and never would have thought of it without the accident of the recent pianist’s touch. “And the photograph of all that had taken its place in the archives of his memory, archives so vast that he would never look at most of them, unless a chance event were to open them again.”

The metaphor of the photograph of sound is curious, as if to be remembered is to be seen, and the vast archives already suggest that memory itself is a form of forgetting. But there is no suggestion yet that the archives can’t be opened, that there is any impediment in them apart from their size, and certainly no suggestion that conscious attempts at storage will destroy the stored material. However, the narrator of the novel does speak elsewhere of “disinterested memory,” that is, a memory unengaged in the practical business of getting through the day. We do not perceive reality as we live it, the narrator says, but we find it again as long as we do not look for it, “in the sudden recall of a gust of wind, of a smell of fire, of a low, flat, sunny sky, close to rain, above the roofs.”

The intervention of chance, or the slackening of the concentrated will, is essential in both passages. “Disinterested” actually means “involuntary” in this lexicon. What gets in the way of memory is trying or needing to remember, just as what blots out life and reality is living itself, the daily pragmatism of survival.

There is a curious passage in À la recherche du temps perdu where the narrator reports a supposed opinion of Bergson’s, represented by an equally supposed Norwegian philosopher. The question is the influence of drugs on memory. Very slight, the fictional Bergson says, at least as far the “solid memory of our everyday lives” is concerned. He does have a friend, though, a professor of ancient history, who finds it hard to remember Greek quotations if he has taken a sleeping pill the night before. The narrator thinks the effect of drugs on memory is exactly the reverse. He doesn’t lose his grasp of Baudelaire’s poetry, he says, or of the philosophy of Porphyry or Plotinus, he loses precisely his sense of everyday life, his “capacity to act in minor matters, in everything that calls for action if we are to repossess it just in time.”

It’s hard to know what’s at stake in this (imaginary) argument, but it is clearly connected to Proust’s investment in the idea of involuntary memory and to his claim that Bergson doesn’t sufficiently distinguish it from memory in its other forms. Drugs, like chance, invade and alter the world of practical intentions. They inhibit, in the view of Proust’s narrator, only what is immediately useful, leaving everything else as it was. So the implied reproach to Bergson rests on his presumed acceptance of the undivided solidity of memory, as if the virtue of memory lay in what it makes available to us rather than what it hides, as if were not obvious that the most interesting regions of those vast archives conjured up in Jean Santeuil are those we can never plan to visit.
The Norwegian philosopher is further reported as saying that Bergson believes “we possess all our memories, if not the faculty of recalling them.” “But what is a memory that we cannot recall?” the narrator pretends to ask. “We do not recall our memories of the last thirty years,” he goes on to answer, “but we are totally steeped in them.” And from here he moves into a mischievous fantasy, a comic critique of his own theory as much as of Bergson’s. If I have within me such a mass of my own memories I can’t summon up, the narrator argues, who is to say this invisible fund doesn’t contain other lives I can’t remember either, my life as another man, for example, or even on another planet? “The same oblivion effaces everything.”19

We don’t need to pursue this entertaining game any further, but it’s worth pausing over Proust’s narrator’s use of the words *appeler* and *rappeler*. These are very ordinary terms, and in *Jean Santeuil* Proust uses *rappel* simply to mean memory. But we can see a particular precision in the language of the later novel and in the letter I quoted, where Proust speaks of our failure to register how beautiful life is or how much we love our cherished dead. It’s not that we don’t remember, it’s that we can’t recall. Significant memories don’t come when they are called, and we couldn’t call them anyway, because we don’t know of their existence until they suddenly arrive. We happen on them; they happen to us.

**Against Intelligence**

Proust’s arguments about memory are never fully separable from his quarrel with the intelligence, by which he seems to mean the whole range of intentional, functional thought. “Every day I attach less value to the intelligence,” the projected preface to *Contre Sainte-Beuve* begins. And in other drafts, “Every day I grant less value to the intelligence,” and “Although every day I attach less value to criticism, and even, if I must say it, to the intelligence.”20

And yet only the intelligence can help us to understand what it is failing to do: “It is to the intelligence that we must look all the same to establish the inferiority of the intelligence . . . It may hold only second place in the hierarchy of values but only it is capable of proclaiming that instinct has to occupy the first.”21 The same argument is developed more subtly and more fully in the later pages of *À la recherche du temps perdu*. The narrator is entertaining two hypotheses about Albertine’s having left him: one nightmarish and true (she has gone for good), the other plausible, consolatory, and wrong (she is only pretending, she will come back if he offers to marry her, or buy her a yacht or a Rolls Royce). The second hypothesis is that of the ingenious intelligence.

But . . . the fact that the intelligence is not the most subtle, powerful and appropriate instrument for grasping the truth is only one more reason in favour of starting with
the intelligence rather than with the intuitions of the unconscious or with unquestioning faith in our premonitions. It is life which little by little, case by case, allows us to realize that what is most important for our hearts or our minds is taught us not by reason but by other powers. And then it is the intelligence itself, which, recognizing their superiority, uses its reasoning in order to abdicate in their favour, and accepts the role of collaborator and servant. Experimental faith.22

This is a very curious passage, pointing in several directions at once. It lacks the programmatic hostility to the intelligence of the preface to Contre Sainte-Beuve, and it certainly makes no easy plea for instinct—“intuitions” and “premonitions” seem the riskiest or most disreputable recourse of all. There is a deep pragmatism in the concepts of “life,” “case” and the “experimental.” We learn as we go, and we “realize” what we have learned. But “other powers,” “servant,” “faith,” and above all “abdicate” suggest a quite different, almost groveling relationship to the irrational. “Collaborator” is strangely placed too, even if we succeed in ridding it of all its later French nuances. Is it possible to be a collaborator and a servant? Couldn’t the master always crack the whip, and wouldn’t a commanded collaboration just be another form of service? More positively, Proust’s narrator can be read as saying that those other powers are still powers of our own mind, and perhaps not purely irrational; that learning to distrust the intelligence is the beginning of wisdom, since the intelligence so often thinks its mission is to keep the truth from us, and ingenuity is a proof not of strength but of helplessness. Abdication still seems to take us too far, though.

Intelligence for Proust is the daily life of the mind and at the same time, and for the same reason, the death of memory. And in Contre Sainte-Beuve memory and its resurrections (Proust’s term) become the whole case against the intelligence. “What intelligence gives us back under the name of memory is not it.”23 Our past lives are “dead for the intelligence.”24 Proust’s evidence for these deaths is a series of memory-experiences in which the intelligence supposedly had no part. All but one of these experiences find their way into À la recherche du temps perdu, carefully distributed into different areas of the text.

The experience that doesn’t survive into the novel concerns the sensation provoked by a piece of green cloth stopping up part of a broken window. Fragments of old perceptions return—“wasps in a shaft of sunlight, a smell of cherries on a table”—but nothing more; not enough for Proust to place the past occasion. “Soon I could no longer see anything, my memory had gone to sleep for good.” The failed invitation does however produce in the writer a simile that later taken quite literally becomes the opening scene of his novel, where a man wakes up in the night to wonder where he is: “For a moment I was like one of those sleepers who awake in the night not knowing where they are, and try to orientate their bodies so as to become aware of the place they are in, not knowing
in what bed, in what house, in what corner of the earth or in what year of their lives they are.”

The other experiences evoked in *Contre Sainte-Beuve* are provoked by a piece of toast, later to become a famous madeleine, dipped in a cup of tea; by some slippery and uneven paving stones; by the sound of a spoon knocking against a plate; and by a line of trees in the countryside. The first experience is placed near the beginning of the novel; the second two, with additions (the texture of a napkin, the noise of a water pipe), close to its climax, at the moment when the narrator is finally able to link his life’s “loveliest and saddest night” with its “most glorious day.” The fourth experience, the only full account of a failure of involuntary memory, that is, of a vivid, even haunting solicitation by a memory that the narrator cannot identify, appears in Proust’s second volume, *À l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs*. It’s worth pausing over this episode before we look in more detail at memory’s triumphs, because failure in this realm, as I have already noted, is the rule rather than the exception, and Proust wants us to remember this.

“I recognized their shape and their formation,” Proust says of the trees in *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, “and the line they made seemed traced from some mysterious and beloved pattern that trembled in my heart. But more I could not tell.” In *À la recherche* the trees, now specifically a cluster of three, appear during a drive the narrator takes with Mme de Villeparisis, a friend of his grandmother’s, in the countryside around Balbec. They are close to a village called Hudimesnil. The narrator wonders, as his author-predecessor did, only rather more elaborately, where he has seen the trees before. Not near Combray, he thinks; and not near the German spa he once visited with his grandmother. Perhaps in some place in his past of which no other trace remains. Perhaps in an old dream, or even a very recent one, “a dream of only the night before, but already so faded that it seemed to derive from much longer ago.” Perhaps he has never seen them, perhaps their hidden meaning only feels like a memory. Perhaps it’s just an effect of déjà vu.

I could not tell. Still coming towards me, they might have been some mythological apparition, a coven of witches, a group of Norns propounding oracles. But I saw them as ghosts from my past, beloved companions from childhood, sometime friends reminding me of shared moments. Like risen shades they seemed to be asking me to take them with me, to bring them back to the realm of the living . . . I watched the trees as they disappeared, waving at me in despair and seeming to say, “Whatever you fail to learn from us today you will never learn. If you let us fall by this wayside where we stood striving to reach you, a whole part of your self which we brought for you will return for ever to nothing.” And it is true that, though the same mode of pleasure and disquiet which I had just experienced once more was to come back to me in later years, though I did attend to it at last one evening—too late, but for ever—I never did find out what it was these particular trees had attempted to convey to me, or where it was that I had once seen them. When the carriage went round a
corner, I lost sight of them somewhere behind me; and when Mme de Villeparisis asked me why I looked so forlorn, I was as sad as though I had just lost a friend or felt something in myself, as though I had broken a promise to a dead man or failed to recognize a god.\textsuperscript{28}

Of course more than memory is at stake here. Hence the extraordinary note of loss and betrayal and squandered chance. What the missed memory stands for, what it is part of, is the whole world of vivid sensation the intelligence cannot hold or store for us. It is the opposite of daily, practical life, it is lived life itself, what Proust’s narrator calls “our true life, our reality as we have experienced it, which is often so different from what we believe it to be that we are filled with happiness when some chance event brings the real memory to us.”\textsuperscript{29} “Experienced” means lived but forgotten; preserved in one form of memory because forgotten in the other. And of course the complicated poignancy of “too late, but for ever” should not escape us.

**Immortality**

When Proust’s narrator dips his madeleine into some warm tea, he experiences a “delicious pleasure,” a “powerful joy.” The “vicissitudes of life” now seem unimportant to him, “its disasters innocuous, its brevity illusory.” “I had ceased to feel I was mediocre, contingent, mortal.” What has happened? He doesn’t know, and indeed says he “had to put off to much later discovering why this memory made me so happy.” But he does finally recognize the particular memory. He can “feel the resistance and . . . hear the murmur of the distances travelled.” What is stirring in his mind is “the visual memory which is attached to this taste and is trying to follow it to me.” “And suddenly the memory appeared. That taste was the taste of the little piece of madeleine which on Sunday mornings at Combray . . . my Aunt Leonie would give me after dipping it in her infusion of tea or lime-blossom.”\textsuperscript{30}

The novel doesn’t tell us how much later “much later” is in narrative time, but the gap matters because it subtly alters even the initial claim for involuntary memory. “There is a great deal of chance in all this,” the narrator says, “and a second sort of chance, that of our death, often does not let us wait very long for the favours of the first.”\textsuperscript{31} “All the exertions of our intelligence are useless,” he tells us; we can do nothing without the accidental cue that sets the memory in motion. But then understanding the event is something else. We can be inexplicably happy through our luck, but we need the help of the scorned intelligence to know what that happiness means.

And whatever the lapse of story time, we must wait until the last volume of the novel for the narrator to arrive at this knowledge. He has a sequence of new memory experiences, and now pauses over them and puts together his theory about them. His response
to each new event repeats the pattern established with the tea and madeleine—baffled, delighted sensation, patient search for the elusive source, final finding of the connection—but he quickly becomes more expert, because the experience is so swiftly repeated: “three times in a few minutes,” as the narrator himself remarks, with another one following not long after that. “One would have said,” he writes, “that the signs which were, on this day, to bring me out of my despondency and renew my faith in literature, were intent on multiplying themselves.”32 One would. They were. He steps on some uneven paving stones in a Paris courtyard and is transported to St. Mark’s Square in Venice; hears the ring of a spoon against a plate and identifies it with the work of a wheeltapper on a stopped train, a sound not consciously heard at the time of the journey; brushes his lips with a napkin and finds himself back in the hotel by the sea in Balbec, where the texture of the towels was similar; and hears the noise of a water-pipe, which also transports him back to Balbec, this time because the sound evokes that of the horns of passing pleasure boats. The narrator’s key phrase, the fairy godmother of his syntax, is “at the moment when” (au moment où): “at the moment” when he steps on the stones, “at the moment” when he tastes the madeleine, “at the very moment” when the second memory-event occurs. The “moment” is always the last possible moment, the moment the magic was waiting for:

But sometimes it is at the moment when everything seems to be lost that the indication arrives that may save us; one has knocked on all the doors which lead nowhere, and then, unwittingly, one pushes against the only one through which one may enter and for which one would have searched in vain for a hundred years, and it opens.33

Of course the fairy-tale result is not inevitable, we have seen that Proust insists on the risks of failure. The person trying the doors cannot know that one of them will open. But the person who has found an open door cannot return to the exact condition of the potential failure. “There is a great deal of chance in all this,” but not now, not when the story is over and ready to be told.

And of course the exploration of the memory experience, the complex redemptive theory the narrator develops, has very little chance about it. “The only way to continue to appreciate [the experiences] was to try to understand them more completely.”34 We don’t need to follow his argument in great detail, since it soon leaves the question of memory behind, but it is worth noting that Proust’s narrator insists that the cases are all the same (“The happiness that I had just experienced was indeed just like that I had felt when eating the madeleine”35) and that he picks up the image of “beautiful ideas” as “tunes in music which come back to us without our ever having heard them, and which we do our best to listen to and to transcribe.”36 His solution to “the riddle of happiness” is that the collision of times, the meeting of past and present in a sensation that belongs to both, reveal the continuing existence of an extra-temporal self, a creature who is fully
alive both now and then. “One minute freed from the order of time has recreated in us, in order to feel it, the man freed from the order of time.”37 This is why he no longer feels “mediocre, contingent, mortal.” But a minute freed from time is itself still a minute, still countable as time, and Proust doesn’t fail to notice this. “Fragments of existence” may escape temporality, but only briefly: “the contemplation of them, while a contemplation of eternity, was itself fugitive.”38 And the narrator’s long meditation on time and the self and the novel he is about to write ends with a startling reappearance of the historical world in which no one is recognizable because everyone has aged so much. He calls this “a dramatic turn of events . . . which seemed to raise the gravest of objections to my undertaking,”39 and in this sense À la recherche ends precisely as the early draft did, by floating the chance of failure. The narrator is not sure that he will have continuing strength to keep the past “attached” to him.40 Time regained in one dimension may always run out in another.

**Time and Sorrow**

The narrator of À la recherche has one more memory experience to report to us before he ends his meditations and returns to the party. It is rather different from the others, and he recognizes this fact, but only to devise a brilliant denial of this difference. There is no flood of happiness in this case, only a sense of disturbance and intrusion, a “painful impression” that strikes him “unpleasantly.”41 He is in his host’s library and has opened a book, the novel François le Champi, by George Sand, the very book, as it happens, that his mother read to him on the night he describes as the loveliest and saddest of his life, when after many refusals to come and kiss him goodnight she relented, with his father’s encouragement, and stayed with him into the bargain. This book is not a trivial if magic-working trigger like the others, but an instance that has alternately been brooded on and repressed. Like the other cues, it resurrects a former self, but that self is a stranger:

> For a moment I had angrily wondered who the stranger was who had just upset me. But the stranger was myself, it was the child I was then, whom the book had just brought back to life within me, knowing nothing of me except this child.42

It is true that here, as in the other instances, a vivid reality is restored, but it’s hard to imagine that pain and happiness are equally welcome, and more importantly, the narrator’s whole argument about the authenticity of first impressions now goes out the window, since this first impression has to be corrected if it is to carry the meaning he wants. It’s not just that the intelligence has to go to work on the impression, which is the general argument in this context. The intelligence now has to correct the impression, invert its meaning. The narrator’s logical agility is extraordinary—the impression caused by the
book “seemed to have too little in common with my current thoughts, until I realized a moment later, with an emotion that brought tears to my eyes, how much in accord with them this impression actually was”—and he invents a wonderful analogy.

In a room where somebody had died, the undertaker’s men are getting ready to bring down the coffin, while the son of a man who has done his country some service shakes hands with the last friends as they file out; if a fanfare suddenly sounds beneath the windows, he is horrified and thinks that some mockery is being made of his grief. At this, although he has until then remained in control of himself, he can suddenly no longer restrain his tears; because he has just realized that what he is hearing is the band of a regiment that is sharing his mourning and paying its last respects to his father’s mortal remains.43

The narrator is right, of course: resurrection, like respect, can take many forms. But not right enough for his own case: noise can’t sound like silence.

The narrator seems happy enough with his sleight of mind here, but I think Proust the novelist expects us to remember other involuntary memory experiences in the narrative, other instances where the past came rushing back in a flood of pain, and indeed bringing far more pain than this easily convertible unpleasantness. The most significant of these events is so central to the novel—it appears in a section called “intermittences of the heart,” which at one point was Proust’s title for the whole work—that I think we have to believe that the narrator is unconsciously willing himself not to remember it as he celebrates his final epiphanies and assimilates the new encounter with François le Champi to them. Perhaps involuntary forgetting is just as important as involuntary memory.

Returning to Balbec a year or so after his grandmother’s death, the narrator bends down to take off his shoes, and is abruptly “filled with an unknown, divine presence.” “I was shaken by sobs, tears streamed from my eyes.”44 He is suddenly, fully remembering his grandmother, as distinct from intentionally seeking to recall her, and in doing so he becomes the self he was when they visited Balbec together. “It was only at this instant,” the narrator writes, “that I learned that she was dead.” Really dead because magically alive again. He had spoken and thought of her often since her passing, he says, “but beneath the words and thoughts . . . there had never been anything that might resemble my grandmother.” “For to the disturbances of memory are linked the intermittences of the heart.” And if our old joys and sorrows live within us,

it is for most of the time in an unknown domain where they are of no service to us and where even the most ordinary of them are repressed by memories of a different order, which exclude all simultaneity with them in our consciousness.45

We are back in the archives Proust mapped out for us in Jean Santeuil. But now the size of the archive is less important than our erratic access to it, and than the uncertainty of
the resurrection’s result. Involuntary memory returns a lost past to us, and in the narrator’s most optimistic reading must produce joy—precisely because the lost is found, and independently of the affective content of what was lost. But it may also return the lost past to us as lost, and this is what happens with the narrator’s grandmother. He struggles vainly with what he describes as both a “strange contradiction” and a “painful synthesis” between “survival and nothingness”: “On meeting her again, I realized I had lost her for ever.” His grandmother is more alive than she was a moment ago, as alive as she had ever been; and by the same token deader than she had been too, given over to “a nothingness that had . . . made of my grandmother, at the moment when I had found her again as in a mirror, a mere stranger whom chance had led to spend a few years with me. . . . I clung to these sorrows . . . with all my strength. . . . I felt that I truly remembered her only through sorrow.”

Can we reconcile these memory-stories, telling of irrefutable joy and undiluted sorrow? In part we can. If loss of reality, the failure of all experience, is the worst thing in the world, then the return of reality, even the most painful, will be some kind of victory, a come-back from death-in-life. And in part we shouldn’t try too hard, because the hesitation between contradiction and synthesis is important, and because we are after all reading a novel. In that novel both character and author need (and find) a resolution in the triumphant sequence of memory experiences near the end. The narrator certainly recognizes, as we have seen, that he might not have stumbled on these experiences; cannot afford to remember, it seems, how difficult such experiences are when turned toward loss of a loved one rather than finding of a self—or more precisely, toward finding of a self full of loss. And the novel stylizes this story by separating its elements. The story of the madeleine and the story of the grandmother look as if they are in distant dialogue: each is what the other forgets. But beyond the needs of the novel and in the larger argument about memory, the stories don’t need to belong to the same register. They can be different, but not opposed. It would be enough, in such a perspective, for the pain of the living past to be real but not the only possibility for that past’s return to reality. In the “strong” philosophy of the novel the powerful joy of involuntary memory becomes a not wholly successful denial of time and sorrow. More modestly we could take it as the perceptible proof that time and sorrow, while undeniable, are not everything.

Noise

Of course the celebrations of involuntary memory, in whatever form and with whatever emotional results, remain part of the narrator’s, and indeed Proust’s own, war on the intelligence. It’s not just that the intelligence can’t resurrect memories for us, it’s that memories reside “only in objects in which the intelligence has not sought to embody them.”
The moment you have been living will not find asylum in the objects to which you have sought consciously to connect it. What is more, if some other thing is able to resurrect them, when they are resurrected with it, they will have been stripped of all their poetry.48

This is quite categorical, and very extreme. We cannot remember anything, in the ordinary sense of “remember.” To seek to remember the past is totally to destroy it—or if you prefer, to make it purely the past, nothing but the past, no longer a candidate for anything but the most abstract and unfelt of resurrections.

What Proust is doing here and what he makes his narrator consistently do in À la recherche is to remove everything that matters from the realm of reason and mastery and to deliver it to pure chance. The resurrection of his lost summers—which were not those summers, he says, when he merely thought of them—“depended, like all resurrections, on simple chance.”49 Like all resurrections. In the novel the repetition of the thought of death as a form of chance that can always arrive too soon sends us back to the notional ending found in the draft: “And no one will ever know, not even oneself . . .” I think the idea of the abdication of reason also hovers here, and makes a new kind of sense in this context. Proust is insisting on the role of chance as a way of magically flattering chance itself, as if he were making an offering to a capricious Greek god. He is underselling intelligence and overselling fortune. Or rather, since no one can know the proper price of either, he is trying to avoid all risk of intellectual hubris.

But there is another form of remembering in À la recherche, and I should like to evoke it as an epilogue, because it is different both from voluntary and from involuntary memory, or perhaps partakes of each. This is the remembering that in one sense informs the whole novel, gives it much of its page-by-page substance while the rescues of involuntary memory provide its ultimate plot. In Du côté de chez Swann, the narrator inserts a later reflection into the story of the goodnight kiss. Of course the whole narrative, as distinct from what is narrated, belongs to this later time, but this passage makes the time lag clear, indeed is about the time lag, and about how time has passed and not passed. The reflection appears just after the father has suggested the mother spend the night with the boy, and just before the mother offers her “official” recognition that the child’s problem is “regarded no longer as a punishable offence but as an involuntary ailment.”

This was many years ago. The staircase wall on which I saw the rising glimmer of his candle has long since ceased to exist. In me, too, many things have been destroyed that I thought were bound to last forever . . . It was a very long time ago, too, that my father ceased to be able to say to Mama: “Go with the boy.” The possibility of such hours will never be reborn for me. But for a little while now, I have begun to hear again very clearly, if I take care to listen, the sobs I was strong enough to contain in front of my father and that did not burst out until I found myself alone again with
Mama. They have never really stopped; and it is only because life is quieting down around me more and more now that I can hear them again, like those convent bells covered so well by the clamour of the town during the day that one would think they had ceased altogether but which begin sounding again in the silence of the evening.50

The house is gone, the parents are gone, much of the inner life of narrator has been destroyed, but the sobs have never stopped. This claim is hyperbolic and metaphorical, but clearly and movingly suggests the persistence of memory. In this view our memories are much closer to us than Bergson’s permanent but elusive possessions or Proust’s own dramatically buried treasures. What conceals the past from us is neither the vastness of the archive nor the workings of chance, neither the mischievous intelligence nor the eagerly misapplied will, but daily distraction, “the clamour of the town,” the sheer noise of getting on with life.
Siegfried Kracauer and Memory Loss

In mid-December 1932 Siegfried Kracauer wrote a short newspaper article entitled “Street without Memory.” Here he describes Berlin’s fashionable shopping street, the Kurfürstendamm, as a place voided of memory: “the embodiment of empty flowing time, where nothing persists.” He relates how on visiting a café where he often ate, and where he was sure he had peeked in the night before, he found it closed, its interior emptied. A year later he found that the café’s replacement, a patisserie, had suffered the same fate. Having disappeared, these spaces do not become part of memory, for “constant change purges memory.” Reflecting on the lost café, he finds it difficult to recall its décor or its clientele. The patisserie that replaced it obliterated the earlier memories. “That which once was is never to be seen again, and that which is current occupies the present one hundred percent.” Kracauer’s city sketch is a lament for vanished memory, not just a specific memory, but also the possibility of having any memories at all.

Where Kracauer diagnosed memory-loss, Walter Benjamin observed a sudden flooding of memory. Memory is flooded by memoirs—Benjamin points to a rash of biographical accounts of war appearing some ten years after the end of the 1914–18 conflict. Resentful soldiers on the losing side made efforts to reshape the meaning of what had occurred. The flood of memoirs as much as Kracauer’s fixation on the forgotten and overridden are both elements of a wider fascination with memory and its processes in Weimar Germany, at a moment of crisis. Both Kracauer and Benjamin assess memory darkly, perceiving it as under threat or fugitive, an arena of social, technological, economic, and political conflict, while “genuine” memory is a possession of only...
those who are or may one day be fully, unalienated post-capitalist humans. In Kracauer’s
diagnosis, something has happened to memory historically. Rapid change and the over-
whelming presence of the current mean that memory is actively expunged in the name of
“now.” Kracauer, a trained architect, perceives a complement to this in building design.
In earlier days ornamentation appeared as a bridge to yesterday and so indicated a sort of
memory preserved by buildings, an index of the persistence of the past. The new struc-
tures on the Kurfürstendamm have no ornamental twiddles on their facades. Their front-
ages are sleek and glassy, repelling associations. Ornament is out of fashion, just as are
the cluttered and decorative interiors of the late nineteenth century, no longer favored in
the super-modern and slick times of the 1920s and 1930s. Modern times are seemingly
without sentiment, without ties that bind to days gone. Modern days are rational, objective,
progressive, and forward-looking. That is the ideology of the modern, its self-justification
and its advertising copy. But Kracauer discerns another motivation, an underlying drive,
that concretely undermines the physical traces of the past, forcing them out of the present.
At the end of 1932 Germany is in the grip of a worldwide depression unleashed by the
Wall Street crash of 1929. In the new Berlin of crisis, businesses can but be improvised,
temporary. Structures are fleeting, everyone bivouacs for a moment. That the buildings
change their function, their décor, their clientele so rapidly, Kracauer notes, is a sign of
economic failure. Kracauer links memory and economy. Modernity’s rapid flux is a prod-
uct of financial instability experienced by individuals as contingency. The flux keeps peo-
ple running on the spot, overwriting old memories with constantly new situations.
Modernity is experienced as a form of amnesia induced by economic conditions.

Kracauer’s diagnosis of the modern condition is bleak. The memoryless are without
a home because they lack a past. They have lost essentially human capacities, which are
related to duration and continuity. Kracauer mentions some dancers he spies in a private
club. They move like marionettes amid leather sofas and carpets that substitute for their
“vanished inner architecture.” “Inner architecture” is Kracauer’s name for all that would
constitute their human existence: the internal axis of past, present, and future, as ex-
pressed in memories, dreams, emotions, desires, wishes. One word for memory in Ger-
man is Erinnerung, which includes within itself the idea of the “inner,” or internalization.
Without innerness, people have become pure surface. It is not only people who lack
depth. The world and all its effects appear to him to be only superficial. Objects, such as
sofas or carpets, persist for a while, only then to be discarded, along with the traces of use
that mark them. Ernst Bloch gave a name to the environments that Kracauer charted. In
his review of Kracauer’s 1930 study Die Angestellten (The Salaried Masses) Bloch called
them the “artificial middle” (künstliche Mitte). As Bloch puts it, Kracauer penetrates this
center of modernity, which others only observe. It is the zone of ghostly white-collar
workers scuttling around in the empty everyday, haunting their locales and rooms. Bloch
calls this the “hollow space” (Hohlraum), a cavernous space chock-full with distractions
and fads. The hollow space makes its inhabitants dizzy and susceptible to hedonistic
gratification among the bedazzlement of fleeting impressions on the streets and in the entertainment extravaganzas. The task of the critic is to find ways to delve beneath this smooth and fluxy surface of humans and objects to discover a “deeper meaning” that must surely still inhere (just as memory is not abolished but fugitive). This quest for meaning is what Kracauer undertook in his analyses of seemingly forgettable movies or sudden and contingent configurations of bodies on city streets.

Kracauer’s analyses appeared weekly in a Frankfurt newspaper. The regular columns for the Frankfurter Zeitung grapple with modernity’s dissolution of contemporary memory. In Kracauer’s rescue operation, the unpredictable and the unmemorable become the sites where memory is reinforced after all, by him. However, his regular writings are subject to the same process of forgetting. The newspaper that contains them is thrown away at the end of each day. The writings continue to exist only as memory traces, which means more likely they are forgotten.

Kracauer, Memory, and Technology

In Kracauer’s writing memory is multiply under threat. It is not simply the pace of change and economic instability that menace memory. Memory is also challenged technologically by modern inventions that counter memory, even as they appear to aid it. Photography is the most notable example. Kracauer compares images that come to mind in memory and images produced by the camera. For him, the brief moment caught in the camera’s viewfinder when a person stands before the lens conveys only a very reduced part of the scene. The photograph is tied to one contingent moment, or rather the external, specialized look of a single moment. When, in Kracauer’s example, a grandmother placed herself before the camera’s lens as a twenty-four-year-old, “she was present for one second in the spatial continuum that presented itself to the lens. But it was this aspect and not the grandmother that was eternalized.”

Photography shows only the surface of a person, the outer skin at one moment in time. In this respect, perhaps, it is coincident with the modern person type, who is, in Kracauer’s depiction, just a shell, without “innerness.” This is unlike the memory-image, which portrays a concentrated and enhanced image of a person. The image that flashes into memory is a whole image of the person. The memory-image conjures up a condensed version of the person that sums up and summons up his or her totality, even if it is selective. Unlike the indiscriminate camera lens, memory, deliberately or not, picks the images it draws into its purview. In time, the grandmother as a young girl becomes anyone, an exemplar of any figure of that age from that year. The old photograph of the grandmother cannot relate to memory because no living memory still retains an image of the grandmother as a girl. No living memory can determine how accurate or inaccurate the likeness is. Her arrested smile “no longer refers to the life from which it has been taken. Likeness has ceased to be of any help. The smiles of mannequins
in beauty parlors are just as rigid and perpetual.” The memory image cheats time because it finds a niche in living memory and so is loosened from any single moment of remembering. Photography, by contrast, fixes one moment and makes it permanent. In doing this it apparently excerpts it from history and memory. Because memory has vacated it entirely, the image of the grandmother is appropriated by time, which makes an image of itself.

All photographs are subsumed by time. Contemporary photographs are also swallowed up by time, but differently. Kracauer comments on the photograph of a current film actress. The photographic evocation of a star, who is a living human being, a “corporeal reality,” functions as a reminder of the figure known originally—if only in mediated form—as the star of a successful film. This photograph has little to do with memory in its full intimate sense. The star is not known by her public. Her public possess only this one moment of her. The photograph fits into the continuum that constitutes our experience of the present. Her image smooths into the now, presumably to be overwritten by the next image, the next star, tomorrow. Unlike photography, memory-images are not instants from a continuous linear narrative, but are rather suddenly flashed up moments that are freighted with significance. Memory is “full of gaps,” consisting of impressions from other times, which make sense only because of their subjective resonance. Memory is composite and personal.

The culture of Weimar Germany was distinctly photographic. Illustrated magazines chock-full of photos snapped up anything and everything in the world. Exhibitions devoted to photographs were fashionable and fully at one with the rhetoric of modernity. Photography and film were the media for mediating the modernity of which they also formed a definitive part. For Kracauer, this accumulated photographic data, reveling in its newness and its ability to communicate the new, is effective at repressing the fact of death: “What the photographs by their sheer accumulation attempt to banish is the recollection of death, which is part and parcel of every memory image.” Memory is intimate with death, and the passing of all things and states, until the time when death engulfs it too. In contrast, the flood of photographs wards off death. But, of course, one day all this most modern photography, this tracing of Weimar’s surface, would become just so many images of outdatedness, of passé fashions, the forgotten and the despised elements from a world that has adopted a “photographic face.” In time photographs lose meaning, reduced to a heap of details. At the point of their collapse, Kracauer sees the possibility that they might gain another type of meaning, existing as an emblem of our grim existential condition. The recorded passage of time shows how fragile and conditional our objects and our lives are: “photography gathers fragments around a nothing.” Despite its repulsion of death, in Kracauer’s eye, photography reveals the deadly emptiness that nests the heart of life. Photography’s expulsion of the essence of a person, a person’s subjective resonance, becomes an advantage when it is used as a document of
history. Once a photograph’s personal significance is quite shriveled, the stockpiled elements that it blatantly displays yield information, details, data that had been overlooked or unnoticed until now. Kracauer observes: “For the first time in history, photography brings to light the entire natural cocoon; for the first time, the inert world presents itself in its independence from human beings.” The estrangement that the photograph delivers as it slips from memory and falls out of kilter with present time—an alienation from human and historical thinking in a personal context—becomes its advantage later when social histories are to be examined. Photography, in its independence, its distance from personal memory, becomes significant for detailing social histories. Kracauer redeems photography and makes its serve the memory of the collective.

Kracauer compares memory to photography precisely because the technology of photography appears to replicate some of the tasks of memory. But his conclusion warns against any true affinity. Walter Benjamin, his contemporary, also made a link between photography and memory, but his analysis of the extent to which humans have been remolded by their technologies encourages him to surmise more of a resemblance than Kracauer might allow.

**Walter Benjamin, Memory, and Image Technologies**

On several occasions Walter Benjamin considers memory in relation to the new technologies of vision. It is as if in modernity memory cannot be thought without recourse to the technologies that usurp its role as archivist. But Benjamin’s is not a dismal view of how celluloid partners memory. For him the new technologies of image-making have entered into modern lives—meeting viewers halfway, in a situation determined not by tradition but by the viewer—and have made themselves indispensable. Photographs and film have seized our imaginations, which is to say they have made themselves part of our internal worlds. One of the starkest examples of this is offered by Benjamin’s memoirs, which appear under two titles, *A Berlin Chronicle* (1932) and *Berlin Childhood around 1900* (1938). Photography and memory mesh at various points in these writings, in which, as in that work that he partly translated, Proust’s *À la recherche du temps perdu*, the material form of memories is of equal significance to the act of reminiscence.

An early version of one of the thirty-odd vignettes in *Berlin Childhood around 1900*, “The Little Hunchback,” mentions the cliché of the rapid film of a “whole life” streaming past the mind’s eye at the moment of death. It is like a thumb-cinema, Benjamin notes. So too should his book of memoirs seem: a rapid succession of images, comprising short scenes that have impressed themselves into memory. Likewise he employs photographic metaphors in *A Berlin Chronicle*. In this collection of autobiographical fragments he reflects on the irruption of the forgotten past into the present. The first reflection describes those peculiar moments when something akin to a magnesium flare indelibly sears onto
memory an image or circumstance—in Benjamin’s example, a room—as if memory were a photographic plate. Some time later that same image flashes once again into consciousness’s view in order to be decoded. Benjamin’s reflection on “temporal removal,” which is arguably the mechanism of photography, involves déjà vu. A wayward segue of past and present produces a “shock” and so, for example, a “forgotten glove or reticule” is stumbled upon, and it causes a word or gesture to suddenly return. Benjamin illustrates his point through an anecdote involving the return of repressed knowledge in the present. He reveals how, one night, when he was five or six, his father entered his bedroom to wish him goodnight, but lingered to report a relative’s death. The little boy was indifferent to the news concerning his older relation. Unable to assimilate the facts his father relayed about heart attacks, instead, as his father spoke, he imprinted onto his memory all the details of his room—because he felt “dimly” that he would one day have to return to search for something “forgotten” there. This he does, some years later, when he finds out the repressed (because scandalous) truth: the real cause of his relative’s death was, in fact, syphilis.

Memory, for Benjamin, is not just recall of events that are buried in the past. It involves a quest for knowledge or truth about a situation. To this extent, memory is envisaged in much the same way as Benjamin imagines photography and film. Like memory, cameras operate with an unconscious. The camera’s undiscriminating eye absorbs more than is consciously perceived and records it all for later examination. In similar fashion, memory develops belatedly into understanding, just as a photograph snatches an image from time and presents it to the world again only after a process of development. Memory deposits are shocked belatedly into knowledge, blasted, as Benjamin says elsewhere, into “the now of recognizability”—“in which things adopt their true—surrealistic—face.” Echoes of the future are deposited in the past like time bombs, and in his memoirs, Benjamin is hunting out the detonated and detonatable mines of the fin de siècle.

Benjamin has occasion to return to the death room again when he writes his memoirs of childhood. For this he conjures up in his mind’s eye memories of spaces, textures, patterns, atmospheres, and relationships. Memory is annexed, in a Proustian way, to sensuous experience. If not the visual, then perhaps the smelled, the tasted, or the heard: Benjamin speaks at one point not of “déjà vu” but of the “already heard,” noting how some events seem to reach us like an echo awakened by a call from the past.

It is a word, a tapping, or a rustling that is endowed with the magic power to transport us into the cool tomb of long ago, from the vault of which the present seems to return only as an echo.

Scuttling back to “the cool tomb of long ago,” Benjamin records the accoutrements of life in Berlin in 1900: the patterns on family dinnerware, the organic forms of garden
SIEGFRIED KRACAUER AND WALTER BENJAMIN

chairs on balconies, the intricacies of Aunt Lehmann’s miniaturized quarry ornament, the swirls of falling snow as tracked through the window of a warm parlor by a bookish bourgeois boy who is prone to illness. Recalling objects and places allows for the adumbration of past experience, of what it was like to be and to feel in the earliest days of the twentieth century. But the memoirs are not an occasion for nostalgic recall of a completed past. This past is incomplete, which is to say that it has repercussions in the present, and from the perspective of redemption, the perspective Benjamin favors, could be otherwise cashed out. If studied closely that which will come into being or could have come into being may already be spotted lurking in it. Memory is not just of the past, but juts into the future too, though this can only be discerned retrospectively. In the frames of the scenes recounted, snared details register the inventory of a future that will yet come into being, and that might have already been anticipated under an attentive enough glare.

In the present the act of remembering comes into its own, for true meaning like photographs, develops later, and then it is memory’s work to reveal a truth at first obscured. This future that lurks in Benjamin’s memories is a grim and violent one, disastrous for the many, but also reflected individually in Benjamin’s various “failures”—his adult illnesses, his lack of success at earning money, his general out-of-placeness. Portents of the fiascoes to come can already be read in the culture of Wilhelmine Germany, even in the most intimate locations, such as the balcony of a bourgeois apartment. For example, disaster is apparent in the vignette “Loggias,” in Berlin Childhood around 1900, which speaks of cradles that become mausoleums. Such a balcony-tomb houses Benjamin, for its uninhabitability seems to him an appropriate domicile for one whose destiny is to be stateless and uprooted. He nestsles among the abandoned clutter that has been exiled from the home. These loggias are the crib of the first recollections of the city. As these memories and their nourishing fantasies fade or are disabused, the loggias become the tomb of an entire bourgeois class, condemned, “in panicked horror,” according to Adorno’s afterword, to witness its “disintegrating aura,” and to come to “awareness of itself: as illusion.” Memory registers catastrophe. In the autobiographical snapshots of A Berlin Chronicle, Benjamin finds in his memory of school rigidly fixed words, expressions, verses that, like a malleable mass, which has later cooled and hardened, preserve in me the imprint of the collision between a larger collective and myself. Just as, when you awake, a certain kind of significant dream survives in the form of words though all the rest of the dream content has vanished, here isolated words have remained in place as marks of catastrophic encounters.

School, which Benjamin hated, has converted itself into a few remembered words, slogans and clichés that exemplify the inflexibility of his educational experience. In remembering this time Benjamin is able to make it historically significant in a wider sense. This stiffness and inertness is an indicator of the wider decadent Wilhelmine culture that will outpour
into war. It is also the prequel to the further catastrophic encounters, such as those that make Benjamin take leave of his home city.

When Theodor and Gretel Adorno collated a selection of Benjamin’s writings for Suhrkamp in 1955 they lodged *Berlin Childhood around 1900* in a section called “Picture-Puzzles and Miniatures” (*Vexierbilder und Miniaturen*). Benjamin cherished these two things—rebuses, because they demanded to be solved and the clues were contained in the image, and miniatures because they condensed the world into handleable, studyable form. Photography—an art of coincidence, when the photographer and camera coincides with the fraction of a moment, an instant of objective arrangement—makes portable picture-puzzles, sometime miniaturizing, occasionally magnifying. Benjamin hoped to parallel this trickery verbally in his memoirs. Unlike in Kracauer’s pessimistic critique of photography, memory finds an analogue in photography. Adorno recognizes this aspect of Benjamin’s memoirs in his afterword to the first German edition of *Berlin Childhood around 1900* in 1950:

> These fairy-photographs of a Berlin childhood are not only the ruins of a long-departed life seen from an aerial perspective, but also shots of the airy state, snapped by an astronaut who persuaded his models to kindly hold still for a moment.28

**Benjamin: Memory and Mementos**

Benjamin began writing his memoirs in 1932. In that same year he wrote to his friend Gershom Scholem that he wanted to spend his birthday in Nice with “a quite droll fellow” whom he had often met in his life. It seems that he was referring to death and that he planned to kill himself in his hotel room.29 Instead he chose to write about memory and imagining the past in a lecture on Marcel Proust. Benjamin’s lecture touches on mortality. He writes of dying and again evokes the cliché of the proto-photographic strip of images of a life whirring through a dying person’s head. The operation of this proto-cinematic device is once more aligned to the process of memory. Memories burst up at a moment of crisis. They are involuntarily summoned strips of montage, flashing past in rapid succession. The notion of the “involuntary memory” is taken from Proust. Involuntary memory does not indicate consciously dredged up recollections, but rather overcomes an individual unexpectedly, stimulated by sensuous experience.30

It is hard to access the past. Much is irretrievable. Memory is not a resource that can be dredged up at will. It emerges not when it is called for but as an involuntary reflex, unleashed by an act as banal as biting into a cake or as critical as dying. Involuntary memory emerges from a loss of control over the conscious application of subjective meanings upon the range of experiences presented to consciousness. For Proust, declares Benjamin, involuntary memory is spontaneous, not goal-bound, glancing off material objects
encountered by chance. It is vivid, because preverbal, and connected to blissfulness, which is why, in Proust, such memories are lashed to childhood. Involuntary memory provides an unexpected shocking link between an experience in the present and one in the past. It disrupts linearity, confounds temporality—and it tends toward uncovering a utopian potential. In his study of the Parisian arcades, Benjamin notes one such involuntary memory. Once, riding on a train through Berlin, he saw the perfect advertisement, a fusion of poetry and painting, which impressed itself upon his mind with such shocking force that it crashed through the floor of his unconsciousness, laying dormant for years. He could remember only the product but not the image, but longed to find it again. For ages he avoided the urge to seek out the manufacturer of the advertised product. But one day, in typical contingent city fashion, passing some backstreet bar in a working-class district of Berlin, encrusted in enamel signs, he stumbled by chance upon a simplified advertisement for the same brand of salt. This stimulated with the force of a flood the memory of the first image: salt dripping from a sack in the desert, loaded on a truck, heading for a sign which reads is the best, and spelling out Bullrich-Salt. Benjamin remarks how this image encapsulates capital’s engendering of the fantasy of a predestined harmony between product, nature, and desire. This is the image of utopia, and it comes unbidden.

Benjamin composes autobiographical memories, but these do not attempt to outline the contours of a single, individual life. Rather he seeks collective histories and collective memories, images available to any child of the Wilhelmine epoch. However, Benjamin acknowledges that experience is dependent on class, and while his memoirs might relate a collective experience of Berlin around 1900, they also indicate that the city is a place of meeting points and uncrossable thresholds between rich and poor. Elsewhere, in his writings on Baudelaire and his study of the nineteenth century, Benjamin asserts a social aspect to memory. He writes of the interior of the bourgeois home, where knick-knacks, mementoes, photographs are memory traps, totemic objects that ward off the future and drag inhabitants back into a past that shelters them, just as the various casings, coverings, etuis, and albums shelter objects. In these cluttered dusty parlors every object embeds a trace in a velveteen case or accepts a trace, as the antimacassars accept the head’s contours and hair oil. His childhood days suffocated under traces, clutter, stuff that clogged up the atmosphere. The twentieth century, by contrast, is airy, sleek, emptied, but it does not provide “dwelling.” The living exist in hotel rooms. The dead inhabit crematoria. Memory, for good or ill, cannot survive in such temporary or interim or lifeless spaces. Instead, memory is marked by the memento or souvenir. Mementos mark the place where life used to be. They are the accoutrements of an alienated populace that has lost touch with genuine experience.

Memory is key for Benjamin. It occupies him in assorted forms: memory as revocable moment (Erinnerung), memory as physical organ (Gedächtnis), souvenirs (Andenken), recollection (Eingedenken), voluntary and involuntary memory (mémorie volontaire/involontaire). Benjamin’s tabulation of this array of memories indicates his concern to
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construct a science, history, and politics of memory. This responds to a perceived assault on memory, concomitant with the emergence of the mass-produced commodity-form, and made tangible in the memento or souvenir. The souvenir is the object that substitutes for memory and concretizes “died-off experience.” In “Central Park,” he states that “the ‘souvenir’ is the schema of the commodity’s transformation into an object for the collector.” Such souvenirs always come in heaps, declares Benjamin, like endless commodities. The souvenir is a “secularized relic” and it cannot but evoke melancholy. In place of experience, the souvenir hopes to force that intentional—voluntary—memory, which is for Benjamin not true memory.

A sort of productive disorder is the canon of the memoire involontaire, as it is the canon of the collector. . . . The memoire volontaire, on the other hand, is a registry providing the object with a classificatory number behind which it disappears. “So now we’ve been there.” (“I’ve had an experience.”)

Souvenirs are particles of splintered memory in the modern era. The souvenir is the packaging up of experience—which means the experience contained is inaccessible. What Benjamin holds out against is the conversion of the thing into the saleable item, and the experience into the disconnected event. Other objectifications of vacated memory in modernity appear in Benjamin’s work: the waxwork figure, the phantasmagoria, the daguerreotype, all ghostly hieroglyphs of the industrial “liquidation of memories.”

Where Kracauer mourns the loss of innerness, Benjamin embraces it in the realistic spirit of Brecht’s “bad new.” If this is today’s “personality type,” then its possibilities need to be explored. To that end, in 1931 Benjamin delineates a type without memory, the “destructive character.” He is a type opposed to repression in its political and psychic senses, who—causing havoc by cutting ways through—removes the traces which sentimentally bind us to the status quo; in order to make possible the formulation of experience according to revised tenets of existence in modernity:

Some people hand things down to posterity by making them untouchable and thus conserving them; others pass on situations, by making them practicable and thus liquidating them. The latter are called the destructive.

The first type commits to the “aura” of things, preserving past traces as precious and impervious objects. The second has abolished “aura” and with it things, including the self. The destructive character would doubtless live, if he could, in the new glass and steel environments designed by Adolf Loos, the Bauhaus, and Bruno Taut with their “rooms in which it is hard to leave traces.” “Erase the traces,” as Brecht insisted in a poem in his 1926 lyric cycle “Handbook for City-Dwellers.” For those traces—the monograms, screens, knickknacks on mantelpieces—are also tied up with possession and so signal class
This exhortation was to take on a horrendous significance in 1930s Germany, when the Hitler regime made efforts to erase the traces of Jews, Communists, Gypsies, and others. The full assault on sections of the population was never known by Benjamin, who took his life in 1940. But he had sensed something of the burgeoning violence, and he left Berlin, site of his memories, in 1933, never to return.

For Kracauer thoughts on memory were spurred by the contemporary situation. Weimar Germany’s economic crisis and its technologically impelled rapid change threatened to wipe out memory. For Benjamin too, reflections on memory were occasioned directly by the contemporary situation, as expressed specifically in his personal circumstances. His recollection of the past and his reflections on the act of remembering were initiated at the start of permanent exile from a country in which everyday life struck him with terror. Political events in Germany—the accession of the Nazis to power—occasioned more reflection on questions of memory, especially in relation to history writing.

**History and Memory in Benjamin**

History is a form of official memory or, rather, in what Benjamin perceives to be its distorted forms, a form of officially sanctioned forgetting. Benjamin’s series of theses “On the Concept of History” are critical of past and present modes of historiography, from the nineteenth century historicists, with their “monumental, long-winded, and basically lackadaisical works,” through the progress-oriented Social Democrats, to the power-mongers of his epoch. Historicism insists on “empathy with the victor,” an imagination of the past through the great deeds of great men, who constitute the ruling classes. In a preparatory note for the theses, Benjamin makes clear how historicism depends on recounting the antics of glorious heroes of history in monumental and epic form and is in no position to say anything about the “nameless,” those who are the toilers in history and those who suffer the effects of historical agency:

> It is more difficult to honor the memory of the anonymous than it is to honor the memory of the famous, the celebrated, not excluding poets and thinkers.

Historical construction is Benjamin’s term for a history-writing that can account for the experience of the nameless. It is able to remember the repressed of history who were its victims and its unacknowledged makers. Benjamin constructs a re-visioning of the past, wherein the historian bears witness to an endless brutality committed against the “oppressed.” This he understands to have been Marx’s task in *Capital*. *Capital* is a memorial, an anti-epic memorial, insisting on redress. Marx’s sketch of the lot of labor is presented
as a counterbalance to the obfuscation of genuine historical experience. Marx memorializes the labor of the nameless, whose suffering and energy produced “wealth” in the vast accumulations of commodities. But Marx’s direct descendants, the German Social Democrats, did not recognize this aspect of Marx’s thought. Instead, they continued to believe in the endless and automatic progress of humanity—via technology—toward a liberated society. Their complacency allowed—or at least did not oppose—fascism, and fascism instituted a corrupt version of history not worthy of the name.

In a letter written in March 1937, Max Horkheimer criticized Benjamin’s view of the “uncompletedness” of history. The crimes that have been committed against the oppressed, and the pain that has been suffered, are irreparable. If history’s uncompletedness is taken seriously, then the theological figure of the Last Judgement is relevant, and this is not a materialist concept. Benjamin affirms this from a scientific perspective, but rejects it as a one-dimensional conception of historiography. Constructing history is not only to be seen as a task contained by a scientific discipline but also, suggests Benjamin, as a form of “remembrance” (Eingedenken):

What science has “determined,” remembrance can modify. Such mindfulness can make the incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and the completed (suffering) into something incomplete. Remembrance, a form of memory, modifies the dead actualities of history. It opens up the completed woundings to some form of reinterpretation, thereby providing the possibility of retrospective justice. Transforming the interpretation of the past opens the field for the transformation of the future. The representation of history is an impetus for political action. Memory—or rather remembrance—modifies history. It is its necessary corrective. This historiography, based on memory, is not capable of changing the world but of changing the image of change, and in so doing, it clears the way for the forces of change or, as Benjamin modestly puts it, makes it possible to improve our position in the fight against fascism:

Formerly it was thought that a fixed point had been found in “what has been,” and one saw the present engaged in tentatively concentrating the forces of knowledge on this ground. Now this relation is to be overturned, and what has been is to become the dialectical reversal—the flash of awakened consciousness. Politics attains primacy over history. The facts become something that just now first happened to us, first struck us; to establish them is the affair of memory. Indeed, awakening is the great exemplar of memory: the occasion on which it is given us to remember what is closest, tritest, most obvious. What Proust intends with the experimental rearrangement of furniture in matinal half-somber; what Bloch recognizes as the darkness of the lived moment, is nothing other than what here is to be secured on the level of science has “determined,” remembrance can modify. Such mindfulness can make the incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and the completed (suffering) into something incomplete. Remembrance, a form of memory, modifies the dead actualities of history. It opens up the completed woundings to some form of reinterpretation, thereby providing the possibility of retrospective justice. Transforming the interpretation of the past opens the field for the transformation of the future. The representation of history is an impetus for political action. Memory—or rather remembrance—modifies history. It is its necessary corrective. This historiography, based on memory, is not capable of changing the world but of changing the image of change, and in so doing, it clears the way for the forces of change or, as Benjamin modestly puts it, makes it possible to improve our position in the fight against fascism:
the historical, and collectively. There is a not-yet-conscious knowledge of what has been: its advancement has the structure of awakening. 45

The past is not fixed but is a point of contest. The past has meaning only for us now in the present. We awaken into it as our now. In its appropriation for us in the present, it becomes a matter of memory, of subjective management, of recall from the perspective of the present. That this is an awakening speaks to Benjamin’s quest for enlightenment, along the lines of Stephen Dedalus’s phrase “History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake.” But for Benjamin the awakening to truth, and liberation, must be carried through collectively.

Questions of memory, of forgetting, of consciousness and repression, become class questions for Benjamin. Not least because the proletariat is denied memory, a claim on tradition, a rightful place in the triumphal march of history. It is cast by Social Democracy as a redeemer of future generations, not a backward-looking, avenging, remembering fighter. 46 That is to say, the proletariat has no Er-innerung, no systematized internalization of the span of decades. The continuum of history, like the poetry of the past, belongs only to the oppressor, he declares. For the oppressed and dispossessed, states Benjamin, there is only discontinuity, starting from zero and nothing. Flashed up in the present are memories of oppression that were never recorded but that have structured present social inequalities and catastrophic politics.

Benjamin’s arrow of memory shooting back and forth between past, present, and future gains in political significance, as through the 1930s Germany slips into a nightmare-sleep that threatens, under the guise of reanimating the past, to allot a present and a future to only the few, as the Third Reich launches Himmler’s “page of history” that, it was claimed, can “never be written.” 47 In hoping to wipe out a people, the Nazis forced memory out as political issue. In a letter to Gretel Karplus-Adorno in Spring 1940, announcing the themes of the theses on the philosophy of history, Benjamin noted that he suspected that the problem of remembering (and of forgetting) would continue to occupy him for a long time. 48 For Benjamin, as for Kracauer, memory is a theme to be pursued at the very moment when it is confronted by technology and threatened with extinction, be that by the pace of change or by a sequence of power-wielders whose rule culminates in disastrous political events. In such circumstances, the injunction against all odds is “never forget.”
In Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy, memory is analyzed as a form of knowledge that has become problematic. Adorno argues that what we can know through memory is threatened with eclipse by certain allegedly more rational forms. That eclipse, though, amounts to an act of forgetting that is, as he puts it, equivalent to a “destruction of memory.” Now obviously not all events or all things can be remembered or ought to be remembered. Adorno’s considerations of the issue, in fact, pivot specifically both on the loss of individuality and on the danger of forgetting human suffering. This places memory at the very center of Adorno’s program in which critique opens up the possibility of the reconciliation of subject and object. Yet the idea has received almost no systematic attention within the scholarship on his work.

Adorno’s analysis of the problem of memory is stimulated by the atrocities of the National Socialist era, though what he offers is not simply a sociohistorical analysis of the past. Adorno’s contention is that the intellectual and spiritual conditions that generated those events persist. In postwar Germany, however, they take the form of precluding an adequate remembrance of the past. His thesis is that contemporary society does not possess the resources which would allow for a full consciousness of what happened in this period: it lacks the capacity to acknowledge the fact of suffering. And the absence of this consciousness is, for Adorno, a forgetting, a destruction of memory. It is not forgetting in the common-sense meaning of the term, that is, when something slips from the mind. Rather it is the effect of a limited consciousness that has acquired an incapacity for knowing reality as it is. Adorno presents this incapacity as an irrationality, in that to be committed to a misrepresentation of reality is a mark of irrationality if that misrepresentation is incapable of being corrected by countervailing evidence.

In “The Meaning of Working Through the Past,” a widely discussed paper of 1959—which reached a broad audience when delivered
as a radio lecture the following year—Adorno lists a number of strategies adopted by those who would seek to reduce the significance of the Holocaust, strategies that Adorno regards as acts of forgetting. Among the strategies are (1) analytical subterfuge in which the notion of “guilt-complex” comes to seem to be a strange, unfounded psychological state of the Germans somehow disconnected from the events, as though there was nothing really to be guilty about (WTP, 90/556, 91/557); (2) euphemism: “the universally adopted, almost good-natured expression Kristallnacht” (WTP, 90/556); (3) feigned ignorance of what was happening at the time, which Adorno believes was really either “an impassive and apprehensive indifference” or simply false given that “the determined enemies of National Socialism knew quite early exactly what was going on” (WTP, 90/556); (4) attempted moral equivalences that cancel the debt, for example, “as though Dresden compensated for Auschwitz,” “the administrative murder of millions of people” (WTP, 90/556); (5) shifting responsibility: “A lax consciousness consoles itself with the thought that such a thing could surely not have happened unless the victims had in some way or another furnished some kind of instigation” (WTP, 91/557).

One might regard these claims as essentially the astute observations of a social commentator. But Adorno’s analysis relies on something deeper. In attempting to answer the question about how a group could “remove . . . from memory” murderous acts of unprecedented enormity, reaching for a panoply of alternative explanations and exculpations, we soon find that Adorno’s views are supported by a series of complex philosophical theses (WTP, 89/555). These various theses are deployed in an effort to understand what Adorno sees as modern irrationality, an absence of reason that makes it possible to forget in this specific sense.

Adorno’s claim about the irrationality of forgetting emerges from within the framework of his “negative dialectics”—his philosophical system, or “anti-system,” as he preferred to consider it—in which he sets out his notions of non-identity and the experience of contradiction. It is through the experience of contradiction, the experience of non-identity, that, according to Adorno, we come up against the limitations of our judgment or concept of an event or object. Only through that experience, Adorno tells us, might the remembrance of human suffering be possible. Through the experience of contradiction we might come to abandon glib or casual conceptualizations of that suffering and of events irreducible to concepts by placing them against the enormity of the events themselves. In order then to understand Adorno’s use of the concept of memory we have to appreciate the philosophical framework within which this concept becomes intelligible in the unique form Adorno gives it.

This chapter will set out first the philosophical framework within which the concept of memory operates and then examine Adorno’s specific application of the concept to the postwar German situation. There is also a further dimension. Adorno posits that engagement with certain artworks can provide us with the sort of experience which is required for what he calls “reconciliation,” the positive appreciation of what is other than us.
His critical theory argues that the possibility of this reconciliation—of the absence of antagonism—between individuals or between individual and society is not predicated on any romantic recollection of better times, of memories which might serve as a model for harmonious relations. Interestingly, Adorno proposes that a denial of certain memories is the first stage of the process of reconciliation. An analysis of this idea will be the third part of the chapter.

Experience, Affinity, and Guilt: The Philosophical Framework

Adorno’s negative dialectic can be considered as a reformulation of the Hegelian theory of experience. Hegel puts forward what for Adorno is an exemplary and by no means utopian model of experience—non-utopian in that it can be achieved under certain conditions—in which experience is understood as a process of intellectual sophistication where beliefs are tested, revised, or rejected. This process is one in which the concepts of the knower attempt to capture the object without reduction, prejudice, or distortion, and it is thus a process of active rationality. This is driven by a desire for “affinity” in which the subject relates, as Adorno sees it, non-antagonistically toward the object. Reconciliation of subject and object is, for Adorno, the affinity of subject and object in the activity of knowledge: “[The] postulate of a capacity to experience the object—and discrimination is the experience of the object turned into a form of subjective reaction—provides a haven for the mimetic element of knowledge, for the element of elective affinity between the knower and the known” (ND, 45/55). Only in this way is knowledge of the object—as opposed to knowledge imposed on the object—possible: “Without affinity,” Adorno remarks, “there is no truth” (ND, 270/267). Hence, for Adorno, experience in its fullest realization would be reconciliation of subject and object in that the object would no longer be suppressed, neglected, or forgotten, under convenient concepts.

In Hegel’s philosophy the concept of experience is explained and demonstrated in the context of the self-unfolding of the Absolute. It is thereby an essential dimension of Hegel’s systematic and developmental account of the concepts of philosophy, society, religion, and art. Adorno excises this concept from its original systematic context in order to reveal what he sees as its potential as an explanation of rational agency in which an individual determined to come to terms with his or her beliefs, to subject them to criticism, to assess them against reality, might operate. Against the realization of rational agency, however, is what Adorno sees as the consciousness-determining influence of contemporary society. Adorno claims that modern society determines the criterion by which we evaluate truth claims. In this way it determines the norms of reasonableness, of what counts as a good or sufficient explanation. (For example, in a racist society certain underlying views of relative racial superiority produce a consciousness to which claims consistent with that underlying view seem to be reasonable.) In this state of “false
consciousness” in contemporary society, a dominant criterion of reason, according to Adorno, is that what is true is appearance: any investigation of relations or systems of power that are not apparent seem to be exercises of “speculation” or “metaphysics” and certainly not of valid knowledge. For Adorno it is simply a contemporary stipulation that “will only allow appearance to be valid.” It follows from this that in a society determined by false consciousness, experience, in the sense critically appropriated from Hegel, does not occur because “false consciousness” does not—because it cannot—subject social norms to scrutiny, and the subject is left with a limited appreciation of objects (in that objects are reduced to appearances). The “withering of experience,” then, is at variance with a “critical consciousness”—synonymous in Adorno’s work with a fully experiencing consciousness—in that it does not have the capacity to criticize the norms that, without ever being explicit, nevertheless determine the societal life in which we live.

In contrast to what he describes as a “reified consciousness”—one not open to change—Adorno proposed the attitude of negative dialectics. He argues that negative dialectics critically maintains a “determinate negation” in which what was once assumed to be the truth of the object is problematized through our reflections on the adequacy of our concepts. In this way the complex determinations of an object come to be recognized. This determinate negation comes about through experience of contradiction—of non-identity—where our concepts do not meet up with objects. This explains why Adorno regards determinate negation as criticism (ND, 159/161). It is criticism of the norms that provide us with the criterion of valid knowledge.

Dialectical rationality, as we might term the model of experience defended by Adorno, is a fidelity to the object: it is the constant self-conscious critique of truth claims. It commits itself to what Adorno sees as the power of contradiction as it attempts to come to terms with an object. Contradiction is not a term of logic or of rhetoric, however: it is a requirement of reason in the face of a world that aspires toward totality. And in this regard a fully reflexive experience is marked by responsiveness to contradiction that the experiencing agent acknowledges as such, as a mark of the failure of his or her concepts to categorize the object: “The less identity can be assumed between subject and object, the more contradictory are the claims made upon the cognitive subject” (ND, 21/41). This is a contradiction between the concept and the object, the object being other and more than what the concept describes it as. “Experience forbids the resolution in the unity of consciousness of whatever appears contradictory. . . . Contradiction cannot be brought under any unity without manipulation, without the insertion of some wretched cover concepts that will make the crucial differences vanish” (ND, 152/152). The dialectical conception of rationality contrasts with everyday, socially determined rationality in which, allegedly, contradiction is not recognized. In this context contradiction is an act of resistance: “To proceed dialectically means to think in contradictions, for the sake of the contradiction once experienced in the thing, and against that contradiction. A
contradiction in reality, it is a contradiction against reality”\(\textit{ND}, 144\)–45/148). It is a “contradiction against reality” because it aims to confront the totalizing drive of what Adorno laments as the “positivistic” consciousness of contemporary society, which is incapable of recognizing the antagonisms that exist between subject and object (the “contradiction in reality”), between individual and individual, individual and society, allowing a compromised version of social cohesion to gain currency. This systematically required cohesion is in no sense reconciliation.

For Adorno critical theory is the business of uncovering the contradictions that sustain society in its current form, and thereby raising them to a critical consciousness. A consciousness of these contradictions contributes, indeed, to the ending of the conditions that require contradictions. The logic of negative dialectics is therefore what Adorno calls “a logic . . . of disintegration” between concept and reality\(\textit{ND}, 145\)/148). In such a condition the irrational effort to “dispute away the distinction between idea and reality”\(\textit{ND}, 335\)–36/329)) would no longer obtain. It employs the category of contradiction to bring about the “confrontation of concept and thing”\(\textit{ND}, 144\)/148). It analyzes alleged self-evident truths and “seeks to grasp, through their form and meaning, the contradiction between their objective idea and that pretension. . . . [It] seeks to transform this knowledge into a heightened perception of the thing itself.”8 The sense of the “thing,” the “matter,” the “object,” is heightened by our experience of failure to encapsulate it. And further: “It is up to dialectical cognition to pursue the inadequacy of thought and thing, to experience it in the thing”\(\textit{ND}, 153\)/156).

However, it is important to recognize that in Adorno the motivation to experience the inadequacy of our concepts is not simply the product of philosophy. That is to say, although we can point out, through philosophical reason, the non-identity of concept and object, the motivation to do so is historical. What Adorno tells us, in fact, is that non-identity is an experience with existential dimensions. It is certainly more than what one commentator thinks of as a “logical metaphor.”9 He claims that it is the experience of guilt that pushes him toward the idea of negative dialectics, toward a philosophy that attempts to retrieve non-identity. Adorno holds that it is because philosophy has hitherto failed to negotiate the question of the individuality of that which does not fall under concepts that negative dialectics is needed. This requires philosophical recognition of that which remains beyond conceptualization; namely, the individual, the non-universal, the non-identical. Adorno sees recognition of non-identity as one motivated by “guilt,” by the sense that part of what the object is has been neglected by our unreflexive knowledge schemas. As he writes: “Dialectics is the consistent sense of non-identity. It does not begin by taking a stand-point. My thought is driven to it by its own inevitable insufficiency, by my guilt of what I am thinking”\(\textit{ND}, 5\)/17). The reflective consciousness is marked by awareness of the inadequacy of its conceptualization, and that leads us to a sense of what the object—the non-identical in our experience—might be: “Our thinking needs a potential that awaits in its opposite \[\textit{das Gegenüber}\], and it unconsciously obeys the idea
of making amends to the pieces for what it has done. In [objective] philosophy this unconscious tendency becomes conscious” (ND, 19 [translation modified] / 30–31).

The idea of guilt in Adorno’s philosophy points to the obligation of thinking, as Adorno puts it, to do “justice to reality” (ND, 41/51). “Doing justice,” “making amends,” “guilt”—all these concepts point in the direction of a mode of knowledge in which the individual moments of history are not to be forgotten. From this, then, we have the idea that philosophy needs a reconstruction of its form in order to negotiate without antagonism or violence the essentially dynamic and particular nature of reality. And this programmatic imperative relates the core ideas of negative dialectics with the problem of memory.

The critical conception of memory is applied, at its most philosophically abstract, to Kant’s efforts to deal with the “thing-in-itself.” This analysis appears in Adorno’s lecture course of 1959 on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In Lecture 16 he explores Kant’s distinction between metaphysical knowledge and the kind of knowledge conveyed in synthetic a priori propositions. This is the distinction that grants preeminence to one form of knowledge—synthetic a priori—over another: “What Kant shares with positivism is the insistence on the finite nature of knowledge and the rejection of metaphysics as a ‘wild extravagance.’”10 But unlike positivism, Kant, Adorno claims, recognizes that there is something beyond the realm of synthetic a priori propositions about which we must continue to ask regardless of the lack of certainty attaching to our answers. Adorno devises the term “block” to express Kant’s dualistic notion in which experience is divided up. The object as it is in itself, as opposed to how it is as we know it though our categories of understanding and forms of intuition, is retained, albeit inconsistently, by Kant. But Adorno describes this as “a kind of metaphysical mourning, a kind of memory of what is best, of something that we must not forget, but that we are nevertheless compelled [by Kant] to forget.”11 The object as it is in itself cannot be deleted from consciousness, yet it can be allowed no role within the space of reasons set out by Kant. Nevertheless, unlike the “positivists” Kant cannot retreat from “the memory of the questions philosophy formerly asked.”12 However, Kant’s response to the “memory” is dissatisfying. He turns away from the attempt to achieve the identity of subject and object by separating them into different realms: The world as it is known (the active subject) is non-identical with the world as it is in itself (the object devoid of all relations to the subject). The latter is retained, according to Adorno, merely because of Kant’s memory of what lies outside philosophical systems of reason. He states: “The decisive feature of Kant is that the anamnesis, the power of memory, thrives because that identity is not possible.”13 This is an interesting account of Kant’s motivations, and no doubt it casts Kant within a set of concerns that would have been quite alien to his intentions. But of particular relevance in the present context is that Adorno, again, makes the connection between “memory” and the relation to an object that might be forgotten. Memory is the preservation of a
kind of knowledge, one that we struggle with, since it is at the margins of what we can conventionally know: it is threatened by an allegedly rational knowledge of the object.

Memory and Working Through the Past

This philosophical framework, which reached it culminating point in the *Negative Dialectics* of 1966, thoroughly informs Adorno’s concrete considerations of the destruction of memory in postwar Germany, as we can see in “The Meaning of Working Through the Past.” The phrase “working though the past” was used in postwar Germany initially as a challenge to the German people to think of what had been done during the reign of National Socialism and to consider how they might somehow move forward from that point knowing how never again to repeat its evils. But Adorno feared that instead the challenge had been subverted by the perpetrators and their sympathizers into a casual “attitude that everything should be forgotten and forgiven” (*WTP*, 89/555). For Adorno, this forgetting—this “effacement of memory” (*WTP*, 92/558)—is a failure of reason, an inability to understand the evidence, an incapacity to realize the contradictory nature of one’s beliefs. Through irrationality what is evident—the facts of the events as well as their immoral character—is not recognized. In essence, it is this modern irrationality that leads to the Mephistophelean “destruction of memory” in which “it’s as good as if it [the Holocaust] never happened” (*WTP*, 91/557). As Adorno explains it: “The impulses and modes of behavior involved here are not immediately rational in so far as they distort the facts they refer to” (*WTP*, 92/558). This is irrationality in its essence for Adorno in that it is an insistence that we not subject our concepts to scrutiny. In reality it is irrationality that, in fact, passes for “rationality” in contemporary society in which it is reasonable to deny the obvious. It is conformism rationality—though more truly it is irrationality—that allows the “forgetting of what has scarcely transpired,” the attitude of getting along (*WTP*, 92/558).

What is involved here is what Adorno describes as a “not so unconscious defensiveness against guilt” (*WTP*, 89/555). And as we saw in the previous section guilt is a motivation to come to terms with the object, to appreciate it in its individuality, and to reflect on the capacity of our concepts to describe it. The effort to not allow oneself to be motivated by this feeling amounts to an incapacity for “affinity.” The problem of the “destruction of memory” is, therefore, closely related to the problem of the destruction of experience. Adorno sets out this problem concretely when noting that anti-Semitic prejudice cannot be explained by an absence of contact between anti-Semites and Jews, as though personal acquaintance would stimulate a more reflective attitude in the anti-Semite. Rather the encounter with Jews does not register experience—does not encourage the revision of contradictory prejudices—simply because the anti-Semite is incapable of experience, and is therefore, in Adorno’s schema “irrational.” He writes: “All too often
the presupposition is that anti-Semitism in some essential way involves the Jews and could be countered through concrete experiences with Jews, whereas the genuine anti-Semite is defined far more for *his incapacity for any experience whatsoever*, by his unresponsiveness” (*WTP*, 101 [italics added]/571). It would be too great a task to explore the question of why it is that the anti-Semite actually hates the Jews—Adorno in *Dialectic of Enlightenment, Minima Moralia*, and his empirical studies offers a wide range of sociological, political, and psychoanalytic explanations—but what is significant is how it is that in the face of evidence the anti-Semite can insist on a prejudiced view. This is the incapacity to be moved by contradiction. According to Adorno it is the denial of the exercise of rationality that leaves the prejudice intact, and that thereby glosses over the acts of the National Socialists by explaining them (as we saw above) under categories that are consonant with the reasons that the perpetrators gave to themselves. Indeed the variety of exculpations proffered on behalf of the National Socialists cannot be refuted by argument simply because rationality (dialectical rationality, Adorno’s idea of rationality) does not operate. As Adorno puts it, “weakened memory . . . resists accepting these arguments” (*WTP*, 95/562).

What is absent, then, in the period of Germany that concerns Adorno is a realization of the contradiction between the incredible murderousness of the Nazis and trivial explanations of how it must have happened, explanations that cannot fit with the reality of what ought to be obvious. In the context of an inability to experience and a tendency to conform, the kind of reflection that would properly scrutinize facile accounts and explanations of suffering, one that would place the concept (the explanation) against the object (the suffering), is simply not available. And the effect of this is the “effacement of memory,” in which the events are “worked through” without reflection and ultimately, therefore, without reconciliation.

Adorno’s regards the “effacement of memory” of the suffering as having certain roots in the conditions of German political and economic consciousness. Taking a Humboldtian line not commonly found in his work he argues that the overbearing state “renders the majority of people dependent upon conditions beyond their control and thus maintains them in a state of political immaturity” (*WTP*, 98/567). And Adorno specifies this “immaturity” as the absence of “autonomous subjectivity,” the ideal of German Idealism and eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German liberal thought, the condition in which one might determine for oneself, in accordance with reason, what one ought to accept as true. The “empty and cold forgetting” (*WTP*, 98/566) is the action of those who “would prefer to get rid of the obligation of autonomy” (*WTP*, 99/567).

Indeed, working against the realization of autonomy is a comforting dynamic of what Adorno famously describes as the culture industry. Adorno argues that what he calls the culture industry encourages a conformist consciousness, and thereby a consciousness suited to the needs of a society that maintains itself through forgetting: “The power of the culture industry’s ideology is such that conformity has replaced consciousness.”

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What is required for the effectualization of experience is instead “autonomous subjectivity.” This is a central idea: the autonomous subject, the agent that operates through reason will not conform; that very act of resistance facilitates, among other things, the only appropriate way of “working through the past.” The exercise of reflexivity is, at once, the exercise of confrontation with fact and the scrutiny of one’s beliefs.

The social phenomenon of reification is posited as an explanation of the problem of memory. Adorno explains it in this way: “I mentioned the concept of reified consciousness. Above all this is a consciousness blinded to all historical past, all insight into one’s own conditionedness, and posits as absolute what exists contingently. If this coercive mechanism were once ruptured, then, I think, something would be gained.” The theory that underpins this claim is never adequately set out. In his work on reification Axel Honneth takes Adorno and Horkheimer’s remark that “[a]ll reification [Verdinglichung] is a forgetting” and develops it into a theory of the loss of recognition. He writes: “It is this element of forgetting, of amnesia, that I would like to establish as the cornerstone for a redefinition of the concept of ‘reification.’ To the extent to which in our acts of cognition we lose sight of the fact that these acts owe their existence to our having taken up an antecedent recognitional stance, we develop a tendency to perceive other persons as mere insensate objects.” Honneth provides a broad base for this, producing insights from pragmatism, phenomenology, developmental psychology, and indeed Adorno. However, his theory does not capture what is at issue in Adorno. An unproblematic layer of interaction somehow forgotten yet functioning is not Adorno’s position: in such a scheme, literally pathological behavior would be normal. Rather, reification is an obstacle to an appropriate self-understanding, an understanding that would involve an appreciation of one’s contextual entwinements or meditations, among which are included our relations with the past. It is therefore a matter of loss rather than of suppression, as Honneth supposes.

Another way into Adorno’s position might be taken through Lukács’s claim that reification “degrades time to the level of space” and that consequently “temporality loses its qualitative, changing, fluid character: it is transformed into a rigid, exactly delimited continuum, filled with quantitatively measurable ‘things’ . . . it is transformed into space.” This Lukácsian thought—that reification is the transfiguration of time into space—actually opens up a line of support for Adorno’s reification claim. In our reified social ontology a critical engagement with the past must be somehow problematized as the very condition of historical consciousness (qualitative time) is excluded. Adorno, in fact, writes about history in a way that resonates with Lukács’s notion of non-reified time. His philosophy of history develops the notion of discontinuity in history. It specifically opposes the concept of history as a succession of moments. As simple succession, Adorno holds, history would lose its qualitative content: it would collapse into a process of sameness. Instead, history contains qualitative diversity. As Adorno describes it: “The truth is that, while the traditional view inserts facts into the flow of time, they really possess a
nucleus of time in themselves, they crystallize time in themselves. What we can legit-
imately call ideas is the nucleus of time within the individual crystallized phenomena, something that can only be decoded by interpretation. In accordance with this we might say that history is discontinuous in the sense that it represents life perennially disrupted.20 It is this diversity and discontinuity, however, that the reified consciousness divested of the sense of qualitative time (Lukács) cannot recognize. A reified consciousness, then, which cannot experience the past, which cannot recognize the suffering of individuals in the past, is the cognitive expression of a reified social reality.

Aesthetics, Reconciliation, Forgetting

In view of Adorno’s efforts, as we have just seen, to retrieve the conditions for memory, it is curious that he also speaks about a form of experience in its fullest realization as achievable only by what we might call a regulative and specific act of forgetting. This is, in fact, aesthetic experience. We need to disentangle this form of experience—which can be actualized—from the ideal form of experience for which Adorno’s project sets out to prepare the conditions.

Full, undistorted experience would entail reconciliation between subject and object, a relationship in which the subject engages openly and reflexively in “affinity” with an object, in a constant process of revision. This is reconciliation not in the sense that the subject comes to be identically “at one” with the object, but rather that the subject would operate with a full cognizance of his or her conceptual limitations, which are constantly revealed though the subject’s ongoing efforts to be at one with the object. This is what Adorno means, in fact, by mimesis. It is precisely the dynamic of subject–object interaction in which subjects “adjust to a moment which they themselves are not” (ND, 138/142). Adorno’s view of modern rationality is such that he believes that reconciliation is not yet possible, that reification has suppressed mimesis.21 Contemporary rationality simply construes the object in terms of the needs of the subject. Against this background Adorno finds in certain forms of aesthetic experience the exemplar of experience that might capture the open, dynamic, or reconciled relationship with the object. This exemplary experience provokes in us a heightened consciousness of our conceptuality and its limits without abandoning it. Experience in this context is non-identity, not a positively non-conceptual experience.

Adorno holds that art can provide us with this first stage of the process of reconcilia-
tion. In Adorno’s terminology art can be the object of negative experience. This reveals that a characteristic of art—of what counts as art—is determined by its contribution to reconciliation. This excludes, therefore, art that sets out to produce reconciliation through the representation of harmony or oneness (typically the case of propaganda art). The very project of reconciliation in this specific aesthetic concept involves the negation of
reconciliation. Adorno writes: “For the sake of reconciliation, authentic works must blot out every trace of reconciliation in memory.”22 The memory of reconciliation—of moments of satisfaction in contemporary society—must be set aside in order to create the conditions in which full reconciliation would be achieved.

In what way can art do this? In Aesthetic Theory Adorno specifies that the process or inner logic of an authentic work is “objectively the counterimage of enchained forces” (AT, 226 / 335). The enchained forces refer in fact to the conformist consciousness of modern society in which the individual will feel complete insofar as he or she follows the norms and expectations of society. Against the conformism of the social process where life, according to Adorno, is entirely predictable, we have the authentic work of art. And for Adorno, “every authentic artwork is internally revolutionary” (AT, 228/339). This revolutionary dimension is its innovation of aesthetic form. Through form an alteration of the grammar of experience to that offered by the “administered world” is produced. This, in effect, is the possibility of another form of rational engagement with reality. Hence as Adorno sloganistically puts it: “Art is rationality that criticizes rationality without withdrawing from it” (AT, 55/87). What qualifies certain artworks as authentic, then, is their capacity to deliver a logic of resistance. (An issue of great difficulty in Adorno’s aesthetic theory is that such artworks need not have been created with the intention of producing “negative experience.”)

It follows from the claim that art implicitly criticizes social reality that it is a constitutionally historical phenomenon (since each society is a historical phenomenon whose limitations and tensions will be particular to it). As Adorno claims: “The Hegelian vision of the possible death of art accords with the fact that art is a product of history” (AT, 3/12–13). Hence the idea of the potentially revolutionary qualities of aesthetic experience must be historically situated. The revolutionary potential of artworks depends on their location within the historical conditions in which they are produced. If society is, as Adorno claims, reified—dehumanizing and reductive, ossifying the relation of subject to object—then authentic art will somehow express this or make it apparent. The ways in which it does so are quite oblique in that art provokes the experience of contradiction—of not being reconciled with reality—without naming society directly. It is here that Adorno’s well-known valorization of modernist art takes effect. According to Adorno, Kafka’s and Beckett’s works achieve this experience of contradiction as a “mimesis of reification” in that they heighten perception of the structured meaninglessness of modern society (AT, 230/342).23 Such artworks set out to defy the representation of harmony sought by heteronomous works. As Peter Uwe Hohendahl explains, “[re]conciliation is denied because any harmonious ending would be tantamount to untruth.”24 These artworks are problematic in that they will not conform to a logic of expectation.

The capacity of Schoenberg’s music to provide the possibility of negative experience, in which “every trace of reconciliation in memory” is excluded, is extensively treated in Adorno’s writings. Schoenberg’s modernism offers a particular route to reconciliation in...
that it provides an alternative grammar of rationality, one at odds with the false reconciliation of modern society. What, in essence, Schoenberg’s music represents for Adorno is that openness to the demands of material that revolutionizes form, that transforms consciousness. Its break with the conventions of harmony is simultaneously a break with the expectations of resolution and totality. The aesthetic reception of modernist, dissonant music can never be achieved without serious effort, and that effort challenges the passive consumption of popular culture, which merely sustains unthinking compliance. Aesthetic experience of modernist art contrasts, therefore, in a critical way with the reduced experience of a reified consciousness: “With Schoenberg affability ceases,” he writes. In Schoenberg—the dialectical composer—one engages with musical material in which, as in emancipated experience, form (or consciousness) adjusts to the object, transforming both itself and the very idea of the object thereby.

For Adorno, then, authentic art offers a route to reconciliation through its capacity to provoke the experience of contradiction. Authentic art—art resistant to yet embedded in our times—cannot be based on memories of a better time; in fact the project of emancipation rejects memory of reconciliation in this sense for fear that it might distract us from authentic reconciliation, which is possible only when we have fully come to terms with objects. Interestingly, though, forgetting is a feature of genuine aesthetic experience. It involves experience in which the subject ceases to take itself to be an agent in control of its environment. It relates to what Christoph Menke describes as “a processual negation of automatic understanding,” in which the conscious operations of our reifying conceptualizations ceases. This moment, indeed, is a loss of the self-certainty of the subject. Adorno writes: “The shock aroused by important works is not employed to trigger personal, otherwise repressed emotions. Rather, this shock is the movement in which recipients forget themselves and disappear into the work: it is the moment of being shaken. The recipients lose their footing” (AT, 244/363). We might reformulate Adorno’s maxim to capture this: All self-forgetting is a dereification.

The function of memory in the project of critical theory takes on, in Adorno’s many discussions of Proust’s work, a virtually contrary significance to that discussed above. For Adorno, what characterizes Proust’s narrative of past experience is its unwillingness to accept “any happiness other than complete happiness.” However, this notion is predicated on the experience of happiness, of certainly better times, that Proust finds in childhood: “Proust’s fidelity to childhood is a fidelity to the idea of happiness.” The primacy of childhood experience, for Proust, is its immediacy and naïveté. This is, as Adorno reads it, the “childhood potential for unimpaired experience,” lost to us through age. Remembrance of this condition prevents us from settling for any compromised version of happiness. Hence for Proust, according to Adorno, “undamaged experience is produced only in memory, far beyond immediacy, and through memory aging and death seem to be overcome in the aesthetic image” (that is, in Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu).
What is remembered, then, stands in critical contrast to experience which contains no historical consciousness of its own loss.

The basis of this positive assessment of Proust is either problematic or at least at odds with Adorno’s general view of the role of remembrance in reconciliation. Adorno praises Proust for “his extraordinary sensitivity to changes in modes of experience,” yet Proust does not “blot out every trace of reconciliation in memory”: his work depends, in fact, on recollections of reconciled experience. It is difficult to follow Adorno’s deviation from his own principle of non-recollection in the name of reconciliation (which he finds exemplified in Kafka, Beckett, and Schoenberg) in this specific case. The special contribution of Proust is the exceptional detail of his narratives: nothing is lost. The implication is that experience, for the child, contains all of this phenomenological richness. The ideal of experience should be to recapture the unique experiential immersion in things. Recollection of that ideal of experience places the memory of happiness “beyond immediacy”—beyond current fragmentary moments of happiness—and it therefore does not lapse into any form of consolation that might somehow inhibit the task of real reconciliation. Rather, Adorno claims, Proust’s work “represents an unconditional renunciation of consolation.” It is not consolatory because it laments the loss of experience. At the same time, immanently contrary to Adorno’s own interpretation (I am not drawing on any independent view of Proust), it must be seen as conciliatory, as, unlike the issues that surround “the destruction of memory,” it is fully engaged with the past. This is precisely what the project of coming to terms with the past would like to achieve. It is engaged with the past and the forms of experience that have come to be precluded. Yet it is difficult to understand what the lament for that preclusion is based on: the resources of Adorno’s theory of experience should indicate that recognition of the loss of experience is indeed the rediscovery of experience. Whereas, by contrast, the problem of reification is precisely that it is a forgetting of experience and therefore an absence of any sense of the possibility of experience.

It is interesting that the project of reconciliation within the framework of critical theory can adopt different approaches to the role of memory (we have already noted a contrast with Axel Honneth). For instance, on the very question of the emancipatory potential of art, Adorno’s associate Herbert Marcuse argues that art contains the memory of freedom. In his *Eros and Civilization*, in which he attempts to reformulate Freud’s notion of the relation between repression and civilization, Marcuse argues that capitalism offers a particular and (contra Freud) by no means necessary repression of the somehow free instincts. These instincts are so repressed, however, so “deep” and “archaic” that they cannot, as Marcuse puts it, provide “standards for the construction of the non-repressed mentality, nor for the truth value of such a construction.” That is, these instincts cannot be produced as an argument because they lie outside argument, and beyond conventional—that is, repressed—experience. But there is one route to the non-repressed.
Marcuse claims that art or fantasy provides us with an insight into non-repressive experience. The instincts that cannot be called up from experience make themselves felt in acts of imagination or fantasy. For Marcuse, art does not operate within the reality or performance principle that shapes the individual to the needs of society. Fantasy is useless to a utilitarian world, and it is thereby, in Marcuse’s view, free of repression. It is not the product of the ego, that feature of the self that conforms to the reality principle. And art, in this way, provides us with a glimpse of the kind of radical experience that might be available to a non-repressed society. And in this way, as Marcuse puts it, art or imagination “preserves the ‘memory’ of the subhistorical past when the life of the individual was the life of the genus, the image of the immediate unity between the universal and the particular under the role of the pleasure principle.” Now it is an extremely difficult question as to what form of “memory” this is: it is not conscious, nor can it be in the unconscious of the individual since he or she has never experienced it. This question must be set aside. But what Marcuse’s attenuated notion of memory points to is the image, somehow, of a better time, of a time of freedom. And this highlights the remarkable complexity of Adorno’s position that authentic art, in a way quite contrary to Marcuse’s thesis—except in the problematic case of his Proust interpretation—eschews the notion of memory of freedom or of reconciliation in order to allow the full experience of contradiction and non-identity.

It is clear that the notion of memory has a significant role to play in Adorno’s philosophy. Although the project of reconciliation, which is the fundamental motivation of Adorno’s critical theory, attempts to conceive of non-antagonistic future relations, Adorno’s analysis of the idea of memory shows us that reconciliation with the past also forms part of the theory. The same conditions of modernity that inhibit future reconciliation stand in the way of memory. Modern irrationality, in which experience is diminished, provides us with no reflexivity, no stimulus to attempt to grasp the object as it is in itself. The experience of guilt—of a sense of obligation to something we know we have not adequately conceived—is suppressed by forms of reasoning that cannot recognize the limits of our conceptual schemes. The destruction of memory, as we have seen, is another consequence of this reasoning. The retrieval of memory is, therefore, an act of social criticism since it involves a repudiation of false reconciliation—the alleged identity of our concepts and reality—and it exposes our attempts to overcome the past, that is, our failure to come to terms with the past in its unique and specifiable individuality.
10. Acts of Memory and Mourning
Derrida and the Fictions of Anteriority

Gerhard Richter

Of the two springs called Mnemosyne and Lethe, which is the right one for Narcissus? The other.
Jacques Derrida, Memoires: For Paul de Man

In a remarkable letter to Käthchen Schönkopf from December 12, 1769, the young Goethe records a description of her as she had appeared in his guilt-ridden dream the night before. Having failed to respond to her most recent missive for what suddenly seemed like an eternity, his sleep was fitful: "A dream last night reminded me that I owe you an answer. It is neither that I had forgotten entirely, nor that I never think of you; no, my friend, every day tells me something of you and of my debts." Goethe continues: "But it is strange—and this is an experience with which you may be familiar—time does not erase our memory of absent ones but it does conceal them. Our life’s diversions, our making the acquaintance of new things, in short, every change in our condition, do to our heart what dust and smoke do to a painting; they render the subtle traits wholly unrecognizable and the strong ones less visible, all in a manner so unnoticeable that one does not even know how it comes about. A thousand things remind me of you, I see your image a thousand times, but so weakly and often with as little sentiment as if I were thinking of a stranger." Even the image of the beautiful head of Fräulein Schönkopf, whom Goethe privately referred to as his “first girl” and with whom he had ended his courtship almost two years earlier, proves no match for the effects of time on memory. While memory requires time to become what it is—no memory without time, no time without memory—time also hinders memory, veiling its specificities, blurring its details, accentuating too selectively and, in so doing, uncannily rendering the familiar strange while, at the same time, causing the
estranged gradually to appear more and more familiar. Like the painting whose original
vibrancy is covered over time with the sediments of life, the image of the other in memory
lives on, submerged beneath ever-thickening layers of temporality and finitude. These
memories, however, cannot be delivered from their fate in the way that the colors of
Michelangelo’s frescoes on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel have been returned to their
alleged sixteenth-century intensity, since memory cannot happen without the obscuring
layers of time and dusty markers of mortality. To the extent that memory occurs—at least
the kind of memory that is perceived as being “individual” or more experientially in-
flected than what in late modernity, perhaps too hastily, is called “collective” or “cultural”
memory—this memory depends upon the very effects of time that also threaten its
undoing.

The double movement by which memory is constructed and obscured, built and
dismantled, offered and withheld is one of the multiple names—but not just any name—
that Jacques Derrida bestows upon the project of deconstruction. Questions of memory,
remembrance, recalling, living on, forgetting, retrieving, losing, saving, surviving, and
mourning traverse his work, in heterogeneous modulations, from *Of Grammatology* in
the late 1960s onward. In a conversation with Anne Berger, Derrida makes explicit the
centrality of the trope and experience of memory for his entire project, explaining that
“if there were an experience of loss at the heart of all this, the only loss for which I could
never be consoled and that brings together all the others, I would call it loss of memory.
The suffering at the origin of writing for me is the suffering from the loss of memory, not
only forgetting or amnesia, but the effacement of traces. I would not need to write other-
wise; my writing is not in the first place a philosophical writing or that of an artist, even
if, in certain cases, it might look like that or take over from these other kinds of writing.
My first desire is not to produce a philosophical work or a work of art: it is to preserve
memory.” Therefore, he confesses, “I struggle against this loss, this loss of memory.”

Neither philosophy nor poetry, neither logic by itself nor rhetoric in isolation, Derrida’s
undertaking is touched by the stringent and ethical demands of each. He sees his writing
both as an enactment of, and a self-conscious resistance to, the eradication of the trace,
the very precondition of legibility and, by extension, the concept of meaning itself. Like a
reader of Goethe’s vanishing mnemonic image, Derrida conceptualizes his work, in all its
multiplicities and refractions, as the attempt to preserve a memory and memory itself,
even if that memory is but the faint trace of an absence, no more than a remnant of the
ashen traces of a genocidal burning that he evokes, in all their melancholia but also in
their potentially affirmative future-directedness, in his book *Cinders*. The trace of Derri-
da’s itinerary always moves, as David Farrell Krell reminds us, from the buoyant phenom-
enological credo, *zu den Sachen selbst* (to the things themselves), toward the ashen remains
of its anagrammatic version, *zu den Aschen selbst*. The minute anagrammatic transposi-
tion of two letters announces deconstruction’s epic theater. We could even say that the
trace, ashen or otherwise, that for Derrida connects the material practice of his work with
its ethicopolitical impetus is inscribed by the transition from the Greek sense of philo-
sophia, the love of wisdom, to a certain memophilia, the love of memory. The practice
of memophilia constitutes a striving to come to terms with the threat of a potentially
inconsolable loss, a relation to the object of memory without which writing’s ethical,
historical, political, and personal commitments would be erased.

But can a kind of thinking be imagined that strives to retain its speculative rigor
while answering first to the stringent demands of its mnemonic commitment rather than
to the classical labor of the concept? As Nietzsche warns us in Human, All Too Human,
“many do not become thinkers merely because their memory is too good.”4 He may have
had in mind, among other things, paragraph 464 of the Encyclopedia, where Hegel re-
marks that it is no accident that, while youth possesses a better memory than older people,
this is so in part “because it does not yet behave in a thinking manner” (sich noch nicht
nachdenklich verhält).5 In this view, thinking and remembering are at odds with each
other such that an overly acute memory stands in the way of rigorous and self-reflexive
thought that would clear the stage of the mnemonic debris that holds back its striving in
new directions. Nietzsche seems to suggest, pace Hegel, that the very thing Derrida wishes
to preserve, memory, stands in the way of true thinking—also perhaps understood in the
Heideggerean sense even before Heidegger, as a kind of innovative movement of thought
that is not at all confined to the limits of conventional and institutionalized philosophiz-
ing, but that instead accepts the challenge of inventing its own methods each time it
encounters a new object or question, that is to say, each time it allows itself to redefine
what truly rigorous thinking is and calls for. Nietzsche’s target, though, is the concept of
memory that informs a nineteenth-century Germanic historicism whose unacknowledged
aim frequently was the nationalistic endorsement of a history of linearity and continuity
in the service of a largely affirmative, unquestioning engine of totalizing consciousness.
This kind of memory prevents the actualization of a new thinking. Believing itself to know
too much already, it is weighed down by the sheer facticity of its empirical attachments.
Such memory cannot think the to-come of thinking because it is shackled by it in much
the same way that Bill Murray’s character in the film Groundhog Day is condemned to
wake up, day after day, to the historical sameness of the identical day, without being able
to change it.

Derrida’s notion of memory, by contrast, does not simply reproduce what is as-
sumed, or once was assumed, simply to be present, ready to be passed on to a new
generation of heirs and epigones. Rather, encouraging himself and us to learn to accept
an inheritance—as, for instance, the inheritance of Marx’s oppositional spirit in Specters
of Marx—Derrida’s writing works to define and perpetually to redefine the meaning of
inheriting without following, the meaning of accepting without repeating, the meaning of
following even by betraying, and the meaning of setting to work an idea even while taking
it in a different direction.6 His work asks again and again how we can show ourselves
responsible to a memory whose laws we have not fully understood, whose history escapes
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us, and yet whose ethicopolitical requirements already have reached us, as though always already emanating from the transcendence of the wholly Other that his interlocutor Emmanuel Levinas so often evoked.

No overall summary of Derrida’s “concept” of memory could responsibly reduce the multiple singularities of its iterations from Of Grammatology onward to a well-defined, single meaning. As Rodolphe Gasché reminds us, Derrida’s “singular reworking of traditional forms of thinking . . . always escapes for essential reasons any essentialist determination”; instead, readers are enjoined to “seek in his writings precisely those structures that singularize, extend, and overflow any totalization” in a way that also renders these texts stages upon which “an ever incalculable and unpredictable response” may be performed.7 It is no different with the vexed and elusive question of memory. With these caveats in mind, which are also always promises, we may turn to two specific texts in which Derrida further inflects the multiple relationships of memory to his project of thinking and writing: the series of 1984 lectures entitled Memoires: For Paul de Man and the 2001 collection The Work of Mourning, which gathers essays, addresses, and meditations written shortly after the death of a friend or colleague over a period of some twenty years. A perpetual and obsessive engagement with the uncontainable logic of memory itself is performed in language each time memory is evoked as though we already knew what the word meant:

What is memory? If the essence of memory maneuvers between Being and the law, what sense does it make to wonder about the being and the law of memory? These are questions that cannot be posed outside language, questions that cannot be formulated without entrusting them to transference and translation, above the abyss. For they require, from one language to another, impossible passageways: the fragile resistance of a span. What is the meaning of the word “mémoire(s)” in French, in its masculine and feminine forms (un mémoire, une mémoire); and in its singular and plural forms (un mémoire, une mémoire, des mémoires). If there is no meaning outside memory, there will always be something paradoxical about interrogating “mémoire” as a unit of meaning, as that which links memory to narrative or to all the uses of the word “histoire” (story, history, Historie, Geschichte, etc.).8

The figurative and allegorical investments of memory in its various articulations preclude any totalization; memory always will have been that whose pastness, present claims, and future-oriented commitments pull it elsewhere, to a different time and space, a different language, a different nation, a different politics.

Meditating, inconsolably, on the passing of his friend Paul de Man, Derrida in the Memoires places memory and mourning into philosophical and experiential relation. While there can be “no singular memory” (Memoires, 14), no mnemonic act or object that would once and for all shuck the traces of its multiple contingencies, the uncontainable memories that bear upon us, traverse and haunt us, are nevertheless connected by a
double affirmation, the “yes, yes.” The double affirmation works to authorize itself in
that the second affirmation, the second “yes,” always seconds the first yes, sanctioning it,
giving it legitimacy. The validity of the first “yes,” its structure as a promise, can only be
confirmed and countersigned by another “yes” that remains to come, that is, it must
defer its validation to a future act that remains bound in the promise of its very first
utterance. The second affirmation of the “yes, yes” acts to “preserve memory; it must
commit itself to keeping its own memory; it must promise itself to itself; it must bind
itself to memory for memory, if anything is ever to come from the future” (Memoires,
20). What Derrida names the “alliance between memory and the seal of the ‘yes, yes’”
can be said to reside, in different formulations and manifestations, “at the heart of decon-
struction” (Memoires, 20). The inscription of the initial “yes,” whether in written or
spoken form, or in texts and situations of any kind, must carry within itself the ashen
trace of its erasability; not that it will be erased of necessity, nor that it will survive intact,
but rather that its very performance is contingent upon its possible disappearance. When
he says that we “cannot write what we do not wish to erase, we can only promise it in
terms of what can always be erased,” and that “otherwise, there would be neither memory
nor promise,” Derrida shows us that the very person or thing that is to be remembered,
by virtue of the awareness of mortality upon which existence is predicated, carries its own
memory within itself (Memoires, 123).

One of the central wagers of Memoires: For Paul de Man is that this alliance between
the doubly affirmative memory and the work of deconstructive thought is inextricably
bound up with the experience of an impossible mourning. Derrida argues that we can
enter a friendship—and, by extension, meditate on it in memory—only to the extent that
we acknowledge our own finitude and the finitude of the friend. The two friends encoun-
ter each other as mortal beings, as bearers of a signature that one day will have been
signed in a prosopopoeiac gesture from beyond the grave. As he writes:

If there is a finitude of memory, it is because there is something of the other, and of
memory as a memory of the other, which comes from the other and comes back to
the other. It defies any totalization, and directs us to a scene of allegory, to prosopo-
peia, that is, to tropologies of mourning: to the memory of mourning and to the
mourning for memory. This is why there can be no true mourning, even if truth and
lucidity always presuppose it, and in truth, take place only as the truth of mourning.
(Memoires, 29)

Like the mourning that memory evokes in us, the memory that mourning leaves behind
for us resists the imposition of closure and the stability of a relation defined once and for
all. Instead, the mourning of memory and the memory of mourning require of us an
impossible affirmation, one that cannot any more be spelled out in advance than it can
proceed according to the curriculum of a described sequence or be implemented in accordance with an eye toward full transparency. It is the thought of the mortal other that I bear within me, and whose bearing within me exhibits me to myself as an other who is linked to other others in his mortality, whose memory always will have been that of the one who can die and who is capable of being entrusted with an other’s memory of his or her mortality.

The poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin, texts to which both Derrida and de Man, like Hegel and Heidegger before them, often return, is in many ways a sustained engagement with this memory of the other’s mortality. In the poem “Die Titanen” (1802–6), the lyrical voice submits: “It is good to rely upon others [or, “orient oneself toward others”]. For no one bears [or carries] life alone” (Gut ist es, an andern sich/Zu halten. Denn keiner trägt das Leben allein). Derrida himself cites the second of these lines in the final sentence of his 2003 memorial lecture for Hans-Georg Gadamer on dialogue and poetry at the University of Heidelberg. The responsible memory of the friend, never responsible enough and always too responsible for its own good, propels us to interrogate this Hölderlinian concept of bearing or carrying. What does it mean to bear life not alone but always together, through, and jointly with an other, even an otherness? What is this being-with, the “with-ness” and witness of life, of bearing life that attaches us to the other and his memory? But Hölderlin’s line “For no one bears life alone,” can also be read to mean that no one carries within himself only life (das Leben allein, in the sense of nur das Leben), which is to say that we always also carry death within us and among us as friends. Our relation to the other, to the memory of the friend, is thus always characterized by a communal bearing or a mutual carrying and by the prospects or memory of sadness, finitude, and mourning.

Derrida reflects on these questions both theoretically in his philosophical writings devoted to finitude and mourning and experientially in his more personally inflected texts devoted to recently deceased friends and colleagues in The Work of Mourning. These include eulogies and meditations on such dead friends as Roland Barthes, Paul de Man, Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser, Sarah Kofman, Gilles Deleuze, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jean-François Lyotard. More recently, these texts were joined by texts on Heiner Müller and on Hans-Georg Gadamer. There are also meditations on the losses of family members, such as Derrida’s reflections on his experience of the dying and eventual death of his mother in “Circumfession,” a text printed in the lower margins of a book about Derrida written by a friend, Geoffrey Bennington—where the reader is confronted with two competing and supplementary texts on each page, the one explicating Derrida, the other written by Derrida himself, embracing, affirming, protesting, clarifying, supplementing, and memorializing the voice of the friend. Leaving the word to someone else—jemandem das Wort überlassen, as one says in German—letting the other speak instead of oneself, and yet continuing to think and write with and for that other is the act of memory and mourning par excellence.
If the law of friendship is the law of mourning and memory, there can be no friendship without the permanent possibility and threat of mourning. One cannot die together with the friend—two can die at the same time, but not really, in the deepest sense, together, as in Kafka's melancholic diction, in "The Judgment," where a son and a father are described as eating their meal simultaneously (gleichzeitig) rather than together (zusammen). Our friendships will always have been conditioned by the future absence of the other, even of the self in the other, and by the fact that one of us inevitably will be left behind to bury, to mourn, to commemorate the other, situated among the friends who have been left behind, the survivors who are now left to walk all alone, in memory of the other. While Derrida works to formulate a series of axioms and laws that respond to the structures of friendship as mourning and finitude, he also reminds us that each death of a friend is singular, each time, as he puts it, the end of the world. Our friends, whether dead or alive, are thus both absolutely singular and unique, and at the same time connected to each other through the possibility and prospect of their and our shared finitude, a finitude that sooner or later will give rise to the tear of memory, of mourning, and of commemoration.

