A companion to

Philosophy

in Australia & New Zealand

Second Edition
A Companion to Philosophy in Australia & New Zealand

Second Edition

EDITED BY
GRAHAM OPPY, N. N. TRAKAKIS,
LYNDA BURNS, STEVEN GARDNER & FIONA LEIGH

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This revised edition is dedicated to the memory of

J. J. C. (Jack) Smart

(1920–2012)
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The two articles contributed by the late Barry Taylor—‘Lewis, David in Australasia’ and ‘Philosophy of Language’—are published here with the kind permission of his literary executors.
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FOREWORD TO THE REVISED EDITION

Soon after the original edition of *A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* was published in 2010 we noticed, or were made aware of, some significant omissions and errors. We therefore almost immediately embarked upon the present revised edition with the aim of correcting any errors and including some articles that did not make it into the first edition. In particular, the following articles have now been added: ‘Australian Aboriginal Philosophy’; ‘History and Philosophy of Science’; and ‘The Oxbridge Connection’. Also, an ‘Addendum’ has been added to the article ‘Australian Society of Legal Philosophy’.

The generally favourable reception of the first edition gives us hope that the *Companion* will continue to serve as a useful and insightful guide for students and observers of philosophy in Australasia.

*Graham Oppy and N. N. Trakakis

June 2013*
The town of Stuart Mill—population 100—lies on the Sunraysia Highway between Avoca and St. Arnaud in the Pyrenees wine region of Central Victoria. In 2011, the town celebrated its 150th anniversary. When the town was founded, back in 1861, the town fathers had originally wished to call the settlement ‘Albert Town’. But there was already another settlement called ‘Alerton’ in goldfields Victoria. So, instead, the town was named for the leading British intellectual figure of the time: John Stuart Mill.

While there are many incidental connections to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand—such as the one just described—that date to the very early days of colonial settlement, it is a curious and interesting fact that Australian and New Zealand philosophers eventually came to make a very significant contribution to world philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century. This Companion—and the wider research project to which it belongs—aims both to publicise, and to provide the resources to explain, the explosion of philosophical activity in Australia and New Zealand after the Second World War.

The entries in the Companion are arranged alphabetically. Major types or kinds of entries include: histories of academic departments in Australian and New Zealand universities; histories of societies and organisations that have promoted philosophical teaching and research in Australia and New Zealand; overviews of the contributions that philosophers from Australia and New Zealand have made to important areas of philosophy (such as logic, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, ethics, political philosophy, and the like); and brief biographies of a small selection of philosophers from Australia and New Zealand.

While the entries on academic departments, societies, journals, and the like aim to give complete coverage, the biographical entries aim only to cover a representative sample of Australian and New Zealand philosophers. We do not claim that the philosophers who have been given biographical entries here are the best, or the most interesting, or the most influential; rather, they are some among many Australian and New Zealand philosophers who have made significant contributions to the advancement of philosophy in Australasia. (In this volume, we should add, ‘Australasia’ simply means ‘Australia and New Zealand’.)
This Companion is one of the products of a large research project undertaken at Monash University between 2005 and 2010. Other products of this project include a two-volume history of Australasian philosophy, a book of interviews with Australasian philosophers, and a book of commissioned public lectures by Australasian philosophers. The overall aim of the research project is to provide a comprehensive account of the history and current state of philosophy in Australasia. (We had also hoped to oversee the construction of an online Directory of Australasian philosophers; however, we have not yet been able to make a start in that direction.)

The production of this Companion was supported by a very substantial Australian Research Council Discovery Grant (DP0663930: ‘History of Australasian Philosophy’) and also by significant grants from the Myer Foundation and the William Angliss Charitable Trust.

The Editors-in-Chief wish to acknowledge the support and assistance of many people who contributed to the production of this Companion.

First, we acknowledge the large contributions to the project made by the Associate Editors—Lynda Burns, Steve Gardner and Fiona Leigh—each of whom was employed on the project for a substantial length of time out of the funds supplied by the ARC. We note, in particular, that Steve Gardner played a leading role in the administration of the project during the second year of the project, when Nick Trakakis was visiting at the University of Notre Dame (Indiana).

Second, we are grateful to the many people who agreed to join the Advisory Board for the Companion. We received a lot of very helpful advice from a range of quarters in firming up the exact shape that the Companion came to take. Perhaps we should note here that there are controversial aspects of the Companion. In particular, our early deliberations about the range of biographical entries involved several changes of mind. Early on, we thought that we would aim for comprehensive coverage, but there are various reasons why that proved infeasible. Later, we thought that we would not have any biographical entries—but when we came to that view, it was overruled by our publishers. At that point, we realised that we could only have a representative selection of biographical entries: there are many other people who might have been included, and whose claims for inclusion are not stronger or weaker than the claims of those who have been included.

Third, and self-evidently, we are enormously indebted to all of the contributors to this volume. Time is a scarce commodity for academic staff in Australian and New Zealand universities at the beginning of the twenty-first century; and contributions to projects such as ours are not necessarily high on prioritised lists constructed by university administrators. We are enormously grateful that so many people have been prepared to devote so much time and effort to the preparation of the excellent entries that are to be found in this Companion. (Naturally, in a work of this size, there are some entries that we commissioned that did not eventuate. This fact accounts for some apparent incongruities—e.g., the lack of an entry on Philosophy in Public Spaces in New Zealand.)
Preface

Fourth, we wish to express our debt to our colleagues at Monash University, both within the Department of Philosophy, and in the wider university. The Department of Philosophy, the Faculty of Arts, and the university itself have all contributed to the establishment and maintenance of a working environment in which it is possible to successfully carry out large scale research projects of the kind in which we have been engaged. In particular, we must thank: Dirk Baltzly, Linda Barclay, John Bigelow, Sam Butchart, Monima Chadha, Karen Green, Toby Handfield, Jakob Hohwy, Lloyd Humberstone, Mark Manolopoulos, Justin Oakley, Rob Sparrow and Aubrey Townsend.

Fifth, we wish to express our gratitude to the fine team of people at Monash University Publishing who were involved in the production of this work: Sarah Cannon, Kathryn Hatch, Nathan Hollier, Joanne Mullins, Michele Sabto, and Leslie Thomas. We are especially indebted to Jo Mullins for her sterling work in managing the project. We are also grateful for the time and expertise of our indexer—and proofreader—Karen Gillen.

Finally, we wish to record our separate debts to family and friends who have supported us during the (long) period in which this project has been undertaken. Extra special thanks from Graham to Camille, Gilbert, Calvin and Alfie; and from Nick to Lydia, John, and his parents who, in migrating to Australia from the home of ancient philosophy (Greece), gave him the opportunity to delve into the riches and pleasures of philosophy in the Antipodes.

Graham Oppy and N. N. Trakakis

May 2010
Adelaide, University of

Chris Mortensen & Graham Nerlich

The University of Adelaide was established in 1874, the third oldest Australian university. An inaugural grant of £20,000 was provided by Walter Watson Hughes for two foundation professorships: in English language and literature and mental and moral philosophy, and in classics and comparative philology and literature. It seems that the university forgot about this money instead of investing it properly, as the money was found recently in a university account, untouched instead of invested. One wonders whether this inaction on the part of the university was consistent with the terms of the grant. One can only speculate further whether, if the money had been invested wisely at the time, the philosophy department would now be the controller of a sizeable portion of the Adelaide CBD.

The first occupant of the philosophy chair was the Rev. John Davidson. He was not a university graduate, but his ministry of the Church of Scotland entailed a considerable education. He seems to have taught mostly logic, presumably Aristotelian logic. His successor was Edward Vaughn Boulger, philosopher, literary theorist and classicist, who had a strong academic background from Trinity College, Dublin before coming to Adelaide. Boulger is notable for having conflicted with the university over tenure of appointment, which the university did not award at the time. He was forced to resign in 1894 due to intoxication.

The first real philosopher to be appointed was William Mitchell, who arrived from Scotland in early 1895. He had already published several papers in Mind, including one as an undergraduate. His main work was the Structure and Growth of the Mind (1907). On the strength of this, he was invited to give two series of Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen (1924 and 1926), which were published as The Place of Minds in the World (1933). Mitchell gave up the chair in 1923. However, he was (unpaid) Vice-Chancellor 1916–1942, where he was the principal driving force for a major expansion of courses and buildings, and the Teachers Training College. He was knighted in 1927, and died in 1962 at the age
of 101. J. J. C. Smart recalls visiting him on his 101st birthday and asking him his advice on how to make 101; his reply was: ‘Young man, get to 100 first’.

Mitchell is not studied these days. One reason for this is his forbidding philosophical style. *Structure and Growth* is almost entirely innocent of logical signposting. This must be held responsible for the misapprehension among historians of Australian philosophy that Mitchell was an Idealist. But in a recent book-length analysis of *Structure and Growth*, Marty Davies effectively demolishes this myth. Mitchell is much more plausibly read as an early realist-empiricist with a particular interest in the nature of the mind, and its development, that is its causal history over the individual’s lifetime, such as a philosophical psychologist might have. If anything, he seems to have been a materialist about the mind, though with something of the flavour of the ‘new mysterians’ such as McGinn (see Davies 2003). The mind-centredness of his approach might well have contributed to the Idealist confusion; but it is a fair assessment that he anticipated some of the doctrines for which Adelaide, and Australia for that matter, later became famous.

Mitchell’s successor was John McKellar Stewart. He was an Australian, a graduate of Melbourne and Edinburgh. He took the Adelaide chair in 1924. His studies in Europe meant that his philosophy had a continental orientation. He wrote particularly on Bergson (1913), and also Nietzsche. His philosophy is even less noticed today than Mitchell’s. He became Vice-Chancellor in 1945, and retired as Vice-Chancellor and professor of philosophy in 1950. The university had for many years a policy of appointing young promising professors; and on his retirement, Stewart generously suggested that his department should take a quite new direction, alien to the concerns of his own studies. Accordingly, his successor was a youthful Scot, J. J. C. (‘Jack’) Smart, who arrived in Adelaide in 1950 to fill the Hughes Chair.

It was a most fortunate appointment. The old philosophy-psychology link was to be cut and separate departments established. Smart appointed U. T. Place to begin and head the newly forming discipline of psychology. He also appointed C. B. Martin, who remained in the department for many years. In these years, Martin’s work in metaphysics, especially in philosophy of mind, was unique in style and widely influential in the Australian context. He later published freely.

Smart’s influence on the university community was immediate and widespread. This was made easier by the comparatively small size of the university. The department ran a small, informal, interdisciplinary group that met to discuss the new, post-war turn in philosophy. One focus of discussion was Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). Visitors and participants from Economics, English Literature, Mathematics and Physics took a vigorous part with Smart, Place and Martin in densely argued sessions. Place published his theory of the identity of sensations with brain processes (an output of these discussions, especially with Smart and Martin). The theory was taken up by Smart in philosophical vein and published in a philosophical journal. The identity theory flourished in philosophy and rapidly became a major and contentious influence
on the philosophy of mind internationally. In one variant or another, it has dominated the subject ever since. It was ironically but affectionately referred to as ‘the Australian Heresy’.

Smart’s and Martin’s decades in Adelaide were halcyon days for the department. This was particularly so for more advanced students who enjoyed a degree of access to and friendship with their teachers that was much missed in graduate studies overseas. For so small a university a surprising number of its undergraduates became prominent philosophers. Brian Ellis, Graham Nerlich, Brian Medlin, Max Deutscher went on to fill chairs in various universities, as did Chris Mortensen who was a graduate student. Michael Bradley and Ian Hinckfuss have also been stimulating presences in Australian philosophy, far beyond what their list of publications and academic rank would suggest.

Smart’s range of interests was very wide, including metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion and ethics. He was and remains a materialist, a scientific realist, an atheist and an act utilitarian. His style is limpid, direct, incisive and terse and always reads so simply that it is easy to overlook its depth and novelty. His early work on the metaphysics of time was important in undermining what is known as the A-theory of time. The flow of time is a myth since there is no good answer to the question how fast it flows. Few searching arguments in metaphysics can be put so briefly and clearly.

A committed Christian on his arrival in Adelaide, Smart was charged with holding views on other philosophical issues which were inconsistent with religious beliefs. Smart breezily admitted the charge and announced himself an atheist henceforth, a declaration to which he firmly stuck. This kind of frankness and commitment to where the argument leads explains the definition of ‘to outsmart’ in the Philosophical Lexicon—to outsmart an opponent is to dismay him by admitting his objection forthwith or embracing the paradox presented.

In many publications Smart defended scientific realism by arguing that the difficulties raised by relativists, conventionalists or subjectivists were merely that realism is novel and surprising rather than objectionable. That was perhaps a fine example of outsmarting. Smart’s scientific realism was also connected with the increased influence by and on U.S. philosophy, which became the centre of gravity of the discipline from the beginning of the 1960s onward. Smart had been trained in Oxbridge philosophy, but scientific realism was a substantial break from that way of doing linguistic philosophy.

In the 1960s the expansion of universities led to a larger membership of staff in the department and a considerable increase in student numbers due to service courses which faculty regulations made necessary. As was the case everywhere else, this was a mixed blessing. Demands on staff time came at a cost to informal and fruitful discussion and staff perforce became more remote from students.

Smart also played a significant part in negotiating the bequest for the Gavin David Young Lectures, which has brought many highly distinguished philosophers to Australia and continues to do so. The list of Gavin David Young lecturers reads like a who’s who of late twentieth-century philosophy: Ryle,
Quine, Flew, Feigl, Davidson, Lewis, Hempel, Dennett, Smart, Putnam and, in 2007, Blackburn.

Smart resigned from the university in 1972, distressed by the changes to the amiable relations with colleagues and students that meant so much to him. It was his affection for the place rather than any estrangement from it that caused his regretful departure.

His successor in the Hughes Chair in 1974 was a former student, Graham Nerlich. Nerlich came to Adelaide from turbulent times in his tenure as professor of philosophy at the University of Sydney. A significant part of these quite prominent, indeed notorious, difficulties was played by the requirement that professors must be administrative heads of their departments. 1974 saw the beginning of significant changes in administrative style at Adelaide: these played some part in Nerlich’s decision to return. Headship of the department was no longer tied to occupancy of the chair. Headship became an elected position independent of academic rank. Nerlich was elected immediately and quickly moved to allow student representation at staff meetings, among other democratic measures. These changes have persisted, and were instituted not only in philosophy but also in the university generally.

Nerlich’s research and publication in his two decades in the Hughes Chair was divided mainly between studies in the ontology of space, time and spacetime and ethics. In the former and larger output he defended realism toward spacetime and especially a unique role for it in ontology as providing geometrical, non-causal explanation in General Relativity. Geometric non-causal explanation was also argued to figure in the explanation of incongruent counterparts and the failure of similarity geometry in non-Euclidean space. Nerlich’s interest in the philosophy of physics had been stimulated early by Smart, and both have enjoyed good relations with the physics department, relations that continue to the present day in the form of a philosophy of physics seminar attended by several noted physicists. In ethics, Nerlich pursued a form of naturalism that sees the development of ethical and broadly cultural practices arising, analogously to the universal yet diverse flourishing of languages, in the natural life of human populations. In addition to Nerlich, strengths in the department in the 1970s and ‘80s were logic (Bradley, Hughes, Mortensen), ethics (Chandler) and the philosophy of religion (Gill).

For many decades, too, the department enjoyed the presence of a vigorous, student-run Philosophy Club. This is a valuable adjunct to formal teaching, since it makes clear to students and those members of the public who attend that philosophy is a way of life, and a great deal of fun. The Adelaide Philosophy Club can be traced back at least to 1929, and is still active today.

The Dawkins Report on tertiary education ushered in global changes in the late 1980s to the financing, administration and accountability of staff within Australian universities. These are widely regarded within the tertiary community as unfortunate. Perhaps the least happy outcome has been the damage caused to fruitful collegiate and research community attitudes. That
has sprung from the burdens arising from increased accountability, decreased trust, increased envy, and much drudgery with forms. This also began the slide in student-staff ratios, which have approximately doubled in last two decades: an inevitable drop in standards as a consequence, it would seem, of increased administrative costs.

In 1994 the Faculty of Arts faced a major revision of financial and administrative practices, which created a crisis. Nerlich resigned for that reason, in what would have been his year of compulsory retirement under former rules. The headship of the department fell to Mortensen. Within a short time, the department was faced with two attempts to destroy it. An external review of the faculty was held, and following their recommendations an internal committee of Arts professors recommended in 1995 that the philosophy department be amalgamated with anthropology, and ‘as philosophers retire they be replaced by social theorists’. Arguments such as that the faculty had social theorists coming out of its ears, and that what it needed was some metaphysics as a balance, were ignored. Several senior Australian philosophers wrote to the Vice-Chancellor in support of the department. In the end, this threat was beaten off by the expedient of simple refusal, a tactic which recommends itself to be used more often than it has been.

Mortensen’s book *Inconsistent Mathematics* was published in 1995. The thesis was that there is room for expansion of our conception of mathematics, by recognising the rich structure available within inconsistent theories. These are not especially theories of foundational concepts such as set theory or semantics or category theory (though these are well known to generate paradox). Rather, mathematical theories of any kind generate contradictions out of standard mathematical tools such as collapse under congruence relations, homomorphisms, cut-and-paste and many other techniques. The philosophical thesis here is that, far from paraconsistent (inconsistency-tolerant) reasoning being revisionist (as intuitionist mathematics is), it represents an extension of what has hitherto been thought possible for mathematics. Work in this area is ongoing, with impossible images (such as those of M. C. Escher) throwing up interesting and novel challenges for mathematical treatment. Mortensen was promoted to the Hughes Chair in 1998.

U. T. Place died in England on 2 January 2000. He bequeathed his brain to the Adelaide philosophy department, to be displayed with the caption: ‘Did This Brain Contain the Consciousness of U. T. Place?’. Reminiscent of Bentham’s gift to the University of London, this was an instructive piece of philosophy and a fine piece of dark humour: a worthy afterthought on his importance to Adelaide and Australian philosophy. It resides in the anatomy museum, and can be seen on the Department’s website.

Later in 2000, the department had to face another threat. A faculty committee containing several senior professors recommended a drastic cut in philosophy’s offerings at the second and third-year level. This would have seen major reductions in enrolments, and a consequent decline in staff, with a spiral downwards into
non-existence a definite possibility. Through a complicated series of manoeuvres, an agreement was reached with the university that four senior staff not far from retirement would go in return for their being replaced by four young, tenured staff. Memorandum to administrators: academics are typically motivated by love of their discipline and desire to ensure its future, and are not typically motivated by fear that threats might be implemented. This renewal of the department’s energies was made possible by the generosity of spirit of those staff who retired then, and they are to be thanked for their actions.

In 2003, however, it proved to be too difficult to beat off yet another threat, namely amalgamation into schools. Philosophy was press-ganged into a School of Humanities, containing also the disciplines media, English, classics, linguistics, French and German. The heterogeneity of this mix gives the lie to the university’s patronising motivation: that the amalgamation would foster ‘synergies’. The philosophy ‘department’ was destroyed in the sense that it became a ‘discipline’ (only parts of the administration remained as departments). Worse, initially the university attempted to do without any heads of disciplines, in favour of a single head of school. Such an abuse of autonomy is alienating in the extreme: elsewhere it has led to an erosion of collegiality as people strive to defend their patch from collapse of student numbers and redundancy. But, as was obvious to all beforehand, it proved to be unworkable, and soon collapsed as discipline heads came back. The main effect was thus to insert a further, unnecessary tier of management with a great increase in costs. This sort of thing happened in many universities around the country at the time, and must be regarded as an absurdity which has the opposite effect on costs from what it claims.

Mortensen retired in 2005. Garrett Cullity had published his book The Moral Demands of Affluence (2004) the year before. The book sets up ‘the Extreme Demand’ on the (relatively) affluent, roughly that one should give everything away to the poor and suffering until the sacrifice outweighs the good it does. While acknowledging the strength of the case for the Extreme Demand (and the weakness of extant arguments against it), Cullity nonetheless argues that it ultimately undermines itself. The book won a Eureka Prize in 2008. Cullity was promoted to the Hughes Chair in 2006. Gerard O’Brien was also made professor in 2007. The current (2008) strengths of the rejuvenated department are cognitive science and the philosophy of mind (O’Brien, Gerrans, Opie, Fernandez), ethics (Cullity, Gamble, Louise), and aesthetics (McMahon). Philosophy at the University of Adelaide has been strong on the philosophy of mind ever since Smart (if not Mitchell), and the major presence of cognitive science can be regarded as the triumph of the physicalist program started by Smart and Place so many years before. The strength in ethics also represents the continuation of a tradition in which Smart and Nerlich made good contributions.
Aesthetics (Analytic)

David Macarthur

If Western philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, then aesthetics is a series of footnotes to Kant. This is as true of the analytic tradition as of the Continental. But there has been an important change of emphasis in the object of inquiry of analytic aesthetics, which predominantly concerns theorising about the experience and criticism of works of art. Kant’s idea of aesthetics as primarily concerned with beauty, or heightened or intensified perceptual experiences of natural phenomena, has largely been eclipsed (but not entirely: e.g. Mothersill 1984). Analytic aesthetics, once considered the neglected step-child of analytic philosophy, is beginning to gain confidence as a significant area of study with much to tell us about human experience, art, taste, expression, representation, interpretation, intention, imagination and reason. In the 1950s analytic philosophers complained of the barrenness of aesthetics, but today as analytic philosophy enters an intense period of self-searching and reassessment, it is to aesthetics that one might profitably turn to gain a better understanding of the complex Kantian origins of the discipline. The most significant Kantian legacy in the aesthetic domain has been the idea of the autonomy of the work of art and our experience of it from other theoretical, practical and sensory aspects of human life.

To approach the topic of analytic aesthetics let us first ask, ‘What is analytic philosophy?’, before turning to the analytic approach to aesthetics, and the contribution of its Australasian practitioners. It is familiar that there is no dominant paradigm or practice of analysis engaged in by those who regard themselves as analytic philosophers. Analytic philosophy can be more fruitfully approached in historical terms as a movement having its roots in the early twentieth-century reactions of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell to Kant and post-Kantian idealists. Just how to understand this reaction is currently a subject of much debate (cf. Redding 2007).

Looked at from this perspective, perhaps the most characteristic feature of analytic philosophy has been a derisive attitude towards Hegel and his immediate successors, who were typically dismissed (often with little or no engagement with their texts!) as endorsing a hopelessly implausible Idealism, understood in terms of an ill-defined dependence of reality on the mind. The recent (re)turn to
Hegel and the sympathetic reinterpretation of his Idealism by leading analytic philosophers such as Brandom (2009) and McDowell (2004) will be seen by some as the end, by others as a further incarnation, of the analytic tradition. The former group tends to look to social pragmatist themes as the way forward in a post-analytic age, whereas the latter group tends to look to a science-inspired metaphysics (often misleadingly called ‘naturalism’) as a new lease of life for analytic philosophy. Of course, one could also follow Bernard Williams (1985) and dissolve much of the debate by conceiving of analytic philosophy as simply a matter of a certain style of writing displaying an overriding concern for argument, drawing distinctions and clarity of exposition.

Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922), an early masterpiece of analytic philosophy, had the unintended effect of giving courage to the positivist conception of philosophy as primarily concerned with the logic of the language of science, a logic that, according to Wittgenstein (following Russell’s Theory of Descriptions), was hidden by the surface grammatical form of language. Aesthetics, not being a science, suffered under this conception but it could approximate it near enough by concerning itself with an analysis of the logic of the language of criticism (cf. Beardsley 1958). It was this impoverished conception of analytic aesthetics, which sharply distinguished meta-criticism from art criticism and which tended to ignore the significance of history and society for an understanding of art, that spurred the Australian philosopher John Passmore to write ‘The Dreariness of Aesthetics’ (1951).

It was the later philosophy of Wittgenstein (1953), however, that arguably had the greatest influence on the development of analytic aesthetics in the later half of the twentieth century. Some examples of significant themes associated with Wittgenstein’s work include: (1) a family resemblance conception of art as an alternative to essentialism (Weitz 1956); (2) an anti-theoretical approach to aesthetics (Kennic 1958); (3) the idea that aesthetic concepts are non-rule-governed (Sibley 1959); (4) the radical idea of letting the object of interpretation (say, an artwork or a philosophical text) become a means of interpretation of that same object (Cavell 1969); (5) the importance of social factors in the definition of art, as in, for example, the institutional theory of art (Dickie 1974); and (6) the importance of the concepts of seeing-as and seeing-in for understanding pictorial representation (Wollheim 1980). A useful survey of contemporary work directly influenced by Wittgenstein is Allen and Turvey (2001).

But analytic aesthetics is a broad church and Wittgenstein’s influence is now less evident. Although analytic aesthetics reflects the broader tendencies within analytic philosophy—it also has its social pragmatist and scientific naturalist camps—it is now too pluralistic and philosophically adventurous to be neatly summarised. Typical questions taken up by the analytic aesthetician include the perennial ‘What is art?’, the ontology of different kinds of art, the paradoxical cognitivity of aesthetic judgment, the nature of artistic intention and its relevance to interpretation, the objectivity of interpretation, and the relation between art and emotion (the artist’s, the audience’s). From the 1960s on there has been a
general movement away from the idea that art can be understood in purely aesthetic terms (often invoking a special aesthetic attitude of disinterestedness) and a growing appreciation of the need to understand art against the historical and social background afforded by artistic tradition, practices and conventions of art making, public institutions of art interpretation and appreciation, and artistic intentions.

Analytic aestheticians are among the most open-minded in the analytic tradition. Its practitioners have long realised that the way forward for analytic philosophy might well lie in appropriating the insights of the Idealist tradition that analytic philosophy began by ostensibly rejecting. Consider one of its leading practitioners, Arthur Danto: even if he is a traditionalist who argues against anti-essentialist Wittgensteinians such as Weitz that art has a metaphysical essence (Danto’s view is, roughly, that the essence of art is ‘embodied meaning’, where the ‘meaning’ in question is contextually dependent on the relevant recent history and theories of art (cf. Danto 1961)), nonetheless he also appropriates a version of Hegel’s idea of the end of art. According to Danto, the developmental history of art ends when Andy Warhol produces ‘Brillo Boxes’ in 1964, an artwork that is perceptually indistinguishable from ordinary physical objects, real-life Brillo boxes. Thereafter philosophy becomes self-conscious about the nature of art, which can no longer be understood in terms of manifest perceptual properties (cf. Danto 1997). Danto is also representative of many analytic aestheticians in having specialist art knowledge (in his case, of painting) and in being involved in the public discussion of art and its significance (Danto was art critic for *The Nation* from 1984 to 2009). For discussion of Danto, see Goodrich (1991).

Recent work in the Australasian context is representative of the most interesting current trends within analytic aesthetics as a whole. In the first place, there has been a move to embrace interdisciplinary approaches to aesthetics drawing on work in other areas of philosophy as well as empirically-based research in the social sciences. This is evidence of a newfound confidence in philosophical aesthetics in the face of the old anxiety that aestheticians are really just philosophers of something else, which is merely applied to the case of art. Gregory Currie (2004) perhaps leads the way here in arguing that making headway with many of the problems of aesthetics requires substantial input from metaphysics, philosophy of language and mind, value theory and empirical research (say, into the activity of interpreting). This interdisciplinary approach is also evident in other notable works: Philip Pettit’s (1983) appeal to considerations in the *philosophy of language* to argue for a sophisticated form of aesthetic *realism*; Eugenio Benitez’s (2003) argument for an intimate relation between ethics and aesthetics; and Denis Dutton’s (2001) discussion of aesthetic *universals* which makes significant use of research in anthropology and evolutionary psychology.

Another representative local trend is to consider special issues raised by particular arts that do not carry over to the general concept of art. This trend often goes with a conception of philosophy that does not see any point in

A third trend worthy of note has been the renewal of interest in questions of taste and, in particular, those concerning beauty—a topic that has been out of favour for some time but which has never been absent from philosophical aesthetics since the time of Plato. John Armstrong (2004) and Jennifer McMahon (2005) are among those making valuable contributions to this literature.

**Aesthetics (Continental)**

Alison Ross

Immanuel Kant’s 1790 work, *The Critique of Judgment*, attempts to define an autonomous field of value for aesthetic judgments. There are complex motivations for this task, many of them internal to the development of the Kantian critical philosophy and especially the exigencies of his moral philosophy. Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic autonomy rests on the claim that aesthetic pleasure follows from the judgment itself; it is not tied to pleasure in the object. Aesthetic judgments are ‘autonomous’ because they concern neither an assessment of the usefulness of the object nor the correct application of rules to this object. The autonomy of the aesthetic domain from the spheres of sensuous appetite (pleasure in the object) and cognition (usefulness or correctness) aims to establish beauty as an analogous form for moral ideas. It is because the feeling for the beautiful is without the constraints of subjective appetite or cognitive rules that it models, analogically, the qualities of moral freedom and serves too as the analogical exemplar of the moral idea. A number of the idiosyncrasies of Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic autonomy follow from the fact that this doctrine is not developed for the investigation of the fine arts or even, what Kant thought of as superior to art, instances of natural beauty, but as a way of investigating the subject’s faculty of judgment and its promise to mediate between the divided worlds of nature (cognition) and freedom (morals). In addition to the status of art as a category of peripheral use for the core problem of his philosophical system, another peculiarity imposed by the exigencies of Kant’s system on his doctrine of aesthetic autonomy is that it is a theory geared to the spectator and therefore to the analysis of the reception of beauty by the figure of the subject. Although some of these peculiarities were challenged
by his immediate heirs in modern German philosophy (G. W. F. Hegel tried to redefine and restrict aesthetics to the ‘philosophy of art’ and Friedrich Nietzsche, like Martin Heidegger after him, railed against the subjectivism of Kant’s theory of judgment and its willing sacrifice of ‘truth’ as a measure of aesthetic value), the untidy nest of issues addressed in Kant’s reflections on aesthetics continues to characterise the broad parameters of research in the field.

Most contemporary writing on aesthetics is post-Kantian because its key issues are framed in relation to Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic autonomy. Some writers have gone even further and attempted to locate a genesis for the split between analytic and Continental philosophy in the different possibilities of interpretation offered by the idiosyncrasies of Kant’s aesthetics. For instance, analytic philosophy is sometimes characterised as accepting the success or desirability of Kant’s differentiation between cognition, morals and taste; to the extent that it insists on the specificity of the questions that define the field of philosophy of art and attempts to refine the differentiation of ‘art’ from other fields it is post-Kantian (Bernstein 1992). In contrast, Continental philosophy departs from the view that Kant’s differentiation between cognition, morals and taste fails; the key issues in this tradition concern the implications of this failure. In general, Continental philosophy tends to pay more attention to the historical legacy of the Kantian problem of system that structures post-Kantian writing on aesthetics. From the perspective of this problem of system, many of the prominent figures in this field accept that aesthetics has significant implications for other areas of ‘value’ philosophy, especially the fields of politics and morals. Such thinkers may be considered post-Kantian because of the evidence in Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* that aesthetics is an evidentiary plank for his moral theory. In this respect they are faithful to the maximal definition of aesthetics as the sensibilisation [Versinnlichung] of (moral) ideas.

At its broadest aesthetics, as its Greek etymology from the verb ‘to sense’ [aisthesis] suggests, concerns the theory of sensibility in general, rather than just the ‘philosophy of the fine arts’. A number of twentieth-century thinkers follow this definition of aesthetics as the general problem of the conceptualisation of sensibility. In this respect we may cite Gilles Deleuze’s ontology and especially his attempt with Félix Guattari to redefine the relations between philosophy/art and science outside of the historical model of autonomy and in terms of an a-subjective theory of sensation. Similarly, the Kantian account of reflective judgment, which is developed in his aesthetics, but also refined in his teleology, is the prototype for Jean-François Lyotard’s approach to ‘the differend’ characterised by the absence of an authoritative rule of judgment. In the cases of both Deleuze and Lyotard aesthetics is understood as a field that admits a general theory of ‘affect’ and one that also critically engages with the Kantian reduction of ‘affect’ to the ‘subject’. Each of these thinkers weight their interpretation of Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* to his appendix on the sublime because, in their view, this appendix departs from the values of consensus and disinterest that define the earlier treatment of taste.
A Companion to Philosophy in Australia & New Zealand

Aesthetics (Continental)

Although there are compelling historical and semantic reasons for using the category of ‘aesthetics’ as the placeholder for theories of sensation and affect, it is equally possible to identify in recent European philosophy three main approaches to literature and the fine arts, each of which addresses a different angle on Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic autonomy. Moreover, the orientation of such a schema diminishes the salience of the analytic/Continental divide for the field of aesthetics and is therefore useful for characterising research in this field in Australasia given the largely ecumenical nature of philosophy departments here.

First, there are those approaches that examine the arts as a social institution. In this approach critical attention to the historical and institutional development of the autonomy of art and a specific concern with art’s social effects is prominent. In this area we can include thinkers as diverse as Theodor Adorno, Karl Heinz Bohrer, Peter Bürger and Pierre Bourdieu. Although there are significant differences between these thinkers, the historical perspective each take on the autonomy of art introduces into the critical assessment of this sphere considerations relating to the constitution of canonicity, the role of commodification in the reception and production of the arts and the prospects for social criticism or innovation from within the arts given these factors.

The second approach comprises those who advocate ‘autonomy’ for art. In this category we can include the work of philosophers such as Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy. These thinkers all tend to criticise attempts to saddle art with significance beyond the aesthetic domain; they argue that these attempts compromise the autonomy of art and the critical value that this autonomy might embody. This approach tends to take its settings from the conceptions of art in the modern German philosophical tradition and to the critical evaluation of the deployment of art within this tradition. For instance, Derrida is especially critical of the way Kantian aesthetics consigns art to the role of the material exemplar of the moral ideal. This approach comments much more on the paradoxes involved in the articulation of the logic of ‘autonomy’ in philosophical aesthetics than it does on the paradoxical freedom art wins through institutional and historical processes, such as the shift from a system of patronage to the entry of art into the mechanisms of a market economy, under which art first becomes intelligible as an ‘autonomous’ field, but also submits to market mechanisms.

Finally, there is the approach that adopts the ‘experience’ of the arts. The thinkers that can be grouped in this category all emphasise the reception and production of the arts and include hermeneutics (Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gianni Vattimo) as well as reception theory (Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Hans Robert Jauss). Some of the positions in this field are described as ‘post-aesthetic’ because they call into question the defining features of Kant’s aesthetics, in particular the ‘spectatorial’ model of judgments of art (Heidegger, Vattimo, Giorgio Agamben). This conception of the art-work as providing access to a specific type of experience is located in a critical relation to the historical emergence of art as belonging to an autonomous sphere of value because it iden-
tifies this process as effectively limiting art’s significance to the confines of the cultural domain and cutting off its relation to ‘truth’.

Despite this long list of German, French and Italian names it would be misleading to characterise the topics treated by this group of European philosophers as entirely incompatible with some of the central topics of Anglophone philosophy of art. After all, one of the key questions common to both fields is how to identify and defend the constitutive marks of a work of art from the sphere of non-art (see, for instance, Arthur Danto). Recent Continental philosophy approaches this problem through the analysis of the techniques involved in artistic production as much as by reference to the institutional processes such as the modern history of the museum that constitutes ‘non-art’ as ‘art’ through the mechanism of the exhibition (the display, for example, of Duchamp’s ‘ready-mades’). In this respect, both fields need to accommodate the changes happening in contemporary art practice, even if some prominent voices in Australasian philosophy express alienation from these changes and attempt to reinforce a normative sense of aesthetic value (e.g. John Armstrong at the University of Melbourne).

In Australasia research in aesthetics sustains the historico-philosophical, but also historico-institutional frameworks that bring with them topics to do with ‘value’ and ‘appearance’ and ‘sensible form’. Moreover, these historical settings also include research on topics related to the understanding of modernity, such as the problem of sustaining a role for normative judgment in the wake of the scientific secularisation of the concept of nature, as well as the historical problem, especially strong in German philosophy, of classification of avant-garde production. Finally, due to its genesis in Kant as the context to raise questions of existential meaning in the wake of secular disenchantment, the modern history of aesthetics has a privileged place in analyses of the changing nature of lived experience in modernity [Erlebnis].

Given the importance of the German and French traditions in this field, some prominent international research is conducted by individuals whose academic careers have been in language or literature departments, rather than in philosophy. Work in this field in Australasia may be schematically divided into three categories: work on the canonical writings in aesthetics; work on the arts; and philosophical writing on topics such as value, sensible form and the problem of normative judgments as these are inflected by both the former two categories as well as recent trends in English-language philosophy.

Two of the main figures working in this field in Australasia are both from the Philosophy Department at the University of Sydney. György Markus, who began teaching at Sydney in 1978 after having emigrated to Australia from Hungary, is a major international figure in this field. Markus’ research is famous for its critical examination of the conceptualisation of ‘high’ culture within the post-Marxist tradition (Markus 1999). He has published a number of important essays and books dealing with the conceptualisation of the commodification of culture in Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno and the paradigm of production in Marxist aesthetics (Markus 1978). He has also published
significant historical pieces on the conception of ‘culture’ and its links to modern European understandings of ‘anthropology’ (Markus 1993).

A former student of Markus’, Paul Redding, also at the University of Sydney, has published pieces on the philosophy of art as well as the broader historical framework and wider issues this field addresses. We may cite in this respect his book *The Logic of Affect* as well as a number of significant essays in which Redding tries to connect the problem of normative judgment, as this is conceived in post-Kantian Idealism, to contemporary topics in analytic philosophy. Although Redding’s work is attentive to the historical topics and formation of this field, his work is unusual because it tries to bring this historical framework to bear on problems in anglophone philosophy (Redding 1999). Finally, the University of Sydney is the base for the Sydney Society for Literature and Aesthetics. This society provides an interdisciplinary venue for conferences, seminars and sponsors the bi-annual publication of the journal *Literature and Aesthetics*. The interdisciplinary mission of this society means that it is neither a partisan in the division between analytic and Continental philosophy, nor is it devoted exclusively to philosophical aesthetics narrowly defined. Some of its participants include Rick Benitez (Philosophy, University of Sydney), Vrasidas Karalis (Modern Greek, University of Sydney) and Catherine Runcie (English, University of Sydney).

Markus, along with other émigrés from the Budapest School (such as Agnes Heller, now at The New School, New York, but who previously taught in Sociology at *La Trobe University*), has also had a significant influence on David Roberts (German, Monash University). Roberts has written critical studies on Romanticism, the German novel and Adorno’s aesthetics. Like Markus, his work has been published in German as well as in English-language publications (Roberts 1991). Roberts’ work in aesthetics and especially the approach he takes to problems in this field tends to be restricted to the German tradition.

Another Australasian figure with international prominence in this field is Andrew Benjamin (Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies, Monash, formerly Warwick University, U.K.). Benjamin has published edited collections dealing with aesthetic topics in the writings of Walter Benjamin and Jean-François Lyotard. In addition to collections on prominent figures in the field of aesthetics, he is also the author of monographs on topics such as the avant-garde, painting and modernism and architecture. Benjamin’s work tends to follow the view, adapted from Kant’s conception of the moral significance of aesthetic value, that art has political significance (Benjamin 2004). Unlike Markus, Redding and Roberts, Benjamin’s work is influenced by the French tradition, especially deconstruction.

There are a number of others who write on literary and aesthetic problems such as the problem of cultural value (John Frow, English, University of Melbourne) or genre (John Frow, Robyn Ferrell, also in English at the University of Melbourne) (Frow 2005; Ferrell 2002). Ferrell has also written on particular artists and the topics of artistic mediums and indigenous art.
Analytic Feminism

Natalie Stoljar

Australasian philosophers have made an extremely rich and diverse contribution to the area of feminist philosophy that has come to be called ‘analytic feminism’. The term dates from the early 1990s when a Society for Analytical Feminism was inaugurated in North America (Garry 2008). Ann E. Cudd has offered a helpful definition: ‘Analytic feminism holds that the best way to counter sexism and androcentrism is through forming a clear conception of and pursuing truth, logical consistency, objectivity, rationality, justice, and the good while recognising that these notions have often been perverted by androcentrism throughout the history of philosophy’ (1996: 20). Feminist theory had been dominated by postmodernism and poststructuralism which, as Cudd observes, often rejects notions such as truth, reason, objectivity, agency and autonomy. Analytic feminism attempts to rehabilitate these notions, not only because they are ‘normatively compelling, but also [because they are] in some ways empowering and liberating for women’ (Cudd 1996: 20). Although it is not restricted to these areas, many of the contributions of analytic feminists are in core areas of analytic philosophy such as philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of science.

An influential Australasian figure is Annette C. Baier, whose early articles ‘What Do Women Want in A Moral Theory?’ (1985), ‘Hume, the Woman’s Moral Theorist?’ (1987), and ‘Hume, the Reflective Woman’s Epistemologist?’ (1993) pioneered two areas of analytic feminism that are flourishing today. These are, first, feminist reconsiderations of historical figures (and the related study of the historical impact of women philosophers), and, second, the intersection between feminism and moral theory. A second pioneer is Genevieve Lloyd. Her work The Man of Reason, first published in 1984, had an important influence on both non-analytic and analytic feminists, because she drew attention to the concept of reason and the ways in which this concept is androcentric in the history of philosophy. Both Baier’s and Lloyd’s work were represented in what is perhaps the most important early anthology of analytic feminism, A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (Antony and Witt 1993). This work did much to set the agenda of analytic feminism.
Many other Australasian philosophers have contributed analytic feminist work in epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of language, moral and political philosophy, and the history of philosophy. Karen Jones has explored the notions of self-trust and testimony in contexts of sexism and racism (2002, 2004). Her article ‘The Politics of Credibility’ was included in the second edition of A Mind of One’s Own (2002). Also in epistemology, Rae Langton’s extensive contributions on objectification have been collected in her recent book, Sexual Solipsism (2009). In metaphysics, feminists have explored the problem of essentialism, and the significance of the debate over nominalism and universals for gender properties (Stoljar 1995, 2010). In the philosophy of language, they have studied the role of language in debates about pornography (Langton 1993; Hornsby and Langton 1998; Langton and West 1999). In moral and political philosophy, Australasian feminists have contributed to feminist bioethics (Dodds 2000, 2007), to the feminist analysis and critique of liberalism (Barclay 2000; Langton 1990; West 2003), and also to the project of rehabilitating concepts that had been repudiated by earlier feminist theory, such as the concept of autonomy (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). Analytic feminists working in the history of philosophy have made important contributions to both the rethinking of androcentric concepts in the history of philosophy and to the discovery of the contributions of female philosophers (Broad 2002; Green 1994, 1995).

The field of analytic feminism has several key features that distinguish it from both traditional analytic philosophy and from non-analytic feminist theory. The first is the ‘blurriness’ (Cudd 1996) of the distinctions between traditional topics in analytic philosophy—for instance, epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of language—and social/political philosophy. An example of this is Langton’s well-known paper on freedom of expression and pornography, ‘Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts’ (1993). Langton uses J. L. Austin’s speech act theory in the philosophy of language to argue that pornography subordinates women and silences their speech. A second example is Catriona Mackenzie’s examination of the role of the imagination in agency and identity. Mackenzie’s analysis of the imagination draws on the philosophy of mind, but the primary goal is to illuminate problems in bioethics and social/political philosophy (Mackenzie 2000; Mackenzie and Scully 2007; Mackenzie 2008).

A second feature worth noticing is that, although analytical feminism is often motivated by political concerns, such as the concern to counter sexism and androcentrism mentioned above, its philosophical insights extend beyond this, and often enrich our understanding of traditional areas of philosophy. For example, recent work on the notion of autonomy by feminist philosophers has argued against standard conceptions of autonomy within moral psychology (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). This work makes genuine progress in our understanding of the concept of autonomy and how it applies in political philosophy and bioethics. Thus, the impact of analytic feminism is not just a political one; it is a philosophical contribution in its own right that often refigures traditional debates.
A third feature of analytic feminism is that it can rely on cross-fertilisation between non-analytic approaches and analytic approaches. Lloyd’s work on reason has already been mentioned, and in general feminists working on the history of philosophy exemplify this cross-fertilisation. The work of another prominent Australian feminist philosopher, Moira Gatens, though it is not primarily analytic, has had an impact on analytic feminism in a number of ways, for example through her analysis of sex and gender categories (1991a) and her work on feminist reinterpretations of Spinoza (2009). Marguerite La Caze’s exploration of the imagery of analytic philosophy is another good example of this cross-fertilisation (2002).

Ancient Philosophy
Dirk Baltzly & Paul Thom

Ancient Greco-Roman philosophy is a staple part of the curriculum in most North American universities. Few research-oriented departments are without a member of staff who describes this as his or her ‘area of specialisation’. This is perhaps partly because North American universities owe so much to the legacy of scholars such as Gregory Vlastos and G. E. L. Owen who brilliantly applied the techniques of analytic philosophy to the study of ancient texts, thus making ancient philosophy seem familiar to their not-so-historically-minded colleagues. By contrast, Australian and New Zealand philosophy departments, which have also been predominantly analytic in their orientation, have not similarly embraced ancient philosophy as an essential area of expertise. The story of scholarship in ancient philosophy in Australasia is thus one in which philosophy departments play an equal, or perhaps even a supporting, role alongside classics departments. Indeed, in the early days of Australian universities, all the teaching of ancient philosophy was done under the aegis of classics.

The University of Sydney may serve as an illustration. From 1852 to 1889, ancient philosophy was taught by the professors of classics. The syllabus included some Platonic dialogues, Aristotle’s Ethics, and bits of Aristotle’s logic. Under Francis Anderson (Challis Professor of Philosophy, 1890–1921) there was a course called ‘Ancient Philosophy’, comprising ninety lectures offering a ‘historical and critical account of the development of Primitive and Ancient Thought’. The lectures covered oriental religions and theosophies, Greek philosophy in its relation to Greek life and culture, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans and Sceptics, Roman philosophy, and the Middle Ages up to Aquinas. Bernard Muscio (Challis Professor of Philosophy, 1922–26) continued the ninety-lecture course on Ancient Philosophy, narrowing the scope
to the period between Thales and Plotinus. From 1927 to 1958, John Anderson as Challis Professor of Philosophy taught an ever-narrowing selection of Greek philosophical texts, focussing on the Pre-Socratics and a few Platonic dialogues.

Anderson’s approach to the Greek philosophers was a little like that of Aristotle to his predecessors: rather than seeking to understand them in their own terms and in their own historical context, he saw their work as fitting his own theoretical framework. Other Australasian philosophers, generally working as isolated individuals, continued to approach ancient texts with interpretive frameworks drawn from contemporary philosophy as late as the early 1980s—witness Frank White’s work on Plato’s metaphysics or Maxwell J. Cresswell’s articles from the late 1970s and early 1980s.

An internationally recognised vehicle for Australasian studies of ancient philosophy came from the classicists. Peter Bicknell and David Rankin of the classics department at Monash University had launched a new journal dedicated to ancient philosophy and science, Apeiron, in 1966. Apeiron published local authors, as well as some international heavy-weights. In addition, beginning in the 1980s, the University of Newcastle’s colourful professor of classics, Godfrey Tanner, organised a series of conferences on themes of interest to classicists, philosophers and theologians. Participants included David Dockrill, who was interested in the Cambridge Platonists, Raoul Mortley, who worked on Neoplatonism, and Harold Tarrant, whose research interests span nearly the entire ancient Platonic tradition. Tarrant recalls that the standard of papers at these conferences was not particularly consistent, but to have raised the bar too high would have resulted in few participants.

The Philosophy Program at the Australian National University achieved something like critical mass with the presence of Kimon Lycos and Paul Thom. Lycos was blessed with a kind of Socratic magnetism. He was also profoundly engaged with contemporary French philosophy. Andrew Benjamin was among the students at ANU at the time and Lycos gave impetus to his subsequent work in ancient philosophy.

The 1980s and ’90s saw the publication of a number of good books in ancient philosophy by Australian and New Zealand authors. These included a commentary on Plato’s Euthydemus from R. S. W. Hawtrey (1981), two volumes from Mortley (1986) on Neoplatonism, work from Tarrant (1985) on the New Academy, Lycos’ Plato on Justice and Power (1987), and Thom’s work on Aristotelian logic (1981) and (1996).

In 1992 the Australasian Society for Ancient Philosophy (ASAP) was founded by Paul Thom, Robin Jackson (Classics, Melbourne), Kimon Lycos and Harold Tarrant (Classics, Newcastle). There was strong New Zealand support from Dougal Blyth (Classics, Auckland) and Ben Gibbs (Philosophy, Waikato). Shortly thereafter the philosophy departments of the University of Sydney and Monash University hired Americans who had trained specifically in ancient philosophy (Rick Benitez and Dirk Baltzly). The new ASAP held regular conferences that issued in two volumes of conference proceedings—a special issue of Apeiron
edited by Benitez (1996) and then a special volume of *Prudentia* edited by Baltzly, Blyth and Tarrant (2001). The former volume testifies to the centrality of Plato among the research interests of ASAP members. The latter volume ranges more widely and includes a paper by Stephen Gardiner (Philosophy, Canterbury) on Aristotelian virtue ethics. This cross-fertilisation with Australia and New Zealand’s strength in contemporary virtue ethics was carried forward by Gardiner in a conference at Canterbury in 2002 that issued in Gardner (2005). It is perhaps work on ancient virtue ethics, together with logic and issues in ancient metaphysics, that has most interested non-specialists in Australia and New Zealand.

Another research initiative of the early 1990s that was significant for the present century was the collaboration of Tarrant, Jackson and Lycos in an ARC-funded project to translate the *Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias* of Olympiodorus (6th c. AD). Through his work on this project, and his membership of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne, Lycos continued to be a major presence in Australasian ancient philosophy. His untimely death in 1995 was a serious loss to the burgeoning research community around ancient philosophy.

The philosophy of late antiquity (200–600 AD) is currently an area of intense new interest among scholars in ancient Greek philosophy. Partly by chance and partly by design, Australia now has a significant international profile in this area. Following on the heels of the successful collaboration on Olympiodorus, Baltzly and Tarrant teamed up with David Runia (who was then professor of ancient philosophy at Leiden University) in a project to translate Proclus’ *Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus* into five volumes for Cambridge University Press. The Proclus project also organised an international conference in Newcastle with papers from leading scholars of late antiquity published as *Reading Plato in Antiquity* (2007). Runia, a world-class expert on doxography and the philosophy of Philo of Alexandria, has now returned to a position at the University of Melbourne. In addition to working with Runia on Proclus’ *Timaeus Commentary*, Michael Share (Classics, Tasmania) has also produced two more volumes of translation from another late antique Neoplatonist—Philoponus and his *Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World* (2005). The final addition to Australia’s concentration of researchers in late antique philosophy was the arrival of Han Baltussen to a position in classics at the University of Adelaide in 2003. In addition to a two-volume edited collection on the Greek, Latin and Arabic commentary tradition, Baltussen is the author of the first book-length study of Simplicius (6th c. AD), *Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius* (2008).

Ancient philosophy in Australia has grown remarkably over the past twenty-five years. It now has an organisational aegis of sorts, a tradition of research collaboration both domestically and internationally, and even a distinctive ‘signature’ in studies in late antique philosophy.
Anderson, John, and Andersonianism

Aubrey Townsend

There is a Professor John Anderson at Sydney University, his Chair being [sic] Philosophy; he is described as a young man of enthusiasms in some directions and representative of school of thought evidenced in the letter to the paper mentioned [Workers’ Weekly]. He is stated not to be regarded very seriously by his colleagues, some of whom have already spoken to him in the present matter. (1930 ASIO file on Anderson, cited by Franklin 2003: 11)

Perhaps Anderson was not at first taken seriously by his colleagues. His impact and influence was always through his students. From the beginning, he attracted a group of very able students, all deeply influenced by his thought and drawn into philosophy: A. D. Hope, Perce Partridge, John Passmore and J. L. Mackie, all in his first five or six years in Sydney. Over the next thirty years, Anderson became the most profoundly and widely influential intellectual figure in Australia. The influence went way beyond the ordinary boundaries of philosophy, to encompass literature, psychology, political theory, law and education; and it went beyond the boundaries of academia to affect political, religious and cultural affairs generally. He was censured in the NSW Parliament, by the senate of the University of Sydney, and frequently attacked by both the Anglican and Catholic churches. No other philosopher in Australia, perhaps no other Australian intellectual, has had anything like that impact. My interest here is how that influence came about and what we can learn from it about the conditions under which philosophy can flourish.

Anderson was still young when he arrived at the University of Sydney. In that first decade, he was engaged in working out a comprehensive philosophical system. For his early students, what attracted and inspired enthusiasm was contact with an original and powerful thinker, working out a ‘position’ with broad implications across the spectrum, one deliberately speaking to them more than the established academic community. When Anderson retired at the end of 1958, the Workers Educational Association produced a special number of their journal, Australian Highway, celebrating Anderson and Andersonianism. Perce Partridge then remarked:

Those of us who studied with him (or later worked with him) had the experience of being associated with a thinker engaged in the work of creating a very impressive intellectual construction. He was hard at it, working over the thought of many writers—Russell,
Moore, Alexander, Marx, Freud, and so on—accepting, discarding, modifying, relating, reaching out to take in new territory. This is what made him a great teacher in that decade ... And his closest pupils at least were in touch, therefore, with an ambitious project of intellectual construction going forward: they could observe at first hand what intellectual creation is like. (1958: 50)

Central to Anderson’s position was a metaphysical doctrine, which he described as realism. His realism contrasted with the Absolute Idealism then still influential in Britain and Australia; but it contrasted almost as strongly with the views held by other realists reacting at the time against Idealism, including people like Russell, Moore, James and Alexander. What is real, all that is real, according to Anderson, are situations in space and time: complex entities constantly in flux. There are no absolutes, no higher beings or levels of reality, no basic or simple entities, no enduring substances, no immaterial or spiritual beings. His was, as he described it, ‘a thoroughly pluralist view in which there is not only an unlimited multiplicity of things to which the single logic of events applies but anything whatever is infinitely complex so that we can never cover its characteristics in a single formula or say that we “know all about it”’ (1958: 55). Tightly interwoven with realism was a set of views in logic, epistemology, theory of mind and ethics.

In logic, the central doctrine concerned the proposition, what can be true or false. Propositions, Anderson held, must have the same structure as potential facts; indeed a true proposition is to be identified with the situation that makes it true. Since reality is not conditional or disjunctive, so propositions are always categorical. And for that reason Anderson stuck, wrongly I think, to a traditional Aristotelian logic. (Mackie 1951 is a good place to pursue the discussion of Anderson’s logic, and Anderson’s first-year lecture notes can be found as an appendix in Anderson 2007.)

Just as there is only one way of being true—there are no grades of truth, no higher truths or necessary truths—also there is only one way of knowing, and that is through observation and critical inquiry. Anderson’s realism led to a form of radical empiricism. As he saw it, the empiricism of the British empiricists, Mill and Russell, was compromised by continuing adherence to characteristic rationalist doctrines: that there are basic data, basic certainties, from which all other knowledge has to be derived or constructed. On the contrary, he held, all knowledge is of facts or situations, and situations are always complex and never exhausted in what we know of them. Hence all knowledge is fallible, always at risk of being displaced by a deeper grasp of the facts.

Knowledge is always a relation between a knower and a known. And since the terms of any relation must be independently real entities, not things constituted by entering into those relations, there are no things whose nature it is to know, or to be known. So consciousness cannot belong to the nature of minds, as Alexander held; minds must be able to be characterised independently of what they know or what they do. That is the fundamental constraint on a theory of mind.
Anderson, John, and Andersonianism

Anderson never published a systematic account of his position. The published essays, for example in *Studies in Empirical Philosophy* (1962), are apt to seem opaque and dogmatic. That is partly because they are written in a clumsy wooden style—Passmore remarks in his memoirs (1997: 93) that Anderson’s influence was a ‘triumph of content over style’—but mainly because they were intended to be placed against the background of a broad understanding of his views acquired through lectures. In the lectures his position emerged as the consistent and coherent standpoint from which the critical discussion of other philosophers proceeded; one gradually absorbed it over the three or four years of an Arts degree. The first-year course introduced logic and then moved to the Socratic dialogues of Plato. In them Anderson found, first, the occasion for reflecting on the value of free enquiry and criticism, and then for an onslaught on any form of dualism. (You can catch a glimpse of the arguments from chapter 3 of Passmore’s book, *Philosophical Reasoning*.) In second year, attention turned to the Pre-Socratics. There Anderson discerned early representatives of most major philosophical positions, including, in the fragments of Heraclitus, a poetic precursor of his own views. Passmore’s memoirs record how influential these lectures on Heraclitus were in shaping his worldview, and I had the same experience many years later. Subsequent courses, on Descartes, Hume and Kant, allowed the exposition of empiricism, as always by way of the criticism of historical rationalist and empiricist figures. These lectures have not yet been published, but the lectures on Alexander’s *Space, Time and Deity* have recently been published (Anderson 2007), using notes taken in 1949 by D. M. Armstrong, Eric Dowling and Alexander (‘Sandy’) Anderson; they provide the most detailed systematic presentation of Anderson’s central metaphysical views. Jim Baker (1986) attempted a systematic exposition of Anderson’s views, but not very successfully I fear.

There was another side to Anderson’s impact: his philosophising was driven by moral and political passion. He thought of himself primarily as an educator. His idea of what education is was made clear in ‘Socrates as an Educator’, reprinted in *Studies in Empirical Philosophy* (1962) and one of his more immediately accessible papers. Education is a primary good, not something to be valued solely for its utility. Its goal is to produce understanding of physical, social and cultural processes, and a critical awareness of the way various interests and conflicts shape historical movements. This view of education drove his passionate opposition to any educational practices tending to produce an uncritical acceptance of traditional beliefs or values, and so especially of the abuse of education by religious interests. Anderson consistently, almost to the end, championed the value of free thought. He did so on campus, especially through two student societies, the Freethought Society, which he founded in 1930, and the Literary Society. And off-campus he championed the same ideals, particularly through his involvement in the Workers Educational Association.

Soon after his arrival in Sydney, Anderson made contact with the Communist Party and so provoked the interest of the security service. But his involvement
with the Communist Party was short-lived, for his commitment to freedom of inquiry and criticism was not then to be subordinated to any social or political program. But he remained a social revolutionary. For a while he defended Trotskyism; then, especially during the forties, he rejected Trotskyism as well and advanced an anti-utopian pluralist position, seeking to expose illusions and to criticise the mentality of servility wherever it is found. Through all this period, his views and polemical activities were decidedly left leaning. (Anderson’s political and polemical writings are collected in Weblin 2003.) But, from about 1949 until his death in 1962, his anti-communism became more strident and his political stance more conservative. Partridge, in the paper I have already referred to, remarked:

‘Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold’. At a certain stage the impetus weakened … Moral and social criticism, a view of the nature or foundations of culture, are for him an essential object of the philosophical enterprise. It was his idea of a ‘fully worked-out position’, taking in the various aspects of life and culture, including the moral and political, which in his case fed the intellectual fire. And which incidentally attracted to him students of such diverse interests. What he had derived from or built upon Marxism was, for this reason, vital to his whole position. Perhaps, then, it was the re-examination, and ultimately the total rejection, of Marxism which was forced upon him by the course which Communism took in the thirties and forties which halted the forward-moving direction of his thinking, and threw him so much into the posture of intellectual resistance and opposition. (1958: 50)

Anderson’s slide into conservatism culminated, in August 1950, in debates in the Freethought Society over the issue of conscription. An Anti-Conscription Committee had been formed, led by David Stove, D. M. Armstrong and Eric Dowling, all former students of Anderson and later to be academic philosophers. Anderson opposed them and suggested, for the first time, that freedom of criticism might be limited by political necessity. The Freethought Society disintegrated and Anderson lost both his most important platform and the support of the radicals he had nurtured. When he retired, the Andersonian movement, if that is what it was, died. Although many of his former students were to be active in philosophy departments at the University of Sydney, University of Newcastle, University of New England and the Australian National University, none of them were Andersonians. None of them thought of themselves as working within a program, or guided by a paradigm, that Anderson had defined.
The four most prominent specialist journals in ancient Greco-Roman philosophy are *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, *Phronesis*, *Ancient Philosophy* and *Apeiron*. Though the last of these is now edited by Jim Hankinson at the University of Texas at Austin, it has its origins in the Department of Classical Studies at Monash University. *Apeiron’s* story sheds an interesting light not only on philosophy in Australia but also on Monash University itself.

Monash University’s Department of Classical Studies had only been in existence for a year when David Rankin decided he had had enough of U.K. classics periodicals. They were too clubby and it was hard for those in the far-flung antipodes to get published. Moreover, only *Phronesis* specialised in ancient philosophy and it was regarded by many as rather conservative in its editorial choices. Rankin conspired with Peter Bicknell to establish a new journal that would be entitled *Apeiron* (‘Unbounded’) to indicate the breadth of its methodological tolerance, and which would be specifically a journal for ancient philosophy and science. Bicknell and Rankin proposed to produce this journal ‘in house’, using printing facilities at Monash University. Advertisements for subscriptions yielded significant requests from North America, but almost nothing from Australia, New Zealand or the U.K. From the University of Melbourne’s classics department across town, Rankin recalls, there was a distinct sense that such an initiative smacked strongly of *hubris* coming from a classics department whose building had not even had time to grow a smattering of ivy upon it.

The first issues of *Apeiron* are stapled sheets of 8 x 13-inch paper with Greek characters handwritten. Rankin and Bicknell made editorial decisions themselves, regarding the refereeing system as one that often stifled new directions in research. True to its title, there were articles on ancient astronomy and even meteorology. (Bicknell’s 1971 article on a possible reference to Kugelblitz in Pliny is, I believe, utterly unique in the annals of scholarship.) While Monash classicists figure prominently in these early issues, there are also contributions from significant overseas scholars such as Philip Merlan, Tom Robinson and Pamela Huby. Significantly absent are contributions from Australian philosophers.

In the mid 1980s, *Apeiron* faced a financial crisis. Monash University was no longer willing to provide printing facilities and it appeared that it was not economically feasible to continue. The editors decided to offer the journal to any institution willing to carry on the tradition. Roger Shiner at the University of Alberta in Canada agreed to take it on, expecting that with a bit of work one could increase the subscriptions to make the journal more financially sound. Under Shiner’s editorship, subscriptions grew. Shiner also instituted a policy of
peer review—not because he was opposed to the previous editorial policy, but because it simply involved too much work and presupposed a significant level of expertise in a rapidly expanding sub-discipline. Shiner had correctly seen that there was good scholarship, more philosophical than classical in its orientation, that was seeking an outlet apart from Phronesis. Shortly after Apeiron moved to Canada, Oxford Studies and Ancient Philosophy were both launched in response to this growing demand for specifically philosophical journals in the area.

Apeiron’s story illustrates several things. The editors were right to think that more journals were needed in ancient philosophy and especially in ancient science. However, Monash University’s penny-pinching ways meant that by the time this judgment was vindicated, the journal was based overseas. It also illustrates the relative insularity of Australian philosophy from kindred disciplines in years past, as well as the leading role of classicists in establishing ancient philosophy as a thriving sub-discipline in Australasia.

The story has a happy ending though. The conference proceedings of the Australasian Society for Ancient Philosophy—a group made up of both philosophers and classicists—was published in 1996 … in a special issue of Apeiron.

Applied Ethics

Janna Thompson

Two types of applied ethics have flourished in Australasia. The first consists of views on human conduct and social life put forward by philosophers who are principally concerned to develop a general philosophical position or approach to philosophy. The second, which more comfortably fits the description ‘applied ethics’, focusses on a practical problem or issue, usually one of current public debate, and uses philosophical reasoning to try to resolve it. The first has always existed in Australasia, as elsewhere. The second was a product of a particular time and a philosophical turn.

For John Anderson, the influential professor of philosophy at the University of Sydney from 1927 to 1958, views about democracy, moralism, education, liberty, and censorship were manifestations of a philosophical worldview (Eddy 1945). If ideas about how to live can be regarded as applied ethics, then the libertarian movement, inspired though not blessed by Anderson, counts as one of the most influential applications of philosophy in Australasia. Though the Sydney libertarians who flourished in the middle of the last century were notorious for drinking, gambling and a male-oriented conception of sexual liberation, they never lost their interest in philosophy and the conviction that it was important to the living of a life.
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John Anderson was not the first Australasian philosopher to pronounce on social affairs. Duncan McGregor, appointed foundation professor of mental and moral philosophy at the University of Otago in 1871, was a Darwinist who had views on the education of women and the protection of lazy and intellectually handicapped people.

In more recent times, John Passmore, Raimond Gaita and Freya Mathews are notable examples of philosophers whose views about moral and social issues arise from a general theory about ontology, culture, morality or history. John Passmore in *Man’s Responsibility for Nature* (1972) addresses current environmental concerns, but his main purpose is to argue that a view about nature and how to treat it ought to be derived from traditions of thought rooted in the history of our culture. Gaita’s influential views on genocide, racism and the responsibility of intellectuals arise out of a moral philosophy that stresses the unconditional respect that we owe to each human being and the importance of the life of the mind (Gaita 1991). Mathews’ (1991) environmental ethics is the consequence of a metaphysical theory about the nature of matter.

There have always been philosophers in Australasia whose theories encompass ethical concerns. But the idea that philosophers should regard it as part of their business to pronounce on practical issues was out of favour during the 1950s and 1960s when philosophers assumed that their proper task was to analyse concepts and to concentrate on the traditional topics of philosophy. A. N. Prior ended his report for the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (AJP) on the 1957 East-West Philosophers’ Conference on the Good Life by expressing regret that getting UNESCO sponsorship dictated the choice of topic. It would have been much better, he thought, if this group of philosophers had instead been able to focus on what matters: logic and metaphysics (Prior 1958: 13).

What caused a change of orientation and brought the second, issue oriented, variety of applied ethics into existence, was in part changes in philosophy and in part the impetus of political events. Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction brought into question basic assumptions about the nature of philosophy and its independence from empirical and practical matters. At the same time a generation of younger philosophers (a particularly large contingent in the new or growing Australasian universities of the 1970s) were motivated by political events to bring their philosophical abilities to bear on the issues of the day. Some found inspiration in Marx as a thinker who believed in the inseparability of philosophy and practice. Others simply applied their analytical skills to current problems.

By the 1980s, Australasian philosophers were writing on many applied topics. Articles by Peter Singer on aid to victims of famine (1972), E. M. Curley on rape (1976), and John Kleinig on good Samaritanism (1976) appeared in early issues of *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. The first issue of the *Journal of Applied Philosophy* (1984) was dominated by Australasian contributors: Stanley Benn writing on deterrence, Helga Kuhse on letting die, Robert Elliot on justice to animals, John Passmore on academic ethics, and Gary Malinas on pesticides and policies. As a sign of the times, a conference on the philosophical problems of
nuclear armaments at the University of Queensland in 1985 brought together participants as diverse as C. A. J. Coady, Graham Nerlich, Brian Ellis, Rodney Allen and J. J. C. Smart.

Many Australasian philosophers have turned their attention to applied issues, but Peter Singer is by far the most important and influential. In three areas of applied ethics he initiated a debate that transcends the confines of the discipline. He is best known for his 1975 book *Animal Liberation*. Going beyond the advocacy of kindness to animals, Singer argues that individual animals, since they are also capable of feeling pleasure and pain, should count no less than individual humans in determining our actions and policies. One of the implications, he argues, is that it is wrong for us to use animals for food. No other recent philosophical work has had as much influence on people’s lives.

The second area to which Singer has made an influential contribution is bioethics. He was one of the first philosophers to engage in the debate about IVF and other developments in reproduction technology (Singer and Walters 1982; Singer and Wells 1984). He is also well known for his attacks on the doctrine that all human life is sacred. By arguing that it can be justified to kill babies who suffer from conditions that make it doubtful that their lives will be worth living, Singer and his colleague and co-author, Helga Kuhse (Singer and Kuhse 1985), won support from many doctors and parents who had been forced to make difficult choices, but faced the ire of those who insisted that each human life is precious or who feared that his view would somehow lead to the handicapped being regarded as unworthy of life.

In the midst of a refugee crisis in East Bengal in 1971, Singer addressed the question of whether individuals have an obligation to help starving people elsewhere in the world (Singer 1972). Using the now famous analogy of the drowning child, his answer was, ‘yes’—indeed, that we ought to help up to the point where we would be sacrificing something of comparable moral worth. Attempts to determine whether this answer demands too much of people have since become a major philosophical activity.

Four other pioneers of Australasian applied ethics are H. J. McCloskey, Robert Young, Robert Goodin and C. A. J. Coady. Swimming against the philosophical mainstream in the 1960s, McCloskey wrote on punishment, liberty, privacy and other topics, and continued in the next two decades to publish articles on applied ethics issues, including treatment of animals and ecological ethics (e.g. McCloskey 1965a, 1965b, 1975, 1987). Young wrote influential articles on euthanasia—the earliest in 1976—and has continued to work on medical ethics, as well as writing on other topics (Young 2007). Coming to the Australian National University in 1989, Goodin had already written several books on welfare ethics, and he went on to write about environmental ethics, smoking, terrorism, and political morality (Goodin 1985, 1989, 1992a, 1992b, 2006). Coady’s 1985 discussion of how to define and morally evaluate terrorism was an early contribution to a topic that has since become a focus of attention.
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The 1970s and 1980s were a period of exploration for philosophers with an interest in applied ethics. In the late 1980s and 1990s, applied ethics became an industry as philosophy departments set up courses and degrees in applied ethics, and as applied philosophers got together to form centres to coordinate research and to provide services. As usual, Peter Singer led the way by establishing a bioethics centre at Monash University in 1980 modelled, as the letter of intent states, on the Hastings Centre in New York (Swan 1980). Another bioethics research centre was set up in the School of Medicine of the University of Otago in 1988. C. A. J. Coady began the Centre for Philosophy and Public Issues at the University of Melbourne in 1990, Ian Hunt was instrumental in setting up the Centre for Applied Ethics at Flinders University in 1994, and Stan van Hooft of Deakin University has conducted Socratic dialogues with members of the public and professional groups from 1998. The St James Ethics Centre, an independent service-oriented organisation, was founded in 1989 by Simon Longstaff, its Executive Director.

Applied philosophy centres, the increasing presence of philosophers on ethics committees of hospitals, universities and other institutions, and the presence of philosophers in the media as commentators on public issues have moved applied ethics into the community and brought philosophers into contact with people outside their discipline. The Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) now offers a Media Prize for the best article or series of articles on philosophy appearing in the media during the year, while the Australasian Association of Professional and Applied Philosophy, formed in 1993, has members who come from the professions and business as well as the universities. The services provided by applied ethics centres—consultancies and special courses for professionals—also give philosophers one of the few means in their power to bring in funds, an important consideration at a time of financial stringency for universities and their departments.

Australasian philosophers have been particularly active in three areas of applied ethics. In environmental ethics they have played an especially prominent role. Richard and Val Routley, writing together and separately, were among the first in the world to present an eco-centred ethics (Routley and Routley 1980). Richard Routley, under the name of Richard Sylvan, went on to develop this ethics, which he called ‘deep-green theory’ (Sylvan and Bennett 1994), and Val Routley, under the name of Val Plumwood, wrote an ovarian work on ecofeminism (1993). John Passmore (1972) advocated a more traditional human-centred position, and H. J. McCloskey (1983) and Robert Goodin (1992) developed political theories of the environment. During the following decades other Australasian philosophers made important contributions. Among them were Robert Elliot (1982 and 1997) who argued that restoration of nature in the aftermath of mining cannot bring back the value lost, Freya Mathews (1991) who put forward a cosmic version of deep ecology, and Lawrence E. Johnson (1991) who argued for the moral considerability of living things and eco-systems. William Grey (1993) and Janna Thompson (1990) criticised eco-centred ethics; Alastair Gunn wrote on
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environmental engineering (Gunn and Vesilind 1998), and Andrew Brennan (1988) on pluralist approaches to environmental ethics.

The second area of applied philosophy where Australasians have concentrated their activities is bioethics, or more broadly, medical ethics. The Australasian Bioethics Association, founded in 1991, holds annual conferences with the Australian and New Zealand Institute of Health, Law and Ethics, and is one of the sponsors of the Journal of Bioethics Inquiry. The Bioethics Centre at Monash University began the international journal, Bioethics, and now publishes the Monash Bioethics Review. There are few applied philosophers who have not written on bioethics or medical ethics at some point in their career. Particularly notable are the contributions of Singer and Young (mentioned above), Helga Kuhse’s joint publications with Peter Singer and her attack on the sanctity of life doctrine (1987); John Kleinig’s (1991) account of the value of life; Suzanne Uniacke’s (1994) writing on permissible killing; views about abortion put forward by Michael Tooley (1983), Rosalind Hursthouse (1987), and Catriona MacKenzie (1992); Julian Savulescu’s (2007) provocative views about genetic enhancement; Nicholas Agar’s (2004) defence of ‘liberal eugenics’; Merle Spriggs’s (2005) work on patient autonomy; Neil Levy’s (2007) development of neuroethics; and Steve Clarke and Justin Oakley’s (2007) work on clinician accountability.

The third area in which Australasian applied philosophers have been particularly active is the ethics of international affairs. Singer’s writings on our obligations to the poor in other countries have been followed by works by Tim Mulgan (2001), Liam Murphy (2000) and Garrett Cullity (2004), who argue in different ways that the demands on us are not as great as Singer supposed. Thomas Pogge, who divides his time between Columbia University and the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), argues that members of wealthy nations have, at least, an obligation to eliminate poverty—a duty that arises from the nature of global relationships (Pogge 2007). Janna Thompson (1992) wrote one of the first books on the subject of global justice and Gillian Brock’s writings focus on cosmopolitan ethics (Brock 2009; Brock and Brighouse 2005). On the violent side of international politics, Coady has followed up his work on terrorism with a book on the ethics of war (2008), and under the auspices of the political violence program of CAPPE, Igor Primoratz (2004), David Rodin (2002) and Jessica Wolfendale (2007) have done significant work on war, terrorism and torture.

Finally, Australian and New Zealand philosophers have not been silent about a politically sensitive topic in their countries: injustices committed in the past against indigenous peoples. Arising from a New Zealand AAP Conference in 1990, Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society (1992) features discussions of issues arising from the Treaty of Waitangi, including an early version of an influential article by Jeremy Waldron (1992). A defence of compensation to Aborigines was published in the AJP by the team of John Bigelow, Robert Pargeter and Robert Young (1990), and in 2000 the AJP published a special issue on indigenous
Armstrong, D. M.

David Mallet Armstrong (born 1926) would have had an international reputation for his work on Berkeley (Armstrong 1960) and in epistemology (Armstrong 1961, 1962, 1973), but it is his contributions to metaphysics that will go down in history. Rigorous metaphysics as practiced by Bertrand Russell, G. F. Stout and C. D. Broad, in England, by D. C. Williams in the U.S., and by Armstrong’s teacher, John Anderson, was decidedly out of fashion in the early 1960s as a result of the apotheosis of Wittgenstein and the insidious effect of the linguistic turn centred on Oxford. That we are now living in the ‘golden age of Metaphysics’, as Peter Simons has put it, is in no small part due to Armstrong’s lucid and sustained arguments for at the time unfashionable metaphysics, first for physicalism (Armstrong 1968), next for universals (Armstrong 1978), then for the non-Humean account of laws of nature as relations between universals (1983), and most recently for states of affairs as truthmakers (Armstrong 1997, 2004). While he may not have been the first to treat them in recent times, Armstrong has brought these topics to the respectful attention of the philosophical mainstream.

Armstrong is a systematic metaphysician whose work is based on three basic theses. The first is respect for common sense, ‘the Moorean facts’ as he calls them. These are beliefs that are so securely grounded in human experience that any philosophical objection serves only to undermine the philosophy in question. This is in tension with his scientific naturalism, the thesis that completed science would be a complete account of everything. The third principle is actualism, the rejection of anything that is merely possible or merely dispositional, including uninstantiated universals. The second and third theses may themselves be based on the idea on which all metaphysics rests, namely that there is a systematic unified account of everything, with a presumption in favour of ‘one way of being’, as Anderson put it.

In his A Materialist Theory of Mind (1968) Armstrong, inspired by the pioneering work of Herbert Feigl, U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart, provides a work that is more thorough than its target, Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind. At the time Ryle’s influence on English-speaking philosophy was far greater than...
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anyone should ever have, especially if they are not even dead. Ryle’s philosophical behaviourism was based on dispositional analyses of mental concepts. By contrast, Armstrong developed what has come to be known as functionalist analyses of the mental states as whatever plays a certain causal role, and then argued that it is neurophysiological processes that play these roles and so are identical to the mental states. For instance, according to Ryle, to be in pain is a mere disposition to behave in various ways, such as taking pills that you believe will cure the pain, whereas Armstrong holds that the pain is whatever is apt to cause those sorts of behaviour. The difference might seem subtle, but everything hangs on the word ‘mere’. Ryle’s account discourages further philosophical investigation, whereas for Armstrong it is then a matter of further argument that the pain is a certain pattern of nerve activity and not something non-physical. It is easy to see the way Armstrong’s scientific naturalism and actualism are implicit in this account, but the book also seeks to do justice to the Moorean facts about ourselves.