This tear of mourning and of memory flows in a passage from a text written in 1990 on the occasion of the death of Derrida's friend Jean-Marie Benoist, "The Taste of Tears." There, we read:

To have a friend, to look at him, to follow him with your eyes, to admire him in friendship, is to know in a more intense way, already injured, always insistent, and more and more unforgettable, that one of the two of you will inevitably see the other die. One of us, each says to himself, the day will come when one of the two of us will see himself no longer seeing the other and so will carry the other within him a while longer, his eyes following without seeing, the world suspended by some unique tear, each time unique, through which everything from then on, through which the world itself—and this day will come—will come to be reflected quivering, reflecting disappearance itself: the world, the whole world, the world itself, for death takes from us not only some particular life within the world, some moment that belongs to us, but, each time, without limit, someone through whom the world, and first of all our own world, will have opened up in a both finite and infinite—mortally infinite—way. That is the blurred and transparent testimony borne by this tear, this small, infinitely small, tear, which the mourning of friends passes through and endures even before death, and always singularly so, always irreplaceably.13

The questions toward which Derrida asks us to open up revolve around the memory and mourning that the tear, this time not an ashen but a translucent trace, inscribes in our relation to the other and his or her mortality. The tear, veiling the eye and withdrawing vision, is the forbidden taste of passing. What will the relation between the tear and the
memory of the friend have signified? The tear of mourning forms even before the empirical death of the friend because, from the beginning, the relation to that friend was touched by finitude and mortality. The memory and mourning of the friend passes through the tear, and the tear, as that which binds all friends in a community without community, is always already both singular and universal. If one must never taste a tear because the act of tasting the tear is an attempt to reappropriate or reannex the other, the tear also is the very figure of that which, within me, was already other, an otherness that makes me who I am.

The potential reappropriation or reannexation of the other in mourning is inflected by the ways in which the very process of memory is conceptualized. In *Memoires*, Derrida therefore reminds us of de Man’s interest in the distinction between two types of memory that worry Hegel in paragraphs 460–64 of the *Encyclopedia*. In German, there are two different words for memory, *die Erinnerung* and *das Gedächtnis*. *Erinnerung*, in that its etymology has evolved from the phrase ‘er innert,’ which literally means ‘he inners’ or ‘he interiorizes,’ bespeaks a kind of interiorizing or incorporative memory, a memory that emphasizes an experiential relation of the self to the object of its mnemonic act, an act that works through annexation and psychic appropriation. *Gedächtnis*, by contrast, is a thinking kind of memory, as the term’s relation to *denken* (thinking) and *der Gedanke* (thought) suggests. (Elsewhere, Heidegger points to the significance of the relation between *denken* and *danken* (thanking) that propel both *der Gedanke* and, by extension, *das Gedächtnis*). As Hegel writes, ‘‘*das Gedächtnis* in this way is the transition into the activity of thought [*Tätigkeit des Gedankens*].’’14 *Die Erinnerung* is the kind of memory that touches me as a form of emotional experience, but it is pre-reflexive, pre-critical; *das Gedächtnis* is the memory that sponsors reflection, that is, calls for thinking about both its object and the very logic by which that thinking occurs as a mnemonic act. *Die Erinnerung* always already has posited a self’s relation to its memory and to the object of its mnemonic act: it propels the self to incorporate the object of the mnemonic act so that it becomes coextensive with it. *Das Gedächtnis* is always ahead of itself, in search of a new relation, always in need of articulating, through the labor of the concept, just how it should relate to the object of its mnemonic act, a relation that, as a form of perpetual reflection, it cannot take for granted once and for all.

Bracketing the question as to whether de Man’s reading of this structure ultimately gets the distinction right as it is set to work in Hegel and leaving open the question of whether Derrida gets de Man’s reading of Hegel right, what should interest us here is what Derrida understands Hegel’s and de Man’s interest in the distinction between *die Erinnerung* and *das Gedächtnis* to imply for the twin projects of memory and deconstruction.15 Here, Derrida reminds us that, based on de Man’s understanding, the ‘‘relation between Gedächtnis and Erinnerung, between memory and interiorizing recollection, is not ‘dialectical,’ as Hegelian interpretations and Hegel’s interpretation would have it, but
one of rupture, heterogeneity, disjunction” (Memoires, 56). As Derrida therefore emphasizes, we can read the failure of memory’s “apparent negativity, its very finitude, what affects its experience of discontinuity and distance, as a power, as the very opening of difference” (Memoires, 58). This view leads him to the suggestion that if “art is a thing of the past, this comes from its link, through writing, the sign, tekhnē, with that thinking memory, that memory without memory, with that power of Gedächtnis without Erinnerung. This power, we now know, is pre-occupied by a past which has never been present and will never allow itself to be reanimated in the interiority of consciousness” (Memoires, 65). We see in Derrida’s argument his insistence on the way in which memory is not a form of recuperation or restoration of a past that once was assumed to be present or even of a past, imagined or not, that claims our attention for its own sake. Rather, just as das Gedächtnis, never able to benefit from the comforts of interiorization, perpetually must revisit and reformulate its own relationality to the object of its mnemonic thinking and even to thinking itself, memory as a radical form of Gedächtnis is directed toward the future. To recognize that its “proper” form always remains still to come also is to acknowledge that memory is not simply a form of afterness but rather an elusive encounter between the “after” of something that never was present and a futurity that has not yet been thought.

The Hegelian distinction between Gedächtnis and Erinnerung as it figures in de Man provides Derrida with the occasion to interrogate memory’s temporality or genealogy as it occupies, of necessity, any discourse on memory. One might inquire into the status of the mnemonic object or idea in relation to a thinking and recollecting self—but who will this self have been if not the Hölderlinian bearer of the other?—that, in spite of its acknowledgement of the concept of a present that is not really present or accessible in any transparent or lucid fashion, nevertheless wonders about the other-directedness of its mnemonic investments. Here, the reality of the mnemonic subject cannot be reduced to the perception of its presence. The recollecting self, the self that exists to the extent that it remembers, always also is invested elsewhere, in a complex network of overlapping and only sporadically conscious commitments. Psychoanalysis, as the study of decentered consciousness, of a lost self-mastery one never possessed, speaks of nothing else. We may recall the rather kitschy 1999 film The Story of Us, which is redeemed by one brief and brilliant scene. The two protagonists, a constantly warring husband and wife couple portrayed by Bruce Willis and Michelle Pfeiffer, are shown sitting next to each other in bed, engaged in yet another of their frequent arguments. After we see the couple quarrelling in a medium close-up, the camera dollies out to show that next to both Willis and Pfeiffer sit their parents in bed with them, arguing along. We realize that these parents are not really sitting in bed with the fighting couple—though, from the empirical standpoint of the rolling camera, they are—but rather that their otherwise unacknowledged influence
over their respective children, their attitudes, wishes, and complaints, continues to determine the lives of these now-adult children in uncontrollable and ghostly ways. The “reality” and “presence” of the bickering husband and wife is overdetermined by the ghostly order of discourses that are not present as such but are nevertheless real. The intricate and elusive memories of a childhood long in the past tense, mostly unconscious, continue to structure a reality that believes itself to have declared its independence from them.

Yet while even our mainstream cultural consciousness appears prepared to concede that our historical and psychological reality cannot be reduced to presence in the sense of a reality structured by visibility and concreteness, we may be more reluctant to follow Derrida’s challenge to the metaphysics of presence in the other direction, that is, toward the past. As he writes in his reading of de Man, the “memory we are considering here is not essentially oriented toward the past, toward a past present deemed to have really and previously existed. Memory stays with traces, in order to ‘preserve’ them, but traces of a past that has never been present, traces which themselves never occupy the form of presence and always remain, as it were, to come.” Therefore, Derrida continues, “resurrection, which is always the formal element of ‘truth,’ a recurrent difference between a present and its presence, does not resuscitate a past which had been present; it engages the future” (Memoires, 58). According to this logic, then, the act and object of memory is not recuperation of something that once was because this would presuppose that, even though the present is not fully present in the present, it once was present to itself as presence, in the past. This view, a kind of inverted eschatology of the mnemonic, would view the past presentness of the present with a nostalgic longing for the resurrection of a lost presence, a present that once granted access to presence in a way that the current present, to the extent that it no longer is coextensive with the past, has forgotten or unlearned.

What might be named the afterness of memory, then, would have to come to terms with the difficult double movement by which it is both imbricated with the past and simultaneously divorced from it. That is to say, the “after” of the afterness of memory cannot view itself in terms of a relation to a former presence that it now claims to follow. This is why “there is only memory but, strictly speaking, the past does not exist,” which is to say that it “will never have existed in the present, never been present” (Memoires, 58–59.). The afterness of memory, rigorously conceived, then would have to divorce itself from a certain “fiction of anteriority” with an eye toward accepting its uneasy relation to what is to come, to the futurity of its trajectory (Memoires, 59).

We may recall here Heidegger’s remark, transcribed in his recently published 1936–37 seminar on Schiller’s Letters on Aesthetic Education, that the purpose of the seminar is not “to find the appropriate place of Schiller in intellectual history” nor to read his texts with a “general historical intention that aims to know what happened back then, but rather to ask for ourselves and that means for the future [sondern wir fragen für uns und d.h. für die
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Zukunft]."

To ask for ourselves—“wir fragen für uns”—does not mean shunning historical knowledge or genealogical insight for the sake of an aggressive and ill-informed presentism that knows no historical awareness or has no Geschichtssinn, or historical sensibility, as German eighteenth-century writers like to say. Rather, Heidegger suggests that the act of reading in the present, that is, carefully and with a rigorous eye, is an act for the future; “für uns, d.h. die Zukunft,” to read for oneself, to think, recollect, mourn, understand, write, create, affirm, protect, criticize, or love something or someone now, for us, here, is to affirm a future, insofar as all these acts remain promises that will need to be reaffirmed always one more time, always in memory of what is still to come. Like Heidegger’s remark—“für uns, d.h. die Zukunft”—Derrida’s understanding of the act of memory cannot be thought in isolation from the ways in which it will not turn its back on the future, even when it seems to face the past through a series of fictions of anteriority.

The mnemonic act, thus conceived, resides in an afterness that has as its object the futurity with which it is not yet familiar, a time that remains open and, of necessity, to come. An analysis of the fiction of anteriority as it inflects memory and its various concepts would strive to articulate the ways in which remembrance, recollection, memorializing, and recalling are eminently future-directed, that is, performed not for their own sake, nor for the comforting resurrection of an assumed past presence or presenced past, but rather in the name of something else, something that by definition cannot have been articulated yet, cannot yet have assumed the promise and burden of a proper name. The afterness of memory, then, is really the open futurity that our acts of mourning and remembrance so often consider, even with the best of intentions, merely to belong to the presence of the past. Here, in mourning the afterness of the mnemonic “after,” the ethical implications of a deconstructive politics of memory may begin to assume form: the future of memory and the memory that there is a future—that is, for us.
11. Deleuze and the Overcoming of Memory

Keith Ansell-Pearson

Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Proust’s novel *In Search of Lost Time (À la recherche du temps perdu)* in *Proust and Signs* contains the striking claim that what constitutes its unity is not memory, not even involuntary memory. The “search” is not steered by the effort of recall or the exploration of memory, but by the desire for truth (which, following Nietzsche, we can say is always “hard”). Memory intervenes in this search only as a means but not the most profound one, just as past time intervenes as a structure of time but not the most profound one. Moreover, according to Deleuze, the search is oriented not toward the past but toward the future. The stress on the need to overcome memory, and an advocacy of the superiority of the future, are prevalent throughout the span of Deleuze’s oeuvre. In *What Is Philosophy?* for example, Deleuze, writing with Félix Guattari, insists that memory plays only a small part in art, adding, “even and especially in Proust.” Deleuze and Guattari cite Désormière’s phrase “I hate memory.” In an essay on the composer Pierre Boulez and Proust, Deleuze cites Désormière’s comment and states that the finality of art resides, in a phrase he borrows from Bergson, in an “enlarged perception”—enlarged “to the limits of the universe”—that requires creating art in such a way that “perception breaks with the identity to which memory rivets it.” In *A Thousand Plateaus* he speaks of the “redundancy” of the madeleine and the dangers of falling into the black hole of involuntary memory. Of course, we must recognize an ambiguity within Deleuze’s position on memory, and he must be read carefully on the issue. The ambiguity consists in the fact that Deleuze thinks that whenever art appeals to memory it is, in fact, appealing to something else (in *What Is Philosophy?* this is called “fabulation,” a notion he borrows from Bergson), and whenever we think we are producing memories, we are, in fact, engaged in “becomings.” Nevertheless, it is quite clear that Deleuze wishes to demote
memory and with respect to both his thinking of art and of time. On art, for example, Deleuze writes in his essay on Boulez and Proust: “According to Proust, even involuntary memory occupies a very restricted zone, which art exceeds on all sides, and which has only a conductive role.”5 For Deleuze it is always the present (and the future), not the past, that is at stake: “We write not with childhood memories but through blocs of childhood that are the becoming-child of the present.”6

In the important second chapter of *Difference and Repetition* (“Repetition for Itself”) on the three syntheses of time, Proust’s achievement is said to consist in having shown how it is possible to gain access to the pure past and to save it for ourselves (Bergson, Deleuze claims, merely demonstrated its existence to us). In Deleuze this second synthesis of time—the first being located in habit—is made to give way to a superior third synthesis of time, the pure empty form of time or time out of joint. The fundamental notion at work here, however, is that of the death instinct and its “forced movement” (*mouvement forcé*).7 This is also what is at stake in Deleuze’s reading of Proust in the second edition of *Proust and Signs*, in which recognition of the forced movement of time necessitates overcoming the erotic effect of memory.8 In this chapter my aim is to cast some light on a number of important notions that play a seminal role in Deleuze’s thinking on memory, but that are often treated in imprecise terms in the literature. They include the pure past, the virtual, and repetition. If we can secure an adequate understanding of the work these notions are doing in Deleuze’s thought we should be able to better grasp the nature of his commitment to the overcoming of memory. In part, this entails developing an adequate understanding of its curious operations and effects. In my view, Deleuze does this most effectively in his text on Proust and in the second chapter of *Difference and Repetition*. For this reason this material constitutes the basis of my reading of Deleuze on memory in this chapter (it is from Proust that Deleuze gets his crucial definition of the virtual). In the conclusion I briefly turn my attention to the collaborative work with Felix Guattari.

**Virtual Memory and the Pure Past**

In spite of all the philosophical innovations he puts to work in his text on Proust, Deleuze is keen to hold onto a reading of him as a novelist of time. If we don’t grant an important role to time in the construction of the novel, we lose all sense of the apprenticeship undergone by the narrator or the hero.9 This is an apprenticeship that in simple but vital terms takes time. As Deleuze writes, “What is important is that the hero does not know certain things at the start, gradually learns them, and finally receives an ultimate revelation” (*PS*, 26). It is an apprenticeship punctuated by a set of disappointments: the hero believes certain things (such as the phantasms that surround love) and he suffers under illusions (that the meaning of a sign resides in its object, for example). For Deleuze, the novel is best conceived in terms of a complex series, and the fundamental idea is that
time forms different series and contains more dimensions than space. The search acquires its distinct rhythms not simply through “the contributions and sedimentations of memory, but by a series of discontinuous disappointments and also by the means employed to overcome them within each series” (PS, 26; see also PS, 86–87). And yet, Deleuze is as keen to show that the novel is not simply about time as he is to show that it is not a novel about memory; rather, both are placed in the service of the apprenticeship that is one in the revelations of art—revelations of true essences.10

The reflective treatment in the novel of the shock of the past emerging in a new and brilliant way takes place in the context of the narrator’s realization that the sensations afforded by sensuous signs, such as the uneven paving-stones, the stiffness of the napkin, and the taste of the madeleine, have no connection with what he had attempted to recall, with the aid of an undifferentiated memory, of the places attached to them, such as Venice, Balbec, and Combray. He comes to understand why life is judged to be trivial even though at certain moments or singular points it appears to us as beautiful. The reason is that we judge ordinarily “on the evidence not of life itself but of those quite different images which preserve nothing of life—and therefore we judge it disparagingly.” The narrator is struck, through this involuntary return of the past, by the fact that life is not truly lived in the moments of its passing where we find ourselves too immersed in immediate enjoyments and social rituals and activities. The unanticipated experiences afforded by involuntary memory go beyond the realm of egotistical pleasures and actually cause us to doubt the reality and existence of our normal self. The contemplation of these “fragments of existence withdrawn from Time,” although fugitive, provides the narrator with the only genuine pleasures he has known, which are deemed by him to be far superior to social pleasures or the pleasures of friendship. The narrator speaks of immobilizing time, of liberating fragments of time from their implication in a ceaseless flow, so as to have this comprehension of “eternity” and the “essence of things” (SLT 3:909). He comes to realize the nature of his vocation: to become a writer and produce literature. The fortuitous fashion of our encounter with the images that the sensations of involuntary memory bring into being vouchsafes for him their authenticity. The “trueness of the past” that is brought back to life will not be found through either conscious perception or conscious recollection. The book of reality will be made up of “impressions” and will devote itself to the task of extracting the truth of each impression, “however trivial its material, however faint its traces” (SLT 3:914). Through this process the mind will be led to “a state of greater perfection and given a pure joy” (the resonance with Spinoza’s Ethics is unmistakable). The impression serves the writer in the same way the experiment serves the scientist. The difference between the writer and the scientist, however, is that whereas intelligence always precedes the experiment, for the writer intelligence always comes after the impression. For the narrator, this means that the “ideas formed by the pure intelligence have no more than a logical, a possible truth, they are arbitrarily chosen. The book whose hieroglyphs are patterns not traced by us is the only
book that really belongs to us” ([SLT] 3:914). For Deleuze the sign of an involuntary memory is an ambiguous sign of life; it has one foot in the pure past and one foot in the future, a future that can be created only through the death instinct and the destruction of Eros.

The extraordinary presentation in the novel of a “fragment” of the past takes place at almost the midway point in the final part of the novel, *Time Regained*. The narrator probes the nature of this moment of the past, asking whether it was not perhaps something much more, “common both to the past and the present” and more essential than either of them. The experience is one in which the “harsh law” of passing reality, in which we can only imagine what is absent and in which imagination is seen as a failure, is neutralized, temporarily annulled

by a marvellous expedient of nature which had caused a sensation—the noise made both by the spoon and by the hammer, for instance—to be mirrored [miroiter] at one and the same time in the past, so that my imagination was permitted to savour it, and in the present, where the actual shock to my senses of the noise, the touch of the linen napkin, or whatever it might be, had added to the dreams of the imagination the concept of “existence” which they usually lack, and through this subterfuge [et grâce à ce subterfuge] had made it possible for my being to secure, to isolate, to immobilise for the duration of a lightning flash [la durée d’un éclair]—what it normally never apprehends: a fragment of time in the pure state [un peu de temps à l’état pur]. ([SLT] 905, translation slightly modified)12

The narrator stresses that this experience is impossible except under specific conditions. We need to have suspended our ordinary, intellectualist relation to the world, in which time is essentially calculative and in which we preserve bits of the past only for some narrow utilitarian purpose.

But let a noise or a scent, once heard or smelt, be heard or smelt again in the present and at the same time in the past, real without being actual, ideal without being abstract, and immediately the permanent and habitually concealed essence of things is liberated and our true self which seemed—had perhaps for long years seemed—to be dead but was not altogether dead, is awakened and reanimated as it receives the celestial nourishment that is brought to it. A minute freed from the order of time has re-created in us, to feel it, the man freed from the order of time. And one can understand that this man should have confidence in his joy, even if the simple taste of a madeleine does not seem logically to contain within it the reasons for this joy, one can understand that the word “death” should have no meaning for him; situated outside time, why should he fear the future?
But this species of optical illusion [ce trompe-l’oeil], which placed beside me a moment of the past that was incompatible with the present, could not last for long. (SLT 3:906, translation slightly modified, my emphasis)

We need to determine the nature of the experience described here, which is said to be neither simply of the past nor of the present. There is also the encounter with the virtual, that which is said to be “real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.” The discovery of lost time enables the artist to give a new truth to the times of life, including time past, and to find for every sign embedded in materiality a “spiritual equivalent” (SLT 3:912). The virtual, however, has to be comprehended as a complex and ambiguous sign of life since it is implicated in a forced movement, and this will prove to be the movement of death. The order of time the narrator refers to is clearly what we take to be normal empirical time, time that is linear and successive. For Deleuze, this order conceals a more complicated transcendental form of time (the splitting of time in two directions), which, in turn, must also give way to the pure, empty form of time. Let us keep in mind the fact that Deleuze remains wedded to two main Proustian insights, which he unravels through a set of theses inspired by Bergson (as in his two volumes on cinema or the essay on Boulez and Proust). The first is that time—the force of time—is not ordinarily visible or perceptible. The transcendental form of time is not ordinarily visible to us, which is why Deleuze comes up with an image of time to make it thinkable. This is the “crystal-image”: “What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time: since the past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, time has to split itself in two at each moment as present and past, which differ from each other in nature, or, what amounts to the same thing, it has to split the present in two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launched towards the future while the other falls into the past.”13 Deleuze goes on to note that it is Bergson who shows us that this splitting of time never goes right to the end, which accounts for the strange and bewildering exchange that takes place in the “crystal” between the virtual and the actual (the virtual image of the past and the actual image of the present). The key Bergsonian insight for Deleuze is that time is not the interior in us but rather the opposite: it is the interiority in which we move, live, and change.14 Second, and drawing on the closing lines of the novel, human beings occupy in time a more considerable place than the restricted one that is allotted to them in space.15

Let me now outline how Deleuze reads the experience of Combray and the madeleine. We should not lose sight of the fact that Deleuze’s first reading of this episode—he will read it again in Difference and Repetition, and in his later works right up to What Is Philosophy?16—takes place in a chapter of Proust and Signs entitled “The Secondary Role of Memory.” Memory is judged to be playing a secondary role in relation to the narrator’s discovery of the superior nature of the signs of art. This for Deleuze is the meaning of the
apprenticeship; it takes time, but it is not an apprenticeship about time as such but about the slow becoming of his vocation and the discovery of the revelations of art.

Deleuze begins with a question: “At what level does the famous involuntary memory intervene?” It is clear for Deleuze that it intervenes in terms of a specific and special type of sign, namely a sensuous sign (such as the madeleine). A sensuous quality is apprehended as a sign, and we undergo an imperative that forces us to seek its meaning. It is involuntary memory, the memory solicited by the sign, that yields for us the meaning: thus, Combray for the madeleine, Venice for the cobblestones, and so on. Of course, not all sensuous signs are bound up with involuntary memory; some are connected with desire and imagination. Here, however, our focus is on involuntary memory and the truth about time it ultimately reveals.

How do we explain that which so intrigues Proust’s narrator, namely, the experience in which the past encroaches on the present and in such a manner that one is made to doubt whether we are in one or the other? The madeleine experience is implicated in a reminiscence that cannot be resolved by the association of ideas or by the resources of voluntary memory, simply because it is an experience of a past that is not simply the past of a former present or of a past that is merely past in relation to our current present. It is truly disorientating. Deleuze poses a set of questions. First, what is the source of the extraordinary joy that we feel in the present sensation (of the past coming back to life)? This is a joy so powerful that it makes us indifferent to death. The episode in the novel of the grandmother’s death is important because here we have an experience of involuntary memory that does not bring joy—the joy of time lost or wasted being regained—but of terrible anguish and paralysis. So death cannot, ultimately, be a matter of indifference, but has to meet with a resolution. Second, how do we explain the lack of resemblance between the two sensations that are past and present? That is, how can we account for the fact that Combray rises up in this experience not as it was experienced in contiguity with a past sensation (the madeleine), but in a splendor and with a truth that has no equivalent in empirical reality? This is what Deleuze calls Combray created as an event.17 The reason why Combray rises up in a new form is because it is a past that is not relative either to the present that it once was or to a present in relation to which it is now held to be past. Deleuze calls this an experience of Combray “not in its reality, but in its truth” and in its “internalized difference” (it is a Combray made to appear not simply in terms of its external or contingent relations).

The experience cannot be explained on the level of voluntary memory, simply because this memory proceeds from an actual present to one that has been (a present that once was present but which no longer is). The past of voluntary memory is doubly relative: relative to the present it has been and also to the present with regard to which it is now held or judged to be past. Voluntary memory can only recompose the past with a set of different presents. Voluntary memory proceeds by snapshots and gives us an experience of the past that is as “shocking,” and as tedious, at looking at photographs. What escapes
voluntary memory, therefore, is “the past’s being as past” (PS, 57). The problem with this as a model of time is that it cannot explain its object, namely, time. Time and again, Deleuze insists in his work that if the present was not past at the same time as present, if the same moment did not coexist with itself as present and past, then it would never pass and a new present would never arrive to replace this one. In short, the past is formed at the same time as the present as in a virtual coexistence of the two. This is Bergson’s essential insight into the formation of time. On one level, therefore, the demands of conscious perception and voluntary memory establish a real succession; on another level, however, there is virtual coexistence. The past is experienced on more than one level, as both the passing of time and as that which is outside normal successive time, a little piece of time in its pure state. But this “pure state” is also a complicated sign of life; it enjoys a double existence, half outside of time (neither of the past nor of the present) and also in death.

Is it significant that the narrator speaks of his experience of time in its “pure state” as a species of “optical illusion”? It is vital we appreciate a key point with regard to Deleuze’s configuration of the virtual, including virtual memory. It is this: For Deleuze, the virtual is not an illusion. Let us take the example of the pure past to demonstrate this point. The pure past is a past that “perpetually differs from itself and whose universal mobility . . . causes the present to pass” (DR, 102). Take, for example, a virtual object (a part of a person or a place, a fetish or an object of love): this is never past either in relation to a new present or in relation to a present it once was. Rather, it “is past as the contemporary of the present which it is, in a frozen present” (DR, 102). Virtual objects can exist only as fragments—as, moreover, fragments of themselves—because they are found only as lost and exist only as recovered. As Deleuze stresses, “Loss or forgetting here are not determinations which must be overcome; rather, they refer to the objective nature of that which we recover, as lost, at the heart of forgetting” (DR, 102). For Deleuze, this provides the key to developing an adequate conception of repetition. Repetition does not operate from one present to another in a real series, say from a present to a former present that would assume the role of an ultimate or original term and that would always remain in place, acting as a point and power of attraction. This would give us a brute or bare, material model of repetition with something like fixation, regression, trauma, or the primal scene serving as the original element.

For Deleuze, by contrast, repetition takes place through perpetual disguise and displacement. This is why he takes issue with Freud’s figuration of the death drive as a return to inanimate matter. Deleuze has a different model of the real: it is inseparable from the virtual. He asks us to consider the following question: Conceive of two presents or two events, call them infantile and adult, and then ask, How can the former present act at a distance upon the present one and provide a model for it when all effectiveness is received retrospectively from the later present? Would not repetition come to subsist on this model solely as the illusory power of a solipsistic subject? (DR, 104). His proposal is that we
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think the succession of presents as implicated in a virtual coexistence of perception and memory: “Repetition is constituted not from one present to another, but between the two coexistent series that these presents form in function of the virtual object (object = x)” (DR, 105). Disguise and displacement cannot be explained by repression because repression is not primary; rather, death, forgetting, and repetition are the primary terms: “We do not repeat because we repress, we repress because we repeat” (DR, 105). Much of this gets confused in theorizing on repetition—as well as in our own heads—owing to the fact that the transcendental form of time is not normally perceptible to us. But it is this confusion that generates the erroneous view that the virtual can simply be dismissed as an illusion; in truth, the contrary is the case, and it is the pure past that denounces the illusion (of a perpetual and self-same present). The pure past assumes the form of an illusion only and precisely when it is conceived of as a mythical former present (DR, 109). It is for this reason that Deleuze posits Thanatos as lying at the base of memory: it is opposed not to the “truth” of the essences and events of involuntary memory but rather to their erotic illusory form (Combray treated as a former present, for example). The question has to be asked, however: Might there still be too much Eros in the discoveries and revelations of involuntary memory?

In the later edition of Proust and Signs, Deleuze reworks the movement of time in a section entitled “The Three Machines.” It is here that we find the reasons for conceiving of time as the forced movement of a certain death instinct. The stakes of this can be made clear when coupled with the presentation of the syntheses of time and the reworking of the death instinct carried out in Difference and Repetition.

Memory and the Death Instinct

What are the lessons in life, love, and death that Proust’s narrator learns from his apprenticeship in signs? The easiest lessons he learns are bound up with the worldly signs. This is owing to their shallowness or vacuity, for example, friendship (the hollowness of its conversations) and the fashions and habits of society. Harder lessons come from experiences of love and death. Such sensuous signs contain an essential ambivalence, since they sometimes bring joy and at other times only great pain. In the case of love its most painful signs are connected to repetitions. Not only do we repeat our past loves, it is also the case that any present love repeats the moment of the dissolution and anticipates its own end.19 It is a psychoanalytic error, however, to suppose that the narrator simply repeats in his series of loves his initial or original love for his mother: “It is true that our loves repeat our feelings for the mother, but the latter already repeats other loves, which we have not ourselves experienced” (PS, 72). The error is to suppose that the object can be treated as an ultimate or an original term and that it can be assigned a fixed place. This is to lose sight of the fact that the object exists only as a virtual object.20 This explains why our loves
do not refer back in any simple or straightforward sense to our mother: “It is simply that the mother occupies a certain place in relation to the virtual object in the series which constitute our present,” and the object is subject to perpetual displacement and disguise (DR, 105). There is simply the “object = x.” Love is not explicated by the ones we love or by the ephemeral states that govern the moments of being in love (Proust, SLT, 3:933–34). Each love in our series of successive loves contributes a difference but one that is already contained “in a primordial image that we unceasingly reproduce at different levels and repeat as the intelligible law of all our loves” (PS, 68). The transitions between our different loves find their law not in memory but in forgetting (Proust, SLT, 3:940). The identity of the beloved is governed by contingency, and our realized loves depend on extrinsic factors, occasions, and circumstances (PS, 76). Equally important are the lessons to be learned from giving up on a spurious objectivist interpretation of things in the world (people and places): “The reasons for loving never inhere in the person loved but refer to ghosts, to Third Parties, to Themes that are incarnated . . . according to complex laws” (PS, 31). The narrator must learn that avowal is not essential to love, since all our freedom will be lost “if we give the object the benefit of the signs and significations that transcend it” (PS, 31). To be faithful to love it is necessary to be harsh, cruel, and deceptive with those we love. Sensuous signs present so many traps for us, inviting us to seek their meaning in the object that bears or emits them, in which “the possibility of failure, the abandonment of interpretation, is like the worm in the fruit” (PS, 32). Joy can be had from all of this, from the lessons of life, love, and death, and it is a joy that resides in comprehension.

But what are we to make of the shattering realization of the brute fact of death in an experience of involuntary memory? Can death be put to work like life and love? The painful realization of the full force of the grandmother’s being dead gives rise to an encounter with the idea of death (SLT 2:783–85). This death seems to haunt life, to highlight the contingent nature of our affections and attachments, our loves, and to rob life of any enduring meaning or sense. How can thought work the idea of death, supposing it can? There is no doubt that this episode presents the narrator of Proust’s novel with a serious challenge:

I was determined not merely to suffer, but to respect the original form of my suffering as it had suddenly come upon me unawares, and I wanted to continue to feel it, following its own laws, whenever that contradiction of survival and annihilation, so strangely intertwined within me, returned. I did not know whether I should one day distil a grain of truth from this painful and for the moment incomprehensible impression, but I knew that if I ever did extract some truth from life, it could only be from such an impression and from none other, an impression at once so particular and so spontaneous, which had neither been traced by my intelligence nor attenuated by my pusillanimity, but which death itself, the sudden revelation of death, striking
like a thunderbolt, had carved within me, along a supernatural and inhuman graph, in a double and mysterious furrow. (As for the state of forgetfulness of my grandmother in which I had been living until that moment, I could not even think of clinging to it to find some truth; since in itself it was nothing but a negation, a weakening of the faculty of thought incapable of recreating a real moment of life and obliged to substitute for it conventional and neutral images.) (SLT 2:786–87)

For Deleuze, the key to producing an adequate reading of this experience is to refer back to the phrase “a little piece of time in its pure state.” In Difference and Repetition he proposes that the Proustian formula has a double referent: on one level it refers to the pure past, in the in-itself of time (passive noumenal synthesis, which remains erotic), but on another level it refers to the “pure and empty form of time,” or the synthesis of the death instinct (DR, 122). The encounter with and exploration of the pure past is erotic because it finds its basis in our need for attachment (to materiality, for example, such as a face or a place). As a power and a desire it holds the “secret of an insistence in all our existence” (DR, 85). But it is not the last word or the final synthesis of time. In the “note on the Proustian experiences” the claim that the fragment of time in its pure state refers to both the pure past and the empty form of time comes at the end of a long paragraph that connects the in-itself of Combray (an example of “the object = x”) with the memory of the grandmother. Deleuze writes: “Eros is constituted by the resonance, but overcomes itself in the direction of the death instinct which is constituted by the amplitude of a forced movement” (DR, 122). What is this “forced movement”?

In the first edition of Proust and Signs the grandmother episode is discussed but the challenge it poses is not confronted. It takes place in the book’s second chapter on “Signs and Truth” at the point when Deleuze recognizes that sensuous signs can be both signs of alteration and disappearance: there is not only plenitude but also absence and the void of time lost forever. The episode of the memory of the grandmother is in principle no different from the madeleine or the cobblestones (PS, 19–20). And yet the experience of the former is shattering and puts the Proustian vision of the redemption of time to the test.

In the chapter entitled “The Three Machines,” Deleuze seeks to show that in Proust’s novel there are several “orders of truth” and no simple or single truth. The first two orders have already been touched upon. These are the orders of reminiscences and essences, of time regained through the production of lost time (it is a paradox of lost time that it is produced as lost), and of general laws extracted from the encounter with the sensuous signs (signs of love, for example, which give way to the idea of love). The third order is the order of universal alteration of death, including the idea of death and the production of catastrophe. This is the order that constitutes the long final finish of the book, the aging of the guests of Mme de Guermantes’s salon, where we encounter sublime disguises and senilities, the distortion of time in matter (distortion of features, the fragmentation
of gestures, the loss of coordination of muscles, the formation of moss, lichen, and patches
of mold on bodies, etc.). All that exists is corroded and distorted by time. Time gives life
and time gives death.

This final order, which is encountered in the memory of the grandmother, presents
an acute problem. This final order fits into the other two orders and would seem to negate
any principle of meaning or value. Is not death lurking away in each and every moment?
When the narrator leans down to unbutton his boot everything begins exactly as in ec-
stasy, the expectation of the strange return with the present moment set in resonance
with an earlier one. But very quickly this joy turns into an intolerable anguish as the
pairing of the two moments breaks down and yields to a disappearance of the earlier one
“in a certainty of death and nothingness” (PS, 157). Reconciliation must be found and
the contradiction solved between the third and the first two orders. In the third order we
are presented with an “idea of death” as that which uniformly imbues all fragments and
carries them toward a universal end. We seem to be confronted with that perennial truism
and existential banality that death robs life of all meaning. But this insight has to be
shown to derive from an optical illusion or effect, just like the optical effect of the pure
past. The contradiction is not resolved in the memory of the grandmother. Whereas the
first two orders ultimately prove productive in the apprenticeship, the latter would seem
to be absolutely catastrophic and unproductive. Hence Deleuze’s question: “Can we con-
ceive a machine capable of extracting something from this kind of painful impression and
of producing certain truths?” As long as we cannot, the work of art encounters the gravest
objections.

Deleuze seeks to show that this idea of death consists of a certain effect of time. The
idea of death must lead to a truth of time being disclosed, one that enables us to conquer
the erotic effect of memory. What is the specific effect of time that produces the idea of
death? Deleuze argues as follows. With two given states of the same person—the earlier
that we remember, the present that we experience—the impression of aging from one to
the other has the effect of pushing the earlier moment into a remote, improbable past.
The movement of time from past to present is “doubled by a forced movement of greater
amplitude” that sweeps away the two moments, stresses the gap between them, and
pushes the past far back in time. It is quite different from the echo of resonance produced
in the madeleine experience, because in this experience we are presented with an infinite
dilation of time and not an extreme contraction of it as with the former experience. This
leads Deleuze to propose that the idea of death be treated “less as a severance than an
effect of mixture or confusion” in which the “amplitude of the forced movement is as
much taken up by the living as by the dead; all are dying, half dead, or racing to the
grave” (PS, 159). This half-death, however, is also of significance in an unexpected way,
a way that the narrator cannot see at the time of the experience of the involuntary mem-
ory of the grandmother and the shocking confrontation with the fact of her death: “At
the heart of the excessive amplitude of the movement, we can describe men as monstrous

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beings,’’ that is, as those who occupy in time a much more considerable “place” than the one reserved for them in space. When viewed under the optics of time, human beings become transformed into giants, plunged into the years and periods remote from one another in time. How is it possible to surmount the objection or contradiction of death? Deleuze argues that death ceases to be an objection to the extent that it can be integrated into an “order of production, thus giving it its place in the work of art” (PS, 160). More specifically, he writes: “The forced movement of great amplitude is a machine that produces the effect of withdrawal or the idea of death.” The encounter with death is another way in which the force and sensation of time are disclosed and experienced. The idea of death, therefore, necessarily relies upon an optics and a perspectivism. It occupies a place within life. It is part of the delay or the meanwhile (entre-temps) of the “event” that belongs, strictly speaking, neither to time nor to eternity. In this delay and “meanwhile,” we have already died and will die innumerable times. It is not, therefore, so much that the dead become distant from us as time goes by, but rather that we become distant from them: the dead die for us through our occupying a place within the forced movement of time. This might explain why at one point in Difference and Repetition Deleuze says that this delay is the pure form of time (DR, 124).

The idea of death is produced as an effect of time. In Difference and Repetition Deleuze writes: “The second synthesis of time [the pure past] points beyond itself in the direction of a third synthesis which denounces the illusion of the in-itself as still a correlate of representation. The in-itself of the past and the repetition in reminiscence constitute a kind of ‘effect,’ like an optical effect, or rather the erotic effect of memory itself” (DR, 88). It is not necessary here to explore the nature of this third synthesis, the pure empty form of time. My principal concern is with Deleuze’s acknowledgement of the curious effect of memory. Deleuze interprets “time empty and out of joint” (time stripped of any actual, empirical content) as “precisely the death instinct,” which, furthermore, does not “enter into a cycle with Eros, but testifies to a completely different synthesis” (DR, 111). The correlation between Eros and memory is replaced by one between “a great amnesiac” and a “death instinct desexualized and without love” (DR, 111). Deleuze takes issue with Freud’s positing of a death instinct existing prior to this desexualized energy. Freud did this for two reasons, according to Deleuze: first, because he allowed a dualistic and conflictual model to preside over his theory of drives, and second, because he relied on a material model for his theory of repetition: “Determined as the . . . return of the living to inanimate matter, death has only an extrinsic, scientific, and objective definition” (DR, 111). In contrast to this, Deleuze proposes a quite different conception of death, for example, as “the last form of the problematic, the source of problems and questions” and as the “non-being where every affirmation is nourished” (DR, 112). This means that death cannot “appear in the objective model of an indifferent inanimate matter to which the living would ‘return’; it is present in the living in the form of a subjective and differentiated experience endowed with its prototype. It is not a material state; on the contrary,
having renounced all matter, it corresponds to a pure form—the empty form of time” (DR, 112). The error of the Freudian model is that it reduces death to an objective determination of matter in which repetition finds its ultimate principle in an undifferentiated material model, “beyond the displacements and disguises of a secondary or opposed difference” (DR, 111–12). Deleuze insists that the structure of the unconscious is not conflictual or oppositional but rather “questioning and problematizing.” And repetition is not a bare and brute power but woven from disguise and displacement; it does not exist apart from its constitutive elements. Deleuze proposes, therefore, that we not posit a death instinct that is distinguishable from Eros either in terms of a difference in kind between two forces or by a difference in rhythm or amplitude between two movements. To suggest as much would imply that difference is simply given, and so is life. Thanatos is indistinguishable from the desexualization of Eros, and “there is no analytic difference between” the two.

Deleuze’s engagement with the motifs of Proust’s great novel is significant for our understanding of the ways in which memory gets figured in his thinking. His reading differs markedly from an entire French (and not only French) tradition that traps the Proustian search in a depressive cycle of nostalgia and regression, spinning in the vertigo of the virtual and seeking refuge from the demands of life and the future in the melancholia of lost time. This appreciation of Proust can be found at work, for example, in the readings advanced by Beckett, for whom Proust’s science is the science of affliction;21 by Georges Bataille, for whom the project is one of attaining a state of total and pure dissatisfaction;22 and by Julia Kristeva, for whom the project is one morbid, and erotically perverse, attachment to death and the past.23 In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari claim that Proust’s aim was not to regain time or to force memories back into existence, but rather to become “a master of speeds to the rhythm of his asthma.”24 In their first collaboration, Anti-Oedipus, they read Proust’s novel as a “schizoid work par excellence” and as a “great enterprise in schizoanalysis.”25 The Oedipus complex is posited as a virtual complex; it is a “reactional formation . . . a reaction to desiring-production.”26 In this work, Freud’s death drive is taken to be a transcendent principle caught up in a subjective system of ego-representation, in which the essence of life is conceived in the form of death itself: “This turning against life is also the last way in which a depressive and exhausted libido can go on surviving, and dream that it is surviving.”27 For them, death is to be approached as part of a desiring-machine; it can only be evaluated in terms of its functioning and the system of its energetic conversions, never as an abstract principle. Death “occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as passage or becoming.”28

When Deleuze attacks memory, it is typically a specific figuration he has in mind. For example when a becoming is declared to be “anti-memory,” as in A Thousand Plateaus, it
is the punctual organization found in standard genealogies that is meant. Such arborescent schemas rest on hierarchical systems with centers of subjectification functioning in terms of an organized memory. Here channels of transmission are preestablished, the system preexists the individual, and any deviation from the norms of the system is treated as an aberration. Is it possible to construct an architecture of memory that would not appeal to a center point, to a fixed point of origin, or to a preestablished end? It could be claimed that this is precisely the role the concept of the “rhizome” is designed to play by Deleuze and Guattari, in which the autochthonous is revealed as the always becoming-heterogeneous of the earth (the becoming of nondenumerable multiplicities, peoples to come, and the anomalous, for example). This is why in his second volume on cinema Deleuze posits a “world-memory” conceived as a continuum of life characterized by metamorphoses that cannot be restricted to a single character, family, or group.²⁹ As Adorno noted: “The category of the root, the origin, is a category of dominion.”³⁰ And as Derrida noted, the concept of politics rarely announces itself without an attachment of the “State” to the family of man and a schema of filiation.³¹ If our desire is to think beyond the law of genus and of species or race, then we also need to come up with a different construction, a different language, of memory. As Deleuze’s work evolves, it becomes clear that the most important impulse informing his critical engagements with memory is a (micro-)political one.
PART 2

How Memory Works
I. THE INNER SELF
From its early days the place and function of memory has been central to the theory and technique of psychoanalysis, though the picture of how memory functions from a psychoanalytic point of view has undergone many transformations. From memories that arose from the hypnotic treatment of adults, Freud began with the notion that hysteria was caused by the sexual molestation of children. As is well known, Freud later felt that in this early work on hysteria, he had overvalued reality and undervalued fantasy.1 In his later work, the main emphasis passed away from actual sexual abuse as a cause of hysteria to fantasies of abuse. Today, the clinical view would overvalue neither reality nor fantasy, but accept that there is probably a complex interweaving of both fantasy and reality in the processes of memory. Though this interweaving process may complicate judgments about the reality of past events, it also provides for the richness and complexity of the psychoanalytic task.

In his early paper on hysteria, written as he was moving away from the hypnotic method toward psychoanalysis, Freud had already outlined a complex picture of the nature of memory. Thus he emphasized that it is not the original trauma of seduction itself that causes subsequent hysterical symptoms, but its reproduction in symbolic form in unconscious memories:

Our view then is that infantile sexual experiences are the fundamental precondition for hysteria, are, as it were, the disposition for it and that it is they which create the hysterical symptoms, but that they do not do so immediately, but remain without effect to begin with and only exercise a pathogenic action later, when they have been aroused after puberty in the form of unconscious memories.2
The trauma thus acquires new meaning after the event, and after genital maturity, by the rearrangement of memory traces. That is to say that experiences, impressions, and memory traces are revised at a later date to fit in with new experiences, or with the attainment of a new developmental stage. In addition, adolescence has a particularly crucial place for such rearrangements of memory traces, both in normal and abusive situations, as it is a time when genital maturity is accomplished. Of course, it is now known that in addition to the delayed effect of sexual trauma on the adult, the child may also be directly and immediately affected by abuse, sometimes with very damaging and long-lasting results. That is, there are certain early experiences that remain constantly pathogenic, with rather little rearrangement in the memory.

While psychoanalytic views on memory have been enriched by recent psychological research, psychoanalytic memory—the memory uncovered during an analytic session—remains strange and complex, involving a particular form of temporality irreducible to the processes of memory studied by cognitive science. The notion of memory that I shall sketch out, is one not so much linked to the conscious thinking subject, the subject of conscious reason or that of empirical psychology, but rather one linked to a different kind of subject—the psychoanalytic subject—marked by the activity of the unconscious and with a complex and elusive structure.

These considerations arise directly from the experience of working with patients in a psychoanalytic setting as well as from the bedrock of Freud’s theories of memory. A common task in the analytic encounter is to wonder where the patient’s memories of their past, or their history, fit into the clinical picture. Analysts vary with regard to how they approach this task. There are those who insist on taking a detailed history before beginning the analysis so as to have some clear bearings before patient and analyst are immersed in the analytic task. There are others who prefer to dispose of memory and desire and begin with a blank sheet, as it were, to see where the patient goes, without having any preconceived historical knowledge. And there are those, probably the majority, who prefer to work with a certain amount of history taken from an initial interview and then allow memories of the past to evolve from the analytic work.

There are further differences in analytic technique with regard to how to make sense of any memories that arise during the session. Some analysts work predominantly with the here-and-now, with a focus on what is going on between patient and analyst in the present, because they consider that what is alive in the session is mainly if not solely the present interaction. Whatever memories arise are seen in the context of the current patient/analyst relationship rather than leading to any detailed exploration of past relationships. This approach contrasts with the more traditional one, where the analyst tries to use the patient’s memories to reconstruct in detail aspects of their past life. There is no clear evidence about which approach is more or less effective. I myself hold that it is of vital importance for the analytic patient to develop a historical awareness, but that this is a highly complex matter, not easily susceptible to empirical research, and not something
that can be simplified into the analyst just using or not using here-and-now interpretations. Rather, it requires both analyst and patient to examine the way that the past weaves organically with the present. Indeed, I would suggest that one could make a simple yet perhaps vital distinction between the past and history. The past only becomes history by means of a special sort of undertaking, an inquiry, whether this be a psychoanalytic or a historical inquiry, involving recording what subjects have remembered and said about those past events. These remembrances are then woven into an elaborate narrative account. The past remains fixed until it is rethought and redescribed at a later date as history, as Freud showed in his concept of Nachträglichkeit, (deferred action). Historical inquiry is a way of freeing the past from its mere pastness.

The kind of historical material with which the psychoanalyst is concerned seems at first sight rather strange, as it consists of multi-layered fragments of memory, odd bits of debris from the past, dream elements, gaping absences, convincing and also unconvincing stories, a history of discontinuities and unresolved questions, of traumas, things unsaid, and memories actively destroyed. Thus the psychoanalytic past is a complicated world, made up of both what can be recalled and, more significantly, what has not been understood, felt, or transformed by the subject—that which evades or eludes the subject.

Psychoanalysis is constantly dealing with ambiguities about the past. A literal and “objective” knowledge of everything that took place in the past is neither possible nor necessary for understanding the subject’s history, though I shall later discuss some ways of assessing the status of recovered memories in therapy. However, the kind of history with which psychoanalysis predominantly deals is not that easy to capture; it often remains elusive. Jean Laplanche has described this as

a kind of history of the unconscious, or rather of its genesis; a history with discontinuities, in which all the moments of burial and resurgence are the most important of all; a history, it might be said, of repression, in which the subterranean currents are described in as much detail as, if not more detail than, the manifest character traits.

I would describe this psychoanalytic history as a history of layers. It is full of shifting strata, fragments of living reality, absences more than presences, a mutilated yet still living past, involving the elusive presence of the unconscious. Some layers from the past follow on directly from one another in time, while others merge, and yet others stand out in apparent isolation. Free association is a method of discovery in the clinical encounter that is particularly sensitive to this kind of history, as it brings to the surface elements from many different layers, without prioritizing any particular layer. Putting the associations into some sort of understandable linear narrative—the history of events—is also part of the clinical work, but is secondary to the construction of a history of layers, which is the main “generator” of new meanings and connections. There is a need in a session to develop some kind of narrative over time, but also to allow associations, which may mix
up memory and perception, the past and the present, to develop from many layers of the mind.

Before giving a number of brief clinical examples to illustrate the various ways that memory comes into the clinical encounter and thereby clarify my picture of psychoanalytic memory, I will turn to consider in detail Freud’s key contributions to understanding memory, some of which I have already touched upon, insofar as they remain basic to my theme.

Freud and Memory

When Joseph Breuer and Freud began working with hysterical patients, using hypnosis and the power of suggestion, they urged the patient to recall past “pathogenic” memories, which were seen to be the root of the contemporary hysterical symptoms. Freud wrote that at first sight it seemed extraordinary that events experienced in the distant past could still continue to operate so intensely; that unconscious memories were not deactivated, or laid to rest, by the usual processes of forgetting. “Our observations have shown . . . that the memories which have become the determinants of hysterical phenomena persist for a long time with astonishing freshness and with the whole of their affective colouring.” Such pivotal memories correspond to past traumas that have not been sufficiently worked over by three kinds of processes. The first is abreaction, where the subject reacts to the events in deeds or words and with the appropriate emotion; without an appropriate reaction of this sort, the memories retain their traumatic quality. The second method is for the subject to bring the traumatic memories into association with other, less traumatic thoughts, feelings and memories: “After an accident, for instance, the memory of the danger and the (mitigated) repetition of the fright becomes associated with the memory of what happened afterwards—rescue and the consciousness of present safety.” Third, the general tendency for memories to fade away and be forgotten wears away the intensity of the once traumatic memories. Furthermore, not only are there contemporary effects from past memories of trauma, but the memories themselves can become traumatic in their own right, acting as a “foreign body” continuing to produce traumatic effects.

These theoretical considerations remained for some time the basis for the psychoanalytic method, which became at first a search for pathogenic memories, with an attempt to find ways of disposing of their traumatic effects through putting “strangulated affects” into words and by subjecting the memories to “associative correction” by bringing them into consciousness. Hysterics who suffer from reminiscences could thus be treated by the “work of recollection.” Already, the physician had become a witness to past events coming to life and then being laid to rest. Through the treatment process, past events could be laid to rest, in that they are no longer so fixed, painful, or repetitious.
The psychoanalytic method subsequently developed by Freud aimed to remove symptoms and replace them with conscious thoughts, but also to

repair all the damages to the patient’s memory. . . . It follows from the nature of the facts which form the material of psychoanalysis that we are obliged to pay as much attention in our case histories to the purely human and social circumstances of our patients as to the somatic data and the symptoms of the disorder.10

The analyst thus pays attention to the significant events of everyday life, past and present. The day-to-day task of recovering small details of the “human and social circumstances of our patients” frees the mind and defeats trauma; recovering lost history is therapeutic. Restoring lost links to the past produces relief, liberating the patient from some of their burdensome past.

In his late paper “Constructions in Analysis,” Freud returned to historical issues after a lifetime of psychoanalytic experience, bringing new and radical insights to the nature of the historical dimension. He describes how the work of analysis aims at helping the patient to give up repressions belonging to early development and replace them with more mature reactions.11 In order to accomplish this task, the patient must recollect forgotten experiences, together with the emotions attached to them. The raw material provided by the patient out of which lost memories are recovered includes fragments of memories in dreams, ideas produced by free association in which we can discover allusions to the repressed experiences and derivatives of the suppressed emotions, and hints of repetitions of the affects belonging to the repressed material found in actions, both inside and outside the analytic session; the transferential relationship toward the analyst particularly favors the return of the emotional connections between past and present.

While the patient’s task is to remember, that of the analyst is to make out or “construct” what has been forgotten from the traces left behind by the repressed material. Though analyst and patient have different tasks, the work of construction is a joint enterprise. Freud compares this work of construction, or reconstruction, to an

archaeologist’s excavation of some dwelling-place which has been destroyed and buried or of some ancient edifice. The two processes are in fact identical, except that the analyst works under better conditions and has more material at his command to assist him, since what he is dealing with is not something destroyed [nicht um ein zerristörtes Objekt] but something that is still alive.12

That is, the analyst is dealing with a live object, not a destroyed one. Like the archaeologist who imagines the walls of a building from the remaining foundations and from the debris and traces of the past, the analyst draws inferences from the fragments of memories,
associations, and behavior of the patient. Both have to face the difficult issue of determining the level or layer to which the material belongs. But compared to the archaeological object, the psychical object, whose early history the analyst, according to Freud, is trying to recover, is better preserved:

Here we are regularly met by a situation which with the archaeological object occurs only in such rare circumstances as those of Pompeii or the tomb of Tut’ankhamun. All of the essentials are preserved; even things that seem completely forgotten are present somehow and somewhere, and have merely been buried and made inaccessible to the subject. Indeed, it may be doubted whether any psychical structure can really be the victim of total destruction.13

As Laplanche pointed out, in his paper on constructions in psychoanalysis, Freud was highlighting the kind of history with which psychoanalysis deals, one “which is at one and the same time a cataclysm (like the engulfment of Pompeii) and a permanent preservation (like the burial of Tutankhamen’s objects in his tomb.)”14 I would add that one can also see how psychoanalysis does not deal with a cognitive form of memory, that is, with something that can be consciously or factually known as such, but with a strange, constructed reality, half memory, half fiction. It may also be the case that with the more psychotic patient there may indeed be a total destruction of parts of the psychical structure, reflecting a profound disturbance in the way that the subject attempts to construct their world after the psychotic breakdown.

Freud’s paper continues by differentiating analytic interpretations from analytic constructions. The former apply to a single element of the patient’s material such as an association, while constructions lay before the patient a piece of their early history which has been forgotten. If nothing further develops from a construction, we may infer that we have made a mistaken one. New material allows us to make better constructions or, one might add, hypotheses. The patient’s acceptance of a construction may be of no value without some additional and indirect confirmation of its correctness, such as the bringing up of new memories, or fresh associations. Every construction is an incomplete one, as it covers only a small fragment of forgotten events; and each individual construction is a conjecture that awaits examination, confirmation, or rejection.15

What follows is probably more controversial and certainly resonates with postmodern debates about the nature of the past. Freud writes that the path that leads from the analyst’s construction can end in the patient’s confirming recollection, but just as possible a result is the patient’s conviction of the truth of the construction; and this conviction of truth may be just as therapeutic as the recapturing of a lost memory. There may be a danger in relying too heavily on this sense of conviction, for it may lead the patient to accept what comes up in analysis too readily. Yet this view also emphasizes that the analyst is often less concerned with all the actual events that happened in the past than with what
the subject has made of past experiences, that is, with psychical rather than material reality, or with what Freud called “historical” rather than “material” truth.\textsuperscript{16}

What can be inferred from the notion that the conviction of the truth of a construction is just as therapeutic as the recovery of an actual memory is that both patients and analysts do not have to know all about a past event for it to have significant consequences. The status of the past is problematical, rather than straightforward. We often know that an event of some kind has happened, but will never know all the details about it. There will always be limitations on the documentary evidence. For example, we still do not know for certain who killed President John F. Kennedy, and why he was killed. We will probably never know, but we do know that he was killed, that Lee Harvey Oswald was the most likely candidate as assassin, and that the event and all the circumstances surrounding the event were significant. We have a powerful conviction of the importance of the events, despite, or perhaps because of, the mystery surrounding them. For those alive at the time of the assassination, it has become a nodal point in their memory, organizing the recollection of other events; it has been transformed into myth, a story of tragic proportions. But the enigma of the perpetrator remains.

Such enigmas about the past are part and parcel of psychic development. There is much we can never know about what “really happened” in early development. Indeed, psychoanalysis is constantly dealing with ambiguities about the past. A literal and “objective” knowledge of everything that took place in the past, along the lines of cognitive memory, is neither possible nor necessary for understanding the subject’s history.

One can already see hints of history as construction in the Freud-Fliess correspondence written in 1896, a time contemporaneous with the paper on hysteria from which I have already quoted. Freud describes in a letter how memory traces are constantly being rearranged from time to time in accordance with fresh circumstances, a process that he called “retranscription.”\textsuperscript{17} A year later, he described the role of Nachträglichkeit, translated by Strachey as “deferred action,” in which early memories and experiences are revised and rearranged at a later date to fit in with fresh experiences or with new developmental stages. The constant rearrangement of memories creates history.

In his 1899 paper on screen memories, Freud questions whether

we have any memories at all from our childhood: memories relating to our childhood may be all that we possess. Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as they were but as they appeared at the later periods when the memories were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not . . . emerge; they were formed at that time.\textsuperscript{18}

It was only some years later in the Wolf Man case that Freud returned to this notion when he emphasized how a scene from early life can become traumatic later, and how
Nachträglichkeit has the effect of making the patient disregard time. Thus Freud writes of the Wolf Man:

At the age of one and a half the child receives an impression to which he is unable to react adequately; he is only able to understand it and to be moved by it when the impression is revived in him at the age of four; and only twenty years later, during the analysis, is he able to grasp with his conscious mental processes what was going on in him. The patient justifiably disregards the three periods of time, and puts his present ego into the situation which is so long past.19

André Green vividly describes the Freudian notion of time central to the psychoanalytic understanding of the past in discussion with Gregorio Kohon. He argues that processes related to time are those that escape observation and most of them have to be deduced retrospectively. Why? Because they took place intrapsychically, reorganizing the results of perception, affects, phantasies, wishes, etc. This is the basis for transference to occur. At the end of his life, Freud arrives at the conclusion that he has to give up the recovery of infantile amnesia, that some traumas have happened before the age of two or two-and-a-half, which cannot be recovered by memory; it can only be acted out or given an hallucinatory expression. So we have to lean on construction. Reconstruction means that you’re going to find what was the real set of events which lead to the neurosis, but neurosis doesn’t work like that, it isn’t created that way. It develops in many ways, going forward, backward, mixing up people and events.20

Green is referring here to Freud’s paper on construction, in analysis that suggests Freud’s complex view of history. The work of construction aims less to discover objective facts about the patient’s past than to understand the impact of the past on the present. Thinking historically in the analytic context is about establishing a connection between past and present ideas and feelings, through examining the traces of the past and their effect in the present. The connection between past and present involves after-the-event understanding. This kind of understanding connects past and present and involves constant rearrangement of past and present realities. Clinical judgment, based upon plausible evidence, comes in when looking at the nature of the past/present interaction, for example in judging whether the patient is defensive, nostalgic, or realistically facing past events.21 Such judgments are complex and cannot be reduced to one narrow focus.

Freud, Origin of Memory, Writing, and the Trace

The trace is something that survives in the present but stands for something in the past; the trace survives and through it one retraces the past. But the trace is fragile and enigmatic, its survival often fortuitous. The past as we know it, then, consists of fragile,
enigmatic traces left by the human subject in various places—documents, oral testimony, fleeting memories, fragments of buildings. Our knowledge of the past is only ever that of a knowledge of traces, or even of traces of traces.

Elsewhere, I have used the analogy of traces left in a ploughed field to illustrate something about the complex and elusive structure of the human subject. Applying this analogy further, one may think of a field in the countryside, perhaps recently ploughed. The farmer may or may not be visible at the moment you come across the field, but he has certainly left traces of his work. Across the field run a number of paths; some of them intersect one another, not necessarily in any order. The field can be used to cultivate a number of different crops, or can be used in a variety of ways. If you use special techniques, it may be possible to detect how the field was used in the past, where previous crops were made and old crops sewn, or where the field may have covered over a previous settlement. The recent activity may even bring to light traces of the past: pottery, bones, or bits of old buildings. The field is like the human subject, with crisscrossing paths and furrows, available for multiple use, a network of traces of activity from the past and present, and holding traces of the past available to be dug up.

The trace appears throughout Freud’s work, from the early *Project for a Scientific Psychology* onward, mainly in terms of the place, role, and problems of the existence of the “memory trace,” which refers to the way in which experiences are inscribed upon the memory. The nature of memory, as we have seen, remained crucial to Freud’s theory and practice, whether in working with patients who cannot remember past events or suffer from remembering the past as in traumatic neurosis (or what is now called post-traumatic stress disorder), or in theorizing about the nature of the psyche. As he put it in the *Project*:

A main characteristic of nervous tissue is memory: that is, quite generally, a capacity for being permanently altered by single occurrences. . . . A psychological theory deserving any consideration must furnish an explanation of “memory.”

As Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis point out, Freud’s theory of the memory trace usually has little to do with any empiricist notion of a memory impression resembling a corresponding reality, that is, with a Cartesian model of the mind as reflecting the outside world. Instead, Freud offers a complicated model of memory traces as being deposited in different systems. In the *Project*, the memory trace is an arrangement of facilitations or reductions in resistance to the passage of excitation, so organized that one pathway through the neurons is followed in preference to another. The main problem for any theory of memory is to account for how the psychical apparatus can both retain permanent impressions and yet also be able to receive fresh impressions.

Jacques Derrida has written a classic paper, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” that both sheds light on Freud’s theory of memory and provides a grounding for Derrida’s own theory of writing, itself to become the basis for much postmodern thought. Derrida
comments that Freud deals with the issue of how to account for the permanence of the memory trace by forging the hypothesis of “contact-barriers” between neurons (anticipating the subsequent discovery of synapses) and le frayage (breaching), the French translation of Bahnung, or facilitation. Bahnung is literally path-breaking, the breaking open of a path, Bahn.

In his Project for a Scientific Psychology, Freud describes two kinds of neurons, the permeable (phi) neurons, which offer no resistance to any nervous energy or charge to nerve stimulation and thus retain no trace, and the other (psi) neurons, which oppose any charge and act as contact-barriers to excitation, thereby offering the possibility of representing memory. An equality of resistance to breaching, or the equivalence of the breaching forces, would eliminate any preference in the choice of the route of excitation and would thus paralyze memory. It is the difference between breaches (known as facilitations) that is the true origin of memory. Only this difference enables a pathway to be preferred. Memory is represented by the differences in facilitations between the resisting psi neurons. As Derrida puts it:

We must not then say that breaching without difference is insufficient for memory; it must be stipulated that there is no breaching without difference. Trace as memory is not a pure breaching that might be appropriated at any time as simple presence; it is rather the ungraspable and invisible difference between breaches.26

Derrida comments that the rest of the Project will depend upon a radical invocation of the principle of difference.

Derrida also highlights another fundamental theme in the Project, concerning the deferral of nervous energy. The nervous system protects itself against dangerous amounts of excitation when a demand is made to take some specific kind of action. It does this by maintaining a sufficient store or reserve that can be subsequently used. That is, the nervous system defers immediate discharge. Derrida points out that we have here Freud’s major discovery of the effect of deferral, which will later become deferred action, or Nachträglichkeit.

Derrida merged difference and deferral into one word, différance, which encapsulated two meanings—the spatial meaning of a difference between elements or qualities, and the temporal notion of delay and deferral. The origin of memory and of the psyche as a memory in general, conscious or unconscious, can only be described by taking into account the difference between the facilitation thresholds. There is no facilitation without difference and no difference without a trace. All the differences involved in the production of unconscious traces can be interpreted as moments of différance, in the sense of placing in reserve. The reality of the deferred effect implies that the Freudian temporality involved in psychical life is not one that can be applied to the phenomenology of consciousness or of presence; instead, it implies, as André Green has argued, a very different notion of
time, one that undermines the centrality of presence. Derrida, deeply influenced by Freud’s overturning of the central place of consciousness in man’s psyche, offers a complex deconstruction of what constitutes the history of Western thought and its domination by the function of presence, by challenging the pivotal role of consciousness in this history.

Derrida uses Freud’s late model of the psychical apparatus as a writing machine to help deconstruct the traditional understanding that writing and texts represent reality. The “mystic writing pad” solves the long-standing issue of how to conceive of the mind as both receptive to new impressions and capable of retaining permanent traces of impressions. The toy Freud refers to has a thin protective sheath of celluloid and a receptive surface of thin waxed paper that sits atop an underlying wax slab. If the covering sheet—the celluloid plus the waxed paper—is lifted off the wax slab, the writing vanishes. The surface of the pad is clear of writing and once again capable of receiving impressions. The wax slab, however, retains a permanent trace of what has been written, which, under a suitable light, can still be read.

Derrida makes several points about the analogy of the wax pad. First of all there are the spatial aspects of the model, a space of writing. The wax slab has a strange, elusive kind of depth, of layers of traces embedded in wax, combining infinite depth with a kind of surface, joining for Derrida two aspects of our existence: infinite depth in the implication of meaning with the absence of any firm foundation. The wax slab also represents the unconscious, with a multitude of layers of traces inscribed on it. There is also the temporal aspect of the model: a time of writing can be represented in the way the writing vanishes every time the close contact is broken between the paper, which receives the stimulus, and the wax slab, which preserves the impression. The coming and going of the writing represents psychic temporality.

In order to make the pad work in space and time, at least two hands are needed, one to make the marks and another to erase them. Derrida uses Freud’s model as a model of his own; one might say that there are two hands, that of Freud and Derrida, both working over the model of the pad, which comes to represent Derrida’s own theory of writing. The human subject finally becomes a “subject of writing,” a subject whose history is written down in the unconscious, and yet whose present is permanently being erased. Writing and erasure become integral to Derrida’s own portrayal of the subject, as does psychoanalysis, with its constant questioning of foundations, and with its infinite depth and elusive surface that undermines the classical concept of the subject. Thus, instead of the classical understanding of the human subject, with its emphasis on presence and consciousness, we have a different kind of human subject, whose past is always being erased, yet can be found somewhere, if only in fragile and elusive traces. The subject’s history is a history of such traces. There is no “full” presence that can be represented; the subject can only construct a partial picture, or story, with many gaps and discontinuities.
Such a view of the human subject and the role of writing has of course greatly influenced historical and literary studies. It is now commonplace to look for the gaps in a life or a field of study, to be aware of the discontinuities and displacements in the historical evidence. Archives are no longer to be seen as the place where everything comes together in a unified way. As Riccardo Steiner described, the archive reminds us of the mutilations that time and life have created, and the interactions between the life and death drives grounding the processes of memory and preservation. Writing can create a sense of continuity out of the historical material, but this continuity is only partial and provisional, as it is always being reorganized after the event; meaning is always being deferred.

**Memory/History/Clinical Encounter**

In order to illustrate the complex way that memory and history enter into the analytic encounter, I would suggest that there are at least five ways of seeing the past from the clinical perspective. First of all, patients may cling to the past, find it difficult to let go of previously painful experiences, and remain in a dead world of past objects, in perpetual mourning, like Miss Havisham in *Great Expectations*. With great insight, Dickens emphasizes how Miss Havisham’s clinging to the past, to the very day and time at which she was jilted at the altar, has a destructive effect on her ward, Estella, and on Estella’s capacity to form relationships. Miss Havisham lives in a kind of Mad Hatter’s world, where time stands still. Estella is to live out her hatred of men as vengeance for Miss Havisham’s traumatic rejection. While Miss Havisham’s dead relationship to the past is an extreme form of unresolved mourning, there are many other less intense or more focal examples where some aspect of the past remains unresolved, acting like a foreign body within the psyche. I found this in an observation of a normal baby whose development and behavior seemed to have been affected by a previous stillborn baby.

The new baby was conceived soon after the loss, and it was evident that the “shadow” of the dead baby fell between mother and the new baby for some months. This seemed to be revealed when, for example, the mother breast-fed the new baby. The baby was content with the milk and was settled, but then the mother decided to feed him again with a bottle. The baby fought the bottle, then refused to take it, and eventually, becoming more and more distressed, began to scream. He eventually calmed down when the mother put him on her shoulder and comforted him. I speculated that this observation revealed the mother’s anxiety about how she could adapt to her baby and give him what he needed. It was as if she were giving him a “second feeding” with the inanimate bottle, after the comforting breast. It seemed that the bottle was unnecessary, a burden, as if it were nothing to do with the good, spontaneous, and alive feeding. Unconsciously, the extra milk might have been for the dead baby. The pattern of feeding continued with modifications for some months, and there was also a tentativeness between mother and child, as
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if there were always something coming between them. However, a year or so later, the relationship between them was much more spontaneous, probably because by then the mother had fully accepted that her child was going to live.

There are also occasions in an analysis when a piece of unresolved history comes to light and helps the analysis move on. This can be seen in the analysis of an ill adolescent boy, with a history of suicide attempts and self-harm, when his analysis started to get stuck and he began to grow silent. It was only when I began to examine how and why I was being exposed over months to a relentless attempt to deaden me that the analysis moved on. It was as if he could not live without deadening the other, and that this might help account for his fear of living and growing into adulthood. It turned out that he was afraid of leaving home because he thought his parents might collapse into a severe depression. Communication at home seemed to involve a persistent threat of imminent catastrophe. In addition, the boredom of many of the sessions at that time corresponded with how he kept his potency and liveliness away from me. I often experienced a fight to stay alive in the sessions, while all my “nourishment” was being taken away. It appeared that he was living at a price; he could hardly bear being alive to his body and to others, and too much life was unbearable.

It was around this time that an important piece of early history, which had been passed over in the early stages of the analysis, came to light again. His mother had had a miscarriage while she was pregnant with him, yet the pregnancy continued, despite the expulsion of an umbilical cord and fetus. A twin (girl) was aborted. It seemed that the fact that he had survived a dead twin might have been related to his difficulty in staying alive to people. I had already taken up with him his murderousness and violence, of which there had been many examples, but I had not understood the relevance of the dead twin. Using this piece of history enabled the analysis to move on again.

I should clarify that I am not saying that he remembered the dead twin; it was more likely that the fact of the aborted baby, perhaps inadequately mourned, became an integral part of the family’s fantasy life, shaping and distorting their relationships. It is possible that he had some sort of unconscious memory of the family atmosphere concerned with his survival and the twin’s death. But whatever the status of this piece of early history, how much it was remembered or was “hearsay,” the analysis certainly began to move again once it was introduced into the sessions. It is also true to say that I began by considering the here-and-now experience of the analysis, such as the deadening atmosphere recreated in the sessions. But I then moved away from this immediate experience to the liberating effect of bringing in a piece of actual history.

This last example shows how past and present interact in the immediate transference relationship between analyst and patient. Transference is a process of the actualization of unconscious wishes and desires linked to childhood experiences in the context of the psychoanalytic relationship. The childhood experiences remerge and are experienced as immediate in the relationship with the analyst. The last example links with the second way
in which the past can be viewed clinically, which arises in Freud’s paper “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through,” where Freud posits that patients in analysis may repeat forgotten and repressed experiences rather than remember them and that repeating is a way of remembering.  

As long as the patient is in the treatment he cannot escape from this compulsion to repeat; and in the end we understand this is his way of remembering. We may now ask what it is that he in fact repeats or acts out. The answer is that he repeats everything that had already made its way from the sources of the repressed into his manifest personality—his inhibitions and unserviceable attitudes and his pathological character-traits. He also repeats all his symptoms in the course of the treatment. And now we can see that in drawing attention to the compulsion to repeat we have acquired no new fact but only a more comprehensive view. We have only made it clear to ourselves that the patient’s state of being ill cannot cease with the beginning of the analysis, and that we must treat his illness, not as an event of the past, but as a present-day force. This state of illness is brought, piece by piece, within the field and range of operation of the treatment, and while the patient experiences it as something real and contemporary, we have to do our therapeutic work on it, which consists in a large measure in tracing it back to the past.

Freud thus emphasizes both the need to trace the patient’s experiences back to the past while also working with present-day realities. With my patient, I had to work with the contemporary reality of dead feelings recreated in the consulting room as a result of the transference relationship, which was ultimately linked to the particular experience of a piece of early history.

While remembering in itself was the main aim of analysis in the early years, particularly with the use of hypnosis to induce memories, Freud pointed out that this was a limited way of understanding what takes place in analysis. Instead, there was an interplay between remembering and repeating. Through appropriate handling of repetitive reactions in our sessions, the patient’s compulsion to repeat is turned into a motive for remembering. While abreaction was the aim of the early days of analysis, with the use of hypnosis to facilitate remembering, and was hence liable to doubts about suggestion, the new approach requires “working through” of repeated material, particularly at intense moments of resistance. This makes for a situation in which analysis is not concerned with the positivist desire to conjure up memories of “what actually took place” in the past, but instead involves a complex interaction between processes of repetition and remembering.

The place and power of repetition can be seen most vividly in severely traumatized patients, who may present a horrific history that they tell with little overt feeling. They may describe a massive trauma, such as being abused or surviving torture or war, which may make the analyst feel sad while the patient seems unmoved. If such patients start
treatment, there is the likelihood of an early major enactment of their history in the session, within the analytic relationship. For example, there may be a sudden opting out and abandonment of the treatment, or a major crisis, as if they were gripped by the force of the repetition compulsion. They seem to be subject to their history rather than subjects of their history.

A third way in which the past may be seen in the clinical context is when it is repressed or denied, as if it did not exist, producing gaps in the memory. Such gaps may be potentially recoverable, as in hysteria, or may remain virtually permanent gaps in the psychic structure, as in psychotic states. Freud describes how in hysteria there are inevitable gaps in the memory, and that the patient’s inability to give an ordered case history is characteristic of this form of neurosis. Losing the connections between events, which can hopefully be recovered, can be seen as one end of a clinical spectrum. At the other end, one could place psychotic functioning, where there is, in Wilfred Bion’s sense, a more primitive and powerful attack on linking events. With the latter, the past can be seen as a catastrophic landscape, a war zone, rather than a site for potential recovery. Donald Winnicott covered similar territory when he described the fear of breakdown in the ill patient, a fear of a breakdown that had already been experienced in the past, with the accompanying fear of the original agony the patient went through. Treatment is about looking for the past that is not yet experienced; that is, the original experience of primitive agony, or catastrophe, cannot be laid to rest unless and until the patient’s ego can gather it into present experiences in the analysis. But to do this requires recognition of the unbearable reality of the past experiences.

Experiencing the agony in the psychoanalytic transference relationship, or bearing the unbearable, is a key theme for the treatment of patients who have experienced major traumas such as child abuse. Not infrequently the issue of abuse arises in the analysis when the patient makes a particular kind of emotional impact on the analyst. It would be simplistic to describe the situation as one in which the analyst becomes, in the transference, the abuser. Rather, the analyst often proves to be a disappointment or a failure; there is a breakdown of the usual trusting relationship; something important may be missed. The reasonably empathic atmosphere may suddenly deteriorate, with the ready creation of misunderstandings, which can leave the analyst feeling as if they have somehow mistreated the patient. The abused adult will recreate the emotionally absent parent, the parent who could not bear the child’s pain and vulnerability, and who had left the child with a sense that the environment failed them and that there is a breach or gap in the parenting experience. An unbridgeable gulf may suddenly appear in the present between analyst and patient, which either party may be tempted to deal with by some kind of precipitous action, such as termination of the treatment. Tolerating these intense moments of being, when the sense of parental failure may, within the transference relationship, become repeated intensely, is an important part of the working through of the past trauma. Rather than stick just to the here-and-now experience of the unbridgeable gulf, I
find it helpful to try both to clarify any remembered details of past traumatic situations and also to construct, through linking it with the atmosphere in the session, the particular emotional context in which the trauma occurred.

For example, a patient in her late twenties had experienced sexual abuse as a child from a member of her extended family. The memories of abuse were repressed until quite early on in her analysis, when she became entrenched in a difficult work relationship with a male colleague in authority over her. This was someone whom she had previously rather idealized, and his “mistreatment” of her was a great disappointment to her. Of course, at first I assumed that this was all very relevant transference material, and I took it in this way, with little impact. She carried on feeling used and “abused.” From what I knew of her family background, there were indications of some parental failure. She had had some good experiences, but her parents had tended to leave her and her siblings in the care of relatives from time to time. The fact that she was left in my care in the analysis, that she felt abused at work, that she also had a certain amount of difficulty in dealing with fantasy and dreams, that she was rather controlling of me in the sessions, and that there had been gaps in her parenting, made me suspect some sort of childhood abuse. Eventually, and rather tentatively, I wondered with her if she had actually been sexually molested in some way as a child. My question produced some relief and, soon after, memories of sexual abuse by an uncle, which she had kept to herself as a child and then forgotten. Her sense of grievance toward the work figure retreated, and I became somewhat idealized for a while. It was some time before she could really show her disappointment toward me. This finally came out some months later, after I had to change a session time, with several weeks’ notice, just before a break. She became furious with me that she had to submit to my schedule. She complained that patients had to adapt to analysts, not the other way round. This eventually led to her recalling how she had had to adapt to her parents’ leavings, when they left her in the unsafe care of her uncle. She expressed a deep sense of grievance about what had been done to her, that she had to be too responsible as a child for herself when she was not ready. I was struck by the feelings she described of being a helpless child and her attitude to the changed session time, and how she talked about having to be in my care on what she felt were my terms, not under her own control. This led to various childhood memories, revolving around the theme of how her parents could not tolerate her anger. I took up the feelings of despair and of protest that she had not been allowed to have, that had arisen around the session change, and which she was able to show me. We were thus able to clarify her present behavior in relation to the past and to construct, through the atmosphere in the session, some of the emotional context in which the abuse had occurred.

This patient’s analysis and the way that the memories of abuse came up may help to clarify the status of recovered memories in analysis. Understanding the role of such memories is more about putting them into a network of past relationships and into a “plot structure” than about considering their role by means of positivistic evidence. The latter
may be useful in confirming the reality of abuse from sources in actual child abuse investigations; but in the therapeutic setting, one is dealing with issues of narrative meaning and significance, with how events may be used in a particular kind of plot structure. Thus, for example, conscious or unconscious memories of abuse may be used to distort present reality—with my patient, the way she projected abuse onto her work colleague. The issue is not what the facts of the past are in a scientific sense, but how the facts are to be described and into what context they are placed.

At the same time, one has to be cautious in making assertions about the status of memories of abuse. The diagnosis of abuse in children is a complex affair, involving detailed assessment of the child’s report of abuse, combined with detailed attention to the nature of the family pathology and the nature of any corroborative evidence. One has to be aware of the presence of coercion of children by adults, with threats if the abuse is revealed, while recognizing that, occasionally, false allegations are manufactured as part of an ongoing parental dispute.

Memories of abuse recovered in adult analysis cannot be subjected to the same clear procedures and are thus inevitably subjected to considerable doubt. The analyst also needs to be wary of a kind of unconscious coercion on their own part to either suggest abusing memories or to help to deny them. Thus it is important that such recovered memories be subjected to rigorous examination of their supposed reality, which the analyst can accomplish several ways: by remaining initially skeptical, or at least open-minded, about the reality of the memories; by assessing the nature of other memories of the past and the character of the transference at the time of their recall; and by exercising caution in accepting the reality of the abuse, however convincing it may appear at first.

It is worth noting in this context that in Freud’s early paper on the etiology of hysteria, he draws up comprehensive criteria for assessing the reality of infantile sexual scenes. These criteria include the uniformity that patients’ accounts exhibit in certain details; the initial significance that the patient ascribes to the events, despite their horrifying consequences; the way that the patient puts particular stress on the events; and, finally, the relationship of the scenes to the content of the whole of the rest of the case history.

Mary Target, examining the recovered memories debate in detail, outlines evidence from empirical studies of memory, which reveal a number of different memory systems. The two most relevant here are implicit or procedural memory, and explicit or declarative memory. The former is nonconscious knowledge of how to do things, including how to relate to people the quality or shape of experiences. The latter can be reproduced as a narrative of events. There is suggestive evidence that implicit memory may be encoded and retained from infancy, while explicit memory does not become durable until three or four years of age. There is no evidence that all experience is laid down somewhere in memory, but there is considerable evidence that recollection is reconstructive, unreliable, and strongly influenced by motivation. Target makes the point that from the psychological research findings, it is likely that people who have been seriously traumatized in early
childhood are more likely to generate false memories of trauma; they sense that something happened and may feel a pressure to remember, but their reconstructions are particularly likely to be wrong. This could be interpreted as the need for the analyst to stick to only what comes up in the here-and-now of analytic transference and not to make any reconstruction of the past for fear of unduly suggesting false memories. However, that runs the risk of repeating the traumatized child’s own experience of not being believed, of suffering alone with no one to turn to. Hence the need for cautious guidelines about examining the nature of any recovered memories. Herbert Rosenfeld emphasized the importance both of case history and of historical context in the treatment of psychotic patients. He advised the analyst to be aware of the historical context of what was being repeated transferentially as a way of dealing with impasses in the analysis of the ill patient, when communication difficulties arise not just from the patient, but also from the analyst’s failure to recognize their own contribution to what is taking place. By implication, he also warned of the pitfalls of merely working in the here-and-now, without the corrective contribution of the historical context; doing so may well misrepresent the patient’s communications.

The above three ways of viewing the past in the clinical context suggest a fourth approach: facing past issues, so that traumas can be worked through. This was clearly needed with the patient discussed above who had been sexually abused. Another example is a man in his thirties who gave a complex story of repeated childhood traumas. For political reasons, he and his family were constantly on the move, rarely settling in one place for long. To compound this uncertainty, he had been given up for adoption at a young age, abandoned by a distant mother and a father unable to cope with him. In analysis, he found his negative feelings difficult to face. In addition, a particular quality to the way that he talked in sessions began to become clear. He constantly agreed with any interpretation in a way that felt uncomfortable. Every dream seemed to confirm what had been interpreted, as if he were really just imitating that which was other. He seemed to create a story about himself that used the other as a way of being, as if he had no identity of his own. This seemed very much linked to his childhood trauma, for example his having had suddenly to adapt to a new caretaker after he was abandoned by his parents or to find a way of eliciting care from others. Helping him find a way of talking that did not merge with and lean on the other was a major focus of his analysis.

Fifth, it may be possible, at least with the neurotic patient, to “revisit” the past from time to time without excessive anxiety and as a pleasant place worth visiting. With the severely traumatized patient, this may never be possible; rather, the past may be accepted as a catastrophic landscape which may be visited from time to time but only in limited doses, and with appropriate protection. Such visits may be made possible by reliving aspects of the past transferentially over time, gradually allowing the patient to tolerate their inner landscape. As an example of the creation of a historical sense through the work of analysis I will end with a vignette from a patient in her thirties who suffered from
feelings of unreality and detachment. Her mother came across as emotionally cut-off, self-centered and unreflective. Her father was kind but unavailable. She was sent to boarding school at a young age, which she suffered in silence. Typical of children from her background, she was taught to hide her feelings and not complain.

From the beginning of her analysis there was a profound fear of being dependent on me, with at the same time a frantic search for live contact with me. A certain amount of real analytic work took place during the week, but by Friday, desperation would arise about the weekend separation. By Monday, it was as if we had to start from scratch: there was no sense of an analytic past. While many patients react in such a way from time to time, it was a constant and worrying feature of her analysis, making it difficult to build a sense of continuity. But reconstructing her life in boarding school became therapeutic because it clarified how she had turned to an “institutional” mother as a way of coping with her feelings of abandonment. Compliance and good behavior disguised the anger and betrayal she felt toward her parents. The detailed “historical” work to reveal what may have happened accompanied discussions of how her past was being repeated in the transference that analysis allowed from week to week. Gradually, a sense of the previous week developed; the weekends remained difficult but not impossible to bear. She no longer had to create the world from scratch each Monday but started to feel that she had something to hold onto from the past weeks; she could have a stable memory. That is, the creation of a historical sense thorough the day-to-day work of analysis was crucial in allowing her to build up a sense of continuity.
13. Memories Are Made of This

Steven Rose

“If any one faculty of our nature may be called more wonderful than the rest, I do think it is memory. There seems something more speakingly incomprehensible in the powers, the failures, the inequalities of memory, than in any other of our intelligences. The memory is sometimes so retentive, so serviceable, so obedient—at others, so bewildered and so weak—and at others again, so tyrannical, so beyond control! We are to be sure a miracle in every way—but our powers of recollecting and forgetting, do seem peculiarly past finding out.”

Thus Fanny Price, Austen’s long-suffering heroine in Mansfield Park. It took more than half a century from the writing of that novel for psychologists to attempt to bring the discipline of the laboratory to bear on this tyrannical and uncontrollable memory, and nearly another before it was to become subject to the molecular probes and confident claims of a resurgent neurobiology. Today’s neuroscience seizes not on Austen but on the poet Emily Dickinson for its claim to knowledge, its leading figures gleefully quoting her verse:

The Brain is wider than the sky,  
For, put them side by side,  
The one the other will contain  
With ease, and you beside.

Yet after my own lifetime of research, in charting the biochemical cascades and cellular remoulding that even the simplest of learning experiences seems to generate in my young chicks (the experimental animals which have participated, albeit involuntarily, in more than three decades of my study of memory) I have to confess that I still don’t feel we have done more than deepen some of its mysteries. Fifteen hundred years before Fanny Price, in his Confessions, St. Augustine listed some
of the phenomena that needed explaining: memory, he says, is a “spacious palace, a storehouse for countless images.” But memory is capricious. Some things come spilling from the memory unwanted, while others are forthcoming only after a delay. Memory enables one to envisage colors even in the dark, to taste in the absence of food, to hear in the absence of sound. “All this goes on inside me in the vast cloisters of my memory.” Memory also contains “all that I have ever learnt of the liberal sciences, except what I have forgotten . . . innumerable principles and laws of numbers and dimensions . . . my feelings, not in the same way as they are present to the mind when it experiences them, but in a quite different way,” and things too, such as false arguments, which are known not to be true. Further, he points out, when one remembers something, one can later remember that one has remembered it. No wonder that the mind seemed to soar outside the physical confines of mere brain-goo. For Augustine, unlike Emily Dickinson, it is the mind, not the brain, that is wider than the sky, and I am inclined to agree.

What the experimental sciences have tried to do, of course, is to operationalize memory, to reduce and control “learning experiences” in such a way that their parameters could be studied. The process was begun by Hermann Ebbinghaus, whose book, *Über das Gedächtnis* (*On Memory*), published in 1885, broke new ground by asking whether there were general laws of memory formation. To explore these general laws, he invented the simple technique that in various forms has been a staple psychologist’s tool ever since—that of the nonsense syllable, a series of three letter sets each composed of a vowel between two consonants, as for instance: HUZ; LAQ; DOK; VER; JIX. Using himself as subject, Ebbinghaus then explored the conditions required to remember such lists; numbers of readings, spacing and so forth, until he could make two errorless readings of the entire list. Once the list was learned, he could then test how successful he was at recalling it at various subsequent times, whether minutes or days later. To quantify this process of recall, all that he had to do was to note how many readings of the list were necessary, at any given time after it had been learned, to once again be able to repeat it without error.

A number of general rules could be derived from such observations. For instance, in any such list of a dozen nonsense syllables, some are easier to remember than others—in particular, those at the beginning and at the end of the list. These are the so-called primacy and recency effects. They may seem obvious when described so simply, but what Ebbinghaus did was to demonstrate clearly that, in this case at least, common sense was supported by science. In addition, he showed that if a list is once learned, it becomes easier to relearn subsequently. A comparison of the number of trials required to learn it the second time with those required first time round provides a calculation that has become known in the psychology literature as *savings*—the measure of memory. The use of the savings score enables one to specify more precisely the loss and stabilization of memory with time. Ebbinghaus found that most of the memory loss occurred within the first minutes after training; once the memory had survived that hurdle it seemed much more
stable, leading to the temporal distinction between short- and long-term memory that has become a staple of subsequent research.

Ebbinghaus’s was the first step in developing the taxonomy of memory that has provided much of the focus of subsequent psychological research. In the 1930s Frederic Bartlett famously showed how the content of even remembered items becomes transformed and simplified over time. And in the 1980s and 90s, Alan Baddeley drew a distinction between working memory—that is, memory dredged up from past experience for current use, so to say—and the more deeply stored reference memory. Meanwhile, based in part on evidence from patients with identifiable brain lesions, Endel Tulving, and later Larry Squire, added a further taxonomical distinction, that between various classes of memory. Procedural memory is remembering how to do something—to ride a bicycle, for instance. Declarative memory is remembering that—a particular two-wheeled drivable object is called a bicycle. Declarative itself becomes divided into semantic (Augustine’s numbers and dimensions) and episodic or autobiographical memory (recall of episodes in one’s own life).

For a neurobiologist, the crucial questions are about how these forms of memory are instantiated in the brain. Do the categories reflect the engagement of different brain regions, and different molecular processes, or are they higher-level distinctions, without matching brain correlates? Until recent decades, the only effective way of addressing these questions in humans was by observing the effects of various forms of brain lesion and disease on memory. Classical disease-induced losses of memory, notably from what used to be called senile dementia but is now more frequently called Alzheimer’s disease, can’t answer these questions because the brain damage such maladies cause is both progressive and very general. But some consequences of strokes or accidents—or surgically induced damage—can be instructive. The most famous case of iatrogenic, or surgeon-induced, memory loss is an epileptic patient, known to every neuroscientist by his initials, HM, who was operated on in the 1950s to remove regions of his temporal cortex and hippocampus so as to eliminate the epileptic focus. The result was a catastrophic loss in his ability to transfer memory from short to long term. HM, who has continued to be a subject of research for the subsequent half-century, can remember events up to the time at which he was operated on, but forgets any new experience within minutes. Although he can show some procedural learning of new skills, he cannot retain declarative—especially episodic, autobiographical—memory. Events, as he himself puts it, simply fade away; he says “every day is by itself.” This observation, soon matched by studies in animals, suggests that the hippocampus has a crucial role to play in the registration of new experience, and that without it and adjacent brain regions, items can no longer be transferred into longer-term memory.

Within the last decades, the possibility of studying ongoing memory processes in the living human brain has been transformed by the advent of new technologies, notably the
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windows opened by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and magnetoencephalography (MEG). The former makes possible the measurement of changes in blood flow to small regions of the brain, the assumption being that the higher the rate of blood flow the more active that region is under any particular circumstance, such as performing a learning or memory task. The latter takes advantage of the fact that signaling within the brain is primarily electrical and that electrical current flow is accompanied by tiny changes in the magnetic field surrounding the current. Both techniques require rather formidable instrumentation; fMRI is better at localizing sites of change, MEG is most helpful in charting the temporal dynamics, making it possible to plot changes in brain activity millisecond by millisecond.

Two examples reveal what can be learned from such techniques. Eleanor Maguire and her colleagues studied London taxi drivers who were asked, while under fMRI, to recall a complex journey within the city. The act of recalling the route activated their hippocampi. In our own experiments, using MEG, we took subjects on a virtual supermarket tour, asking them to make choices of items to purchase based on their past experience and preferences. Faced with a choice, say of three brands of coffee, subjects took about two seconds to press a key indicating their choice. But in those two seconds, there was a flurry of brain activity. Within 80 milliseconds, the visual cortex became active; by 300 milliseconds, the left inferotemporal cortex, assumed to be a site of memory storage, was engaged, as the subjects silently vocalized the range of choice items—and at 800 milliseconds, as they made their final decision as to which item they preferred—assuming they preferred any—the right parietal cortex, associated with affect-laden decisions, was active. These dynamics reveal the many regions of the brain involved in even a simple act of episodic and semantic memory; even primary sensory regions like the visual cortex are more active when people are performing a memory-related task than when they see the same images but are asked simply to make a cognitive choice—for instance of which item is the shortest of those displayed. Thus Baddeley’s working memory does not seem to be simply localizable to one brain region.

Revealing though such studies are—and they are as yet in their infancy as the techniques and instrumentation mature—there are limits to the types of answer they can provide. If learning and the making of memory demand cellular and molecular changes, these cannot be studied except in animals. To do this demands developing models of learning and memory in these animals that may serve in some sense as a surrogate for the same processes in humans. The doors to such an approach were opened early in the last century by Ivan Pavlov’s well-known experiments with dogs. Pavlov trained them to associate the ringing of a bell with the arrival of food, and hence to salivate (a learned or, in the jargon, conditioned reflex). In the 1930s B. F. Skinner developed a different learning model (operant conditioning), in which animals had to perform some act, such as pressing a lever to obtain food, or to escape an electric shock. If after one or more trials the
animal’s behavior changes appropriately—for instance, by salivating to the bell, pressing the lever sooner in response to a signal, or running a maze faster and with fewer errors—the animal is said to have learned from the experience. And, when it performs the learned task in an error-free way, it is said to be remembering the experience. The unspoken assumption is that whatever the brain processes that are involved in such changes in the animal’s behavior may be, they are similar to those occurring in the human brain when we learn and remember. The Skinnerian view was that all creatures learn and remember in the same way, that there are general laws of learning that are as universally applicable as the gas laws or gravitation in physics.

Of course, there are problems with such an assumption. What and how an animal will learn is species-specific. Some food-storing birds, such as scrub jays, can recall during winter the many thousands of sites at which they cached edible seeds the previous summer. Others—songbirds like zebra finches—cannot learn such tasks but readily acquire new songs. Further, an animal can only inform a human experimenter that it is learning or remembering by way of some change in its performance of a task. It may “remember” its previous experience but choose not to perform the task appropriately—a point made in the 1950s in a famous critique of Skinnerian approaches, a paper called simply “The Misbehaviour of Animals.” Despite heroic attempts at complex experimental designs, the taxonomic distinctions between procedural and declarative learning and memory are always going to be confounded in animal studies.

Yet if learning from some new experience results subsequently in a change in the behavior of the animal when presented with a similar situation, one must assume that something has changed in the brain to support the changed behavior. This inferred intervening variable is regarded as a memory “store,” “trace,” or “engram,” which is formed when learning is taking place and reactivated when that learning is later recalled. The challenge for neurobiologists then became that of identifying the anatomical, cellular, molecular, or physiological nature of the trace. The temporal distinction between short- and long-term memory, the evidence that short-term memory is labile and easily disrupted, whereas long-term memory seems relatively protected, suggested that it must depend on some structural remodeling of the patterns of neural connection within the brain, engraving the memory in the brain in a manner analogous to that of inscribing a magnetic trace on a tape or a CD that can subsequently be replayed, invoking the original material. The seductive metaphorical power of computer “memory” has been influential in shaping thought on this question.

The myriad nerve cells in the brain (a hundred billion in the human cortex alone) communicate by way of up to ten-thousandfold (a hundred trillion) more junctions, known as synapses. It is at the synapses that electrical signals traveling down one nerve axon trigger the release of chemical signals—neurotransmitters—that in turn carry the message across a small gap to an adjacent nerve cell, stimulating a response in the second cell. Maybe learning results in some change in synaptic connections, so as to create novel
signaling pathways? In 1948 the Canadian psychologist Donald Hebb framed the hypothesis that has shaped all subsequent biochemical and physiological research in the field, that learning involves the remodeling of such synaptic junctions. In his own words:

Let us assume then that the persistence or repetition of a reverberatory activity (or “trace”) tends to induce lasting cellular changes that add to its stability. The assumption can be precisely stated as follows: When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such that A’s efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased.

The most obvious and I believe much the most probable suggestion concerning the way in which one cell could become more capable of firing another is that synaptic knobs develop and increase the area of contact between the afferent axon and efferent [cell body]. There is certainly no direct evidence that this is so. . . . There are several considerations, however, that make the growth of synaptic knobs a plausible perception.²

By the 1960s, neuroscientists had become sufficiently confident in the power of their technologies to attempt to verify Hebb’s hypothesis experimentally. But after an initial burst of enthusiasm the field became mired in controversy. Claims that training rats on some simple task resulted in increases in RNA (ribonucleic acid) and protein synthesis in their brains and, even more extravagantly, that when the RNA was extracted and injected into the brain of a recipient, the memory was transferred too, achieved great publicity but were technically flawed. Research funds dried up and even to suggest that one was working on the biochemistry of memory became somewhat disreputable. More patient experiments in the 1970s began to revive confidence, and Hebb’s plausible perception became tangible evidence. Two disparate approaches helped. One seems very remote from memory as we might understand it. The physiologists Tim Bliss and Terje Lomo placed stimulating and recording electrodes into cells in the rat hippocampus and found that if they fired a train of electrical pulses into the cells, their output properties were permanently modified; the cells showed a “memory” of their past experience.³ The phenomenon, called long-term potentiation, became intensely studied as either a mechanism or a model for memory over the succeeding decades. At around the same time, the psychiatrist-turned-neuroscientist Eric Kandel began exploring the physiological properties of the neurons in the giant sea slug *Aplysia californica*. Aplysia has two useful properties. One is that it can be trained on a simple task, to contract its gills (rather as a land slug rolls into a ball) in response to a jet of water being applied to its tail. The second is that many of its nerve cells are giant and the “same” cell is easily identifiable from slug to slug. Kandel was able to map the neural circuitry involved in the withdrawal reflex and to identify some specific synapses whose electrical properties and biochemistry changed as the slug learned. With
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a reductionist rhetorical flourish, Kandel offered the research community “memory in a dish.”

Over the decades that followed, evidence from a variety of labs, including my own, showed that indeed, when an animal—in my case a young chick—is trained on some novel task, there are increases in the size and strength of specific synaptic connections in particular brain regions. Under the microscope, the connections are structurally larger and the efficacy of the neurotransmitters within them is enhanced. The experimental problem was to prove that these changes were in some way associated with the storage of the putative memory trace, rather than a consequence of other aspects of the task and its performance. For example, in the task we use, young chicks are offered a small bright bead. Almost invariably, they will peck at such a bead within a few seconds of seeing it. If the bead is made to taste unpleasant (we dip it in a rather bitter, curryish-tasting liquid), the chick will peck once, and then demonstrate its distaste by shaking its head energetically and wiping its bill on the floor of its pen. If it is subsequently—any time up to several days later—offered a similar but dry bead, the chick will not peck it, but back away, sometimes replicating the earlier pattern of head shaking and bill wiping. We infer that the chick has learned, after a single experience, that this particular color, shape, and size of bead tastes unpleasant—at least in this specific context—and that when the bead is presented once more, this memory is reactivated. For the initiates, this is described as one-trial passive avoidance learning.

The passive avoidance task has a number of experimental advantages. It is quick and reproducible and builds upon a normal aspect of the young chick’s behavioral development—that is, to spontaneously explore its environment by pecking at small objects. Because the training event—the peck at the bead—takes only a few seconds, one can readily separate the immediate consequences of the bitter taste from the subsequent cascade of events during the transitions between shorter- and longer-term memory. Advantages have corresponding disadvantages. Is what we discover about learning in such a young animal, where the brain is developing rapidly, relevant to learning in adulthood? Do the molecular events involved when a chick learns in a single trial not to peck a bead in any way correspond to those during the many trials a rat needs to learn to run a maze—still less those when a child learns the names of the days of the week or what to expect on its birthday?

Even setting these queries aside, can we be sure, even for the chick, that the change we find in the synapses is actually some form of memory trace? That is, that it is a necessary, sufficient, and exclusive change in the brain that in some way “represents” the memory, enabling it later to be recalled? Could the change not have occurred simply as a result of some aspect of the initial experience, such as the taste or sight of the bead, or the learned motor activity of pecking? Or, as we cannot know whether the chick has learned the task without testing it, maybe it is a consequence of the recall experience rather than the learning itself? I don’t intend here to reprise the decade-long series of
control experiments that enabled us to distinguish between non-specific experience-induced and learning-induced changes. I have discussed these at some length in my book *The Making of Memory.* But it may be of more than merely technical interest to outline the sorts of approach one can use.

There are broadly two approaches to identifying the molecular processes, such as passive avoidance, that occur in the minutes to hours following training on a simple task and that are presumed to be required for the maintenance of short-term memory and to underpin the transition to long-term memory, a process called memory consolidation. One can train the animal on the task and look for changes in some putative biochemical measure—the activity of an enzyme, the concentration or rate of synthesis of a molecule. Or one can attempt to disrupt the consolidation process by administering an inhibitor—an antimetabolite, or drug known to block a specific biochemical process believed to be necessary for consolidation. If the drug blocks such a process, then the animal should subsequently not recall the task; that is, it should show a specific amnesia. Observing the changes in the suspected biochemical measure over time or the time window during which the administered amnesic agent is effective makes it possible to plot a temporal sequence of molecular events—a biochemical cascade—occurring over the hours following training that seem to culminate in the lasting modulation of synaptic strengths. Since the 1980s I have used both methods in tandem in elucidating this cascade in my chicks.

Within the minutes following the onset of the training experience, there are changes in the release of neurotransmitters at the synapses in specific brain regions. As well as activating the postsynaptic nerve cell to fire, these increases also stimulate a wave of biochemical activity in the cell, which in due course results in the synthesis of a family of proteins, called cell adhesion molecules, destined to be transported to the synapses. Cell adhesion molecules are a bit like Velcro. They are located in the cell membrane, for instance at the synapse, with one end (the Velcro end) sticking out into the space between one nerve cell and the next, holding the two sides, pre- and post-synaptic, together. The newly synthesized adhesion molecules that are produced as a result of the training experience are dispatched to the activated synapses (a process that takes some 4–6 hours in chicks and rats), and inserted into their membranes, altering the strength of connections between the two sides of the synapse. This would seem precisely to confirm Hebb’s hypothesis for how memory might be coded and stored in the brain.

The distinguished Nobel Prize–winning biochemist, Hans Krebs, in whose Oxford lab I was based during a postdoctoral period in the early 1960s, once told me that for every biological problem, God had chosen an appropriate organism in which to tackle the problem. I have argued that, for the study of the molecular processes involved in memory formation, the chick is indeed God’s organism. Others have made different choices, ranging from fruit flies and sea slugs to the more familiar laboratory rats and mice. In 2001, the Nobel Committee opted for the slug—although the prize they gave its developer, Eric
Kandel, was not so much for his memory work with the slug as for his studies of its neurotransmitters. What is interesting and encouraging is that despite the differences and learning paradigms, a sequence of broadly similar molecular processes has been shown to occur in the brains or nervous systems of these varying species during and following the training experience.

So can we conclude that we have found the engram—or at least identified the processes whereby engrams are constructed? The suggestion that memories are encoded in terms of changed synaptic connectivities has certainly proved attractive to a new breed of researcher, who call themselves computational neuroscientists, interested in making mathematical and computer models for how learning might occur in a distributed neural network connected by a mesh of synapses. In such a theoretical network, each memory (or association) is represented by activity in a specific set of synapses, a unique pattern, but any one synapse can be involved in many different such associations. On this basis, and estimating the number of synapses that it contains, Edmund Rolls has calculated that the hippocampus can store some 36,500 memories.