In the two volumes of *Universals and Scientific Realism* (1978) and in *What is a Law of Nature?* (1983) Armstrong, in his systematic and fair-minded way, criticises the alternatives to his own account, which is that there are universals, that they cannot exist without instances, and that laws of nature are relations between universals (a position also adopted by Fred Dretske and Michael Tooley). These three volumes could be thought of as one work in three parts, because, as Dretske points out, realism about laws of nature is one of the best reasons for preferring realism about universals to the nominalist alternatives. Here too we may see the basic principles of Armstrong’s metaphysics operating, notably his actualism. For one of the most serious rivals to realism about universals is David Lewis’ account of properties as sets of possibilia, whereas Armstrong is committed to accounting for possibility in terms of actual entities. Therefore, he went on to develop an account in which possibilia are replaced by combinations of universals (Armstrong 1989a). The most original feature of Armstrong’s theory of universals is his clear distinction between properties and relations on the one hand, and concepts or predicates on the other. As a consequence Armstrong is a selective realist about universals, considering it a matter for detailed discussion as to just which predicates correspond to universals. His answer is that the predicates used in completed science will correspond to some of the universals and that all other universals are structural ones composed from those. This is, he notes, quite compatible with the infinite structural complexity of all universals. Unlike Anderson, who argued for infinite complexity a priori, Armstrong considers this question to be settled only by completed science.

Most recently Armstrong has been a leading proponent of an ontology of states of affairs (1997), including the truthmaker theory of truth (2004a). This is a natural development of his actualist rejection of the Platonist conception of universals as things capable of existing by themselves.

This is not the place to object to the details of Armstrong’s impressive systematic metaphysics but the tension mentioned above is worth further comment. The respect for both science and Moorean facts, combined with the metaphysicians’
Asian Philosophy

Half a century ago, in 1958, a special issue of the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (vol. 36, no. 1) was dedicated to what was the first East-West Philosophers’ Conference in Australasia, held the previous year in Canberra. UNESCO sponsored this ‘7-day live-in workshop’ and participants were brought out from India, Pakistan, and of course Australia and New Zealand (including Daya Krishna, Humayun Kabir, Sharif Hakim, A. N. Prior, J. L. Mackie, Alexander and Quentin Boyce Gibson, John Passmore, Annette C. Baier, A. K. Stout, amongst others). The inclusion of the conference reports by Prior and Kabir (some seventeen pages long), with a number of papers presented at the conference, indicated a great step forward for the acceptance of Asian philosophy within the mainstream of Australasian philosophy. In a show of camaraderie, articles were also solicited from J. J. C. Smart, R. D. Bradley, C. A. Campbell, and Kai Nielsen. The work of B. M. Arthadeva, a regular contributor from India to the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, was also discussed in this issue.

The teaching of Indian philosophy in Australasia reached a high point in the 1960s and ’70s, with the arrival of Abu Sayyid Ayub from Calcutta University in 1962. Ayub worked closely with A. C. Jackson at Melbourne University and helped establish the Department of Indian Studies that left a lasting legacy in Melbourne. (The teaching of Asian philosophy was transferred to the Philosophy Department after the Indian Studies Department was merged with Asian Languages.) After Ayub left in the mid 1960s, Jos Jordens took over teaching Indian philosophy until he moved shortly afterwards to the newly-established Australian National University (working there with A. L. Basham and J. de Jong). In the early 1970s, encouraged by J. J. C. Smart, who shared an interest in Indian philosophy with his brother and noted comparative philosopher and scholar of world religions, Ninian Smart, Ian Kesarcodi-Watson joined the Department of Philosophy at La Trobe University. Kesarcodi-Watson (who, sadly, died prematurely in 1984) was instrumental in mentoring a good number of philosophers who went on to teach in the areas of Asian and comparative thought at Australian universities. A volume of essays was published to memorialise his legacy (Bilimoria and Fenner 1989). Also worthy of note here are the names of Yog Chopra, Rusi Khan, and Chin Liew Tan, who joined the Department of
Philosophy at Monash University and maintained conversational interests in aspects of Asian philosophy. Further, in 1976 Bimal K. Matilal (Spalding Chair of Indian Religions and Ethics at All Souls, Oxford) visited Victoria University of Wellington, where he taught Indian logic over a semester.

Until then, there were no specialised conferences strictly related to Asian philosophy. However, Asian philosophy continued through this period to be addressed in forums for Asian and comparative philosophy. In June 1984, the Asian and Comparative Philosophy Caucus (ACPC) was formally organised in Victoria; it was affiliated with the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP), and was convened by Bilimoria and Fenner, with Richard Franklin as the second vice-president. About twenty members enlisted, including some drawn from New Zealand. The ACPC began, from December 1984, to issue regular newsletters through which it disseminated information about activities in the field, and it established closer links with the American-based Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy. Meanwhile, members of the Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy (ASACP) assiduously participated in the five-yearly East-West Philosophers' Conferences in the East-West Centre in Honolulu, Hawaii, and also sponsored panels in those meetings, as they did within the AAP annual conferences (Bilimoria 1995: 2).

In early 1990 the Asian and Comparative Philosophy Society of Australasia (the pre-incorporation name of the ASACP) held a mini-conference jointly with the Australasian Association for Phenomenology and Social Philosophy. A report by Ian Mabbett read:

> The conference covered a wide spectrum, with Indian belief systems strongly represented, as might be expected, but with valuable Sinological contributions, and a number of papers addressed to general questions of East-West cultural contact. It would be tempting to say that with this conference the Asian and Comparative Philosophy Society of Australasia has acquired both an atman and a tao, but for the fact that the atman is illusory and the wise do not speak of the tao. At any rate, participants came away with a strong sense that something of value had been achieved, for it has so far been but rarely that people with this particular combination of interests have been able to meet and talk in Australia. (Mabbett 1991: 103–104)

A new page was turned and a new phase begun. The dozen years since the journal Philosophy East and West published a refereed collection commemorating Asian and comparative philosophy in Australia (see Bilimoria 1995) have seen a profusion of research in this area, and a dramatic increase in the salience of Asian philosophy on the Australian scene. Important work has been done in Chinese and Japanese philosophy, Indian philosophy and Tibetan philosophy, while Buddhist philosophy has emerged as an area of distinctive national strength.
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The main centres for research and teaching in Chinese philosophy are to be found at the University of New South Wales (UNSW) and the Australian National University (ANU). Karyn Lai anchors the flourishing research and teaching program in Chinese philosophy at UNSW, where she focuses on the contemporary relevance of early Chinese philosophy, especially Confucianism and Daoism. Her book, *Introduction to Chinese Philosophy* (2008), presents a comprehensive introduction to the foundations of Chinese philosophy, and she is currently working on reasoning and argumentation in Chinese thought. At ANU, John Makeham has published on Confucian hermeneutics, *Transmitters and Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects* (2003), which was awarded the Joseph Levenson Book Prize in 2005. He is currently working on the formation and development of Chinese philosophy as an academic discipline in twentieth-century China and on the role of Yogacara Buddhist thought in modern Chinese intellectual history. He has just been appointed general editor of the new Brill series, ‘Modern Chinese Philosophy’.

At Macquarie University, Shirley Chan teaches Chinese philosophy, and has examined Confucian intellectual history in her book, *The Confucian Shi, Official Service and the Confucian Analects* (2004). Her current research interests lie in the newly-discovered Guodian Bamboo strips (4th c. BCE). Wu Xiaoming (University of Canterbury) has published monographs with Peking University Press, the most notable of which is *Rereading Confucius* (2003); he works particularly in the area of comparative Chinese and contemporary European philosophy. Feng Chongyi (University of Technology, Sydney), and John Hanafin and Peter Wong in Melbourne are significant scholars in Chinese philosophy, with Wong acting as one of the Book Review coordinators of the journal *Sophia*. Western Australia saw a brief flurry of activity in Confucian studies in the late 1990s in the work of Daniel Star, now at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE) at ANU.

Orthodox Indian philosophy has been actively pursued in New Zealand since the arrival of Jay L. (Shankar) Shaw at Victoria University of Wellington in 1970. Shaw’s prolific and pioneering research explores a range of topics at the interface of classical Indian thought and contemporary Western philosophy, including topics relating to knowledge and belief (Shaw 2007), causality (Shaw 2005), and meaning (Shaw 2003). Also influential in New Zealand has been Roy Perrett, who was educated at the Universities of Canterbury (M.A.) and Otago (Ph.D.), and in India as a Commonwealth Scholar at the Banaras Hindu University. Perrett also taught philosophy in New Zealand (at the University of Otago, Victoria University of Wellington, and Massey University), before moving to Australia to take up a position as senior research fellow at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE) at Charles Sturt University, and then in 2002 joining the Department of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii. Apart from numerous articles, Perrett’s publications include a study of Hindu ethics (Perrett 1998) and a series of edited collections on various aspects of Indian philosophy (e.g. Perrett 1989, 2000–01).
The tradition of analytic Indian philosophy has been continued by Purushottama Bilimoria at Deakin and Melbourne Universities, and by Monima Chadha at Monash University, who have been the most active scholars in this field in Melbourne. Chadha's work addresses Indian epistemology, with a special focus on Nyaya philosophy of mind. Bilimoria focuses on recent and contemporary Indian philosophy, both in India and in the diaspora, as well as on classical Mimamsika thought. He has also contributed to Indian ethics and bioethics (see Bilimoria, Prabhu and Sharma 2007), and recently edited (with Andrew Irvine) Postcolonial Philosophy of Religion (2009).

Buddhist philosophy in Australia and New Zealand has traditionally been strong with the legacy of de Jong at ANU and Ian Mabbett at Monash. Paul Harrison's philological work in Buddhist studies has always addressed deep philosophical issues, particularly in the study of early Mahayana Buddhism. He chaired Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of Canterbury regularly before his retirement and move to Stanford, and he is the senior editor of the Skøyen manuscripts in Norway. The philosophical study of Buddhism received an infusion of new blood with John Powers' arrival at the ANU, followed a few years later by Jay Garfield at the University of Tasmania. Although Garfield remained at the University of Tasmania for only three years, he has continued to maintain a close connection with Australian philosophy, with an honorary appointment at the University of Melbourne and regular visits to Australia. John Powers continues in the Faculty of Asian Languages and Civilisations at the ANU, and both he and Garfield specialise in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, and share interests in contemporary Buddhism in the West and in the relationship between Buddhism and recent anglophone philosophy, though Powers also works on Chinese, Japanese and Korean Buddhist philosophy. Another specialist in Buddhist thought, Padmasiri De Silva, who works on Buddhist psychology, environmental ethics and emotions, moved from the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, where he was professor and head of philosophy and psychology, to a research fellowship at Monash University before his retirement.

Garfield initiated the University of Tasmania Buddhist Studies in India Program, an extensive exchange program linking that university directly to the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in India. This program takes students from all over Australia to study Buddhist philosophy in India, and brings Tibetan students and scholars to study, teach and to pursue research in Australia. The program is now directed by Sonam Thakchoe, who was also the first Tibetan scholar to earn a Ph.D. in Australia under the program. The University of Tasmania also hosts Anna Alomes, who works on Buddhist philosophy and Gandhian philosophy. With its large cohort of postgraduates studying with Buddhism and its exchange program, the University of Tasmania has become a major hub for Buddhist philosophy. These centres for Buddhist philosophy at the ANU and the University of Tasmania have drawn other Australian philosophers whose primary research areas are in Western philosophy into research and teaching in Buddhist philosophy. Most notable among these are Graham Priest
at the University of Melbourne and Christian Mortensen at the University of Adelaide, both of whom combine interests in logic and paradox with research in Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy.

The principal forum for the discussion of Asian philosophy in Australia in this period has been the annual meeting of the ASACP. In some years, this has been a stand-alone meeting; in others it has been a meeting held in conjunction with the conference of the AAP. The Society has also held an international conference in conjunction with the International Society for Chinese Philosophy in 2005 at UNSW; the Book Supplement to the Journal of Chinese Philosophy (see Lai 2007) contains a selection of refereed papers, some of which were first presented at this conference.

At the Melbourne AAP conference of 1999, the ASACP stream was one of the largest and best attended in the conference. The ASACP conference has attracted many overseas visitors, including J. N. Mohanty (Temple University), Ninian Smart (University of California, Santa Barbara), Mark Siderits (Illinois State University), Roy Perrett (then Massey University, now University of Hawaii), Roger Ames and Chung-ying Cheng (University of Hawaii), Chad Hansen (University of Hong Kong), Lauren Pfister (Baptist University of Hong Kong), and Tan Sor Hoon (National University of Singapore). Asian Philosophy panels within AAP annual conferences have continued to be held each year, and in 2008 the ASACP organised a two-day conference in Melbourne to overlap with the IAPL (International Association of Philosophy and Literature) and AAP conferences.

A number of collaborative research projects in Asian and cross-cultural philosophy have borne fruit in Australia, including one at Monash University focussing on the philosophy of mind, one at Melbourne focussing on conventional truth, and one at the University of Tasmania on the history of Tibetan philosophy. Sophia, the international journal of philosophy of religion and philosophy pursued in the context of religious traditions, continues to be edited at the University of Melbourne, and is now published by Springer. The journal has been a regular venue for publication, by Australasian and international scholars alike, of essays in Asian philosophy. With its new publisher, it is expected to raise its profile considerably, and with it, the visibility of the active Asian philosophy community in Australasia.

Auckland, University of

Robert Nola

The second half of the nineteenth century saw a flourishing of the founding of universities in the English-speaking world in response to the demand for advanced education. The impetus for the establishment of the first university in
New Zealand in 1869 came from the Scottish settlers who had already founded the city of Dunedin. The eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment and educational traditions that they brought with them dominated many aspects of universities in New Zealand such as the staff appointed, the kind of degrees that were offered and the subject matters that were taught from medicine to classics.

The New Zealand Government responded to the Otago initiative by passing several acts in the early 1870s setting up the University of New Zealand. This became a federal arrangement of colleges which the University of Otago eventually joined (but retaining its title as a university) along with Canterbury College (1873), Auckland College (1883) and Victoria College of Wellington (1897). This structure disappeared only in 1961 when each became an autonomous university.

One of the four foundation professorships at Otago was in mental and moral philosophy; the appointee was a Scot, Duncan McGregor, from the University of Aberdeen. Following this lead, the University of New Zealand made general provision for each College to include mental science in its degrees with three core papers in psychology and ethics, logic, and history of philosophy (ancient and modern). At Auckland College discussions about making an appointment in the area dragged on for over twenty years after its foundation, with these subjects being taught only intermittently until 1906.

In the early 1900s a Joseph Penfound Grossman (1865–1953) arrived in Auckland, initially working as a journalist for the Auckland Star. He distinguished himself by becoming the first triple Honours graduate at Canterbury College in English and Latin, political science, and mental science. But his fortunes in Christchurch reversed when he was given a two-year sentence in the late 1890s for forgery. He gained an appointment at Auckland College in 1906, as the first lecturer in three areas: economics, history and commercial geography. Probably to supplement his salary Grossman agreed to teach, as part of his contract, two courses in mental science. Throughout his tenure he covered much the same material: logic based on the writings of Jevons and Mill, psychology based on writings by James and Stout, and ethics through a range of people including Mill, Muirhead and McKenzie. With Grossman’s appointment the foundation of two subjects at Auckland College, history and philosophy, was through a person whose surface reputation as someone of broad interests turned largely on journalism and his ability, well testified, to captivate an audience through his brilliance as a lecturer.

In 1915 Grossman became a ‘multi-professor’ in his four subject areas. In the early 1930s he was dismissed by the College for, amongst other things, getting his successor in mental science, William Anderson, into debt by asking him to be a guarantor of a series of promissory notes, each of which was supposed to pay off an earlier promissory note. Such was Grossman’s reputation as a lecturer that the Students’ Association sent him a letter of appreciation at the time of his dismissal. By 1920 Auckland College agreed that Grossman should be relieved
of some of his many teaching tasks and that a professorship in mental and moral philosophy be established. This title remained for the years 1921–24; but after 1925 it was converted to a professorship in philosophy, it being understood that the subjects of psychology and political studies (effectively history of political ideas) were part of the domain of philosophy. Continuing the Scottish tradition, William Anderson (1889–1955), an M.A. graduate of the University of Glasgow, took up the professorship, occupying it over 1920–55. His much better known younger brother, John, took up the chair of philosophy at the University of Sydney in 1927.

Unlike his brother, William published only a handful of papers, several being concerned with issues in education. In his obituary on Anderson, his successor Anschutz attempts to summarise Anderson’s views on philosophy. He tells us that Anderson understood it to be ‘the theory of practice’, that he held that ‘philosophy is co-extensive with political theory’ and that ‘education was for him primarily a matter of politics’. Though William’s broad claims need much unpacking, they do initially stand in contrast to the view of his brother John in which critical inquiry is essential to education, its aim being to challenge traditions and to replace opinion by knowledge. Little has been done to investigate the similarities and differences between the views of the two brothers. But it is evident that William’s impact on philosophy at Auckland stands in an inverse relation to the considerable philosophical impact of his brother on philosophy and the broader academic community in Sydney.

Richard Paul Anschutz, a graduate of Auckland College who won a scholarship to study for a Ph.D. at Edinburgh University, joined the department in 1929 as its second philosophy staff member. He succeeded Anderson in the chair from 1955 to 1961. He was the first member of the department to publish a book, a study of J. S. Mill. In the 1930s, articles written by Anschutz led him to be at the centre of a controversy over academic freedom, especially freedom of speech, at Auckland College. Eventually the liberals who supported Anschutz prevailed over the conservative opposition, in particular by removing some conservatives from the Auckland College Council. Given the political turmoil of the 1930s, academic freedom was an issue in many universities, particularly in Great Britain. The widely reported dispute led 620 British academics to sign a congratulatory letter to Auckland College once the liberals had succeeded; two of the signatories were Lord Rutherford and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

During Anschutz’s tenure the number of staff increased to five and included Annette Stoop (later Annette C. Baier) and Gavin Ardley who published several books and who also became a joint editor of a new journal Prudentia, founded in 1969. The last connection with Scottish philosophy was in the person of Alexander Macbeath who, after temporarily occupying the chair at the University of Tasmania, also temporarily filled the chair at Auckland in 1963.

During the 1950s the department produced graduates such as Rom Harré (later of Oxford University and several other universities), J. J. MacIntosh (later of Oxford and Calgary), and Ray Bradley who was appointed to the chair at the
University of Auckland in 1964. With Bradley the pre-history of the department ended as he introduced it to the world of contemporary philosophy through changes to the curriculum and in new directions for research. He made a number of new appointments, including the original logician Malcolm Rennie (1940–80); he also gave Robert Solomon his first visiting appointment, an arrangement that continued until Solomon’s sudden death in 2007. This considerable break with the past was continued by Hugh Montgomery who succeeded in the chair when Bradley left for Simon Fraser University at the end of 1969.

When the chair Bradley vacated was advertised there was a rather intriguing applicant, Paul Feyerabend, for whom the university created a special position. He came during the winter terms of 1972 and 1974, the period during which his book *Against Method* was being prepared and then proofed. Serious illness prevented subsequent visits. His lecturing style was electrifying and unconventional. Student numbers in the lecture theatres swelled well beyond the number officially enrolled and for several years afterwards many students were declared ‘Feyerabendians’; but they soon discovered that he was a hard act to follow.

In the late 1970s Hugh Montgomery relinquished his headship owing to developing cancer and died in October 1979. His successor was the distinguished Swedish logician Krister Segerberg. His emphasis on research corresponded with a change in the university which began to require research-based teaching. As a result the department developed a research ethos which has subsequently grown. By the time Segerberg resigned at the end of 1992 to take up a position at the University of Uppsala, the department had grown to ten members of staff. He was succeeded by John Bishop.

Philosophy now has the largest student enrolments of any department in the Faculty of Arts, and is one of the biggest Australasian departments with eighteen permanent members of staff. From the 1970s New Zealanders who have studied overseas have had a strong influence on the transformation of the department; and to this can be added the influence of a large number of staff originally from Australia. With a constant stream of overseas visitors, the wide range of courses it offers including a Ph.D. program, the department has ceased to be the backwater it once was and has become fully engaged in the era of globalised, international philosophy.

For better or worse academics are subject to performance assessment regimes, the most thoroughgoing in New Zealand being that due to PBRF (Performance Based Research Funding). Under this regime, philosophy across all New Zealand departments has been assessed as the top discipline in the country. The Department of Philosophy at the University of Auckland has always been amongst the highest ranking departments in its faculty and in its university, with a subsequent boost to its funding well above earlier low levels. Such results can only be achieved on the basis of considerable research activity at a high level of achievement by the staff as a whole.
In this article it is convenient to take a generous attitude to what is to count as analytic philosophy. For example, the New Zealander A. N. Prior may be considered an analytic philosopher even though he treated the tenses of verbs as ontologically significant operators on sentences. By contrast, another tradition, dating at least from the young Bertrand Russell, has treated tensed expressions as indexicals, that is, much like ‘now’, ‘I’, ‘here’ etc., dependant on the person and time of utterance. The inspiration behind analytic philosophy, or at least the idea that philosophy consists in the analysis of concepts, derived from Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, which F. P. Ramsey regarded as a paradigm of philosophy. Russell’s theory allows us to treat ‘The present king of France is bald’ as meaningful even though there be no king of France to refer to. What appears to be a referring phrase in ‘The present king of France’ (but can it refer when there is no present king of France?) disappears when we translate the sentence as ‘There is a king of France and only one such and he is bald’. This removes puzzle-ment about the apparent reference to a nonexistent, and the sentence is seen to be merely false. Change ‘king’ to ‘president’, and to know whether the sentence is true I would simply need to see (e.g.) a photograph. The idea, then, is to translate apparently puzzling sentences into non-puzzling ones. However, in interesting cases such translations were not forthcoming. For example, philosophers tried to translate sentences about tables or stars into sentences about sense data. (In retrospect this epistemologically motivated aspiration was a mad one anyway, with its horrible anthropocentricity or at least psychocentricity.)

The Cambridge philosopher John Wisdom, in a long series of articles in *Mind* (somewhat misleadingly titled ‘Other Minds’), immediately gave up translation for more informal elucidations (see Wisdom 1952). In part following Wittgen­stein, he ushered in a new conception of philosophical analysis, which was for a time (a bit misleadingly) called ‘ordinary language philosophy’. However, the word ‘ordinary’ should not be misplaced. Gilbert Ryle held that we can talk not only of the use of ordinary (i.e. commonsense) language, but of the ordinary use of commonsense, scientific, technological, theological etc. language. Ryle stated that he himself was concerned mainly with commonsense language because he had had a classical education based on Latin and Greek, and not with the sciences of physics, chemistry, genetics, biochemistry, and so on. By a natural evolution the direct rapprochement led J. J. C. Smart and others such as Adolf Grünbaum and notably W. V. Quine in the U.S. to advocate a hard-headed metaphysics where plausibility in the light of total science was seen as a pointer to metaphysical truth. Indeed, Quine held that there was no sharp line between science and philosophy.
George Paul, who had been a student of Wittgenstein's, arrived at the University of Melbourne in 1939 and had a great influence there, not only in the philosophy department but throughout the university. After World War Two he became a fellow of University College Oxford, and although he thought that he was past his peak at that time, this would be contested by Smart. Paul was a great applier of Wittgenstein’s methods, and his untimely death was a significant loss to philosophy. He published relatively little and might not have fared well in the present ‘publish or perish’ and bureaucratic climate.

D. A. T. Gasking arrived at the University of Melbourne immediately after the war and was outstanding. He was that rare bird: a lucid Wittgensteinian. In old age he told Smart that he was really Vienna Circle, but there actually was a lot of Wittgenstein in his methods. Moreover, as C. B. Martin was keen to point out in conversation, there was a lot of verificationism in Wittgenstein. Greatly impressive in Melbourne in the post-war years was A. C. Jackson, who had come to philosophy through Paul and had attended Wittgenstein’s lectures in Cambridge. He suffered from a Wittgenstein-induced reluctance to publish but had great profundity as well as something of Wittgenstein’s rather gnomic style of expression. Both he and Gasking were still flourishing in the 1950s and beyond. Ten of Gasking’s papers (three previously published and seven previously unpublished) have been collected and edited by I. T. Oakley and L. J. O’Neill, with one of the papers extensively edited and another reconstructed from lecture notes (Gasking 1996).

In 1950 John Anderson was still dominating the department at the University of Sydney, though there was a separate department under Alan Stout of moral and political philosophy. J. L. Mackie, who later went on to great things at University College Oxford, was a member of Stout’s department. At that time Anderson was very dogmatic and preferred disciples, and although Mackie was quite sympathetic to Anderson’s metaphysics, he criticised Anderson’s failure to support his contentions with argument, and he also differed from Anderson by arguing for the subjectivity of ethics.

A slightly older Sydney philosopher who was also well able to differ from Anderson was John Passmore. An excellent historian of philosophy but also a fine philosopher in his own right, Passmore was professor of philosophy at the University of Otago in 1950–54. He then returned across the Tasman to be a reader, later professor, at the Australian National University, where he became the doyen of Australian philosophers and a pioneer of environmental philosophy.

In New Zealand again, A. N. Prior, a graduate of the University of Otago and presciently promoted at the University of Canterbury by J. N. Findlay, was teaching an enormous load of seventeen lectures and tutorials per week. But this did not prevent him from continuing to write numerous books, including a valuable though rather eclectic one on formal logic (Prior 1955). He and Smart met at the Sydney AAP conference in 1951 and became close friends, pursuing their disagreements with almost weekly letters across the Tasman.

The year prior to this meeting, in August 1950, Smart had arrived at the University of Adelaide. What passed as ‘psychology’ was still thought to be the
Australasian Analytic Philosophy (1950s)

basis of philosophy and was taught in the philosophy department in its first-year course. Smart soon changed that and very importantly succeeded in having U. T. Place hired as a lecturer. With Smart’s encouragement, Place became de facto independent and soon set up an experimental laboratory and acquired an excellent colleague, Syd Lovibond, who later became professor at the University of New South Wales. Place always thought of himself as a psychologist, but in fact became much more widely known as a philosopher. Unfortunately he did not stay long, returning to England for private reasons, one of which was an amateur interest in Roman British archaeology.

Psychology soon became a de jure and not merely a de facto independent department, and also very much bigger than the philosophy one. It was in Adelaide that U. T. Place wrote his seminal paper, ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’ (1956), and an earlier one, ‘The Concept of Heed’ (1954). These converted Smart from his Rylean dispositional account of the mind, and after all a Rylean disposition surely requires a categorical basis. Place did not give up the Rylean account for such things as beliefs and desires, but it soon became evident (as was suggested by D. M. Armstrong) that these could be contingently identified with brain states. B. H. Medlin, in defending such a view, suggested the more felicitous title of ‘Central State Materialism’. Another important arrival at the University of Adelaide was that of C. B. Martin, then a graduate student at Cambridge. He had a very independent mind, and after a short stay in Adelaide and some time in a chair at the University of Sydney, he returned to North America where he continued a very illustrious career. During this period Smart was also publishing on space and time, the reality of theoretical entities, and utilitarianism in ethics.

Besides a fine philosophy department, the University of Melbourne was also home to an excellent Department of History and Philosophy of Science, benevolently headed by Diana Dyason. She was definitely ‘H’, not ‘P’. One of the ‘P’ was John Clendinnen, who proposed a very interesting defence of direct induction (not mere reliance on the hypothetico-deductive method). Gerd Buchdahl was a leading ‘P’ person, but a bit too fond of Kant to be genuinely ‘analytic’. Around this time (during the 1950s decade), Melbourne also witnessed the rise of moral philosophy in the work of Kurt Baier and W. D. Falk, and it was amusing to hear them arguing about whether one could have a duty to oneself. The Sydney Andersonians would not have had much time for the word ‘duty’ in moral philosophy, which has its chief place in legal and military contexts. Also at the University of Melbourne were John McCloskey and Hector Monro, both important moral philosophers. Monro was a New Zealander who taught at the University of Otago before moving to be senior lecturer at the University of Sydney, and from there to an inaugural chair at Monash University, as at the same time did A. C. Jackson. Monro’s Empiricism and Ethics (1967) qualifies him as ‘analytic’, but with his reliance on moral intuition McCloskey probably was not. He contested Smart’s utilitarianism, which in the tradition of David Hume was allied to a non-cognitivist meta-ethics.
Australasian Analytic Philosophy
(1960s Onwards)
Stephen Hetherington

What is perhaps most striking, both at first glance and upon deeper examination, is that there is no core area of analytic philosophy to which Australasian philosophy, from the 1960s onwards, has not contributed significantly. This article will convey some sense of that philosophical fecundity.

Only some sense of it, though; I will not attempt to describe every notable idea emanating from Australasian analytic philosophy during this period. It has been a time of sustained and wide-ranging productivity, of much excellence, within Australasian philosophy. Other entries in this Companion document this fully; here, I gesture at a few landmarks.

There is no manifestly best way to tell this tale. No single area of Australasian analytic philosophy has been the fount for the others. Nevertheless, some areas have occupied more Australasian philosophical minds than others; and it is with one of those that I begin.

The Metaphysics of Mind

When 1950s Australasian analytic philosophy comes to mind, the philosophy of mind is probably what first enters the mind. U. T. Place (1956) and J. J. C. Smart (1959b) placed it there, laying the foundations for what came to be called Australian materialism. Did this focus fade away in the 1960s and beyond? Not at all. Developments ensued, especially thanks to D. M. Armstrong (1968). What is a sensation? What, in general, is a mental state? Answer: a physical state, a specific one. Armstrong argued that philosophy supplies the conceptual framework for this answer—with science then finding the details within. The result is a contingent identification, of mental states with brain states.

And so a debate began. Frank Jackson (1982), in particular, deepened it. He introduced us to Fred and Mary, two experientially deprived people. Mary, for example, was raised in a room where only black and white surrounded her, where she nonetheless learnt all there is—all of the physics, all of the biology—to experiencing colours. Only upon leaving that room, one fortuitous day, did she herself experience something’s being red. Did she thereby come to know something new—new for her—about the world? If so, is there more to experience than can be reported—and learnt—in physicalistic terms, from within science? In the early 1980s, at any rate, Jackson thought so. If he was right, Australian materialism was mistaken.
That debate was enlivened further in the 1990s. (And it persists, still energetically.) David Chalmers (1996) asked us to ponder conceptual reducibility. He did so by letting loose some zombies. Yes, zombies: is it possible for a world physically identical to ours to include zombies? It is (urged Chalmers): physicalism is not conceptually adequate to the task of ensuring that conscious experience is understood. Even if science identifies the two, this identification is not conceptual.

Provocative philosophy, indeed. Distinctive, too. And it maintains Australasian philosophy’s involvement in one of contemporary philosophy’s central conceptual debates.

The Metaphysics of Properties

The question of whether some mental properties could not be scientifically described is partly an instance of this question: Are all properties in principle scientifically describable? And that depends upon how we should answer the question of what it is to be a property. Starting in the 1970s, Armstrong helped to revive widespread philosophical interest in those questions. When philosophers now confront that oldest of old philosophical puzzles—the problem of universals—they reach not only for Plato, but also for Armstrong (1978; 1989b). First, he clarified the conceptual issues; next, he developed a solution strategically akin to his earlier analysis of mind. Thus, Armstrong argued that there are universals—repeatable properties, which help to constitute the world’s being however it is. But he argued, too, that only science—not the semantics of everyday or even careful speech and thought—reveals the details of which universals exist. Conceptual analysis shows us that properties are repeatables; science uncovers the actual properties within the world.

Has everyone agreed with Armstrong about this? Of course not; analytic philosophy thrives on disputation. Keith Campbell (1990), for one, defended a view—inspired largely by the American philosopher D. C. Williams (1966)—of properties as particulars, as non-repeatable but resembling.

Philosophy of Language

Even if Armstrong was right not to regard language and its semantics as sufficing to tell us which properties exist, we must not set aside the possibility of these linguistic elements of the world revealing other elements of the world. Nor must we presume, admittedly, that this is what language does for us. Australasian analytic philosophy of language, from the 1960s onwards, has accommodated both of those possibilities. How does meaning arise? How is it present, as part of a given utterance or thought?

Australasian answers to these questions have played notable roles within the internationally dominant discussions. Oxford, especially, in the 1970s and 1980s was a centre for analyses based upon the writings of Donald Davidson and Michael Dummett. And some Australasian philosophers were part of that trend. Barry Taylor (1980), for instance, sought to understand aspects of how a
Davidsonian—a truth-conditions-based—theory of meaning should be developed and applied. Huw Price (1988) explored questions arising within a Dummettian framework, particularly ones bearing upon the clash between realism and anti-realism. (What clash is that? I return to this in a moment.)

Also at the heart of international philosophy of language from the 1970s onwards was the work of the American Hilary Putnam (e.g. 1975), partly building upon influential suggestions by another American, Saul Kripke (1980 [1972]). One Australasian philosopher in particular has, since that time, engaged prominently with that tradition—helping to constitute it as a tradition. Michael Devitt (e.g. 1981; 1984) has vigorously defended a Putnam-Kripke picture of meaning as built upon reference, with reference in turn being understood in terms of causality. At its base, that is how language meets the world—referentially, through causal interaction.

On that picture, language really does meet the world: there is a world. Dummett, for one, had championed a conception of anti-realism. Yet although this view was gaining adherents, Devitt would have none of that. In the spirit, we might say, of Australian materialism about mind and of Armstrong’s scientific realism about universals, Devitt has championed a robust realism about the world in general. Language largely reveals the world. Language is not a vehicle merely of illusion. And so a theme recurs (even if contested by, for instance, Taylor’s anti-realism: 2006). Again, an Australasian contribution to analytic philosophy has striven not to be distracted by what it would regard as mere conceptual possibilities, attempting not to lose sight of what is real.

Nevertheless, Australasian analytic philosophy has not been wholly like that. Should we regard language as sometimes directing us towards a realm of nonexistent beings—possibilia? Richard Routley (1980) argued so. How should this sort of puzzle be decided? One criterion could call upon the concept of truthmaking. For instance, is a nonexistent being, Pegasus, needed as part of a truthmaker if the statement ‘Pegasus is a winged horse’ is to be true? Notable Australasian accounts of truthmaking—bearing indeed upon all the metaphysical topics identified in the sections above—are John Fox’s (1987) and Armstrong’s (2004a).

**Logic**

Talk of meaning can lead swiftly to talk of lack of meaning—of meaninglessness. And one of the more distinctive Australasian contributions to analytic philosophy has indeed concerned meaninglessness. Mainly in the 1960s and 1970s, Leonard Goddard and Richard Routley fashioned the contours of the logic of significance; or (as it has sometimes been called) the logic of nonsense. Are some sentences grammatical yet meaningless? This is a question with surprising philosophical potential. Maybe there are category mistakes like that (an idea promoted famously by Gilbert Ryle: 1949)—even including some claims which seem philosophically substantial. If there are, how should logic absorb them? Can logic do this? Goddard and Routley (1973) provided the most detailed investigation of this topic.
Nor has Australasia’s significance in logic ended there. Relevance logic (or Relevant logic, as it is also known) did not originate in Australasia. But it has prospered here, principally through Richard Routley (who was later Richard Sylvan) and Valerie Routley (who was later Valerie Plumwood, Robert Meyer, and Ross Brady. (For overviews, see Routley et al. 1982; Brady 2003; 2006.) What constraints should we place upon the nature of the entailment relation, if we are to avoid licensing some notorious fallacies of logical consequence? (These apparent fallacies arise within classical logic.) Do we need to formalise the idea of premises somehow being relevant, in terms of content, to whatever they are being held to entail? Many have thought so, expending much effort on this project.

We also must not overlook Australasian contributions to paraconsistent logic. Richard Routley and Robert Meyer were important to these; as has been Graham Priest (e.g. Priest, Routley, and Norman 1989). Whenever inconsistency is present within some premises, considered jointly, what can be logically entailed by them—short of allowing (as classical logic does) that everything can be? For which constraints, which desiderata, should we reach here? Work continues on these questions.

Epistemology

In the 1960s and 1970s, Australasian epistemology was concerned mainly with the nature of perception. What is it to have a perceptual experience? And how does perceptual knowledge arise from it? The former question intermingled epistemology and the philosophy of mind; but the latter question led definitively into epistemological issues. It was at the heart of much lively debate, especially featuring Armstrong (1961; 1963), J. L. Mackie (1963), Brian Ellis (1976), and Jackson (1973; 1977b). The epistemic dimension of perceptual experience attracted most attention. Are sensation reports incorrigible? Do they give us knowledge? Is perception itself a kind of knowledge?

Out of all this emerged Armstrong’s main contribution (1973) to epistemology in general—his epistemic reliabilism. Primarily, this was a theory of non-inferential knowledge. In that respect, it included his oft-cited comparison between a reliable thermometer and anyone perceiving surroundings in a way that provides immediate knowledge. This sort of reliabilist picture became quite influential, with reliabilism now being one of analytic epistemology’s major ideas. Armstrong’s version of it was an initial and seminal one.

It arose as part of epistemology’s grappling with ‘the Gettier problem’—a classic, by now, of analytic philosophy. This problem was conceptual: what, exactly, does the concept of knowledge encompass? How are we to define knowledge? The American philosopher Edmund Gettier (1963) had posed two counterexamples to the traditional conception of knowledge (as being a justified true belief). Epistemologists had rushed to repair the damage, with reliabilism being one suggestion. It has continued thriving, though, even beyond the Gettier problem. This matters to its significance because there have also been
a few challenges to Gettier’s having really posed quite such a problem. Stephen Hetherington (1998; 2001: ch. 3) and Brian Weatherson (2003b) have been among those few challengers.

Recently, too, Australasian philosophy has contributed to discussions of *a priori* knowledge. These contributions could equally well have been mentioned above, in the section on the philosophy of language, because they reflect new complexity in our conception of how a term means a specific concept. Chalmers (1996) and Jackson (1998b) have been particularly prominent in articulating the idea of *two-dimensionality* in a term’s meaning. For example, can we distinguish between two concepts which are separately meant by a given predicate (such as ‘knowledge’)? One of these concepts would have an extension which, if knowable, is empirically so. The other’s extension would be knowable, if at all, only *a priori*. Will this distinction help us to resolve conceptual confusions? The debate is under way.

**Consequentialism**

At the heart of reliabilism, as a theory of knowledge, is the matter of how effective a specified belief-forming method is at producing *true* beliefs. In this respect, reliabilism is a *consequentialist* theory of epistemic value. Australasia has been similarly prominent—probably even more so—in defending and applying consequentialist theories of *moral* value. Utilitarianism, especially, has been noteworthy within Australasian philosophy.

J. J. C. Smart (1973) defended utilitarianism, in a well-known interchange with the English philosopher Bernard Williams. Smart’s goal was to understand, in utilitarian terms, the nature of a morally right action. That goal has driven, equally, Peter Singer’s influential accounts of utilitarianism. Most famous—and it really is famous, even outside academic philosophy—has been his defence (1990 [first edition 1975]) of an ethical status for non-human animals. ‘Animal liberation’: the term has become synonymous with a social movement. The term was Singer’s.

Further applications of his utilitarianism principles have also created controversy. His influential ethics textbook (1993b [first edition 1979]) reflects his general program. Of particular notoriety has been his stance (along with Helga Kuhse: 1985) on what would be ethically permissible in the treatment—or mistreatment, as many have called it—of severely incapacitated newly-born infants. Earlier than that was Singer’s (1972) argument in support of the case for our morally needing to increase our personal levels of humanitarian aid. These theories have persisted within his philosophical development.

Do they render utilitarianism—or consequentialism, more generally—too demanding a form of theory, though? Tim Mulgan (2001) has striven to defuse this fundamental concern.

**Methodology**

What is analytic philosophy? If one was to immerse oneself within Australasian philosophy for a while, how clear a sense would one gain of what it is to be an
Australasian Association for Logic

Ross Brady

In the mid 1960s the University of New England (UNE) was a centre of logic for Australia, essentially due to the presence of Len Goddard and Richard Routley (who was later Richard Sylvan). A logic conference was held there in 1964, attended by twenty-five people, and after this conference a meeting of eighteen of those people occurred, to discuss the setting up of a Logic Association. Such a motion was passed, to be ratified at the next meeting. The inaugural conference was held in 1965 at UNE, with Len Goddard as president and Richard Routley
Australasian Association for Logic

as secretary. At the AGM the ratification took place, initiating the Australasian Association for Logic (AAL).

The object statement of its constitution, as amended in 1991, reads: ‘Its object shall be the furtherance of studies in logic, in particular, in formal logic, history of logic, foundations of mathematics, philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of logic, and the applications of formal logic to problems in philosophy, computer science, artificial intelligence, and any other appropriate science or technology’. Further, ‘The Committee shall arrange a Conference … normally at least once in each calendar year’ and ‘Such Conferences shall be held in New Zealand … normally once in every three years’.

In order to achieve this breadth, it has often been worthwhile to co-locate the AAL conference with a related conference in an adjunct discipline. Generally, this has been the Australasian Association of Philosophy conference, but has recently included the Australian Artificial Intelligence Conference, the Australasian Computer Science Week, the Australian Mathematical Society Conference, and the International Advances in Modal Logic Conference.

In 1967 the American-based Association of Symbolic Logic agreed to sponsor the AAL conferences and to publish the abstracts of its papers in the Journal of Symbolic Logic and later in the Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.

During 1969–74, there were no official conferences organised. Nevertheless, there were five papers presented under the AAL banner in 1970 at the University of Sydney, and Richard Routley presented an AAL paper in 1971 to the AAP conference at the University of Queensland, announcing the semantics for relevant implication.

By 1975, the centre of logic had moved to the Australian National University, essentially due to the presence of Richard Routley and Robert Meyer. There, Michael McRobbie provided the impetus to revive the AAL conference as its secretary. John McGechie, as last president from 1968, presided over the meeting in 1975 to re-constitute the AAL. This was then consolidated in 1976 with Routley taking up the presidency and with McRobbie continuing as secretary.

The AAL conferences have attracted a number of international visitors, the most notable being the following: Grattan-Guinness in 1977; Wojcicki in 1979; van Fraassen, Lewis, Skyrms and Zalta in 1981; Brink, Chellas and Seldin in 1986; Pollack in 1988; Deutsch, Hugly, Lewis and Teichman in 1989; Hindley in 1990; Chellas, Dunn and Lance in 1992; Hjorth in 1993; Chellas, Lewis and Hindley in 1994; Dretske in 1995; Zalta in 1997; Akama, Griffin, Lycan and Zalta in 1998; Lewis in 1999; Beall and Lycan in 2000; Beziau in 2001; Bueno in 2003; and Wansing and Weiermann in 2005. The following distinguished logicians have come as invited speakers: Suppes in 1978; Cresswell in 1979; Chellas, Dunn, Segerberg, Smiley and Thomason in 1983; Hamblin, Meyer and Tichý in 1984; Hughes in 1986; Tennant in 1989; Field in 2000; Read in 2001; Dezani-Ciancaglini in 2002; and Venema in 2006.

The AAL conferences have hosted a number of ground-breaking papers. The following come to mind: Goddard, ‘Towards a Logic of Significance’ in 1966;

Also, a number of the conferences were special in various respects. In 1979, Rod Girle introduced an Academic Issue of the Australian Logic Teachers’ Journal. In 1986, there was a discussion on logic teaching, led by Brian Chellas and Martin Tweedale, initiating the introduction of critical thinking in Australasia. In 1989 the AAL held the twenty-year memorial conference for A. N. Prior, with a conference volume, Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior, edited by Jack Copeland (1996a). This was the largest conference we have ever had, with one hundred people attending and sixty-two papers presented, only a selection of which were published as abstracts in the Journal of Symbolic Logic. In 2002, approval was given to initiate an internet journal to be called the Australasian Journal of Logic, edited by Greg Restall (manager, philosophy), Martin Bunder (mathematics), and Errol Martin and Hans van Ditmarsch (computer science).

Australasian Association for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science

R. W. Home

In the mid 1960s, Australia boasted two substantial university programs in History and Philosophy of Science (HPS), at the University of Melbourne and the University of New South Wales (UNSW), and a number of other people, chiefly employed in departments of philosophy, who were active in this field. The UNSW group arranged a conference in May 1966 at which it was agreed in principle to form a national HPS association. A working party was formed to draft a constitution. In August 1967, during a second conference hosted by the UNSW group, a formal decision was taken to establish an Australasian Association for the History and Philosophy of Science. The constitution that had been drawn up was adopted and an executive elected. The association’s stated purpose was ‘the furtherance of the study of the history of the sciences, technology, and medicine; of the philosophy, logic, and methodology of the sciences; and of related subjects’. That it should be an Australasian rather than an Australian association, thus including New Zealand in its bailiwick, was agreed following an impassioned plea from the only New Zealander present.
During the following few years, the membership of the association grew steadily as new university programs in HPS were established and increasing numbers of postgraduate students entered the field. Eventually, the number of members stabilised at somewhere between 100 and 150, a significant proportion of whom have always been drawn from beyond the narrow confines of academic programs in HPS. Reflecting a trend in HPS studies elsewhere, the name was expanded in 1979 to the Australasian Association for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science (AAHPSSS).

The association’s principal activity has always been its annual conference, the first of which was held at the University of Melbourne in August 1968. More often than not, conferences have been held in conjunction with the annual conferences of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, and only rarely has the association’s conference proceeded entirely alone. The annual Dyason Lecture honours the association’s founding President, Diana Dyason, who was for many years Head of the Melbourne HPS Department.

In addition to holding an annual conference, the association for many years issued a newsletter, at first annually and later semi-annually. This offered members a lively survey of activities in the field in different parts of Australia and New Zealand (and, for a time, Papua New Guinea), including departmental news and lists of higher-degree theses in progress, of members’ publications, and of the papers presented at the annual conferences and later also at meetings of the local branches of the association that were established in Sydney and Melbourne.

In due course, AAHPSSS also began circulating, as ‘Proceedings’, typescript sets of the papers presented at the annual conferences. Some members saw this as a first step towards the launching of a full-blown Australasian HPS journal. Others, however, worried about the likely lack of focus of any journal that attempted to cover the very wide range of interests represented in AAHPSSS. As a means of addressing this problem, in 1982 a monograph series, Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, was launched, in which individual volumes focussed on particular themes within the broader field of HPS. Edited by R. W. Home, Professor of HPS at the University of Melbourne from 1975, and published by the international publisher D. Reidel (later, Kluwer Academic Publishers), the series had extended to seventeen high-quality volumes by the time Home passed the editorship to Stephen Gaukroger (University of Sydney) in 2002. Published now by Springer, the series continues under a new name with a less explicit regional focus, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.

In 1984 AAHPSSS also launched a journal, Metascience, initially under the editorship of W. R. Albury, Professor of HPS at UNSW, that it was hoped would become a ‘forum for critical debate … a meeting place of ideas growing out of specific disciplinary niches, but of interest to overlapping segments of cognate fields’. Though it published some interesting papers, the journal struggled to attract enough high-quality material, with many members of the local HPS community preferring to publish in established overseas journals. In 1991, it was reconfigured into a review journal intended to serve as ‘a guide to recent
publications and a forum for the critical appraisal of new and important works of scholarship. In 1998, responsibility was transferred from AAHPSSS to a commercial publisher. Now independent of the Association though still with strong Australasian connections, the journal enjoys an excellent reputation.

AAHPSSS was established at a time when HPS was expanding within the tertiary education systems of Australasia, and it played a valuable role in bringing those involved together for mutual support, encouragement, and the cross-fertilisation of ideas. More recently, as many of the teaching programs have declined, the AAHPSSS has also shrunk. Its future is insecure and uncertain.

Australasian Association of Philosophy

The Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) is the professional association for philosophers in Australasia. The aims of the association, as stated in its Memorandum of Association, are: to promote the study of philosophy; to promote the exchange of ideas among philosophers; to encourage creative and scholarly activity in philosophy; to facilitate the professional work and protect the professional and academic interests of philosophers. The AAP has always included Australia and New Zealand; in 2004, Singapore was also admitted.

The AAP is run by an executive (the Council), elected by the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the association. The Council comprises a President, Chair, Secretary, Treasurer, Editor of the association’s Australasian Journal of Philosophy, and such other people, with various roles, as the AGM or the Council determines from time to time. Positions other than the presidency are usually held on an ongoing basis. The presidency changes every year. Membership of the AAP is open to all interested persons, as well as professional philosophers; but voting rights at meetings of the association are limited to members who are, or have been, active in Australasian philosophy at tertiary level, including research students.

The association was founded on 17 January 1923 as the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy. The first president was Bernard Muscio (University of Sydney); the first editor was Francis Anderson (University of Sydney); and amongst the first vice-presidents were William Ralph Boyce Gibson (University of Melbourne), Elton Mayo (University of Queensland), and William Mitchell (University of Adelaide). Since then, a great number of distinguished Australasian philosophers have been active in the association.

When the association was founded, psychology was not yet established as an autonomous discipline; the association changed its name to ‘The Australasian
Australasian Association of Philosophy

Association of Philosophy’ in 1958, after it had become so. There is a New Zealand Division of the Association (AAPNZ) which was formally established in 1978. The New Zealand Division of the AAP did operate as an informal association prior to this date, with the inaugural New Zealand Conference held in 1953. At various times, there are or have been active branches of the AAP in various Australian states and the Australian Capital Territory.

An important aspect of the AAP is its annual conference. This has been held on a continuous basis since the inception of the association. Each year, the conference is hosted by a university department/school/program of philosophy. For the most part, it has been held at a university location. In its earliest years, the conference rotated annually between the University of Sydney and the University of Melbourne. Since the 1950s locations have diversified, with the conference circulating amongst various universities in different states in Australia, and from time to time in New Zealand.

When the conference first started, it was very small, lasting for a day or two, and with a handful of papers. It now lasts for a working week, starting with the presidential address on Sunday evening. Over recent years, the number of papers has averaged between 150 and 160. The conference has a strong international reputation, and attracts philosophers not only from Australasia, but also from North America, Europe, Asia and other parts of the world. It is characterised by its egalitarian nature, known for its social activities, as well as its intense philosophical ones. The AGM of the AAP is held during the conference. As well as taking business decisions, it has at various times taken stands on political issues, including nuclear weapons, East Timor, and the treatment of Eastern Bloc philosophers.

Another major function of the AAP is to run its journal, the Australasian Journal of Philosophy (AJP). This was first published in the same year the association was established (1923), as the Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, changing its name to the present one in 1947. The journal is now, therefore, one of the oldest English-language philosophy journals in the world, and is constantly ranked as one of the best of these. Articles are published only after a rigorous and anonymous peer-review system, managed by the Editor. In common with the other top-rated international philosophy journals, its acceptance rate is currently less than 10%. It is heavily cited in the general philosophical literature and covered by all the major abstracting and indexing services. In 2007 it was rated ‘A’ in the European Reference Index in the Humanities (ERIH).

From its inception until 1997, the AJP was published by the AAP. The publication rights (though not ownership or editorial control) were given to Oxford University Press in that year. In 2005, these were transferred to Taylor and Francis, operating under its Routledge imprint. The whole back run of the AJP has now been digitised, and is available online to subscribers. Since 2007, the AAP, in conjunction with Routledge, has awarded an annual Australasian Journal of Philosophy Best Paper Award. This is awarded to the best piece published in the AJP in the preceding year, as determined by a committee set up by Council.
A Companion to Philosophy in Australia & New Zealand

Australasian Association of Philosophy

In addition to its scholarly content, the *AJP* contains an historical record of the AAP and the activities of members of the profession. The ‘Notes and News’ section includes, amongst other things: proceedings of conferences, records of resolutions and policies, as well as general news about members of the profession, including movements and obituaries. Much of this information (including a list of executives of the association and conference proceedings dating back to 1923) is available on the AAP website.

The AAP has always been active in defending the interests of philosophy in Australasia and of Australasian philosophers. Over the years, the AAP has collected data on the profession and produced various reports on it. The most celebrated instance of the association’s stance in regards to an individual philosopher involved the chair of philosophy at the University of Tasmania from the mid 1950s to mid 1960s. In 1956, the University of Tasmania summarily dismissed its chair of philosophy, Sydney Sparkes Orr. The AAP considered the action ‘contrary to academic tradition’ and passed a resolution on 18 August 1958 stating that the University of Tasmania was ‘not a suitable place of employment for teachers of philosophy’. This declaration came to be known as the ‘black ban’. The ban was reluctantly continued throughout the next decade, and was lifted at Orr’s death in 1966, only after which time was the chair filled again. Throughout this period, the AAP supported the reinstatement of Orr to academic life. It provided and organised financial support for Orr’s legal case, and also for his family after his death. The Orr case was exceptionally public; the AAP’s activities on behalf of individual members, of necessity, often requires confidentiality.

Since the AAP was established in 1923 a number of more specialised Australasian philosophy organisations have come into being. The AAP provides an umbrella organisation for these, and over the years has worked closely with many of them (including the Australasian Association for Logic, the Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, and Women in Philosophy). Often, these other organisations hold their conferences in conjunction with the AAP conference, or organise streams within it.

In recent years, and especially with the increased funding provided by giving the publication rights of the *AJP* to a professional publisher, the AAP has been able to increase and expand its professional activities considerably. It has instituted an annual meeting for heads of philosophy programs; collects data on the state of the profession on an annual basis; contributes to various Federal Government reporting activities; and makes submissions about philosophy to various government bodies. Through its website, the AAP provides information about jobs, conferences, mailing lists and the academic study of philosophy. The volume of activity has increased so much that in 2006 the AAP appointed a salaried Executive Officer (part-time) for the first time.

An important aim of the AAP over recent years has been to raise the public profile of philosophy in Australasia. It has organised various public lectures, has run press lunches and has in other ways facilitated communication between
journalists and philosophers. In conjunction with Taylor and Francis, it awards an annual AAP Media Prize for the best piece by a philosopher published in the popular media in Australasia during the previous calendar year. It also awards occasional prizes to journalists for their work relevant to philosophy. The AAP has produced a short film, entitled ‘What is Philosophy?’, which explains for the general public what philosophy is, and the benefits of studying it. This can also be found on the AAP’s website.

Through its activities, the AAP has made a substantial contribution to the sense of community in the profession and has played a major role in fostering both philosophy in the Australasian region and the impact of Australasian philosophy internationally.

Australasian Association of Philosophy, New Zealand

Colin Cheyne

Beginnings

The New Zealand Division of the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAPNZ) consists of all New Zealand members of the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP). It has long been supposed that the New Zealand Division began with the first New Zealand Philosophy Conference which was held at Canterbury University College, Christchurch on 22–25 May 1953. However, it was not until 1977 that the following article was added (along with many other amendments) to the AAP Articles of Association:

Members of the Association in different regions shall have the right, with the prior passage of an ordinary resolution by the Association, to constitute a Division of the Association.

(The old (1923) Articles of Association make no mention of ‘Divisions’.) At the Annual General Meeting of the New Zealand Philosophy Conference on 11 May 1978 the following resolution was carried:

We New Zealand members of the Australasian Association of Philosophy wish to be constituted as a Division to be known as the ‘New Zealand Division’ of the Australasian Association of Philosophy under Rule 38 of the Articles of Association of the Australasian Association of Philosophy.
Subsequently at the AAP Annual General Meeting (AGM) in Canberra on 30 August 1978 the following resolution was carried:

That New Zealand members of the Association be constituted a Division of the Association.

Thus, the New Zealand Division had its official beginning in 1978, although an unofficial New Zealand Division of the AAP had been in existence for a few years prior to that. The earliest documented use of the term ‘New Zealand Division’ occurs in 1972 (‘Notes and News’, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 50 (1972): 205). Earlier conference announcements occasionally refer to the ‘NZ Section of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy’, and to the ‘New Zealand Philosophical Association’, but most conferences were simply announced as the ‘New Zealand Philosophy Conference’.

For the purposes of this article, I will continue the tradition of regarding the 1953 conference as the beginning of the Division, in part because the annual conferences have been by far the main activity of the Division (unofficial or official). This is to some degree reflected in the Articles of Association governing Divisions which say little more than that:

Normally each Division shall hold an annual conference.

All office-bearers of a Division shall be Full Members of that Division.

A Division may adopt such Divisional by-laws as it sees fit … unless … they are not consonant with the objects of the Association.

The 1978 decision to form an official New Zealand Division was not without controversy. Indeed, at the preceding New Zealand AGM in May 1977, it was resolved:

That this unofficial association does not wish to be a Division of the AAP in accordance with the proposed rules,

and a committee was set up to investigate the formation of a New Zealand Association of Philosophy. Concerns centred around a perceived threat to the autonomy of New Zealand philosophical affairs, poor communication, and neglect by the AAP Council. A spate of communications followed between office-holders in both countries and concerns were allayed by amending the ‘proposed rules’, along with reassurances of improved communication in the future. Hence, the very different New Zealand resolution of May 1978.

New Zealand concerns about autonomy, communication and neglect have occasionally surfaced since. At the AAPNZ AGM in May 1987, ‘[a]fter considerable debate, a motion to change the name of the [New Zealand] Division to The New Zealand Association of Philosophy was lost’ (‘Notes and News’, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 65 (1987): 375). There is correspondence which indicates that this debate had been going on at least since 1985. However, this
was not a secessionist move, but an attempt to attach the name ‘New Zealand’ more prominently to distinctively New Zealand activities, such as the Annual Conference. Although the proposal was lost, the debate did prompt the AAP Council to reserve a seat on Council for a New Zealand representative (AAP AGM Minutes, 27 August 1986). With improved communication via air travel and email, the editorship of the AJP in New Zealand from 2002 to 2007, and New Zealand representation on the AAP Council, feelings of isolation or neglect appear to have largely evaporated.

Conferences

Although the record is incomplete, it is believed that New Zealand Philosophy Conferences have been held annually since 1953, except for 1955. The fiftieth conference was celebrated at Massey University in 2003. With occasional variations, the conferences have been hosted by each university department in turn. The first conference at Canterbury College was in 1953, Victoria College of Wellington 1954, Auckland College 1957, University of Waikato 1968, and Massey University 1972. It is not known when the first conference was held at the University of Otago, but possibly 1956. The first for which there is a record is 1960.

The early conferences featured a small number of papers spread over a number of days (usually Friday evening to the following Monday morning) but were, by most accounts, very lively affairs. The first conference (described in a delightful article in Bennett 1953) included papers by J. J. C. Smart (Adelaide), George Hughes (Victoria), E. S Robinson (Kansas), Hector Monro (Otago), Bob Durrant (Otago), William Anderson (Auckland), John Passmore (Otago), A. N. Prior (Canterbury), and Jonathan Bennett (Canterbury), an indication of the quality of presenter and presentation that has continued to the present.

The conferences remained small until the early 1970s, after which they grew in size (albeit with considerable variation), multiple sessions were introduced, and overseas philosophers became more prominent. (Notable, regular attendees included David Lewis and William G. Lycan.) Recent conferences have generally featured between forty and one hundred papers. In 1997 a combined AAP/AAPNZ conference was held in Auckland. Billed as Philfest ’97, it also included the Australasian Association for Logic, Australasian Association for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science, and Women in Philosophy conferences for a grand total of 171 papers. A second combined AAP/AAPNZ conference was hosted by the University of Canterbury in 2002 and another is planned for Otago in 2011.

Until 1987 the conferences were almost always held during the May vacation, after which they moved to the August vacation. With the arrival of semesterisation at some universities, common vacation periods during the academic year disappeared and conferences have been held in early December since 1998, the only exceptions being the joint AAP/AAPNZ conferences held in early July, the traditional time for AAP conferences.
Conferences usually open with a presidential address on the first evening. Notable exceptions were 1989 when the Arthur Prior Memorial Conference (a joint conference with the Australasian Association for Logic) at the University of Canterbury opened with an inaugural address by Rom Harré (Oxford), and 1990 when the conference was an official NZ 1990 Project commemorating the 150th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. That conference opened with an address by the Honourable Matiu Rata (a former minister of Maori Affairs).

Officeholders

Until recently the Division had two office-holders, a President and a Secretary who was that year’s Conference Organiser. The Secretary became President for the following year. At the 1988 AGM it was suggested that there would be advantages in a procedure which ensured that both President and Secretary were members of the host university. One advantage noted was that this would enable the appointment of a president who would be available to serve on the AAP Council (AAPNZ AGM Minutes, 23 August 1988). After a few years of ad hoc appointments along those lines, the 1992 AGM resolved that ‘the AAPNZ adopt as standard practice the provision of a President by the conference host department’ (AAPNZ AGM Minutes, 28 August 1992).

Concerns about the lack of an institutional memory and confusion over changes in policy lead to the appointment in 2003 of a longer-term Secretary with responsibility for ongoing divisional business, record-keeping, and policy development. The new Secretary became the New Zealand representative on AAP Council. The position of President reverted to a more nominal role, with the sole duty of delivering the Presidential Address. The position of Conference Organiser (formerly Secretary) continues as before.

Other Business

## New Zealand Philosophy Conferences

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>President</th>
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<td>27–30 August</td>
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Robert Young

Publication of the Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy commenced in 1923, consequent upon its founding by the professors of philosophy and a couple of professors of psychology from universities in Australia and New Zealand. As the name of the journal indicates, it was intended at the time to cover two disciplinary fields. The founders explicitly acknowledged the difficulties they faced in emulating the specialised journals in existence in the U.K. and the U.S. because they considered their readership likely to be restricted by the size of Australasian universities and the limited range of their disciplinary offerings. Accordingly, there was, for example, no thought of competing with the four leading philosophy journals that had been established late in the nineteenth century and around the turn of the twentieth century, viz., Mind and Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in the U.K., and The Journal of Philosophy and The Philosophical Review in the U.S.
The first editor, Francis Anderson, emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Sydney, took the time in the inaugural issue in a contribution ‘From the Editor’s Chair’ to explain that, in addition to publishing material of interest to professionals from two separate disciplines, the journal was also intended to be a vehicle for topics of more general interest. On the philosophical side, for instance, there was to be coverage of metaphysical topics but also of concrete problems of social and political ethics. Little was said of the expectations for psychology, but a clue may perhaps be gleaned from the fact that whereas discussions of psychoanalysis featured strongly, the journal only very rarely published experimentally-based material. Among the other points of note in Anderson’s account of the intentions of the journal’s founders was that the journal was not to be an organ for any particular school of philosophical thought. Though this intention has continued to play a role in editorial policies to this day, it is nevertheless fair to say that the journal has published very little material from, for example, philosophical traditions emanating from either continental Europe or Asia.

Despite the thought that the founders clearly gave to how they envisaged the journal’s character, they were fearful that it might fall between two stools in targeting academics and their students from two distinct disciplines as well as the wider community. Fortunately, their fears were not realised. The journal has not only survived but has thrived, and now occupies a distinguished place among the very professional philosophical journals its founders believed it could not hope to emulate.

When Francis Anderson returned to Europe, Tasman Lovell, professor of psychology at the University of Sydney and the only non-philosopher ever to serve as editor, picked up the reins from 1927 to 1934. The range of topics covered during this period remained very much as in the first few years. In fact, the journal continued quite appropriately to be styled The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy right up until 1947. Even so, the very first issue in 1948 under the new title of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy included a paper by William O’Neil, professor of psychology at the University of Sydney, as well as a review by him of an introductory psychology textbook. (The definite article in the title was removed in the early 1980s.)

In 1935 John Anderson—unrelated to Francis but the brother of the long-serving professor of philosophy at Auckland University, who had also been one of the journal’s founders—assumed the editorship. John Anderson was a towering albeit divisive figure in the discipline, particularly in Sydney, but he maintained a steady-as-she-goes course with the journal until his retirement from the role of editor in 1946. He was, however, not above doing something that a contemporary editor would be loath to do, namely, publishing a significant number of his own papers. Indeed, in his very first year as editor he included four papers he had written. Lest it be thought that some of them may have been accepted by the previous editor, it is worth drawing attention to the advice he gave on the masthead to prospective contributors, namely, that for a paper to be published...
it had to be received at least six weeks prior to the issue being published (in March, June, September or December, respectively). It would appear that the refereeing process, to say nothing of the publishing process, could be handled much more expeditiously in the 1930s than it can be today.

During the latter part of World War Two the sequence of publishing four issues per year was broken, with the journal for understandable reasons appearing only irregularly. Continuity of publication was preserved, nevertheless, with at least one issue appearing in the years in question. (From 1947 until 1978 the journal appeared in May, August and December but in 1979 it reverted to the original arrangement of four issues per year in March, June, September and December.) When John Anderson’s time as editor came to an end, John Passmore took over for a short period—from 1947 to 1949—before he gave way to the journal’s longest serving editor, Alan Stout, whose term of office ran from 1950 to 1967. These early years after the War were marked by a notable increase in the publication of work by international contributors. There had always been some international contributors. The very first volume, for instance, had included pieces by Bertrand Russell (‘On Vagueness’, a topic that continues to be of interest) and Norbert Wiener (‘On the Nature of Mathematical Thinking’, another topic that remains of contemporary interest). But relatively few non-Australasian contributors published in the journal during its early decades. One result of the growth in numbers of staff and students in Australasian universities was that there was a new and larger contingent of local contributors. But, more importantly, the rising quality of the local contributions became better appreciated abroad and this, in turn, lifted the profile of the journal. In 1950, for example, Gilbert Ryle published an article about John Anderson’s views, views that he considered were insufficiently known outside Australasia. Still, what catches the eye most about the journal in the middle of last century is the emergence of various local philosophers who were destined to become internationally renowned. The published work of some, like Passmore, was already known internationally, but the careers of others, like that of A. N. Prior in New Zealand, were just taking off. The arrival in New Zealand of Karl Popper and in Australia of the likes of Kurt Baier, W. D. Falk, Douglas Gasking and J. J. C. Smart, coupled with the beginnings of the notable careers of New Zealanders such as Hector Monro and Australians such as J. L. Mackie, whose famous ‘A Refutation of Morals’ had been published in the journal in 1946, all helped lift the standing of Australasian philosophy internationally.

By mid century there were many more professional philosophical journals in existence than at the time of the founding of the journal, but the work of those just mentioned and later that of Jonathan Bennett, George Hughes, Maxwell J. Cresswell, Annette C. Baier, U. T. Place, C. B. Martin, D. M. Armstrong, Brian Ellis, John McCloskey and a host of other young Australasian philosophers, most of whom pursued postgraduate study overseas, all helped raise awareness of the quality of Australasian philosophy and, indirectly, of the journal.

Graham Nerlich, one of those who had ventured abroad for further study, edited the journal from 1968 to 1972. He was to be the last Sydney-based editor.
because the journal moved away from its birthplace for the first time to the
Australian National University, Canberra, when Robert Brown assumed the role
during the years 1973 to 1977. When Brian Ellis was appointed editor in 1978 the
journal moved once more. It remained at La Trobe University after Brian retired
as editor at the end of 1989. His successor, Robert Young, served as editor from

In the course of these three decades the journal published the work of a very
large number of internationally known philosophers, especially from the U.K.
and the U.S. For instance, it frequently included papers by the outstanding
American philosopher, David Lewis. The journal, which had once been pri-
marily a vehicle for the publication of the work of Australasian philosophers,
had become a truly international journal. But, just as importantly, appreciation
for the quality of their work meant that Australasian philosophers were as
likely to publish in the leading overseas journals as in the Australasian Journal
of Philosophy.

After 1997 a new set of arrangements was instituted for publication of the jour-
nal. Negotiations with a number of leading academic publishing houses who had
expressed interest in publishing the journal because of its prominent standing—it
had come to be generally regarded as one of the top ten professional philosophical
journals—culminated in Oxford University Press entering into an agreement
with the Australasian Association of Philosophy to publish the journal for
five years from 1998 to 2002. The arrangement coincided with the appointment
for the first time of three joint editors rather than a single editor, namely, Peter
Forrest and Fred D’Agostino (from the University of New England) and Gerry
Gaus (from the Queensland University of Technology).

In 2005 Routledge succeeded Oxford University Press as publisher of the
journal. Simultaneously, the editorship moved for the first time to New Zealand.
Maurice Goldsmith from Victoria University of Wellington took on the role,
a role that he relinquished at the end of 2007 when he handed over the reins to
Stewart Candlish (University of Western Australia) who will edit the journal
until 2012.

From humble beginnings the journal has gone on to play a significant role
within professional philosophy. It nowadays publishes only a small proportion
of the material that it receives from all over the world, and this enables it to
maintain high standards. While the rigorous refereeing processes to which
present-day submissions are subject, and the far greater numbers of those sub-
missions, make for an interesting contrast with the way things were during the
earliest stages in its history, the soundness of the foundations that were laid at
its inception undoubtedly have contributed to the journal’s rise to its present
pre-eminence. Successive editors and their support teams have, in consequence,
been able to build something far more impressive than the founders were able
to entertain.
The Australasian Society for Ancient Philosophy (ASAP), according to Benitez (1996), was founded in 1991 by Kim Lycos, Robin Jackson (both then of the University of Melbourne), and Harold Tarrant (then of the University of Sydney). It was designed to bridge the gap between the worlds of philosophy and classics, which has often seemed somewhat artificial to those working on Greek philosophy. Being from the beginning an informal organisation, its history has not been easy to track, and its functioning has been somewhat spasmodic. It has never had formal membership fees, thus making any formal membership list redundant, but did once have modest funds of its own until the death of Treasurer Kim Lycos in 1995, after which it became impossible to access them. No accounts have since been kept. Small events have taken place on a reasonably regular basis, whether at small separate conferences or through sponsoring panels at wider philosophy or classics conferences. Topics have tended to be broad in order to cater for the interests of all those working in ancient philosophy within Australia and New Zealand.

Three of the ASAP’s meetings have resulted in two volumes, the first being *Dialogues with Plato* (Benitez 1996), which was important for bringing the work done in Australasia to the attention of the international community. The second was a collection on *Power, Pleasure, Virtues, and Vices*, edited by Dirk Baltzly, Dougal Blyth and Harold Tarrant, and published as a *Prudentia* supplement volume at the University of Auckland in 2001. This incorporated papers from the ASAP’s 1998 and 2000 conferences, and was distributed to all institutional subscribers of the journal. Since then the ASAP has perhaps been the victim of the increasing success of ancient philosophy, resulting in academics who have been busier (five have been involved in externally funded projects) and more internationally involved. There may be nobody quite certain who the ASAP’s office-bearers are at present, but events happen regardless, with the latest being a three-day conference on Socrates and Alcibiades at Newcastle in December 2008. This had been preceded by ASAP panels at the conference of the Australasian Society for Classical Studies at Christchurch in January 2008. Commendably, the majority of those giving papers would have been from philosophy rather than classics backgrounds.

There has consequently been no shortage of events at which our graduate students have been able to present papers to audiences combining a broad expertise in the area of Greek philosophy, while some of those graduates who attended in earlier times now have books to their credit. Contributions from those who had been graduate students were a significant part of the two conference publications.
mentioned earlier, while a further two graduate students gave papers at an international conference in Newcastle in 2002, and saw their work ultimately published in Tarrant and Baltly (2006). It is likely that more such initiatives will occur, and that the society will continue to function in a similar way in the near future.

Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy

Robert Sinnerbrink & Matthew Sharpe

The Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP) was established in Melbourne in 1995 by a group of postgraduate students dissatisfied with the lack of institutional recognition for Continental philosophy in Australian universities. Its original aims were to provide a broad intellectual forum for academics, writers, artists, and postgraduates researching topics in contemporary European philosophy. The society grew out of the defunct Australian Association of Phenomenology and Social Philosophy (AAPSP), which was established in the late 1970s and held regular conferences until the group’s demise in 1994. The history of the ASCP reflects a common pattern in Australia, with postgraduates and younger academics, supported by established figures (such as Marion Tapper, Rosalyn Diprose, and Paul Patton), actively responding to the institutional marginalisation of European philosophy.

The emergence of the ASCP in 1995 also reflected the growing interest in French poststructuralism (particularly Deleuze) during the 1990s. The original founding committee consisted of two office bearers, Graham Jones (President/Chair) and Paul Atkinson (Treasurer), and several non-office bearing members (Ralph Humphries, Andrew Johnson, Clive Madder, Michael Fagenblatt, Simon Cooper, and Melissa McMahon). This committee gave the new society a constitution, a membership list, a website and a regular newsletter (entitled Virtuosity and edited by Graham Jones). The general running of the organisation later transferred to Melissa McMahon (who also edited two issues of the newsletter) with the assistance of Ralph Humphries, Stephen O’Connell, and Andrew Lewis.

The inaugural ASCP conference was held in Melbourne in 1996 on the topic ‘Time and Memory’ (organised by Graham Jones, Paul Atkinson, and Ralph Humphries). International keynote speakers included Keith-Ansell Pearson, Constantin Boundas, Daniel W. Smith, Brian Massumi and Philip Goodchild, and among the local speakers were Elizabeth Grosz and Paul Patton. A number of the conference papers were subsequently published in issue 8.2 of the University of Melbourne journal Antithesis (edited by Karen Barker, Graham
Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy


The first Sydney conference, ‘Truth and Lies’, was held in 1998 and organised by Melissa McMahon, and included a special panel on the then topical ‘Sokal Affair’. The same year Oliver Feltham and Melissa McMahon organised, on behalf of the ASCP, a special lecture by French philosopher Alain Badiou.

Attempts were also made at this time to establish an ASCP journal but these proved unsuccessful. The 1999 Sydney conference (‘To be Done with Judgment’) featured a panel on the history of Continental philosophy in Australia. Remarkably, with minimal financial or institutional support, the ASCP was able to host lively annual conferences organised by postgraduates (Esther Anatolitis, John Dalton, Melissa McMahon, Kirsten MacKillop, Andrew Montin, Tim Rayner, Jack Reynolds, Sean Ryan, and Peter Ujvari) that attracted a host of international speakers. The society’s survival was assisted by the creation of a new ASCP website (<http://www.ascp.org.au>) maintained by Andrew Montin and Esther Anatolitis, the latter serving for many years as caretaker of the ASCP between annual conferences.

The University of New South Wales ASCP conferences in 2000 and 2005 (organised by Rosalyn Diprose, Catherine Mills, Simon Lumsden, and Andrew Haas) included international keynotes such as Judith Butler, Robert Bernasconi, Wendy Brown, Catherine Malabou, and Diane Perpich. Conferences at Melbourne (2002), University of Queensland (‘Imagination’, 2003), Macquarie University (‘Critique Today’, 2004), Deakin University (‘Trauma, Historicity, Philosophy’, 2006), and University of Tasmania (‘Dialogues in Place’, 2007) included international figures such as J. M. Bernstein, Cheung Chan-fai, Agnes Heller, David Morris, Robert B. Pippin, Julian Young, and Guenter Zoeller, as well as leading Australian names (Max Deutscher, Rosalyn Diprose, Robyn Ferrell, Anne Freadman, Moira Gatens, Fiona Jenkins, Genevieve Lloyd, György Markus, and Paul Patton).

After years of debate, the ASCP became a formalised society, welcomed by the AAP, in December 2007. At this time, its constitution was revised and an ongoing executive committee was established, chaired by Robert Sinnerbrink (Macquarie) and including members from universities across Australia and New Zealand (Simone Bignall, Richard Colledge (Australian Catholic University), Fiona Jenkins (ANU), Jack Reynolds (La Trobe), Matheson Russell (Auckland), and Matthew Sharpe (Deakin)). The ASCP continues to foster interest and research in Continental philosophy, and to contribute to the development of a pluralistic Australasian philosophical community. The 2008 conference was held at the University of Auckland, signalling a new stage in its development within the Australasian region.
Australian Aboriginal Philosophy

Max Charlesworth

There is nothing in Australian Aboriginal cultures that is remotely similar to what we in Western European societies call ‘philosophy’. However, it is possible to extract what might be called a ‘folk philosophy’ from the sophisticated systems of practical knowledge that enabled the indigenous peoples of Australia to live and thrive for many thousands of years in a mostly hostile and isolated environment. It is worth remembering that the Aboriginal peoples, who arrived in Australia more than 50,000 years ago, had populated every region of this vast country long before the European ‘invasion’ and had invented elaborate forms of kinship relations, hunter-gatherer economies and systems of dispute resolution. They also developed some 200 variant languages with novel grammatical structures. In many Aboriginal communities today people speak three or four distinct languages, including special languages used in ritual contexts.

This rich body of practical rationality was enmeshed in intricate, quasi-religious bodies of myths, symbols, rites and ceremonies about the coming-into-being of the cosmos, the appearance of humans, human sexuality and reproduction, the lands or terrains that the Aboriginal people occupied, the existence of evil, death, and life after death.

A number of anthropologists, such as A. P. Elkin (1891–1975), T. G. H. Strehlow (1908–1978) and especially W. E. H. Stanner (1905–1982), have attempted to show how a rudimentary ‘philosophy’ might be constructed out of that body of mythological material. Thus Stanner has argued that the philosophical gist, so to speak, of the ‘creation’ myths is that the world is meaningful in the sense that it can be understood and shows a ‘beneficial intent’ toward us (Stanner 1998: 2). In other words, the world about us is a cosmos and not a chaos governed by capricious and malevolent powers. In the same way, the philosophical gist of the ‘spirit conception’ myths of indigenous Australians is that the human person is a compound of a body and a non-bodily element and has an intrinsic value. The Dreaming stories are also linked with the egalitarian ethos of Aboriginal peoples and their resistance to any form of monarchical structures. In addition, there is a ‘life-force’ animating the world and the terrain or ‘country’ of particular groups, which conserves and renews life in all of its forms and which can, so to speak, be tapped into and drawn upon by those groups.