But a calculation of this sort is based on a prior set of assumptions: that biological memories can be decomposed into isolated monads and measured in terms of the bits and bytes with which computer people calculate the power of their machines. It is this that is so unrealistic; how many bits of information does the variety of memories listed by St. Augustine require? For that matter, how many bits of information do my chicks need to remember to avoid pecking at a small red bead but know that it is safe to continue pecking at a yellow one? The chick categorizes the experience of pecking the bitter bead in terms of the color, shape and size of the bead, the context in which it was pecked, its own past experience of pecking other beads, and probably many other features as well, any one of which may provide the cue for its subsequent behavior. I am far from sure that, for the chick, this complex of meanings within which any subsequent sight of and response to the bead is embedded is simply decomposable into information theory’s bits. Indeed, this theoretical concern is rapidly confirmed by experiment. The linear cascade that the biochemical and pharmacological experiments demonstrate, leading from transient changes in the release of neurotransmitters to seemingly permanent structural changes in the synapse, was no sooner established than paradoxes began to appear in the data. Memory traces apparently firmly located in one brain region seem over the subsequent hours and days to migrate to others—as indeed might have been suspected from HM’s experience. His hippocampal damage did not erase old memories, only prevent new ones being formed. Furthermore, there is no single site for “the memory” as if it constituted a discrete entity. The MEG experiment I referred to above shows that many brain regions are involved in the dynamic process of recalling and responding to prior experience. And even for my chicks we have been able to show that different aspects of the memory of the bitter bead—its color, shape, size—engage different ensembles of nerve cells and synapses distributed in different regions of the brain.
Furthermore, memory involves more than just synapses, more even than just brains. How well a person or a chick learns and remembers depends on many other aspects of body state. Alertness and attention depend on physiological processes such as blood flow and hormonal level. Memory involves emotion as well as cognition, and hormones produced outside the brain, notably adrenaline and its neurotransmitter relative noradrenaline, are engaged in determining what is remembered. When chicks peck a bitter bead, a surge of steroid (corticosterone, the chick’s equivalent of cortisol in humans) is released into the bloodstream. Too little or too much corticosterone, and the chick will not remember the experience and will peck the previously bitter bead when tested later. In this sense, learning and remembering—memory—is a property not of individual synapses or nerve cells or brains but of the entire organism, the person.

Nor is this all. Hebb’s model is one of learning, of what happens when an animal, or human, registers some new experience. Implicit in it is also a theory of recall: that remembering the experience involves reactivating the novel pathways that learning has generated. Memories are stored as in computer files, and remembering would seem to be no more than pulling these files out of deep storage and reopening them. But this mechanical model won’t do. Each act of recall is itself a new experience. Reactivated memories are subtly changed each time we recall them. Classroom experiments beautifully illustrate what we all know to be the case. Thus in the aftermath of the disaster that destroyed the Challenger space shuttle and killed the astronauts on it, a group of psychology students were encouraged to write down their recollections of the event. The records were stored, and a year later they were asked to write the account again. The huge discrepancies between their first and second accounts indicated just how labile memories of quite dramatic events are. Far from passively recording the past, we in our memories actively reconstruct it.

Very recently, neurobiology has begun to catch up with common experience and the psychologists. Many labs, including our own, have now shown that when an animal is given a reminder of a previously learned experience, the memory becomes labile once more and can be disrupted by drugs and biochemical inhibitors rather as it can be during initial consolidation. Some researchers have begun to speak of this as “reconsolidation.” However, the temporal dynamics of reconsolidation are rather different from those of consolidation; different brain regions are involved, and the biochemical changes do not exactly recapitulate those of consolidation.

Of course, being reminded of a past experience is itself to some extent a novel experience. We don’t step into the same stream twice, and memory depends on history. That neurobiologists have only recently come to realize this shows just how blinkered and reductionist their—our—paradigms have been. We are trapped by the experimental need for simple and reproducible designs, for operationalizing our definitions of “learning,” “memory,” and so on as if these complex processes could be trapped within small boxes,
sealed off from everything else that is going on in a living, behaving, learning, and remembering organism throughout every moment of its existence. Our experiments capture only a small part of such complexity, and we are at fault if we mistake this small part for the whole.

Half a century ago, neuroscience saw the brain as composed of discrete centers, regions responsible for vision, audition, pain, memory, and so forth. Superimposed on all these different regions was a super-coordinating center, the association cortex. Separate regions reported upward to this coordinator, which assembled them and instructed the motor regions of the brain how to respond. This homunculus inside the head was the source of identity, individuality, the “I” located a few centimeters behind our eyes.

Alas for simplicity, there is no such homunculus. As Gertrude Stein said about, I believe, Oakland, there is no there there. Brains don’t have a central processor, a super-manager controlling everything. Rather they are distributed networks of cellular ensembles, richly interconnected, which between them create the illusion of coherent experience that we all in our normally functioning moments share. The enigma of memory, as with so many aspects of brain processes, seems to be that it is both localized and nonlocalized. Remembering is at once sure and certain, as when we recall the names of the days of the week, or mount and ride off on a bicycle for the first time in many years, and as evanescent and elusive as a soap bubble, as when we try to remember the first moment we saw a lover and compare our own memory of that event with his or hers.

Fanny Price was surely right. Which is why we neurobiologists of memory must from time to time come out of our labs, reflect on our own varied procedural, declarative, episodic, and autobiographical memories, and turn to the work of those philosophers, poets, and novelists who can illuminate and interpret our experience so much more richly and meaningfully than can the most ingenious experimenter.
In his contribution to the first issue of *Memory Studies*, Jeffrey Olick notes that despite “the mutual affirmations of psychologists who want more emphasis on the social and sociologists who want more emphasis on the cognitive,” in fact “actual cross-disciplinary research . . . has been much rarer than affirmations about its necessity and desirability.”

The peculiar, contingent disciplinary divisions that structure our academic institutions create and enable many powerful intellectual cultures, but memory researchers are unusually aware that uneasy faultlines and glaring gulfs lie in the uncertain zones between them. The processes of memory are simultaneously natural and cultural. But our difficulties in imagining even fragments of a genuinely integrated framework for understanding diverse memory-related phenomena do not arise from a simple “two-cultures” problem: it’s not as if there are substantially unified visions of memory within either the sciences or the humanities.

It might look from the outside, in particular, as if there is a single increasingly consensual scientific approach to memory, encompassing neuroscience, psychology, and (perhaps) philosophy of mind. But, of course, closer immersion reveals a patchwork of more-or-less distantly related subdisciplines, each with their own dynamics and disputes, each uneasily connected to neighboring disciplines and practices and to a raft of related non-memory domains. The vast institutional, practical, and tacit apparatus of “normal science” within specific subdisciplinary cultures remains productive despite (or even because of) the absence of explicit bridges or interarticulations of methods, concepts, and theories with those next door. This situation has two consequences for interdisciplinary endeavors. It is extraordinarily difficult for humanities theorists to find the right scientific and psychological theories on which to draw and with which to seek articulations. Second, there is no real danger from “reductionism”: actual inter-level explanatory strategies in the
sciences of memory will be compatible with great explanatory pluralism and will tend to make the activities and processes of remembering look more complicated, rather than less.²

In such a pluralist spirit, then, this chapter draws on just a few of these traditions in cognitive, clinical, developmental, social, and personality psychology, in the cognitive sciences and cognitive anthropology, in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, and in social ontology to trace one idiosyncratic path through contemporary approaches to memory and cognition. Our choice of topics is driven by a desire to suggest that diverse “cognitive” approaches have much to offer memory researchers in the humanities and social sciences. The recent history of the sciences of memory offers a sharp contrast and corrective to the stereotyped image of cognitive science as a scientistic quest to model all the mind’s complexities on the dull mechanism of our current digital computers. The scope of cognition broadens, as we seek to demonstrate, to include emotion and motivation, embodiment and movement, and to address factors below conscious awareness and control as well as beyond the individual. The activities of remembering that matter in everyday life often involve the interaction and coordination of memory-related processes at many different levels and timescales: neural, cognitive, affective, bodily, social, material, and cultural.

Alongside excellent and original works of broad appeal that synthesize ideas from the cognitive and psychological subdisciplines of memory,³ other recent writers have issued persuasive calls for integrative theory-construction.⁴ Rather than attempting exhaustive coverage, we aim to provide informative references to support a distinctive, picaresque track through the study of such processes of coordination. We begin with an idealized account of distinctions between forms or systems of memory and of their core functions and then home in on one troubled faultline by looking at the limits of awareness in memory and at recent ideas about inhibition and repression. We sketch some new directions in the interdisciplinary study of social memory phenomena and conclude by briefly raising some questions about the roles of memory in embodied skills.

The Ecology of Memory

Most chapters in this volume focus on the many occasions when we remember experiences and events from our own past, together or alone. This form of memory, variously labeled “personal memory” by many philosophers and “autobiographical memory” by many psychologists, is only one among a range of tasks that human memory performs. Additionally, remembering our past calls on a whole range of related capacities, such as motivation, language, and emotion, as well as the basic ability to store and retrieve information. Remembering can also occur without a person consciously recalling a particular
past event: memory is used to know facts, to learn skills that become automatic over time, and to remember to do things in the future.

The attempt to distinguish between different types of memory has a long history. As Steven Rose notes in his chapter on neurology in this volume, the modern neurocognitive taxonomy developed gradually following the study of the brain-injured patient HM, who became unable to form new memories following a lesion of his medial temporal lobe. Despite HM’s extensive amnesia, he was able to acquire new skills (such as mirror drawing), even though he could not remember learning them. This led researchers to a primary distinction between declarative memory, where information is consciously recalled and can be articulated, and non-declarative memory, which cannot be easily articulated but is expressed through the acquisition of learned behaviors or skills. Because of the focus on learned behavior, non-declarative memory is sometimes called procedural memory, or “remembering how.” We focus further on procedural memory in the last section of this chapter.

Within declarative memory, psychologists make the further distinction between episodic memory, or memory for specific, personal events, and semantic memory, or memory for facts. Episodic memory has been described as “mental time travel” by theorists who stress the phenomenological reliving of a past event; it is argued by some to be a uniquely human faculty. The label “episodic memory” is also closely related to “autobiographical memory,” although theorists taxonomize differently here. Semantic memory has been described as “symbolic knowledge of the world.” That is, the label “semantic memory” encompasses all the information that we store about the world, and has been described as accompanied by a feeling of “knowing” rather than “remembering.” In the form of schemas or other dynamic knowledge structures, semantic memory can also have significant influence on the details of the way we remember our own past.

Many questions remain about the nature, medium, and format of representations within the declarative and non-declarative memory systems, and indeed whether it is necessary to postulate representations at all. It is also unclear what’s entailed in considering these as distinct systems at all and whether such a division enhances our understanding of memory. While some memory theorists propose a “multiple systems approach” to understanding memory, others argue for a “components of process” approach, where one system can flexibly perform apparently different processes.

How Memory Works: Basic Cognitive Models

As well as creating a taxonomy of memory types, cognitive psychologists examined what human memory does, using an information processing approach. According to this framework, human memory has three major tasks to perform. First, it must receive incoming information, a process termed “encoding.” Then, it must retain the information over time in some way, a process termed “storage.” Finally, it must be able to access the
information at some future time, a process termed “retrieval.” Using this information processing perspective, Richard Atkinson and Richard Shiffrin developed an influential model of memory to capture the relationship between these processes (see Figure 1). Through many modifications, as the broader information processing paradigm has itself mutated, this “modal model” has provided the basis for contemporary cognitive models of memory.

According to the modal model of memory, external events and information are “perceived” or experienced by the senses and reside in great detail and richness, yet only very briefly, in sensory memory. The duration of this brief period varies from one sensory system to another, but is probably no more than three or four seconds for any of them. After this, most of the information in sensory memory is lost. However, information that we pay attention to or that captures our attention is transferred to short-term memory. So the control process that determines which information survives is attention.

Short-term memory is sometimes equated with consciousness because it is what we are thinking about at any given moment in time. In comparison with the large (although only momentary) storage capacity of sensory memory, the storage capacity of short-term memory is small, around seven items, and without active rehearsal, short-term memory lasts for about fifteen to twenty seconds. During its brief existence in short-term memory, some of the information may be immediately recalled or converted into behavior (for instance, dialing a telephone number you’ve just been given by directory assistance). Alternatively, some of the information may be rehearsed and encoded; that is, put into a

![Modal Model of Memory Diagram](Image)

form that allows for storage in long-term memory. More recently, as researchers have identified the complexity of the tasks required of short-term memory, a replacement construct termed “working memory” has developed, which acknowledges the multiple processes involved in performing the tasks described. Working memory holds information “online,” for instance when we remember the words from the beginning of a sentence in order to understand the end, or when we perform arithmetic in our head. Perhaps we sometimes also exploit the information-processing capacities of our immediate environment to expand the powers of our working memory.

Information that reaches long-term memory may stay there permanently, organized by reference to its meaning rather than randomly, and available for retrieval as needed. Such retrieval is accomplished by bringing materials back to working memory (from which they can be recalled, or turned into behavior). The general label “long-term memory” covers the taxonomy described above, encompassing both declarative and procedural memory, and both episodic and semantic memory.

Functions of Memory

Despite the widespread adoption of this basic computational view of memory, recent theory and research recognize that memory is more complicated than this model might suggest, especially memory of personal experiences or emotional material. The memory system is crucial in allowing us to navigate our world by providing a means by which we can learn and modify our behavior. One major function of memory is to accurately encode, store, and retrieve different kinds of information. However, memory has broader functions, such as maintaining our sense of self, regulating emotion, motivating and directing future action, and helping us to promote and maintain relationships with others. It is because of these broader functions that memory becomes more complicated. We do not just encode, store, and retrieve whatever information we encounter; rather, each of these processes is performed selectively depending on our motivations, goals, and expectations.

This acknowledgement of the role of motivation in memory is not new. In 1932, Frederic Bartlett emphasized that one function of remembering, particularly in a social context, is to share our impressions with others. Thus, people are likely to construct and embellish upon their memories rather than generate a strictly accurate representation of what happened: “A story told to auditors is never quite the same as a story told for readers. Even when the matter is identical, the manner is different.” That is, memory is largely constructed: it is constructed from a range of sources, including what is stored and what is accessible, personal motivations, social motivations, and situational demands.

Since Bartlett’s time a number of theorists and researchers have emphasized the close relationship between what is remembered from people’s lives and their identity. Such an emphasis raises difficult questions about truth in memory, including whether truth is an
appropriate ideal for memory and whether construction necessarily entails distortion. Alongside its pragmatic functions (storing information) and interpersonal functions (maintaining relationships), declarative memory makes claims on the world. In general, in remembering we seek to track the truth: in contrast to our imaginings and stories and myths, we are often uneasy or dismayed when our take on the past is challenged or overturned. Yet because reality and experience have complex structures, and because the requirements on remembering vary dramatically across contexts, truth in memory is neither a simple nor a single thing. The choice of precision or grain of detail in recall, for example, can matter as much as brute correspondence with reality. For this reason, the constructive nature of personal remembering in particular is not, as it is sometimes portrayed, a barrier to truth. If human memory is more like a compost heap than a storehouse of discrete cells, then its intrinsic dynamics drive our productive capacities to select and to generalize appropriately. The brain’s plasticity in “storage,” its pervasive openness to influence, remains more adaptive than sinful even if it occasionally leads us astray.

Identity Functions of Memory: The Self-Memory System Model

We will now discuss one major current theory of autobiographical memory, in which motivation is central: on this view, cognition and affect are tightly interwoven in the mundane operations of memory. We return to the implications of a constructivist approach to memory in the section “Between Individual Memory and Collective Memory,” below. In Martin Conway’s Self-Memory System model (SMS), people’s knowledge about their lives has three broad levels of specificity: lifetime periods (e.g., when I was in high school), general events (e.g., going to class), and event-specific knowledge (e.g., a final exam). Hence autobiographical knowledge is hierarchical, organized in the knowledge base with increasing specificity. A specific autobiographical memory is generated by a stable pattern of activation over all three of these knowledge bases. In Conway’s model, “feelings of remembering” arise because of activation at the most specific level of the hierarchy: sensory-perceptual details. The construction of the particular pattern of activation that results in an autobiographical memory is constrained by control processes that coordinate access to the knowledge base and modulate output from it. According to the SMS, control processes are the unconscious processes that generate mental models from cognitions, affects, and behaviors in order to attain goals. These control processes are termed the working self. Cognition is goal-driven, and success or failure in goal attainment is experienced as emotion. The working self can facilitate or inhibit retrieval of certain memories depending on current goals. Autobiographical memories consistent with self-goals can be accessed quickly and with little effort via direct retrieval.
In the SMS, the influence of goals occurs at encoding, storage, and retrieval to affect the content and accessibility of autobiographical memories. Conway and Christopher Pleydell-Pearce distinguish between two types of retrieval. The first, direct retrieval, occurs as a spontaneous response to a particular cue. Direct retrieval is not under the influence of control processes. The second type, generative retrieval, is a complex three-stage process guided by the working self. In generative retrieval, the working self generates retrieval models that are used to direct the search process. These models provide constraints on the type of information that can come into consciousness. The goals of the working self in the given context determine the product of generative retrieval.

Conway identifies two principles underlying autobiographical memory. The first is coherence, referring to the need to maintain an integrated and consistent sense of one's life experiences. The second basic principle of memory is correspondence, referring to the need for episodic memory to correspond with reality. The SMS acknowledges that both these principles are important in autobiographical memory, but for different reasons and possibly in different circumstances. Correspondence allows the working self to keep track of progress in goal attainment to avoid unnecessary repetition of tasks. Autobiographical memory must therefore bear at least some resemblance to reality. However, the working self makes memories that are consistent with goals and beliefs highly accessible, while memories that conflict with the self are distorted or inhibited. According to Conway, Jefferson Singer, and Angela Tagini, correspondence is likely to be more important in the short term, since it allows the working self to keep track of actions that have been completed in the pursuit of goals. However, coherence is likely to be more important in the long term, since it allows the generation of different versions of “self-in-the-past” and “self-in-the-present.”

Thus, one major feature of the SMS is its emphasis on the goal-directed nature of autobiographical remembering and forgetting. Conway proposes that the self and autobiographical memory interact reciprocally: the self constrains what is remembered, and memory constrains possible selves. Thus, autobiographical memory is inherently selective. What is remembered from our lives is determined by our current working self, the image of ourselves we are motivated to have at any given time. Autobiographical memories that are consistent with the goals and values of our current working self are prioritized for remembering, while memories that conflict with our working self are more likely to be forgotten. Self-identity goals influence which events from our lives are recalled and the way in which these events are recalled.

Extending Basic Cognitive Models

This brief overview summarizes the way cognitive psychologists approach human memory. Of course, such psychological models are limited in important ways: they are idealized simplifications of incredibly complex, socially-embedded, cognitive-affective
processes, and there is by no means consensus about most of the issues covered. However, this principled, empirical approach has great value. In maintaining experimental rigor, we can lay the groundwork for an understanding of the way memory works. Supported by empirical findings, we can extend these robust and reliable models to examine more advanced questions about memory. In the sections that follow, we demonstrate the way these basic understandings of the types and processes of memory can be extended and developed to guide research and to enhance our understanding of memory in the laboratory, in the clinic, and in the world.

**Awareness and Inhibition**

The distinctions and processes delineated by psychologists that we have discussed above are useful when examining controversial issues in the study of memory. We can extend the basic information-processing model to examine the interplay between memory and consciousness, and we can use Conway’s motivational approach to memory to ask why certain memories are available to consciousness and others are not at any given time. In this section we examine the complex and controversial issue of whether certain memories can be intentionally forgotten or at least intentionally blocked from conscious retrieval from long-term memory. We draw together a range of approaches to this issue, including the theoretical debate surrounding repression, clinical case studies of psychogenic amnesia, and experimental laboratory paradigms that measure the intentional forgetting of memories.

One way psychologists understand the relationship between memory and consciousness is to differentiate between “explicit” and “implicit” memory. These terms are similar to the declarative/non-declarative distinction we have described already, but the distinction between explicit and implicit is not conceptually identical. Explicit memory can be consciously accessed, while implicit memory refers to the influence of past experience on behavior in the absence of conscious recollection. Implicit memory may encompass procedural memory, or memory for skills, but also may include a range of other phenomena where memory is expressed in behavior even when it is not accessed consciously. For example, one index of implicit memory is that participants in studies are faster to complete a word stem that they have seen in a previous trial than a novel word; this effect occurs for amnesic patients as well, indicating that implicit memory is independent of explicit memory.

**What Is Repression?**

The concept of repression is controversial in psychology, and consensus regarding the term is hard to find. The earliest use of the term was to refer to the inhibition of ideas by
that is, repression was defined as a way of managing cognitive load by focusing on relevant information at the expense of irrelevant information. When Freud adopted the term, he described it as a defensive form of memory inhibition, in which memories that cause psychological distress are excluded from awareness. Freud also argued that, while these repressed memories cannot be consciously recalled, the effects of these traumatic memories emerge indirectly by causing psychopathological symptoms. In contemporary terminology, this definition implies that repressed memories are implicit; while they cannot be consciously recalled, they continue to influence behavior. Later theorists, such as Anna Freud, refined Freud’s definition by stipulating that repression was necessarily an unconscious process, while deliberate or conscious avoidance of memories was termed “suppression.” However, in one ambitious recent synthesis, Matthew Erdelyi argues that there is no clear difference between repression and suppression, that consciousness is not so clearly an either/or criteria, and that it is more useful to follow Freud in defining repression as “rejecting and keeping something out of consciousness,” by whatever mechanism. Erdelyi defines repression simply as “a consciousness-lowering process,” that is, any process that reduces the accessibility of unwanted information. This equating of repression and suppression is controversial, and there is little consensus in the literature.

Repression in the Clinic: The Role of Trauma

Much of the evidence for repression has come from clinical cases. Disruptions of autobiographical memory are present in a range of clinical disorders, such as post-traumatic stress disorder and functional amnesia. In such disorders, forgetting is experienced as out of control, and explicit memory is impaired for particular events or whole lifetime periods. However, implicit memory is usually intact. For instance, Lionel Sasson Lyon described a case of a woman with psychogenic fugue—a loss of all sense of her identity and of her personal memories—who was amnesic for her identity and all personal information. However, when given a phone and asked to dial whatever number came to mind, she called her mother. Thus there is case study evidence that people can have explicit amnesia for life events even while still demonstrating implicit memory for those events. While the presence of autobiographical forgetting in clinical disorders has been well documented, the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. Of particular importance in clinical cases is the role of trauma in triggering such amnesia. However, it remains unclear whether cases like these are examples of an automatic response to trauma or whether they are the result of more motivated attempts by the individual to suppress negative memories.

So how do the features of clinical amnesias compare to the features of repressed memory? Or can clinical amnesias be better accounted for by normal forgetting processes?
According to Freud’s definition, repression is the result of unbearable psychological distress and is a way of defending the ego against the consequences of such distress. Clinical cases also suggest that amnesia can be triggered by trauma, such as the death of a family member in the case of “Lumberjack,”37 or by assault.38 However, reported cases differ in important ways, with some patients, such as “Lumberjack,” reporting wholesale amnesia for their whole identity and life history while others report amnesia for specific, traumatic events. Freud’s concept of repression proposed that the target of repression can vary in specificity and that repression can even target particular aspects of certain events (such as memory for emotions during an experience), as well as whole events (similar to Conway’s hierarchical model of autobiographical memory39). Finally, clinical amnesias often resolve spontaneously, meaning that they better fit the profile of repression (where the memory remains stored but subconscious) than normal forgetting processes, where amnesia for a particular event indicates that it is no longer stored. That is, in terms of process, repressed memories (and memories forgotten in cases of clinical amnesia) remain stored in long term memory, but can no longer be retrieved into short-term memory, while in normal forgetting, memories are no longer stored at all.

Repression in the Laboratory

Experimental psychological research has examined shifts in memory accessibility and developed experimental paradigms that can reliably create forgetting in the laboratory. While the relevance of these paradigms to repression is hotly disputed, they constitute a useful starting point in determining whether and how people can intentionally forget unwanted information. In this section we examine two such paradigms: think/no-think and post-hypnotic amnesia. Michael Anderson and Collin Green suggest that their think/no-think (TNT) paradigm is a laboratory analogue of Freudian repression.40 In this paradigm, participants study word pairs and learn to recall the second (associate) word when presented with the first (cue) word. During the critical phase, participants repeatedly avoid thinking about the associated words when presented with certain cues, and repeatedly respond to other cue words by saying the associated word. Later, they try to recall all the associated words. Research indicates that participants’ recall of avoided associate words is poorer than their recall of baseline associated words (words that did not appear in the critical phase). Thus, deliberately avoiding thinking about information when presented with a reminder of it makes that information more likely to be forgotten. In the TNT paradigm, repression is equated with active, effortful suppression of unwanted information. Further, Anderson and his colleagues claim to have identified the neural systems underlying suppression in the TNT paradigm.41

However, other researchers have been unable to replicate Anderson’s findings.42 Further, whether such a procedure tests Freudian repression is arguable. First, in the TNT
paradigm, memory avoidance is deliberate and effortful, and so is only evidence for repression if repression is the same as suppression. Second, theories of repression suggest that repression only occurs for material that threatens the ego, that is, for deeply psychologically disturbing memories. It may not be reasonable to expect that such a system can be activated at will, simply because the experimenter instructs it, in the absence of any emotional motivation to do so. This separation of process and cause remains disputed: Anderson and Benjamin Levy argue that the mechanisms involved in repressing memories can be studied separately from the causes of engaging them, while John Kihlstrom argues that repression cannot be studied without the use of traumatic stimulus materials, which makes it ethically very difficult to directly manipulate repression in the laboratory.

Another experimental paradigm examining the relationship between memory and consciousness is post-hypnotic amnesia. Post-hypnotic amnesia (PHA) has been considered the laboratory parallel of clinical amnesia. In PHA, the hypnotist suggests that after hypnosis, the participant will not be able to remember particular material or events. In hypnotizable participants, this suggestion reliably leads to dramatic memory loss similar to the memory loss that occurs in clinical disorders. PHA shares features with the clinical amnesia cases described above. It is initiated deliberately by the participant, targeting whichever particular memories they are instructed to target, so it is goal-directed and selective and can be applied to memories of varying specificity (e.g. word lists, whole episodes, whole lifetime periods). In clinical cases, amnesia is also goal-directed, targeting memories that are distressing. Additionally, PHA occurs without apparent effort and is reversible given the cancellation cue. Similarly, clinical amnesia is experienced as involuntary, although it can be reversed by providing retrieval cues. Finally, research has demonstrated that PHA impairs explicit memory while leaving implicit memory intact, similarly to clinical amnesias and conceptualizations of repression. These PHA experiments indicate that human memory is cognitively equipped to perform the kind of tasks hypothesized to be involved in repression.

The experimental approach to intentional forgetting demonstrates that this approach can advance a field that has reached a theoretical stalemate. Empirical psychological principles may help to tease apart which factors of the concept of repression are crucial, such as the difference between repression and suppression, and between neutral and emotional material, because we can test the predictions that come out of the various theories. For example, Freud’s theory of repression suggests that explicit memory for the target material is impaired, while implicit memory is spared. Thus, if Anderson and Green’s think/no-think paradigm models repression adequately, research should show that implicit memory is spared in this paradigm. If repression is a process that occurs only for distressing material, people should find it much easier to forget negative rather than positive life events in PHA experiments. Much experimental work remains to be done, and the answers are by no means clear yet, but using these experimental paradigms, driven by models of
memory processes, to test aspects of each theoretical viewpoint gets us closer to an understanding of which factors and parameters may be important.

Between Individual Memory and Collective Memory

In the section “The Ecology of Memory,” we described the consensus in cognitive psychology that personal remembering is a constructive process. What’s encoded is highly selective, shaped by our patterns of attention, interest, and expertise; what’s “stored” tends to mix and blend with related thoughts and feelings; and what’s retrieved depends on subtle features of the current mood and context. Some psychologists treat this openness in our biological memory systems as a troubling flaw: their individualist accounts of memory distortion characterize external influence on memory as primarily negative, the relentless intrusion of the social into malleable individual memory.

Such views derive in part from a focus on the highly-charged legal context of assessing eyewitness testimony. Elizabeth Loftus writes, for example, that “misinformation has the potential for invading our memories when we talk to other people.”49 Although research on suggestibility has been productive in these contexts, it does not show that social forces inevitably contaminate or corrupt. Indeed, successful remembering may often rely on interpersonal and other support. Because units of information are in general not retained distinctly at independent locations within the neural component of our memory systems,50 we have learned (both culturally and individually) to integrate our relatively vulnerable and permeable biological memory with more stable external scaffolding. On its social dimension, such “relational remembering”51 is particularly important for locating and renegotiating the emotional significance of the personal or shared past. Sharing and co-constructing memory, Sue Campbell argues, is our default: even those occasions when we do not talk about our pasts “have some of their meaning in relation to our natural habit of sharing the past.”52 While some psychologists have ignored this social dimension of memory, there is a new trend in cognitive psychology toward measuring and manipulating social processes in remembering, and certain cognitive models and paradigms used by psychologists can readily be extended to explore social aspects of memory.53

One area of psychology that has always focused on social influences on memory is the developmental domain. The meshing of individual and interpersonal perspectives on the past is present early in memory development as children begin to attend jointly with adults to shared past experiences. Alongside the developmental work on early embodied interaction discussed in the chapter by Felicity Callard and Constantina Papoulias in this volume, more specific accounts of the development of personal memory have been developed in the powerful social interactionist tradition. In their recent synthesis, Katherine Nelson and Robyn Fivush characterize the emergence of autobiographical memory as “the outcome of a social cultural cognitive system, wherein different components are
being opened to experiences over time, wherein experiences vary over time and context, and wherein individual histories determine how social and cognitive sources are combined in varying ways.\textsuperscript{54} This research tradition addresses a range of individual, gender, and cultural differences in the development of thought and talk about the past: cross-cultural experimental work traces various pathways of the interaction between parental reminiscence style and a child’s developing competence in talk about the past.\textsuperscript{55} The child’s social scaffolding affords not a unidirectional imbibing of emotional or self-related norms for evaluating past experience but a spiral process in which the child’s changing competence in dialogue about the past itself in turn directly shapes and flavors the ongoing dynamic co-construction of narratives.\textsuperscript{56}

Spontaneous thought about the personal past, then, gradually develops out of early memory-sharing practices, as the child slowly picks up the causal connections between events in time, and within her own past, and the existence of different present perspectives on the same once-occupied time. On one account of this developmental process, the child is grasping the temporal asymmetry of experience and implicitly seeing that remembered events can, in principle at least, be integrated on a connected temporal dimension. It is a sophisticated achievement, linked to a range of related cognitive and socio-affective changes, as the child moves toward a practical understanding that she cannot change the past: the ongoing social renegotiation and reevaluation of the meaning of past actions, emotions, and events shows her that while there can be a multiplicity of rich perspectives on the past, her actions are in one sense unique and irrevocable.\textsuperscript{57}

These interpersonal dimensions of memory’s emergence also mark the way that mature activities of remembering function in support of our temporally extended agency. Many social practices, such as promising and forgiving, and complex emotions, such as grief, love, and regret, depend on personal memory and on a grasp of temporal relations. Fallible but more or less reliable remembering can keep what happened in the past alive, giving it significance for ongoing relationships. Couples and groups of different kinds rework and reinterpret past events together for many purposes, relying on more or less shared expectations and mutual commitments in the way they present themselves to outsiders and enact their ongoing projects.

It’s natural in many such contexts for members of the group to operate as, and at least implicitly consider themselves as, a “plural subject” of memory, to borrow a label from Margaret Gilbert’s social ontology.\textsuperscript{58} Thoughts and statements of the form “we remember . . .” can have many different context-dependent implications. Sometimes a group is merely thrown together by accident, perhaps through witnessing an incident in the same place. Other groups are long standing and share memories of events and actions that they themselves deliberately undertook as a group. The forms and media of such sharing of memories also vary significantly and can (for example) be more or less interactive. Thus social memory phenomena can be understood within a kind of multidimensional space, in which a notion of true “collective memory” might mark
not a metaphysically distinct set of sociocognitive systems that differ from “individual memory” on some single discoverable criterion, but rather a region in this space in which the cases of shared remembering under consideration score more highly on more of those relevant dimensions. Terminological confusion about “collective memory” could be due then to the multiplicity of relevant and undertheorised phenomena, not to their nonexistence: what might look like competing theoretical approaches may in fact apply to distinct but complementary aspects of the world of memory phenomena.59

Despite the difficulty of probing such complex phenomena empirically, mainstream cognitive psychologists are entirely aware that “in many circumstances in society, remembering is a social event.”60 They have developed a number of relevant paradigms, including studies of collaborative recall, social contagion, and transactive memory.61 Each of these paradigms assesses social influence on memory in different ways and focuses on different questions. In collaborative recall studies, the recall output of a group of three is compared with the pooled recall output of three people working alone, to directly index the impact of the group on what is remembered.62 The collaborative recall paradigm is focused primarily on amount recalled: research shows that while groups remember less than the pooled sum of individuals, the group discussion does enhance subsequent individual memory.63 In social contagion studies, incorrect information is suggested to the participant during discussion with a confederate.64 The social contagion paradigm focuses primarily on accuracy: research shows that people come to remember items they never saw themselves that were mentioned in discussion.65 In studies of transactive memory, the focus is on the influence of prior relationships, and performance on memory tests by intimates such as romantic partners is compared to the performance of pairs of strangers.66 The transactive memory paradigm focuses primarily on amount recalled: research shows that couples remember more than pairs of strangers when they are allowed to adopt their own strategy, but less than strangers when they have to use a strategy assigned by the experimenter.67

As yet, much of this research has been conducted with relatively simple stimuli rather than more significant emotional, personal, or shared memories, and (with the exception of transactive memory), most research has been conducted with convenience groups rather than long-standing real-world groups, and the processes adopted during the discussion have often been restrictive or unnatural.68 However, clear directions are increasingly apparent for extending such studies to examine the costs and benefits of sharing memories and the parameters of group influence in more realistic settings.69

Such sociocognitive studies can help to ward off the temptation to see individual memory and group memory as entirely distinct phenomena, to be studied separately in the cognitive and the social sciences respectively: that dichotomy leaves us puzzling about the analogies or parallels between the concepts applicable in each domain. Instead, memory processes in brains, minds, and groups are often interdependent, interacting and
coordinating to compile particular versions of the past from whatever incomplete or partial raw materials are available. This approach, in which personal and collective memory are not just compatible but complementary, is faithful to Maurice Halbwachs as well as to Bartlett and to Lev Vygotsky: “One may say that the individual remembers by placing himself in the perspective of the group, but one may also affirm that the memory of the group realizes and manifests itself in individual memory,” says Halbwachs.70 Neither individual nor shared memory has ontological priority.

Of course, most socially distributed memory systems are not exclusively social, in that the spread of resources drawn on in complex activities of remembering may include material, symbolic, technological, and cultural artifacts, objects, and media, in addition to other people. This is how on-board biological memory is transformed, not just augmented. As Vygotsky wrote, “Even such comparatively simple operations as tying a knot or marking a stick as a reminder change the psychological structure of the memory process. They extend the operation of memory beyond the biological dimensions of the human nervous system and permit it to incorporate artificial, or self-generated, stimuli, which we call signs.”71 Likewise, Halbwachs, in his 1939 case study of “the collective memory of musicians,” argues that “the score in this case functions exactly as a material substitute for the brain.”72 Cognition in such cases can be literally distributed across brain, body, and world,73 and remembering involves a range of external systems of “exograms.”74 These approaches to material agency and “the cognitive life of things”75 offer promising links with related work in cognitive archaeology and cognitive anthropology.76

So while some cognitive psychological models have traditionally been individualistic, there are also areas of psychology that have a long history of exploring the relationship between the individual and the social in memory. Further, the established individual models of memory can be extended to test predictions that come from philosophical approaches to distributed cognition and social memory. For example, we might expect that what a group remembers will be different from what is remembered by the individuals that make it up, that the nature of the group, the relationship between group members, and the material being remembered are all important factors in determining social influence on memory. These are empirical questions, as yet largely unexplored.

Habit, Skill, and Embodied Memories

History, we have suggested, animates socially-distributed groups of many kinds and at many different time scales. Likewise, the embodied changes that ground individual memory capacities—the skin-bound components of the distributed cognitive systems we have described—operate at different rates and rhythms. Explicit personal memories are about the single and often distant incidents from which they derive, such as getting lost in the mall, or the first kiss. In contrast, when we remember how to ride a bike, riff around a
jazz standard, or hit a backhand down the line, our skill memories (sadly) can only derive from long, repeated training, from routines and practices, from many related experiences rather than one. In this section we return to the domain of procedural memory to raise very briefly some key under-examined questions about the more complex forms of habit, skill, and embodied memories. Suggesting the label “kinaesthetic memory” in these contexts, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone describes the way “a kinetic dynamics unfolds that is at once both familiar and yet quintessentially tailored kinetically to the particular situation at hand.” Bartlett had argued along similar lines in favor of treating such constructive movement processes as the model for remembering in general:

Suppose I am making a stroke in a quick game, such as tennis or cricket. . . . When I make the stroke I do not, as a matter of fact, produce something absolutely new, and I never merely repeat something old. The stroke is literally manufactured out of the living visual and postural “schemata” of the moment and their interrelations. I may say, I may think that I reproduce exactly a series of text-book movements, but demonstrably I do not; just as, under other circumstances, I may say and think that I reproduce exactly some isolated event which I want to remember, and again demonstrably I do not.78

The study of embodied skills naturally makes contact with the interdisciplinary work on embodiment discussed in Callard and Papoulias’s chapter in this volume: though addressing different issues, we also suggest that phenomenology and dynamical cognitive science can be natural allies rather than glaring antagonists in investigating skilled movement. We don’t draw so directly on neuroscience, but we note that the same processes of coordination and integration that we identified in discussing social memory also operate within the brain. The integrative approach to memory and cognition that we have sketched is obviously not intended to compete with our best accounts of neural processes. Because brains don’t get much done on their own and because their embodied and cultural support systems complement them in the conduct of flexible cognitive activities, certain aspects of theoretical neuropsychology can be reinvigorated by attending to the highly distinctive neural contributions to larger transient or enduring coupled systems.79 Perhaps the very distinction between declarative and procedural memory, on which procedural systems and the skills they support tend to be envisaged as relatively rigid and insulated, will turn out to need recasting in light of dynamical network-oriented neuroscience.80

Some more classical approaches to the psychology of movement have postulated stored motor programs as the drivers of high-level expert performance. Rich mental representations of the domain in question—music, dance, sport, cooking, driving, and so on—mediate between perception and action: the expert’s superior performance is primarily due to superior knowledge of or memory for the task domain, knowledge that is
acquired through long deliberate practice and stored perhaps in “long-term working memory.” The “proceduralized” rules or knowledge structures may be unconscious, perhaps in the form of “if-then” production rules, so this picture of prestructured scripts organizing movement in advance isn’t refuted by experts’ subjective lack of awareness of any search through stored options. But cognition on the basis of procedural memory, on these classical cognitivist views, is nonetheless an analytically separable phase of processing between distinct cycles of perception and action.

This broad picture, nicely dubbed the “classical sandwich” by its ardent critic Susan Hurley, has come under increasing pressure from phenomenology and the embodied/embedded cognitive sciences, as well as from theorists of dance, music, and sport. It may have some grip in contexts where the object of skill is stable and can be revisited many times, such as a piece of classical music. But in certain other highly dynamic environments, in which more thorough improvisation is required, it’s not clear that there could be exhaustive psychological maps of complex and changing task domains: flowing embodied abilities to track and engage with open environments may be the result more of trajectories followed than rules implemented. Any psychological principles that are used by beginners or competent performers are likely to be only partially accurate, not responsible for a full panoply of flexible interaction. In turn, experts who do offer accounts of the reasons for and processes behind their decisions and actions are often able to give little more than retroactive rationalizations. The default assumption within some elite communities is that it’s better to be a brilliant performer unable to articulate your gift than an introspective self-analyst. Both verbal and conscious interventions in the exercise of skill are likely to disrupt the grooved flow, so embodied absorption in the moment is the way to keep action safely insulated from the corrosions of thought. As one top cricketer wrote, “When you’re playing well you don’t think about anything.”

Hubert Dreyfus’s phenomenology of everyday expertise applies this picture of “spontaneous, transparent coping” to a range of skill domains in which expertise (he argues) is the gradual relinquishing of all reliance on explicit rules. Following Dreyfus, Elizabeth Ennen argues that the smooth and engaged bodily coping of an expert is “mindless”: she “simply responds.” In similar vein, prominent researchers in cognitive archaeology and material culture studies argue that skilled experts find their equipment so easy to use that they simply “think through things, in action, without the need of mental representation.” Explicit thinking and declarative memory are not involved in the exercise of genuine expertise, indeed are likely to obstruct it.

However, so sharp a separation of knowing from doing, remembering that from remembering how, is unlikely to be the whole story about embodied expertise. Many top performers continue to rely on and explicitly rehearse simple self-instructing maxims such as “watch the ball” or “let me see jazz hands,” even though these do not operate as top-down programming rules for the body to follow. Such verbal hints or tags function as “instructional nudges,” fallibly allowing swift, context-dependent intervention at
points of entry in action sequences that have become chunked or condensed through embodied practice. Imagery, gestures, bodily routines, or interpersonal interventions too can develop into means of activating flexible links between knowing and doing. This is not to reinstantiate a newly dualist picture of thought as an inner realm behind practical skill, but rather—as Bartlett wished—to reimagine thinking itself as an intricate and worldly active engagement with complex physical and cultural demands. Again, an array of mixed conceptual, empirical, and cultural investigations suggests itself for researchers willing to combine interdisciplinary range with arduous immersion in specific practices of remembering and acting.

... 

We have described, across four very different regions of the curious landscapes of contemporary memory research, some potential contributions from cognitive psychology and cognitive science that open out toward research in the humanities and social sciences, rather than foreclosing such explorations with a sigh of premature mastery. Starting at the cognitive heart of the interdisciplinary enterprise, we examined the ongoing refinement of typologies of memory and its functions. From there we looked first inside or underneath, at puzzles over the limits of our control over and awareness of memory, and then outward at the integration of individual memory into interactive groups. Finally we sketched some issues about the roles of memory in the learning and performance of embodied skills. In each context, there are many legitimate choices to make concerning the appropriate trade-offs between experimental control and ecological validity. To study memory in the wild better, which is everyone’s aim, our research communities need to become more pluralist while retaining the component specialist traditions: The conceptual and methodological bridges we all dream about—between the computational and the cross-cultural, or between neuropsychology and narrative theory—have to be built gradually, from both ends at once, with distinctive expertise and shared enthusiasm. We believe that in this process the cognitive sciences are likely to adapt and transform, continuing to play their central but far from lone role in the interdisciplinary study of memory.
The study of cultural memory depends almost without exception upon a prior physiological or psychological account of individual memory. Aby Warburg’s influential studies of cultural memory, including his innovative Mnemosyne project of the mid- to late 1920s are rooted in his early work on energetic models of the physiology of memory, contemporaneous with those that provided the point of departure for Freud’s analyses of the pathologies of memory in the 1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology and for Bergson’s 1896 Matter and Memory. Charting the relationship between cultural processes of memory and the formation of individual memory remains a challenge to memory studies, one that is often ignored or otherwise discreetly relegated to the sidelines. Yet the danger of a reductive account of memory threatens from both sides, as much from the social and cultural as from the physiological and psychological. In recent decades, however, developments in the neuro-physioanatomy of memory suggest a radically new understanding not only of the formative processes of individual memory but also of those of social and cultural memory and, most importantly, of the inseparable relationship between them.

In an influential introduction to neuropsychology published in 1973, A. R. Luria described the “cerebral organization of memory” as one of the “least explored fields of psychophysiology,” holding the promise of “a new and largely unopened chapter of neurophysiological science.” Yet in retrospect it is clear that the neurophysiology and anatomy of memory had already entered a phase of revolutionary development that would fundamentally change the understanding of the physical processes underlying or constituting memory. A number of diverse sources including advances in the knowledge of the function of neurons and their organization in the brain and nervous systems, the development of the discipline of immunology, and the clinical
pathologies experienced by patients in the aftermath of brain surgery contributed to an enhanced understanding of the physical organization of memory. While many of the results of the neuroscientific exploration of memory are by now well established, the field is still in a phase of dynamic development and the interpretation of its findings open to debate.

One of the fundamental problems facing the investigation of memory is the proper point of departure: Should memory be approached structurally or functionally? The first approach, characteristic of the anatomical tradition of medical research locates the place of memory within the architecture of the brain, while the latter, more characteristic of the physiological tradition, would attempt to describe its function. Both approaches are complementary, but the precise relationship between the anatomy and the physiology of memory remains in question and subject to debate. The two Nobel Prize winners active in this field, the contemporaries Gerald Edelman (1929–) and Eric Kandel (1929–), illustrate this diversity of approach, with Edelman emphasizing the role of the architecture of neural group networks in the experience of memory and Kandel the electrical and biochemical processes that contribute to the plasticity of the synapse. Although their work is clearly complementary, neither makes extensive or systematic critical reference to the work of the other: Edelman’s “neural Darwinism” is attentive to the role of functional selection while emphasizing the structural stability of emergent neural networks, while Kandel focuses on the synapse and the role of electrical and biochemical function in shaping the architectural properties of the synapse. In awarding their prize to Kandel in 2000, the Nobel Committee was characteristically diplomatic, acknowledging his contribution to neuroanatomy as showing that “our memory may be located in the synapse” and to neurophysiology with the claim that “changes in synaptic function are fundamental in the formation of different types of memory.”

The distinction between the anatomical and physiological approaches to understanding the body may be traced to the work of two important figures in the history of medicine, Andreas Vesalius (1514–1564) and William Harvey (1578–1657). Vesalius’s On the Fabric of the Human Body (1543) systematically presented the visual architecture of the human body in seven books focusing on the skeleton, muscular organization, the venous and arterial systems, the brain and the nervous system, and the internal organs of the body. Based on close anatomical examination and motivated by the desire to describe visually the morphology of the body’s organs and their spatial relationship with each other and with the whole body, Vesalius’s book inaugurated modern anatomy as the precise and analytical description of the shape and place of the organs of the body. Harvey’s Anatomical Disquisition on the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals (1628), while indebted to the advances made by Vesalius and the school of Padua where Harvey studied, nevertheless pursued a different inquiry. Harvey’s point of departure was less the question of the shape and location of the organs of the body than their function. He was concerned primarily with the function of the heart, not with its architecture; his approach
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consisted in putting questions to the living body, formulating experiments that would disclose function. None of this would have been possible without the accurate descriptions of Vesalian anatomy, but the emphasis on the investigation of function rather than the description of structure was quite different from the approach pursued by anatomy. While the integration of structure and function would become the goal of research into the life of the body, the tension between the complementary approaches persisted in general medical research and specifically research into the brain and memory.

The difference between the two approaches may be expressed in terms of whether memory can be specifically located somewhere in the brain or whether it consists in a global mental function akin to consciousness. If the former, then the question arises of where it is located and what shape it assumes; if the latter, that of how it functions and its effects. The answers to such questions presuppose some understanding of the constitution of the brain itself. The recognition that the brain possessed well-defined internal articulations along with attempts to locate discrete mental functions in terms of these articulations formed part of the legacy of ancient Greek and Roman medicine. Yet the recognition that the constituent parts of the brain possessed a specific cellular structure—the neuron—was the much-disputed discovery of Santiago Ramon Cajal (1852–1934) in the 1890s. The anatomical properties of the neuron were the subject of a famous dispute between Cajal and Camillo Golgi over whether the filaments issuing from the nerve cells (axon and dendrites) were discrete or linked in a global network. The anatomical dispute had drastic implications for the understanding of the function of the brain. Cajal’s position, which prevailed, focused physiological research on the function of the neuron as an individual part of a signaling system, concentrating specifically on the functioning of the terminals that input and output signals from the neuron. The points of proximity between the terminals of neurons—named synapses by Charles Sherrington (1857–1952)—thus became a major focus for physiological research into the functioning of the brain and nervous systems.

The history of this research is largely a twentieth-century achievement, with a number of extraordinary discoveries all of which contributed to the late twentieth-century revolution in the understanding of memory. The neurons were functionally and structurally distinguished according to whether they were involved in transmitting sensory signals to the brain, motor signals from the brain, or interconnecting neurons within the brain. Their function as a signaling system was achieved by a combination of electrical and biochemical properties (their precise character remained in dispute until after the Second World War). The synapse formed an electrical potential that was either maintained or dramatically altered by means of the transfer of chemoelectrical charges—ions—by means of the opening and closing of protein gates across the synaptic cleft. The drastic electrochemical changes associated with the “action potential” or the inequality associated with the arrival of an electrical signal at the presynapse combined with the “synaptic potential” or local inequality of the postsynapse in effecting communication between neurons.
The explanation of the experience of memory in terms of the neuron doctrine poses a number of particular and fascinating problems that may be approached architectonically or functionally. At the root of all the specific problems is the more general one of accounting for the persistence of neural structure or function over time—precisely the problem of memory. This problem is complicated by the contribution of the third great tradition of modern medical inquiry alongside anatomy and physiology, namely, pathology. Pathology, or the study of dysfunction and structural anomaly, has until recently played a prominent role in the study of the link between structure and function in the brain. Nineteenth-century neurology was dominated by the pathological method, proceeding from the location of lesions within the brain to allegedly corresponding mental dysfunctions. The inaugural step in this direction was Pierre-Paul Broca’s 1861 association of aphasia with a lesion in the left frontal lobe of the brain. This suggested that the function of speech was indeed localized within a specific area of the brain. The key clinical case in the pathological study of memory was Brenda Milner’s (1918– ) studies of HM, a patient who underwent brain surgery in the attempt to alleviate devastating symptoms of epilepsy. Surgery removed the inner surface of the medial temporal lobe and, crucially, the hippocampus. The symptoms of epilepsy were relieved, but at the cost of a severe and very idiosyncratic memory disorder. HM possessed full memory of the time before the operation, a good short-term memory measured in minutes and a procedural memory but suffered the complete inability to form long-term memories of events after the surgery. This pathology suggested that it was important to distinguish between different types of memory as well as pointing unequivocally to the localization of these types within discrete parts of the brain. Milner’s work showed that loss of the inner temporal lobe and hippocampus directly compromised the ability to form long-term memory.

The existence of proof for the localization of the functions of memory and the need to account for the persistence over time of neural structure or function poses problems for the understanding of memory that have been met in fascinating ways. It is necessary to account not only for the persistence of neural structure or function but also for its clustering or concentration in particular parts of the brain. The approaches to these problems of memory have adopted complementary but still not fully convergent methodologies. One approach, associated with Gerald Edelman’s “neural Darwinism” departs from the premise that the brain is to be understood as a population of neurons that conform to the rules of selection elaborated for population biology. The cerebral cortex alone has a population of a hundred billion neurons, each possessing on average a thousand synapses, thus indeed constituting a vast population. Edelman’s scientific background is in immunological memory research, where the “memory” of an antibody is not something recalled by a cell when facing attack but rather the property of a number of specialized cells that form members of a vast population of cells waiting to reproduce when confronted with a recognizable threat. The emphasis on the properties of populations informs his views of the selective emergence and maintenance of neural networks for memory in
general. Connections between neurons enter a process of natural selection that produces neural architectures and distributions unique to each brain. Much of the approach of Edelman and his school consists in identifying dynamic mappings and the properties of feedback or reentry that ensure their reproduction, yet the stabilization of such global mappings supposes a physiological account of the persistence and repetition of networks at the level of the individual neuron:

Global mappings provide a necessary substrate for relating categorization to memory. This relationship cannot generally be accounted for by the activity of any one small neural region, for, by their nature, global mappings must include large portions of the nervous system. Within a global mapping, long-term changes in synaptic strengths tend to favour the mutual re-entrant activity of those groups whose activity has been correlated across different gaps during past behaviour.5

The phenomenon of memory and its localization is thus explained by means of the reiteration of global mappings, but this in turn is a process in which synaptic strength plays an important role.

If Edelman’s work departs from the population of neurons, that of Kandel has its point of departure in the individual synapse. His work on the neurons of the invertebrate Aplysia showed the plasticity of the synapse and the changes in its structural and functional properties that took place in response to activity. Kandel’s extremely sophisticated physiological research, motivated by an early and enduring fascination with Freud and psychoanalysis and the oft-stated desire to extend the “talking cure” to the individual neuron, details the genetic and biochemical factors involved in the production of enzymes and specific proteins in response to the excitation of the synapse. It gives an account of the process of the structural change of the synapse that leads to morphological change that adapts it to the repeated connections that characterize memory. These findings are often linked in the literature with a suggestion by Donald Hebb in his 1949 The Organisation of Behaviour: A Neuropsychological Theory cited by Kandel: “When an axon of cell A . . . excites cell B and repeatedly or persistently takes part in its firing, some growth process or metabolic changes take place in both cells so that A’s efficiency is increased.”6 This property of the neuron, later known as LTP or long-term potentiation, is central to explaining why certain connections are repeated. Experiments in disrupting LTP in specific synapses seem to result in compromising memory, while its augmentation leads to the growth of memory. The discovery of LTP in certain synapses of the hippocampus seems to move in the direction of an explanation for the important role of this part of the brain in the formation of long-term memory.

The various approaches to the physical understanding of memory have generated a number of findings and perhaps an even larger number of questions. Memory is increasingly recognized as a physically dynamic system far removed from any mechanical analogies of storage and retrieval, such as those suggested by the operation of computers. The
different kinds of memory appear to obey a rule of localization, with long-term memories associated with the cerebral cortex, procedural or routine memory with the putamen, traumatic and unconscious memory with the amygdala, and instinctual memory with the caudate nucleus. The process of memory formation also seems to obey complex rules of temporal and spatial distribution, with the formation and retrieval of semantic memory associated with the cortex, and event memory initially focused in the hippocampus and then over a period of sometimes years repeatedly distributed by means of neural networks to specific areas of the cortex where the potential networks are established and form part of the explicit memory system.

The anatomy and physiology of memory are much more fully understood now than even twenty years ago. The macro- and micro-neural approaches of Edelman and Kandel to the problem of memory seem in many ways complementary and even logically, if not historically, dependent upon each other. The accounts of the neural structures and functions that add up to the experience of memory are increasingly inseparable. They form the background to understanding an increasing number of specific and identifiable properties of memory, a process aided by the emergence of sophisticated brain research and diagnostic technologies. While the physical account of memory remains incomplete and fragmentary and may or should always form but a part of a broader understanding of cultural and historical memory, the progress this field of memory studies has made since the 1970s is remarkable, not only for an understanding of the physical basis of remembering but also for diagnosing and potentially treating devastating diseases and pathologies of the memory.

The implications of this work are only beginning to be explored in the fields of sociology and cultural analysis. The new models of memory, although located at the level of the synapse and the physioanatomy of the brain, far from being reductive explanations, emphasize the role of experience and education in the formation of the brain and its memory. This dynamic and interactive approach points to new ways in which to explore the relationship between physiological, social, and cultural memory that will need to be considered in future work in the broader field of memory studies.
II. SUBJECTIVITY AND THE SOCIAL
Marc Bloch’s remark comes halfway through the unfinished final chapter of *The Historian’s Craft*, on historical causation. For Bloch human consciousness is “the subject matter of history . . . reality itself.” To ask why something happened or how it happened and under what conditions is a “common law of the mind,” Bloch avers, an “instinctive need of understanding.” Historical facts are psychological facts in the sense that however “brutal” are external forces, “their action is weakened or intensified by man and his mind.” Man’s mind is not always conscious, logical, or rational, Bloch continues; it can be explained neither by *a priori* assumptions nor by the “pretended truths” of psychological common sense. Causes cannot be assumed, he adds in the final sentence: “They have to be looked for.”

*The Historian’s Craft* was drafted from memory in the early 1940s, when Bloch, a medievalist and cofounder with Lucien Febvre of *Annales* (1929) was active in the French Resistance, and continued in captivity before he was taken into a field and shot with twenty-six others by the Gestapo. The book opens with the question asked by his twelve-year-old son as the Nazi generals marched into Paris: “What is the use of history?” Events and ideas of the twentieth century had put history on trial, Bloch reflects, although European civilization since the Greeks and Romans, through the Judeo-Christian tradition, is ineradicably historical, a cast of mind imbibed by individuals through law, language, and generational memory. The historian deciphers the origins, as well as the causes, of beliefs and events in past times, borrows from other disciplines, studies, and works through the manifold times of the present,
and strives to “feel with words.”4 Bloch imagines the “shock” a historian might experience if he “were able to take a walk through a village” in Carolingian times to overhear peasants discussing their status or seigneurs describing that of their dependents. These overheard conversations would not give the “total meaning of life,” Bloch continues, but the “underlying feeling” of their times, as vital for the historical narrative as legal or economic relations.5 Historians of the twentieth century experience this “shock” of feeling in the archives of oral history—one of the century’s significant new archives of collective memory, Jacques Le Goff suggests (he names journalism and the media as the others)—whose voices offer not unmediated meaning but a strong wish for their experience to be heard.6

Oral history—“memory-talk” in Annette Kuhn’s phrase—is often the absent dimension of thought and sentiment in histories of the twentieth-century welfare state and social democracy, just as ordinary lives seemed “infinitely obscure,” “submerged,” and “uncompleted” to Britain’s interwar literary and political elites.7 This perception of “obscenity,” of “incompleteness,” was as powerful an impetus to reform as empathy or dread of the barbarians at the gates; it made for a sense of loss that underpinned the voluntarism characteristic of much British liberal activism.8 Yet ordinary people’s needs and wants—in particular those of women in the aftermath of world war, amplified by universal suffrage, by the death of men, by mass production’s new universe of objects and things, by the shared glamour of dance-hall and cinema—constituted a dynamic dimension of “never again” that willed Clement Attlee’s Labour government in 1945.9 The principles of national insurance, provision “from cradle to grave,” and the universalism of the National Health Service (NHS) articulated by Beatrice and Sydney Webb, William Beveridge, and Aneurin Bevan, among others, were the outcome of common feeling and thought condensed in the political demands of labor and feminism, and in new forms of association such as the League of Nations Union or the movement for birth control. Traces of that thought and feeling—discarded by New Labour—haunt welfare institutions still. Twentieth-century history, still in the minds of its protagonists, still unsettling the present and future, is in thrall to memory.10

This chapter uses oral histories and autobiographies of twentieth-century Londoners, recorded or written between the 1960s and the 1990s, in order to unearth some of Bloch’s “underlying feeling” that underpinned class relations and generated a sensitivity to social justice mid-century. It selects iconic moments in spoken and written childhood memories—Wordsworth’s “spots of time” perhaps—that reveal the (remembered) child’s self-awareness in relation to the outside world and to the child’s own place within it.11 Memory, a way of thinking as figurative as it is literal, fuses the imaginative world with everyday life, dramatizes and recreates the past as it is retrieved. Most of what happens is forgotten, yet nothing of past life perishes, Freud believed.12 Image, scene, or other person is cannibalized, infused with primitive (infantile, visceral) feeling, combined, condensed, and transposed and might erupt in bodily feeling, dream, or nightmare; meanings transmute with every retelling; in which every slip or hesitation of pronoun or syntax marks a shift
in emotional register. Subjective individual time is compound: the past shadows or over- 
reaches the present, jettisons the future; the several times of historical event, life-cycle, 
and inner world hold simultaneously in mind. Memory works on the cusp of inner and 
outer reality. Words of the dead in the archives of the recent past reveal the lived experi-
ence of ordinary people that shaped thought and feeling, often unconsciously, of twenti-
eth-century culture and its institutions as surely as did the minds of the elites. The 
historian’s task is the same: to listen carefully, for change sounds in personal memory.13

The Smell of Poverty

We don’t remember childhood, we imagine it.

Penelope Lively, City of the Mind, 1991

Few people have continuous memories before the age of seven. Earliest memories might 
be no more than a sound, a smell, or an image, but the recollection given precedence, 
Freud and later historians of autobiography have observed, offers a clue to the life.14 In 
her finely composed autobiography, Doris Bailey (born in 1916), opens her account of 
er early childhood with the “queer smell” of poverty that hung around one of her school 
fellows, “poured” from some of the open doors in their street, mingled with the smell of 
carbolic and lysol (which attacked head lice) and of horse manure, dampness, and wet 
knickers, and followed her home to be greeted by her mother’s frantic anticipation—
“Your father’ll kill me.” Doris Bailey had been wrongly accused of head-lice by the “tight-
lipped” Nitty Nora, the school nurse, during the latter’s periodical inspection of the chil-
dren, but her teacher ignored her protests. Placed at a separate table, her hair labeled “not 
clean”—marks of shame—“the memory of that morning has stayed with me all my life; 
for I learnt at that early age the impossibility of trying to reason with authority.”15

“Nitty Nora” appears in most London memories of the period, emblem of the effi-
ciency of the London County Council’s (LCC) school medical services, testimony to the 
association of head-lice with dirt and the working classes in the LCC mind, and a lead 
into the collective memory of domestic economy. Doris Bailey’s extended family, like all 
respectable households in her street and neighborhood, eliminated the “stench of pov-
erty” by rituals of cleanliness and repair—copper clothing wash, tin baths by the fire, 
daily jug washes—that were for the most part the responsibility of the women of the 
household, in Bailey’s case, her mother, aunts, and grandmother. In winter the three 
layers of petticoats plus the combinations that Doris Bailey and her sisters wore were 
stitched, mended, and then inspected by their father. If a clean shirt showed a speck of 
dust it was whipped off and replaced. Sunday best had to be immaculate. “Spotless 
clean”—a reiterated phrase—applied to both boys and girls and identified a family or an 
individual as “a cut above” or “superior.”
Memories of clean, patched, improvised clothing meticulously track the emotional economies and household labor of working-class families during the interwar years, rituals unevenly displaced by indoor running water, electricity, bathrooms, and ready-made clothing. They record the moment of transition from hand-me-downs, rag-stalls, and scraps brought home from factories to mass-produced and mass-consumed lipstick, silk stockings, cheap frocks, suits, and shoes, an economic transition that was self-transformative. Rose Gamble, in her Fulham autobiography, made this sudden wellspring of affluence the source of a rush of sexual knowledge. When her family moved from one room off the King’s Road, Chelsea, to the new local authority buildings in 1929, she watched her mother and father walk down the road together arm in arm toward the department store to buy—on the hire purchase—furniture for their new flat. “I understood for the first time that she belonged to him as well as us,” she comments, a realization that deepened as, walking through the flat, room by room, she saw the gold taffeta bedcover with orange flowers that lay on her parents’ bed and was filled with embarrassment.

“Mental Anguish”

Lily van Duren’s formative memory had the quality of a nightmare. Born in Minton Buildings, Brick Lane, Bethnal Green in 1914, two memories, she said, “stood out.” The first was being “wheeled around the streets” in a “long basket work pram,” then “crying” and “my mother coming into the room with a candle.” The second memory was seeing her mother ill in bed. Lily’s parents had married in Russia and came to London in 1910, exiles from the pogroms. Both had been married before, each had one child from their first marriage. Lily and her brother

used to go to school together. . . . I think I must have been quite young when I started school, I was about four years old, he was about seven. I remember my father used to give us a ha’penny each, and he used to, somehow or other, cajole this ha’penny from me . . . and we used to come home for lunch, and my father was a cabinet-maker. In those days people used to come home, midday, to dinner. . . . Well, I remember on this particular day, my brother and I came home from school, midday, and we had to go up a flight of stairs, and there was a door at the top, and, you know, we knocked . . . and there was no reply. . . . I assumed, in my mind, that this was very unexpected, you know. And then my father came home, he had the keys, and we got into the flat. And then I could see my mother lying on the floor in a white nightgown. And the next thing I remember was, you know, a whole lot of adults, all dashing about all over the place, saying well, “the gas was on,” and “did she do it on purpose?”
The children were hurried away. After her mother’s suicide, Lily’s father combined looking after the children with earning his living as a cabinetmaker. He left the two young children in the charge of Lily’s older half-sister, Rose. One day, four-year-old Lily, who had been locked in the lavatory by Rose, fell out of a window while trying to escape down a drainpipe, and spent weeks in Great Ormond Street Children’s Hospital. As a result of this accident, Lily and her brother were sent to the Jewish orphanage in West Norwood, South London—it was a family decision—and placed in separate houses, one for boys the other for girls. Siblings were allowed to visit for one hour only on Saturday afternoons. “I remember screaming and screaming, I was in such terrible agony . . . mental anguish it was.” So great was her heartache that the orphanage rules were broken and her brother was allowed to come from school every afternoon to see her—“he was my link.” Lily had no memory of feeling until the orphanage.

Lily’s mother’s suicide had been retold in family stories so often that it was no longer clear to her what she had seen and understood at the time and what she had been told later, an uncertainty reinforced by the fact that what she had been told had been spoken in Yiddish, her own first language long ago forgotten—“it became a lost language for me.” Lily’s immediate family of one brother, one step-sibling, and one half-sibling, supplemented by aunts and cousins (with whom she had lost touch by the end of the 1930s), were among the 60,500 Russian and Polish immigrants recorded by the Census as living in the four East End London boroughs of Stepney, Bethnal Green, Hackney, and Stoke Newington in 1921, London’s “Jewish ghetto.” Many of these families were widowed, Lily recalled, the father often having returned to fight on the side of the Bolsheviks during Russia’s civil war. She remembered few new migrants in the 1920s; but like Lily’s parents earlier in the century, the thousands who fled fascism and Hitler’s Germany left behind everything to take a chance amid the grim poverty of London’s East End. Lily’s memory of her mother’s suicide—told several times in interviews—was exceptional only in its tragedy. Exile, the threat of destitution, break-up of family, and loss of language—“cumulative loss”—encompassed many such Jewish family histories; they were part of the history of London’s expansion between the wars.

Fear of death, abandonment, and loss—infantile terrors—reached beyond the experience of forced migration. They form part of the fabric of the general memory of interwar Londoners. Death of a parent was common in the twenties, and then the workhouse or orphanage beckoned. “We were alone, denied a father,” Celia Wilmot, daughter of a Fleet Street office cleaner and printer who had been killed in the trenches, told me, shifting pronoun in a gesture of common experience as she spoke: “You could well end up in the workhouse.” Families, usually mothers, in working-class neighborhoods already overcrowded, took in orphaned children rather than see them put in a “home,” the name commonly given to local orphanages, run either voluntarily or by the council, or to the workhouse. The van from Dr. Barnardo’s orphanage that took children away was dreaded with real
cause, the van itself a metonym for domestic tragedy, outside interference, unwanted officialdom. May Jones’s mother had “seen off the van” in Stepney Green, when her husband, an oyster sorter, died of pneumonia after the war.26 Lily van Duren and her brother, among thousands of other London children, spent months or years in an orphanage or “home”; spells in hospital or convalescent home with measles, scarlet fever, whooping cough, meningitis, diphtheria, tuberculosis punctuated many childhoods. Medical opinion and local authority separated the child from its contaminating environment, prevented the spread of infection by isolation; parents and children feared the separation. Dr. Barnardo’s continued to send children as domestic servants to the Empire until 1925; voluntary and local authority homes did the same until well into the 1940s. Jim Wolveridge’s father, for instance, rescued him from a convalescent home in the 1920s, lest he be sent away as cheap labor or into the military. Not all meanings of “home” between the wars were sentimental.27

The van features in Charlie Chaplin’s popular film The Kid, made in Hollywood in 1917 and drenched in nostalgia for Chaplin’s London of the 1890s. The Kid, one of the few films named in memory-talk, according to Annette Kuhn, played in neighborhood venues across London throughout the twenties, often attached to church or settlement, venues that disappeared in the thirties as City-financed chains of Odeons and Gaumonts—picture palaces—replaced them after the advent of sound in 1927. The Kid played to cinema audiences of mostly women and children who watched while peeling potatoes or knitting or eating oranges and nuts, often either lip-reading or listening to the titles read aloud by a neighbor.28 The mythic power of the story rested on the fantasies and fears of belonging and abandonment common to families and households fractured by poverty, ill-health, and the “misfortunes” of everyday life. Children relished such stories. Rose Gamble’s favorite, for instance, recited over and over again by her sister in the quiet and dark before bedtime, told of the lost orphan, or “the Happy Traveller,” whose theme was being “found and loved”: it roused feelings of “sheer ecstasy and we lived every second.”29 The Kid’s story of the abandoned showgirl, sentimentality, and stock characters belong to the music hall and melodrama; slapstick and the tramp’s feckless aspiration and dignity were Chaplin’s signature. But its happy ending had a new and modern twist: the fallen woman’s—or “unfortunate” girl’s—ability to earn her living and find her child resolves the plot.30

The Kid opens with the gates of the workhouse, or “home” for unmarried mothers, closing on a mother and infant turned out by a stern-faced matron. Mother and infant wander the streets, pause for rest in the park until eventually the mother places her child in a car outside a grand house in a wealthy street. Thieves steal the car and dump the baby, who is found by the tramp as he picks up a fag-end. A series of comic encounters with a policeman and a working-class mother (the different faces of authority) force him to take the baby back to his derelict room where he improvises a cot, a feeding machine, and nappies. The child thrives. He cooks and fights for Charlie, acts as lookout and
stone-thrower for his glass windowpane repair racket. But when the boy falls ill, a neighbor fetches the doctor, who reports the duo to the authorities. Two villainous men arrive in a van, seize the distraught boy from the arms of the tramp and drive off. The tramp chases the van across the rooftops; he leaps down to release the child, and together they escape. Meanwhile, the seduced and abandoned chorus girl finds fame, fortune, and—eventually—reconciliation with her irresistible street urchin son (brilliantly played by Jackie Coogan). The final shot shows the tramp, after a blissful dream sequence of heavenly encounters with his lost child, bereft and exhausted, entering the palatial home of the chorus-girl-become-star, reunited with the kid.

Film critics in the twenties counted *The Kid* among Chaplin’s masterpieces in spite of its “unnecessary amount of realism.” Chaplin, who grew up in South Lambeth, the son of music hall artists, of course knew the story he was telling. Seduction, the trope of domestic melodrama, was a matter of fact for many working-class women and a theme of many family histories well into the twenties and thirties. Celia Wilmot, born in Drury Lane Buildings, was the granddaughter of a foundling, Jessie Bailey. Jane Smith’s grandmother, a stonemason’s daughter who lived in the stuccoed labyrinth of Pimlico, had been “seduced by a guardsman” she met in the park, her infant raised as her sister. In one Hackney school in the twenties, a teacher remembered, several girls had babies before they were married, “brought up by the girls’ mothers as their own—they weren’t bundled out of the way.” All parents “protected” their daughters in the years between leaving school (usually fourteen) and full adulthood. All young women were warned against “white slavery”—debated at the League of Nations throughout the 1920s. Protection, a legal principle restricting women’s industrial employment since the 1840s, again became the subject of intense debate among feminists claiming their right to employment in the 1920s. Within the family it meant accompanying daughters or sisters to work or across London, looking out for them, and “nothing said” if calamity fell.

Enforced secrecy, the mother’s willingness to absorb such arrivals born to “unfortunate girls,” did not lessen the shock of discovery to the child her or himself. One “son” from the Isle of Dogs never “spoke to his mother again” after he was told that his sister was in fact his mother. The illegitimate son of William Whiteley, of Whiteley’s, London’s first department store, walked into the store and shot and killed his father when he found out who he was. These two instances—sober counterpoints to Freud’s “family romance”—are multiplied in oral history. Close-knit families, overcrowded homes, small comforts—these only just held at bay the “ocean of violence” beyond the safety of the familiar.

**“Just Birth”**

A real nightmare forms the leitmotif of the autobiography of Doris Bailey, whose smell of poverty we encountered above. Bailey recalled the Zeppelin and Gotha raids of the
First World War from when she was two, a time when feelings passed swiftly among people huddled together. She heard the ping and bang of the bombs as they fell, and she caught her mother’s “fear and cried bitterly” as she sat on her lap during one raid. Her “good memory” had made Bailey the “brainy one” in the family, “clever” because she could learn dates, times-tables and poetry “like a parrot”—learning by rote was the “pulse” of schooling. Bailey had a remarkable although not singular birth memory. Throughout her childhood she suffered from nightmares:

Whenever I had a cold, or childish upset, tall thin men in white would stand in the corners of the bedroom, and advance on me, swearing loudly and stretching out bony hands to grab me. I would run from them, run and run until I fell head first down a tiny, tight tunnel. This tunnel was slippery and slimy on all sides, and the slithery walls would press upon me until I felt I should be crushed. Then, just when I could stand no more, I would shoot out from the tunnel of horror into a huge, light open space, cold and echoing. I would start screaming then, loud piercing screams that brought my mother running to me. She would light the candle, give me a drink and sit on the bed awhile, showing me the familiar outlines of the room. . . . Every “flu” episode . . . brought the same sensations, until my own first baby was born. In a flash, it came to me that this was what my own nightmare was all about. It was just birth; and it has never once troubled me since.

Bailey’s screams echo Lily van Duren’s “mental anguish” at being left alone, and, like hers, they brought someone she loved to her side. The slippery, slimy, and cold tunnel, the sense of being crushed, matches fears of snakes and suffocation common in childhood memories. “Tall thin men in white” also belong with the ghoulish figures that stalked or otherwise troubled childhood imagination. Rose Gamble’s terror-stricken visits to the outside lavatory, for instance, down two flights of stairs in the dark, across the soft earth-beaten floor of the scullery, where rats scuffled underneath the copper, reached a pitch of horror outside the room of Mr. Sackett, an old man in a long black coat who haunted her in the streets and cemetery near her home. Bailey’s night-light enabled her to see all “manner of things moving about in the room . . . creeping slowly toward” her; “shadows in the scullery crawled with figures from Grimms’ Fairy Tales and there were goblins in the copper.”

Dark passageways and yards, kitchens or steps, cupboards under stairs, outside lavatories conjured phantoms and creatures who peopled the houses, streets, and wastelands of the city and were then reproduced in rumor, newsprint, and close-up and absorbed repetitively by eager gothic imaginations across class and generation. Jack the Ripper—“founding father of the modern sex crime”—remained a potent playground horror thirty years after he murdered five Whitechapel prostitutes, his presence reiterated in the foggy
streets and gas-lit interiors of Alfred Hitchcock’s *The Lodger* (1927), G. W. Pabst’s *Pandora’s Box* (1929), and Thorold Dickinson’s *Gaslight* (1940). The moving image imitates the thought process itself: “It all comes back in pictures,” wrote Syd Foley, born in the Irish community of Marylebone in 1917, whose own safe and loving childhood came to an abrupt end with the arrival of a soldier stepfather in the early twenties who “exiled” him from his mother’s bed.

Doris Bailey’s birth memory magnetized associations until, refracted through later events, like Freud’s screen memories the dream acquired new meanings. “Tall thin men in white”—unlikely assistants at a birth in Doris Bailey’s Bethnal Green street in the interwar years—might have come to mind through the specter of hospital medics conjured by her boy cousin who tormented her with tales that the white mice she sold in Club Row market would be “use[d] for experiments”; or they might be ambulance men—portents of death—who arrived at the back of her house one day, lifted a small dead boy out of the canal, covered him in a grey sack and took him away under the silent observation of the neighbors. After this event her father taught the children to swim, on boards in the back garden.

Bailey gave the dream a later happy—Freudian—ending. Her desires reworked the dream. She had wanted to be a minister when she grew up, or a writer; she dreamed of wealth, of “being somebody.” She wanted to live in a family where no one shouted, swore, or drank. Once she realized, to her disappointment, that only men could preach, she resolved to become the next best thing—a minister’s wife. She married a devout, gentle churchgoer, a Sunday school teacher. On the birth of a son soon after the Second World War a “new dream was born”—that she might become the mother of a minister. This dream was fulfilled.

Early memories reveal the foundations of the conscious, continuous self in a mix of fantasy, bodily feeling, family story, and the local landscape,—all figments of the imagination. The shock of death and separation, an image grasped from nightmare or dream, proved the bedrock of experience in interwar London memories; fear and shame break into conscious memory, as they had done for Burnett’s and Vincent’s nineteenth- and early twentieth-century autobiographers. But these interwar memories were also libidinal. Bailey’s first chapter opens with the stench of poverty and ends with her playfellow enviously watching her mother breast-feed, greedily seizing the breast from her baby brother and sucking from it herself. Women’s desire makes its appearance in memoir as it does in fiction, cinema, and political demand in the period.

Hallucinatory inner landscapes seemed real enough to the observant London child. Homes for unmarried mothers, run by voluntary committees in alliance with church or
local authority furnished every borough in the County and multiplied in residential boroughs like Westminster, Chelsea, Kensington, and Hampstead where the wealthy and their domestic servants lived. Doris Knight peered into the garden of the Salvation Army Mother and Baby Home in Clapton, where the babies of the “unfortunate girls” lay in cots and prams in the sunshine. Roughly one door in thirty was that of a workhouse; according to one estimate, one third of Londoners in the County died in one, and fear of the workhouse will die only with the last of that generation. While not all institutions were as overbearing as those housing the mysteries of birth and death, school medical inspection, like a visit to the Poor Law Guardians or local housing officer, was experienced from childhood as random, intrusive, punitive. Bailey’s account of the way in which public scrutiny provoked her mistrust of authority articulates the deeply ingrained, widespread ambivalence toward welfare legislation in the middle decades of the century, which liberal policymakers and social researchers knew had to be overcome if the poor, the unemployed, or all the working classes were to be made to “feel” their citizenship as entitlement.

Life stories before the Second World War are thickly threaded with family stories, or “what I was told.” Cinema and newsprint did not break the continuities of generational memory. In this respect interwar mentalities are in a continuum with enlightenment thought: “We confound what we have heard from others with that which we really possess from our own experience,” Goethe observed in the opening of his autobiography, and the vocabulary of misfortune, dream, seduction, and bundling in twentieth-century memoir reaches back to eighteenth-century plebeian speech, if not earlier, even as it borrows colloquialisms from trade and locality where workers were “hands,” neighbors “a cut above,” and school a way to “better oneself.” Memory and experience did not begin with birth. Embellished with folklore and gossip, family stories predate the birth of the child, place her or him in a family history, and make of the self a “company of many.” Parents’ and grandparents’ wishes and thoughts—“ancestral voices”—imprinted themselves in the child’s mind, kindling desire and ambition, thoughts that did not end with death. Grace Foakes, for instance, was born in Shadwell, Limehouse, in 1903. When she married in the 1920s she took over the lease of the flat in which she had grown up. Her first child was born at the end of the 1920s. She had, she wrote, “but one thought in my mind. My children were to have a different life from the one I had known” and she felt the presence of her mother (long since dead) with her in this wish. “Moderns” of the 1920s and 1930s were haunted by values from another age.

This chapter opened with Marc Bloch’s affirmation of human consciousness as the foundation of historical reality and the need to search deep to find causal explanation of human motivation. These fragments or shards of individual childhood memory and the everyday lives that made them were emotionally commensurate with the events of death, world war, poverty, and fascism; the inner rhythms of fear and desire mixed with the detritus of everyday life to shape common mentalities, a dimension of the structure of
feeling, of the history of the time. The Second World War brought the childhoods, glimpsed in this chapter, to an end, literally and figuratively. London’s East End Jewish ghetto had disappeared by the fifties; Gamble, like Bailey, returned home in the middle of war to find her home and thousands like it destroyed by bombing. Only memories remain, recorded in archive, memoir, and life-story, there to be listened to and written again into historical narrative.
17. Affect and Embodiment

Felicity Callard and Constantina Papoulias

The best maxim for the 21st century is, “There is no memory save emotional memory.”

Lawrence E. Hedges

The Turn to Affect

In his book *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed*, political theorist William Connolly protests against “the insufficiency of . . . intellectualist and deliberationist models of thinking” by suggesting that such models, as manifested in philosophy and the human sciences, give too much priority to the highest and conceptually most sophisticated brain nodules in thinking and judgment [and may] . . . underestimate the importance of body image, unconscious motor memory, and thought-imbued affect.

Connolly is specifically interested here in expanding what thinking is and does, but to do so, he immediately turns to reconceptualizations of thinking currently taking place within neuroscience. His linking of intellectualist and deliberationist models of thinking to “the highest and . . . most sophisticated brain nodules” is emblematic of the current mode of interdisciplinarity animating humanities scholarship: neuroscience is frequently being called upon to provide what Connolly himself later calls “conversations”—but what we instead suggest tend to be taken as solutions—regarding various problematics within the humanities. The topic of Connolly’s concern, “thinking,” plays a central part in this turn: the superseded view of thinking stands for the Cartesian *cogito* and hence as a shorthand for particular models of subjectivity (those “intellectualist and deliberationist” models); the expanded model comes to give, thanks to neuroscience again, “unconscious motor memory, and thought imbued affect” their dues.
Connolly’s proclamation is indicative of an increasingly common position taken by cultural and social theorists. In the last decade or so, the humanities and parts of the social sciences (for example, cultural geography, anthropology, and sociology) have witnessed an affective and emotional turn. Such a turn explicitly denounces Descartes’ split between mind and body, moves beyond what it regards as a restrictive preoccupation with cognition and representation, and laments what it sees as the deadening effects of linguistic and discursive analyses. As Clare Hemmings has argued, investment in the affective is particularly visible in cultural studies, where affect stands for the thickness of our engagement with the world and for something in the specificity of embodied experience that exceeds constructionist models of subjectivity and that can, therefore, come to transform the very social structures within which this subjectivity is otherwise mired.

Scholars’ diverse disciplinary backgrounds and theoretical investments mean that there are numerous definitions of affect; there tends, nonetheless, to be a consistent distinction between the terms emotion and affect across the humanities’ literatures, even though this consistency is not uniformly found in the original literatures drawn upon. Hence, affect refers to an amorphous, diffuse, and bodily “experience” of stimulation impinging upon and altering the body’s physiology, whereas emotions are the various structured, qualified, and recognizable experiential states of anger, joy, sadness, and so on, into which such amorphous experience is translated. Thus affect is precognitive, while emotions are understood as distinct categorizations of experience related to a self. (We feel fear because of a physiological event: fear, the identifiable emotion, is a judgment on a primary bodily mode of engagement with the world.)

Crucially, then, the turn to affect expands the category of experience: an affective “event” is not consciously apprehended but is, rather, what happens to the body directly on the level of its endocrinology, skin conduction, and viscera. As we will show in this chapter, this investment in affect is a move away from an understanding of subjectivity and of experience that is based on an internal world, on particular formulations of memory and representation, and that is associated with psychoanalytic models and the category of the psyche as such. Instead, the affective turn is concerned with nonrepresentational and extralinguistic aspects of subjective experience, aspects that its advocates associate with the very fact of embodiment and the particularities of our physiological responses to the world. This turn to affect and embodiment is not necessarily a turn away from the relationship between memory and subjectivity; rather, it is the relationship between memory and representation that the interest in affect seeks to loosen. As exemplified in Connolly’s list above of phenomena that we must not underestimate, the turn to affect can also be seen as a turn to memory—as long as such memory is understood as embodied and nonrepresentational. This is an implicit or procedural memory, subsisting as the embodiment of patterns of excitation that construct our sense of self. The wager is that if we attend to affect and to how it courses through the body, we might edge closer
to illuminating the elusiveness and vitality of the embodied present. Affect is thus seductive to cultural theorists insofar as it is not entirely bound by any social or psychic structuration. It promises an engagement with the living present and a break with the tyranny of representational memory—that is, a break with an apprehension of the present through particular understandings of representation and signification, as a second-order reality.

Some scholars go further, however, and see in affectivity an essential irreducibility to memory, whether representational or embodied. Mark Hansen, a philosopher and cultural theorist of new media, tends toward such a polarization between memory and affect. Hansen, who is concerned with mapping the relation between technological change and an attendant reshaping of human subjectivity, regards the body’s ability to experience its intensity, to experience itself as “more than itself,” as “comprising a power of the body that cannot be assimilated to the habit-driven, associational logic governing perception.”

This is not least because digital technologies now tend to operate “beneath the threshold of image memory”; in other words, they are not constrained by “human perceptual ratios” and therefore influence our “embodied lives at a level, as it were, below the ‘threshold’ of representation itself.” (It is important to note, incidentally, that such insights are, in turn, derived from data gathered by other digital technologies in the form of brain imaging devices, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI). For Hansen:

Affectivity comprises the faculty of the new: it is the modality through which the individuated being remains incomplete, which is to say... open to the force of the preindividual.

Affectivity, then, is that which names “the capacity for the body to be radically creative,” and hence not wholly beholden to—or constrained within—that which came before. Hansen, indeed, frequently distinguishes the problematic of affectivity from what he calls “the politics of memory” or the “problematic of a memorial incompletion.” These phrases refer to the conceptualizations of those such as Derrida, whose emphasis on a particular understanding of tradition and of the dependence of consciousness on the past, on Hansen’s account, forecloses consideration of the future-directed force of affectivity.

Hansen’s work, like that of other humanities scholars interested in affect, frequently turns to engage scientific and psychological literature. These transpositions often mean that terms or concepts are plucked from their original contexts and put to work in different arenas and for different purposes. And this is particularly the case as regards those two central concepts, affect and representation, whose contraposition so frequently structures debates over memory. There are numerous models of representation, that most complex of terms, circulating in various disciplines, and it would be foolhardy to assume that what is being referred to in one context is equivalent to that being used in another. Nonetheless, one could argue that “representation” is most frequently conceptualized using a specular
model, in which there is a specular distance between subject and object (that which is represented). It is against this hegemonic interpretation of representation that arguments on behalf of affect frequently find their force.14 Our chapter will, of necessity, draw on several overlapping disciplines and fields of inquiry: psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, and neuroscience; trauma studies (which is, of course, itself interdisciplinary); and literature from the humanities and the social sciences that manifests a turn to affect and the emotions. In so doing, this chapter will attempt to elucidate some of what is at stake in relation to conceptualizations of both memory and affect when such interdisciplinary crossings take place.15

Memory and Affect in Freud

Freud is indispensable to explorations of memory and affect: his rich and at times contradictory conceptualizations of both terms have had enormous influence on subsequent discussions, and continue to do so.16 More specifically, as we have mentioned, those scholars cleaving to the promise of affect often explicitly distinguish their formulations from those of Freud. In order to understand why this is the case, it is important to clarify which reading of Freud they wish to depart from. Let us stay, for a moment, with William Connolly and his desire to embed affect at the heart of thinking. Connolly wants to develop “a wide range of tactics by which to work on affective memories that help to structure perception and judgment”:

Freud’s theory . . . limits too-stringently positive possibilities of technical intervention into the habitus of the self and the habits of larger collectives. Put another way, Freud encloses memory traces within a deep interpretation in which he knows the source and shape of the most archaic traces, even though those beset by them do not.17

Let us put to one side Connolly’s over-optimistic reading of Freud’s claims to knowledge and instead concentrate on what motivates Connolly’s argument. This is not an argument against memory, but rather against a particular conceptualization of memory. What is under siege is a model in which memory is cut off from contingency and casts its shadow too bleakly over the future. Thus, while Connolly will allow that we have “distinctive memory traces” from our childhood, he claims that their effect “is real without being wholly determinative.”18 (Moreover, Connolly’s enumeration of possible memory traces makes it clear that he is more interested in those that “filtered into your mode of being” prior to the development of language—gestures, affects, and “visceral habits of perception.”) Freud’s conception of memory is, on such a model, too beholden to language and representation, as we have already discussed. In addition, it is said to set too much store on the prescriptive and constraining influence of the most archaic on that which follows.
in the subject’s life. What needs to be eschewed, therefore, is a conception of memory that pulls the subject too much into the past—or, rather, perhaps, in which “the archaic,” qua fixed memory traces modeled on language, erupts from the unconscious too suddenly and ferociously into the present.

Does such an interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis stand up to scrutiny? The specific objects of psychoanalysis are, first and foremost, the unconscious and the traumatic nature of human sexuality. That memory lies at the heart of the psychoanalytic endeavor is because of the extraordinarily complex role that the “memory trace” plays in Freud’s writings in relation to fantasy, the emergence of sexuality, and repression. Memory is most obviously related to sexuality through the structure of Nachträglichkeit (afterwardness, or deferred action), which Freud first described in his Project for a Scientific Psychology. Here, a young woman’s compulsion not to go into shops alone is traced back to a forgotten earlier episode in which she had been molested. The memory “aroused what it was certainly not able to at the time, a sexual release, which was transformed into anxiety.” Freud notes that the case, which is exemplary of hysterical repression, demonstrates

a memory arousing an affect which it did not arouse as an experience, because in the meantime the change in puberty had made possible a different understanding of what was remembered. We invariably find that a memory is repressed which has only become a trauma by deferred action.

The affect (of fright and anxiety) is labile—in this case it is directed toward shopkeepers whose laughs remind the young woman of the grin of the shopkeeper who molested her—and is intimately associated with libido (via the memory of the molestation).

While no one would dispute that the problematic of memory and its relation to sexuality lies at the heart of the psychoanalytic endeavor, scholars and clinicians (both psychoanalytic and non- or anti-psychoanalytic) are far from united as regards the place that affect holds—and ought to hold—within psychoanalysis. Freud himself clearly believed that a patient’s distress was tied to disturbances of both memory and affect, and his considerations of affect extended from his earliest formulations right up to his death. In his early psychoanalytic essay “On the Physical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Communication,” co-authored with Joseph Breuer, we encounter the famous description of the hysterical patient for whom the memory of the psychical trauma “acts like a foreign body which long after its entry must continue to be regarded as an agent that is still at work”; a psychical trauma, Freud and Breuer clarify, is any experience that calls up distressing affects, such as “fright, anxiety, shame or physical pain.” Moreover, the continuation of this passage emphasized that relief from hysterical symptoms demanded the work of both memory and affect:
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each individual hysterical symptom immediately and permanently disappeared when we had succeeded in bringing clearly to light the memory of the event by which it was provoked and in arousing its accompanying affect, and when the patient had described that event in the greatest possible detail and had put the affect into words. Recollection without affect almost invariably produces no result.24

That affect needed to be aroused alongside memory made clear that this was not an etiolated procedure relying on the patient’s neutral narration of a previous experience: the domain of the linguistic was not enough on its own. But while memory and affect are intimately bound together in Freud’s early writings on hypnosis, it is simultaneously the case that Freud relied on the important conceptual division he made between the category of the idea (Vorstellung—which also connotes presentation and representation properly speaking) and that of affect (Affekt).25 Crucially, both Vorstellung and Affekt were central to Freud’s conception of the drive (Trieb), which, Freud emphasized, can be known only via its representatives, namely the ideational representative and the quota of affect. Repression, in attempting to banish to the unconscious those representations (thoughts, images, memories, fantasies) bound to a drive, resulted in different outcomes for the two drive components: the Vorstellung could be repressed; Affekt could only be suppressed. Affect, within this formulation, was intrinsically capable of separation from the idea or memory trace to which it was initially bound and hence could become “falsely connected”—to use a phrase from Freud’s early writing—to other representations. What import does this have for the relationship between memory and affect within psychoanalysis? Most notably, the relative independence of representation and affect means that it is representation that comes to represent, as it were, memory (via memory traces), whereas affect is positioned as resistant to representation and hence to memory.26 However, in Freud’s formulations, neither affect nor memory is in itself the foundation of psychic reality. Rather, each can only occupy this space insofar as its is tied to the drive, and through the drive to unconscious wishes, to sexuality and to fantasies associated with it.27

Most current forms of psychoanalysis, then, work primarily within the terrain of Vorstellungen—memory traces, representations, fantasies. But psychoanalysts of all stripes are ready to acknowledge the crucial role that affect plays in treatment. As the psychoanalyst and philosopher Jean Laplanche emphasizes, “What is essential for the individual, both in life and in the treatment, is the destiny of affect,” but “the analytic method begins with the discovery that, ultimately, it is not by seeking to play on affect that one will best intervene in the destiny of the affect.”28 (Laplanche is implicitly critiquing hypnotic or cathartic techniques that “play on affect” by directly attempting to handle it, intimating that these will not fundamentally shift intractable patterns of affect.) As Laplanche puts it: The “cause” or “causes” that psychoanalysis searches for “are of the order of representation, they are memories, fantasies or imaginings, and imagos.”29
How, then, in psychoanalysis do the operations of memory work in and through affect? First and foremost, manifestations of affect cannot, when approached psychoanalytically, be assumed to bear any obvious relationship to either their precipitating or historic cause. To be terrified by something or furious with someone does not mean that the cause for that terror or that fury is *that* something or *that* someone: further investigation is required in order to discern the representation that, enmeshed with the thwarted wish or fantasy, drives the manifestation of affect. But one must also bear in mind Freud’s dictum that suppression of the development of affect is “the true aim of repression.” The act of repression can result, therefore, in several outcomes: that the affect remains, largely as it is; that it is transformed into a “qualitatively different quota of affect” (most commonly to anxiety); or that it is suppressed. This means not only that emotions can transform into their opposite (affection into aggressivity, say), but that an apparent lack of affective intensity, or feelings of intense boredom, might not be all that they appear. In Freud’s account, affects range from tightly structured and qualitatively specific to diffuse and unattached to any obvious object or precipitator (what psychiatrists would now call “generalized anxiety”). This means that while affects, unlike memory, are not tied to language, they nevertheless, like memory, possess different temporalities and are not necessarily tied to their present objects—my anger toward X can just as easily be a displacement from an original target or an original emotion. In other words, the intensity of the affect is in no way a guarantee of its authenticity. Finally, affects and memory alike are constitutive of psychic reality: as representatives of the drive, they are tied to the pleasure principle and therefore to the domain of the subject not determined by self-preservation.

Neuroscience

While those associated with the affective turn have largely spurned psychoanalysis, they have been far from hostile to certain neuroscientists’ and developmental psychologists’ research on affect. These researchers inherited the terrain of consciousness that had previously been mined by cognitive psychologists, but in so doing, they have restructured their predecessors’ understanding of cognition.

Cognitive psychology typically preoccupied itself with the study of memory and excluded the study of affect. For cognitivists, affects could become objects of study only insofar as the mind made them meaningful through cognitive processing and representational “filing”: such “emotional experiences” were, then, said to be determined by our subjective interpretation of forms of arousal. The affective was therefore routed through the cognitive and only became conscious—and hence, able to be felt—through a process of cognitive appraisal. In other words, “emotions result from meanings, and meanings, to a large extent, from inferred consequences or causes.” Types of affective event that
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could not be understood as forms of appraisal either were excluded from studies of cognition or featured simply as forms of distortion affecting memory and thought. And so while on the one hand cognitive psychology understood discrete emotions as particular types of cognition, it also studied arousal as a particular kind of interference of memory that could be subject to measurement. Affect, then, from early experiments in task performance under stress, right up to the emergence and consolidation of the new nosology of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in the 1980s, was understood by the majority of cognitive psychologists as arousal—a literally mindless force that was at best a lubricant to memory and at worst (in cases of traumatic hyperarousal) productive of damage and mnemonic disorder.

Papers in cognitive psychology still cite, for example, the Yerkes-Dodson law of 1908. This law claimed that moderately strong arousal at the time of encoding strengthened memories, while both weak arousal and hyperarousal effectively blocked the ability to remember.33 Another proposal concerning the memory–emotion correlation, the Easterbrook (or weapon focus) hypothesis, reconfigured the Yerkes-Dodson law for visual memory: here, high arousal was believed to narrow witnesses’ ability to recall visual scenes by producing a kind of tunnel vision in which only the emotionally salient fragments of an event (e.g., the muzzle of a gun) were held in memory while the rest blurred together.34 The hypothesis regarding “flashbulb memories,” a more recent incarnation of this memory–emotion correlation, argued that high arousal can produce a quasi-photographic effect: the scene (here, again, the emphasis was predominantly on the visual) would be indelibly burned into the mind of the spectator participant, with all its trivial details intact.35 Other psychologists have since criticized the assumption of accuracy of both “weapon focus” and “flashbulb” memories, suggesting that while certain traumatic events appeared to produce remarkably vivid memories, these were far from accurate even as they were firmly believed to be so by the participants.36

The separation that cognitive science maintained between memory and affect has, in recent years, been reconfigured, and this has ushered in a more fluid account of the relays between thought, affect, and memory.37 This reconfiguration has extended to conceptualizations of memory itself.38 Psychologists in the 1970s expanded memory from a faculty linked to internalized representations (“mental images”) to a number of systems or modalities, only some of which were, strictly speaking, representational. This expansion was enabled by the study of brain-damaged patients who, while having lost the ability to form new memories (“declarative memories”), surprisingly retained the ability to learn new skills (“procedural memories”). The location of these patients’ lesions suggested that memory, as well as comprising different modalities, was neurally locatable in a number of different areas in the brain. The emergence of the category of procedural, or non-declarative, memory acted as a significant catalyst for a rearticulation between the memorial and the affective. By the mid-1970s, experimental psychologists had begun to suggest that virtually all adult cognitive skills could be more usefully conceptualized as distinct
memory operations: there was a kind of memory that manifested itself explicitly through
the recalling of specific incidents (e.g., an appendicitis operation during childhood); an-
other that emerged as different kinds of knowledge (e.g., the earth is round); a third that
manifested itself in behavior, as perceptual-motor skills (e.g., driving or problem-solving);
as well as a fourth that provided the spatial coordinates for those skills to be used.

While fierce debates continue to surround the hypothesis and the precise delimitation
of distinct forms of memory, this expansion of the mnemonic meant that memory was no
longer exclusively tied to representation; rather, cognitive science could consider that a
vast network of patterns, skills, and habits that underlie conscious acts without themselves
becoming conscious are also memory functions. At the same time, the use of digital
imaging technologies has enabled the visualization of the brain as a complex and dynamic
space of emergent chemical changes and synaptic growth and has shown that particular
stimulations result in distributed activity (for instance, the execution of a simple task may
be shown to engage multiple areas, some associated with muscular activity, some with
reflection, and so forth). What this has meant is that the cognitive/noncognitive distinc-
tion could no longer be easily maintained upon the observation of brain activity: here,
what had been thought to be a cognitive function appeared now to involve the support
of diverse, purportedly unrelated areas. And some of those areas have been increasingly
regarded as caught up in affective processing.

It is the work of three researchers in particular, Bessel van der Kolk, Joseph LeDoux,
and Antonio Damasio, that has, for a variety of reasons, been most readily taken up by
scholars in the humanities interested in affect and embodiment. In the subsequent three
sections, we summarize the understandings of affect, memory, and embodiment em-
ployed by each of these writers and indicate their significance for larger debates concern-
ing the articulation between these three terms.

_Bessel van der Kolk_

In 1980, the publication of the third edition of the _Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders_ formalized the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. As Allan
Young’s cogent genealogy of this diagnosis makes clear, PTSD consolidated a particular
conceptualization of “traumatic memory” and indicated the reinvigorated interest that
psychiatrists, psychologists and psychoanalysts, among others, were taking in trauma fol-
lowing the Vietnam War. This interest has, unsurprisingly, resulted in a wide range of
new accounts of memory and affect. The diagnostic criteria for PTSD emphasized that
one of the key manifestations of PTSD was the _re-experiencing_ of the traumatic event
through at least one of the following:

1. recurrent, intrusive, and distressful recollections of the event;
2. recurrent distressful dreams of the event;
3. sudden acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring, because of an association with an environmental or ideational stimulus. (DSM-III criteria).

Placing experiences of distressing affect at the center of the PTSD diagnosis raised two difficult questions: First, to what extent could these reenactments of traumatic events—“acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring”—be termed memories and anchored back to a specific event? Second, to what extent was trauma an “experience” that the subject underwent and then “re-experienced”? Both questions posed significant challenges for researchers engaged in issues of memory and affect.

One position in the debates over trauma that became influential within both the sciences and the humanities centered on the claim that trauma resists representation—and hence resists memory understood through representational coordinates. The neuroscientist Bessel van der Kolk has been particularly influential in this regard. For van der Kolk, traumatic events (events characterized by extreme levels of affect) are captured within the brain differently from ordinary events (and hence from ordinary memory). Van der Kolk effectively updates the Yerkes-Dodson law through neurobiological findings. He draws on a body of research that maintains that severe or sustained stress can suppress the usual operations of the hippocampus, “creating context-free fearful associations, which are hard to locate in space and time.” Thus, while the traumatic events themselves are subject to amnesia, this is not the case for the “feelings associated with them.”

In van der Kolk’s account, high levels of affect are said to produce an embodied and nonrepresentational memory that is seen somehow as more present and intense than the “normal” memories of our past. As the title of one of van der Kolk’s articles claims: “The body keeps the score”; in other words, something in the body holds on to, stores, the intensity of a particular experience, even when explicit memories are knocked out by that intensity. However, van der Kolk then goes further, to suggest that traumatic memories are not only present implicitly, as feelings, but also that they activate a very particular type of iconic memory in which the past is preserved literally—and that such memory is what intrudes in PTSD nightmares or during flashbacks. And so, “memories” of the trauma are “predominantly experienced as fragments of the sensory components of the event: as visual images, olfactory, auditory, or kinaesthetic sensations, or intense waves of feelings.” Here, visual images, like “waves of feelings” and “auditory sensations,” are perceived not as representations but as “fragments of sensory components” cut off from representation and from the integrative work of perception.

Van der Kolk regards himself as confirming and continuing the work of the nineteenth-century neurologist Pierre Janet on dissociation. Janet believed that intensely affective, disturbing experiences were not properly integrated into the memory system and instead produced dissociated “traumatic memories.” Van der Kolk updates Janet to suggest that trauma produces affectively charged “body memory” that exists outside of the frame of cognition and representational memory.
subject to wide-ranging critique both by other scientists and by historians of science. In particular, his claims that traumatic memories are literal reproductions of a traumatic event are unconfirmed in the literature and seem to rest on a semantic confusion between affective and representational aspects of memory. Van der Kolk’s research, though precarious on scientific grounds, fits neatly with certain imperatives circulating in the humanities: trauma is framed to challenge well-worn accounts of cognition, symbolization, narration. On one side, then, appears representation and the memory trace; on the other side, trauma, affect, and the body.

Joseph LeDoux

Joseph LeDoux’s work has centered on the endocrinological changes and brain activations associated with the production of fear. On his account, “emotional memory,” as he terms it, is a separate registration from explicit memories about that same event. This emotional memory is conceived along the lines of a conditioned stimulus response: it involves the forging of a link between the thalamus (an area of the brain responsible for gathering sensory information) and the amygdala (a small area near the center of the brain that seems to be responsible for the activation of endocrinological changes, such as the secretion of adrenaline). The systems responsible for this endocrinological change can operate autonomously from cognition, and so the individual is not aware of the stimulus occasioning the fear response; or, to put it differently, fear can be generated in the absence of a representation. In this sense, what LeDoux calls “emotional memory” is not memory at all, properly speaking, since the reconstruction or representation of an emotional event in its lived intensity is not possible. Rather, emotional memory refers to the body’s ability to generate an emotional response anew when confronted with a particular stimulus. This response can be considered an aspect of memory anew when confronted with a particular stimulus. This response can be considered an aspect of memory insofar as it is “learned”; however such learning takes place without the engagement of cognition, the processes of thinking and judgment associated with the neocortex.

LeDoux, then, sees emotional memory as a precognitive mode of interacting with the world. In other words, emotional memory is understood as a foundation of cognition rather than as its other: precognitive processes are those that “guide reflexive, instinctive, biologically prepared or genetically disposed behaviour”; these are defined against types of cognitive processing that are “dependent on some form of learning or experience-based memory.”49 In this context, emotions are conceptualized as the outcome of a precognitive system of bodily response to environmental stimuli, a system that forms the biological substratum of consciousness. For LeDoux, the purpose of this emotional processing system is adaptive; that is, possession of this “thoughtless,” fast-track route from stimulus to action facilitates survival in situations of environmental threat (we automatically jump back in fear when we see snake-like objects). Through affective experiences,
the organism adapts to environmental change by altering the chemical milieu of the body, its viscera and autonomic nervous system.

Indeed, LeDoux claims that some basic emotional responses to particular stimuli (such as that initiated by the snake) are genetically fitted: that is, they exist as a species memory.50 This view is shared by a number of neuroscientists. Damasio too claims that “the brain is prepared by evolution to respond to certain Emotion Competent Stimuli with specific repertoires of action.”51 Crucially, this visceral automaticity can also become maladaptive: once a specific emotional memory is laid down, it can never be extinguished. While for LeDoux thoughts and memories can be enlisted to regulate such emotional conditioning (by inserting them into particular representational spaces, or stories about the self), emotional conditioning remains essentially outside cognitive control as though in a frozen state. To use LeDoux’s own words, one can establish “cortical control over the amygdala’s output” but cannot “wip[e] clean . . . the amygdala’s memory slate.”52 What this means, then, is that affective responses both engage the present immediately and precognitively and at the same time generate “out of time” experiences in which the organism responds inappropriately to stimulation because of a previous connection that does not know extinction. Here, despite LeDoux’s emphasis on the adaptational value of emotional memory, he also seems to underline that intrusive affect possesses a traumatic “timelessness” that is an inherent risk of emotional memory as such.

Antonio Damasio

If LeDoux and van der Kolk are wedded to a distinction between the affective and the cognitive, a distinction maintained through the argument for separate emotional and declarative memory systems, Antonio Damasio attempts to challenge this distinction on a more fundamental level. As the title of Descartes’ Error (1995), his first best-selling book suggests, Damasio wishes to undo the Cartesian distinction between mind and matter (res cogitans and res extensa). On Damasio’s account, thoughts and representations are not separable from affective experiences because representations are always imagistic and thinking is distributed through the body. His neurobiological perspective allows him to translate emotions and thoughts alike into releases of chemicals within the bloodstream (hormones) or between the synapses in brain cells (neurotransmitters). Sensations impinge upon our bodies as chemical and neural responses that temporarily change our internal milieu (that is, our visceral environment, the autonomic nervous system, and the flow of hormones in our blood). The reinforcing of these transitory body states then becomes a neural pattern, and mental images (the currency of our minds and what Damasio regards as cross-modal representations of body states) somehow arise from these neural patterns. While Damasio does not provide an account of the change from neural pattern to mental image, he positions mental images as dispositions, which form the basis of both emotions and memory. This is because, for Damasio, mental images are not
images of an event or object but images of our interactions with that object. Memory is therefore inherently relational and affective. Damasio claims, for example, that autobiographical memories should not be conceptualized simply as images or schematizations of events but rather as the disposition of the body during that event, as the chemical and neural changes and adjustments that formed part of a perception and that persist to some extent as part of the memory. It is as if memory of X is also the memory of proprioception of the X-encounter (i.e., it is also the memory of skin conduction, pupil dilation, and sweating when perceiving X). In other words, memory of X is here a map of relational engagements between our body and X. Rather than following the split between representational and embodied memory, Damasio then effectively recasts representation as an embodied process.

Developmental Psychology

“It is turning out that the “missing link” in psychoanalysis is the nonverbal affect transacting relationship between the developing human infant and the primary caregiver, since this serves as the matrix of the individual’s emerging unconscious.” The neuroscientist and psychoanalyst Allan Schore argues, as the foregoing quotation indicates, that the individual is founded through the intersubjective transmission of nonverbal affect. Developmental psychology has, since the 1980s, increasingly staged the affective as the basis of self-building in infancy. In so doing, the discipline has provided fertile resources for those wishing to challenge accounts that stage the subject upon the operations of memory and unconscious fantasy. Here, by contrast, caretaker–infant interactions are said to organize a precognitive, prelinguistic, and embodied basis for self-experience and identity, and affect becomes the lining of self and internal world alike. Perhaps the central axiom of this body of work is that of affective resonance. (Indeed, it is the work on affective resonance by developmental psychologist Daniel Stern that has been most readily engaged by scholars within the humanities.) Affective experiences are regarded as inherently contagious and transmissible from body to body. For example, if a gunshot (stimulus) produces a series of endocrinological changes felt as a sudden distressing heightening of arousal, then the look, sound, and feel of this distress will automatically transmit a sudden heightening of arousal to others. This transmissibility of affect is at its most heightened in infancy because infants lack both a sense of personal history and its mnemonic supports, as well as the neurological development that would allow them to regulate their affective experiences. (The immediacy of this transmission between adults is in doubt because in adults such transmissions are always modulated by their own histories of affect regulation.)

The observation of infant–carer interaction has provided psychologists with the privileged view of what we might call zero-degree subjectivity: infants are said to possess aptitudes for engagement but no representational world. (This is because, in neurobiological
terms, their neocortex, where representation is understood to take place, has not yet matured.) Consequently, infantile bodies are convulsed with affect in such a way that affective resonance with the parent is heightened; such heightened resonances in turn shape the infant’s brain and emergent capacities for self-organization. Daniel Stern described this process of mother-infant affective resonance using the term attunement: attunement is the ability of the carer to enter the feeling states of the infant and to translate them into another modality. For example, an infant may emit rhythmic cries rising in intensity while the mother matches the rhythm and cadence of the cries by tapping the infant’s body, thus transmitting her sharing of the child’s pleasurable feeling back to him. In its most basic form, at the point where the other simply shares and returns intensity and rhythm, attunement communicates nothing. Its function is not to transmit a message but to create a shared space in which a communion between mother and child can take place. It is “a recasting, a restatement of a subjective state” by non-verbal means. Importantly, such echoing is not said to be imitative: the mother does not simply mimic the behavior of the child; rather she is said to recast his feeling state into a different modality. This recasting, Stern contends, is essential for the foundation of self: it “tells” the infant that her or his feeling is recognized and therefore that it is real and shareable. Here again, attunement refers to the body’s authentic expressivity: it does not represent, or mimic, but rather enters the felt present, or lived experience, of the body.

Attunement is not the end of the story, of course: this sharing of experience between mother and child evolves into a parental modulation of the affect experienced by the child, whereby direction and tonality of affect is subtly manipulated (hyperarousal may be interrupted, hypoarousal may be intensified, etc.). Initially, in the neurobiological version of the story, this parental modulation consists in the mother acting as the infant’s external neocortex, thus prompting the development of the infant’s own forebrain. What the child internalizes, then, are regulatory interactions—episodes of communication and modulation of affects that, eventually, constitute the individual’s mode of engaging the world. Indeed, for Allan Schore “the core of the self lies in patterns of affect regulation that integrate a sense of self across state transitions, thereby allowing for a continuity of inner experience.” Dispositional memory is, therefore, positioned at the core of the self. In this way, human biology adapts to the particular social space in which the infantile body finds itself: in a sense, it is the infolding of such a space that produces the biosocial self.

Here in the wake of neurobiology and its developmental applications, bodily memory and affective experience are brought together as the precognitive foundation of the self: “[a]ffect regulation fundamentally underlies and maintains self-function, and this process is essentially nonverbal and unconscious.” Though affect transactions are located as the matrix of an unconscious, this is a very different unconscious from that envisaged by classical psychoanalysis, and it is important to consider this difference. This unconscious functions primarily as nonrepresentational bodily memory, in the sense that it is made
up of habits of acting and feeling, as well as the felt tonality of our present (our habitual state of arousal, which Stern calls “vitality affect”). The story of the affective foundations of the self then presents us with a corrective of sorts to classical psychoanalytic theories of subjectivity: in the place of a model of subjectivity based on conflict, sexuality, and fantasy, this model is based on the homeostatic regulation of affects through an embodied, affective space. This consists of a certain rhythmicity of pattern that provides us with the capacity to modulate our experience of the world and adapt to socio-environmental exigencies. Crucially, this affect patterning (what Robert Clyman has called “the procedural organization of emotions”61) possesses a materiality that exceeds and preexists the sway of fantasy. Indeed, Stern claims that infants are primarily engaged with reality (albeit a reality of rhythm) in the sense of interactions with others, before they come under the sway of sexuality and the pleasure principle. What this biosocial supplementation to the psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity suggests, then, is that what motivates the subject is adaptation and that drive and sexuality have a secondary, much reduced role.

The desire to understand and conceptualize “experience” has been one of the animating forces underlying work in the humanities, and, we have suggested, motivates much of the literature on memory. The preoccupation with experience is just as strong, if not stronger, for those turning to affect. In this current interest in the affective aspects of experience, memory has been expanded to include nonrepresentational, embodied faculties such as corporeal memory, motor memory, and implicit or procedural memory.62 The maxim from the psychologist and psychoanalyst Lawrence Hedges with which we began—that the state of play in the twenty-first century vis-à-vis our understanding of subjectivity is that “there is no memory save emotional memory”—seems to align all these embodied modes of memorialization. However, the phrase emotional memory itself masks considerable conceptual divergence in the putting together of its two terms.

The stakes of this divergence become more visible if we turn back to a particular commentary on memory and the emotions by the Swiss psychologist Edouard Claparède in the early twentieth century that subjects the concept of emotional memory to stringent critique.63 Claparède, in attempting to describe the mental processes involved in different kinds of recollection, claims that the tendency to experience in the present a previously experienced scene is especially likely to occur when I seek to represent to myself a past emotion: the emotion can only be experienced as a state of myself. It can only be known from within, and not from outside. . . . One cannot be a spectator of one’s own feelings; one feels them, or one does not feel them; one cannot imagine them [image them, represent them] without stripping them of their affective essence.64
Claparède distinguishes between two kinds of experience: in one, an emotional event is recalled and this process of recollection serves to strip the memory of its affect; in the other, memory takes the form of a reliving of the emotion in the present. Since the distinctiveness of an emotional experience is its intensity—that is, its felt tonality in the present—emotional memory in the sense of a projection of an emotional state as past, is then, strictly speaking, for Claparède an impossibility.

The current use of the term *emotional memory* could then be seen as offering ways of negotiating, sublating, or refusing the distinction between affect and representation that Claparède compellingly set out. For example, both Joseph LeDoux and, to some extent, Bessel van der Kolk virtually restate Claparède’s distinction: here, emotional memory, understood on the model of a conditioned stimulus response, is an intrusive eruption of affect that disturbs our habits of perception and is created in response to a non-cognized stimulus. LeDoux, indeed, even mentions Claparède’s writings when distinguishing between what LeDoux terms “emotional memory” (i.e., implicit, fear-conditioned memory), which he distinguishes from “memory of an emotion” (i.e., explicit declarative memory). For developmentalists like Daniel Stern and Allan Schore, by contrast, emotional memory refers to embodied patterns of relatedness that underlie our sense of self; here the tonality of these patterns carried from the social interactions of our infantile past is said to contribute to the felt aspects of our experience in the present. In this way, developmentalists appear to overcome Claparède’s distinction and to suggest that memory carries, as it were, an affective lining. Damasio complicates the picture further: for him, all memory is embodied, by which he means that what we would tend to associate with representational memories in fact also include all the traces of our felt experiences with objects in our environment. While Damasio appears to refuse Claparède’s distinction between representation and affect, his model does not explain how embodied memories (what he calls mental images) emerge out of the activation of synaptic pathways (Damasio’s neural patterns).

Perhaps, then, we need to focus on this difficult distinction between representation and affect or recollection and embodiment, even as some of the humanities’ investment in affect testifies to a wish to be done with linguistically conceived memory and, with it, representation altogether. As we have suggested, Freud too emplots the psychoanalytic method around the problematic of this same distinction, when he claims that sexuality and the drives manifest themselves either as recollections or as affect. In exploring this distinction, we should not forget that the move from representation to affect is only one aspect of the current interest in embodiment. Subtending this interest is the humanities’ engagement with vitality, with the elusive rhythm of life as it quickens the body. And it is here that the distance from a psychoanalytic reading of subjectivity is at its most marked. For Freud, the movement of affect in the body is tied to what constitutes the psychic domain. While Freud remained undecided about how to represent this domain (oscillating between various formulations of the pleasure principle, libido, and the death drive),
he nevertheless insisted that this bodily intensity is fundamentally irreducible to vitality, and indeed that it interrupts the principle of self-preservation. Freud’s drive is that which scrambles the body’s bio-logic. From such a vantage point, the current investment in affect can be understood not simply as the fleshing out of memory but, more fundamentally, as a bracketing of the eruptive force of the drive and hence a curious chastening of the flesh. In this sense, it is crucial that we interrogate the implications of placing affect in the service of vitality rather than as its interruption.
Ever since the pioneering work of Sir Frederic Bartlett, it has become commonplace to assume that the process of remembering the personal past is a reconstructive one mediated by a host of significant factors, ranging from prevailing conventions of remembering all the way to the inevitable impact of present experience on the rendering of the past. The recognition of this simple and seemingly indisputable fact has become something of a double-edged sword in the conceptualization of memory. On the one hand, it has vastly expanded the field of memory studies: memory, far from being the mere videotape-like replica of the personal past it was often assumed it to be, has emerged instead as a richly textured, multivocal text, as potentially relevant to the literary critic or the cultural historian as to the psychologist. On the other hand, however, the widespread recognition of the reconstructive nature of memory has destabilized the idea of memory itself.

Consider in this context the fact that much of what we remember about the personal past is suffused with others’ memories—which are themselves suffused with other others’ memories. Consider as well the fact that much of what we remember is also suffused with stories we have read and images we have seen, in books and movies and beyond. And, not least, consider the fact that all of this extraneous “second-hand” material will be folded into whatever “firsthand” material there may be through a process of narrativization, that is, a quite spontaneous process of transforming memory into narrative. There is a tendency still, among many, to use the language of being-affected-by to conceptualize this state of affairs: memory is affected by this or that factor or set of factors, which in turn implies that it remains possible to separate it out from such factors, that there remains something pure and unsullied, at least in principle. But if in fact there simply is no videotape, and if,
moreover, what we actually remember is always already suffused with “influences” of the sort just mentioned—which is to say, not merely affected by them by constituted through them—what can it possibly mean to speak of memory?

When it comes to writing about the personal past, of course, the issues at hand become that much more complicated. The inchoate narrative wrought via memory will become codified, solidified; a second order narrativization will take place. “Perspectives are altered by the fact of being drawn,” Updike has written; “description solidifies the past and creates a gravitational body that wasn’t there before.”2 The issue of genre will become more acute as well, and, to a greater or lesser extent, whether consciously or unconsciously, there will be contact with specific plotlines and modes of telling. Some of the resultant texts will be memoirs, others autobiographies, others still works of fiction. And if recent history is any indication, there will emerge heated controversies and vexing questions concerning the very status of some of these texts: What really happened? How much reconstruction has there been, and of what sort? How much of the story is true? In which section of the bookstore does this belong? Perhaps there should be a new section entirely—a memory-and-narrative section, where all these different kinds of texts would find a home, with any and all questions about what they “really are” happily suspended. But we do not seem quite ready for this.

**Remembering and Writing**

In a provocative essay entitled “Book of Days,” Emily Fox Gordon recounts the process of transforming a personal essay entitled “Mockingbird Years” into a memoir with the same title. Although she had had some misgivings about doing so—not least because she was beginning to consider the genre of memoir “problematical”—Gordon had ultimately succumbed to the idea, the result being a lucrative contract and “one of the calmest, happiest periods” of her life. “I suspected that there was something a little Faustian about the deal I made with my publisher,” she admits, “but I found it difficult to fix my attention squarely on my qualms. It seemed slightly ridiculous to berate myself for accepting the terms of the marketplace and turning my essays into a memoir—a bit like putting on airs.”3 Gordon’s ambivalence aside, the fact of the matter was, *Mockingbird Years* was exactly the kind of thing a publisher loves. It was old but new, a novel variation on a familiar theme. It fit neatly into a reliably salable sub-category of the “my story” memoir—the therapy saga—but it was distinguished from others of its kind by a contrarian twist. In my memoir, therapy was not the vehicle of deliverance but the villain: the troubles I brought into my therapy were minor, I argued, but the destructive effects of what I called my “therapeutic education” were not.4
TELLING STORIES: MEMORY AND NARRATIVE

Although she herself had read very few self-discovery memoirs, Gordon “somehow . . . had managed to absorb all the conventions of the genre. Perhaps,” she muses, “it was enough just to have lived in contemporary society and to have watched TV.”

Notice here that we already have before us a significant problem—should we choose to regard it as such—frequently associated with both autobiographical memory and narrative alike: the way we remember, and the way we tell, is suffused with conventions, with schematic, even stereotypical, renditions of the personal past, derived from countless sources, many of which are external to one’s own personal experience. Ernst Schachtel’s classic essay “On Memory and Infantile Amnesia” spells out the conventional dimension of memory as follows:

If one looks closely at the average adult’s memory of the periods of his life after childhood, such memory, it is true, usually shows no great temporal gaps. It is fairly continuous. But its formal continuity in time is offset by barrenness in content, by an incapacity to reproduce anything that resembles a really rich, full, rounded, and alive experience. Even the most “exciting” events are remembered as milestones rather than as moments filled with the concrete abundance of life . . . . What is remembered is usually, more or less, only the fact that such an event took place. The signpost is remembered, not the place, the thing, the situation to which it points. And even these signposts themselves do not usually indicate the really significant moments in a person’s life; rather they point to the events that are conventionally supposed to be significant, to the clichés which society has come to consider as the main stations of life. Thus the memories of the majority of people come to resemble increasingly the stereotyped answers to a questionnaire, in which life consists of time and place of birth, religious denomination, residence, educational degrees, job, marriage, number and birthdates of children, income, sickness, and death.

As a general rule, therefore, “The processes of memory thus substitute the conventional cliché for the actual experience.” This substitution, coupled with the aforementioned fact that much of what we remember derives from without, from sources outside the perimeter of our own firsthand experience, makes for a most complicated situation. Where does “my” memory begin and end?

In the case of those who elect to write about the past—that is, to turn their memories into narrative—the problems at hand may become that much more salient. Along these lines, Schachtel writes,

One might well say that the greatest problem of the writer or the poet is the temptation of language. At every step a word beckons, it seems so convenient, so suitable, one has heard or read it so often in a similar context, it sounds so well, it makes the phrase flow so smoothly. If he follows the temptation of this word, he will perhaps
describe something that many people recognize at once, that they already know, that follows a familiar pattern; but he will have missed the nuance that distinguishes his experience from others, that makes it his own. If he wants to communicate that elusive nuance which in some way, however small, will be his contribution, a widening or opening of the scope of articulate human experience at some point, he has to fight constantly against the easy flow of words that offer themselves.9

Judging from what Gordon says about _Mockingbird Years_, it is not entirely clear how strenuously she herself fought this fight. Indeed, after conducting an informal survey of self-discovery memoirs subsequent to writing her own, she reports that nearly every one—including her own—``can be reduced to the following formula'':

The protagonist (1) suffers and/or is damaged, often at the hands of parents, but sometimes as the result of an illness or repressive thought system, (2) seeks out or encounters a person or institution or vocation or influence that offers escape, healing, relief from, and/or transcendence of the original suffering and/or damage. These persons or vocations or influences turn out to be false, unreliable, or inefficacious (think of drugs, gurus, false religions, sexual obsessions, bad marriages). (2) is repeated. Each time the protagonist's wish for relief is frustrated, the stakes grow higher: the reader's sympathetic identification grows and the narrative tension increases. Just at the point when the reader's pleasure threatens to become pain, the protagonist (3) stumbles across the finish line. Through the agency of yet another vocation or influence or person or institution, the protagonist at last achieves the relief, escape, or transcendence he has been seeking all along. (In my memoir, therapy was the oppressive force, writing the agent of liberation.) The drive toward narrative closure, which seems to be encrypted in human DNA, is realized in an emotionally satisfying conclusion.10

``Men''—and women—``like poets,'' Frank Kermode adds, ``rush ‘into the middest,’ _in medias res_, when they are born; they also die _in mediis rebus_, and to make sense of their span they need fictive concords with origins and ends, such as give meaning to lives and to poems.''11

According to Kermode, there is a measure of deceit entailed in this very process: ``Novels . . . have beginnings, ends, and potentiality,'' he suggests, ``even if the world has not.''12 Indeed, there is a distinct sense in which the novel ``has to lie. Words, thought, patterns of word and thought, are enemies of truth, if you identify that with what may be had by phenomenological reductions.''13 The implication? To the extent that we partake at all of these fictive strategies in the course of our own efforts at remembering and writing—which on some level it would appear we must—we too must lie. There is even some evidence to suggest that these processes are organically connected. As Lauren Slater,
in her “metaphorical memoir” Lying, notes in this context, “The neural mechanism that
undergirds the lie is the same neural mechanism that helps us make narrative. Thus, all
stories, even those journalists swear up and down are ‘true,’ are at least physiologically
linked to deception.”

The theoretical story is getting decidedly stranger. Remembering the personal past
seems to give itself over “naturally” (perhaps by virtue of its being “encrypted in human
DNA”) to narrative, and narrative is in turn (the story goes) linked to lying. “Autobiogra-
phy,” in particular, “is hopelessly inventive,” Michael Gazzaniga insists. On his account,
there is a “special device” in the brain he calls the interpreter that “reconstructs . . . brain
events and in doing so makes telling errors of perception, memory, and judgment.” The
interpreter also tries “to keep our personal story together.” And, “To do that, we have to
learn to lie to ourselves. . . . We need something that expands the actual facts of our
experience into an ongoing narrative, the self-image we have been building in our mind
for years.” The interpreter, therefore, “tells us the lies we need to believe in order to
remain in control.” Once one turns this spin-doctoring process into autobiography, the
lies become that much more pronounced.

Lies aside, there also remains the fact, noted earlier, that autobiographical memory
and autobiographical narrative alike entail present constructions of the past. As Michel
Leiris notes in Manhood, the past has been reconstructed “according to my recollections,
adding the observation of what I have subsequently become and comparing these later
elements with those earlier ones my memory supplies. Such a method has its dangers,”
Leiris notes, “for who knows if I am not attributing to these recollections a meaning they
never had, charging them after the fact with an affective value which the real events they
refer to utterly lacked—in short, resuscitating this past in a misleading manner?” The
vantage point from which one remembers and writes, therefore, itself represents a kind
of ending, which in turn serves to transform, and perhaps falsify, the meaning of the
events of the past. These events point to the specific future that has become one’s present,
which is of course why they were selected for inclusion in the first place. “The difficulty,”
Georges Gusdorf has written, is simply “insurmountable”:

No trick of presentation even when assisted by genius can prevent the narrator from
always knowing the outcome of the story he tells—he commences, in a manner of
speaking, with the problem already solved. Moreover, the illusion begins from the
moment that the narrative confers a meaning on the event which, when it actually
occurred, no doubt had several meanings or perhaps none. This postulating of a
meaning dictates the choice of the facts to be retained and of the details to bring out
or to dismiss according to the demands of the preconceived intelligibility. It is here
that the failures, the gaps, and the deformations of memory find their origin; they
are not due to purely physical cause nor to chance, but on the contrary they are the
result of an option of the writer who remembers and wants to gain acceptance for this or that revised and corrected version of his past, his private reality.19

These issues may be especially pronounced in the case of fiction writers who write their memoirs or their autobiographies. “There are some semi-fictional touches here,” Mary McCarthy admits of her own Memories of a Catholic Girlhood. “I arranged actual events so as to make a good story of them. It is hard to overcome this temptation if you are in the habit of writing fiction,” McCarthy notes; “one does it almost automatically.”20 For Philip Roth too, in The Facts, there was the need to “resist the impulse to dramatize untruthfully the insufficiently dramatic, to complicate the essentially simple, to charge with implication what implied very little.”21 On the basis of these accounts, it would seem that the process of telling stories about the personal past essentially involves lying to ourselves (via memory) and then further fictionalizing these lies (via narrative). Is there any other way of thinking about these matters?

Narrative Paradoxes

Thus far, several interrelated issues have surfaced that warrant our consideration as we explore the process of telling stories about the personal past. The first, dealt with succinctly by Schachtel, concerns the conventional dimension of autobiographical memory and narrative. On the one hand, it is clear enough that there is no escaping this conventional dimension. It is part and parcel of our hermeneutical situation, that is, the fact that we are always already in the world—in the midst of language, culture, history, “prejudice”—as we try to make sense of it.22 On the other hand, it is also clear that, even while there is no escaping this situation, there nevertheless remains a kind of pressure, a narrative pressure, to speak the truth. So it is, Schachtel told us, that the writer must always strive to move beyond convention—or, perhaps more appropriately put, to imaginatively rework convention in such a way that something new can be said. But what exactly does this mean? What can it mean?

Closely related to this issue is the aforementioned issue of the sources of stories. Gordon, you will recall, had told us that perhaps she had learned some elements of the genre of memoir simply by living in contemporary society and watching TV (and going to the movies, reading books, and so on). What she has also told us, in effect, is that these external sources have in fact become internalized and that the resultant narrative—as well as the memory on which it relies—is a curious admixture of her own firsthand experiences and those secondhand experiences bequeathed from without. There is thus something of a paradox here too, and it is not unrelated to the first one we encountered: just as there is no extricating memory and narrative from convention, there is no extricating that which is wholly “ours” from that which derives from without.23 As noted earlier,
there remains a tendency to reserve the term “memory” for the former, the supposition being that knowledge derived from external (secondhand) sources gets imposed on the internal (firsthand) process. But if these external sources become constitutive of the very fabric of our memories, how are we ever to separate out internal from external, the “actual” from the “imposed”? And yet, there is a pressure here too, to do precisely this, a pressure to rely on our own memories and to tell our own stories as best we can. But what can this possibly mean? Is autobiography even possible?

The third issue, which we have already explored in some detail, is perhaps the most vexing of all. While Gordon had spoken of an inherent drive toward narrative closure, Kermode, Slater, and Gazzaniga had gone so far as to relate the process of narrating to lying. I have suggested elsewhere that there is a deep and abiding connection between the narrated life and the examined life. In a related vein, I have also suggested that remembering and narrating the personal past can be a vehicle of moral recuperation, that is, a vehicle for correcting the shortsightedness, or even blindness, that frequently befalls present experience. Last, but not least, I have tried to retain a place in the process of telling stories for the possibility of telling the truth—indeed a deeper and more capacious truth than the one generally operative in much of contemporary thought, especially in the sciences. How can students of memory and narrative have reached such radically different conclusions about these matters? From one perspective, the storyteller is a liar, as a matter of necessity and course. From the other, the storyteller may be seen as having the best available pathway toward self-knowledge. Both cannot be true. The challenge of rethinking the memory–narrative connection thus remains.

Let us return to Gordon’s essay to flesh out these difficult issues. “When I think of Mockingbird Years,” she writes,

I picture it as a crude map depicting the three essays from which it originated as aboriginal landmasses. In my mind, they are connected by a series of narrative bridges, long chains of interlocking “and then, and then, and then(s).” Even though I had adapted the original essays for use in the memoir, I view them as uncontestable territories—pieces of the truth. The narrative bridges, on the other hand, seem to me to be flimsy things, instrumentally constructed, spanning a watery chaos.

Gordon acknowledges that the essays she had written were also constructions, as much as the narrative parts that would eventually unite them. She also acknowledges that the essays themselves partake of elements of narrative and that, consequently, they are hardly to be regarded as pure, immune from the sort of “flimsiness” she has come to associate with narrative bridges. As such, she writes, “I find it hard to account for my settled conviction that they were somehow truer than the parts I viewed as narrative bridges.” But the conviction was there, along with an “uneasy conscience.” Something was amiss at the very heart of the memoir—indeed, perhaps at the very heart of memory itself.
“As memoirs go,” Gordon notes, “mine is fairly honest.” She did “take a few liberties here and there with details of décor and landscape, but there are no large-scale inventions, no outright untruths.” Moreover, “Everything that I say happened in my memoir happened, and happened more or less when I said it did.” What, then, is the problem? In what sense had she “distorted the truth of [her] life almost beyond recognition?” Here is her answer, which she frames in terms of “the tripartite lie of contemporary memoir”:

First, I presented what was only one of a multitude of possible autobiographical stories as if it were the story of my life. . . . Next, I allowed this narrative to influence the selections I made from the nearly infinite set of possibilities—and orderings of possibilities—that my life history afforded me. . . . Finally, and most seriously, I wrote from an impossibly posthumous point of view, as if I knew the final truth of my life—as if I were confident that nothing that happened in the future might yet revise it. While I was careful to hedge my bet with irony and a certain tentativeness of tone, I knew in my writer’s heart that where I left off, my readers would take over—their passion for narrative closure would finish the job for me. And then they would hoist me onto their shoulders and make much of me, or at least some of them would. The odd consequence of the lie of my memoir was that my mere, and logically necessary, survival was enough to turn my story into a triumph.29

Part of the problem, from Gordon’s point of view, was a kind of narrative hubris, the audacity of supposing that she had discovered the “final truth” of her life. Perhaps, therefore, she ought to have been a bit more humble about what she could and couldn’t know of her life, of herself. But there was also the problem of narrative itself. Her perspective is a curious one. “I feel a little ashamed that I was so ready to sell my essayistic birthright for a mess of memoiristic pottage,” she confesses, “but I can’t deny that my book was better, or at least more readable, for having a story line. A narrative arc is necessary to a memoir of the kind I contracted to write, particularly one that encompasses all or most of a life and brings it up to the present day.” Her explanation: “It’s the length that does it: the brain will submit to an amoebically free-form twenty-page essay, but will balk at the prospect of three hundred pages without a through-line.”30 The intra-psychic lie that Gazzaniga had spoken of, which was needed “to keep our personal story together,” is thus magnified in the case of memoir; without it, Gordon implies, readers’ brains would simply tune out after twenty pages, and sales would plummet. This, at least, is how it all appears now.

“For two years after Mockingbird Years was published,” Gordon continues,

I struggled to disentangle the triumphant narrative self of my memoir from my necessarily non-triumphant real self. I lost touch with my real past, and consequently lost access to the future; I was unable to live and consequently unable to write. Like a
character under a fairy-tale curse, I had no choice but to wait until a sense of the actual past returned to me—until the season of my false triumph had passed and the weeds of authenticity had grown high enough to obscure the orderly garden of memoir.31

Fair enough: clearly, there was a significant gap between the story Gordon had told and who she really believed herself to be. But is the problem here the seeming inevitability of hindsight and narrative working their self-aggrandizing ways? Or is it that Gordon had written an overly self-aggrandizing narrative, one that simply wasn’t as truthful as it might have been? Must autobiographical narrative be triumphalist? Must the “garden” of memoir be as orderly as she suggests? Must memoirs lie?

The plot thickens: “The past I longed to retrieve was not just the past unmediated by the story of a life in therapy, but the past unmediated by any narrative at all. I wanted to rediscover my history under the aspect of nothing but itself.” Gordon, therefore, essentially wanted to engage in a kind of time travel, to a land before narrative, to a past whose future was as yet undetermined. “How did this past look as I turned back to face it? Very much the way the future looked to me as a child—like a great undifferentiated ocean of time. Here and there, events and impressions heaved up to break the surface of the unmapped waters of the past, but I had very little sense of the geography of the region.”32 Fortunately, there had been lots of baby pictures, which Gordon would be able to explore “as hungrily as an archeologist examining the artifacts of a lost civilization.” She needs these pictures; “without them I could no longer bring to mind the stages of a face that changed every week. How much more of the lost world of my history might I have been able to reclaim if I had taken more pictures, kept other kinds of records of time as it was passing?” Not only did these photos help Gordon remember her daughter as she had appeared throughout the course of her childhood; they also gave her “a foothold in time. Having recovered [her daughter’s] red denim overalls,” for instance, she “can also retrieve other details and scenes through association, and thus triangulate my way back into an era of which they have come to be an emblem. Those photographs—or at least a few of them—have become the central nodes of a whole system of recollection.”33

Gordon is hardly to be faulted for wanting to return to those earlier days via the baby pictures; they allow a different kind of relationship to the past, one that is more concrete, more sensuous. But it remains unclear why this relationship ought to be elevated to the status of truth, and memoir demoted to that of the lie. There is a twofold assumption operative in Gordon’s essay as well as in the work of many theorists of autobiographical memory and narrative. The first part of the assumption is that immediate experience—that which occurs in the context of the sensuous present moment—represents a kind of baseline of the real; it is the foundation, against which all other accounts are to be compared, the indubitable archive of What Really Happened. And even if it is recognized that the immediate is itself mediated (and is in that sense not so immediate as the word
implies), there nevertheless remains the assumption that it is somehow purer, less tarnished by the sundry designs and desires we bring to the world upon looking backward and trying to make sense of it all. The second part follows from the first: insofar as memory—and, by extension, narrative—veer away from the fleshy immediacy of the (past) present moment, they cannot help but involve some measure of distortion and falsification. Often, following Bartlett especially, the more neutral language of “reconstruction” is used. But there is no mistaking the thrust of such work, in which the leading terms are accuracy and distortion, “true” memories, which are closer to unmediated reality, and “false” ones, which deform it. The implication is clear enough: to the degree that memory departs from What Really Happened, in the sensuous fullness of immediate experience, it cannot help but falsify the past. Narrative simply makes matters worse.

I want to question this twofold assumption, and I want to do so in a twofold way. First, I want to question the tendency to equate the immediate, the momentary, the sensuous present, with reality. It is one reality, to be sure, but there is no necessary reason to consider it primary—the “baseline,” as I called it, against which any and all other renditions are to be compared. Indeed, there are profound limits to the present moment, precisely because of our all too human tendency to be unreflectively caught up in it. I do not wish to denigrate the present moment; it undoubtedly has virtues of its own. What’s more, it can certainly be argued, compellingly, that too often we are blind to the present moment, moving through our lives all too hastily, all too unaware of what’s there, before us, in the world. There are nevertheless limits to the present moment, tied not only to blindness, hastiness, lack of awareness, and so on, but to the absence of that sort of temporal distance that allows us to see things in their full, or at least fuller, measure. As Hans-Georg Gadamer puts the matter, “What a thing has to say, its intrinsic content, first appears only after it is divorced from the fleeting circumstances of its actuality.” As such, temporal distance, so often assumed to be a source of distortion or outright falsification, bears within it a “positive and productive possibility of understanding.”

This brings me to the second reason for casting into question the twofold assumption outlined above. In line with questioning the immediate-moment-as-reality thesis, I want to question what might be termed the reconstructive-memory-as-inevitable-distortion thesis. Let me be clear about this issue: there can be distortion, there can be false memories, and all the rest. Inquiring into these sorts of issues is vitally important. This focus on accuracy and distortion, however, is but one axis of inquiry into the reconstructive dimension of memory. I therefore want to turn to a quite different axis of inquiry, my primary interest being in the revelatory power of memory—that is, its capacity to yield insight and understanding of the sort that could not, indeed that cannot, occur in the immediacy of the present moment.
Gordon has clearly made use of this revelatory power. As she now realizes,

The narrative of my memoir was a lie, and for some time it made my entire history disappear. . . . Like every story, it was told after the fact. I had no way of knowing until quite late that I would hear any call [to become a writer] at all, and when I did, I seized upon it to justify what was failed in my life. My memory subsequently colluded with the narrative scheme by consigning everything unrelated or potentially antagonistic to it—my studies; my motherhood; my marriage; the pleasures, pains, and struggles of my daily life; the ambition that I could hardly contain, much less conceal from myself; even the writing I did before I pronounced myself a writer—to relative obscurity, so as to dramatize my modest success by throwing it into bold relief.38

There is a tragic aspect to this new story Gordon wishes to tell about herself. “The only way I seem to be able to reclaim my own experience,” she writes, “is to remember it ‘under the aspect’—under the aspect, that is, of narrative interpretation, which initiates distortions of the past as automatically as a rent in a stocking begins a run. . . . What comes later in a life draws its significance from what came earlier, but only in the dead letter of a narrative can what comes earlier draw its significance from what comes later. Life can be read backward, not forward.”39

Where does this leave her? “My long-odds bet [about becoming a writer] paid off,” Gordon writes, “but even so, my reckless dismissal of so much in my life that did not fit my notion of destiny is something to regret.” There will be a brief meditation on this idea: “Regret. What can I make of this anachronistic sentiment? Regret is the obverse of the triumphalism I’ve been describing here. Its voice is quiet; in a noisily therapeutic age, all but inaudible.”40 But there is an ironic twist to this final rendition of things: the very insight that Gordon has attained—about herself, about the seemingly inevitable distortions of the past, about the lie of memoir—has itself derived from memory, as has her regret. But it is precisely this measure of insight—attainable only in memory, via narrative—that is belied by the insistence on the lie of memoir and of narrative interpretation more generally.

This suggests that a more capacious view of both memory and narrative is warranted. The fact that memory is always already mediated does not mean that it is irreparably tainted and impure. Indeed, and again, the fact of memory’s mediation is the very condition of possibility for the emergence of insight into one’s past of precisely the sort we see in Gordon’s case. There are of course degrees of mediation: while some memories do emerge in relatively pure form, others are much more visibly permeated by mediating factors. In a related vein, the distinction between what might be called “first-order” memory—tied to “my own” firsthand experience—and “second-order” memory—tied to external sources—also remains. (As Eva Hoffman has insisted, those who lived through the
Shoah surely have a different relationship to that reality than those who have learned about it through others. But this distinction cannot, and should not, be framed in terms of the unmediated versus the mediated. Indeed, the challenge in this context is precisely to determine and to chart the multiple ways in which mediation works. By doing so, the idea of mediation may not only be deemed less troublesome by the likes of Gordon and others, but will also expand the space of memory itself and thereby minimize some of the regret that may be experienced over the fact of never quite arriving at the promised land of the utterly unvarnished past present. Is memory ever exclusively “mine”? Phenomenologically, the answer is surely yes: there is an irreducible “my-ness” to certain memories, especially those that involve sensuously felt experiences. There also exist some memories that seem to return us to what was, to a past present experience. But our very consciousness of this fact suggests that even these ostensibly pure Proustian resurgences are inseparable from the present act of remembering and all that we bring to it. Moreover, insofar as the process of remembering the personal past always takes place in and through language, culture, and history and thereby partakes of sources outside the perimeter of the self, what is “mine” is always already permeated by otherness.

The process of remembering the personal past is always already permeated by narrative as well—if not the full blown sort we find in memoirs and autobiographies, then the more inchoate sort, the rough draft—that exists the moment we try to make sense of the movement of experience. Indeed, it has been argued strenuously that the process of living is itself permeated by narrative, that indeed to be human is to live in and through the fabric of narrative time. But what about the act of writing, the act of actually telling the story of personal past in a memoir or autobiography? A number of the writers from whom we have heard have suggested that, whatever problems the process of remembering may bring in tow, the process of writing exacerbates them. There is willful, conscious artifice; there needs to be a storyline, a “narrative arc,” as Gordon had put it, in order to draw readers in. As she herself admits, her book was that much better for it. Now, it is of course true that the process of writing about the personal past can simply falsify it, not only because writers sometimes concoct experiences that never happened or didn’t happen anywhere near the way they were described, but also because they sometimes fashion images of their lives that are patently out of sync with the actual movement of their lives. One needn’t be a hard-nosed empiricist or crude positivist to see that this is so. It is equally clear, however, that some writers can and do write about the personal past in such a way as to disclose features of experience that would otherwise remain unacknowledged and unseen. We thus return full circle to Schachtel, who had spoken of the “widening or opening of the scope of articulate human experience” through writing. Telling stories about the personal past thus turns out to be a most complicated business, sometimes veering toward lies, sometimes veering toward truths, indeed deeper ones than generally meet the eye. How is this possible?
Tell stories: memory and narrative

Poiesis and Reality

Let me conclude this chapter with several fairly strong assertions about the relationship between “lies” and “truth” as these terms apply to the process of telling stories about the personal past. The first is that the notion of lies, when used to refer to the processes that go into the fashioning of life narratives, is parasitic on an overly narrow—and very problematic—conception of what reality is. The second assertion is that the conception of reality upon which this notion of lies is parasitic is problematic for at least two basic reasons. The first, again, is that it is equated with the allegedly raw and pristine, the unmediated and unconstructed, the “real stuff.” To the extent that reality is always already mediated, there is ample reason to question this conception. The second and more complicated reason is that this conception of reality is tied to a conception of time—basically, clock time, the time of lines, instants, sequences—that is inadequate to the dynamics of human temporality. To draw these two ideas together: the conception of reality that usually surfaces when stories of the personal past are relegated to the status of artful lies is one that is imagined to be free of our own designs, a string of “stuff” that just happens, “in time,” and that we inevitably falsify when we later look backward and try to impose some order. With the help of the notion of poiesis, I want to cast this conception of reality radically into question. In doing so, I also want to suggest that rethinking the process of telling stories can open the way toward a more comprehensive, capacious, and adequate view of memory, narrative, and reality itself.

“What is essential to the story-teller’s position,” David Carr has suggested, “is the advantage of . . . hindsight, a . . . freedom from the constraint of the present assured by occupying a position after, above, or outside the events narrated.” This position is a treacherous one. By being located “after, above, or outside the events narrated,” the storyteller—particularly the autobiographical storyteller—runs a number of significant risks. Gordon and some of the others from whom we have heard have done well to outline many of them. By virtue of this very position, however, the storyteller also has the opportunity to make sense of things anew. To “make sense of”: in this simple phrase, there is reference both to making, in the sense of a kind of constructive doing, and to explicating, in the sense of discerning what is actually there, in the world. It is at this juncture that the idea of poiesis may be useful. As I have suggested elsewhere, poets strive neither for a mimetic re-presentation of the world nor a fictive rendition of it. Rather, what they seek to do is rewrite the world through the imagination, such that we, readers, can see or feel or learn something about it that might otherwise have gone unnoticed or undisclosed. Contra Gordon and company, Yves Bonnefoy has suggested that “this world which cuts itself off from the world seems to the person who creates it not only more satisfying than the first but also more real.” Bonnefoy goes on to speak of the “impression of a reality at last fully incarnate, which comes to us, paradoxically, through words which have turned away from incarnation.” Poetry, poetic language, rather than entailing the imposition
of meaning, entails disclosure, “unconcealedness,” as Heidegger calls it, its aim being nothing less than the revelation of truth. Along these lines, poetry seeks to depict the “realer than real”; it is an effort to move beyond the exterior of things and thereby to actualize the potential of meaning the world bears within it. Notice here the parallel between memory and poetry: just as memory may disclose meanings that might have been unavailable in the immediacy of the moment, poetry may disclose meanings and truths that might otherwise have gone unarticulated. Both are thus potential vehicles of what might be termed recuperative disclosure; they are agents of insight and rescue, re-collection and recovery, serving to counteract the forces of oblivion. In autobiographical narrative, memory and poetry meet.

Whether the process of telling stories obscures the personal past or reveals its hidden potentialities depends precisely on the storyteller’s capacity to use language artfully. “Under the law of aesthetic form,” Marcuse wrote some time ago, “the given reality is necessarily sublimated: the immediate content is stylized, the ‘data’ are reshaped and reordered in accordance with the demands of the art form. . . . Aesthetic sublimation makes for the affirmative, reconciling component of art, though it is at the same time a vehicle for the critical, negating function of art.” This critical function “resides in the aesthetic form. . . . The work of art thus re-presents reality while accusing it.” Herein lies the radical truth-telling potential of poiesis: “The truth of art lies in its power to break the monopoly of established reality (i.e., of those who established it) to define what is real.”

Telling stories about the personal past, when done artfully, embodies this very power. It also shows why the mediating work of memory and narrative, far from necessarily obscuring reality, can reveal it and, through this revelation, redefine it. Returning to Schachtel one final time, the task of the storyteller is to “fight constantly against the easy flow of words that offer themselves in order to find those that will say something new and valuable, something that moves beyond the cliché, the stale sentiment, into a region of truth.

This perspective on telling stories applies not only to memoirs and the like but also to a wide variety of other texts and practices, both autobiographical and non-autobiographical. To be sure, one way to tell a story, one way to tell the truth, is to use language in such a way as to be representationally faithful to the past present. This seems to be what Gordon had most wanted to do. But there are countless other ways to tell stories and countless other vehicles for entering what I have here called a region of truth. Alongside memoirs, there are oral histories and other such ventures. Alongside the literary arts, there are the plastic arts. Alongside stories of the self, there are stories of others and of nonhuman realities. Some of these stories will follow a more or less traditional narrative path, beckoning readers or viewers to follow along. Other narrative paths will be much more tortuous, leading readers or viewers to fashion stories largely on their own. Whether these ventures succeed depends decidedly less on their representational accuracy than on their capacity to disclose a recognizable world and to do so in a way that somehow adds
to it, releases its inchoate potentialities. Finally, then, narrative poiesis is about the profound, never-ending challenge of fashioning stories able to do justice to the inexhaustible profusion of meaning that is constitutive of human life.

Gordon’s situation, as considered in “Book of Days,” is a complicated one, and there is much more to her story than what I have addressed here. Toward the end of her essay, for instance, she recalls concluding “that there was something to be said for planning to make a life instead of planning to make a story of my life.”54 Perhaps this gets to the heart of the matter. Perhaps, that is, her guilt and her regret were a function not only of the kind of story she was eventually to tell, which she couldn’t help but see as an outright lie, but of the very project of storytelling. Why couldn’t she just live? “How many times have I comforted myself with the old saw about how the unexamined life is not worth living?” In her case, however, it had come to feel that “the reverse might well be truer—that the unlived life might not be worth examining.”55 For Gordon, it almost seems as if the relationship between living and telling can be formulated as a zero-sum game: had she lived more, she might have told less. There also might have been fewer glaring discrepancies between what was and how she came to tell about it. But it could be that living and telling are not so far apart as she implies. And it could also be that the process of telling stories, rather than leading straightaway to lies, can lead in the direction of truth. Had Gordon been better able to see and feel this possibility, she may have been able to avoid some of the guilt and regret that had so plagued her.
III. PUBLIC MEMORY
The study of ritual has received its greatest elaboration in the work of anthropologists. This chapter, then, will be a discussion of how anthropologists, including psychological anthropologists, say ritual is related to human memory. Let me begin the discussion with the first question a reader may ask: What is ritual?

Ritual

The simplest definition of ritual is repeated and standardized communicative action, in which communication is not simply through signs but also through symbols. In the *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*’s entry on ritual, Edmund Leach defines it as any form of repeated action that is not only functional or technical but also aesthetic. Ritual is the aesthetic aspect of repeated action, conveying meaning that is also an expression of power.¹ But this makes ritual ubiquitous, an aspect of most human action. So Leach’s definition narrows it down by dwelling on ritual form, noting that ritual is a dramatic performance, one that is stylized, distorting normal, everyday repeated action. The distortion itself is, he says, part of the communicative code.

Such a performance is dramatic, in that it has a structure and is compelling. Its structure is that of a separation from the everyday, a state of suspension, and a return that is also a separation from whatever was disclosed in the state of suspension from the everyday. It may be a prescribed sequence of verbal or nonverbal acts, usually both. This sequence was first proposed by Arnold Van Gennep in 1909,² but it has been worked over by many subsequent anthropologists, most famously Victor Turner, whose work on ritual drama, including divination and pilgrimage as well as rites of passage, made the middle stage, which he
called “liminality”—a state of being on the border, or “anti-structure,” as he termed it—famously suggestive. 3

Ritual performance is compelling, both for its participants and for its audience, because it has to be completed and because much depends on its completion, into which is built an expectation, be it of peacemaking or rainmaking. Consider first the fact that ritual has to be completed. Maurice Bloch pointed out that the communicative code of ritual is highly formalized, that in it ordinary speech turns to oratory, to archaic forms (such as masks and costumes), or to song, and ordinary communicative gestures turn to dance. 4 Rituals are highly predictable speech and body acts in sequences that have to be completed. Compared to ordinary propositional speech and its almost infinite openness and logic, ritual is far less communicative; it is not logical or propositional but is instead a manifestation of traditional authority. It has the illocutory force of authority itself. It forces the participants, even those whose privileged parts in its performance mark them out as having greater authority, to follow its sequences. Ritual is a performance to which they consciously submit because it came from before and will be repeated in future. What ritual communicates is authority. Its words are like objects and its objects are symbols, emotive and with multiple meanings understandable in the context of the occasion or event of ritual performance.

When we now consider what is expected from its completion, such as the renewal of life, we have moved not only beyond signification, but beyond symbolic authority. At the very least, as in commemorative ritual, the performance does something of itself, brings to mind what might have been forgotten and in a certain way that will, perhaps, warn or prevent (never again), or articulate solidary resolve (they died for us). But quite often the expectation goes beyond what is achieved by performative acts of authority, to effects such as healing, response to prayer, ecstatic possession, and revelation. Rituals are repeated performances with expectations of effects beyond the normal.

With this stress on authoritative action, anthropologists ask whether the exegesis of the meaning of rituals, given by the thoughtful or authoritative experts that are so vital to anthropologists, is part of ritual. If the essential character of ritual is that it is action, nonverbal and verbal, then its explication is secondary. But if the ritual is both verbal and nonverbal and the verbal acts—such as spoken or silent prayer, or invocation of cosmic forces, or the chanting of scriptures, or the giving of sermons—are a commentary on the nonverbal action—as in a list of the offerings and the naming, placing, and praising of the deity to whom they are made—then surely exegesis is part of the ritual. Even so, further exegesis is then extraneous to the action.

Emphasis on ritual action has been called “orthopraxy.” The prefix ortho- introduces a key to what ritual is, as distinct from habit or custom, namely that it is prescribed. But there is a distinction between orthopraxy and orthodoxy, between the prescription of practice and that of doctrine or of faith in a mystery that includes belief, which may come later as an epiphany after years of obedience. It is a distinction used to differentiate modes
of religiosity, those that are ritualistic and those that stress belief. For instance, Jewish and Chinese religious ritual observance are said to be orthopraxic whereas Christianity, or at least Protestant Christianity, is said to be doctrinaire. But since both ritualistic and doctrinal religions contain prescribed actions, verbal as well as nonverbal, in which the verbal is often textual and contains commanding descriptions of the world beyond the everyday world of the living, the distinction is of minor importance. This chapter, in any event, is concerned with ritual, a broader category than religion. Ritual is prescribed and authoritative action with expectations of effects beyond the normal, which is to say it is neither functional nor technical according to the knowledge of the people concerned, to what they treat as technical and for use. You could say that religion is traditional ritual authority expanded into doctrine, an authoritative interpretation of ritual rules and practices. The doctrine or its affirmation is incorporated into ritual.

Ritual is prescribed, and it is therefore a deliberately learned discipline, not just a habit picked up with experience and mimicry. It does things to people who perform it. Its performance forms public emotions and virtues, whether ascetic or ecstatic, whether through pain or through pleasure. Catherine Bell concludes in “The Ritual Body,” a key chapter of her book *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, that rituals “forge an experience of redemptive harmony.”5 “Redemptive” means to claim a return on what is owed, for instance, in an ideal of justice and just reward. Two different situations—or both together—induce this ideal experience or expectation of redemption. One is when relationships of power are being negotiated and when a basis for them is sought beyond a particular person’s or group’s claims to wield authority. The other is when such authority is claimed to be socially redemptive in such a way that it is also personally redemptive. The experience is part of what is learned practically in the performance of ritual. Learning and participating in ritual is an experience of a model situation, of a basic number of what Bell calls oppositions, such as male–female, inner–outer, right–left, and up–down. The ways they are related to each other act as an instrument for knowing and appropriating the world. Learning them molds dispositions that are effective because ritual provides an experience of the coherence of a current hegemony. Like Leach and Bloch, Bell maintains that ritual is an expression of power and that it always involves a negotiation of authority.

There are of course other ways in which hegemonic authority is conveyed and naturalized, such as the way children are taught by their parents to behave. But ritual is to be distinguished from other social and linguistic practices. It is distinctive by the differentiation it creates through reference to, intimation of, or experience of a summary totality and a timeless tradition. Ritualization “does not resolve a social contradiction. Rather it catches up into itself all the experienced and conventional conflicts and oppositions of social life, juxtaposing and homologizing them into a loose and provisional systematicity.”6 It creates a context for other social practices. It is practical spatial learning-to-be and conveys an overarching sense of time. It creates ritualized agents who act as recreators
and emenders of ritual as if they were doing what has always been done and who hold
the ritual as a model for and of other social practices. It is a distinctive linguistic practice
by virtue of its long and set order, distinct from other forms of statement, from proposi-
tional statements. Ritual may be explicated by the telling of a story, but the story does not
capture ritual, which is a universal and personal drama, not a play. And it is unlike
language in being nonlogical, not a structure of oppositions and their resolutions in a
paradigmatic order of classification. It is a constant deferral of resolution through a se-
quential interleaving of oppositions (commonly of fleshly life and everlasting life) hinting
at an ultimate and higher unity and harmony.

So ritual is learned repetition and a discipline. It is like other habits and techniques
of the body, but distinctive. It is another kind of memorized action, one that Bell specifies
by its content, by what it induces: intimation of a greater totality and authority, the
experience exemplified by the ecstasy of being removed into something greater than a
single self.

Other anthropologists focus less on what habits of cognition are learned and more
on the emotions formed by the discipline of the prescribed ritual performance. Gilbert
Lewis singles out the components that alert anyone familiar with the context. Familiarity
that determines choices of action and composition tells people that something is different
and that it is ritual. What alerts us is what brings about the separation of ritual from
habit: the heightening of color, noise or the percussive transport of music, the pungency
and selection of smells, the performance of peculiarly stiff formality and switches from
noise to silence, the avoidance of foods ordinarily eaten and the eating of foods not
ordinarily eaten, anxiety and fearful anticipation and then the shock of pain (of a puberty
or another initiation rite), the revelation of secrets, the inducing of an experience that is
or is not named as that of a god or God, the situational oddity. Oddity and intensity do
not just pertain to the experience of pain in the ordeals of initiation rites or of ecstatic
transport. Ritual performance everywhere also includes occasions of positive excess,
avoidance of negative comment or open conflict, enactments of generosity with spectacle
or food, rituals of reversal and mockery, sexual impropriety—in short carnival: perform-
ances of visions of abundance and of hedonistic disorder.

Ritual can vary in intensity and degree, be more or less clearly called out as a memory,
and the feelings and emotions can be induced by pain, by anticipation, relief, and release,
or by pleasure. But whatever the variation, ritual performance is a corporeal experience,
not just an image. Ritual creates a memory, and when it is repeated, it is reinforced.
Depending on its intensity and frequency, it is more or less lasting or revisited, and
moreover, it is recalled in other situations, adding to one’s knowledge of what happened
and to what it has by now referred in its own and subsequent contexts.

Anthropologists have also pointed out that changed situations are read into the repe-
tition of ritual action. Ritual endures, accommodating change, precisely because it is pre-
scribed action, not exegesis. Exegesis depends on interpreting in accordance with what
RITUAL AND MEMORY

has changed. Ritual, on the other hand, is like myth, stories we live by, according to which we identify with others and share models of conduct that is often extreme, of heroes and villains, of an originary past and an expectation of continuity and possibility, and into these are fed our personal and individual experiences and events that are new, unique, personal, or contingent.

From ritual as memorable experience and expectation, Talal Asad turns to ritual as a learning of emotions. Helped by Foucault’s concept of microtechnologies of discipline, Asad shows how in early Christian monastic ritual, prescribed performance of divine service also produces both virtue and desire. He proposes that this aspect of prescribed action has been marginalized by the post-Enlightenment emphasis on representation and on symbols and their interpretation.8

A fitting conclusion to this section is a theory of ritual that builds on the work of the anthropological theorists I have discussed. They have convinced Caroline Humphrey and James Laidlaw that ritual has to be seen as an action intrinsically distinct from other action.9 It is a boundary marker, marking itself out as different from other action and from linguistic logic and meaning. Ritual action creates a space and a time that is distinct from other kinds of standardized or conventional action. Most important, it is not habitual. This is where Humphrey and Laidlaw propose their own theory. Performers of ritual know they are committing themselves to prescribed action. Humphrey and Laidlaw call this prescription “archetypal.” Even when it is changed, the change has to be ordained by a preceding authority that always preexists it. Ritual’s authority is in its intrinsic temporality, to which I shall now turn.

Social Memory and the Temporality of Ritual

Societies don’t remember, but there are institutions for the transmission of knowledge. Ritual is one and it works by means of repetition. Ritual is itself remembered. But note that every social institution is an institution of transmission. People acting in and through those institutions remember them, or represent them to themselves, and feed into them their particular experiences. Stories and objects of institutional life and knowledge trigger associations with stories and objects external to it in expressed or unexpressed dialogue. But because every social institution is also an institution of transmission, Maurice Halbwachs’s pioneering work and Paul Connerton’s equally pioneering reworking of it tend to flatten habit and transmission into a generalized social memory.10 But institutions trigger stories and mutual recognitions through learned habits of interpretation, using background assumptions shared by some but not by others, asserted in order to differentiate experience, its validation, and its recognition. We should therefore think of publics in the plural and consider how and whether they are linked into a cohesive public. Ritual, because it is prescriptive and leaves room for a number of possible exegeses, is one means
of linking memories and providing occasions for sharing them. But rituals also divide. One set of rituals refers to and recreates one sense of overarching reality, as Bell points out. Other sets of rituals recreate other worlds. Each set produces a different public.

Further, since memory is in a rudimentary sense a past, we are bound to ask whether and in what sense a past is built into what are mutually recognized memories. Is it simply continuity, or does our common memory have a past distinct from the present, and if so, how is that past related to the present? Is such a relationship directional, oriented toward a future, as autobiographical memory is, even if it contemplates only a moment? In short, social memory brings us to the question of temporality: What temporalities are learned within social institutions, particularly through rituals? Memory is temporal, and its study must involve theories of time.

There have been many anthropological statements about human senses of time. A good review of them and a good argument about them can be found in Alfred Gell’s book *The Anthropology of Time*. Gell argues that the experiential sense of time is a way-stage between, on the one hand, an inner time-series of mental models and maps that is aided and kept going as symbolic capital by those who wield power, and, on the other hand, an outer time-series of tasks in the real world that depend on economic activity and geographic fact. By his own admission, Gell has not dealt with history and tradition, but, starting from universal senses of time, we can move to historical temporalities. Two intimately linked and universal human senses of time are kept going and formed socially in personal interaction as well as in less intimate, larger-scale transmissions: (1) Sequential or nonrepeated time in various scales, from split-second momentary sequences that are the neuropsychological elements of autobiographical memory, to life events, to numerically ordered or named years or generations or dynasties; and (2) Cyclical or repeated time, again on different scales, from the neuropsychological momentary recognition and repetition of a response to previous or similar experience, to annual cycles, to generational cycles of life cycles. Like senses of time, memory is both sequential and cyclical. Even when it is not tied to a chronological date, it is recalled in and triggered by a present situation. Memory thus relates to the present through the mode of time. It is also placed and formed in historical temporalities that accompany mental maps. It infuses sequences of the stories we live by.

Historical temporalities are ideological formations of senses of time. I contend that all historical temporalities involve an adjustment to a present, usually for a better future. In other words, they may include repetition and cyclical time but they are sequential because they contain a teleology. One could go further by specifying the conventions of particular historical temporalities, such as that of the project of modernity and the way it has been incorporated into the temporalities and cosmologies of particular cultures. For now, however, it is enough to point out that temporalities underlie any narration of pasts. This enables us to ask what temporalities are transmitted in ritual and what ritual may transmit as a vehicle for memories.
Historical temporalities construe the past as pertinent in the present in a number of ways. A contrast between two of them is illuminating for a discussion of ritual. The first recounts the past as a saga or a myth, the past as a before that explains or directs or makes sense of the present and its eternal or universal truth, even if the cause of the present is so trivial as to be whimsical. The second recounts the past as a unique narration of events and circumstances, in which a past that is gone is a model for the present, or evokes nostalgia, or must never be allowed again, or simply has happened and has been but no longer is. Individual biographies, stories that tell lives, can take on the character of either relation to the present, heroic or generic or contingent. For instance, death rituals consign personal memories of the deceased to heroic eulogy or to “abstract identity, depersonalised destiny and generic vitality.”

Ritual as a marker of repeated occasions and points of transition in a life cycle or in annual cycles provides points of convergence and repetition for personal memories and the sharing of them. The very timing and repetition of rituals also conveys at least a rudimentary cosmology, a rhythm of cyclical time and of biography, its continuity as well as the sense of position and place that Catherine Bell pointed out. Many rituals also work to contain what threatens to disrupt or destroy continuity, threats averted by the correct performance of the ritual. But like the present of myth, the temporality of ritual is of an eternity. Its tense is of something that has always been so, is repeated, or is revitalized or recovered, or of a continuity that is adjusted to a change. Plainly, anthropologists and historians can claim great merit for showing when and how a ritual was “invented” or when new elements were introduced. In principle, a history of any ritual can be written or recounted. It can tell us much. For instance, Andrew Walsh writes of a commemorative rite in northern Madagascar that marks and celebrates an event by the hoisting of a mast, and he shows that interpretations of what it celebrated according to one witness in 1961 differ radically from how another interpreted it to him in 1997 mainly because the political and economic contexts, the two “presents” of interpretation, were so different even while the rite and the polity that it drew together remained the same. Despite Walsh’s focus on the history and changing contexts of the rite, I want to draw from this example the more basic point, once again, that interpretation is extraneous to ritual and that ritual’s intrinsic time is that of repetition, of continuity and archaism if not of eternity.

History and Its Ritual Transmission

Commemorative rites seem to be an exception to this point. They mark a particular event and the lives that were spent (heroically or tragically, heedlessly, catastrophically) in it, which are made significant by the commemorative rite. But the rite enters a set or a repertoire of commemorative rites, which make up the shared past of an ongoing present. The rhetoric of gesture and performance and the architecture of memorials, however
innovative, all aspire to a time out of the contingent present. Civic Holocaust memorials and days mark a unique event, the attempted annihilation of Europe’s Jews, but they place it in a cyclical time, in an architecture and with words that cast the commemoration as a negative example and lesson for all time, through which visitors are drawn into vicarious memories of identification with the victims and a horrified understanding of how the Holocaust and other genocides happened, in the hope, however forlorn, of preventing them from ever happening again.

War memorials convert historical events, on one hand, and families’ individual mourning for their dead, on the other, into a grander vision, of a national or human destiny. Live memories, whether of wars that ended in defeat or in victory, of the chaos of war, or of the violence of death and the cutting from a living self of a life cut short, are all turned into a ritual monument of self-sacrifice. As Michael Rowlands has pointed out, the narrative of history and the pointless repetition of death are thus turned into an enduring monument. The monument and its accompanying commemorative rites repeat the names, if they are included, or evoke the anonymous fallen by a significant ritual act by which the chaos and pain of death can be forgotten by its transformation into a remembrance. It may be a monument of classic heroism, as the memorials (but not the graveyards) of the “Great War” tend to be. Or it may be a gash in the earth like Washington’s memorial to Vietnam veterans, which much more ambivalently suggests the pointlessness of the sacrifice. Or it may be the field of blank slabs in the center of Berlin, an equally enduring memorial to the horror of the annihilation of Europe’s Jews. All of them evoke the spirit of an enduring present of redemption in which the personal is raised into a collective transformation, as Catherine Bell has pointed out about ritual in general.

Death rites also mark a unique event, the death of a person. But they turn the event into a typical one, in which the unique person is included. Even in a case, among the Toraja of Indonesia, of what the participants stress is an “intimate” calling back and reconstitution of a life (rather than a rendering of it as separated from the living present), intimacy is identification of and with the “kernel” of the dead person as one of a few types of humanity. The living identify with the deceased, passing through the stages of death, a process Dmitri Tsintjilonis calls “obviation” of the past and the present. In this way, as in all death rituals, personal memories are opened out to myths and senses of life and death in general. The uniquely personal fades into the typical by a process of ritually ordered amnesia.

Death rites turn into a form of history as they extend into rites for the honoring of ancestors and as the dead are selectively entered into remembered or recorded genealogies. Whether and to what depth this occurs depends on the importance of relationships of descent for a culture’s social organization. But whether reckoning of ancestry is deep or shallow, mortuary rites and commemorations of ordinary deaths extend into stories of origins and mark out dislocations, removals, and the remaking of places of origin. In addition, they allude to the secretly or openly acknowledged displacement of those whose
place it had been. But this is mythical or saga-like narrative. Ancestral rites, where they occur, convey events that are the past of a continuing present of a collective entity, in these cases a descent group.

Rites and their sites can also convey the history and geography of far larger populations than the descendants of a common ancestor. Hierarchies of shrines and the roads by which pilgrims visit them create sacred landscapes, as do the places of heroic deeds and their commemoration. They orient us spatially around past and present places of belonging. By carefully checking archaeological finds of ritual sites of the Yanesha people of the lower Andes against the myths of deity-heroes whose stories are commemorated there, Fernando Santos-Granero has been able to trace the geography of several centuries of history, as people were forced up from the Amazon basin by hostile others, emerging as “Yanesha,” who were then forced further upland to avoid the Spanish conquerors. He gives us a further example to add to those of other anthropologists, such as those in Australia who have described how new places of autochthonous belonging are created and ritually perpetuated.

Histories are written into landscapes through ritual and myth. But history as written from archaeological and documentary evidence functions in a quite different mode from mythical temporality, just as the landscape of events and histories of them are quite different in mode from a ritual landscape, which is cosmological or cosmogonic, that is, of a world and its origins and of humanity in it. What the performance of rituals does is to locate those whose rituals they are. Their location and the focus they provide forms places of their identification as if for always.

Ritual as a Different Kind of History

The relation between memory, history, and rituals, is taken up by Michael Lambek who mounts a critique of the unique authority we tend to accord to individualized memory and evidential historiography. In the course of his critique, Lambek raises the issue of how feelings, ethics, and the recalling of the past into the present are linked. He bases his critique on Sakalava spirit mediumship, which he observed in northern Madagascar. Lambek’s starting position for a comparison of the making and maintenance of history is to question two distinctions vital to the Western tradition. One is between poiesis (expressive creativity) and a rational, dispassionate representation of the past based on evidence. The other is between praxis (acting on practical reason) and theoria (reflection, pure theory). Many other distinctions are inferred from these two. For instance, he questions the distinction between history, an account of the past, and memory, a clinging to what has happened and bringing it into a living moment. Often, philosophers and historians assert that these distinctions are axiomatic. But they do not exist for the Sakalava spirit mediums.
When possessed by spirits, mediums dress and act the part of a significant character in a royal line. Even when not possessed, they conform to the likes and dislikes, demeanors and emotions of the beings that appear through their bodies. The past is brought into the present vividly. Often several pasts are simultaneously present because beings from different times are made present by their mediums and interact. Every possession is also an adaptation to and a comment on current circumstances. It is the telling of history by the performance of characters, who then make history by their new encounters, in which they nevertheless observe genealogical prerogatives, the service and deference that juniors owe seniors. The past is respected genealogically, but at the same time it is not just made present. It is telescoped, made simultaneous. The medium is an experiencing human in the present, so that the character from the past is neither history nor memory—the medium is aware of the other being and the burden of bearing her or him.

Spirit-possession is at once grand and directed to personal “cases.” It aspires to the status of mythic history, bringing gods or ancestors to life, and at the same time it responds by making judgments or prescribing ritual action on “cases” of the recent dead or of the living. It makes of them a public property precisely by including them into an ever-present mythic history. The emotional history enacted by Sakalava spirit-mediums legitimates a royal court and does this by creating a spatial and temporal disposition—not a chronological story of events but a genealogy of the dead brought into being.

Ritual as Transmission of Unspecified Events

Other anthropologists have read into the history of rituals the effects and the transmission of great emotional events. Two studies in particular have seen in rituals, despite their temporality, despite their never referring to particular events, the history and trauma of slavery.

Rosalind Shaw claims that the landscape of threatening spirits and the divination rituals performed by the Temne of Sierra Leone form an unconscious memory through habit that conveys the terrors of the slave trade and turns them to creative use. She counts ritual as a kind of body memory, a nondiscursive re-experiencing of suffering. Like Lambek, she counterposes this public memory to the narration of what she calls positivistic (evidence-based) histories of the slave trade, calling the rituals emotion-laden and suggesting that they teach and convey a moral imagination. To my mind, she and Lambek neglect the descriptive terms, such as “devastating” or “terror,” used by historians to convey events and acts that are horrifying. But the main force of her argument comes from the idea that the terrors of enslavement are not articulable, not evidential. They are “unspeakable,” in all the word’s meanings. And rituals, unlike descriptive words, can convey the “nightmarish character of the traffic in human commodities” through the sites and stories of powerful spirits and their use and abuse by diviners, witches, and
chiefs. She produces evidence that there were more spirit shrines in places of human settlement before the slave trade than there are now, assuming that many of what were then considered protective have now become threatening and have been transposed into borderlands. Ritual evocations of borderland menace enfold the turbulent history of slave raiding, turmoil, and civil war that still engulfs Sierra Leone in an abiding sense of witchcraft and threat.

Nicolas Argenti makes a similar claim for the rituals of succession to kingship in the Grasslands of the Cameroons. He argues that the masked dances in the chief’s court, an example of which he saw in 1992 in the chiefdom of Oku, include actions and symbols that make sense only when you know that chiefs and heads of lineages sold their own youth into captivity. For instance, two of the masked characters that dance at the enthronement of the king are known to enact “twins,” who had in former times been buried with the old king, the double bodies marking the distinction between the eternity of kingship and royal power over life, on the one hand, and the fleshly life of the corpse of the king, on the other, while at the same time marking the crossing over between death and life. Twins can also be understood to be “slaves,” who also exist between death and life. Another instance is a threatening character who comes last in a line of masked men, who perform a slow and shuffling dance while he keeps them in line in front of him, driving them and preventing them from harming the audience or being harmed by the audience. Is he protecting them? Their shuffle is a sign of age and therefore of the respect they are due, Argenti says. But it might also be seen to evoke the awkward gait of captured slaves, who were bound to one another to be led to the coast in single file. The fact is that there are many possible interpretations, and none of them are given discursively.

The fearsome masked dancer carries in his hand a blade of grass called a Fulani sword, and at the back another masked dancer wields an actual cutlass. The young men who form the palace guard and also perform announce that outsiders are planning to use the occasion to murder. Fulani were slave capturers from the north. More immediately, the military guard are terrifying because it is they whose noisy progress could be heard at night as they went about the business of capturing for labor or capital punishment and who still act as the court’s military guard. The kings, in whose succession the ritual links the new king, preyed on their own people and said that there were cannibal-witches in their midst that they had to capture. The kings are themselves feared as cannibal-witches whose attacks hollow out their victims until they are mere human husks, an appropriate image for slaves. Argenti points out that youth in the audience come both to mock and to act as those threatened by the dancers. They come in order to be near and to touch the revealed and terrible power of chiefs. But the hollowing out—turning living men into mere bodies forced to find work elsewhere that could kill them, work undertaken to earn the means to return and marry and so become “men”—could lead to their future. Their part in the ritual, according to Argenti, is a working through of their dread of the future,
of what will have been, which is also what was, including slavery and, after the end of the
slave trade, being bound by ropes as porters for colonial rulers.

Neither the Temne nor the Grasslands people mention slavery willingly. Why not?
Initially, Shaw argues, because to remember is like commemoration, acknowledging and
bringing to life the power of the person remembered, and nobody wants to do this for
slavery and slave-takers.26 But she cites inquiries, including her own, that have succeeded
in convincing people to speak about the subject. The inhibition can be overcome in gen-
ceral discourse, but knowledge of the past never comes up in interpretations of ritual.
What the rituals convey is awesome and terrifying power and what they trigger are stories
of the abuse of power, but not specifically of enslavement. Instead, the rituals enact the
royal gift of life and the concomitant negative power over life in general terms; they evoke
reproduction of life and its opposite, cannibalism. They display the contrast between
those with power over life and those like the watching and mocking youth who are depen-
dent on that power, ultimately under the threat of being put to death.

Are Argenti and Shaw right in thinking that this ritual demonstration of the power
over life conveys the traumas of the slave trade? Do the rituals, in Argenti’s vocabulary,
act out the “encrypted” trauma of slavery? In terms of the individual experience of trauma
as it has been clinically described and treated as an unspeakable void that governs the
activities of the sufferer and produces involuntarily recurrence of flash-bulb memories, of
course not. As Argenti writes: “In contrast to traumatic re-enactment, these performances
are not the trauma.”27 Some ritual enactments and reminders of generalized horror, of
the possibilities of enormous power, can be screens for personal traumas, but they are
not their enactment—which would be enslavement itself. Have changes to the rituals,
during or since the slave trade made a difference to what the rituals seen by Shaw and
Argenti can convey? The question remains open. But the point remains that rituals are
screens, they are a mythologization of personal imagination and memory by which the
personal, memory proper, is shared and made public. They in turn provide the imagery
and genre for the recounting and recalling of experiences.

Eric Mueggler shows how a more recent horror was incorporated into the rituals
of the Lolop’o, a mountain people in southwestern China.28 The Lolop’o ritual imagery
of the underworld and of powers over the life of the dead and the living includes a
category of black ghosts who prey on the dead who are wild because unmourned. Black
ghosts can also kill the living and turn them into wild ghosts. The black ghosts are ex-
tremely exacting and greedy for the offerings that they must be given to cease their pred-
atations. In Zhizuo, to the north of the Chinese province of Yunnan, after the central state
had mobilized local officials into conducting land reform and collectivization, collective
offerings were banned and small household offerings reduced. According to Mueggler’s
inquiries, the response of the Lolop’o was a telling of stories of illness, madness, and death
suffered by those living in the houses occupied by the new state offices, stories of illnesses
caused by neglected gods of fertility or of rain or by vengeful ghosts. From the mid-fifties,
these stories grew in coherence and force. Then the mass mobilization called the Great Leap Forward, instigated to produce grain and steel far in excess of previous targets, which forced people to eat in collective dining halls, produced not sudden abundance but mass starvation, here as everywhere in China. Even minimum death rituals and ghost exorcisms had to cease for lack of offerings. An indirect reflection of this was the telling of stories of black officials becoming increasingly demanding and killing more and more people. Since the late seventies, when the old rituals began to be performed again, there have been exorcisms of black officials and mourning rites for the unmourned. Mueggler sums up with the comment that the famine “unbalanced the digestive flows of grain and meat, through houses and bodies” that made up the community and its gods, ancestors, and ghosts.29 In other words, a spate of rituals did reflect the historical event, but placed it into a perennial imagery of sickness, death, and the ideal of well-being as a balanced flow. Since the secular state and local officials are now part of their lives, the rituals the Lolop’o perform now enact what Mueggler calls the spectral state, with features identifying it as far away but capable. It can reinforce male potency,30 but it can also spread a malign “bitter herb from heaven.”31

Everyone learns conventional ideas of what it is to die a good death and how to mourn properly, turning the dead into an archetypal (to use Humphrey and Laidlaw’s term) memorial past. When disaster and political events create bad deaths, in which people die or are killed and cannot be mourned properly, there is often also a physical dislocation as well as a disruption of the past and its continuity. Such radical contingency threatens extinction, but everywhere, after intervals of varying duration, attempts are made to restore continuity and to repair bad deaths, to find and memorialize the lost dead whose spirits haunt and harm the living. Judith Zur movingly describes how, after the vicious counterinsurgency of the U.S.-backed military dictatorship in Guatemala, worse deaths than had ever been experienced began to be retrieved and transformed for mourning.32

When, alternatively or in addition, a new politics comes to state power through a revolutionary event with an ideology condemning older ways of mourning and disposal of the dead, a new project and temporality is introduced, as in China. In such an instance, the distances between official ideology, academic history, and ritual temporality are reduced. The politics of ritual is close to turning ritual from a cosmic ideology of repetition into a political ritual of history as destiny. But people persist, secretly if necessary, with older death rituals. Then a further change of regime seems to allow their open revitalization, but the new politics is also a manipulation of the temporality of rituals of death. Katherine Verdery’s study of the fate of statues and the spate of reburials in post-socialist countries stresses, as do all anthropologists now, that rituals of death, like all rituals, are corporal, sensual experiences.33 Likewise, corpses and bones, however their rites may have been politically manipulated, are physical remains and carry for their mourners an authenticity that purely verbal ideology and revisions of history do not. Reburials in, for
instance, the former Yugoslavia, in the soil of established graveyards or removed with the soil of the old into new burial grounds, do remake places politically with new inclusions and exclusions of belonging. They are central to reformulated claims to a past, to proprietary rights and to state territory in a new politics invested in that past, and they convey an ardent moral universe of blame and accountability. At the same time, they extend the rewriting of political history and the finding of a new political order into a greater dimension that Verdery calls “cosmic.” The rituals act on politics and political history with their own temporality. They enchant politics, she says, filling it with stories of spiritual occurrences and uncanny powers.

Ritual as Transmission of Specified Events

Of course, rituals do commemorate and name events, the births of gods, the resurrection of Jesus, the assumption of the Prophet Mohammed, the Passover. These are the events of a mythology, which bear a relation to evidence-based history but are not events of such a history because they are part of a cyclical liturgy and a world-forming temporality not of past lives as such but of past lives that transcend a particular life into a life beyond death that can affect an eternal present. Nevertheless, some historians claim affinity with these rituals, claiming that both ritual and history are acts of public memory in a time when Auschwitz has brought progressive narrative radically into question.

In a close examination of Jewish liturgy and history of the Holocaust, as well as the end of modernist optimism and its chronologies after Auschwitz, Gabrielle M. Spiegel juxtaposes an equation of history and memory with an equation of history and ritual and questions all the distinctions within and between them. She describes the writing of memory books that began in the Nazi ghettos and continued after liberation from the annihilation and labor camps. Such books are historiographical records, but they are also defiant acts of remembrance, written preservations of the collective life that had been completely destroyed. She points out that, even when written by non-observant Jews, they became analogues of the liturgical models of the destruction of Jews: the destruction of the two temples, the binding and sacrifice of Isaac, Jews’ martyrdom for the Name of God. The memory books were acts of defiance of the blank page that the Nazis tried to make of both the Jews and of their own attempts to wipe out the documentary record of their destruction of Jews. The memory books were as unlike narrative history as is survivor testimony, which puts into words vivid, flashbulb memory, resisting closure, again more like the temporal structure of liturgy, a never-ending repetition. In fact, the Holocaust, or Shoah as it is called in Hebrew, has been included, by a law of the state of Israel, in a secular liturgical calendar as the day before the anniversary of the formation of Israel, turning shame into glory. It could have been included in the much older Jewish liturgical and lunar calendar alongside the day of the destruction of the two temples and the hope,
with the next day’s new moon, of the coming of the Messiah. Instead, a politicized ritual cycle parallels the older liturgical cycle, both of them recording historical events into a hope for eternal life and continuity. Jewish communities include both calendars in their annual rituals.

In all countries, there is a more secular and politicized calendar of rites, one that passes down a heroic time and reaffirms the nation, even as the country retains older, more religious liturgies that allude to “cosmic,” or enchanted perpetuity. Both liturgies are distinct from personal memories and from academic historical narratives.

Ritual as Memorization and Transmission

So far I have discussed ritual as a formation, a conveyer, a trigger, or a screen for the mutual recognition of memory, emotion, and event. Now, finally, I turn to theories of how ritual as a mode of transmission relies on human memory. Ritual functions, I suggest, as a creation of memorable experiences and as a training of memory.

Fredrik Barth proposed two modes of transmission of religious knowledge in Southeast Asia and Melanesia, which may be found elsewhere. One is the transmission from a guru in words, extending over great distances, with long-standing relationships perpetuated and carried further by writing. The other is transmission by initiation into ancestral knowledge, accomplished by an elder manipulating concrete symbols. Both modes convey esoteric knowledge, but in the second mode, the initiator’s knowledge is local and the initiation ritual transmits knowledge through what Barth calls a spellbinding ordeal. For Barth, this pair of modes of transmission of ritual knowledge is not universal. It is closely linked to two different concepts of a social person and two different relations of exchange in the region. But Harvey Whitehouse has turned these models into universal modes of religiosity. His theory sits alongside a growing number of studies of religion and of religious ritual that build on cognitive and evolutionary psychology.

The evolutionary approach is, as always, to find the survival function, which is the facilitation of group coordination through the spreading of mutually recognized ideas. Whether such a proposition is an ex post facto argument that simply confirms what is (where there is common religious belief there is a group) need not bother us; we can stay with the plurality of publics and the way ritual can link or divide them. More relevant to this chapter is the basic cognitive psychology of memorization that the theory mobilizes for an evolutionary psychology of ideas. Of the many new ideas that occur, which survive and why?

Whitehouse’s answer is to propose a distinction between the two modes as modes of religiosity, based on the psychological distinction between two kinds of memory, both of them explicit and lasting. One is semantic memory, which refers to mental representations of a propositional nature, learned knowledge conveyed by linguistic and other semiotic
means of communication, which are themselves learned knowledge. Here, Whitehouse inverts Bloch’s and Bell’s point that ritual is nonlogical and not propositional by asserting that it performs a proposition (of belief) that has to be repeated because belief is to a certain degree counterintuitive, which makes it memorable but also requires repeated restatement. This is the doctrinal mode. Doctrinaire repetition of truths, verbal rituals, conveys semantic ideas and makes them last. It prompts conventional exegeses of them, which are added to doctrinal repetitions. Doctrinal ritual is capable of large-scale extension, linking groups over time and space. The other mode of religiosity, according to Whitehouse, depends on the creation of vivid experience of images in autobiographical and episodic memory. Rituals that create autobiographical memories induce strong emotions of anticipation, pain, and pleasure. An important part of such rituals is the inflicting of extreme and unusual experiences, as Lewis had pointed out, accompanied by images created and reproduced for the purposes of the rites: awe-inspiring images (masks, dances, paintings), such as those described by Argenti. Like trauma, submission to such rituals creates flashbulb memories of what most struck the participant. The ritual of having had to undergo them to avoid a greater danger motivates their exegesis and their repetition. Exegesis occurs when people recall the rituals in which they had participated and also when the rituals are repeated, but their repetition is not frequent or at least does not have to be. Whitehouse insists that exegeses in the imagistic mode are “spontaneous” and interpersonal. Lewis gives examples of how they are rehearsed and repeated over the lifetime of a person, so that exegetical recall is extracted from momentary, fragmented, and much more personal flash-bulb memories. Nonetheless, Whitehouse maintains, even such repeated exegeses do not become part of imagistic rituals.

Both modes coexist in any one religion, but according to Whitehouse they do not mix. The doctrinal mode tends to become routinized tedium and is kept lively by religious leaders’ rhetorical devices and sermons that apply the repeated doctrine to changing and personal circumstances. They are further re-enlivened by prophetic, imagistic rites.

The argument that minimally counterintuitive images and ideas are attractive propositions relies on Pascal Boyer’s theory of religious ideas, that they are minimally counterintuitive and therefore vivid and memorable and so have the highest survival rate. By intuitive Boyer means what is learned from infancy by experience, by the application of built-in cognitive capacities to experiential knowledge of material and physical surroundings and necessities for survival or more comfortable living. Images that entail one counterintuitive feature are particularly vivid, such as a human with a monstrous head, or a human who can float and pass through solids, or a father (stereotypically pictured with a beard, or with severe but kindly eyes) who created the things and children not just of one person but of the world, or another father who drives sleighs that are themselves counterintuitive because they can fly gifts to everyone.

The complexity of ritual imagery is difficult to break down into singular minimally counterintuitive images. But the basic argument that some images are more memorable
than others is compelling and seeks answers to the question why. On ritual and memory, the argument says, one thing that drives ritual’s repetition is precisely such memorable images, which may be combinations of a basic repertoire of metaphoric motifs, just as folk stories and myths are analyzable into basic motifs or mythemes. Such combinations are interestingly counterintuitive and demand to be imputed as the cause of extraordinary or disturbing events and strange objects. They are the stuff of fears and rumors, as well as of rituals of propitiation and exorcism. For instance Santos-Granero recounts rumors that spread among the Yaneshia in the Andes of body-snatchers that kill to extract fat for a cure for a strange disease only suffered by the Spanish colonists, or of snatching human bodies to bury them under foundations and bulwarks for contemporary state projects that have destroyed the places of spirits who need to be fed in this way to prevent them from destroying a road and its bridges. The same imagery and name for the body-snatchers, *pishtacos*, persist while their function and context changes over the centuries. The same adaptable persistence is true for the performance of rituals, as I have already pointed out.

The contributions to a collection of constructively critical studies based on this theory show that there was not as great a divergence between the doctrinal and imagistic modes of religiosity as Whitehouse had claimed. As a result of such criticisms, Whitehouse concludes the book with a compromise theory of cognitively optimal images that are the most memorable, with a minimum of counterintuitive elements in both doctrine and vision. Nevertheless, he leaves intact the theory of two kinds of transmission based on two kinds memory and the counterintuitive catchiness of ritual imagery.

**Concluding Reminder: A Confirmation of the Peculiar Quality of Ritual**

A close cognitive theory of ritual brings us back to the theory of ritual persistence and its peculiarity, namely that ritual is prescribed and demands commitment and submission. Maurice Bloch adds a cognitive layer to Humphrey and Laidlaw’s proposition that ritual is distinct from other action. Bloch’s theory is based on the human capacity for theory of mind, the capacity to posit the intention of another mind in communication, to know that the other is also positing a mind in me or another. This capacity is the uniquely human means of acting socially, equivalent to the means possessed by other animals to cooperate (as herds, swarms, hives, flocks). But it has as a side effect the imputing of intention and knowledge of others’ intentions to any notable object or event. This is the beginning of a theory of religious imagery and belief. For Bloch, ritual—all ritual—has the peculiar quality that it hazes theory of mind and the imputing of intention. Theory of mind naturally imputes intention to a singular and individual counterpart, such as a god. But ritual does something strange. Bloch points out that ritual differs from habit, such as the habitual use of language, because it is conscious repetition. Ritual demands
submission as a conscious process. Prescribed ritual action certainly mediates the intention of an imputed agency, such as a demon, and participation may have as many intentions as there are participants. But the ritual as medium to which participants submit hazes intentionality. We submit to what must be done, as it has been done. This is how ritual joins together our various intentions in a shared memory.

In performing a ritual, we deliberately set aside any attribution of the ritual’s existence to a singular origin. But we cannot remove our instinct to impute intention. The only way to satisfy the propensity to impute intention, according to Bloch, is to turn our theory of mind on a vague and collective counterpart, such as “our ancestors” or another “we” stretching into the past as the originating authority of ritual. People explain themselves to outsiders in formulations that say, We have always done this, and in this way. The hazing of intention is, Bloch argues, typical of the first phase of a ritual, an attack on self and on normal, intuitive order and expectation, in readiness for a transformation and a triumphant return to the world from which the ritual has been a counterintuitive removal.

I want to stress that the authority of ritual repetition is the medium for imputing intention and origination. Succumbing to repetition does not make the thinking and acting subject dumb. Instead it lets something in, making ritual an enactment of communication from and with imputed but present authors, conveyed through its own authority. In addition, it is a medium into which the contingencies of the here and now are admitted through the performers’ inventiveness, something that becomes part of its repetition. Ritual is not history. Nor is it personal memory. It produces experiences that are memorable. But of itself, it is a transmission of its own discipline of memory and of its intrinsic temporality. New elements, new customs, and personal memories and their organization are added into it. Rituals incorporate events, but events as they are transformed and transposed into the temporality of ritual authority, of prescribed repetition. Ritual performance is, finally, a trigger and a screen for the sharing of different memories and for their organization into publics of shared submission to it or to its observation and enjoyment as “ours.”
One of the most difficult theoretical issues confronting the study of memory has been the conceptual problem of group memory and how memories carried by individuals become part of a larger social dynamic. While there has been much debate about descriptive, adjectival terms such as “collective,” “cultural,” “popular,” and “social” memory, terms that are often invoked with noticeable imprecision, less consideration has been given to questions of what social relations make memory public or how we understand the very “publicness” of memory. When we think of the public, or a public, it is out there, encompassing the notion of being on view in front of others, which usually also has a spatial component, a place of meeting others, of memory shared. Public memory is also a phenomenon contrasted, at least implicitly, to our understanding of private memory as inside, internal. Yet we also know that ultimately these dichotomies—external and internal, public and private—never quite stay in place, and this is especially so in relation to our conceptualizations of memory. Bradford Vivian properly warns of the dangers of defining memory according to “fixed categories: as categorically public, collective, or private.”1 It is precisely the mutual interconnections between public and private that are both most fascinating and most difficult to uncover.

Kendall Phillips makes a distinction between “public memory” and what he calls “the memory of publics.” The first refers to “memories which affect and are effected by various publics”: that is, following Hannah Arendt, the public is a realm in which we act together or remember together. It is an arena that people actively constitute through their collective action. The latter speaks to the “public appearance” of memories, a focus on cultural practices such as ritual and repetition that are carried out in public arenas. The two memories are not mutually exclusive, but the second speaks more clearly to the politics of remembering in the public sphere.2 There is always conflict about how an event is
remembered and what it means. In becoming public, memory is inevitably steeped in controversy. In our contemporary societies in the West, the publicness of memory is constituted most of all in the field of popular or mass culture—mediated through the channels of mass communication—and it is here especially that we can locate a privileged site for the playing out of the ethical issues arising from the historical or the remembered past. These vernacular forms themselves overdetermine the mediations in play, and add to the controversial properties of memory in its public forms.

The most impressive body of interdisciplinary work on the construction of group memory to date has concentrated particularly on moments of profound historical catastrophe or transition: the Holocaust, major wars, the end of Communism in Eastern Europe. Much of this work—following in the slipstream of Durkheim and Halbwachs—moves beyond a highly localized focus, a feature of most oral histories and of autobiographical memory, to the national or transnational arenas, incorporating analysis of a range of competing sites of memory, which necessarily prove more capacious than the memory of any single individual. Such sites accrete memories that are sustained beyond any individual lifespan, most often in physical memorials, monuments, and places and in collective rituals. Studies such as these depend analytically on grasping the processes by which memory is, at any single moment, transmitted and circulated, produced and received.

Memory identified as public or collective in this sense is constituted not only by what people remember of their own experiences but also by a constructed past that’s described by Barbara Misztal as “culture’s active meaning-making.” In her view, in order for personal memories to become part of a wider collective phenomenon, individual experience is necessarily transfigured and is therefore always “more than” individual. Public memory, in this sense, refers to a past that is both commonly shared and collectively commemorated—these should not be understood as the same activities—though, of course, not one necessarily shared by all people, unambiguously, in any particular collectivity.

But for a number of critics, an approach such as this raises more problems than it solves. Wulf Kansteiner, for example, questions the continued usefulness of exploring group memory when, as he sees it, the outcome provides only an abstracted notion of memory, belonging ethereally to some unspecified social “group.” Oren Baruch Stier, Jay Winter, and Misztal herself all argue that to avoid such abstractions we need to retain “a sense of both [memory’s] individual and collective dimensions.” Simply put, it is this problem I address here, seeking to track empirically the movements between the private and individual zones of remembering, on the one hand, and, on the other, their translation into a mediated public reality.

A Long War

One day in the not too distant future, perhaps within twenty or so years, there will be no one alive who participated in the two great world wars of the twentieth century. For those
who were born after these temporal watersheds of our historical landscape yet who still found themselves conscripted to the memory of wars that, in a sense, was not “theirs,” this historical, demographic transition could represent a release from an obligation to the memory of others. Alternatively, many could experience a marked sense of loss, a breaking of the link with the past that only the witness provides. There will be no frail, rheumy old men (it is generally men whom we think of here) struggling along the remembered terrains of the front line. But none the less will the rituals of commemoration remain, for such ceremonies are, after all, of the mind: they speak not to the past but to the present.

Only a few men and women who fought in the First World War are still alive and, in anticipation of the generation of participants in the Second World War dying, there has been a significant increase in memorialization of the Second World War by states and by civic organizations. There now exists a vast memorial archive composed of writings by historians and novelists, recordings and images of war-experience, individual testimonies, established sites of memory, movies and TV programs, and so on. Yet in the new millennium, we are in a strange temporal and demographic transition. War memories are becoming a largely intergenerational phenomenon, removed from the direct eyewitnesses, as meanings shift ever more radically in relation to current circumstances, assuming different shapes in our generational imaginations. Yet even so, the war memories of any single population, whether victor or defeated, often still remain unsettled: even now new generations can experience these pasts in this present as uncanny and unreconciled; memory itself remains unappeased.

In this chapter, I examine the public response to a single television series, *Changi*, screened in Australia in 2001. Changi was a notorious prisoner of war (POW) camp established by the Japanese after the fall of Singapore in 1942. When the Allied forces in Singapore surrendered, the Japanese captured sixty-two thousand men and women, of whom fourteen thousand were Australians. The figures are startling: some three percent of Australians who were POWs in Europe died in captivity; thirty-six percent of those captured by the Japanese perished.6 The TV program, shown fifty years after the war had passed, sought to represent the memory of these Australian POWs, a matter still alive to all variety of fears, anxieties, and prohibitions in Australian national culture. When the program was aired, a number of those who had been POWs were still alive, and they were able to articulate their own experiences, decisively affecting the public debate that followed.

In larger political terms, aside from the brutalities experienced, the memory of Changi also has prominent historical resonance in Australia, in Singapore, and (to a lesser extent) in Britain, for behind the name lies the historical memory of “betrayal” that many Singaporeans and Australians experienced at the fall of Singapore. The effects of the capitulation of British authority—its entire colonial edifice, incorporating the colonial government, the military and its allies, and the civic life of the settler population, collapsed so spectacularly that it seemed as if not one of the Britons held faith in the system they
were charged to uphold—ran through the region as a whole, with Britain’s possessions in the southern Pacific left unprotected against the Japanese advance. In Australia these memories remain vivid, and can still be mobilized politically.

The TV series consisted of six episodes, written and produced by John Doyle, well known (in an unlikely scenario) as part of a satirical comedy duo who represented a particular kind of muted Australian masculinity: laddish, irreverent—larrakin. It was broadcast on public television by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), which doesn’t usually attract a mass audience, but the series gained a significant share of the viewing public as the story progressed each Sunday night. *Changi* achieved ABC’s highest Sunday night ratings in a decade, gaining, on average, 1.3 million viewers each week. There were, as well, an unknown number who watched the repeats or who saw the series on video or DVD. In addition, each week several hundred people responded on the program’s Internet feedback forums.

In the programs, six elderly men were filmed meeting in a club and recalling their experiences as youngsters, connecting present and past in an engaging, inventive manner. With a relatively small budget it proved impossible to recreate visually the historical experience of the camp in full Hollywood mode, so Doyle chose instead a hybrid genre. In eschewing a realist genre he gave to the programs a dreamlike quality that was designed to echo the process of remembering itself, also introducing music as a reality-distancing device in order to encode certain sorts of memories in particular episodes. Within this aesthetic strategy the producers also chose to give prominence to a historical eyewitness who had been imprisoned at Changi, adding, it seemed, a realist component that was, as it turned out, to complicate the public reception of the series. Slim de Gray, the former POW, who acted both as consultant and participant, appeared as himself, that is, as an old man and ex-POW. This mix of history, memory, and fiction, although it may well have driven the popularity of the program as television, served as well to create a degree of dissension about the realities the program was projecting. Where was the truth to lie?

Memories of war are revealing in many ways—not least because notions of public and personal became permeable, forever reconstituted in the emergencies that turn the practices of daily life upside down. Marita Sturken associates the concept of “cultural memory” with traumatic events, where “both the structures and the fractures of a culture are exposed.” Indeed through the twentieth century, the commemoration of those who died in war created new collective sensibilities, mentalities that have tied citizen to nation in powerful, novel arrangements. As Jay Winter notes, in the history of war remembrance, the stories told about popular experience have changed over time. “Once they focused on battles and combatants. Now victims, civilians, and women are at the heart of acts of remembrance. . . . War brings family history and world history together in long-lasting and frequently devastating ways. That is why women as well as men now construct the story and disseminate and consume it.”
Yet what is also evident in the study of Australian POW memories is the central political dimension at work. As Yael Zeruvabel reminds us, “collective memory continuously negotiates between available historical records and current social and political agendas.” Even in the heavily mediated domain of popular culture, however, public reconstructions of the past are nonetheless constrained, to a degree at least, by the available historical accounts. Inevitably, questions of politics and questions of historical authenticity become inextricably bound, the one to the other. Thus it is not just by overt political means that some memories are retained and others consigned to oblivion. Susan Suleiman has argued that we need to counteract the “sacrilization of memory” and the “injunction to remember” through what she identifies as critical memory studies. This conforms to Alison Landsberg’s call for a more openly political reading of memory, and with Ashavai Margalit’s investigations into the ethics underwriting the study of memory. Similarly, Bradford Vivian insists that “the ethical and political implications of collective or public memories must be measured by the quality of the social relationships established or sustained through their expression rather than the transcendent truth or undiminished authenticity of memory itself.” Perspectives such as these serve to overcome a given dichotomy between truth and fiction and in so doing allow for more intermediate, more contingent political readings of the meanings that underwrite public-memory texts, particularly those, like Changi, that claim some anchorage in historical verisimilitude.

However forceful the verisimilitude, mediations are also present. Public memory in our own times is impossible to disentangle from the workings of the mass media. The dearth of thoughtful empirical studies from within the remit of media studies on the ways in which the producers of media texts create the raw material of public memories remains a problem. But the central insight that, as a result of electronic media, people are able to take on memories of a past to which they have no historical or geographical connection, with strangers whom they do not know, has had a profound impact on expanding our understanding of remembrance as a necessarily public practice, introducing the notion of “prosthetic memory.” What kind of memories could these be?

Memories of Changi

On April 10, 2007 journalist Tony Stephens, writing an article on the widow of Bill Moxham, a Changi survivor, and her fight for public compensation for her husband’s early death, referred to her struggle with the Veterans’ Affairs Department as a “long war.” Bill Moxham had been one of the six Australians, out of nearly two and a half thousand, who survived the Sandakan death march of some 265 kilometers in 1945. Like others in his predicament, Moxham returned home, quickly married, and did his best to forget his wartime experiences. But his life and that of his new wife on a farm in outback New
South Wales became a nightmare, dominated by Moxham’s drinking and violence, threatened and real, toward his wife and children. This was, it seems, a common pattern of events for many of those men who returned from the war. What is of interest, though, is that in 2007—many years after the war itself—Stephens, as a journalist, was able to identify both husband and wife as “victims of the war.” Symptomatically, their eldest daughter is quoted as saying: “We were never allowed to talk about what was troubling him.” It was many years into her adult life, in the 1980s, when she heard—significantly for our concerns here with public memories—an ABC radio program about prisoners of the Japanese that “everything fell into place”: “After years of thinking my father was a wife beater and alcoholic I knew there was much more to it.” In 1956, Wilma Moxham fled the family home, taking her children with her; five years later, on his forty-eighth birthday, her husband committed suicide, unable to deal with the nightmares, the flashbacks, and the rage. I look at a photo of him in 1947, framing the article in the middle pages of the newspaper. He is smiling, with no hint of the turmoil underneath.¹⁸

This story, spanning sixty-seven years, speaks powerfully about the continuing effects of war on men and the consequences for their families that resonate across generations. But it also tells us about the gap between the experience of these men and the wider articulation of their memories. For as with other traumatic experiences of war, many who suffered remained silent, such that there occurred a rupture in the customary processes by which memory is transmitted within families across time. In this case, it wasn’t until a public radio program many years later that Bill Moxham’s daughter began to comprehend the memories that haunted them all. The programs themselves, based on oral histories and fashioned into radio documentaries by ABC journalist Tim Bowden, marked the important historical moment when the Australian POW story shifted from being a subordinate one to one that dominates the nation’s public memory of the Second World War.

Personally, I first became interested in the memory of the Australian prisoners of war through my experience as a teacher of history. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the occasional student would want to research the subject. The older ones would want to know why their POW father refused to speak about the war, lamenting the prolonged impact of the war on their family. In the 1990s, a teenager asked me: “Why does my grandfather cross the road when a Japanese person walks by?” Several questioned why their family refused to buy a Japanese car. In a 2001 interview for a national survey on Australians and the past, a woman from Queensland offered this vignette:

My father-in-law was in World War Two. New Guinea and Borneo and another place. . . . But he doesn’t talk about the killing, only about mateship with the other soldiers. He doesn’t like Japanese. I’ll tell you a story. Their daughter took them back out west a few years ago and for a surprise she took them to a resort to spend the weekend. Well, it was owned by Japanese, and my father-in-law would not get out of the car! They had to leave. It was too much for him, I guess.¹⁹
Tales of this kind persist in anecdote and asides, in “the little stories” told between family members and friends. They speak of the significant underground tensions in the latter part of the twentieth century, between the process of dealing with war experiences and the emergence of Japan as a major trading partner since the 1960s, which explains the repeated focus in these stories on consumer goods as anxiogenic objects. Gradually, what could not be spoken in private came to be articulated in the public media.

There are various ways one can track the way this silence began to buckle, in part because of the shifting public discourse. Ivy Luscombe, for example, married an ex-POW who had been forced to work on building the Burma–Thailand railway. She lived for over fifty years with his waking up screaming with nightmares, his long-term illnesses, and his serious food obsessions. Yet he was a quiet man and never spoke about his experiences to Ivy, to his daughters, or to his grandchildren. He refused to watch or to allow Ivy to watch the film *Bridge On the River Kwai* in the 1960s nor forty years after that would he turn on the television to watch *Changi*. Throughout these years Ivy never felt able to discuss her husband’s behavior with anyone else, not even the other wives at battalion reunions. It was only after her husband’s death that she talked by chance to a neighbor whose husband had also been a POW and discovered that they had shared similar experiences of living with men who had undergone this deep, unspeakable trauma.  

Indeed, these memories had had a curious trajectory in the public sphere. Starting in the 1940s, the press photos of emaciated, physically damaged, traumatized POWs returning home provided an iconic “flashbulb” memory of the experience for Australians. (These are now reproduced in school textbooks.) For many years after, there were no widespread military commemorations of those who died in captivity, nor—until the 1980s—were there significant state sanctioned memorials and ceremonies. POW memories were not a central feature of war commemoration in the thirty years after the war, even while they were integral to the “war-damaged” family’s experience. Yet while there occurred no official recognition, within popular culture—more specifically, within popular literature—from the 1950s there appeared an important subgenre of masculine fiction that dwelt on the stories of Japanese cruelties, and on Australian heroism, comprising books that sold in their millions. Robin Gerster argues that an important feature of these memories at this time was explicitly racist. It “stemmed from the fact that Australians, like other westerners, had been forced into slave labour by orientals.” Since Australians were prisoners, they could never claim military or physical superiority, suggesting that so far as their stories were internalized they emphasized personal survival rather than a collective, military ethos. One historian, Stephen Garton, comments on the implications of this gulf: “Many prisoners saw their experience in racial terms—civilization against barbarism, east and west—and any historical account of these events that does justice to the ways in which the prisoners lived and understood them has to take on the burden of these sentiments.”
How then can we understand the repeated refrain from family members of returned POWs about the silences of their war experiences? If there were personal accounts of this collective experience circulating in at least the unofficial domain of popular culture, with a huge readership, how could anyone claim not to know? What kind of public was this “reading public”? The gap involved here is about the transmission of personal memory between and across generations. There is an expectation that the memory of an individual’s participation in public events will be shared with lovers or spouses, with siblings and parents, and passed on to children as part of a family’s oral heritage. The inability to speak signifies to others both the extent of trauma, the unspeakable, unrepresentable experience and, if it is a defining moment in a life, it also acts as a barrier in intimate relations with others in the family. Other factors are also at play here: this story is about men from the 1940s and 1950s who had been emasculated as POWs and who had been shaped by particular historically contingent forms of masculinity, and there is good reason to think that they may have felt it would have “unmanned” them to speak of their experiences in intimate settings.

Yet from the 1990s, the many personal accounts of Australian POWs become increasingly incorporated into a form of national memory such that, as Joan Beaumont has argued, there is—ironically—now a kind of amnesia about other experiences of the Second World War in Australia. The POW experience, having remained a subordinate memory for so long, is, in a strange reversal, now everywhere, the touchstone for all experiences of the war and a critical component in the remaking of the Anzac legend. In an important intervention, Stephen Garton, critical of the Changi program, offers a conjunctural interpretation, stating that he believes the series “enacts and enfeebles a narrative of the POW experience. It is narrow, parochial, inward looking, blind to the complexities, deaf to the multiplicity of former prisoner voices but attuned to John Howard’s nostalgic vision of national cohesion cemented through the commemoration of the Anzac ethos.” This reminds us that the overcoming of a trauma—the act of speaking—can, politically, take many different forms.