Again, the folk philosophical correlate of the elaborate mythology of the Dreaming is that there is a Law or spiritual authority which expresses the sacred traditions of a particular people and imposes them on its members. While it is misleading to make comparisons with Western European moral philosophy, one
Australian Aboriginal Philosophy

might say very tentatively that the indigenous peoples of Australia are quasi-Kantians in their reverence for the moral ‘Law’.

Finally, the Dreaming can be seen as an attempt to symbolise the connection of the metaphysical beginning or ‘ground’ of things and the here-and-now world of our experience. Thus, Elkin (1969: 88) has suggested that, in cosmological terms, the Dreaming is the ‘ever-present, unseen, ground of being—of existence’, and that there are analogies between the mythical thinking of the Aborigines and the Greek pre-Socratic philosophers. On the other hand, Stanner is sceptical about this approach and he reminds us that Aboriginal cultures had no literate tradition of the kind that was available to the pre-Socratics and no ‘self-conscious intellectual detachment towards the myths’. From the Western European side also, Stanner says, our understanding of Aboriginal myths is limited by ‘our abysmal ignorance of the deeper semantics of Aboriginal languages, including the secret languages often used by ritualists’ (Stanner 1998: 22). One might add that we know very little about the connections between Aboriginal myths and the pictorial art startlingly displayed in the recent Aboriginal paintings of Emily Kngwarreye, Rover Thomas, Paddy Bedford, Linda Syddick and many other indigenous artists.

Quite apart from these interpretations of Aboriginal systems of myths, there have been a number of recent attempts to see the Dreaming in ecological terms akin to the ‘Gaia hypothesis’ of James Lovelock, who views the universe as a living and self-regulating system. Deborah Bird Rose’s book *Dingo Makes Us Human: Life and Land in an Aboriginal Australia* (1992) is an excellent example of this approach. A similar view of the Dreaming has been proposed by Heather McDonald (2002), who argues that Aboriginal religions are wholly centred upon the land and that it is literally from the land, the terrain on which a particular group lives, that its members derive their spiritual values. Indeed, one philosopher has characterised Aboriginal thinking as ‘geosophical’ (Swain 1993).

It is obvious that the rudimentary Aboriginal ‘folk philosophy’ just described will not help contemporary philosophers in solving problems about human consciousness, the foundations of ethics, or metaphysical issues about ‘what there is’. The question then arises: why study Aboriginal thinking when it is clearly incommensurable with what we call ‘philosophy’? One answer is that the study of Aboriginal ‘philosophy’ brings home to us that philosophy, as we heirs of the Greeks know it, is a cultural invention or construction that was born out of a set of material and cultural circumstances in the small city-state of Athens some 2500 years ago, and was by good fortune precariously sustained and developed in the Middle Ages through its interaction with Christianity and Islam, and later through its dialectical relationship with the natural sciences. Again, we need to remind ourselves that, like the indigenous Australians, most past civilisations got along quite successfully and happily without philosophy as we know it.
The Australian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics (AAPAE) grew out of a conference on teaching applied ethics, held in Sydney in 1992. Academics and professionals from a number of different backgrounds met together, found a great deal of common ground, profited from their interchanges, and were eager to meet again on a regular basis. The next step was to form an association which could bring together people normally separated by traditional discipline and professional boundaries. Hence the formation in 1993 of the AAPAE, a non-partisan, non-profit national umbrella organisation for all those concerned with applied ethics in its many forms. Each year since its inception, the AAPAE has held an annual conference, and it has published proceedings of each of those conferences.

The AAPAE is an incorporated body administered by an executive committee under a constitution. In addition, a Conference Committee is appointed each year to organise an annual conference. The AAPAE aims to have office bearers from throughout Australia. The broad purpose of the AAPAE is to encourage awareness of applied ethics as a significant area of concern, and to foster discussion of issues in applied ethics. It provides a meeting point for practitioners from various fields together with academics with specialist expertise. The formal aims of the AAPAE, as stated in its constitution, are: to facilitate networking between individuals and institutions working or interested in the area of professional and applied ethics; to foster community discussion of issues related to professional and applied ethics; to encourage a focus on the teaching of professional and applied ethics; to facilitate the organisation of conferences, meetings and other events in order to fulfill the above aims; and to develop and distribute publications, including a newsletter and conference proceedings.

The primary activities of the AAPAE have been hosting its annual conferences and publishing proceedings of those conferences. The AAPAE maintains a website (<http://www.arts.unsw.edu.au/aapae/>)) and also an active email notes-and-news list to which nonmembers as well as members can subscribe. The AAPAE has also had a close connection with The Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics (published by the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), Charles Sturt University), with ex officio membership on the Journal’s editorial board, and journal subscription included as part of the AAPAE’s membership package. The AAPAE has also irregularly published its official
Australian Catholic University newsletter, *Australian Ethics*, and has provided its members with a complimentary subscription to *Res Publica* (published by CAPPE, University of Melbourne).

**Australian Catholic University**

John Ozolins

Although philosophy had been taught at the Australian Catholic University (ACU) and its predecessor colleges for many years, it was not until 1999 that the university Senate formally approved the establishment of the School of Philosophy. At the establishment of the university in 1991, philosophers were part of what were known as the Centres for Religion and Philosophy, one in each of the states in which the university was situated, and philosophy units or subjects were to be found in a variety of education, nursing and liberal arts courses. These were generally service units in *philosophy of education*, health care ethics and introductory units in philosophy concerned with the search for meaning and with ethics in general. A full major in philosophy was developed for the university’s Victorian Division Bachelor of Arts in 1991–92, and in 1993–94 the various units in philosophy offered in different states were consolidated into one major. The ACU major in philosophy developed at that time remains essentially the same today, fifteen years later.

The breadth of the major, covering all areas of philosophy, is a testament to the breadth of philosophical interests of the philosophers at ACU in the early 1990s. The contributors to the original philosophy major, who could be considered the core of what was to become the School of Philosophy, were: Peter Coghlan, whose interests are broadly in English literature and moral philosophy; Peter Drum, with interests in Aristotelian philosophy; John Ozolins, with interests in metaphysics, epistemology and applied philosophy; John Quilter, with interests in applied philosophy, logic and moral philosophy; Bernadette Tobin, moral philosophy and health care ethics; Keith Joseph, moral philosophy and applied ethics; and Mark Wynn (now at University of Exeter), *philosophy of religion* and history of philosophy.

At ACU on secondment since 1993, Raimond Gaita, best known as a moral philosopher and writer of the memoir, *Romulus, My Father*, became the half-time foundation professor of philosophy in 1998. In 1995, fresh from Oxford, the philosopher/theologian Anthony Fisher OP (now Bishop Fisher) joined ACU, bringing an interest in medieval philosophy to the university. He departed in 2000 to found the John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family. Keith Joseph left the university in 1998 and was replaced by Stephen Buckle, well known internationally for his work on Hume. Andrew Gleeson (now at Adelaide
University), a moral philosopher, joined the school in 2002, resigning to return to Adelaide for family reasons in 2005.

The ACU philosophers met together face-to-face for the first time in 1994 and resolved to become a national school. They were helped in this resolve, though it was to take another four years, by the decision of the university to establish five National Disciplinary Networks within the Sub-Faculty of Theology. Philosophy was the only network which went on to become a school in a restructured Sub-Faculty of Philosophy and Theology in 1999. John Ozolins was appointed Foundation Head of the School of Philosophy in 1999, a position he still retains.

Although the philosophical interests of the school are broad, the close connection with Theology has nurtured a very distinctive approach to philosophy that always seeks to engage with the Catholic intellectual tradition, but not be dominated by it. The school’s strengths lie in its ability to not only discuss philosophical questions from within a Christian perspective, but also to seek the truth by critiquing that perspective from different philosophical viewpoints.

### Australian National University, Faculties Philosophy Program

There have been two Philosophy Programs at the Australian National University (ANU): one in the Faculty of Arts and one in the Research School of Social Sciences. To understand why, one needs to know a little of the history of the ANU. When in 1901 the nation of Australia was formed by federating the six states, a capital city was required. The site chosen was Canberra. A new Parliament House was opened in 1926, and the new city began to be built. By 1930 a college of the University of Melbourne was established. Philosophy was first taught in the new Canberra University College (CUC) in 1931, and again in 1933, by the Rev. Eric Owen, the local Presbyterian minister.

In 1934, Quentin Boyce Gibson was appointed as a part-time lecturer to give a course of lectures on Psychology, Logic and Ethics. He had five students. CUC had no need of a philosophy lecturer in 1935, so Gibson proceeded to Oxford, but returned to the CUC in 1945 as the first full-time lecturer in philosophy. Upon his retirement in 1978, his colleagues honoured his foundational role by endowing the Quentin Gibson Prize. He published three books, the last in his 85th year (Gibson 1960, 1961, 1988).

Quite independently, as part of the post-war reconstruction, in 1946 the ANU was also established in Canberra, devoted entirely to research. As Canberra began
to grow, it became clear that the CUC would eventually grow into an autonomous university. To many, however, two universities in Canberra seemed a ludicrous proposition, yet the staff of the new ANU were strongly opposed to taking over the CUC. In the end, the impasse was broken by parliament amending the ANU Act to ‘associate’ the CUC, but keeping it distinct. The union was effected in 1960, with the research schools (collectively renamed the Institute of Advanced Studies) continuing to accept only Ph.D. students, and the former CUC accepting students only from undergraduate to Masters levels. Over time, the former college evolved into The Faculties, and from 1970 it too was allowed to accept Ph.D. students. The first Ph.D. written in the department (Small 1974) was awarded in 1974. Since then, there has been a steady stream of successful Ph.D. theses, on a wide range of topics.

In 1957, Kurt Baier was appointed professor, and began building the department. The next ten years were a time of change. Baier did not stay long, and was succeeded as professor by Peter Herbst in 1962. Bruce Benjamin died, while Ray Bradley, George Schlesinger and David Bostock also stayed only a few years before moving on to other positions. They were replaced by Kimon Lycos, Bill Ginnane and Thomas Mautner, and in 1967 by Genevieve Lloyd, Paul Thom and Richard Campbell, all Sydney graduates studying at Oxford.

Herbst was born in Berlin of Jewish parents, and had been sent to school in England. In 1940, he was one of a large number of ‘enemy aliens’ rounded up and shipped out aboard the Dunera, to be interned in Australia. He found a way out of the internment camp by enlisting in the Australian army, and so in mid 1942 he did just that. At the same time he studied philosophy at the University of Melbourne, where he was especially influenced by George Paul, who had been a student of Wittgenstein. Herbst came to the ANU after spending 1956–61 at the University College of the Gold Coast (now Ghana), where he had been promoted to professor.

Although there were always fixed-term appointments, visitors and periods of study leave, after the appointment of Peter Roeppe in 1971 the tenured staff continued unchanged until Herbst’s retirement at the end of 1984. The department had a number of notable features. One was the intensity of debate amongst the staff, on a wide range of topics, from metaphysics to contemporary politics, from lifestyle to art. Herbst regularly taught courses in aesthetics, and after his retirement, so did Thom; this interest in the arts generated a number of books (Anderson et al. 1982; Thom 1993, 2000). Animated discussions would frequently rage up and down the corridor, and on the stairs, and in the faculty tearoom, led by Herbst, Lycos and Ginnane. For them, philosophy was not just a subject to be studied and taught; it was a way of life.

Another notable feature of this diverse group was that everyone shared, in their different ways, an interest in the history of philosophy. The attitude of W. V. O. Quine—that there are those who do philosophy and then there are those who do the history of philosophy—was regarded as a travesty. On the contrary, all held in common an understanding of the discipline as growing out of its history, a view
shared even by the logicians. This interest is evident in books published during this period (Campbell 1976, 1992; Thom 1981, 1996; Lloyd 1984; Lycos 1987) and in the appointment of Udo Thiel in 1992 (Thiel 1990, 2002). The urge to be comprehensive was also manifest in Mautner’s editing for Penguin *A Dictionary of Philosophy* (1996).

The staff diverged in this period from what became the paradigm of ‘analytic’ philosophy. In different ways, everyone was interested in the ‘big questions’. There was also growing interest in so-called ‘Continental’ philosophy. Courses on *phenomenology* were intermittently offered from the mid-1960s onwards, and on the philosophies of Marx and Freud, Hegel, and twentieth-century European philosophy from the late 1970s onwards. The department became committed to maintaining a balance and an interaction between the ‘analytic’ and ‘Continental’ traditions, a commitment maintained through the appointment of Brian Garrett in the former tradition (Garrett 1993, 1998, 2006; Garrett [ed.] 1993), and successive appointments in the latter of Moira Gatens, Penny Deutscher, and Fiona Jenkins. These three also offered courses in *feminist philosophy*, which had been introduced by Lloyd in the late 1970s. Bruin Christensen, who has published extensively on Heidegger, and who had a fixed-term appointment during Campbell’s service as Dean and Pro Vice-Chancellor in the 1990s, returned to a tenured position.

In late 1986 Neil Tennant, whose main interests were in philosophical logic, was appointed professor, but in 1990 took leave of absence and resigned at the end of 1993, taking up an appointment at Ohio State University. Lloyd was appointed professor at *University of New South Wales* in 1986, Campbell was promoted to professor in 1993, and Thom likewise in 1997. Ginnane retired and Lycos moved to the University of Melbourne. Thom served a term as dean before moving to Southern Cross University as an executive dean in 2001.

In 2000, as part of a reconstruction of the Faculty of Arts, the department became a ‘program’ in a new School of Humanities. It was headed by Jeremy Shearmur, who had been a research assistant to Karl Popper, and had originally been appointed to teach political theory in the Department of Political Science, before being transferred to philosophy (Shearmur 1988, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996–97). Campbell and Roeper have now retired, and Thiel moved in 2009 to a chair in Salzburg. Jenkins became Head of the depleted program.

Fruitful interaction and joint appointments developed, however, with the *Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics* (CAPPE), a partnership between the Australian National University, *Charles Sturt University* and the University of Melbourne, funded by the Australian Research Council. It constitutes the largest concentration of philosophers working on applied philosophy and public ethics in the world.

In 2010 the basic structure of the ANU, described above, is to be radically altered. An arrangement of disciplinary ‘Colleges’ cutting across the Faculties/Institute divide, introduced in 2008–09, is to be consolidated by fully integrating all parallel programs. Relevant here is that the new College of Arts and Social
Australian National University, History of Ideas Unit

Sciences is to be organised into a Research School of the Humanities and the Arts and a Research School of Social Sciences. A School of Philosophy is to be formed within the latter. It is not yet clear how complete this integration of the two philosophy programs will be; both teaching-and-research and research-only positions will be maintained, and initially at least staff rooms will not be moved to a single location. How these changes will affect the style and character of the two programs remains to be seen.

**Australian National University, History of Ideas Unit**

Robert Brown

The History of Ideas Unit developed in 1961–63 from the historical interests of some members in the departments of Social Philosophy, Law, History, and Political Science, at the Australian National University (ANU). A chair in the History of Ideas was established in 1974. Eugene Kamenka was appointed to it and he served in that position until his death in 1993 when the History of Ideas Unit was disbanded.

Born in Berlin, Kamenka was the son of Russian parents who arrived in Sydney when he was aged nine and spoke only Russian and German. When he graduated from Sydney Tech High School he came first in English in the State leaving examination, and then became a student at the University of Sydney in the philosophy department led by John Anderson. From him, Kamenka learned to connect ideological views and social attitudes to their philosophical foundations. This gave his thought a systematic character that was displayed both in the organisation of the History of Ideas Unit and the subjects—the major political, legal, and social ideas of the past two centuries—that its members pursued. The History of Ideas Unit also enriched the university by attracting a stream of the ablest visitors to conferences, by leading seminars, and by giving public lectures. Kamenka also made the work of the unit known by giving lectures at overseas universities, and by his frequent participation at conferences in many countries in Europe, Asia, and North America.

In the 1970s the staff of the History of Ideas Unit was augmented by the addition of S. L. Goldberg, then professor of English at the University of Melbourne and previously professor of English at the University of Sydney; by Robert Brown, then editor of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy and a member of the Department of Philosophy at the ANU; and by Knud Haakonsen, a prominent historian of seventeenth and eighteenth-century moral and legal philosophy. The interests
of these three men considerably expanded the program of the History of Ideas Unit. In addition, the historian, F. B. Smith and the philosophers John Passmore and Stanley Benn became associated with the work of the unit. The result was that in the 1970s visitors as diverse as Karl Wittfogel from the University of Washington, Quentin Skinner from Cambridge University, and John Plamenatz from Oxford came to the Unit. By the late 1980s the many visitors included: Stefan Collini (Cambridge), James Moore (Concordia), Alan Ryan (Oxford), Robert Byrnes (Indiana), D. Castiglione (London), N. T. Phillipson (Edinburgh), Isaiah Berlin (Oxford), M. Richter (Hunter College), and L. Feur (Virginia). These distinguished men—women were not well represented in this discipline—helped introduce the work of Australians to overseas scholars and to each other.

Both these groups published a good deal during their stay in the unit. Kamenka himself led the way, publishing more than six hundred papers. Visitors supplied not only several hundred papers but many dozens of books, some of them now standard works, yet all these productions were merely one part of the History of Ideas Unit’s contribution to Australian intellectual life.

Australian National University, Research School of Social Sciences

Robert E. Goodin, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith & Daniel Stoljar

In 1946 the Australian National University Act established the university, and by 1952 four Research Schools—of Social Sciences, of Pacific Studies, of Physical Sciences and of Medical Research—had been established. Philosophy, in the form of a Department of Social Philosophy headed by Professor Percy Herbert Partridge, was a foundation part of the Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS). Partridge continued as professor of social philosophy until his retirement in 1975, also being dean of school from 1961 to 1968.

John Passmore began his career with the RSSS as reader in philosophy in 1956. He was appointed professor of philosophy in 1958, becoming Head of Department in 1962. His books include the seminal A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Passmore 1957; 1985) and Man’s Responsibility for Nature (Passmore 1974; 1980). During this time John Harsanyi and Stanley Benn were senior fellows, and Robert Brown, Edwin Curley and Eugene Kamenka joined as research fellows. All proceeded to distinguished careers, Harsanyi being awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1994, jointly with John Nash and Reinhard Selten. Curley, a distinguished historian of philosophy, was a senior fellow in philosophy by the
time of his departure in 1977; he is now James B. and Grace J. Nelson Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. In 1969 Kamenka was appointed professorial fellow and head of the separate History of Ideas Unit in RSSS; Brown joined that Unit in 1973, where he served as senior fellow until his retirement in 1985. Brown, a philosopher of social science, was for many years editor of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Benn, best known for Social Principles and the Democratic State with R. S. Peters (Benn and Peters 1959) and A Theory of Freedom (Benn 1988), was appointed professorial fellow in philosophy in 1973, a post he held until his retirement in 1985.

Passmore appointed Richard Routley (later known as Richard Sylvan) to a senior fellowship in 1971, a position he held until his death in 1996. Robert Meyer, who came as a postdoctoral fellow in 1974, remained in the program for two decades, rising to professor. Meyer and Sylvan were the foundation of a world-class logic group within the program. The standing and achievement of this group was such that it ultimately became a self-standing entity, the Automated Reasoning Project (ARP). ARP later became a founding department of a new research school at ANU, the Research School of Information Sciences and Engineering.

In December 1976, J. J. C. Smart took up the chair and became Head of the Program, in which capacity he served for nearly a decade. Smart is with D. M. Armstrong the most famous architect of materialism in the philosophy of mind and staunch defender of utilitarianism in moral philosophy; his books include Philosophy and Scientific Realism (Smart 1963) and, with Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against (Smart and Williams 1973). Philip Pettit was appointed to a professorial fellowship in 1983. His appointment was initially in the Director’s Section, with a remit to work with individuals across a range of academic programs—a role he filled with great distinction. He was made Professor of Social and Political Theory by special appointment in 1989, a position he held until 2002 when he left for Princeton University, where he is now Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values. During his time with the school Pettit wrote many influential books including The Common Mind (Pettit 1993) and Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Pettit 1997a).

Frank Jackson succeeded Smart in the chair, becoming Head of the Philosophy Program in 1986. Author of the much cited ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ (Jackson 1982), Jackson went on to publish many important books and articles, culminating in his John Locke Lectures, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Jackson 1998b). Robert Goodin, whose work straddles political theory, public policy and applied ethics, was appointed to a professorial fellowship in 1989; founding editor of the Journal of Political Philosophy, Goodin’s books include Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Goodin 1995). Michael Smith was appointed to a senior fellowship in 1995 after having spent a year with the program on secondment in 1993, during which time he wrote his influential book, The Moral Problem (Smith 1994). Goodin went on to become professor of philosophy in 1992 and

Smith took over as Head of the Philosophy Program in 1998 when Jackson began a four-year term as Director of the Institute for Advanced Studies. The cross-disciplinary Social and Political Theory group acquired full program status in 1999, and Goodin and Pettit’s appointments became joint with it, until 2004 when Social and Political Theory was folded back into the Philosophy Program. In that process the Philosophy Program acquired another professor: Geoffrey Brennan, author of many books including *The Reason of Rules*, with Nobel laureate James Buchanan (Brennan and Buchanan 1985), and editor of *Economics and Philosophy*. In 2007, Brennan moved to the Economics Program, RSSS.

Martin Davies was appointed professor of philosophy in 2000. One of the founding editors of *Mind and Language*, Davies works in philosophy of mind and language, epistemology and cognitive science; he is also well known for his foundational work with Lloyd Humberstone on two-dimensional semantics (Davies and Humberstone 1980). In 2001, Kim Sterelny, the author of *Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition* (2003) and editor of *Biology and Philosophy*, took up an appointment as professor in the program, half-time with Victoria University of Wellington until 2009 when he became full-time at RSSS. Peter Godfrey-Smith, author of *Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (Godfrey-Smith 2003), accepted a half-time appointment as professor of philosophy; the other half of his time was spent as visiting professor at Harvard University, where he moved full-time in 2006. Also in 2001, philosopher of mind Daniel Stoljar, who went on to write *Ignorance and Imagination* (Stoljar 2006), was appointed to a senior fellowship, which he took up in 2002.

Davies took over as Head of Program in 2004 when Smith left to become professor of philosophy at Princeton University. In that same year Jackson became Director of RSSS. Also in 2004, David Chalmers, author of the celebrated *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory* (Chalmers 1996), joined the program on a Federation Fellowship, setting up an ARC Research Centre for Consciousness; and Alan Hájek, a specialist in probability theory and decision theory, joined the program from Caltech as professor of philosophy. The approach to philosophy that is typical of Chalmers’s work in *The Conscious Mind*, of Jackson’s in *From Metaphysics to Ethics* (1998b) and of Jackson, Pettit and Smith’s (2004) in their collaborations collected in *Mind, Morality and Explanation* became known as ‘the Canberra Plan’.

In 2006 Davies moved to Oxford to become Wilde Professor of Mental Philosophy and Goodin assumed the headship. Stoljar was made professor of philosophy and in 2007 became Head of Program as Goodin assumed responsibility for an ANU-wide initiative on ‘Public and Private Reasoning’. Frank Jackson stepped down as Director of the RSSS, and took up visiting appointments at Princeton and La Trobe, though he continued to spend significant periods at the ANU. 2007 also saw the RSSS appoint a new professor of philosophy, Jonathan Schaffer, who has made seminal contributions across various topics
in metaphysics and epistemology, including the important paper ‘Trumper Preemption’ (Schaffer 2000). The program also appointed, for the first time, two junior continuing members of staff: Susannah Schellenberg, a philosopher of perception trained at the University of Pittsburgh, and Nicholas Southwood, a moral and political philosopher trained at ANU.

The Philosophy Program regularly hosts a number of workshops and conferences, some thematic and others focusing on the work of individual philosophers such as Ned Block, Michael Bratman, Tyler Burge, John Gardner, Tony Honoré, Philip Pettit and Robert Stalnaker. In 2003 it hosted a series of occasional Tanner Lectures on Human Values by Martha Nussbaum; that was the second to be held in Australia, the first series also having been held two decades before at ANU. The program holds an annual Jack Smart Lecture in honour of J. J. C. Smart and the Social and Political Theory group within the program hosts another annual lecture in honour of John Passmore. Jack Smart lecturers have included Frank Jackson, Peter Singer, David Lewis, Jerry Fodor, Thomas Scanlon, Simon Blackburn, Timothy Williamson, Ruth Millikan, Philip Kitcher and Brian Skyrms. John Passmore lecturers have included Quentin Skinner, Alan Gibbard, James Buchanan, Jeremy Waldron, Anne Phillips, Sheila Jasanoff, Jane Mansbridge, Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Larry Temkin. The Smart and Passmore Lectures are among the highlights of the program’s academic calendar, just as the Coombs tearoom is a famous feature of its intellectual life on a day-to-day basis.

Many honours have been bestowed on members of the Philosophy Program over the years. Passmore, Jackson and Goodin were all elected Corresponding Members of the British Academy, and Passmore of the American Academy of Arts and Social Sciences and the Royal Danish Academy as well. Passmore gave the Tanner Lecture in Cambridge for 1981. Jackson gave the 1995 John Locke Lectures at Oxford; and in 2006 Jackson gave the Blackwell Lectures at Brown University. Davies gave the Carl G. Hempel Lectures at Princeton in 2003 and the Chichele Lectures at Oxford in 2006. Goodin gave a Miliband Lecture at LSE in 2002 and the Dewey Lecture at Chicago in 2008. Also in 2008, Sterelny won the Jean Nicod Prize and delivered the Jean Nicod Lectures, which are delivered annually in Paris by a leading philosopher of mind or philosophically oriented cognitive scientist. In 2004, Sterelny’s Thought in a Hostile World won the Lakatos Prize awarded for an outstanding contribution to the philosophy of science, widely interpreted, in the form of a book published in English during the previous six years. Smith’s The Moral Problem won the 1994–95 Book Prize of the American Philosophical Association for the best philosophy book published in the previous two years by a younger scholar. Goodin’s New Handbook of Political Science, co-edited with Klingemann (Goodin and Klingemann 1997), was an Outstanding Academic Book for 1997 by Choice, the official journal of the American Association of College and Research Libraries. Hájek’s paper ‘What Conditional Probability Could Not Be’ (Hájek 2003) won the 2004 Article Prize of the American Philosophical Association, awarded every two years to
the author of the best article published in the previous two years; and Schaffer won the same prize in 2008 for ‘Knowing the Answer’ (Schaffer 2007b). The Philosopher’s Annual selected Hájek’s ‘Waging War on Pascal’s Wager’ (Hájek 2003) as one of the ten best articles in philosophy in 2003, and Schaffer won the Australasian Journal of Philosophy Best Paper Prize in 2008 for ‘From Nihilism to Monism’ (Schaffer 2007a). Stoljar gave the Weinberg Lecture at the University of Michigan in 2004. Chalmers was awarded the Stanton Prize by the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in 2004, and the Barwise Prize of the American Philosophical Association for contributions to philosophy and computing in 2008. His work has been the subject of conferences in Buffalo (1999) and Cologne (2006). In 2010 Chalmers will deliver the John Locke Lectures, the second member of the program to do so.

Research in the Philosophy Program has been bolstered over the years by a long succession of outstanding shorter-term staff members and multitudes of visiting fellows. Among the former are Fred D’Agostino, Karen Bennett, Helen Beebee, David Braddon-Mitchell, Andy Egan, Peter Forrest, Gerald Gaus, Richard Joyce, Karen Jones, Knud Haakonssen, John Hawthorne, Richard Holton, Rae Langton, Michael McRobbie, Peter Menzies, Karen Neander, Graham Oppy, L. A. Paul, Adam Pautz, Huw Price, Elizabeth Prior, Michael Ridge, Laura Schroeter, Michael Stocker, and Michael Tooley. Complete lists of philosophers who have worked or visited at RSSS since 1983 can be viewed at RSSS (2009).

Australian Philosophers in Ghana (1949–61)

Jane Grant

‘People were rather surprised when we announced our going and our destination’, Gwen Taylor wrote of husband Dan Taylor’s acceptance of the chair of philosophy at the recently established University College of the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1949. ‘We were interested’, she explained, ‘in view of India and Pakistan just becoming independent and the awful incursions of the South African apartheid thugs and in confirming our views that colour of skin was irrelevant to intelligence and just maybe being a bit of help’ (email to author, 27 October 2007).

‘Dashing, left, larrikinish ... slightly unkempt’, as then philosophy student Brian O’Shaughnessy recalled, Taylor was decidedly ‘not a gent’ (O’Shaughnessy interview with author, 14 October 2007). A senior philosophy lecturer during the intellectually charged post-war years at the University of Melbourne, Taylor was a highly respected and charismatic figure. ‘Everyone went to Dan’s first-year lectures’, Mary McCloskey remembered, and most would return later in the day for his second-year lectures, which took up where the earlier one left off with
the opening line ‘as I was saying’. Wide ranging lectures relating contemporary fiction to Greek philosophy would at times spill over into heated debates with the students. McCloskey has a strong memory of a young Don Gunner at the back of the lecture hall clambering down over the seats in order to ‘get closer to the argument’ (McCloskey interview with author, 6 November 2007).

The decision to go to Africa may have surprised people, and in the context of the post-war Australian intellectual and artistic exodus to Britain it was unorthodox. And yet, as Taylor was well aware, the Gold Coast maintained close intellectual ties to Britain. Established in 1951 as a consequence of the Asquith Inquiry into the colonies and higher education, the University College of the Gold Coast had a ‘special relationship’ with the University of London. Most of the members of the academic and administrative staff were white, and until 1961 when the University College was finally granted autonomy, examinations were set and degrees conferred by the University of London. And as the Gold Coast had already established a Technical College, the University College was free to deliver a classical education. In the late 1950s this ‘special relationship’ would be seen by many African nationalists as the long arm of colonialism, but for Taylor—in the process of establishing a traditional department of Western philosophy in a far flung British colony—the close relationship would prove very useful.

Further connections with the British academies had been forged through George Paul in Oxford. A student of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Paul had been an influential figure during the years he taught at University of Melbourne, introducing his students to the late work of Wittgenstein. ‘Because of George Paul, but especially because of the calibre of ex-Melbourne students turning up in Oxford (some of them Kurt Baier, Michael Scriven, Alan Donagan, Gerd Buchdahl, A. C. (‘Camo’) Jackson, Peter Herbst), Dan was welcomed by Ryle, Hampshire, Austin, John Wisdom of Cambridge, and indeed by the Oxford Register’ (Taylor, 2007). One of Taylor’s innovations as professor was to establish a visiting lectureship for a term a year, and invitations were accepted by Michael Dummett, Anthony Quinton, Bernard Williams and George Paul. ‘They were at first quite astonished by the students’ keenness to discuss philosophical issues’, Gwen Taylor recalled, ‘and willingness to question a teacher (especially one with the authority of a white skin).’

Taylor had not calculated on such high enrolments in philosophy, and his wife Gwen, also a philosopher, agreed to teach the first-year students until another lecturer could be employed. In 1951 he appointed former University of Melbourne student Len Grant, who came ‘with very good recommendations from Camo Jackson, Gasking and old Boyce Gibson himself’ (Taylor, 2007). As O’Shaughnessy remembers him, Grant, a Wittgensteinian, was ‘brainy but neurotic’ and had completed his M.A. under Camo Jackson. They ‘talked in a language of their own’. O’Shaughnessy also recalled that it was the ‘fundamental questions’ which Grant put to him that helped shape his thesis. Grant would spend two years in Ghana ‘lecturing and conducting tutorials on the Oxford pattern in Logic, Ethics and History of Philosophy,’ but would resign in 1953
Australian Philosophers in Ghana (1949–61)

‘for personal reasons’ (Letter from Len Grant to T. M. Owen, 12 August 1960). Taylor’s second appointment, however, drew from a wider Australian circle. At a time when the rivalry between the universities of Melbourne and Sydney was at its most intense, Taylor’s decision in 1952 to appoint Peter Gibbons, a University of Sydney graduate and protégée of John Anderson, displayed an unusually open mind.

The students not only proved themselves keen, but also highly talented, as attested to in a letter Gilbert Ryle wrote to Taylor thanking him ‘for those gifts you sent us’ (quoted by Taylor, 2007). William Abraham would be the first African to be appointed a Fellow of All Souls, returning to Ghana to teach philosophy and serve in President Nkrumah’s first Cabinet, before leaving for the U.S. and a chair at the University of California Santa Cruz. Supervised in Oxford by Gilbert Ryle, Kwasi Wiredu would become a pioneer in the decolonisation of African philosophy, and later be appointed to a chair in philosophy at the University of Florida.

Dan Taylor’s last appointment, in 1955, was another former University of Melbourne student, Peter Herbst. A German Jew who was fortunate enough to be at boarding school in England when Hitler came to power, Herbst was one of a number of future Melbourne philosophers that included Baier and Buchdahl who arrived in Australia as ‘enemy aliens’ on the Dunera. Herbst also went to Africa with ‘certain political ideals in mind’, and as he would later tell journalist Stewart Harris he saw his job ‘as interpreting the European philosophical tradition’ to people outside of it. ‘We believed … hoped it was not necessary to destroy the culture, unlike the missionaries’ (Peter Herbst interviewed by Stewart Harris, 21 February 1994, National Library of Australia).

In 1960 Herbst was appointed professor when Taylor left to take up the chair at Otago University in New Zealand. Herbst’s interests, however, were beginning to turn from philosophical inquiry to anthropology and African history. At this point he also developed a keen interest in photography, producing a remarkably intimate record of jazz trumpet player Louis Armstrong’s 1957 tour to Ghana. Africa, he said, had a profound effect on him, but while some of his colleagues assimilated into the African way of life he did not ‘want to abandon my European/Anglo-Saxon heritage, retaining my identity, the image of myself which I had formed before’ (Herbst 1994).

Herbst, as colleagues Thomas Mautner and Richard Campbell have commented, ‘opposed the fashionable egalitarianism of the levelling-down kind, also called anti-elitism’ (Peter Herbst Memorial Service Program, ANU, 2007). In many ways, Herbst was the apotheosis of the high European culture which Nkrumah, with his program of Africanisation, wanted to free Ghana. A clash was inevitable, with Herbst beginning to see the socialist government as ‘an increasingly arbitrary and dictatorial regime which wanted a university compliant with an agenda to transform Ghana into the leader of a pan-African revolution’ (Herbst 1994). In 1959 the situation came to a head over academic freedom. ‘We were invited by Nkrumah to teach a course in African ideology beginning with
Marxism, but the interpretation we placed on Marxism was not pleasing to the government. We were roundly abused and felt quite endangered. Increasingly people we knew … Africans … were being arrested’ (Herbst 1994).

Claiming the University College had become ‘a breeding ground for unpatriotic and antigovernment elements’, in 1960 Nkrumah set up a Commission to establish the guidelines for an autonomous university which would ‘cease being an alien institution and to take on the character of a Ghanaian university’ (Botwe-Asamoah 2005: 190). Herbst was selected by the university to be on the committee and met regularly with the Minister and senior advisors. The Commission, according to Herbst, was a charade. After a year of deliberation, they learned that all serious decisions about the nature of the new university had already been made by the government. In protest Herbst resigned, but possibly he realised he had little choice: in May 1961 the entire academic staff were sacked.

The journey to Ghana of these Australian philosophers in the lead up to and immediate aftermath of Independence is a fascinating if unacknowledged footnote in Australia’s cultural history. Their legacy, overshadowed as it is by the politics of post-colonialism, is less easy to evaluate. No doubt for many, as Gwen Taylor so fervently hoped, they were ‘a help’. And yet, however keen men such as Herbst were to distance themselves from the missionaries, the tradition they so vigorously extolled was predicated on a form of cultural excision which was not dissimilar. Reflecting on these years, Wiredu commented:

I finished my undergraduate studies in Philosophy in Ghana in 1958, just a year after our independence from Britain. In the whole of the period of philosophical study not a single word was said about African philosophy, nor indeed was the phrase ‘African philosophy’ ever mentioned. In fairness, my teachers cannot be blamed for this. They were hired to teach us western philosophy, and that is what they did. (Kresse 1996)
contributions included Lyndel Pott (from 1963 on) and Upendra Baxi (from 1967 on).

Initially the society met in private homes five or six times a year. A written paper and one or more written responses were circulated in advance; at the meeting the authors spoke to their papers as a basis for general discussion. In the early years an elaborate summary of the discussion was circulated after each meeting. Incomplete sets of these early papers can be found in most Australian law libraries.

Most papers were later revised for publication—often in the *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie*, the journal of the Internationale Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, of which the ASLP became the Australian section. In 1963 a special supplement to the *Archiv* was devoted to ASLP papers (*Australian Studies in Legal Philosophy*, edited by Tammelo and Blackshield together with Enid Campbell). The European links were established through Tammelo, who had taught in Heidelberg before migrating to Australia in 1948.

The society was formed in part to enable recent graduates in law to maintain an interest in legal philosophy, often through expanded versions of seminar papers given in their final L.L.B. year. Among them were several future judges including John Bryson, David Hodgson, Robert Austin, John Goldring, and most notably Michael Kirby. Older members included the philosopher John Burnheim, the criminologist Gordon Hawkins, the historian Henry Strakosch, and Roman Catholic priests like P. M. Farrell, W. J. Uren, and James Esler. A particularly active member was Otto Bondy (1904–1976), who had worked in Vienna in the 1930s with Hans Kelsen (1881–1973), was interned in Australia after fleeing the Nazis, and eventually practised as an accountant in Bondi. Through the ASLP he was able to return to Kantian legal philosophy and the publication of scholarly papers. Also giving papers were a steady stream of international visitors, notably including René Marcic (1919–1971), who died tragically in an air crash on his way home after his visit to Sydney.

In 1972 Stone retired; Tammelo returned to Europe to take up Marcic’s former chair at the University of Salzburg; and Baxi returned to India, later to be Dean of Law and subsequently Vice-Chancellor at the University of Delhi. For some years the future of the department remained in doubt, and its younger members struggled to keep the ASLP alive. But in 1975 Alice Tay (1934–2004) was appointed as professor of jurisprudence. Assisted by her husband Eugene Kamenka (1928–1995), she was able to reconstitute the society on a wider national basis. Since 1976 its papers have appeared in a regular journal, the *Bulletin of the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy*. 
Australian Society of Legal Philosophy – Addendum

Jeffrey Goldsworthy

The ASLP remained based at the University of Sydney until 1994, with various changes made to its Executive Committee from time to time. Prominent in the organisation during that period were Justice G. J. Samuels, and professors Alice Tay, Lauchlan Chipman, Martin Krygier and Wojciech Sadurski. In the meantime, strong state branches developed, particularly in Queensland and Victoria, which organised their own activities. In 1994, the headquarters of the ASLP moved to the University of Queensland, under the presidency of Professor Alan Fogg. It moved again in 1999 to the Australian National University, where its affairs were conducted until 2007 under the leadership of professors Tom Campbell (President) and Peter Cane (Secretary). From 2008 until now, its headquarters have been at Monash University, where it has been managed by Professor Jeffrey Goldsworthy (President) and Dr John Morss (Secretary). Throughout these years, its main activities have been the convening of an annual conference, held at different locations throughout the country, and the publication of the Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy (AJLP), whose thirty-seventh volume was published in 2012. The AJLP, under the editorship of Professor Campbell since 1999, has achieved international recognition in the field of legal theory, and all issues since 1977 are available on HeinOnline.

Automated Reasoning Project

John Slaney


From the mid 1970s, the logic group in the Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS) at the Australian National University (ANU) became increasingly distinct from the rest of the Department of Philosophy. Though strongly encouraged by John Passmore and especially J. J. C. Smart, who believed that excellence should be fostered wherever it takes root, the logicians clustered around Richard Routley (later Richard Sylvan) and Bob Meyer formed a cohesive group with a
distinctive non-classical—at times anti-classical—outlook. By 1977, for instance, the logic group had its own weekly seminar series, quite separate from that of the Department of Philosophy. At that time, it led the world in research into Relevant logic and paraconsistency, and did pioneering work on the broader topic of substructural logics. Meyer’s important philosophical contributions on truth and on propositions circulated underground in the ‘Yellow Series’ of unpublished technical reports from this time. A series of fortunate visits and short-term appointments, including those of Chris Mortensen, Ross Brady, Graham Priest and Newton da Costa, also helped build up the group and shape its agenda. The book Relevant Logics and their Rivals (Routley et al. 1982) contains not only a version of the group’s manifesto but also a sample of its spirit and style. Several of the Ph.D. students at that time, notably Errol Martin, Paul Pritchard (a computer science student), Michael McRobbie, John Slaney, Steve Giambrone and Paul Thistlewaite, followed Meyer’s lead in investigating the potential applications of computing to non-classical logic. Over the period 1980–1985 there was particular interest in the decision problem for relevant logic. Thistlewaite, supervised by Meyer and McRobbie, developed the theorem prover Kripke specifically to aid in the search for a proof of undecidability.


Eventually, the logic group was split from the Department of Philosophy and set up as a five-year project, the ‘Automated Reasoning Project’ (ARP) under Michael McRobbie’s leadership. Meyer joined the ARP, but Sylvan did not. Martin and Slaney returned to Canberra to work in the new group, and Rod Girle was recruited from Griffith University in 1988. Ed Mares, Igor Urbas and Mark Grundy joined the group later. The ARP enjoyed strong programmer support in the form of Peter Malkin, John Barlow and Zdzislaw ‘Gustav’ Meglicki, who replaced Malkin in 1989. Ironically, the motivating decision problem was solved (in the negative) by Alasdair Urquhart on a visit to Australia before the ARP could actually commence. This was one of several negative results which have effectively marginalised the Anderson-Belnap Relevant logics: their complexity is extreme (at least hard); there is no good interpolation theorem for logics such as R; relevant arithmetic is not closed under material detachment and so fails to include the classical theorems in its extensional part. This last result, by Meyer and Harvey Friedman, was perhaps the most profound technical achievement of the ARP and helped to direct its research away from the preoccupations of the former RSSS logicians. Nonetheless, the group pushed ahead with research not only in philosophical logic and in mechanised deduction for non-classical systems, but also in classical first-order theorem proving. Again, a series of visiting fellows were important catalysts for the work: Joerg Siekmann, Hans-Juergen Ohlbach, Kit Fine, Hajime Sawamura, Chris Brink and Ewing ‘Rusty’ Lusk were prominent among them. McRobbie and others were engaged in research not only into logic and automated reasoning but also into high-performance computing and especially parallel computing. The
Automated Reasoning Project

Centre for Information Science Research (CISR) was set up during this time, and was also headed by McRobbie and co-housed with the ARP. An agreement between the ANU and Fujitsu (Japan) specified automated reasoning as one of the areas of research collaboration. This, together with the ARP’s involvement in the ‘Fifth Generation Computing’ project in Tokyo, brought the group into close contact with Japanese research, resulting eventually in significant contributions to artificial intelligence.


When the ARP as part of RSSS came to its scheduled end in 1991, the group did not completely disperse but remained as an interest group within RSSS (where Meyer had his position) and CISR (which employed McRobbie and Slaney). In 1993, the group was formally reconstituted as an academic unit within CISR. Greg Restall joined the new ARP as a postdoctoral fellow funded by the ARC, and another postdoctoral fellowship awarded to the group allowed the recruitment of Rajeev Gore in 1994. The research focus continued to shift from non-classical logic towards artificial intelligence, and the group was able to survive despite its tiny size by means of vigorous participation in international collaborative projects, notably with Japanese and European partners. The Logic Summer School, which remains an annual event, dates from this period.


In 1994 the ANU set up a new Research School of Information Sciences and Engineering, with the ARP as one of its departments. CISR was subsequently dissolved, but the ARP continued, though it remained painfully small until after 1999 when it was merged with the Computer Sciences Laboratory and was able to grow once more to near the size of the old RSSS project. Restall moved to Macquarie University in 1995 (and subsequently to the University of Melbourne) and Meyer was forced to retire in 1997, after which he remained as professor emeritus. However, Slaney and Gore stayed to form the core of the RSISE department. Matthias Fuchs spent three years with the group from 1997, and was followed by John Lloyd, Jen Davoren, Katalin Bimbo, Sylvie Thiebaux, Yannick Pencole and Tomasz Kowalski. Research on substructural logics, non-classical proof theory and paraconsistency remained on the ARP’s agenda, but the interest in artificial intelligence (deduction, constraint satisfaction, planning, search, diagnosis) increased, as did the strand of work in formal methods for software engineering.

Postlude: Developments since 2003

The National Centre of Excellence in Information and Communication Technology (NICTA) was set up in 2002 and recruited its first research staff in 2003. The ANU logic group formed the nucleus of NICTA’s Logic and Computation Program, one of three such programs in the applied logic area. Gore, Kowalski and Slaney were seconded into Logic and Computation, while Pencole and
Thiebaux similarly joined the Knowledge Representation and Reasoning Program. NICTA recruited vigorously during 2003–2005, though the focus of its research is on computer science and its applications rather than on logical theory for its own sake. Gore and Kowalski moved back into the university after some years of association with NICTA, though Slaney remains involved, and Thiebaux is now (2009) the Director of NICTA’s Canberra laboratory. NICTA researchers, including Peter Baumgartner, Michael Norrish, Jinbo Huang and Andreas Bauer, hold adjunct university positions. The reorganised School of Computer Science within the ANU now has Logic and Computation as one of its constituent research groups. This group, headed by Gore, continues the research interest in automated reasoning and proof theory and sees itself as the heir to the ANU’s philosophical logic tradition.
Annette C. Baier was born in Queenstown, New Zealand in 1929 and educated at the University of Otago, and then at Oxford. Though she has taught philosophy at the universities of Aberdeen, Auckland and Sydney, most of her career was spent at the University of Pittsburgh. She was President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, one of very few women to hold this position, and in 1995 delivered the Paul Carus Lectures, published as The Commons of the Mind. Her book A Progress of Sentiments is an interpretation of the philosophy of David Hume. Much of her other work is contained in articles, some of which are republished in two collections: Postures of the Mind and Moral Prejudices. She retired in 1995 and lives in New Zealand with her husband Kurt Baier.

Baier’s work spans ethics, philosophical psychology, epistemology, philosophy of mind, political philosophy, feminism and history of philosophy. A unifying theme throughout her work is naturalism. She sees much of the philosophical tradition from Descartes to Locke and Kant as in conflict with a naturalistic outlook. For instance, Locke distinguishes the biological entity, ‘the man’, from the thinking thing, or person. It is possible, Locke says, that the same man could be born of different women at different times. Lockean persons are detached from gene pool, social connections and family origins, and have only a tenuous psychological continuity. Baier points out that this Lockean view of persons also makes it seem that women are fixed by their biology while men float free. On the alternative naturalist perspective, all persons are corporeal beings with a genetic inheritance upon which their ability to think is dependent. Baier points out that naturalists should also realise that human infants depend for long periods on other human persons, usually mothers, if that ability is to mature. She argues therefore in Commons of the Mind that reason is not, as Descartes believed, whole and complete in each of us: it is a social skill that needs to be
nurtured in children and develops fully only in relations with others. We are born to persons and learn the arts of personhood from others. We are essentially ‘second persons’, since self-consciousness is dependent on the responses and recognition of others, particularly those first persons who treat us as one of them. Upon this mutual responsiveness depend the arts of representation, language, memory and conscience.

Personhood in the Lockean and Kantian tradition is a moral concept and persons are moral atoms. Both in the philosophy of mind and in ethics atomists attempt to analyse phenomena into basic constituents which obey (or should obey) universal laws. Baier’s naturalism leads to a rejection of atomism and the liberal contractarianism which depends on it. Idealised, separate moral atoms are a figment of philosophers’ imagination, she argues, and a focus on these imaginary entities directs attention away from our collective responsibilities in the real world (such as our responsibility for the environment) as well as from what is done to people as groups. Baier is also critical of the Kantian and contractarian belief in universal rules governing moral relations between autonomous individuals. Contract theories assume that relations between persons are relations of equality, but vulnerability and asymmetrical dependence are more common in human relations and should be of more concern to ethicists than deals done between equals.

The dominant philosophical influence on Baier’s work is Hume. Her book _A Progress of Sentiments_ provides a valuable account of Hume’s philosophy in his _Treatise of Human Nature_. The _Treatise_ is often read in a disjointed way by philosophers who focus on arguments about causation or perception or morality or personal identity in isolation from each other. Baier’s unified account corrects these partial readings and also challenges the traditional conception of Hume as a radical sceptic and destroyer of reason. She sees Hume as freeing us from the obsessions and anxieties of a one-sided intellectual theorising, thus permitting the philosopher to engage all the capacities of the mind, including memory, feeling, passion and imagination as well as reason. Her approach makes use of Hume’s self descriptions in the early sections, tracing his moves from solitary independent thinker to victim of common habit, to sceptic and liberator from norms, to reasoner enmeshed in his own contradictions and finally to his reunion with friends in the common human refusal to think further about such things. The inevitable return to philosophy (after a session of backgammon or wine) will be with the whole mind, knowing and accepting its feelings and indulging its passions. Baier argues that Hume intends this dynamic to reveal the absurdity of the contradictions we are led into by narrow intellectualising. It also moves us towards a reformed and less sceptical reason: one which conforms more closely to commonsense. Metaphysical concerns give way to the moral and practical issues investigated in books two and three of the _Treatise_. Hume argues here that we have a better understanding of human passions and morality if we recognise the interdependence of reason and sentiment.
Baier agrees of course with Hume’s conclusions, and her interpretation also provides an insight into her own conception of philosophy and how it applies to the world. Unlike most moral theories, which Baier sees as applying just to the morality of a few adult intellectuals, Hume’s theory recognizes the scope of ‘vulgar’ morality and the role of reflection and sentiment as a force in human life. What a theory calls ‘morality’ should be the kind of thing a mother could teach her children, she says, suggesting in her article ‘Extending the Limits of Moral Theory’ that we might explain someone’s moral character by saying, ‘His mother was a contractarian (libertarian, utilitarian)’ (1986a: 541).

In several of her articles she argues that an ethical theory appropriate to women’s concerns and moral insights will tend to be a Humean one. Drawing on the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan, she claims that what women want in a moral theory is something more comprehensive than an account of moral obligation. An adequate theory will allow scope for the role of feeling in moral judgement. It will also require an account of the concept of trust. This notion can shed light on both love and obligation and integrate women’s and men’s ethical theories. For an ethics of love must give an account of the conditions of trustworthiness and an account of obligation must deal with issues about trusting the enforcers of obligation.

Baier’s most influential article is ‘Trust and AntiTrust’ (1986a). Starting from the observation that trust is necessary, since no one is self-sufficient with respect to those things they care for most, Baier develops an analysis of this important concept, previously unexplored by philosophers. Trust involves more than reliance: it is letting others take care of something we care about and giving them discretionary powers to do so. Not all things that thrive in conditions of trust are good, however: exploitation may depend on trust. So how should relations of trust be assessed morally? The task is to distinguish the relevant moral features of those relations.

Though she has spent most of her working life in North America, Baier’s conception of ethics has influenced philosophers in Australasia. One such philosopher is Karen Jones, who like Baier sees trust as distinct from mere reliance and as involving discretionary power. But Jones argues that trust should be seen more as an attitude of optimism vested in the goodwill and competence of those we count upon. She takes trust to be more a way of seeing the other rather than a relation of the kind Baier analyses.

Baier’s work deserves to have wide influence. It investigates the consequences of a conception of human beings as interdependent social animals, a view of ourselves which is commonly accepted but often forgotten by philosophers.
Declared a university in 1994 (although its predecessor institutions date back to 1870), the University of Ballarat focusses on achieving greater educational benefits for the communities in Central and Western Victoria. In particular, it has always aimed to closely integrate its development and strategic objectives with the various needs of the region. This has meant that seemingly strictly academic disciplines such as philosophy have always had a somewhat ambiguous status within the institution.

Nonetheless, the possibility of philosophy being included within the unit offerings of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences was raised back in 1986 (when the institution was the Ballarat College of Advanced Education), and resulted in two philosophy-specific units, entitled ‘Logic and Reasoning’ and ‘Being and Knowing’, being offered for the first time in 1988. These however were controversial new offerings and were initially taught by staff with an interest in the subject matter on a voluntary basis (with staff getting little recognition of this teaching in their workload). Furthermore, given that these units were originally taught by staff from outside of the Humanities and Social Sciences, there was ongoing tension regarding their ownership, position within the B.A., and potential funding. Despite these problems, a further introductory philosophy unit was developed and first offered in 1991, and a proposal for a Minor in Philosophy (comprising five units, students needing to complete four) was circulated towards the end of 1991.

These modest beginnings, spearheaded by John Winkelman (a lecturer in psychology), led to the contracting in 1994 of Edwin Coleman to be responsible for the coordination and teaching of the Minor. This in turn led to the addition of more specialised units in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of science, and classical, modern, political and Asian philosophies. Initially part-time, this position became full-time in 2003 with the appointment of Angus Nicholls as lecturer in philosophy, who was then replaced by Jane Mummery in 2005. Since her appointment Jane Mummery has further consolidated the Minor in Philosophy, refining and increasing the offerings in philosophy by adding units in applied ethics and Continental philosophy, and units emphasising connections not only with other disciplines such as film, mass media and cultural theory, but also with the problematics of technology and the environment.

The past years have seen philosophy secure its position at the University of Ballarat. The current unit offerings, set within a dynamic interdisciplinary context, introduce students to a broad range of philosophical traditions and give them the chance to develop a strong foundation in philosophical study.
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The past few years have also seen the growth of a small cohort of postgraduate students working in the fields of political and Continental philosophy and phenomenology. This group, with Jane Mummery’s encouragement, also founded the University of Ballarat Annual Philosophy Symposium in 2007. This provides a showcase for student and staff research and, it is hoped, will become a gathering of all those interested in philosophy in the Ballarat region.

Hence, from very modest beginnings with a few units taught on a voluntary basis, philosophy at Ballarat has become a thriving part of the university. This is due to the collective commitment and enthusiasm of previous and current staff and students, all of whom have been instrumental in keeping philosophy alive and vibrant in the face of funding and teaching problems, concern over the structure of the B.A., and issues regarding the strategic direction of the university. It is to be hoped that regardless of the challenges thrown at it, philosophy will continue to be part of what the University of Ballarat offers the communities in Central and Western Victoria.

Bioethics

Lynn Gillam & Georgina Hall

Bioethics investigates ethical issues that arise out of the practice of medicine and pursuit of biotechnology, covering a broad array of practical matters including informed consent, advance directives, euthanasia, abortion, and reproductive and genetic technologies. Ethics as a philosophical discipline has in the past been largely concerned with quite abstract issues in metaethics and normative ethical theory, but advances in science since the 1970s have given applied ethics a high profile and real-life, practical urgency.

Bioethics is a relatively new field of academic inquiry, and has two distinctive features. Firstly, its nature as an academic discipline is contested. It tends to be seen by philosophers as a specialty area within moral philosophy, usually as a branch of applied ethics. Others, however, see it as a multi-disciplinary field of study, drawing not only from philosophy, but also from law, sociology, the biomedical sciences, medicine and the other health professions, politics and theology. On the latter view, it is not only philosophers who do bioethics. In this article we will describe the contributions of three, often overlapping, groups working in bioethics: (i) philosophers in academic philosophy circles; (ii) philosophers, doctors, lawyers, social scientists, biomedical scientists and others working on specific issues in bioethics, often in the public domain; and (iii) healthcare professionals, some of whom have philosophical or bioethics training, working in both health care and academia.
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The second distinctive feature is that bioethics is not solely a theoretical or abstract discipline. Being concerned with actual matters of how scientists and health professionals should act, and how public policy should be framed, bioethics must by its very nature interact with people, ideas and practices in these areas. Arguments made by philosophers in the field of bioethics are often intended to have practical application, and even if not so intended, will be frequently interpreted in this way. The extent to which bioethics has become a public rather than a purely academic discourse, with attendant public responses, is exemplified by Peter Singer’s ill-fated academic trips to Germany in 1989 and 1991, where courses, public lectures and ultimately the International Wittgenstein Symposium on Applied Ethics were cancelled because of public opposition to the idea of euthanasia even being discussed.

Helga Kuhse summed up the unusual position of bioethics in the philosophical landscape when she was asked in a 1998 interview with the Voluntary Euthanasia Society of Scotland why she, a philosopher, would take such a public stance on euthanasia and ‘take sides’. She responded:

In the first half of this century and beyond philosophers generally took the view that ethics was concerned largely with an analysis of the meaning of words, such as ‘good’ or ‘right’, and that practical questions were not their concern. In the 1970s this had begun to change and philosophers focussed on practical questions—such as the moral rights and wrongs of abortion, the Vietnam war, and the question of euthanasia. In this they returned to a much older tradition that has always seen moral philosophy or ethics as practical, that is, as being concerned with what to do, rather than with knowledge, or what is the case. I have always seen moral philosophy as practical in that sense. After all, if your moral reflection tells you that a particular action or policy is unfair and unjust, and that traditional modes of thinking about it are deeply flawed, how can you remain silent and do nothing? (Kuhse 1998)

Although issues such as abortion and euthanasia have been current for many years, the field of bioethics as a distinctive academic discipline arguably began in the 1970s. In Australasia, the most prominent early voices were the philosophers Peter Singer, Max Charlesworth, and Helga Kuhse.

Peter Singer has worked more broadly in applied ethics, but is undoubtedly the best-known Australian bioethicist. His seminal early works included Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals (1975) and Practical Ethics (1979). In the second edition of the latter, he famously and controversially challenged the traditional ‘sanctity of life’ doctrine, putting forward a utilitarian analysis of abortion and euthanasia debates, and giving a central role to the concept of personhood. Often quoted, and often misunderstood in the public debate, is his position that ‘killing a disabled infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person. Very often it is not wrong at all’ (Singer 1993: 191).
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In 1981, Singer was appointed the foundation Director of the Centre for Human Bioethics at Monash University, the first Australasian research centre devoted entirely to bioethics. Other bioethics centres soon sprang up during the 1980s, based at hospitals as well as universities, including the Bioethics Centre at the University of Otago, the St Vincent’s Bioethics Centre at St Vincent’s Hospital Melbourne (founding Director Nicholas Tonti-Filippini), the Plunkett Centre for Ethics at St Vincent’s Hospital in Sydney (founding Director Bernadette Tobin), and the Centre for Values, Ethics and Law in Medicine (VELIM) at the University of Sydney (founding director Miles Little). Bioethics centres are now a standard feature of the bioethics landscape in Australasia.

This development of bioethics centres coincided with, and was to some extent driven by, events of the time. In Australia, new and contentious advances in biotechnology, especially reproductive technologies such as IVF (in vitro fertilisation) and surrogacy, became the subject of public and academic debate, particularly because many of the scientific developments were coming from the Melbourne-based research team led by Carl Wood and Alan Trounson at Monash IVF. Peter Singer was prominent in these debates over reproductive technologies, publishing *Test-Tube Babies: A Guide to Moral Questions, Present Techniques, and Future Possibilities* (Singer and Walters 1982) and *The Reproduction Revolution: New Ways of Making Babies* (Singer and Wells 1984). His position was broadly in favour of reproductive technologies, and in particular attributed no significant moral status to human embryos. This position was challenged by Norman Ford, a Roman Catholic theologian who later became the founding Director of the Caroline Chisholm Centre for Health Ethics, in *When Did I Begin?: The Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science* (1988).

Coming from a quite different theoretical perspective, Max Charlesworth, now emeritus professor at Deakin University, also wrote about these issues in his *Life, Death, Genes, and Ethics* (1989). Initially, Charlesworth favoured the more restrictive and conservative approach adopted by the Waller Committee, but gradually altered his views, taking the more liberal position that in a democratic society individual autonomy should be protected where it does no harm to others. Charlesworth’s later book *Bioethics in a Liberal Society* (1993) reflects this view. In 1988, Charlesworth was appointed Chair of the National Bioethics Consultative Committee (NBCC), set up by the Australian government to brief it on issues such as human embryo experimentation, gamete donation and access to reproductive technology. Most notably, Charlesworth chaired an investigation into surrogacy which recommended in favour of altruistic surrogacy. This finding was controversial at the time and faced so much opposition that the committee was all but disbanded in 1991.

Another prominent voice in bioethics in Australia at this time was Helga Kuhse, who worked closely with Peter Singer at the Monash Centre for Human Bioethics from the early 1980s (Singer and Kuhse 1993), especially on issues
related to euthanasia and end-of-life decisions. Major publications from this time include *Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants* (Kuhse and Singer 1985) and *The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine: A Critique* (Kuhse 1987). Kuhse, like Singer, took a utilitarian approach to these issues.

Robert Young, a philosopher from La Trobe University, was also involved publicly in the voluntary euthanasia debate as President of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society of Victoria. During this time he wrote *Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom* (1986), which has been an influential contribution on autonomy, arguably the central ethical concept for bioethics. Another important contribution on autonomy is Merle Spriggs’ book *Autonomy and Patient Decisions* (2005).

In New Zealand in the 1980s bioethics was partly driven by the landmark event which came to be known as ‘The Unfortunate Experiment’. In 1987, two journalists revealed disturbing evidence about a study of cervical cancer conducted by a leading Auckland obstetrician, who had included his patients in an ongoing clinical trial without their consent or even knowledge. They were not informed of potentially helpful treatment alternatives that were available to them, and some died as a result. A Commission of Inquiry followed, chaired by the future Governor-General of New Zealand, Dame Silvia Cartwright. The Cartwright Report became a key document in bioethics, especially human research ethics, in New Zealand.

Grant Gillett is perhaps the best known New Zealand bioethicist of this time, and he continues to be active and influential in the field. A neurosurgeon with a doctorate in philosophy, Gillett was the founding Director of the Bioethics Centre at the University of Otago. He is the co-author of *Bioethics in the Clinic: Hippocratic Reflections, Representation, Meaning and Thought* (Gillett et al. 2004), and *Medical Ethics* (Gillett et al. 1992). Other New Zealanders prominent in bioethics at this time were Gareth Jones (1991), writing on respect for the dead, and Rosalind Hursthouse, writing on abortion (Hursthouse 1987).

By the early 1990s, bioethics was expanding, with more philosophers and academics from other disciplines involved, and the range of bioethical issues under active consideration was broadening. At this time, the Australasian Bioethics Association was founded by Max Charlesworth and Christine Martin, with the aim of promoting debate on bioethics issues amongst academics and health professionals broadly. Reproductive ethics (abortion, IVF, surrogacy) remained a major area of interest: contributors to the debate included Catriona MacKenzie (1992), Suzanne Uniacke (1994), Rosalind Hursthouse (1991) and Leslie Cannold (1995) on abortion, and Justin Oakley (1989), Susan Dodds and Karen Jones (1989) on surrogacy. Euthanasia (increasingly referred to under the umbrella of ‘end-of-life decision-making’) also continued to attract attention (e.g. Kuhse 1994). Emerging areas at that time included research ethics, clinical ethics, and the ethics of genetics (especially pre-natal testing), and since then all have become established in the bioethics arena.
Research ethics became subject to a regulatory system, as well as a field of research in bioethics, and has attracted considerable attention, especially from Paul McNeill (McNeill 1993) and many others, including Lynn Gillam, Deborah Zion and Bebe Loff (Zion et al. 2002). The National Health and Medical Research Council made a requirement that universities and other research institutions have Human Research Ethics Committees (HRECs), and in the 1990s set up the Australian Human Ethics Committee (AHEC) to oversee them. Many bioethicists have served on the AHEC, including Nicholas Tonti-Filipinni, Wendy Rogers, Don Chalmers (a lawyer) and Chris Cordner. Chalmers was Chair of AHEC when the first National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans was produced in 1999, and Cordner chaired the working party for the 2007 revision of the National Statement. Many others have been members of HRECs.

Clinical ethics is now a recognised area of specialisation within bioethics, with informed consent, end-of-life decisions, the doctor-patient relationship, organ transplantation (e.g. Ankeny 2001), and resource allocation as some of the matters at issue. Key figures include both clinicians with bioethics or philosophy training, and bioethicists, such as Paul Komesaroff, Ian Kerridge (1998), Mal Parker, Lynn Gillam, Annette-Braunack Mayer and Wendy Rogers (2004), all of whom were involved in the formulation in 1991 of a consensus medical ethics curriculum (Braunack-Mayer et al. 1991). Megan-Jane Johnstone put forward a bioethically-informed but distinctive nursing position in clinical ethics (Johnstone 1989).

The ethics of genetic interventions, especially pre-natal and pre-implantation diagnosis, and genetic enhancement, are the subject of ongoing debate. Julian Savulescu, in a well-known article which propounds the principle of ‘procreative beneficence’ (Savulescu 2001), has argued that parents have a moral obligation to ensure that they produce the most genetically optimal offspring. Savulescu was Director of the Ethics of Genetics Unit at Melbourne’s Murdoch Childrens Research Institute at the time and is the Director of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics in the U.K. Nicholas Agar, in Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement (2004), also examines the extension of human reproductive freedom to include the selection (or avoidance) of certain characteristics of future children. A very different voice, much more critical of selection technologies, came from Christopher Newell (1999), a bioethicist and well-known disability advocate with a background in theological ethics, who passed away suddenly in mid 2008.

Alongside all of this, there has been ongoing work on ethical theory relevant to bioethics. Virtue ethics has become prominent through the work of Justin Oakley (Oakley and Cocking 2001), who took over from Helga Kuhse as Director of the Monash Centre for Human Bioethics in 1999, and Rosalind Hursthouse (1999). The notion of an ‘ethics of care’ advanced by some nursing theorists has come under sustained investigation by Helga Kuhse (1997) and Stan van Hooft (1995).
Bioethics is not an easy area of philosophy to come to grips with, being characterised by diversity and multi-disciplinarity. Apart from philosophers, medical doctors (e.g. Gillett, Savulescu, Komesaroff and Kerridge) are centrally involved. Legal academics (including Don Chalmers, Cameron Stewart, Belinda Bennett, Roger Magnusson and Margaret Otloowski) play a major role, especially in the public domain. Notable among these is Loane Skene (1998, 1990), who has written extensively about genetics and the use of human tissue and informed consent. Skene was Deputy Chair of the Australian government’s Lockhart Committee, which reviewed the use of human embryos and recommended legalising the creation of embryos for research on somatic cell nuclear transfer in 2005. There is also a significant presence in Australasian bioethics of theologians and philosophers working from a Roman Catholic perspective, including Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, Norman Ford and Bernadette Tobin. Sociologists such as Rob Irvine are also involved. Some philosophically trained bioethicists, including Lynn Gillam (Guillemin and Gillam 2005), Annette Braunack-Mayer (2005) and Paul Komesaroff, have also incorporated empirical research methods and theoretical frameworks from the social sciences into their work, a trend which appears to be turning into a common and established practice in Australasian bioethics. This diversity and multi-disciplinarity can be expected to continue fruitfully in the future.

**Body, The**

Rosalyn Diprose

Australasian philosophers, particularly feminist philosophers influenced by European philosophical traditions, have been at the forefront of international attempts to reconceive the nature of human embodiment. Beginning in the late 1970s, with the introduction of pertinent European thought into the philosophy curriculum at the University of Sydney (e.g. the work of Freud, Lacan, Foucault, and Derrida), Australasian philosophers of the body have developed critiques of dominant concepts of the human body and alternative models of the role the body plays in subjectivity, politics and ethics.

The fundamental target of these critiques is two related ways that ‘embodiment’ is loosely understood within and beyond philosophy: in the sense of the concrete expression of human being in a body and in the sense of the concrete expression of ideas, concepts, and meanings in material signifiers (e.g. words, laws, or social institutions). Implied in both senses of embodiment is the idea of the incarnation or expression in material form of a non-material essence where that essence is assumed to exist prior to its embodiment and ideally persists in pure form,
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despite its embodiment. Following Descartes’ *Meditations on First Philosophy*, for example, where human existence is said to centre on a thinking, non-material substance, the embodiment of that **consciousness** (in a bio-mechanical, causally determined body) is viewed as incidental and secondary to the essence of human being. Similarly, if concepts are assumed to be immaterial entities, then their embodiment in and expression through material signifiers (words, laws, etc.) is said to be secondary to the origin and essence of meaning. In both cases, the body tends to be viewed as either irrelevant to the essence it supposedly signifies or a problem: a potential hindrance to achieving rational subjectivity in the case of the human body, and the source of the corruption of meaning in the case of the body of the sign. Such assumptions limit our understanding of how socio-political meanings and values about human differences (about sexed, raced or ‘disabled’ bodies, for example) impact on our perception of other persons (to foster inequitable social relations, for instance) or how embodied human beings might be ‘socialised’ by the different meanings they signify in a social and political context. Philosophers of the body ask how socio-political meanings of differences become incarnated in human beings without assuming we are fully determined by those meanings or, conversely, free to reject them at will.

Answering that question has involved challenging the **dualisms** (mind/body, reason/passion, meaning/expression, culture/nature) apparent in these two general senses of embodiment. The body is thereby given a more active role in the expression of human being and of cultural meanings. Various accounts of the body have emerged from this work that draw on ideas from the history of philosophy to challenge dominant understandings of corporeality and the corporeal and affective dimensions of human agency, perception, thinking, and sociality. These accounts characterise human existence in ways that fall between materialism and **Idealism** by proposing that the body and the differences it signifies are central to human existence, but are irreducible to a bio-physical, causally determined mechanism of Cartesian philosophy and of some forms of contemporary materialism. And, insofar as these models of the body account for the incarnation and transformation of social and political norms, meanings and values, they also provide ways of rethinking the role of the body and affectivity in ethics and politics.

Two early and highly influential interventions along these lines in Australasian philosophy was Moira Gatens’ ‘A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction’ (first published in 1983) and **Genevieve Lloyd**’s *The Man of Reason* (first published in 1984). The significance of Lloyd’s book for a philosophy of the body lies more in her critical examination of dichotomous thought (in particular mind/body dualism and the related distinction between reason and passion) and its consequences for ideas of sexual difference, rather than an examination of the nature of embodiment per se. She demonstrates that, in the history of philosophy, ‘the male-female distinction has been used to symbolise the distinction between reason and its opposites’ such that ‘our ideals of Reason have historically incorporated an exclusion of the feminine, and that femininity itself has been partly
constituted through such processes of exclusion’ (Lloyd 1993: x, xix). Gatens’ focus has been on showing how the body plays a pivotal role in this process of the social constitution of sexual and other differences. Initially with reference to Freud’s idea that the ego is a bodily ego, she argues that human identity and behaviour do not reside exclusively in the mind; nor is the body a neutral or passive tabulae rasa upon which ideas of (sexual and other) differences are imprinted. Rather, Gatens argues, the different ways in which male and female bodies are represented, perceived and evaluated in a socio-political context feed back, through the incorporation of these ideas, into the different (and sometimes conflicting) ways that sexed bodies are lived at the level of pre-reflective experience (Gatens 1996b: 3–20). The connection between, on the one hand, critiques of dichotomous thinking and of the socio-political representation of differences and, on the other hand, efforts to reconceive the body, is explained by Gatens in ‘Toward a Feminist Philosophy of the Body’ (1988): redressing social inequities requires, not only political action, but also work on the conceptual dimensions of the relation between the bodies of the disadvantaged and the body politic (the state apparatus and culturally dominant conceptions of the body) (see also Gatens 1991a, 1991b). The third significant figure influencing the emergence of philosophies of the body in the 1980s was Elizabeth Grosz: through her teaching of semiotics (Jacques Derrida’s critiques of dichotomous thought and the representation of differences, in particular) and her early work on the social constitution of embodied sexual difference influenced by psychoanalytic theory, in particular that of French feminists, such as Luce Irigaray (Grosz 1989).

The development of philosophies of the body through the late 1980s and early 1990s was due to a large degree to the teaching activities of these philosophers and their graduate students at the University of Sydney, Australian National University, University of New South Wales, and Monash University. The multidirectional character of the philosophies of the body that began to emerge in Australasia, and the variety of philosophical resources being used, was reflected in an anthology published in 1991, Cartographies: Poststructuralism and the Mapping of Bodies and Spaces (ed. Diprose and Ferrell). Several Australian authors represented in this volume, one of only two on the body available internationally at the time, went on to publish works reconceiving the body and its relation to the politics of difference, thinking, and/or ethics: Diprose (1994, 2002), Ferrell (1996, 2006), Gatens (1996), Kirby (1997), Patton (2000), and Vasseleu (1998). At the same time, by the late 1980s, there was a critique of the classical Liberal (Lockean) notion of the body as the person’s property emerging in Australasian political philosophy (Pateman 1988) and in bioethics (Mackenzie 1986; Dodds and Jones 1992).

Australasian philosophers of the body have drawn from three other philosophical traditions, besides psychoanalytic theory and the critiques of the dualist conception of the representation of differences mentioned above. First, Spinoza’s seventeenth-century critique of Descartes’ substance dualism has played an important role in inspiring revised ideas of the body, particularly through the work
of Gatens (1988, 1996) and Lloyd (1996). Within Spinoza’s monism, the mind is an ‘idea of’ the body; mind and body are the same substance conceived under two different ‘attributes’. Therefore, the human body does not contain a mind nor do bodies incorporate pre-existing ideas; rather, every ‘mode’ of extension is identical with the ‘idea of’ that mode. Using Spinoza’s related concept that imagination is also an idea that reflects the constitution of the body, Gatens develops her idea of ‘imaginary bodies’ to explain how historically and culturally variable ideas of different bodies constitute bodies and their powers and, conversely, how human powers may be altered ‘through changes in our understanding of self and others’ (1996: xiv). This lays the foundation for a new ethics and politics of difference proposed in Imaginary Bodies (Gatens 1996).

Second, reinterpretations of two aspects of Nietzsche’s ‘materialism’, and their development through the work of Foucault and/or Deleuze, have also been influential in advancing Australasian philosophies of the body, particularly through the work of Diprose (1989, 1994), Grosz (1994) and Patton (1989, 1991). These are Nietzsche’s proposal in On the Genealogy of Morals that social moral norms are incorporated through punishment such that ideas that become conscious are already ‘interpreted’ through the body; and his doctrine of ‘will to power’, which includes the idea that bodies are ‘works of art’, that is, bodies are forces, sets of effects, or ‘quanta of power’ in relation to other quanta of power that, through resistance, evaluation and interpretation, form complexes of power and meaning (Diprose 1989, 1994). Both these ideas of the body foreshadow Foucault’s influential thesis in Discipline and Punish that the human body is the locus of subjection (social control and subject formation) in that ‘micro-techniques of power’ such as discipline and ‘biopower’, in concert with prevailing social norms and the knowledges of the human sciences, produce self-regulating bodies that enact ideas which need not pass through consciousness (Patton 1989). In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) develop the idea of a ‘body without organs’ from Nietzsche’s thesis about ‘quanta of power’. The ‘body without organs’ describes the corporeal intensities, powers, and flows that exceed and defy organisation and regulation into a meaningful, proper body. Paul Patton’s translations, teaching, and research of Foucault and Deleuze’s philosophy in the 1980s and 1990s have played an important role in bringing that work to bear on the development of philosophies of the body in Australasia such that adaptations of Foucault’s thesis on the body and power appear throughout the field. Reinterpretations of Deleuze’s philosophy of corporeality, power, and difference, while apparent in the early 1990s, began to have a greater impact by the late 1990s, both in political philosophy (Braidotti 1994; Patton 2000) and aesthetics (Colebrook 2002; Munster 2006).

The third dominant resource for Australasian philosophers’ rethinking of the body, difference and meaning since the 1980s has been twentieth-century existential phenomenology, particularly the work of Simone de Beauvoir (Gatens 1991b; Mackenzie 1986; Deutscher 2005) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the body and its critical appropriation by Diprose (1994, 2002), Grosz
(1994) and Vasseleu (1998). On Merleau-Ponty’s model of the perceiving body (in *Phenomenology of Perception* 1962, for example), socio-political meaning is necessarily ambiguous and open to transformation, and ‘subjectivity’ is intercorporeal such that the meaning expressed in perception comes as much from the world and from the other person as it does from oneself. Through this, and his later idea of sensibility through ‘flesh’ (the ‘intertwining’ of bodies, ideas and ‘matter’ in general), Merleau-Ponty provides resources for bringing together questions of human embodiment with the embodiment of meaning, understanding both in terms of the following formula: the body expresses existence, not as a symbol of an external or inner idea; the body expresses existence (and therefore meaning) as it realises it through sensibility in the ‘undividedness of the [act of] sensing and the [“object”] sensed’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964). One important application of Merleau-Ponty’s work in the hands of Australasian philosophers of the body has been in critiques of the medical model of the body in relation to bioethics (Diprose 1994; various authors in Komesaroff 1995). By the early 2000s Diprose extended this approach to the body, combined with Emmanuel Levinas’ idea of ‘responsibility for the other’, to formulate an ethics of ‘corporeal generosity’ (2002). The phenomenological approach to the body has reached into interdisciplinary fields since 2000, including attention to the politics of cultural difference and postcolonialism and is being further developed by a new generation of Australian philosophers, such as Reynolds (2005), Ross (2007) and Sorial (2004).