The decisive break in the pattern of remembrance of the POW past occurred in the 1980s, in part a result of demographic changes, in part a function of wider social transformation of Australian society. From that point on, a new nomenclature appeared, in which the “victim” came to be superseded by the figure of the “survivor,” a term that offered a greater measure of agency. Survivor stories began to proliferate in the mass media, allowing for the belated heroization of the POW (such as of Weary Dunlop, a doctor in Changi whose memoirs went into many editions). These turned, by way of a generic Australian populism, on irreverence, humor, male mateship, resourcefulness, and camaraderie in the face of overwhelming odds—qualities that were dramatically present in the TV reconstruction of 2001.
Public Responses to *Changi*

The first organized response to the *Changi* series was initiated by the *Sydney Morning Herald*. Six former POWs were brought together to offer their views of the programs, built on their experiences. Journalistic practice requires journalists to interview ("on the spot") those who have witnessed an event—the figure of the eyewitness—and from these oral reconstructions, at a second level of mediation, to create the "story." For historical events that occurred long ago, journalists use much the same techniques, in this instance though, not so much in order to create the story, but to verify the one supplied by the fictions of television. This was supplemented, in the *Changi* example, by seeking too the opinion of accredited experts, in this case, Peter Stanley from the Australian War Memorial, who was critical, and a range of academics, whose opinions varied. Thus the press attempted to shape the terms of public engagement on the basis of historical authenticity. This was partially successful and generated a measure of public unease, prompting the journalists to ask whether the viewers could trust the version of events presented to them. This, of course, was complicated by the entanglement of memory and the historical record, which the series had deliberately—knowingly—mixed together. Doyle himself appeared reluctant to be drawn into these controversies: aware that he had a moral responsibility to the men he’d portrayed, he resorted to defending the program as "art" rather than as verifiable history. He claimed, in other words, the authority only of memory.

The group of former POWs interviewed by the *Sydney Morning Herald* had no qualms about accepting, formally, the mix of fact and fiction the series was based on, nor even Doyle’s distinctive brand of black humor. But at the same time they felt compelled to establish their existential status as survivors by criticizing the lack of authenticity of the programs. "Where’s the tenko?" they asked, referring to the endless head counts and roll calls they had been subjected to. In one episode, a hatless soldier was depicted standing on a box all day in forty-degree-Celsius heat, refusing to salute the Japanese military. "But everyone knows," they said, "that a bloke without a hat had to bow, not salute." A more glaring error, in their terms, was that the series showed the POWs wearing slouch-hats, which carry iconic meaning in Australia, symbolizing the Anzac tradition. "We didn’t wear the slouch-hats, the sun was too hot." They concluded of the series: "It could have been better, but this is not a documentary, it’s a drama, a bit of theatre." Two of them, however, were more forthright: "It’s a big joke. Half of it is rubbish," commented one. "I read somewhere that John Doyle warned there would be a lot of criticism over what he’s done," said another. "And by crikey I will tell you what. He’s right." The man awarded Doyle "certainly no more than 3 out of 10 for factual accuracy." At one point Doyle found himself on the ABC program *Backchat* countering further criticism. He argued that a truthful representation of POW experiences was impossible,
in part, he explained, because of the financial constraints under which he worked: “Docu-
mentary or naturalism,” he claimed, “was never an option. . . . In no way is it historically
accurate. . . . Historical accuracy was . . . not the ambition at all. If truth is the first
casualty of war then fact is the first casualty of drama.”

To a degree, discussions such as these served to frame popular responses to the series.
Critically, though, a new medium intervened: the Internet, indicating an important con-
vergence between the mass media (television, the press) and new digital forms of commu-
nication that allow private voices to assume a heightened public prominence. Here we can
see the beginnings of new, still undeveloped structures of television audience participa-
tion emerging, creating unprecedented communities of memory.

After each episode of Changi, ABC opened a “guest-book” on the Internet, seeking
comment from viewers. At first, those who signed in tended to address, rather formally,
ABC or John Doyle himself. But as the guest-book evolved, viewers were able to interact
with each other, bypassing the mediation of the professionals. In all, some seven hundred
people participated. Many took the opportunity to establish their personal authority,
speaking on behalf of relations and friends no longer alive. They sought to establish a
claim to an inheritance, a publicly remembered personal inheritance. In reading these
stories we can witness, through all the mediations, the degree to which Changi fostered a
particular kind of historical consciousness, a moment when people became aware of their
own historicity, of living in historical as well as in personal time. Thus one person com-
mented on the way the series’ movement between the old men in the present and their
remembered young selves in the POW camps imagined a continuity between different
generations: “a real sense of continuity is being fostered on screen. The old guard is
hanging on to the new in a powerful way. This must have been a real experience for all
generations. Interesting that it is a work produced by baby boomers, fronted by the
youngsters and the seniors.”

Of the many who spoke about their family relationships, a continuing thread across
the weeks was the previous “silence” and refusal, or inability, of the men to speak about
their experiences and the gap in understanding this had left. Kelly (many people were
identified only by first names or by numbers or by code names) declared that “the show
has answered questions which I never got to ask my grandfather.” Graham, too, who had
a father in Changi, said: “he never spoke much about the war and this series helps me to
understand why.”

Many of the younger participants in the forums contrasted the television series with
the institutional histories they had encountered at school. They positioned it against these,
even though the politics of the series may not have been dissimilar to their formal history
curriculum. For example, Lydia, in her final year of school, commented that she had been
“disheartened by the sheer boredom of our history. Although Changi was not entirely
historically accurate it brought a new interest in our vivid history. I’ve watched every
episode about 20 times.” Jenny too spoke of her “boredom” with the Australian history
curriculum in year ten (the middle of high school in New South Wales, where history remains compulsory). “I am enjoying the *Changi* series very much as is my 13 year old brother.” Jake also indicated that beyond the screen, the program resonated in school group discussions and had in part become imbricated into everyday life: “I like many other Australians have fallen in love with *Changi*. I am a year 12 male high school student from NSW, and all of my friends and I watch the show.” The series clearly had an important role in making a specific set of male experiences available for discussion to a number of other constituencies across generations and genders.

Initial responses were marked by considerable feeling, not only because the programs were designed to be powerfully evocative, but also because the act of remembering itself could be painful. One contributor claimed that “the ‘brutality’ you portray is a flea bite compared to what really took place. I fear that you open more wounds than you heal . . . about why older Australians do no forgive or forget.” Similarly, Eric D., who had been in a concentration camp as a child, wondered “how many survivors were able to watch the series right through and what they thought of it . . . I could only watch part of the first episode.” Another spoke for the previous generation in her family: “My mother could not watch after the first three episodes for it brought back too many painful memories not just of being there but living with the aftermath.” Remarks of this kind clearly spoke to the considerable tension in Australia between the competing desires to remember and to forget. As W. G. Sebald said of the Germans, they were always “looking and looking away” at their own past. However, at points, the programs managed to dramatize precisely this dilemma, as Diana observed: “I was staggered to see the ambivalence the older blokes had about going back into it. They were portrayed as totally engulfed by the experience and yet unable to share it even with their mates. This was all incredibly and frighteningly true to life as I have seen it.”

The bulk of the Internet debate focused on two related questions: the persuasiveness of the programs in terms of their production—and some referred here again to questions of authenticity—and the portrayal of the national character, particularly the idea of Australian mateship as a means of surviving the camps. So far as the latter was concerned, as we might expect, it was men especially who responded to the ideals of mateship and who did so by reflecting upon their relationships with older men. Gary H., claiming his *bona fides*, remarks that he had spent “hours and hours” with vets from many wars, “and this series presents an accurate depiction of everything that I have heard from an emotional viewpoint.” Similarly, “Gazza” valorizes his father’s experience:

As the son of an ex-POW in Changi, and having heard first hand of my father’s experiences, congratulations—there are so many truisms in this, the first episode of the series. Specifically the mateship thing. I have never witnessed camaraderie and an impenetrable friendship like Dad had with his mates—it superceded any relationships
I have witnessed, due to the shared experiences over 3 years. Well done. Dad would be proud.

Shane, who lost his father on the Burma–Thailand railway, takes on the anger felt by the survivors of the previous generation: “I think the larrikinism, and the bond of mateship, shown in the show reinforced what I already knew to be fact by just talking to these gentleman in the association. . . As for the Japanese, we may forgive, but we will never ever forget.”

The unappeased anger of some of the POWs—or anger on their behalf—simmers just below the surface of these responses, encapsulated by the phrase “we do not forgive or forget.” In portraying these memories, Doyle adopted much of the anti-Japanese sentiment to shore up empathy for POWs and to portray their “nobility” in the face of their suffering. Others, though, expressed anxieties about the racism expressed. One female respondent comments: “Maybe it doesn’t make all Japanese look like part of the War, but it does continue the idea of them being less human that the Western participants in the war.”

The responses to the production itself were perhaps more ambivalent. One woman, with an uncle who had survived, spoke of her disappointment, claiming that the series was “superficial, arty.” She contrasted the TV representation to the official commemoration: the Changi War Memorial in Singapore, she wrote, “shows what really happened.” Others drew on the history of POW representation and found the series wanting. Phil said after the first week: “Without the pervading sense that the lives of these Australian soldiers now hang by a thread in the hands of the Japanese, and this after Nanking, all that follows in this drama is of little consequence: the humour, the need for food, the meeting with ‘Arsehole,’ etc. This was achieved seemingly effortlessly in King Rat, A Town Like Alice and Bridge Over the River Kwai. I found the programme fails badly on this major dramatic point.” John D. found the time shifting between present and past distracting: “But I then came to realize the program is more about the Changi in their hearts than just a fictionalized documentary.” Another appreciated the “the musical interludes,” which “prevented me from being too horrified as each story unfolded” (though a number were hostile). Some engaged with the metaphorical intent of the series in interesting ways: “Ignore the carping critics (especially the man from the war memorial),” says Viola, “who wouldn’t know a good story if they fell over it. The only way we can cope with such horrors is through fiction.” Here the formal institutional authority of the historian is pitted against a belief in the virtues of “telling stories” as a means to apprehend the past. Moreover it is evident that even some who were not men, not from the military, could identify with the national myths of mateship the programs presented, such as Trig, a forty-year old woman: “Changi evokes all the memories I hold fast in my heart, yet I am a woman and have never been to war.” This prosthetic memory reveals how the television series was instrumental in consolidating a public and collective memory of war.
We can see from the range of these responses that there was by no means any consensus, either on the nature of the program or on the memories it evoked. As Jay Winter argues of the cinema, “film disturbs as many narratives as it confirms.” The same holds true here. By following a case such as this, where there has been a rupture in the “private” means by which memories of past experiences are communicated, we can see that the cultural transmission of memories is increasingly being externalized or made public and taken over by new media. Negotiations over remembrance continue in new digital forms, not fully in the public eye, but in a more fluidly understood “public” space that is at once more individually negotiated and yet can encompass much larger collectives than in former times.

As in many countries, in Australia “the long war” remains unfinished; the nature of public memory suggests that the meanings of this past in our present can never be fixed. Changi remains evocative of unresolved feelings and emotions for many Australians who lived through the war or were raised in the generation after. It’s strange for those of us who travel to Europe, stopping off at the new Changi International Airport in Singapore. A sense of dislocation pervades the vast expanses of the duty-free malls and departure lounges, erasing the past and turning Changi into one of those archetypal non-places of contemporary times. If nothing else, it reminds us of the fragility and shifting valency of public memories.
21. Sites of Memory

Jay Winter

Sites of memory are places where groups of people engage in public activity through which they express “a collective shared knowledge . . . of the past, on which a group’s sense of unity and individuality is based.” The group that goes to such sites inherits earlier meanings attached to the event, as well as adding new meanings. Such activity is crucial to the presentation and preservation of commemorative sites. When such groups disperse or disappear, sites of memory lose their initial force, and may fade away entirely.

The term, abumbrated in a seven-volume study edited by Pierre Nora, has been extended to many different texts, from legends to stories to concepts. In this brief essay, I define the term more narrowly to mean physical sites where commemorative acts take place. In the twentieth century, most such sites marked the loss of life in war.

Such sites of memory are topoi with a life history. They have an initial, creative phase, when they are constructed or adapted to particular commemorative purposes. Then follows a period of institutionalization and routinization of their use. Such markings of the calendar, indicating moments of remembrance at particular places, can last for decades, or they can be abruptly halted. In most instances, the significance of sites of memory fades away with the passing of the social groups that initiated the practice.

Sites of memory operate on many levels of aggregation and touch many facets of associative life. While such sites were familiar in the ancient and medieval periods, they have proliferated in more recent times. Consequently, the subject has attracted much academic and popular discussion. We therefore concentrate here on sites of memory in the epoch of the nation-state, primarily in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In the modern period, most sites of memory are imbedded in events marked distinctively and separately from the religious calendar.
There has been some overlap, though. Visiting a commemorative site on Armistice Day, November 11, in countries that observe the end of the 1914–18 war, is close enough to the Catholic feast of All Saints on November 2, and in some countries with a large Catholic population, the two days occupy a semi-sacred space of public commemoration. First comes the visit to the cemetery; then the visit to the war memorial or other site. The day marking the end of the Second World War in Europe, May 8, is also the saint’s day of Joan of Arc. Those engaging in commemorative acts on that day may be addressing the secular celebration or the Catholic one; some celebrate the two together. Usually the site chosen to mark the day differs.

Commemoration at sites of memory is an act arising out of a conviction, shared by a broad community, that the moment recalled is both significant and informed by a moral message. Sites of memory materialize that message. Moments of national humiliation are rarely commemorated or marked in material form, though here too there are exceptions of a hortatory kind. “Never again” is the hallmark of public commemoration on the Israeli Day of Remembrance for victims of the Nazi persecution of the Jews. The shells of public buildings in Hiroshima remind everyone of the moment the city was incinerated in the first atomic attack. Where moral doubts persist about a war or public policy, commemorative sites are either hard to fix or places of contestation. That is why there is no date or place for those who want to commemorate the end of the Algerian War in France, or the end of the Vietnam War in the United States. There was no moral consensus about the nature of those conflicts; hence there was no moral consensus about what was being remembered in public, and when and where were the appropriate time and place to remember those wars.

When the Japanese prime minister visits a shrine to war dead, he is honoring war criminals as well as ordinary soldiers. The same was true when President Ronald Reagan visited the German cemetery at Bitburg, where lie the remains of SS men alongside the graves of those not implicated in war crimes. And yet both places were sites of memory: contested memory, embittered memory, but memory nonetheless.

The critical point about sites of memory is that they are there as points of reference not only for those who survived traumatic events, but also for those born long after them. The word memory becomes a metaphor for the fashioning of narratives about the past when those with direct experience of events die off. Sites of memory inevitably become sites of second-order memory, places where people remember the memories of others, those who survived the events marked there.

Historical Remembrance and Sites of Memory

Increasingly over the twentieth century and beyond, the space between history and memory has been reconfigured. In between is a varied set of cultural practices that may be described as forms of “historical remembrance.” Many such practices emerge when people confront sites of memory. The term historical remembrance is one that is an alloy,
a compound, which we need because the two defining concepts we normally use, history and memory, are insufficient guides to this field. Commemoration requires reference to history, but then the contestation begins. Whose history, written for whose benefit, and on which records? The contemporary memory boom is about history, to be sure, but historians are not its sole or even its central proprietors. Witnesses demand the right to be heard, whatever historians say. When the *Enola Gay* exhibition at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, “The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II,” was constructed painstakingly as history in 1995, it was attacked and rejected by people—ex-servicemen—who had their own history. And the “witnesses” won. The exhibition was reorganized. This was no simple tale of sordid political pressure. Here was a real collision between “history” and “memory,” a collision arising out of the different subject positions of those involved in the exhibition. The outcome was a kind of “historical remembrance” that made space for the claims both of historians and of those whose lives as soldiers they were describing.

If “history” has difficulty in withstanding the challenges of “memory,” the opposite case can be just as problematic. Witnesses forget, or reconstruct, their narratives as a kind of collage, or merge what they saw with what they read. Memory left to itself renders history, a documented account of the past, impossible. Furthermore, “memory” is a category with its own history and its own mysteries. Cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists have taken huge strides in understanding how individuals remember, but leaders in the field admit that there is a vast amount of fundamental work still to be done. How much harder it is to construct a model or set of pathways to describe how groups of people remember together.

And yet these traces are all around us. “Historical remembrance” is a discursive field, extending from ritual to cultural work of many different kinds. It differs from family remembrance in its capacity to unite people who have no other bonds drawing them together. It is distinctive from liturgical remembrance in being free of a preordained religious calendar and sanctified ritual forms. And yet historical remembrance has something of the familial and something of the sacred in it. When all three are fused, as in some powerful war memorials—Maya Lin’s Vietnam memorial in Washington comes to mind—historical remembrance is a phenomenon of enduring power.

Adopting the term *historical remembrance* has other advantages as well. Using it helps us avoid the pitfalls of referring to memory as some vague cloud that exists without agency, and to history as an objective story that exists outside of the people whose lives it describes. Historians have memories too, and their choice of subject is rarely accidental. They are part of the memory boom, though not its leading part. When they join other men and women who come together in public to remember the past—their past—they construct a narrative that is not just “history” and not just “memory,” but a story that partakes of them both. Historical remembrance is what they do and how they contribute to a memory boom that extends well beyond the historical profession. Sites of memory are places where historical remembrance happens.
This approach to the subject provides a solution to some of the controversies surrounding the topic of sites of memory. Three in particular stand out. Some critics claim that commemorative practices sacralize war and the political order that governs it. But this objection misses the point that pacifists have used sites of memory for precisely the opposite purpose. Languages of mourning have sacred elements in them, but they are never alone. Historical remembrance subsumes these cadences as it admits the power of family rhetoric to shape the language people use when they come to sites of mourning. A second objection is that sites of memory proliferate because memory has ceased to exist within our lives and therefore needs to be created in artificial forms. Thus Pierre Nora spoke of concocted *lieux de mémoire* occupying the space of vanished and authentic *milieux de mémoire*. Lieux de mémoire, he posits, are artificial substitutes for the living memory-culture of the past. This argument betrays an ingrained Eurocentrism. Anyone who even glances at the power of living sites of memory in Latin America or India, for example, will realize that the distinction cannot hold. Milieux de mémoire are alive and well, and so are oral and written traditions of remembrance that inform them. A third objection is that sites of memory are places where people escape from politics. We remember because we cannot see an achievable future; thus the efflorescence of interest in sites of memory coincides with the period of disillusionment following the 1960s when Marxism collapsed as a theory of history and a theory of society. Memory, from this angle, is a “fix” for those who fear the future and have given up their conviction that they can master it. This argument is incomplete at best. In some cases the quest for memory does offer an alternative to a plan for the future. But among Guatemalan Indians or Palestinians or Vietnamese people, the construction of narratives about a past recently disfigured by massive violence is not alternative to politics but rather its direct expression. Sites of memory are places where local politics happens. The men and women who come to such places arrive with a mixture of motives and hopes; to claim that they are there to flee politics is absurd.

On one point, though, the critical conversation about sites of memory has not gone far enough. All the critics cited here base their arguments on a clear separation of history and memory. This position cannot be sustained. It makes no sense to juxtapose history and memory as adversarial and separate concepts. As I have already noted, they overlap in too many ways to be considered as pure categories, each living in majestic isolation on its separate peak. Historical remembrance is an analytical category of use here, in that it enables us to understand more fully both the field of force between history and memory and the people who fashion, appropriate, and pass on to us sites of memory.

**Commemoration and Political Power**

Much of the scholarly debate about sites of memory concerns the extent to which they are instruments of the dominant political elements in a society. One school of opinion emphasizes the usefulness to political elites of public events at such sites establishing the
legitimacy of their rule. Some such events are observed whoever is in power—witness Bastille Day in Paris or Independence Day in Philadelphia or elsewhere in the United States. But other events are closely tied to the establishment of a new regime and the overthrow of an older one: November 7 was the date that marked the Bolshevik revolution and establishment the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. That date symbolized the new order and its challenge to its world-wide enemies. The march past of soldiers and weapons deployed by the Soviet army in Moscow was a moment of commemoration as well as of muscular pride, demonstrating to both the domestic population and the outside world the authority of the Revolution.

This top-down approach proclaims the significance of sites of memory as a materialization of national, imperial, or political identity. Anzac Day, April 25, is celebrated as the moment when the Australian nation was born. It commemorates the landing of Australian and New Zealand troops as part of the British-led expeditionary force sent to Turkey in 1915. The fact that the landing was a failure does not diminish the iconic character of the date to Australians. It is the day, they hold, when their nation came of age. There are many sites of memory where this day is marked. First, people come to war memorials throughout Australia. Second, there is a state event at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, an edifice built in the shape of Hajia Sofia in Istanbul. On the walls of this building are inscribed the names of all Australian soldiers who died in the war. Third, there is an annual pilgrimage, still robustly attended in the twenty-first century, to the shores of Gallipoli itself. There, Australians mark the Gallipoli landings on the beaches where they took place.

By no means are all commemorative activities or sites of memory associated with warfare. The birthdates of monarchs or deceased presidents are marked in similar ways. Queen Victoria’s birthday, May 24, was Empire Day in Britain; now it is celebrated as Commonwealth Day. The creation of such commemorative dates was part of a wider movement of what some scholars have termed “the invention of tradition.” That is, at the end of the nineteenth century, new nation states and preeminent imperial powers deepened the repertoire of their ceremonial activity. Such flourishes of the majesty of power were then immediately sanctified by a spurious pedigree. To display ceremonies with a supposed link to ancient habits or forms located in a foggy and distant past created an effective cover for political innovation, instability, or insecurity. Interestingly for our purposes, such traditions have only a tenuous attachment to a site, thereby increasing the flexibility of choices available to those who want to invent traditions.

This functionalist interpretation of commemoration has been challenged. A second school of scholarship emphasizes the ways that sites of memory and the public commemorations surrounding them have the potential for dominated groups to contest their subordinate status in public. However much political leaders or their agents try to choreograph commemorative activity, there is much space for subversion or creative interpretation of the official commemorative script. Armistice Day, November 11, was a
moment when different groups came to war memorials, some for the celebration and others for the denigration of military values. Pacifists announced their message of “never again” through their presence at such sites of memory; military men and their supporters used these moments and the aura of these sites to glorify the profession of arms and to demonstrate the duty of citizens, if necessary, to give their lives for their country in a future war. The contradictions in these forms of expression on the same day and in the same places have never been resolved.10

This alternative interpretation of the political meaning of sites of memory emphasizes the multivocal character of remembrance and the potential for new groups with new causes to appropriate older sites of memory. From this point of view, there is always a chorus of voices in commemorations; some are louder than others, but they never sound alone. Decentering the history of commemoration ensures that we recognize the regional, local, and idiosyncratic character of such activities and the way a top-down approach must be supplemented by a bottom-up approach to the performance of scripts about the past at commemorative sites in villages, small towns, and provincial cities, as well as in the centers of political power.

Very occasionally, these dissonant voices come together, and a national moment of remembrance emerges. On such occasions, however, there is no one single site of memory at which this braiding together of leaders and led takes place. One example of this diffusion of remembrance is the two minute silence, observed in Britain between 1919 and 1938 at 11:00 AM on November 11. Telephonists pulled the plugs on all conversations. Traffic stopped. The normal flow of life was arrested. Then the Second World War intervened, and such disruption to war production was not in the national interest. Thereafter the two minute silence was moved to the Sunday nearest November 11. But in the two decades between the wars, it was a moment of national reflection, located everywhere. Mass-Observation, a pioneering social survey organization, asked hundreds of ordinary people in Britain what they thought about during the silence. One answer was that they thought not of the nation or of victory or of armies, but of the men who weren’t there.11 This silence was a meditation about absence. As such, it moved away from political orchestration into the realm of family history. To be sure, families commemorated their own within a wider social and political framework. But the richest texture of remembrance was always within family life. This intersection of the public and the private, the macrohistorical and the microhistorical, is what has given commemoration in the twentieth century its power and its rich repertoire of forms. But the very complexity of these processes means that sites of memory are not always the foci of acts of remembrance.

In addition, some buildings can be converted into sites of memory unofficially. A cinema where workers organized a strike, a home where women created a midwifery or child care center, a school where people made homeless by a natural disaster found shelter: each can be turned into a site of memory by those who lived important moments there.12 Official certification is not necessary when groups of people act on their own.
Unofficial sites of memory must be preserved through the time and cash of groups of people. That is a crucial defining feature of sites of memory: they cost money and time to construct or preserve. They require specialists’ services—landscapers, cleaners, masons, carpenters, plumbers, and so on; they need funding and, over time, refunding. There are two kinds of expenditure we can trace in the history of sites of memory: capital expenditure and recurrent expenditure.

The land for such sites must be purchased; and an appropriate symbolic form must be designed and then constructed to focus remembrance activities. The first step may require substantial sums of public money. Private land, especially in urban areas, comes at a premium. Then there are the costs of architects’ fees, especially when a public competitive tender is offered, inviting proposals from professionals. Finally, once the symbolic form is chosen, it must be constructed out of selected materials and finished according to the architect’s or artist’s designs.

When these projects are national in character, the process of production occurs under the public eye. National art schools and bodies of “experts” have to have their say. Standards of “taste” and “decorum” are proclaimed. Professional interests and conflicts come into play. Much of this professional infighting is confined to national commemorative projects, but the same complex step-wise procedure occurs on the local level too, though without the same level of attendant publicity. Local authorities usually take charge of these projects, and local notables can deflect plans toward their own particular visions, whatever public opinion may think about the subject.

Most of the time, public funding covers only part of the costs of commemorative objects. Public subscriptions are critical, especially in Protestant countries where the concept of utilitarian memorials is dominant. In Catholic countries, the notion of a “useful” memorial is a contradiction in terms; symbolic language and utilitarian language are deemed mutually exclusive. But the Protestant voluntary traditions have it otherwise. In Protestant countries, commemorative projects take many forms, from the sacred to the mundane: in Britain there are memorial wards in hospitals and memorial scholarships in schools and universities alongside memorial cricket pitches and memorial water troughs for horses. In the United States and in Australia there are memorial highways. The rule of thumb is that private citizens pick up most of the tab for these memorial forms, and the taxpayer pays for the rest. The state provides subsidies and occasional matching grants, but in many cases the money comes out of the pockets of ordinary people. The same is true in Britain with respect to a very widely shared form of public commemoration: the purchase of paper poppies, the symbol of the Lost Generation of the First World War. These poppies are worn on the lapel, and the proceeds from the sale go to aid disabled veterans and their families.
Recurrent expenditure for sites of memory is almost always paid for by taxpayers. War cemeteries require masons and gardeners. The Imperial (now Commonwealth) War Graves Commission looks after hundreds of such cemeteries all over the world. The cost of their maintenance is a public charge. Private charities, in particular Christian groups, maintain German war cemeteries. Once constructed, memorial statues, cemeteries, or highways also become public property, and require public support to prevent them from decomposing. They are preserved as sites of commemorative activity.

Much of this activity is directed toward inviting the public to remember in public. This means directing the public toward particular sites of remembrance. Some of them are near their homes. In Britain and France there are war memorials in every city, in every town, and in every village; it is there that Armistice Day ceremonies are held annually. Churches throughout Europe of all denominations have memorial plaques to those who died in war. Special prayers were added to the Jewish prayer book to commemorate the victims of the Nazis in the Second World War, and later, those who died on active service in the Israeli army.

Remembrance in local houses of worship or at war memorials requires that the public travel a short distance from their homes to sites of remembrance. But given the wide dispersal around the world of cemeteries in which lie the remains of millions of men and women who died in two world wars, the business of remembrance also entails international travel. Such voyages start as pilgrimage; many are mixed with tourism. But in either case, there are train and boat journeys to take; hotel rooms to reserve; guides to hire; flowers to lay at graves; trinkets and mementos to purchase. In some places, museums have arisen to tell more of the story the pilgrims have come to hear and to share. There too money is exchanged along with the narratives and the symbols of remembrance.

This mixture of the sacred and the profane is hardly an innovation. It is merely a secular form of the kind of pilgrimage, for example, that made San Juan de Compostela in Spain the destination of millions of men and women in the Middle Ages who came to honor the conventionally designated resting place of the remains of one of the original Apostles. Pilgrimage to war cemeteries is public commemoration over long—sometimes very long—distances. Where does pilgrimage stop and tourism take over? It is impossible to say, but in all cases, the business of remembrance remains just that—a business.

**Aesthetic Redemption**

The life history of sites of memory is described by more than political gestures and material tasks. Frequently, a site is also an art form, the art of creating, arranging, and interpreting signifying practices. This field of action can be analyzed on two different but intimately related levels: the aesthetic and the semiotic.
Some national commemorative forms are distinctive. Others are shared by populations in many countries. The figure of Marianne as the national symbol affixed to thousands of town halls throughout France could not be used in Germany or Britain. The German Iron Cross, on commemorative plaques, denotes the location and the tradition in which commemoration is expressed. Germany’s heroes’ forests or fortresses are also imbricated in Teutonic history.

At times, the repertoire of one country’s symbols overlap with that of others’, even when they were adversaries. After the First World War, the first industrialized war fought among fully industrialized nations, many commemorative forms adopted medieval notation. Throughout Europe, the revolutionary character of warfare was marked by a notation of a backward-looking kind. Medieval images of heroic and saintly warriors recaptured a time when combat was between individuals, rather than the impersonal and unbalanced duel between artillery and human flesh. The war in the air took on the form and romance of chivalry. On the losing and the winning sides, medievalism flourished. We can see these traces clearly in stained glass windows in many churches, where a site of memory for the two world wars takes on a meaning by virtue of its proximity to older religious images and objects. Twentieth-century warfare thus takes on a sacred coloration when its sites of memory are located within a sacred grammar and a sacred building.

Until very late in the twentieth century, on war memorials the human form survived. In some instances, classical images of male beauty were chosen to mark the “lost generation”; others adopted more stoical and emphatically nontriumphalist poses of men in uniform. In most cases, victory was either partially or totally eclipsed by a sense of overwhelming loss. Within this aesthetic landscape, traditional Christian motifs were commonplace. The form of the grieving mother—Stabat Mater—brought women into the local and national constellation of grief.

In Protestant countries, the aesthetic debate took on a quasi-religious character. War memorials with crosses on them offended some Protestants, who believed that the Reformation of the sixteenth century precluded such “Catholic” notation. Obelisks were preferable, and relatively inexpensive too. In France, war memorials were by law restricted to public and not church grounds, though many local groups found a way around this proscription. In schools and universities, the location of such memorials touched on such issues. Some were placed in sacred space (in chapels), some in semi-sacred space (around chapels), and some in secular space. Public thoroughfares and train stations also housed lists of men who had died in war. Placement signified meaning.

Twentieth-century warfare democratized bereavement. Previously, armies had been composed of mercenaries, volunteers, and professionals. After 1914, Everyman went to war. The social incidence of war losses was thereby transformed. In Britain, France, and Germany, virtually every household had lost someone—a father, a son, a brother, a cousin, a friend. Given the nature of static warfare on the Western front, many—perhaps
half—of those killed had no known grave. Consequently, commemorative forms highlighted names above all. The names of the dead were all that remained of them, and chiseled in stone or etched on plaques, these names were the foci of public commemoration, both on the local and the national scale.

Sites of memory preserved the names of those who were gone. In some rare cases—Australia is one of them—war memorials listed the names of all those who served. This notation was a constant rebuke to those who passed the site knowing full well that their names were not inscribed on the memorial. Most of the time, though, the dead were the names that mattered, so much so that alphabetical order replaced social order. The overwhelming majority of war memorials list those who died in this way. A small minority listed men by rank, and some listed men by the date or year of death. But sites of memory were built for the survivors, for the families of those who were not there, and these people needed easy access to the sole signifier left to them—the name of the dead person.

This essential practice of naming set the pattern for commemorative forms after the Second World War and beyond. After 1945, names were simply added to Great War memorials. This was partly in recognition of the links between the two twentieth-century conflicts, and partly a matter of economy. After the Vietnam War, naming still mattered, and First World War forms inspired memorials, most notably Maya Lin’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington. Her work clearly drew on Sir Edwin Lutyens’s memorial to the missing on the River Somme at Thiepval, inaugurated in 1932.

By the later decades of the twentieth century, artistic opinion and aesthetic tastes had changed sufficiently to make abstraction the key language of commemorative expression. Statues and installations thereby escaped from specific national notation and moved away from the earlier emphasis upon the human figure. The exception to the rule is Soviet commemorative art, which resolutely stuck to the path of heroic romanticism in marking out the meaning of what they called the Great Patriotic War (World War II). In many instances in Western Europe, but by no means all, forms that suggested absence or nothingness replaced classical, religious, or romantic notions in commemorative art.

This shift was noticeable in Holocaust remembrance. Holocaust sites of memory—concentration and extermination camps, in particular, but also places where Jews had lived before the Shoah—could not be treated in the same way as sites commemorating the dead of the two world wars. The first difficulty was the need to avoid Christian notation to represent a Jewish catastrophe. The second was the objection of observant Jews to representational art, either forbidden or resisted within Orthodox Jewish tradition. The third was the absence of any sense of uplift, of meaning, of purpose in the deaths of the victims. Those who died in the Holocaust may have affirmed their faith thereby, but what is the meaning in the murder of one million children? To a degree, their deaths meant nothing, and therefore the Holocaust meant nothing.

Representing nothing became a challenge met in particular ways. Some artists provided installation art that literally vanished through the presence of visitors, for example,
by inviting them to hammer in metal rods and thereby attest to the irreversible character of genocide. Others projected photographs of the vanished world onto the facades of still erect buildings occupied by non-Jews. Others adopted postmodern forms to suggest disorientation, void, emptiness. Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish annex to the Berlin Historical Museum is one such site. It has been likened to a Jewish star taken apart, or a lightning bolt in stone and glass. Whatever metaphor one chooses, it is a disturbing, tilted, nonlinear representation of the unrepresentable.

Since the 1970s, commemoration of the Second World War has become braided together with commemoration of the Holocaust. This presented aesthetic as well as social and political challenges. Great War commemorative forms had sought out some meaning, some significance in the enormous loss of life attending that conflict. There was an implicit warning in many of these monuments. “Never again” was their ultimate meaning. But “never” had lasted a bare twenty years. Thus, after the Second World War, the search for meaning became infinitely more complex. And the fact that more civilians died than soldiers in the Second World War made matters even more difficult to configure in art.

Finally, the extreme character of the Second World War challenged the capacity of art—any art—to express a sense of loss when it is linked to genocidal murder or thermonuclear destruction. We have mentioned how Auschwitz defied conventional notations of “meaning,” though some individuals continue to try to rescue redemptive elements from it. The same is true for the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Sites of memory are places where people affirm their faith that history has a meaning. What kind of site is appropriate where the majority of people see no meaning at all in the events being marked in time and in space? Ignoring Auschwitz or Hiroshima is impossible, but locating them within earlier commemorative structures or gestures is either problematic or absurd or both.

Ritual

Public commemoration is an activity defined by the gestures and words of those who come together at sites of memory to recall particular aspects of the past, their past. Such moments are rarely the simple reflection of a fixed text, a script rigidly prepared by political leaders determined to fortify their position of power. Inevitably, commemoration overlaps with political conflicts, but it can never be reduced to a direct function of power relationships.

There are at least three stages in the history of rituals surrounding public commemoration. The first we have already dealt with: the construction of a commemorative form. But there are two other levels in the life history of monuments that need attention. The second is the grounding of ritual action in the calendar and the routinization of
such activities; the third is their transformation or their disappearance as active sites of memory.

One case in point may illustrate this trajectory. The date of July 1, 1916 is not a national holiday in Britain; but it marks the date of the opening of the British offensive on the River Somme, an offensive that symbolized the terrible character of industrial warfare. On that day, the British army suffered the highest casualty totals in its history: a volunteer army, and the society that had created it, were introduced to the full terrors of twentieth-century warfare. Groups of people still go to the Somme battlefields to mark this day, without national legislation obliging them to do so. Theirs are locally defined rituals. A party of Northumberland men and women bring their bagpipes, and mark the moment when the battle began, locating themselves at a gigantic crater they purchased to ensure the site would not be ploughed over and forgotten. Others from Newfoundland go to the still extant trench system at Beaumont Hamel where their ancestors were slaughtered on July 1, 1916. There is a bronze caribou at the site to link this place to the landscape from which the men of Newfoundland—their British colony—came as volunteers to fight for King and country. In France, November 11 is a national holiday, but not in Britain. Legislation codifies activities whose origins and force lie on the local level. Public commemoration flourishes within the orbit of civil society. This is not true in countries where dictatorships rule; Stalinist Russia smashed civil society to a point that it could not sustain commemorative activity independent of the party and the state. But elsewhere, local associations matter. And so do families. Commemorative ritual survives when it is inscribed within the rhythms of community and in particular, family life. Public commemoration lasts when it draws out overlaps between national history and family history. Most of those who take the time to engage in the rituals of remembrance bring with them memories of family members touched by these vast events. This is what enables people born after wars and revolutions to commemorate them as essential parts of their own lives. For example, children born in the aftermath of the First World War told the story of their family upbringing to grandchildren born sixty or seventy years later. This transmission of childhood memories over two or sometimes three generations gives family stories a power that is translated at times into activity—the activity of remembrance.

There are occasions when the household itself becomes a site of memory. The great German sculptor and artist Kathe Kollwitz kept the room of her dead son as a kind of shrine, just as it had been when he volunteered for war in 1914. In Paris, there is a public housing project in a working-class neighborhood where above every apartment door is listed the name of a soldier who had died in the Great War. This is their home too, the metaphoric residence of those who were denied the chance the rest of us have of living and dying one at a time.

This framework of family transmission of narratives about the past is an essential part of public commemoration. It also helps us understand why some commemorative forms are changed or simply fade away. When the link between family life and public
commemoration is broken, a powerful prop of remembrance is removed. Then, in a short
time, remembrance atrophies and fades away. Public reinforcements may help keep alive
the ritual and practice of commemoration. But the event becomes hollow when removed
from the myriad small-scale social units that breathed life into it in the first place. At that
moment, commemorative sites and practices can be revived and reappropriated. The
same sites used for one purpose can be used for another. But most of the time, sites of
memory live through their life cycle and, like the rest of us, inevitably fade away.

This natural process of dissolution closes the circle on sites of memory and the public
commemoration that occurs around them. And rightly so, since they arise out of the needs
of groups of people to link their lives with salient events in the past. When that need
vanishes, so does the glue that holds together the social practice of commemoration. Then
collective memories diminish and sites of memory decompose or simply fade into the
landscape. Let me offer two instances of this phenomenon. For decades Dublin’s National
War Memorial, designed by Sir Edwin Lutyens, was completely overgrown with grass. No
one could tell what it was, and this was no accident. That thirty-five thousand Irishmen
died for Britain’s king and country was not an easy matter to acknowledge as a feature of
Irish history after the Armistice in 1918. But with the waning of sectarian violence in the
later decades of the twentieth century, the grass was cut and the monument reappeared, as
if out of thin air. Sites of memory vanish, to be sure, but they can be conjured up again
when people decide once again to mark the moment they commemorate. At other times,
resurrection is more difficult. For years, I asked my students at Cambridge what they saw
at the first intersection into town from the railway station. Most answered nothing at all.
What they did not see was the town war memorial, a victorious soldier striding back home,
right at the first traffic light into town. They did not see it because it had no meaning to
them. It was simply white noise in stone. For them to see it, someone had to point it out,
and others had to organize acts of remembrance around it. Without such an effort, sites of
memory vanish into thin air and stay there.

We have reached, therefore, a quixotic conclusion. Public commemoration is both
irresistible and unsustainable. Constructing sites of memory is a universal social act, and
yet these very sites are as transitory as are the groups of people who create and sustain
them. Time and again, people have come together at particular places, in front of particu-
lar sites of memory, to seek meaning in vast events in the past and try to relate them to
their own smaller networks of social life. These associations are bound to dissolve, to be
replaced by other forms, with other needs and other histories. At that point, the character-
istic trajectory of sites of memory, bounded by their creation, institutionalization, and
decomposition, comes to an end.
It is possible that even when working from memory, I saw the world in movie terms, as who did not, or, indeed, who does not?

Gore Vidal¹

The recent film *The Butterfly Effect* (Eric Bress and J. Mackye Gruber, 2004) tells the story of a young man, Evan, whose capacity to recover lost memories goes further than most, for once his memories return, he learns how to “jump into” the scenes of his past, traveling back in time to divert fate and put right the wrongs of the past. But this “memory travel” turns out to be doomed from the start. Only by killing himself at birth, Evan discovers, can he change the past and save the girl he loves. In an early scene, Evan is undergoing memory recovery therapy for blackouts and memory loss. Under hypnosis, his psychiatrist encourages him to think of his memory “like a movie. You can pause, rewind or slow down any details you wish. Remember,” his psychiatrist continues, “it’s only a movie. You’re completely safe.” This scene—and the film to which it belongs—exemplify the cinema’s current fascination with memory and, in foregrounding the close ties between cinema and memory, draw on themes that recur, both in films concerned with memory and in writings on the cinema and memory. In counterposing the safety of cinema spectatorship with memory’s potential to disturb, and the relative permanence of the photographic and cinematic image with the mind’s tendency to forget, this scene demonstrates cinema’s simultaneous promise both to enhance and to tame memory. In gesturing also to the cinema’s capacity to manipulate memory’s often involuntary divergences from linear temporality—a capacity now devolved down to spectators by the pause, rewind, and slow motion of video or DVD—*The Butterfly Effect* instantiates the hope expressed in cinema/memory metaphors for some respite from
memory’s profound unbiddability. But if Evan’s “memory travel” tropes the cinema’s resemblance to and surpassing of “natural” memory, expressing a wish to change the past and overcome memory’s caprices, then *The Butterfly Effect*’s dystopian conclusion suggests that this is a hope that may not be fulfillable by the cinema or its heirs. Nevertheless, the ties between cinema and memory run deep and continue to fascinate.

The cinema’s long-standing and intimate relationship with memory is revealed in cinema language’s adoption of terms associated with memory—the “flashback” and the “fade,” for instance—to describe cinematic dissolves between a film narrative’s present and its past. The routinized deployment of these terms has rendered them unremarkable, suggesting an apparently automatic, involuntary, and mechanical relationship between cinema and memory. Theories of cinema’s relation to memory have hinged, too, on meta-psychological accounts of the cinema as a mechanical, technical, and ideological apparatus geared to the production of particular spectator positions as well as on the involuntary and automatic aspects of both cinema spectatorship and memory. But the question of cinema’s relation to memory remains open and has been theorized within three distinct paradigms. Memory has been conceived of by analogy with cinema, and in a reverse move, the cinema—and specific types of film—have been understood to be analogous with or even to be modes of memory. Third, and more recently, in theories of cinema/memory, the relations between cinema, film, and memory emerge as more porous and more deeply interpenetrating than is allowed for by the two preceding formulations.

Models of memory as cinema, cinema as memory and cinema/memory all elaborate differently nuanced understandings of cinema and of memory. The history of these metaphors does not illustrate a straightforward narrative of progress in the understanding of memory or of the cinema. Instead, they reveal both more and less than “the reflections of an age, a culture, an ambience” or “an intellectual climate.” For—particularly since the nineteenth century—at moments, the figuring of memory by media, including the cinema, and of the cinema by memory have become key sites within which to explore, map, and radically critique the changing relationship between the “inside” and the “outside,” the personal and the social. Always at stake in discussions of the cinema’s relation to memory is the question of memory’s “transindividuality”: the social and cultural, as well as the individual and personal aspects of memory, for cinema—along with television and digital and print media—has been central to the development of the concepts of cultural, social, and public memory. At stake, too, is the question of memory’s relation to the history of media forms and technologies.

**Memory as Cinema**

Cinema was by no means the first medium to have informed understandings of memory, and neither has the metaphorical troping of memory confined itself to the media.
Memory has been figured as wine cellar and dovecote, treasure chest and labyrinth. However, the classical association of memory with the wax tablet in Plato’s *Theaetetus* founded an enduring pattern of associations between memory and imprinting, memory and writing and, more recently, memory and the visual media, that continues to this day. Through such metaphors, philosophers and, more recently, psychologists have striven to understand the workings of memory.

The strength of memory’s association with the visual media derives in part from broader para-optical models of thought, consciousness, and the mind and in part from the often-noted visuality of memory. Though the association of memory with visual media has a longer history, it reached its zenith in associations between memory and nineteenth-century inventions such as the daguerreotype and then photography. As Douwe Draaisma explains, “photography’s revolutionary new technique for preserving images” led to a plethora of photographic metaphors in papers on visual memory. These associations between memory and the visual media extended beyond visual memory to encompass memory in general, their view of memory revealing a mechanist philosophy typical of the nineteenth century and expressed, too, in Freud’s famous analogy between memory and the mystic writing pad. In this essay, Freud drew on and developed the classical association between memory and writing on the wax tablet, while using the writing pad’s “mystical” ability to retain and erase in order to figure the mind’s mechanisms of perception, remembrance, and forgetting. Freud’s emphasis, in this essay, on forgetting and remembering, inscription and erasure provides one example of an early “mediated” modeling of memory prefigurative of deconstructivist theories of subjectivity and writing.

The invention of photography eclipsed the camera obscura’s capacity to reflect moving images, encouraging the analogy between memory and still images. But the invention of the cinema opened the way once again for understandings of memory by analogy with the moving image. Interestingly, however, such analogies have continued to emphasize the stillness of the images constitutive of film stock over the illusion of movement granted by the apparatus of projection. For instance, Henri Bergson’s unfavorable comparison of the intellect with intuition compared intellectual thought to the cinema’s mechanical animation of fragmented and isolated extractions of reality, using cinema as what Amy Herzog has termed “a model for the forces of rationality that immobilize and fragment time.” In Bergson’s formulation, the cinema may be mobilized to demonstrate how the intellect differs from memory, rather than as a metaphor for memory. Only with Deleuze’s rereading of Bergson does the cinema become not a metaphor for either memory or the intellect but what Herzog describes as a practice with “the potential to create its own fluid movements and temporaliess.”

Bergson’s alignment of the cinema with rationality, rather than with intuition, foregrounds the apparatus of projection and the mechanical movement of film stock through the projector’s lens. But when we turn to the cinema and to films that model themselves
on the workings of memory, then it is film’s capacity to express memory’s intuitive associational links that emerges as one of multiple associations between cinema, film, and memory.

Cinema as Memory

Memory’s metaphorical alignment with the still, as opposed to the moving, image is sustained even by films that model themselves on the workings of memory. In films such as Alain Resnais’ *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (1959), art and avant-garde cinema’s abiding fascination with memory expresses itself through relatively immobile camerawork, lengthy, photograph-like shots, and brief flashback sequences evocative of involuntary memory. Similarly, in Terence Davies’s beautiful memory films *Distant Voices Still Lives* (1988) and *The Long Day Closes* (1992), shots often resemble still photographs from a family album, the “logic” governing relations between such shots and scenes being closer to memory’s poetic associations than to narrative cause and effect. These films’ relations to memory complicate the distinction between form and style, flashbacks providing the formal means for the connection of the diegetic present with its remembered past while evoking the “feel” of memory’s movements. So too, memory films such as Davies’s complicate the relations between personal and social memory, underlining the fact that memories are not simply “ours” by drawing from and mediating a cultural memory bank of cinematic images and sounds. Davies’s memory films remember the past, in part, by means of aural cinematic quotation, alluding not just to a history the films purport to share with their spectators, but to a commonly-held memory-store constituted by the films of the past.

The permeability of the boundary between personal and social memory extends beyond memory films intended for public exhibition to the domain of the home movie. Like images from the family album, home movies supplement, enhance or even supplant intimate memories of the personal and familial past, while drawing on film language learned as much at the cinema as at home. The transmission of memories stored in home movies depends, too, upon the capacity of their spectators to recognize those archived memories. With the loss of that social community of remembering, home movies cease to provide documentary evidence for, or commemoration of, a remembered past, their protagonists becoming something like the anonymous ghosts of an unremembered past.

Though avant-garde and art cinema and memory films constitute privileged locations for investigating cinema’s relation to memory, those relations extend to almost every genre and every period of film history—shadowing, if not coinciding exactly with the history of the flashback. Memory permeates the cinema’s narratives, plots, and modes of narration, from mainstream entertainment cinema’s subordination of the memory
flashback to the exigencies of economical and coherent linear narration, to the foregrounding of memory and its vicissitudes in recent mainstream U.S. entertainment films, including *Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind* (Michael Gondry, 2004), *Memento* (Christopher Nolan, 2001), and the Bourne trilogy: *The Bourne Identity* (Doug Liman, 2002), *The Bourne Supremacy* (Paul Greengrass, 2004), *The Bourne Ultimatum* (Paul Greengrass, 2007). The impossible memories of a murdered man motivate one of the most famous film-long flashbacks, in Billy Wilder’s film noir *Sunset Boulevard* (1950), and the symptoms of traumatic memory, particularly as they had been discussed by psychoanalysis, provided the alibi for surrealist incursions within Alfred Hitchcock’s *Marnie* (1964), as well as his earlier *Spellbound* (1945). Meanwhile, the very possibility of the cinematic “illusion” depends upon optical memory, as the fast flowing frames leave their imprints on the spectator’s retina, masking each image’s stillness and separation from the next—an aspect of cinema memory much exploited by experimental and avant-garde cinema.

If the extensiveness and complexity of cinema’s relation to memory and of understandings of cinema as memory exceed the bounds of any short summary, it has been the cinema’s capacity to discipline, enhance, supplement, or substitute for memory that has provoked deepest debate. Already in the 1930s, the perception of a “memory crisis” had prompted the critical theorists Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin to consider photography’s and cinema’s relation to modernity’s assault on the inner world of memory. Unsurpassed in his grasp of cinema as both opportunity and loss, and facing head-on the erosion of memory’s inner world by the shocks of modernity, Benjamin imagined the cinema’s role in producing new modes of modern subjectivity capable of thinking—and thinking critically—under modern conditions. In an essay on Baudelaire, Benjamin described modernity’s erosion of involuntary memory, and its supplanting of experience (once passed on through intimate modes of contact and storytelling) by modern modes of mediated information. But Benjamin did not reject the innovations introduced by cinema. Instead, he argued that:

the techniques based on the use of the camera and of subsequent analogous mechanical devices extend the range of the mémoire volontaire; by means of these devices they make it possible for an event at any time to be permanently recorded in terms of sound and sight. Thus they represent important achievements of a society in which practice is in decline.

As well as providing a technological support for memory, Benjamin suggested, habituated exposure to the startling rush of cinematic images might enable spectators to withstand better the shocks of modern city life: “Technology,” he wrote,

has subjected the human sensorium to a complex kind of training. There came a day when a new and urgent need for stimuli was met by the film. In a film, perception in the form of shocks was established as a formal principle.
If, in this appraisal of cinema, Benjamin seems to align its technology with modernity’s attack on memory, he had already seized on the potential of cinema’s technological enhancement of vision to aid in the perception of “the necessities which rule our lives.” Through devices such as slow motion and close-ups, the cinema projects images unavailable to consciousness, cinema becomes an optical unconscious with the potential to produce liberatory visions of modernity’s spaces: “Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go travelling.”

For Benjamin, the cinema becomes a technology for the advancement of (political) consciousness in the modern era of “post-memory.” Impelled by his particular relationship with Marxism to find revolutionary potential in the present, Benjamin grasped technology’s role in eroding tradition and memory, but he grasped, too, the cinema’s potential to proffer alternative modes of consciousness in an age of ravished memory. As much contemporary feminist film criticism has shown, the full resonance of Benjamin’s writings on cinema’s relation to memory, time, and spectatorship remains to be revealed.

Recent criticism—even where it acknowledges debts to Marxism, to Benjamin, and to the critical theory of the 1930s—fails to match either the subtlety of Benjamin’s dialectical vision or its embrace of cinematic images, technologies, and temporalities. Instead, contemporary criticism, focusing, in the main on filmic representations of the past, has tended to adopt unadulteratedly positive or negative views of the cinema’s relation to memory in modern and postmodern times. Much of this criticism is informed by a pervasive view that sees the contemporary moment—with its purportedly relentless focus on the present, its detachment from the past and from traditional modes of knowledge, and its information and media overload—as one in which the past can no longer be adequately grasped. On such accounts, older modes of memory, under the pressure of the contemporary “storm” of representations, live transmissions, and instant replay, have given way to their mediated substitutes or supplements. For criticism inflected by a Marxist belief in the revolutionary necessity of grasping the dialectical relation between past and present, it is the lack of any truly historical consciousness that is seen to be (poorly) substituted for by the cinema’s nostalgic “memories” of the past.

Though indebted to Benjamin, Fredric Jameson finds little progressive potential in the dubious pleasures of the nostalgia film. Jameson identifies two types of nostalgia film: those that recreate the look and feel of past times, for instance, Chinatown (Roman Polanski, 1974) or American Graffiti (George Lucas, 1973), with their evocations of the 1930s and 1950s; and films that return to a past period by evoking the feel and shape of older media series or genres, for instance, in Star Wars (Lucas, 1977), which reawakens a sense of the past by pastiching the style and look of the Saturday afternoon serial. For Jameson, the nostalgia film’s recycling of the look and feel of the past substitutes the pleasures of nostalgic memory for historical consciousness, or the capacity to know and understand the true relationship between the past and the present. Jameson’s critique of the nostalgia
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film disparages the pleasures of cinematic nostalgic memory—and of the cinema’s role in constructing and transmitting “cultural memories” of, for instance, the look and feel of past decades, of the pleasures of Saturday afternoon serials. For Jameson, these pleasurable “memories” constitute poor or even debased substitutes for historical consciousness.

A similarly derogatory stance has inflected recent criticism of the “heritage film”—another category of film that has been constituted by film criticism as a mode of cinematic cultural memory. The heritage film, often adapted from well-known literary works—for instance, Howards End (James Ivory, 1992) and A Room with a View (Ivory, 1985), both adapted from novels by E. M. Forster—and characterized by high production values and lavish, lovingly dwelt-on period detail (including location shooting at stately homes), has been criticized for its “artful and spectacular projection of an elite, conservative vision of the national past” and for its pleasurable spectacle associated with nostalgia for a fantasized vision of a lost Englishness. In an argument reminiscent of Jameson’s critique of the nostalgia film, Andrew Higson has suggested that even where the heritage film’s narrative may offer an ironic, critical commentary on the national past—as with the adaptations of Forster—the power of its commentary is diminished by the film’s fetishistic spectacle that commodifies its version of that past, turning it into a glossy surface to be pleasurably consumed.

That what the heritage film articulates is cultural memory might be confirmed by noting its similarities with other modes of memory film—heritage films are “typically slow moving and episodic, avoiding the efficient and economic causal development of the classical film. The concern for character, place, atmosphere and milieu tends to be more pronounced than dramatic, goal-directed action.” But the politics of heritage cinema’s versions of cultural memory remain in question. If the identification of “alternative heritage films,” such as Lynne Ramsay’s Ratcatcher (1999) or Terence Davies’ trilogy (1976–83), set outside metropolitan centers and evoking working-class and regional cultural memories, leaves in place critiques of the mainstream heritage film as conservative spectacle, Raphael Samuel’s defense of heritage offers a more nuanced approach to these mainstream films, suggesting that denigratory criticism of heritage may be at best misguided and at worst blinkered and elitist. Critics of heritage accuse it, argues Samuel, of sanitizing the record of the past, while making it harmless and unthreatening in the present. “Heritage,” says Samuel, “has had a very bad press, and it is widely accused of wanting to commodify the past, and turn it into tourist kitsch.” But, he goes on to suggest—in terms that might serve, also, as correctives to the absolutism of Jameson’s critique of the nostalgia film—that historians too attempt to hold their readers’ attention by drawing on “vivid detail and thick description to offer images far clearer than any reality could be.” Yet while history still claims to tell the “unvarnished truth,” historians accuse heritage of passing off fabrication as the true picture of the past. Samuel emphasizes too, the “social condescension” embedded in critiques of heritage, suggesting, for instance, that “literary snobbery comes into play: the belief that only books are serious.” Critiques of heritage
may be influenced too, he goes on to suggest, by “a suspicion of the visual” that assumes that “artefacts, whether they appear as images on the television screen, or as ‘living history’ displays in the museums . . . are not only inferior to the written word but, being by their nature concerned with surface appearance only, irredeemably shallow.”34 To Samuel, the implication that such pleasures are almost by definition mindless, ought not to go unchallenged: “People don’t simply ‘consume’ images,” he concludes, “in the way, in which, say, they buy a bar of chocolate. As in any reading, they assimilate them as best they can to pre-existing images and narratives.”35 Here I want to stress the democratizing drive fuelling Samuel’s proposals concerning the cultural and political elitism embedded in critiques of heritage culture and its pleasures, since this is a theme that has been taken up in discussions concerning the politics and pleasures of the contemporary history film.

A group of films released in the waning years of the last century, and taking as their subject events of recent U.S. history, for instance, Oliver Stone’s Born on the Fourth of July (1989), Platoon (1986), Nixon (1995), and JFK (1991), and Robert Zemeckis’s Forrest Gump (1994), have all been characterized by elliptical, fragmented narratives, a mix of fact and fiction, and an emphasis on the lives of ordinary people. These films have more frequently been discussed in the context of history than of memory, and it is within this context that they have been associated with processes of democratization. Vivian Sobchack has argued that, far from signaling the “end of history,” today’s highly mediated world, in which events and their representation come to occupy almost simultaneous moments, produces a new awareness of “one’s comportment as an historical actor . . . a very real and consequential ‘readiness’ for history.”36 For Sobchack, this readiness for and democratization of history can be seen too in the contemporary history film’s focus on ordinary people and its address to a media-savvy audience that well understands TV, film, and digital media’s relations to “the happened.” For Sobchack, the new historical consciousness, of which the contemporary history film forms a part, promises “a vibrant connection of present to past and a sense of agency in the shaping of human events” as well as “a more active and reflective historical subject.”37 But if films such as JFK and Forrest Gump have been treated as contemporary history films, their elliptical narratives and their mixing of fact and fiction have been associated also with traumatic memory, producing rather different understandings of these films’ relation to memory, history, and audiences.

The idea of trauma cinema bears some relation to Benjamin’s writings on cinema and modern experience—an experience that Benjamin associated with the overwhelming shocks to the human sensorium meted out by the noise, speed, and inhumanity of mass production and city life. Drawing on Freud, Benjamin argues that the warding off of these shocks by consciousness had the effect of protecting against their traumatic effect while diminishing memory, since, on Freud’s account, “becoming conscious and leaving behind a memory trace are processes incompatible with each other within one and the same system.”38 As we have seen, for Benjamin, the cinema offered the potential to train human
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consciousness in its attempts to ward off higher and higher levels of shock. More recently, Hayden White’s seminal essay “The Modernist Event” described contemporary experience in terms that exceed those of Benjaminian shock. Laying stress on the impact of what he controversially terms “holocaustal” events, including the Holocaust itself, two world wars, and the great depression, White argued that the scale and complexity of these events confound humanity’s sense-making capacities, functioning “in the consciousness . . . exactly as infantile traumas are conceived to function in the psyche of neurotic individuals. . . . They cannot be simply forgotten . . . but neither can they be adequately remembered.” In the case of relatively recent events—White cites, for example, the explosion of NASA’s Challenger space shuttle in 1986—the sheer extent of, and manipulability of, their visual representations compounded these effects: “All that the ‘morphing’ technology used to re-present the event provided was a sense of its evanescence. It appeared impossible to tell any single authoritative story about what really happened—which meant that one could tell any number of possible stories about it.”

White concludes that only the adequate representation of these events will loosen their traumatic hold, allowing them to be mourned and forgotten. Having cited Oliver Stone’s controversial film *JFK*—a work that blurs the distinction between fact and fiction and in which a catastrophic event “intrude[s] on linear narrative and disturb[s] realist representation”—White concludes that strategies such as these, indebted as they are to their modernist literary forebears, offer precisely this potential. On White’s account, the incomprehensibility and “unbelievability” of traumatic events confound their integration into preexisting images and stories; hence trauma cannot be integrated into memory. But modernist trauma cinema, while refusing the fetishistic illusion of mastery of the event, ushers in the possibility of representing that which had hitherto confounded representation, allowing mourning, remembrance, and even, perhaps, forgetting.

Contemporary theories of trauma cinema continue that modern tradition within which the media—and cinema in particular—come to be understood as a substitute, supplement, or support for modern memory’s atrophy, failure, or vicissitudes. In this new area of film theory, much remains to be thought through. White, joined by much of the writing that has informed theories of trauma and film to date, proposes that it is the shocking nature of events that renders them inassimilable and that causes the symptoms associated with trauma’s disturbance of normal memory. However, other psychoanalytic understandings of trauma focus on the interface between events and the preexisting psychological “landscapes” through which those events are mediated. The latter approach would call on film theory to develop modes of analysis better able to engage with questions of the spectatorship of trauma films, including the range of spectator positions they make available and the diverse ways in which trauma films have been, or might be, read by different audiences. Though writings on heritage, nostalgia, and trauma films all approach cinema as a mode of memory, it is also noticeable that in discussions of trauma and film, and under the influence of a broader ethical turn within humanities scholarship, the
question of how cinema might prove adequate to the remembrance and mourning of traumatic experiences has supplanted that focus on the politics of memory that drives much of the criticism of nostalgia and heritage films. That these approaches need not be regarded as incommensurate may have been demonstrated for us already in Benjamin’s prefigurative writings.

Commentaries on trauma and film propose that trauma films have the potential to provide a cultural “working through” of traumatic memories—that they might enable some remembrance of events that, due to their shocking nature, have left only scars rather than memories. Though trauma theory—much of it produced in the U.S.—has yet to make this explicit, its focus falls, in the main, on events—the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the Vietnam war, 9/11—that have occurred during the lifetimes of recent generations of U.S. film audiences. The theorization of cinema as substitute or supplement to memory reaches its zenith, however, with the introduction of the concept of prosthetic memory. Alison Landsberg has mobilized the concept of prosthetic memory to argue that the cinema has the capacity to implant memories of events unexperienced by audiences and previously unknown to them.45 Theorists of cinema as prosthetic memory take as their starting point theories of early cinema as a cinema of attractions46 and theories of cinema as an embodied experience,47 work that posits cinema not as representation, but as an experience that fully and directly engages the body and its feelings or affects. Theories of cinema as prosthetic memory build too on cybertheory’s accounts of technology’s dissolving of the borders between humans and their electronic, digital, and media “enhancements.”48 Theories of cinema as prosthetic memory propose that the experience of spectating certain kinds of films is indistinguishable from lived experience and has the potential to create long-lasting “memories” with the capacity to remould identity.

That theories of “prosthetic” memory need not be related only to mass-mediated experiences has been demonstrated by the philosopher Bernard Stiegler, whose writings on technics ought not to be confused with theories only of film and prosthetic memory, since, as Ben Roberts explains, for Stiegler, human history in its entirety has occurred “in the realm of . . . technical evolution . . . in which it is impossible to separate the living being from its external prosthetic technical support.”49 Though Stiegler views the emergence of cinema as marking “a distinctive shift in the history”50 of memory’s exteriorization, on Stiegler’s account, “cinema simply partakes in the history of mnemotechnics or the ‘exteriorization of memory’ from primitive tools through writing to analogue and digital recording.”51 For Stiegler, then, the industrialization of memory consequent upon the invention of cinema and other mass media “is not a transformation in the relationship between technology and culture or between technology and the individual imagination but a transformation in the technology of memory itself.”52 For theorists of film and prosthetic memory, on the other hand, the cinema’s capacity to transmit memories comes to be understood precisely in relation to a potentially revolutionary transformation of
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culture and of the individual imagination. Once posited, this transformation has been welcomed and greeted with trepidation. While acknowledging that memories may always have been “prosthetic,” Landsberg’s somewhat utopian vision builds on the ways in which cinema audiences may feel emotionally “possessed” by a character long after a film has ended, proposing that this might enable a new, enduring, and politically progressive capacity to identify across social differences, including those of ethnicity and class. In problematizing oppositions between authentic and false memories, and between real and virtual experience, theories of cinema and prosthetic memory usher in a world in which prosthetic memories can enhance understanding of others, building empathic alliances across difference. But the implantation of memory by cinema is a scenario that may lend itself to darker interpretation. Writing uncharacteristically polemically of the impact of certain films upon popular memory, Michel Foucault proposed that cinema constituted one of “a whole number of apparatuses . . . set up . . . to obstruct the flow of this popular memory.” “Today,” he continued,

cheap books aren’t enough. There are much more effective means like television and the cinema. And I believe that this was one way of reprogramming popular memory, which existed but had no way of expressing itself. So people are shown not what they were, but what they must remember having been.53

In terms reminiscent of the Frankfurt School’s warnings concerning the mass media, Foucault proposes here that the cinema as agent of the ruling powers might overlay popular memories with false ones. In Robert Burgoyne’s similarly dystopian vision, the film Forrest Gump is understood to reprogram memory “in such a way that the political and social ruptures of the sixties can be reclaimed as sites of national identification.”54 Whether viewed with optimism or fear, theories of cinematic prosthetic memory promulgate the view that cinema can implant memories of the unexperienced, or reprogram existing memories. These theories imbue the cinema with remarkable powers without offering full explanations of the processes by which cinematic prosthetic memories come to be integrated into the memories of spectators. Prosthetic memory models the cinema–memory relation as one in which cinema implants memories into passive spectators, but this takes no account of the spectator’s negotiation of images. The assumption by theories of cinematic prosthetic memory of an equivalence between spectating a cinematic experience and living through an experience dissolves the distinction between representation and event. By adopting this perspective and by imbuing the cinema with immense powers to transform identity by transforming memory, theories of prosthetic memory forget film theory’s earlier theorizations of cinema spectatorship and of the complex interplay between text and spectator. In short, by proposing that memories originating in film make their way seamlessly into the minds of spectators, theories of cinematic prosthetic memory offer a one-way account of prosthetic memory.

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But there is an approach to the cinema and memory that weds a complex understanding of the spectatorship of films, and of the inner worlds into which films become integrated, to a full analysis of films and their complex webs of meaning, allusion, and affect. Analyses of cinema/memory demonstrate that what we take to be personal memories are informed by cinema images. But the ways that these images are remembered and become woven into the texture of identity/memory is as much a question of the history of individual subjects as it is a question of films themselves. In theories of cinema/memory, one-way theorizations that conceive of cinema as that which programs, substitutes for, or supplements memory become transformed into a fully two-way exchange.

Cinema/Memory

So far we have seen that memory has been conceived of by recourse to the cinema and that the cinema has been conceived of as a mode of memory. But more recently, film theorists have begun to conceive of the cinema/memory relation in new ways. Theorists such as Annette Kuhn and Victor Burgin have explored the transitional or hybrid world of what I’m calling “cinema/memory.” This is a world constituted of images, sequences, and their associated affects. Situated within the mind, yet positioned between the personal and the cultural, cinema/memory melds images remembered from the cinema with the inner world’s constitutive “scenes” or scenarios. Such recent accounts of the cinema–memory relation do not merely mobilize conceptions of memory and its processes in order to deepen our understanding of the cinema, nor do they simply illuminate memory by recourse to understandings of the cinema. In place of formulations that give primacy to the cinema or to memory, what emerges is a liminal conception of cinema/memory, where the boundaries between memory and cinema are dissolved in favor of a view of their mutuality and inseparability. By exploring the world of cinema/memory, this strand of film theory dissolves conceptual boundaries between the inside and the outside, the personal and the social, the individual and the cultural, and the true and the false. Burgin’s and Kuhn’s explorations both take the form of what Kuhn has elsewhere called “memory work”—a practice that uses critical analysis of one’s own memories to produce deeper understandings of identity’s complex relation to culture and the media.55

Investigations of cinema/memory seek answers to the question, “What binds together images and sounds in personal memory with images and sounds in collective memory?”56 The explorations advanced by Burgin and Kuhn of cinema/memory are differently nuanced and follow different paths. Though their investigations move in opposite directions—remembered film images forming a prompt for Burgin’s journey and an ending of sorts to Kuhn’s voyage through her own reveries—both suggest that the process that binds together the personal and the collective constitutes the inner world’s psychical mediation of cinema.
Burgin’s quest to understand the compelling nature of certain remembered film images uses psychoanalysis to explore a chain of associations that lead from the affects aroused by those remembered images back to his earliest psychical fantasies. For Burgin, then, these remembered film images constitute “screen memories” (as Freud had called them)—memories “that come . . . to mind in place of, and in order to conceal, an associated but repressed memory.” Noting that sociologists have found “an almost universal tendency for personal history to be mixed with recollections of scenes from films and other media productions,” and drawing on the psychoanalytic ideas of D. W. Winnicott and his own self-analysis, Burgin concludes that the inner landscape within which fantasies are bound together with scenes and images spectated at the cinema constitutes the “location of cultural experience.” Explorations of cinema/memory such as Burgin’s reveal the processes binding inner and outer worlds, “experience” and “culture.” But in place of the overtly public-political perspectives that have driven critiques of nostalgia films or heritage films, for example, explorations of cinema/memory offer “micro” portraits of culture’s most intimate locations. Burgin himself expresses some unease about his own shift from film theory’s “study of the ways in which films . . . contribute to the formation, perpetuation and dissemination of dominant systems of commonly held beliefs and values” to the study of “whatever irreducibly subjective meanings an image might have for this or that individual.” Responding to his own unease, Burgin concludes by proposing that what he finds at the end of his own analysis has a universal resonance: “the mise-en-scène of a riddle we must all answer at one point or another . . . : the enigma of sexual difference.”

But perhaps analyses of cinema/memory can and do move beyond the apparent universalism and ahistoricism of Burgin’s conclusion, for in her analyses of her own daytime reveries and their associations with certain film images, Kuhn reveals cinema/memory’s binding of individuals with a national imaginary and with place. This binding turns out to be very much a two-way affair. Beginning with her own daytime reveries while walking through London streets, Kuhn traces certain of her reverie-images back to two films—Humphrey Jennings and Stuart McAllister’s moving wartime documentary *Listen to Britain* (1942), and Derek Jarman’s powerful and angry attack on the ravages wrought by Thatcherite politics upon Britain, *The Last of England* (1988). Kuhn notes that both these films make “shorthand allusion to the mythopoesis of a particular national imaginary.” The attunement of these films’ aesthetics and sensibility to those of memory’s inner worlds suggests, perhaps, that their evocations of memory may render them particularly assimilable with reverie’s inner landscapes. Kuhn’s central exploration, or “memory work” demonstrates how her own daydream images or “reveries” allude to yet transform images from remembered films. Kuhn reveals how, by means of psychical processes of condensation and displacement, images from these two films become integrated, in modified form, with those “scenes” that constitute our inner worlds. Kuhn demonstrates, for instance, how, under the sway of fantasies including Freud’s “family romance” and
“primal scene fantasy,”66 she produces reveries that are intimately associated with these remembered films:

What my two stories have in common above all is that in both I am placing myself firmly in the centre of the frame. . . . It is not difficult to grasp the desire behind the Listen to Britain reverie, which is very much a primal scene fantasy. Part of its intense pleasure must surely lie in its affirmation that I belong in this place where I am standing, that this place belongs to me and, above all, that my attachment to it reaches back to a time before I was born. . . . In my fantasy, I cast myself as a witness of, and participant in, a moment when the most ordinary of activities . . . become imbued with an aura of transcendence. . . . My reverie then combines a primal fantasy with a host of other fascinations (with the recent past, with recent war, with a family romance); and sets these into imaginings in which a sense of place, a sense of belonging to a place, are central.67

This exploration of cinema/memory as “cultural experience” illuminates the intimate and “micro” processes through which subjectivity binds itself with culture, place, and nation, while noting also how these processes may be prompted or facilitated by films that share in the aesthetics, languages, and textures of memory.

Future Directions

Explorations of cinema/memory such as Kuhn’s68 produce intimate and forensic accounts of certain common yet unique processes by which cinema images become bound with, and are remembered through, scenes already constitutive of the inner world. Research in the area of what I’ve called cinema/memory unpicks a particular set of relations between cinema, memory, and spectatorship, revealing both the usefulness and the limitations of terms such as “personal” and “public” memory. Though Burgin expressed concern that his research on cinema/memory focused only on “irreducibly subjective meanings,”69 cinema/memories prove to be composites and condensations, belonging wholly neither to the public world of the cinema nor to the personal and interior realm of fantasy. In this sense, cinema/memory, with its binding together of images assimilated from cinema with the psyche’s currency of “scenes,” serves to highlight the fact that memory is never straightforwardly or irreducibly subjective. At the same time, cinema/memory research reveals the limitations of studies of memory cinema, including heritage, nostalgia, and trauma films, for such largely text-based analyses tell only part of the story, lacking the capacity to reveal fully how such films might mesh with and be assimilated with the intricacies of psychical scenes and preexisting images. But telling part of the story is not without value, particularly where we can hold in mind that the story we are telling is only
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part of a more complex picture in need of further exploration. In that spirit, I want to end this chapter by returning from cinema/memory’s micro-focus on exchanges between the psychical and the public to questions more easily recognizable, perhaps, as those of the politics of memory and the cinema.

As we have seen, Kuhn’s journey through cinema/memory led her to two films—Jennings and McAllister’s Listen to Britain and Jarman’s The Last of England—both of which allude, Kuhn notes, to “the mythopoesis of a particular national imaginary.” These two films evoke, however, very differently nuanced versions of nation. Listen to Britain constructs national life—evoked through soundscapes, in particular—as enduring under enemy fire, while The Last of England comprises a welter of scenes of terrible devastation and violence wrought by the nation—and one government in particular—on parts of itself. In their essay on cognition and memory in this volume, John Sutton, Celia Harris and Amanda Barnier argue that the interpersonal dimensions of memory’s emergence support social practices, including promising and forgiving, and complex emotions, including grief, love, and regret. I’d like to take up that insight, extending its reach from the developmental and the familial to the field of culture and cinema, in order to suggest some areas for future research. Taking its lead from the directions followed by memory research in the humanities more generally, much of the research on cinema as memory that has emerged since the 1990s has focused particularly on cinema’s relation to national catastrophe, victimhood and trauma, leaving unexplored cinema’s relation to a fuller range of memory’s interpersonal and public dimensions and the social practices that these might facilitate, support, or inhibit. If Listen to Britain might lend itself to analysis in the context of national suffering and trauma, The Last of England, while associated also with the devastation of aspects of England, evokes national memory to quite different effect, for this is a film that mourns losses associated with self-inflicted violence, in the form of the damage wreaked by Thatcherism upon its own nation. Staying with this theme of intra-national violence, I want to conclude this chapter with some thoughts about the role of cinema in the public remembrance of such violence. How exactly does the cinema “remember” such a past?

These are questions that can be answered only in the specific and in the local. Rabbit-Proof Fence (Philip Noyce, 2002) evoked the great disturbances and sorrows caused by the forced removal of thousands of Aboriginal children from their families by the Australian authorities between 1900 and 1970. Told through the true story of three sisters who escaped from the state home in which they had been placed, traveling over two thousand miles along the titular fence back to their own country, the film brought “this epic journey to public attention.” Prompted by and responding to Bringing Them Home (1997), the controversial national inquiry into what became known as the “stolen generations,” Rabbit-Proof Fence’s mainstream popularity made it a huge success at the Australian box office. The success of this film elicits all manner of questions—about how, exactly, films can be said to “recover” such memories, about their address to spectators, about how
such films are viewed by specific audiences, and about the role of such films in the broader public and political negotiation of the past and construction of the future.

As Felicity Collins and Therese Davis explain, *Rabbit-Proof Fence*’s generic hybridity—its complex melding of familiar Hollywood and Australian cultural and cinematic genres, plots, and narratives—arguably contributed greatly to the film’s resonance for, and its capacity to move, its Australian audience. Collins and Davis identify *Rabbit-Proof Fence*’s mixing of elements of Hollywood genres, including the maternal melodrama, the adventure and the chase film, the romance-quest, and the political-historical drama. These elements, they go on to show, are orchestrated with the Australian theme of the “lost child”—“a recurrent theme in the Australian cultural tradition.”74 This is a theme, Collins and Davis explain, that has traditionally spoken to European settler anxieties associated with life in an unknown land far from home. But, Collins and Davis propose, the settler “lost child” theme may also have allowed for some recognition—though only on settler culture’s terms—of the history of child separation, so that “at some level of the Australian social imaginary, ‘the Aborigine’ may still be seen as the ‘lost child.’”75 Yet in *Rabbit-Proof Fence*, Collins and Davis conclude, the “lost child” theme is made to speak otherwise than of an infantilized, landless people: it is embodied in “the image of Molly emerging from the desert, both as a child and later as a grown woman . . . demanding recognition of Aboriginal people as being at home in their country.”76

Collins and Davis’s analysis of *Rabbit-Proof Fence* suggests that it would not be quite accurate to propose simply that the separation of Aboriginal children from their mothers constituted an aspect of the past that, until the release of the *Bringing Them Home* report, settler Australia had preferred, on the whole, to forget—a history whose telling was “long overdue.”77 Instead, what emerges is that the motif of the lost child had already provided one problematic way of remembering that past—a way of remembering that was arguably revised by *Rabbit-Proof Fence*. What is at stake here, then, is how images become articulated with preexisting images and narratives, the resonances of which—as we have seen above—remain to some degree open. The terms upon which the renegotiation of elements of the social imaginary—the revising of memory—takes place are, however, immensely complex. I have drawn on Collins and Davis’s analysis of *Rabbit-Proof Fence* in order to demonstrate how film theory has explored the cinema’s specific role in the rearticulation of cultural memory in the public sphere. As we have seen, this rearticulation is orchestrated through form, genre, narrative, address, and plot. Of import too are the relations between the institutions and authorities of the public sphere—which extend, in the case of the renegotiation of these Australian memories, as Collins and Davis show, to the spheres of the state and to the institutions of public opinion, as well as to the cinema.

But also important is the historico-political moment, which provides the germinating soil, so to speak, from which films, and other cultural forms grow. *Rabbit-Proof Fence* emerged after the Australian High Court’s 1992 *Mabo* decision, which recognized the property rights of Australia’s Indigenous peoples, and in the wake of the *Bringing Them*
Home report, but before the new Australian Labor Party Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, delivered a historic speech, “Apology to Australia’s Indigenous Peoples,” at Parliament House, Canberra, on February 13, 2008. While the report, the Mabo decision, the film, and the speech have all played their part in the renegotiation of national memory in the public sphere, the precise articulations between these very different sites remain to be explored. Earlier, I made reference to Sutton, Harris, and Barnier’s proposal in this volume that complex emotions and social practices are supported by memory’s interpersonal dimensions. This proposal might be extended to embrace memory’s national, political, and cultural dimensions, including, for our present purposes, the cinema and specific films. Films such as Rabbit-Proof Fence may play a part in supporting revisions of interpersonal memory linked to grief and regret and producing specific social practices—in this case, new recognitions of the rights of Indigenous people, an apology speech, and changes in government policy. But this suggestion remains highly speculative, for research on cinema and memory has yet to—and would perhaps be hard pressed to—develop methodologies and projects that might fully test that hypothesis.

I have chosen to end this discussion of cinema and memory by shifting perspective from the intimate terrain of cinema/memory toward larger questions of the cinema’s role in the revision of a nation’s cultural memory. But in making this shift I have spoken in the singular, of a political and historical moment, of a national cultural imaginary, and of cultural memory. Yet, as my discussion of cinema/memory has already shown, those singular terms screen as much as they reveal. Though films and their constituent scenes may articulate with commonly recurring psychical fantasies including the family romance and the primal scene, as well as with more culturally and nationally nuanced themes such as that of the “lost child,” those articulations take place on terrain differentiated by individual and cultural histories. But as I hope I’ve also indicated, I don’t think this should lead film or cultural theory to abandon its quests to map the relations between politics, culture, and memory—though it should encourage us to temper our findings with an awareness of the diversity of the terrain we attempt to map and the need to research as closely to the ground as possible.

This chapter has surveyed the field of cinema and memory research to date, but there is much ground still to cover, from the field of global media relations to the intimate terrain of spectators and their psychical and affective relations to the cinema as memory. The cinema is but one aspect of an “intermedial” field of cultural memory that extends to literature, photography, television, digital media, and beyond, articulating with public discourses and domains of many kinds, as well as becoming assimilated within the hybrid scenes of our inner worlds. Research has yet to focus fully on the articulation of memory across media—on how memory “travels,” as it were, between different media, as well as across and between diverse public institutions and sites. Future research might focus too on the ways in which cinema memory travels across and between nations, asking how the
consuming national memories evoked, revised, and negotiated by films such as *Rabbit-Proof Fence* or *The Last of England* might be consumed differently across national divides, as well as by different audiences within any single nation. Questions of cinema memory’s journeys across spatial and national borders connect too with issues of time—with the question, that is, of how cinema memories travel across time and between one historical moment and the next. Meanwhile, studies of cinema/memory such as those discussed in this chapter have transformed understandings of the relations between our inner worlds and our media experiences, so that spaces once imagined as separated—albeit by a porous membrane—now emerge as transitional space. But how these insights might be brought to bear on broader questions of the politics of cinema memory in the public, cultural, and national spheres and vice versa? These are the questions that remain very much open to future study.
Introduction

In the age of sampling, chronology is twisted from a straight line into a loop. Cybernetic memories are plucked out of history, stored in machine banks, to be potentially mutated, then reassembled in any combination rhythmically. Digitally coded events leave sensory residue across distributed networks of body-machines. Memories are transgenetically transported across species and scales; biological programming becomes folded into unintended host bodies in a mnemonic symbiosis: layers of memory stratified into a machinery of achronological time.

The evolution of capitalism is marked by the technological development of human history. The idea that this evolution will result in homeostatic equilibrium (the tendency of progress toward a balanced end point or culmination of civilization) implodes and can no longer be maintained. In a schizophrenic disjunction, mnemotechnic capital, the packaging of memory into technical objects and their subsequent valorization, decodes and recodes personal biography and cultural history into memory implants, interchangeable commodified machine parts, exchangeable for money, while simultaneously erecting the dreary procession of monuments, commemorations, and memorials into the architecture of the mediatic city.

We want to argue for a postcybernetic conception of memory that questions the assumptions underlying the mnemotechnics of new media cultures. Human memory has now been externalized into ubiquitous networks and distributed digital storage devices. Memory has become prosthetic, a neuro-extension that can be archived via uploading and readily accessed via downloading. General memory capacity appears therefore to have been increased like computer memory; it can be moved, erased, recombined, and upgraded. While we agree that the
intervention of cybernetic technologies, both analog and digital devices working via feedback loops and binary codes, have produced a significant juncture in the relationship between culture and nature, technology and biology, we will seek to problematize the key ideas that inform critical approaches to this nexus.

We will point to a number of problems. First, we question the notion of technology as an extension of man (as, for instance, in the McLuhanist legacy). In such accounts, technologies operate on the sensory capacities of a body by amputating physiological functions via technological enhancements. For example, much has been written regarding the video camera as an extension of visual perception, which transforms the transitory image on the retina and its memory trace into a recorded image. Amputation here mutates the organ from being merely an access point to the outside world, into a port in a technological circuit. In the videotape, memory becomes a physical recording, amputating visual memory and installing it in the limited-to-storage space of tape library.

More recently, with the emergence of digital media, the outward explosion of media in prosthetics has been superseded by the implosion of information into neural networks. Theorists such as Friedrich Kittler emphasize that all media are information systems and that the computer is able to produce a mediatic environment, a matrix of information that goes beyond the mere prosthetic extension of specific organs.1 The computer transforms the physically stored media recording into databases where memories can be retrieved with the touch of a button: in Paul Verhoeven’s film Total Recall (1990), inspired by the Philip K. Dick story “We Can Remember It for You Wholesale,” purchasable digital implants serve as memories of vacations only virtually experienced.

Most technocultural theories of memory take as an explicit or implicit starting point the insights of the science of cybernetics, where information systems cut across humans, animals, and machines. Our focus on machines of memory, however, places such technologies within a broader environment. Machines for us are dynamic environments or ecologies that can be composed of technical, social, and biological components. Such machinic ecologies are more than the sum of their component parts—the machinic in fact refers to the relation between the parts, which, we argue, must be treated as real, that is, autonomous, productive, and in contact with what is yet to come, what is not yet part of the system, its outside. Therefore, rather than imagine a cybernetic archive of the past, we argue by way of an engagement with the nonlinear temporalities of media that new technologies have realigned the archive away from merely storing or reconstructing the past of human experience, so that it becomes something that anticipates change, anticipates the not yet experienced. From the archive of the past, then, to a conception of memory or an archive of the future: This, we argue, takes us toward a postcybernetic conception of memory.

The following will investigate this apparently anomalous archive of the future, made possible by recent developments in new media technologies. It seems paradoxical to ask whether we can technologically archive an event which has not yet happened. Intrinsic to
the definition of the archive as a repository of stored memories is some basic sense of past-hood, time dissolved but recorded in some container, receptacle, or surface. Yet this paradox functions, we suggest, to hack some of the key programs of contemporary capital, which constantly packages sensations and perceptions into a real yet virtual presence. What we mean here is the way in which capital packages possibilities of experience, using becoming other or feeling other to promote consumption. Branding, for example, operates by producing perceptions of possibility, memories of what you can potentially experience to encourage expenditure. Similarly, this paradox is at work within the discourse of digital media production; the database compresses memories into codes and operates as a field of possibilities that feeds back on the production process. For instance, the media samples (for instance, recorded audiovisual memories) that are encoded in digital databases demarcate the field of possible designs. While stored as codes, these media samples are said not to have a physical presence but nevertheless, as possible content, they have a virtual influence on the process of production. For us, however, virtual memory exceeds the delimited field of possibilities of the digital. In this chapter, we will develop a postcybernetic conception of the virtual in relation to machines of memory.

Ubiquitous computation, by stringing together distributed digital storage devices across the planet, has meant that technical machines have increasingly become receptacles for human memory. The designed environment, with its ports and connections, mobile devices and wireless networks, hubs and hotspots, has become a mnemonic ecology. In this ecology, information saturation and sensory overload are the norm—and a symptom is the generalized condition of time anomaly, generated by the swirling weather system of looped media. This has been referred to as the sphere of prosthetic memory, which leads some to controversially suggest that in evolutionary terms, machines are currently acquiring human memory in nonhuman, technical networks. Is this merely the extraction by capital of surplus value of bodily potentials, whereby every extension of the human nervous system becomes an investment for the increased efficiency of the system, technologically freeing up memory to leave more time for consumption? (Free your memory space, deliver your thoughts to the archives—data banks—and save your life in insurance policies so that you can be whatever you want to be now?) Despite its apparent success, such a model only scratches the surface in explaining how capital abducts memory. The symptom of this process, and the info-sensory overload it facilitates may lie behind the generalized proclivity toward distraction and attention deficit disorder, which are said to have become the cultural norm of late capitalist media networks, rather than a mere psychopathology. As William Bogard argues, distraction “removes you, takes you away, ‘subtracts’ you from your surroundings.” From the actual present, you are abducted and immersed into a technological environment of recorded audiovisual memories that demands a constant shift of attention. What is being capitalized is the gap between short-term and long-term memory, between moments of attention in such environments; that is, what capital recognizes is not each memory itself but the movement across memories.
Accompanying this ecology of media memory is the contemporary consolidation of preemptive power, where an attempt is made to populate and modulate that which has not yet happened by actualizing events instead of merely warding them off. This mode of power raises questions about accepted views of the linear relation between past and future and the complex unfolding of the present. For preemptive technocapital, an archive, a repository of stored memories of the future, is not just some predictive simulation but rather an investment in future feedback, an investment by intuitive anticipation.

Branding serves as an example of this mode of preemptive power in its active production of memories of the future—memories that you haven’t had yet, despite their sense of familiarity. Branding generates an atmosphere of time anomalies crowding the media ecologies. Branding in this mode operates on the body by producing a feeling of virtual experience, one that has not yet happened as past. In its infinite differentiation of product ranges, branding plays with a combination of familiarity plus unfamiliarity, a *past-futurity*. Branding installs the memory of virtual experiences in order to produce a certain receptivity to brand triggers. No longer relying on lived bodily experience—physical sensuous feeling—brand memory implantation operates through the body remembering a virtual sensation. The remembrance is activated by the power of suggestion whereby the body, in being seduced, anticipates, precipitates, and propels a movement: the suggestion produces the memory. In short-term intuition, the future yet to be formed is actively populating the sensations of the present, anticipating what is to come, feeling what happens before its actualization.

In mnemonic dimensions of contemporary technoculture, a postcybernetic thought of nonlinear time broadens the narrow concerns with identity, biography, and history that demarcate the cultural study of memory. First, with cybernetics, human memory becomes wired up to the memory of technical machines. Here modes of storage and retrieval are entangled with a system’s capacities of learning and interaction, modifying the notion of finite memory. Second, the “science” of memetics brings evolutionary approaches to the study of cultural and genetic memory. Converging with contemporary neuroscience, recent memetic theory suggests that memory is not located in the brain, but distributed in the gaps of neural networks, in the brain’s synaptic plasticity. Finally, Bergson’s and Whitehead’s theories of virtuality and immediate time, we argue, open the concept of memory to the notion of cosmology, the ontology of the nonliving, beyond the extension of human memory into technical machines.

No longer can memory be restricted to the psychological, even when expanded to include a whole culture or collective unconscious, nor to the finite storage systems of hardware. Rather, we need a machinic conception of memory to argue that an exclusive focus on either technological or human memory remains inadequate. Instead our concern is with the affective and its relations to memory and the virtual, processes intensified by current media ecologies of connection, transmission, and transformation. We engage with
such processes to investigate further how the mnemotechnics of capital modulate desiring futurity.

**Cybernetic Memory**

To understand the impact of new technologies on memory, it is important to revisit their conceptual origins in early cybernetic science. Cybernetics, the science of communication and control of information in humans and machines, revealed that a linear conception of time was problematic in understanding how all physical systems, both living and nonliving, are able to learn, that is, to record, store, and retrieve information. Cyberneticist Norbert Wiener argued, for instance, citing the invention of learning machines—machines whose past preprogramming did not completely determine their future behavior—that it was misleading to rely on a Newtonian notion of time. Cause and effect could no longer be mapped into a linear relation between the past and the future. Wiener noted, following the work of physicists J. W. Gibbs, Ludwig Boltzmann and Robert Brown’s theory of motion, that the intervention of contingency, random motion, and statistical probabilities rendered future events uncertain.

For cybernetic systems to learn and adapt, they need to store information regarding their environment in a memory databank, a sort of black box regulated by feedbacks, where information, once inputted into the system, can be stocked up and later retrieved or recollected. Each new input that enters the system pushes it toward its storing capacity, risking a systemic overload. The storing capacity or memory of a system, living or nonliving, is related to a computing problem that has been addressed in different ways during what have been defined as the first and the second waves of cybernetics. During the “first wave,” memory was understood in terms of devices common to both humans and computers that encode, store, and retrieve information. When Alan Turing devised a machine able to compute information that passes it on a tape as a set of finite symbols (0, 1, or blank), it became apparent that mental processes were not just notes of instruction that could be emulated by logical machinery. Expanding on the work of Turing, John von Neumann claimed that memory capacity was shared by both computing machines (artificial automata) and the nervous system. Memory was a subassembly of the nervous system and could be converted from analog wave into digital bits: “A memory can retain a certain maximum amount of information, and information can always be converted into an aggregation of binary digits, ‘bits.’”

Yet these studies of the physical embodiment of memory in the nervous system suggested that memory had no definite location. Von Neumann argued that there were many parts of the nervous system, for example genetic material (DNA, RNA) and chemicals (hormones), that themselves worked as memories. The operation of these memory subsystems was controlled by nerve cells that enabled the flip-flops or switchings of the nervous system between one state and another, similar to how transistors or any high-speed
electronic technology select and control the flow of information and energy. Memory storage, then, depended on the nerve cells, which stirred the input-output of information in different parts of the nervous system. Thus, on this account, there was no true forgetting in the nervous system, since impressions, once received, could be removed from the center of attention, but never truly erased.

The study of mental processes involved in memory and learning acquired a more central focus in the works of cybernetician Gregory Bateson, who claimed that a mental process is always a sequence of interactions between parts. In a cybernetic system, each signal traveling through the information loops will also carry messages concerning the behavior of the whole system. Each message was at the same time a systemic memory, a recording of previous states of the system. The system could learn and remember: “it will build up negentropy and it will do so by the playing of stochastic games, called empiricism or trial and error.” Learning in this way implies that a system complexifies by turning energy into information. For Bateson, the mind was not a cybernetic black box, regulated by input–output encoding loops that maintain a constant negative feedback toward homeostatic balance. Rather, Bateson argued that learning occurred through trial and error, and he therefore defined mental states as open to positive feedback and modifications. On this account, the mind did not passively register information from the environment, but actively entered into transformative interactions with it. Bateson’s work marks an important turn in cybernetic theory from the first to the second wave.

Following Bateson, the second wave of cybernetics suggested that living systems were autopoietic (self-creating) as opposed to nonliving or allopoietic (non-self-created)—and were anything but passive recorders of incoming data. According to Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, “the nervous system does not pick up information from the environment. . . . On the contrary, it brings forth a world by specifying what patterns of the environment are perturbations and what changes trigger them in the organism.” The nervous system was considered as a unity, a closed network of changes triggered by the activity between its components. Closed, self-referencing systems could still interact with their external environment, but only by producing representations of the outside in a neural map.

Maturana and Varela’s so called “radical constructivism” implied that the cognitive apparatus constructed its reality without knowing that these inputs came from the sensory surface of the system (living or nonliving). In other words, sensory input could not be clearly distinguished from any other nervous signal by the cognitive apparatus. This meant that the source of sensory signals could only be recognized after, a posteriori. Thus, memory did not at all consist in the retrieval of stored sensory information. Memory did not stock up external and internal data. Rather, according to Alexander Reigler, the function of memory was to compress sequences of constructed cognitive patterns into compounds that could be readily accessed afterward, ultimately serving as inputs for cognition. Thus radical constructivism
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brought together cognition and memory. Memory could not be compared to a static snapshot in isolation from the evolution of knowledge. It was rather implicated in cognitive processes. This relation between memory and cognition was central to the second wave of cybernetics and has therefore been crucial to the design of information technologies and systems such as consumer profiling databases that transform information into useful knowledge. For example, Amazon.com not only remembers your previous purchases as a pattern of information, but has also learned to suggest future purchases, by converting this data into knowledge by cross-referencing the data profiles of other users.

Contagious Memories

The field of memetics (a theory of cultural evolution) has further developed some of these cybernetic concerns with memory relevant to new media culture. The memeticist Aaron Lynch has pointed out that cultural evolution emerges from differences in the transmissivity, receptivity, and longevity of memes, the informational units of culture, suggesting that “classical” social sciences have neglected transmissivity and longevity in favor of receptivity. An important insight of the memetic approach to culture was that memory need not inhabit the human brain but could be instantiated in physical objects or recording media, distributing memory across cultural networks. And while meme theory has a number of limitations, its utility in the context of new media network ecologies is still notable. As Matt Fuller has pointed out, “it is inherently collectivist . . . it sees the individual operator in culture as a nodal point, not a totality.”

The central concept in memetics was the meme, a concept coined by Richard Dawkins in his infamous text *The Selfish Gene*. Describing the spread of certain beliefs as “viruses of the mind,” Dawkins wrote that the meme was to cultural evolution as the gene was to biological evolution, a basic building block, a unit of transmission of cultural memory in an epidemiological field of minds. To host a meme was therefore to store it in memory. The key claim of the memeticists was that culture was affected by the abstract principles of evolution: selection, variation, adaptation, which constituted what Daniel Dennett called an evolutionary algorithm, an evolving set of rules or repeated instructions.

Thus memes are a subspecies of the broader category of cultural replicators. In passing both inside and outside of brains, the meme is unique in that it is spread by a process of imitation, for example, humming a tune from an ad. Imitation, with or without mutation, is the evolutionary process of copying, depending on the fidelity, fecundity, and longevity of the replicators. Mutation and selection here may intervene, due, for example, to media-specific degradations (for instance, the loss of fidelity in the repeated copying of copies by an analog photocopier), the imperfections of human memory or communication (forgetting, stuttering, and so forth), time of contact or exposure (for instance, the
length of an ad containing an earworm), speed of transmission (influenced, for example, by bandwidth), and limitations on storage “space,” (a problematic concept).

However, importing a hardware model of finite mnemonic storage space from early cybernetics into a memetic conception of memory remains problematic. In The Electric Meme, Robert Aunger argued that memes were essentially a specific subspecies of memory. Aunger compared the movement of memes with the movement of information patterns through the brain; when a particular skill becomes embedded as habit, “a meme may migrate through the brain as it goes from being a sensory stimulus to a short-term and then a long-term memory.”

For Aunger, the birth of memory involved the emergence of a set of specialized neurons that, unlike receptor and motor neurons, would fire only on certain types of input fed to them from other neurons; these were in a sense “inter-neurons” or connectors. He maintained that memories were distributed across neural networks and were therefore always relational. The exact process of this distributed memory storage was thought to vary, most importantly between long-term and short-term memory, and went straight to the heart of memetics’ primary raison d’être—the autonomy of cultural evolution from biological evolution, and in fact culture’s ability to adapt biology. Memetics attempted to break with the dominance of genetics, which had repelled cultural studies from most other varieties of social Darwinism.

In a suggestion crucial to understanding the varying functions of memory, Aunger maintained that the “primary difference between short-term and long-term memory is therefore the direct involvement of genes.” These memories were thought to be stored as variations in synaptic connections between neurons. These changes in the topology of the network could occur because new cells (networked nodes) or new connections between existing cells were added, thereby adjusting the physical wiring of the brain in relation to feedbacks from the environment. Requiring new cells or parts of cells, these storage systems related to more long-term memories. Finally, the plasticity of the synapses, that is, the microtemporally varying strength of the synaptic connections themselves was thought to relate more closely to short-term memory, which, as Aunger argued, functions “independent of new protein synthesis” and therefore defined a zone of relative autonomy from genetic interference.

For memetics, memory was stored not in brain cells themselves, but rather in the synaptic gaps of neural networks, adding cultural memory to genetic memory. Just as memetics emphasized the autonomy of cultural memory from genetic physicality, so recent neuroscientific research on the workings of memory has argued that if states of mind are not exactly in the head, it is because they are extended throughout the whole of the physical body and its environment. As Andy Clarke suggested, neuroscience has come to rethink the brain as extended outside the headspace. Mental states, including states of believing, are grounded in physical traces that remain firmly outside the head, in the body and the environment.
A step toward the notion of extended mind was initiated by research in the late 1980s and 1990s on autonomous agents. This research modeled the adaptive success of single, complete, embodied systems: insects that walk and seek food, cockroaches detecting and evading attackers, robots that learn to swing from branch to branch using real mechanical arms, etc.\textsuperscript{25}

An intimacy between brain, body, and world defined an extended adaptive system, where the mind was the activity of an essentially \textit{situated} brain: a brain at home in its proper bodily, cultural, and environmental niche. In this view, all kinds of external props and aids, such as laptops, filofaxes, texts, compasses, maps, slide rules, and so forth, par-took in the extended cognition of the mind, which acted to counterbalance the limitations of its basic biological system. As a result, memory and cognition depended on the mind’s expanding zones of interaction.

In a similar vein, neuroscientist Gerald Edelman argued that memory was not a content to be placed in the brain. Following William James, who described the “specious present” in which perceptual and memory systems interacted, Edelman called the ability to construct a conscious scene “the remembered present.”\textsuperscript{26} At each moment, the perception of the now interacted with the perception of the past. The past did not simply reduce the perception—now or present—to what it was. Rather, it was the now or present that was added to the past, producing a new perception of the past laid down in one’s neural groups. Edelman thus argued that memory was nonrepresentational. It had neither semantic nor syntactic properties. “Memory is more like the melting and refreezing of a glacier.”\textsuperscript{27} Instead of representation being stored in snapshots of the present, the fluidity of the passing present each time became solidified, compacting memory in new configurations. Here perception altered recollections, and recollections altered perception: fluctuating memories served not to store but to construct the present-past.

Most recently, loosely grouped under the heading of affective computing, interfaces have been developed to remember more than merely the information typed in at the keyboard but also, with the aid of sensors that detect micro-movements of facial muscles and heart rate, the emotional and physiological status of the user. Such developments have derived from the insights of scientists such as Antonio Damasio, who argued for a neurophysiological analysis of the interrelation between emotion and consciousness.\textsuperscript{28} While some feelings—pleasurable feelings, for example—optimized learning and recall, others—especially painful feelings—perturbed learning and suppressed recall.\textsuperscript{29} According to Damasio, this is because memory depended on the state of the affected body.\textsuperscript{30} Memory was not in the mind but in the emotional experience of the body. The linking of emotion with memory provided evolutionary advantages, since an affective experience of danger taught a person to recognize danger and thereby avoid it.\textsuperscript{31} The evolutionary advantage of emotional memories, therefore, lay more in the importance of foreseeing the future than of passively retrieving the past. Thus, what was stored was only the information necessary to reassemble the approximate record of the past and not a complete
record of physical and physiological data. What was stored was a trace, the affect of a memory trace. Each time the same event was remembered, the pattern of convergence between brain regions would be different, changed by a complex network of new emotional associations and experiences. Memories were emotional constructions of the present. In much the same way, biosensing media architectures have become increasingly responsive to the moods and movements of the user.

Virtual Memory

Whereas recent neuroscientific research has challenged the early cybernetic notion of memory as storage, highlighting the relation between memory and perception, the past and the present, these studies only partially assist with our problematic: To what extent can cybernetic technologies produce an archive of the future, an anticipative memory of what is yet to come? It may be argued that these neurocybernetic conceptions of memory are still too dependent on models of probabilities whereby the future remains a statistical calculation of past experience. In other words, the past remains a function of future-prediction, and the recalling of the past remains a constructive action of the present. For example, cellular phone operating systems regulate syntactic possibilities by predicting the text that is to be entered, what is yet to come, what is yet to be keyed into the phone, is only a probability derived from a preprogrammed past. Hence, the advent to come has already happened: in predictive text, there is no room for futurity or potentials for linguistic mutation.

Déjà vu

New media technologies, insofar as they create immersive environments networked to digital sample memory, have precipitated a condition whereby images and sounds from the non-present can reappear in any place or time, producing a kind of technologically enhanced déjà vu. In the age of remixing, this leads to more than the constant pastiche effect pointed to by theorists of postmodernism whereby nothing new can ever be created but only the past recycled—in other words, a world in which cultural memory is predestining. Rather, we suggest, in the mediatic attention/distraction economy, media technologies are constantly and unpredictably intervening in the gap between long-term and short-term memory. It is common now to falsely hear the familiarity of tones or falsely recognize apparently seen images. Rather than identify technologically stored cultural memory as predetermining, we propose a machinic ecology of memory where the past coexists as a potential of the present.

In contrast with the focus of second-wave cybernetics on the cognitive probabilities of memory, where memory depends on the acquisition of knowledge, Henri Bergson’s
early-twentieth-century investigation of the relation between memory and matter offers a view of the mind in movement, what he calls duration. Anticipating contemporary neuroscience, Bergson also conceived of memory as enmeshed with perception. Yet, for Bergson, perception is not a representation of the world but is intrinsically entangled with the movement of a body. The lived body itself exists, in addition to its immersion in a media environment, as an image among many, receiving and giving back movement. Bergson distinguishes between psychological memory (memory of the psyche), habitual memory (memory of the body) and ontological memory (pure, virtual recollection). Each time we remember, each time we recall a past perception, we do more than psychologically retrieve data fixed in the brain or in the body. Instead, for Bergson, to remember is to enter a realm in which the past coexists virtually (in potential) with the present. For Bergson, each perception can activate potentials for memory, which exceed actual past perceptions. Remembering, then, has nothing to do with a psychological recollection, the reconstruction of narrative from the standpoint of the subject, an autobiographical rehearsal of the self. With virtual memory, the body is an indeterminate center of action, not the container of representations of the self, the model, for example, on which personalized computing is based. We move, therefore, from the virtual identities of digital selves in the cultural theories of new media, which, we argue, are sustained by the cybernetic notion of memory as a databank of probabilities, toward a notion of memory as virtual recollection that can account for the feeling of déjà vu intensified in an audiovisual sample-based culture. The introduction of the concept of the virtual points us to a postcybernetic conception of memory, in which the database does not archive fixed representations, but matter itself functions as an archive of potentiality, where the past and the future coexist in the present. In this way, the past never passes but remains contemporaneous with its present. The past stays in potential, continuously ready to actualize its present anew. This is why, according to Bergson, we experience paramnesia, the illusion of déjà vu, false recognition, time anomalies, and memories of past-futurity. What is left of memory when past-present chronology collapses?

The term déjà vu, common in English and German, translates from the French literally as the “already seen.” The sensation that it usually tags relates to an uncanny feeling of familiarity with something you should or could not be familiar with because you are experiencing it for the first time. Déjà vu suggests time collapsed onto itself; perhaps some kind of mnemonic haunting or future feedback effect. In the literature on déjà vu, it is often related to a memory disorder known as paramnesia, a term referring to the illusion of remembering events while they are being experienced for the first time (or a condition in which the proper meaning of words cannot be remembered). In the scientific literature, the déjà vu feeling has often been tied to temporal-lobe epilepsy, usually occurring just before an attack or during the seizure in the gaps between convulsions. But it is widely accepted that it is actually much more widespread than its identification as psychological pathology would suggest.
For Bergson, paramnesia is a symptom that explains that “there is a recollection of the present, contemporaneous with the present itself,” as Deleuze puts it. Here the sense of duration occurs as the past appears to be lodged between two tendencies of the present. As Deleuze puts it: “The present is the actual image, and its contemporaneous past is the virtual image, the image in a mirror.” Thus, a memory does not chronologically follow a perception in the present but rather is to be rigorously understood as contemporaneous with it. At each moment, duration splits into two trajectories: one verging toward the future and the other veering into the past. Two enmeshed planes coexist: virtual memory—the past in itself contracted and expanded—and actual memory—a memory of the present and the emerging future. Hence memory can detach itself from the past by differentiating itself in something new. Like Dick’s memory implant that offers you a memory of a past you haven’t lived, memory conjoined to the virtual can create a sense of familiarity with occasions you have never experienced.

The virtual plane of the past indeed indicates that the past and the future are not separated as a past of the present and a future of the present. On this Bergsonian account, time is not conceived of as linear but as intensive duration, degrees of covariations whereby perception, the actual present, is the continual activation of memory, the virtual, the past. This is not linear continuity, where the past determines the present or the present constructs the past. Each present perception stirs what lies in potential, the futurity of the past, emerging again yet anew. The lived present is thus a synthesizer of the past and the future contracted in microtemporality. Here déjà vu points to actions at a distance, echoes and resonances, replays of a multiplicity of memories in duration.

So while the info-saturation of proliferating media technologies may encourage the feeling of time anomaly associated with déjà vu, the conception of temporality it points to exceeds the effect of recent media technologies and is rather, for Bergson, an ontological principle.

Anterior Future

“We think of the future in time-spans of centuries, or of decades, or of years, or of days. We dwell critically upon the mass of fables termed history. . . . In considering our direct observation of past, or of future, we should confine ourselves to the time-spans of the order of magnitude of a second, or even a fraction of a second.”

The technological environment, we argue, does not just encourage us to think the coexistence of the past with the present. In the déjà vu example, our false familiarity with an occasion may denote not just that we have already experienced it sometime in the past. It may also be that we feel the inevitability of the unfolding occasion to the extent to which the future coexists with the present or the present opens onto anticipation.
Memories, for Alfred North Whitehead, are always memories of the future, time anomalies where the future is immediate to the present’s contraction of the past, as if the future were haunting its own emergence. For Whitehead, the past does not determine the future but eats into the future. In such achronological causation, the future is active in the present, unfolding the process by which the past-present enters the present-future. The past does not determine the future any more than the future determines the past—they are in co-causal relation. Whitehead suggests that toprehend the transition between the immediate past and the immediate future is of the order of short-term intuition—a time-span that lasts a second or fraction of a second—“which lives actively in its antecedent world.”41

For Whitehead, prehensions or feelings42 are microtemporal modalities of perception defining not only the conceptual feeling of past occasions in present experiences but also the way the objective existence of the present lies in the future. Conceptual prehensions indicate not that the past predicts the future, but that the future is anticipated in the present. As Whitehead argues: “Cut away the future, and the present collapses, emptied of its proper content. Immediate existence requires the insertion of the future in the crannies of the present.”43 Whitehead distinguishes two coexisting modalities of perception, “causal efficacy” and “presentational immediacy.” Causal efficacy is a direct perception of prior actual occasions, which are causally related or relevant to a subsequent actual occasion. Here perception is enmeshed with memory as what has passed; particular occasions are objects of prehension in the present. On the other hand, presentational immediacy is a direct perception of present actual occasions, which may lead to a process of integrating these occasions with actual occasions in the past. Thus perception is caught between two parallel feelings of the body, the feeling of the precedent world, or the past, and the feeling of the current world, or the present. But these feelings are not exclusively sensory. Indeed, there is a nonsensuous—or extrasensory—dimension to them, which defines prehensions as the grasping of the immanent connection between actual occasions in the past and the present.

Whitehead argues that we prehend two kinds of data: sensuous and nonsensuous. On the one hand, “perception in the mode of presentational immediacy” marks the precise, digital kind of data that nerves transmit. These sensuous data constitute physical prehensions. Memory, on the other hand, is the nonsensuous mode in which we perceive past actual occasions. Whitehead cites immediate (short-term) memory as an example of nonsensuous perception. The memory that enables me not to forget the point I am making while completing a sentence exposes the immediate grasp of the vague past that floods the whole bodily system, a “perception in the mode of causal efficacy.”44

Thus, alongside physical prehensions, we prehend concepts. These make up the mental pole of an actual occasion of feeling. At the mental pole, we prehend the infinite world of what-might-be. Conceptual prehensions can be understood as pure potentials in
abstraction from embodiment. From the actual entities that we prehend physically, we can abstract some potentials, what they may become. Conceptual prehensions are entangled with the physical prehensions of previous actual occasions and thus produce the propositions of the past, which are again reassembled in a process of reenaction not directed by present physical data. Thus, while linked to past physical prehensions, conceptual prehensions are of a nonphysical nature—that is, they embody the feeling of the passing of time that is autonomous from sensory information. A memory would then be considered a conceptual object imbued with potentials—the infinite world of what-might-be. When remembering, we prehend an actual occasion in the past reenacted by an actual occasion in the present, which does not reproduce the past but tends toward its own future. The immanent relation between actual occasions of the past and present, however, does not follow the same pattern as the relation between the present and the future. While the actual occasions of the past are prehended by present occasions, there are no actual occasions in the future “to exercise efficient causation in the present.”  

The future is not occupied by actual occasions. In the present, there are not future occasions. If the future is immanent to the present, it is so in a different sense, compared to the way individual occasions of the past are prehended in the present.

Whitehead proposes to understand the “doctrine of the future” according to a process of self-completion of each individual occasion, a passage from reenaction to anticipation. Here the future belongs to the conditions of the present, which are themselves linked to the actual occasions of the past. Yet, this does not imply that the past could have foreseen its forthcoming present or that the present merely reproduces the past. While present occasions derive from the past, the past itself does not predict the actual occasions of the present. In the same way, a present experience does not refer to any particular future memory of itself. Memory is thus a unidirectional relatedness. Here the relationship between past, present, and future is a cycle of creation and destruction, reenaction and anticipation intermitted by the acquisition of novel content.

To remember, then, entails a cyclical yet nonlinear dynamic whereby an occasion of experience is initiated in the past—which is alive in itself—and terminated in the future—which is also alive. Such an occasion starts as an effect facing its past and ends as a cause facing its future. If the present emerges from the past, it is also, at the same time, immanent in the future. The reenaction of the past passes through the acquisition of the new to be accomplished in the present, yet the content of the present remains the future. Completion is also anticipation. Anterior future: the present remains at once occupied by the past and the future. Yet, this is not the cybernetic prediction of probabilities, whereby future contingencies can be statistically calculated. On the contrary, prehensions tackle a universe of microtemporalities, enabling the future not to be predicted by means of probabilities but to actively occupy the present by means of immediacy.

Similarly, against the entrapping of memory in the autobiographical historical narrative of the past, Whitehead suggests that it is in short-term memory, short-term intuition,
that the sense of a present’s immediate past and future returns, a sense of invention inherent in the present.46 "In this sense, the future has objective reality in the present. . . . For it is inherent in the constitution of the immediate, present actuality that a future will supersede it."47 Whitehead defines this temporal immediacy as the enjoyment of the present: an open-ended enjoyment of reenaction and anticipation where the future enters the present once the past has perished for futurity to populate the present anew.

Mnemo-Machinery

We have attempted to establish a postcybernetic conception of memory as virtual body, virtual matter, in which the future and past are deeply implicated in the present. The temporal dislocation of the technocultural matrix and its tendency toward total sensation experience is central to preemptive power, but this can only be inadequately understood in terms of simulation. To assume the neuroprogramming of a digital power that manipulates us at the level of memory through the generation of a hyperreality—a simulated, packaged world—is to ignore the nonlinear workings of virtual memory, the microtemporalities of duration. What such postmodern accounts of living in global media saturation neglect, in their portrayal of hyperreal simulation as a mega-mnemo-implant construct outside of historical time, is the achronological compossibilities of the virtual—the coexistence of multiple durations.

As Deleuze, following William Burroughs maintains, cybernetic control society operates through mediatic addiction by way of bodily habits.48 This does not stand for a zombification of the body through dependence on the imperatives of the mediascape but rather for the microactivation of what a body can do, albeit within the terms of the domain of demarcated and relatively predetermined possibility. Contemporary branding culture, for example, sets out to distribute memory implants across technical media platforms, which provide you with the already-enjoyed, already-sensed, to encourage repetition of consumption, a repetition of a memory that you haven’t had. The operation of power, through branding, seeks to remodel long-term memory through a kind of time anomaly. Branding tends to occupy the shortest possible time spans by entering the dynamics of short-term intuition—the coexistence of the past-present-future—at the same time, ceaselessly affecting long-term memory by instigating movement in the neurophysiological plasticity of the brain. Branding potentiates long term memories through the stirring of new synaptic connections, the marking of new paths of memories that are immediately familiar. Long-term memories are continuously reassembled in nonlinear combinations as a result of the immediacy of short-term memory.

Thus branding attempts to create a collective mood that induces loyalty through repetition. Of course loyalty to a brand, the nonhuman agency of the virtual corporate body, is simultaneously a mode of addiction. Branding both installs a web of associations
and generates loops of libidinal investment. But this double-edged process of addiction is inadequately understood if conceived in terms of closed loops or the locking down of behavior in a homeostatic circuit whereby a chain of association becomes habit and moves from short-term to long-term memory through reward. What is crucially omitted from this picture is positive feedback, the immediate transformation of virtual memory.

Could it be that memory has always been prosthetic, so that its extension into the networked cybernetics of mediatic communication was actually invented during the genesis of culture, as explored in evolutionary theories of memetics? If so, a cosmology of memory begins with the evolution of sensuous thought, at the point when transmission becomes affective contagion, the propagation of sensations. The time-scrambling of Bergson and Whitehead suggests that, in a specific sense, memories of the future are conceivable, so long as these memories are either intuitive or prehensive, as opposed to simply knowledge of possible futures. Affect is both the unfolding of the past into present experience but also the way this experience acts on the past to unravel a new future.

Affective power acts on autonomic responses, that is bodily memory, but these instinctual responses are not simply reducible to habits. Central to Brian Massumi’s conception of affect is the suspension of the linear causation of stimulus and response. *Every time autonomic response is activated through media power, an unpredictable potential enters.* There is a relationship between physical bodies and technical machines that is more than simply informational or emotional. Such relation, we argue, is virtual.

Hence our focus on the importance of moving beyond memetics’ obsession with imitation to emphasize virtual mutations in cultural replicators, germinators of difference and not stabilizers of variations. With each occurrence, a body is transformed through the vague memory of the previous instance, and the anticipation of the next occasion. Cultural replications would then entail the propagation of infectious copying habits, the “bad habits” of normalization, of enforced replicators. Memories here are an affective impingement of bodies on bodies, a mnemotectonics of speeds and slowness, entering into compositions, concrescences, that activate potential in a rhythmic oscillation between the virtual and the actual, inventing process and processing invention. Memories are therefore material relations. They are not confined to individual subjects. Neither are they specifically human. Memories no longer relate purely to a trace of the past but, more importantly for us, hint at the activity of the future in the present. Every actual body is shadowed by its virtual double. As with monads, each body has its own singular enfolded memory of matter ready to enter a new curvature of time.

What kinds of symbiogenetic or mutant compositions do the machines of memory initiate? From synapses to bodies to technical machines, across scales, every connection provokes mnemonic mutation. However, whether conceived as the alleviation of the pressure of remembering—the amputation of memory—or as a mnemonic extraction by the technosphere, for us, the machines of memory have always been prosthetic, always been
ecologically distributed across drifting layers of mnemonic involution, the virtual coexistence of the past and future in the present. As we have argued, memory is inextricably entangled with futurity. Thus, memory cannot be conceived purely as an accumulator or container of lived experience, a technical archive of the past. On the contrary, to the designers of new media theories and technologies, we pose anew our earlier paradox: How to engineer an *archive of the future*?
Controversies
24. Slavery, Historicism, and the Poverty of Memorialization

Stephan Palmié

Visiting revolutionary Cuba in the winter of 1967–68, the Jamaican writer Andrew Salkey was one of the last ever to record a conversation with a person who remembered once having been a slave in a New World plantation society.1 Born in 1860 to enslaved parents on a plantation in the province of Villa Clara, Salkey’s centenarian interlocutor, Esteban Montejo, had run away as an adolescent, hiding in the woods for what may have been several years until news of the end of Cuba’s first war of independence and the gradual abolition of slavery reached him. Yet slavery did not end in Cuba until 1886, and while Montejo seems to have worked for wages when he returned to life on a plantation, he lived under the shadow of slavery for the first quarter of a century of his long life.

Like many other visiting celebrities, such as the novelists Graham Greene and Hans Magnus Enzensberger and the composer Hans Werner Henze, Salkey had been introduced to Montejo by the Cuban writer Miguel Barnet, who had discovered Montejo in the course of a government-sponsored oral history project in 1963 and later published an internationally acclaimed testimonial novel, *Biografía de un cimarrón*, based on Montejo’s tape-recorded reminiscences of his early life.2 Accompanied by Barnet and an official “minder,” Salkey met Montejo in a retirement home for military veterans and must have conversed with him for several hours. Their subjects ranged from Montejo’s experience of slavery and of the second Cuban war of independence to life under the Cuban Revolution and his fervent admiration for Comandante Fidel Castro. The encounter left Salkey shaken. “I felt like a robber,” he writes. “Had I taken too much from Esteban?” Although it is difficult to say what exactly Salkey meant, it appears that what struck him was the realization that he had appropriated the limited time and energy left to a man who, in a past beyond any contemporary’s remembrance, had
once been someone else’s legal property himself. Perhaps Salkey had already begun to mourn Montejo as the last publicly known survivor of New World slavery, the last witness to a human tragedy of unfathomable proportions.

As Salkey seems to have sensed, Montejo’s death in 1973 was to mark a historical juncture: the end of an era, by then of more than 400 years’ duration, when the term slavery could still designate the contents of autobiographic remembrance. We will never know who may have been the last victim of New World racial slavery alive after Montejo’s death. But it is clear that with his or her passing, the experience of slavery likewise passed out of “living memory.” By the end of the twentieth century, the grammatical and semantic range of possible statements about the particular form of slavery Montejo had endured as a young man irrevocably shifted from the realm of first-person propositions concerning past experience into third-person forms of discourse: local tradition, historical reconstruction, or organized public commemoration. This is not to say that institutions of extreme dependence and hyperexploitation comparable to historical forms of New World slavery did not persist beyond the point in time when Brazil became the last American nation to finally abolish chattel slavery in 1888. Nor is it to deny that forms of so-called “neo-slavery” that arose in the course of the twentieth century with or without state sanction do not command public attention. It is to say that no one alive today in the Americas “remembers” how it felt to be a slave. Nor, for that matter, could anyone tell us what buying, owning, or selling human beings was like. Since both victims and perpetrators of what North Americans used to call the “peculiar institution” are gone, the profoundly difficult question facing their progeny—and, indeed, all of us (however we might wish to construct that pronoun)—has become how slavery and the enslaved can and ought to be remembered. No longer able to represent themselves and their experience of slavery, the slaves have to be represented.

My paraphrase of Marx’s famous dictum is not capricious here. What it aims to evoke is a well-known paradox in the historiography of slavery that is patently evident in Montejo’s case. For although Salkey assures us that he did not edit a single word of the interview Montejo granted him, it is hard to say who or what speaks to us from the pages of Salkey’s book, let alone Barnet’s Biografı´a de un cimarrón. Surely not Montejo’s unmediated memory—a fact that seems to have dawned upon at least the publisher of a new Anglophone translation in changing the title from The Autobiography of a Runaway Slave to The Biography of a Runaway Slave. Often regarded as a foundational text of the Latin American genre of “testimonial literature,” Barnet’s Biografı´a de un cimarrón foreshadowed, and indeed exemplifies, both the hopes western intellectuals invested in the potential of a counterhegemonic “poetics of solidarity” and the deeply troubling implications of what Barnor Hesse, in speaking of nineteenth-century slave narratives, calls a mass-produced “symbolic commodity” that, far from reflecting genuine forms of subaltern consciousness and self-expression, represented a tightly controlled medium for the propagation “of the ethos of (white) abolitionism.” As critics of both testimonio and
the slave narrative have repeatedly pointed out, the individual voice of the formerly enslaved or oppressed that appears to speak from such accounts is not only irredeemably composite, but in fact functions as a carefully crafted authenticating device designed to create an impression of narrative immediacy and “unvarnished” truthfulness that underwrites, in Reinhardt Koselleck’s words, a strategically deployed “fiction of . . . facticity.”

To be fair, Barnet never claimed to present the unedited recollections of an ex-slave. Instead, he explicitly conceived of the text he and Montejo produced as part and parcel of a revolutionary literature not only projected toward the “masses,” but, at least in part, authored by them as well. True also that much of the criticism Barnet garnered from historians and anthropologists for the editorial and artistic license he took in reworking Montejo’s taped utterances and his refusal to make the original transcripts or tapes available may result from an anxiety about being cheated out of a set of primary data that, as things are, can only be gleaned from a document “corrupted” by Barnet’s authorial presence. Nevertheless, few if any known first-person narratives of life “under slavery” could possibly escape the strictures historians have heaped upon Barnet’s—undoubtedly tendentious—rendering of Esteban Montejo’s words. In fact, the irony may well be not just that Barnet unwittingly replayed the role of the abolitionist amanuensis that so often has been regarded as the distorting filter between the authors of the vast genre of Anglophone slave narratives and their latter-day critical public; rather, as with the 101 known first-person accounts of the horrors of North American slavery published in England or the United States before the end of the latter country’s Civil War, it is also that Montejo might have lived out his life in a revolutionary Cuban veteran’s home without anyone ever noticing him—taking his memories of slavery and heroic engagement in the second Cuban war of independence to his grave. Phrased in more analytic terms, even if we discounted the multiple epistemological problems connected with autobiographical memory and first-person narrative that are dealt with elsewhere in this volume, the very conditions that appear to enable us to “hear” the slaves’ voices paradoxically militate against their construction as unmediated and authentic.

Yet if Montejo’s case seems to exemplify Spivak’s famous dictum that “the subaltern cannot speak” except in the distorting language of those who would deign to give him or her “voice,” we need to ask: How then could there possibly be a “memory” of slavery? For Montejo’s case is obviously not an isolated one. Consider the more than three thousand interviews recorded with elderly North American ex-slaves between 1929 and 1938, mainly under the auspices of the Federal Writers’ Project, an initiative of the New Deal-era Works Progress Administration (WPA). As was becoming clear even when George Rawick published the first nineteen of a total of forty-one volumes of the narratives during the heyday of African American political mobilization in the United States in 1972, the collection did not represent what historians like to call a transparent “window into the past” of slavery, but afforded—at best—glimpses through a glass darkened by multiple
distorting interferences. If a racist American academic historical establishment had refused to grant evidentiary value to the WPA narratives during the time of their production on account of their supposedly partisan bias, some of the stronger notes of caution were now voiced by black historians who feared that the conditions of their production might render them a deeply compromised source for the “empirical” reconstruction of the slave experience in North America.16 They were, of course, right: the majority of the interviews were conducted by white interviewers in the then segregated South. They could be shown to have been spiked with leading, culturally insensitive, or otherwise methodologically inadmissible questions, burdened with context-setting strategies that misled the impoverished elderly consultants, or—alternatively—warped by the preconceptions and gullibility of interviewers unable or unwilling to question the misinformation they not infrequently were strategically fed. As the eminent black historian John W. Blassingame caustically summed up the concerns that had emerged soon after the publication of the collection, “uncritical use of the [ex-slave] interviews will lead almost inevitably to a simplistic and distorted view of the plantation as a paternalistic institution where the chief feature of life was mutual love and respect between masters and slaves.”17 An interpretative cycle had closed: once rejected by white American historians as inappropriate to the project of a past designed to heal the wounds of a bloody Civil War fought, at least nominally, over slavery,18 now the ex-slave testimony was viewed with suspicion by African American historians who questioned its appropriateness to the project of revising a fundamentally racist American historical canon in the post–Civil Rights era. Even when Ira Berlin, Marc Favreau, and Steven Miller published a CD with excerpts of twenty-six of the thirty-three audio recordings of ex-slave testimony stored at the Smithsonian Institution,19 the question of what exactly the ghostly voices of long-dead ex-slaves testify to—the past of nineteenth-century slavery, the present of the 1930s, or a hopelessly overdetermined hybrid of both—could not be said to have been resolved. The ex-slaves, in Dwight McBride’s apt Derridean phrase, remained “impossible witnesses” to their own past20—or so it would appear from a historicist point of view.

Blassingame’s and other criticisms notwithstanding, the WPA collection was extensively used in U.S. social histories of slavery in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet it has only rarely been drawn upon (let alone explicitly discussed) in the literature dealing with slavery and memory that began to take shape by the late 1980s. Here it is worth noting how little this new literature has in common with previous attempts to mine the published nineteenth-century slave narratives or the WPA records for data from which to synthesize historical accounts of slavery. While social historians once agonized over how to counterbalance the multiple distortions inherent in both types of sources, test their contents for factuality, or establish criteria for the representativity of individual ex-slaves’ testimony about slavery, much of the current literature on slavery and memory seems fairly unconcerned with such methodological issues and indeed tends to make surprisingly little use of texts purporting to reflect the remembrances of individual slaves.21 This might be taken to
relate to theoretically grounded suspicions about the nature of subjectivity and the opacity of all linguistically rendered “experience.” But given the general absence, in much recent writing on slavery and memory, of principled epistemological arguments concerning the very notion of subject and object in any kind of propositions about the past, this seems unlikely. Rather, it would appear that this ostensibly curious neglect of such documents relates to a fundamental transformation of the category of memory itself in much contemporary historiography. Put simply—and no doubt simplistically—by the 1980s, the meaning of the term “memory” began to rapidly shift away from first-person recollections of witnesses contemporary to historically significant events or processes and increasingly came to circumscribe forms of commemorative praxis on the part of social collectives whose members had never personally lived through the pasts so “remembered.” In the case at hand, this meant a fundamental reordering of the terms of debate. No longer primarily concerned with determining the “authenticity,” “accuracy,” and hence “validity” of ex-slave testimony pertaining to the past that slavery was, we seem to have become increasingly, if not always explicitly, concerned with the past that slavery is—or ought to be, given the structures of privilege and inequality of the world we currently inhabit.

This is clearly evident in some of the first publications explicitly foregrounding the issue of “memory” in the literature on slavery, such as the literary scholars Geneviève Fabre and Robert O’Meally’s anthology *History and Memory in African American Culture.* Conceived under the sign of Pierre Nora’s, by then increasingly influential, neo-Halbwachian formulation about an antinomy between memory and history, much of this volume set the tone for a rapidly expanding literature that came to emphasize an essentially romantic and often explicitly antihistoricist conception of memorial consciousness and commemorative practice—pitted against the then still prevailing empiricism of the so-called new social history’s study of slaves and other subaltern populations. Ostensibly purged of its deeply conservative Gallic nationalism, and often analogized (explicitly or not) to the literature on Holocaust “memory” emerging at the same time, Nora’s concept of collective memory as an organic source and vital medium of national identification became reconfigured as a means of popular counterhegemonic assertion: in much of the literature that emerged under labels such as “slavery in history and memory,” the verb “to remember” now designates an active, and often deliberate refusal on the part of racially marginalized populations in the United States to surrender collectively held visions of the past systematically devaluated or silenced in institutionally empowered forms of historiography. As a result, memory morphed from a source (however problematic) of evidence utilized in disciplined historical reconstruction into a metahistorical category denoting a stance toward and within contests about the public representation of collective pasts.

To a certain extent, this conceptual move was fruitful, for it directed attention away from the morally dubious positivism of an increasingly sterile debate on the reliability of a set of unavoidably problematic “primary documents.” Instead it focused attention on
the practice of representing slavery as a historical moment to which contemporary citizens of formerly slaveholding nations simply could not but relate, in one way or the other. Increasingly foregrounded as a past pragmatically significant in regard to contemporary social issues and political struggles or meaningful in respect to competing visions of collective futures, slavery gradually transformed from an experience over which people like Esteban Montejo might still have asserted an individual interpretative monopoly to a screen for the projection of diverse and fundamentally contested claims on larger histories. The upshot of this was a significant shift in the epistemic and representational status of the remembrance of slavery: rather than constituting the content of consciousness that has been held to define individual identity and personal continuity since the time of Locke and Hume, memory now has become the corporate property of collectivities, mnemonic communities that have come to imagine themselves in relation to their perceived obligation to ensure the social reproduction of representations of pasts enacted or endured by people to whom such collectivities trace relationships held to be of continued (and corporately constitutive) moral and political salience in the present.

This, of course, is the sense in which the memory of slavery is nowadays invoked by activists and legal scholars in contemporary debates about retributive or restorative justice. Cases in point are the reparations movement in the United States or the ongoing investigations of the legitimacy of land claims launched by or on behalf of descendants of runaway slaves (quilombolas) in Brazil. Here it is clear that the term “memory” has largely come to function less to designate any specific content of what is in fact remembered (or forgotten) at any one point in a specific social context than to characterize the form of an explicitly collective “moral practice” calibrating the legitimacy of present day social entitlements and iniquities in relation to the historical human disaster of slavery—conceived now as the “inalienable possession” of descendants of its victims, and as a lasting moral debt on the side of descendants of its direct perpetrators or indirect beneficiaries. The pasts in questions here are by no means “over and done with.” As a chrono-topic referent, circulating in and through such discourses, “slavery” now indexes a durational “past imperfect” that continues to predicate present moral relationships.

The upshot of this has often been acrimonious debate about accountability and redress conducted along both forensic and actuarial lines: who profited from slave labor, how such profits might be assessed, what forms of “opportunity costs” were incurred by the victims, the extent to which slave labor underwrote the rise of the United States as a global economic power, or even how the proverbial “forty acres and a mule” might be translated into contemporary monetary values. These are no longer the academic questions they had been during the “cliometric boom” of the 1960s, when such debates were still largely restricted to the pages of the *Economic History Review* and similar such publications. Instead, and after several successfully initiated lawsuits against U.S. corporations such as the insurance giant Aetna, CSX Railways, and J. R. Reynolds, the question no longer appears one of mere quantification, but of the legal and philosophical grounds on
which restorative justice might be administered. Space does not permit an adequate discussion of the multiple and truly agonizing ethical and political issues involved here. But the debate itself increasingly shows that attempts at quantitative reckoning tend to recur to the same forms of empiricist arithmetic and objectivist historicism that the calls for a categorical devoir de memoire (obligation to remember) originally aimed to unhinge.

The danger here seems to lie not just in trivializing, by quantification, the incomensurability of the sheer tragedy of New World slavery and ignoring the cultural and ideological centrality of its regime of systematic dehumanization in the formation of Western modernity itself. Nor is it merely that slavery’s lasting impact on post-emancipation schemes of racially iniquitous nation building might be written off through “terminal” compensatory settlements purporting to wipe clean the historical slate without effectively addressing contemporary structures of privilege and inequality. Rather, and as in the debate about apologies for slavery, a major part of what is at issue, is the nature of the collective subjects involved in making or accepting amends for the historical wrong of slavery: since neither victims nor perpetrators of slavery are alive today, how other than by positing essentialized transhistorical continuities, on the level of corporative legal and moral identities, might one establish juridically enforceable or even only ethically binding relations between pre–Civil War U.S. slaves or slaveholders on the one hand, and anyone clearly recognizable group of present-day citizens of that nation on the other? Such historically transcendent corporate identity essences are precisely what contemporary discourses on mnemonic communities claim to bring to light. But as Michel-Rolph Trouillot has argued, they tend to do so on the template of an ideology extending the model of liberal possessive individualism not only into politically dubious conceptions of society as a collection of otherwise autonomous “heirs” to the estate of memory, but also across stretches of time in a manner that is intrinsically implausible by virtue of the very model of the historically unencumbered individual market actor such constructions of collective memory take their departure from. Instead of marking a “departure from liberal discourse in which equality is achieved though the suppression of the past,” the mnemonic essentialization of collective identities paradoxically returns us straight to the core of such discourse. In the case at hand, slavery is denounced as an aberration from the principle of individual liberty on the very grounds that once had made slaveholding possible—the individual subject’s inviolable rights to property—and that continue to render contentious forms of transformative justice based in conceptions of structurally embedded collective rights and obligations, such as affirmative action.

But this is not the only irony involved here. For the switch from an (epistemologically problematic) objectivist sense of slavery’s “historical truth” to a formally far more relativistic “politics of memory” is also evident in the blatantly self-congratulatory manner in which, for instance, France’s president Jacques Chirac, five years after the French Senate had passed la loi Taubira, declaring slavery a “crime against humanity,” could celebrate the “first commemorative day in metropolitan France for remembering slavery and its
abolition.” As Chirac triumphantly put it on May 10, 2006, “Faced with the infamy of slavery [France] took the requisite action, [and] was the first to do so.” Though Chirac’s immediate reference was to the emergency decree declaring general emancipation that the Revolutionary Civil Commissioners Léger-Félicité Sonthonax and Étienne Polvorel had issued in war-torn St. Domingue in 1793, what he failed to properly emphasize was not only the fact that Napoleon reinstituted slavery in the French overseas colonies less than ten years later, but also that la Grande République had rather less than historically transcendent reasons for celebrating its record on human rights at that particular point in time: although the coincidence was likely fortuitous, the fact that Paris’s largely nonwhite and Muslim-inhabited banlieux had, only months before, exploded in the worst civil unrest the country had seen since 1968 was certainly not without relevance for the occasion. Surely, what we are dealing with here is all but what Wendy Brown calls the establishment of a morally binding “connection of a particular [transformative] political aim in the present with a particular formation of oppression in the past.” It is the commemorative creation of a safe distance between loudly proclaimed past “crimes against humanity,” and the unspoken racism and iniquities of the present.

This example underscores Trouillot’s and Saidiya Hartman’s point that acts of commemorating slavery (or its abolition) tend to rest on the classic historicist axiom of an unbridgeable temporal distance between the event and its present day (historiographic or mnemonic) recall. At the very least, this is so because the commemorative “retrieval” of past events presupposes a notion of the objective givenness and unalterability of the past. Yet this notion of a fixed, objective past whose ontological as well as epistemological separation from the present must be upheld lest “the past” be contaminated by “presentist” concerns is in itself not only logically unsound but deeply ideological. This is amply evident in a contemporary culture of organized public commemoration that elides and silences continuities between past and present in the service of Whiggish teleologies of progress, domesticates wrongful pasts through what Elizabeth Povinelli, in a somewhat different context, calls the “cunning of recognition,” or forecloses significant political options by fetishizing an originary trauma at the expense of an effective exposure of mechanisms of the reproduction and transformation of relations of power and inequality. For once the latter have become subsumed under and absorbed into the histrionic pathos of factually inconsequential celebrations of victimhood and contrition, such reifications of the past effectively become, in Horkheimer and Adorno’s famous words, instances of forgetting. In either case, the results, it would seem, are often aimed less at redressing present-day iniquities in the name of past injustice than toward increasingly shallow performances addressing an “international community” allegedly watchful of contemporary collective subjects’ politically correct enactment of simulacra of historical consciousness and responsibility.

That these two moments—mere histrionics of atonement and inconsequential reclarations of commemorative recognition—can go hand in hand, is demonstrated by the
mnemonic projects for which the Maison des Esclaves in Gorée, Senegal, has become a lasting metonym. Here, it would seem, we have a prime Nora-esque “lieu” of transatlantic “memory.” Declared a Unesco World Heritage Site in 1980 and currently the focus of organized mass tourism, this structure, apparently a fine example of eighteenth-century French colonial architecture, has since 1995 become the object of both global commemorative cathexis and disciplinary historical abreaction. That year, a brief posting on the newly founded internet listservs H-Africa and H-slavery by the American historian Philip Curtin elicited storms of protest. What Curtin, an expert on Senegalese history and the slave trade more generally, had argued was not only that Gorée had played a negligible role in the slave trade from Senegal. More than that, Curtin maintained, on apparently good evidentiary grounds, the edifice known as the Maison des Esclaves had never been used as a commercial slave entrepot, and its famous “door of no return” (through which, by that time, thousands of African American tourists had passed in organized reenactments of the beginning of the “Middle Passage”) had never served the function of delivering captive Africans to waiting European slave ships. Calling the Maison des Esclaves a “hoax” and a “scam,” Curtin immediately drew fire from a variegated but mostly academic on-line audience. Though some of Curtin’s critics raised the question of a Eurocentric definitional monopoly over what was to count as “evidence” of the devastating import of the Atlantic slave trade, perhaps predictably, the debate largely focused on the “veracity” of the claims of Joseph Ndiaye, a Senegalese amateur historian who had managed to launch the piece of real estate in question to global attention.

Dissent on the part of Curtin and other professional historians, however, does not seem to have impeded visits to Gorée’s Maison des Esclaves by such late-twentieth-century dignitaries as Pope John Paul II, Nelson Mandela, Bill Clinton, and—in 2003—George W. Bush, who delivered not the kind of apology for slavery his presidential predecessor Clinton may (or may not!) have pronounced there, but a trite rumination on the progress of liberty and democracy the United States had inspired, if not always actively aided. But is irony really involved here? And if so, where does it reside? Is it that the Pope, Mandela, Clinton, or Bush chose to commemorate the “right thing” in the “wrong place”? Or is the issue of “historical accuracy” merely a screen beyond which other questions may be safely put aside? In fact, there may be at least two grounds on which to rest an argument that it really doesn’t matter if Ndiaye’s Unesco-authorized narrative about the Maison des Esclaves corresponds to “historical actuality.” The first is that, given the sheer scope of transatlantic slaving, pretty much any spot on the West African coast along an arc stretching from Senegambia to present-day Angola might serve as an appropriate commemorative site. The second, more critical issue concerns whom such commemorative acts are supposed to involve and address. At least in the case of Bush’s visit to Gorée, the inauthenticity of the ritual gesture arose not from a misplaced concreteness of location but from misdirected acts of illocution. For as Michael Ralph notes, Bush’s ringing praises of freedom were pronounced in the absence of virtually all Senegalese denizens of Gorée.
island—rounded up and confined as they had been, during Bush’s visit, in a local soccer stadium by security forces guaranteeing the unimpeded historical reflexivity of the president of a nation that, by then, had become Senegal’s second major international economic underwriter. Clearly, whatever the historical status of the Maison des Esclaves may be, the hoax and sham perpetrated here was not of Ndiaye’s making. Yet if that is so, would not the—irresolutely present—context and implications of such utterances about the past be the yardstick by which we might want to measure the moral (and ultimately historical) import of such talk? Is it more troubling to misremember a set of morally irrelevant “facts” (by whoever’s standards these may be so construed) in the service of re-presenting past horrors than to commemoratively disestablish a connection between unquestionably immoral pasts, and morally questionable presents?

Professional historians, at least in North America, have tended to be singularly equivocal in their increasingly frequent pronouncements on such matters. Consider the 2003 presidential address to the Organization of American Historians, by the leading contemporary historian of Colonial American slavery, Ira Berlin. Giving a detailed and admirably nuanced overview of the multiple controversies that broke out in the United States over the “memory of slavery” at the turn of the twenty-first century, Berlin rightly homes in on what he sees as a tendency for slavery to have “become a language, a way to talk about race in a society where race is difficult to discuss” and where “much of American life—access to jobs, housing, schools, medical care, justice, and even a taxi—is still controlled by race.” These are important insights. But Berlin lets go of them almost as soon as he has voiced them. Instead, he veers into a defense of academic historicism against undisciplined visions of history (“memory”), arguing for what he, in an astonishing case of misplaced irony, calls the “freeing of slavery in the United States from the stereotypes that have bound it.” Almost predictably, in what follows, Berlin recurs to intellectually and politically highly troubling commonplaces in contrasting images of “memory’s” partisan particularism, presentistic orientation, exclusivity, emotional appeal, static and transhistorical vision, and generally uncritical nature with the historian’s “skeptical and detached” labor in the service of “careful, dispassionate reconstruction of lived experience.” Ever mindful of the “axiom that the past is a foreign country and that it must not be studied with an eye to the present, not looking for precursors of nowadays or harbingers of the contemporary world,” Berlin’s “historian,” we are led to believe, is the ultimate guarantor of, and last bastion between, an honest empiricism and a wild jumble of competing (and often mutually contradictory) populist presentisms. Of course, like many of his colleagues, Berlin eventually concedes that the historian can no longer ignore the “memory of slavery,” for “because it touches individual men and women with such power, memory becomes the driving force in the search for social
justice, the mortar that bonds the violations of the past to the grievances of the present.”

Still, such “memory” ultimately militates against the skeptical, critical, and all-inclusive inspection of the past that is at the very heart of the historical enterprise. For those who draw on the remembered past, the study of slavery is not something that can be viewed dispassionately, questioned, inspected, and debated. Their truth is not one among many. Their understanding must be recognized, embraced, and celebrated, for the reality of slavery was absolute and undeniable.

“History and memory,” Berlin concludes, “both speak to the subject of slavery and the long experience of people of African descent in their American captivity, but they speak in different tongues,” and “not surprisingly, where history and memory meet, the results are often unpleasant.”

Like many other American historians, Berlin eventually closes on a conciliatory note. Despite it all, he says, history and memory “desperately need each other,” lest in the case of slavery, “memory is denied and history is allowed to trump memory, [so that] the past becomes irrelevant to the lives of all Americans at the beginning of the twenty-first century,” or, alternatively, lest “memory is allowed to trump history, [so that] the past becomes merely a reflection of the present with no real purpose other than wish fulfillment or, at best, myth with footnotes.” That may or may not be so (and, in any case, would seem to depend on an undertheorized, and ultimately banal, conception of both memory and history, in which the former has become a mere gloss for what, only half a century ago, most American professional historians would have written off as the product of the undisciplined popular historical imagination anyway). Yet is the “unpleasantness” professional historians encounter when publicly confronted with passionately defended but “unevidenced”—and perhaps unevidenceable—versions of the past only the result of a denial of the gratifications of historical wish-fulfillment to personally aggrieved or otherwise interested—and so necessarily uncritical—memoriophiles by the steeley-eyed historian, undauntedly facing up to the truth? And is Berlin’s ultimate call for “testing memory against history’s truths and infusing history into memory’s passions” in order to achieve a national past “that is both memorable and, at last, past”—over and done with—not a paternalistic evasion of the fundamental issues at hand? Is it the professional historian’s job to tell people what to remember, and is it theirs to develop suitable passion for such properly authenticated versions of the past? Or are we witnessing the emergence of a historiographical equivalent to the “false memory syndrome” controversy in American psychotherapy? Phrasing the matter in such polemical terms does not make the answer to these questions any easier. But it might point us toward a potentially more fruitful conception of what Bourdieu might have called the “field of historical production.”
Like it or not, American historians nowadays confront a plethora of extra-disciplinary (and sometimes positively anti-disciplinary) discourses laying claim to and aiming to authorize versions of the past of slavery. Speaking with Foucault, one might argue that Berlin’s undoubtedly well-meant call for a reconciliation between the “history” and “memory” of slavery is but a belated reaction to an “insurrection of subjugated knowledges” that American social historians themselves unwittingly encouraged when breaking up the normalized code of white male “national history” that W. E. B. Du Bois once bitterly denounced as a form of “propaganda” requiring a “searing of the memory” that rendered the memories of ex-slaves and the historical vision of their descendants irrelevant to the projection of a canonical “national past.” Alternatively, one might argue that the gradual, usually belated, and often all but uncontroversial embrace of “minority” history by the American historical profession ultimately failed in achieving its end; the result instead is what Gramsci might have called a state of “transformist hegemony” where the selective incorporation of the cultural productions (here: expressions of historical consciousness) of subaltern groups into a reigning cultural consensus diffuses their oppositional potential and so only solidifies ideological domination. Either way, however much one might sympathize with the plight of historians like Berlin (whose seminal contributions to the social history of North American slavery are undeniable), it will not do to erect rhetorical barriers between a “history” of slavery and its supposedly undisciplined, irrational other, “memory.” This is so because the disinterest or even distrust academic historiography of slavery confronts particularly, but not only, among African Americans ultimately bespeaks forms of historical consciousness that neither build on nor seek authorization in Berlin’s historicist “axiom that the past is a foreign country.” Instead, and precisely because the past is not a foreign country but—once summoned—constitutes a domestic issue of the here and now, such oppositional forms of the historical imagination need not obey the evidentiary canons of post-nineteenth-century Western historiography. In fact, in sometimes positively privileging the objectively unevidencable over “established facts,” they merely exemplify that any form of knowledge production concerning the past necessarily takes shape within what Koselleck calls historically as well as socially specific “spaces of experience” and “horizons of expectation” that include, in this case, principled suspicions about pasts that do not correspond to any form of morally credible present social arrangements. Let us not mince words here. Both “history” and “memory” ultimately revolve around and in turn aim to fashion, authorize, and motivate specific definitions of moral community in the present. What they differ on—at least in the case at hand—are the standards of plausibility in regard to which “pasts” might convincingly underwrite what “presents.”

To argue as much is, in my view, not at all to endorse an all-out relativism that might come to sanction frivolous denials of massive atrocities. Nor need taking such a stance oblige us to lend credence, a priori, to unsubstantiated claims to “memories” of past injustice and tragedy. It is to ask how we can study any claim on the past as a proposition
issuing from, situated within, and aiming to make an impact on, a larger, contemporary discursive and social field. As Eric Hirsch and Charles Stewart phrase the issue at hand, whether “realized in Western societies or elsewhere,” the study of representations of the past as cultural forms in social circulation is not in itself “concerned with objectivity, accuracy and factuality in local accounts of the past”; what it is concerned with is the cultural and political investment in, and work performed by, such accounts within specifiable social settings, including the institutional structures that underwrite the contextual acceptability of some of them as “truthful” representations of the “actual” past.

Of course, to engage in such a project might force us to abandon a good part of the methodological canon on which contemporary history stakes its disciplinary identity. But what, apart from an ultimately spurious sense of the boundaries of the discipline of history, might be at stake in entertaining, if only for epistemological reasons, a “coherence theory of truth” about the moral significance of present statements about the past? One thing that is certain is that it would be hard to sustain the dichotomy between memory and history on such grounds. What David Scott calls “verificationism” will then have lost much of its purchase as a technique to authorize the one and delegitimate (or functionally reduce) the other. But might this not lead to a clearer, sociologically more precise and politically more consequential understanding of the kinds of social “past-relationships” both terms would seem to address?
Citizens of the former Soviet Union, the men and women who grew up under Communism, share many extraordinary experiences of hardship, violence, and trauma. They have also spent the greater part of their lives interpreting and discussing their experience in a language almost entirely shaped by ideology. These aspects of their mental world lend special resonance to the work of collecting and analyzing their memories. In their case, too, the controversial term “collective memory” has real meaning. The Soviet state was very largely sealed from outside influences for several decades beginning in the 1930s. Official discourse was carefully shaped and monitored. As a result, millions of people learned to see and understand the universe using words, expressions, and even values that now appear remote, misguided, and frequently bizarre. As well as helping to define them as a collective, this uniformity points to one of the first lessons that their story has to offer now. Among the many privileges of listening to their accounts of life, their witness to the power of mass-mobilizing politics stands out as a reminder that all assumptions, and especially the most fashionable, demand constant question.

It is in part because of this that I find the current vogue for writing about memory, and even for treating it as some kind of key to our humanity, so troubling. The fashion has the same universal appeal, and the same arrogance, as conventional political correctness. All too often, young researchers are diverted from the task of understanding events (hard work, and full of pitfalls), preferring the soft and slippery world of “memory,” a subject-area that currently promises an easy moral authority (since it allows the writer to appear so liberal, so human) as well as a comforting fuzziness (so you can’t easily get it wrong). It is tempting, these days, to study memories of war (or interpretations of Jane

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Austen, as Edward Said once remarked) rather than look at the original for oneself. This essay is written with that uneasiness in mind. I came to memory by accident, reluctantly, and I write about it equally unwillingly. On its own, without other evidence and other techniques of research, it may be a distraction for historians. The Soviet case, moreover, stands testimony to the power of politics to distort and even replace collective, shared, and individual memories, making the value of interpretation ever more precarious.

The accident that brought me to the topic was my interest in Russia’s violent past. At the time (the mid-1990s), historians of the subject were still preoccupied with recovering the details of what happened from newly-opened Soviet archives, a research task more important, and more telling, than almost any other after so many decades of lies. Among their priorities was the need to estimate numbers. Russia fought in the first world war, losing millions in its own trenches, until the revolution of 1917. The infant Soviet Union then suffered a civil war and devastating famine, the trauma of social revolution and the collectivization of peasant agriculture, a further famine, political repression, including mass executions and forced labor, and then, most devastating of all, the catastrophe of total war against Nazi Germany. In each case, the Soviet state, which controlled information about population statistics, had underestimated (for public purposes at least) the number of human casualties. Even the scale of Soviet war losses, which we now believe to have exceeded twenty-seven million between 1941 and 1945, was originally presented at a fraction of its true measure. The number of Stalin’s more obviously political victims, meanwhile, was seldom referred to by Soviet sources, let alone estimated, until the second half of the 1980s.1

All this made statistical and demographic research vital as soon as the possibility appeared. But numbers, though crucial, said little about the human impact of catastrophe. My interest lay in exploring that story, in building on the work of those who had cleared so much ground. As a historian, I was able to use a wide variety of sources to inform myself. Letters and diaries from the Soviet period, political reports about the public mood, literature, even art and memorial sculpture all told me a great deal about the Soviet past. Sources created at the time have drawbacks, especially in a society where words had to be weighed, but they are almost always valuable. Like memories, indeed, their silences can be as telling as the things they state.

That said, I knew that hearing stories directly from the survivors of Soviet power would open new vistas of understanding. I did not—could not—predict what insights they might offer, not least because almost no one had worked in this way with Soviet citizens before. The timing was fortuitous in the best sense of the word. It was my privilege to talk to people who would not have been able to speak of private matters to a foreigner before, to travel on my own to places where outsiders seldom visited, and yet to speak to people who were still young enough to recall clearly, healthy enough to face the strain of the tormenting past. Two separate projects followed. The first was a general investigation...
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into the twentieth-century Soviet experience of mass death, trauma, and bereavement, the second a more focused study of Red Army combatants in the Second World War.²

Before looking in detail at some of these projects’ findings, it might help to take note, as I had to do at the time, of some of the general problems of oral history. These directly govern the question of memory, for oral history is little else. Even researchers who make appointments with elite political actors, hoping to gain extra insight into narratives of events, need to remember that they are working with nothing more substantial than memory, and memory is biased, personal, fallible, and subject to moods. Similar remarks, of course, apply to documents—they are seldom objective, seldom complete, and often reflect the author’s situation, prejudices, fears, and basic analytical competence—but memory, because it varies from day to day and from interview to interview, can seem slighter than any document. It is also a two-way process. People are not merely respondents. They are human, as are interviewers, and the dynamic between each pair will influence the types of memory that emerge. I have often found myself answering more questions than I could put as some magnificent octogenarian quizzed me on my social origins, political views, race, religion, and dietary habits. Humor is vital, as are patience and humility. These are not words that spring to mind when planning archival research of more conventional kinds.

Forgetting, the obverse of memory, is also important. A person’s silences are often as important as the tale they choose to tell, but by their nature they will never advertise themselves. Interviewers have to be well briefed, and more than briefed, for they will also have to judge whether to raise the missing issue (seeming pushy, maybe even causing distress) or let the silence hang. A related problem is confabulation, the exaggerations, distortions, and downright falsehoods that people construct, consciously or not, in order to live with the past. Like silence, these may follow patterns that tell us as much about the impact of history as any timetable or stenographer’s report.

When it comes to the stories themselves, it is important to listen for narrative patterns. Here again, patience is vital. An eagerness to cover the ground or to make sure of the facts can result in disruption, breaking the narrator’s concentration and imposing a pattern of the researcher’s making (or, more frequently, no pattern at all). Interruptions also involve specific choices of words. Conducting interviews in a foreign language raises this issue more starkly than usual, but it is a universal one. I may choose to talk of the Holocaust, for instance (and there is a direct Russian word that corresponds to the term), but survivors from Soviet lands may prefer “genocide.” They may even choose to evade a specific name for the mass murder of Jews, preferring circumlocutions that leave the unspeakable unlabelled. In either case, the point is that it is their choice, their language, that is of interest, and not their ability to fit their stories into a pattern imposed by their interviewer.

Trauma itself is central to the understanding of memory. For decades now, psychiatrists have been aware that some traumatic memories can be stored in a part of the brain,
the hypothalamus, that is separate from the location of banal recollections. This separation may enable appalling images to be overlooked most of the time so that life can go on without an endless reference to terror and flight. The traumatic memories’ use, as information, will come if the threatening event is repeated, perhaps enabling the survivor to endure a second time. Meanwhile, the images are not easy to assemble in ordinary circumstances. When someone says that they cannot remember battle, starvation, or extremes of pain, they are not necessarily lying, either to their interviewer or to themselves.

In many cases, however, persistent prompting can retrieve some memories of pain, while certain triggers—loud noises, for instance, or perhaps the smell of rough vodka—can bring traumatic memories rushing back. Photographs may also act as prompts, especially if they are new to the respondent and spark memories they had forgotten to lock well away. If this sounds like advice for interviewers, however, it should not. The retrieval of traumatic images is not cost-free, above all for the survivor involved. People forget, in part, in order to protect themselves. There are genuine ethical questions facing any historian who asks individuals to try to reassemble memories of war, torture, or bereavement. At worst, they could push that person back into the nightmare they hoped to escape, at best they are likely to leave behind confusion, distress, and renewed pain.

I was fortunate to have been advised of all this before I began my work, but the reality of it was made clear to me as I traveled around western Ukraine in 1998 in the wake of a team of interviewers who had been collecting data about the Holocaust. I never encountered the interviewers involved, but it was clear that they had conducted rapid sessions with survivors of the Jewish genocide, many of whom were left confused and even sick as a result. Apart from the sheer stress of recollection, the problem was that elderly people had been left without support, comfort, or companionship as the interviewers drove away. Whatever the fruits of the project, its subjects were left more unhappy than they had been before, still balked of justice after half a century.

So interviews do not “help” their subjects, and historians who undertake them need to think hard about their work. It seems a small point by comparison, but they must also think about its impact on themselves. Interviews, after all, are two-way things. The past does not sit still and wait while we take notes. It answers back, corrects, pleads, prompts, and scolds. It also presses cake, tea, vodka, and the neighbors on its visitor. Less tangibly, it casts a shadow, leaving us to deal with our own guilt, pity, and a gathering depression. I can think of no more rewarding aspect of my research in the past decade than the hours I have spent in the company of Soviet veterans of every kind, but nor can I think of anything more taxing.

Those are the universal perils, common to research of this type anywhere. What I want to do now is to look at things that are specific to the Soviet case. Taking memory, and specifically its traumatic aspect, as my theme, I will follow two main lines of discussion. First, I will suggest that the classic story of trauma’s legacy, the medical diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) now so universally accepted, simply misses the
point in the Soviet case. It is irrelevant because it is an import to the Soviet situation, a
discovery that suggests that, while suffering is universal, the reactions to it, especially at
the social level, are culturally specific. Only an interview project could have established
this. No documents hear the patterns of ordinary people’s speech.

Second, I will compare two kinds of respondent and show how their status within
postwar Soviet society—and the stories that their society told about their lives at the
collective level—affected not only their personal, private memories but also the ways in
which they built their lives in the shadow of catastrophe. Again, this amounts to an
exploration of possible social and cultural responses to trauma, as well as to the recollec-
tion of it in the longer term. I will then draw these points together to consider the value
of such recollections to the study of humanities.

In view of the near-total acceptance of PTSD as a diagnostic reality, a universal
human issue, the Soviet attitude to trauma, at least as the survivors and their carers
communicated it to me, came as a surprise. Before I left for Russia I had been prepared—
very carefully, by people with a lot of expertise working with survivors of the Nazi geno-
cide—for the idea that the majority of my respondents would be suffering from some
form of mental trauma. I was advised to look for persistent anxiety, irritability, sleepless-
ness, and depression. It was suggested that I ask people about their dreams. For a few
weeks, my first as an interviewer, I looked diligently for these signs of trauma. My notes,
a parallel text accompanying transcripts and tapes, were, like a psychiatric commentary,
semi-medical, and, like a lot of doctors’ notes (I think), they purported to know the
minds of the respondents better than they did themselves.

It was not difficult to see the traces of their harsh lives in the stories Soviet people
told, nor was it hard to discover how state control of language and expression had shaped
their perceptions. Elderly and frail, survivors of the Gulag often found it awkward to talk
about their suffering. Alternatively, they could talk of little else, repeating the same tropes
with increasing intensity, as if sheer effort would lift some burden from their hearts. Some
were tearful, others—and one in particular—were angry. The angry man cornered me in
the workshop where he now does carpentry and hammered with his fist right next to my
face, telling me that the message Stalin had conveyed to him—and that, by implication,
he was now conveying to me—was that we were dust. Nothing but dust. The Russian
word is as emphatic a monosyllable as the English, and I can recall it now as vividly as if
he were hammering beside me as I write.

There was plenty of evidence, then, that people suffered emotionally as well as materi-
ally as a result of oppression and violence, and many have continued to do so, in various
ways, throughout their lives. What I cannot say is that they appeared to be ill. The trauma
model posits mental illness, even disability, which is, of course, why PTSD has become so
familiar, even popular. Because it carries potential compensation in Britain and the
United States, it is, as one psychiatrist pithily remarks, the one diagnosis of mental illness
that people actually want to receive. But the survivors I met and interviewed were neither
mentally ill nor deluded about the impact of stress upon their lives. On the contrary, they were often models of resilience, their courage and their grace inspiring.

Of course, the survivors still living in the 1990s were among the most resilient. Stress may have driven thousands of those who did not survive to take their own lives, or to succumb to other hardships and disease, while wartime trauma was concealed within the appalling casualty figures. Who can tell if this or that infantryman died because of bad luck or the carelessness that arises from nervous exhaustion? The point is not to question the ubiquity of suffering and trauma in Soviet Russia but to see that people regarded them differently. Just as crucially, moreover, any exclusive focus on mental suffering seems absurd when material problems continue to loom so large.

Survivors of the Gulag were usually deprived of everything, including educational opportunities. Most were penniless when they were released, and many have stayed that way into old age. When I asked them to tell me what their problems were or are, they seldom talked about nightmares. Poverty—a legacy of violence, oppression, and a criminal state—figures far more significantly. Some are concerned that they cannot afford to feed and clothe themselves in the newly-minted capitalist Russia. Others are more troubled by the fact that they cannot buy presents for their grandchildren. Hunger is something many can take, for themselves. But to be unable to buy branded foreign chocolate for their grandchildren—the poverty is often that basic, not a matter of PlayStations or bicycles—feels intolerable. The exploration of memory, oral history, here brings the researcher face to face with the human legacy of political events. No books or documents teach the past like this.

That said, the issue of trauma still remains. I am not a psychiatrist, and I cannot make judgments about the mental health of random populations around the world, but I have spent a lot of time talking to Russian psychiatrists and their patients, and also to the people who might be deemed to be at risk. The impression that emerges is one of a society—and I mean the Soviet one, for the wealthiest of today’s Russians are beginning to discover the attractions of western-style therapy—that dealt with hardship and with extreme suffering in ways that were different from those currently favored in my own. To some extent the techniques were coercive, though hardly less than the more totalizing cognitive therapies now available in Britain. To some extent, too, they were inhumane, since they made no allowances for weakness. Instead of pitying the mentally impaired, indeed, Stalin’s regime locked them up. Well into the 1980s, a diagnosis of clinical depression was enough to guarantee that the sufferer would not be granted a driver’s license.

Two points emerged from the things that people said, from their choices of words and images. First, it became clear that the western European emphasis upon the ego is entirely foreign to the Soviet generation. Their communist culture, and—more or less in harmony with it—their older, collectivist culture, emphasized membership of the group, not the analysis of individual feelings. The group provided support in return and even a
sense of personal worth. Rather than looking inward, then, survivors of Stalinist bloodshed turn to each other. In the past, they went on parades and waved flags. Now they sing songs together and tell old stories. The old way was to assert that life was getting better—Stalin himself was fond of the phrase. Today, despite the collapse of Soviet power, they still use more or less the same technique.

The appalling truth—appalling to an outsider, that is—is that these collective statements worked. Morale really was improved by propaganda. Listening to the stories people told, many of them speaking after decades of arbitrary suffering, I was struck by the fact that so many of the victims of one of the cruelest regimes of the twentieth century were actually homesick for it. The traces were there in the way the people talked, in their enduring love for communist slogans and festivals. When a gallery in St. Petersburg mounted an exhibition of socialist realist art entitled, ironically, “agitation for happiness,” a large proportion of people who commented in the visitors’ book expressed their pleasure at seeing such cheerful images back on display, their nostalgia for communist truths still innocent of any sense of rage.

Most of those I met would also balk at the idea of medicalized therapy for what they would call troubles of the soul. Many survivors of the camps tell their stories repeatedly—the horror is their albatross, and they need an audience even today. But they would reject the notion of a “cure” for something that they do not see as illness. Indeed, some regard their painful memories as a resource. I want to tell my story, they would say, you people have to know. It is essential that, collectively, we do not forget. Such voices sound frail when set against the clamor of contemporary Russia, but the contrast only serves to emphasize the courage of the elderly, to say nothing of their generosity at a time when the young are too busy to sit and talk. It is a significant act, in a troubling and fast-moving world, to pause and reassemble stories from the past.

When I got to know some of them well, I did ask some of the elderly about the idea of therapy, of paying someone to listen to the stories. Back in the mid-1990s, a group of psychiatrists who had trained during the Second World War completely failed to understand my question. “We had contusion, of course,” one of them said, referring to mechanical damage to the skull and brain. “But what is this post-dramatic [sic] stress?”

More recently the arrival of British, American, and German aid teams in the former USSR has spread awareness of PTSD widely among the psychiatric profession, but older people remain skeptical. “Therapists?” One elderly woman was amazed when I explained what they were. “Don’t you go on railway journeys in England? What are railway carriages for?”

In the 1990s, then, Soviet survivors of trauma did not believe themselves to have mental health problems—the idea was anathema—and even if they felt that they carried a burden from the past, they did not consider that it could, or even should, be cured. As medical fashions gradually change, the universality of this kind of view is dissolving. Increasingly, wealthier people in larger cities are encountering Anglo-American discourses
of stress, healing, and therapy. It will be interesting to see how these affect their memories of Stalinism, and especially the emphases they choose in new accounts. The case is instructive, and not only for what it suggests about psychiatric diagnosis, adaptation, and cultural norms. But from the point of view of a student of memory, the crucial lesson is that the respondents were not mistaken in the past. They are not slowly finding enlightenment but adopting the style and language of an economically dominant culture. Either way, and whatever our own assumptions and prejudices, it is both patronizing and misguided to assume a better knowledge of survivors than they have themselves.

It is also a mistake to transfer conclusions drawn about the patterns of remembering that characterize one group of people to other groups, even if these are people of similar age and even if they all come from a society as rigid and homogenizing as the Soviet Union. I will explore this by analyzing some of the conclusions I was able to draw after interviewing Gulag survivors—the victims of political repression—and Red Army veterans from the Second World War. The latter might be seen as victims too, especially since many came from families whose members had suffered hunger, expropriation, or death at the regime’s hands, but few related their lives in a victim’s tone. Sixty years after the war’s end, and half a century after the Gulag’s virtual dissolution, Stalinist values persist, internalized by Stalin’s victims to an almost unchallenged degree.

The power of propaganda, of the state’s own value system, is most tragically evident in the case of Gulag survivors. Here are people who have every right to be enraged, to rail against the injustice of a system that arrested them for no cause, destroying their families, their homes, their health, and the futures for which they had been working in good faith for years. The classic spokesman for that group is the writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, whose novels were the first to force the reality of the Gulag upon an unwilling Western imagination in the 1970s. Others, too, not all of them so fluent, can link their suffering to the oppressive nature of an entire social, political, and ideological system. To the extent that they were excluded from mainstream Soviet life even after their release, many survivors of the camps have unusually perceptive things to say about Stalinism, and some are clear-sighted about its impact on their neighbors, employers, and former friends. The Gulag generated a language and culture of its own, perhaps the only systematic alternative to official Soviet ones. Their identity as outsiders is an attractive, bitterly sympathetic characteristic that most of its survivors share.

Despite their suffering, however, and despite their awareness of a macabre injustice, the majority of Gulag survivors, the ordinary people who do not write books, are still caught up, to a greater or lesser extent, in the paradigms of the very system that destroyed their world. Ironically, too, they remain caught even today, when younger people who know nothing of the Soviet mind are oblivious to the shadows and slurs that still oppress their elders. The first sign of this entrapment, of the persistence of Soviet ways of thought (and degrees of guilt), becomes obvious as soon as older people speak. The majority of
Gulag survivors, poorly educated, poor in other senses, too, present themselves in interview exactly as good Soviet citizens were taught to do. That is, when asked informally about their lives, most respond with the same set piece.

It is poignant indeed to sit with a frail and elderly person and hear them declaiming in this way. They start with their year and place of birth—which seems natural, if precipitously self-revealing—but then they talk about their social origin, identifying themselves according to the class hierarchy that Lenin established and Stalin refined. It is better, by these rules, to state that one’s parents were poor peasants than to admit, perhaps, that one’s father was a shopkeeper or, worse, came from a family of priests. The fact that “poor peasant” is not a statement about life but a political claim (“middle” peasants were less well-regarded, and kulaks, supposedly the wealthiest peasants, were social pariahs), the fact that it conceals layers of injustice (the labels were ascribed from outside and bore little relationship to economic reality in the villages), even the sheer redundancy of the language—all these things speak of Stalinism’s enduring and poisonous hold upon citizens’ minds.

After social origin comes education. This, too, is strange to British ears, since few of my colleagues would state how many years of schooling they had received if asked about their lives by a total stranger. Oddest of all, however, is the brief statement about party membership. “I joined the party in 1934,” one veteran might say, while another might state that he was “non-party.” Either way, what was happening was a self-location with reference to a value system and language that have vanished—and that had also punished them for their whole lives. Here again, of course, no British respondent would automatically state what political party they belonged to (and there is a choice, including that of joining none and caring for them not at all). For Soviet citizens, party membership was a defining measure of citizenship, privilege, and prospects.

The irony is cruel already, then, but there is worse to come. Gulag veterans always insist upon their innocence. At one level, such a statement is obvious. Stalin’s repressions swept through the Soviet population with apparent irrationality (the rationale lay in the fear that they created, not the choice of victim) and almost no one who suffered was “guilty” of a recognizable offence. The whole system was outrageous, illegal, its charge sheets and interrogation records monstrous fabrications. The point is that few of the elderly can see this clearly in their own cases. When they recount their arrest and interrogation, and then the appalling tale of their exile, they keep a close eye on the criminal code. “They tried me under article 58 section 10,” they will say. “But when you look at the article itself, you can see that in my case . . . ,” and then follows the self-justification, the appeal to rationality. The message is that a mistake was made. But the deeper implication is that in other cases, arrest and outrageous sentence may have been justified, since few then make the next step and declare that the whole system was absurd, brutal, and inhumane.
Few survivors would follow their own logic to this point. The implication hangs mutely in their choice of words, their silences. At its core, the problem lies with Stalinism’s saturating propaganda, not with their failure to think harder about the world. And there is one more key to the power of the past in their lives. For whatever doubts might have been possible in the 1930s, whatever anger smoldered among displaced peasants or impoverished clerks, the cataclysm of the Second World War would transform everything. It was the watershed in everybody’s lives, and survivors of the Gulag are not exceptions.

The Gulag was a lethal place to be throughout the five years of the so-called Great Patriotic War. Its inmates were forced to work harder than ever, digging minerals, logging, or providing the raw labor for construction sites. Work was presented as their patriotic duty, their chance to make some amends, and they were pressed to do so at a time when even the supposedly free citizens of the Soviet Union labored like slaves. In the Gulag, as everywhere else, meanwhile, rations shrank, and for some prisoners they fell below the level needed for survival. Mortality rates in the camps were always appalling, but they peaked in 1942, the most terrible year in a brutal history. The prospects for those prisoners who were allowed to serve in the Red Army were hardly better. Many were drafted directly to the front, rattling from Siberia to East Prussia in unheated trains. Without training, without adequate food, clothing, or care, many would die in the first fighting that they saw. It was called “redeeming crimes against the Motherland with one’s own blood.”

With such memories to haunt them, it would be natural for Gulag veterans, doubly victimized by repression and the burdens of the war, to resent everything about the system that they served. Ironically, however, most are proud of their contribution to the war effort, and proud, too, of their enduring patriotism. No survivor conveyed this to me more bluntly than Yudif Borisovna, a magnificent ninety-year-old Gulag survivor, patriot, and former communist.

Yudif’s early memories include images of life in the cosmopolitan city of Odessa. It was here that she learned to play the piano, the child of well-to-do and educated parents. During the civil war, Yudif’s father worked for the Cheka, the Soviet revolutionary police, and later his career in the service of the new state would take him to an elite administrative post in Moscow. His only daughter flourished at school, receiving the best education that Soviet science could provide, and by the mid-1930s she was contemplating a professional career. No one predicted the catastrophe that broke in 1937. Yudif’s father was arrested that February, and her mother disappeared a few months later. In August, it was Yudif’s turn. As she huddled in the Butyrki prison, or sweated her way to the Urals in the cramped wagon of a convict train, she did not know for certain that her father had been shot, nor did she know that her mother was still alive. She would learn nothing of their fates for almost twenty years. Her imprisonment, her exile in a series of dismal camps, continued until the amnesty of the 1950s. Only then would she discover that her mother was alive, a confused semi-invalid, never able to cope with the reality of life again. The
two women returned to the Moscow region (they were banned from the city itself) and built lives for themselves, but they remained impoverished, outcast, and stigmatized. Even today, Yudif’s tiny flat is scarcely furnished, her cupboards empty.

Despite all this—and much that I have no space to describe—Yudif’s resilience is inspiring; she is one of the most attractive people I have ever met. She shows me a photograph of herself as a teenager, proud of the thick hair that still graces her head. There are pictures of her father, shot in the neck as a Trotskyist, a photograph of the family before everything was lost. A disaster that would have destroyed weaker people is related calmly, almost without tears. The Gulag might have broken Yudif’s health, but somehow she survived. She even conceived and bore a son there, although—like so many women of her generation—she would outlive her child. She talks of the past with little bitterness, but there is one topic that remains both sensitive and irreducible. Yudif regards herself as a war veteran. Her labor was as vital to the victory as any free person’s, and it was offered willingly and in a patriotic spirit.

This is the only point where rancor surfaces. Yudif can still picture the scorn that greeted her when she returned to freedom, the whispers, spitting, cold remarks. War veterans of other kinds, she comments, received generous pensions and the plaudits of a grateful state. But Yudif, loyal patriot though she remains, got nothing but cruel disdain and the whispered rumor that there is no smoke without fire. Even in the mid-1990s some kinds of veteran received more generous pensions than others. Yudif’s was among the most miserly. While such discrimination lasts, while the divisions that Stalin’s state established still endure, it is hard for survivors to transcend their pasts. Touchingly, however, Yudif still treasures one pathetic prize. In 1995, she was among the thousands of Gulag survivors who received a medal from Boris Yeltsin’s government for their war service. The state involved had gone—the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991—and its values had been repudiated, but for people like Yudif the recognition was vital. The garish piece of plastic is one of her dearest possessions.

Yudif’s patriotism is a poignant reminder of the intensity of the emotion provoked among Soviet survivors whenever the war against Hitler is mentioned. It is sad, then, that her right to be counted among the veterans is dismissed by so many of her fellow survivors. Like her, most ordinary soldiers in the Red Army grew up at a time of state violence and acute social deprivation. Few indeed are the people who can thank Stalin for richer, calmer, more fulfilling lives. Nonetheless, Red Army veterans regard themselves as an elite, more patriotic and more Soviet than the “rats” who stayed in the rear. Many—not all—view former Gulag inmates with disdain, while most would claim that the Red Army carried the main burden of the country’s war effort. Sixty years of affirmation, of commemorative ceremonies, medals, speeches, and the like, have turned these former peasants and frightened young conscripts into heroes.

Having interviewed at least two hundred veterans of Stalin’s war, I remain amazed by the tales of courage, stamina, and generosity that many tell. But these are almost always
framed by a pervasive myth, a story of the war as a collective exploit, and it dominates the way that the war is remembered and described. The struggle against fascism was the most vivid and demanding chapter in the lives of almost all survivors, but they relate it with surprising uniformity of style and emphasis. I can think of few examples where the state’s control over ideas, and even over individual imaginations, has been more pervasive.

Veteran soldiers generally begin their accounts with very much the same biographical details about social origin, education, and party membership as Gulag survivors do. But while each Gulag story is different, and while each contains emotion of the harshest kinds, war veterans’ tales tend to be bland. They pick up speed when they reach the moment when the young man signed up for the front, but thereafter there are standard words and images for almost every stage. The emphases follow a pattern, too, and the subjects that most narratives avoid are also identical. Among other things, war veterans will never talk about cowardice, desertion, or crime. Partly because of this, but also because of the uniformity of the language, their stories also have a synthetic feel. They talk as if, almost, they were describing events and emotions that affected someone else.

There are good reasons for their detachment. In the first place, veterans of the Second World War are now remembering events that happened more than sixty years ago. Anyone’s memory is unreliable over such an expanse of time (a fact that most interviewers, who will not have lived as long, may easily overlook). People forget, and when they do, they turn to other sources—books and films, but most of all their own favorite and time-honored anecdotes—in order to provide a story. Confabulation is little more, in these cases, than the repetition of tales that were created years ago and that have come to stand for everything, to play the part of memory.

Like Gulag survivors, war veterans are often trying to assemble memories of trauma. In some cases, their minds will block things out, in others, long-established surrogates for memory serve better than the real thing. Not all of these are the result of individual fantasy, either. I often found, when listening to veterans’ tales, that the story I was hearing had a strangely familiar ring, and often, later, I would realize that the narrative I had just heard had been written by a war novelist like Konstantin Simonov decades earlier. The point here—and it is another difference between war veterans and other survivors of Stalin’s world—is that war veterans have an almost infinite supply of fictional or memoir sources to draw on. They also have an all-purpose collective myth, a morale-boosting narrative of resistance and victory created by their state during the war and sustained by it ever since. They are eager to talk, to share all this, but getting them to think back to reality, to the details of life, emotion, fear, or hope, remains difficult. They were, in fact, more difficult to interview, over and over again, than Gulag survivors.

Other problems also account for this peculiar reticence, a barrier despite the endless torrent of their words. Many claimed that they still felt bound by the oath that all Red Army soldiers had to sign before they could be demobilized. This pledged them to silence on every aspect of military life, including strategic or operational matters but also covering
the poor food and their lack of boots. They were also forbidden to mention any crimes they might have witnessed at the front, a taboo that, among other things, ruled out the whole story of rape in Prussia in 1945. The state to which these people pledged this oath betrayed them terribly after 1945. Some veterans, indeed, ended up in the Gulag, including many of those who protested the army’s atrocities in Germany. Moreover, the Soviet state ceased to exist years ago, negating any oaths made to it back in 1945. It is a testimony to the power of these people’s loyalty—and also, perhaps, to their fear—that so many demobilized soldiers feel bound by their old promise sixty years later. Patriotism is even stronger among the veterans whose lives Stalin was so willing to throw away than it is among the victims of his vicious purge.

So what is going on, and what do these two kinds of narrative, the war veterans’ stories and those of Gulag survivors, tell us about memory, trauma, and oral history? One thing that stands out is that Stalin’s people had a clear idea of hierarchy. Anyone who listens to their stories would call it a hierarchy of victims, but to the survivors themselves the differences between a former inmate of the Gulag (with or without a medal for war service), a veteran of Stalingrad, and the last man to escape a punishment battalion and fight on to Koenigsberg are crucial. These differences dictate such things as the size of someone’s pension, but that is not the main issue. The real hierarchy was a creation of Stalinist culture, a system that thrived by making everyone feel slightly superior to their neighbor—and desperately afraid of losing the edge that they had over others in their street.

So the power of Stalinist politics is one enduring feature of memory, but it is more important to listen for the accounts of survival. I do not mean the fables that all soldiers tell about their exploits at the front, fascinating though these may be. Oral history is not the place to look, really, for “facts”; at best it is only one of several ways of recovering the past. More telling, for in this case there is no other source, is the question of how these millions of people have managed to live with images—sounds, sights, words—that are supposed to haunt human imaginations to a disabling extent. One answer is that they did it in part by making the stories formulaic and even boring. By being boring about violence—and two hundred stories later I should know—they were also able to distance themselves from the emotional truth at the heart of all their wars.

It is that truth, in the end, and not any trick of Stalin’s, that explains their enduring patriotism. Red Army veterans will often say that they fought for revenge and in a spirit of hatred for the fascists, and both those claims are largely true. More complicated, however, is the observation that they also fought out of a kind of love. To appreciate this, you need to go a bit further than the traditional explanations of combat motivation, which state that soldiers fight for their buddies, for the primary group of mates that immediately surrounds them in their billet and on the battlefield. After all, few infantrymen in the Red Army survived for more than three months at the front line. Comradeship was a transient thing, seldom allowing for enduring friendships between living men.
Death, however, was part of the story. The killing of a close friend, which was a daily, sometimes hourly, occurrence, served only to make the cause yet more sacred. Soldiers whose friends had perished could not betray their country, the patriotic cause, without betraying precious memories. A dead comrade had an even stronger hold on the imagination than a live one, indeed, for the dead can watch one’s inner world. A living friend will never truly know what you are thinking, but a dead one, in imagination, sees into your soul. It was death—and comradeship—that made the war sacred, and its sanctity has never lifted. Now that they are old and failing, veterans feel an even stronger obligation to the memory of their wartime mates, to say nothing of a greater sense of their closeness. It is almost sacrilege to talk of this, let alone to question the meaning of an old person’s most private sense of loss.

The other thing the war did was to destroy people’s pasts. At a material level it often knocked away their homes and their careers, their prewar lives. More vitally, however, war—combat—separated people from their former selves. As every combatant attests, battle is a kind of spiritual Rubicon, to say nothing of presenting a physical challenge that can change a person overnight. Soldiers aged rapidly at the front. They developed new muscles and suntans, but they also acquired scars, injuries, and boils. Many lost teeth (and there were no toothbrushes at the front, so everyone’s teeth suffered). Others were shocked to find that their hair had gone white overnight. In their letters to their wives, still others wrote of their fear that they might have become impotent.

What all this means is that the war marked a loss more profound than veterans can easily describe within the space of an interview. Only the belief that the sacrifice was worthwhile can ever make this bearable. If a veteran began to doubt that story, the result would be disabling bitterness. For this reason, too, even survivors of the Gulag turn to the story of wartime service to make sense of loss, disability, poverty, and shame.

These are the real lessons of the memories I heard over the past decade. My observations are not about false or true memory or subjectivity, nor are they about a search for facts. The most important insight that Soviet stories offer is a tale of survival in extreme circumstances, of making something out of almost nothing, and of the dignity that such a choice confers. From a political point of view, as an outsider, I might deplore the refusal to be angry or to act on the insults and injustice of Stalinism. As a listener with an open mind, however, I have learned something about human endurance. Among the people I met were scores of heroes in the simplest and most conventional sense—people who stayed beside their guns while everyone they loved lay shattered beside them, people who slipped through German lines at night, survivors of Siberian ice and darkness. Their stories of the past were inspiring, but more important was the story of their lives. They sat beside me, leafing through old pictures, and as we drank our tea they talked about their grandchildren, about the weather and the news. Despite it all, they had made real lives after the memories, evaded the specter of bitterness, and found a unique and extraordinary peace.
“In the past half-century, two works have marked what can be called conceptual breakthroughs in our apprehension of the Holocaust,” writes Shoshana Felman in her 2002 book The Juridical Unconscious. The first was Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, which appeared in the United States in 1963 as a report on the Eichmann trial held in Israel in 1961. The second was the film Shoah by Claude Lanzmann, which first appeared in France in 1985.” These two works, Felman elaborates, changed “the vocabulary of collective memory”—they added a “new idiom to the discourse on the Holocaust.” A new idiom, Felman might have said, to the discourse on memory more generally, for in the decades between the Eichmann trial, Lanzmann’s Shoah, and Felman’s assessment, the Holocaust has in many ways shaped the discourse on collective, social, and cultural memory, serving both as touchstone and paradigm. For Felman, this new idiom, this shift in “our vocabularies of remembrance,” is witness testimony. Witness testimony locates the possibility of grasping the Holocaust in “the slippage between law and art”—between the closure brought by legal judgment and the open-ended immediacy and presence preserved in a work of art.

Seeing the Eichmann trial, Arendt’s book, and Lanzmann’s Shoah as breakthrough texts in the discourses on memory of the last half-century can help us to define the provocations and challenges that the Holocaust has brought to memory studies and to ask, conversely, how the notion of “memory” and memory studies have shaped the contours of Holocaust studies. Thus, the trajectory between the trial, the film, and Felman’s book—one of many possible trajectories through which one might approach these questions—foregrounds and sharpens the fundamental contradiction brought by the centrality of witness testimony to cultural discourses about memory: the contradiction between the necessity, on the one hand, but also the impossibility of fully bearing witness
to this particular traumatic past. If our vocabulary of collective memory has had to shift over the last half century, it is precisely due to this aporia and the evidentiary, ethical, and artistic crises it has spawned. These crises have indeed been at the heart of memory studies, bringing with them a concentration on the figure of the embodied witness, on trauma and transmission, and on the complex relationship between enunciation, listening, and truth.

In what follows, we look closely and critically at the contradictions at the core of Holocaust witness testimony. We argue that the theoretical and philosophical efforts to grasp and define these have provoked a radical rethinking of the workings of memory and transmission: in particular, a foregrounding of embodiment, affect, and silence. Yet we caution that a hyperbolic emphasis on trauma and the breakdown of speech has risked occluding the wealth of knowledge and information transmitted by thousands of witnesses who have been eager to testify to the victimization and persecution they have suffered. We find that the very questions and aporias that have made the Holocaust a touchstone for the study of twentieth-century memory and catastrophe have thus engendered two distinctive interpretive uses of witness testimony—one linked to a troubling idiom of uniqueness and exceptionalism, potentially supporting nationalist and identity politics, the other, to cosmopolitan or transnational memory cultures able to sustain efforts toward the global attainment of human rights.

The Witness

Throughout *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Arendt evaluates, critically, different aspects of the trial. Among other objections, she contends that the trial should primarily have been about Adolf Eichmann and his crimes and not, as it turned out to be, about the horrific suffering of the victims. “Eichmann was on the stand from June 20 to July 24, or a total of thirty-three and a half sessions. Almost twice as many sessions, sixty-two out of a total of a hundred and twenty-one, were spent on a hundred prosecution witnesses who, country after country, told their tales of horror.” Arendt criticizes the selection of witnesses and the extensive hearing they received (many volunteered, some had published books and were well known). She finds the victim testimony to be distracting, extraneous to the judgment of the accused. Only one witness, Herschel Grynszpan, serves as a model for her, in the “simplicity,” economy, and narrative skill with which he tells his story: it took him no more than ten minutes to convey the “needless destruction of twenty-seven years in less than twenty-four hours.” Listening to this witness, “one thought foolishly: Everyone, everyone should have his day in court. Only to find out, in the endless sessions that followed, how difficult it was to tell the story.” For Arendt, it takes righteousness, a “purity of soul, an unmirrored, unreflected innocence of heart and mind” to testify in this
way, but she finds that few possess the moral virtues requisite for such narrative simplicity and clarity.5

Critics of Arendt, however, as well as other commentators on the trial, find its essence precisely in the space it provided for the voices and the embodied presence of the survivor-witnesses.6 If the Eichmann trial was revolutionary, a milestone in the history of Holocaust memory and memorialization, it is because it allowed for a collective story to emerge through individual victim testimonies and to gain, in Felman’s terms, “semantic authority.”7 The authority, in fact, transcends those victims who were able to testify at the trial; it even transcends those who did not survive to tell their tale. Famously, Gideon Hausner, the prosecutor, opened his own address to the Israeli court not on behalf of the state he represented, but of “six million prosecutors”: “When I stand before you, judges of Israel, in this court, to accuse Adolf Eichmann, I do not stand alone. Here with me at this moment stand six million prosecutors. But alas, they cannot rise to level the finger of accusation in the direction of the glass dock and cry out j’accuse against the man who sits there. . . . Their blood cries to Heaven, but their voice cannot be heard. Thus it falls to me to be their mouthpiece and to deliver the heinous accusation in their name.”8 If the Nuremberg trial focused on the war criminals and left out the story of the victims, the Eichmann trial served as a corrective, foregrounding in that courtroom the unwieldy survivor narratives that so annoyed Arendt. “It was mainly through the testimony of witnesses,” Hausner later wrote, “that the events could be reproduced in court, and thus conveyed to the people of Israel and to the world at large, in such a way that men would not recoil from the same narratives as from scalding steam, and so that it would not remain the fantastic, unbelievable apparition that emerges from Nazi documents.”9 While Arendt, and also Judge Landau, protested against the procession of witnesses—their unruly confusions, contradictions, and misrememberings—the prosecutor and subsequent commentators saw the “picture” they “paint,” and the collective voice they assume, as the trial’s most meaningful legacy. Indeed, it may be Arendt’s very discomfort with witness testimony, and the contradictions it reveals, that move Felman to feature Eichmann in Jerusalem as in itself such a landmark text. Her conversation and disagreement with Arendt allow Felman to strengthen her claim that “the Eichmann trial legally creates a radically original and new event: not a rehearsal of a given story, but a groundbreaking narrative event that is itself historically and legally unprecedented.”10 For Felman, this is the translation of private stories into one collective story that receives a legal hearing and public acknowledgement and validation.11

At the center of this single collective story was the interrupted testimony of Yehiel Dinoor, to which Felman devotes an entire chapter entitled “A Ghost in the House of Justice.” Dinoor was a concentration camp survivor who had become a writer under the name of K-Zetnik, and who had published a number of works about what he called the “planet Auschwitz.” (KZ is the German abbreviation for Konzentrationslager.) When
asked about his “pen name” by the prosecutor, K-Zetnik protested that it was not a pen name since he did not consider himself a writer of literature. Instead, echoing and transforming Hausner’s proxy speech on behalf of “six million prosecutors,” K-Zetnik presented himself as a chronicler speaking in the name of and evoking all the concentration camp inmates, or “K-Zetniks,” from the “planet Auschwitz,” whose “look,” he said, “was inside [his] eyes.” 12 The prosecutor’s interruptions of the witness’s evocation of these inmates, and his insistence on asking the witness a few direct questions about his experiences, provoked K-Zetnik to faint on the stand and be taken to the hospital, where he fell into a coma for several weeks. While Arendt sees K-Zetnik’s testimony as a case in her point against victim narratives, the Israeli poet Haim Gouri, who also covered the trial, asserts that in fainting, K-Zetnik “in fact, . . . said it all.” 13 In Felman’s terms, “what K-Zetnik wants is not to prove but to transmit.” 14 Instead of describing him as a failed witness, as Arendt does, Felman sees him as a terrified, retraumatized witness—one who, in the courtroom and in the encounter with Eichmann, returns to the “other planet” and relives his horrific experiences there before the eyes of the world, collapsing the distance between present and past, between “here” and “over there.” In that sense, his lifeless body can be said to “say it all.” As Gouri concludes, “The things he added afterward would turn out to be merely superfluous detail.” 15

In fact, by inviting survivors to bear witness, the court seems to have made space for the fainting episode of K-Zetnik and even perhaps for the possibility that such an episode might complicate the given understanding of legal evidence. For Felman, it illustrates the “slippage between law and art:” it reflects that unspeakable and unrepresentable realm that stands outside of legal discourse and that can only be transmitted through the body language and the non-verbal performance of the traumatized witness. K-Zetnik’s moment of collapse becomes a paradigm for the aporia of Holocaust testimony—the necessity and the impossibility of bearing witness to the “planet Auschwitz.” Its “testimonial power . . . lay precisely in the pathos—the crying power—of its legal muteness,” Felman asserts, and thus it attests to the new understanding of evidence and the new forms of listening and interpretation that the traumatized survivor of the Shoah has provoked. 16

The disagreement between Arendt and Felman about the trial and their divergent interpretations of Dinoor’s collapse reflects the shift in the dominant conception of Holocaust memory and representation in the last half century: indeed they stage the encounter between “history” and “memory” in Holocaust studies. The historian Annette Wieviorka locates this encounter in the shift in the function of testimony that comes with the Eichmann trial but that, in its aftermath, is relevant beyond the context of the law: “Testimony has changed direction. Print has been replaced by the tape recorder and the video camera. At the same time, the function of testimony has also changed. In the years following the war, the primary aim of testimony was knowledge—knowledge of the modalities of genocide and the deportation. Testimony had the status of an archival document. Today . . . the purpose of testimony is no longer to obtain knowledge. Time has passed and the
historian does not trust a memory in which the past has begun to blur and which has been enriched by various images since the survivor’s return to freedom. The mission that has devolved to testimony is no longer to bear witness to inadequately known events, but to keep them before our eyes. Testimony is to be a means of transmission to future generations.”17 With the Eichmann trial, Wieviorka says, the witness becomes a “bearer of history,” an “embodiment of memory [un homme-mémoire], attesting to the past and to the continuing presence of the past.”18 The “bearer of history” illustrates the need for “memory” to supplement “history.” As Geoffrey Hartman writes: “Survivor testimonies do not excel in providing vérités de fait or positivist history. . . . Their real strength lies in recording the psychological and emotional milieu of the struggle for survival, not only then, but also now.” For Hartman, “the immediacy of these first-person accounts burns through the ‘cold storage of history.’” They give “texture to memory or to images that otherwise would have only sentimental or informational impact. . . . [Now] . . . emotion and empathy accompany knowledge.”19

If the main function of testimony now is not to inform factually but to transmit affectively, it cannot do so by purely verbal means, whether oral or written. K-Zetnik’s linguistic breakdown, and the telling nature of his physical collapse, suggest all that he could not express verbally within the frame and the idiom of the courtroom. Jean-François Lyotard has called this disjunction of idioms “the differend”: “A case of a differend between two parties takes place when the ‘regulation’ of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom.”20 And Jacques Derrida has worked to uncouple the notion of “bearing witness” from the notion of “proof” that tends to “divert” and “contaminate” it, suggesting it “appeals to the act of faith” and is “heterogeneous to producing proof.”21 In fainting, K-Zetnik performs that appeal and brings that other idiom, located in the memory of his body, before the eyes of the court, and he thus transmits another kind of knowledge, one that exceeds the “facts” of his persecution. In his essay on the memoirs of Auschwitz survivor Charlotte Delbo, Thomas Trezise, echoing Lyotard on the differend, shows that “the voice of testimony cannot fully coincide with itself torn as it is between the language of fact and the shattering of the very framework on which the intelligibility of such language relies.”22

The “language of fact” offers information about the past, and can constitute legal evidence and archival documentation. It can also serve as a protective shield enabling survival. Charlotte Delbo distinguishes between two kinds of memory of trauma, the “‘ordinary’ intellectual memory, the memory connected to the thinking processes” from which she can speak of Auschwitz, and the “deep memory” that “preserves sensations, physical imprints,” “the memory of the senses.” Delbo describes the elaborate ways in which she needs to shield herself from being re-engulfed by the deep memory and thus
the immediacy and lasting presence of Auschwitz: “Auschwitz is there, unalterable, precise, but enveloped in the skin of memory, an impermeable skin that isolates it from my present self. . . . I live within a twofold being.”

Dinoor/K-Zetnik: The survivor-witness’s two names reflect such a “twofold being.” Significantly, K-Zetnik’s collapse occurred at the moment when he was questioned about his name. In objecting that his name is not a pseudonym, K-Zetnik insists on remaining inside his “Auschwitz self” that is located in the body and outside speech. But, under what conditions, and in what mode, can the traumatized, desubjectified, dehumanized victim bear witness from inside the protective “skin of memory?” When Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub write, in their book *Testimony*, that the Holocaust is “an event without a witness,” they elaborate precisely on this difficulty of being “a witness to oneself,” which, Laub insists, is “central to the Holocaust experience.” “There was,” Laub continues, “historically no witness to the Holocaust, either from outside or from inside the event.” Laub argues that no one could bear witness from the outside because Nazi ideology was so psychologically invasive and pernicious that “no observer could remain untainted” and all external frames of reference disappeared. Thus, what collapsed was the possibility of a victim addressing an Other—one uncontaminated by the magnitude of the event. Without the possibility of an implied listener, the dehumanized victim is unable to bear witness to him or herself, “from the inside.” The paradox of the witness’s “I” is an essential element of the contradiction between the necessity and the impossibility of bearing witness to the Holocaust.

Claude Lanzmann’s *Shoah*, Felman’s second paradigm-shifting work and one, as she shows, deeply influenced by the Eichmann trial, is precisely dedicated to making possible the act of witness “from the inside,” albeit in retrospect. Visually, its nine and a half hours exclude all archival footage in favor of the faces of surviving victims, bystanders, and perpetrators, and of the places where the events of the Shoah took place. Pursuing most obsessively the actual machinery of extermination perpetrated by the Nazi regime, Lanzmann concentrates many of his interviews on the surviving members of the Sonderkommando, the special squads of Jewish prisoners who were forced to aid in the process of extermination, cleaning gas chambers and ovens, exhuming mass graves. These are the individuals whom Primo Levi called “bearers of a horrendous secret,” and it is this secret that Lanzmann, breaking through their protective shield of trauma, most wants them to reveal and to transmit to him and to his cinematic audience.

Viewers of *Shoah* are often surprised at the detailed factual questions Lanzmann poses during his interviews; why, we wonder, for example, does he need to know exactly how large the undressing room was or how many steps it took to walk to the gas chamber? In posing these kinds of factual questions to witness after witness, Lanzmann seems to be using testimony to elicit information, in the first sense that Wieviorka outlines. But the rehearsal of the minute facets of the extermination process may well
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serve another purpose altogether. Along with the invitation to repeat songs and sayings, to reenact, bodily, the movements and gestures of the past and to remember its very details, Lanzmann is able to provoke powerful nonverbal bodily reenactments of the kind the world witnessed from K-Zetnik at the Eichmann trial. There are a few uncanny moments in the film, when survivor- and bystander-witnesses do not merely narrate the past but literally seem to be back inside it. Memory, here, gives way to what Lanzmann calls “incarnation.”

The most disturbing and controversial example of this form of reenactment is the testimony of Abraham Bomba, a barber who cut Jewish women’s hair inside the gas chambers in Treblinka and who, in the film, is interviewed in a barber shop in Tel Aviv while cutting the hair of a male client. Bomba’s hands repeat the familiar gestures of a barber cutting hair, while the filmmaker poses question after question to him about his memories of cutting the hair of groups of naked women shortly before they were gassed. “How did it look, the gas chamber?” Lanzmann asks. “Can you describe precisely?” When Bomba is then asked how he felt when he first saw the naked women entering the gas chamber, he resists the question: “I felt that accordingly I got to do what they told me, to cut their hair in a way that it looked like the barber was doing his job for a woman.” Lanzmann pulls back, asks for more factual detail and suggests, “Can you imitate how you did it?” before returning to his question about feelings and impressions. Bomba resists more directly on this second occasion: “I tell you something. To have a feeling about that . . . it was very hard to feel anything, because working there day and night between dead people, between bodies, your feelings disappeared, you were dead. You had no feeling at all.” But even as he protests against the discussion of feelings, Bomba begins to narrate the most searing story of all—the moment when the women from his own hometown entered the gas chamber and began talking to him. His narrative breaks down completely when he gets to the description of how a barber friend of his from his hometown met his own wife and sister in the gas chamber. Bomba describes this but then stops, insisting that “it’s too horrible.” As he ceases to speak, the camera closes in on his face scrutinizing it insistently. After a moment’s pause, Lanzmann’s prodding voice is heard saying: “We have to do it . . . We must go on.” The witness remains silent and withdraws into himself. His lips are dry, he licks them repeatedly, turning his tongue this way and that in his mouth. He then mutters a few inaudible and incomprehensible phrases in what could be Polish or Yiddish, looking down, shaking his head and avoiding the camera. After what seems like a long while, he wipes his eyes, and continues talking about his friend and his wife and sister in his strongly accented English. But what, one might ask, could he say that his moments of desperate silence and pleading not to go on did not already convey?

Like K-Zetnik at the Eichmann trial, Abraham Bomba is able to bear witness “from the inside”—literally from inside the gas chamber, and from inside his own “Auschwitz self.” But, for him, reaching into the depths of that place means ceasing to speak at all, at
least for a few moments. One certainly wonders whether the “friend” who met his wife and sister was not actually Bomba himself, and whether he can only remember that scene through the protective shields of projection and displacement—in the second person (“you were dead”), or the third (“a friend of mine”). When, in a recent seminar at the Museum of Jewish Heritage in New York, Lanzmann ventured that “the tears of Bomba are worth gold,” he clarified the values on which his project is based. The ultimate truth, he implies, the ultimate act of witness, comes from inside the gas chamber and from the mute testimony of memory emerging from the body.

Filip Müller, one of the most verbally articulate witnesses in Shoah, also breaks down and cries precisely at the moment when he tries to describe the people from his own hometown walking into the gas chambers. In despair, Müller decided to join them in death but the women pushed him back out, demanding that he survive to bear witness. He can tell that story in the film, but he can powerfully transmit it through his moments of silence and through his hand gestures and tears.

The disjunctions and non-coincidences that are at the heart of traumatic testimony, the location of the essence of Holocaust experience in the bodily wound, and thus in the deep embodied memory of the survivor, have shaped the debates about Holocaust memory and representation in the last decades. They account for a privileging of video testimony as the genre most able to communicate the sense memory of the survivor. Yet, problematically, they may also abstract the moments of muteness and of collapse as those that most closely reveal the “truth” of the event. Articulate promoters of video testimony like Laurence Langer even believe that through the embodied presence of the survivor and the bodily reenactment of the camp experience, this genre can give us a form of access to an “unmediated truth” about the Holocaust or to “the thing itself” (Langer’s terms). Video testimony includes narrative and bodily reenactment, and its interpreters often focus in greater detail on this latter dimension that written testimony fails to provide. The moments that best illustrate and represent embodied memory tend to be the moments where speech fails and where the distance between past and present seem to collapse. In these moments—moments like Bomba’s speechlessness or K-Zetnik’s fainting—the body of the traumatized witness “from the inside” seems closest to offering access to the unspeakable essence of trauma and its continuity in the present. But when, in the process of analysis and reflection, we cite and repeat those moments, when we thus abstract them from the context of their appearance, we risk projecting too pervasive a structure of meaning onto them.

In these moments, the oral witness goes mute. We see the way this happens when Bomba’s mouth literally runs out of sufficient saliva to go on producing words. Only after a few struggling moments can Bomba put his “Auschwitz self” back inside the protective skin of memory to continue his narrative. Our attention is riveted to the muteness and bodily affect. Such concentrated attention to the deep memory lodged in the body, and to the unspoken and unspeakable dimensions of traumatic recall, can, however, give rise
to a troubling implication: that silence and muteness are more telling and forceful than verbal narratives. Muteness and the mute witness have thus acquired the status of the "true" and "complete" witness to the Shoah, particularly through the influential, but, we find, deeply problematic argument of Giorgio Agamben in his Remnants of Auschwitz. For Agamben, the "complete" witness, the only one who can give a true sense of what he calls "Auschwitz" (Agamben refuses the term "Holocaust" or any term like it, using only "Auschwitz") is the "Muselmann," who represents humanity at its limits. In the camp, prisoners designated as "Muselmänner" were the ones who ceased to be human beings, who gave up and knew that they would die. They are the walking corpses, the living dead, the bearers of "bare life." The "Muselmann" is unbearable to look at, yet he is at the core of the camp, and thus at the core of what Agamben calls "Auschwitz." In Agamben's terms, the "witness" is the remnant, the humanity that could not be destroyed, that survived the annihilation, but that cannot speak.

Agamben's argument is based on his reading of a passage in which Primo Levi, in his essay "Shame," questions his own authority to bear witness to the reality of Auschwitz and the Nazi genocide: "My religious friend had told me that I survived so that I could bear witness. . . . I must repeat: we, the survivors, are not the true witnesses. . . . We survivors are not only an exiguous but also an anomalous minority: we are those who by their prevarications or abilities or good luck did not touch bottom. Those who did so, those who saw the Gorgon, have not returned to tell about it or have returned mute, but they are the 'Muslims,' the submerged, the complete witnesses, the ones whose deposition would have a general significance. . . . We speak in their stead, by proxy." Agamben's hyperbolic reflection stands in contrast to Levi's modest and understated disclaimer. While Levi specifies that the "true" and "complete" witness is the one who did not return because he was murdered, or because he was so traumatized as to return mute, Agamben collapses this distinction and concentrates on the broken and speechless figure of the "Muselmann" as the only authoritative and "complete witness." It is this figure that embodies the "aporia of Auschwitz" and provokes Agamben to work through the irreducible paradox of testimony: "the one who cannot bear witness is the true witness, the absolute witness." Who can bear witness for all those who can no longer testify on their own behalf, Primo Levi asks. In the Eichmann trial, the prosecutor stood before the court as the "mouthpiece" of "six million prosecutors" whose "voices could no longer be heard." Levi speaks "in their stead, by proxy." The ranting K-Zetnik was the proxy witness for those who did not survive to tell their tale. But Agamben's remnant is speechlessness itself: there is no proxy.

With the liminal figure of the mute, desubjectified witness who can only testify outside language, we reach not only the limit of the human but also the limit of the historical and legal archive. Mute testimony, deep embodied memory, is not verifiable. It exceeds the boundaries of documents, records, and other conventional forms of evidence. It shifts
the transmission and knowledge of the past onto an entirely different register. Here, indeed, we reach what Agamben calls the “aporia of Auschwitz,” or the “non-coincidence between facts and truth, between verification and comprehension.”46

Truth and Truthfulness

“Aujourd’hui, je ne suis pas sûre que ce que j’ai écrit soit vrai. Je suis sûre que c’est véridique,” writes Charlotte Delbo in the epigram to Aucun de nous ne reviendra (None of Us Will Return), the first part of her memoir, Auschwitz et après (Auschwitz and After). It is a phrase she will repeat and use again in another work, La mémoire et les jours (Days and Memory). But her English translator, Rosette Lamont, translates the sentence differently in the two volumes: “Today, I am not sure that what I wrote is true. I am certain it is truthful” (None of Us Will Return), and “This is why I say today that while knowing perfectly well that it corresponds to the facts, I no longer know if it is real” (Days and Memory).47 In None of Us Will Return, Delbo’s sectional title itself situates her testimonial account into a contradictory temporality and reality. The future tense suggests that it is written “from the inside,” where return indeed would have seemed impossible. The “none” and the “us” place the first person voice of the witness both under erasure and into a larger community of witnesses. Perhaps, she implies, none of them did, in fact, return and the present voice of testimony does not correspond to the past persona of the camp inmate, and even less so, to her prewar self. With her epigram, Delbo, now firmly situated in the present of retrospection (“today”), profoundly qualifies the “truth” of her utterance. But how? What is the difference between vrai and véridique, or, in Lamont’s translation, “truth” and “truthfulness”? On the one hand, Delbo could be saying that today, in the space of the “after” (“Auschwitz and After”), she no longer recalls the exact facts but is certain she is conveying a deeper truth about her camp experience, its essence, its deep memory. Lamont’s first translation, distinguishing between truth and truthfulness, seems to support this meaning. On the other hand, Delbo may be saying the opposite, as the second translation suggests: today, she can convey the factual truth of her experience (véridique) but, having encased Auschwitz in its protective skin, and being in the “after,” she no longer can or wants to access the deep memory, the affective and traumatic reality of the past.

Delbo’s ambiguity underscores the complicated status of truth that emerges from the focus on the figure of the survivor-witness “from the inside.” When Hannah Arendt voices her impatience with the witnesses at the Eichmann trial, she questions their ability to distinguish, many years later, between things they might themselves have experienced and things they would have read or heard from others. In a court of law these factual distinctions are crucial ones. But they are also crucial to historians. Searching for “historical truth” in oral testimony—factual accuracy that can be corroborated and not dismissed
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or denied—these historians are suspicious of testimonial narratives, of “soft” evidence constructed in individual acts of recall.

Addressing the historical validity of testimonial rendering, the psychoanalyst Donald Spence has clarified a difference between what he has called “narrative” truth and “historical” or factual truth. “Narrative truth” derives from an act of memory and is shaped by circumstances in the present moment in which it is remembered: it “can be defined as the criterion we use to decide when a certain experience has been captured to our satisfaction; it depends on continuity and closure and the extent to which the fit of the pieces takes on an aesthetic finality. Narrative truth is what we have in mind when we say that . . . a given explanation carries conviction.”48 In contrast, “historical truth is time-bound and is dedicated to the strict observance of correspondence rules; our aim is to come as close as possible to what ‘really’ happened. . . . We must have some assurance that the pieces being fitted into the puzzle also belong to a certain time and place and that this belonging can be corroborated in some systematic manner.”49 This disjunction is sometimes described as defining the difference between “history” and “memory” and the conflicts in Holocaust studies between some historians, on the one hand, and psychoanalysts and literary and cultural scholars, on the other.50 But the testimony of the survivor-witness “from the inside” may exceed this distinction altogether. Not only may it get the facts wrong, but it can also resist a coherent story in which the pieces fit together and come to closure. It thus posits the question: Is there a form of truth that is neither “narrative” nor “historical”?