By developing their philosophies of the body through a range of philosophical traditions, Australasian philosophers have not only produced multifarious models of human embodiment for which they are internationally renowned, but they have also made significant contributions to scholarship on thinkers such as Spinoza, Nietzsche, Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Deleuze.

**Bond University**

Damian Cox

Bond University is Australia’s first not-for-profit private university. It was founded in 1987 and its first students enrolled in 1989. Located in Queensland’s Gold Coast, it has grown into a successful university with over 4,000 students.

Philosophy has played a central role in the curriculum at Bond University since the university’s inception. Undergraduate programs in Law, Business, Information Technology, Education, Psychology, Humanities and so on include a suite of core (i.e. compulsory) curriculum components. Philosophy is represented in the core curriculum through a course in the history of ethics and political philosophy,
and, from 2010, through a course in informal logic and reasoning skills. Bond University teaches a major in philosophy, covering topics in epistemology and 

**metaphysics**, philosophy of mind, **philosophy of religion**, Buddhist philosophy, political philosophy, and philosophy and film.

Philosophers who have made significant contributions to Bond University include: Raoul Mortley (Platonism, Neoplatonism, the development of Christianity, and contemporary European Philosophy); Peter Harrison (seventeenth-century **philosophy of science**); and Damian Cox (**realism**, ethics, politics).
Canberra Plan

Daniel Nolan

The expression ‘Canberra Plan’ has two connected uses. The primary use is to pick out a particular kind of philosophical analysis. This form of philosophical analysis is a close relative of the so-called ‘Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method of defining theoretical terms’; some would even use the two expressions as synonyms.

The less common use is to pick out a cluster of views associated with staff and students in the Philosophy Program of the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University, particularly during the 1990s. As well as including a commitment to the Canberra Plan in the first sense, the Canberra Plan in this second sense included various metaphysical commitments like physicalism and four-dimensionalism in the philosophy of time; and philosophy of language commitments like the use of two-dimensional semantics. The remainder of this entry will concentrate on the first, narrower sense of ‘Canberra Plan’.

The origin of the expression ‘Canberra Plan’ was in drafts of O’Leary-Hawthorne and Price (1996), where it was used as an uncomplimentary label for the method of philosophical analysis described above. As O’Leary-Hawthorne and Price say, ‘Canberra’s detractors often charge that as a planned city, and a government town, it lacks the rich diversity of “real” cities. Our thought was that in missing the functional diversity of ordinary linguistic usage, the Canberra Plan makes the same kind of mistake about language’ (O’Leary-Hawthorne and Price 1996: 291, n23). The label has stuck: see, for example, Lewis (2004: 76 and 104, n3), who talks about the ‘Canberra Plan’ for causation, referring to the theories proposed in Tooley (1987) and Menzies (1996). A number of ‘Canberra Planners’ have recuperated the expression and would use it to describe their own projects.

In many ways the centrepiece of the Canberra Plan is the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis approach to theoretical terms. Those interested in the technical details
Canberra Plan

should consult Lewis (1970) and Lewis (1972): only an informal characterisation will be given here. The core of the method is to treat the targets of philosophical analysis to be implicitly defined by a defining theory. The defining theory is then manipulated to give us a ‘role’ expressed in relatively neutral terms: for example, applying the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis approach to folk psychology is supposed to provide, at least in principle, a specification of what beliefs, desires, etc. are entirely in terms of their typical causal role in being produced by sensation and causing bodily movements. Once we have a role (e.g. for beliefs and desires), we look to our theory of the world to tell us what it is that plays that role: what the best deservers are. According to Lewis (1970), the best deservers to be the referents of expressions like ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ are certain brain states, since these are the things with the right sorts of causal relationships to sensation on the one hand, and behaviour on the other.

Sometimes when we use a defining theory of $X$ to tell us that $X$ is whatever satisfies such-and-such conditions, we end up with a role that nothing satisfies perfectly. For example, Jackson and Pettit (1995) suggest we use something like folk morality to yield a ‘role’ played by moral goodness, fairness, justice, right action, and the rest. But given the vagaries of ordinary moral opinion, it is unlikely that anything will have all of the features attributed to, e.g. moral goodness. The best deserver need not satisfy all of the conditions specified by a role: it is only important that it satisfy enough, and satisfy more than its rivals.

So far, then, we have a proposal for producing the definitions of problematic expressions and a way of establishing identities between theoretical posits (e.g. mental states and brain states). Two other things need to be supplied before such a process can be carried out. We need to be able to come up with a suitable defining theory in the first place, and we need to know what there is in the world to serve as potential ‘best deservers’, or role-fillers, for the second stage of the process. Canberra Plan analyses typically have distinctive approaches to these two questions as well.

When dealing with theoretical terms in the sciences, it might be reasonable to expect that we can find a canonical theory, or group of canonical theories, to use as our basis. But there is not usually a ready-made theory to use when we want an analysis of free will, or right action, or truth, or properties. A procedure Canberra Planners often engage in at this stage is called ‘collecting the platitudes’. The platitudes concerning a certain topic are significant truths about that topic that are implicitly believed by most, or all, competent speakers. This technical use of ‘platitudes’ is to be distinguished from the ordinary meaning of that word—there is no requirement that the Canberra Plan platitudes should be immediately obvious or apparently uninteresting. When the Canberra Plan is applied to the philosophy of mind, the aim is to articulate folk psychology: by analogy, the aim when gathering the platitudes about other topics is often articulate ordinary or ‘pre-theoretic’ commitments about the topic.

There is much less discussion in the current literature of how to determine what potential role-fillers there are than there is about how to determine what
the roles are. Many of the central Canberra Planners, like David Lewis, Philip Pettit and Frank Jackson (these days) are naturalists and physicalists, and so in many cases Canberra Planners will assume that the sought-for deservers will be physical objects or states or properties of some sort. Physicalism is not necessary to employ Canberra Plan methods, of course. But philosophers without a settled fundamental ontology face a significant question at this stage: where should we look to discover what potential ‘deservers’ there are to fill the roles specified by step one?

So far I have been describing the Canberra Plan method as something that collects all the relevant platitudes, constructs a role that only a few things might meet, and locates a best deserver for an eventual identity claim. But sometimes it can be useful to only carry out part of this program. For example, one could construct enough of the role, and be opinionated enough about what the range of potential deservers is, to answer some questions of philosophical interest, even if no specific theoretical identity claim could be established. In fact, this partial use of the plan was what happened in Lewis (1970) and Lewis (1972): Lewis did not purport to actually provide a complete folk psychological theory to be Ramsified, nor did he say exactly which brain states were identical with each belief or desire. Instead, Lewis provided only a few platitudes, and drew the general conclusion that beliefs and desires must be some brain state or other.

Philosophical analysis on the Canberra Plan is often associated with defending the respectability of *a priori* philosophical knowledge, and with armchair methods in philosophy more generally. (One of the seminal papers for the Canberra Plan was Frank Jackson’s 1994 paper called, ‘Armchair Metaphysics’. This method would at least arguably give *a priori* results if the assembled platitudes implicitly defined the theoretical term in question. If it was analytic that $X$ was whatever best played such-and-such a role, then the philosophical analysis produced would be *a priori*, at least given the usual assumption that analytic truths are *a priori*. This approach to the *a priori* is associated with Rudolf Carnap (see Carnap 1963: 958–63).

Key papers for inspiring the Canberra Plan are David Lewis’ (1970 and 1972), as well as the development of analytic functionalism about the mind in Lewis (1966) and Armstrong (1968). Later papers where Lewis discusses his method of philosophical analysis also influenced Canberra Planners (see Nolan 2005: 213–27 for a survey of Lewis’ method). As well as those papers, there are a number of works that stand as prime examples of applications of the ‘Canberra Plan’. Jackson (1998b) is probably the most central, a book-length defence of an approach to conceptual analysis in the Canberra Plan tradition. Jackson, Oppy and Smith (1994) is the paper that sparked the original ‘Canberra Plan’ label in O’Leary-Hawthorne and Price (1996). Tooley (1987) and Smith (1994) are both books that carry out Canberra-Plan-style analyses. Braddock-Mitchell and Nola (2009) is a book of essays discussing the Canberra Plan by both its supporters and its critics.

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Canterbury, University of

Derek Browne

Few traces remain of the early history of philosophy at Canterbury. Courses in ‘mental science’ were taught from 1900, but there is no evidence that philosophy played anything other than a minor role in the life of the university for the next few decades. The future of philosophy at Canterbury even became a matter of public debate in 1936, when it was proposed to fill the newly created chair in philosophy with a psychologist. Public protests followed. Letters appeared in the local newspaper, arguing that the institution could not be counted a university until the chair was occupied by a philosopher. In 1937, I. L. G. Sutherland became professor of philosophy, even though he was a social psychologist. He remained in that position until 1952.

The profile of philosophy in the university was dramatically elevated with the arrival of the young Karl Popper in 1937. Popper brought modern European sophistication to the philosophy program, and intellectual provocation to the whole academic environment of an isolated, provincial university. He completed The Poverty of Historicism and wrote The Open Society and Its Enemies while at Canterbury, books he later described as his ‘war effort’ (Popper 1976: 115). Effort it must have been, for his teaching load was ‘desperately heavy’ (he had sole responsibility for teaching philosophy) and the university authorities were unhelpful to the point of hostility: ‘I was told that I should be well advised not to publish anything while in New Zealand, and that any time spent on research was a theft from the working time as a lecturer for which I was being paid’ (Popper 1976: 119). Popper made a lasting contribution to the whole university sector in New Zealand. He was instrumental in the promotion of a culture of research, and was a leading figure in the movement that transformed the University of New Zealand (as it then was) into a respectable research institution (Hacohen 2000: 499). He left New Zealand at the end of 1945.

A. N. Prior took over the philosophy program in 1947, as sole teacher of philosophy in what was now the Department of Psychology and Philosophy. An assistant lecturer was appointed in 1952, and Prior became the first real philosopher to occupy the chair of philosophy. He initiated a divorce between philosophy and psychology, and set about creating the modern philosophy curriculum at Canterbury. By 1951, a complete program in philosophy to Master’s level was available for the first time. And yet, like Popper before him, Prior rose above the daunting teaching load to produce a stream of publications of lasting significance. Logic and the Basis of Ethics was published in 1949, followed by major creative work in logic, including the invention of tense logic and fundamental contributions to the development of possible worlds semantics for propositional
modal logic. Prior was publishing up to ten journal articles a year at this time. He left the university in 1958 to take up a chair at Manchester.

Michael Shorter had arrived from Oxford as a lecturer in philosophy in 1954, and he took over the chair in 1959. Under his leadership, Oxford styles of philosophy held sway in the department. The program flourished under Shorter, and by the time he returned to Oxford in 1970, the department had five full-time philosophers on board.

R. H. (Bob) Stoothoff took over the chair in 1970, and the department entered into a long period of stability. David Novitz joined the department at this time, and soon made an impact on the general intellectual life of the university, as well as making important contributions to philosophy of art internationally. The most significant publication of this era was the English translation in three volumes of the philosophical writings of Descartes, a project initiated by Bob Stoothoff, and carried out with Dugald Murdoch (also in the department at Canterbury at that time) and John Cottingham. For a time, Descartes was the most visible philosopher in the Department.

Graham Oddie took over the chair on Stoothoff’s retirement in 1994, but his stay was brief, and Graham and Cynthia Macdonald were appointed joint professors in 1998. With Jack Copeland, the Macdonalds continued the tradition of distinction in research at Canterbury. But their tenure too was brief, with Cynthia Macdonald leaving Canterbury for a chair in Belfast in 2005.

In recent times, under the influence of Copeland, the department has gained a reputation for work on Alan Turing, artificial intelligence, and theory of computation.

Philosophy at the University of Canterbury has been greatly enriched in recent years by a succession of Erskine Visitors, including Daniel Dennett, Fred Dretske, Ruth Millikan, Simon Blackburn, William G. Lycan, Stephen Stich, and a host of other prominent philosophers.

(Novitz [2008], was of great value in the preparation of this article.)

Causation

Brad Weslake

Philosophical work on causation in Australasia has been extraordinarily rich and diverse, and in a brief survey much important work must remain unmentioned. Here I provide a selective overview, designed to highlight particularly influential work and to indicate the diversity of the contributions made by Australasian philosophers.
Causation

**Regularity Theories**

I begin with the regularity theory of causation defended by J. L. Mackie (1965, 1974). According to Mackie, $c$ is a cause of $e$ just in case $c$ is an insufficient but nonredundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition for the occurrence of $e$. This is often abbreviated as the claim that $c$ must be an INUS condition for $e$ (a term suggested by David Stove). This is a regularity theory because sufficiency is analysed in terms of causal laws, understood as a species of universal generalisation.

Mackie's account has a number of problems. First, the account assumes, contrary to empirical evidence, the truth of determinism. Second, as Mackie himself recognised, the account does not provide an account of the direction of causation, since under the assumption of determinism if $c$ is an INUS condition for $e$ then $e$ is also an INUS condition for $c$. Third, for related reasons also appreciated by Mackie, the account has problems discriminating events that are correlated because related as cause and effect, and events that are correlated because related as effects of a common cause. Finally, the account raises a puzzle concerning our knowledge of causal relations. Surely we are not in general in a position to know any of the conditions sufficient for a given event; but then how do we know that a given event forms part of such a condition?

**Difference Making Theories**

There is a natural move to make in response to these sorts of difficulties with regularity theories. Instead of analysing causation in terms of complicated regularity-involving conditions, analyse it instead in terms of the idea that causes make a difference to their effects. There are two main ways this basic idea has been pursued: (i) in terms of the idea that causes raise the probability of their effects; (ii) in terms of the idea that effects counterfactually depend on their causes. Both ideas have been pursued in great detail in the literature, but they face a number of problems.

First, there is the problem of pre-emption, involving cases in which there is a non-active backup cause, the existence of which shows alternatively that (a) the effect does not counterfactually depend on the actual cause, or (b) the probability of the effect is lowered by the actual cause, or (c) the probability of the effect is raised by the non-active backup cause.

Michael McDermott (1995, 2002) examines the pre-emption problem in the context of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and proposes a version of the counterfactual analysis that builds on the basic idea of the Mackie account. According to McDermott, a direct cause is a part of a minimal sufficient condition for an effect, as with Mackie. But a sufficient condition is analysed not in terms of causal laws but rather counterfactually, as a condition such that the effect would have occurred even if any other actual events had not occurred. Causation is then defined in terms of causal processes, which are in turn defined in terms of chains of direct causation.
Peter Menzies (1996), on the other hand, decisively raised the pre-emption problem for probabilistic theories of causation. The solution Menzies adopts is that the causal relation is to be theoretically identified as ‘the intrinsic relation that typically holds between two distinct events when one increases the chance of the other’ (p. 101). So on this view the difference-making relation is not definitive, but rather a defeasible marker, of the presence of the causal relation. One problem with this view is that it seems to rule out cases of causation by double prevention, in which causation seems to both depend on extrinsic facts and to occur independently of the existence of a physical relation between cause and effect.

A different problem concerning difference-making theories has been pressed by Huw Price (1992, 1996). Price argues that neither counterfactual nor probabilistic accounts of causation can ground the direction of causation, since the time-symmetric nature of the fundamental physical laws means that difference-making is symmetric in microphysics. Price argues that the best account of causation is instead an agency theory, according to which c causes e just in case bringing about c would be an effective means for an agent to bring about e. A similar account had been earlier defended by Douglas Gasking (see Oakley and O’Neill 1996). This account is defended against standard objections by Menzies and Price (1993). In subsequent work, both Menzies and Price have argued that causation is not purely objective, Price (2007) on grounds that it is constitutively connected with the time-asymmetric perspective of agents, and Menzies (2004, 2007a) on grounds that the most plausible counterfactual theories of causation require a contextually determined set of background conditions and default states against which difference-making counterfactuals are to be evaluated.

**Process Theories**

Appealing to a notion of causal process, as both McDermott and Menzies do, has been a popular way of responding to the pre-emption problem. Phil Dowe (2000) has elevated this idea into an analysis in defending a process theory of causation, on which causal relations between events are derivative on causal processes. Process theories of causation require a distinction between pseudo-processes and genuine processes, and an account of causal relevance. Dowe prefers accounts of these that rely on the notion of a process involving a conserved quantity. Process theories also require a distinction between causes and effects, and it is an issue with these theories that the resources required to make this distinction cannot be found among the phenomena with which they are centrally concerned. Dowe, for instance, prefers an account in terms of probabilistic relations that are only contingently satisfied by actual causal processes. There is also the question of how to reconcile the theory with our ordinary causal judgements, which seem to be justifiably made in the absence of evidence that would support any claim concerning conserved quantities. Finally, one of the central problems with any process theory is how to account for prevention, and causation by absence. Dowe (2001) claims that apparent causation by absence really involves a different relation, quasi-causation, defined in terms of counterfactuals. Among other problems,
the question arises why, since quasi-causation plays the same role as causation in practical inference and explanation, it doesn’t count as real causation. If so, then Dowe has at best stated an interesting empirical fact about certain cases of causation, rather than an analysis of causation in general.

**Non-Reductionist Theories**

One of the intuitions behind process theories is that causation is an intrinsic relation. This intuition has been defended in a different form by D. M. Armstrong (1999). According to Armstrong, the concept of causation is a primitive. Causation is, however, to be empirically identified with the instantiation of a universal necessitation relation between states of affairs. Armstrong has also, famously, argued that causation may be perceived. Like Dowe, Armstrong has a *prima facie* problem handling cases of prevention and causation by absence, since he denies the existence of negative states of affairs. In response, he endorses Dowe’s appeal to quasi-causation.

**Causation as Explanation**

Finally, Michael Strevens (2004, 2007, 2009) has defended an interesting inversion of the standard view of the relationship between causation and explanation. The standard view of those who defend causal theories of explanation is that we first have a complex difference-making theory of causation, and then a simple theory of explanation according to which explanation involves citing causes. According to Strevens, causation is a relationship between basic physical events that may be analysed either in terms of a Dowe-style process view or a difference-making view restricted to maximally fine-grained events. Explanation, on the other hand, involves abstracting away from these causal details in various ways, in order to identify difference-makers. The abstracting procedure is similar to Mackie’s criteria for identifying causes (2004). Strevens goes on to claim that we can understand causal claims of the form $e$ causes $e$ as elliptical for claims of the form $e$ causally explains $e$. Moreover, Strevens claims that this account solves traditional problems for difference-making accounts, such as pre-emption (2007). If so, then perhaps Mackie was on the right track after all.
Sturt University, but later (in 2003) incorporated the Australian National University as a partner. Its specific SRC funding from the ARC expired at the end of 2008, but the three universities have agreed to continue the Centre in a federated form on a renewable three-year basis.

CAPPE is Australia’s major unit for applied philosophy and one of the largest in the world. It arose out of a small but flourishing Centre for Philosophy and Public Issues at the University of Melbourne and a fledgling Centre at Charles Sturt University (CSU) with a similar orientation. The Directors of the two Centres, Tony Coady at Melbourne and Seumas Miller at CSU decided to make a joint application for a Special Research Centre when Coady’s efforts to secure the University of Melbourne’s support for a single bid based at that university were unsuccessful. (Applications to the ARC for SRCs could only be considered if nominated by the home universities with a maximum of six nominations allowed, but Melbourne, in its wisdom, decided to put forward no applications from the Humanities, and so a joint application had to be submitted through CSU, with Miller as the designated Director. It was CSU’s sole application.)

In its first decade CAPPE has operated within six broad program areas, the focus and description of which have changed slightly over that time. Currently they are: Criminal Justice Ethics; Business and Professional Ethics; Ethical Issues in Biotechnology; IT and Nanotechnology: Ethics of Emergent Technology; Political Violence and State Sovereignty; Justice and the Human Good. All programs have achieved remarkable success in terms of research output and all have been successful in attracting research grant income. Authored books, co-edited books, journal articles and book chapters have been produced in abundance and with both academic and general impact: these include to the end of 2008, 422 publications in refereed, academic journals, 50 major review articles, 405 chapters in academic books, 62 authored academic books and 76 edited academic books. CAPPE has attracted many of the best-known applied philosophers in the world to its three campuses either as temporary visitors or as members of staff: full, adjunct or part-time. Its visitors include Howard Adelman, David Archard, Richard Arneson, Bernard Gertz, Frances Kamm, Elizabeth Kiss, Arthur Kuflik, Loren Lomasky, David Rodin, John Tasioulas, and Michael Walzer. The staff associated with CAPPE in that period (many of whom continue with it) include Andrew Alexandra, Tom Campbell, Margaret Coady, Tony Coady, James Griffin, Marilyn Friedman, Jeanette Kennett, John Kleinig, Neil Levy, Larry May, Thomas Pogge, Igor Primoratz, Doris Schroeder, Peter Singer, Chin Liew Ten, Janna Thompson, and Suzanne Uniacke. Beyond research publications, CAPPE has been involved in numerous ethics consultations of various kinds, and has also been active in engaging the public in its work through publishing in non-academic journals and giving talks, interviews and so on for radio, television and online media.

Since the ‘reforms’ to higher education in Australia in the late 1980s, begun by the Labor Party’s federal education minister, John Dawkins, and continued by subsequent governments, the survival of university teaching and research is
now predominantly dependent on how individuals and units can raise money by their own efforts. Beyond student fees, the strain of raising money from industry, donors, research bodies and the public sector has become an enduring preoccupation of academics and university decision-makers. Applied philosophers have better prospects for such funding than their ‘pure’ colleagues, but even so philosophy of any sort is bound to be low on the priorities of corporate sponsors. Inevitably, funding of initiatives like CAPPE, once direct ARC support finished, is a tenuous affair, though it must be said that CAPPE has had impressive successes in attracting ‘outside money’. Universities expect long-established departments or schools to find outside money to support their work, especially in research, so new ventures are under even greater pressure to attract such finance. All three universities have agreed to continue a level of funding that is welcome but minimal, and at the time of writing there have been staff reductions, especially at Melbourne. ARC Linkage grants and other collaborative efforts with non-academic bodies provide one of the key prospects for funding salaries and administrative support, but they have their problems. A major one is that heavy dependence upon important but basically service activities (such as researching integrity systems for a police force or drawing up a code of ethics for a professional group) inevitably makes inroads upon the task of more central philosophical research and creativity that must remain the core business of CAPPE and should inform its service functions. How CAPPE copes with this into the future will be a major challenge.

Charles Sturt University

John Weckert

Charles Sturt University (CSU) was established in 1990 from an amalgamation of the Riverina-Murray Institute of Higher Education (RMIHE) located at Wagga Wagga and Albury, and Mitchell College of Advanced Education at Bathurst (MCAE). There was some philosophy taught at RMIHE, including business ethics and computer ethics as part of professional courses in business and information technology respectively, but it was with the appointment of Seumas Miller as professor of social philosophy in 1994 that the discipline began to develop rapidly. New philosophy appointments were made in the following years, a philosophy major was established in the B.A. degree and there was considerable expansion of offerings in applied ethics, most notably in police ethics. In late 1999 CSU philosophy received its second significant boost with the awarding of an Australian Research Council Special Research Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE). To date, CAPPE is one of only two
Special Research Centres to be funded in the humanities. The new Centre was a joint project between CSU and the University of Melbourne, with CSU being the host institution and the director, Professor Miller, being a CSU employee. In 2004 the Australian National University (ANU) also became part of CAPPE after the CSU node of CAPPE had been based on the ANU campus from 2001. With the establishment of CAPPE more philosophers, particularly in applied ethics, were employed at CSU, and it quickly gained a significant international reputation in this field. In recent years a number of important appointments have been made jointly by CSU-CAPPE with overseas universities, currently Oxford University, John Jay College of City University, New York, and Washington University in St. Louis. Recent significant appointments include Professor John Kleinig, the leading international expert on criminal justice ethics, and Professor Larry May, one of the foremost international researchers in global justice. As of 2008, CSU employs eighteen philosophers full-time or part-time, seven at professorial level and all at level B or above. Most of the appointments are, or include, half time research positions with CSU-CAPPE.

A notable feature of philosophy at CSU has been the emphasis on applied ethics and the number of consultancies and Australian Research Council Linkage Grants gained by CSU philosophers.

The postgraduate program is growing, both in the coursework Masters area and in the number of Ph.D. students. Currently six Ph.D. students are enrolled and three have graduated in the last few years.

# Classical Logic

Greg Restall

Philosophical logic in Australasia is much more famous for innovation in modal logic and other areas of non-classical logic than in core, traditional classical logic. For accounts of those themes in research in Australasian philosophy, the reader is referred to the entries on modal logic, non-classical logic and Relevant logic. There is some work in philosophical logic that remains to be covered, and that is the subject for this article. It is fitting that in a region most famous for non-classical logic, the entry on classical logic should focus on work that is not non-classical.

Classical logic here is understood as traditional two-valued propositional logic and its extensions with quantifiers, as introduced by Frege, Russell and Whitehead, and which became dominant in logic teaching and research throughout the world from the middle of the twentieth century to this day. Classical propositional logic can be taught in many ways, with truth-tables, or with a proof technique such as ‘natural deduction’, and in most philosophy departments
throughout Australia and New Zealand logic teaching forms a part of the first or second year program for philosophy students, whether as a compulsory unit or as one of a few options. The teaching of classical logic in Australasia has been a distinctive feature of the philosophy curriculum there, and so it is with this topic that we will start. From there, we will look at two prominent issues in research in philosophical logic in Australasia that also count as not non-classical logic.

### Logic Teaching in Australasia

Logic teaching throughout Australia and New Zealand has played an important part in the activities of researchers in philosophy departments. For a significant number, it has not been an adjunct to research, but a core activity. From the Masters Program in Logic established by Malcolm Rennie, Len Goddard and Richard Routley (later Richard Sylvan) at the University of New England in the 1960s, to new textbooks replacing the teaching of Aristotelian logic with classical logic, by Charles Hamblin at the University of New South Wales, and Malcolm Rennie and Roderic Girle at the University of Queensland, logic teaching modernised significantly through the 1960s and ’70s (see Hamblin 1967, and Rennie and Girle 1973). Girle’s work, in particular, saw logic become a part of the high school curriculum in Queensland, and through his work, the Australian Logic Teachers’ Journal was founded in 1976, and lasted through ten years of publication—a vital resource for logic teachers in secondary and tertiary education throughout Australia and beyond.

Girle’s pedagogy was radical: he taught logic using Raymond Smullyan’s tableaux (tree) technique, a proof system which is mechanical enough for students of many levels to be able to master, yet also with pleasing formal properties that make technical results in logic (soundness and completeness, decidability, etc.) straightforward to explain (Girle 2002). This technique has seen broad adoption throughout the region, and Girle has made use of it in teaching classical logic to many generations of students, at the University of Queensland and now University of Auckland.

Introducing logic by way of tableaux has moved beyond Australia, to be adopted in many centres around the world, and the technique has been extended far beyond classical logic to be the centrepiece of Graham Priest’s widely used Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (2001) as well.

### Classical Logic and Language

Charles Hamblin, mentioned above, was a logician, trained at the University of Melbourne and the London School of Economics, and returned to Australia, becoming the professor of philosophy at the University of New South Wales, where he worked until his death in 1985. His research in logic was instrumental in the development of research in computer science in Australia: in the 1950s he developed a programming language (based on ‘Polish’ Notation, familiar from work in logic in this period) for the third computer available in Australia. He also worked on the logic of imperatives, the categorisation of fallacies, and on formal treatments of the rules of dialogue (Hamblin 1971), where the formal rules of
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classical logic play just one part in a larger system of rules for asking questions, giving answers, etc. This work has been taken up by other Australasians, such as Jim Mackenzie and Rod Girle. Hamblin, furthermore, provided a close analysis of classical logic itself: for example, his under-appreciated paper on a fragment of classical logic (Hamblin 1973) presages more recent work on tractable languages, and translations between natural and formal languages.

Type Theory

Another strand of work in classical logic in Australasia is found in a tradition of work on type theory. Type theory, which dates back at least to Russell and Whitehead’s *Principia Mathematica*, goes beyond classical predicate logic by adding higher domains of quantification: not only can we talk about all things (the domain at level 1), but also all collections of things (the domain at level 2) and collections of collections of things (the domain at level 3), etc. Russell and Whitehead’s original theory was a ‘simple’ type theory of this kind. Russell’s later work showed that one might need to complicate the picture: perhaps talk of higher categories of things facilitated the description of more things lower down in the hierarchy, and if we think of these stages as stages of construction, then perhaps we need to keep track of this. Perhaps the hierarchy has to be ‘ramified’ and when we talk of all of the many different collections of things, we need to be aware of whether we need to specify in advance which collections we mean before we can construct things based on them: a definition or construction satisfying this kind of restriction is said to be predicative. Allen Hazen (of the University of Melbourne) has done a great deal of research on predicative logic (Hazen 1983) and Russell’s ramified type theory (Hazen 2004).

Work in type theory has not merely been of historical or purely theoretical interest in studies in formal logic itself. Work in classical type theory has been applied to other areas of logic, most prominently in Australasian work on the logic of adverbs.

Adverbial Modification: With Types and without

Malcolm Rennie, also mentioned above, wrote a short monograph on applications of type theory in natural languages (Rennie 1974). One of those applications is in the logic of adverbs. We may say that Sam sliced a bagel, and when we do this, we use the name ‘Sam’ and the predicates ‘bagel’ (to distinguish those things that are bagels and those things that are not) and ‘sliced’ (to distinguish those pairs of things where the first sliced the second from those where the first didn’t slice the second). To say that Sam sliced a bagel is to say that there is some thing that is both a bagel, and is such that Sam sliced it. We can also say that Sam *carefully* sliced the bagel. Here ‘carefully’ is not a predicate in the same way: neither Sam was carefully (though, he perhaps was careful), nor was the bagel. ‘Carefully’ in that sentence modifies the predicate ‘sliced’. It is one thing to slice, and another to *carefully* slice. Rennie’s work on type theory classified the logic of different kinds of adverbs. Merely finding a place in a hierarchy of types is not
the end of the story: different kinds of adverbs combine in different kinds of ways. Gunsynd is a champion and a miler and a racehorse: it follows, for example, that he is a champion racehorse, but it does not follow that he is a champion miler. (Perhaps he is a champion over another distance.) In Rennie’s work these kinds of differences are classified and an account is given of how we are to understand them.

This type theoretical account of adverbs is taken up in a larger setting in the work of Maxwell J. Cresswell, chief among many (see, e.g. Cresswell 1985a). In this expanded context of work in logic and linguistics, the resulting typed logic is richer than Rennie’s original setting, as modal and contextual features play a vital role. Not only are there types for objects at level 0, and truth values, and constructions out of them at different levels, but also for possible worlds and other indices of evaluation such as speakers and times. In this work, type theory meets modal logic to form a mainstream tradition in formal semantics in the work of Montague, Cresswell, Partee and others.

This approach to the logic of adverbs and other predicate modifiers was not the only one pursued in Australasian logic in the second-half of the twentieth century. Barry Taylor’s work took things in another direction, in which the towering conceptual structure of a never-ending hierarchy of types is traded in for a slight increase in ontology (Taylor 1985). Instead of thinking of the predicate modifier ‘carefully’ as a predicate of a higher type, we can think of it as an everyday predicate describing items in the world in the same manner as do the predicates ‘bagel’ or ‘sliced’. The trick is to admit that the items are different. What is careful is not the bagel, or perhaps not even Sam, but the event of the slicing. Taylor argues that one should follow the work of Donald Davidson, and hold that when we say that Sam carefully sliced a bagel, we say that there is an event which is a slicing of a bagel by Sam, and which is careful. In this way, the adverb becomes a predicate describing an item, where the item is now a concrete event. Taylor’s work extends Davidson’s logic of adverbs by giving a rich account of the structure of events as a species of the wider genus of states of affairs. The result is a picture of adverbial modification that allows one to avoid a hierarchy of types to stay within the realm of first-order classical logic, at the modest cost of an ontology of events and states of affairs.

Australasian work on predicate modifiers in a rich logical setting has not ended with the work of Rennie, Cresswell and Taylor. Recent approaches to the topic by Lloyd Humberstone (of Monash University) have shown that there are many insights remaining to be mined in this area (Humberstone 2008).

Into the Future

There is no doubt that classical logic will play an important role in philosophy teaching and research in Australasia into the future. It is hard to say what shape that might take. One hint of where this may go is in some recent work of the author (Restall 2005), which presents a new defence of classical logic, connecting it to other themes in the norms and pragmatics of assertion and denial.
Clinical Ethics

David Neil

Broadly speaking, ‘clinical ethics’ refers to ethical issues arising in relation to the medical treatment of patients. Clinical practice is an area where ethical and legal theory are closely connected and the main topics one would find in a textbook of medical law parallel the central concerns of the literature on clinical ethics: consent to medical procedures, the duty to provide information (particularly information salient to consent), risk, privacy and confidentiality. The most difficult and contentious areas of both clinical ethics and medical law are at the boundaries of life and the boundaries of autonomy. At the beginning of human life we confront the issues of abortion, child destruction (the destruction of a foetus capable of being born alive) and the withholding of treatment for severely ill or disabled newborns. Ethical or legal problems at the end of life concern the justification for withdrawal of treatment, euthanasia and the concept of brain death. The key questions here are: under what circumstances and by what means may death be hastened and what should be the criteria for a legal determination of death? Issues at the boundaries of autonomy concern the ethical and legal status of proxy consent for non-autonomous patients, the justification of paternalism, and the moral and legal force of advance directives.

Distinct ethical issues arise in virtually every area of clinical practice and consequently a wide range of philosophical theory finds practical application in the domain of clinical ethics. For instance, debates around the killing of embryos and foetuses, the concept of brain death and the status of severely brain damaged patients are necessarily concerned with metaphysical problems: personal identity, defining the beginning and ending of a distinct human life, and the relationship of the person to the body. Theories of distributive justice bear on judgments about resource allocation and decisions about which treatments will be made available to which patients. The notion of patient autonomy, which has acquired a central place in clinical ethics, must ultimately appeal to a philosophical account of the meaning and value of autonomy. New kinds of medical information, such as genetic information, raise novel problems for theories of privacy and property. And, in general, substantive normative claims in clinical ethics are typically grounded in a normative ethical theory, such as utilitarianism. One approach to normative theorising that is indigenous to medical ethics is known as ‘principilism’ or ‘the four principles approach’, developed by Beauchamp and Childress (2008). The four principles approach requires that clinical dilemmas be assessed in terms of the principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, and that a chosen course of action should aim to ‘balance’ respect for
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those principles. This approach to ethical analysis, however, does not provide any substantive method for resolving conflicts between those principles in concrete cases and has been criticised as reducing to a form of ethical intuitionism.

Historically, clinicians’ duties and patients’ rights are founded in the common law. However, medicine is increasingly a focus of legislative attention and one sign of the growing level of social concern with issues of clinical ethics is the amount of new Commonwealth and State statutory law regulating clinical practice. Recent changes in medical law include:


- legislation regulating assisted reproduction: *Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984* (Vic); *Reproductive Technology Act 1987* (SA)

- legislation controlling cloning: *Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction Act 2002* (Cwlth); *Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Act 2006* (Cwlth)

- legislation requiring medical practitioners to give patients sufficient information for informed choice in accepting or refusing treatment: *The Health Services Act 1988* (Vic) section 9(e) (other jurisdictions have enacted similar provisions)

- legislation regarding privacy in health care: In 2001 provisions were added to the *Privacy Act 1988* (Cwlth) setting out 10 ‘National Privacy Principles’ which apply to health service providers

- legislation limiting civil liability in negligence claims: *Wrongs Act 1958* (Vic); *Civil Liability Act 2002* (NSW); *Civil Liability Act 2003* (Qld); *Civil Liability Act 1936* (SA); *Civil Liability Act 2002* (WA); *Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002* (ACT); *Civil Liability Act 2002* (Tas); *Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003* (NT).

In addition to legislative means, the development and enforcement of standards in clinical ethics has seen the publication of a number of guidelines, statements of patients’ rights and professional codes of ethics. For instance, the National Health and Medical Research Council published the *General Guidelines for Medical Practitioners on Providing Information to Patients* (2004) and the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care has developed the *Australian Charter of Healthcare Rights* (endorsed by Australian Health Ministers in July 2008). Although not law themselves, such documents may be referred to by the courts in interpreting the common law. Similarly, Medical Practitioners Boards may
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refer to codes of ethics in disciplinary procedures against clinicians charged with breaching their ethical duties.

The *General Guidelines for Medical Practitioners on Providing Information to Patients* were developed on the basis of a joint inquiry by the Australian, New South Wales and Victorian Law Reform Commissions and a resulting report in 1989, entitled *Informed Decision Making About Medical Procedures*. Empirical studies conducted by the Victorian Law Reform Commission in 1986–87 revealed that doctors were giving patients less information than they wanted. The report concluded that there existed a pervasive attitude among doctors that it was in patients’ best interests for doctors to decide what information should be given and what treatments their patients should undergo (NHMRC 2004). The struggle to change the historically paternalist culture of medicine and to make respect for patient autonomy a primary duty of clinicians has been at the heart of the development of both clinical ethics and medical law in Australia.

This trend towards both specification and enforcement of ethical standards in clinical practice can be attributed to several factors, including: technological advances in medicine (which have both raised public expectations of medical treatment and generated debate around controversial procedures); greater general awareness of patients’ rights; and the growth of the disciplines of bioethics and medical law. Clinical ethics is a major subdivision of the discipline of bioethics and its importance for Australasian philosophy is most clearly evidenced in the appearance of a number of institutional centres specialising in research and teaching in clinical ethics. The first Australian research centre in bioethics was the Monash Centre for Human Bioethics, which was established by Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse in 1980 (Oakley 2006). Currently, centres engaged in clinical ethics research include:

- Australian and New Zealand Institute of Health, Law and Ethics (Macquarie University)
- Bioethics Centre (University of Otago)
- Caroline Chisholm Centre for Health Ethics (Mercy Health)
- Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (Australian National University, Charles Sturt University, University of Melbourne)
- Centre for Human Bioethics (Monash University)
- Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine (University of Sydney)
- Clinical Unit in Ethics and Health Law (Newcastle Institute of Public Health)
- Plunkett Centre for Ethics (Australian Catholic University)
- St James Ethics Centre
- Southern Cross Bioethics Institute.
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Australian academic journals that publish research in clinical ethics include: Monash Bioethics Review, Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, and Medical Journal of Australia.

The subject matter of clinical ethics overlaps with other areas of applied ethics. In particular, clinical ethics overlaps substantially with human research ethics, not least because most medical research subjects are also patients. This is important because developments in research ethics have exercised a considerable influence on the development of clinical ethics as a discipline. In Australia, as in most Western countries, the establishment of formal mechanisms for the ethical oversight of medical research began in the 1960s and were originally based on the Declaration of Helsinki, adopted by the World Medical Association in 1964. The peak body for medical ethics in Australia is the Australian Health Ethics Committee (AHEC). It was established in by the National Health and Medical Research Council Act 1992 and its primary functions are to advise the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) on ethical issues relating to health and to develop guidelines for human research. The NHMRC Act specifies the composition of AHEC, whose twelve members must include a person with expertise in philosophy and a person with expertise in medical ethics.

In Australia, proposed research projects involving human research must first be reviewed and authorised by a Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), which assesses experimental protocols against the requirements of the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research involving Humans (NHMRC 2007). Clinical ethics, by contrast, is concerned with situations arising in the course of medical treatment, which are often unanticipated. Yet many of the issues that are central to research ethics, such as informed consent, are equally central for clinical ethics, and the conceptual and institutional developments in research ethics over the last forty years have had a considerable effect on how the same issues are approached in clinical ethics. For instance, current standards in informed consent procedures for patients undergoing treatment in hospitals owe a great deal to the scrutiny of informed consent by evaluating research proposals and by the evolution of research codes of practice.

While human research is now subject to a legally enforced national system of ethical evaluation, there are currently no standardised ethical review procedures for clinical decision-making. However, recent years have seen the establishment of clinical ethics committees in some hospitals, whose role is to provide advice and support to doctors, patients and their families faced with difficult medical dilemmas. Examples of the kind of dilemmas that clinical ethics committees address include withdrawal and withholding of treatment, refusal of treatment, advance directives, high-risk treatments, contested resource allocation and late-term abortions. They may also have a policy formation role and an ethics education role within their institution. The structure, functions and procedures of clinical ethics committees tend to be developed internally in hospitals where such committees are set up, and thus differ from institution to institution. Hospitals are not required to form clinical ethics committees and, although accurate
current figures are not available, a study in the early 1990s found that around 16% of hospitals had a clinical ethics committee (McNeill 2001). It has been argued that clinical ethics consultation has a valuable role to play in hospitals, and even when ethics consultation does not produce consensus it serves an important function in communicating what is or is not accepted practice, in improving transparency and in avoiding unacceptable decisions (Gill et al. 2004). The New South Wales Department of Health has created a clinical ethics advisory panel whose role is to advise NSW Health on clinical ethics issues and to provide guidance and support for hospital clinical ethics committees. It remains to be seen whether the goal of developing an institutional framework and national guidelines for clinical ethics consultation will be adopted more broadly in the Australian health care system in the future.

Legislation

The Acts Amendment (Advance Health Care Planning) Bill 2006 (WA)
Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT)
Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA)
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas)
Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA)
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld)
Consent to Medical and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA)
Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW)
The Health Services Act 1988 (Vic)
Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984 (Vic)
Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic)
Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT)
National Health and Medical Research Council Act 1992 (Cwlth)
Natural Death Act 1988 (NT)
Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT)
Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld)
Privacy Act 1988 (Cwlth)
Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction Act 2002 (Cwlth)
Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Act 2006 (Cwlth)
Reproductive Technology Act 1987 (SA)
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic)

Institutional Centres

Australian & New Zealand Institute of Health, Law & Ethics,
Bioethics Centre, at the University of Otago,
<http://dnmeds.otago.ac.nz/departments/mss/bioethics/index.html>
(accessed 18 October 2008)
Caroline Chisholm Centre for Health Ethics (Mercy Health),
Cognitive Science

Peter Slezak

Judged by the usual institutional criteria, cognitive science has established itself internationally as a self-conscious scientific research field with academic departments, conferences, journals, societies and textbooks. The *Journal of Cognitive Science* was first published in 1976, and the U.S. Cognitive Science Society with its annual conference was inaugurated shortly afterwards in 1979. In Australia, the first Centre for Cognitive Science and graduate degree program were established in 1987 at the University of New South Wales, followed by degree programs at the University of Western Australia, Flinders University, University of Queensland, Monash University and La Trobe University. The Macquarie University Centre for Cognitive Science (MACCS) was established in 2000 and the Australian National University (ANU) Centre for Consciousness (located within the Philosophy Program in the ANU Research School of Social Sciences) was set up in 2004.

The inaugural conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science was held at the University of New South Wales in 1990 and, although the formal
Society lapsed a year later, the conference series has continued on a regular biennial basis. (University of Melbourne 1993, University of Queensland 1995, **University of Newcastle** 1999, University of Melbourne 2000, University of Western Australia 2002, University of New South Wales 2003, **University of Adelaide** 2007, Macquarie University 2009.) Papers from these conferences inaugurated the series *Perspectives on Cognitive Science* (Slezak, Caelli and Clark 1995; Wiles and Dartnall 1999), with subsequent volumes oriented towards Australasian philosophy in cognitive science (Clapin, Staines and Slezak 2004; Hetherington 2006).

Pylyshyn’s (1984) landmark *Computation and Cognition* envisaged cognitive science becoming a scientific domain like biology or geology, based on a proprietary vocabulary and autonomous explanatory principles. The unifying principle would take cognition to be literally a type of computation. In the wake of these developments, in philosophy there was a widespread shift from conceptual analysis to a form of theorising that is not clearly distinct from scientific inquiry. Patricia Churchland (1986: ix) expressed her early impatience with ‘most mainstream philosophy’ and her turn towards a promising ‘new wave in philosophical method’ that ‘began in earnest to reverse the antiscientific bias typical of “linguistic analysis”’. Dennett (1978), too, reflected on this shift from ‘modest illuminations and confusion-cures’ to seeing philosophy of mind as ‘a branch of philosophy of science, that dominates the best work in the field today’, taking an interest in the theories and data of relevant disciplines such as psychology, the neurosciences, artificial intelligence and linguistics.

Identifying Australian philosophical contributions to cognitive science in this vein is confronted by two difficulties. First, the question of who is to count as an Australian philosopher is more or less arbitrary and irrelevant to the content of his or her work. Among the founders of **Australian Materialism**, both U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart were of British origin. Place lectured at the University of Adelaide for only four years from 1951 to 1954, where his brain now resides in a jar—perhaps sufficient credentials for qualifying as an Australian philosopher. Many Australians have gained higher degrees at universities overseas, expatriate Australian philosophers may be found in academic positions around the world, and many non-Australians occupy positions in philosophy at Australian universities.

A second difficulty concerns the very conception of philosophy within cognitive science. To be sure, as Fodor (1998) has noted, some philosophers still tend towards aprioristic or ‘ordinary language’ views that accord philosophy a primacy, even defining scientific inquiry. For example, Woodfield (1982: ix) suggests that ‘the whole subject is built upon a realisation that philosophers can contribute more by investigating discourse about mental states than by investigating mental states themselves’. Despite the shift in concerns with the so-called ‘cognitive revolution’, it would be invidious to make a strict distinction between traditional philosophy of mind and cognitive science. For example, **D. M. Armstrong’s** (1968) seminal contribution to the materialist conception of mind antedates
cognitive science but is undoubtedly a precursor and foundation of these developments in philosophy.

More recently, David Chalmers’ (1996) influential work has ranged across AI, meaning and modality, though his work on the ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness is less concerned with theories or empirical work in cognitive science and his method of conceivability may be found in Descartes’ argument for dualism. Other Australian philosophy of mind has also been more or less independent of research in empirical disciplines of cognitive science (e.g. Stoljar 2001, 2005, 2006; Ismael 2007). Jackson’s (1982) famous paper on epiphenomenal qualia and the Mary ‘knowledge argument’ deals with venerable philosophical worries (see Stoljar and Nagasawa 2004). Qualia, folk theories and meaning have also been discussed by Braddon-Mitchell (2003), and even the notorious Gettier Problem may be discerned at the heart of questions concerning mental representation and externalist conceptions of meaning (Hetherington 2007).

Empirical research in cognitive science often rehearses traditional philosophical puzzles in a new guise, leading Fodor (1994) to quip that ‘cognitive science is where philosophy goes when it dies’. Notable among persistent philosophical problems has been the ‘Imagery Debate’ (Kosslyn 1994; Pylyshyn 2003), described by Block (1981) as among the ‘hottest topics in cognitive science’, even though it was familiar to Descartes. ‘Crucial experiments’ designed to refute the ‘pictorial’ account (Slezak 1992, 1995) in favour of what has been pejoratively termed Pylyshyn’s ‘philosophical’ theory have not resolved the debate.

The history of science and philosophy must be included within the scope of our topic, as Sutton (1998) demonstrates in his Philosophy and Memory Traces, significantly subtitled Descartes to Connectionism. Sutton’s work has extended across historical antecedents of cognitive science. (See also Gaukroger, Schuster and Sutton eds 2002; and Slezak 2006.)

The formalisms of Chomsky’s generative linguistics have given rise to persistent philosophical controversy about the enterprise and especially about the ‘psychological reality’ of grammars (D’Agostino 1986; Devitt and Sterelny 1987, 1989; Stone and Davies 2002; Devitt 2006; Slezak 1981, 2009). Chomsky’s theories also gave new impetus to the traditional philosophical debate concerning ‘innate ideas’ and the ‘blank slate’. Chomsky’s central argument in favour of a Universal Grammar cites the ‘poverty of the stimulus’—the claim that we know so much based on so little evidence—but remains widely disputed, notably by Cowie (1997, 1998).

The representational theory of mind has been discussed by Sterelny (1990), Clapin (2002), Slezak (2002) and Godfrey-Smith, who has also written on folk psychology (2004a, 2005a), evolution of cognition (1996, 2005b) and functionalism (2009b).

Classical, symbolic approaches to computing, Alan Turing and artificial intelligence have been discussed by Copeland (1993, 2004); Gödelian arguments against artificial intelligence by Slezak (1982), and computation and creativity by Dartnall (2002).
Connectionist models have been discussed by Davies (1991) and van Gelder (1990, 1992), and neurocomputational models of cognition and consciousness by O’Brien and Opie (1999, 2002, 2006). Computational views of cognition taken to include both classical symbolic and connectionist models have been challenged by dynamical systems, conceived as having numerically describable states that evolve over time rather than representational states governed by rules (van Gelder 1995; Port and van Gelder 1995).

Australasian philosophy oriented towards experiments and theories in cognitive science includes work on delusions and neuropsychology (Bayne 2008; Bayne and Fernandez 2008; Davies et al. 2001, 2003); on functions, content and biological approaches to mental representation (Neander 1991a, 1995a, 2006); on emotions (Griffiths 1997; Griffiths and Scarantino 2008), and on developmental, evolutionary psychology (Griffiths 2007, 2008; Sterelny 2003; Sterelny and Fitness eds 2003). Other empirical topics include memory (Sutton 2004, 2007, 2008a, 2008b), distributed cognition (Sutton 2006) and dreaming (Sutton 2009), mental states, representation (Khentzos 2004, 2007), mental causation, folk theory and experience (Menzies, 2003, 2007b, 2008).

Conditionals

Stephen Barker

As Callimachus wrote, ‘Even the crows on the roofs caw about the nature of conditionals’. Antipodeans have been particularly crow-like in their intense cawing about *if*; producing thereby some quality philosophy. Linguistically, conditionals are expressed, paradigmatically, by *if*-sentences. Not every *if*-sentence is deemed as expressing a conditional. For example, Austin’s biscuit conditionals might be denied such status despite their names: *if you want some, there are biscuits in the sideboard*, offers no logical relation between antecedent and consequent. Some conditionals are expressed without *if*: *No bomb no war* or *Were she to go, there would be a battle*. The study of conditionals is an interplay between purely semantic and syntactic considerations.

We can discern families of conditionals: singular as opposed to general, and, within the class of singular, indicatives as opposed to counterfactuals. People usually have in mind declaratives: the non-declaratives, *if*-imperatives or interrogatives are not often considered. General *if*-sentences are occasionally considered. Few attempts are made to offer unified treatments, across these categories, let alone a unified treatment of *if*. But this tendency to the piecemeal is not restricted to southern shores. My review respects the boundaries in its examination of antipodean meditations upon the curiosities of *if*. 
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### Indicative/Counterfactual/Subjunctive Taxonomy

A topic of debate about conditions in which the cawing reached fever-pitched heights was waged, largely in the 1990s, about taxonomy. Let’s begin there. Consider the three *if*-sentences:

1. Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did.
2. If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, someone else would have.
3. If Oswald does not shoot Kennedy, someone else will.

The original idea (from non-Antipodean Adams (1975)) is that (1) is a different semantic class from (2): the first is an **indicative**, the second a **counterfactual**. The second, rejecting a conspiracy view about Oswald’s actions, is true, but (2) false. The indicative is assertable merely on the belief that someone shot Kennedy, if this belief is in no way dependent on the belief that Oswald was the assassin. What then of (3)? Tradition places (3) with (1), appealing to the supposed sameness of *indicative mood*. Vic Dudman, in a series of papers (including 1984, 1991a, 1991b, 1994, 2000) places (3) with (2), disputing the whole idea of indicative mood, and offering an alternative analysis of tense and **time** in conditionals. (Gibbard’s (1970) work needs recognition here.) Dudman’s work goes beyond issues of classification, offering novel insights into matters of deep structure. Those who have joined the fray, both in direct and indirect ways are Frank Jackson (1987), Bennett (1988, 1995), and Barker (1996). See also Ellis (1984), building on Ellis (1979), and Jackson (1984a) for a separate debate about taxonomy.

### Indicatives

Deep concern about the material implication analysis of indicatives has spawned an array of theories about indicatives. **J. L. Mackie** (1973) proposes a conditional assertion theory view that an indicative *if* $P$, $Q$ involves an assertion of $Q$ in the scope of a supposition of $P$. Perhaps the best known work by an Australian is Jackson’s *Conditionals* (1987). This work mainly discusses indicatives—it embraces David Lewis’ (1973) possible worlds treatment of subjunctives. Jackson holds that the material implication analysis of conditionals is an adequate treatment of truth-conditions for indicatives. But the solution for him is to add more, not to take away. For Jackson, *if* $P$, $Q$ is true if and only if $(P \not\rightarrow Q)$. But indicative *if* $P$, $Q$ carries a further meaning: a conventional implicature about the speaker’s subjective **probability** state, which boils down to the conditional probability of $Q$ given $P$—$\Pr(Q/P)$—being high. That enables Jackson to explain what he takes to be the data about assertability of indicatives—Adams’ Thesis:

Adams’ Thesis: *if* $P$, $Q$ is assertable to the degree that $\Pr(Q/P)$ is high.

Jackson thinks that a Gricean conversational implicature analysis cannot explain the data. This is disputed by Barker (1997). That Adams’ Thesis captures the data is disputed by Dudman (1992).

Looming large in the discussion of indicatives are the triviality results of Lewis (1976). These assume Adams’ Thesis. Triviality arises under the assumption that:
Stalnaker’s Thesis: \( \text{Pr}(\text{if } P, Q) = \text{Prob}(Q/P) \)

Given Adams and Stalnaker we get a contradiction. These results have been developed by Hayek (1989). Jackson’s approach avoids the problem since he denies Stalnaker’s Thesis: the probability of \( \text{if } P, Q \) is that of \((P \text{ É } Q)\).

Barker (1995) offers a theory of conditional assertion, but a non-standard account that extends to non-declaratives, which is developed further in (2004). McDermott (1996) offers a conditional assertion theory of indicatives, related to ideas developed by Belnap.

Nolan (2003) returns to a possible worlds defence of indicatives. Weatherson (2001) uses possible worlds with a **two-dimensional modal logic** to explain both indicatives and counterfactuals. He changes his mind in (2009), offering indexical relativism to explain open indicatives.

Australia has taken conditionals into the realms of alternative logics: see Routley (1982) and Priest (1987). Ellis (1979) uses the dynamics of rational belief-change to explain both indicatives and subjunctives.

### Counterfactuals and Subjunctives

The analysis of counterfactuals—often treated as subjunctives—is dominated by the conception laid down by almost antipodean Lewis (1973, 1978) and by Stalnaker (1968). This is the idea that a counterfactual is true if and only if the nearest \( P \)-worlds are \( Q \)-worlds. Nolan (2005) gives a good introduction to the framework and the broader context of Lewis’ philosophy. This is opposed to the metalinguistic approach according to which a counterfactual is true if and only if \( P \) and cotenable premises entail \( Q \) or probably \( Q \), and so on.

Most work by Australasians buy into Lewis’ proposal—some reject it. Of those who accept, they are still keen to modify. Jackson (1977a) argues that overall similarity cannot be right: similarity must be restricted temporally. So does Bennett (1984). McDermott (1999) presents an interesting idea about worlds and middle knowledge. The framework assumes primitive access points. Huw Price (1996) argues that the asymmetry is perspectival, and is intimately connected to the temporal orientation of agency.

The conditionals self-styled maverick Dudman (1994) has much to say against the possible worlds approach, doubting the analysis of antecedents and consequents upon which it is based—see Barker (1996) and Dudman (1996) for a response. Braddon-Mitchell (2001) invokes a slight modification of Lewis’ similarity semantics in terms of lossy laws to deal with miracle-semantics. Barker (2011) argues that the whole possible worlds approach is a mistake.

These modifications relate to an ongoing issue about counterfactuals in indeterministic contexts. The problem of so called Morgenbesser betting counterfactuals—assertions of \( \text{If } I \text{ had bet on heads}, \text{ I would have won}, \) where an indeterministic coin has landed heads—is examined by Bennett (1984, 2004), Barker (1998, 1999) and Pavel Tichý (1976a).

Barker (1999) offers a metalinguistic approach that deals with probabilistic counterfactuals, arguing that possible worlds approaches cannot deal with these.
Hájek (unpublished) argues that most would-counterfactuals are false, whether in indeterministic or deterministic contexts, due to the conflict with might-not-counterfactuals and would-counterfactuals.

**Other Kinds of ‘If’, and ‘If’s and Other**


**Conditionals and Broader Issues**


**Consciousness**

Jon Opie

Understanding consciousness and its place in the natural world is one of the principal targets of contemporary philosophy of mind. Australian philosophers made seminal contributions to this project during the twentieth century which continue to shape the way philosophers and scientists think about the conceptual, metaphysical and empirical aspects of the problem. After some scene setting, I will discuss the main players and their work in the context of broader developments in the philosophy of mind.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, scientific psychology set itself the task of systematically exploring the mind, understood as the conscious activity that accompanies perception and thought. Labs in Germany and the U.S. began the tedious work of determining the structure of experience via the reports of trained subjects operating under carefully controlled stimulus conditions. The
hope was that the phenomena revealed by this means might eventually be correlated with activity in the central nervous system.

Many philosophers considered this project misguided. The logical positivists, who insisted that a statement is only meaningful if one can specify observable conditions that would render it true or false, rejected the view that psychological predicates such as ‘pain’ have any subjective content. A statement like ‘Paul has a toothache’ is merely an abbreviation for a list of physical events (such as Paul weeping, Paul’s blood pressure rising, etc.) which collectively exhaust the meaning of the statement (Hempel 1980).

Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein (1953) regarded the so-called ‘mind-body problem’ as the result of a misuse of ordinary language. According to Ryle, it is a ‘category mistake’ (1949: 16) to treat the mind as part of the body, because psychological and physical language follow different rules. The former provides a mentalistic short-hand for characterising behavioural dispositions, but does not pick out the internal causes of behaviour (unlike physiology).

It was in this climate that U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart, both working at the University of Adelaide, first proposed their pioneering idea that conscious states and processes are none other than states and processes of the brain: the so-called ‘identity theory’. In philosophy circles this was widely regarded as an outlandish proposal. One English philosopher is said to have reacted: ‘A touch of the sun, I suppose’ (reported in Armstrong 1993: xiii). Place, who first proposed the theory, thought the dispositional analysis of mental concepts such as ‘believing’ and ‘intending’ was sound, but claimed that there is ‘an intractable residue of concepts clustering around the notions of consciousness, experience, sensation and mental imagery, where some kind of inner process story is unavoidable’ (1956: 44). He emphasised that the identity theory is not an analysis of statements about sensations into statements about the brain, but a defeasible scientific hypothesis (ibid.: 45).

Smart, initially a skeptic (see his 2008), soon came to the theory’s defence. Following Place, he compared the identity of sensations and brain processes to the relationship between lightning and electrical discharges. The latter is not a matter of definition; one can understand statements about lightning without any knowledge of electricity. Nor is it a matter of lightning and electrical discharges being contemporaneous and co-spatial (as when two gases are mixed). Rather, it is an ‘identity in the strict sense’ (Smart 1959b: 145). Lightning is nothing more than an electrical discharge. Likewise, the identity theory asserts that sensations are not merely correlated with brain processes, as psychologists had supposed; they are one and the same thing.

To the objection that we attribute different kinds of properties to experiences and brain processes—sensations are private, brain processes are public; sensations can be intense or unpleasant, brain processes cannot—Smart responded that our linguistic conventions are not fixed, but will undoubtedly change with future science. We may one day be able to state objective physiological criteria for the
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application of expressions such as ‘Smith experiences a strong sweet taste’, and will have no qualms about describing experience in physical terms (ibid.: 152–3).

To the objection that ‘raw feels’ such as the yellow of a lemon, or the sweetness of sugar, are irreducibly mental, Smart offered an account of colour, taste, etc., as ‘powers … to evoke certain kinds of discriminatory responses in human beings’ (ibid.: 149). Such powers belong to the objects we perceive, not to our sensations. Thus, in describing sugar as ‘sweet’ we are not referring to a non-physical quality of a sensation, but to a power of sugar to produce certain effects in us. After-images are a problem here, since they have no object. However, Smart noted that a report such as ‘I see a yellow after-image’ can easily be expressed in a topic-neutral way (i.e. in terms that are neutral between materialism and dualism), for example: ‘Something is going on with me that is like what goes on when I look at a lemon’ (ibid.: 148–50).

An important player in these early developments was **C. B. Martin**, who was at the University of Adelaide between 1954 and 1966. Although Martin did not publish a great deal at the time, his influence is frequently acknowledged by Place and Smart (see Place 1989 for an account of Martin’s contribution to ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, and Martin 2007 for an overview of his distinctive approach to dispositions, emergence, and mind).

**D. M. Armstrong** (1968, 1977) and Brian Medlin (1967) were part of a second wave of Australian identity theorists. They extended the theory by offering a causal analysis of mental states as ‘[states] of the person apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour’ or ‘apt for being brought about by a certain sort of stimulus’ (Armstrong 1968: 82). A desire for food, for example, is a state of a person that typically produces food-seeking and food-consuming behaviour; a belief that it is raining is a state that is typically caused by rainfall, and so on. Both Armstrong and Medlin argued that the states which play these roles in us are states of the brain. Their account, known as ‘central-state materialism’ (Feigl 1967), differs from the Place/Smart theory in that it identifies all mental states, not just conscious ones, with brain states.

Consciousness appears in two guises in Armstrong’s work: as introspective awareness, and as the qualities of sensations and mental images. Armstrong regards introspection as analogous to perception, but whereas perception informs us about objects in the physical environment, introspection is a kind of inner sense whereby we acquire information about our own mental states. It produces these special states of awareness via some kind of self-scanning process in the brain (1968: 323–38). As remarked above, perception presents us with the problem of *qualia*, Locke’s secondary qualities. Like Smart, Armstrong argued that these apparently qualitative features of experience do not belong to conscious states at all, which are ‘transparent’ (1993: xxii). What our perceptual states reveal, when they don’t deceive us, is certain complex micro-physical properties of external objects (1968: 270–90).

The causal analysis of mind, independently worked out by **David Lewis** (1966), contributed to the development of **functionalism** (Putnam 1967). Functionalism
identifies a mental state with a causal role: the kinds of stimuli that produce it, the kinds of behaviour it produces, and the way it interacts with other mental states. One of the advertised strengths of functionalism is that it imposes very few limits on the nature of the physical states that can play such roles, thus allowing for mentality in organisms, or even machines, that are physically very different from us. Armstrong originally held that a given type of mental state is identical to a corresponding type of brain state (1993: xv). This ‘type-type’ theory is vulnerable to the possibility of mental states that are realised by more than one kind of brain state. Functionalism only insists that a mental state should be realised by some physical state or other—mental states are multiply realisable.

Despite its advantages, functionalism has come in for some serious flack. Frank Jackson, a self-confessed ‘qualia freak’ (1982: 127), is among a number of philosophers who have expressed dissatisfaction with physicalism in both its type-type and functionalist forms. The problem, as Jackson sees it, is that no amount of physical information about the structure, function, or causal history of brain states can capture the phenomenal qualities of experience. Consequently, physicalism must be false. In support of this claim Jackson asks us to imagine a neuroscientist, Mary, who has spent her whole life in a black and white room, her only access to the outside world provided by a black and white monitor. By assumption, Mary knows everything there is to know about the neurophysiology of colour vision, despite never having seen a coloured object. What will happen when she exits her room? Jackson takes it to be obvious that Mary will learn something new about visual experience, and thus that physicalism leaves something out (ibid.: 130). This ‘knowledge argument’ has generated a great deal of critical reaction (see, e.g. Churchland 1985, Lewis 1988). For his part, Jackson no longer buys the conclusion of the argument, on the grounds that it is self-defeating: if Mary learns something new, then qualia are non-physical; but if qualia are non-physical then they are causally inert, and can’t influence our beliefs; so Mary’s new qualia can’t possibly lead her or us to conclude that qualia are non-physical (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996: 134).

David Chalmers is another Australian philosopher who takes issue with earlier treatments of qualia. Chalmers divides the mystery of consciousness into an ‘easy problem’ and a ‘hard problem’. The easy problem is to explain how the brain processes stimuli, integrates information, and reports on our internal states. The hard problem is the further question: ‘Why is all this processing accompanied by an experienced inner life?’ (1996: xii). Chalmers believes that the hard problem goes beyond what can be explained in terms of the structural and dynamical properties of physical processes, because ‘the existence of my conscious experience is not logically entailed by my functional organisation’ (ibid.: 97). We can see this, he claims, by recognising the conceptual possibility of phenomenal zombies: creatures that are physically and functionally identical to us, but which lack experience. Although phenomenal zombies may not exist in our world, ‘the mere intelligibility of the notion is enough to establish the
Conclusion’ (*ibid.*: 96). Chalmers advocates what he calls ‘naturalistic dualism’ according to which conscious experience has phenomenal (or proto-phenomenal) properties that are not entailed by physical properties, but which may be lawfully related to those properties (*ibid.*: 124–9).

Jackson and Chalmers offer modal arguments for their anti-physicalist positions: they argue from certain possibilities—the existence of phenomenal zombies; that an omniscient scientist might know all the physical facts, yet learn something new via experience—to conclusions about experience. Daniel Stoljar has recently developed a general response to this style of argument. He defends what he calls ‘the ignorance hypothesis’ (2006: 6), the claim that we are ignorant of a type of non-experiential fact that is relevant to the nature of experience. Such ignorance undermines our capacity to imagine the scenarios described by Chalmers and Jackson (*ibid.*: 67–86). One simply can’t imagine a phenomenal zombie, for example, if one is not in possession of all the relevant facts. One *can* imagine an organism that lacks experience even though it is identical to us in all the non-experiential respects we know about. But this is no zombie, because our imagining has perforce omitted some of the physical facts (those of which we are ignorant). Although Stoljar doesn’t offer a positive account of such facts, he argues for the plausibility of the ignorance hypothesis on the basis of historical precedent and general observations about our epistemic situation (*ibid.*: 87–141).

O’Brien and Opie (1999), swimming against the functionalist tide, defend a connectionist approach to consciousness. Their connectionist vehicle theory identifies conscious states with stable patterns of firing in the brain’s many neural networks. Connectionists argue that such firing patterns are a crucial class of representing vehicles in the brain, whose interactions are the causal basis of cognition (Rumelhart, McClelland and the PDP Research Group 1987). O’Brien and Opie’s account thus does justice to both the representational role of consciousness and its causal impact on behaviour. It is an identity theory in the original sense, because it identifies phenomenal consciousness with a particular type of neural activity. The theory explains consciousness not in terms of what the brain’s representing vehicles *do*, as a functionalist would, but in terms of what they *are* (1999: 138). The prospects for a vehicle theory of consciousness depend on the ability of disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience and psychophysics to establish a detailed mapping between the rich, multi-layered structure of consciousness, and the equally rich, multi-level organisation of neural activity, as envisaged by early experimental psychologists.

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Consciousness, Metaphysics of
Ole Koksvik

Drinking a glass of cold water on a hot day feels a certain way. It is hard not to wonder why it feels *that* way, and indeed why it feels any way at all. In an influential and evocative way of speaking, a being is conscious just in case there is *something it is like* to be it (Nagel 1974). Similarly, a mental state is conscious just in case there is something it is like to be in that state. When there is something it is like to be a being, we say that that being has phenomenal experience, and when there is something it is like to be in a certain mental state, we say that that state has phenomenal properties, or a *phenomenology*. (This notion of consciousness contrasts with *access* consciousness [Block 1997], with which we shall not be concerned here.)

There are many interesting philosophical questions about phenomenal consciousness. For example: What is the relation between a creature’s being conscious and a mental state’s being conscious (Van Gulick 2009: section 2)? How is the overall phenomenology of a conscious being related to the more specific phenomenal experiences that being has (Bayne and Chalmers 2003)? What is the relationship between (phenomenally) conscious mental states and mental states that represent the world as being a certain way (Siewert 1998: ch. 8; Horgan and Tienson 2002; Chalmers 2004b; Crane 2001: ch. 3; Pitt 2004)? Do all conscious mental states have *content*, and if so, of what kind (Siegel 2008)? Do we stand in a special relation to our own conscious states, a relation, e.g. of special authority, incorrigibility or infallibility (Macdonald 1995; Gertler 2008; Williamson 2000: ch. 4)?

Australasian philosophers have made important contributions to the philosophical understanding of consciousness in many areas, but there is insufficient room here to discuss them all in appropriate detail. Accordingly, a narrower focus is adopted: this entry shall be exclusively concerned with the philosophical treatment of certain metaphysical questions about consciousness, in the analytic tradition. (Even with this narrower focus, there are inevitably many regrettable omissions and simplifications.) What kind of thing is consciousness, and how does it fit in with the rest of the world? Australasian philosophers’ attempts to answer these questions have been enduringly influential.

The metaphysical questions about consciousness are questions to which one’s initial puzzlement about consciousness can quickly lead. They are also questions which have become absolutely central to the philosophy of mind, both in Australasia and worldwide. Why is that? An important part of the explanation is that apparent progress toward showing how mental states such as beliefs and desires fit into the rest of the world often seems incapable of being generalised to also
show how consciousness fits in. Consciousness has thus come to occupy much the same role as was previously occupied by a more general concept of mind: it stubbornly resists explanation. One way to view the positions discussed below is as attempts to address this unsatisfactory situation.

**The Identity Theory**

The identity theory of the mind was developed at the **University of Adelaide** by U. T. Place, an English psychologist who was a lecturer there from 1951 to 1954. Place was strongly influenced by discussions with J. J. C. Smart (on whom more below) and C. B. Martin. Martin was an emergentist, not a materialist, but despite differences in views, his influence on the philosophers who interacted with him, in Adelaide (1954–66), Sydney (1966–71) and elsewhere, is widely acknowledged.

Place (1956) argues that a reasonable scientific hypothesis is that the ‘intractable residue’ of conscious experience is identical with processes in the brain. While the metaphysical independence of (kinds of) entities can often be inferred from the logical independence of statements about them, this is not always so, and conscious states and brain processes constitute one of the exceptions. (On this inference, see also Putnam 2002b: 73–4.) In general, commonsense observations and scientific observations should be taken to be observations of the very same phenomenon whenever the latter, together with relevant theory, provide ‘an immediate explanation’ of the former (Place 1956: 48). That is precisely what Place expects to see as our understanding of the brain advances: patterns emerging in the study of brain processes will eventually allow us to explain all our introspective observations.

J. J. C. (‘Jack’) Smart, born in Cambridge and educated at the universities of Glasgow and Oxford, held a chair at the University of Adelaide from 1950 to 1972. Originally a behaviourist, he was convinced by Place (and also influenced by Feigl 1958) to adopt the identity theory. Smart (1959) argues that we must either understand conscious mental states as ‘nomological danglers’ (the term is due to Feigl) or identify them with brain processes. We have, he says, good reasons to reject nomological danglers but no good reason to reject the identification, so the identification should be accepted. (Smart spends the best part of the paper replying to objections, including objections from considerations to do with ordinary language; with respect to the latter Martin, who was staunchly opposed to ordinary language philosophy, may have been influential.) Nomological danglers are epiphenomena, caused but not themselves causally efficacious. Smart’s objection to such entities seems to be based, first, on a denial of the very possibility of entities connected to the rest of the causal machinery of the world in this way, and second on the view that if such entities did exist, the laws relating them to the rest of the world would be strange, because they would relate microphysical objects with macroscopic phenomena.

The latter thought is presumably motivated by ‘unity of nature’ considerations: we find that the laws that do the real explanatory work elsewhere relate small
entities to other small entities, so that is what we should expect where the mind is concerned as well. Whether this adds much independent weight to an already monistic outlook is perhaps doubtful: if, for independent reasons, consciousness is regarded as truly unique, the appearance of unusual laws relating it to other parts of the world should not be surprising.

Another aspect of Smart’s article is worth noting, because it may partially explain why it became so influential, even though it was largely concerned with defending a claim already made by one of his colleagues. U. T. Place had called the sense of identity he employed ‘the “is” of composition’ and had introduced it by means of analogies with cases such as someone’s table being an old packing case and someone’s hat being a bundle of straw (Place 1956: 45). This seems to leave at least some room for a distinction between the experience and the brain process: if four legs plus a tabletop compose a table, the result is usually taken to be six, and not five, distinct objects in total. In contrast, Smart insists that sensations and brain processes are strictly identical (Smart 1959b: 145).

The identity theory is often understood as claiming that when I experience pain, a certain (type of) brain process just is my experience. But other animals do, and extraterrestrial beings may, have brains that differ substantially from ours: they may not have brain processes of the same kind as mine (on a specification of kinds of brain processes narrow enough to yield sufficient variation in conscious states). Yet this does not seem to be a good reason to conclude that they do not feel pain, and it is compatible with having strong reasons to think that they do. If causing tissue damage to alien life forms causes them to retract the damaged body part, if they appear to be strongly opposed to having their tissue damaged and strongly motivated to bring about the cessation of the damaging process and to ensure that it is not repeated, etc., then it seems that we would have very good reason to think that they feel pain, and any knowledge of the aliens’ innards would not affect that. (Note that there is no reliance here on the claim that a certain repertoire of behaviour is all there is to pain.) Thus pain seems likely to be multiply realisable: it can be instantiated in brains quite different from ours, and perhaps even in systems we would not recognise as brains.

**Functionalism**

Functionalism is, roughly, the view that mental states are states whose identity or character is exhausted by the causal relations they stand in to (sensory) inputs, (behavioural) outputs and other mental states (Putnam 2002b: esp. 76; Levin 2009; Lycan 1994; Block 1994; on the relationship between functionalism and the identity theory, see Jackson 1998a: section 2 and Smart 2008: section 5).

Varieties of functionalism differ with respect to the information considered relevant for the individuation of mental states. On some views, the relevant information is available to everyone (at least all competent adults) in virtue of shared beliefs about how beliefs, desires, etc., respond to stimuli, interact with each other and result in behaviour. On other views, the pertinent information is that which has resulted or will result from scientific psychology (see Block 1994: 325).
Australasian philosophy is associated especially with the former type of view, versions of which are defended by, e.g. D. M. Armstrong, David Lewis, David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson. Here I concentrate on the first two.

‘The concept of a mental state’, Armstrong argues, ‘is the concept of something that is, characteristically, the cause of certain effects and the effect of certain causes’, and this is all there is to our mental state concepts (1981: 21). Characteristic causes of mental states are other mental states as well as events and objects in a person’s environment; a characteristic effect is behaviour.

As is common with philosophical theories, functionalism is often put forward in sketch form: we are told in rough outline how the theory will analyse mental concepts and asked to trust (or to share the intuition) that the details can be filled in. One of Armstrong’s very significant contributions in *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (1968) was his attempt to provide an analysis of a range of important mental concepts in considerable detail (see also his 1973 and 1981).

As one might expect, beliefs and desires play a central role. ‘[P]erception’, for example, ‘is nothing but the acquiring of true or false beliefs concerning the current state of the organism’s body and environment’ (1968: 209). A challenge for Armstrong’s position is that we are sometimes subject to known illusions, and in those cases we do not (generally) believe what we see. To account for this, Armstrong states that perception is either the acquisition of beliefs, or the acquisition of degrees of belief (credences) which are ‘held in check’ by stronger credences (1968: 221), or acquisitions of dispositions to believe (1968: 222–3). (See George Pitcher 1971: esp. 91–3 for a very similar account; Jackson 1977b: ch. 2 argues that these manoeuvres fail to salvage the theory.)

The key to see how the causal theory he advocates can encompass conscious experience is, Armstrong argues, to recognise that experience is transparent. (Armstrong is an early advocate of this thesis, which has received much attention of late.) We are not aware of properties of our experiences; what we are aware of are only the properties of the objects of those experiences. For example, in perception, the redness associated with certain perceptual experiences is to be understood as the redness of the perceived object (1981: 27–29). And this allows us, Armstrong thinks, to capture conscious mental states in the causal story: just as with all other mental states, a conscious state is that which has certain characteristic causes, like red objects in the environment (where ‘red’ is cashed out in terms of physical properties, such as surface reflectance profiles).

A similar account was developed independently (and published slightly earlier) by David Lewis. Lewis was American but had a strong association with Australia, due in large part to his close friendship with Smart. He visited Australia more than twenty times from 1971—when Smart had organised for him to give the *Gavin David Young Lectures* at the University of Adelaide—to 2001, and is now considered an ‘honorary Australian’, at least by Australian philosophers (see Weatherson 2009; Nolan 2005). ‘The definitive characteristic of any (sort of) experience as such’, Lewis argued, ‘is its causal role, its syndrome of most typical causes and effects … which belong by analytic necessity to experiences’ (1966: 17).
One of Lewis’ distinctive contributions is his development of a general method for defining theoretical terms, which he then applied to mental state terms to yield an argument for the identification of mental states, including conscious states, with brain processes (see his 1970 for the development, his 1972 for a less technical presentation, and his 1995 for more details; the argument for the identification is in his 1966).

Start with a theory formulated by a long sentence (formed, perhaps, by conjoining the sentences that express the theory), ‘the postulate of \( T \): \( T[t_1 \ldots t_n] \).

Replace each of the \( n \) terms which occur in that sentence with a new variable, \( x_1 \) to \( x_n \), and then existentially quantify the result. This is the Ramsay sentence for the theory. It is silent on how many sets of entities stand to each other in the relations postulated by the theory; it claims only that at least one such set exists. Lewis argues, however, that theoretical terms are best understood as uniquely referring, or else as not referring at all. The introduction of a theory should be understood as claiming that there is exactly one set of entities which satisfy the theory, and so the modified Ramsey sentence, which states that the theory has a unique realisation, is what is of real interest: \( \exists x T[x] \) (or \( \exists y \forall x (T[x] = y) \)).

This much follows, according to Lewis, from our concepts along with conventions for the introduction of new concepts (1972: 254, 1970: 439–40). Lewis argues that if empirical science discovers what actually uniquely realises the theory \( T \), we are compelled, as a matter of logic, to identify the referents of our concepts with these realisers. So if, as he believes, a specification of conscious mental states in functional terms can be extracted from folk psychology, and if, as he thinks highly likely, physical science eventually isolates the unique realisers (or near enough realisers) of those specifications as neural states, then the identification of conscious experience with neural states is forced upon us (Lewis 1966).

Functionalism can be seen as a response both to objections to the identity theory and to objections to behaviourism. The multiple realisability of mental states, which presented a difficulty for the identity theory, seems to be permitted on functionalist theories. For example, pain is the occupant of a certain functional role in the mental organisational structure (or, perhaps, the second-order property of having that role occupied; see Lewis 1995: 419–21). Provided that a functional characterisation can be given which is general enough to encompass all creatures who plausibly feel pain, the unpalatable implication that creatures with brains that differ from ours do not experience pain appears to be avoided. (An implication may be the that there is ambiguity in the concept of pain; see Lewis 1983a: esp. 128. However, for an argument which purports to show that functionalism is also vulnerable to the objection from multiple realisability, see Block 1994: 330.)

For at least simple versions of behaviourism, a difficulty is that no single behavioural disposition is associated with a belief: which behaviour a belief will bring about depends on which other beliefs the person has, as well as on the person’s desires (Geach 1957: 8). But according to functionalism, the array of causal
Consciousness, Metaphysics of

relations which individuates a mental state includes relations with sensory input, behavioural output and other mental states. So even if some creatures suppress all pain behaviour (Putnam 2002a) and even if there are perfect actors, who imitate having an experience perfectly, functionalism would not force us to the mistaken conclusion that the creatures lack painful experiences or that the actor has them.

Functionalism seems to retain from behaviourism and the identity theory the virtue of offering a possible way of integrating the mind with the physical world (while also being compatible with their non-integration; see Block 1994: 326, 330): ‘if the concepts of the various sorts of mental state are concepts of that which is … apt for causing certain effects and apt for being the effects of certain causes, then it would be a quite unpuzzling thing if mental states should turn out to be physical states of the brain’ (Armstrong 1981: 21). One might again ask, however, whether that promise really extends to consciousness. Are conscious states individuated exhaustively by their functional roles?

Dualism

Powerful arguments to the effect that they are not are presented by Australian dualists. In his seminal article ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ (1982), Frank Jackson argues that facts about phenomenal experience are left out of all explanations restricted only to physical facts, even functional explanations. Through two thought-experiments Jackson presents his ‘knowledge argument’ for the view that physical information must leave something out. In one of them (for the other, see 1982: 130 and 1986) Jackson asks us to imagine that we encounter a person, Fred, who is capable of making a colour discrimination we cannot. For Fred, the things we classify as red fall into two groups, red₁ and red₂, as different from each other as yellow and blue are to us. Jackson argues that no amount of physical information, including functional information, will tell us what it is like to have the colour experience Fred has when he sees a colour that he, unlike us, can discriminate from the others. Therefore, there is more to know than what is encoded in physical information (1982: 128–30).

The knowledge argument had appeared, although not by that name, some fifty-five years earlier. John William Dunne argued that there is ‘a characteristic of red of which … all seeing people are very strongly aware’, such that a blind person who has been told all the physical facts still ‘would have not the faintest shadow of an idea that [seeing people] experience anything of the kind’ (1934: 15). However, Jackson’s vivid presentation of the argument generated a flurry of activity (see, e.g. Ludlow, Nagasawa and Stoljar 2004), and the fact that he himself no longer endorses the knowledge argument has not stopped the paper from remaining one of the most discussed and influential papers in recent philosophy of mind.

Another influential argument for dualism, often said to have revived the debate over dualism, is David Chalmers’ ‘zombie argument’ (1996: 94–9). Chalmers argues that it is logically possible that there be something—a phenomenal zombie—which replicates my physical makeup and (therefore) my functional organisation down to the most minute detail but which has no phenomenal
experience. He claims that the possibility of a zombie twin shows that the facts about my functional organisation and physical makeup do not entail the facts about phenomenal experience. There is more to know than what the physical sciences can tell us. (For predecessors to the zombie argument, see Chalmers 1996: ch. 3, n.1. Chalmers in fact discusses five different arguments, which he regards as all pulling in the same direction.)

These arguments purport to show that what one can learn from one set of facts is not all there is to know. One might think that the metaphysical question about consciousness, whether or not consciousness itself is physical, is not immediately settled even if the knowledge and zombie arguments are successful. In particular, a popular thought has been that it might be metaphysically necessary that consciousness is a brain process even if it is conceptually or logically possible that consciousness is something else. Both Jackson and Chalmers, however, take their arguments to have the strong metaphysical consequence that conscious experience is not identical to physical or functional states or processes (Chalmers 1996: ch. 4, esp. 131–40, and Jackson 1986: 291).

An important predecessor to both these arguments is found in the work of Keith Campbell, who succeeded D. M. Armstrong as Challis Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney in 1991. Behaviourist and causal (functional) analyses, Campbell argues, leave out ‘the very thing which matters most about [conscious states]. Pains hurt: indeed that is their most salient feature’ (1984: 71–2), and, in general, these theories cannot capture what it is like to be an experiencing subject (104). Campbell also briefly discusses an ‘imitation man’, a being who, like Chalmers’ zombie, lacks phenomenal experience, but is functionally similar (in Chalmers’s case, there is functional identity) to experiencing subjects (100).

The views on the metaphysics of consciousness discussed in this entry all have contemporary defenders, and are all controversial. A view that has not been discussed is that there really are no phenomenal experiences at all (a view often associated with Dennett 1988, 1991). Whether that view ought to be taken seriously is a question not discussed here. For those who remain convinced that there are conscious experiences, however, the continuing debate over their nature is profoundly influenced by the contributions of Australasian philosophers.

There are many other important Australasian contributions to research on consciousness (here again I apologise for inevitable omissions). Responses to Jackson’s knowledge argument have been put forth by John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter (1990, 2006), Lewis (1990b), Cynthia Macdonald (2004), Philip Pettit (2004b), Denis Robinson (1993), and Jackson himself (2003, 2004a). The thesis that the zombie argument and similar arguments misleadingly seem plausible to us because we lack knowledge of some physical truth has been given detailed defence (Stoljar 2006), and the view that the zombie intuition guides meaning while being metaphysically idle has been explored (Braddon-Mitchell 2003). Phenomenal concepts, the content of phenomenal and intentional states, and our knowledge of that content have been investigated (Chalmers 2004b, 2005, 2003; MacDonald 1995). The lessons to be learned about consciousness from
Consequentialism

Simon Keller

Consequentialism says that morality is all about making the world better, or producing good consequences, or bringing about good states of affairs. Alongside deontology and virtue ethics, consequentialism is one of the three major approaches to normative moral theory. The most recognisable and historically significant version of consequentialism is classical utilitarianism, which says that the morally right act is always the one that produces the greatest balance of happiness over unhappiness, with the happiness of all individuals counting equally.

There are various ways in which a moral theory may depart from classical utilitarianism while still claiming to be consequentialist. It may agree that right acts are those that bring about good states of affairs, but not that better states of affairs are simply those containing greater quantities of happiness. It may concentrate not on the actual consequences of an act, but rather on the act’s expected or foreseeable consequences, or on the consequences of adopting the rule or policy under which the act falls. Or, it may concern itself not with acts, primarily, but rather with character traits, motives, persons, or something else, assessing these entities by assessing their consequences.

The more attention is paid to theories that differ from classical utilitarianism in such respects, the harder it is to draw a sharp division between consequentialist and non-consequentialist theory. Still, there is a distinctive consequentialist temperament, inherited from classical utilitarianism. A consequentialist begins with a view about how the world ought to be, and evaluates entities (whether acts, rules or something else) by asking how well they do at getting us there.

Australasia is more closely associated with consequentialism than with any other moral theory, and these days consequentialism is more closely associated...
Consequentialism

with Australasia than with any other part of the world. Two of the most prominent recent proponents of classical utilitarianism, J. J. C. Smart and Peter Singer, are Australians, and Australasian philosophy has been at the forefront of efforts to develop consequentialism in its non-utilitarian forms—and also of efforts to refute it.

Classical utilitarianism has considerable appeal within the context of the respect for science and reductionist inclinations found among many Australasian philosophers. The theory is simple and elegant, its implications for particular cases are relatively clear, and it explains a wide variety of moral phenomena in terms of a single core value: the maximisation of happiness.

The theory also has straightforwardly moral attractions, which are the focus of the positive arguments in Smart’s seminal defence of utilitarianism (1973). Utilitarianism says that everybody, for the purposes of morality, counts equally, and it captures the credible thought that the whole point of morality is to make individuals better off. Also, as Smart is quick to point out, utilitarianism avoids the rule-worship or fetishism apparent in many of its competitors. Non-utilitarian moral theories are likely to imply that, sometimes, morality requires us to turn down opportunities to reduce misery or make individuals happier. But does a theory not look like a fixation, the utilitarian can ask, when it tells us not to put the best interests of individuals first?

Smart’s essay also faces up to utilitarianism’s central theoretical chore: the effort to stave off counterexamples. If it is a virtue of utilitarianism that its implications for particular cases are clear, its major weakness is that those implications are often counter-intuitive. To mention some of the many famous examples: utilitarianism implies that you should kill an innocent person for her organs, if you can use the organs to save the lives of several others; it implies that a pacifist ought to take a job manufacturing weapons, if by doing the job badly she can prevent others from doing it well; and it implies that it is a good thing to take pleasure in the suffering of others, if they are going to suffer anyway. The underlying problem for utilitarianism is that it grants no fundamental importance to certain moral concepts—respect, rights, virtue, integrity, autonomy—that play significant roles in ordinary moral thinking.

Smart gives a clear and honest expression of the standard utilitarian strategy for responding to such cases. First, utilitarians deconstruct the examples, trying to show that they are remote and unlikely, and that the utilitarian verdicts are hence not quite so unpalatable. Second, utilitarians downplay the importance of moral intuitions, suggesting that the opinions of the ‘man on the street’ should not be accepted as authoritative ethical data. Third, utilitarians style themselves as reformers, setting out to challenge and improve upon commonsense morality, not simply to reify it. Even the most committed utilitarians will admit, however, that their anti-utilitarian intuitions remain extremely difficult to shake.

Australasian consequentialists after Smart do not tend to focus directly on defending the utilitarian criterion of right action. Instead, they tend to pursue either the project of applying the broadly utilitarian perspective to questions
in practical ethics, or the project of developing versions of non-utilitarian consequentialism.

The outstanding representative of the first project is Peter Singer. Without relying on utilitarian premises, Singer offers strong arguments for his claims that we are morally obliged actively to prevent significant harm, not just to refrain from causing it (Singer 1972); that there is no morally significant difference between the suffering of humans and the suffering of animals (Singer 1975); and that the value of a human life consists not in its sacredness or sanctity, but in its quality (Singer 1994a). These are all distinctive implications of utilitarianism, and the doctrine is strengthened, and certain objections withstood, when they are shown to be plausible in their own right.

When it comes to the second project—building non-utilitarian forms of consequentialism—much of the work carried out by Australasian philosophers is motivated by the worry that consequentialism, in its traditional forms, is too demanding. Consequentialism requires us to sacrifice anything of ours that can be used more efficiently elsewhere; we should not spend money on holidays, clothes or theatre tickets, for example, if that money could do more good in the hands of those worse off than ourselves. A version of this worry that has received particular attention among Australasian philosophers is the ‘nearest and dearest’ objection. Consequentialism, says the objection, asks us to treat everyone equally, and hence tells us that we are not permitted to favor other people in the ways that genuine love and friendship demand. How can I be a true friend, the objection asks, if I value all others only for their contributions to the general happiness, and if I am prepared to abandon my friends whenever I notice that I can produce more happiness elsewhere? (The most influential statement of this objection is Stocker 1976, written while Stocker was working in Australia, and one of the most sophisticated is presented by the Australians Dean Cocking and Justin Oakley (1995).)

The New Zealander Tim Mulgan argues that consequentialism can deal with the demandingness objection, but only if it offers different consequentialist accounts of different parts of morality. Mulgan (2001) presents ‘Combined Consequentialism’, which applies simple act consequentialism to the ‘realm of necessity’—the realm within which we deal with the needs of everyone—but a form of rule consequentialism to the ‘realm of reciprocity’—the realm within which we deal with the goals of those within our delimited moral community. (Mulgan’s treatment of the realm of reciprocity has some similarities to the view developed by the Australian Liam Murphy (2000).) Mulgan’s latest work extends his framework to cover questions about individuals in yet a different moral realm: those yet to be born (Mulgan 2006).

Consideration of the ‘nearest and dearest’ objection has inspired several other suggested modifications to classical utilitarianism. Much of the relevant work has been done at the Australian National University. Robert E. Goodin (1995) suggests that we restrict the scope of utilitarianism, applying it to public life but not to personal relationships. Philip Pettit (1997b) shows how a consequentialist can be a pluralist about value, seeking to advance not only
individual happiness, but also such values as peace, truth-telling, respect for property, wisdom and—presumably—love and friendship. Pettit’s view remains a form of consequentialism, because it instructs us to promote these values, even at the cost of failing to instantiate them in our own lives; if going to war will lead to long-term peace, you should go to war, and if betraying a friend will produce more and better friendships elsewhere, you should betray the friend.

Pettit also points out that there can be consequentialist reasons to value certain kinds of non-consequentialist thinking. A world in which we think as friends is probably better, Pettit says, than one in which we always think as consequentialists. Frank Jackson (1991) pursues a similar thought, saying that often the way to achieve a collective goal is for each member of the collective to focus on one part of the goal. Perhaps, then, the most effective strategy for improving the lives of everyone is for each of us to concentrate upon those we know and love best. If these suggestions hold, then we may find reasons to approve of the non-consequentialist psychology of friendship, in ourselves or in others, from a consequentialist perspective.

Michael Smith (2009) argues that the ‘nearest and dearest’ objection still stands, and presses for a further theoretical move. He suggests that we adopt a relativistic account of value, so that different individuals have different states of affairs at which to aim. Smith’s approach judges each act on its consequences, but it abandons what has often been seen as consequentialism’s defining characteristic: the telling of a single, objective story about the goodness of states of affairs, standing prior to any consideration of particular agents and circumstances.

Australasian consequentialism begins with classical utilitarianism, but the further its development the less prominent its concern with the utilitarian theory of right action. It has two major ongoing contributions to offer. First, there is the development of distinctive and fruitful approaches to questions in practical ethics, influenced by a broadly utilitarian perspective. Second, there is the development of moral theories—call them ‘consequentialist’ or not—that stand as viable alternatives to deontology and virtue ethics. Classical utilitarianism may ultimately be impossible to defend, but its insights continue to yield important philosophical work, both practical and theoretical.

Cresswell, Maxwell J.

Edwin Mares

Maxwell John Cresswell was born on 19 November 1939 in Wellington, New Zealand. He went to Wellington College before attending Victoria College of the University of New Zealand, where he obtained a B.A. (1960) and an M.A.
Cresswell, Maxwell J.

(1961). He then went to the University of Manchester on a Commonwealth scholarship, where he studied for a Ph.D. under A. N. Prior. He got his Ph.D. in 1963 and returned to Wellington to a lectureship at his alma mater, which had by then become Victoria University of Wellington. He was given a personal chair in 1974. He taught at Victoria until his retirement in 2000. He has taught part-time since at Texas A and M University and at the University of Auckland.

Cresswell is an extremely prolific writer. As of the writing of this article, Cresswell has written ten books (two of these are collections of his articles), and 128 articles or book chapters. His main fields of research are logic, philosophical semantics, and the history of philosophy (especially Greek philosophy, Locke, and Bradley). Here I will concentrate on Cresswell’s contributions to philosophical logic.

Modal Logic

Cresswell has made many important contributions to modal logic, but his greatest achievement is that, together with George Hughes, he wrote *An Introduction to Modal Logic* (1968). This book was the first modern introduction to modal logic. It is distinguished from its predecessors by including a lengthy treatment of possible world semantics and completeness proofs for the standard systems. It was extremely successful, and was by far the most widely taught and read textbook in the field for about two decades. Hughes and Cresswell published some supplementary material in their 1984 book, *A Companion to Modal Logic*, and produced an updated version in 1996: *A New Introduction to Modal Logic*.

Although much of Cresswell’s work in logic has been in producing semantics for natural languages (see below), the basis for all of his logic has been possible worlds semantics. He has defended the use of possible worlds in many places, and produced a constructive metaphysics of worlds in ‘The World is Everything that is the Case’ (1972).

Lambda-Categorial Grammar

One of Cresswell’s key contributions to semantics is his λ-categorial grammar (see Cresswell 1973). The project of λ-categorial grammar is to provide a simplification of Montague grammar. The idea behind Montague grammar and λ-categorial grammar is to provide a way of understanding natural languages so that the semantic interpretation of a sentence can be read directly from its syntax. The syntactic structures of λ-categorial grammar so-to-speak wear their semantics on their sleeves. They can act, then, as intermediaries between the surface grammatical sentences of natural languages like English and their semantic interpretations.

Consider, for example, the following sentence:

Bess barks.

In a hybrid of English and standard logical notation we represent this as

\[ Barks(Bess) \]
This formal representation changes the word order of the original. But with \( \lambda \)-categorial grammar, we can capture the word order of the original sentence:

\[
< \text{Bess}, \lambda, x < \text{Barks}, x >>.
\]

The Greek letter \( \lambda \) is a variable binding operator. It abstracts from a sentence. If we take the open sentence \(< \text{Barks}, x >>\), we can produce an abstract \(< \lambda, x < \text{Barks}, x >>\). This abstract is a predicate that is true or false of individuals. The ‘category’ of a first order predicate like \(< \lambda, x < \text{Barks}, x >>\) is \(< 0, 1 >\). This means that it represents a function that takes individuals (entities of category 1) to propositions (entities of category 0). Names and quantifier expressions on Cresswell’s view are of the category \(< 0, 0, 1 >\). This means that they represent functions that take properties to propositions. In \(< \text{Bess}, \lambda, x < \text{Barks}, x >>\), Bess represents a function that takes a property to the proposition that a particular individual (i.e. Bess) has that property. Taking names to be higher order functions of this sort allows us to retain a natural word order in sentences of the \( \lambda \)-categorial language.

The \( \lambda \)-categorial representation of the sentence is its ‘deep structure’ or ‘logical form’. We can read off the semantic interpretation from a logical form in a way that we often cannot from a sentence in the surface grammar of English. Consider

Everyone loves someone.

We can assign two different logical forms to this sentence:

(1) \(< \text{everyone}, \lambda, x < \text{someone}, \lambda, y, < \text{loves}, x, y >>>>>\)

(2) \(< \text{someone}, \lambda, y < \text{everyone}, \lambda, x < \text{loves}, x, y >>>>>\)

The difference between these forms can be understood in terms of the order in which they are evaluated (Cresswell 1973: 82).

To interpret form (1), we first look at the open sentence \(< \text{loves}, x, y >>\). The interpretation of this is a function from worlds to sets of ordered pairs of individuals \((i, j)\) is in the set at \(w\) if and only if \(i\) loves \(j\) at \(w\). We then look at the open sentence \(< \text{someone}, \lambda, y, < \text{loves}, x, y >>>\). This sentence is true at a world \(w\) of an individual \(i\) if and only if there is some \(j\) such that \((i, j)\) is in the interpretation of \(< \text{loves}, x, y >>\) at \(w\). And so \(< \text{everyone}, \lambda, x, < \text{someone}, \lambda, y, < \text{loves}, x, y >>>>>\) is true at \(w\) if and only if everyone at \(w\) is an \(i\) such that there is some \(j\) such that \((i, j)\) is in the interpretation of \(< \text{loves}, x, y >>\) at \(w\).

To interpret form (2), we again first interpret \(< \text{loves}, x, y >>\). Then we look at \(< \text{everyone}, \lambda, x, < \text{loves}, x, y >>>\), which holds of an individual \(j\) at \(w\) if and only if everyone \(i\) in \(w\) is such that \((i, j)\) is in the interpretation of \(< \text{loves}, x, y >>\) at \(w\). Hence \(< \text{someone}, \lambda, y, < \text{everyone}, \lambda, x, < \text{loves}, x, y >>>>>\) is true at \(w\) if and only if there is some \(j\) in the interpretation of \(< \text{everyone}, \lambda, x, < \text{loves}, x, y >>>\) at \(w\).

Thus we have a way of disambiguating sentences of English, while retaining a natural word order. Note that the word order in the logical forms is not always
exactly the same as the word order in the surface grammar. Disambiguation for-
ces these differences on us. But the word order is still rather natural. If one is
asked to disambiguate ‘everyone loves someone’ in English, she will probably do
something like pointing out the difference between ‘for each person there is some
person that he or she loves’ and ‘there is a single person whom everyone loves’.
These two statements are very close in word order to the two forms (1) and (2)
given above.

The step-by-step method of interpretation that we went through also illus-
trates how λ-categorial grammar gives us a compositional semantics for natural
languages.

**Hyperintensions**

In the mid 1970s, Cresswell distinguished between intensional and hyper-
intensional contexts (Cresswell 1975). The modal operator □ (‘it is necessary
that’) is an intensional operator. Suppose that the formula □α is true at a
possible world w. Suppose also that the equivalence α ≡ β is also true at w. We
cannot thereby infer that □β is also true. We cannot substitute for equivalent
formulae into modal contexts—such contexts are intensional. But if we know
that □(α ≡ β), then (if our logic of modality is a standard (or ‘regular’) logic) we
can infer that □β. Consider on the other hand a belief context—‘Jeremy believes
that p ∨ ¬p’. Now, p ∨ ¬p is necessarily equivalent to every other tautology,
but we cannot infer that Jeremy believes every tautology. Thus belief contexts
are more opaque than modal contexts. Hence Cresswell calls such contexts
‘hyperintensional’.

An intension of a statement is a set of possible worlds, the worlds in which that
statement is true. A hyperintension is a structured entity of sorts. In λ-categorial
grammar, the following is a representation of ‘Jeremy believes that p ∨ ¬p’:

\[
<Jeremy, <\lambda, x, <believes, x, <that, <\lor, <p, <\neg, p >>>>>
\]

The intension of < ∨, < p, < ∼ p >>> is the entire set of possible worlds. But
the hyperintension of this sentence is a structured entity, which includes the
instensions of disjunction, p, and negation within it. This structured entity is
a structured meaning (see Cresswell 1985b). Different tautologies represent
different structured meanings, even though all of them have the same intension
(the entire set of worlds). In this framework, belief is in effect taken to be a
relation between a person and a hyperintension. The role of ‘that’ in the above
representation is not really as an operator on the sentence ‘p or not p’ but rather on
the parts of the sentence (1985b: 30).

One interesting feature of Cresswell’s view is that the structure of the meaning
that is to be taken to be the object of belief is not determined just by the surface
grammar of the sentence used to report the belief. Rather, the exact structure
may vary from case to case (see Cresswell and von Stechow 1982, and Cresswell
1985b).
Indexical Semantics

Cresswell’s indexical semantics generalises the notion of an index that has become familiar from modal and tense logic. In modal logic, we do not merely claim that a statement is true or false, but rather that it is true or false at a particular world. Similarly, in tense logic, a sentence is said to be true or false relative to a particular time. In some cases, a world or time needs to be supplied in order to interpret a sentence. Consider, for example, ‘it is now 3 o’clock’. This sentence cannot be interpreted unless the time at which it is uttered is known. Similarly, ‘actually, there are no unicorns’ cannot be interpreted unless it is known at which world it is uttered. The world and time of an utterance are called ‘indices’.

Consider the following statement (from Partee 1989; taken from Cresswell 1995: 5):

The enemy is well-supplied.

A ‘point of view’ is needed to interpret this sentence. Seen from the English point of view at Waterloo, the enemy is the French. Seen from the French point of view, the enemy is the English and Prussians. The phrase ‘enemy’ is what Cresswell calls a ‘relational noun’. It represents a two place relation (as in, e.g. ‘France is the enemy of England’), but it is used in this sentence as if it were a general noun. Its relational nature, however, indicates that there is a position in the sentence (rather like a free variable) that needs to be satisfied by some entity. And this entity needs to be supplied by context. Cresswell (1995) provides a formalisation using $\lambda$-categorial grammar of sentences that include relational nouns, and a theory of how contexts supply such entities.

Critical Philosophy Journal

Paul Crittenden

The announcement of the journal Critical Philosophy in 1983 began with the bold promise to foster philosophical work that was at once contemporary and historically informed:

The new journal will attempt to bring the history of philosophical thought to bear on contemporary social and cultural issues, and to encourage critical reflection, from a historically informed perspective, on the styles and forms of contemporary philosophical activity. (Quoted from Critical Philosophy, vol. I, no. 1, editorial introduction, p. 3)
The first issue appeared in 1984, and the journal ceased publication in 1988 after just four volumes. The journal was initiated by Genevieve Lloyd and Kim Lycos from the Australian National University, and Paul Crittenden (editor) and Stephen Gaukroger (Review Editor) from the Department of General Philosophy at the University of Sydney. Marion Tapper, University of Melbourne, joined the editorial committee in 1986. Each of the first two volumes contained two issues, consisting typically of four articles, one or two review articles, a dozen book reviews, and numerous informative booknotes. Volumes 3 and 4 consisted of double issues on nominated topics.


Volume 3, Philosophical Papers on Nuclear Armaments (1986), was published with the support of the Australasian Association of Philosophy. Motions condemning the production of nuclear weapons had been passed at the Annual General Meeting in 1983, and again in 1984, and an AAP-sponsored conference on ‘Philosophical Problems of Nuclear Armaments’ was held in Brisbane in 1985. The Critical Philosophy volume consists of a number of the Brisbane papers along with others submitted directly to the journal. With papers by Rodney Allen, Graham Nerlich, Brian Scarlett, Jim Thornton, Jocelyn Dunphy, Bill Ginnane, Graham Priest, Janna Thompson, Tony Coady, Brian Ellis, Brian Medlin, and Richard Sylvan, the volume stands as a valuable collection of essays on a topic that remains contemporary.

Volume 4, on Philosophy and Literature, includes articles by Bernard Harrison (on Muriel Spark and the Book of Job), Charles Pigden (on Dostoievski), Kevin Hart (on Heidegger and the essence of poetry), David Novitz (on the view that philosophy is no more than a variety of literature), Ray Walters (on Proust), Wal Suchting (on Jean Améry), Jindra Tichý (on Plato versus Sophocles), and Kim Lycos (‘Hecuba’s Newly-learned Melody: Nussbaum on Philosophy learning from Euripides’).

In the first issue in 1984, the editor noted that ‘the launching of a new journal is particularly hazardous in the current economic climate’. Critical Philosophy published a fair series of articles and reviews and had its share of supporters and critics; but funds were lacking for the journal to continue beyond 1988. Its
appearance for several years might be seen as a sign of the times and a worthwhile, if minor, venture in philosophy in Australia in its time.

Critical Thinking

Sam Butchart

The modern concept of ‘critical thinking’ as a goal of education derives from the work of the American pragmatist philosopher and educational theorist, John Dewey (Dewey 1933). The central idea is that educators should teach students how to think well for themselves, rather than simply teaching ‘facts and figures’. Students should be able to critically assess claims, beliefs, policies and arguments that they encounter, not just in academic contexts but in everyday life, the workplace and social and political contexts. The idea assumes that there are some general purpose, more or less context independent thinking skills and dispositions that can be taught, or at least encouraged.

The aim of producing ‘critical thinkers’ has been adopted by many curriculum authorities and universities in Australasia. There is an explicit focus on the teaching of thinking skills in the school curriculum frameworks of New Zealand, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory. At the tertiary level, a majority of universities now include critical thinking in their lists of graduate attributes—the essential skills they aim to instil in their students.

Critical Thinking and Informal Logic

A necessary component of the ability to think critically about a claim or policy is the ability to assess the evidence or reasons which might count for or against it. For that reason, the ability to analyse, construct and evaluate arguments is often considered to be a core component of critical thinking (though not the only component; critical thinking also clearly requires certain dispositional traits or ‘habits of mind’—to actively seek out evidence for and against one’s own views, for example).

The goal of teaching critical thinking therefore overlaps to a significant extent with the goals of the informal logic movement. ‘Informal logic’ is a term used to denote both a skill and an academic discipline. The skill is the ability to construct, analyse and evaluate real, natural language arguments—arguments as they are found in books, articles, newspapers, opinion pieces, essays, political speeches, public debates and so on. The academic discipline studies the theory of informal argument and how the skill can be taught and improved.
Informal logic began to gain ground in the 1970s and arose from a perception that the standard introductory undergraduate course in symbolic logic is of very limited use as a practical tool for evaluating real arguments. Students themselves began to demand courses that were more relevant and applicable to the assessment of arguments concerning the political and social issues of the day. New courses and textbooks began to appear, emphasising ‘real-life’ arguments and attempting to provide new tools for their analysis and evaluation. Early examples of the new style of textbook are Kahane’s *Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric* (1971), Johnson and Blair’s *Logical Self-Defense* (1977) and Michael Scriven’s *Reasoning* (1976).

These developments seem to have been rapidly adopted in Australian and New Zealand universities. J. L. Mackie, for example, was teaching a course in informal logic at the University of Sydney in the early 1960s, making use of the method of argument diagrams described below. As of this writing, undergraduate courses in critical thinking are taught in approximately 70% of philosophy departments in Australian universities and in every philosophy department in New Zealand. The teaching of elementary formal logic has not been abandoned—it is still considered by many to be an essential component of a philosophical education—but this is now supplemented by critical thinking courses which are often explicitly aimed at improving everyday, practical reasoning skills.

Although the main figures in the development of informal logic and critical thinking are based in the U.S. and Canada, philosophers in Australasia have made important contributions. In this article I will describe the contributions of three of the most influential: C. L. Hamblin, Michael Scriven, and Tim van Gelder.

**C. L. Hamblin**

Charles Leonard Hamblin (1922–1985) was professor of philosophy at the University of New South Wales from 1955 until his death in 1985. Apart from being one of Australia’s first computer scientists (inventing, in the 1950s, the push-pop stack and one of the first computer programming languages), Hamblin has been a major influence in the field of informal logic.

His book *Fallacies* (1970) anticipates many themes that were to emerge in informal logic. A fallacy is a common pattern or type of argument that, though often persuasive, is in fact unsound. Well known examples of fallacies include affirming the consequent, begging the question, argument *ad hominem*, illegitimate appeal to authority, and so on. The topic was introduced by Aristotle and has been extended throughout the centuries. Hamblin’s was the first ever book-length discussion of the fallacies and contains a scholarly and detailed history of the topic which remains unsurpassed to this day.

The book begins with some trenchant (and highly influential) criticisms of the then standard textbook discussions of fallacies, which are in Hamblin’s view ‘as debased, wornout and dogmatic a treatment as could be imagined—incredibly tradition-bound, yet lacking in logic and in historical sense alike, and almost without connection to anything else in modern logic’ (1970: 12). Many of Hamblin’s critiques have become widely accepted by the informal
logic community. Hamblin noted that many of the fallacies are not obviously arguments at all; the fallacy of ‘appeal to force’, for example, or the fallacy of ‘many questions’, illustrated by questions such as ‘Have you stopped beating your wife?’. More significantly, many so-called fallacies are not always bad arguments. Appeals to authority and arguments ad hominem are sometimes quite legitimate. Standard treatments of the fallacies, Hamblin argued, either fail to notice this or provide no guidance on distinguishing the invalid cases from the valid.

Hamblin’s book is not merely critical, however. It also contains a substantial and influential positive component. Hamblin went on to argue that, despite the failings of the standard account, the topic of fallacies nonetheless fills an important gap left open by formal logic. Hamblin argued that what is required is an extended conception of argument, according to which ‘there are various criteria of worth of arguments; that they may conflict, and that arguments may conflict … All this sets the theory of arguments apart from Formal Logic and gives it an additional dimension’ (1970: 231). According to Hamblin, there are aspects of argument appraisal that go beyond the standard set by formal deductive logic. There may, for example, be good arguments both for and against a given conclusion. If so, then the ‘goodness’ of an argument cannot be simply identified with the standard of ‘soundness’—deductive validity combined with the truth of premises—for there cannot be two deductively sound arguments for a conclusion and its opposite. Here Hamblin anticipated a point that has now become widely accepted in the field of informal logic.

If formal deductive logic is not the whole story, what do we need to fill the gap? Hamblin argued for what he called a ‘dialectical’ conception of argument. The essential point is to recognise that arguments typically take place in the context of a dialogue (real or imagined) between two or more people, usually with differing views on the matter in question. This has several implications for informal logic. For example, the idea that in a good argument the premises must be true should be abandoned. One reason is that truth is not sufficient; a person who argues from premises which are not known to be true, but are only true ‘by accident’ has not given a good argument. But requiring premises to be known to be true is too strong. Instead, Hamblin argued that the right criterion is dialectical; a good argument requires premises that are accepted by the parties to the dialogue. These themes and arguments have emerged again and again in the subsequent history of informal logic and critical thinking.

Hamblin further developed his dialectical account of argument, introducing the idea of formal dialectic. He devised a variety of formal ‘dialogue-games’ to model argumentative dialogues. In Hamblin’s games, players take turns to make moves such as making a statement, putting forward an argument, asking a question, or asking the other player to support one of their statements with an argument. Players build up a store of commitments with each move they make. Rules determine what moves are allowed and how the commitment store changes with each move. In recent years, these dialogue games have found applications in linguistics, computer science and artificial intelligence, in areas such as natural
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language processing and communication protocols for autonomous software agents.

Michael Scriven

Michael Scriven (b. 1928) was educated at the University of Melbourne, attaining a B.A. in mathematics in 1948 and an M.A. in philosophy in 1950. While at the University of Melbourne, he (like many others) was influenced in his thinking about formal and informal logic by D. A. T. Gasking, who taught there from 1946 until 1976. Scriven completed a D.Phil. in Oxford in 1956 and joined the philosophy department at the University of California, Berkeley in 1966, where he began teaching courses in Practical Logic and Practical Ethics. From 1982 to 1989 he was professor of education at the University of Western Australia, and he was professor of evaluation at the University of Auckland in New Zealand from 2001 to 2004.

Scriven’s critical thinking textbook *Reasoning* (1976) is a classic and has served as a model for many of the textbooks that followed. Scriven eschews the use of formal logic entirely and proposes a seven-step procedure for understanding and evaluating real arguments: (1) clarification of meaning; (2) identification of conclusions; (3) portrayal of structure; (4) formulation of unstated assumptions; (5) criticism of premises and inferences; (6) introduction of other relevant arguments, and (7) overall evaluation. With variations, this framework of analysis (steps 1–4) followed by evaluation (steps 5–7) has been reproduced in many textbooks.

There are several innovative features of *Reasoning* worth mentioning here. First, Scriven’s was one of the first textbooks to make use of argument map diagrams. These diagrams are used to portray the global structure of an argument—the way in which premises, intermediate conclusions and the final conclusion all fit together. In these diagrams, each statement in the argument is written out and numbered, then arrows connecting the statements are drawn to represent the inferential relationships between them.

Scriven was not the first to make use of such diagrams—they appear, for example, in Beardsley (1950) and Toulmin (1958)—but he introduced some useful innovations, which are still often used today. He suggested writing out and numbering each statement of the argument in a separate ‘dictionary’, then using just the numbers in the argument map diagram. Unstated premises (assumptions) are labelled with a letter rather than a number, to distinguish them more clearly from the explicit premises of the argument. Scriven also introduced the idea of incorporating into the argument map statements that count against the conclusion, by labelling the numbers in the argument map with a ‘+’ or ‘−’ sign.

A second important feature of Scriven’s text is the extensive discussion of the process of formulating unstated premises or assumptions. Scriven adopts three criteria for inclusion of an unstated assumption in the analysis of an argument. The assumption must be (1) strong enough to make the argument sound, (2) no stronger than it needs to be to make the argument sound, and (3) have at least
some relation to what the arguer would be likely to know or would believe to be true. With regard to (2) and (3) Scriven was one of the first authors to make explicit the role of the principle of charity in the identification of assumptions in arguments.

Since the publication of *Reasoning*, Scriven has continued to be involved with the theory and practice of critical thinking. He has published several articles on a variety of topics in the field and (with Alec Fisher) a book on methods for evaluating critical thinking skills in students (Fisher and Scriven 1997). Scriven’s interest in critical thinking led to an interest in the more general concept of *evaluation*—the process of coming to a reasoned conclusion about the merit or worth of something (products, processes, services, government and non-government programs, and so on). He has helped to found the field of Evaluation as a flourishing discipline in its own right, with its own academic journals and professional organisations (Scriven 1991).

**Tim van Gelder**

Tim van Gelder (b. 1962) was educated at Geelong Grammar, the University of Melbourne (B.A. 1984), where he studied law, mathematics and philosophy, and the University of Pittsburgh (Ph.D. 1989). He taught at the philosophy department of Indiana University until 1993, when he returned to Australia as an Australian Research Council QEII Research Fellow. From 1998 to 2005 he was principal fellow in the department of philosophy at the University of Melbourne, while working primarily for the private firm Austthink, which he co-founded in 2000.

Van Gelder’s early work in philosophy focussed on issues in the foundations of cognitive science. When he turned his attention to critical thinking, he proposed the Quality Practice Hypothesis as a model of how critical thinking skills might be improved (van Gelder *et al*. 2004, 2005). This hypothesis states that critical thinking skills can only be improved by extensive deliberate practice—a concept based on research in cognitive science on how expertise is acquired in a variety of cognitive domains. Deliberate practice must be *motivated* (the student should be deliberately practicing in order to improve their skills), *guided* (the student should have access to help about what to do next), *scaffolded* (in the early stages it should be impossible for the student to make certain kinds of mistake), and *graduated* (exercises gradually increase in difficulty and complexity). In addition, for practice to be effective, sufficient *feedback* must be provided.

With this in mind, van Gelder and colleagues at the University of Melbourne developed a critical thinking course based around computer assisted argument mapping exercises. Students are provided with exercises in which they have to create an argument map diagram, like those described above. Van Gelder’s team developed computer software to assist students in the creation of these argument maps. Text can be typed into boxes and edited, supporting premises can be added, deleted or moved around. Evaluations of the premises and inferences can also be incorporated into the diagram.
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This argument mapping software (now known as Rationale and commercially available from the Austhink organisation) is used to support extensive deliberate practice in applying argument analysis skills. Students are provided with a sequence of exercises of increasing difficulty in which they have to create a map of an argument. The software itself provides some of the scaffolding and guidance by building certain constraints into the kind of diagram that can be produced (for example, every argument must have one and only one main conclusion) and offering context-sensitive help. Feedback is supplied by tutors and model answers—pre-prepared argument maps to which students can compare their work (van Gelder 2001).

Using this approach to teaching critical thinking, van Gelder and others at the University of Melbourne have achieved impressive results. Over a single semester, twelve-week course, they have consistently recorded significant improvements in critical thinking, as measured by a standardised multiple-choice test, the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (van Gelder et al. 2004). The software is now used for teaching critical thinking in dozens of universities and hundreds of schools in Australia and world-wide. In 2001, van Gelder was awarded the Australian Museum Eureka Prize for Critical Thinking, in recognition of this work.

Critical Thinking in Schools in Australasia

Moves to incorporate the explicit teaching of critical thinking skills in primary and secondary schools in Australia and New Zealand are fairly recent. Where this has been done, the work of Edward de Bono has been very influential. De Bono’s ‘Cort’ (‘Cognitive Research Trust’) program of thinking lessons and his ‘Six Thinking Hats’ scheme are widely used (de Bono 1985, 1987).

Many academic philosophers in Australasia have been involved in the teaching of critical thinking in schools through the ‘Philosophy in Schools’ program (Lipman 1987). In this approach, pupils are provided with a stimulus, such as a story, situation, film, television show or newspaper or magazine article. The stimulus is used to introduce a philosophical question (for example: What makes something fair or unfair? If you’re not good at something, does that mean you’re bad?) The teacher then guides pupils through a classroom discussion of the issues, encouraging them to provide reasons for opinions, and to distinguish good reasons from bad ones. The aim is to encourage and model a spirit of intellectual curiosity and fair-mindedness, and to inculcate the idea that opinions can and should be backed up by sound arguments.

Many schools in Australasia use this approach to teaching critical thinking. There are now Associations for Philosophy in Schools in most states in Australia, New Zealand and in Singapore. The Federation of Australasian Philosophy in Schools Associations (FAPSA) is a not-for-profit umbrella organisation, set up to promote philosophy teaching in schools and provide resources and training for teachers. It organises conferences and publishes the journal Critical and Creative Thinking.
Deakin University opened in 1977 with a unique brief: to provide educational opportunities to people who, by reason of distance or disadvantage, had been excluded from higher education. Schooled by visiting academics from Britain’s Open University, the initial course offerings were multidisciplinary and prepared for off-campus delivery through elaborately produced printed course materials. The newly appointed Planning Dean of the School of Humanities, Professor Max Charlesworth, was intent on teaching philosophy in a new way. Charlesworth considered that more traditional schools focussed on the canonical texts of either classical or early modern Western thinkers, filtered them through the prism of contemporary problems, and saw themselves primarily as training the next generation of professional philosophers. Deakin would open philosophy to a wider audience through more topical and cross-disciplinary approaches. Early units combined discussions of such thinkers as Freud and Marx with literary works by Sartre and Brecht, explored Asian philosophies and aboriginal spirituality, and theorised alienation as an aspect of the contemporary human condition. Charlesworth encouraged interactions between the fields of history of ideas, religious studies, social studies of science, literary studies, art history, and anthropology, both in curriculum design and in research, and appointed staff with a much wider range of backgrounds than was typical in philosophy departments.

Central to the Open University model, no one academic ‘owned’ the curriculum of any one unit in a course. All units were prepared by cross-disciplinary course teams so as to produce units with a broad vision as well as depth of scholarship.

Of course, this curriculum development model depended upon high levels of funding, not only to produce the quality materials but also to support the high levels of staff time required. After five years federal government funding policies changed. The idea that some universities would be funded for an almost exclusive focus on distance education was displaced by a uniform and reducing funding
Deontology

The university’s response involved an insistence on efficiency which made the cross-disciplinary approach increasingly difficult. Over time, the areas of social studies of science, religious studies and history of ideas became unified into philosophy (which was never formally constituted as a department), and the chair in Philosophy was left vacant on Charlesworth’s retirement.

However, the legacy described above has been maintained in the form of an unusually wide ranging and eclectic set of course offerings and research interests. Deakin philosophers maintain a strong interest in the best of both Anglo-American, Asian and Continental philosophy. Comparative and philosophical studies of world religions remain important, with members of the group editing the international journal *Sophia*. Owing to its administrative location in the School of International and Political Studies, the philosophy area has developed its strengths in political philosophy and global ethics. It offers the only postgraduate program in Australia in Psychoanalytic Studies. For twenty years, Deakin philosophers hosted the annual Freud Conference, were involved in the Continental philosophy movement in Australia, and in 2006 hosted the annual conference of the *Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy*.

Deakin has maintained its commitment to distance education with current delivery being largely through the worldwide web, with pre-prepared online course materials and on-campus lectures streamed to off-campus students. In these ways, Deakin provides unique opportunities for undergraduate and postgraduate students anywhere in the world keen to explore the less well-trodden fields of philosophy.

Deontology

David S. Oderberg

‘Deontology’ is a broad term covering a multitude of normative ethical theories. On the negative side, the most that can be said for what unites them is their opposition to consequentialism. On the positive side, it is that they all hold, in one way or another, the primacy of the concepts of duty and rightness over those of utility and consequences. It is sometimes said that deontologists prioritise the right over the good, but this is not strictly correct. Natural law ethics, for example, begins with a theory of the good and derives moral obligation from the agent’s orientation toward it, but it is a deontological theory in the broad sense; that is to say, it recognises irreducible rights and obligations, though these are but one element of an overarching and more complex approach to morality.

Inevitably, Australasian ethics began its life as largely deontological, under the exclusive influence of the British Idealists. Philosophers such as Francis
Anderson and William Mitchell, inspired by Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling and the like, blended notions of Freedom, Consciousness, Will, and Obligation (for the Idealist, usually capitalised) into a largely secular version of religious morality consistent with the respectable Victorian standards of the time. These in turn were part and parcel of Empire, and for the Australian Idealists duty and right went hand in hand with civilisation and moral uplift.

The eclipse of Idealism in general, not just in ethics, was followed by decades of debate over meta-ethics—the meaning of moral terms, whether morality was subjective or objective, the plausibility of non-cognitivism, and so on. A return to normative ethics slowly began after World War Two, the landmark work being The Moral Point of View (1958) by Kurt Baier. Described by D. H. Monro as ‘Ross without intuitions’ (1959), the book sets out an answer to the perennial question ‘Why be moral?’ in terms of an appeal to an objective morality of rules (e.g. do not cheat, do not be cruel, keep promises) that are true irrespective of social or cultural conditions. They are exceptionless but flexible since the formulations build putative exceptions into them. The rules should be obeyed since it is in the overall interest of everyone to follow them. Moral reasons, then, override self-interest. Baier’s theory is a kind of ‘ideal observer’ theory, according to which morality is justified from a neutral or impersonal perspective.

The publication in 1967 of Moral Notions by Julius Kovesi caused a minor sensation. Although mainly meta-ethical in character, constituting a sustained attack on the fact-value distinction, this important and under-rated book should be mentioned in a deontological context since Kovesi uses the Aristotelian form-matter distinction to shed important light on moral concepts. What he calls ‘complete’ moral notions have both a formal and a material element. To describe an act as a killing is to give its matter, but not its form. To describe it as the intentional killing of an innocent person is to give its form as well. Form is given by intention and related mental states such as knowledge and motive. A complete moral notion, containing both form and matter, has instances such that we are able, by a rule, to determine them as right or wrong. An incomplete moral notion has no such rule: when we say that a killing is wrong, we do not merely add a reminder of its moral status (unlike ‘murder is wrong’) but use moral judgment to determine that the act is wrong. This way of looking at moral concepts clearly anticipates the defence, by Philippa Foot, Bernard Williams and others, of ‘thick moral concepts’. But it is also highly congenial to deontology, for which some such distinction between intention and deed (or thing done) needs to be made.

Perhaps the most thoroughly deontological of Australasian works is Alan Donagan’s The Theory of Morality (1977). Donagan sets out what he calls the morality of the ‘Hebrew-Christian tradition’. The theory he elaborates is that part of traditional morality that can be divorced, in his view, from theism. He takes morality to be a system of exceptionless laws deriving from a single basic principle. This, he claims, is Kant’s categorical imperative formulated as enjoining respect for human beings as rational creatures. From this, he asserts, the further principles of morality can be deductively derived using extra conditions such as
non-moral premises specifying kinds of act. This leads him to a way of answering moral problems that, while by no means on all fours with the traditional morality he claims to be elaborating, has much in common with it. Since traditional morality is not Kantian in nature (Kant’s moral theory being an etiolated secular version of it), this is not surprising.

In the decades since Donagan’s book, no revival in deontological theories has been discernible in Australasia or among most of the Australasian philosophers based abroad. On the contrary, if there is an Australian approach to moral theory, it is more than ever identified with consequentialism. Some redoubts remain, however, most prominently among expatriates. John Finnis is one of the leading representatives of the ‘new natural law theory’, a variation of (and arguably a departure from) the Thomist natural law tradition. His book *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (1980) sets out a theory of both based on a conception of ‘basic human goods’ (such as life, knowledge, and friendship). A very different approach, though also highly deontological in character, is Raimond Gaita’s *Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception* (1991). Gaita emphasises the lack of seriousness, among contemporary ethicists, concerning the reality of moral evil. He disparages scepticism about evil as itself a kind of evil, or intellectual corruption, and urges a return to the truths of moral experience, especially as found in phenomena such as shame and remorse. The argumentative style and approach is broadly Wittgensteinian, and eschews the systematic and more formal approach of theorists such as Donagan. Mention should also be made of Eric D’Arcy (later Archbishop of Hobart), whose 1963 book *Human Acts* provides important action-theoretic foundations for deontology, with roots in Thomistic natural law; and H. J. McCloskey, who has published many articles against consequentialism and in defence of rights, and whose *Meta-ethics and Normative Ethics* (1969) defends Rossian intuitionism.

Dualism

Yujin Nagasawa

It is widely recognised that Australia has produced a number of prominent physicalists, such as D. M. Armstrong, U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart. It is sometimes forgotten, however, that Australia has also produced a number of prominent dualists. This entry introduces the views of three Australian dualists: Keith Campbell, Frank Jackson and David Chalmers. Their positions differ uniquely from those of traditional dualists because their endorsement of dualism is based on their sympathy with a naturalistic, materialistic worldview rather than with a supernaturalistic, spiritual worldview.
Keith Campbell

In his book *Body and Mind* (1970, 2nd ed. 1984), Keith Campbell defends a version of property dualism, which he calls the new epiphenomenalism. According to traditional epiphenomenalism, mental states are causally inefficacious non-physical by-products of physical states. Campbell’s new epiphenomenalism, however, disagrees with this. He argues that ‘some bodily states are also mental states and that the causal mental properties are physical properties of these bodily states’. The new epiphenomenalism differs then from physicalism because, unlike physicalism, it affirms that ‘the enjoying or enduring of phenomenal properties is not a physical affair’ (1984: 127). In sum, Campbell’s epiphenomenalism is not epiphenomenalism about all mental states but epiphenomenalism exclusively about phenomenal properties.

Frank Jackson

Frank Jackson (1982, 1986) defends a version of epiphenomenalism that is similar to Campbell’s. While Jackson finds physicalism initially attractive, he believes that it ultimately fails. He expresses his intuitive refutation of physicalism poetically as follows:

Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the kind of states, their functional role, their relation to what goes on at other times and in other brains, and so on and so forth, and be I as clever as can be in fitting it all together, you won’t have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky.

(Jackson 1982: 127)

Jackson claims that this intuition can be used to construct three arguments against physicalism: (i) the knowledge argument, which is based on the well-known imaginary scenario of Mary, who is confined in a black-and-white environment, and the scenario of Fred, who can recognise one more shade of red than ordinary people can; (ii) the modal argument, according to which there is a possible world with organisms exactly like us in every physical respect that lack consciousness; and (iii) Nagel’s ‘what it is like to be a bat’ argument. Honouring their Australian proponents, Robert Van Gulick calls these ‘boomerang arguments’ (Van Gulick 2004: 367). The distinctive feature of boomerang arguments is, according to Van Gulick, that they reach across to the epistemic domain of the world and then circle back to the metaphysical feature of the corresponding reality. That is, they derive the ontological conclusion about the nature of the world from epistemic premises about what we can know or what we can conceive of.

Convinced thusly of the falsity of physicalism, Jackson defends epiphenomenalism. His epiphenomenalism has two important features. First, exactly like
Campbell, Jackson rejects the idea that mental states are inefficacious in the physical world. He holds instead that ‘it is possible to hold that certain properties of certain mental states, namely … qualia, are such that their possession or absence makes no difference to the physical world’. Second, he denies that the mental is totally causally inefficacious. He allows that ‘the instantiation of qualia makes a difference to other mental states though not to anything physical’ (1982: 133).

Jackson is, however, no longer a dualist. In 1998 he declared that he had come to think that the knowledge argument failed to refute physicalism and, accordingly, that physicalism is true (Jackson 1998c). However, Jackson’s former dualist position remains very influential.

David Chalmers

Despite Jackson’s retraction, Australia continues to produce prominent dualists. In 1996 David J. Chalmers published Conscious Mind, which now represents one of the most important contemporary defences of dualism. Chalmers maintains that there are two distinct problems of consciousness: the hard problem and the easy problem. The easy problem is to explain the function, structure and mechanism of the brain; in other words, to answer questions that cognitive scientists and brain scientists ordinarily work on. The hard problem, on the other hand, is concerned with fundamental relationships between physical processing in the brain and the rich phenomenal experiences that it gives rise to. Chalmers claims that the existence of the hard problem exposes the limitations of the physicalist approach to consciousness. He also appeals to various arguments against physicalism, such as Jackson’s knowledge argument and various forms of the modal argument, and concludes that phenomenal properties do not supervene on physical properties.

While Chalmers describes his position as ‘the disjunction of panprotopsychism, epiphenomenalism and interactionism’, he states that his ‘preferred position on the mind-body problem … is not epiphenomenalism but the “panprotopsychist” (or “Russelian”) position on which basic physical dispositions are grounded in basic phenomenal or protophenomenal properties’ (Chalmers 1999: 492–3). Panprotopsychism is the view that physical objects have protophenomenal properties, which are such that, while they are not themselves phenomenal or experiential, a proper combination of them constitutes phenomenal properties. He believes that panprotopsychism solves various metaphysical perplexities of consciousness.

Dualism as a Revised Form of Physicalism

One might find it peculiar that dualism has flourished in Australia, where physicalism has traditionally been so influential. Once we look more closely at the contents of these Australian dualisms, however, we can see that this is not peculiar at all. Contrary to traditional dualists, most Australian dualists adopt their version not because they are attracted to a supernaturalistic, spiritual worldview but because, perhaps paradoxically, they are attracted to a
naturalistic, materialistic worldview. Campbell, Jackson and Chalmers all start with physicalism, which they find \textit{prima facie} most plausible, and amend it, almost reluctantly, into dualism in accordance with persistent problems that evince the intractable nature of consciousness. The following passage by Campbell exemplifies this point:

\begin{quote}
The account given of awareness by phenomenal properties is the only point where the new epiphenomenalism diverges from Central-State Materialism. Perhaps the new Epiphenomenalism could be called Central-State Materialism Plus. (Campbell 1970: 125)
\end{quote}

Similarly, Alec Hyslop, another Australian epiphenomenalist who influenced Jackson’s commitment to epiphenomenalism, writes as follows:

\begin{quote}
Epiphenomenalism’s appeal is to those who are convinced that the Materialist view of human beings is false, but regret this, regretting that the case for Materialism fails, overwhelmed by qualia. Epiphenomenalism gets as near to Materialism as is decent, so it is thought. It is a (more than) half way house: not Materialism but deeply Materialist, giving us a world of purely material causes. (Hyslop 1998: 61)
\end{quote}

Even Chalmers’ panprotopsychism, which appears initially even more extraordinary than Cartesian dualism, can be construed as a form of physicalism. Chalmers remarks:

\begin{quote}
From one perspective, [panprotopsychism] can be seen as a sort of materialism. If one holds that physical terms refer not to dispositional properties but the underlying intrinsic properties, then the protophenomenal properties can be seen as physical properties, thus preserving a sort of materialism. (Chalmers 2002c: 265)
\end{quote}

Australian dualism is therefore consistent with the naturalistic character of Australian philosophy of mind. It is based on a firm conviction that even if the physicalist approach to the problem of consciousness fails, there is no reason to jump to the conclusion that supernaturalism is true.
Environmental Philosophy
Freya Mathews

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s huge environmental struggles were erupting throughout Australia. Spectacular campaigns were fought for the Great Barrier Reef, the Colong Caves in the Blue Mountains, Fraser Island and Lake Pedder. Meanwhile, along the eastern coast of the continent the native forests, threatened with wholesale wood-chipping by the Forestry Commission, were providing a training ground for young environmental activists. Two of these, Val and Richard Routley (later to become Val Plumwood and Richard Sylvan respectively), happened also to be philosophers, headquartered at the Australian National University. Their participation in the fight for the forests brought to their attention a jumble of unexamined values, assumptions and allegiances on the part of conflicting parties, a political terrain of obfuscation, ideology and sentiment ripe for philosophical analysis. Sifting through this jumble, the Routleys recognised that the environmental problems that had by that time come starkly into public view were the upshot not merely of vested interests, incompetent administration and inappropriate technologies but also of underlying, barely conscious attitudes to the natural world that were built into the very foundations of Western thought. In a series of papers they circulated to colleagues at the Australian National University, they analysed these attitudes as the expression of human chauvinism, the groundless belief, amounting to nothing more than prejudice, that only human beings mattered, morally speaking; to the extent that anything else mattered at all, according to this attitude, it mattered only because it had some kind of utility or instrumental value for us. This assumption, which came to be known more widely as the assumption of anthropocentrism or human-centredness, was a premise, they argued, not only of the forestry industry, with its narrow-minded reduction of ancient forest to timber resource, but of the entire Western tradition. In response to this assumption, Richard Routley posed, in clarion tones, the inevitable question: Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?
Is there a need, in other words, for an ethic of nature in its own right, an ethic that values the forest, the natural world at large, for its own sake independently of its utility, its instrumental value, for us? (Routley 1973; Routley and Routley 1980)

Drawing for inspiration on the American thinker, Aldo Leopold, and in dialogue with contemporary American environmental philosophers, such as John Rodman, the Routleys rapidly worked out the elements, as they saw them, of such a new environmental ethic. They argued that any such ethic must rest on the intrinsic value of natural entities, where intrinsic value was precisely the value that attached to those entities in their own right, independently of their utility or instrumental value for us. Intrinsic value, they thought, would confer moral considerability. But how exactly was this hypothesis of intrinsic value to be understood? Did it imply that natural entities would be valuable even if (human) valuers did not exist? Richard Routley thought it did. He set out the ‘last man’ argument, according to which it would be wrong for the last person left alive on earth, after some imagined terminal human catastrophe, to destroy the remaining natural environment, even if it consisted only of vegetation, rocks and rivers, and other insentient elements (Routley 1973). But how could value exist without a valuer? Since, the Routleys conceded, the activity of valuing requires some form of mind or consciousness, non-conscious natural entities could not confer value on themselves. The Routleys were not prepared to extend consciousness, in some larger sense, to all natural entities, since that was the way of ‘mysticism’ or ‘pantheism’, anathema in those days (and probably still today) to analytical philosophers, and a reductio ad absurdum of any argument that led to it. So how was the purported intrinsic value of non-conscious entities to be accounted for? Uncomfortably, the Routleys plumped for a view of value as tied only to possible rather than actual human valuers: if actual human beings did in fact value natural entities for their own sake, as the last man argument purported to demonstrate, then even if human beings ceased to exist, it would still be true to say that, were they to exist, they would value those entities, and this was sufficient, according to Richard Routley, to confer intrinsic value and hence moral considerability on nature (Routley 1973). (Critics were not slow to find this argument strained. See Elliot 1982a and, for a later critique, Grey 2000.)

The kind of moral consideration appropriate to the environment would properly translate into respect, care, responsibility or concern, the Routleys argued, rather than more legalistic moral categories, such as rights and obligations, that seemed to imply a social contract. Such moral respect and responsibility were consistent with the use of natural resources, provided such use was respectful and hence circumscribed, limited to what was genuinely necessary (Routley and Routley 1980).

Armed with their new theory of environmental ethics, the Routleys took on the Forestry Commission in their seminal 1973 book, The Fight for the Forests, a comprehensive economic, scientific, sociopolitical and philosophical critique of the forestry industry in Australia (Routley and Routley 1973a; Orton 1997). Environmental historian William Lines makes no bones about the impact of this publication:
No Australian author or authors had ever combined philosophical, demographic, economic, and ecological analysis in one volume as part of one connected argument. The Routleys were unique. They challenged conventional academic boundaries as barriers to understanding and dismissed claims to objectivity as spurious attempts to protect vested interests. They exposed both wood-chipping and plantation forestry as uneconomic, dependent on taxpayer subsidies, and driven largely by a ‘rampant development ideology’. (Lines 2006: 144–5)

It is hard not to concede that the Routleys set the bar: they not only helped to articulate in the 1970s questions that would define the agenda for environmental philosophy for decades to come, both in Australia and in the rest of the English-speaking world, but in their hands these ideas also became a potent weapon of engagement, of strenuous environmental activism.

Meanwhile, of course, others within the small circle of Australian philosophy had responded to the Routleys’ challenge regarding the moral status of natural entities. Not all concurred in the need for ‘a new, an environmental, ethic’, an ethic that broke with the entrenched anthropocentrism of the West. For instance, in his 1974 book, *Man’s Responsibility for Nature*, John Passmore argued that, while the natural environment indeed stood in need of protection from unfettered exploitation and degradation, a case for such protection could be made in traditional Western terms. He identified several Western traditions of human/nature relations, of varying degrees of anthropocentrism: the despotic tradition, according to which humans were indeed permitted to dispose of nature as they saw fit; the stewardship position, according to which we were entitled to cultivate nature for our own purposes but were also charged with its custody; and the cooperative tradition, in which the task of humanity was to increase the productiveness of raw nature. While despotism, the major tradition, was indeed patently unqualified to serve as a basis for environmentalism, both stewardship and cooperation could be adapted, Passmore argued, to environmental ends. Passmore also pointed out that other traditions had at times been influential in the West: primitivism, romanticism and mysticism, all of which were dismissed by him out of hand as inconsistent with science—and hence with reason—on account of attributing mind-like properties to non-sentient natural entities. Like the Routleys, he characterised such positions as *pantheist*, and ‘pantheism’ was for him, as it was for them, a term of opprobrium and last resort, requiring little in the way of refutation.

The debate between Passmore and the Routleys illustrated nicely a distinction that the Norwegian philosopher, Arne Naess, had drawn in his important 1973 paper, ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-range Ecology Movement’. The shallow ecology movement, according to Naess, was the movement to protect and preserve the natural environment for purely anthropocentric reasons, which is to say for the sake of its utility for humanity. The deep ecology movement, by
contrast, was the movement to protect nature for biocentric reasons, which is to say, for nature’s own sake. Stewardship and cooperation might serve as a basis for a shallow ecology movement that sought to preserve natural resources for human benefit, but they would not, as the Routleys quickly pointed out, serve as the basis for an environmentalism that valued nature for its own sake: stewardship and cooperation were both compatible with a total (albeit, in today’s parlance, sustainable) makeover of the earth’s environment, and by no means guaranteed the protection of wilderness that environmentalists of a deeper green persuasion particularly sought (Routley and Routley 1980).

The question of moral considerability—who could claim it and what conferred it—was central to the discourse of environmental philosophy as it began to take shape in the English-speaking world in the late 1970s. Peter Singer was already arguing that any creature that possessed sentience (by which he meant the capacity for experiencing pain) could claim moral considerability, since, according to his utilitarian perspective, wrongness consisted in nothing other than the giving of pain or misery to those capable of experiencing it. Little stretching of conventional Western moral categories was required then to bring sentient animals into the moral fold, and the publication in 1975 of Singer’s concise, tightly argued but accessible and amply illustrated book, Animal Liberation, had already helped to launch a world-wide animal liberation movement. On Singer’s criterion, non-sentient natural entities, such as insects, plants, rivers, ecosystems and landscapes, failed the test of moral considerability, but to the extent that sentient creatures depended on such entities for their existence, a case for their protection could still be argued (Singer 1979).

Amongst other early respondents to the Routleys’ challenge were some who, like Passmore, rejected the imputation of moral considerability to nature and others who accepted it, though on varying grounds. Janna Thompson considered anthropocentrism to be inevitable and any attempt to disengage value from human valuers to be incoherent, but, following Marcuse, she argued for an enlightened anthropocentrism, according to which a way of social life premised on appreciation for and receptivity to the joy and, as Marcuse put it, the ‘erotic energy’ of nature would be conducive to harmony and creativity in society and hence to human fulfilment. The psychology that led to the domination of nature was, from this point of view, indicative of a larger political psychology of domination, and was therefore ultimately opposed to human welfare (Thompson 1983, 1990). More sceptical even than Thompson concerning the prospects for a new environmental ethic was John McCloskey. His scepticism arose principally from his sense that certain ecological entities, such as the tapeworm and the malaria organism, were self-evidently neither intrinsically nor instrumentally valuable (McCloskey 1982).

Another member of this early circle, William Grey, was initially well disposed towards the notion of the intrinsic value of nature (Grey 1982), but eventually adopted a position not unlike Thompson’s, finding the basis for an environmental ethic in an enlightened anthropocentrism. According to Grey’s argument, human
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goods and goals were inextricably entwined with nature, but not with nature under its largest, evolutionary aspect: the successive waves of extinction and planetary adjustments of evolution render nature under its evolutionary aspect beyond the scope of ethics altogether. Human goods and goals were rather entwined with the particular biological fabric of our own immediate world, the world of the present evolutionary era. That fabric requires protection if the shape and meaning of our own human purposiveness is to be preserved (Grey 1993). Robert Elliot, on the other hand, embraced the notion of the intrinsic value of natural entities, but analysed it precisely as a function of the origins of such entities in long and deep evolutionary and ecological processes, in contradistinction to artefactual entities, which originate in abstract human conceptions and intentions. Elliot brought out the force of this distinction by a comparison between fake and original objects: a fake work of art, for instance, is regarded as of little value compared to the original. By similarly contrasting instances of ‘ecological restoration’ with original and intact ecosystems, Elliot revealed an important aspect of what it is about ‘nature’ that environmentalists find intrinsically valuable (Elliot 1982b; for further discussion, see Lo 1999).

In an international context, arguments for the moral considerability of nature and for a specifically environmental ethic were by now, in the later 1980s through to the 1990s, tending to fall into distinct streams, or ecological philosophies. These ecological philosophies included deep ecology (inspired by Naess), ecological feminism, socialist ecology (generally known as social ecology), the land ethic and bioregionalism. Australian philosophers, including new players who had not been part of the Routley circle in the 1970s, made significant contributions to most of these streams, though some, such as Andrew Brennan (who arrived in Australia in 1991), preferred, in the face of such a diversity of approaches, to take a frankly pluralist rather than partisan stance on the question of environmental value, providing bracing critical commentary across the board. Environmental offshoots of the process philosophy of A. N. Whitehead and of the Hegelian tradition also came on-stream in this decade, notably via the contributions of Arran Gare and philosophically-minded biological scientist, Charles Birch.

Deep ecology was conceptualised by Arne Naess as a political platform supported by philosophical foundations—worldviews or, as he put it, ecosophies—which could vary from one supporter to another. It was via agreement on the platform that one counted as a deep ecologist. Over the years different versions of the platform were formulated, but central to all versions was the idea that the non-human world was intrinsically valuable and non-human beings were in principle as entitled to ‘live and blossom’ as were human beings. At Murdoch University in Perth, Warwick Fox, under the supervision of Patsy Hallen, wrote a doctoral thesis, published in 1989 as Towards a Transpersonal Ecology, in which he provided the first truly systematic defence of deep ecology, arguing that the idea of the ‘ecological self’ at the heart of Naess’ own ‘ecosophy’ received confirmation, as developmental psychology, from the field of transpersonal psychology.
Freya Mathews offered a metaphysical extension of the idea of the ecological self in her 1991 book, *The Ecological Self*, attributing ‘self’ status to self-realising systems generally, arguing that not only organisms and perhaps ecosystems and the biosphere, but the cosmos itself, qualified as such systems. ‘Selves’ were imbued with a conative impulse, or impulse for self-preservation and self-increase, that set them apart from purely mechanical systems, and constituted self-value. Selves were intrinsically valuable because, by the reflexiveness of their very nature, they valued themselves.

Another book that appeared in 1991, *A Morally Deep World*, by Lawrence Johnson, also argued along ‘deep’ lines. Johnson construed the good, morally speaking, in terms of well-being. Any life process with a degree of organic unity and self-identity sufficient to endow it with well-being interests qualified as morally considerable. Such life processes could be identified at a number of levels—not only at the level of the individual organism, ecosystem and biosphere, but also at the level of species: things can turn out better or worse for a species just as they can for an individual organism. Some species flourish while others decline. Something can thus be defined as a life process with interests without it being in any way a subject of sentience or consciousness. Johnson emphasised that there was no neat way of tying up the various levels of value via strict rules and rankings. Appropriate morality was a matter of attitude, of respect and consideration for all entities that have interests. We should aim to forge a *modus vivendi* consistent in a general way with the balance of nature.

Ecofeminists approached the question of the moral considerability of nature from a different quarter. Why, they asked, had nature in the Western tradition been instrumentalised, stripped of moral considerability and subjugated, in the first place? Their answer was that this subjugation was conceptually of a piece with other, political subjugations, particularly the subjugation of women. The concept of nature was the cornerstone of a dualistic conceptual system organised around mutually defining pairs of opposed and differentially ranked categories, such as nature/culture, human/animal, mind/body, reason/emotion, spirit/matter, civilised/primitive, theory/practice, science/superstition, mental/manual, white/black, masculine/feminine. This conceptual system had evolved over the course of Western civilisation to legitimise the domination of a number of groups, including the working class, colonised peoples and women. The construction of ‘nature’ as a moral nullity, to which subordinated groups could be ideologically assimilated (workers, women and indigenous peoples being positioned as ‘closer to nature’ than white middle-class males), was at the core of this dualistic system. It followed that the deconstruction of this dualistic conception of nature was key not only to the ‘liberation’ of the natural world itself, but also to that of these other groups. A definitive treatment of this ecofeminist argument was furnished by Val Plumwood in her 1993 classic, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*. Patsy Hallen and Ariel Salleh also made pioneering contributions to the articulation of ecofeminism, Hallen via feminist critique of science (Hallen 1995) and Salleh via historical materialist analyses of gender roles (Salleh 1992). Salleh also joined
Plumwood in mounting an ecofeminist critique of deep ecology (Salleh 1984; Plumwood 1993).

Indeed, from the late 1980s into the 1990s the ‘green wars’ raged, both inside Australia and outside. Ecofeminists accused deep ecologists of masculinist bias in many of their central tenets. These included their reliance on abstract theoretical conceptions of nature as sources of deep ecological attitudes and a ‘cowboy’ valorisation of wilderness and wilderness experience in preference to more modest and immediate, embodied and domestic, manifestations and experiences of nature (Salleh 1992; Mathews 2000). Deep ecologists also allegedly demonstrated a preference for holistic over relational conceptions of nature, where holism was seen to imply, in contrast to relationality, the incorporation and obliteration of others rather than engagement with them (Plumwood 1993; for a reconciliation of deep ecology and ecofeminism on this point, see Mathews 1994). Social ecologists, led by Murray Bookchin in the U.S., joined postcolonialists and critical theorists in attacking deep ecologists as misanthropic, since deep ecology seemed to prioritise the interests of nature over those of the world’s poor and dispossessed. Deep ecologists were also charged with political naivety, their prescriptions for change being deemed to lack any analysis of political power. (For a spirited Australian defence of deep ecology against these charges, see Eckersley 1989, 1992.) Richard Sylvan poured scorn on deep ecology as an insufficiently rigorous discourse, describing it as a ‘conceptual bog’, ‘afflicted’ and ‘degenerate’, and styling himself a ‘deep green’ theorist as opposed to a deep ecologist (Sylvan 1985a, 1985b). Everyone, it seemed, took a swipe at deep ecology, and Fox, for one, spent a lot of time defending it (Fox 1986, 1989a, 1989b). But ecofeminism was also disparaged, both by other feminists and by social ecologists, as ‘essentialist’, on the grounds that some of the earlier ecofeminists, seeking to claim the ecological high ground for women, had seemed to endorse the patriarchal characterisation of women as ‘closer to nature’ than men, on account of women’s reproductive biology and practices. These debates were unquestionably unnecessarily vitriolic, but they were also sometimes productive of useful clarifications, as in the debate over holism versus relationality, thrashed out between deep ecologists and ecofeminists.

Despite the fact that arguments were flying thick and fast, much of the debate in the 1980s and 1990s tended to skirt around what was arguably the foundational question of the whole discourse, namely that of the actual nature of nature—what was it, if anything, about the natural world that warranted our treating it as morally considerable? While it was plain to see why sentient animals might be entitled to moral consideration, it was not so clear why plants, let alone rocks and rivers and landscapes, might be so entitled. The Routleys’ original arguments for the intrinsic value of nature fell far short of the mark (Godfrey-Smith 1982). The deconstructive approach of ecofeminism largely by-passed the question by focussing on the political rationale for the moral nullification of nature. Purely psychological or phenomenological approaches, such as those favoured (though not exclusively so) by Naess and Fox, which advocated acts of psychological
‘identification’ with wider circles of nature as a source of ecological consciousness, left open the question of whether such identifications had an objective basis in ontology or were just a matter of subjective choice. Despite these evasions, there can, at the end of the day, be no avoiding the ‘hard problem’ of environmental philosophy, the question of metaphysics, of the nature of nature. We are drawn back inevitably to questions of telos, of self-meaning and self-purpose, of conativity, intentionality, agency, subjectivity and mind in nature—to the very spectre so shunned by the analytical philosophers of the original Routley circle, the spectre of supposed ‘mysticism’ or ‘pantheism’.

While some of the thinkers in the ‘deep’ tradition, such as Mathews, had approached the question of the moral considerability of nature from an avowedly metaphysical perspective, there was one branch of environmental philosophy that positively specialised in the metaphysical approach, namely that derived from process philosophy. Amongst philosophers in Australia, Arran Gare was the pre-eminent exponent of this approach. In a series of books in the 1990s, but perhaps most importantly in *Nibilism Inc*, Gare provided a broad analysis of the metaphysical foundations of modern civilisation and the political and environmental implications of those foundations, while also proffering an alternative in the shape of the process tradition, a tradition that began in the romantic period and continued into the twentieth century in the persons of Bergson, Alexander, Whitehead and others. The process perspective, defined in contrast to the mechanistic perspective of classical science, represented the world dynamically, as intrinsically in-process, its differentia indivisible, inter-fusing and self-becoming rather than ontologically discrete, inert and set in motion only by external forces, as the particle manifold of classical physics was. From such a perspective, reality was more analogous in its structure to music than to a machine, with both the past and the future actively, morphogenetically, immanent, as unfolding form, in the present. In other words, from this perspective ‘reality’ could not be conceptually arrested at a single moment, frozen in a Newtonian snapshot of the universe, any more than a symphony can be arrested in a single note. Both time and space were in this sense emanations of form rather than antecedent containers for it. From such a perspective, we ourselves are already implicated in the self-unfolding of the world, and so it makes no sense to try to separate ourselves from ‘nature’ with a view to instrumentalising and dominating it. To compromise the self-unfolding of the world is to compromise our own existence.

This ‘hard question’ of environmental philosophy, the metaphysical question, which was by and large shunned by the earlier analytical philosophers of the environment, has come more to the fore in the last decade. As the concerns raised in environmental philosophy in earlier decades have rippled out into other disciplines and been taken up by a range of scholars in the field that anthropologist and cultural theorist Deborah Rose has dubbed the ‘ecological humanities’, a language of sentience and agency, often influenced by Indigenous thought, has crept into discussions of nature (Rose 1996; Rigby 2005; Plumwood 2009; Tacey 2010; and many of the articles in the journal *PAN Philosophy Activism Nature*).
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Attributions of ‘sentience’, in the sense of awareness, to the natural world are popping up in Australian scholarship in many contexts. Rose and Plumwood have adopted the term ‘philosophical animism’ to cover a position that construes nature as a community of persons (Rose 2009; Plumwood 2009). Mathews has developed her argument from the conativity of self-realising systems into a full-blown cosmological panpsychism (Mathews 2003, 2009). Quite diverse possibilities for interpreting nature as a locus of mind-like attributes are currently opening up, and much exciting work in this connection remains to be done.

Meanwhile, in the last decade other new themes have been emerging in the philosophically-informed discourse of the ecological humanities. Aboriginal voices, long referenced in ecological philosophy but seldom heard, are now making their own representations (Graham 1999, 2009; Grieves 2009). Place as a locus of identity and of conservation has been added as a key category of environmentalism. Jeff Malpas, for instance, has established a place studies network at the University of Tasmania; John Cameron of the University of Western Sydney organised a series of ecologically oriented ‘Sense of Place’ gatherings in the late 1990s and early 2000s. (Val Plumwood, on the other hand, has problematised the valorisation of favoured places. See Plumwood 2008a.) The earlier preoccupation of environmental philosophy with forests and wilderness preservation has come under fire with a new emphasis on cultures of sustainability in the suburbs and the city (Davison 2005; Fox 2006). Andrew Brennan and Norva Lo are investigating the relation between worldviews and behaviour, challenging the traditional assumption of environmental ethics that anthropocentric worldviews give rise to bad environmental behaviour and ecocentric worldviews to good environmental behaviour: they are calling for an ‘empirical philosophy’ that sociologically investigates the correlations between belief and action (Lo 2009; Brennan and Lo 2010). Ocean ethics has finally commanded the attention of philosophers with the publication of Denise Russell’s Who Rules the Waves? Piracy, Overfishing and Mining the Oceans. Val Plumwood, before her own death in 2008, published a series of influential essays on the ecological significance of death (see, e.g. Plumwood 2000 and 2008b).