Dori Laub’s example of this excess has become iconic in discussions of truth and witnessing. Laub cites the testimony of a woman who witnessed the failed uprising by Auschwitz prisoners in October 1944. At one moment in her account, he notes, the distance between past and present disappears: “She was fully there. ‘All of a sudden,’ she said, ‘we saw four chimneys going up in flames, exploding. The flames shot into the sky, people were running. It was unbelievable.’”51 Laub then outlines the debate between historians and psychoanalysts watching the woman’s testimony at a conference. The historians dismissed it for its inaccuracy: they stressed that only one chimney was blown up during the Auschwitz uprising and that her mistake invalidated her account of events. But the psychoanalyst who had interviewed the woman, Dori Laub himself, suggested that she was testifying to a different form of truth altogether, “not to the number of chimneys blown up, but to something else, more radical, more crucial: the reality of an unimaginable occurrence. . . . The event itself was almost inconceivable. The woman testified to an event that broke the all-compelling frame of Auschwitz, where Jewish armed revolts just did not happen and had no place. She testified to the breakage of a framework.”52

With the centrality of the survivor-witness in the discourses on Holocaust memory, many historians have come to appreciate not only the compelling nature of “narrative truth” but also this dimension that emerges in Laub’s example. Laub’s notion of “truth”
stresses aspects of historical experience that are subjective, submerged, even silent—feelings, perceptions, apprehensions, misapprehensions, and “deep memories” that, certainly in the case of the Holocaust, are affected by trauma. Unlike the positivist historians quoted by Laub, many historians, oral historians of the Holocaust, in particular, have found that testimonies, such as the factually inaccurate account from the witness interviewed by Laub, can tell them more about the meaning of an event, and about the process of its recall in the present, than about the event itself. Indeed, they are aware of the emotional dynamics of traumatic recall and forgetting, and sensitive to the dialogic nature of oral history—of the listener’s or interviewer’s impact on the telling. In taking into account an affective dimension and the meaning of an event for the teller herself, historians are expanding the notion of truth and are coming to a deeper, more encompassing historical understanding of what we might now think of as an embodied form of “truthfulness.” The challenge that such historians still face, of course, is how to defend this enlarged notion of truth without opening the door to revisionism and denial.

Listening and Transmission

The argument between the psychoanalyst and the historians in Laub’s account is an argument about listening to the survivor-witness “from the inside.” The historians know too much, Laub suggests, and their knowledge (of the number of chimneys that blew up, for example, of the betrayal by the Polish underground, or of the squashing of the rebellion and the gassing of the resistance) blocks their willingness to listen to what beyond the factual the woman’s testimony might have transmitted to them. The psychoanalyst, on the other hand, does not let his own historical knowledge interfere with the act of listening. He is trained to perceive that the witness does more than give information about the past, however accurate or inaccurate. The witness “from the inside” relives the experience, and the good listener has to be there with her as she is doing so. The woman Laub interviewed returned to the implausible moment of resistance, and thus, in Laub’s elaboration, “a dazzling, brilliant moment from the past swept through the frozen stillness of the muted, grave-like landscape with dashing meteoric speed, exploding it into a shower of sights and sounds.” In Laub’s vivid terms, the woman’s testimony enabled the gates of Auschwitz to open again and to allow her listeners in to witness the improbable moment of rebellion, the “breakage of the frame, that her very testimony was now reenacting.” In other words, Laub suggests that the woman communicates a more essential truth beyond the limits of her words to the one who knows how to listen psychoanalytically: the truth of her enunciation lies in the affect she projects and provokes in her listeners.

Laub has written eloquently about the responsibilities of listening to oral testimony. In response to Primo Levi’s recurring nightmare in Auschwitz, in which Levi returns
home and tries to tell his story, only to have his sister and other listeners get up from the
table and leave, Laub writes: “if one talks about the trauma without being truly heard or
truly listened to, the telling might itself be lived as a return of the trauma—a re-experiencing
of the event itself.”56 “‘True’ hearing, ‘true’ listening, is then, by implication, a listen-
ing for the emotional affective embodied truth of the witness’s story. This psychoanalytic
listening places the listener herself at risk: “there is a need for a tremendous libidinal
investment in those interview situations. . . . Testimony is the narrative’s address to hear-
ing; for only when the survivor knows he is being heard will he stop to hear—and listen
to—himself.”57

In becoming a privileged genre promising access to the embodied memory of the
survivor-witness, oral and video testimony have redefined the act of listening as “second-
ary witnessing” and have placed enormous burdens on the interviewer. Video testimonies
show that memory and testimony are acts in the present, not present accounts of the past.
They show how memory enters language, and how it changes in the process. They show
how an event lives on, how it acquires, keeps, and changes its meaning and its legacy.
They show how the witness changes in the process of telling, or reliving. The listener must
hear silence, absence, hesitation, and resistance. She must look and listen, comparing
bodily with verbal messages. She must allow the testimony to move, haunt and endanger
her; she must allow it to inhabit her, without appropriating or owning it. 58 Theorists of
testimony have spent a good deal of effort to define the fine line between good listening
and appropriation.59

But there is more. Geoffrey Hartman and Dori Laub have argued that if the victim
has been dehumanized by the camp experience, has lost the “you” who enables the “I”
to speak, those who listen to witness testimony have the capacity to restore the victim’s
humanity and identity. While empathic listening can actually be therapeutic, therefore,
“bad listening”—listening that does not take on the responsibility of providing the “you”
necessary to restoring the “I”—can retraumatize the witness. Some of our previous exam-
ple seem to corroborate this warning: K-Zetnik fainted and went into a coma when the
judge interrupted his account and tried to ask specific questions. Abraham Bomba is
retraumatized before our eyes when Lanzmann asks him about his feelings and enjoins
him to go into the part of the story Bomba had so carefully encased in a protective shield.
For both these listeners, testimony served a purpose beyond the healing of the witness.
And both, paradoxically, provoke an enactment of trauma—a mute witnessing—that suc-
cceeds in transmitting some quality of the “inside.” For more distant spectators and listen-
ers, therapeutic listening and the powerful transmission of affect and body memory seem
to be at odds.

But what, in fact, is being transmitted in those moments of fainting, muteness or
collapse? What does it mean to say that in fainting K-Zetnik said it all? That Bomba’s
tears are “worth gold?” What narratives, what memories, does the figure of the survivor-
witness from the inside support, and what are the stakes of these narratives? We would
suggest that the moments of mute or traumatized witness that have become so paradigmatic in recent discussion are so open to interpretation and projection that, outside the narrow framework of the psychoanalytic encounter, they preclude therapeutic restorative listening in favor of ascription and appropriation.

**Uniqueness and Comparability in Global Time**

This conclusion leads us back to the point where we began, Hannah Arendt’s critique of the Eichmann trial and her misgivings about witness testimony. But we want to consider another aspect of her argument—her belief that Eichmann should not have been tried in Israel but before an international court; that his crimes were committed against humanity and not merely against “the Jewish people.” The focus on anti-Semitism and the endless repetition of crimes against Jews throughout history, she argues, relativizes and detracts from Eichmann’s particular and unprecedented crimes. Felman considers Arendt’s view jurisprudentially conservative. But, from our post-Rwanda, post-Balkan, mid-Darfur perspective, is not Arendt’s call for a permanent international criminal court, and for an understanding of genocide as a crime against humanity, remarkably prescient and progressive?

Arendt’s position anticipates two key perspectives in Holocaust studies: one viewing the Holocaust as the worst act of anti-Semitism, and therefore principally as a crime against the Jews; the other as the worst act of racism, and, as such, a crime against humanity. In this regard, the testimony of victims, especially as manifested in speechlessness or muteness and in bodily projection, can lend itself to interpretations that directly or indirectly support one or the other of these viewpoints. The figure of the muted, traumatized survivor—the “Muselmann,” K-Zetnik, or Bomba, for example—largely communicating through affect and not words, can become a screen on which the listener or interpreter can project various meanings. Witness testimony from the inside can thus be appropriated and used to undergird the image of Jewish extreme victimization that fuels nationalist and identity politics. Indeed, as Arendt observes regarding the Eichmann trial, Holocaust memory, through spoken and unspoken witness testimony, served to enhance the process of nation-building in the new Israeli state. It was employed to present a Zionist narrative before a “hostile world” and to collectivize Jewish identity. If, in this memory discourse, the Holocaust appears unique and incomparable, it is not by way of a historical argument that points out its unprecedented elements, but on an affective level that contemplates and “co-owns” the immeasurable suffering of its Jewish victims. Calling attention to the increasing currency of the unspeakability trope is thus to lift Holocaust memory out of this new discourse of uniqueness.

Certainly Holocaust memory may also serve a different purpose in our age of globalization. As Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider have optimistically written, it may “provide
the foundations for a new cosmopolitan memory . . . transcending ethnic and national boundaries.” Shifting focus from the national to the cosmopolitan, and rejecting the claim, largely implicit in Pierre Nora’s influential work *Les lieux de mémoire* (*Realms of Memory*), that the nation-state is the “sole possible (and imaginable) source for the articulation of authentic collective memories,” they argue that representations of the Holocaust can impart “authentic feelings” and “collective memory” on a global level. Memories of the Holocaust—or representations of this event in spoken and unspoken testimony—can thus “facilitate the formation of transnational memory cultures, which in turn, have the potential to become the cultural foundation for global human rights politics.” In so doing, Levy and Sznaider write,

> the cosmopolitanization of Holocaust memory does not imply some progressive universalism subject to a unified interpretation. The Holocaust does not become one totalizing signifier containing the same meaning for everyone. Rather its meanings evolve from the encounter of global interpretations and local sensibilities. The cosmopolitanization of Holocaust memories thus involves the formation of nation-specific and nation-transcending commonalities.

Muteness in the aftermath of trauma, the affect that emerges through testimony—these are the human elements of survival that can become the links between the diverse catastrophes of our time. And yet, as we have seen, powerful affect also lends itself to a hyperbolic discourse of uniqueness and exceptionalism. A cosmopolitan memory of the Holocaust, we would suggest, cannot be built on the affect of victimization only, but must include the responsibility of the perpetrators, the complicity of bystanders, and the willingness of the descendants of victims, perpetrators, and bystanders alike to claim the legacy of a traumatic past. Expanding Holocaust memory and decontextualizing it from its European specificity—turning the Holocaust into a holocaust, as Levy and Sznaider suggest—can only be achieved if the uniqueness and exceptionalism attributed to its victim suffering for nationalist ends is abandoned and the field of memory is broadened to include other victims, other perpetrators, and other bystanders involved in acts of mass violence and persecution. Such an expansion does not in any sense aim to diminish or relativize the experiences and suffering of European Holocaust survivors or to detract from the vast evidentiary and moral contribution their spoken as well as muted and bodily testimony has provided and continues to provide for us. On the contrary, its goal would be to incorporate these memories into an enlarged global arena, making room for additional local, regional, national, and transnational testimonies about slavery, colonialism, genocide, and subordination. These diverse scenes of memory and testimony and their role in activist and legal struggles for remembrance, recognition, restitution, and justice—in South Africa, Rwanda, the Hague, Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala, for example—offer a political urgency for memory and testimony that reflect back to Holocaust
remembrance and inscribe it into today’s global language of human rights. It is here that we can find the influence of transnational memory studies on Holocaust studies.

Such a broadened, universalized archive of memory, consisting of witness testimony and other primary and secondary sources, may then indeed permit us to apply the future-oriented lessons that many have derived from the Holocaust more globally. Truly responding to the ethical provocation that witness testimony has transmitted and conveyed across generations and political boundaries would then entail our determined and collective efforts to prevent or to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing from being committed again.
27. The Long Afterlife of Loss

Eva Hoffman

Loss leaves a long trail in its wake. Sometimes, if the loss is large enough, the trail seeps and winds like invisible psychic ink through individual lives, decades, and generations. When the losses are as enormous as those that followed from the Holocaust—when what was lost was not only individuals but a world—the disappearances and the absences may haunt us unto the third generation; and they may inform our very vision of the world.

The transmission of loss across generations undoubtedly happens in the aftermath of every collective atrocity. But the Holocaust was a history-altering event, the great wound that bisected the twentieth century and has altered our vision of history and human nature itself. The Shoah has been studied intensively—sometimes obsessively—for its lessons in the extremities of cruelty and of suffering; and the large body of literature, testimony, and reflection to which it has given rise can serve as a template for the understanding of other historical calamities as well. Sixty years after the event itself, that literature includes a growing body of investigation and self-reflection about and by the so-called “second generation”—that is, the literal descendants of Holocaust survivors. It is for these literal descendants that the legacy of the Holocaust is felt in its most intimate form; and it is here that the delicate issues of transferred trauma and deferred mourning are felt most poignantly. In a sense, the elusive, deeply subjective experience of the Shoah’s heirs is also an acute example of a broader phenomenon: the bequest of historical experience from one generation to the next; and the attendant passage of that inevitable knowledge of loss and death that are the constants of the human condition, and sometimes, of wisdom.
More than for our parents, the Holocaust, for us their children, was the paradoxical fundament. Dan Bar-On, an Israeli psychoanalyst who has written about the effect of the Holocaust on three generations, puts this simply: “My parents’ generation grew up in a world without a Holocaust,” he writes, “but for us there could be no such world.”

To start with the Holocaust as the foundation is, potentially, a premise for a nihilistic or a wholly disillusioned philosophy; and perhaps the Shoah is the hidden basis for the metaphysics of nullity and absence, for the urge to deconstruct all meanings and reach an empty center, so salient in postwar visions of the world. But in childhood, the awareness of loss and death is not yet philosophy. Instead, for many of us, as we were growing up in the proximity of an awful knowledge, the Holocaust constituted both the most frightening kind of family fable and a sort of awful normalcy.

The knowledge of great loss and destruction was for us the first knowledge. It came with family stories, with those primal pellets of information in which so much later thought and inquiry is condensed. But how was the knowledge conveyed to us, how was it passed on?

In considering the legacy of the Holocaust, it has become routine to speak of the “memory” of that event and to adduce to this faculty a moral, even a spiritual value. But it is important to be exact: We who came after do not have memories of the Shoah. Not even those of us who grew up in the closest proximity to survivors have our own recollections of the events that constituted that event. I heard my parents speak of their wartime ordeal from my earliest years. In a way, I seemed to know the “story” of their survival—and all their close ones’ murder—from the beginning: the attic in which they were hidden by their Ukrainian neighbors; the bunker in the forest that my father had dug out with his brothers, the bridge on which he was arraigned by two hostile Ukrainian youths, and the icy river into which he jumped in order to save his life. The way my mother’s young sister died, and the mass grave into which her body was thrown. These scenes and disconnected fragments were my first knowledge, a primal pellet of imagery and narration in which a cargo of information was contained. The iconography of endurance, and of perishing, was so stark, so powerful, as to seem to belong to me, to my own perceptions. But of course, it didn’t. The attic, the bunker, the bridge that I had envisioned in my mind probably bore little correspondence to the actual sites or to the textures of my parents’ experiences.

I do not believe that memories can be transferred to another mind, nor acquired by psychogenetic inheritance. This is important to remember, as we are tempted, individually or collectively, to “identify” with historical tragedy; or to gain a sense of moral entitlement from fashionable victimological identities. Instead, what we children of survivors knew, what we often received with great directness, were the emotional sequelae of our elders’ experiences, the acid-etched traces of what they had endured. This, perhaps, is indeed the way in which one generation’s legacy is actually passed on to the next—through the
imprint of various personal and historical experiences, as these are traced on individual psyches and sensibilities.

In a sense, the possibility of such communications seems to me a hopeful fact of human nature, for, clearly, we are connected to each other more profoundly and more palpably than we often care to acknowledge. We have come to know by now that we affect each other in ways that are both immediate and invisible, that mental states are communicated, indeed transferred, from one psyche to another not only through rational messages, but along unconscious, or at least non-conscious channels. But the hopeful fact has its unhappy side, for pathology and despair can be passed on as efficiently as more salubrious states. There were bonds and transactions between survivor parents and their children that sometimes took lifetimes to unravel. There was a casting of a shadow, a transference of an immensely heavy burden. There were signals conveyed along subterranean passages from survivors to their descendants that injected anxiety into the latter’s veins, or exploded like time-delayed bombs in their psyches long after they had been planted.

Where the psychic damage to the parents has been severe enough, such communications, or processes, have come to be referred to as “the transmission of trauma,” or, alternatively, of “traumatic memory.” As with “trauma” itself, I think caution is advisable in the use of these phrases and their implicit reification of tenuous, intricate, and—yes—rich internal experiences. And yet, the phrases do refer to real phenomena. For of course, the conditions of survivors’ lives, their psychic states and scars, could not but affect or infect those around them, their children most of all. There was a passage of something, by some means. If we cannot yet say exactly what or how, nevertheless, the questions raised by transmission of trauma are an extreme version of more general questions, about the transmission of any family legacy. What features of our parents’ personalities enter us, and through what means? How do they become preserved or transformed within us, converted into liberating visions, or twisted into paralyzing knots? It is possible that, just as Freud used the study of neurosis to illuminate the structure of the normal psyche, so the close examination of the intergenerational passage of acute psychological states may throw light on more general, or “normal” processes through which affective messages are communicated from one psyche to another, and from one generation to the next.

Clearly, the strongest form of such transmission is the earliest. When the passage of subjective states happens between the mind of the adult and the delicate, hyperreceptive psyche of a child, the effects can be profound and formative. Psychoanalysis has long been interested in the inward workings of such transactions. But in recent decades, experimental psychology and, increasingly, the “harder” sciences of biology and neurology have undertaken close studies of mothers and infants and have observed how maternal states are conveyed to the child through body, gesture, ways of holding, gaze. They have also described how a child’s chaotic, inchoate inner states are shaped or left to founder by parental “containment” or its absence. If the mother or parental figure can provide some
calm, some framing for the confusions of childish sensations, then the child may become calmer, more stable, more confident. If such containment is missing, then internal confusion continues to reign.

Undoubtedly, there were good, bad, and middling mothers and fathers among survivors of the Holocaust. Undoubtedly, most of them meant well—maybe desperately well. And undoubtedly, some of them failed in providing for their children the foundations that happier families may furnish. We may surmise, on that most primal level, that some of the mothers, having undergone so much loss, clung too closely, too desperately to their infants—clung to them for dear life. Others, it seems, were too numbed or too afraid to make much physical contact with their children at all. Afraid, perhaps, of new losses; afraid to pass on what was now inside. Whatever their best desires or intentions, whatever the precise methods of communication, the states of feeling conveyed by survivors to their offspring were often of the most radical negativity.

What was the impact of such states on the children’s psyches? The psychoanalytic literature in this area is large and often poignantly informative. As with survivors themselves, each case and story is of course different, but there are leitmotifs that recur with sufficient regularity to suggest patterns of phenomena and of feeling.

Over and over again, in second-generation literature, testimony is given to a helpless, automatic identification with parental feelings and their burden of intense despondency. Over and over, the children speak of being permeated by sensations of panic and deadliness, of shame and guilt. And, accompanying the suffusion by parental unhappiness, there is the need—indeed, the imperative—to perform impossible psychic tasks: to replace dead relatives or children who had perished; to heal and repair the parents; above all, to rescue the parents. To rescue the parents, and keep rescuing them, from their grief and mourning, from death which had so nearly engulfed them and which had undone so many. To keep undoing the past, again and again. A more than Penelope-like devotion, a more than Sisyphean labor; for this boulder not only keeps rolling down the hill, it can never be rolled up in the first place. A more than Orphic danger, for to look back in this case is to be dragged into Hades yourself. And yet, the children keep trying, are compelled to keep trying: for how can you leave your parents in a state of half-death, how can you not try to bring them out of an inferno?

And the parents so often hoped for rescue. They invested so much in these children, and imbued them with so much yearning. To replace—revive—the dead ones; to undo the losses; to repair the humiliations wrought by the abusers; to provide the redress of unconditional love and protection against deadly danger. There were hopes, no matter how unconscious, that the children could relive all that the parents had lived; and, at the same time, that they could start new and much happier lives.

Unconscious expectations are often paradoxical; the transactions between survivor parents and their progeny sometimes seem nearly magical. Dina Wardi, an Israeli psychotherapist who has worked extensively with groups of second-generation adults, suggests
in her book *Memorial Candles* that, in every survivor’s family, one child is chosen as a “memorial candle”—that is, as the instrument of commemoration, devotion and mourning.2 Once such a symbolic role is conferred on them, the children rarely have the wherewithal to refuse it. They become votaries on the altar of the Shoah, their own lives and selves dedicated to their hurt parents and to the perished, whether they will or not. In Wardi’s groups, the adult “children of survivors” recount, without sentimentality and often with a kind of wonder, dreams that feature scenes and sites of death. The patients discover their deep identification with the parents, but also with lost relatives whom they never knew. Often, they are relatives for whom they are named—for almost all of them, it turns out, were named for someone who was murdered. (I think of the moment, when I was about six, when I was told I was named for my two murdered grandmothers, my sister for my mother’s sister. I did not have even the most shadowy images of these grandmothers, nor a sense that I had lost something with their deaths. But I remember my parents’ tender sadness as they told me this, and a sense of a somber, though honorific mantle, being draped round my shoulders).

Sometimes, the identification with the dead has the character of the uncanny. I think, for example, of a young woman, described in one case study, who came from a newly prospering family of survivors, but who felt compelled to search trash bins for scraps of food at night. It turned out that a perished aunt of hers—whose story she may or may not have literally heard—had been forced to do just that, in another country, in another time. I think of the many case studies that report strange somatic symptoms, especially eczemas and rashes, for the skin is apparently a highly sensitive register of unconscious anxiety. Sometimes, it is precisely the children who express parental fears in these ways, while the parents remain seemingly calm and unbothered; for the adults, in some cases, may have enough wherewithal to “contain” or conceal their worst anxieties, even as the children sense them under or on the skin.

There is a strange fascination in such phenomena, perhaps because we still do not understand sufficiently how they happen, how the mind, or the unconscious, takes in scraps of moods or psychic states or half-heard information and converts them back into eerily apt symbolism. The process can give the impression of an almost literal haunting, a notion that recurs often in writing about the intergenerational transmission of trauma. Something re-emerges from the past that we thought had been dead... but which has lain dormant in the turrets and caverns of the soul, till it returns in the form of specters and shadows.

Such manifestations belong to the world of ghost stories and the gothic—psychologically speaking, a world of fantasy and inner distortion. For in the second generation, the anxieties, the symptoms, no matter how genuine in themselves, no longer correspond to actual experience or external realities. They do not even correspond to anything that could be called “memory.” In that sense, the guilt, fears, and shames, the mourning and acedia of survivors’ progeny are a kind of distortion or exaggeration. And
yet, at the same time, this is exactly the crux of the second generation’s difficulty: that it has inherited not experience, but its shadows. And sometimes, it needs to be said, wrestling with shadows can be more frightening, more confusing, than struggling with solid realities. Like Hamlet’s father, the ghosts demand devotion, sacrifice, justice, truth, vengeance. The uncanny, in Freud’s formulation, is the sensation of something that is both very alien and deeply familiar, something that only the unconscious knows. If that is so, then the second generation has grown up with the uncanny.

In another essay, “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud makes the suggestive observation that in order to accomplish the natural process of mourning—to grieve and then move on—you have to know what you have lost. If you do not know what the lost object is, then mourning can turn into a permanent melancholia, or depression, as we would call it today. Freud, who to a large extent altered his theory as a result of observing the results of the First World War did not live to see the Second, and he may not have taken into account the losses of possibility, from which it may be impossible to recover—losses, as after the Holocaust, not only of particular persons, but of a people and a world. But his observation is particularly evocative for the second generation, whose entire historical situation has placed it in the “melancholic” position, whose fate it has been to live with a multitude of lost “objects” that they never had a chance to know. (I think of my grandparents, whose visages I did not know even from photographs. Again and again, throughout my earlier years, I tried to understand that, by all rights and natural patterns of the world, I should have had grandparents, that, in some notional way, I had had grandparents. An incomprehensible loss, the uncanny by another name.) Transferred loss, more than transferred memory, is what children of survivors inherit; and how do you get over loss that has no concrete shape or face? Vague loss itself, a placeless melancholia, may become the medium in which we live.

The psychological story of the second generation is worth looking at because it tells us much about those impalpable movements of interiority and invisible corridors between mind and mind through which our crucial, first knowledge is formed. But it is not the whole story. The legacy of the Shoah also makes demands on us—demands that are moral, historical, and, ultimately, metaphysical. It is one characteristic of “trauma” and post-traumatic states that time stops at the most awful moment, that the past continues to overwhelm and overshadow the present and the mourning never lifts. The necessary task, for those who come into the inheritance of loss, is in a sense to liberate themselves from the thrall of the past sufficiently not to mistake our ancestors’ history for our own. The demand has been to recognize and reckon with great suffering without mistaking destruction for the root and origin of the world—to place absence within the parameters of presence, death within the parameters of life.
Again: When the losses are as enormous as those that followed from the Shoah; when their dimensions threaten to cover the whole landscape of the imagination, the task is difficult and often involves an arduous trajectory. But the trajectory also constitutes an intense moral and affective education. It is part of the second generation condition—but also its opportunity—that, by the virtue of inheriting its forbidding history, it has had to grapple with some fundamental questions not only notionally or formally but through immediate engagement, and in the smithy of the soul. Any morality worth its name begins in passion, or at least in subjectivity; and in order to become an ethics, it needs to be extricated, sometimes painfully, from the messy undergrowth of feeling and internal conflict.

Perhaps the most heuristic part of the second-generation experience inheres in the proximity to persecuted parents and elders, in intimate relations with people who have been greatly wronged and hurt. The close witness of suffering, the intimate coexistence with those who have been injured, is part of a transformative process whereby that early, psychically imbibed knowledge can be—in the best case scenarios—converted into a more conscious ethics and vision of the world. It is not our own suffering, in other words, but the suffering of others that poses an emotional and a moral challenge. How to acknowledge another’s grief without being swallowed up by it oneself; how to gain one’s own autonomy without abandoning those who need us; how to offer compassion without reducing the other to the status of “victim;” how to continue to treat victims of extreme violence as moral agents, even while recognizing the extent of their extremity.

On a larger scale, such questions are among the central issues of our time. How should we treat individuals who have been “traumatized,” or groups that have been collectively victimized? What kinds of reparations are owed, and what kinds of standards can we bring to them? On such questions, our attitudes toward vulnerability and pain are often inconsistent and confused. On the one hand, we live in a time when identification with the victim is taken as a moral good; when groups that are perceived as “our” victims are presumed to be automatically innocent and automatically in the right. At the same time, much in our contemporary world mitigates against the acceptance of suffering, or incorporating it into our vision of the human lot. Our ideals of control, self-improvement, freedom from dependence, and the very speed of middle-class life do not leave much room for frailty, or for solidarity with those who may need our help. Our lives are so structured that we depend increasingly on mediating institutions for the care of the vulnerable. At the same time, our rhetoric is ever more pervaded by the professional and sociological vocabulary of victimhood—and in that vocabulary, suffering becomes reified into pathology or aggrandized into martyrdom. Suffering becomes Trauma; a person who has experienced adversity or been treated harshly becomes the Victim.

Indeed, it seems to me that the excesses of identity politics and various identifications with the victim—wherein groups who are perceived as “our” victims are presumed to be
automatically innocent and automatically in the right—are themselves a kind of displace-
ment, wherein the actualities of suffering are placed at a safe distance and relegated to the
sphere of abstract compassion and morality. But victimhood is not—for all that we would
wish otherwise—a conveniently moral condition. This is something that those who have
lived in intimate proximity to loss and mourning know or have to learn. If we lose our
sympathy for suffering, we lose part of our moral being. The bearers of atrocity’s scars
deserve our help, our understanding, the alleviation of pain. On a personal level, if we are
to be of help to those who have suffered great losses, then we need to remember, or
perhaps relearn, the very old arts of simple sympathy and empathy; the ability to take in
a story without excessive comment, to imagine what the other feels without diminishment
or exaggerated sentiment; most of all, perhaps, to imagine the reality of the other person’s
situation accurately, and, sometimes, to help the sufferer see more accurately as well.

But if we are not to engage in yet another displacement, then we need also to remem-
ber that to deserve our sympathy or help, the victims of atrocity do not have to be espe-
cially virtuous, nor saintly—or should such virtue be expected of them. Persecution is
not a character-improving process, and collective suffering cannot assure collective merit.
This is why a politics of trauma is not a sufficient antidote to the politics of power and
why an ethos of martyrdom cannot serve as a basis for a decent society. After the collective
memories have been excavated and the individual narratives recounted we need the resto-
ration of principles that will assure mutual respect, even if we do not share enough past
to warrant mutual love. Otherwise, the memories of pain will soon turn into someone’s
rage, and the conflicting narratives will come into possibly deadly conflict. Sympathy for
those who suffered is our moral duty; but we cannot cease to treat the victim as a moral
being. The recipients of great wrongs need, for the restoration of their moral world—and
a shared moral world—a recognition of those wrongs; but they cannot be placed outside
the community of justice and reason.

The intimate, felt legacy of the Shoah confers on us not only its weight and burdens,
but a profound endowment. An early knowledge of death and loss is much more terrify-
ing—and transgressive—than an early knowledge of sex; but it can also be a source of
deep instruction. Mourning, after all, is at the very root of much human knowledge—of
mortality, vulnerability, the needs for human connection. It is at the root, perhaps, of the
reparative urge, the desire to protect our altogether perishable world, to redress some of
its harshness and bring to it some healing and consolation. If one can dip into the somber
past without being swallowed by it, then the past can become a rich vein of meaning. If
you dare visit the Shades, you may bring back the kind of pity that is the source of beauty.
Orpheus’s song cannot bring back those claimed by the underworld, but it can become
richer for his sojourn there. The urge to rescue, to repair and salve, which many of us felt
so painfully in our early transactions with wounded parents, can transform itself—if it is
contained in sufficient frameworks of emotional safety—into the re-creative and recon-
structive urge, into the desire for creativity and meaning. The troubling closeness to pain
can expand into more considered compassion; the instinctive protest against our elders’ humiliation can turn into a broader recognition of everyone’s need for dignity and for justice.

Specters can be harder to grapple with than realities. But of course, specters can eventually be dispelled, as realities cannot. Many among the survivors’ progeny have gone on to free themselves of their Sisyphean burden. Many have gone on to live lives free of ghosts. This is not the same as forgetfulness—indeed, what is required for such exorcism is almost its opposite. It seems that just as for survivors only full remembering could bring about some catharsis, so for the second generation, only a full imaginative confrontation with the past—with the ghosts of the dead, with the humiliations the parents suffered, with loss of what one did not know, and grief too deep for tears—can bring the haunting to an end. Here, psychoanalytic wisdom is the same as that old moral or philosophical kind: Only the truth—within the limits of the human condition—can make you free.

It was in the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington that I had my strange epiphany. As I walked through this most daunting of museum exhibitions, and as I entered into its hellish world as into a familiar element, I suddenly thought: But there must also be something outside of this. There must be a reality that is not horror, but that is equally foundational. For me, in the beginning was the war, and the Holocaust was the ontological basis of my universe. And indeed, the Holocaust continues to stand as a kind of limiting condition of experience, and therefore a necessary part of our knowledge about human nature. It is because the Holocaust exposes the negative extremes of human possibility that it has been taken as philosophically central, not only by childhood minds, but by so many thinkers of our time. Hell, especially if it is of human making, is surely one clue about the human condition—and the Holocaust extends our knowledge of the human hell.

And yet, unless we want to fall into permanent melancholia or nihilistic despair, we cannot take the Holocaust as the norm that governs human lives. We cannot start from it as a basis, or move toward it as a form of transcendence, even of the darkest kind. That is why it is necessary to separate the past from the present and to judge the present in its own light. It is necessary to incorporate loss into a vision of life without losing the leaven of sympathy or empathy or the acknowledgment of our precariousness and fragilities. Again, coming into the knowledge of the Shoah is an acute form of the knowledge with which we all need to reckon: the awareness of everyone’s vulnerability to the workings of time and decay, the quiet suffering that attends our ordinary condition of mortality, and for which perhaps the only compensation is our tenderness for each other’s vulnerabilities, for what Adam Zagajewski calls “the mutilated world.”5 “We must love one another or die,” W. H. Auden said. Actually, we must love one another and die. We must love each other, ultimately, because we die.
After the dark logic of the Shoah, acceptance of a benign world does not come easily. The “normal” may seem suspect, or it may seem thin. How to find richness, authenticity, and depth in the temperate zones of ordinary life? How to find sources of significance that do not derive from extremity and to endow with value not only great losses but modest gains? In a sense—as with all aspects of second-generation experience—this is a question that arises in every transition to maturity; but which, for children of survivors, is sharpened to a fine acuity. For the inheritors of traumatic historical experience, the ability to separate the past from the present—to see the past as the past—is a difficult but necessary achievement.

The moment of that separation, of letting go, is a poignant one, for it is akin to the giving up of mourning. There is pain in the very diminution of pain, the danger that time will dilute morality as it dilutes passion. We do not, generally, forget the facts; anyway, these are always available as information, in books or on the Internet. What we do forget, imperceptibly but inevitably, are the sensations accompanying the facts: the rightful rage, gratitude where it is due, the anguish of loss for the loved one’s death. This has to be accepted as part of time’s work and its passage. But if we do not want to betray the past—if we want to remain ethical beings and honor our covenant with those who suffered—then moral passion needs to be supplanted by moral thought, by an incorporation of memory into our consciousness of the world. There is a Jewish tradition that says that we must grieve for the dead fully and deeply, but that mourning must also come to its end. Perhaps that moment has come, even as we must continue to ponder and confront the knowledge that the Shoah has brought us in perpetuity.
28. Migration, Food, Memory, and Home-Building

Ghassan Hage

Everything which is eaten is the food of power.

Elias Cannetti, *Crowds and Power*

The relation between home and food is an essential one. Its ideological power is constantly exhibited in various items of everyday life such as the status of the “homemade” on the food market. That a quiche, for example, is labeled “homemade” at one’s local delicatessen distinguishes it from the mass-produced. It makes it ooze that specifically homely goodness: intimations of sound nutrition, careful choice of ingredients, and careful labor (of love). That is, it becomes a bit of “mother’s cooking”—which, at an important level, is, of course, a continuation of breast-feeding, the most homely of the homely yearnings and fantasies. In much the same vein, the myth of being handed a “mother’s mouthful,” *lu'mit 'umm,*1 is among the most powerful gendered structuring themes of the yearning for *lib-blehda* or *blehda*, “the national home,” “our national home,” or “back home,” among the Lebanese in general, and certainly among Lebanese migrants in Sydney. The yearning for a “mother’s mouthful” is one and the same as the yearning for “back home.” Both yearnings involve a specific form of remembering of an imaginary state of well-being.

This essay aims to emphasize that diasporic nostalgia as a memory of “back home” should not be always treated as a form of homesickness. Homesickness is, as its name suggests, a sickness: a state where one’s memory of back home plays a debilitating function and produces a state of passivity, where the subject is unable to “deploy” himself or herself in the environment in which he or she is operating. This is why nostalgia should not be conceptually collapsed with home-sickness as it can readily be conceived in a far more positive light as an enabling memory.
Far too often, the collapsing of all migrant yearning for home into a single “painful” sentiment is guided by a “miserabilist” tendency in the study of migration that wants to make migrants passive pained people at all costs.

Of course, that nostalgia can take the form of homesickness is clearly the case. This is especially so since diasporic nostalgia is often grounded in an experience of disempowerment, in the sense of an experience of an inability to do certain things: inability to speak properly, inability to direct oneself, inability to socialize, and so forth. This is made clear in the introduction to Hamid Naficy’s well-known work, The Making of Exile Cultures, in which he associates his nostalgic memories of separation from the homeland with “the separation from the native language and the control one has in using it—a control that is gradually diminishing.” It is useful to interpret this state of homesickness, from a Bourdieusian perspective, as a state emanating from a dysfunctional habitus, that is, a habitus that finds itself unable to strategize and improvise in the face of a radical newness. Homesickness, in this sense, inserts itself in the unbridgeable fissure opened between the self and the environment when a person finds themselves unable to act. One takes refuge in the memories of the past from the potentially traumatizing encounter with the present. This is perhaps the difference between having memories and inhabiting them. Homesickness is a case of the latter. Nostalgia on the other hand, as will be emphasized here, is an active insertion of memory in the construction of the present and the future.

This essay is based primarily on interviews conducted with Lebanese migrants, mostly living in suburbs around the city of Parramatta (west of Sydney), on the role of nostalgic memories of food in Lebanon in their attempts to make themselves feel at home in Australia. I will begin by analyzing the general process of migrant home-building. I will then examine more specifically the practices of home-building associated with food. Finally, I will move to an examination of the nature of food centered intercultural transactions between the dominant culture and migrants.

On the Nature of Homes and Home-Building

Émile Benveniste, in his seminal work Indo-European Language and Society, gives a documented historical substantiation of the common saying “a house is not a home.” He differentiates between the linguistic roots of the conceptions of “home as family,” that is, as an affective social unit, and “home as construction,” or what we refer to as house. In this sense, home-building is not necessarily the equivalent of house building or domestic space building, but can be. House building does not necessarily include the attempt to build oneself a familial, comforting, and “homely” space and home-building does not necessarily involve house construction. It is on such a basis that I would like to suggest a definition of home-building as the building of the feeling of being “at home.” It is in this
sense that I am considering the home as an affective construct, an affective edifice constructed out of affective building blocks (blocks of homely feeling). I would like to suggest that for it to come into being, to be successfully erected as it were, this homely affective structure has to be built with affective blocks that provide either in themselves or in combination with others four key feelings: security, familiarity, community, and a sense of possibility or hope. These are the feelings that it is the aim of home-building to foster and maximize, to put together into a livable affective structure.

The feeling of security is of course one of the most basic feelings we aim to foster in our homely space. This feeling derives from the availability of what we consider necessary to the satisfaction of basic needs and from the absence of harmful threatening otherness. But this is not enough. For one can be in such a space without being in one’s own homely space. A deeper sense of security and homeliness emanates from the space where we not only have but feel empowered to seek the satisfaction of our needs and to remove or exclude threatening otherness. That is, home is a place governed by what we consider to be “our law.” We can feel secure where the law of the other rules, but we cannot feel at home. To be at home one has to feel, to a certain degree, a willful subject in one’s home. This, for example, is the difference between a servant’s and a housewife’s belonging to a home. While both the servant and the housewife are subjected to relations of power and domination, under class and patriarchal relations, respectively, nevertheless, the housewife derives a sense of belonging and empowerment within the home that the servant cannot usually achieve.

The feeling of familiarity is generated by a space where the deployment of our bodily dispositions can be maximized, where we feel in possession of what Bourdieu would call a well-fitted habitus. Bourdieu defines habitus as embodied history but, to a certain extent, it is also embodied memory. Clearly, not every habitus operates in the spaces in which it has historically evolved and where it is most at home. It is because each habitus is endowed with what Bourdieu, following Spinoza, calls a conatus, a tendency to persevere in its own being, that a habitus will aim at home-building: the creation of the space in which its strategic dispositions can be maximized. This involves the creation of a space where one possesses a maximal practical know-how: knowing what everything is for and when it ought to be used. It also involves the creation of a space where one possesses a maximal spatial knowledge: knowing almost unthinkingly where one is, where one needs to go for specific purposes, and how to get there. This sense of implicit familiar knowledge implies spatial and practical control that in turn implicates the sense of security examined above. One need only consider the traumatic event of losing one’s house keys to see how the event brings to the fore the anxiety associated with losing the capacity of spatial and practical control over the home.

The feeling of community is also crucial for feeling at home. Above all, it involves living in a space where one recognizes people as “one’s own” and where one feels recognized by them as such. It is crucially a feeling of shared symbolic forms, shared morality,
shared values, and most importantly perhaps, shared language. A home is imagined as a
space where one possesses maximal communicative power, in Bourdieu’s sense—that is,
the capacity to speak appropriately in a variety of recognizable specific situations. It is a
space where one knows that at least some people—family or friends—can be morally
relied on for help.6

Finally, and this is something often forgotten in theorizations of the home, a home
has to be a space open for opportunities and hope. Most theorizations of the home em-
phasize it as a shelter, but, like a mother’s lap, it is only a shelter that we use for rest
before springing into action and then return to, to spring into action again. A space that
is only a shelter becomes, like the lap of the possessive mother, a claustrophobic space. It
loses its homely character.7 A home has to be an existential launching pad for the self. We
must feel propelled by it. As such, a homely space is a space where we feel we are “going
places.” It has to be open enough that one can perceive opportunities of “a better life”:
the opportunity to develop certain capacities and skills, the opportunity of personal
growth, and, more generally, the availability of opportunities for “advancement” whether
as upward social mobility or emotional growth or in the form of accumulation of sym-
bolic or monetary capital.

This notion of possibility is crucial in understanding all of these homely feelings. This
is because homely structures are more an aspiration, an ideal goal guiding practices of
home-building, than an existing reality; what propels people into home-building is pre-
cisely the recognition of a future possibility of more security, familiarity, and so forth.
People experience homeliness to the extent that they live in an approximation of their
ideal home. But their homes are never secure, familiar, or communal enough and never
allow for as many opportunities as one yearns for. Homes are homely because they pro-
vide intimations of homeliness, hints of those feelings, and the possibility for more.

In what follows, I want to develop this notion of intimation as a definition of all
those fragments that trigger a migrant’s memory in the form of nostalgia and offer possi-
bilities for homely feelings. I will provide examples of different kinds of intimations that
are present in the social life of migrants. But unlike many theorists of diaspora, I will
stress that not all intimations of homeliness are memories of lost homelands. From the
moment of arrival into host nations, migrants encounter many intimations of new possi-
bilities. I want to stress that, contrary to what is often believed, intimations of lost home-
lands, as well as, more obviously, intimations of “new homelands,” should be seen as
affective building blocks used by migrants to make themselves feel at home where they
actually are. They are part of the migrant’s settlement strategies rather than an attempt to
escape the realities of the host country. For migrants, that is, memory belongs to the
construction of the future. It is only in certain pathological situations that memory be-
comes a form of entrenchment in the past.

If homely feelings are based on such intimations as I have described, home-building
can then be seen as the practice of fostering these intimations and seeking more of them.
I will provide a more concrete example of the way this practice of fostering homely intimations is lived by Lebanese migrants in Australia, first in a general sense and then, more particularly, in the practices centered around food production and consumption.

Migrant Home-Building: The Fostering of Positive Intimations

In cultural studies, the analysis of migrant nostalgia has been concerned largely with its manifestations or absences in literature. This has led to an excessively intellectualist conception of the phenomenon. Not many works in cultural studies have aimed at examining the everyday-life discourse of nostalgia that accompanies the settlement of “non-intellectual” migrants in Australia or elsewhere, let alone perceived the implication of such nostalgia as an active or positive (in the sense of optimistic) form of home-building. Writings on migrant homes appear as if there are no migrants living in them. Commentators more often associate migrants with a nostalgia equated to homesickness. In this sense, nostalgia is assumed to be the exact opposite of home-building: a refusal to engage with the present, and a seeking of an imaginary homely past as a hiding place from the present time and space. Migrants apparently are an essentially depressed mob.

My aim, then, is not to theorize migrant home-building by opposing it to memory and nostalgia or by displacing the latter’s importance in migrant daily life. Rather, I want to argue that nostalgic feelings are sought as a mode of feeling to do with the home where one is in the present. That is, nostalgic feelings are affective building blocks in the sense I have suggested. They are used by migrants to engage in home-building in the here and now.

Nostalgia is nothing more than a memory of a past experience imagined from the standpoint of the present to be homely. Clearly, nostalgic feelings abound not only in migrant life but in everybody’s life. They guide home-building in the present because one seeks to foster the kind of homely feeling one knows. And nostalgic feelings are invariably those homely feelings one remembers having experienced in the past. Thus, when one yearns for a communal life, one’s understanding of such a life is guided by the kind of communal feelings one remembers having had in specific situations in the past. This is why this yearning for homely communality translates into an attempt to build the past conditions of its production.

Such nostalgic homely feelings can be sought or triggered accidentally, but, far from being an escape, they are more often deployments actively fostered to confront a new place and a new time and to try to secure oneself a homely life within them. Consequently, the fostering of nostalgic feelings is one of the main aspects of home-building. It is only when faced with the impossibility of home-building that nostalgia can degenerate into a debilitating homesickness. This is why such a homesickness decreases the longer migrants reside in a new country. The length of stay translates into a more developed ability to
engage in home building, that is, among other things, to recognize and exploit new possibilities and opportunities for fostering nostalgic feelings.

Nostalgic feelings are experientially triggered. They can be triggered by an absence, what I will call a negative intimation, or by a presence, a positive intimation. Here is an example of a negative intimation that came up during an interview with a Lebanese man telling of his early days in Australia:

I had been here for around six months, and I was driving back home to Punchbowl from Liverpool, where I had gone to see the owner of a petrol station who had advertised for a job. I can’t remember exactly where now, but it was pretty deserted. And I got this flat tire and I had no spare. I couldn’t speak English . . . not that there were many people driving by. I started walking. Then it got dark and, as I was walking, I started to think of myself heading to the village. Sometimes when I returned late to the village from Tripoli, I used to have to take a bus that stopped a fair distance out of the way. So I had to walk the rest of the way home. But invariably I met someone I know driving up and they give me a ride. And that’s how I began to think of home. I started thinking that soon someone I know was going to turn up. I started remembering all the people with whom I took rides. I could even remember the details of their car, the sound of the horn, what they said to me. I got so engrossed by my thoughts that I really thought I was home. And when I heard a car coming I turned around hoping it will be . . . for some reason I just thought it was my brother. But it wasn’t . . . [He has a tear in his eye. The story he was telling happened ten years ago.] I had to walk all the way home. I arrived home around three o’clock. I couldn’t speak to anyone the next morning. [He sighs] . . . Su’bi el’hijra [migration is a difficult thing].

Here, nostalgia is triggered by a direct experience of lack of homely feeling of familiarity (lack of practical and spatial knowledge) and lack of communality (lack of recognition and the non-availability of help). As such, the nostalgic experience and the remembering triggered by it are both essentially depressive. It is the accumulation of this kind of nostalgia that produces states of homesickness.

Positive nostalgia, by contrast, is not necessarily induced by a direct experience of lack. It is triggered by a positive presence that comes to fill a passively and only potentially existing lack. That is, the person does not necessarily go around feeling that they lack something; rather, they encounter an object that creates both a yearning for a past homely experience associated with it and, in that very process, a feeling that the object was lacking. Thus, it is the positive encounter with a person, a sound, a smell, or a situation that offers an intimation of an imagined homely experience in the past, an experience of “back home.” These intimations operate like “imagined metonymies” in that they are fragments
that are imagined to be traces of an equally imagined homely whole, the imagined past “home” of another time and another space.\textsuperscript{13}

Below is a classical nostalgic passage published in the Lebanese Australian newspaper \textit{El-Telegraph}. It is a populist poem written to invoke the experience of listening to the Lebanese singer Wadih El-Safi. No other male singer has ever reached the national superstar status of El-Safi. His songs and his voice have become part of Lebanese folklore. Because of constant broadcasting, as well as use in schools and on virtually any private or public occasion, Wadih El-Safi has become rightly known as the “Voice of Lebanon.” This makes listening to El-Safi a particularly suitable trigger of nostalgic feelings among Lebanese migrants in Sydney, and indeed across the world. What better “reminder” of the nation than the voice of the nation itself?

Sing O Voice of Lebanon and take us back through your voice to our homes. Pull us out of here and deliver us from the tortured life of exile.

Sing to us of Lebanon, sing to us your hymns that make us adoringly kneel in the shadows of the cedar tree. Sing to us our traditions, our forefathers . . . sweating under the olive tree, and take us back to where we’ve known peace just as today we know war.

Sing oh Wadih, return with us and let your music weave the web of memories and hope, so that we remember the smell of early morning coffee as it brews, and the sight of blessed grapes as they hang heavily from the vines on our homes’ rooftops . . .\textsuperscript{14}

Like a taped message from relatives passed along by a recent arrival to Sydney, the voice operates as a conduit to the imaginary world of the homeland—as “back-home.” Song and music, in particular, with their sub-symbolic meaningful qualities,\textsuperscript{15} are often most appropriate in facilitating the voyage to this imaginary space of feelings. It is in this sense that they operate as \textit{intimations} of the imagined homely nation left behind. The voice operates as an imagined metonym, in the sense that it stands in for a totality that does not and never has existed but is imagined as a homely totality from afar.

In the poem, it is important to stress that despite the rhetorical “Pull us out of here and deliver us from the tortured life of exile,” voyage is not invoked out of a desire to be home. Rather, this mode of delivery is a ritualistic “moaning” familiar in exilic cultures. Those who truly experience a tortured life of exile, like the man I interviewed, are unable even to “speak to anyone the next morning,” let alone sing about the need to be delivered from the life of exile. Positively experienced nostalgia does not necessarily involve a desire to “go back”; more often than not, the “Pull us out of here and deliver us from the tortured life of exile” is a desire to promote the feeling of being there \textit{here}. One tries to foster intimations of homely feelings, of situations such as they are imagined to have been experienced in Lebanon: upholding familial law as one’s own law, surrounding oneself
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with socially and culturally recognizable and pleasing objects, smells and sounds to promote specifically “Lebanese” feelings of security, owning one’s home, ensuring that one is surrounded by Arabic-speaking people, having family around, having familiar house decoration to promote Lebanese feelings of familiarity, creating Lebanese “neighborhoods” and Lebanese shopping centers, holding Lebanese parties to promote feelings of Lebanese communality—all of these are modes of fostering homely intimations.

It can be noticed ethnographically that some migrants show more interest in remembering than others. For some, what is at stake is not just specific memories but in the very practices of remembering “back-home.” In many migrant communities, one can note specific individuals who are “good at remembering back-home.” They become “priests” or “virtuosos” of memory and remembering who are asked on such occasions as community events and parties, to deploy their skills and publicly remember stories and events that happened back-home for the benefit of the collective.

But, let us stress one more time, the aim of all this remembering, whether by oneself or by others, is not to go back. By fostering these homely intimations, migrants provide themselves with a better base for confronting and launching themselves into life in Australia: by them, they build a shelter from “social and cultural crisis,” and also find a base from which to perceive and grasp Australian opportunities. It is in this sense that nostalgic feelings are used in the process of home-building in Australia. I will show this more clearly by examining practices of home-building centered on nostalgic feelings triggered in the production and consumption of Lebanese food.

Migrant Home-Building and Food

Part of the history of early Lebanese migration to Australia, like many early migration histories, is one of deprivation of familiar fruits, vegetables, and other ingredients. One of the interesting elements of this deprivation is the emergence of creative practices of substitution. Thus, even negative nostalgia does not necessarily lead to passive depression. One Lebanese who lived in Bathurst in the 1940s told this story:

Although some tahini arrived by boat every now and then, we used to go through long periods without it. Sometimes we used to really crave for tahini dishes. Finally, we improvised: either Mum or Dad, I can’t remember, probably inspired by the similarity between the texture of peanut butter and that of tahini, decided to grind some of it with garlic and oil and we used it as a substitute for tahini sauce with a grilled fish. Long after, when tahini became always available I used to sometimes crave for the peanut sauce!

In this climate, the very encounter with yearned-for fruits and vegetables triggered strong intimations of “home.” Home food not only provides intimations of security in filling a
basic need for nutrition in a culturally determined way, it also intimates familiarity in that one must know what to do with it, how to cook it, how to present it, and how to eat it. It thus promotes a multitude of homely practices for those who might otherwise face the unknowable (one thinks, for instance, of Salman Rushdie’s description of an Indian migrant facing an English kipper in *The Satanic Verses*). Furthermore, food also provides a focus for practices of communality, especially in collective eating, whether in private or public spaces. In the interview that follows, a Lebanese woman tells an exceptionally graphic story of the homely intimations triggered when she encountered Lebanese cucumbers, of which the Australian Lebanese, except for some who managed to successfully grow them in their gardens, were deprived until the late seventies:

Nayla: It was incredible. I was visiting my sister who lived on the other side of the station. On the way back, I stopped to get some beans for dinner and here they were . . . I touched them . . . I held them in my hands. They were firm. It was like touching my mother [who lived in Lebanon]. Shawki, the shopkeeper, saw me, smiled, and nodded. “Yes . . . there’s Lebanese farmers growing them down near Liverpool. No more mushy stuff.” That’s how we refer to the Australian cucumbers. I bought two kilos, although we were poor then, and they were very expensive. I ate one on the spot in the shop. Adel [her husband] used to say, almost everyday, how much he missed the taste of Lebanese cucumbers. When Adel came back from work that day, I made a tomato and cucumber salad with garlic and lemon because that’s what I really felt like, and brought it to the table and said to him “close your eyes,” and I put the plate in front of him. When he opened his eyes, he looked at the plate and it took him a little while to realize what I was making such a fuss about. And then . . . [she laughs]

Adel (laughing and interrupting): No don’t tell him . . . it’s very embarrassing.

Nayla: Yes . . .

Interviewer: Come on, you must tell me, what did he do?

Nayla (laughing): He got up, he kissed me and he started dancing and singing something like “Ya ‘ayn ‘al khyar!!” [roughly: “Oh I love you cucumbers”]. [Everyone laughs.] It all sounds so silly now. But the cucumbers really made us happy. It was like reuniting with a close relative.

In this homely scene generated by the cucumbers, we see the nostalgic elements triggered by the cucumbers, but we also see how the practices of fostering intimations of being in Lebanon (represented here in the making of a salad by which the cucumbers yield their potential homeliness) are at the same time practices of home-building in the here and now. As with all practices of fostering intimations, these migrant practices of home-building are about providing a stable homely structure from which to access “a better life” in
Australia. This can be seen in a mild form in this short extract from an interview with a man whose use of Lebanese coffee after a period of deprivation made him not only more at home, but also better able to face his day:

I started making coffee in the morning like we used to have it in Lebanon. You know, subhiyyeh [early morning]. Whenever I have time to just sit down and drink it, I am immediately transported to our apartment in Beirut. . . . Initially, when I started having the coffee in the morning, I was noticeably different and happier at work, so much so that one of my workmates asked me, “How come you’re so enthusiastic these days John?” I said to him, “I’ve been drinking Lebanese coffee in the morning.” He looked at me, shook his head and said, “Bloody wogs . . . I don’t know . . .”

Just as food provided the basis for homely practices within the private sphere, it also provided the basis for practices of home-building in the public sphere, in particular, fostering intimations of homely communality. This is how an article in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, whose coverage of the food scene in Sydney dates from the immediate postwar era, describes the process: “As each wave of immigrants to Australia settled in, little knots of eateries, evocative of the old world, served as meeting places where lonely groups of migrants chatted in their native tongue and recreated the tastes of home.” An article in the same newspaper some twenty years earlier describes a more specific process involving the Ceylonese Tea Centre in the early seventies:

It isn’t surrounded by the neat green slopes of tea bushes—only the roar of Castlereagh Street Traffic—but it’s the nearest thing to home for the 5,000 or so Ceylonese who live in Sydney. . . . At night, if there is a special occasion, the Ceylonese gather to eat food characteristic of their spice-rich island. . . . The Tea Centre invites Ceylonese wives to cook their favorite dishes for the celebration held at the restaurant.

Although the tradition of public eateries has never been dominant among Lebanese migrants, village clubs have always provided an alternative and continue to do so: on weekends and special occasions, someone’s house or a hall is transformed into a “village party.” Men and women sit around large barbecues of grilled meats, chicken, and garlic. Often the party ends with a *dabkeh*, danced to the sound of traditional mountain shepherds’ music.

Despite all the homeliness fostered by such private and public culinary practices of home-building, there was one expression of homely communality that, according to many older Lebanese migrants, remained minimal until the mid-seventies: culinary recognition by the dominant culture. Such appreciation of their food and other cultural forms by members of the dominant culture was, for migrants, a source of pride in social settings.
where “Australians” had shown little recognition of “ethnic value.” Before the multicultural era, many culinary practices of home-building happened away from the “Anglo gaze”—the gaze of those positioned in the space of the dominant Anglo culture. There is an abundance of stories, told by the older interviewees, of eating secretly to avoid being seen by white Australians. One is of a Lebanese family’s backyard party for their son’s first communion in 1962:

Our neighbor, who had been quite friendly, looked from above the fence and was talking to my husband. Nagibeh was taking out a plate of kebbeh nayyeh [raw meat with crushed wheat pounded into a paste] and when she saw him, turned around straight back to the kitchen. She said she didn’t want the neighbor to think we were cannibals! My young sister, who’s always been a bit of a troublemaker [mal’uneh] took the plate from her hand and said, “Let him think what he wants.” She went out straight to him and said, “Would you like to try our raw meat?” Nagibeh hid her face with her apron! The neighbor looked at my sister and said, “Raw meat! I am going to call the police!” And he left. Nagibeh ran to my sister and said, “See, I told you! All you ever do is put us in trouble!” We all started talking at once, each proposing what we were going to tell the police, when suddenly the neighbor reappeared on the fence with a plate and said, “Well are you going to give me some of this meat or what?!”

Despite the specificity of this neighbor’s reaction, it is clear that the whole story is structured by an implicit fear of the Anglo gaze and its imagined rejection of the migrants’ food. It is this imagined gaze that was to be increasingly transformed by the advent of multiculturalism.

Of course, multiculturalism did not constitute a magical clean break with such a reality, and the official discourse of a move from monocultural assimilation to multicultural plurality exaggerates the before and after of this historical transition. Clearly, there were cross-cultural culinary interactions before multiculturalism. At the same time, the negative Anglo gaze has not totally disappeared—even today, as a number of interviewees indicated, kids in some schools are taunted about their “ethnic lunches.”

Conclusion: Diasporic Memory and Spatial Haunting

In this chapter I have emphasized the articulation of migrant memory of “back-home” through the active process of home-building that migrants engage in when they settle in a new country. I have pointed out that, in this sense, migrant memory is no different from any other memory to the extent that we all invest in memories of an imagined
pleasurable past to produce and construct a pleasurable present and the future. The specificity of migrant memory is that this attempt to construct the present is located in a space that marks a radical discontinuity with the remembered past. A fuller treatment of such memory would need to go into the effect of this spatial discontinuity. While all memories are relational and are fantasies of other times and other spaces, it can be argued that migrant memories articulate the relation between space and time in a unique way. It is well known that many migrants imagine their homeland to have remained exactly as they remember it being the day they left: to them, the past still exists in the present, but elsewhere. This “presently existing space of the past” skirts and sometimes even infiltrates everyday experiences as a “spatial haunting” specific to the diasporic condition. Diasporic memory, then, is more than something produced in the specific practice of remembering: it is a permanent spatial accompaniment to all experiences of the present.
The Seventh Veil, released in 1945, represents one of the earliest cinematic portrayals of gothic psychiatric narratives—stories that position the female psyche as a darkly shrouded mystery, revealed through the investigations of a pioneering psychiatrist. As a prototype of this genre, The Seventh Veil registers the emerging position of the psychiatrist in facilitating modern forms of female subjectivity—forms that require a reworking of memory and a therapeutic encounter with a debilitating past.

The film opens with Francesca Cunningham, a talented young concert pianist, languishing in a catatonic state after a car accident. Physically recovered but emotionally paralyzed, she passively submits to psychiatric treatment. Her psychoanalyst, Dr. Larson, administers hypnosis to unlock the mystery of her traumatic illness, a conversion hysteria from which she has lost the use of her hands. In explaining clinical hypnosis to a wary colleague, Dr. Larson suggests that the psychiatrist must overcome the patient’s inhibitions, just as the surgeon must get the patient to undress before performing the operation. Dr. Larson continues to explain the mysterious workings of the mind to his medical colleague:

The human mind is like Salome at the beginning of her dance. It is hidden from the outside world by seven veils. Veils of reserve, fear. Now with friends, the average person will first drop one veil, then another. With a lover, she will take off five, maybe six, but never the seventh. The mind likes to cover its nakedness and keep its private thoughts to itself. Salome drops her seventh veil of her own free will, but you will never get the human mind to do it. Now, I use narcosis. Five minutes under narcosis, and down comes the
seventh veil. And we can actually see what is going on behind it, and then we can really help.

In the 1980s and early '90s, many mental health practitioners united around the project of bringing down the seventh veil, exposing the deeply buried secrets of women. Chastising Freud for turning away from sexual abuse as the primary cause of female psychopathology, clinicians in the burgeoning field of trauma therapy expressed an unwa-
vering commitment to one of Freud’s earliest claims: that therapeutic exploration of fe-
male symptoms often leads to a traumatic sexual scene from childhood.2

As therapists worked their way through deeper layers of memory, the sexual scenes reported in the clinical literature of the 1980s and '90s took on an increasingly gothic tone. Recollections of incest became more violent and scenes of familial abuse more horrific, particularly as patients diagnosed with multiple personality disorder emerged as a prime source of recollections of familial barbarism and perverse sexual cruelty.

Clinical reasoning that guided the recovered memory movement established causal links between incest, trauma, and amnesia, but clinical passions also seemed to be stoked by the therapeutic process of uncovering graphic sexual scenes from childhood. In de-
scribing the appeal of the gothic, literary critic Diane Long Hoeveler suggests that “we,
like the characters in the female gothic novel, want to find something hidden, mysterious,
depth, and esoteric behind the black veil, and usually this elusive deep structure is imaged
as some sort of sexual or psychic secret.”3

Second-wave feminism opened up political space for women to talk about incest and other hidden forms of abuse, and the solidarity of the movement claimed important victories in “breaking the silence” around boundary violations suffered by women.4 At the center of the incest recovery movement was a critique of the patriarchal family, and particularly the illusion that the family is a place of refuge for girls and women. At the
same time, the tremendous elasticity of sexual abuse as a political category was problem-
atic, as was the increasingly dramatic and grisly genre of memories that emerged.5 In the
aftermath of the women’s movement of the 1970s, female grievances were not as readily silenced as in the past. But the bar was raised for what counted as a compelling story. As politics in the United States turned to the right, the public threshold for registering human misery and for responding to the grievances of women seemed to rise.

This chapter presents a psychoanalytic feminist analysis of the trauma and recovered memory movement of the 1980s and '90s and introduces an alternative to the true/false memory distinction that dominated the debates. In focusing on the trope of uncovering buried pathogenic secrets, the chapter draws out subversive dimensions to this drama-
turgy while also outlining its pitfalls. Any project of progressive social change requires a capacity to transcend mundane reality, to probe for deeper meanings, and to uncover unrealized potentialities. Yet once the oppressed begin to speak, historical and social
dynamics intervene to shape both what is said and what is most readily heard and remembered.

Psychoanalytic traditions enlist various models of divided consciousness and unconscious remembering but stress the dynamic nature of representations of the past. The truth of a recollection may lie in the positions of various protagonists and the dilemmas represented, rather than in the factual content of the account. Psychoanalytic theory also provides a framework here for addressing the question of how stories that are not literally true may acquire believability within particular historical and social contexts. This chapter focuses on the rhetorical use of the concept of traumatic memory in late-twentieth-century mental health culture and the freight this category carried both for women patients and for feminist-informed psychology.

Science, Feminism, and the Recovered Memory Debate

For many clinicians schooled in trauma theory in the 1980s and '90s, therapeutic work required a willingness to face the grisly horrors patients had suffered in childhood—areas where previous generations of clinicians dared not look. A line of feminist analysis pursued in the mental health field centered on the complicity of the professions in covering the tracks of patriarchal power. Campaigns focused on the battered child syndrome and, later, the battered women’s syndrome advanced the idea that professionals habitually cast a blind eye on the injuries of family dependents in deference to male authority.

Feminists tended to align themselves with the position that women’s memories must be “validated,” whatever the conditions under which they were produced. As a corrective to the history of silencing women, or of labeling angry women as hysterics, this stance of “believing women” acquired the force of a moral mandate. One cost of the mandate to “believe” women, however, was to adopt a highly literalist view of memory, one that stripped women’s stories of their rich complexity. Further, this literalist view downplayed how official translators on the scene (including therapists) shape the transformation of inchoate, unstoried experience into narrative accounts.

The genre of memories that came to dominate public discourse and to divide the mental health community in the late twentieth century departed in key respects from earlier descriptions of clinically facilitated recollections. First, there was a dramatic disjuncture between prior autobiographical recollections and the recovered memories reported in the trauma therapy literature during the 1980s and '90s. Women had begun to speak more openly about incest and other forms of sexual abuse during the 1970s, but their narratives generally stressed the prohibition to speak rather than the failures of memory.

Most critics of trauma therapy and recovered memory drew a line between incest survivors who held previous knowledge of having been abused, cases thought to be non-problematic, and those women who “found” their memory through a therapy or recovery
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group experience. The scientific critiques generally focused on these latter cases, where hypnosis or other social influences were thought to account for the emergence of memories of abuse. Critics also relied heavily on the distinction between continuous and new memories to defend against charges that they were denying the scope and traumatic impact of childhood sexual abuse. Fixated on the factual veracity of recovered memories, many of these critics overlooked, however, the more troubling question of why large numbers of women were experiencing such a deep disjuncture in autobiographical recall.

Throughout the 1980s and early '90s, the claims of recovered-memory advocates were morally persuasive in part because the victim in the drama was cast as motivated to not remember the abuse rather than to confabulate a story. Why would women recall sexual scenes that were so abusive, therapists asked, unless such abuse really happened? By the mid 1990s, however, public discourse on this question shifted to include more of the arguments of skeptics. The moral high ground shifted away from trauma therapists, as successful legal challenges to hypnotically recovered memories gained momentum. The False Memory Syndrome Foundation, an organization of accused parents and their scientific allies, also mounted an effective campaign to intensify the controversy by casting accused parents and female patients as the victims of zealous therapists who “implanted” false memories in the minds of hapless patients.

In *Rewriting the Soul*, the philosopher Ian Hacking argues that both sides in the debate over recovered memories of childhood abuse rely on the “sciences of memory” that emerged in the late nineteenth century. The sciences of memory, according to Hacking, intervene in the project of preserving the past by substantivizing the hidden, the secret, and translating it into publicly verifiable knowledge. While religion similarly holds the power of explicating the ineffable, science bridges this realm of uncertainty in a more decisive way. Whereas religion stirs awe before the ineffable, science is essentially antihypnotic in its aim, committed to a project of dispelling the aura of impenetrable mystery surrounding human experience.

Both sides of the recovered memory debate appropriated the authority of science in making public claims concerning private knowledge. Science presupposes a knowable, verifiable “truth” that is open to impartial scrutiny. Whether it took the form of calling for more reliable tests of memory, summoning charts documenting the neurological effects of trauma, or outlining procedures for avoiding the contamination of memory, the dominant discourses in the war over family recollections in the late twentieth century were scientific ones.

For Hacking, the “deep structure” of the memory controversy is more philosophical than empirical, more fundamentally tied to ingrained cultural ambivalence over psychology’s role in secularizing the “soul”—what is felt to be the enduring, intimate core of human existence—than to the technical claims of various contestants. The “soul” that is lost, recovered, and rewritten throughout the history of the sciences of memory, feminist theorists might add, is not an abstract, ineffable essence but, rather, is related to those
domains of life most intimately associated with women. Even though men, like women, have bodies, emotions, and families, these dimensions of experience have been coded predominantly as feminine.\textsuperscript{15} The psychology of the “hidden”—with its dramatic plots, secret motives, and revelatory discoveries—has an unmistakable association with the feminine.\textsuperscript{16}

**Images of Hidden Trauma**

The idea of a concealed reality, operating below the threshold of conscious awareness, has been one of the most generative concepts in the psychoanalytic tradition, particularly as it introduces tension between states of “knowing” and “not knowing.” Whether describing intrapsychic or social forces, theorists have enlisted the concept of the unconscious to explain conflict over self-knowledge.\textsuperscript{17} For women, as well as other oppressed groups, remembering involves a struggle to access more authentic versions of the past, against interpretations imposed by the more powerful. As the poet Adrienne Rich describes it, “whatever is . . . buried in the memory by the collapse of meaning under an inadequate or lying language—this will become, not merely unspoken, but unspeakable.”\textsuperscript{18}

As a psychology of secrets—a theory of hidden knowledge revealed through narratives—psychoanalysis creates a more hospitable audience for female storytelling than does the highly operationalized world of scientific psychology.\textsuperscript{19} In contradistinction to cognitive theories of memory that stress the encoding and retrieval of memory, psychoanalysis asserts a narrative coherence to mental life.\textsuperscript{20} From a psychoanalytic perspective, repression is not simply interference in the mental retrieval of information but, rather, signifies human conflict over self-knowledge. The concept of the unconscious introduces creative space for storytelling and for recognizing the importance of the unspoken and of experience located at the margins of what is most readily noticed.

The concept of the unconscious may also be used in mystifying or intrusive ways, particularly as therapists become over-involved in exposing hidden parts of the patient’s interior world. In bridging the distance between the private and the public, between fantasy and reality, many therapists and women patients in the burgeoning field of trauma therapy in the late twentieth century were guided by the curative aim of locating the toxic residue of early sexual invasions. Further, therapists assumed that fragments of trauma memory tended to leak into consciousness in the form of dream-like imagery.\textsuperscript{21}

Since fantasy was associated in popular culture with “making things up” or hysterical ravings, feminist-informed therapies were committed to establishing an external cause for a wide range of disturbances reported by women. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) acquired tremendous currency among progressive clinicians and feminists during this era because it located the source of pathology in the magnitude of events suffered rather than
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in dysfunctional mental processes. PTSD represented a compromise between the anti-psychiatry movement and critiques of labeling, on the one hand, and the movement to recognize the deep and sustained psychological effects of social problems such as war and sexual assault on the other. But trauma diagnoses such as PTSD also depended on establishing a history of trauma to meet the criteria for the disorder.

In much of the trauma literature of the 1980s and '90s, the problem of female disengagement from intrusive experiences was cast through the linking of sexual trauma and dissociation. Since survivors of known trauma often exhibited symptoms of dissociation, many therapists enlisted the concept of dissociation in explaining why histories of sexual abuse may be forgotten, even as these same histories are expressed through a range of symptoms. Unable to escape an abusive encounter, trauma therapists reasoned, the sexual abuse victim protected herself by entering a trance state.

Dissociation is a term used to describe a failure in the normal integrative processes of mind, such as fugue states or dissociative identity, or it connotes a means of establishing emotional distance. In the area of memory and identity, dissociation refers to a fragmented, unintegrated sense of self and chronic states of amnesia. As a defense, dissociation encompasses a broad range of distancing responses, particularly in response to feeling captive to the will of another. Rape survivors, for example, often describe the experience as a feeling of "not being there." Trauma therapists drew on observations such as these to argue that early sexual violations produced fragmented identities in women. Further, they argued that feelings of disconnection or emotional flooding were the direct result of early sexual trauma.

Dissociation is sometimes confused with Freud's concept of repression in that both terms refer to unconscious forgetting. While he initially adopted Pierre Janet's dissociation model of "double consciousness," Freud later rejected it. Freud's repression model, while undergoing significant shifts over time, was a more dynamic model of unconscious processes than was the dissociation model. Repression implied that events with affect-laden, personal meaning are never passively stored in an unconscious realm of the mind but rather are filtered through motivational states and psychic structures. Internal demands upon the ego, such as impulses and fantasies, are the primary source of unconscious forgetting and of various splits within the ego. In other words, mechanisms of defense are organized intrapsychically, often in relation to anxiety-provoking internal images or sensations. As the child enters adolescence, for example, new moral capacities and preoccupations collide with intensified sexual awakenings, and these conflicting pressures heighten the meaning of earlier sexual recollections.

While many psychoanalysts believe that repression may be lifted under clinical conditions, it is generally assumed that the ego—a term encompassing various reality-monitoring and anxiety-regulating functions of the mind—continues to disguise unconscious material. In the dissociation model, however, the unconscious is assumed to be more directly accessible, with divisions expressed through alternating states of awareness or
identity. Dissociationists claim that under conditions such as hypnosis, split-off areas of mind (such as traumatic memories) directly surface in consciousness. Repression, on the other hand, implies a “deeper,” less accessible unconscious.

Trauma therapists tended to routinely interpret women’s mental imagery that felt deviant as an indicator of trauma. This clinical foreclosure on disturbing imagery was costly for women patients in that the legitimacy of mental states—and particularly culturally “unauthorized” sexual and aggressive imagery—required the production of memories of sufficient magnitude to explain the intensity of such imagery.

Multiplicity and Female Psychic Distress

The burgeoning diagnosis of multiple personality disorder (MPD) in the late 1980s grew out of the widening array of therapists specializing in trauma disorders. As “multiples” appeared on countless talk shows and films, this prototypical female patient assumed a historically unprecedented authority in the mental health field. As the oracle of traumatic visitations from the past, the multiple emerged as psychiatric heroine, displacing the emotionally and physically paralyzed hysteric, the people-pleasing codependent, and the manipulative borderline personality of previous eras. Therapists in the dissociative identity disorders field were captured by the creativity of women diagnosed as multiples, expressed in the creation of a complex cast of characters, or “alters,” often numbering in the dozens.

After a flurry of intense psychiatric interest in “double personality” at the turn of the century, MPD had lapsed into obscurity until its robust revival in the 1980s. Indeed, a mere hundred or so of the tens of thousands of documented cases were diagnosed prior to 1980, when MPD was transferred from the category of hysterical neuroses, where it had been listed as a subtype, thought to be extremely rare, to the newly expanded cluster of dissociative disorders. This migration of MPD across categories went beyond the mere reclassification of mental disorders. Rather, it was part of a broader movement to shed the cultural baggage of hysteria, specifically its sexist associations with female emotional “excess” and fantasy proneness, and to extend the clinical applications of the trauma/dissociation model.

Multiplicity is most often described as a pathological elaboration of normal dissociation, which refers to the mind’s capacity for altered states of consciousness and for parallel processing of information. Dissociation theorists argue that in response to severe childhood trauma, and particularly sexual abuse, some children come to rely on dissociative mechanisms to defend against the emotional pain of abuse. Pretending she is someone else, assuming the position of an outside observer, or simply spacing out, the victim of childhood sexual assault develops whole systems of identity and memory that operate independently of one another. The child creates a separate persona that coexists with the original personality, and this second persona assumes the emotional task of managing knowledge of the traumatic experience. As repeated trauma occurs, further splits in
consciousness may develop and new “alter” selves or personalities are formed. These balkanized states within carry on a secret life, assuming control at moments of stress and then receding, unbeknownst to the “host.” While some hidden personalities or alters may be experienced as “inner helpers,” assisting the host personality by assuming control during times of emotional distress, others take more destructive forms, carrying out psychological guerrilla warfare with the host personality.

The clinical validity of this dramatic, mutating condition rests on establishing the presence of an amnesic barrier between at least two of the personalities. While the importance of amnesia, as a diagnostic criterion, has been the subject of ongoing, intense debates in the MPD field, most of the leading writers agree that amnesia separates most convincingly the “true” MPD cases from their various look-alikes. Amnesia includes both periods of lost time—blackouts or fugue states—and failures to remember alter personalities. In the clinical cases reported, the host personality is typically amnesic for all of the alters, particularly at the onset of treatment, whereas the alters may exhibit co-conscious properties. The therapist, more often than the patient, is the one who first discovers these latent, parasitic agencies within and who facilitates their entry onto the stage of consciousness. At the time of diagnosis, two to three personalities are generally discovered. Over the course of treatment, an average of thirteen to seventeen alters are identified, although many cases report more than a hundred.

Skeptics argue that psychogenic amnesia does not generally take the form of whole personality constellations. Traumatogenic events may be forgotten, although this is more likely to be ephemeral and specific to details of events than to apply to entire domains of identity. Further, critics argue that it is an enormous leap to move from the specific effects of psychogenic amnesia and fugue states to the elaboration of entire systems of personality organization, with their corresponding memories, identities (sex-, race-, and age-specific), modes of relating, and unique physiological responses.

MPD is described as “a pathology of hiddenness,” requiring intensive efforts on the part of the therapist to ferret out the layers of concealed alters. Clinicians focus on missing time or gaps in the life narrative. Their reports of patient histories are filled with intrigue, with mysterious clothing and meetings with strangers. The multiple is the woman with a secret life, the woman who finds herself in unexpected places, arousing suspicion in others. In the clinical reports of male and female clinicians alike, there is a highly paranoid aspect to this psychiatric probing.

There is a noir as well as a gothic element to the psychiatric discourse on MPD, bearing striking resemblance to the “woman of the night” in the noir film genre. Like the detective who moves between the masculine, rational world of the day and the feminine, irrational world of the night, MPD therapists are arbiters of the changing boundaries of gendered identity. In the noir convention, the detective is voyeuristically captured by the fantasy of a concealed, nocturnal world where female powers operate. Feminist film critics have argued that this male pursuit of the woman of the night, whom he ultimately brings
under control, mobilizes collective anxieties over a maleness readily overwhelmed by a
culturally emergent but threatening female authority.

The search for more elaborate trauma memories was itself an anxious evasion of
what might emerge from the whole of women’s conflicts. The MPD patient expresses,
through this psychiatric narrative, a creativity and rebelliousness much less evident in
clinical portraits of the past. The clinical discourse of MPD permits women to dramatize
socially prohibited feelings—murderous rage, lesbian fantasies, or grandiosity. Yet MPD
therapists paradoxically intensify the very dissociation they seek to treat. The diagnosis
and treatment of the disorder focused on ferreting out the trauma memories that gave
rise to such florid imagery. As a repository of a bottomless sea of trauma memories, the
female psyche was simultaneously an object of fascination and evacuated of any substan-
tive capacities.

Much like the late-nineteenth-century hysterics and double personalities, the late-
twentieth-century narrative of multiplicity registered unrealized potential on the cultural
horizon. Multiplicity may very well describe a state of emotional and imagistic flooding,
a groundless place between the refusal of old constraints and the discovery of new possi-
bilities for female identity that are not yet integrated into a coherent sense of self. The
paranoid and voyeuristic gaze of MPD therapists did capture concealed currents of female
desire. But these same therapists remained fatefully blind, like Oedipus, to the operations
of their own concealed desires.

Different historical periods create a tendency toward particular defenses and disor-
ders. Historical factors also shape the cultural narratives available to therapists in inter-
preting clinical material. By the late twentieth century, women had made significant
advances in public life that permitted new avenues of identity formation. The multiple’s
vast cast of alters, whose purported psychic function was to “hold” trauma memories,
suggests an emergent sense of female entitlement, on the one hand, and fragmentation
and helplessness on the other.

The MPD movement also enacts broader cultural anxieties over sexuality and female
rebellion, translating them through the moral authority of the sexual abuse recovery
movement. Multiplicity may emerge, as many practitioners claim, out of the desperate,
creative efforts of girls in attempting to escape the trauma of childhood sexual invasions.
But the chronic demands and neglects girls and women endure in daily life, along with
stunted opportunities, may also be experienced as a form of captivity, and these more
mundane forms of bondage are more difficult to dramatize, less arousing of psychiatric
intrigue.

Descent into Hell: Satanic Ritual Abuse as a Feminine Narrative

As therapists searched for hidden memories that would explain the increasingly debili-
tated states of women patients, horrific accounts of childhood torture emerged. The MPD
field was inundated with reports of a vast, intergenerational conspiracy of Satan-worshipers, engaged in ritual sacrifice of animals and babies, sexual torture, and celebration of the Black Mass.36

Patients diagnosed as suffering from multiple personality disorder were a primary source of the growing number of satanic ritual abuse (SRA) stories that circulated in the 1980s and ’90s. In the therapeutic uncovering of deeper layers of trauma memory, often under hypnosis, the personalities or alters that surfaced brought with them tales of sexual torture carried out in the basements of homes and churches of respectable members of their own communities. In the clinical literature, satanic ritual abuse is described as multigenerational, multi-perpetrator assaults on children. According to believers, these satanic cults were elaborately organized networks of adults who engage in cannibalism, ritual sacrifice of babies and animals, sexual torture of children, and parody of the Christian religion through the Black Mass. The primary aim of the Satanists, believers insisted, was a simple dedication to evil. Many clinicians spoke of how listening to such stories changed their worldview; how through the accounts of survivors they had seen the face of absolute, unredeemable corruption of the human spirit.37 Beliefs in these conspiratorial, large-scale cults remained unwavering for many, in spite of the lack of material evidence to support such claims beyond the stories of “survivors.”

As these stories become more graphic and elaborate, they often extended beyond the ritualized torture of children to include the “programming” of cult members that left them like walking time bombs. The emergence of the programming delusion, which was widely endorsed by clinicians in the trauma therapy field, spawned a new subcategory into the differential diagnosis of MPD: some alters were designated as reactions to childhood trauma whereas others were regarded as having been implanted by the Satanic cult for maintenance of control over the survivor into adulthood. A new typology emerged for the differential diagnosis of the disorder with the distinction between “reactive” and “structured” MPD.38

Cult survivors suffering from structured MPD were thought to be programmed to commit suicide on particular dates or were implanted with cryptic cues that prompted self-mutilation, particularly when the victim sought help from a mental health professional. Generally, the triggers for these more malevolent alters to surface corresponded to particular dates that held significance for the cult, such as pagan holidays, or to idiosyncratic symbols, such as hidden messages deciphered from greeting cards. Much of the self-destructive behavior of MPD patients came to be understood as part of the labyrinthine programming of the cult. Vampire-like, the cult was believed to operate in the realm of the hidden, under the cloak of various disguises, dreading the redemptive light of mental health practitioners who were committed to unveiling their nefarious deeds.

These accounts seem hysterical at best and psychotically paranoid at worst. How, then, could otherwise sensible therapists and feminist crisis counselors become convinced of their literal truth? One contributing factor centered on the “culture of belief” fostered
by the trauma therapy movement—one that left no ground for interpreting primitive mental imagery other than as the register of trauma. Since one of the axiomatic principles in working with sexual abuse in the 1980s was to “validate” the memories of survivors and to combat the culture of “denial,” graphic reports of childhood torture found a receptive clinical audience.

Clinicians were governed by a kind of Pascal’s wager: it was better to err on the side of belief than of disbelief. Clinical literature was rife with warnings about the dangers of retraumatizing the patient by questioning the authenticity of their reports. Indeed, treatment protocols codified “believing the survivor” as an essential element of healing. The patient’s memory of trauma, too horrific to reveal to conventional practitioners, could only emerge in a therapeutic environment of absolute receptivity to the “unthinkable.”

This clinical mandate to “believe the victim” overlooked, however, the influence of translators on the scene. In their analysis of reports of satanic ritual abuse that emerged in dozens of day care centers throughout the United States in the 1980s, Debbie Nathan and Michael Snedeker conclude that these SRA stories did not originate with children themselves. In a ventriloqual fashion, the children began to report sexual abuse after hours of intensive police interrogation, with their stories cascading over a period of months into grueling tales of killing and eating animals and babies, sacrificial ceremonies, and pornographic encounters with devil worshipers. In the McMartin case in Manhattan Beach, police investigators and therapists who conducted the investigation held prior beliefs in satanic practices and were seeking evidence in support of them. Nathan and Snedeker’s interpretation of the SRA accounts emphasizes the convergence of Christian beliefs, ambient cultural anxieties over public care of children, and rank opportunism on the part of investigators and clinicians.

The tendency in the debate over SRA, however, as in the recovered memory debate more generally, was to inscribe the boundary between truth and falsehood too definitively. Once recovered memories of satanic orgies, past lives, and other fantastical tales were debunked, critics often smugly turned away from their defeated opponents, declaring a decisive victory. Yet this is where the real work of psychology begins—at the threshold between the imaginary and the “real.” Dramatization plays an important role in storytelling, although its role in trauma narratives is decisively downplayed in the clinical literature.

While satanic ritual abuse accounts are patently irrational, they may contain a concealed story of actual abuses or terrors. But they also may be enlisted to dramatize more everyday conflicts and crises in female development. The SRA drama is, at base, a tale of female heroic transfiguration in the face of evil, yet it draws heavily on ideas of female chastity and childlike innocence. In surviving the ravages of the cult, the girl child is anointed with special powers. As psychoanalyst George Ganaway has pointed out, it is remarkable how many of the stories of the cult center on the female protagonist’s preparation or training for the high priesthood.
In *Suffer the Child*, a book heralded in the dissociation field as a landmark study in the links between MPD and satanic ritual abuse, Judith Spencer presents a labyrinthine tale of female virtue overtaken by sinister forces. Her patient, a thirty-four-year-old woman who had been previously diagnosed as schizophrenic, became the surrogate child of Spencer and her husband, who together devoted many hours a day to her care.

The patient, we learn early on, was raised by a fundamentalist Christian woman who was preoccupied with the devil. Devoutly religious yet prone to frequent moral lapses, particularly in her sexual behavior, this mother is relentlessly abusive of her daughter. Beatings and forced enemas emerge as part of childhood recollections, mixed with Bible readings centering on cleansing the body of the devil’s influence.

Yet this more conventional history of religious and everyday abusiveness is sidelined by the central story. The chronic hardship of her childhood comes to life in the plot that vitalizes the book: it is the cult, the shadowy world of devil worshipers, that emerges as the fascinating, main protagonist in the drama. At the same time, this alternative scene permits a profound specialness for the woman patient, a sense of her place in a maniacal but purposeful cosmos. Indeed, the cult, we are told, had recognized the special powers of “Jenny,” the assigned childhood name of this patient who multiplied into a plethora of selves.

Throughout the clinical story, virtue and cleanliness are symbolically equated, as the young blue-eyed virgin enters into her ordeal of ritual defilement. The cult makes her do unspeakable things, forcing the heroine to actively engage in profane acts that are orchestrated from on high. As events turn monstrously sinister, culminating in the protagonist’s participation in the murder of a woman, the text takes on a pornographic quality:

The high priest caressed the woman’s face and breasts. Then, concealing his actions, he injected her with a drug to sedate her further. He continued to explore her body with his hands, now exaggerating the moves for the benefit of the observers. He entered her first with the tip of the dagger, then with his hands. He prolonged the sensual play. He presented first a symbolic phallus, then his own for her to fondle and take into her mouth. She offered no resistance to these acts, nor to his final act of coupling. The people became increasingly aroused.

This clinical narrative has strong echoes of the nineteenth-century female gothic novel, which flourished in a similar period of gender instability and feminist resistance to domestic confinement. As a feminine narrative of resistance, the satanic abuse memory shares with the gothic novel a veiled attack on the patriarchal nuclear family. Pursued and overtaken by corrupt older men, the beleaguered heroine escapes her state of desperate captivity and emerges the moral victor. The SRA story registers a similar sense of invasive corruption, represented in the imagery of bodily contamination.
Blind to the tremendous generativity of the human mind—its capacity to elaborate on everyday misery and to dramatize mundane suffering—many therapists in the trauma field lapsed into their own form of dissociated reasoning. In disavowing everyday sources of female conflict over the body and sexuality, therapists in the SRA field operated blind to the pornographic substrate of these stories, as well as to how the clinical situation reproduced wider cultural demands on female storytellers.

... 

Although women (and the oppressed in general) often hauntingly remember what the more powerful choose to forget, this same potent truth suffers a terrible fate if it is applied in overly concrete or unreflective ways. In the context of the women’s movement of the 1970s, feminism meant confronting imaginary fears generated by patriarchy as well as resisting actual bodily assaults. Consciousness-raising meant coming to terms with the seductiveness of power and our own complicity with patriarchy, as well as exposing perpetrators and bringing them to justice.

As an alternative to the either/or positions offered by trauma therapists and their critics, this chapter recasts the terms under which we might approach questions of the believability of childhood memories. The trauma therapy movement did help women remember sexual violations from childhood. In breaking through the threshold of unresponsiveness to everyday female suffering, many women patients were responsive to the clinical call to give dramatic form to undisclosed grievances. But in casting the female psyche as a conduit for trauma memories, the rich complexity of female subjectivity and the creative side of remembering were cast aside.

In adjudicating memory claims, it is important to distinguish between situations where the factual veracity of the story matters and those situations where truth lies in the motifs and dramaturgy of the account. Feminists resisted evidence of fantasy at work in women’s disturbing recollections because the woman is so often portrayed in patriarchal society as fantasy-prone and dependent on masculine reason to steady her. Yet feminist-informed approaches to psychology must incorporate the uncertainties of memory and the vital role of fantasy and imagination in mental life, with all of their potential for distortion as well as for creativity.

The recovered memory controversy also serves as a reminder of the dangers of zealous moral campaigns. New insights are inevitably accompanied by their corresponding blind spots, particularly if they are carried out with an excess of self-righteousness. A reflexive invocation to “believe the victim” overlooks the complex social choreography of victim accounts, including the role of various helpers on the scene who assist with the translation. Further, it is important to recognize how survivor stories are structured through what victims anticipate that listeners are prepared to hear.
As trauma therapists so rightfully brought to public attention, memory operates protectively and according to what consciousness is able to bear. In addition to traumatic experiences, female ambivalence over sexuality, aggression, and authority works its way into the complex narratives and registers of memory. Repression of female desire remains part of the psychic legacy of patriarchy, as does the history of sexual abuse and other violations. In areas of life rife with anxiety and emotional pain, recovering memory, whether individually or collectively, is inevitably shaped by individual and social defenses. One defense involves minimization, or defensive denial or disavowal of human cruelty. Reports of perpetrators and victims often include the defensive minimization of the extent of the abuse, although for different reasons. The perpetrator minimizes to escape moral responsibility, whereas the victim may do so for protection from the enormity of what has been suffered. The other defensive tendency, one neglected by trauma therapists, centers on magnifying perceived threats. Disturbing scenes from the past may be dramatized in order to evoke a response in the listener. Hunger, hopelessness, and work exhaustion, much of the chronic suffering produced by economic policies pursued throughout the globe, are less readily translated into the trauma narratives available to Western audiences. Many human problems in the modern world do exceed our capacities to conceptualize and emotionally contain them. And many also exceed the capacity of therapists to offer a cure. Preoccupation with secrets, trauma, or the extremes in human cruelty may operate as a manic defense against these more mundane and less readily articulated grievances.

Stories about the past may weave images from horror and gothic genres in capturing the magnitude of what has been suffered. Women patients and therapists who were haunted by subterranean alter personalities and scenes of ritualized abuse undoubtedly were ciphers for such broader social anxieties. But the gothic heroine in these stories also dramatizes a key source of ambivalence in the wake of second-wave feminism. In entering public life and breaking down barriers, women may find that the gothic narrative holds nostalgic appeal. One motif in the narrative concerns concealed feminine desires, with the mystery centered on what forms of female agency are concealed behind the veils of consciousness. Women, including many feminists, have historically made use of the notion of a female mystery to both invite and elude male intrusions into female spaces. Yet there were considerable costs in relying so heavily on the gothic narrative, particularly for those women patients who, like the innocent heroines in their recovered memories, were bound by the terms under which they could speak about suffering and desire.
30. The Gender of Memory in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Annie E. Coombes

The stories of the TRC represent a ritualistic lifting of the veil and the validation of what was actually seen. They are an additional confirmation of the movement of our society from repression to expression. Where in the past the state attempted to compel the oppressed to deny the testimony of their own experience, today that experience is one of the essential conditions for the emergence of a new national consciousness. These stories may very well be some of the first steps in the rewriting of South African history on the basis of validated mass experience.

Njabulo Ndebele

Established in 1996 as an essential component of nation-building and the peace process, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was born out of the historic compromise brokered in 1993–94 between black and white nationalism in South Africa, a compromise that many have insisted inevitably circumscribed the commission’s work, thwarting its attempts to “heal the nation.” The commission’s brief, in the words of its chair, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, was to

unearth the truth about our dark past, to lay the ghosts of that past so that they will not return to haunt us and that we will thereby contribute to the healing of a traumatised and wounded people, for all of us in South Africa are wounded people and in this manner to promote national unity and reconciliation.

Clearly, in some senses, the TRC had an impossible mandate. The process was inevitably overburdened from the start by the expectations of those who desperately needed a visible material and symbolic form of reparation for the crimes committed under apartheid rule. The fact that the commission had the power to grant amnesty, but only to recommend reparations, further undermined its effectiveness.
For some critics, the hearings were simply “public rituals [that] . . . constitute part of a set of complex mnemonic readjustments designed to signpost momentous events in a revised narrative of apartheid, and in so doing to expunge the ideological motivations for the conflict.”4 Others focused on the lack of adequate reparations for the victims of apartheid and expressed a concern that the overweening emphasis on “restorative justice,” with its Christian message of self-sacrifice, required an unsustainable level of sublimation of the self for the good of what is, essentially, an abstract entity—the “nation”—and that this was expecting too much from those who continue to be marginalized economically and materially even since the new dispensation in 1994.5 In addition, many argued that the TRC’s proscriptive demands that testimony be confined to incidents of gross human rights abuses effectively diminished the legitimacy of accounts of more insidious daily erosions of personal liberty through, for example, the implementation of the pass laws and the constant forced removals.

Nevertheless, while many saw its mandate as impossibly altruistic given the historic compromise of its inception, even the most trenchant critics concede that something productive can ensue from such national confessionalists.6 For example, some have seen the final report of the commission as constituting an alternative cumulative account of events otherwise unrecorded during the long apartheid years and argue that the five volumes of testimony and confessionalists form a new national history, replete with the revisions and mythmaking that are the staple of such chronicles.7

Neville Alexander and Deborah Posel, both of whom explicitly addressed this notion of the TRC as a form of historiography, damningly pointed out a critical lacuna in the final report: the failure to analyze the institutional and structural role of apartheid itself in generating the violations that formed the basis of the TRC hearings.8 Referring to another aspect of the commission that proved highly controversial—the insistence on the legal equivalence of all forms of gross violation of human rights, whether committed by members of the liberation movements or by the state security forces—Alexander argued that “the fundamental flaw in the conceptualisation of the TRC as a mechanism for ‘dealing with the past’ lies in the fact that the question of moral debt is blurred by both trying to ‘share’ it between victim and perpetrator and by individualising it, that is, removing it from its systemic embedment” within the system of apartheid.9 Despite various special hearings focused, for example, on the business, media, and legal sectors and on youth and women, which were designed to investigate more fully the underpinnings of the apartheid state—the work of its leaders and experience of its victims—Posel claimed that “the Report does not take a position on apartheid, even if this is effaced as though it [apartheid] were historical fact. If we look for an answer to the question of how and why apartheid emerged, how and why it took particular forms, how and why it survived for over four decades, all the report has to offer is ‘racism.’” She continued, “Having to focus a narrative of the past around the clash between ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ provides very blunt tools for the craft of history-writing, ill-equipped for more nuanced understandings of
political violence, ideological positioning, the politics of complicity and collaboration, all of which would have moulded a deeper, fuller sense of the nature and dynamics of racism in South Africa.”

This chapter takes as its starting point the notion of the TRC as an alternative form of historiography, and the commission’s final report as an official account of national remembering, despite the fact that it is inevitably as much about forgetting. Drawing on Fiona Ross’s important research, I argue that the lessons provided by women’s testimony to the TRC—not just its content but the mode of its delivery—adds a structurally necessary dimension to our understanding of the memories of the lived experience of apartheid, a dimension excluded from the revisionist accounts of the emergence of the new nation in public commemorative culture in South Africa. It seems to me that unless the lessons gleaned from this testimony are incorporated into commemorative and heritage initiatives, any broader agenda to inspire active participation in an inclusive democracy will fail. Consequently the chapter explores the extent to which it might be possible for memorials and memory sites satisfactorily to embody characteristics found in the oral and performative expression of the women’s testimony at the TRC and in their memories of violence, abuse, and resistance. I am also concerned with exploring the extent to which non-participants can view these memory sites ethically, following Susan Sontag’s caution about voyeurism and Gayatri Spivak’s insistence on listening without engaging in a necessarily narcissistic empathy that obliterates the speaker’s right to an incommensurable experience. Obviously, “women” as a category should be understood as contingent upon the different ways in which race and class mediated the violence of apartheid. Nevertheless, despite vast differences among women’s experiences, their testimony is often located in the temporal and spatial detail of the quotidian—in the intimacies of domestic routine and family life—and consequently, it is here that the insidiousness of daily infringements of civil liberties and their effects on individuals is most keenly represented.

In a moving and acutely perceptive analysis of women’s testimony to the TRC Ross convincingly identifies consistent characteristics in their retelling of events. According to statistics drawn from the first five weeks of the hearings, most women recounted incidents of human rights violations experienced by others, not by themselves. Ross argues that, consequently, “taken as a whole, their testimonies illustrated the gaps in women’s public speech; absences and silences that, for the most part, had to do with representation of their own experiences of violation.” Citing Pamela Reynolds’s research, Ross acknowledges that there may be strong cultural and social reasons that make it difficult for some women to speak directly about the abuse and physical violation of their own persons. The women (black and white, working- and middle-class) she tracks through the TRC hearings seem to present their testimony in one of two modes: either as a highly disciplined chronology, demonstrating a clear political and institutional awareness—an almost forensic expert witnessing of events that directly affected them—but where they avoid foregrounding their own status as victim; or through a textured and layered account
punctuated by performative “pause, gesture and silence” that embeds the violence they recount in the daily rhythms of a domestic or work routine and family life irreparably torn apart by events. According to Ross, these other narratives follow a different convention from the more forensic testimony, but both are evidence of specific kinds of gendered knowledge.

Cinema and the Media

A case in point is the mothers’ testimony concerning the murder on March 3, 1986, of a group of young men from Guguletu Township outside Cape Town, known as the Guguletu Seven. Antjie Krog transcribes the testimony supplied by Eunice Thembiso Miya, the mother of twenty-three-year-old Jabulani, who was murdered on that day:

I got into the train at quarter to five, got to work. I was working two shifts: two hours in the offices, then from there I would go to char, just to have more pocket money, because the money that I was getting from the offices was too little. . . . I did my usual shopping. Then I went home with the train. We switched on the TV for the news, it’s my daughter who did that—her name is Thombisodwa who switched on the TV. . . . She said, “It’s him.” I said, “No, it can’t be him, I just saw him this morning, it can’t be him, I can still remember what he wore this morning. He had navy pants and a green jacket and a warm—and a warm woollen hat.”

Thus Eunice Miya used the details of her domestic routine to create a temporal context for her son’s death. Her son’s murder and what becomes recognizable as the daily struggle of her own life—the details of which are told only incidentally as the framework to locate the event—are, as a result, inextricably entwined.

In 2000, Frances Reid and Deborah Hoffmann directed Long Night’s Journey into Day: South Africa’s Search for Truth and Reconciliation, a feature length documentary that followed up on the aftermath of four cases from the TRC. There are many things that could be said of this prize-winning documentary, but for the purposes of this chapter, I will focus on the final sequence, which similarly deals with the case of the Guguletu Seven. In the documentary, we watch the mothers of the dead youths at the TRC hearing, where they are invited to view a video of the aftermath of their sons’ killings. The video turns out to have been produced as promotional propaganda with the aim of demonstrating the efficiency of the police in rooting out and destroying ANC insurgents through ruthless undercover work, in an effort to obtain more funding.

We watch the film of the mothers watching the police video graphically displaying their sons’ mutilated bodies on the screen in images of callous brutality. The scenes of horror are cumulative for us as viewers, since the preceding sequence shows an archive
news bulletin in which the dead body of Christopher Piet, the son of Cynthia Ngewu, is rolled over at the end of a length of string tied to his waist like a piece of meat. One by one, the mothers collapse or walk out, overwhelmed by physical and emotional distress. This is hard to forget—but equally hard to watch. What does it mean to look at these scenes as a sympathetic outsider and what difference does it make to this question to remember also that similar images were shared by many South African viewers of the TRC, as it was experienced second-hand in both aural (radio) and visual (television) accounts at the time of the hearings?

Susan Sontag, in Regarding the Pain of Others, ruminates on the difference between protesting suffering as opposed to acknowledging it. She goes on to argue that “there is shame as well as shock in looking at the close-up of a real horror. Perhaps the only people with the right to look at images of suffering of this extreme order are those who could do something to alleviate it. . . . The rest of us are voyeurs, whether or not we mean to be.”

In Long Night’s Journey into Day, we cannot help but feel horror at the deeds we witness with the mothers, but our shame is provoked by witnessing their extreme distress from the comfort of our seats beyond the time and space of the hearing. The skill of the film lies in its dialectical structure, which enables us (the international audience for whom it was intended), together with one of the men responsible for their sons’ deaths, to acquire absolution. The final segment shows the women face to face with Thapelo Mbelo, one of three black undercover policemen schooled at Vlakplaas, the infamous special forces torture training camp. Seeking amnesty at the hearing, Mbelo offers testimony that ultimately helps discredit the police version of events. The mothers are utterly in command of this excruciating confrontation, their composure and eloquence completely restored as they proceed to castigate and condemn Mbelo as a traitor to his own people, though finally all but one forgive him.

The other effect of this scene is the realization that the unbearable distress we have witnessed in the hearing may have served a purpose to which most of us have no access: a provocative cathartic release for the women, not for the benefit of others but entirely for themselves. Agency, in other words, may have remained with the women all along. We felt like the voyeurs of Sontag’s essay but are ultimately absolved. The film recalls how, at the time, the TRC was roundly criticized for subjecting Cynthia Ngewu, Eunice Miya, and the other mothers to the terrible images of their sons’ murder all over again. Mary Burton, one of the commissioners, remembers how she apologized for this insensitivity to one of the mothers, who responded that, on the contrary, she felt much better for having seen the footage because it gave her more information about her son’s death.

One significant aspect of the South African commission that distinguished it from its eighteen international counterparts, such as those in Latin America, is that it was the first to make widespread use of public hearings. The other crucial dimension to the South African example is that it was turned into a media spectacle. The lies, the deceptions, the brutality, the tears, the weaknesses, and the strengths were transformed into theater
through televised representations, broadcast regularly by the South African Broadcasting Corporation and on national radio and reported in the national press. Horrifyingly, in some cases (that of Ashley Kriel for example) the media knew and reported amnesty decisions about individuals’ killers before their family had been informed.24

Media coverage of the TRC, more than any other event in South Africa’s recent history, has highlighted the debate around what is and is not representable through visual culture. In particular, television coverage of the hearings of the Amnesty Commission (AC) and the Human Rights Violation Commission (HRVC) brought into focus the incommensurability of the means of representation with the actual pain, suffering, and other complex emotions lived by the central protagonists of these poignant and horrifying narratives.

There are a number of implications that follow from such a public representation of pain and shame. While one might argue that such media coverage made the TRC process accessible and available to more people, it is also true that, as with all media representations, the coverage was necessarily only a series of edited highlights, so that the apparent transparency and access television offered were circumscribed by significant gaps and silences.25

Ironically, it is the public nature of what inevitably becomes spectacle that sets limits on the means by which multifarious forms and levels of personal pain and experience can be made explicit to viewing publics. One of the effects of the televised tribunals is that the focus of communication becomes the body, with its repertoire of performative gestures for exhibiting personal trauma: speech (usually narrative), tears, aggression, withholding, and hesitation. Ultimately, the visibility of the TRC process has contributed to the frustration of representing a nuanced version of the “truth.” It demonstrates rather the difficulties of providing an adequate representation of the anguish of the victim. Furthermore, the inability to produce an account that engages the complexities of personal lived experience of such pain also has repercussions for the ways in which such pain can be made to serve as representative for the larger ideal entity of “national pain” or “collective guilt.”

Ross claims, citing the commission’s final report, that the TRC was concerned primarily with experiences that were both literally and visibly embodied.26 Veena Das has controversially argued that it might be possible to feel another’s pain viscerally, as an experience in one’s own body, thus making it communicable rather than a point of ineffable demarcation, as it appears in Elaine Scarry’s *The Body in Pain*.27 Certainly, both the documentary film and the evidence of the testimony itself suggest that it is precisely at the point where narrative breaks down and a bodily expression takes over that the full horror of the situation is brought home to the viewer.