To the old focus on value questions in abstracto has been added, in the last decade, a new emphasis on the literary and cultural studies of environmental themes. For example, an Australian journal, PAN Philosophy Activism Nature, launched in 2000, and the ‘Ecological Humanities Corner’ of the journal Australian Humanities Review, both encourage a mix of philosophical, literary and cultural studies perspectives in their approach to environmental themes. Kate Rigby at Monash University leads a research effort into the Romantic antecedents of ecological thought in a literary and ecocritical context. Animals—their place and meaning in human cultures rather than merely the ethics of our treatment of them—have also become a major preoccupation (Franklin 2006, Rose 2011). A major international conference on the cultural studies of animals, Minding Animals, was held at Newcastle in 2009. And as the planet enters the sixth great extinction event in its history, the significance of extinction, particularly animal
extinctions, has emerged as a topic of urgent philosophical and ethnographic inquiry, as evidenced in Deborah Rose’s circle of postgraduates and postdoctoral fellows at Macquarie University.

Though for some philosophers environmental ethics was, in earlier decades, merely an academic pursuit, for most it was intended as a moral wake-up call, a call to the world to take moral responsibility for the ravages wrought by industrial society on natural systems. Core categories of environmental philosophy, such as anthropocentrism versus biocentrism and intrinsic versus instrumental value, were eventually absorbed into the rhetoric of the environment movement, but the wake-up call was not by and large heeded by the wider society. Our planet is consequently today in the throes of an ecological catastrophe the reality of which scientists no longer deny and the proportions of which defy human imagination. Now that the wake-up stage has passed, it remains to be seen whether philosophy in any shape or form, in Australia or elsewhere, will be capable of helping to elicit an effective human response to this epochal challenge.

Ethics Centre of South Australia
Wendy Rogers

The Ethics Centre of South Australia (ECSA) is a collaborative venture between Flinders University, the University of Adelaide and the University of South Australia, in partnership with the Government of South Australia. The aims of ECSA are to promote scholarship and education in applied ethics, and to contribute to public debate on ethical issues. To this end, ECSA has a number of research themes and a central series of public seminars on contemporary ethical issues.

Deliberations about ECSA began in 2003 when a group of academics across the three South Australian universities met to discuss the possibility of establishing a centre for applied ethics, drawing upon the staff and resources of all three institutions. A working party was formed, with two staff from each of the universities, representing a range of disciplines and interests in applied ethics. The working party obtained seed funding from the three universities to appoint a project officer and develop a business plan for the centre. During 2004, supported by the project officer, the working party met regularly to develop formal plans for ECSA. This included numerous meetings with staff across the universities and with ministers and senior public servants in a range of departments of the Government of South Australia, seeking support for ECSA. In tandem with meetings seeking support and the development of the business plan, members of
the working party commenced with various projects including grant applications, public seminars and workshops.

In late 2004, members of the working party met with the deputy vice-chancellors and pro vice-chancellors (Research) of Flinders University, University of Adelaide and University of South Australia, who agreed to establish ECSA formally as an unincorporated joint venture between the three universities. This was followed by a public meeting to inform interested stakeholders, and to seek endorsement for the establishment of seven research themes plus an education theme, led by members of the working party:

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<th>Ethical theory</th>
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<td>Ethics education</td>
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Following a lengthy period of negotiation, in mid 2005 the deputy vice-chancellors and pro vice-chancellors (Research) from Flinders University, University of Adelaide and University of South Australia signed the Joint Venture Agreement to establish the Ethics Centre of South Australia, in partnership with the South Australian Department of Health. A/Prof. Annette Braunack-Mayer (University of Adelaide) and A/Prof. Wendy Rogers (Flinders University) were appointed as Interim Joint Directors of ECSA. The ECSA was officially launched on 25 November 2005 with an invited address from Julian Burnside QC.

Robert Crotty, emeritus professor of religion and education at the University of South Australia and with interests in religious ethics and ethics of the world religions, was appointed as Director in early 2006. Under Professor Crotty’s leadership, members of ECSA have developed a range of active research programs, delivered seminars and workshops on topics in applied ethics for the university and public sector, made international links and commenced planning for an educational program extending across the three universities. ECSA is governed by a Steering Committee, managed by a Research and Education Committee, and has an Advisory Board.
Evil, The Problem of

N. N. Trakakis

Australasian philosophers have in many ways led the field in recent discussions on the notorious problem of evil, the problem of reconciling the existence of a being that is unlimited in power, knowledge and goodness with the existence of evil (or evil of certain sorts or amounts) in the world.

It all began with J. L. Mackie’s ‘Evil and Omnipotence’ paper, published in 1955 in *Mind*. Here Mackie posed the problem of evil as a *logical* problem: it is the problem of removing an alleged logical inconsistency between certain claims about God and certain claims about evil. Mackie argued that the inconsistency can be removed only by giving up one or more of the propositions constituting the problem, e.g. by denying God’s omnipotence (or placing significant limits to God’s power) or denying the existence of evil. Seemingly more promising strategies, such as the idea that evil is due to human free will, were rejected by Mackie on the grounds that ‘if God has made men such that in their free choices they sometimes prefer what is good and sometimes what is evil, why could he not have made men such that they always freely choose the good?’ (1955: 209).

This view, that God could have created a world in which everyone always freely did what is right, came to be known as Mackie’s ‘Utopia Thesis’, and it provoked much debate in subsequent literature.

Interestingly, two early Australian responses to Mackie’s argument came from Catholics who challenged Mackie’s Utopia Thesis. Father P. M. Farrell, in a response to Mackie also published in *Mind* (1958), defended the Thomistic view that evil is a privation of being that is inherent in the creation of contingent things (though Farrell’s critique of Mackie soon became more public and more strident, if not uglier as well; see Franklin 2003: 84–5). Anticipating Plantinga’s free will defence, Selwyn Grave (1956) argued that, if free will is given an indeterminist reading, then for all we know it might not have been possible for even God to create a world in which all free agents always do what is right. Mackie replied to these critiques in his 1962(b) paper, ‘Theism and Utopia’. And in his posthumously published *The Miracle of Theism* (1982)—a work which functions as a kind of counterpoint to the natural theology of Swinburne’s *The Existence of God* (1st ed. 1979)—Mackie again turns to his argument from evil, which he modifies and defends against recent critics such as Plantinga. (Despite this, Plantinga’s free will defence is widely considered today as having decisively refuted logical arguments from evil such as Mackie’s. For an opposing view, see Oppy 2004.)

One innovative twist in Australasian contributions to the problem of evil relates to the widely held assumption that compatibilist theories of free will render the problem of evil insoluble (for if compatibilism is true, then God can
_simply determine all his creatures to always do the right thing, without thereby removing their free will). John Bishop (1993b), however, has argued that even compatibilists can avail themselves of the free will defence, provided that the defence is supplemented with a further higher good (beyond freedom of action itself), viz. the good of the highest forms of mutual loving personal relationship (though Perszyk 1999 has replied that Bishop’s compatibilist version of the free will defence is not in fact consistent with compatibilism). Like Bishop, Robert Young (1975) contends that, even if compatibilism is true, it does not necessarily follow that God would prefer a world in which people always freely choose the good over a world with moral evil in it. Having defended a compatibilist account of freedom against rival libertarian accounts, Young then admits that resolving the problem of evil given the truth of compatibilism becomes ‘one of the most difficult exercises in Christian apologetics’ (1975: 214). Not deterred, however, he conducts a thought experiment where a compatibilist world in which every person always (freely) does what is right is described in detail and compared with a world like ours where people (with compatibilist freedom) regularly do what is wrong. Young argues that, although there is nothing obviously incoherent or inconsistent in the description provided of the evil-free world, such a world is so radically different from our world that it is easy to overlook not only the difficulties in drawing evaluative comparisons between the two worlds, but also the many demerits of a world without (moral) evil: for instance, the inhabitants of such a world ‘wouldn’t even be of moderate moral stature because they wouldn’t be faced, for example, with needing to forgive or with the difficult task we presently have of acting rightly even when morally wronged’ (1975: 221). Similarly, Martin Davies (though not at the time working in Australia) argued that, ‘even if causal determinism is true, it is very far from clear that the mere existence of evil, or the existence of moral evil in particular, provides an argument against the existence of God’ (1980: 127).

Continuing with the non-theistic side, both H. J. McCloskey and Michael Tooley have also developed arguments from evil. McCloskey (1960) discusses and rejects a number of purported solutions to the problem of natural evil, before doing the same with the problem of moral evil, rejecting as does Mackie (but not for the same reasons) appeals to human free will. (McCloskey 1974 is a book-length treatment of the subject.) Michael Tooley (1991), at the time a senior research fellow in the Philosophy Program at the Australian National University’s Research School of the Social Sciences, distinguishes different ways the argument from evil can be formulated; contends that the argument is best stated in concrete, not abstract, terms (thus focussing on particular kinds of evil, and not on the sheer existence or quantity of evil); considers a number of responses to arguments from evil, and argues that each of these fail; and concludes that ‘nothing less than a reasonably complete theodicy will do’ (1991: 131), though he does not engage in an assessment of theodicies. Although Tooley left Australia’s shores long ago, it is worth mentioning that he has recently engaged in a debate on the existence of God with Alvin Plantinga, published as Knowledge of God
Evil, The Problem of

(2008). Here Tooley’s case against theism is based largely on his evidential (or inductive) argument from evil, and his defence of this argument rests on his justification of the crucial ‘inductive step’ that proceeds (roughly put) from ‘No goods we know of justify God in permitting evil e’ to ‘(It is likely that) no goods whatsoever justify God in permitting e’.

Another debate on the existence of God, in the same Blackwell series, features J. J. C. Smart against John Haldane (1996, 2nd ed. 2003). Evil, argues Smart, is readily explicable from the perspective of evolutionary naturalism, but not from a theistic perspective: there is no plausible way of reconciling the existence of God with the existence of evil, especially natural evil (1996: 66–73). Haldane’s reply (1996: 152–60) that natural evil is an unavoidable by-product of a natural system made up of a variety of species with different capacities and competing interests, only prompts Smart to ask: ‘But could not God have created a universe with different laws, non-metabolising non-competitive spirits, all engaged in satisfying non-competitive activities such as pure mathematics or the production of poetry?’ (1996: 184).

On the theistic side, the Catholic philosopher M. B. Ahern (1971) ends on the irenic note that, given the nature and complexity of the problem, it is impossible for any theist to show that all actual evil is justified, and similarly impossible for any non-theist to show that actual evil is not justified. This view, now known as ‘sceptical theism’ as it is usually proposed by theists who are sceptical of our ability to discern God’s reasons for permitting evil, was ably defended by another Catholic philosopher from Australia, F. J. Fitzpatrick, in a 1981 article in Religious Studies. The sceptical theist view has found many proponents of late, but its shortcomings and dangers have been documented by both Oppy (2006: 289–313) and Trakakis (2007: chs 4–7).

Theistic yet less sceptical has been the Jesuit, John Cowburn (1979, rev. 2003), who has developed a theodicy based largely on Teilhard de Chardin’s view that evolutionary progress—and hence the concomitant physical suffering and disorder—is an unavoidable feature of any universe containing corporeal living beings. Bruce Langtry also develops a (partial) theodicy in God, the Best, and Evil (2008), but one that appeals to goods bound up with free will and moral responsibility, while remaining neutral between compatibilism and libertarianism. While Langtry’s theodicy can be seen as attempting to account for at least some natural evil, insofar as it attempts to account for the fact that humans undergo much ‘dysfunction’ (where this includes such conditions as paralysis, blindness and senile dementia), Trakakis (2007: ch.11) argues against received opinion that leading contemporary theodicies do not succeed in explaining any instances of natural evil at all.

Other Australasian contributions to the problem of evil that are worthy of note include Ken Perszyk’s work on Molinism, this being the theory that God’s omniscience encompasses both foreknowledge and middle knowledge (i.e. knowledge of what every possible free creature would freely choose to do in any possible situation in which that creature might find itself). Perszyk has
contested various common assumptions about Molinism, including the view that Molinism, in virtue of attributing a high level of knowledge and control to God, renders the theodisc’s task harder in comparison with some alternative conceptions of divine omniscience, such as the ‘open theist’ view that the future is open and unknowable even for God (Perszyk 1998).

More radically, Michael Levine (2000a) characterises the theodicies (or defences) recently developed by Christian philosophers—especially Swinburne and van Inwagen—as ‘terrible solutions to a horrible problem’. ‘If van Inwagen and Swinburne were political figures,’ Levine writes, ‘there would be protesters on the street. I mean this literally and not polemically. After all, what they have done is to offer not just a prima facie, but an ultimate justification for the holocaust and other horrors. What should be explained is how this has gone virtually unnoticed in the literature’ (2000a: 107). Levine goes on to suggest that the proposals of Swinburne and van Inwagen are ‘indicative of the lack of vitality, relevance and “seriousness” of contemporary Christian analytic philosophy of religion’ (2000a: 112). (A similar stance on theodicies is taken in Trakakis 2008.) In his comprehensive study of pantheism, Levine (1994) has also argued that pantheistic conceptions of divinity, unlike traditional theistic conceptions, evade the problem of evil altogether.

More radically still, John Bishop (1993a, 1998, 2007b) has long argued that the problem of evil renders the traditional theistic conception of God (or ‘the omni-God’, as he calls it) morally problematic. The argument from evil that Bishop develops is a logical (and not evidential) one, and one that is based on particular concrete cases of great suffering. Bishop’s claim, in short, is that from the perspective of certain non-utilitarian value-commitments (commitments which, Bishop concedes, can rationally be rejected), God cannot justifiably permit, say, a child being tortured to death, even if this were necessary for the realisation of some supreme good. Consider, for example, the fact that God, in the classical theodisc world, must sustain the world even while some terrible evil is taking place, so as to bring about some greater good. But what this entails—e.g. sustaining in each episode of torture and abuse the perpetrator’s capacities to inflict suffering and the victim’s capacity to endure it—seems incompatible with what a perfectly virtuous moral agent would do, at least given certain value-commitments. The theist’s best option, then, is to look for alternative and religiously adequate understandings of the divine, and Bishop’s preferred alternative is one that is thoroughly naturalistic: God on this view is not a supernatural agency or entity, but is (literally) love, a supreme community constituted by and emerging from persons-in-loving relationship.

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Existentialism

Maurita Harney

Introduction

The common concern that loosely unites the diverse assortment of writers known as ‘existentialists’ is a preoccupation with the question of what it means to exist as a human individual situated in the world.

Although it is not a doctrine or even a unified set of themes, what marks existentialism as significantly different from analytical philosophy is its approach and style. Its starting point is the phenomenological orientation of the experiencing subject and for this reason it is seen as part of the Husserlian phenomenological tradition. Within the broad field of Continental philosophy it is further distinguished by a number of features: it emphasises authenticity and is a philosophy of engagement, seeing values and meanings as the creation of the individual rather than a matter of conformity to fixed, universal and rational principles. Existentialist philosophy embraces the experiential dimension of human existence, emphasising and evoking moods and emotions such as angst, dread, absurdity, futility, and alienation.

Amongst Australian philosophers, there is general agreement about the centrality of the French existentialists, most notably Sartre and to some extent Beauvoir and Camus. Some of the ideas of Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty, though problematic, are also included. Marcel and Jaspers are usually included to a lesser extent as are writers such as Kafka, Dostoevsky and Beckett.

In Australian philosophy, existentialism–related teaching and research has largely followed the fortunes of phenomenology, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. As a teaching area it is usually understood as a fairly well-circumscribed movement, or at least a cluster of agreed-upon themes and exponents. However, research in the area is much richer and far more diffuse, ranging from exegetical commentaries and interpretations of key thinkers and themes, to the practice of existential phenomenology. Existential phenomenology is the use of Husserl’s phenomenological method to address existential themes, specifically those concerning Heideggerian-derived being-in-the-world. These themes include relations with others and embodiment, as well as a broad range of cultural and political themes.

The 1940s to the Mid 1970s

Despite their geographical isolation from Europe, Australian philosophers in the 1940s and early 1950s were not totally unfamiliar with the ideas of the
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existentialists. A. M. Ritchie (1947) published a critical review of existentialism in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, and there is mention of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Marcel in other issues (McDonald 2008). By the late 1950s and the 1960s, the ideals of secularism and rationalism had replaced the pluralism characteristic of the earlier years of Australian philosophy, and there was little tolerance for a philosophy like existentialism which celebrated irrationalism, was unashamedly subjective, and was far too close to religious concerns like the meaning of life. Along with phenomenology, it was perceived to lack clarity and rigour, and remained ‘other’ in Australian philosophical circles (Harney 1992). Its reception was typified by the ‘partly puzzled, partly hostile’ response of Sydney analytical philosophers to a paper by Max Deutscher on ‘Sartre and Self-Deception’ in 1970.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s existentialism had a minor presence in the teaching programs of many Australian universities. It was often the first of the ‘Continental philosophy’ subjects to enter teaching courses, and was usually combined with a phenomenology component. Sometimes existentialist themes were incorporated into other subjects on personal identity, ethics, or philosophy of mind. Academically, however, existentialism was better known in the scholarship of other disciplines—theology, literature, modern languages (French and German)—well before Australian philosophy departments embraced it.

It wasn’t until the 1970s when as part of, or precursor to, a blossoming of interest in Continental philosophy generally, centres of interest in existentialism began to emerge offering prospects of postgraduate studies. Initially these were associated with Max Charlesworth at University of Melbourne, and with Max Deutscher at Macquarie University.

In 1967, Max Charlesworth introduced a second-year subject, ‘Contemporary European Philosophy’, which emphasised the existentialism of Sartre, Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty. In this he was supported by Alexander Boyce Gibson, then professor of philosophy at Melbourne, who also lectured on existentialism at Monash University in the late 1960s. At Macquarie University, Max Deutscher began introducing aspects of Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel into his philosophy of mind courses in the early 1970s, and later taught a subject, ‘Existentialism and Phenomenology’, previously taught by Husserl scholar Luciana O’Dwyer.

A series of lectures on existentialism was presented by Robert Solomon from the University of Texas at Austin to philosophers at the University of Melbourne and La Trobe University in 1970. This was the first of many visits by Solomon who helped to communicate the unfamiliar ideas of existentialists to audiences of analytic philosophers and to legitimate it as genuine philosophy.

The ‘Golden Years’: Mid 1970s to Mid 1980s

The decade from the mid 1970s marked the golden years of existentialism. In 1974, Charlesworth became founding dean of humanities at the newly established Deakin University. Its first philosophy course, ‘Images of Man’, was built on existentialist philosophy and drew cross-disciplinary links with literature
and psychology. Douglas Kirsner and, later, Stan van Hooft and Russell Grigg joined Deakin University having served their apprenticeship in existentialism with Charlesworth at the University of Melbourne. Another early recruit was Jocelyn Dunphy, who had studied in Paris with Ricoeur. There was a lively interest in existentialism amongst professional psychiatrists at this time, and the relationship between Sartre and R. D. Laing was the topic of a book by Kirsner (1976).

Cross-disciplinary links were also forged between existentialism and education in Robin Small’s teaching at Monash University. Small had completed a doctorate on Heidegger at the Australian National University (ANU) in 1973. His supervisor, Richard Campbell, had a strong interest in metaphysical and theological aspects of existentialist themes. ANU philosophers were generally supportive of Continental philosophy, and Maurita Harney introduced subjects on existentialism there from 1973 to 1981.

From the late 1970s a new generation of graduates with a grounding in existentialist thought helped to establish existentialism as an area of serious intellectual concern. Marion Tapper taught existentialism at the ANU (1982), the University of Queensland (UQ) (1983–1985), and the University of Melbourne (since 1986). Tapper developed a strong interest in Sartre and Beauvoir as a result of her teaching, although her involvement in Continental philosophy is far broader than existentialism.

Opportunities for communicating and presenting research in existentialist ideas were provided by the phenomenology conferences of 1976 (ANU) and 1980 (UQ). The small number of emerging ‘alternative’ journals also provided a forum: Dialectic, convened by Bill Doniela of University of Newcastle, and Critical Philosophy edited by Paul Crittenden, who taught some existentialist subjects at the University of Sydney. Sartre, Beauvoir, Nietzsche and Heidegger were the popular figures in existentialism research.

Beyond the academy, existentialism was capturing the popular imagination during the 1970s. It had a strong following in continuing education courses and, in Melbourne, the Existentialist Society was formed by David Miller in 1971. It continues to offer monthly public lectures on a very broad range of topics.

Early in 1975, Max Charlesworth presented a series of programs on national radio on French existentialist thought. It included interviews with Sartre and Beauvoir and other French intellectuals including Raymond Aron. It was immensely popular and the interviews were subsequently published as a book (Charlesworth 1975).

Existentialism was a philosophy that captured the spirit of the time, especially the liberation movements of the late 1960s—in politics, education, psychiatry, and in feminism where Simone de Beauvoir’s La Deuxième Sexe had already been ‘discovered’ by first wave feminism. Students perceived existentialism as relevant to their own experiences, and key writings were increasingly accessible through literature, especially with new translations coming out in affordable paperbacks.
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Existentialism’s popularity with students did not go unnoticed by departmental conveners in an era where student numbers began to matter. However, although the 1980s saw broader acceptance of existentialism as a respectable undergraduate subject, most teaching of it was fairly minor, usually confined to a single subject in undergraduate courses. For new generations of students, however, it was often the magnet that drew them into the richer intellectual field of Continental philosophy that was beginning to flourish in a variety of manifestations in Australian philosophy.

In New Zealand, there has been a long tradition of interest in existentialism at the University of Auckland. It is an important component of Julian Young’s writings and teaching in Continental philosophy. Young joined the department in 1970 and is a frequent visitor to the University of Tasmania. Robert Solomon’s visits to Auckland began in 1968, and continued since, with almost annual frequency in the decade before his death early in 2007. Although his interests were not confined to existentialism, Solomon was an important influence on the Auckland department, including then student, Jeff Malpas. Malpas was to teach existentialism at Murdoch University from 1989, and then from 1999 at the University of Tasmania, where he holds the chair in philosophy and has continued his commitment to existential phenomenology.

Fragmentation and Eclipse: Mid 1980s to the Twenty-First Century

By the mid 1980s, amongst philosophers aligned with the Continental tradition, existentialism began to lose its appeal. Key figures like Nietzsche, Heidegger and Beauvoir remained popular research targets, but for reasons other than their existentialism. Moreover, as conference proceedings and publications from the mid 1980s show, existentialism was eclipsed by the more fashionable movements of structuralism, and then poststructuralism, deconstruction, and postmodernism. Many ‘first generation’ philosophers of existentialism who had moved on to other areas of Continental philosophy saw existentialism as old-fashioned mainly because of its humanist overtones. This was more likely in the case of Melbourne-based philosophers who tended to see existentialism as a fairly well circumscribed historical movement, with fluctuating contemporary significance. Their Sydney-based counterparts in Continental philosophy were more likely to identify explicitly with the tradition of existential phenomenology, thereby seeing their work as continuous with ‘traditional’ existentialism. Deutscher, in retrospect, identifies most of his work as existential phenomenology. Malpas identifies with this tradition as well, reflecting his emphasis on Heidegger’s contribution to that tradition, most notably to the notion of existentialist engagement. Other philosophers work within the tradition of existential phenomenology on topics such as ethics and politics, including Sartre’s politics of engagement (Marguerite La Caze and Michelle Boulous-Walker, both University of Queensland), and a broader range of themes relating to contemporary culture, sexual difference and embodiment (Ros Diprose, University of New South Wales).
Renewal: The Twenty-First Century

There are signs that existentialism has enjoyed a renewal of interest in Australia in the first decade of the twenty-first century. To some extent this is a European-led revival inspired by contemporary thinkers like Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Nancy and Alain Badiou, who are not regarded as ‘existentialists’ per se, but whose works draw on or problematise traditional existentialist themes relating to humanism and ‘the subject’.

However, a number of local conferences and events honouring existentialist thinkers attest to renewed interest in existentialism quite independently of these global developments. In 2003, Max Deutscher published Genre and Void: Looking Back at Sartre and Beauvoir. Themes from this work became the subject of papers by Paul Crittenden and Marguerite La Caze at the 2004 conference of the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy. In 2005, day-long conferences in honour of Sartre were held at the University of Queensland organised by La Caze, and in Melbourne organised for the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy (MSCP) by Marion Tapper and Anne Freadman (Department of French). In the same year, Jack Reynolds (La Trobe University) taught existentialism for the MSCP summer school. At Auckland in 2007, a conference in memory of Robert Solomon, which included sessions on existentialism, was organised by Robert Wicks. Similar events are planned to honour Beauvoir’s anniversary in 2008.

There is a long tradition of Kierkegaard scholarship in Australasia, and although a large proportion has been theologically-based, its philosophical exponents have become more visible in recent years. It is represented by William McDonald (University of New England), who has documented Kierkegaard scholarship in Australia (McDonald 2008), the late Julia Watkins (University of Tasmania), Antonio Imbrosciano (University of Notre Dame, Fremantle), and Patrick Stokes (University of Melbourne). A ‘Kierkegaard and Asia’ conference was held in Melbourne in 2005, and a Kierkegaard stream was included in the 2007 conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy. Derrida’s work on Kierkegaard has also contributed to a renewal of interest.

The relationship between existentialism and religious themes finds expression in a variety of ways. It is present, for example, in the writings of Kevin Hart, formerly of the Monash Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies, and in Ian Weeks’s teaching at Deakin University. It is also emerging as a theme of interest in Max Deutscher’s recent work.

There are many generalist publications on existentialism by Australian academics. These include numerous encyclopaedia articles on existentialism, as well as books aimed at introducing students and lay audiences to existentialist ideas (Reynolds 2005; Fox 2008). There are also significant publications which, like Deutscher’s Genre and Void, undertake a reassessment of existentialism in the light of post-existentialist thinking. Neil Levy (Melbourne CAPPE and Oxford) observes links between Sartre and Foucault in the context of modernism and postmodernism, and entertains the idea of a ‘Foucauldian’ existentialism (Levy

Existentialism lives on through diverse forms of expression in the teaching and writing of Australasian philosophers. The legacy of existentialism is acknowledged by philosophers working in existential phenomenology on a very broad range of topics and approaches, some traceable directly to existentialist influences, others seemingly remote from existentialism but still within Continental philosophy. In keeping with the spirit of traditional exponents of existentialism, such themes and topics are all explored as part of the question of being and of human situatedness.

**Existentialist Discussion Group and the Existentialist Society**

David Miller

**Existentialist Discussion Group**

The Existentialist Discussion Group (the precursor of the Existentialist Society) commenced in 1970. Its origins were not from academia but from soapbox oratory. Its convenor, David Miller, had been spruiking at Melbourne’s Speakers Corner at the Yarra Bank on Sunday afternoons in an attempt to discover whether he was an anarchist, an individualist, or a nihilist. His confusion had arisen from reading the German philosopher, Max Stirner (1805–1856). Several of the Speakers Corner participants sometimes gathered after the Sunday sessions to argue the pros and cons of the British ‘Angry Young Man’, Colin Wilson. This group would then wander off to argue over a coffee and, perhaps later, a meal.

Social ferment was in the air. The Student Rebellion had hit Melbourne. Demonstrations against the war in Vietnam were taking place. One of the activist groups, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), had organised the ‘Free University’. Miller approached the SDS at Melbourne University and asked if he could set up discussion groups within the Free University. Permission was granted. So the ‘Yarra Bank group’ became the nucleus for the meetings of the Existentialist Discussion Group in the University of Melbourne’s Students Union. Soon, however, the SDS decided that organising the Free University was far too ‘bourgeois’, and that they should be taking to the streets to participate
in the demonstrations. The Existentialist Discussion Group met on a weekly basis for a few years, before becoming a monthly meeting. Miller had dropped out in 1974. The Group lasted till 1977. Although attendances ran to about a dozen people, there was a period in the early 1970s when it attracted a weekly attendance of fifty to sixty. Perhaps because of its location at the University of Melbourne, the Group was mainly comprised of students.

As a reflection of the ‘Student Revolt’ the rebels had rejected the god-like authoritarianism of the academic lecturers and demanded their say. The discussion-group format seemed to be the democratic way of achieving this. One recurrent problem was the in-group jargon of those utilising the verbiage of a particular philosopher or discipline, so everyone was encouraged to have their say no matter how crude or inarticulate. Ideally, others would translate it into lucid terms. Unfortunately, this was not always done.

**Existentialist Society**

In 1971 the Existentialist Society was launched. Miller was attempting to combine a lecture format with a discussion-group format. Following the lecture, the audience was invited to critically demolish the speaker’s viewpoints, if they could. Alternative viewpoints were presented and cross-floor disputations were encouraged. The question/discussion periods were not chaired. Admittedly, it did not always work. If things got out of hand, a volunteer chair-person was called for. Nevertheless, this seeming chaos proved to be popular.

The Existentialist Society has an informal structure. It has no constitution. There is no formal membership. It has no committee; people volunteer for tasks. At the monthly lectures, ‘begging bowls’ are passed around for donations towards hall-hire expenses from those who can afford it.

The first few meetings of the society took place at the Athenaeum Art Gallery, above the Athenaeum Theatre. The society’s meetings then moved to the Royal Society of Victoria. In 2005, after thirty-four years at the Royal Society, the Existentialist Society relocated to the Unitarian Church Hall (in East Melbourne).

The society’s inaugural speaker was Max Charlesworth from the University of Melbourne’s Department of Philosophy. Over the ensuing years Charlesworth presented occasional lectures on existentialist issues. However, by October 1978, his lecture topic somberly pronounced ‘The Death of Existentialism’. Charlesworth’s final lecture to the society, in December 1981, was entitled ‘After Existentialism’. Nevertheless, the society soldiered on.

The society’s original aim was to provide lectures and discussion on the ideas of those philosophers, authors and playwrights who, for whatever reason, were labelled as ‘existentialist’. Rather than following a narrow focus on existentialism, the society’s interest area widened out to such a degree that it became a hotch-potch of not only philosophy and literature, but also psychology, ethics, theology, ideology, history and science.

The purpose of the Existentialist Society is expressed as follows: ‘For those who question whether life has a meaning and a purpose. For those who despairingly
ponder whether one can live without self-deception or without hedonistic escapes; yet who, despite the anguish of life’s futility and meaninglessness, still seek purpose and an authentic existence’.

Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond

Dominic Hyde

Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond: An Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items (EMJB) is the 1980 treatise by Australasian philosopher Richard Routley (later Richard Sylvan), defending and developing Meinong’s theory of objects. At 1035 pages it constitutes a formidable attempt to rehabilitate Meinong’s theory of nonexistent objects from the obscurity into which it had fallen.

Early work by Routley on problems in the philosophy of science led him to think that the dominant empiricist, reductionist views were in need of radical reform. His substantial work in non-classical logic was one aspect of this reform. His development and application of a Meinongian metaphysics was the other key aspect. Joint work and discussion with his collaborator Val Routley (later Val Plumwood) convinced him that the key assumption, ‘the fundamental philosophical error’ that generated so many philosophical problems, was what they called the Reference Theory (1980: i). This error, leveled across the board at empiricists, Idealists and materialists alike, was the acceptance of the ‘mistaken’ view that all proper use of subject expressions in true or false statements is referential use, and thus truth and falsity can be entirely accounted for, semantically, in terms of reference—i.e. reference to entities that actually exist (1980: 54).

A perceived characteristic of the fallacious Reference Theory was the rejection of all discourse that could not be explained simply in terms of the reference of its (proper) subject-terms, particularly intensional discourse (1980: 54). A related characteristic was what was termed the Ontological Assumption, the view that one cannot make true statements about what does not exist. Routley’s arguments for the falsity of the Reference Theory then led, most notably, to his attempt to rehabilitate Meinong’s theory of nonexistent objects through his advocacy of noneism—a theory of objects which aimed at ‘a very general theory of all items whatsoever, of those that are intensional and those that are not, of those that exist and those that do not, of those that are possible and those that are not, of those that are paradoxical or defective and those that are not, of those that are significant or absurd and those that are not; it is a theory of the logic and properties and kinds of properties of all these items’ (Routley 1980: 5–6). This was the task taken up in EMJB.
The first half of the book, Part I, contains revised versions of essays first written and presented to audiences in the late 1960s. This work points to the overall ambition of the project, the basic noneist theses, the perceived inadequacies of classical logic and the logical revision necessary for the project—in particular the development of a suitable intensional logic (a relevant paraconsistent logic dealt with in some detail in the Appendix, ‘Ultralogic as Universal?’, originally published as Routley 1977) and a quantification theory capable of distinguishing between ‘neutral’ and existentially loaded quantification. Importantly, on the view developed ‘there is’ is not synonymous with ‘there exists’ and distinct quantifiers are proposed. Further issues centring on existence, identity and time are also discussed with the development of a temporal logic consistent with noneism and an ‘improved’ philosophy of time.

Part II begins with a response to Quine’s famous attack on Meinongianism, ‘On What There Is’. Chapter three, ‘On What There Is Not’ (an abridged version later appearing as Routley 1982) clarifies and develops the noneist view that some things do not exist (e.g. contra Meinong, nonexistent items are said to have no being of any kind) and long-standing philosophical puzzles surrounding non-existence (e.g. the Platonic riddle of nonbeing) are then taken to be easily resolved. Chapter four continues with an extensive survey, analysis and response to a wide range of further objections. (It builds on the earlier Routley and Routley 1973—perhaps the clearest, succinct presentation and defense of Routley’s views on Meinong.) Subsequent chapters, five to twelve, then deal with elaborations and applications of the theory.

Key to the defense of noneism, and a central unresolved difficulty for Routley’s account, is a clear account of the properties nonexistent objects may be taken to have. Like Meinong himself, Routley takes a primary application of the theory of objects to be in the philosophy of mathematics and the theoretical sciences (see chapters ten and eleven). Mathematical objects and the theoretical abstractions of scientific explanation are taken to be nonexistent objects to which we can nonetheless correctly attribute properties. The number four is even, and is not odd; ideal gases are composed of molecules whose collisions are elastic, not inelastic, etc. Objects can be correctly attributed properties whether they exist or not. But what properties can they be correctly said to have? The answer is addressed by way of the characterisation postulate (CP).

According to CP objects have the properties they are characterised as having. Thus the tree outside my window is a tree, and the round square is round. But problems quickly emerge with an unrestricted CP. If the round square does not (contra Russell) already invite inconsistency, the square that is square and not square does, counting as both square and not square. Having already restricted CP (in chapter one) so as to exclude ‘noncharacterising predicates’ like ‘exists’ (thus excluding problematic attributions like existence to nonexistent objects), chapter five develops a ‘paraconsistent Meinong’ accepting of inconsistency and tamed by the use of an underlying paraconsistent logic rather than imposing further restrictions on CP.
Much subsequent criticism of noneism has focussed on the characterisation problem: which predicates are ultimately to count as characterising. Even accepting a paraconsistent turn, predicates like ‘being an $x$ such that $Fx \& p$’ (for arbitrary proposition $p$) will, if characterising, result in triviality. In the eyes of many, the characterisation problem was never satisfactorily resolved in *EMJB*. (Explicitly building on *EMJB*, Priest 2005—dedicated to Routley—proposes a solution and further refines and develops noneism.)

A book that typified much of Routley’s work, *EMJB* is highly innovative and unorthodox. He himself wrote in the preface, ‘it is pleasant to record that much of the material is now regarded as far less crazy and disreputable than it was in the mid 1960s, when it was taken as a sign of early mental deterioration and of philosophical irresponsibility’ (Routley 1980: vii). He, along with a number of collaborators, did much to advance disreputable theories on a number of philosophical fronts. *EMJB* was one such example.
Feminist Bioethics
Susan Dodds

Feminist bioethics encompasses a relatively wide range of activity. It can be described broadly as the study of issues relating to health and medicine that is either directly concerned with the gendered effects and significance of health policy, practices and conceptualisations of health and illness, or is distinctly informed by feminist social, ethical or political theory. One characteristic that is normally present in feminist work is its ‘concern to understand and eliminate oppression’ (Crosthwaite 2001: 32). The challenge of characterising the scope of feminist bioethics is made more difficult because, as an area of applied philosophy, feminist bioethics has arisen from and continues to be informed by a broad range of academic disciplines and areas of political activism. Feminist bioethics in Australia and New Zealand is carried out through work in a range of areas of research and practice, of which philosophy is one important part. Australasian feminist bioethics is distinctive because of the ways in which Continental and analytic philosophical influences are frequently brought together to address issues about health, medicine and the body, and because of the particular social, legal and historical influences shaping health care, medicine and public policy in Australia and New Zealand.

Women’s Health, Political Activism and Feminist Bioethics in Australasia

Feminist activism and political praxis that was most visible during the late 1970s and early 1980s has been a significant influence on the development of feminist bioethics. For example, Australian feminists active in the Feminist International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering (FINRRAGE), including Heather Dietrich, Renate Klein, Robyn Rowland and Romaine Rutnam, have written academic and popular works that challenge the claims of medical researchers about the risks and benefits for women arising from
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reproductive technology and genetic engineering, especially as these manifest relationships of power and subordination (see Arditti, Klein and Minden 1984; Rowland 1992). In New Zealand, women’s health consumer advocates, such as the Women’s Health Action Trust, have been similarly active in drawing public and political attention to the ways in which health and medical practice and technologies can harm women’s interests. A significant case was publicised in the writings of the journalist and co-founder of Women’s Health Action, Sandra Coney. Coney’s investigative journalism uncovered a case of a medical researcher at the National Women’s Hospital who sought to test his hypothesis that there was no clear relationship between a positive cervical cancer screening test (Pap smear) and the subsequent development of cervical cancer but without advising women whose routine screening tests returned positive results. The women on whom this research was conducted were effectively involved without their knowledge or consent (Coney 1988; Cartwright 1988). Coney’s writing drew attention to the institutionalised power imbalances and gendered assumptions that created the circumstances within which this scandal could arise.

Philosophical Approaches in Australasian Feminist Bioethics

The breadth of feminist bioethics reflects the broad scope of bioethics generally, encompassing critical ethical exploration and evaluation of all aspects of health care provision, professional responsibility, medical research, developing medical technologies, and their social and legal contexts. Nonetheless, Australasian feminist bioethics is particularly evident in writing that addresses: abortion (Mackenzie 1992; Mills 2005; Nie 2005); reproduction and reproductive technologies (Dodds and Jones 1989; Diprose 1994; Waldby 2008); and genetic enhancement, genetic engineering and trans-humanism (Diprose 2005; Shaw 2003; Mills 2008). Philosophically, two overlapping sets of concerns dominate Australasian feminist bioethics. The first addresses and extends a set of critiques of the dominant approaches to bioethics coming out of North America, those founded on a liberal conception of the self. The second starts from an exploration of the ethical salience of human embodiment and the social significance of living as temporally extended, socially constituted embodied agents.

Principlism, Liberalism and Autonomy

Feminist bioethicists have challenged several assumptions of the liberal self (as rational, autonomous, unencumbered chooser) that dominates much of the writing in bioethics and health care. These critiques are particularly levelled at the bioethics literature coming out the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s, emphasising patient choice. These challenges apply to different degrees to utilitarian, deontological and principles-based approaches. ‘Principlism’ was developed during the 1980s by Thomas Beauchamp and James Childress as a pluralist, non-foundationalist approach to ethical decision-making through the application of four general moral principles to particular ethical problems. The
four principles of autonomy, justice, non-maleficence and beneficence have their grounding in Kantian deontology, Rawls’ theory of justice, Mill’s utilitarianism, Judeo-Christian morality and even a vestige of the Hippocratic Oath (Beauchamp and Childress 1994). Feminist bioethicists have sought to demonstrate both the limitations of these different normative approaches and the assumptions about agency, emotion and independence that underpin them (e.g. Dodds 2000).

At the same time, feminists influenced by Carol Gilligan’s ‘ethics of care’ approach (Gilligan 1982) have extended this approach to issues associated with health care, often drawing on Susan Sherwin’s (1992) work on a feminist bioethics of health care. Gilligan argued that women tend to draw on a different approach to ethical reasoning from the approach normally found in men’s ethical responses. Women, Gilligan argued, were less likely to seek to apply abstract individualistic principles in their moral decision-making and were more likely to articulate their moral reasoning in terms of the tensions among interpersonal relationships that could be fostered or threatened by different courses of action. Australasian feminist engagements with the ‘ethics of care’ approach include Peta Bowden’s work on the ethical practices of care involved in the provision of nursing care (Bowden 1997).

Other feminists have sought to redress the limitations of the liberal conceptions of the moral self through critical articulation of the inability of the idealised atomistic, autonomous rational chooser to capture human selfhood, and in particular human selfhood as it manifests in the context of health care, reproduction and dying. Developing from work in moral psychology by Diana Meyers (1989), the idea of a relational approach to personal autonomy has been developed and applied in the context of bioethics by a number of feminists (e.g. Donchin 2000), including those in Australasia (Dodds 2000; Mackenzie and Scully 2007). Relational approaches to autonomy seek to recognise that people’s capacity for autonomous choice is shaped by and depends on the interpersonal relationships (particularly parental care) and social institutions that may foster or frustrate the development of the self and the limits and possibilities of human embodiment (see Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). The approach draws from feminism a concern about the ethical significance of oppression and domination for the development of selfhood and recognition of the ways in which the physical reality of human embodiment and bodily differences shape human agency. Applying these to the scope of bioethics draws out the limitations of those approaches that emphasise patient choice or reductive utilitarianism.

Embodyment, Power and Biopolitics

The second major area of distinctly philosophical development within Australasian feminist bioethics also attends to human embodiment and challenges the assumptions of disembodied universalism found in other ethical approaches. This work develops from Continental philosophy, particularly informed by the works of Australian feminist theorists Elizabeth Grosz (1986b, 1989) and Moira
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Gatens (1988, 1991b), and seeks to understand the ethical significance of being, perceiving and theorising the world in and through human embodiment: that is, to explore what ‘lived bodily experience’ means for being people and how we understand our ethical responses to one another. Ros Diprose (1994) and Philipa Rothfield (1995) have each sought to develop the idea of a philosophy of the body in its application to bioethics. In doing so they have each identified the ways in which bodies become meaningful in different contexts (medical, familial, political) and the ways in which those meanings shape, and are shaped by, how individual embodied agents understand themselves, their world and their ethical responses. Rothfield attends particularly to the interactions between discourses of the body and bodily movement through an engagement with the world. Diprose’s exploration of embodiment, bioethics and reproductive technologies involves not only a critical exploration of ideas of embodiment and sexual difference, but also an analysis of the potentially oppressive effects of certain meanings ascribed to a range of reproductive bodily practices.

More recently work in bioethics and philosophy of the body has been pursued by Catherine Mills (2008), whose work explores Michel Foucault’s (1981) notions of biopolitics and biopower (the ways in which contemporary governments view biological life as a site for regulation and control) and the development of these notions in the work of Giorgio Agamben (1998). Mills’ work critically engages with debates about genetic enhancement, reproductive technologies and concepts of risk and security.

Although the analytic and continental philosophical approaches to bioethics employ distinct methods and draw on different literatures, it would be a mistake to view them as oppositional or directed at wholly different concerns. Increasingly the two areas overlap, in both their topic of concern within health and medicine and in the philosophical questions they seek to answer. As a result there is a relatively high level of cross-referencing between the different areas and approaches of feminist bioethics in Australasia.

(Further reading: Bennett, Karpin, Ballantyne and Rogers 2008; Donchin 2004; Feminist International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering; Rogers 2006.)
Feminist philosophers in Australasia have produced a substantial body of work, which involves a range of significant areas: history of philosophy, debates around sex, gender, and the body, ecofeminism, and feminist issues in ethics. Despite the relatively low numbers of women in philosophy, feminist philosophy has become established through teaching, conferences, and publishing (see MacColl et al. 1982). Feminist philosophy was taught in some major philosophy departments from the early 1970s onwards, often in conjunction with Women’s Studies programs, but not until the 1980s or even ‘90s in others. ‘Philosophical Issues in Feminist Thought’ was first taught at the University of Sydney in 1973 (Grave 1984: 215–16) and a philosophy and women’s studies course was introduced at Flinders University in 1973 (Franklin 2003: 307). In the 1980s and ‘90s papers feminist philosophy and other areas were presented at Women in Philosophy conferences in Australia and New Zealand.

The first articles in feminist philosophy were published at around the same time and this publication gathered pace in the 1980s. Early papers engaged with theories such as Marxism, liberalism, and psychoanalysis in order to provide a critique or develop a form of the theory more adequate to feminist concerns. The resources of both European and analytic philosophy have been transformed in feminist philosophy in the Australasian context. In 1998 a conference was held at the University of Warwick in the U.K. called ‘Going Australian: reconfiguring Feminism and Philosophy’, and some of those papers were published in a Hypatia special issue in 2000. The editors found that Australian feminist philosophy is distinguished by its concern with specificity and its use of genealogies to address contemporary questions and open up new possibilities in ontology, ethics, and politics.

This article will concentrate on the work and the concerns in feminist philosophy that have generated debate locally and internationally. The most important text in this tradition is Genevieve Lloyd’s book, The Man of Reason (1984), in which she argues that ‘our ideals of Reason have historically incorporated an exclusion of the feminine, and that femininity itself has been partly constituted through such processes of exclusion’ (1984: x). This is evident not only in derogatory remarks about women’s capacities for reason found in the work of Hegel and Rousseau, for example, which are often noted, but also in texts that describe ideals of reason that involve the exclusion of traits symbolically associated with the feminine such as natural forces, passivity, matter, the corporeal, the passions, the personal, and the private. This is so, Lloyd argues, even when philosophers hold the view that women are capable of reasoning, such as Descartes, and is
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often exaggerated in the work of commentators (1984: 38–50). Responding to
criticisms of her view in the preface to the second edition of her book, Lloyd sees
an understanding of the metaphorical operation of the male–female distinction to
be important to philosophical ideals of reason (1993: viii).

Although not explicitly a response to Lloyd’s work, Karen Green’s *The Woman
of Reason* (1995) takes issue with the view that feminine ideals of reason are
excluded from the history of philosophy and argues that we can find such an ideal
in the work of Christine de Pisan, Mary Wollstonecraft, and even Rousseau. In
her view, ‘if we designate theories “feminine” because they postulate the existence
of basic moral motives, or sentiments, connected with innate tendencies to love,
and we designate theories “masculine” when they assume that moral motivation
is derived from non-moral desires and reason, Rousseau emerges as a “feminine”
theorist’ (1995, 84). In her book, *Yielding Gender*, Penelope Deutscher criticises
both *The Man of Reason* and *The Woman of Reason* on the grounds that they neglect
how philosophical texts such as those of Rousseau and Augustine use instability
and contradiction to sustain masculine conceptions of reason and disparaging

In the foregoing discussion the term ‘masculine’ has been used as if its meaning
is straightforward, but other feminist philosophical debates in Australasia contest
the meaning and ground of terms such as masculine and feminine, and male
and female. Moira Gatens and Val Plumwood differ over the importance of
gendered traits, with Gatens arguing for a form of sexual difference feminism and
Plumwood for the importance of a concept of gender distinct from sex. *Elizabeth
Grosz*, in *Volatile Bodies* (1994), also delineates a form of sexual difference feminism, one that uses modern and postmodern theories of the body to describe
distinct bodies.

Gatens, in ‘A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction’ (in Gatens 1996, al-
though first published in Allen and Patton 1983), criticises the distinction on
the grounds that it neutralises sexual difference and sexual politics and assumes
that both the body and the psyche are passive *tabula rasa*. Instead, she argues
that there are at least two kinds of bodies—male and female—and therefore
at least two kinds of lived experience. We live our different bodies through
the different meanings similar behaviours acquire in the two sexes and this
affects consciousness. A female subject has specific bodily experiences such as
menstruation, shame and modesty, which means that femininity in a female is
qualitatively different from femininity in a male. Gatens concludes: ‘there is a
contingent, though not arbitrary, relation between the male body and masculinity
and the female body and femininity’ (1996: 13). More recently, both Gatens and
Lloyd have turned to the work of Spinoza for a non-dualistic conception of the
self (1999).

Plumwood, who has also contributed a great deal to ecofeminist debates (see
Plumwood 1993 and 2002), replies in ‘Do We Need a Sex/Gender Distinction?’
(1989) that in a limited form, the distinction is necessary and defensible. She gives
a range of important features of such a form of the distinction, including: that
gender differences are more variable and more changeable than sex differences; that it helps to explain how the feminine has been devalued; it enables criticism of biological reductionism; it enables recognition of variation in relation to gender ideals; it makes it possible to see the oppression of women as open to change, and to acknowledge that gender is intentional or bound up with what people believe is the significance of biological sex (3–4). Plumwood argues that we need not assume that gender is added to a neutral and passive body. All that is assumed in the distinction is that the body alone does not determine gender identity. Her preferred conception of gender is as a shared social story about reproductive difference as well as concrete practices, or ‘the social meaning of sex as embedded in social practices’ (8). Plumwood’s view is that difference can be elaborated against a background of basic similarity and the aim of feminism should be a radical restructuring of gender differences rather than the removal of gender differences.

Although they differ on the issue of the sex/gender distinction, Gatens and Plumwood, like many other feminists, would agree that there is a need to re-conceptualise the body since corporeality and sexual difference have both been neglected in the philosophical tradition. Thus, in *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism* (1994), *Elizabeth Grosz* reflects on a conception of corporeality that addresses this neglect. Her goal is to develop a non-dualist, non-reductionist account of the body and subjectivity premised on an acknowledgment of sexual difference, using the work of Freud, Lacan, Schilder, Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche, Lingis, Foucault and Deleuze, and subjecting them to feminist critique. Grosz argues that the body itself is as much a cultural and historical product as the mind, and uses the Möbius strip as a model of the way the body is imbued with subjectivity and the way subjectivity is material. She writes: ‘The strip has the advantage of showing the inflection of mind into body and body into mind, the ways in which, through a kind of twisting or inversion, one side becomes another’ (1994: xii).

For Grosz, we live our bodies in one way through a psychical body image which is influenced through social, cultural and historical factors. The body image is a psychical mapping of the body as lived and experienced in relation to others. From the other side of the Möbius strip, she argues that bodies’ interactions with the world create all the impressions of subjectivity or consciousness from the outside in through the constraints and pressures on our bodies. For example, torture and punishment are inscribed on our body and lived; the body is also marked by clothing, grooming, gait, exercise, drugs, and diet, and we live our bodies differently under a system of oppression. Grosz, like Luce Irigaray, acknowledges the range of specificities of bodies, such as racial, ethnic and class differences, but accords a special status to sexual difference, arguing that ‘if anything it occupies a pre-ontological—certainly a pre-epistemological—terrain insofar as it makes possible what things or entities, what beings, exist (the ontological question) and insofar as it must pre-exist and condition what we can know (the epistemological question)’ (1994: 209). She recommends that we understand women’s bodies other
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than as a lack and explore the way we live our bodies, particularly our conception of bodily fluids.

The discussion thus far may suggest that Australasian feminist philosophy does not concern itself with specific ethical and political issues, yet this is not the case. Feminist issues in ethics and politics have been explored on both sides of the Tasman by authors such as Rosalyn Diprose, Jan Crosthwaite, Christine Swanton, and Susan Dodds. In her book, *The Bodies of Women* (1994), Diprose explores conceptions informing and challenging biomedical ethics, Crosthwaite and Swanton examine sexual harassment and the idea of treating women as sex objects, and Dodds addresses feminist issues in *bioethics*.

Explorations of sexual harassment will be the focus here. Crosthwaite and Swanton’s paper appears in the only feminist philosophy supplement to the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (*AJP*), in 1986. (*AJP* (1993) contains a selection of papers from the 1992 Women in Philosophy Conference.) They develop a conception of sexual harassment based on the idea that ‘behaviour of a sexual nature or motivation in the workplace counts as sexual harassment if and only if there is inadequate consideration of the interests of the person subjected to it’ (Thompson 1986: 100). In a later paper, Crosthwaite and Priest argue that sexual harassment is ‘any form of sexual behaviour by members of a dominant gender group towards members of a subordinate gender group whose typical effect is to cause members of the subordinate group to experience their powerlessness as a member of that group’ (1996: 72). The earlier paper accepted that it is possible for women to sexually harass men, but the later paper explicitly argues that this is not possible in cultures where men are dominant (1996: 75). This view connects sexual harassment with a pervasive gender asymmetry.

In recent years feminist interest in historical philosophical texts has continued, especially in the work of Spinoza (Gatens and Lloyd 1999) and Christine de Pisan (Green and Mews 2005), as have discussions of the imaginary using the work of Michèle Le Dœuff (Lloyd in Battersby 2000; Max Deutscher 2000; La Caze 2002), and work in feminist bioethics (Dodds 2004) and environmental philosophy (Plumwood 2002). Like feminist movements in other parts of the world, feminist philosophers have progressively linked questions concerning the oppression of women to issues concerning race and culture (Lloyd in Battersby 2000) and to ethical questions generally (Diprose 2002). Aboriginal feminists have criticised the lack of attention to indigenous experience in much feminist theorising and Aileen Moreton-Robinson suggests that feminisms ‘through theory and practice do not just tolerate racial differences, but should understand that they are constituted through and implicated in complex power relations between women’ (2000: 70). Developing an account of these complex power relations is another challenge for Australasian feminist philosophy.
Flinders University
Greg O’Hair

Flinders University was established in 1965. Brian Medlin was appointed foundation professor of philosophy, and Greg O’Hair senior lecturer. Teaching in philosophy began in 1967.

As with other universities set up in the 1960s there was a general desire to do things a bit differently. Flinders University had schools rather than faculties, and disciplines rather than departments. It was hoped that this would encourage interdisciplinary links and work, and to a degree it did.

Brian Medlin had several ideas about a curriculum. During the preceding years he, along with D. M. Armstrong, had developed Central State Materialism, which generalised the Place-Smart identity theory beyond sensations to all mental states, including beliefs and desires. Medlin had also published papers using modern logic, and was convinced that logic should have an important place in undergraduate courses. Indeed a (non-optional) half of the Philosophy I course was devoted to propositional and predicate logic, up to and including the Completeness Theorem. This worked well (surprisingly) for a number of years. A specialist logician, Dene Barnett, was appointed next to teach logic through to Honours level. There was also a strong emphasis on epistemology and metaphysics.

In the meantime, the Vietnam War was escalating, as was conscription for it and opposition to it. Medlin was very active in the anti-war movement from early on, and was increasingly radicalised by experiences gained in it. A new generation of students was demanding radical changes in universities around the Western world, and Flinders was no exception. By the early 1970s, most of the philosophy staff—which included, by then, Rodney Allen, Ian Hunt, Ken Sievers and Lawrence Johnson—agreed with the need for radical changes.

New courses in Marxism, Political Economy, Women’s Studies (which began in 1973, taught by Rita Helling) and Politics and Art were introduced. Group assessment was developed and applied in a number of courses. A Consultative Committee, with students as well as staff, was set up and met regularly until well into the 1980s.

All these measures were opposed initially on university committees. The proposal to introduce Women’s Studies in particular aroused indignation. (It even provoked the Professor of Spanish to propose a course on Bullfighting Studies, complete with bullfights on the Plaza.) Later, of course, such courses became quite common, and Women’s Studies or Feminist Philosophy were taught at Flinders over many years, by Liz Storey, Jean Curthoys, Christine Vick, Ros Diprose and Linda Burns.
The way the Women’s Studies course was planned and run also reflected a desire to involve members of the community who might not otherwise go to university. It was planned by a committee involving women from the community, and a number of such women participated actively in the course. Some went on to complete a degree at Flinders.

The Politics and Art course, taught by Medlin, was very innovative and attracted artists, poets (Medlin himself was a noted poet) and musicians, from on and off campus. Everyone taking the course had to produce a practical project. Out of this process, a well-known folk-rock group, Redgum, was born.

Although Lawrence Johnson did not agree with the radical and Marxist trends in the discipline, he also introduced—quite early for Australia—courses on Asian Philosophy, and Environmental Philosophy.

Looking back on the early years, the contrast with universities today is striking. The changes that were then made democratically with students, and accepted, albeit at times reluctantly, by other academics seem modest compared with the sweeping changes to the structure and workings of universities introduced by successive governments and administrations.

In the 1980s and ’90s a number of other courses were introduced, including a variety of interdisciplinary ones, involving the Medical School, Legal Studies, Computer Science and Cognitive Science. After a number of years without any new staff, the discipline was able to appoint George Couvalis, and later, Ros Diprose.

Medlin took early retirement in 1988, and after several years the chair was advertised and Greg Currie was appointed. Currie continued the interdisciplinary links and succeeded in raising the research profile of the discipline. Much of his well known work, including joint publications with Ian Ravenscroft and Catherine Abell, grew out of his time at Flinders. Also during this time Linda Burns and Ian Ravenscroft were appointed.

In recent years cutbacks in funding, leading to retirements without replacement, have shrunk the discipline. However, it was able to appoint Craig Taylor to teach Moral Philosophy and is currently making another continuing appointment. The discipline offers a range of topics through Honours—including ones with links to other disciplines—and supervises Ph.D. students. It has publications in a number of areas, and in 2009 Taylor hosted a very successful Hume Conference.

(Thanks to Rodney Allen, George Couvalis, Ian Hunt, Pamela Lyon, Ian Ravenscroft, Craig Taylor and Nick Trakakis for helpful comments.)
The Centre for Applied Philosophy was established as a Flinders University Research Centre in 1994. A management committee, with Ian Hunt as its Director, ran the Centre. Ian Hunt remained its director throughout its history. Its early plans were to conduct mini-conferences on topical themes in applied philosophy, with public policy implications, and to publish collections of papers from the conferences and other collections dealing with important issues of debate, where philosophy could make a valuable contribution in examining positions taken or clarifying conceptual issues that underlay public policy debates.

The centre’s first conference was on changes to the Australian industrial relations system, with a move away from dispute resolution through arbitration to enterprise bargaining. This resulted in a publication edited by Ian Hunt and Chris Provis (1995), titled *The New Industrial Relations in Australia*. This publication proved useful as reference material for industrial relations courses in Australian universities.

The next collection (Burns and Hunt 1996), published by the centre itself, was an equally successful exploration of the issues surrounding euthanasia, titled *The Quality of Death*. It arose from public debate over the issue of whether there are decisive moral objections to legislation introduced in the Northern Territory to legalise medically assisted death in certain circumstances. This publication attracted national and international interest, with orders placed for the book for many years afterward.

The centre then faced a difficult period of declining funding and increasing workloads for academic staff involved. It organised a conference on the West Review of Australian Universities together with The Flinders Institute of Teaching, but publication of the proceedings of this conference (Hunt and Smyth 1998) did not have a wide audience. The centre subsequently held another mini-conference on ‘The Future of Solidarity’, but a refereed proceedings was not published due to insufficient interest from key contributors, who may have published papers elsewhere, as its director did (Hunt 2001).

The centre in its final years organised a well-attended series of public lectures titled ‘Science, Biotechnology, and Designer Lifestyles: The End of Humanity as we Know it?’, which explored the moral dilemmas and impact on the human condition of using new technology for perfectionist ends: to have desired babies, bodies, feelings and experiences, or to design disease and pest resistant sources
of food. It also conducted a successful campaign led by Lynda Burns to introduce philosophy as a senior high school subject in South Australian schools.

Its final conference was among its most successful. The refereed proceedings on the conference theme of ‘The Rights of Strangers’ was published as a two-part symposium, guest edited by Ian Hunt (2003), in *The Australian Journal of Human Rights* (volume 9, issue 2 and volume 10, issue 1, 2003–2004). The symposium papers explore the issue of whether the new policies of the Australian government on refugees involved violations of the rights of people who were not citizens to asylum and effective protection. The centre has since been subsumed within the Ethics Centre of South Australia (ECSA).

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**French Philosophy**

Robert Sinnerbrink

Interest in French philosophy within Australia, surprisingly enough, dates as far back as the 1920s (see Grave 1984: 31–2, 39–40; Harney 1992: 127–28). **John Passmore**, for example, described Australian philosophy at this time as ‘deeply interested in Continental philosophy’ (Harney 1992: 127), notably in the work of Henri Bergson (Grave 1984: 39–40). With the rise of analytic philosophy, however, Continental philosophy in Australia was soon institutionally marginalised. Despite waves of interest in *phenomenology* and *existentialism*, then Marxism and feminism, and later French *poststructuralism*, it is only from the late 1960s through to the late 1970s that the first courses, conferences, and active research on contemporary French philosophy finally appeared in Australian universities (Harney 1992: 133–43).

**Australian Bergsonism**

Australian interest in French vitalist Henri Bergson was well established in the early decades of the century, thanks largely to W. R. Boyce Gibson, second professor of philosophy at the [University of Melbourne](https://www.unimelb.edu.au) (1911) (Grave 1984: 31–2, 39–41). Best known today for his landmark translation of Husserl’s *Ideas*, Boyce Gibson co-taught Bergson—who he described as one of the key thinkers of the age—in courses with J. McKellar Stewart (appointed as lecturer in 1912), whose book *Critical Exposition of Bergson’s Philosophy* (1911) was one of the earliest Bergson studies in English (Grave 1984: 43). In 1923, J. Alexander Gunn, a specialist in ‘contemporary and nineteenth-century French philosophy’ (Grave 1984: 43) was appointed at the University of Melbourne. Gunn had published two books on French thought: *Bergson and His Philosophy* (1920) and *Modern French Philosophy* (1922), as well as an article on Bergson (‘Great Thinkers:
Bergson’) in the *Australian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology* (1925), known today as the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* or AJP. In the latter, Gunn expressed the hope that Bergson might soon visit Australia (Grave 1984: 44), and plans were even underway to have Bergson lecture at the University of Sydney in 1928 (University of Sydney Archives 1927). Australians would have to wait many decades, however, for visits by prominent French thinkers (Jean Baudrillard in 1984, Jacques Derrida’s ‘virtual appearance’ via satellite in 1996, Alain Badiou and Derrida in 1999, and Jacques Ranciere in 2006).

**French Existentialism and Phenomenology**

Although interest in phenomenology goes back to W. R. Boyce Gibson’s pioneering work on Husserl, there was little institutional recognition of phenomenology and existentialism in Australia for most of the post-War period. French existentialism (primarily the work of Sartre) was regarded with suspicion and disdain by mainstream anglophone philosophers. In his *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, for example, John Passmore breezily remarked that ‘professional philosophers … dismiss it [Sartre’s existentialism] with a contemptuous shrug’ (1957: 450). Despite such dismissals, a few figures bravely pursued their interest in post-War French thought. A. M. Ritchie of Newcastle University had published work in phenomenology and existentialism during the 1940s and ‘50s, but never taught any university courses on these topics (Harney 1992: 134). Pioneering Melbourne philosopher Max Charlesworth pursued his doctoral studies at the Husserl Archives in Louvain, and introduced phenomenology and existentialism to his students at the University of Melbourne. Charlesworth also introduced Australia’s first course dedicated to contemporary European philosophy (in 1967), which began with Husserl but gave major emphasis to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty (Harney 1992: 133). Despite a large student following, Charlesworth’s main scholarly relations were with literary critics in the French department, existentialist theologians, and philosophically-minded Freudians (Harney 1992: 133–4)—anticipating the interdisciplinary reception of contemporary French philosophy that continues today.

This institutional marginalisation of French philosophy began to change during the 1960s and ’70s. In Sydney, pioneering figures included Max Deutscher, the foundation professor of philosophy at *Macquarie University* (1966), who had developed an interest in French and German existentialism (Sartre, Heidegger, Jaspers) early in his career (he had been a prominent figure in the materialism debates of the 1960s). While at Oxford in the early 1960s, Deutscher read a paper on Sartre ‘partly because no one else there was familiar with Sartre at the time’ (Harney 1992: 136). Deutscher’s interest in Sartre deepened during the 1960s and he began introducing themes from Sartrean existentialism to his students at Macquarie University (Paul Crittenden had also been teaching and researching Sartre’s work at the University of Sydney during this time). Deutscher drew on his training and expertise in analytic philosophy in approaching existentialism and phenomenology, and later, French feminist and poststructuralist thought.
This did not prevent certain colleagues regarding Deutscher’s existentialism as a kind of philosophical corruption. As David Stove opined after hearing one of Deutscher’s papers on Sartre, ‘that’s what comes of consorting with philosophically underdeveloped countries!’ (Deutscher 2008). Despite this, scholarly interest in phenomenology and existentialism began to grow, William Ginnane’s review of Merleau-Ponty’s *In Praise of Philosophy* and *Phenomenology of Perception*, for example, appearing in the *AJP* in 1964.

A host of social, cultural, and political factors contributed to the growing interest in French philosophy in Australia: the emergence of newer universities during the 1970s (Griffith, Murdoch, and Deakin), the expansion of tertiary education, the availability of French philosophical works in translation, and growing student political awareness connected with the Vietnam war protests, civil rights, and feminist movements (Harney 1992: 140–1). For many younger scholars, French philosophy seemed to offer a richer vocabulary to describe the contemporary world than mainstream analytic philosophy. Witnessing the 1960s student demonstrations and political upheavals in the U.S. convinced Max Deutscher, for example, that ‘the vocabulary of analytic philosophy was too narrow to grasp contemporary events’ (Deutscher 2008). This would also be the case, following the collapse of Marxism, with the turn towards French poststructuralism during the 1980s and ’90s.

During the 1970s, a new generation of philosophers emerged who began the serious reception of French philosophy after the existentialist and phenomenological wave. Genevieve Lloyd and Kimon Lycos, for example, had taught French philosophy at the ANU during a period that was decidedly postexistentialist. Indeed, Lycos had already begun a translation of Foucault’s first volume of the *History of Sexuality* (in 1976–77) well before Robert Hurley’s version was published in 1978. Among the students that Lycos and Lloyd taught were Rosi Braidotti and Andrew Benjamin, who wrote Honours theses on topics in French philosophy and went on to become internationally recognised authorities on Deleuze (Braidotti), Derrida, Lyotard, and *Continental aesthetics* (Benjamin).

Marion Tapper, who had completed a doctorate with Deutscher on ‘Dichotomies’, was another key figure in disseminating French thought during the 1970s and 1980s. Having studied existentialism in the late sixties she then taught existentialism, phenomenology, Heidegger, and feminism at a number of institutions, including at the Australian National University (ANU), Macquarie University, and the University of Queensland (UQ), before taking up a position at the University of Melbourne in 1986 teaching contemporary European philosophy. Many of Tapper’s Melbourne students would become instrumental in establishing the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP) in 1995 and the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy (MSCP) in 2003.

The first phenomenology conference in Australia was organised in 1975 by Maurita Harney, who had also introduced existentialism and phenomenology to the ANU in 1973 (Harney 1992: 142–3). Growing out of these conferences,
the Australian Association of Phenomenology and Social Philosophy (AAPSP) emerged in the late 1970s, organised by figures including Max Deutscher, Bill Doniela (University of Newcastle), Maurita Harney, Luciana O’Dwyer, and Marion Tapper. The group was originally called the ‘Australasian Association for Phenomenology and the Social Sciences’ but later changed its name. The AAPSP was the first Society for European philosophy in Australia, and continued to conduct regular conferences until its demise in the early 1990s, at which time it was reborn as the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP). This transition from the AAPSP to the ASCP symbolised the generational shift from phenomenology and existentialism to French poststructuralism, a shift that had already been occurring in some departments from the late 1970s.

Marxism, French Feminism, Poststructuralism

The University of Sydney was the scene of a famous split and formation of two separate departments (General Philosophy and Traditional and Modern Philosophy) in 1973 (see Franklin 2003: 281–312; Franklin’s informative account of the split, however, is marred by his dismissive approach to Continental philosophy). The split began already in 1971 over whether Marxism should be taught in the department (by Michael Devitt and Wal Suchting); it then intensified, in 1973, over whether feminism should also be taught (by Jean Curthoys and Liz Jacka), which precipitated the division into two separate departments (Traditional and Modern, and General Philosophy). The split occurred while French Marxism (particularly Althusser) was making a strong impression in Australian political and philosophical circles. Indeed, the Department of General Philosophy was for a time a hub of Althusserian Marxism (particularly the work of Wal Suchting), as evident in the 1978 anthology Paper Tigers, based upon the first-year General Philosophy ‘Counter-ideology’ course (Franklin 2003: 303). The Department of General Philosophy soon developed a more ‘Continental’ orientation, however, including specialities in French poststructuralism (Paul Patton), French feminism (Grosz and Mia Campioni), and psychoanalysis (Grosz and Campioni).

Elizabeth Grosz had been an undergraduate during the split, and went on to become a key figure lecturing in the Department of General Philosophy from 1978 until 1991. Having worked on Lacan and feminist theory during the late 1970s, she later published influential books on these topics (1989, 1990) and became an internationally recognised authority on French feminism. Genevieve Lloyd (who became professor at University of New South Wales in 1985) produced path-breaking research on the history of philosophy from a feminist perspective (1984) that inspired a generation of Australian feminist scholars. Penelope Deutscher, Rosalyn Diprose, Robyn Ferrell, Moira Gatens (now professor at University of Sydney), Vicky Kirby, Marguerite La Caze, Cathryn Vasselu, and Elizabeth Wilson have all contributed to Australian ‘corporeal feminism’ by exploring the intersections between French feminism, psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, and political philosophy (Franklin 2003: 361–73).
Another key figure in the dissemination of poststructuralism during the 1980s was Paul Patton, now professor at the University of New South Wales (UNSW). As a postgraduate Patton had travelled to Paris in order to write a doctoral thesis on Althusser, and while there he attended Foucault's lectures and Deleuze's famous seminars (between 1975 and 1979). The impact of encountering Deleuze and Foucault prompted Patton to then embark upon a series of important translations. Upon his return to the Department of General Philosophy in 1979, he taught an Honours/postgraduate course on Foucault, and translated two Foucault interviews that were published in a volume edited with Meaghan Morris, one of the earliest English-language books on Foucault's work (1979). This was followed by translations (with Paul Foss) of Deleuze and Guattari's 'Rhizome' (published in 1981), several Baudrillard texts in 1983–84 (co-translated with Foss and Ross Gibson), another Foucault interview published in *Art and Text* (1984), and Baudrillard's keynote address for the massive 1984 Futur*Fall conference at the University of Sydney (organised by Alan Cholodenko, Elizabith Grosz, and Edward Colless), papers from which were later edited into a book (1987). While the Futur*Fall conference focussed particular interest on Baudrillard's work, Gayatri Spivak, celebrated translator of Derrida's *Of Grammatology*, was the other international keynote speaker. Patton taught a number of courses on French philosophy during the mid 1980s (at UNSW), an Honours/postgraduate course on Deleuze in 1989 (in Department of General Philosophy), undergraduate courses in French philosophy in 1990–91 (at the Australian National University), and then regular courses on French philosophy in the Department of General Philosophy from the early 1990s. He was also responsible for the long-awaited English translation (in 1994) of Deleuze's 1968 magnum opus, *Difference and Repetition*.

Australian philosophers such as Patton, Grosz, and Andrew Benjamin made an important contribution to the dissemination of French poststructuralism during the 1980s through their early English translations of, and commentaries upon, works by Foucault, Deleuze, Baudrillard, Irigaray, Derrida, and Lyotard. Some of these texts also had a more local, pedagogical function. From the late 1970s, *Language, Sexuality, Subversion* (1978), *Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy* (1979), and *Beyond Marxism?* (1983) had been used for teaching in General Philosophy by John Burnheim, Mia Campioni, Moira Gatens, Grosz, and Patton. Indeed, the 1980s and '90s more generally were marked by intensive teaching of courses on recent French philosophy (Grosz at Sydney throughout the 1980s; Rosalyn Diprose at Flinders from 1991 to '94 and later at UNSW; Robyn Ferrell at Macquarie from the mid 1990s; Michelle Boulos-Walker at UQ; Penelope Deutscher at the ANU, followed later by Fiona Jenkins).

Today, research into contemporary French philosophy continues with a younger generation of scholars exploring the intersections between poststructuralism, psychoanalysis, phenomenology, critical theory, post-analytic philosophy, and aesthetics. Indeed, in recent years, a flurry of books have appeared on key French thinkers and movements, with much attention now being focussed on
work critically responding to poststructuralism, notably by Alain Badiou, whose magnum opus, *Being and Event*, was recently translated by Oliver Feltham (See Reynolds 2004a; Reynolds and Roffe 2004b; Diprose and Reynolds 2008; Colebrook 2001; Feltham 2008). Melbournians David Barison and Daniel Ross have even made an award-winning philosophical documentary, *The Ister* (2004), featuring interviews with Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Bernard Stiegler. Responding actively to its institutional marginalisation, French philosophy in Australia has now established itself as a thriving area of diverse research.

**Functionalism**

**William G. Lycan**

Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is one species of the view that mental states are (nothing but) internal states of the brain. It was inspired, circa 1960, by three things: the *identity theory of mind* that had been put forward a few years earlier by U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart of the University of Adelaide; a prominent objection to that theory, offered by Harvard philosopher Hilary Putnam; and the then emerging computer model of the mind. Functionalism continues to this day as a leading theory of mind. But it has never been popular in Australasia.

**The Identity Theory**

Place and Smart had begun as behaviourists, falling in roughly with Skinner in psychology and Carnap and Ryle in philosophy. On that view, to be in a mental state of type such-and-such is merely to behave in certain characteristic ways or to be disposed to do so; there are no such *things* as ‘minds’, and mental states are not occurrent or episodic or inside people’s heads. But doubters found it inescapable that there are, in some sense, inner mental episodes that we know from the inside—thoughts, feelings, experiences, that occur in real time and that are not constituted either by any actual behaviour or simply by the mere truth of a hypothetical ‘If X were to happen, you *would* do Y’.

While still primarily loyal to behaviourism, Place (1956) courageously granted that ‘there would seem to be an intractable residue of concepts clustering around the notions of *consciousness*, experience, sensation, and mental imagery, where some sort of inner process story is unavoidable’ (1956: 44). According to Place and Smart, and contrary to the behaviourists, at least some mental states and events are genuinely inner and genuinely occurrent after all. They are not to be identified with outward behaviour or even with hypothetical dispositions to behave. But,
contrary to mind-body dualists of any sort, the inner mental items are not ghostly or non-physical either. Rather, they are neurophysiological.

More precisely, every mental state or event is numerically identical with some state or event occurring in their owners’ central nervous systems. To be in pain is to be in neuro-state such-and-such (Putnam’s (1960) famous example was to have your c-fibres firing); to experience a yellowy-orange after-image is to be in a different characteristic neuro-state, and so on. The model here was that of empirical scientific identifications: lightning with electrical discharge, water with H₂O, and genes with segments of DNA molecules.

Place and Smart (1959b) applied this identity theory of mind only to sensations; only later did David M. Armstrong (1968) generalise it to all mental states and events. Armstrong also supplied a direct deductive argument for the theory. He maintained that mental concepts are causal concepts like ‘poison’ or ‘sunburn’—more specifically, that a mental expression is defined in terms of standard causes and standard effects, e.g. pain = whatever state of a person plays role P (being typically caused by tissue damage, and in turn causing wincing, crying out, withdrawal, favouring, etc.). We know that a priori, in virtue of having the concept of pain. And it affords a role-occupant identification: neuroscientists find out empirically that what in fact plays role P is the firing of c-fibres (i.e. it is c-fibre firings that are typically caused by tissue damage, etc.). Therefore, pain is the firing of c-fibres, QED. (A very similar argument had been given independently by David Lewis (1966), later an honorary Australian.)

**Putnam’s Objection**

The identity theory of mind as understood so far entails that for every type of mental state/event, there is a corresponding physiological type of state/event (with which it is identical). But Putnam (1960) pointed out a presumptuous further implication: that a mental state such as pain has always and everywhere the neurophysiological characterisation initially assigned to it. If pain is itself nothing but the firing of c-fibres, then in order for any creature of any species to be in pain, the creature would have to have c-fibres. But there is no reason to think that anything so physiologically specific as c-fibres are required in order for any creature—mongoose, mollusc, or Martian—to feel pain; why should we suppose that any organism must have the same biochemistry as we, in order to have what can be accurately recognised as pain? This is a sort of species chauvinism. The identity theorist had overreacted to the inadequacy of behaviourism, and focussed too narrowly on the specifics of biological humans’ actual inner states.

Putnam advocated the obvious correction: What was important was not its being c-fibres (per se) that were firing, but what the c-fibre firings were doing, what their firing contributed to the operation of the organism as a whole. The role of the c-fibres could have been performed by any mechanically suitable component; so long as that role was performed, the psychology of the containing organism would have been unaffected. Thus, to be in pain is not per se to have c-fibres that are firing, but merely to be in some state or other, of whatever
biochemical description, that plays the same causal role as did the firings of c-fibres in the human beings we have investigated. We may continue to maintain that pain ‘tokens’, individual instances of pain occurring in particular subjects at particular times, are strictly identical with particular neurophysiological states of those subjects at those times, viz., with the states that happen to be playing the appropriate roles; this is the thesis of ‘token identity’ or ‘token materialism’. But pain itself, the kind, universal or type, can be identified only with something more abstract: the role that c-fibre firings share with their potential replacements or surrogates.

The Computer Model

Putnam compared mental states to the functional or computational states of a computer: just as a computer program can be realised by any of a number of physically different hardware configurations, so a psychological ‘program’ can be realised by different organisms of various physiochemical composition, and that is why different physiological states of organisms of different species can realise one and the same mental state type. Where an identity theorist’s type-identification would take the form, ‘To be in mental state of type \( M \) is to be in the neurophysiological state of type \( N \)’, Putnam’s computational or ‘machine’ functionalism has it that to be in \( M \) is to be merely in some physiological state or other that plays role \( R \) in the relevant computer program—that is, the program that at a suitable level of abstraction mediates the creature’s total outputs given total inputs and so serves as the creature’s global psychology. The physiological state ‘plays role \( R \)’ in that it stands in a set of relations to physical inputs, outputs, and other inner states that matches one-to-one the abstract input/output/computational-state relations codified in the computer program.

Functionalism

Thus, the functionalist identifies types of mental state/event with functional roles, the psychological roles characteristically played in us by the physiological structures. The functionalist agrees with the identity theorist that every mental state/event token is identical with some physiological state/event token; but she denies the identity theorist’s implication that for every type of mental state/event, there is a corresponding physiological type of state/event. Functional roles, like mental states themselves, are multiply realisable; they can be played by different physiological structures in different creatures.

The Australian Reaction

Smart and Armstrong were not daunted or even much impressed by Putnam’s point. Smart has said (p.c.) that he never intended the chauvinist implication. Indeed, contrary to a widespread belief, he never spoke of c-fibres and never countenanced Putnam’s focussing on them, precisely because it conveyed the misleading impression of physiological specificity.
Functionalism

It is true that Smart argued for the identity theory from the premise that there are type-type correlations between mental states and neurophysiological states (the best explanation of the ‘correlations’ being that the mental states are simply identical with the neurophysiological ones). But he did not mean that the correlations extended past the human species. (For his current view of the relation between functionalism and the identity theory, see Smart 2007; also, Jackson, Pargetter and Prior 1982; and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996.)

Armstrong was especially well placed to resist the chauvinism charge, because nothing at all in Armstrong (1968) committed him to type identity. On the contrary: his causal theory allowed very generously for multiple realisation; just as for Putnam, all that mattered was the causal role, not what particular physiological structures played that role.

Place, interestingly, went on to defend type identity against multiple realizability, and did so throughout his distinguished career as both psychologist and philosopher (1967: 2004).

Comparison of the Causal Theory to Functionalism

Armstrong’s and Lewis’ theories have neologistically been called ‘a priori functionalism’ and ‘analytical functionalism’. That is entirely inappropriate, because neither Armstrong nor Lewis deployed any notion of function, either in the computational sense or any bio-/teleological sense (on which, see below). But there are important similarities.

As noted, Armstrong and Lewis too think in terms of roles, viz., of neurophysiological states being mental states in virtue of occupying the relevant causal roles. But there are two important differences between the causal version of the identity theory and functionalism. First, the roles appealed to by the causal theorists are characterised entirely in commonsense terms, while the functionalist imagines them as being described in some technical vocabulary following the appropriate research. That leaves Armstrong and Lewis open to objections based on the roles’ being insufficiently constrained (see below).

Second, in the same vein, the causal analysis of the mental was a priori, a conceptual analysis of the meanings of mental terms; functionalism, like the identity theory, is an empirical hypothesis or bet. That leaves Armstrong and Lewis open to fantastical imaginary counterexamples, in a way that a posteriori functionalism is not. We can imagine that pain is not the firing of c-fibres; so what? All that shows is that we can imagine the identity theory to be false. So too, of course, we can imagine that pain is not psychofunctional state type $T_{5,057}$. (Though Chalmers (1996) argues that the genuine conceivability of these non-identities, combined with further premises based on a technical apparatus derived from two-dimensional intensional logic, does show that the identity theory and functionalism are false.)

Here is one example, due to Keith Campbell (1970), of an objection that succeeds against the commonsense causal analysis but fails against functionalism: A state of a creature, or for that matter of an assembly of Meccano parts or beer
tins, could occupy the commonsense role of pain but without being mental at all, much less feeling like a pain. A commonsense causal analysis of pain contains very little information; see, e.g. Armstrong’s mature analysis (1968: 310–16). (Remember, the causal analysis is a conceptual or at least an a priori claim; purely imaginary cases are fair play.) The functionalist has a much richer set of concepts with which to constrain the roles in question, and is not answerable to merely imaginary scenarios.

Though Australasian philosophers have not defended functionalism as such, it is appealed to by some, e.g. Sterelny (1990) and Griffiths (1997).

The Teleological Turn

There is a subsequent version of functionalism, that appeals to ‘function’ not in the computational sense but in the biological sense. The relevant role with which a mental state is to be identified is now to be characterised teleologically, in terms of what the state, or its containing neurophysiological device, is for—what the state or device is supposed to contribute to the subject’s behavioural capabilities (Lycan 1981; 1987; Millikan 1984; Sober 1985; Neander 1991; Neander is Australasia’s leading proponent of the teleological perspective). In Sober’s phrase, it ‘put[s] the function back into functionalism’, by speaking of ‘proper’ function, what a thing’s job is. Pain, for example, has the proper function of signalling bodily damage and causing certain other inner states and motor outputs, leading to repair and to avoidance of the source of the damage. (That is probably what pain was selected for, if structures within our Pleistocene ancestors produced pain that played this role and thereby increased the average fitness of those ancestors.)

This teleological understanding of function has several advantages. First, it affords a more biological and more accurately multi-leveled view of the mind, and in particular a realistic picture of psychological explanation. The teleofunctionalist explains psychological capacities by means of a ‘function-analytic’ strategy (Fodor 1968, Cummins 1983). Such an explanation describes a system, such as a body or a brain, as a collection of nested components. Each component is identified, and its function is described, and the overall capacities of the system are explained in terms of their cooperative activity.

Second, the machine functionalist treated functional ‘realisation’, the relation between an individual physical organism and the abstract program it was said to run, as a simple matter of one-to-one correspondence between, on the one hand, the organism’s repertoire of physical stimuli, structural states and behaviour, and on the other the program’s defining input/state/output function. But this criterion of realisation was seen to be far too liberal; since virtually anything bears a one-one correlation of some sort to virtually anything else, ‘realisation’ in the sense of mere one-one correspondence is far too easily attained (Block 1978; Lycan 1987: ch. 3). Lycan and Sober proposed to fix that by imposing a teleological requirement on realisation: a physical state of an organism will count as realising such-and-such a functional description only if the organism has genuine organic integrity and the state plays its functional role properly for
the organism, in the teleological sense of ‘for’ and in the teleological sense of ‘function’.

Third, machine functionalism’s two-levelled picture of human psychobiology is, to say the least, unbiological. Neither living creatures nor even computers themselves are split into a purely ‘structural’ level of biological/physiochemical description and any one ‘abstract’ computational level of machine/psychological description. Rather, they are all hierarchically organised at many levels, each level ‘abstract’ or ‘functional’ with respect to those beneath it but ‘structural’ or concrete as it realises those levels above it (Lycan 1987).

**Objections to Functionalism: Intentionality**

Functionalism inherits some of the same problems that had plagued behaviourism and the identity theory. They fall into two main categories, respectively headed by philosophers, ‘intentionality’, and ‘qualia’ or phenomenal character.

‘Intentionality’ as used in this literature does not mean anything to do with people’s intentions. It is a technical term, and refers to the aboutness of propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires, those cognitive and conative states that are described in everyday language by the use of ‘that’-clauses. One believes that Helen Clark was born in Hamilton, NZ, and one’s belief is about Clark. One believes that rabbits are mammals, and that belief is about rabbits.

The objects and states of affairs upon which our propositional attitudes are directed may actually exist, in the real world. But equally they may not: beliefs are often false, desires can be frustrated, hopes may be dashed. The attitudes may also be about ‘things’ that do not exist: Sherlock Holmes, the Easter Bunny, the free lunch. Franz Brentano raised the question of how any purely physical entity or state could have the property of being about or ‘directed upon’ a nonexistent state of affairs or object; that is not the sort of feature that ordinary, purely physical objects can have.

Machine functionalists reply by appeal to some version of a ‘conceptual role’ theory. Sellars (1956) developed an analogy between mental states and sentences in a language, suggesting that both get meaning in the same way, by their inferential roles: the meaning of a sentence depends on what it can be inferred from and on what sentences people can infer when that sentence is uttered. Likewise, Sellars argued, mental states have intentionality in virtue of the inferential roles they play in their owners’ mental economies. Machine functionalists broaden this characterisation to include computational roles more generally, speaking of ‘semantic networks’.

Teleofunctionalists such as Millikan (1984), Dretske (1988), Fodor (1990), and Neander (1991, 2004) have argued that teleology must enter into any adequate analysis of intentionality. According to these theorists, a neurophysiological state should count as a belief that rabbits are mammals, and in particular as about rabbits, only if that state has the representing of rabbits as one of its psychobiological functions.
Objections to Functionalism: Phenomenal Character

The ‘quale’ of a mental state or event is that state or event’s feel, its introspectible ‘phenomenal character’. Many philosophers have objected that functionalism cannot explain or even acknowledge the notion of what it feels like to be in a mental state of such-and-such a sort. Yet those feels are quintessentially mental—it is they that make the mental states the mental states they are.

Block (1978) and others have urged various counterexamples—cases in which all the right functionalist conditions are satisfied, but in which the creature lacks mentality or its phenomenal aspect. For example, the population of China might be organised in such a way as to implement a program that is functionally equivalent to our brains when we feel pain, but the nation would not thereby experience pain.

Machine functionalists have replied either by denying that Block’s scenario is possible or by insisting that if it is possible, the Chinese giant does experience pain. Teleofunctionalists have an additional option: to point out that the population of China is not an organism and does not have the relevant teleological structure; its states are not for the right ends.

Nagel (1974), Jackson (1982), Chalmers (1996) and many others have argued that one might know all the relevant functional (and other physical) facts about the brain and the environment, yet not know the facts about what the corresponding experiences are like for their subjects. Here too some functionalists have replied by toughing it out and insisting that such a situation is impossible. Others have maintained that knowledge is perspectival and fine-grained: one could know that a pillar was made of salt without knowing that the pillar was made of NaCl, but that hardly shows that salt is anything but NaCl.

All these objections and replies remain very much up in the air.
The Gavin David Young Lectures in Philosophy are funded by a bequest made by Jessie Frances Raven in memory of her father, Gavin David Young. G. D. Young (1825–1901) arrived not long after the founding (1836) of the colony of South Australia in 1848. He became prominent in business circles (in mining, banking and shipping). He seems not to have contributed directly to our subject, although there is some evidence of his interest in it. Ms. Raven’s bequest is for ‘the promotion, advancement, teaching and diffusion of the study of philosophy …’

The series of lectures began in 1956, when Professor J. J. C. Smart invited Gilbert Ryle to give the first of them. Ryle was then Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford and his Concept of Mind was the most prominent book on its topic in that decade. The department has been fortunate in continuing to enlist philosophers of similar outstanding international distinction to present the lectures. Many of them owed to the series their first visits to Australasia and all of them travelled elsewhere in the region. The series has played a not insignificant role in giving Australasian philosophy the high profile that it now enjoys.

1956 Thinking
1959 Terms and Objects
1963 The Presuppositions of Immortality
1965 Towards a Philosophy for Our Age of Science
1968 Agency and Causality
1971 The Paradoxes of Time Travel
1979 Science and Rationality: Analytic vs. Pragmatic Perspectives
1984 Conscious Experience and Intentionality
1987 Our Place in the Universe
1998 Mind and Body
2007 Philosophy on the University: Truth, Ethics and History

Gavin David Young Lectures
Graham Nerlich
German Philosophy

Paul Redding

‘German philosophy’ had an early presence in Australia, given the fact that the first professor of philosophy at the first Australian university (Francis Anderson, Challis Professor of Logic and Mental Philosophy at the University of Sydney, 1891–1921) was a representative of that late nineteenth-century ‘British Idealist’ movement that took as its starting points the classically ‘German’ philosophies of Kant and Hegel. But just as British Idealism was to be eclipsed in the English-speaking world by ‘analytic philosophy’, in Australia the outlook represented by Francis Anderson was not to last. By the second half of the twentieth century, and in particular with the influence and reputation of David M. Armstrong and (the British born but Australian settled) J. J. C. Smart, Australian philosophy would come to be strongly identified with the type of materialist approach to metaphysics that seemed the antithesis to that of the ‘Germans’. As a consequence, one is unlikely to find much that bears directly on the interests that Anderson shared with his German forbears within the current incarnation of the journal of which he was the first editor (albeit, under a different title), the flagship Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Nevertheless, despite the presence within most Australian philosophy departments of the somewhat negative outlook that analytic philosophy has had more generally towards ‘German philosophy’, ways of philosophising that take their bearings from the tradition of Kant and Hegel can still be found strongly represented within the Australian philosophical landscape. Historically, this probably owes much to the upheavals that, as elsewhere, affected Australian university campuses and intellectual life in the 1960s and ’70s. In particular, in the highly politicised context of opposition to Australian participation in the Vietnam War, the reception of neo-Marxist ideas brought with it a revival of interest in the intellectual world from which Marxism itself emerged. Once more the line of thought running from Kant to Hegel and beyond was taken seriously. Moreover, around the same time, interest in the mostly German ‘phenomenological’ movement of the twentieth-century was taken up by a range of philosophers unsatisfied with what they saw as the limitations of analytic philosophy. There now seemed the possibility of an alternative to the mainstream, and since that time much ‘German’ philosophy has been carried out within this broad framework.

Here a point of clarification as to the meaning of ‘German’ in ‘German philosophy’ may be appropriate. Not all Germanophone philosophers, of course, will be thought of as ‘German’ in the sense discussed here. Gottlob Frege, for example, the revolutionary innovator in logic, is not usually thought of as ‘German’, even
if, as some would claim, his 'Kantian' heritage is clear. Moreover, Kant himself is taken seriously by many mainstream analytic philosophers working in particular areas, especially practical philosophy and aesthetics, but in ways that tend to extract him from his ‘German’ context. Rather, what characterises ‘German philosophy’ in the sense discussed here has more to do with ways in which Kant’s conception of human freedom came to be associated with ‘historicist’ approaches to human social existence in the period after him. This is most obvious with the ‘German Idealists’—Fichte, the early Schelling, and Hegel—but it also runs through the more ‘existentialist’ approaches of the later Schelling, Nietzsche and Heidegger, as it does in the attempt of Marx to ‘invert’ Hegelian Idealism into a ‘dialectical materialism’.

While the interest in the Marxism of the 1960s and ’70s has definitely waned, it is notable that interest in many of these other areas that, as it were, came in on the coat-tails of Marx, has not. Thus it is often the case that one will find on the curriculum of Australian philosophy departments at least one or two undergraduate units with some distinctly ‘German’ content—most commonly units devoted to ‘phenomenology and existentialism’, or to some type of ‘critical’ social philosophy or approaches to culture. At some centres, however, interest in German philosophy has been consolidated to a greater degree, with distinct teaching and research programs growing around it. Probably the most prominent department of philosophy in this regard at the present is that at the University of Tasmania, following the appointment of Jeff Malpas to the chair of philosophy. After a prototypically ‘Australian’ philosophical training (as a student of Smart at the Australian National University), Malpas had found his way, via the philosophies of less German-adverse analytic philosophers like Donald Davidson, into Heideggerian phenomenology, and from there to Kantian ‘transcendental philosophy’ (see, e.g. Malpas 2006; and Crowall and Malpas 2007). The place of German philosophy at the University of Tasmania was further strengthened by the appointment of Marcelo Stamm, who had been trained by Dieter Henrich, one of the philosophers responsible for the revival of ‘German Idealism’ in Germany itself in the latter part of the last century (Stamm 1998). A series of research projects have allowed Malpas and Stamm to establish a collaborative network with leading philosophers in Germany, such as the Fichte scholar Günter Zöller, and local ‘Continental’ philosophers such as Andrew Benjamin, thereby locating Hobart squarely within the ‘German’ map. (Benjamin is the author of numerous books in aesthetics and critical theory—see, e.g. Benjamin 2006.)

The presence of the German philosophy currently taught and researched within philosophy departments in the Sydney region can be partly traced back to the ‘disturbances’ within the Department of Philosophy at the University of Sydney in the early 1970s. Wallis Suchting, together with Michael Devitt, introduced into the Sydney curriculum a form of ‘scientific’ Marxism that had eventually brought in more general ‘Continental’ (French and German) philosophy in its wake (see Suchting 1986). In the late 1970s, the appointment of the Hungarian
philosopher György Markus led to a consolidation of interest in German philosophy (Markus 1978, 1986), as did that of Paul Crittenden, with his work on Nietzsche. Originally postgraduates supervised by Markus, Paul Redding and John Grumley went on to teach and undertake research in aspects of the German tradition within the department—Redding mainly exploring contemporary ways of interpreting Hegel’s epistemology and metaphysics (Redding 2007), and Grumley working more in the context of contemporary critical social theory (Grumley 2004). Recently, Hegel’s approach to philosophy has been taken into the field of the philosophy of religion by postdoctoral fellow, Paolo Diego Bubbio, trained in the Italian tradition of Hegelian and hermeneutic thought.

At the University of New South Wales, Paul Patton, since taking up the chair of philosophy in 2002, has engaged in and promoted work not only in French philosophy, but also in Kant and Nietzsche (see, e.g. Patton 1993). The German presence in that department has further been strengthened by the appointment of Simon Lumsden (also originally from Sydney), who engages Hegel with the more ‘French’ approaches to subjectivity and politics, and, more recently, of James Phillips, a research fellow who works on Kant and Heidegger. At Macquarie University, German philosophy has also maintained a strong presence, after an early interest in European philosophy had been promoted by Max Deutscher, Luciana O’Dwyer and Ross Poole. Presently, German philosophy is there pursued by Nicholas Smith from the U.K. (working on critical social theory and hermeneutics: Smith 1997), by the French and German trained Jean-Philip Deranty (working on Hegelianism and neo-Hegelian approaches to ‘recognition’: Deranty 2009), and by another former Markus supervisee from the University of Sydney, Robert Sinnerbrink (working on Hegel and Heidegger: Sinnerbrink 2007).

While the philosophy department at the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University in Canberra has always been singularly ‘Australian-analytic’ in orientation, philosophy as practiced within the ‘Faculties’ has long given a strong place to the German tradition. There, the earlier influence of Richard Campbell was probably crucial (Campbell 1992), and more recently, Udo Thiel, born and trained in Germany, and Bruin Christensen, with postgraduate training in Germany, have kept the German tradition alive. Thiel has worked extensively on Kant’s philosophy of mind and consciousness, and Christensen in the areas of neo-kantianism and phenomenology (Christensen 2008).

In the Melbourne region, within the Philosophy Program at La Trobe University, Toula Nicolacopoulos and George Vassilacopoulos have pursued collaborative work on the political dimensions of Hegel’s philosophy (Nicolacopoulos and Vassilacopoulos 1999), while Jack Reynolds works in critical social theory. At Monash University, interest in German philosophy has been pursued more within the Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies than in the Department of Philosophy itself. There, work at the intersection of critical theory and German philosophy has been done by philosophers Andrew Benjamin
Grosz, Elizabeth

Elizabeth Grosz’s philosophy can be divided into three broad, overlapping periods, beginning with a form of ‘corporeal feminism’ (Colebrook 2000; Grosz 1985, 1993), followed by an extension of feminist questions of embodiment and sexual difference into questions of space and time (Grosz 1994), and then a turn to life and evolution (Grosz 2007, 2008). These three periods are mutually reinforcing themes rather than changes in direction, and all develop and intensify an ongoing commitment to a positive conception of life. Grosz’s recent work, which takes Darwinian theories of evolution to argue that processes of sexual selection proceed by display, is in some ways anticipated by her earliest work that argued for the ways in which a body’s ‘morphology’ or its perceived contours enabled and inflected experience and expression. In this regard Grosz’s career runs against the grain of twentieth-century philosophy and anticipated the current ‘affective’ or ‘vitalist’ turn in Continental philosophy as well as the theories of embodied cognition that have led to a perceived overcoming of the divide between Continental and analytic philosophy. It needs to be noted that while identified with ‘Continental’ philosophy in Australia, Grosz read French philosophers such as Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Luce Irigaray without considering them as versions of ‘textualism’ or the ‘linguistic paradigm’. Her work in the late 1980s and 1990s is more in tune with the attention to life and systems
that marks contemporary Continental philosophy. It also needs to be noted that while the distinction between analytic and Continental philosophy is now being hailed as defunct, and this by way of a return to livings systems theory in the works of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, Grosz has always read ‘Continental’ philosophers through questions of epistemology, embodied cognition and the relations between science, art and philosophy.

Educated in the philosophy department at the University of Sydney before its split into departments of General Philosophy and Traditional and Modern Philosophy, Grosz’s work is typical of Australian work in the French tradition in its clarity of style and attention to fundamental questions of political theory, knowledge and the possibility of interdisciplinary understanding. Grosz’s work on Luce Irigaray, for example, did not focus—as North American and British feminists were to do—on *écriture féminine* (an approach that was mired in the opposition between a female writing that flowed from an essential body, and a constructed femininity). Instead, she insisted that Irigaray’s account of the emergence of the experiencing subject through bodily relations would require us to think of selves beyond the opposition between a body as it is in itself (biological essentialism) and a body as mere vehicle for mind (simple constructivism). Grosz pursued the problem of the body both as lived and lived in visual and imaginary relations through a series of writers, including Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gilles Deleuze. Although Australian feminists of the 1980s were attendant to the body as a contributing element in the imagination of what it is to be a self, Grosz’s work was marked by a sense of the body as unruly or volatile: the body was not simply a medium through which selves live their world but is also inflected by its spatial, cultural, sexual and temporal relations. And although she was one of the first feminists and first philosophers working in English to stress the significance of the work of Deleuze, Grosz never adopted Deleuze as a paradigm or theory and instead pursued the problems articulated in Deleuze’s corpus as a whole: the problem of the virtual (which Grosz defined as a dimension of all temporal experience), the problem of creative evolution, and the problem of the relation between the thinking self and that which lies beyond thought.

One useful way of reading Grosz’s corpus is to see that despite the fact that her work appears to be dominated by proper names and exegesis—her first book was an introduction to Jacques Lacan, her second an introduction to French feminism—her readings of key figures in Continental philosophy went against the grain of some standard notions of late twentieth-century French thought. Both Lacan and the French feminists who were the subjects of Grosz’s work had been interpreted from a primarily linguistic point of view (Moi 1985). Lacan, to the present day, is often regarded as having established the primacy of the Symbolic order—the system of language through which we articulate all our desires (Zizek 2007)—while French feminism is frequently regarded as misguidedly essentialist insofar as it argues for a positive notion of sexual difference beyond the gendered coding of bodies. Despite clear changes of direction and emphases, the original contributions of Grosz’s mature work can be discerned in her early, seemingly
introductory texts. First, the book on Lacan paid attention to the necessary, and not simply transitional, stage of the Imaginary in psychic development. While language—or the Symbolic order—is essential in establishing the status of the self as a subject, or one who can be recognised by others in ongoing relations and interactions, this general system is preceded by the establishment of a basic unity or sense of oneself as an integrated whole. Lacan’s own research had attended to the ways in which animals mirror and mimic each other, becoming captivated by images of bodily unity. In her early text on Lacan, Grosz anticipates her later writings on display, embodiment and morphology (or the ways in which bodily motilities and borders will contribute to the mode of subject and its relation to other subjects).

Judith Butler, whose work is often contrasted with Grosz’s (Cheah 1996), argues that selves are formed through subjection to a system of differences (language and gender norms), and that the self is primarily gendered—distinguished as male or female—while ‘sex’ can be known ex post facto as that which must be posited and presupposed as the ground of gender, but known only from the position of gender (Butler 1990). Grosz, by contrast, emphasises sexual difference, and draws upon Lacanian psychoanalysis to challenge Lacan’s own argument that ‘woman does not exist’. For Lacan, woman is the fantasised object of desire that is posited as what must have been prohibited; woman is only known as lost, as the object that precludes one from enjoyment. Grosz, however, draws upon Lacan’s own concept of the Imaginary to formulate the concept of morphology that will challenge this masculinist assumption that woman is outside the symbolic and subject relations. Before one enters linguistic relations there must be a basic assumption of oneself as a unified body, capable of speech; this is given both through the image one beholds of oneself in the mirror, and also through the way one is regarded by others. Grosz draws upon the work of Irigaray to argue that the visual, tactile and affective potentials of one’s mode of body will therefore play a constitutive role in the way in which one lives and imagines the style of relations to others. In her second book, Sexual Subversions (1989), Grosz argued for a positive theory of sexual difference that charted a path between strong biological determinism on the one hand, and social constructivism on the other. It is not the case that bodies are neutral blank slates or passive material supports upon which culture inscribes difference; nor is it the case that a body’s sexual, genetic or anatomical make-up will determine a social gender. Selves are at once irreducibly sexual, for their sense of their own bodies and potentials are given in the way they desire and view other bodies; at the same time the sexual is neither reducible to gender nor familial reproduction. Grosz was one of the first philosophers to reject the sex/gender distinction that had been dominant in feminist philosophy and sociology. Whereas Judith Butler rejected the notion of a material or embodied sexuality before the social relations of gender and argued that sexuality (and matter) were necessarily presupposed by gender but could not be known outside those presuppositions other than negatively, Grosz argued that the position of woman, or the position of a subject who was not placed within the
symbolic order as the other of a prohibited or lost feminine, could be considered as a positive (if yet to be fully articulated) subjective possibility.

In the second phase of her work Grosz extended this argument of feminist philosophy to advance a strong theory of embodiment. Although modern philosophy has tended to be increasingly anti-Cartesian in its rejection of any notion of mental substance, favouring materialist accounts of persons, Grosz formulated an anti-Cartesian account of embodiment that did not simply assume the materialist position but questioned the ways in which matter had been defined as other than mind. In *Volatile Bodies* (1994) she argues, again, for human beings as essentially embodied, with notions of the self, its possibilities and its relations being inflected with the visual, tactile and affective sense one has of one’s physical relations with others. But she also contests the idea of the body as a stable material entity; for the experience of the body as a self in relation to others requires an ongoing negotiation of borders, a production of an inside in relation to an outside.

It is this argument that relations produce, rather than being produced by, selves that allowed for a strong presence of the visual and artistic in Grosz’s work. Her book on architecture (2001), for example, does not see the production of buildings and cities as work undertaken by subjects who remain distinct from their creations. Rather, all space is distributed and lived according to bodies who, in their relations to each other, are at once effected through spatial relations at the same time as the spaces those selves inhabit create different modes of self and time. There are not spaces that contain bodies, nor bodies that construct spaces, but relations among bodies over time that unfold certain patterns and possibilities that architecture both responds to and ramifies. In her Wellek Library Lectures on art (2008), Grosz makes a radical departure from the history of aesthetic theory, as she refuses to consider art as either defined institutionally through conventions or essentially through some notion of art as a specifically human practice of reflexivity or creative expenditure. Drawing on theories of Darwinian sexual selection, and Deleuze’s theory of life as beginning with the territory or the creation of a field of relations, Grosz makes two broad claims regarding art and life. First, art is not a display and ornament added on to an otherwise functional life, for without processes of display and visual allure animals would not select or be attracted to each other. These processes of expression and presentation in the animal world already place living organisms in a creative relation to their milieu, so that an animal can either deploy camouflage to survive in the present or visual and aural abundance to attract a mate, with the functionality of the latter process being open to all sorts of variation beyond the survival of the present organism or population. Second, once art is no longer defined as a cognitive, self-reflexive exercise or as a social construct, Grosz can argue for the significance of contemporary Australian indigenous art which she sees to be producing a relation to sensations and materials that is markedly distinct from the meta-artistic and self-referential practices of Western and postmodern aesthetics. The significance of this work on art goes beyond aesthetics, however, for it raises questions about the relation between humanity and animality that refuse both
a biological continuism (for there is something distinct about art and display) and a metaphysical separation (for there is also something of animal life in all art). Here, again, as in all her work, Grosz sails between the Scylla of material reduction and the Charybdis of a simple dogma of human distinction.
Kevin Hart’s most significant contribution to philosophy in Australia came in the form of his highly acclaimed Cambridge University Press monograph of 1989, *Trespass of the Sign* (reprinted by Fordham University Press in 2000). Hart graduated with a doctorate from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne in 1986, having completed a B.A. at the Australian National University. He left Australia for the U.S. in 2002 and is currently Edwin B. Kyle Professor of Christian Studies at the University of Virginia. His publishing career is marked by an equal commitment to poetry and philosophy, and this is so despite the fact that his philosophical writing is committed to explaining philosophical ideas historically (with references going back to the ancient sources) and formally, with an emphasis on the internal consistency of positions. His philosophical work also inflects the content, if not the form, of his poetry which focusses intently on the enigmas of experience. (His early literary-critical work described the Australian poet A. D. Hope as ‘orphic’, a word that might be used in relation to Hart’s own writing.)

From his early monograph on Jacques Derrida and Martin Heidegger to his recent work on Maurice Blanchot (*The Dark Gaze*, 2004) and Jean-Luc Marion (*Counter-Experiences*, 2007), Hart emphasises the philosophical rigour of intellectual figures often deemed to be mystical, hermetic or irrational. His monograph and edited collection on Maurice Blanchot (*The Power of Contestation*, 2004), for example, at once places Blanchot in the line of influence from Heidegger and Bataille, the former emphasising God’s absence, the latter the inherently exorbitant nature of the sacred; at the same time as Hart explains this experience of God’s absence in highly logical terms. After the French Revolution and the destruction of any worldly figure of God’s presence, the sacred and divine are experienced as having departed and yet, in their very absence, as requiring all the more thought and philosophical responsibility. These themes—of the
importance of philosophy, of responsibility, of God’s absence, and the modes of writing required by the modern departure of any figure of authority within the world—are announced in The Trespass of the Sign. This book’s major achievement was its linking together of Jacques Derrida’s criticism of the linguistics of the signifier with the tradition of negative theology. Unlike those appropriations of Derridean deconstruction that dominated the U.S. and the U.K. and which were frequently literary or ‘playful’, Hart argues that Derrida’s deconstruction is best understood as a highly cogent response to the tradition of the absence of God, a tradition that begins well before Augustine and Christian theology but which reaches an intensity in the French enlightenment. Placing Derrida after Heidegger’s argument that Being cannot be defined or exhausted by the understanding of any entity that is an object of experience or predication, Hart argues that Derrida’s deconstruction is a highly rigorous and necessary response to the absence of God. Whereas many hostile commentators (most notably Jürgen Habermas in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity) have read French philosophy after Nietzsche as a form of anti-philosophical and overly literary irrationalism, Hart makes a case for deconstruction as a highly responsible, philosophical and post-Kantian response to anti-foundationalism. Even though Hart was educated in the highly Wittgensteinian and Aristotelian atmosphere of the University of Melbourne in the late 1980s, he rejects those readings of Derrida as a pragmatist who argues for the absence of stable meanings in the face of merely contextual determinations of language. On the contrary, just as it is the case that any attempt to grant a definition, ultimate predication or definitive experience of God (or Being or Presence) would be at odds with the essentially infinite nature of that which it seeks to describe, so we can say that any attempt to delimit or exhaust the sense of certain concepts (such as justice or democracy) would belie the infinite potentiality of those concepts.

Following Derrida, Hart ties the Kantian structure of the Idea—that we can think a series beyond possible experience—to an understanding of the concept that is opposed to any structuralist understanding of language as ‘signification’. Far from being a philosopher who abandons meaning, or any possibility of experience outside language, Derrida insists that the linguistic possibilities of concepts open experience up to an infinite or exorbitance beyond any present. We can experience a present or ‘now’ as this or that determined sense only because the present is marked or traced by a repeatable or ‘ iterable’ potential; a concept can only mean or intend a sense if it can be repeated beyond its context. Thus justice cannot be defined ostensively, for the concept intends ‘justice in general’, and this, in turn, allows us to think ethically of a possibility of justice beyond any of its instances. For Hart, in The Trespass of the Sign, it is this structure and potentiality of language, conceptuality and presence that ties Derrida’s work on the conditions for the possibility of experience to negative theology. Although we can have any number of names that allow us to think a God beyond finite, worldly, general and iterable being, those names only serve to open language and experience beyond its limits. Hart’s reading of Derrida is unique in several respects for it ties
a rigorous philosophy of linguistic and conceptual possibility of experience to a
tradition of thinking God, beyond experience.

This way of approaching Derrida becomes a philosophy in its own right in Hart’s
later work on Blanchot. Derrida’s work was already indebted to, and in dialogue
with, Blanchot. It is this curious structure of experience—an experience of that
which cannot be presented in experience, or an ‘experience without experience’—
that unifies Hart’s work and characterises his singularity as a philosopher, critic
and poet. If one wishes to remain committed to the integrity of the philosophical
enterprise by attending to fundamental questions of existence, experience, pres-
ence and the infinite, then one can neither pursue an analytic commitment to
ordinary language, nor adopt a merely literary approach to language as the con-
stitutive condition for experience. Instead, drawing upon Heidegger, Derrida,
Blanchot and contemporary co-authors such as Geoffrey Hartman and Jean-Luc
Marion, Hart has formulated a unique synthesis of theological, phenomenolog-
ic and poststructuralist philosophical arguments to formulate a theory of the
ways in which finite experience—including the experience of language as an
event within the world—intimates or allows us to experience that which would lie
beyond the finite, but could not be conceptualised or grasped as a logical infinite
or (as Hegel would have termed it) a ‘bad infinity’ simply posited in opposition to
the finite. It is this philosophical trajectory that works at once on the structures
and possibilities of linguistic experience, while at the same time recognising lan-
guage’s intentional structure, which has been enriched by Hart’s work as a poet
and literary critic. In his work on Samuel Johnson (Samuel Johnson and the Culture
of Property, 1999) Hart explores the relation between produced works, historical
and textual circulation and the sense or meaning of texts. Working against the
dominant ‘cultural studies’ paradigm that a work has sense only insofar as it is
circulated, read and valued, Hart puts forward a complex and sophisticated case
for the sense and worth of cultural objects beyond their material conditions of
production, circulation and recognition.

Today Hart is recognised primarily for his contribution to a reading of post-
structuralism as an extension of the tradition of negative theology, and for his
work on the concept of experience, a concept which at once requires and goes
beyond the parameters of analytical philosophical inquiry.

History and Philosophy of Science
John Forge

It might be thought that departments of History and Philosophy of Science
(HPS) devote about half their time and effort to philosophy of science. But while
that is true of some HPS departments worldwide—Pittsburgh for instance—it is not true of HPS ‘downunder’, and for two reasons. The first is that HPS in Australasia has always been construed very broadly, to include subjects like the history of technology, the history of medicine, the politics of science and technology, the sociology of science and technology, and so on, as well as history of science and philosophy of science. The four original HPS departments—at the universities of Melbourne (1946), New South Wales (UNSW) (1966) and Sydney (1974) and Wollongong (1975)—have had close associations and much in common with departments and units devoted to Science and Technology Studies (STS), notably at Deakin and Griffith universities. Indeed, the departments at UNSW and Wollongong changed their designation from HPS to STS in the early 1980s, although STS at UNSW became HPS once again in 1995. The second reason why philosophy of science has been apparently under-represented in HPS is not unconnected with these names changes—namely, an antipathy of philosophy of science in some quarters.

It is well known that logical empiricism was the dominant approach in philosophy of science from the end of World War II until the 1970s. And it is well known that this tradition was criticised both from within and without philosophy of science. Criticism from within had much more influence in Australia, at UNSW and Wollongong in particular. Both of these departments had appointed specialists in science policy—Jarlath Ronayne as UNSW’s professor, and Ron Johnston as Wollongong’s head of department—who reoriented these departments away from ‘traditional’ HPS concerns towards STS and particularly to science policy, both as something to be practised and as an object of study. It was believed that philosophy of science had been shown, by Kuhn for example, to be an outmoded and irrelevant approach to science. At UNSW, apart from a significant book on models in science (The Role of Analogy, Model, and Metaphor in Science by William Leatherdale), philosophy of science was simply neglected, while at Wollongong a more radical approach was taken and philosophy of science courses were removed from the curriculum. It is both unfortunate and surprising that heads of HPS departments would confl ate philosophy of science and logical empiricism and think that arguments about the latter apply to the former, but it seems that this is what happened. However, this period of change has given rise elsewhere to many interesting and fruitful approaches and the subject thrives today. Philosophy of science in HPS elsewhere in Australasia was not so affected by these developments. And at UNSW, ideas about the social construction of science had a valuable influence on the department’s historical research and teaching.

Turning to substantial contributions to the field, Melbourne HPS has produced a series of important works in philosophy of science. Worthy of mention here are Brian Ellis’ work on the mathematisation of nature, Basic Concepts of Measurement (1966); John Clendinnen’s persuasive arguments attempting to vindicate induction; Henry Krips’s The Metaphysics of Quantum Theory (1987), a significant contribution to a difficult field; and, more recently, notable work has been done by
Howard Sankey on incommensurability and by Neil Thomason on the nature of reasoning based on statistics. Elsewhere in Australia, Alan Chalmers at Sydney is best known for his *What Is This Thing Called Science?* (1976). Also, when at Sydney, Paul Griffiths published *What Emotions Really Are* (1997). While at UNSW, John Forge began to think about Ellis’ ideas on measurement, which influenced his *Explanation, Quantity and Law* (1999). Also at UNSW, Peter Slezak undertook a critique of the underlying assumptions of the strong program in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Although they may not be card-carrying philosophers, David Oldroyd published *The Arch of Knowledge* (1986), a history of the philosophy of science; John Schuster undertook important work on Descartes; and John (‘Jack’) B. Thornton published on scientific entities.

New Zealand never had an HPS department named as such, but the University of Auckland did set up a small and short-lived unit called ‘Science and Human Affairs’ with three members, including Robert Nola, well known for his work in support of scientific realism. New Zealand philosophers of science have, however, taken an active part in AAHPSSS, the Australasian Association for History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science, and have made contributions to the Association’s journal, *Metascience*.

To conclude this brief discussion with the present state of play, the centre of gravity of philosophy of science in HPS has shifted strongly towards Sydney. The Unit for HPS in Sydney is the only department that has grown in recent years, and it now has several philosophers of science as members, in addition to many affiliates and associates. Philosophy of science has not, however, died out elsewhere, with a presence still at Melbourne and at UNSW.

**Hursthouse, Rosalind**

Michael Slote

Rosalind Hursthouse spent her childhood in New Zealand, taught for many years at the Open University in England, and is now professor of philosophy at the University of Auckland, where she was also Head of the Department of Philosophy from 2002 to 2005. Hursthouse is best known as a virtue ethicist, and most of her work, both theoretical and applied, has exemplified that approach. Her thinking has been steadfastly Aristotelian, and indeed much of her work, even her work in applied ethics, has in some way or other involved Aristotle.

Although she had written a substantial amount previously, she burst upon the international philosophical scene for the first time in 1990–91, with three remarkable articles published within a year of each other. One of these, ‘Arational Actions’ (*Journal of Philosophy*), made an important break with familiar models.
of human voluntary action. Davidson’s influential account had seen intentional actions as based in desires and beliefs and as done for some purpose; but Hursthouse’s article mentions a variety of actions that don’t fit that model: e.g. jumping for joy or scratching the eyes out of a photograph of a hated rival. These are not things that one does with any purpose in mind, and one doesn’t do them for a reason (which is not to say that they can’t be explained in humanly understandable terms). Philosophers had to think again about what human actions really are.

Another of the three articles, perhaps the most influential and important among them, was entitled ‘Virtue Theory and Abortion’ and appeared in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. Combining her interests in theoretical and applied ethics, Hursthouse outlined an account of the structure of a new version of Aristotelian **virtue ethics**, defended it against various potential objections, and then applied it to the issue of abortion. Rather than seeing the moral issues surrounding abortion as depending on questions about the rights of the fetus or the mother, Hursthouse argued that the rightness of obtaining an abortion depends on the attitude or motivation of the mother in doing so. If the mother seeks an abortion for frivolous reasons (e.g. she can’t be bothered raising a child), she acts wrongly; but if she already has six children and is very poor, her motives for seeking the abortion may be morally more weighty, and it may not at all be wrong for her to do so.

The third article in the trio was called ‘After Hume’s Justice’ and appeared in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. It offered an account of social justice in mainly Aristotelian terms and demonstrated that talk of certain human or individual rights can be accommodated by virtue ethics. (But Hursthouse did not seek to justify democratic institutions.)

These articles led people to expect important further work from Hursthouse, and she didn’t disappoint them. Her 1999 book *On Virtue Ethics* has had a great influence on current developments in virtue ethics and on the field of ethics as a whole. But in order to explain why, we need to backtrack a bit. We need to understand how virtue ethics emerged during the last half of the twentieth century as a major alternative to **consequentialism** and Kantianism, after having been dormant for about three-hundred years. But for reasons of space I have to be brief.

In 1958 Elizabeth Anscombe wrote an article called ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ that strongly criticised Kantianism and consequentialism (she actually at the same time invented that term) and that urged a return to Aristotle. This, as we now see, marked the beginning of a revival of interest in virtue ethics, and although in the earlier years that revival mostly took the form of criticisms directed at other moral views, virtue ethics eventually began to see and advance itself in a more positive light, as an overall theoretical or philosophical approach to the problems of moral philosophy that disagreed with other such approaches. Hursthouse was an advocate of this more systematically positive—and in her case Aristotelian—way of doing or defending virtue ethics, and since most, though by no means all, work in virtue ethics over the past few decades has been modelled to some extent on Aristotle, Hursthouse’s book lies at the very centre of recent
developments. In fact, given the current emphasis on Aristotelianism, Hursthouse herself is arguably the most important figure now working in the field. And since virtue ethics has now taken its place, along with consequentialism and Kantian ethics, as one of the three major theoretical approaches to ethics, Hursthouse’s work has had more general implications and influence.

Her book *On Virtue Ethics* goes beyond the article ‘Virtue Theory and Abortion’ in a number of ways. The earlier article had seen virtue ethics as involving, essentially, a three-tiered structure. Roughly speaking, actions were to be evaluated in terms of whether they exhibit or fail to exhibit certain virtuous character traits, and character traits were to be regarded as virtues if they promoted the (rational) happiness of the agent who possessed them. This scheme is eudaimonistic in character: it makes virtue status depend on what is good for the agent. But Hursthouse moved away from eudaimonism to a substantial extent in *On Virtue Ethics*. There she treated the good of the agent, the good of his or her group, the good of the human species, and certain hedonistic factors as all relevant to status as a virtue (or vice). She was somewhat unclear about how these factors are to be weighed against one another in deciding what counts as a virtue, but she had in effect abandoned eudaimonism (which is rejected by most modern moral philosophers). On the other hand, she had retained the three-tiered structure of the earlier article. (However, in a recent reply to criticisms by Brad Hooker in the journal *Utilitas* she expresses doubts about whether her work should be thought of as having such a definite structure.)

Hursthouse’s work in applied ethics is not some sort of afterthought in relation to more theoretical work, but actually antedates the (full) development of her theoretical views. Her first published book, *Beginning Lives: A Philosophical Study of Abortion and Related Issues*, investigated various practical issues independently of the three-tiered framework she eventually developed; but the book already showed her tendency to reject liberal, Kantian, and utilitarian views on issues like abortion. A later book on applied ethics, *Ethics, Humans and Other Animals*, did reflect her more developed theoretical ideas, and it applied those ideas, among other things, to issues about our treatment of animals. (Some of her other work does this as well.)

More recently, Hursthouse has also done important applied work on questions of environmental ethics. During the past decades of the virtue ethics revival, it hasn’t been at all clear how or even whether virtue ethics can deal with moral issues concerning the environment, but in her recent article ‘Environmental Virtue Ethics’ (in P. J. Ivanhoe and R. Walker, eds, *Working Virtue*), Hursthouse argues that (Aristotelian) virtue ethics is not too human-centred to provide an environmental ethics. What she does in this article certainly expands the previous limits of virtue ethics and gives us reason to think that virtue ethics may really be able to deal in a general way with moral issues about the environment.

Hursthouse’s most important ideas developed relatively late in her career, but they have certainly been riveting for moral philosophers, and they represent a very substantial contribution to the field of ethics as a whole.
The honour of being the first to teach philosophy in Australia belongs to the Congregationalist minister Barzillai Quaife (1798–1873), in the 1850s, but teaching philosophy did not formally begin until the 1880s, with the establishment of universities (Grave 1984).

Two approaches have dominated Western philosophy in Australia: Idealism and materialism. Idealism was prevalent between the 1880s and the 1930s, but dissipated thereafter. It was particularly associated with the work of the first professional philosophers in Australia, such as Henry Laurie (1837–1922), Francis Anderson (1858–1941), William Mitchell (1861–1962) (who rejected the label) and a second generation including W. R. Boyce Gibson (1869–1935). Idealism in Australia often reflected Kantian themes, together with the British, particularly Scottish, revival of interest in Hegel through the work of the ‘Absolute Idealists’ T. H. Green (1836–1882), F. H. Bradley (1846–1924) and Henry Jones (1852–1922), the latter of whom conducted a popular lecture tour of Australia (Boucher 1990).

A number of the early New Zealand philosophers, including Duncan MacGregor (1843–1906), William Salmond (1835–1917), and Francis W. Dunlop (1874–1932) were educated in the Idealist tradition and were influential in their communities, but produced relatively little. William Anderson (1889–1955), at Auckland, brother of John at Sydney, was the only New Zealand philosopher that seemed to retain Idealist views.

In Australia, materialism gained prominence through the work of John Anderson, who arrived in Australia in 1927, and continues to be influential. John Anderson had been a student of Henry Jones, who can be said to have influenced both strands of Australian philosophical thought.

The Idealism found in Australasian philosophy is best characterised as a set of concerns rather than as a single body of doctrine. Starting from consciousness,
and particularly from moral activity, Idealists pursued moral, metaphysical and religious themes, underpinned by a unified account of the world. They gave appropriate acknowledgement to the development of materialist natural sciences. They accepted the findings of natural science in all areas other than those that related to self-consciousness and the activities of mind. They refused to reduce consciousness or mind to matter, and made mental and moral experience central to their account of the unity of the world. The Idealists took little interest in, and were often hostile to, other doctrines that have sometimes been labelled ‘Idealist’, such as the attempt to resolve all reality into mental phenomena (see, for example, Miller 1930: 10).

The early Australasian philosophers taught across very wide fields. Francis Anderson was to teach ancient thought, modern philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, logic, psychology, politics, sociology and economics. Mitchell said his chair was more like a sofa, since it was to cover philosophy, economics, literature, education and psychology (Smart 1962). MacGregor had both medical and philosophical training, and was a surgeon, before later becoming Inspector of Lunatic Asylums (Tennent 1993).

Throughout the period of Idealism’s intellectual dominance, philosophy was conceived in relation to psychology, and particularly in terms of how they should be distinguished from each other. The main professional organisation was the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy. Its journal published articles in each field, dropping the term ‘psychology’ from its title only in 1946. Whilst there was interest in empirical psychology conducted in the laboratory, there was an important distinction to be made between this form of psychology, allied to natural science, and the philosophical psychology that served as a path into broader, metaphysical, thought. This psychology was characterised, in the work of Henry Laurie, William Mitchell and W. R. Boyce Gibson, by a focus on the method and results of introspection and conceptual clarification. It served to establish key philosophical themes, including the relationship of mind and matter and the status of the ‘self’ or personality. Gibson, for example, was a noted ‘personal Idealist’, who placed considerable emphasis on the irreducibility of ‘personality’ (Helgeby 2006).

When seen in the context of later developments in philosophy in Australia, the Idealists appear to eschew technical argument and definition. Their approach to philosophy appears more literary in orientation, but also directed to a wider audience. A particular strength of the Idealist approach to philosophy was the ability to bring multiple critical and constructive perspectives to bear on an issue. An example of this was the tendency to approach a key theme, such as the concept of personality, simultaneously from a moral, metaphysical and psychological perspective. Idealists typically sought to grasp an issue in its fundamentals, and to clearly convey the insight they had gained.

As in Britain, Idealism in Australia was a philosophy of engagement with moral and social issues and many of its adherents made significant practical contributions to society, education and politics. Francis Anderson was influential in
Identity Theory of Mind

Daniel Stoljar

The identity theory of mind says that the mind is—i.e. is identical to—the brain, and in particular that individual mental states, such as being in pain, suddenly remembering where your car keys are, or smelling a lemon, are identical to particular physical states of the brain. The theory played an important role in the development of Australian philosophy. It was formulated and defended by Australian and Australian-associated philosophers in the 1950s and '60s, in particular U. T. Place, J. J. C. Smart, D. M. Armstrong and David Lewis, and the basic principles of the theory continue to have a significant presence in
Australian philosophy, for example, in the program for metaphysics set out in Jackson (1998b). Why does the identity theory require defending? Isn’t it a part of scientifically informed commonsense that the mind is the brain? So it might initially seem. But for many philosophers in the 1930s and ‘40s, the identity theory involved a logical confusion, a category mistake as Ryle (1949) put it, and so could not be true, regardless of how appealing it might seem on the surface. It is not that such philosophers were dualists in the traditional sense; far from it. Rather their view was the mental sentences such as ‘I am feeling melancholy’ do not report facts, and related to this, that mental expressions such as ‘the feeling of melancholy’ do not denote items or things in the world and so do not denote things in the brain. If that is right, an identity statement such as ‘the feeling of melancholy = brain state $S$’ brings together expressions that have different logical jobs, and so is itself neither true nor false. One motivation for this view is that it seems to provide a way to dissolve the traditional mind-body problem, i.e. the problem of whether materialism or dualism is true. For if ‘the feeling of melancholy = brain state $S$’ is a category error, so too is ‘the feeling of melancholy = spiritual state $S^*$’. Hence both sides in the traditional mind-body debate are confused. Another motivation is the simpler one that mental terms do not seem to mean the same thing as physical terms, and indeed are drawn from quite different linguistic and conceptual environments.

It was against this background that the identity theory was developed. Following Stubenberg (1997), one might divide the identity theory in the 1950s and ‘60s into two versions. One version is associated with Herbert Feigl (see Feigl 1967) and other philosophers who had moved from Europe to the U.S. in the 1930s and ‘40s; Stubenberg calls this the ‘Austrian’ version. Another version is associated with philosophers either working in Australia or who spent considerable time in Australia—the ‘Australian’ version. One thing that divides the Australian version from the Austrian version is that the Austrians were more concerned with the physical part of the identity theory, i.e. with the question of what brain state or physical state various mental states are to be identified with. For the Australians, by contrast, the emphasis was more on the nature of mental states, and in particular on providing an analysis of what various mental states consisted in. (It is worth noting, however, that later developments in Australian philosophy of mind seem in considerable sympathy with the Austrian version of the identity theory; see, e.g. Chalmers 1996 and Stoljar 2001.)

Within the Australian version of the identity theory, one might make a further division between two temporal phases in its development. U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart, then colleagues at the University of Adelaide, are the key figures of the first phase. In Place’s 1956 paper, ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, we find an acceptance of the point that identity statements such as ‘the feeling of melancholy = brain state $S$’ bring together expressions that have very different meanings and so are not true by definition. But even if not true by definition, Place insisted that
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they are (on occasion) nevertheless true. To be more precise, Place insisted on something close to this. For in fact Place’s focus was not on the identity statements as such, but on statements such as ‘her table is an old packing case’, which he thought of as involving what he called the ‘is’ of constitution. It is natural to read Place here as saying that the mind is constituted by the brain rather as a table might be constituted by an old packing case. In turn, this seems to entail that a table (or the mind) might have properties that the old packing case that constitutes it (or the brain) does not. But then Place is not defending an identity theory strictly speaking. The reason is that the sense of identity that is at issue in these debates is the logical one, according to which if \( x = y \), then every property of \( x \) is a property of \( y \); correlatively, if even one property of \( x \) is not a property of \( y \), then it is not the case that \( x = y \).

Like Place’s ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, Smart’s major paper ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ (1959b) did not argue positively for the identity theory. Rather Smart’s stated goal is to remove any conceptual barriers to that theory. (Smart in fact says that his paper is simply a complement both to Place’s paper and to Feigl 1967, the key document of the Austrian version of the identity theory.) What distinguishes Smart’s contribution, however, is his very sharp focus on identity statements, and therefore on logical features of the identity theory. In particular, Smart’s point was to exploit Frege’s distinction between the sense of an expression and its referent in order to defend the identity theory from the objection that it is a category error. According to Smart, a statement like ‘the feeling of melancholy = brain state \( S \)’ brings together expressions, not with different logical jobs, but with different senses; hence such statements might be true if the referents of the relevant expression are identical.

While ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ contains responses to a lot of objections to the identity theory, perhaps the most famous is Objection #3, which was advanced by Max Black, and is sometimes called ‘Black’s Objection’. The objection is important because in Smart’s reaction to it we see ideas that later emerged as functionalism, are important to Lewis’ and Armstrong’s later versions of the identity theory, and which generated a literature on what is now called ‘the property dualism argument’ (see, e.g. White 2002). In essence the objection is this. Take ‘the feeling of melancholy = brain state \( S \)’ again. As we have seen, according to Smart, this statement brings together expressions with different senses, or, to put it in Fregean terms, is a cognitively significant identity statement. But it is plausible to suppose in general that if \( a = b \) is cognitively significant, then there must be some property \( F \) expressed by \( \text{‘}a\text{’} \), and some property \( G \) expressed by \( \text{‘}b\text{’} \) which are distinct from each other. (It is the properties that are distinct here, not \( a \) and \( b \) which are of course identical.) So, in particular, if ‘the feeling of melancholy is brain state \( S \)’ is true and cognitively significant, there must be a property expressed by ‘the feeling of melancholy’ (call it ‘Mel’) which is distinct from whatever property is expressed by ‘brain state \( S \)’. But what this suggests is that the truth of Smart’s identity theory is compatible with a version of property dualism, the reason being that the property associated with
the feeling of melancholy—i.e. Mel—might be (for all that has been said) a non-physical property. But Smart certainly intends to rule out property dualism; his whole point is to defend materialism. So it is required of him to say, not only that the feeling of melancholy is some brain state, but also that Mel is identical to some physical property. But at this point a problem of principle emerges. For suppose there is some physical property, call it ‘Phel,’ which is such that ‘Mel = Phel’ is true. Presumably this identity claim is cognitively significant just as the original one was; hence Black’s objection emerges all over again, and a regress looms.

To block this regress, Smart made two suggestions. The first was that it is not necessary, for the defence of materialism, that Mel be identical to a physical property; it is sufficient if it is identical with a topic-neutral property, where a ‘topic-neutral’ property is one which is neither physical nor mental but is instead quasi-logical, i.e. involving such general notions as causation, tendencies, dispositions and so on. The second suggestion was that there is a topic-neutral property, call it ‘Tel’, which is such that the identity statement ‘Mel = Tel’ is true and yet is analytic or true by definition (though perhaps a rather unobvious definition). In effect, this involves a modification of the idea that the identity theory is a hypothesis unrelated to considerations of meaning. Smart did think that the statement ‘the feeling of melancholy = brain state S’ was a hypothesis which had nothing to do with the meaning of the terms. But he nevertheless thought that, in order to respond to Black’s objection, there must be an analysis of the sense of ‘the feeling of melancholy’ into non-mental, topic-neutral terms. So Smart’s proposal is that the referents of mental terms are physical but that the senses of such terms are topic-neutral. This puts him in direct conflict with philosophers as different from each other as Ryle (1949) and Kripke (1980), both of whom deny that there is any definition of the mental into anything else at all.

Smart’s paper was distinctive because of its focus on logical features of identity and because of its appeal to topic-neutral language. It was distinctive in two further ways as well, ways that mark a division between the first phase of the Australian version of the identity theory and the second phase, in which Armstrong and Lewis are the key figures. First, Smart (and Place) insisted on a divorce of sensory and perceptual mental states, on the one hand, from cognitive and conative mental states (i.e. beliefs and desires) on the other. Indeed both Smart and Place believed that Ryle’s behaviourist position was correct about the latter. By contrast, the positions developed by Armstrong and Lewis in the mid 1960s were intended to apply to all mental states whatsoever. This is particularly the case in Armstrong (1968), where the theory is applied to many kinds of mental states, including beliefs, perception, sensations, and introspection.

Second, Smart thought that the identity theory was an empirical hypothesis in the sense that it was made probable by scientific observations, but as we have seen he did not argue positively for the identity theory. Both Lewis (1966) and Armstrong (1968) did provide such a positive argument however; indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that this argument provides one of the lasting insights of the
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Australian version of the identity theory. Taking pain and c-fibres as a classic example of a mental and physical state respectively, the argument can be set out as one in which the key statement of the identity theory (3) follows logically from two others, and in which the support for these two premises is mentioned in parentheses:

1. Pain = the state that occupies causal role \( R \) (by conceptual analysis)
2. C-fibres firing = the state that occupies causal role \( R \) (by empirical inquiry)
3. Ergo, pain = C-fibres firing (by the transitivity of identity).

This argument is simple on the surface but it contains a number of complexities, complexities well brought out in the extremely rich discussions of these matters by Lewis and Armstrong. An element that is central for Armstrong is the idea present in both (1) and (2) that pain is the state that occupies a causal role \( R \). In developing and defending this idea, Armstrong connects it with another strand of thinking in Ryle, his account of dispositions, and via that with the discussion of dispositions. An element that is central for Lewis is the spelling out of what ‘causal role \( R \)’ might come to. Lewis’ discussion of these matters connects the identity theory to ideas about definition associated with Ramsey and Carnap (see, e.g. Lewis 1972). A third element, important for both Lewis and Armstrong, is the claim that (1) is true if it is by conceptual analysis. This element is required by Lewis and Armstrong for much the same reason it was required by Smart, viz. to respond to Black’s objection.

How plausible is this argument and its conclusion? One objection that was historically important is the so-called ‘multiple realisation’ objection. According to this objection, which is promoted by Putnam (1968) and Fodor (1974), mental properties cannot be identical to physical properties, for physically very different creatures (e.g. Martians) could all instantiate the same mental property. This objection received a classic treatment from the point of view of the identity theory in Lewis (1983a). A different objection targets the claim that (1) is true by conceptual analysis, and so is necessarily true. This is the part of the Lewis-Armstrong argument for the identity theory that is extremely controversial. Some, influenced by traditional dualist thinking, argue that no such conceptual analysis is possible in this case. Others, influenced by Ryle and others, continue to suppose that mental and non-mental terms do different jobs and so cannot be conceptually equivalent. Still others, influenced by Kripke and others, say that there are no conceptual connections here at all. These issues, and issues like them, are still very much a part of contemporary philosophy, and not simply of philosophy of mind. This goes to show how deep the Australian contribution to the identity theory runs.
Induction, The Problem of

John Fox

Introduction

Statements merely about what we have experienced do not entail generalisations, or predictions; yet in everyday life and in science accepting some of these is indispensable. The classical problem of induction was that of justifying such acceptings on empiricist standards. But for any positivistic philosophy, which valorises science yet insists on rigorously logical arguments from strictly empirical premises, the problem of justifying such accepting is acute; indeed, insoluble. In the mid twentieth century, when such philosophy was dominant, this was widely accepted as an awkward but demonstrated fact of life. Salmon reported it as a consensus. The Humean condition, Quine said, was the human condition.

An obvious move might be to extend logic beyond deduction; so Carnap proposed an analytic inductive logic. But this could not do the trick. For analytic inferences are non-ampliative, and so do not yield conclusions about the future, the general or the observed, even with probability, from premises merely about the past, the particular or the unobserved.

Now any demonstration fails unless its premises and form of inference are all more secure than the negation of its conclusion; for otherwise it is at least as reasonable to reject what is not so secure as it is to accept the conclusion. And some general beliefs, or beliefs about the future, are so intuitively reasonable that they count as relatively hard facts, refuting theories of rationality that if true would rule them out.

Even if the classical problem is recognised as insoluble, and the standards are relaxed, the problem of justifying such beliefs (and such modified standards) remains, and deserves the title ‘problem of induction’. But this problem transforms into the much more general one of providing an adequate epistemology. So I will not deal with it in this sketch.

Many intelligent philosophers (e.g. Popper, Goodman, Feigl) who saw the classical problem as insoluble devised different problems, closely enough related to Hume’s to earn the label ‘problem of induction’, but which possibly could be solved. I will consider three Australian philosophers (Ellis, Clendinnen and Stove) who arguably made significant contributions to solving problems of this kind, explaining briefly in each case what particular problems they were addressing, barely touching on relevant parts of the international scene. I will also briefly mention some work that has helped clarify or reconceptualise the problems or helped settle some questions on their fringes.
Vindication?

Feigl (1950) drew a contrast between validation and vindication. It relies on a controverted contrast between the epistemic and the merely pragmatic. To validate a belief is epistemic and evidential: it is to show that it is true, or objectively probable, in the light of evidence. (Validating an inference can be characterised analogously.) Validating induction he saw as the insoluble problem. For his alternative problem he coined the term ‘vindicating induction’. I shall use it more generally for any alternative problem of this kind: to vindicate a belief (or inference) is to show, or provide good reason to accept, the reasonableness of accepting (or making) it, in some way that nevertheless does not provide epistemic or evidential support for it; i.e. which provides no validation. A paradigm of ‘vindication’, of belief in God, is Pascal’s ‘wager’. Reichenbach (1938) and Salmon (1955, 1961) would develop vindications of induction. In Australia, Ellis and Clendinnen did so in rather different ways.

Ellis (1965) accepted the validation/vindication distinction and undertook to provide only the latter. He criticised the straight rule of induction, which Reichenbach and Salmon had ‘vindicated’, on many scores: for example, because its chosen desirable features (e.g. yielding only mutually consistent predictions) are lacked by the scientific methods we sensibly do use, and because in many contexts we would not consider it reasonable to follow (if a carefully examined, homogeneous and symmetrical coin came up heads in 550 of 1000 tosses, we would not extrapolate to a long-run relative frequency of 55%). Ellis argued that no rules determine on the basis of known facts about particulars what unique theory they best support. So inductive rules (understood as determinative rules for making probability judgments solely on the basis of such facts) are not enough.

Ellis also argued that scientific theories have a legitimate role in what probability judgments we should make. For without such theoretical understanding, we would have only syntax to guide us in our use of inductive rules. But, he argued (generalising Goodman’s ‘grue’ cases and the curve-fitting problem), it is mathematically demonstrable that if syntax were our only guide, any inductive rule could be used to justify any of an infinity of possible projections of any sequence of events. If it were rational to reject our theoretical understanding of a situation solely on the basis of conjecture about the future, all such understanding could rationally be rejected out of hand. So such rejection is irrational. Theoretical involvement is necessary for rational non-demonstrative argument. So, he concluded, our projections of the future should preserve our theoretical understanding of reality unless or until we are forced by experience to change it.

In effect Ellis defended principles of theoretical and conceptual conservatism. His picture of scientific practice was like that propounded as normal in Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), and he was vindicating the rationality of scientific practice as described by an account that was widely being condemned as irrationalist.

Arguably, despite what he thought at the time, Ellis’ was not a vindication in Feigl’s sense, but a contribution to a less empiricist theory of rationality. Later,
Ellis (1998) offered as a new and more comprehensive solution something which was explicitly not a mere vindication. For it was based on epistemic values, by contrast with mere instrumental utility. But I am not here discussing alternative epistemology.

If validation is impossible, even pragmatic vindications face a severe problem. To calculate the expected utility of some course of action one needs estimates both of the desirability of the outcome and of the probability of the action having that outcome. Without the latter, the ‘validation component’, the vindication does not get off the ground.

Would-be validators have on the whole been sophisticated philosophers, and take this point. Reichenbach and Salmon, for instance, claimed not the utility of their variants of induction, but rather their conditional utility: that if any predictive rule had utility of a certain sort, their variants would.

John Clendinnen (1966) developed this somewhat complex strategy. Here’s a sketch of the argument. By an ‘objective’ method he meant one that ensured that those who followed it agreed; by ‘concordant’, he meant not giving rise to contradictory conclusions. He argued that induction was the only objective method of prediction, that objective methods are the only ones we could have good reason to believe were concordant, and that being concordant was a necessary condition for success. So, he argued, we should prefer objective methods, and so induction. Vindication!

An important exchange between Frank Jackson (1970a, 1970b) and Clendinnen (1970) advanced the discussion. Jackson supposed the rationality of induction, but argued against the particular vindication. He argued, for example, that concordance was a necessary condition not only for ensuring success but for ensuring failure, so that it was not a necessary condition for ensuring success rather than failure, which was what we desired; that it can be more rational to follow a method that merely happened to be fairly successful rather than an unsuccessful one that had a feature necessary for being shown capable of reliable success; that it can be more rational to follow a method that has that feature (though we can’t show it) and is in fact fairly successful to one which we can show has that feature but is not.

In reply, Clendinnen rejigged his argument. His basic claim, in the end, was that if the world were orderly enough, induction would work; but if it were not, there would be no rational way of predicting. Jackson did not disagree. But he pointed out that if these were both true, then induction would only be rational if it would work. So it could only be shown to be rational by showing something that, with Clendinnen’s claims, implied that it would work.

Surely a chess commentator would put a double exclamation mark by this. For Jackson’s point shows that even if induction can be vindicated Clendinnen-style, it is only to the extent that it is validated. But the point of vindicating rather than validating induction is to show that induction is rational even though we can’t show that it will work.
I think that points like this last one were a main reason for the decline in popularity of the vindicators’ strategy.

Clendinnen (1982) provided a variant vindication, arguing that to trust any alternative methods to induction was irrational, as all had the character of arbitrary guesses; and that a notion of simplicity, which ruled out Goodman-type anomalies, had to be understood as part of the specification of induction, and ensured that induction lacked this arbitrariness.

David Stove

Probably the most notable Australian philosopher of induction was David Stove. A great deal of his work was devoted to destroying inductive scepticism.

He took five tacks. He tried to refute inductive scepticism or closely related positions, using the calculus of probabilities, interpreted as a calculus of strength of arguments. He did this mainly in Stove (1973). In his witty polemic (Stove 1982) he tried to destroy the credit and repute of those he took to be the currently most influential inductive sceptics. Third, he argued that deductively valid arguments do not have various features they are commonly taken to have which provide desirable contrasts with inductive arguments (e.g. that all arguments of the same form preserve truth). Fourth, he bluffly asserted (or pointed out) the undeniable reasonableness of various inductive arguments, and their lack of need of further justification. Finally, he tried to provide something further (reason not the need), by supporting or improving a method fathered by D. C. Williams and grandfathered by Laplace. These last three tacks feature in Stove (1986). Only the first and the fifth need discussing here.

The first depends on the theorem that when \( P(p) \) and \( P(q) \) both \( \neq 0 \), \( \frac{P(p/q)}{P(p)} = \frac{P(q/p)}{P(q)} \). So evidence alters the probability of an hypothesis in the same ratio as the hypothesis alters the probability of the evidence. Actually, Stove never pointed out quite this; he focussed on the special case where the initial probability of the evidence < 1 and the hypothesis entails the evidence, pointing out that this latter altering is an increase; so that here evidence indeed raises the probability of the hypothesis.

So, he argued, there are non-deductive arguments that raise the probability of their conclusions. This refutes both what he calls ‘deductivism’ and what late in his book he calls ‘Hume’s inductive scepticism’. All the variants of such refutations by Stove or his students (e.g. Gemes 1983, 1989) took standard probability axioms as self-evident, interpreted as a calculus of the strength of inferences.

Though he thought of this interpretation as Carnapian, I think it was original. Fox (1975) argued against it, from a Stovean assumption: that tautologies provide no grounds for inferring contingent claims.

Earlier in the book Stove had carefully argued that ‘it is not about all inductive inferences, but only predictive-inductive ones, that there exists an argument in Hume which is explicit and clear, and which ends in a sceptical conclusion’ (1973: 29). The example offered of such an inference was ‘This is a flame, and all of the many flames observed in the past have been hot, so this is hot’. Many
reviewers (Blackburn 1973, Hinckfuss 1974, Fox 1975) pointed out that Stove’s argument does not refute scepticism about these. Their point, roughly, is that Stove’s argument shows that if you have won the first three legs of a quadrella your chances of winning the quadrella have gone up, but not that your chances of winning the final leg have.

Later Fox (1999) claimed to refute an even weaker version of deductivism, by showing that certain invalid arguments cannot consistently be deemed unsound. He called an argument ‘sound’ just if whenever its premises are true, it is reasonable to accept its conclusion. Proof examples are trivial: e.g. any instance of ‘It is reasonable to believe that p; therefore, p’. He called such arguments ‘epistemic syllogisms’. Though this proof was trivial, he claimed it was of some interest in that epistemic syllogisms were required to conclude, for example, Newton’s otherwise deductive derivation of the law of universal gravitation. This was partly in reply to some of the argument in Alan Musgrave (1993: esp. 170–5). Musgrave had deviated from Popper to the extent of agreeing that tentative acceptance even of laws and theories could be rational, but argued that the good reasoning involved in displaying such rationality could be construed as involving only deductively valid inferences. Newton’s argument for gravitation was a paradigm of such.

Fox’s conclusion was overstated. For the inconsistency is shown only on the assumption that some judgments of reasonableness are fallible, and a deductivist can consistently deny this. In refuting deductivism given fallibilism, all that is shown inconsistent is deductivist fallibilism.

Fox also tried to defuse some apparent oppositions between partisans of induction and of deduction, by arguing that precisely if there are sound inductive forms of argument, science can be given an adequate rational reconstruction using only non-inductive forms of argument; but also that precisely if scientific argument can be so analysed, there must be sound inductive forms of argument.

Stove’s later positive work on induction was a much more sophisticated attempt to use probability theory. Whether or not it was an improvement on the much neglected Williams (1947), it was important in bringing the latter back to general attention.

Stove interpreted Bernouilli’s ‘law of large numbers’ as involving two different interpretations of the probability calculus: one to do with proportions or frequencies of attributes in populations, the other his logical interpretation, to do with strength of arguments. The law so read stated the strength of certain population-to-sample (direct) inferences. Laplace had tried to derive a similar theorem about sample-to-population (inverse) inferences, but the derivation had been widely criticised for relying on a dubious ‘principle of indifference’. Williams had tried to rehabilitate a broadly Laplacean approach.

Williams had in effect appealed first to the intuitiveness of the following claim about paradigm population-to-sample inferences: that the strength of (e.g.) the argument ‘90% of As are Bs; this is an A / this is a B’ is 0.9. His crucial ingenious move was then to take as his As, samples, and as his Bs, samples matching the population in some relevant respect and to some desired degree of accuracy; so
that if the respect were ‘being C’ and the desired degree ‘within 3%’, a sample of which 54.5% were C would match a population in which 57% were C. It can be shown that even with samples of fairly small sizes—3000, say—and considerable margins of error, the vast majority of samples match the population. So, simply applying the statistical syllogism to these values of A and B, one gets in effect strong sample-to-population inferences. (Double exclamation marks.)

At first thoroughly persuaded, Stove came to see flaws in Williams’ argument and set himself to remedy them; his two readings of probability remedied some. Other problems had to do mainly with the generality of its conclusion. Thus concerned solely with rebutting inductive sceptics, and not with developing a theory of sound inductive inference, Stove focussed on a particular example and did not try to defend any general principle.

Patrick Maher (1996) provided a Bayesian critique of Williams-Stove. Adequate discussion of their work is still, I hope, to come. But even if successful, their work does not tackle the classical problem of induction. For they start by assuming as obviously acceptable the soundness of certain non-deductive inferences: statistical syllogisms. They claim that these entail such consequences as the validation of some generalising or sample-to-population inductive inferences. This claim of entailment is not incompatible even with Humean empiricism.

**Frank Jackson, Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow**

Various unpublished La Trobe papers had some influence in samizdat. Parts of a 1970 conference paper by Fox are summarised above in the introduction and in the argument that all vindication requires some validation.

A claim was (and still is) standardly made: that while merely adding new information as premises never alters the validity of deductive arguments, it can alter the soundness of inductive arguments. In an unpublished 1972 paper, in the course of clarifying the role of the principle of total evidence, Frank Jackson undermined this standard claim. The point was roughly this.

Sometimes we reasonably argue inductively, from facts A to conclusion B. Two assumptions are required for this inference to be reasonable. The first is the special case of some principle of total evidence, that when our total relevant evidence is A it is reasonable to infer B. The second is that \textit{A is our total relevant evidence as to whether B}. Given both these and A, we can in fact \textit{deduce} that it is reasonable for us to conclude that B. Further information can indeed lead us rationally to reject this conclusion; but it does so not by merely adding a premise, but by falsifying the second assumption above. The original argument is still valid; but with an essential premise no longer true, it no longer counts as a good argument for its conclusion.

Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow acknowledged Jackson’s influence in their 1997 paper, ‘The Validation of Induction’. This did not address that topic in Feigl’s or my sense; rather their claim, like Musgrave’s, was that even in sound inductions only valid arguments were involved. Their important argument generalised Jackson’s.
Take any good inductive argument with premises $P$ and conclusion $C$. It is only good, if it is reasonable in those conditions, given its premises, to accept $C$. Call some suitable spelling out of the conditions ‘$M$’, and consider the argument with premises $M$ and $P$, and the conclusion $C^*$: ‘It is reasonable to accept $C$’.

Pargetter and Bigelow’s key assumption was that truths of the theory of rationality were like truths of mathematics; in particular, that claims like ‘Given $M$ and $A$, $C^*$’ are, if true, necessary. Not epistemically necessary (they were not infallibilist about epistemology); but still, true necessarily (in all worlds). So they analyse any good inductive argument from $A$ to $C$ as enthymematic for one from $M$ and $A$ to $C^*$, and this in turn as having a suppressed major premise which is a necessary truth; so that all good inductive arguments are deductively valid!

Tim Oakley (1998) argued, against Pargetter and Bigelow, that there were irreducibly sound inductive arguments which shared a property of cogency that a deductivist analysis did not capture. In reply, Bigelow and Pargetter (1998) argued against this, but somewhat modified their original conclusion by taking on board the (then unpublished) argument of Fox (1999), that though in such arguments $C^*$ is reached by deductively valid means, $C$ itself is not, for reasonableness does not entail truth; so that even on their construal, the inductive argument to its original conclusion is not valid, requiring also an epistemic syllogism.

**The Rationality of Induction as Contingent on the Way the World Is?**

Some (e.g. Kornblith 1993) had argued that induction works because of the way nature is. This takes the success of induction for granted and proposes an explanation of it, and so does not answer a Humean sceptic. Howard Sankey (1997) argued rather that induction is justified because of the way nature is; and so that a cluster of metaphysical doctrines about the existence of natural kinds provides a solution of Hume’s problem.

When our predicting that unobserved $A$s are $B$s is usually correct, what makes it so might be that $A$s are by nature the kind of thing that is essentially $B$; though it might (in general, or just for different values of ‘$A$’ and ‘$B$’) be merely that nearly all $A$s happen to be $B$s. Any of a variety of ways the world may be would ensure our being usually right. But what does this have to do with rationality?

Stove (1986: ch. 1) had devastatingly mocked the enterprise of justifying induction on the basis of assumptions about nature. His mockery rested on the intuition that ways things are contingent, but that inductive support is a matter of pure logic, and as such, necessary.

But some theory of rationality may consistently present what manners of inferring are rational as contingent on the way the world is; e.g. on what makes such manners as a rule likely to lead to truths. Bigelow and Pargetter suggested that in a theory of pure rationality that comprises only necessary truths, some such truths are of the form: ‘In circumstances $C$, it is rational to trust method $M$’. Sankey can be construed, in their terms, as suggesting that we want a theory of what methods it is actually rational to trust, that induction is such a method $M$, and that such a
theory will be contingent on C (e.g. an abundance of natural kinds) and therefore will not categorically pertain to the theory of pure rationality.

So such a strategy cannot be ruled out. For it to yield a solution rather than a sketch of one, I suggest, it requires a defensible theory of pure rationality. Sankey’s sketch postulates as rational inference to the best explanation. He hints that the success of science suggests as a best explanation a special fit between the mind and the world, a somewhat neo-aristotelean conclusion; given such a fit, he argues that induction is likely to be successful.

Sankey’s strategy, therefore, is to assume as intuitively sound a particular non-deductive kind of inference—in this case, to the best explanation—and thence to argue that some straight inductive inferences, usually considered much more problematic, are also sound. Interestingly, the Laplace-Williams-Stove strategy does this too, choosing instead as more basic the statistical syllogism.