Obviously, the experiences of women, like the mothers of the Guguletu Seven, form a part of the legacy of the liberation struggle that made the “new” South Africa a reality, and one of the TRC’s recommendations, after all, was the provision of appropriate memorials and monuments to this struggle. And yet it is precisely their contribution that is
absent from the heritage industry that has burgeoned since 1994. What are the issues raised by these examples—the women, the documentary, the testimonies—that might need to be addressed in any public commemorative structure? Is it possible to commemorate the sense they make of the past in some form that would offer a lasting testimony to women’s extraordinary contribution to this passage of South Africa’s history, without minimizing whatever might be distinctive about both the experiences themselves and the means of their retelling (the witnessing and the testimony)? Are any of the usual means by which we embody the past in the public domain adequate to the task? Can the conventional paraphernalia of public commemoration (museums, monuments, memorials) effect the response which I believe *Long Night’s Journey Into Day* delivers? That is, to engage our horror at the mothers’ pain but be pulled back at the last minute, from either voyeurism or narcissistic empathy, to a place where we can both accept the inassimilable difference advocated by Spivak and approach Sontag’s protesting action?

It seems to me that several points have to be addressed: the willingness to widen the definition of acts of resistance in order to include, for example, the determination to create a “normal” family environment, to persevere in instilling ethical, moral, and social values in one’s children; or the refusal to comply with the hated pass laws—acts that might fall outside the grand narratives of the more familiar acts of heroism and sabotage. It would have to engage with the unbearable tensions between the demands of political activism (often kept secret even from partners and close family members) and the role of mother and partner. An adequate commemoration of the legacy of women’s resistance would have to acknowledge the elliptical allusion to some women’s own experience of violence through the detailing of time and space measured and defined by the quotidian, by family, by the domestic. It would have to recognize a somatic response and expression that might be something greater than a simple breakdown of control.

**Monuments**

In March 2000 a monument by a local artist, Lungile Maninjwa, was erected to the memory of the Guguletu Seven. The mothers of those so brutally murdered were affronted by the lack of consultation over what form such a monument should take and, more to the point, claimed that the result was incomprehensible to them and therefore inadequate as a tool for memorializing the event, which had touched them closest. In response, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (a body set up after 1994 to ensure reparations for victims of apartheid) stated that while they acknowledged how crucial it was that any memorial be accessible to the mothers, it had been impossible to accommodate everyone’s needs, with many inevitably feeling that they had been inadequately consulted.

The point here is that even where women’s knowledge is directly relevant, it is often ignored—here, the mothers were ignored despite the importance of their testimony at the
TRC and the fact that their very experience as witnesses was understood to be indispensable to the eventual verdict. It is also further evidence of any monument’s conflicting role as both a public metaphor and the site for the cathartic public enactment of commemoration for a private grief whose extent and the nature remain generally unknowable.

Consequently, much was riding on the first national monument to publicly acknowledge women’s political activism: The Monument to the Women of South Africa, unveiled in August 2000 (Figure 1). The monument is located at the site of the historic women’s march of August 9, 1956, in which a multiracial crowd of about twenty thousand women converged on the Union Buildings in Pretoria to protest the extension of the detested pass laws to black women. Despite some criticisms of the monument, it was clearly an attempt to embody a different sensibility. Neither conventionally monumental in scale nor figurative, it proposed a participatory, performative engagement with a specifically gendered and culturally located activity (associated with the grinding stone at its center) that also resonated with the now famous challenge made by the petitioning women in 1956: “Wathint’abafazi Wathint’imbokodo Uzokufa” (You have tampered with the women. You have struck a rock. You will be crushed). The first public monument in recognition of women’s role in the liberation struggle it may be—but it remains virtually inaccessible.

The Women’s Jail

When the last prisoner left the Women’s Jail in Johannesburg in 1983, thousands of women of all colors and creeds had been incarcerated within its walls. During the apartheid years, their “crimes” ranged from theft and murder to home brewing, sex work, refusal to carry a pass, to consorting with or membership in the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party, the Pan-Africanist Congress, or any other political or social organization banned under the regime.

In some senses, the jail, which opened as a national heritage site in 2005, could be interpreted as the long-awaited women’s equivalent to Robben Island—a site whose history would finally put women’s role in the struggle to end apartheid on the map of a new national history, and a destination for national and international tourists. Even if it never achieved World Heritage status, the jail might at least be seen as a partial response to those women who at the time of Robben Island’s opening to the public had angrily remonstrated about the new government’s apparent disregard for the torture, isolation, and deprivation that many women had suffered both in prison and at home for the sake of the liberation movement.

I want to suggest that the curatorial interventions at the Women’s Jail represent an attempt, spatially and through the deployment of objects, to create an experience for visitors that retains characteristics familiar from the oral and performative expression of women’s testimony at the TRC. Crucially, this commemorative site might also enable the
Figure 1  Wilma Cruise and Marcus Holme, detail from Monument to the Women of South Africa, Pretoria. Mixed media, 2000. Photograph by Annie E. Coombes.
international viewer to adopt the adequate ethical viewing position of Spivak’s injunction. What follows concentrates on those sections where black women (political activists and those classified as “common law” prisoners) were detained.

The courtyard where women were brought in to the prison is now flanked by two new office buildings, one of which houses the Commission on Gender Equality. The gravel underfoot has been replaced with soft grasses, and a covered walkway leads the visitor into the central atrium of the jail, with sides made of glass panels bearing photographs of women revisiting the site of their incarceration set among their inscribed comments as they try to reconstruct that moment in their lives. We read their words as we look through the glass to the site they try to reconstruct in their minds’ eye, and inevitably we attempt the same imaginary leap. Their eyes direct ours.

At various locations around the courtyard are transparent mesh boards with reproductions of the paintings Fatima Meer made clandestinely while in detention on terrorism charges in 1976. Representing another kind of “archive” or “evidence,” these are placed at points where the tangible physical evidence of buildings and cells no longer exists.

The corrugated iron cells are here represented by a full-scale physical floor plan, indicating the door and the two buckets in each cell for ablutions and drinking water (Figure 2). There is no attempt to reconstruct a cell—rather we are invited to register one of the most important aspects of it for the prisoner: its size. There is a touching and unusual acknowledgement here, it seems to me, of the incommensurability of the somatic memory of the cell with what any reconstruction could offer as an equivalent. This pared down analogue has no pretensions about providing an equivalent experience—it is entirely other than what it represents. Like a grave whose contents we can only imagine, it marks out a plot of land inhabited by spectral traces. In other words, this is presented as an inassimilable experience but one from which we can nonetheless gain knowledge of a kind.

The testimony, gathered from survivors’ workshops run at the Women’s Jail and from which the curators derive their inspiration, reproduces many of the features we have already met in the women’s testimony given at the TRC. In the context of the prison, however, the narratives become raw, focused on both bodily excesses and deprivations. Devoid of the anchoring details of domestic routine, they concentrate on the body and its functions. A feature common to all women’s prison memoirs is the focus on menstruation. One common law prisoner in the memory workshops run by the Women’s Jail, stated:

"In 1976 there were no pads, but small bags with four corners and made of canvas. And they were not soft and the blood stain did not come out when washed, but after your periods you were to give them back . . . to be used by others next time. We used to ask for bandages and pins to tie around the waist to hold this diaper as no panties were allowed. . . . Pads arrived later on, only whites were given pads."
FIGURE 2  Ground plan of a cell at the Women’s Jail, Johannesburg. Metal, 2005.
Photograph by Annie E. Coombes.
Jeannie Noel, Durban activist and ex-political prisoner, remembers:

They had useless chores to keep them busy. . . . We had a tarmac yard. . . . The [common law] prisoners scrubbed that tar on their knees and that’s when we noticed they had no broeks (underpants) on. . . . One of the older women witnessed this woman bending and scrubbing, and her pad fell off.34

These memories are consistent with the findings of the TRC Special Hearing on Women, which emphasized the “many stories of how women were degraded when menstruating.”35

Over and over again in the testimony, these moments of shame and defiance are rehearsed by former political and common law prisoners alike. Yet when asked directly about torture, they are as evasive as those who testified before the TRC. Despite the degradation attached to the episodes involving menstruation—a subject still shrouded in euphemism in many homes today—these stories are precisely the ones that nonetheless seem to wrest power from the perpetrators and place it back into the hands of the ex-prisoners. Perhaps there is something empowering about choosing to defy the taboo menstruation represents in society more generally. Torture and its violations are inevitably a highly personalized encounter, whose insidious intimacies are often too complex to share or too painful to name. Acts of defiance by political prisoners were effective in changing some aspects of the prison regime, resulting, for example, in the distribution of underwear to all prisoners—while other features of the prison experience, such as torture, remained beyond their control.

Complimenting the testimony of the women themselves, the curators deliberately chose an oblique presentation of the issue of torture and physical violation. Consequently, in the upper atrium of the jail, several mundane items stand illuminated or sheathed in glass casing (Figure 3). Like Veronica’s veil, they glow transcendentally above the visitor. Two of these contain a pair of knickers and a standard-issue calico square of the sort used as a sanitary pad by some prisoners. A panel cites ex-prisoners’ stories connected with the objects. Other daily objects singled out for our attention are a pass book, a black plastic shopping bag (to indicate the kinds of daily activities that might be interrupted as you were unexpectedly taken into detention), and a birthday card made in prison by Fatima Meer for Jeannie Noel. It is a quiet display, perhaps disproportionately aestheticizing, but one that symbolically reinvests these ordinary objects with the potency they once possessed, without at any point engaging in attempts to reconstruct the experience that makes them meaningful in the context of the Women’s Jail.

Installations in the narrow isolation cells attempt to instill a more dialectical awareness in the visitor. Former prisoners have been filmed telling the story of a particularly significant object from the period just prior to their imprisonment. Nolundi Ntamo (jailed for going out without her pass book) talks about the party dress she bought to celebrate her
high school certificate in Durban in 1978, which she described as “the most exquisite dress [she] had ever seen.” Nikiwe Deborah Matshoba (a leader of the 1976 students uprising in Soweto, who as a Section 6 political detainee, incurred the most severe form of detention) tells the story of her own wedding dress, purchased for the wedding she was banned from attending (Figure 4). This metonymic curatorial strategy subtly conveys the violence and deprivation of detention, not by inviting a narcissistic empathy on the part of the viewer through narration of the horrors of the prison experience or an attempt to recreate it, but by poignantly recalling an object of desire made impossible by detention—a fantasy representing an ideal denied the women in prison. The wall plaque outside the cell provides a layering of different categories of information. The first item is a current photographic portrait of Deborah Matshoba, below which a text sets out a brief biography up to the time of her imprisonment, including the activities for which she was arrested. Another line displays the apartheid regulation that sanctioned her imprisonment. Her occupation in 2005 is given. At this time she was working as part of the curatorial team on the Women’s Jail exhibition. Finally, extracts from the new Constitution highlight the legislation that should ensure that such events cannot occur in the future.

Our awareness of the excruciatingly confined space of the cell, with the physical presence of the ex-prisoners’ faces telling the story in real time, together with the multilayered information panel outside, all combine to engage our senses in ways that reinforce
FIGURE 4 Nikiwe Deborah Matshoba’s wedding dress in one of the isolation cells at the Women’s Jail, Johannesburg. 2005. Photograph by Annie E. Coombes.
our apprehension of the passage of time. In this layering of history, we confront not only
the gulf between the past and the present but also their inevitable interconnection. Ex-
tracts from legislation from these two recent moments in South Africa’s history—the
times of apartheid and of democracy—connect the Women’s Jail with the hopeful symbol
of the New Constitutional Court in the neighboring precinct. The juxtaposition ensures
that the women instantly become a tangible part of the solution and of real political
change. A simple device, it is perhaps one of the most effective means of valorizing the
lost years and months in these women’s lives, poignantly captured in a statement by
Malishoane Mokoena in one of the memory workshops. When asked what she would
choose to put on the wall of her cell to bring things alive for the visitor, she replied, “I
was a beautiful girl, I would bring those pictures and say, ‘compare and contrast—this
picture of a girl that went straight back home to do her mother’s washing.’ . . . I would
bring the pictures and would say ‘this is the woman, the girl that came to jail.’ I was a
young woman.”

The curatorial strategy at the Women’s Jail mobilizes material culture and the animation
of spaces to stimulate memory. The dilemma the curators face is that no matter how
poignant the chosen objects, there is always a degree of incommensurability between what
is expressed in the testimony and the forms that are supposed to embody that experience.
The oral testimony and the women themselves steal the show. They seem so much more
compelling than any animation through the usual museological combinations of text,
object, and space could ever be.

Nonetheless, I want to argue that it is precisely the recognition of this gap between
experience and representation that, in the end, enables the curatorial team to produce a
convincing somatic translation of the ex-prisoners’ memories. Rather than narcissistically
empathizing with the pain of the narrators, and attempting to put us in their shoes, the
curatorial strategies induce us to acknowledge this incommensurable difference. The
displays in the Women’s Jail are not voyeuristic documents of others’ pain nor attempts
to reconstruct events or sensations. They do not entice us in to the action and seduce us
with a fantasy of shared experience. The resolute metonymy deployed at the Women’s Jail
means that we are never permitted to suspend our distance. In addition, it is the ex-
prisoners themselves who are insistent on the need for what we might call a secondary
witnessing: a public witness to their own reclamation of this site of their incarceration,
and a public acknowledgment of their sacrifices for the new nation. Less interested in an
international tourist visitor (though some ex-prisoners want these to engage with their
histories), the women are exercised by other concerns. They speak about the importance
of remembering women’s struggle, and they highlight the fact that everywhere the histor-
ies that are told are the histories of the ANC and of those who went into exile, and that
those who stayed behind, like the generation of the Soweto Uprising, are forgotten. 39 Jeannie Noel explains: “I was so shocked, I was so heart sore that not a generation later, they don’t know a damned thing . . . We have to let our young women know the price that we paid . . .” 40

The women’s prison narratives may all be intimately personal and autobiographical, but they nonetheless resonate far beyond the individual’s experience, and this combination is powerful. We may agree with Sontag that, “strictly speaking, there is no such thing as collective memory—part of the same spurious notion as collective guilt.” But it certainly seems that the embodied forms of these women’s stories succeed in significant and affective ways in providing what she calls “collective instruction.” “What is called collective memory,” she suggests, “is not a remembering but a stipulating: that this is important, and this is the story about how it happened, with the pictures”—and, we might add, objects—“that lock the story in our minds.” 41
The present state of memory studies requires a particular attention to the transmission of what has been accumulated in this field since the 1970s. That was a decade in which many of the energies that had been employed in direct political activism during the previous decade were translated into cultural terms, opening up new areas of research, in which memory was central. I am thinking of the role memory has played over the past four decades in the constitution of cultural history and cultural studies in general, and more specifically of gender studies, cinema and literary studies, area studies, age studies, and so on. There was thus a passage from an accrual of memory—instigated with the hope, or the illusion, that such an act could be directly political and could immediately give the voice of the past back to the present—toward an increasing attention to interpretation. Such attention led many oral historians, for instance in Italy, to develop the concept of subjectivity—and of memory understood as subjectivity—as a central aspect of historical research. Another element that was brought to consciousness for the historians working in these new territories of history was the consideration that, in Stuart Hall’s terms, these new types of history inevitably involve a dislocation from active political work. One essential aim of these historians, if they want to be faithful to the original function of their discipline, must therefore be to maintain a tension between the practice of their discipline and the political and social situation in which they live, as well as to ask themselves how their own work relates to social justice and how can it serve as a resource for the future. All this is particularly relevant to the issue of memory and especially to that of oral memory. Of course, the genealogy of the interest for memory in the second half of the twentieth century is more complex than this brief sketch can say, since it involves great historical questions such as the role of the Shoah in that century and for our present. However,
the two components I have hinted at are precious for understanding orality within the present dynamics of memory and the problematic connected with it. This is the point of view from which I have read *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates*; it is true that the book encompasses a larger area of research and reflection than that of oral memory, but its contributions are also very important in light of it.

The importance of transmission, of which teaching is a major aspect, is linked with the general assumption—seminal for this volume—that memory and forgetting today inform and reorganize the terrain of politics. This means that the very definition of politics—or of what constitutes the political today—is modified by putting memory at the center of the problem. In fact, the attention to memory opens up new ways of conceiving the relationships between the cultural and political, and specifically the link between politics and daily life. Memory cannot help presenting the daily dimension of any event and process, and although its rendering of the political value of such dimensions is often hidden and cryptic, it is the task of interpreters of memory to make that value explicit. In my own ongoing research in the field, which is concerned with age and aging, I see memory’s potential politics in rescuing the link between aging and memory from the stereotypes that make such memories repetitive and banal. The commonplaces that we collect about this link—for instance, that aging opens the way to the world of memory—can be deconstructed in such a way that meaning is given back to what has become a stereotype devoid of concrete sense. It is the reference to the individual or the group that remembers that allows us to situate historically and make concrete what is remembered and what is not. The issues of forgetting and silence are indeed equally important for understanding the political reverberations of memory.

This is actually possible only when we move, as this volume does, from generality to concrete analysis. This does not mean that we abandon generality, but that we consider it historically, critically valorizing the thinking of such writers as the second section of Part 1 of this volume considers. I found it particularly useful to follow the itinerary that this part maps from Bergson to Deleuze, as it invites us to reflect on our own position in respect to those authors and to take a stand in the history of memory. We cannot ignore or reduce the importance of this step, first, in taking responsibility for the past of theories of memory in a pedagogy aimed at ourselves, and second, in making possible the transmission (and in particular the teaching) of present day problems of memory in a way that cannot be done without first reconsidering where such problems come from and on what basis we can found our theoretical understanding of memory, whether oral, written, or visual.

In some chapters, an issue comes to the fore that is crucial today in the ongoing transformation of the sociohistorical disciplines: the value of emotions in the production and the study of memory. For instance, Felicity Callard and Constantina Papoulias analyze the recent emotional turn in the humanities and parts of the social sciences, and show that attention to affect expands the category of experience. Thought, affect, experience, and memory are thus linked together in corporeal memory and more generally in
embodied modes of memorialization, while the concept of emotional memory negotiates
the distinction between affect and representation. In Steve Goodman and Luciana Parisi’s
chapter on postcybernetic memory, affect is understood both as the unfolding of the past
into present experience and as the way in which this experience acts on the past to unravel
a new future, so that memories are an affective impingement of bodies that act on bodies,
which Goodman and Parisi define as material relations neither confined to individual
subjects nor specially human, enlarging the concepts of both memory and affect.

My own itinerary through the book does not in any way exhaust its potential, but it
may be worth reporting as an example of a possible transversal reading. I appreciated the
first section of the second part of the book, which provides a good bridge between theory
and its application to the practice of a discipline (Freud, for instance, keeps reappearing in
different perspectives). The section shows the variety of psychological and psychoanalytic
approaches available in studying the unconscious and, through it, human subjectivity,
making for a pluralist yet specialist approach. We are taken across disciplines on a pica-
resque tour of the “curious landscapes of contemporary memory research” (Sutton, Har-
riss, and Barnier). We learn that autobiographical memory is only one of a range of tasks
that human memory performs, as are the identity functions, to which oral history has
accustomed us. Having perused what, for some of us, is an unknown world, where we are
introduced to different types of memory (procedural, declarative, episodic, semantic), we
find ourselves coming back to our known world of the humanities and social sciences, as
cognitive psychology opens up toward it. As the broad field of memory studies unfolds
for us, we venture into the physioanatomy of the brain and the physiology of memory, in
the dynamic and interactive approach proposed by Howard Caygill. Here too, new ways
are opened up: by exploring the relationships between cultural processes of memory and
the formation of individual memory, we can avoid a reductive privileging of one side over
the other.

But for me the real emotion came when reading the chapters in the second and third
sections of Part 2, first of all the one closest to my own field of oral history, in which Sally
Alexander uses oral life stories as well as autobiographies of twentieth-century Londoners
to unearth some of the “underlying feeling” that generated a sense of class and social
justice. In other words, I was moved to see that the theories and ideas presented earlier
on in the book—especially that of the dynamic between the conscious and unconscious—
could be translated so convincingly into historical narrative and conjugated with events
of death, war, poverty, and fascism. In this narrative, individual women appear through
their memories, and the story of the single individual is contextualized within family
stories that pre-date his or her birth. The importance for the individual of others’ memo-
ries, a point Alexander deals with historically, reappears in a reflexive form in Mark Free-
man’s chapter about the spontaneous process of narrativization, or the transformation of
memory into narrative.
History as a discipline is conjured again when Jay Winter defines “sites of memory”—the physical sites where commemorative acts take place—around our need to link our lives with salient events of the past in a space between history and memory, one where cultural practices of the present animate historical remembrance. Thus the very notion of “sites of memory” is historicized: such sites are shown to vanish when they lose meaning for people but remain capable of being resurrected when people decide once again to mark the moment they commemorate; since sites of memory are so deeply linked with the subjective decisions of human beings, they become as transitory as the groups of people who created them in the first place. In Paula Hamilton’s similar historical perspective in a chapter on public responses to an Australian TV miniseries on a Japanese camp for prisoners of war, negotiations over remembrance take place in a public space that is individually negotiated and yet encompasses larger collectives than in previous times.

This is a useful reminder that memory is based not only on words, as we oral historians are accustomed to understand, but also on images, which give rise to visual narratives. The topic is picked up by Susannah Radstone with reference to the analogy between memory and cinema, not on the ground of memory as cinema and cinema as memory—equations we are used to—but rather on the more intriguing terrain of cinema/memory, a world situated within the mind, yet positioned between the personal and the cultural as it melds cinematic images with the inner world’s constitutive scenarios. The resulting configuration of memory and cinema as mutual and inseparable dissolves conceptual frontiers between inside and outside, individual and cultural, true and false. This is in fact a result of the book as a whole and a tendency present in most chapters, which pose questions that lie open to future research, so that one feels immersed in a work in progress, one that converges from different directions of research and thought. In fact, many chapters in this volume end either by posing direct questions or by appealing to future steps to be taken.

Another achievement of this book is its multidisciplinarity. For instance, its authors acknowledge the importance of ritual for the study of memory from different perspectives: the historical (Winter), as well as the anthropological, which is actually the original birthplace of such recognition, anthropology having always acknowledged the role of ritual as conscious repetition, a form of shared memory discernible in the processes of memorization and transmission, as Stephan Feuchtwang shows.

Perhaps most interesting for me is the last part of the book, significantly titled “Controversies.” Its tone is anticipated in the chapters of the first section of Part 1. I take as exemplary of this tone the work that Bill Schwarz does to tease out the implications of the long debate on Pierre Nora’s Les lieux de mémoire, interpreting it as a symptom of the degree to which memory still has to carry the burden of a historical practice incapable of engaging with temporality. A similar capacity for unpacking memory’s implications is shown in the chapter by Ghassan Hage, based on interviews with Lebanese migrants living
near Sydney, on their memories of food from Lebanon, and showing that migrant memory is not different from any other memory; or in Annie Coombes’s chapter, which, on the basis of women’s testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, concludes that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as collective memory but that the embodied forms of the stories those women tell provide “collective instruction,” in Susan Sontag’s term.

However, this capacity to take stock of a long debate and at the same time add something innovative to it is particularly vivid in the chapter by Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer on the aporia of the necessity and the impossibility of bearing witness to the Shoah. According to Hirsch and Spitzer, the effort to understand the contradictions at the core of Shoah witness testimony has provoked a radical rethinking of the workings of memory and transmission, in particular a foregrounding of embodied practice and affect and a focus on the unspeakability of trauma. The chapter’s final part points to two interpretive uses of witness testimony: one linked to an idiom of exceptionalism and uniqueness that potentially furthers nationalist and identity politics, and the other connected to cosmopolitan or transnational memory cultures capable of promoting the global attainment of human rights. In this sense, one can legitimately say that representations of the Shoah potentially give rise to a new memory that is not based exclusively on the affect of victimization but includes the memory of the perpetrators, the complicity of bystanders, and the “memory” of descendants, coupled with that of various primary and secondary sources. All this requires the effort—particularly important for me and for my own work deconstructing Eurocentrism—to decontextualize the Shoah from its European specificity.

As if responding to the point Hirsch and Spitzer make about descendants, Eva Hoff- man faces the problem of those who came after the Shoah, the inheritors of traumatic historical experience. Today these inheritors must develop the ability to separate the past from the present, to recognize that there is something outside the horror of the Shoah, to grieve for the dead and at the same time bring mourning to its end.

Although this book is wide in its multidisciplinarity, I could not help reading it from my specific point of view, which is to look at the advantages that these many paths of research present for historiography. In this sense I value the appeal by Stephan Palmié to challenge the existing boundaries of history, on the basis of a revisitation of the history and memory of slavery in the New World that asks that we study any claim on the past as a proposition issuing from, situated within, and aiming to make an impact on a larger contemporary discursive and social field. In the same way I appreciate Catherine Merri- dale’s passage from the diffidence toward memory with which she opens her chapter—stemming from her interest in Russia’s violent past and based on a variety of sources—to her conclusion that the most important insight that Soviet stories offer today is a tale of survival in extreme circumstances and of the dignity that this confers on the survivors.
This book is at once bulky and unfinished. After being immersed for some time in its vast contents, having accepted the sudden changes of perspective that take place in the passage from chapter to chapter and part to part—and yet having perceived the many subtle recurrent connections between chapters and parts—I appreciate how this collection brings up to date the most crucial questions concerning memory today and yet does not claim to solve any of them once and for all, but invites every one of us to revisit and discuss our own work as well as its interconnections with other disciplinary fields and other approaches.
Notes

Introduction: Mapping Memory
Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz

1. For one of the earliest accounts of contemporary Western culture as mnemonic, see Andreas Huyssen, *Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia* (New York: Routledge, 1995).


3. Proponents of this view may trace their pessimism concerning the accelerated erosion of memory by digitization back to Plato’s view that writing separates the knower from the known, producing what Aleida Assmann has termed a “memory ersatz”; Assmann, “Canon and Archive” in *Cultural Memory Studies*, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nübling (Berlin: de Gruter, 2008). For a study of the relations between cultural memory and digitization see José Van Dijck, *Mediated Memories in the Digital Age* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007).


1. How to Make a Composition: Memory-Craft in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages
Mary Carruthers


3. Ezekiel is commanded to remember and then write down all he sees for the benefit of the people of Israel—to place what he sees in his heart (*pone cor teum in omnia*, “set your heart upon all these things”) as the Vulgate says (Ezek. 40: 4), with a play upon the Latin verb *recordari*, “recollect.” On the significant role played by memory/recollection in our very ability to conceive and plan a future, see Yadin Dudai and Mary Carruthers, “The Janus Face of Mnemosyne” *Nature* 434 (March 31, 2005): 567. Dudai has published a helpful dictionary of concepts in neuroscience relating to the various aspects and activities of memory; see his *Memory from A to Z* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).


5. “Hic tantos auctores, tantos libros in memoriae suae bibliotheca condiderat, ut legentes probabiliter admoneret, in qua parte codicis quod praedixerat invenirent”; Cassiodorus, *Institutiones* 1.5.2. I have used the edition of R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937). Cassiodorus mentions the example of Didymus the blind expositor in this same passage. In his *Life of St. Anthony*, an essential book of early monasticism, St. Athanasius remarked on Anthony’s well-stocked memory, which served him instead of books: see chapters 2 and 3. As a boy, St. Anthony refused to learn to read and, according to his *Life*, learned his vast store of Scripture entirely by oral means. The impression this story made on St. Augustine precipitates the crisis he described in *Confessiones*, Book VIII.

6. I have described Aristotle’s analysis in *Book of Memory*, chap. 2; see my notes there for further references.

7. An important authority was Albertus Magnus in his commentary on Aristotle’s work *Liber de memoria et reminiscentia*, tractatus 2, c. 3. Recollection is defined as rational investigation (that is, investigation that consciously uses a method or scheme) and distinguished from *iterato addiscens* or repetitive learning. A translation of this treatise can be found in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, eds., *Medieval Craft of Memory*, 118–52.

8. This numerical limit was confirmed by modern psychological experiment by G. A. Miller, “The Magic Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information,” *Psychological Review* 63 (1956): 81–97.
9. “Ita, quamlibet multa sint quorum meminisse oporteat, fiunt singula conexa quodam choro [ne erre]nt coniugentes prioribus consequentia”; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 11.2.20; cf. 11.2.37–38, where similar advice is given. In this essay, I have cited the Latin edition of Michael Winterbottom for Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), except in this instance, a notorious crux, where I have given the reading of the corrected fifteenth-century manuscripts. See Russell’s note to his translation of this passage.

10. One should recall that *meditatio* was the word used in Latin rhetorical treatises for the stages of composition: see, for example, Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 10.6. “Premeditation” of one’s subject matters was considered essential to successful oratory, and Quintilian notes that it depends entirely on the strength of one’s memory. I have discussed at length some of the ways in which rhetorical training and early meditational practices influenced one another in *Craft of Thought*.


13. I have discussed examples of all these organizing figures in *Craft of Thought*; they include works by Hugh of St. Victor (Noah’s Ark), Bede (the Temple of Solomon), Gregory the Great (Ezekiel’s Temple), Richard of St. Victor and Adam of Dryburgh (the Tabernacle), and a number of monastic writers who wrote about the “orchards” and “gardens” of the soul. One example particularly stands out. Richard of Fournival (d. about 1260), a canon of the cathedral at Amiens, discussed a reading curriculum or library, organizing his topics as a garden of books arranged as though they were planted in beds (see *Craft of Thought*, 273–74). Several of these figures are described and explained in the medieval works translated in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, eds., *Medieval Craft of Memory*.


20. Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 11.2.32; the translation is Russell’s for the Loeb Classical Library.

21. See Harry Caplan, *Of Eloquence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), 196–246, and Jocelyn P. Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind* (London: Routledge, 1997). This persistent feature is perhaps related to the physiology of human sight, for the eye does not see continuously but in “jumps,” or saccades, a function of changes in gaze and focus controlled not in the eye but in the...
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22. From Hugh of St. Victor’s preface to a chronicle of Biblical history, quoted from my translation in *Medieval Craft of Memory*, 38.


24. *Institutio oratoria* 11.2.32. In Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 342. It is not possible that Hugh knew Quintilian’s text directly, a fact that underscores both the longevity of ancient pedagogy and the importance of practical technique, rather than written sources only, in accounting for its survival and adaptations.


26. Dante Alighieri, *Vita nuova*, 1.1 (my translation from the edition of Domenico de Robertis [Milan: Ricciardi, 1980]). Dante’s remark about words written in his memory “under larger paraphs” is at the end of section 2.10. Paraphs mark major divisions in medieval manuscripts but do not necessarily correspond to what we now call paragraphs.

2. The Reformation of Memory in Early Modern Europe

Peter Sherlock


8. “Atque indicia de Interpretatione Nataeae complectuntur partes in genere duas; primam, de educendis aut excitantibus Aximatibus ab Experientia; secundam, de deducendis aut derivandis Experimenis novis ab Axiomatisb. Prior autem trifaram dividitur; in tres nempe Ministrationes; Ministrationem ad sensum; Ministrationem ad Memoriam; & Ministrationem ad Mentem, sive Rationem”; Francis Bacon, *Novum organum* (London, 1620), 165, aphorism X.

9. This is not to deny the significance of eighteenth-century thinkers such as the Neapolitan historian Giambattista Vico, who did indeed understand memory, not reason, as the locus of interpretation, whereby humans linked and made sense of both past and present. See Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory*, 32–51.

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15. David Loades, ed., *John Foxe and the English Reformation* (Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar Press, 1997). Foxe’s memory-making was so effective, it is really only in the last two decades that his creativity in weaving a narrative and his diligence in research has been unpicked and understood by David Loades, Tom Freeman, and all those associated with the John Foxe Project at the University of Sheffield. For further information, see http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/foxe/index.html (accessed March 31, 2006).
24. I am indebted for these observations to conversations with Charles Zika. For comments on these in an English context, especially the phenomenon of ghosts in post-Reformation England, see Peter Marshall, *Beliefs and the Dead in Reformation England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
30. For insights into Petrarch’s significance and the idea of “future memory,” I am indebted to Elise Grosser at the University of Melbourne. We await her forthcoming PhD thesis on Renaissance conceptions of fame.


32. An extraordinary example of this is Thomas Lyte’s genealogical chart presented to King James following his accession, now housed in London, British Library Additional MS 48343.

33. See for example John Weever’s condemnation of Polydore Vergil in his *Ancient Funerall Monuments* (London, 1631), 298.


39. Ibid., 211.


42. Le Goff, *History and Memory.*

3. Memory, Temporality, Modernity: *Les lieux de mémoire*

Bill Schwarz

With thanks to Susannah Radstone.


10. Ibid., xxiii.


12. Schorske, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna, xxxiv.


17. The most helpful of these I’ve found to be Nancy Wood, Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Postwar Europe (New York: Berg, 1999), chap. 1; and Peter Carrier, “Places, Politics and the Archiving of Contemporary Memory in Pierre Nora’s Les lieux de mémoire,” in Memory and Methodology, ed. Susannah Radstone (New York: Berg, 2000).

18. In what follows I will be concentrating only on Nora’s own contributions to the various volumes.


25. Ibid., 1:2 and 1:7.


32. Ibid., 1:5.
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33. Ibid., 1:1. Indeed, Nora is keen to emphasize that the slow collapse of rural society explains the theorizations of Bergson, Freud, and Proust: “The disintegration of the traditional French image of memory as something rooted in the soil and the sudden emergence of memory as something central to individual identity were like two sides of a single coin, as well as the beginning of a process that has today reached an explosive stage.” Ibid., 1:11.

34. Ibid., 1:2.

35. Nora, “Current Upsurge in Memory.”


37. Ibid., 1:xi.


40. Nora, “The Era of Commemoration,” in Realms of Memory, 3:611; and see Pierre Nora, “Generation” in Nora, Realms of Memory, 1:498–531, which offered him the excuse to malign the soixante-huitards.


44. Ibid., 1:xvii; and for Proust, Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History,” in Realms of Memory, 1:20.


4. Bergson on Memory
Keith Ansell-Pearson


6. Ibid., 223.

7. Ibid., 151–52.

8. This is very much in line with how neuroscientists frame consciousness today: “Consciousness reflects the ability to make distinctions or discriminations among huge sets of alternatives.” Gerald M. Edelman, Wider than the Sky: The Phenomenological Gift of Consciousness (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), 141.
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14. Ibid., 73.
15. Ibid., 79.
17. Ibid., 38.
18. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 84.
19. Ibid., 95.
20. Ibid., 101.
21. Ibid., 148.
22. Ibid., 127.
23. Ibid., 106.
24. Ibid., 170.
25. Ibid., 171.
26. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
31. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 139.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 175.
36. Ibid., 177.
37. Ibid., 151.
38. Bergson, Matter and Memory, 133–34.
39. Ibid., 135.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 166.
42. Ibid., 165.
43. Ibid., 165–66.
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46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., 150.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 117.
57. Levinas, *Time and the Other*, p. 132.
59. Ibid., 186.
65. Ibid., 440.
66. Ibid.

5. Halbwachs and the Social Properties of Memory
Erika Apfelbaum
Cosser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), but as the English edition is abridged, some passages are translated from the French original.


10. Apfelbaum, “Désordre individuel et désordre social.”


14. Ibid.


17. Ibid., 37.

18. Ibid., 38.


24. Ibid., 183.


35. Semprún, *L’écriture ou la vie*.

6. Memory in Freud

Richard Terdiman

NOTE: Some of the material in this essay is drawn from Richard Terdiman, *Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), chapters 7 and 8. More detail on many of the points raised can be found there.

2. Freud’s most thoughtful reflections on the analytic situation as a system of two will be found in “Constructions in Analysis” (1937), SE 23:257–69.


5. Freud repeated this doctrine concerning the cause of hysteria regularly throughout his career, even as late as “Constructions in Analysis” (1937; SE 23:268).

6. Consider this passage from the “Dora” case where Freud comments on how easy it proves to understand what patients want to keep hidden and yet almost obsessively betray: “He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore” (“Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” [1905], SE 7:77–78).

7. For the image, see David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 252.

8. In Freud’s period this debate took the form of an argument over what neurologists termed “localization,” the argument that specific memory storage locations could be mapped within the brain. Freud was opposed to such literalist notions. Psychoanalytic interpretation supposes an unconstrainable variability and mutability of psychic representations. Any doctrine that tends to normalize such representations, or subject them to a criterion of simple fidelity to preexisting contents, would inevitably have impoverished such a theory to the point of abolishing its field altogether. The effect would have been to undermine Freud’s concept of memories as representations and turn them into nothing more than reproductions.

9. For an account of Freud’s reasons for abandoning the seduction theory, see William McGrath, Freud’s Discovery of Psychoanalysis: The Politics of Hysteria (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), chaps. 4–6. In 1924, Freud republished “The Aetiology of Hysteria” (originally published in 1896) which summarized his “seduction theory.” Upon the article’s republication, he added the following note to his wrenching description of the pain that accompanied his psychoanalytic patient’s recollection of infantile sexual abuse: “All this [the emotion patients experienced in recounting these memories] is true, but it must be remembered that at the time I wrote it I had not yet freed myself from my overvaluation of reality and my low valuation of phantasy” (Freud’s emphasis; SE 3:204 n. 1).

10. For Freud, consciousness itself has no capacity for the retention of anything. “Our memories—not excepting those which are the most deeply stamped on our minds—are in themselves unconscious” (Interpretation of Dreams [1900]; SE 5:539). “Becoming conscious and leaving behind a memory-trace are processes incompatible with each other” (Beyond the Pleasure Principle [1920]; SE 18:25).

11. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud introduced the abbreviations Ucs, Cs., Pcs., etc. to designate the parts of the psyche—the unconscious, consciousness, the preconscious respectively; see SE 5:540ff.

12. For numerous other statements dating between 1900 and 1937 of Freud’s undeviating position on this point, see Terdiman, Present Past, 274–76.


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16. In his attack on Freudianism, Ludwig Wittgenstein posed the same problem: “This procedure of free association and so on is queer, because Freud never shows how we know where to stop—where is the right solution? Sometimes he says that the right solution, or the right analysis, is the one which satisfies the patient. Sometimes he says that the doctor knows what the right solution or analysis of the dream is whereas the patient doesn’t: the doctor can say that the patient is wrong”; “Conversations on Freud: Excerpt from 1932–33 Lectures,” in *Philosophical Essays on Freud*, ed. Richard Wollheim and James Hopkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1. From the beginning of his career Freud struggled with this difficulty. In 1897 he wrote somewhat defensively to Fliess, “All this is not entirely arbitrary.” Dec. 22, 1897; *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904*, trans. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 288; cf. *SE* 1:273.

17. For more analysis of these points, see Terdiman, *Present Past*, 331–38.

18. The question arose as early as *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), and Freud’s response had been unequivocal: “It is in fact never possible to be sure that a dream has been completely interpreted” (*SE* 4:279). It recurred in the *Three Essays on Sexuality* (1905): “It is not always possible to trace the course of . . . connections with certainty” (*SE* 7:155). In “‘Wild’ Psycho-Analysis” (1910) he says this: “One may sometimes make a wrong surmise, and one is never in a position to discover the whole truth” (*SE* 11:226). And finally, in “Constructions in Analysis” (1937), he acknowledges that “every . . . construction is an incomplete one” (*SE* 23:263).

7. Proust: The Music of Memory
Michael Wood


9. Malcolm Bowie, *Proust among the Stars* (London: HarperCollins, 1998), 65: “Applying it as a key to understanding Proustian time is rather like looking at the working day from the viewpoint of weekends and holidays, or at the lives of plain-dwellers from the neighbouring mountain-tops.”
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15. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 537.
20. Proust, Against Sainte-Beuve, 3, Contre Sainte-Beuve, 211, 216; translation slightly modified.
21. Proust, Against Sainte-Beuve, 8; Contre Sainte-Beuve, 216.
22. Proust, Fugitive 391; À la recherche, 4:7.
23. Proust, Against Sainte-Beuve, 3; Contre Sainte-Beuve, 211; translation slightly modified.
24. Proust, Against Sainte-Beuve, 4; Contre Sainte-Beuve, 212.
25. Proust, Against Sainte-Beuve, 6; Contre Sainte-Beuve, 214.
27. Proust, Against Sainte-Beuve, 6; Contre Sainte-Beuve, 214.
30. Proust, Way by Swann’s, 47–50; À la recherche, 1:44–47.
31. Proust, Way by Swann’s, 47; À la recherche, 1:44.
32. Proust, Finding Time Again, 176; À la recherche, 4:447.
34. Proust, Finding Time Again, 185; À la recherche, 4:456.
38. Proust, Finding Time Again, 183; À la recherche, 4:454.
40. Proust, Finding Time Again, 358; À la recherche, 4:625.
42. Proust, Finding Time Again, 192; À la recherche, 4:462–63.
44. Proust, Sodom and Gomorrah, 158; À la recherche, 3:153.
47. Proust, Sodom and Gomorrah, 160, 161; À la recherche, 3:155, 3:156.
48. Proust, Against Sainte-Beuve, 5; Contre Sainte-Beuve, 213.
49. Proust, Against Sainte-Beuve, 3; Contre Sainte-Beuve, 211.
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8. Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin: Memory from Weimar to Hitler
Esther Leslie

2. Ibid., 72.
3. Ibid. 73.
9. Ibid., 48
10. Ibid., 49.
11. Ibid., 54.
12. Ibid., 49–50.
13. Ibid., 50.
14. Ibid., 57.
15. Ibid., 59.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 56.
18. Ibid., 62.
19. Some vignettes included in Berlin Childhood around 1900 appear in various versions. The version of “The Little Hunchback” referred to here appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung on August 12, 1933 and can be found in Walter Benjamin, Berlin Childhood around 1900, in Benjamin, Selected Writings, 3:344–413:384–85.
25. Benjamin refers passim to his failure: essentially it is the inability to be assimilated into bourgeois society.
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32. See Ibid., 320.


34. Ibid., 4:182.

35. Benjamin, Arcades Project, 211. The ellipsis covers a passage from Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu about the joy of the collector who stumbles by chance upon the other half of a pair.


39. See the editors’ notes in Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, 6:799.


43. Benjamin, Arcades Project, 471.


45. Benjamin, Arcades Project, 388–89.


47. This refers to Himmler’s Posen speech to SS leaders on October 4, 1943, in which, pronouncing on the extermination program, he said, “we will never speak about it publicly. . . . This is a glorious page in our history, and one that has never been written and can never be written. . . . Later perhaps we can consider whether the German people should be told about this. But I think that it is better that we—we together—carry for our people the responsibility. . . . and then take the secret with us to our graves.” Quoted in Richard J. Evans, Rereading German History, 1800–1996 (London: Routledge, 1997), 162.


9. Adorno on the Destruction of Memory
Brian O’Connor

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Suhrkamp, 1970–80), 10.2:555–72:557. Subsequent references are taken up into the text, using the abbreviation WTP, with English page numbers first, followed by the German.


3. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), xx; Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, 6:10. Subsequent references are taken up into the text, using the abbreviation ND, with English page numbers first, followed by the German.


7. As Adorno writes: “Such a rigid and invariant basis contradicts that which experience tells us about itself, about the change that occurs constantly in the forms of experience, the more open it is, and the more it is actualized. To be incapable of this change is to be incapable of experience.” (ND, 388/380.)


14. Adorno was committed to understanding this idea in as concrete a way as possible, as is evidenced by his involvement with the “studies on authority” project during his time in the United States. The outcome of this project was published as Studies in the Authoritarian Personality, in collaboration with Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford (New York: Harper and Row, 1950); Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 9.1. Later, the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, of which Adorno was a key member, undertook a comprehensive, somewhat prosecutorial, and certainly controversial, study of postwar German guilt, entitled Schuld und Abwehr (Guilt and Denial), in Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 9.2.

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22. Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 234 (italics added); Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, 7:348. Subsequent references are taken up into the text, using the abbreviation AT, with English page numbers first, followed by the German.
23. See Norbert Rath, Adornos Kritische Theorie: Vermittlungen und Vermittlungsschwierigkeiten (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöeningh, 1982), 84–96, for a systematic treatment of this idea.
24. Peter Uwe Hohendahl, Prismatic Thought (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 83.
34. Ibid., 142.

10. Acts of Memory and Mourning: Derrida and the Fictions of Anteriority
Gerhard Richter


16. Derrida’s notions of the past that has never been present, that is, the past that “is” only in the passing of the trace, should also be thought in terms of his understanding of an “absolute past,”
a past without a real past conceived as presence, in other texts, such as *Of Grammatology*. See especially David Farrell Krell’s chapter on this aspect of the *Grammatology*, “Mourning Ultratranscendence,” in his *The Purest of Bastards*, 103–16.


**11. Deleuze and the Overcoming of Memory**

Keith Ansell-Pearson


7. Freud’s *der Todestrieb* was translated into English by James Strachey not as “death drive” but as “death instinct.” In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze refers to the “Freudian conception of de l’instinct de mort.” The clue to Deleuze’s choice is to be found in his definition of drives as bound excitations; this suggests that for him the death instinct is the primary movement of life because it denotes unbound energy. For further insight into this issue see Richard Boothby, *Death and Desire: Psychoanalytic Theory in Lacan’s Return to Freud* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 229 n. 1, 29–30, 69–70, 71–72, and 83–84. I concur with Boothby that the primary function of the death drive in Freud is not biological: “As a radical force of unbinding, the death drive must be interpreted psychologically. The death drive designates the way the bound organization of the ego is traumatized by the pressure on it of unbound instinctual energies” (84).

8. The category of forced movement comes from Aristotle and features in his treatment of different kinds of movement, natural and unnatural. See Aristotle, *The Physics* 4.8 and 8.4. Deleuze’s *Proust and Signs* was first published in 1964 and then republished several times throughout the 1970s. It is the 1970 expanded edition that first includes the added segment on “The Literary Machine.” A further edition of the text was published in 1976 that included at the very end a piece written in 1973, entitled “Presence and Function of Madness: The Spider.”

9. For Deleuze, it is important to appreciate that the “search” is not simply bound up with an effort of recall but, as recherche, is to be taken in the strong sense of the term, as one would speak of “the search for truth” (PS, 3). This point has recently been emphasized by Roger Shattuck in *Proust’s Way* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 2000), 209.

10. Deleuze holds the essences of art to be superior to those found in the sensuous signs, such as the signs of involuntary memory. See Deleuze, *PS*, 61–65. In essence, Deleuze’s argument is that sensuous signs, unlike the signs of art, cannot separate themselves from external and contingent determinations. As such, they “represent only the effort of life to prepare us for art and for the final revelation of art” (PS, 65). See also chapter four, “Essences and the Signs of Art,” (PS, 39–51).
Deleuze's text, “essence” is bound up with “internal difference” and functions as a principle of individuation.


12. Roger Shattuck translates the verb *miroiter* as “flashes back and forth” and notes that it also means “to glisten” and “to shimmer.” He describes this passage as the most important one on memory in the novel, and explains the experience the narrator is describing, which is akin, Shattuck says, to a “trick” or “subterfuge,” as like having “two probes in time the way we have two feet on the ground and two eyes watching space.” Moreover, what “would otherwise be a meticulous analytic explanation is suddenly set in motion and brought to life by the verb *miroiter*,” so that the sensation of time “becomes iridescent, like a soap bubble, like the plumage of certain birds, like an oil film on water. This enlarged double vision of the world projected in time embodies a parallax view: it provides a sense of depth resulting from a displacement of the observer.” See Shattuck, *Proust’s Way*, 124.


14. On time that is neither empirical nor metaphysical but transcendental see ibid., 271.


17. On the event in Deleuze, see *What is Philosophy?: “The event is immaterial, incorporeal, unlivable: pure reserve. . . . It is the event that is a meanwhile [un entre-temp]: the meanwhile is not part of the eternal, but neither is it part of time—it belongs to becoming. The meanwhile, the event, is always a dead time; it is there where nothing takes place, an infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, awaiting and reserve” (156, 158).


20. On the virtual object, see the important and precise treatment in Deleuze, *DR*, 98–103. A number of points are worth noting: first, that virtual objects are incorporated in real objects and can correspond to parts of a subject’s body, to another person, and to special objects such as toys and fetishes; second, that virtual objects belong essentially to the past, in particular, the formation of the pure past (so virtual objects exist, says Deleuze, as “shreds of pure past”); third, that these peculiar kinds of objects exist only as fragments of themselves in which they are “lost” only as “lost” and exist only as recovered; fourth, and perhaps most decisively, that they are implicated in the amorous game and play of repetition. This means that Thanatos is immanent to the movements of repetition and to the displacement and disguise of the virtual object.


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26. Ibid., 129.
27. Ibid., 333.
28. Ibid., 330.

12. Memory and the Unconscious
Roger Kennedy

2. Ibid., 212.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 221.
9. Ibid., 162.
12. Ibid., 259.
13. Ibid., 260.
26. Ibid., 201.


31. Ibid., 150–52.


13. Memories Are Made of This
Steven Rose


14. Memory and Cognition
John Sutton, Celia B. Harris, and Amanda J. Barnier

**NOTE:** Our warm thanks to Ed Cooke, Rochelle Cox, Paul Keil, Doris Mcllwain, Charlie Stone, and Rob Wilson for their contributions to the framework developed in this chapter, and to the editors for their patience and encouragement.


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9. See, for instance, Nelson, “Self and Social Functions.”


28. Conway, “Memory and the Self.”
29. Ibid.; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, “Construction of Autobiographical Memories.”
34. Ibid., 502.
37. Schacter, Searching for Memory, 221.
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44. Kihlstrom, “Repression.”


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68. See Celia B. Harris, Amanda J. Barnier, and John Sutton, “Minimal vs. Interactive Collaboration and the Costs and Benefits of Collaborative Recall,” submitted manuscript.


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79. Clark, “Re-inventing Ourselves.”

15. Physiological Memory Systems

Howard Caygill


16. Memory-Talk: London Childhoods

**Sally Alexander**

**NOTE:** This chapter is taken from chapters in a project in progress, “*Skin of the Day*”: Women in London Between the Wars, partly funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. Thank you to Bill Schwarz for thoughtful editing.


2. Bloch, *Historian’s Craft*, 194–9, 151. Bloch did not complete the book. Lucien Febvre published in his preface the brief notes that survived. Under the idea of cause they included the following note: “The ‘destruction’ of cause and of motive (the unconscious)”; this is immediately followed by the words: “The idea of chance” (xvi).

3. Bloch, *Historian’s Craft*, 3–12. For some of the ways in which being and time were being explored in relation to each other in phenomenology, modernism and psychoanalysis after the First World War in European thought, see Bill Schwarz, “‘Already the Past’: Memory and Historical Time,” in *Regimes of Memory*, ed. Susannah Radstone and Katharine Hodgkin (London: Routledge, 2003), 135–51, which is republished as *Memory Cultures: Memory, Subjectivity, and Recognition* (Somerset N.J.: Transaction, 2006).


13. Oral histories and autobiographies cited in this essay were compiled and written between the 1960s and 1990s. For some account of that moment, see the articles by Ken Worpole and others in Raphael Samuel, ed., People’s History and Socialist Theory (London: Routledge, 1981). I’ve used three archives of London oral histories: my own interviews from the 1970s and 1980s; the Island History Trust (IHT), focusing on the period since the 1870s; and the Making of Modern London archive (MML) compiled 1980s, in the Museum of London. My chapter owes a good deal to John Burnett’s unsurpassed portrait of the architecture, process, and content of autobiographical childhood memory. Early memories, Burnett discovers, are shaped by “unhappy experience,” by turning points in consciousness of the self; they recall moments of philosophical awakening and imagination, fear of death, shame, authority, and violence (John Burnett, Destiny Obscure: Autobiographies of Childhood, Education and Family from the 1820s to the 1920s [Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1984], 23–65). Burnett argues that modernization (higher living standards and reduced birth rate) introduced improvements in family life among the poor, encouraging the growth in affection; civilized notions of family life and affection, he argues, had filtered down from the upper and middle classes to the lower middle and artisan classes via education, industrial legislation, and so on by 1914. My emphasis—partly inspired by Burnett’s own sensitive interpretations of the texts—is on the impact of working people’s needs and aspirations on legislation and culture, and I work from the belief that the capacity for affect, while mitigated by economic conditions, is not produced by them. David Vincent discusses the relationship between economic lives and emotion in Bread, Knowledge and Freedom: A Study of Nineteenth-Century Working Class Autobiography (London: Methuen, 1981), chap. 3.

14. The recollection given precedence or that introduces the individual’s life, usually “holds the key to the secret pages of his mind”; Sigmund Freud, “A Childhood Memory of Goethe” (1917), in SE 17:149.


21. Lily van Duren, interview with Anna Davin, October 1980. There were five suicides a day in the County of London during the interwar years, the numbers rising from previous years, as too were the proportion of women committing suicide; Robert Sinclair, *Metropolitan Man: The Future of the English* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1937), 44–47.


23. Sixty thousand men from the County of London had been killed during the war, and thousands more were wounded and died a slow death; the influenza epidemic that swept Europe twice, in 1918 and in 1919, killed thousands more. Ill health was endemic and maternal mortality was rising in the thirties. See Robert Sinclair’s doom-laden account of London’s “C3 population” in *Metropolitan Man*, chap. 2, based on the London statistics.


25. Thirty percent of Londoners in the County of London lived three or more families to a house into the 1930s; NSL, 1:39–41.


30. Compare, for instance, *Way Down East* (1920), directed by D. W. Griffith and starring Lillian Gish, which tells of a seduced girl, a dead infant, and public exposure, includes a life threatening chase, and is well worth watching.


36. The proportion of illegitimate births in London fell from 4,727 in 1900 to 3,641 (approx. 4% of all births in the County) in the early thirties, as a result of increasing access to and knowledge of
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birth control through local clinics, maternity and child clinics, and some general practitioners; NSL, 9:292–96.


38. MML series 1, 45.8, Mrs. M. Welsh, who had been a shop assistant at Whiteley’s in the twenties. Freud’s “Family Romance” (1909), in SE 9:237–41, describes the child (usually a son, the girl’s imagination being in this respect “weaker”) unconscious envying and growing hostile toward his father, as well as wishing to exalt him. In these powerful workings of feeling and the imagination, Freud sees the origins of myth.

39. Church, Over the Bridge, 61–62.

40. See Rosie Kennedy, “Children and the Impact of the First World War” (PhD diss., Goldsmiths College, University of London), chap. 1, for memories of the First World War in the aftermath of the second.


42. Ibid., 13–14. Angela Rodaway recounts how she woke from dreams as a child and young adult shouting in fear “and must have been born a thousand times as I waited for the birth of my child”; Rodaway, A London Childhood, 13.

43. See, for example, Helen Fletcher, Bluestocking (London: Pandora, 1986), 30.

44. Births in Bailey’s household (and neighborhood) were home births, attended perhaps by the doctor, or by the local woman; Bailey, Children of the Green, 24, 27.

45. Gamble, Chelsea Child, 7–8; Doris Knight, Millfield Memories (London: Centreprise, 1976), 17.


47. Quoted in Burnett, Destiny Obscure, 313; see also Leonora Eyles, The Ram Escapes: The Story of a Victorian Childhood (London: Peter Nevill, 1953), 1, for memories as “pictures in my mind.”


49. Bailey, Children of the Green, 24, 29.

50. Ibid., 13, 81, 108, 119, and 120. For Freud’s much criticized feminine wish, see Sigmund Freud, “Femininity” (1933), in SE 22:133.

51. Compare shame as a source of social injustice in Bailey with David Vincent’s discussion of the same process of development in nineteenth-century radical autobiographies, in Bread, Knowledge and Freedom, 93.

52. Knight, Millfield Memories, 24; William Goldman is among many who testifies to the vulnerability of domestic servants, “pouring in from the derelict mining areas of Wales . . . young, lonely, inexperienced and simple in their needs”; Goldman, East End My Cradle: Portrait of an Environment (London: Robson, 1988, orig. 1940), 68.

53. Sinclair, Metropolitan Man, 17, 162.


55. For eighteenth-century plebeian speech, see, for example, Tanya Evans, Unfortunate Objects: Lone Mothers in Eighteenth-Century London (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 109–17.


17. Affect and Embodiment
Felicity Callard and Constantina Papoulias

NOTE: We are most grateful to Ruth Leys, Susannah Radstone, and Bill Schwarz for their careful readings of, and comments on, earlier versions of this chapter.


5. Sylvan Tomkins, the maverick psychologist who is currently much favored by cultural theorists is an exception: for him, “discrete emotions” are primary. Nonetheless, most cultural theorists tend to see emotions as secondary, socialized versions of bodily forces. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick led the way for a rethinking of Tomkins’s work; see Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, eds., Shame and Its Sisters: A Sylvan Tomkins Reader (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995).

6. It can be argued that the turn to affect replays some motifs in the similarly celebrated turn to memory, in cultural studies at least. Kerwin Lee Klein, in an important article that analyzed the fascination of memory for both scholars and the larger socius, argued that the work that we wish memory to do is “to re-enchant our relation with the world and pour presence back into the past”; Kerwin Lee Klein, “On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse,” Representations 69 (2000): 145. Affect too is about presence (the lived, “fleshed” experience) and ultimately about reenchantment.
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11. Ibid.

12. Hansen tends to use the term *affectivity* rather than *affect*; he borrows here from the philosopher Gilbert Simondon.

13. Hansen, for example, cites the researchers Joseph LeDoux, Antonio Damasio, and Daniel Stern, all of whom we shall discuss later in the chapter. Connolly, similarly, cites Damasio and LeDoux.

14. We should point out that our own use of the term *representation* usually implies this hegemonic meaning.

15. A note of caution is in order here: In this chapter, we are preoccupied with how a very particular privileging of affect as embodied memory has been crystallizing across different disciplinary domains since the 1990s. However, in neuroscience and developmental psychology in particular, the currency of research based on experimental findings arguably has a shorter life than in the humanities. We do not claim here to be keeping pace with the latest research in this area (not least because new experimental findings can reorient scientific debates in a matter of months rather than years). Rather, we are concerned with the following: first, with how a particular series of texts and emerging conceptual apparatuses originating in a particular scientific habitus became transferable and communicable to the humanities and to social theory within a particular discursive juncture; second, with the extent to which this cross-disciplinary attention to “embodied memory” is being presented as a certain overcoming of psychoanalytic conceptualizations of memory and of subjectivity more generally.

16. Indeed, it is clear—though the reasons for why this is the case would require extensive analysis—that Freud is frequently a touchstone, if sometimes an unacknowledged one, for those exploring memory, affect, and the body from a committedly non-psychoanalytic position. In other words, it sometimes seems as though it would be impossible to explore affect and the body without positioning oneself, explicitly or implicitly, in relation to Freud.


18. Ibid., 47.

19. This interpretation plots Freud’s own writings and is also indebted to the French school of Freudian commentary and practice, particularly that of Jean Laplanche. However, there are a number of contemporary psychoanalytic practitioners who, since the 1970s at least, have attempted to align psychoanalytic theory with the findings of developmental psychology and, more recently, with neuroscience. For a characteristic example that bears specifically on the relationship between memory and affect, see the special issue of *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* 25.1 (2005) entitled “Exploring Emotional Memory: Psychoanalytic Perspectives.”


22. Ibid., 356.
24. Ibid., italics in original.
25. Affect is a notoriously slippery word in Freud’s oeuvre. Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis define it as “the qualitative expression of the quantity of instinctual energy and its fluctuations” (Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith [New York: Norton, 1973], s.v. “affect”), thereby pointing to its dual qualitative and quantitative characteristics. André Green describes affect as “a moving quantity, accompanied by a subjective tonality” (André Green, The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse, trans. Alan Sheridan [London: Routledge, 1999], 70). In the early psychoanalytic paper “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence,” Freud described “a quota of affect or sum of excitation—which possesses all the characteristics of a quantity . . . which is capable of increase, diminution, displacement and discharge, and which is spread over the memory-traces of ideas somewhat as an electric charge is spread over the surface of a body” (Freud, “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1894), in SE 3:60).

26. It is important to note that Freud was indebted to Darwin’s formulations on affect (Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 3rd ed. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, orig. 1872]); in Studies on Hysteria, Freud and Breuer note that “sensations and innervations” belonging to the field of “The Expression of the Emotions” comprise “actions which originally had a meaning and served a purpose” (Sigmund Freud and Joseph Breuer, Studies on Hysteria (1895), in SE 2:181). This statement, incidentally, as well as framing the close relationship that affect has to physiology, sees affect as in itself a kind of memory—the carrying over into the present of actions that once, deep in the prehistoric past, had specific purposes.

27. This is, of course, to push to one side the vexed place that war neuroses and trauma hold in Freud’s thought and the intractable challenge they posed to his libido model and its attendant conceptualizations of memory and affect. However, as Ruth Leys has shown, it is far from clear—on both conceptual and empirical grounds—that trauma can be separated out from sexuality and fantasy; Ruth Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).


31. Adam Phillips makes clear the affective complexity of, for example, worry, boredom, and composure in terms of their ability to contain manifold diverse attitudes and feelings about oneself, others, and the world around one; Adam Phillips, On Kissing, Tickling, and Being Bored: Psychoanalytic Essays on the Unexamined Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).


37. Technological and discursive changes in psychology and psychiatry certainly played a significant part in these changes. The emergence of new medical imaging technologies, for example, enabled a new mapping of the mind onto the brain, as particular neurochemical processes could be said to make feeling and remembering visible. The development of psychotropic drugs meant that mental problems could be associated with the dysregulation of chemical substances between the brain’s neurons. See Allan Young, The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Joseph Dumit, Picturing Personhood: Brain Scans and Biomedical Identity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); and David Healy, The Anti-Depressant Era (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).


41. Young, Harmony of Illusions.

42. A good example is Cathy Caruth’s interdisciplinary edited book, whose very title, Trauma: Explorations in Memory, points to the energy that the category of trauma gave to inquiries into the function (and dysfunction) of memory.

43. For a powerful critique of both van der Kolk’s and Caruth’s formulations concerning the manner in which trauma resists representation, see Leys, Trauma. See also, for a discussion of van der Kolk’s work, Young, Harmony of Illusions.


47. Elsewhere, van der Kolk likens this traumatic isolation of memory to a momentary regression of the traumatized person into infancy.
48. Key texts in which this debate is played out include those by Caruth and van der Kolk, as well as Leys, *Trauma*. Elspeth Probyn, in analyzing shame, cites van der Kolk when wondering whether “feelings lie quietly at the back of the mind” or are “slotted away in the body’s filing system”; “some mental representation of the experience is laid down by means of a system that records affective experience, but that has no capacity for symbolic processing and placement in space and time.” Probyn goes on to praise the complexity of “what the body does habitually”; Probyn, *Blush*, 65.


50. In the use of such “stories” about the brain by scholars in the humanities, the terminological and conceptual disjunction between disciplines is frequently disavowed. For example, it is unclear how scholars in the humanities ought to interpret LeDoux’s claim that the amygdala responds to a sensory cue from the thalamus; in what sense are such cues both based on perception and nonrepresentational? To what extent can an image or a sound be perceived directly? Since it is not only snakes but also snake-like (wriggling) objects that can generate fear, how far can we talk about perceiving formal similarities in objects without invoking the term representation? And does it make sense to claim (as LeDoux and others do) that such formal similarities are universally perceived?


55. Stern is perhaps one of cultural theorists’ most favored psychologists. His work is cited in the writings of Brian Massumi and Mark Hansen and figures prominently in the emerging body of writings on affect in cultural geography. Affective resonance as a concept originates with the psychologist Silvan Tomkins in his multi-volume opus *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness* (New York, Springer, 1962–92). Tomkins’s account of the primacy of the emotions in communication was partly conceived as a polemic against Freud’s privileging of the drive.


58. Ibid., 498.

59. Ibid., 542.

60. The feminist philosopher Teresa Brennan has produced a remarkable if problematic retheorization of sexuality through affectivity in her posthumous book *The Transmission of Affect*. Brennan, in a vitalistic recasting of Freud, reconceives libido as a life force (living attention) that is passed from the mother to the infant through what Stern called attunement. Tellingly, Brennan argues that conflict, fantasy, and psychic distress are a byproduct of the blocking of such energy and concludes that “disorder is not inherent in the body or the flesh, which loves regulation”; Brennan, *Transmission of Affect*, 155. Brennan’s insistence on the wisdom and orderliness of the body is shared by many writings in the turn to affect and merits further study.


62. These terms are not equivalent, though in unison, they have come to oppose explicit or representational memory.

63. Claparède’s commentary was brought to prominence through Ruth Leys’s provocative discussion of it in her book *Trauma: A Genealogy*. It has since been taken up in various ways by other

64. Edouard Claparède “La question de la mémoire affective” (1911), quoted in Leys, Trauma, 96.

65. For LeDoux’s discussion of Claparède see Ledoux, Emotional Brain, 180–82.

18. Telling Stories: Memory and Narrative
Mark Freeman

NOTE: This chapter draws on material in Mark Freeman, Hindsight: The Promise and Peril of Looking Backward (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

6. See especially Eva Hoffman, After Such Knowledge: Memory, History, and the Legacy of the Holocaust (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Hoffman writes extensively about being a member of the “second generation”—in her case, the child of Holocaust survivors—and the “paradoxes of indirect knowledge” that accompanied her status. As she notes, “The formative events of the twentieth century have crucially informed our biographies and psyches, threatening sometimes to overshadow and overwhelm our lives. But we did not see them, suffer through them, experience their impact directly. Our relationship to them has been defined by our very ‘post-ness,’ and by the powerful but mediated forms of knowledge that have followed from it” (25). See also Edward Shils, Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981). “Memory,” Shils writes, “is furnished not only from the recollections of events which the individual has himself experienced but from the memories of others older than himself with whom he associates. From their accounts of their own experiences, which frequently antedate his own, and from written works at various removes, his image of his ‘larger self’ is brought to include events which occurred both recently and earlier outside his own experiences. Thus, his knowledge of his past is furnished by the history of his family, of his neighborhood, of his city, of his religious community, of his ethnic group, of his nationality, of his country and of the wider culture into which he has been assimilated” (51).

8. Ibid., 291.
9. Ibid., 296.

13. Ibid., 140.
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16. Ibid., 26–27.
17. Ibid., 138.
23. Of special note in this context is Helen Keller’s autobiography, *The Story of My Life* (New York: New American Library, 1988, orig. 1902), in which, after having discovered that she had unwittingly plagiarized a short story, Keller writes that she “cannot be quite sure of the boundary line between my ideas and those I find in books. Perhaps this is so,” she ventures, “because so many of my impressions come to me through the medium of others’ eyes and ears” (48). “It is certain,” she adds, “that I cannot always distinguish my own thoughts from those I read, because what I read becomes the very substance and texture of my mind. Consequently, in nearly all that I write” (including, of course, the autobiography that contains these very sentences), “I produce something which very much resembles the crazy patchwork I used to make when I first learned to sew” (53). See also chapter 3 of my own *Rewriting the Self: History, Memory, Narrative* (London: Routledge, 1993), as well as my “Worded Images, Imaged Words: Helen Keller and the Poetics of Self-Representation,” *Interfaces* 18 (2000): 135–46. For another exploration of the Keller case, see Roger Shattuck, “A World of Words,” *The New York Review of Books*, Feb. 26, 2004: 21–24.
28. Ibid., 25.
29. Ibid., 26.
30. Ibid., 27.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 28.
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35. Freeman, “Too Late.”
37. Ibid., 264.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 30–31.
41. Hoffman, After Such Knowledge. See also Mark Freeman, “Autobiographische Erinnerung und das narrative Unbeßuste” (“Autobiographical Memory and the Narrative Unconscious”), in Warum Menschen sich erinnern können (Autobiographical Memory in Interdisciplinary Perspective), ed. Harald Welzer and Hans J. Markowitsch (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006), 129–43; also, “Charting the Narrative Unconscious: Cultural Memory and the Challenge of Autobiography,” Narrative Inquiry 12 (2002): 193–211. By “narrative unconscious,” I refer to “those culturally-rooted aspects of one’s history that remain uncharted and that, consequently, have yet to be incorporated into one’s story” (193). As I also suggest, we become aware of the existence of this unconscious “during those moments when our own historical and cultural situatedness comes into view” (200). While Hoffman uses different language to deal with this issue, her own process of self-discovery and self-realization is very much in keeping with the idea of the narrative unconscious.
47. Carr, Time, Narrative, and History, 60.
50. Of special interest in this context is Patricia Hampl, I Could Tell You Stories: Sojourns in the Land of Memory (New York: Norton, 1999). Appearances notwithstanding, the work of memory,
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Hampl suggests, is closer to poetry than to fiction: “The chaotic lyric impulse, not the smooth drive of plot, is the engine of memory.” In memoir and other such autobiographical ventures, this impulse may be “domesticated” into narrative, but the driving passion behind it derives from “the wild night of poetry” (224).

52. Ibid., 9.
55. Ibid., 31.

19. Ritual and Memory
Stephan Feuchtwang

NOTE: I thank Nicolas Argenti and Harvey Whitehouse for suggesting some very necessary revisions, without holding them responsible for the result. I also thank Amit Desai for searching out much of the relevant anthropological literature.

6. Ibid., 105–6.
10. Maurice Halbwachs, Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1925); Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); see also the chapters by Erika Apfelbaum, Paula Hamilton, and Jay Winter in this volume.
11. See the chapters by Roger Kennedy, John Sutton et al., and Mark Freeman in this volume.
13. Ibid., 314.
23. Ibid., 264.
24. Ibid., chap. 2.
29. Ibid., 196.
30. Ibid., 308.
31. Ibid., 316.
37. Lewis, *Day of Shining Red*.
38. Argenti, “Remembering the Future.”
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41. Santos-Granero, “Writing History into the Landscape.”
42. Harvey Whitehouse and James Laidlaw, eds., Ritual and Memory: Toward a Comparative Anthropology of Religion, (Walnut Creek, Calif.: Altamira Press, 2004).

20. A Long War: Public Memory and the Popular Media
Paula Hamilton

5. Misztal, Theories of Social Remembering, 5; her book also includes a succinct survey of the debates about Halbwachs in the chapter “Theorizing Remembering”; Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006); and Oren Baruch Stier, Committed to Memory: Cultural Mediations of the Holocaust (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).
8. The Australian prime minister Paul Keating often used the memory of Singapore to shore up the idea of an independent Australia against the British colonial heritage. His biographer and former speechwriter, Don Watson, claims that next to John Curtin, the prime minister of Australia in 1942, Keating made more speeches on the war than anyone else. See Don Watson, Recollections of a Bleeding Heart (Sydney: Vintage Australia, 2002); and, on the fiftieth anniversary of the fall of Singapore, Paul Keating, “John Curtin’s World and Ours,” July 5, 2002, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library (ICPML 00746/1).
10. For Sturken, “cultural memory” is a refinement of the idea of collective memory that particularly engages with cultural production; see Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic and the Politics of Remembering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 3–5.
11. Winter, Remembering War, 6.
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15. Vivian, “‘A Timeless Now,’” 205.


17. Landsberg, in Prosthetic Memory, was not the first to articulate the notion of prosthetic memory but her account is the most comprehensive. See also Robert Burgoyne, “Prosthetic Memory/Traumatic Memory: Forrest Gump (1994)” http://www.latrobe.edu.au/screeningthepast/firstrelease/fr0499.


26. 25. Other commentators included the historians Joy Damousi and myself; Garton, “Changi as Television,” 80–81.


30. Guestbook, Changi Internet forum, Kelly, November 18, 2001; Graham, October 14, 2001; see also Sian, October 20, 2001.


32. Guestbook, Changi Internet forum, Gazza, “Father Would be Proud” (post 368); Phil (post 338) was hostile; and Shane (post 295) reiterated the common saying that it was impossible to “forgive and forget,” all on October 14, 2001. (Later participants did not have post numbers.)
21. Sites of Memory
Jay Winter


22. Cinema and Memory
Susannah Radstone

2. For a wide-ranging and illuminating study of the cinematic flashback and its relations to memory see Maureen Turim, *Flashbacks in Film: Memory and History* (New York: Routledge, 1989).


5. Ibid., 3.

6. Ibid., 104.

7. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


17. See Turim, *Flashbacks in Film*.


19. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Esther Leslie’s contribution to this volume.


21. Ibid., 171.


27. Ibid.
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28. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 259.
31. Ibid., 271.
32. Ibid., 267.
33. Ibid., 266.
34. Ibid., 266–67.
35. Ibid., 271.
37. Ibid., 7.
40. Ibid., 24; see also Janet Walker, Trauma Cinema (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
42. Walker, Trauma Cinema, 20.
43. Texts that have particularly influenced the development of theories of culture, film, and trauma include Cathy Caruth, ed., Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); and Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New York: Routledge, 1992).
50. Ibid., 59.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid. 60.
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58. Burgin, Remembered Film, 68.
59. Ibid., 68.
61. Burgin, Remembered Film, 65, quoting Winnicott (emphasis in orig.).
62. Ibid., 70.
63. Ibid.
64. Kuhn, Family Secrets, 112.
67. Kuhn, Family Secrets, 118.
68. See also Kuhn’s later research on memories of British cinema-going in the 1930s, published as Annette Kuhn, An Everyday Magic: Cinema and Cultural Memory (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002).
69. Burgin, Remembered Film, 70.
70. Kuhn, Family Secrets, p.112.
72. Ibid., p. 133.
73. The film earned AU$1.2 million in its first week of screening; ibid., 133.
74. Ibid., 139.
75. Ibid., 149.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., 135, quoting Becker Entertainment, Rabbit-Proof Fence Media Kit, 11.
78. For the complete text of the speech, see http://www.aph.gov.au/house/Rudd_Speech.pdf.

23. Machines of Memory
Steve Goodman and Luciana Parisi

2. See, for example, Hans Moravec, Mind Children (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).
7. Ibid., 66.
8. Ibid., 67–68.
9. Ibid., 63–94.
11. Ibid., 118.
14. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 179.
21. Interrogating this nexus between genetic and cultural memory, memeticist Susan Blackmore argues for a process she terms “memetic driving” to emphasize that we must think the “coevolution” between genetic and memetic replicators: “The past history of memetic evolution affects the direction that genes must take to maximise their own survival. We now have a coevolutionary process between two quite different replicators that are closely bound together. To maximise their success the genes need to build brains that are capable of selectively copying the most useful memes, while not copying the useless, costly or harmful ones. To maximise their success the memes must exploit the brain’s copying machinery in any way they can, regardless of the effects on the genes. The result is a mass of evolving memes, some of which have thrived because they are useful to the genes, and some of which have thrived in spite of the fact that they are not—and a brain that is designed to do the job of selecting which memes are copied and which are not.” She concludes, “If memes are truly replicators in their own right then we should expect things to happen in human evolution which are not for the benefit of the genes, nor for the benefit of the people who carry those genes, but for the benefit of the memes which those people have copied.” (Susan Blackmore, “Evolution and Memes: The Human Brain as a Selective Imitation Device,” http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Articles/cas01.html [accessed, February 12, 2006], originally in *Cybernetics and Systems* 32.1 [2001]: 225–55.)
23. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 93–94.
29. Ibid., 178.
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30. Ibid., 179.
31. Ibid., 146–47.
32. Ibid., 148–50.
33. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer (New York: Zone
34. Ibid., 38.
35. Ibid., 36.
36. Ibid., 78–84.
37. Ibid., 44–45.
38. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomilson and Roberta Galeta (Lon-
39. Ibid.
191–92.
41. Ibid., 192.
42. Prehensions, for Whitehead, entail the “perception of the settled world in the past as constitu-
tuted by its feeling-tones, and as efficacious by reason of those feeling-tones.” (Alfred N. Whitehead,
York: The Free Press, 1978], 120.)
43. Whitehead, Adventures in Ideas, 191.
44. Whitehead, Process and Reality, 129.
45. Whitehead, Adventures in Ideas, 195.
47. Ibid., 215.
49. Brian Massumi, “On the Autonomy of Affect,” in Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Move-

24. Slavery, Historicism, and the Poverty of Memoralization
Stephan Palmié

NOTE: I would like to acknowledge the comments and criticism offered by Bobby Hill, Ira Berlin,
the participants in New York University’s Atlantic History Workshop, and the students in my “An-
thropology of History” graduate seminar at the University of Chicago.
Henze, who met Montejo in 1969–70, went on to compose a work for baritone, guitar, flute, and
percussion, set to a libretto of Enzensberger’s adaptations of Barnet’s text that premiered two years
before Montejo died in 1973, at the approximate age of 113. As Henze later recalled, Montejo “was
then 107 years old, tall as a tree, walked slowly and upright, his eyes were lively, he radiated dignity
and seemed well aware that he was a historical personage”; Hans-Werner Henze, Music and Politics
(London: Faber and Faber, 1982), 174.
4. A fact that, as William Luis argues, Montejo himself may well have been aware of; Luis, “The
Politics of Memory and Miguel Barnet’s The Autobiography of a Run Away Slave” MLN 104 (1989):
475–91:480.

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10. See Miguel Barnet, La fuente vida (Havana: Editorial Letras Cubanas, 1983).

11. Of course, this is essentially but a version of the epistemological quandaries historians encounter in dealing with what Marc Bloch called “intentional evidence” (Bloch, The Historian’s Craft [New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953]). It is likewise a problem that has not only always bedeviled the genre of anthropological life histories (Sidney W. Mintz, “The Sensation of Moving while Standing Still,” American Ethnologist 16 [1989]: 175–85) but similarly plagues contemporary attempts to ethnographically “give voice” to the “native.” For a thought-provoking interpretation of the fundamentally heteroglossic nature of Barnet/Montejo’s Biografía see Luis, “Politics of Memory.”


13. And taking also his recollections of less-than-admirable pursuits in the service of local políticos Montejo documentably engaged in after the turn of the twentieth century, and over which Barnet and the historian Michael Zeuske fought a pitched battle in the pages of the journal New West Indian Guides (Barnet, “The Untouchable Cimarrón,” New West Indian Guide 71 [1997]: 281–89; Zeuske, “The Cimarrón in the Archives: A Re-Reading of Miguel Barnet’s Biography of Esteban Montejo,” New West Indian Guides 71 [1997]: 265–79). For further information concerning the context of the production of Barnet’s book, see Luis, “Politics of Memory.”


29. This is an ideological move, we might say, that Miguel Barnet had apparently been able to perform even while Esteban Montejo was still speaking to him: for Barnet, “el cimarrón” had already become a metonym of pasts on which he himself aimed to leave his interpretative stamp in the name of the Cuban revolutionary national project. Luis, who provides the most sensitive reading of the text in regard to this moment, suggests that there are traces of textual evidence that support the assumption that Montejo may not have shared Barnet’s vision of history and instead remained skeptical, if not outright disillusioned; Luis, “Politics of Memory.”


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34. Lambek, “Past Imperfect.”


37. See Knapp, “Collective Memory and the Actual Past.” On the legal question of how restitutionary claims based on personal injury might be rendered “descendible” see Westley, “The Accursed Share.”


39. The logic becomes obvious in the American legal form of the class action suit, in which the plaintiffs are treated as collectivities composed of instances of wronged persons rather than as groups.


41. Hence perhaps Charles Maier’s worry that the global trend toward “revisiting . . . collective victimization and catastrophe” at the end of the twentieth century may less reveal a genuine concern to transcend such pasts than reflect “our current incapacity to entertain transformative political projects for the future and hence to invest our collective resources in contesting the past”; Charles S. Maier, “Overcoming the Past? Narrative and Negotiation, Remembering and Reparation: Issues at the Interface of History and the Law,” Politics and the Past, ed. John Torpey (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 295–303:303.


43. Named so after Christine Taubira, a delegate from French Guyane who had originally introduced the bill—no doubt in the sincere belief that it might lead to genuine political reflection.

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2006/speech_by_the_president_of_the_republic_marking_the_first_commemorative_day_in_metropolitan_france_for_remembering_slavery_and_its_abolition.50223.html.


46. As Christine Chivallon puts it in regard to the rush to commemorate the slave trade that seems to have gripped the city of Bristol under the impact of Britain’s newly discovered “multicultural” agenda in the late 1990s, “the boom in memory was only translating the excess that marks the instrumentalization of all signs that serve to accredit a social vision in which the acceptance of difference must be viewed as already achieved,” rather than as a woefully incomplete project (Chivallon, “Bristol and the Eruption of Memory: Making the Slave-Trading Past Visible,” Social and Cultural Geography 2 [2001]: 357).


48. Proof of the pudding is that—pace Aristotle, and with the significant exception of Count Tolstoy—few modern claims upon the past have ever explicitly been made in the name of “poetry.” See Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Knapp, “Collective Memory and the Actual Past”; Michael Lambek, The Weight of the Past: Living With History in Mahajanga, Madagascar (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Koselleck, Futures Past.


52. Trouillot, “Abortive Rituals.”


56. One needs to note an additional layer of irony here: for it was arguably the work of historians of the Atlantic slave trade like Curtin that, by empirically assessing its scope and authoritatively...
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inscribing it into the Western historical imagination, makes possible statements like the foregoing
(or, indeed, the entire controversy). I thank Fred Cooper for this observation, though I do not
think that it has much bearing on the present argument. Compare Steven Feierman, “African
Histories and the Dissolution of World History,” in Africa and the Disciplines, ed. Robert H. Bates,
V. Y. Mudimbe and Jean O’Barr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 167–212, on the
non-additivity of historical knowledge.


58. This is not to say that the “memories” fostered by “roots tourism” are unproblematic. As
Paulla Ebron argues in her analysis of a McDonald’s-sponsored “African American homeland tour”
to Gorée Island, not only does contemporary corporate “identity marketing” aim to domesticate
oppositional expressions of difference. It also effectively disarticulates the vision of a shared transat-
lantic history of oppression central to mid-twentieth-century forms of political Pan-Africanism by
replacing it, on both sides of the Atlantic, with “the pragmatism of free-market wealth generation”
(Hasty, “Rites of Passage,” 58). In the case Ebron describes, the “McDonald’s tour . . . brought
participants into an identity journey that blocked out much of collective politics, both African and
American, even as it gave us a sense of connection” (Ebron “Tourists as Pilgrims,” 928; cf. Hartman,
“‘The Time of Slavery’”). Nonetheless, to compare these two modes of mnemonic practice coincid-
ing at the Maison des Esclaves risks mistaking the profit-driven manipulation of authentic desire to
connect with and mourn a tragic past with the staging of commemorative rituals designed to render
such connections irrelevant in and for the present.

59. These range from Representative Tom De Lay’s accusation that President Clinton treason-
ously criticized the United States on foreign soil in delivering (what arguably was not) an apology
for slavery, to the much publicized “genomic exposure” of Thomas Jefferson’s paternity of one of
his slave Sally Hemings’s sons, to the last-minute decision of the Library of Congress not to open
its “Back of the Big House exhibit” (which soon after surfaced at the District of Columbia’s Martin
Luther King Public Library), to the belated discovery that Philadelphia’s Freedom Bell exhibit was
to be housed on the grounds where George Washington kept his slaves during his presidency, and
on to scuffles that broke out during the Colonial Williamsburg Museum’s reenactment of a slave
auction, or—apparently even more disturbing for Berlin—the interruption of scholarly dialogue by
an unruly lay audience during a 1998 Omohundro Institute for Early American History and Culture
conference on the merits of a newly unveiled CD-ROM database on the transatlantic slave trade
(David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson, and Herbert S. Klein, eds., The Trans-Atlantic
Slave Trade: A Database on CD-ROM [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999]). For more
on such controversies see the contributions to James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, eds.,

60. Ira Berlin, “American Slavery in History and Memory and the Search for Social Justice,”

61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., 1262.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 1262–63.
65. Ibid., 1266.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., 1266ff.
68. For instance, Bernard Bailyn, “Considering the Slave Trade: History and Memory,” William
70. And these might include not only descendants of victims of slavery, but—in all fairness—
disgruntled white supremacists and “neo-Confederates” in the U.S. South as well.
1935).
74. Though Peter Novick, in *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity” Question and the American
Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), does not phrase matters in
such terms, his still unsurpassed social history of North American historiography can, in fact, be
read as a veritable catalog of instances of the operation of this logic. If unwittingly, Joyce Appleby,
Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacobs, in *Telling the Truth About History* (New York: Norton, 1994),
attest to its continuous salience. Cf. Chakrabarty on what he calls the emergence of “subaltern
pasts” as a function of the operation of historical reason in the production of “minority histories”
(*Provincializing Europe*, 97–113).
75. Koselleck, *Futures Past*.
76. Compare here Fasolt’s doubly sacrilegious comparison between the Eucharist as the major
ritual of Catholicism, and contemporary historians’ ritual of producing evidence: in both cases (the
body of Christ and the historical past), we are arguably dealing with an ultimately unsubstantiable
“reality” that must be represented, and rendered socially binding, through ritualized procedures.
As Fasolt argues, the sacredness (in Durkheim’s sense) of evidence, central as it is to such rituals,
arises out of and in turn stabilizes liberal visions of personal freedom and accountability—two key
components of a credo at the very core of modern historiographical praxis (Fasolt, “History as
Ritual”).
78. David Scott, *Refashioning Futures: Criticism After Postcoloniality* (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1999).

25. Soviet Memories: Patriotism and Trauma
Catherine Merridale

NOTE: I presented a version of this chapter at the University of Southampton’s Memory Research
Group in May 2006. I am grateful to the participants for inviting me and for their helpful comments
in discussion.

1. The debates of the late 1980s are summed up in articles such as Alec Nove’s “Victims of
Stalinism: How Many?” and S. G. Wheatcroft’s “More Light on the Scale of Repression and Excess
Mortality,” both in *Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives*, ed. J. Arch Getty and Roberta T. Manning
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 261–74, 275–90. For problems of accessibility and
the early impact of glasnost, see R. W. Davies, *Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution* (Hound-

2. The first book, concerning death and memory, was my *Night of Stone: Death and Memory in
Russia* (London: Faber and Faber, 2000). On the war veterans, see my *Ivan’s War: The Red Army,
1939–1945* (London: Faber and Faber, 2005). I am grateful for the support of the Economic and
Social Research Council in both cases, and also for research leave funded by the Arts and Humanities
Research Board.
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5. The remark was picked up by Derek Summerfield in his “The Psychological Legacy of War and Atrocity: The Question of Long-Term and Transgenerational Effects and the Need for a Broad View,” Journal of Nervous and Medical Disease 184.1 (1996): 375–77.


7. Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago, published in English in 1974, resulted in his expulsion from the USSR. Like earlier “revelations,” it served to ensure that the European Left could not turn to the Soviet Union for comfort at a time of political crisis, but like earlier publications (notably Viktor Kravchenko’s I Chose Freedom), it was unwelcome in such political circles.


10. See Merridale, Ivan’s War, 174.

11. After Stalin’s death, the Gulag was gradually liquidated, initially on the instructions of Lavrenti Beria and then as part of Nikita Khrushchev’s program of de-Stalinization.


26. The Witness in the Archive: Holocaust Studies/Memory Studies
Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer

NOTE: This chapter appeared in Memory Studies 2.2 (2009): 151–70. We thank Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz for their invitation to write this article and the challenging question they posed to us: What has Holocaust Studies brought to Memory Studies and how, conversely, has Memory Studies inflected Holocaust Studies? We are also grateful to members of the Columbia Cultural Memory colloquium and the Seminar on the Age of the Witness at CUNY Graduate Center for their excellent suggestions on earlier versions of this article.


2. Among other possible trajectories we could have chosen, are visuality and especially photography as privileged media of memory; the acute interest in museums and memorials as media of
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history and memory; and the challenges of intergenerational transmission of traumatic histories, or what we have termed “postmemory.” Each of these trajectories would have led us to explore the connections between Holocaust studies and the larger field of memory. Certainly a key factor motivating our choice of testimony as the topic to pursue is its important role in the new truth commissions that have increasingly come to serve as vehicles of transitional justice in the aftermath of catastrophe on a global scale. For a related argument about Holocaust testimony, see chapter 3 in Dominick LaCapra’s recent study History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009).


4. Ibid., 229.

5. Ibid.

6. In his Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, Agamben distinguishes between two kinds of witnesses: one, emerging from the Latin notion of testis (based on the third party, terstis), is one who observes but does not live through the event; the other, the superstes, is the one who has lived through something and bears witness to it; Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 1999), 17. Our discussion of witnessing in this article concerns the superstes, the survivor-witness.


10. Felman, Juridical Unconscious, 123.

11. Felman objects to Susan Sontag’s provocative reference to the Eichmann trial as “the most interesting and moving work of art of the past ten years,” arguing: “There is at least one crucial difference between an event of law and an event of art . . . : a work of art cannot sentence to death. A trial, unlike art, is grounded in the sanctioned legal violence it has the power (and sometimes the duty) to enact”; Felman, Juridical Unconscious, 152–53. For Sontag’s remark, see her “Reflections on The Deputy,” in Eric Bentley, ed. The Storm Over “The Deputy” (New York: Grove Press, 1964), 118.


15. Gouri, Facing the Glass Booth, 129.


26. Ibid., 81.

27. Ibid.


32. Ibid., 114.

33. Ibid., 116.

34. Ibid., 117.


37. As Sidra deKoven Ezrahi has written, these debates revolve around questions of authority and authenticity. In the dominant desire to get as close as possible to the heart of the abyss, the “black hole” of Auschwitz, certain voices, certain sites, and certain genres have gained greater authority over others. In what Ezrahi terms the “static or absolutist” approach to representing the Holocaust, as opposed to a more “dynamic or relativist” one, the Holocaust is conceptualized as a series of concentric circles with Auschwitz and the gas chamber—unreachable, immobile, and ultimately incomprehensible—at the center; Sidra deKoven Ezrahi, “Representing Auschwitz,” *History and Memory* 7.2 (1996–97): 120–53.

38. In contrast, witnesses invariably apologize for breaking down during their testimony. Most try hard to maintain composure, to tell stories, provide information and, indeed, “truth.”


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See ibid., 144–94, for a more encompassing critique of Remnants of Auschwitz. See also the critique by Philippe Mesnard and Claudine Kahan, Giorgio Agamben à l’épreuve d’Auschwitz (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 2001).

43. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 150.
44. For Agamben, the notion of the archive needs to be redefined to accommodate the “unsayable.” See Remnants of Auschwitz, 144.
45. See Derrida’s distinction between “bearing witness” and “proof” in “Poetics and Politics of Witnessing,” 75.
46. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 12.
49. Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth, 32.
53. In this regard, see especially the work of James Young on “received history” and of Dominick LaCapra on “transference.”
55. Ibid., 63.
56. Ibid., 67.
57. Ibid., 71.
58. In his critical analysis of Laub’s debate with the historians, Thomas Trezise takes Laub to task precisely for his reliance on the lens of clinical psychotherapy, which leads him to “selective listening,” “exaggeration,” and “mythmaking.” After watching three testimonies on which Laub’s analysis might have been based, Trezise finds that none of them project the extreme change of affect highlighted in Laub’s interpretation. In his response, Laub claims as a form of interpretive evidence the psychoanalytic process of countertransference that emerges in the “intimate dialogue” of testimony and thus his own counter-transferential responses and recollections. These led him, in this case, to “replac[e] the manifest text (of the testimony) with its latent meaning.” Laub thus insists on testimony as a psychoanalytic encounter, whereas Trezise sees testimony as a “generic hybrid”
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that “requires for its reception a plurality of interpretive frameworks”; Trezise, “Between History and Psychoanalysis,” 31; Laub, “On Holocaust Testimony.”


60. For her elaboration of this call, see Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, esp. 261–79.

61. “It is necessary that our youth remember what happened to the Jewish people. We want them to know the most tragic facts in our history”: Arendt quotes the Israeli David Ben Gurion’s comment about the function of the Eichmann trial; Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 10.


64. Levy and Szaider, Holocaust and Memory, 32.

65. Ibid., 4.

66. Ibid., 11–12.

67. See Michael Rothberg’s recent book Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009). See also recent work on how the invocation of a transnational Holocaust memory can serve as a screen memory in local scenes of catastrophe, for example, Neil Levi, “‘No Sensible Comparison? The Place of the Holocaust in Australia’s History Wars,” History and Memory 19.1 (Spring/Summer 2007): 124–56.

27. The Long Afterlife of Loss
Eva Hoffman


6. W. H. Auden, “September 1, 1939,” New Republic, October 18, 1939. The first version of the poem, written in response to Germany’s invasion of Poland, included the line “We must love one another or die.” Auden subsequently altered this line to “We must love one another and die.”
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28. Migration, Food, Memory, and Home-Building

Ghassan Hage

Note: This essay is a revised version of a text that appeared in Helen Grace, Ghassan Hage, Lesley Johnson, Julie Langsworth, and Michael Symonds, Home/World: Space, Community and Marginality in Sydney's West (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1997).

1. The inclusion of some Arabic throughout the text is meant primarily for Arabic-speaking readers who would appreciate the expression in its original form, given the layers of meanings it is capable of expressing and that are sometimes lost in the process of translation.


4. While I realize that this definition of home is stated as if it were an a priori certainty, in fact it is the end result of both my empirical investigation and my extensive reading in the substantial literature already available on the subject. In particular, I would like to recognize the important influence of a highly stimulating issue of the journal New Formations, no. 17, Summer 1992, titled “The Question of 'Home.'”

5. If I get up at night, “my feet” can take me to the toilet or to the fridge without having to “really” wake up and think where to go. Home is a space of maximal bodily knowledge.


7. This is empirically true for both men and women. The point is important to our purposes, for among migrants, both men and women who bury themselves at home and do not succeed in opening up to the host society are frequently pathologized and their houses considered unhomely.


9. What is good for Edward Said (“Reflections on Exile,” in “After the Revolution,” special issue of Granta 13 [1984]: 159–72) or Salman Rushdie (Imaginary Homelands [London: Granta/Viking, 1991]) is taken as if it represents a universal condition. The point is not that Said’s and Rushdie’s experiences of nostalgia are unimportant in explaining other forms of nostalgia but that the sociological specificity of the subject is ignored. Interestingly, Said and Rushdie deploy nostalgia to make lives for themselves in the West, where they actually live.


12. All interviews cited in this chapter were conducted by the author in the suburbs of western Sydney in 1993.

13. It is important to note that, for international migrants, such spaces of homely feelings from within the new country are only national spaces (Lebanese, Greek, Vietnamese, etc.). That is, if in a village in Lebanon, a woman marries someone in the same village, she will experience homesickness when she moves to her husband’s house. The spatially-yearned-for “back-home” in this context is her prior home in the village. If they both move from the village to Beirut searching for
work, she will also experience homesickness, but in this case the yearned-for back-home becomes "the village." It is only when she migrates to Australia that back-home becomes Lebanon. In all these cases, the sphere of actual experience is much more limited than the spatial category (house, village, city, nation) used to refer to it.


16. Sydney Morning Herald, January 26, 1993, Good Living, 22. Although they capture an important aspect of the process, these descriptions are clearly romanticized, for such articles aim at more than just describing; they construct migrant eateries as desirable places for consumption by non-migrants.


18. I do not want to leave the impression that these practices of traveling back-home in order to engage in home-building in the present leave people entirely satisfied. There is a whole dialectic of lack, which as one woman put it "leaves a bitter taste" after each event of this sort. It takes you back-home but not quite, and you are left lacking. Despite its importance, I have chosen not to concern myself with this dialectic here, since it is a generalized "existential" condition well analyzed in psychoanalysis.

29. The Seventh Veil: Feminism, Recovered Memory, and the Politics of the Unconscious

Janice Haaken


9. Herman, *Trauma and Recovery*; Freyd, *Betrayal Trauma*; Bass and Davis, *Courage to Heal*. These works stress recovering and validating childhood memories of abuse as vital to recovery.


12. For discussion of feminist analysis of the False Memory Syndrome Foundation, see Haaken, *Pillar of Salt*, chap. 1.


25. Herman, *Trauma and Recovery*.
27. Research on memory supports both the concepts of dissociation and repression as systems of defense, although the repression model is more consistent with findings that fluctuating and current mood states influence autobiographical recall. See, for example, Gordon H. Bower, “Mood and Memory,” *American Psychologist* 36 (1981): 129–48. For distinctions between the repression and dissociation models of divided consciousness, see Ernest R. Hilgard, *Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action* (New York: Wiley, 1977); Singer, ed., *Repression and Dissociation*; and Haaken, *Pillar of Salt*.
30. For discussion of historical parallels between MPD and earlier female diagnoses, see Haaken, *Pillar of Salt*, and Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul*.
32. See Hilgard, *Divided Consciousness*, for discussion of amnesia and differential diagnosis.
38. Ross, *Multiple Personality Disorder*.
39. For symptoms of “disguised presentation” of abuse commonly included in checklists for clinicians, see Bass and Davis, *Courage to Heal*.
41. For further elaboration of this argument, see Haaken, *Pillar of Salt*, chap. 10, and Frankfurter, *Evil Incarnate*. 

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43. Ibid., 19–20.

30. The Gender of Memory in Post-Apartheid South Africa
Annie E. Coombes

NOTE: This chapter is dedicated to the many courageous women who were imprisoned for their challenges to the apartheid state and whose sacrifices made the new South Africa possible. In particular I wish to thank the ex-detainees from the Sizoya Sibuye (SiSi) organization who generously shared their time and memories with me while I was conducting my research on the Women’s Jail: Yvonne Ntonto Mhlauli, Patricia Alarm, Joyce Dipale, Maggie Nozi Makhudu, and Maleshane (Mally) Mokoena. Juby Mayet (a former political prisoner) describes one of SiSi’s main aims as making “Number Four [another name for the Old Fort Prison complex, which also houses the Women’s Jail] as famous as Robben Island, because it seems that the world at large forgets that many women played an important part in achieving democracy for our country”; *Mapping Memory: Former Prisoners Tell Their Stories; An Exhibition Created by Lauren Segal, Clive van den Berg and Churchill Madikida*, (Johannesburg: Constitution Hill, 2006), 8. Many thanks to Shula Marks for her careful reading of an earlier version of this chapter. It has benefited from the insights of many colleagues around the world where I have presented versions as keynotes and lectures (including Oxford University, Harvard University, and Göteborg and Norrköping Universities). Thanks to my colleague at Birkbeck College, Hilary Sapire, for inviting me to speak at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies Workshop on Cultures and Memories of Confinement in Southern Africa and for her comments and those of the other participants. Thanks also to Clive van den Berg and especially to Lauren Segal for generously providing insights into the curatorial process at the Women’s Jail and for facilitating my access to transcripts of the ex-prisoner and ex-warder workshops.

5. See Charles Villa-Vicencio, “Getting on with Life: A Move Towards Reconciliation,” in *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*, ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press; London: Zed Press, 2000), 199–209. Although Villa-Vicencio, who was the director of research for the TRC, is one of the most measured and ultimately supportive commentators on the TRC, he puts his finger on the crucial demand made of the victim: “The victim is asked to give priority to his or her obligations as a citizen rather than a violated person in the creation of a new and different
kind of society—within which the bigger picture of national unity and reconciliation is promoted” (201, his emphasis).


7. Bundy, claims that “it goes without saying that the TRC was charged with writing an official history”; Bundy, “Beast of the Past,” 13.


13. Fiona C. Ross, “Speech and Silence: Women’s Testimony in the First Five Weeks of Public Hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering and Recovery, ed. Veena Das, et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 253. The statistics she cites are instructive. In the first five weeks of the hearings, 204 testified about 160 cases of human rights violation. Out of these 58% were women, but only 13% of the women testified directly about violations against women. Most of my citations of Ross are from this article, but the fuller account of her research can be found in her wonderful monograph, Bearing Witness.


16. Ibid., 259.

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19. The film won the Grand Jury Prize of the 2000 Sundance Film Festival, and was nominated for an Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature. It focused on the cases of the Cradock Four, the killing of Amy Biehl, the bombing of Robert McBride, and the murders of the Guguletu Seven.
20. Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 36.
21. Ibid., 38.
22. The Ugandan Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights, which sat between 1986 and 1994, held public victim hearings, but these were considerably fewer in number than in South Africa; see “Wounded Nations, Broken Lives,” 148–50, for a list of truth commissions and war tribunals held internationally between 1971 and 1996. See also Hayner, “Same Species, Different Animal,” esp. 35.
23. See Archbishop Desmond Tutu, “Foreword” TRC, 1:19–20, where he singles out the South African media for special thanks and explains the reason for welcoming their participation: “We are particularly grateful for the work of SABC radio, which communicated in all our official languages to ensure that even the illiterate did not miss out. We want to mention, too, the special television programme that was broadcast on Sunday evenings—giving a summary of the previous week’s events at the Commission and a preview of the coming week’s events. No wonder these television and radio programmes won prestigious awards—on which we congratulate them. The media helped to ensure that the Commission’s process was as inclusive and as non-elitist as possible.”
28. Ciraj Rassool, Leslie Witz, and Gary Minkley, suggest that Lungile Maninjwa and another artist similarly commissioned by a local authority were “seen as rooted in their respective communities and as having the ability to express the sentiments and respond to the sensibilities of the community.” Clearly, the mothers of those commemorated by the monument held a different view. See Ciraj Rassool, Leslie Witz, and Gary Minkley, “Burying and Memorialising the Body of Truth: The TRC and National Heritage,” in After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, ed. Wilmot James and Linda Van de Vijver (Athens: Ohio University Press; Cape Town: David Philip, 2000), 124.
29. In 2005 another monument was erected by Donovan Ward in collaboration with Paul Hendricks; it consists of seven silhouettes representing the seven murdered youths set into plinths containing a bronze plaque with a portrait and information about each individual. I do not know if this has found more favor with the victims’ mothers.
30. For more details of the commission of the monument and its local response, see Annie E. Coombes, History after Apartheid: Visual Culture and Public Memory in a Democratic South Africa
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31. See Coombes, History after Apartheid, chap. 2, “Robben Island: Site of Memory/Site of Nation,” particularly 105–15, which explores the dearth of representations of women’s participation in the liberation struggle in public commemorative culture in South Africa and women’s response to the opening of Robben Island.

32. Fatima Meer, however, on seeing the site, had other things to say about the planted grass and the new buildings: “Terrible to see all this thing pushed up and the prison gone. I mean if this is a historical monument, then you don’t go around making it all pretty. I would much rather see the cells. Cells as they were and the cells in Winnie’s yard were even more terrible”; transcript, Constitution Hill Project, Workshop of Political Prisoners at the Women’s Jail, September 27, 2003, 25. See also Lauren Segal, Clive van den Berg, and Churchill Madikida, eds., Mapping Memory: Former Prisoners Tell Their Stories, (Johannesburg: Constitution Hill, 2006), which was an exhibition devoted to collecting both men and women’s prison memoirs at the Old Fort complex in Johannesburg.


35. TRC, 4:298.


38. See also Jill Bennett, Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005).

39. Cecilie Palmer: “Go into women’s struggle, there is a period where things like the terrorisation of the Transvaal . . . are not even mentioned. You can forget, you can forget. They stand on platforms . . . then they talk about the march in ’56, the banning of the ANC and then they talk about . . . exile” (ibid., 49).

Unidentified speaker: “There are a lot of people who are not appreciated and there are a lot of people who are depressed, who can’t find jobs, who are . . . you know, nobody. . . . Some of them were detained and some are from exile and nobody appreciates them and there are a lot of people now who are telling lies . . . who are saying they were underground, and some of them we knew were never involved” (ibid., 48).

Lolo Tabane: “Maybe we need to say to ourselves and to the world, particularly to the world, . . . that there was a certain period in our lives which has been lost and that period needs to be told and needs to be appreciated and needs to be connected from the past to the future” (ibid., 54).


41. Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 76–77.
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