Bayesianism

In some ways Bayesianism has continued in a modified way Carnap’s project of inductive logic; but it has taken on board almost all of Popper’s critique of inductivism (see Fox 2000). Probably most recent Australian work on induction has been done in a more or less Bayesian framework. I don’t know of any that has notably advanced the framework, but one development I find of much interest. It was provoked largely by challenges Lakatos and Feyerabend provided in the 1970s. Lakatos had argued that philosophies of science should be evaluated largely by their adequacy to the history of science, and that all but his own fell foul of this test; Feyerabend had argued that all accounts of rational methodology that also deemed much recognised great science rational could be rebutted by showing that their paradigm examples did not fit their principles. Both were scathing about the inadequacy of all inductivisms.

Jon Dorling (1979) rose to these challenges by arguing that the Bayesian analysis of the history of science explained vastly more as rational than any Popperian or Lakatosian account could, and in particular it could provide a general solution of the Duhem problem—that of explaining when, in the face of unexpected results, it was rational to reject a core theory, and when to reject instead some auxiliary hypothesis. He illustrated this with a case in which Bayesian moves overwhelmingly dictated retaining the theory and abandoning the auxiliary hypothesis. His paper was intended to function as a Kuhnian paradigm, and to provide the basic techniques for solving many other historical conundra. It has not had the attention it deserves, but it has inspired a few impressive pieces of research and analysis.

In Australia Neil Thomason (1994) in particular contributed to this program, arguing, for example, that the very arguments of Galileo that Feyerabend had cited as showing that he flouted all proposed canons of rationality could be plausibly and naturally construed as straightforwardly Bayesian reasonings.

Maureen Christie (2000) presented a case history of the discovery of the cause of the hole in the ozone layer. The participants, under Popperian influence,
thought of the role of the spectacular observations as refuting a dominant theory, but no: it was only via the support they gave to a rival theory, previously considered improbable, that the dominant view was discredited. This ‘ultra-inductivist’ acceptance of the chlorine theory also fits a Bayesian picture like a glove. The acceptance of statistical thermodynamics on the basis of Einstein’s analysis of Perrin’s experiments on Brownian motion—which Feyerabend had misdescribed as a Popperian falsification of classical thermodynamics—was a comparable case; as indeed was taking the phases of Venus as discrediting Ptolemaic models on the basis of the support they gave to Copernicanism.
The Jack Smart Lecture is perhaps the most prestigious annual lecture in Australasian philosophy. It was founded in 1999 to honour its namesake J. J. C. Smart and is hosted by the Philosophy Program in the Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS) at the Australian National University (ANU), of which Smart was professor from 1976 to 1985.

Each year the lecture is delivered by a leading international philosopher and attended by professional philosophers, students, members of the public and, at the time of writing, Smart himself. Topics have ranged from issues in applied ethics through to the philosophy of quantum physics—a breadth of coverage that reflects Smart’s own.

The Jack Smart Lecture was originally conceived and organised by Michael Smith, who was Head of the Philosophy Program at the RSSS in 1999. Funding was sourced from money generated by the Philosophy Program’s contribution to the ANU Vice-Chancellor’s ‘Endowment for Excellence’ fund. The inaugural lecture was delivered by Frank Jackson, who succeeded Smart as professor and head of philosophy at the RSSS, and was entitled ‘Locke-ing onto Content’.

In 2000, the lecture was delivered by another Australian philosopher, Peter Singer, who, like Smart himself, is a renowned defender of utilitarianism. Singer spoke on our ethical obligations to those outside our own countries. In the following year, David Lewis, in one of his last public lectures, presented his paper on quantum physics: ‘How Many Lives has Schroedinger’s Cat?’

Since then, the Jack Smart Lecture has been delivered by Jerry Fodor on the nature of concepts, 2002; Thomas Scanlon on blame, 2003; Simon Blackburn on realism and pluralism, 2004; and Tim Williamson on conceptual analysis, 2005. In the last three years, the topics of the lectures have centred around another of Smart’s interests, evolutionary biology. Ruth Millikan spoke on evolution and

Jackson, Frank Cameron

John O’Dea

Born in 1943, Frank Jackson took Mathematics and Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. Upon graduation, in 1967 he taught for one year at the University of Adelaide before returning to Melbourne for a lectureship appointment at La Trobe University. While at La Trobe, Jackson published his first book (also his doctoral thesis), *Perception: A Representative Theory* (1977b). In 1978 he succeeded his father, A. C. (‘Camo’) Jackson, to the chair of Philosophy at Monash University, before moving to Canberra in 1986 to succeed J. J. C. Smart as Head of the Philosophy Program in the Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS). Jackson delivered the John Locke Lectures at Oxford University in 1994–95, only the second Australian to do so, and has delivered many other named lectures. At the Australian National University (ANU) he also served for some time as Director of the Institute of Advanced Studies and other high level administrative positions, for which, in addition to his singular contributions to philosophy, he was awarded the Order of Australia in 2006 by the Australian Government. He is currently on a joint appointment between Princeton University and La Trobe University, and continues to spend considerable time at ANU.

Jackson’s philosophical writings are notable for their range. He has written influential works on philosophical logic, philosophy of mind, philosophical methodology, philosophy of language, ethics, and metaphysics. The discussion here will be confined to the first three of these areas.

**Philosophical Logic**

In *Conditionals* and elsewhere, Jackson defended the view that indicative conditionals (of the general rough form, ‘If P, then C’), have the same truth conditions as the material conditional of predicate calculus, ‘P → C’ which, though often expressed ‘If P then C’, is formally equivalent to ‘¬(P & ¬C)’: ‘It is not the case that both P is the case and C is not the case’. This is not an easy position to defend, since there are many apparent counterexamples to the truth-functional equivalency thesis. H. P. Grice defended it using the theory of conversational implicature. According to this theory, even if an assertion is strictly true it must abide by certain general conversational rules (e.g. that the speaker believes the assertion) in order to be ‘assertable’. Grice claimed that the apparent
Jackson argued that Grice’s defence is hopelessly vulnerable to counterexample, and went on to construct a defence that drew on Grice’s notion of conventional implicature. Jackson’s use and elaboration of the idea of conventional implicature was novel and influential. He argued, following Grice, that by convention we attach certain implications to particular words. For example, the use of ‘but’ in the assertion that ‘This bicycle is plastic but strong’ implies that plastic bicycles are usually not strong, but this implication is neither part of the truth conditions of that sentence, strictly speaking, nor given by general rules of conversation. It is merely the sort of implication that attaches, by convention, to the use of ‘but’. Similarly, Jackson argued—here departing from Grice—that the use of ‘if’ is governed, by convention, by adherence to what he called the ‘Ramsey Test’, namely that the supposition of the antecedent of a conditional increases one’s credence in the consequent (within the supposition), or, in Jackson’s terms, the consequent is robust with respect to the antecedent. The function of conventional implicature, as Jackson elaborated it, is not to impart beliefs to one’s interlocutor, but rather to smooth the passage of the beliefs one is really trying to impart—namely, in the case of indicative conditionals, the beliefs by which the conditional is evaluable as strictly true or false.

Philosophy of Mind

In his writings in the field of philosophical logic, Jackson employed with considerable precision and inventiveness one of the standard argumentative tools in that field, namely linguistic or conceptual analysis. In *Perception*, Jackson employed that methodology in the defence of the sense-datum theory of the object of perception. Here Jackson argued that there is a sense of the ‘way things look’ which is neither comparative (in the sense of looking like something) nor epistemic (in the sense of merely looking some way). This sense of ‘looks’—the phenomenal sense, as Jackson dubbed it—describes the way things are perceptually with us and is therefore quite legitimate, indeed indispensable, and yet, Jackson argued, does not describe the way things are physically. A number of theories about perceptual experience are compatible with this idea, most notably adverbialism, the idea that perception does not have an object at all; seeing red and seeing green are distinguished not by being a perception of a red thing as opposed to a perception of a green thing, on this account, but merely by being an instance of ‘seeing redly’ as opposed to ‘seeing greenly’. Jackson argued that adverbialism is false because some differences between experiences cannot be captured without talk of objects; the difference, for example, between the perception of a green triangle and a red square, and the perception of a green square and a red triangle. The only remaining option, Jackson argued, is that perception has an object and that object is not physical; that is to say, the object is mental. This then raised the question of the relation between the world itself and perception. One possibility is Idealism, the idea that the world is itself mental in nature, and we
see it directly. Jackson rejected Idealism in favour of representationalism, the view that the world itself is physical, and that the immediate objects of perception—the sense data—are representations of that physical world. Although his book *Perception: A Representative Theory* did not bring about a revival in the sense-datum theory of perception, many of the arguments in it, such as the argument against adverbialism, were highly influential.

Jackson is perhaps most well known for an argument, put forward in 1982 and defended in 1986, that some properties of conscious experience are neither physical properties nor can causally affect physical properties. The argument employs the hypothetical case of a future scientist who has come to know every physical fact that could be relevant to conscious experience, but has never actually had the experience of seeing colours. Jackson argued that when such a person has her first colour experience, she will learn something about the world, namely *what it is like* to have a colour visual experience. Since, intuitively, such a person would thus learn a fact about conscious experience, and yet already possess all the physical facts, the learned fact must not be a physical fact. Therefore, the argument concludes, physicalism about conscious experience is false. The ‘Knowledge Argument’, as it is known, provoked a wide range of published responses though very little agreement, a state of affairs that continues to exist. Jackson did not defend non-physicalism beyond the two papers, but the Knowledge Argument has become part of the standard arsenal of non-physicalist philosophers. David Chalmers used it to great effect in his very influential book in defence of non-physicalism, *The Conscious Mind* (1996). Jackson himself repudiated the conclusion of the Knowledge Argument in a 2003 paper, in which he defends physicalist representationalism about conscious experience.

**Philosophical Methodology**

Jackson has been an influential defender of the use of conceptual analysis in philosophy. Beginning in a 1992 critical notice of Susan Hurley’s *Natural Reasons*, then elaborated in a paper, ‘Armchair Metaphysics’, and further expanded in his 1996 John Locke Lectures (published in book form as *From Metaphysics to Ethics* 1998b) Jackson employed two-dimensional modal logic, developed by Stalnaker and others, in the course of an argument that conceptual analysis is actually indispensable for the resolution of certain problems common in philosophy. According to Jackson, the lesson to be learned from Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity* is not that there is a cogniser-independent ‘metaphysical’ necessity, but rather that sentences (most relevantly sentences such as ‘Murder is wrong’ or ‘The mind is the brain’) express two propositions, or have a dual intensional structure. Teasing out the two propositions is an armchair enterprise and a necessary first step to discovering their truth (a point on which Stalnaker himself did not agree).

On Jackson’s view, a goal of metaphysics is completeness. It seeks to give an account of what exists, without double-counting, and what doesn’t. $H_2O$ molecules exist; water exists but is the same thing as collections of $H_2O$ molecules. Brains exist; do minds exist in addition, or are they the same thing as functioning brains—
or do they not exist at all, strictly speaking? Jackson argued that this ‘location or elimination’ question, an essential one for metaphysics, always has an *a priori* component, which is the task of discovering the entailment relations between statements in the vocabulary of (in this case) neuroscience and statements in everyday mental (or ‘folk psychological’) vocabulary. Jackson’s use of two-dimensional modal logic purported to demonstrate how a successful analysis *combined with empirically obtained contingent knowledge* is essential for answering ‘location or elimination’ questions.

Finally, Jackson defends a version of descriptivism about linguistic content, representationalism about phenomenal consciousness, and *naturalism* about ethics. The latter position was developed, in large part, in a series of papers in collaboration with Philip Pettit. Jackson and others at the ANU in Canberra defended a program of thorough-going naturalism through conceptual analysis that became known in the mid 1990s as the ‘Canberra Plan’.

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**James Martineau Memorial Lecture**

Leila Toiviainen

The thirty-year-old series of James Martineau Memorial Lectures to the general public of Tasmania was made possible by a bequest from the estate of Samuel Lovell (1851–1936). Born in New Norfolk, Tasmania, Lovell began his career as a rural teacher and was later an inspector of schools (see the obituary of Lovell in *The Mercury* newspaper, dated 19 September 1936). Lovell’s bequest was intended for the study of the philosophy of James Martineau (1805–1900), an English philosopher who wrote on philosophical and religious topics, and who ‘was regarded as the foremost spokesman of Unitarianism in England’ (Schneewind 1967: 169). However, during the thirty years of James Martineau Memorial Lectures, Lovell’s remit has been interpreted loosely by the staff of the School of Philosophy at the University of Tasmania as encompassing topics from *philosophy of religion* to moral philosophy.

The inaugural James Martineau Memorial Lecture was held in both Hobart and Launceston in August 1973 in order to extend the benefits of the lecture beyond Hobart and to alleviate the ‘very bitter regional jealousies in Tasmania’ identified by Professor William Joske in his letter a year later to the second James Martineau Memorial lecturer, Professor Keith Campbell (Joske 1974). The inaugural lecture was given by Graham Hughes from Victoria University of Wellington on ‘The Problems of Evil’. He noted in his letter to the organiser, William Joske, that the title’s ‘plural is essential’ and that he would try to make his lecture ‘both philosophical and semi-popular’ (Hughes 1973). There are no
records of attendance in Hobart, while in Launceston eighty-two people were present to hear Hughes. This was considered a great success by W. F. Ellis, the then director of the Queen Victoria Museum and Art Gallery in Launceston, in his letter to the university public relations department, headed by Malcolm Hills (Ellis 1973). (The James Martineau Memorial Lecture in Launceston was held at the Queen Victoria Museum and Art Gallery, as there was no University of Tasmania campus in Launceston until 1980.)

Keith Campbell of the University of Sydney was the second James Martineau Memorial lecturer, speaking on ‘The Evidence of Things Unseen’. He argued that the religious hypothesis ‘suffers eclipse from superior natural explanations, or runs into trouble in contrast with the world we would expect and the world we actually find’ (Campbell 1974).

From the 1970s onwards the annual lecture has been given by many internationally renowned scholars on issues of interest to academics and the wider public. Often the lecture has been given by an author whose publications have attracted an unusual amount of publicity. Peter Singer, then professor of philosophy at Monash University, gave a lecture on animal liberation in 1981 following the publication of his influential book on this topic six years earlier (Singer 1975). In 1988 Genevieve Lloyd of the University of Sydney, by then widely known as the author of The Man of Reason (1984), dedicated her James Martineau Memorial Lecture to the ethical aspects of feminism, where she addressed issues posed by equal opportunity and affirmative action policies.

In 1997 the lecture was delivered by Kathleen Higgins (from the University of Texas), who discussed the relevance of music to the ethical life and the ways in which musical experience might help overcome the limitations of recent moral theory. The attractiveness of virtue ethics in enabling human beings to live a good and happy life was discussed by Timo Airaksinen of Helsinki University the following year. The aesthetic aspects of a truly moral life were further examined by Julian Young of the University of Auckland in his 2000 James Martineau Memorial Lecture on God, poetry and philosophy.

The contrast between the material advances made by Western nations and the lack of progress made by developing nations in relation to poverty, health care and education has been the topic of two recent James Martineau Memorial Lectures. In 2001, soon after the events of 9/11, Geshe N. Samten of the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in India spoke on how we have ignored the advancement of human qualities so that today we find ourselves in a poorer situation than our ancestors. Similar themes were addressed in 2006 by Bhandra Ranchod, the former South African High Commissioner to Australia. His talk on ‘The Ethics of Forgiveness—Lessons from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Ten Years On’ was a comment on how to move from apartheid to democracy and from poverty to health and education.

The annual James Martineau Memorial Lectures remain an integral part of the intellectual life of Tasmania. They provide insights into developments in moral theory and religion both to the general public of the island and to its scholars.
La Trobe University
Brian Ellis

The Department of Philosophy at La Trobe University was one of the four departments originally established in the School of Humanities, which took its first students in 1967. I was appointed as foundation professor, and took up my position there in June 1966. In the initial carve up of responsibilities, I was appointed dean, and so presided over the school’s board of studies, and officially represented the school on the Academic Board. I came to the job from the University of Melbourne’s Department of History and Philosophy of Science, where I had been a Reader.

I thought of philosophy as a group of disciplines concerning the nature of human inquiry and understanding. At the centre, were metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and human reasoning—subjects that would have to be available for study at both graduate and undergraduate levels in any decent university. For these were studies about the nature of human inquiry and understanding that were of universal concern. But around this core, I argued that there ought to be a range of specialist subjects that were concerned with the philosophies of science, mathematics, politics, history, music, literature, psychology, and so on. These subjects, I thought, should be made available, wherever possible, especially to students taking courses in these areas.

Accordingly, I argued that philosophy had an important role to play in the new school structure that was then being designed for La Trobe—as a bridge between the disciplines. As a result, philosophy was made available to students throughout the University. I also argued that philosophy, like history, had, both historically and philosophically, very strong links with the social sciences, and should therefore be accorded a significant place in that school too. Accordingly, it was admitted as an official member of the School of Social Sciences, as well as of the School of Humanities. So, very early in the history of La Trobe University, the Department of Philosophy established a strong and influential position for
itself in the university. It also proved to be a very attractive subject for students. This was, almost certainly, due partly to the times: the war in Vietnam, and the cultural liberation movements of the sixties and seventies, created a strong interest in social, moral and other foundational questions about society. But these factors were probably not the only ones that led to the extraordinary growth of student numbers in philosophy. It may also have been due partly to the breadth of philosophy’s intake, and to the fact that students of humanities had relatively few subjects to choose from. But, whatever the reason, philosophy boomed at La Trobe in the 1960s and ’70s, and by the end of this period it had become by far the largest philosophy department in Australia. Indeed, by this time, it was large even by American standards.

The rapid growth in philosophy at La Trobe enabled the department to develop into an academically distinguished and wide-ranging one within a very short period of time. In 1970, when there were already twelve full-time members of the academic staff, John McCloskey was appointed to the second chair of philosophy. His appointment greatly strengthened the areas of moral and political philosophy in which he specialised. In 1971 he published *John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study*, and shortly after that, in 1974, he published his important book, *God and Evil*. But this was just the beginning: by the end of the ’70s the Department of Philosophy had more than doubled its size, and it was widely acknowledged to be the best and most comprehensive philosophy department in Australia. Philosophy was not the only department to flourish at La Trobe. The departments of history and sociology also became the leaders in their respective fields, as did some of the science departments. And, some of the credit for this must go to the innovative ‘schools’ structure of the university, which provided for wide-ranging inclusive departments, and the enlightened administration of the university, which saw its role as being to assist the academic community in their efforts to build a strong teaching and research institution.

Like all universities, La Trobe was caught up in the revolutionary fervour of the early seventies, and the Department of Philosophy naturally came under attack by student radicals. At this time, there were many who thought that philosophers should be leading the struggle against both capitalism and the Vietnam War, as indeed they were at the University of Sydney and Flinders University. They were encouraged in their efforts to radicalise the La Trobe department by the visit of Robert Solomon in 1970–71, who was, at this time, heavily involved in the student movement in America. Solomon gave a series of university-wide lectures on existentialism that created great excitement, and earned him a large and devoted following. But the department was essentially an academic one, with a strong commitment to democracy, both within the university and in the state more generally. Most members of the department were naturally opposed to the Vietnam War, as nearly all social democrats were, but few felt obliged to take part in a revolutionary movement that was clearly also aimed at the overthrow of capitalism. They just wanted to end the Vietnam War, and get on with their teaching and research.
La Trobe University

As a teaching department in the 1970s, philosophy was strong. Robert Pargetter, Tim Oakley, Ross Phillips, Anna Cushan and Jan Crosthwaite were all outstanding as lecturers or tutors. Pargetter was the star lecturer, and Oakley and Phillips made huge contributions to the teaching work of the department through their untiring and conscientious efforts to involve the students in philosophy. But it was in research that the department excelled. In 1973, J. J. C. Smart resigned his chair at the University of Adelaide to accept a readership in philosophy at La Trobe. Smart was a revered figure in Australian philosophy by this time, and his presence added lustre to an already flourishing department. His book with Bernard Williams, *Utilitarianism: For and Against*, was published in that year and sparked a lively debate in the department on the foundations of morality. Peter Singer was appointed to a lectureship in the department in 1975, the year in which his own book, *Animal Liberation*, was published. And Singer’s present utilitarian stance obviously owes a great deal to the departmental debate that was occurring in La Trobe at this time. Robert Young’s *Freedom, Responsibility and God* (1975) developed the important connections between liberal theory and theology. Tom Richards’ book, *The Language of Reason*, published in 1978, was a book about reasoning and the philosophy of language that was concerned with applied logic, as much as it was with formal logic. Logic, for Richards, was not merely the abstract theory of truth preservation. It was a formalism that he thought could, and should, be used more constructively to analyse arguments in ordinary language, and he set about demonstrating how this could be done. I thought this too, and throughout the 1970s I worked, at times with Barbara Davidson, on developing epistemic foundations for the standard logical systems. In 1979, I published these results in *Rational Belief Systems*, and laid the foundations for an on-going research program on the dynamics of belief. In 1977, Frank Jackson wrote his important book, *Perception: A Representative Theory*, which challenged the widely-held theory of direct realism, and argued in favour of a kind of Lockean representative realism.

The academic successes of the department naturally led to recognition of its excellence. Gershon Weiler was appointed to a chair at the University of Tel Aviv in 1973, and was the first of a number of professorial appointments from La Trobe’s philosophy department. Others in the 1970s were J. J. C. Smart (1976) to the Australian National University (ANU), and Peter Singer (1977) and Frank Jackson (1978) to Monash University. But the Department had become overstuffed by 1980. The high levels of student enrolments could not be sustained. Sociology replaced philosophy in the fashion stakes, and philosophy faced increasing competition for student enrolments from other humanities’ departments. Consequently, the department found itself under constant pressure of having to reduce staff numbers. And this led to a kind of brain drain. Tom Richards resigned to take up a position in Computer Science at La Trobe. Alwynne Mackie became Head of the Canberra College of Art. Michael Stocker, Chris Murphy, Kim Sterelny, Jack Copeland, Chris Corder, Jan Crosthwaite and Suzanne Uniacke were all appointed to positions in other universities.
And then, finally, at the end of the decade, Robert Pargetter (in 1989), and John Bigelow (in 1991) were appointed to chairs at Monash University. And, throughout this whole period, the Department of Philosophy survived without a single replacement.


The long drought in philosophy appointments in the 1980s, which led to the brain drain, was followed by a crippling administrative squeeze, which effectively denied philosophy its due. John McCloskey had retired in 1989, and was not replaced. Given the squeeze on appointments that was already beginning to occur in humanities, this was to be expected. But when I retired in 1994, La Trobe’s philosophers were entitled to expect that I would be replaced within a year or two. The La Trobe department had, after all, been the pre-eminent department of its kind in Australia, and as good as any in the English-speaking world outside of North America. And, it had just lost four senior members of staff, two to professorial appointments at Monash University, and two due to professorial retirements. However, the university was changing rapidly. If the 1980s were characterised by increasing levels of managerialism at La Trobe, the 1990s saw the beginning of the era of corporatism. Michael Osborne was appointed Vice-Chancellor in 1990, and saw his role as being that of the CEO of a large corporation. Consequently, departments that were not paying their own way, through research grants, patents and the like, or did not have a great many students, were always under threat. The investments in time and effort that individuals had put into building up these departments, and the international reputations they had achieved, counted for little. The educational quality of La Trobe’s programs was also thought to be more or less irrelevant. What mattered most to the administration were output and productivity—as these quantities were measured by the Australian Research Grants Commission. Economic arguments replaced what used to be called (in La Trobe’s happier collegiate days) ‘academic’ arguments.

Academically, the success stories in philosophy at La Trobe University in the period of corporate dominance were Janna Thompson, Freya Mathews, Behan McCullagh, Ross Brady, and me, perhaps, in my retirement. Janna Thompson
Laws of Nature


In 2005, the department (sorry, the Philosophy Program in the School of Communications and Critical Inquiry) received the welcome news that Andrew Brennan had been appointed to fill the vacant chair of philosophy from 2006. He has already made some excellent new appointments. Frank Jackson was welcomed back to the department (as part-time professor) in 2008.

**Laws of Nature**

Toby Handfield

In the analytic tradition, one of the most important influences on metaphysical and epistemological inquiry has been Hume’s problem of induction. In the course of his argument, Hume suggests that if we had evidence that nature is governed by laws, then we would have grounds for inductive inference. But since evidence that nature is governed by laws is itself formed by induction, we can have no such grounds. Evidently we do believe in laws of nature, so empiricists were left with the project of trying to identify what we could mean by talk of laws. The typical empiricist response was to identify laws with certain types of regularity. For a regularity theorist, ‘It is a law that \( p \)’ means simply that \( p \) is true, and \( p \) has a suitable logical form: being a regularity that does not make reference to particulars, and saying something like ‘All Fs are Gs’.
Laws of Nature

It was widely known throughout the first half of the twentieth century that such views had somewhat counterintuitive consequences. There are certain paradigmatic features of laws which appear to be inexplicable on the assumption that laws are mere regularities. For instance: (1) Laws of nature are thought to be relatively robust under counterfactual suppositions. Mere regularities, however, are extremely fragile under counterfactual suppositions. (2) Laws appear to ‘govern’ their instances, at least in some sense. A statement that ‘All Fs are Gs’, even if true, does not seem to govern anything. And finally, (3) laws appear to be importantly different from cosmic regularities that hold by coincidence. Compare the fact that there are no mile-wide spheres of gold and the fact that there are no mile-wide spheres of uranium-235. The former is a mere accident, while the latter is more than a mere coincidence: its truth—or at least its extremely high probability—is ensured by the laws. It would not be practically possible to make such a sphere unless the laws governing thermonuclear fission were very different.

But if laws are mere regularities, then it appears to entail that all of these pre-theoretical beliefs about laws are either false or are true only in some grossly attenuated fashion.

Despite the parlous state of regularity theories, no serious alternative emerged from the first half of the twentieth century. Then in the 1970s, D. M. Armstrong (working at the University of Sydney) and Michael Tooley (then at the Australian National University) independently conceived the idea that laws of nature were higher-order relations between universals. Outside Australia, a similar idea was also put forward at the same time by Fred Dretske (1977). This was a major development in the history of thought about laws of nature, as it opened up a quite different line of inquiry than had gone before in the tradition of regularity theories.

For both Tooley (1977) and Armstrong (1978: ch. 24; 1983), the basic tenets of the higher-order relation theory are as follows: ‘All Fs are Gs’ is a law if there exists a higher-order relation of ‘nomic necessitation’ that obtains between the universals $F$ and $G$—typically symbolised ‘$N(F,G)$’. The obtaining of this relation necessitates the truth of the regularity ‘All Fs are Gs’, but the obtaining of the regularity is not a sufficient condition for the obtaining of the necessitation relation.

This theory promises to avoid many of the problems that beset the regularity theory, because it posits a genuine difference in ontology between cosmic regularities and laws. However, the exact mechanism by which a higher-order relation between universals could necessitate a regularity in all the instances of those universals remains notoriously obscure—and this point is the basis of criticism by empiricists (van Fraassen 1989: ch. 5; Lewis 1983: 40).

Armstrong also claimed that his metaphysical theory of laws had implications for epistemology which addressed the original issue of Humean scepticism about induction. According to Armstrong (1983b: 103–6), a regularity theory dooms its proponent to inductive scepticism, but the higher-order relation theory allows one to justify an inductive generalisation via an inference to the best explanation.
Having observed a regularity which appears robust under counterfactual intervention, one can infer that the regularity is backed by a law. The law thus serves as an explanation of the observed sample, but it also entails the truth of the universal generalisation. So by inference to the best explanation, one could make a justified inference to the existence of the law, and thereby obtain a justification for the universal generalisation also.

While Armstrong and Tooley developed the higher-order relation theory of laws, David Lewis (1973: 73–4) developed a version of the regularity theory which he attributed to F. P. Ramsey. The Lewisian account of laws defines a law as a theorem in an optimal systematisation of contingent fact. By a systematisation, Lewis means a deductively closed set of sentences that has been organised into an axiomatic system. Numerous such axiomatic systems are possible, and they can be graded on two key dimensions: simplicity and strength (or information content). The deductive closure of an encyclopaedia would fare very well for strength, but would fare poorly for simplicity. In order to achieve greater simplicity, it will often be necessary to sacrifice strength. For a systematisation to be optimal, it must strike the best balance between simplicity and strength. Lewis made later refinements to the theory, so as to accommodate problems such as gruesome predicates (Lewis 1983: 41–2) and probabilistic laws (Lewis 1994: §4).

Lewis’ theory constituted a huge advance for the regularity theory, because it was no longer subject to such compelling counterexamples as had been raised against less sophisticated regularity theories. In conjunction with Lewis’ theory of counterfactual semantics, it appeared to sustain the claim that laws are robust under counterfactual inference. Moreover, because lawhood required something far more demanding than mere truth and logical form, his theory gave a more plausible account of what sort of evidence is required to suggest that a proposition is a law.

However, the Lewisian account, like earlier regularity theories, is unable to vindicate the idea that laws ‘govern’ their positive instances. Instead, they appear to be useful summaries of their instances. Moreover, critics of the Lewisian theory remain unconvinced that it properly distinguishes between coincidental regularities and lawlike ones (Armstrong 1983b: 66–73).

A much more recent innovation has been a revival of interest in an essentialist theory of properties which lends itself neatly to an account of at least some laws of nature. Brian Ellis and Caroline Lierse (Ellis and Lierse 1994; Ellis 2001) defend the theory that universals have dispositional essences. Mass, for instance, is essentially such as to confer the causal power to resist acceleration. A law such as \( F = ma \) can then be interpreted as a compact summary of a disposition conferred by all masses as a matter of metaphysical necessity.

This leads to the principal objection to an essentialist account of laws of nature: it seems to give them too much modal strength. While a regularity theory seems to treat laws as implausibly fragile truths, an essentialist theory suggests that counter-legal conditionals, such as ‘Had the law of gravity been a touch
different, the Milky Way would not have been as stable’, are vacuously true (Bigelow 1999). This is disturbing, since counter-legals of that sort seem to be perfectly intelligible, and scientists sometimes make reference to counter-legal circumstances as an integral part of developing thought experiments.

### Lewis, David, in Australasia

Barry Taylor

When in the mid 1960s David Lewis attended seminars in Harvard given by the visiting J. J. C. Smart from Adelaide, the consequences were to be greater than he could have anticipated. First, he was to meet Stephanie (‘Steffi’), his future wife. Second, the contact with Smart was to lead to his invitation to Adelaide as a Gavin David Young lecturer in 1971, initiating what was to be a lifelong relationship with Australasia, with profound impact on philosophy in the region.

From the time of this first visit until his untimely death in 2001 from complications of diabetes, Lewis was to visit Australasia almost annually during the summer teaching break in Princeton. Undoubtedly, a primary attraction for him was a highly congenial intellectual atmosphere. To begin with, Maxwell J. Cresswell in Wellington was a fellow devotee of the philosophical deployment of possible worlds, having like Lewis been influenced by the seminars of Richard Montague at UCLA. Again, in the philosophy of mind, Lewis subscribed to the identity theory of mind, the ‘antipodean heresy’ of U. T. Place, J. J. C. Smart, D. M. Armstrong, Brian Medlin, and many others. Last, but by no means least, Lewis had come to turn from his early interest in the philosophy of language to systematic metaphysics, approached head-on rather than studied as the shadow cast by language, whether that be the vernacular of the folk (as conceived by Austin and Ryle) or the austere vehicle of science (in the manner of Quine). This message was welcome in an Australasia where those party to the heritage of John Anderson viewed with jaundiced eyes the foreign linguistic trend then laying siege to their stronghold.

D. M. Armstrong was one senior figure with whom Lewis struck an immediate rapport, as much because of the new work of both in general metaphysics as past shared doctrine in the philosophy of mind. So, for example, Armstrong’s views on universals provoked Lewis to a critique and an articulation of an alternative view of their significance (Lewis 1983b), whilst Lewis’ modal realism led Armstrong to frame his alternative account of possibility (Armstrong 1997). But perhaps the most important influence Lewis was to exert was on a member of the next generation to Armstrong’s, Frank Jackson. Already a major figure on the Australasian scene, Jackson was at La Trobe University,
then Monash University when Lewis’ antipodean visits began; and in 1986 he became Head of the Philosophy Program at the prestigious Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS) at the Australian National University (ANU). Jackson quickly picked up on Lewisian themes, particularly in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics; his dialogue with Lewis profoundly shaped the thought of both. Through Lewis’ continuing contributions to the national conference and to seminars at individual universities, through the influence of leading figures on the scene such as Armstrong and Jackson, and through the increasingly powerful role of the RSSS in setting the themes of Australasian research, a plethora of younger philosophers were to have their research parameters deeply affected by Lewis’ ideas. For a list intended as representative rather than exhaustive, we may note John Bigelow, Linda Burns, David Coady, Antony Eagle, Peter Forrest, Alan Hájek, Allen Hazen, Mark Johnston, Rae Langton, Peter Menzies, Daniel Nolan, Denis Robinson, and Barry Taylor. Ever generous with his time, Lewis spent hours in informal discussion with all of these; in the case of many of them, he acted as a mentor, with advice and assistance concerning their future careers.

Lewis’ visits were almost entirely informal, and self-financed. In a typical trip, he and his wife Steffi would spend a week attending the annual mid year conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy. This would be followed by a week or so of holiday socialising and travel with Steffi, who would then return home to her job. David would then travel to Melbourne, using the University of Melbourne as his base. There he lived simply, staying in backpacker accommodation (his spare blanket being stored from year to year in the university’s Department of Philosophy). Refusing offers of a visitor’s office, he worked alongside undergraduates in the department’s small Gibson Library. From this base he made many forays to read papers across Australia, and often in New Zealand as well; but Melbourne remained his spiritual home in the antipodes. He developed a typical Melburnian passion for Australian Rules football, and became a fanatical supporter of Essendon. (Most Melburnians regard this as his greatest failing. These are all and only those who support a rival club.) His Melbourne connection was formally recognised by the award in 1995 of an honorary doctorate from the University of Melbourne.

What were the attractions of the antipodes which led Lewis to return so regularly? Undoubtedly the congeniality of the intellectual environment, already adverted to, was one; and through it Lewis made many friendships. Another was its isolation from the pressures of life in his home university; huddled in the Gibson Library in Melbourne, he could devote himself fully to his work, untroubled by persons from Porlock—the more so since his convenient Luddism sheltered him from disturbance by email. Those of us who knew him here, however, would find it hard not to think that there was more to it than this, and that Lewis had a genuine affinity for the informality and egalitarianism of the antipodean way. When he died, a mean-spirited and ignorant obituary in the New York Times sneered at his possible worlds realism.
At the same time, the tabloid Melbourne *Herald-Sun* ran a simple but dignified tribute under the headline ‘Great Thinker Loved Our Footy’. The contrast may explain part of what Lewis found attractive.

**Lincoln University**

Grant Tavinor

Philosophy has a short and fragile history at Lincoln University. Lincoln is a former agricultural college located on the Canterbury Plains, twenty minutes drive from Christchurch (on the South Island, New Zealand). The inclusion of philosophy at the university began only in 1994, where it was introduced as a core element of the Bachelor of Social Science degree taught within the then Human Sciences division. Papers in introductory philosophy, logic and **critical thinking**, moral philosophy, environmental ethics, and **philosophy of science** were offered initially. Stan Godlovitch and Glenys Godlovitch were responsible for the teaching of philosophy from 1994 until their departure in 2002. Grant Tavinor was appointed lecturer in philosophy in the following year. In 2006 the current Vice-Chancellor proposed to disestablish the teaching of philosophy at Lincoln University, citing the sustainability of the university in the rationale for what was only one of a number of cost-cutting proposals. The proposal to disestablish philosophy was initially fended off in the consultation stage, and as of 2009 philosophy is still taught at Lincoln University, though in an attenuated form.

**Lloyd, Genevieve**

Megan Laverty

Genevieve Lloyd is emeritus professor of philosophy at the **University of New South Wales** (UNSW), and research associate in philosophy at **Macquarie University**. She has done more to shape Australian philosophy than any other woman philosopher. Her first book, *The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy*, is a canonical feminist text. Lloyd gained a B.A. from the University of Sydney and then a D.Phil. from Somerville College, Oxford University. She worked at the Australian National University (ANU) until 1987 when
she became the first appointed female professor of philosophy in Australia. While a professor at UNSW, Lloyd taught a number of significant female philosophers including Penelope Deutscher, Robyn Ferrell, and Catriona McKenzie.

Lloyd’s scholarship has advanced the fields of feminist philosophy, history of philosophy, philosophy and literature, and Spinoza studies. She creatively intervenes in established philosophical procedures by reading philosophical texts ‘forwards’, using them to glimpse what we might have been and still could become (Lloyd 2000). Lloyd analyses the literariness of philosophical texts in order to reveal the historicity of philosophical arguments. Her scholarship demonstrates that philosophers inevitably absorb the language, imagery and ideologies of their respective cultures. Theoretical distinctions, combined with modes of expression and associative thinking, can work to reinforce and, in some cases reactivate, cultural prejudices. Lloyd describes this as the ‘passive’ imagination, which she distinguishes from the ‘reconstructive’ or ‘active’ imagination.

The pervasive presence of the ‘passive’ imagination necessitates philosophers to be just as attentive to how they write and read as they are of what they write and read; for the how and what of philosophy are inextricably connected. Philosophers should do this, not by transcending culture in an effort to become something that they are not—the persona of the passionless, disembodied and intellectual philosopher—but by developing an awareness of their own social positioning as they engage with the perspective of others. Employment of the ‘reconstructive’ or ‘active’ imagination will allow new generations of philosophers to insert themselves into the philosophical tradition; providing modern re-workings of old themes and introducing new ones. Lloyd’s scholarship does just this and is distinguished by a sense of the drama that informs all philosophical inquiry, irrespective of whether it is our desire to come to terms with grief, mortality or what we find the most fulfilling life.

The Man of Reason was published in the mid 1980s when feminism was becoming the subject of serious academic attention. In it, Lloyd reviews how canonical Western philosophical texts inadvertently describe the social status of women and thus determine our feminist reactions. She argues that philosophical discourse has unconsciously assimilated certain cultural images of masculinity and femininity. For example, reason came to be represented as a uniquely human achievement in the seventeenth century, largely due to René Descartes. Rationality was associated with maleness and constituted a move aware from nature and, by association, femininity. Despite Descartes’ egalitarian intent, the representation of reason as an achievement only served to further isolate women from humanity’s supreme accomplishment. Lloyd’s feminism is also elaborated in contributions to anthologies and her edited volume, Feminism and the History of Philosophy. She views feminist philosophy as an evolving set of self-reflective reading strategies characterised by attentiveness to the negative effects of dichotomous thinking and a desire to correct the imbalance by focussing on emotional, imaginative, and social relations.
In the book, *Being in Time: Selves and Narrators in Philosophy and Literature*, Lloyd challenges the postmodern caricature, arguing that traditional philosophers and modern novelists do not assume a unified self; instead they forge a unified self against the threat of fragmentation by relying on such concepts as *consciousness* (Augustine), *God* (Descartes), *memory* (Proust), *judgment* (Kant) and *eternal return* (Nietzsche). Lloyd seeks to reactivate such dynamic and complex conceptions of the self in an effort overcome the dichotomy between the modern (unified) and postmodern (fragmentary) self. *Being in Time* is an eloquent plea for reconsidering the relationship between philosophy and literature. For Lloyd, it is not the case that philosophy has sovereignty over truth. Philosophy does not simply discover the truth, just as literature is not pure invention. Truth is discovered and invented by the different unifying function of both philosophy and literary. Each in its own way—one through concepts the other through characters—seek to meaningfully respond to what is genuinely problematic in human experience.

During the 1990s Lloyd turned her attention to Benedict de Spinoza's ontological doctrine that undermines the dichotomous relations of the Cartesian tradition. Spinoza claims that the mind is an idea of the body. He argues that the eternity of the mind is achieved only when an individual realises that his or her being is finite and entirely dependent on substance. Spinoza's philosophy does not posit a self that is distinct from the external world. He does not encumber philosophy with problems of skepticism and other minds. His philosophy allows for the legitimate consideration of the various existential dilemmas that have dominated human history. In *Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present*, Lloyd and Moira Gatens use Spinoza to reflect on the question of collective responsibility, in particular that of non-indigenous Australians for atrocities against indigenous Australians.

Lloyd draws widely from the philosophical tradition and beyond. Her analysis of Augustine, Immanuel Kant and Spinoza, is frequently informed by such unorthodox thinkers as Giles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida and Paul Ricoeur. Over and above these contemporary influences, Lloyd’s natural affinity is with the stoics. Although Lloyd is not a scholar of the Stoics, she shares many of their ideas. She remains interested in how philosophical and literary thinking can reconcile us to the difficulties and pain of human life. She does this in part by the pleasure that her writing generates, and also through her abiding interest in *time* and our relationship to it. Her most recent publication, *Providence Lost*, explores the history of providence in Western philosophical thought.
Mackie, J. L.
Keith Campbell

John Leslie Mackie was born in Sydney, Australia, on 25 August 1917, the son of Alexander Mackie and Annie Duncan. Alexander Mackie, an able and aspiring young Scotsman, had emigrated from Edinburgh in 1906 to become Principal of Sydney Teachers College. He became an eminent educationist, from 1910 combining his role at the Teachers College with the Chair of Education at the University of Sydney. John grew up in Wahroonga, on Sydney’s North Shore, and educated at Knox Grammar School, maintaining the Scottish connection. At the University of Sydney, which he entered in 1935, his main interests were initially in classics and mathematics, with philosophy coming to the fore a little later, as he studied under the celebrated, formidable and charismatic John Anderson.

A stellar career in classics and philosophy won him a scholarship to Oxford, where he entered Oriel College to read Literae Humaniores in 1938, graduating with a First in 1940. At that point he undertook war service, training in radar and then radio maintenance, being commissioned in the REME, and serving in the Middle East and in Italy, including at Monte Cassino—experiences he rarely spoke about in later years.

After the war, he returned to a lectureship in Alan Stout’s Department of Moral and Political Philosophy at the University of Sydney, although the title of the department did little to restrict the range of topics on which he researched and taught. In 1947 he married Joan Meredith, herself an outstanding graduate of the university. Their family eventually comprised three daughters—one of whom, Penelope, is herself a professional philosopher—and two sons. In 1955 he took up the chair of philosophy at the University of Otago, in Dunedin, New Zealand, where, although remaining for just four years, he made enough of an impact to be serving as Dean of Arts and Music at the time of his return to the University of Sydney to take up the Challis Chair of Philosophy on John Anderson’s retirement. In 1963 he left for Great Britain, going first to fill the

Meticulous, courteous, industrious, with a degree of devotion to duty striking in one who held that moral values lack any objective foundation, he was universally admired as an outstandingly capable and committed philosopher’s philosopher. An undoubtedly apocryphal anecdote captures his character: while Alasdair MacIntyre, P. F. Strawson, and Mackie were Fellows together at University College, the authorities circulated a memorandum asking all dons to keep a record for a week of the proportions of their working hours spent on research, teaching, and administration. MacIntyre sent back a blistering missive instructing them not to waste his time. Strawson looked at the form, wrote ‘One third, one third, one third’, and went back to what he was doing. J. L. Mackie went out and bought a stop watch.

Mackie was a realist empiricist in the Lockean mould. Although influenced by Anderson, and retaining his teacher’s naturalism and rationalist approach, he was never a disciple. Nor was he ever tempted by any of the notions according to which philosophical issues are not genuine problems, but merely conceptual confusions. His work is characterised by patient and always dispassionate analysis of specific questions, striving first for a clear statement of the problem, then proceeding by careful exploration and appraisal of the arguments available in support of alternative proposed solutions. Mackie applied this analytic style of reasoning across a broad range of issues. He made contributions to, among other topics, the understanding of logical paradoxes, the nature of conditionals, the theory of causality, the interpretation of counterfactual conditionals, the theological problem of evil, the theory of ethics, the interpretation of Locke’s epistemology and metaphysics, and of Hume’s ethics.

In the first part of his career, Mackie published a succession of important articles, but no books. This pattern of publication changed in 1973 with the appearance of Truth, Probability, and Paradox, a collection of essays on logical themes. This was followed in rapid succession by The Cement of the Universe (1974), which presents his views on causation, and Problems from Locke (1976). This latter work tackles characteristically Lockean themes, including primary and secondary qualities, perception, substance, universals, identity, and innate ideas, but its focus is on contributing to contemporary discussion of these issues. In Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977), Mackie presents a sustained argument for a distinctive account of moral thinking as a mistaken projection of subjective attitudes onto objective situations. His position in ethics has some affinities with Hume’s moral theory, which he discussed in a book of that name appearing in 1980. Lastly, posthumously, The Miracle of Theism was published in 1982. This burst of productivity propelled Mackie to the forefront among British philosophers of his generation, and his relatively early death, while still at the height of his powers, was keenly felt.
Of his many contributions, Mackie’s importance as a philosopher rests principally on his championing of four main theses. In philosophical theology, he maintained over many years of patient argument that all the attempts to reconcile the existence of evil with the classical Christian conception of God as omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent are failures, and that any plausible variations on them will fail also. In philosophical logic, he claimed that, despite appearances, counterfactual conditionals are not actually propositions at all, but condensed and elliptically expressed arguments. The conditional’s antecedent is the argument’s premise, and its consequent is the conclusion. The counterfactual conditional is to be accepted if the condensed argument is a good one as it is, or can be made good by the supply of plausibly understood additional premises. In metaphysics he advanced a particular account of causation. In almost every case, the whole cause of an event involves multiple factors, so we need an account of causal factors. These, Mackie held, are INUS conditions, that is: Insufficient but Non-redundant parts of Unnecessary but Sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the effect.

In ethics, Mackie’s fourth distinctive thesis is that although the semantics of ordinary indicative moral discourse apparently require that there be moral facts in virtue of which moral claims are true or false, there are in reality no such moral facts. Moral discourse must therefore be explicated as arising from widespread error. Mackie argued that people’s attitudes and feelings when considering their own or other people’s behaviour and its effects leads them to assume, falsely, the existence of objective features of right or wrong, good or bad, in human situations, which correspond to, and validate, those attitudes and feelings. As there are no such validating properties, people must take upon themselves responsibility for the judgments they make.

In the years since his death, Mackie’s philosophy has continued to attract attention, with a steady flow of articles discussing his work. The INUS treatment of causal conditions now seems to have been accepted as part of a consensus on causal factors. But his account of counterfactual conditionals has few adherents, in large part because it cannot comfortably accommodate the way in which such sentences can be nested with others in compounds which have truth values in much the same way as nested indicatives. Mackie’s views on ethics and in the philosophy of religion are more controversial. Papers in both criticism and defence of his ethical theory, his response to the problem of evil, and his view of miracles continue to appear. There has yet to appear a demonstration that his anti-objectivist ethical theory does nothing to undercut his critique of Christianity by way of the problem of evil.
Early Days

The Department of Philosophy was founded in 1967 at the same time as Macquarie University. At the time of its founding, the department had two full-time members of staff: Max Deutscher and Leonard Carrier. Deutscher was the foundation professor of philosophy, having come from a post as senior lecturer at Monash University. He had taken a B.Phil. in philosophy at Oxford University, where he was much influenced by his supervisor Gilbert Ryle. For two years he lectured in philosophy at Trinity and Exeter Colleges at Oxford before returning to Australia. Carrier, who had been a student of Donald Davidson, was recruited from the University of Miami to teach logic and language. In the next few years many of the longstanding staff were recruited. In 1969 Jim Baker, Vic Dudman, Robert McLaughlin, and Alan Olding joined the staff. In 1970 John Kleinig and Tony Palmer were appointed as lecturers. In 1971 Michael Stocker and Ross Poole joined the staff as did San MacColl in 1973. Many of these staff members worked in the department until their retirement in the mid-to-late 1990s (except for Stocker who moved to the University of Sydney in 1970, Kleinig who moved to CUNY in New York in 1988, and MacColl who moved to UNSW in 1991). After the retirement of these longstanding staff, the department went through a period of reconstruction when several new members of staff were appointed. Catriona Mackenzie was appointed in 1991, Peter Menzies in 1996, Greg Restall and Caroline West in 1997, Nicholas Smith in 1998 and John Sutton in 1999. In subsequent years, the department has had a regular turnover of staff, with a number of new staff and postdoctoral scholars taking up positions.

The research of the department is best surveyed in terms of four main areas, where the research has been concentrated.

Logic and Language

The department has had a long tradition of scholarship in the area of logic and philosophy of language. As noted, Carrier was appointed first to teach in this area. Other people to work in the area were Doug Busch (1977–87), San MacColl (1973–90), and Vic Dudman (1969–95). Dudman’s work on conditionals and the philosophy of language has achieved considerable prominence in the literature. He was also instrumental in setting up a strong undergraduate program in critical reasoning and introductory logic. The tradition of scholarship in this area has been continued by recent appointments in the area: Greg Restall (1997–2002), Alexander Miller (2004–6) and Albert

**European Philosophy**

The department is well known for its pioneering development of European philosophy in Australia. Deutscher started his academic career as an analytic philosopher but also had longstanding interests in Sartre. His early publications on remembering, inferring and physicalism led to work on Husserl’s phenomenology, an interest already whetted by Ryle (see Deutscher 1983). Deutscher’s interests in *French philosophy* deepened through his career with books on Michele le Doeuff (2000) and Sartre and Beauvoir (2003). Many other members of the department contributed to the tradition of scholarship in European philosophy. Ross Poole’s longstanding interests in Marx and Nietzsche culminated in the publication of *Morality and Modernity* (1991). Luciana Dwyer (1978–89) was steeped in the Husserlian tradition. Robyn Ferrell (1992–2004) was an active presence in the department promoting research in contemporary French Philosophy. The department also benefited from the presence of a number of scholars on short-term contracts who contributed to this area: Elizabeth During, Paul Redding (1989–90), and Moira Gatens. In recent years the focus of research in this area has shifted to *German Philosophy*, and in particular to Hegel and critical theory, through the work of Nicholas Smith (1998 – present), Jean-Philippe Deranty (2003 – present), and Robert Sinnerbrink (2003 – present).

**Feminism, Ethics, and Applied Ethics**

For many decades the department had a strong tradition of scholarship in the areas of ethics, and social and political philosophy. Some highlights of this scholarship include Kleinig’s work on paternalism (1983) and valuing life (1991) and Poole’s work on nationalism (1999). For a number of years (1985–89) Val Plumwood was a tutor in the department, enhancing its profile in the areas of feminism and environmental ethics. The area of *feminist philosophy* was further strengthened with the appointment of Catriona Mackenzie (1991 – present) and of Robyn Ferrell. The recent appointments of Cynthia Townley (2004 – present) and Mianna Lotz (2006 – present) have consolidated the tradition of research in ethics and *applied ethics*. The department now has very active teaching and research collaborations inside and outside Macquarie University in the areas of professional ethics, *bioethics* and biotechnology, neuroethics and *moral psychology*. A Research Centre on Agency, Norms and Values, headed by Mackenzie, was established in 2007 to focus research in these areas. In 2009 Wendy Rogers and Jeanette Kennett were appointed to research professorships to consolidate the department’s existing research excellence in *medical ethics*, neuroethics and moral psychology.
Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science, Cognitive Science

Several long-serving members of staff had active interests in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. For example, Alan Olding’s 1990 book examined the tenability of natural theology in the light of the theory of evolution. During his short tenure as a lecturer in the department, David Papineau (1978–80) produced two books on the philosophy of the social sciences (1979a, 1979b). In the post-1990s period Peter Menzies’ influential series of publications on causation and John Sutton’s (1998) work in the history of cognitive science contributed to the tradition of scholarship in the philosophy of science. Recent members of staff have tended to focus their research in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, establishing strong research links with the Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science. Tim Bayne (2003–07) and Sutton have made important contributions in this area. Bayne has since taken up a position at Oxford University in 2007 and Sutton moved in 2008 to the Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science.

In conclusion, if the department has had some central guiding spirit throughout its history, it has been a spirit that questions philosophical orthodoxies and standard ways of doing philosophy. Early members of the department, especially those who worked in European philosophy, felt certain exclusionary pressures from other Australasian departments. However, with the greater acceptance of European philosophy, the department has taken the lead in Australia in developing a pluralist ethos that encourages philosophers from analytic, European and other traditions to work harmoniously together. It continues to go from strength to strength with increasing staff numbers, flourishing undergraduate and postgraduate programs, and a strong research focus.

Maori Philosophy

Mason Durie

Polynesian Origins

The history of Maori philosophy embraces three overlapping phases. First, Polynesian foundations can be traced to a lengthy sojourn in the Pacific; second, subsequent settlement in Aotearoa (New Zealand) gave rise to tribal traditions; and third, as a consequence of progressive urbanisation, a philosophy that values
‘being Maori’ as much as belonging to a tribe has emerged. The three phases are progressive, each premised on earlier worldviews, customs, and values.

Although there is some debate, almost certainly the Polynesian migration started in Africa, and over a period of several thousand years progressed across the Indian Ocean, to the west coast of India, thence to Southeast Asia. From Taiwan there were migrations west to Madagascar and east to the Bismarck Archipelago (east of New Guinea) and then into central East Polynesia (McKinnon 1997: 9–10). Where suitable land was reached settlements were established and wherever that occurred cultural elements were left behind. Over time and over distance, unique characteristics emerged to give distinctiveness to each new settlement though without entirely severing the connecting, but increasingly tenuous, thread that was to remind later generations of a common starting point. The thread is still evident in aspects of language, art, histories and biological markers, and has been grouped by historians into artefact/activity trails, biological trails, and linguistic trails (Howe 2003: 71–88).

Maori philosophy has its roots in the Pacific. There is abundant linguistic, anatomic, genetic, oral, archaeological, navigational and cultural evidence that Maori have close affinities with other Pacific peoples, and reached Aotearoa around 1300 AD after voyaging from more northern islands within the Polynesian Triangle. Maori language has much in common with languages of Hawaii, Rarotonga, and Tahiti; throughout Polynesia the vowels are consistently the same while the consonants are always followed by a vowel. Similarly there is a widespread Polynesian tradition of personifying the environment, linking human origins to the natural world, and drawing on the landscape to cement personal identity (Te Rangi Hiroa 1958).

Like many Pacific narratives, Maori accounts of creation attribute biodiversity to the separation of the sky (Rangi) and the earth (Papatuanuku). Reluctantly forced apart, the separation enabled their offspring, among whom were the forerunners of forests, ferns, fisheries, oceans and the elements, to reach maturity and establish their own identities while retaining affinity with each other. Human evolution was part of the saga; as participants in an ecological network, close relationships existed between people and the natural environment.

Other aspects of Maori philosophy also reflect the Pacific connection, including the marae—a tribal meeting place also found in Tahiti and Rarotonga—and a centre for the elaboration of culture and dialogue (Dansey 1971: 8–23). The concept of tapu similarly had its origins in Polynesia and remains integral to a Maori philosophy. Early missionaries and anthropologists placed considerable weight on tapu as a spiritual phenomenon associated with retribution. In their views, popularised in written form, the laws of tapu were seen to be derived from higher powers and mortals were expected to fall into line, or suffer serious consequences (Best 1924: 175). The spiritual connotation equated tapu with sacredness and it was used as a translation for ‘holy’. Tapu was also linked with chieftainship, ‘high birth’ and the discretion of tohunga (healers) to demarcate
people and places of special significance (Philips 1954: 174–98). But a more utilitarian view of the purpose of tapu was discussed by a Maori scholar, Te Rangi Hiroa (1949). He drew a connection between the use of tapu and the prevention of accidents or calamities; a dangerous activity or location would be declared tapu in order to prevent misfortune. More earthly than a divine message from the gods, or the recognition of status, the conferment of tapu was a precautionary measure to reduce risks associated with the realities of social engagement, wellbeing, and environmental protection.

**Tribal Traditions**

Some anthropologists consider that Maori arrived in Aotearoa more or less by accident, having been blown off course while fishing (Sharp 1957: 128–43). But DNA studies confirm that a significant colony of Maori settlers was firmly established in Aotearoa some 800 or more years ago (Murray-McIntosh, Scrimshaw, Hadfield, Panny 1998) and modern scientific findings endorse the conventional view that a planned migration to Aotearoa took place around 1300AD, probably from Tahiti, through Rarotonga (Te Rangi Hiroa 1949: 36–64).

Less clear, however, is whether the legend of a single Great Fleet was actually a story invented and made popular by Percy S. Smith (Smith 1913, vol. 4: 72). Although based on Māori oral traditions, principally the Whatahoro manuscripts, Smith heavily edited the material and added elements from other sources so that the original Maori accounts became distorted in favour of an amalgamated tribal version that had both simplistic and romantic appeal to European scholars (Simmons 1976: 315–21). More likely, instead of a great and organised fleet, there were a series of disparate migrations that subsequently led to the development of discrete tribal groups.

The point is a further reminder of the doubtful reliability of early European authors who depended on Maori informants but introduced their own cultural paradigms to analyse and reinterpret the material. In transferring oral tradition into written form, integrity was often lost when linear histories and synchronic approaches were superimposed on Maori worldviews (Binney 1987: 16–28). Instead of validating local knowledge and perspectives, the main purpose of oral tradition, historians and anthropologists all too frequently dismantled the bond between event and human experience for the sake of chronological logic. Concerned about authenticity, Simmons identified five conditions against which validity might be tested: occurrence in a number of sources; occurrence in songs and chants; persistence to present times; occurrence in early sources; genealogical validation (Simmons 1976: 10–12).

In any event, once settled in New Zealand tribes began to form their own customs and worldviews, not entirely divorced from the Polynesian base, but distinctive in language, protocols and histories, and shaped by the realities of landscape and climate.
Maori Philosophy

Transposing the Oral Tradition

Based on some five thousand years in the Pacific and then elaborated to accommodate new experiences in Aotearoa, Maori knowledge, matauranga Maori, evolved in parallel with changing ecological and social circumstances. There was no written record but tribal experts used oral narratives and symbolic art forms to transmit information and understanding, to ponder the future, and to study connectedness. As in the Pacific, human existence was essentially contextualised as part of a wider environmental framework within a timeframe that extended over a score or more generations. Metaphor, allusion and the juxtaposition of past and future added depth and meaning to oral literary explanations, contributing to the emergence of a tribal worldview within which knowledge and its application had a genealogy of its own, and appointed guardians were entrusted to safeguard the integrity of the learning process.

The advent of a written language in the nineteenth century added a further option for the dissemination of knowledge but also a new level of complexity. On the one hand the printed word greatly expanded avenues for recording and distributing information, but on the other it diminished the role tribal experts had played as guardians of authenticity and relevance. Tribal distinctiveness, for example, could be readily overlooked by authors who sought to convey understandings of Maori philosophies as undifferentiated endeavours that transcended tribe and community.

It was not until the early twentieth century that a new generation of Maori scholars began to face the task of disseminating and verifying knowledge in ways that accorded with both oral methods and written literary traditions. By virtue of university and tribal educational experiences they were able to act as conduits between two centuries and between different modes of scholarship. Raised in tribal societies and retaining close tribal affiliations, they were inevitably answerable to critical Maori readers, and were not able to avoid marae standards of proof. But nor were they immune from the standards demanded of serious academic writers. In short, they lived and worked at the interface between two systems of knowledge and two sets of accountabilities.

Their seminal publications contained essential elements of tribal philosophies. Reweti Kohere, for example, published a collection of proverbs that neatly captured tribal perspectives, attitudes and values such as collective strength, resource sustainability, tribal authority, and ecological connectedness (Kohere 1951). In Nga Moteatea, a collection of tribal songs edited by Apirana Ngata, not only were historic markers recounted but there were fresh insights into ways of thinking and understanding the world, including tribal genealogical pride, the significance of place, and the rich use of imagery that compared the relationship of human encounters to natural phenomena (Ngata 1950). Writing as an insider in English and Maori, Ngata demonstrated that it was possible to transpose oral transmission to the written medium without losing meaning, context, or impact. Moreover, he was able to demonstrate that tribal songs were more than words set to ancient music; they were also rich sources of history, literature and philosophy.
Maori scholars who wrote tribal histories based their narratives on tribal dynamics, politics, and relationships. Interweaving song, linguistic nuance, genealogical connections, and geographical significance into stories about battles and leadership, their descriptions uncovered a holistic understanding of human encounters and territorial attachment (Jones and Biggs 1995: 170–6). More recently, tribal philosophies have been rehearsed in submissions to the Waitangi Tribunal (Byrnes 2008: 88–103). Established in 1975 as a Commission of Inquiry to investigate claims against the Crown for breaches of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, the Tribunal accepted oral evidence from older witnesses. Recurring themes of land alienation, environmental despoliation, and unjust laws were associated with reduced access to tribal land, dismissal of tribal guardianship over the natural environment, and diminished authority. The themes also confirmed the ecological perspective adopted by tribes and the fusion of human identities with landscape so that resource alienation was perceived not only as a loss of an economic base but also as a cause of spiritual impoverishment (Waitangi Tribunal 1983).

‘Being Maori’

After World War Two, and largely for economic reasons, Maori moved away from rural villages and tribal society to live in larger towns and cities. Second generation urban migrants grew up in environments where Maori language was seldom spoken and Maori culture was absent except in crude form to satisfy tourist expectations. By the mid 1970s increasing numbers of Maori were concerned about an apparent assimilatory policy and students protested about the failure to have Maori language available in schools. A decade later the Waitangi Tribunal found that the Government had been in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi for failing to protect Maori language (Waitangi Tribunal 1986).

Even before the Tribunal had completed its inquiry, however, a cultural revitalisation was underway. Urban Maori wanted to ‘live as Maori’ and to participate in the Maori world (Durie 2003: 197–211). But the world they lived in was not the same as the world of their parents and grandparents. First, a gap had been created between place of residence and turangawaewae—the traditional home to tribe and family. Second, a major consequence of urbanisation had been a shift in the foundations for identity. No longer exclusively dependant on tribe, customary lands or rural lifestyles, identity was increasingly a function of being part of generic Maori networks and participating in those aspects of culture that were shared by all Maori.

‘Being Maori’ was possible in urban environments. Despite the urban context Maori language, for example, remains a major marker of identity. Although tribes have distinctive dialects, a common Maori language has become the province of thousands of second-language learners, reinforced by a Maori language television channel, Māori language immersion schools and Maori language print media.
Greater mobility and improved technology have also made it possible to retain links with extended families and with tribe—even though the links may be electronically mediated and visited, rather than lived. Some tribes have established tribal marae in metropolitan communities, while in other centres urban collectives have established their own marae that have significant but attenuated tribal links. Ironically, perhaps, urbanisation has strengthened tribal resolve. Maori continue to identify themselves according to tribal affiliations; five-yearly census takes record tribal affiliation; a wide range of health and social services are delivered by tribal authorities; and tribes are organised along corporate as well as customary lines.

It seems clear that being Maori in the twenty-first century will reflect tribal and urban realities (Mcintosh 2008: 38–51). At the same time the influence of a global philosophy will impact significantly on indigenous worldviews. Some Maori will reject the wider sphere and create an identity that is exclusively reinforced by Maori culture and custom, even at the risk of denying inevitable worldwide trends. More likely, at least if past trends are any guide, Maori will adapt to new environments, retaining cultural markers that are portable, and refashioning others to accommodate new places and new times. In that respect Maori philosophy is likely to be in a state of continuous evolution.

Martin, C. B.

John Heil

Charles Burton Martin (1924–2008) is one of those philosophers whose influence outstrips his reputation. Martin's early, unwavering opposition to Oxford-style 'linguisticised' philosophy and to philosophical theses tinged with verificationism helped set the course of work in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind in the second half of the twentieth century.

Born in Chelsea, Massachusetts in May 1924, Martin entered Boston University in 1944, graduating with an A.B. in philosophy in 1948. He earned admission to Emmanuel College, Cambridge partly on the strength of an undergraduate Honours thesis on Spinoza that had impressed A. C. Ewing, who was instrumental in Martin's becoming a Member of the College. At Cambridge Martin studied under John Wisdom, but remained impervious to the seductions of 'ordinary language' philosophy, which had begun to make inroads among his contemporaries. He was awarded a Ph.D. in 1959. His thesis, Religious Belief, was published the same year.

Martin spent two years (1951–53) in Oxford, attending Ryle's lecturers and seminars before joining J. J. C. Smart and U. T. Place at the University of
Adelaide in 1954. In Adelaide Martin participated in discussions that culminated in Place’s and Smart’s seminal articles on Central State Materialism—the mind-brain identity theory. In 1966, Martin accepted a post at the University of Sydney alongside D. M. Armstrong, who had moved from Melbourne to Sydney in 1964 as J. L. Mackie’s successor in the Challis Chair of Philosophy. Martin was professor of philosophy at Sydney until 1971, when he accepted a professorship at the University of Calgary. He retired to Medicine Hat, Alberta, in 2001.

Although he came of age in a philosophical climate dominated by Wittgenstein and Ryle, the influence of these philosophers on Martin appears to have been wholly negative. In an era obsessed with conceptual analysis, Martin insisted on ontological seriousness. From the 1950s Martin pushed for the importance of causality in accounts of the mind (functionalism’s core thesis), insisting that perception, memory, and belief were causally loaded some years before the appearance of Grice’s famous defense of a causal theory of perception in 1961 (see Martin 1959: 109). In 1966 Martin published, with Max Deutscher, an influential paper, ‘Remembering’, defending the idea that memories were, of necessity, linked causally to the past.

Attitudes toward publication today are very different from those prevalent in the 1950s and ’60s. Like many of his contemporaries, Martin preferred to work out ideas in lectures and discussions with students and colleagues, rather than seeing them through to print (see both Smart and Armstrong, in Heil 1989). One result is that Martin’s philosophical influence has been largely indirect, coming by way of other philosophers—in Australia, the U.S., Britain, and Canada, and a battery of high-powered philosophical correspondents, including D. M. Armstrong, David Lewis, and the neuroscientist Rodolfo Llinas. Philosophers today whose views reflect positions originally championed by Martin are often oblivious to their source (Grave 1984: 111).

A longstanding opponent of dualism, Martin never embraced the reductionist component of Australian Materialism. States of mind are internal states that play certain causal roles, but they are, as well, qualitatively distinctive. Indeed their causal roles depend on their qualitative nature. A common mistake, according to Martin, is to imagine that qualities are uniquely mental: every property is both a power and a quality, both dispositional and qualitative. Martin was, at first, inclined to regard properties as ‘two-sided’: every property has a qualitative and a dispositional ‘face’. This would require a brute connection between qualities and powers, however, an ontological anomaly. More recently Martin has defended a ‘surprising identity’ of qualities with powers: properties are powerful qualities (Martin 1997, 2008; see also Armstrong et al. 1996).

The surprising identity evokes Martin’s hero, Locke, as does Martin’s (1980) account of substance, and his acceptance of Locke’s maxim that ‘all things that exist are particulars’. Properties, Martin holds, are ‘tropes’, particular ways particular objects are. Unlike most contemporary friends of tropes, however, Martin favours a two-category ontology. Objects are not bundles of tropes.
Properties are had by, modifications of, particular substances. Following Locke, he characterises substances as substrata, but denies that this requires a notion of bare, propertyless particulars. Properties are ways particular substances are; every substance must be some way or other. As ways substances are, tropes are ‘non-transferable’. Socrates’ whiteness is Socrates’ whiteness, a way Socrates is. Martin thus rejects ‘trope transfer’ accounts of causation according to which causal relations involve a property’s migrating from a cause to its effect. Such views, he argues, belong to a tradition of ‘pipeline’ theories of the kind espoused by Descartes who, in Meditation Three, contends that whatever is in an effect must be present in its total efficient cause.

Martin holds that causation is best understood by reference to manifestations of dispositions—powers. Causation is not a temporally extended external relation between distinct events, but a fully mutual manifestation of reciprocal disposition partners. Salt’s dissolving in water is a mutual manifestation of dispositions present in the salt, the water, and the enveloping atmosphere. The world is not a linear sequence of causal chains but a ‘power net’ encompassing manifestations of dispositions which are themselves dispositions for manifestations with particular kinds of reciprocal disposition partners.

Martin’s conception of power or dispositionality is best understood in contrast to attempts to analyze dispositions counterfactually (see Martin 1994, a paper written in the 1950s). We deploy counterfactual locutions to pick out dispositions defeasibly by reference to their ‘typifying manifestations’. A fragile vase would shatter were it struck or dropped. An object can possess a disposition, however, even though the counterfactual is false. A vase swathed in bubble wrap might fail to shatter when dropped, yet would nevertheless retain its fragility.

Counterfactuals, then, cannot easily be used to distinguish cases in which an object lacks a disposition from those in which the object possesses the disposition, but its typifying manifestation is inhibited. They fail, as well, in ‘finkish’ cases, those in which conditions that would normally yield the manifestation of a disposition result in an object’s acquiring or losing the disposition in question. A wire is live if, were it touched by a conductor, current would flow from the wire to the conductor. But consider the electro-fink (Martin 1994: 2–4). An electro-fink incorporates a wire that is dead, but which becomes live when touched by a conductor. The counterfactual holds of the electro-fink, but the wire is not live.

Attempts to bolster the counterfactual analysis have missed an important element of Martin’s treatment of dispositions. One and the same disposition would manifest itself differently with different reciprocal disposition partners. The disposition responsible for a vase’s shattering might also, in concert with other reciprocal partners, be responsible for the vase’s maintaining its shape, or reflecting light in a particular way, or liquefying when heated. This feature of dispositionality is obscured when the focus is on ‘triggering events’ eliciting manifestations. Manifestations are mutual affairs that depend equally on complexes of reciprocal disposition partners.
Dispositional reciprocity has been ill appreciated by philosophers writing on powers. The individuation of a power involves ways the power would manifest itself with a variety of actual and possible reciprocal disposition partners. This provides indirect support for Martin’s contention that a property’s qualitativity and dispositionality are non-contingently related. You might think that a ball’s sphericity is only contingently connected to its rolling (rather than tumbling) down inclined planes. We can easily imagine balls failing to roll. But balls are complex objects that include countless dispositionalities that shape their behaviour with different reciprocal partners. A steel ball would fail to roll down a magnetised inclined plane or in the absence of gravitational pull. What is much more difficult to imagine is a ball’s sphericity not at all disposing it to roll, to make a concave impression in soft clay, to reflect light so as to look spherical. In the absence of a theory, we would, Martin thinks, find it altogether natural to identify the quality of sphericity with a disposition that would manifest itself in these ways with these reciprocal partners.

Martin’s brand of Australian realism reflected in his rejection of counterfactual analyses of dispositions, is reflected as well in extended criticisms of Dummett and Davidson (1984a, 1984b), his insistence on ‘ontological candor’ (1993), and most especially in his defence of a robust truthmaking principle: truths require truthmakers, a doctrine Martin has promoted tirelessly since the 1950s (see Armstrong 2004; C. Martin 1992, 1996, 2000). More precisely, truths require truthmakers and truth bearers. Truth bearers are not propositions but representations the significance of which stems from the use to which they are put in intelligent systems, another doctrine discernible in Locke. Use is grounded in dispositionalities of users (Martin and Pfeiffer 1986; Martin and Heil 1998). Mental representations are imagistic (Locke again). These can be verbal, but most are not: the importance of language to thought has been overrated by philosophers (Martin 1987).

Martin’s The Mind in Nature (2008) provides a synoptic view of his mature thinking on topics in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. Mental properties differ from physical properties, not in being immaterial, but qualitatively. Because every property is qualitative and dispositional, qualitativity permeates the physical and mental realms as does dispositionality. Nature includes both. Although it is convenient to talk of the world as comprising objects—particular substances—possessing properties and interacting in various ways, such a view ultimately leads to an unacceptable conception of objects as possessing indefinite boundaries. We can resolve these difficulties in a way that comports nicely with the world as physicists tell us it is by embracing a conception of the world as a single substance. Ordinary objects, then, are ways this substance is—tropes! Martin has come full circle from an undergraduate thesis on Spinoza, through Locke, and back to Spinoza.

Contributions to Marxist philosophy in Australasia have continued from the 1960s to the present. The twenty-year period from 1975 to 1995 represented a maturation of a renewed intellectual acquaintance with Marxist philosophy, following upon a revival of interest in it in the 1960s and early 1970s. This overview is not a personal history of Marxist philosophers, nor will it dwell on personal foibles and political conflicts around Marxist Australian philosophers—that sort of thing is already more than amply covered in the case of the University of Sydney by James Franklin’s (2003) sometimes entertaining history of the 1970s ‘split’ in its philosophy department.

After the Cold War began in the immediate aftermath of World War Two, an extensive critique of Marxism was developed in Western philosophy. Questioning of the credibility of the role of the U.S. in Vietnam during the 1960s (Horowiz 1971) led to questions about the sources of political power and distrust of public media in capitalist societies, which is nicely captured by Noam Chomsky (1969) and Ed Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988, 2002). This in turn led to questions about the nature of capitalism and attempts by more powerful, developed capitalist countries to exercise control over less developed countries. This prompted a revival of interest in Marxist philosophy. New contributions engaged with the Cold War critiques of Acton (1955), Plamenatz (1954, 1963) and Popper (1960, 1966). They also engaged with interpretations and developments of Marxist philosophy grouped into the three main schools of Analytical Marxists, Althusserians, and Hegelian Marxists.

The Australasian part of this new wave of interest in Marxist philosophy was peripheral but worth noting for its grounding in scientific method. All but one of the contributions discussed in this overview has engaged with and developed the relationship between Marxist philosophy and philosophy of science taken broadly as including logic and philosophy of logic. More recently, the relationship of Marx’s social theory to ‘actually existing’ socialism brought about a lull in contributions to Marxist philosophy, although it has revived somewhat in Australasia in recent years.

The High Point of Marxist Philosophy in Australasia: 1975–1995

The period of most intensive activity in Marxist philosophy in Australasia was preceded by an important contribution from Eugene Kamenka, who had come with his parents to Australia as a refugee from Nazism in 1937. With the publication of his Australian National University (ANU) Ph.D. thesis, he advanced the idea that Marx rejected normative ideas in favour of a science
of ethics, which Marx nevertheless failed to establish. Kamenka (1972: 101) attempts to sketch a basis for such a science, relying on John Anderson’s ideas on morality and causality. He also rightly stresses free cooperation as the basis of Marx’s revolutionary project and a key value to which Marx is committed. However, Kamenka’s analysis fails to provide a viable basis for the idea of free cooperation. It emerges as a kind of ‘authentic’ or ‘self-sufficient’ cooperation, free from subordination to ends other than those ‘intrinsic’ to that kind of activity. The circularity inherent in defining free cooperation as that which does not require ‘censorship, punishment and protection’ (1972: 104) leaves unresolved as many questions as it answers.

In positing free cooperation as Marx’s key good, Kamenka anticipates the important contribution of György Markus (1978). Markus, who was one of Lukacs last students, first published an English translation of an earlier work in Hungarian and later published in English an even more important work, which he titled Language and Production: A Critique of the Paradigms (1986). This relates Marx’s project of taking production as the exemplary instance of social organisation to subsequent theories that have used processes of communication through meaningful language as the exemplar of social relationships. Markus argues that social life cannot be understood in terms only of a paradigm of language. A stronger case can be made for the paradigm of production, as it has implicit in it shared consciousness and thus language as one essential means for the collective organisation of production and transmission of productive culture (1986: 34–8).

In his earlier work, Marxism and Anthropology, Markus’ original move is to claim that two opposing interpretations of human nature (the humanist and anti-humanist or structuralist) fail to grasp that human nature is not a fixed datum concerning individuals but is constituted by developing ensembles of social relationships, which may be assessed against a standard of what is ‘most worthy and appropriate for … human nature’ (Marx 1976: 959) rather than merely against standards set by any given social formation. Since the human essence is not a biological given, this socio-historical genesis of human life is simultaneously the genesis of its essence.

Markus’ position is interesting because he takes account of the Hegelian antecedents of Marx’s thought but differentiates Marx’s view of human nature and history from both traditional materialism and Idealism by stressing the role of practice in the self-constitution of human life and the shape of history. To my mind, though, he sometimes makes arbitrary extrapolations from Marx’s text. For example, he maintains that the spheres of necessity and distinctively human freedom must be institutionally separated in a communist society (1986: 70–3, 83). This makes Marx’s view needlessly implausible, however much followers of Marx may have used this idea to rationalise the oppressive productive relationships of the sphere of necessity within ‘socialist’ societies.

Wal Suchting, also of the University of Sydney (in the Department of General Philosophy), made another important contribution to Marxist philosophy with
the publication of his slim book, *Marx and Philosophy*, in the same year as Markus’ critique of the paradigms of language and production was published in English. Suchting too stresses the overriding importance of the notion of ‘material practice’ in Marx’s philosophy but is more influenced than Markus by Althusser’s reading of a ‘break’ in the direction of a ‘scientific Marx’, which for Althusser occurred with the drafting of *The German Ideology* in collaboration with Engels.

In a number of articles leading up to his book (including, especially, Suchting 1983), Suchting provides a critique of traditional epistemology. He claims that it poses a philosophical problem, whose philosophical solutions inevitably collapse into either scepticism or dogmatism. Suchting proposes that we should instead dismiss the philosophical problem of knowledge as a ‘scholastic question’. We can then simply replace the problem of knowledge with the view that knowledge develops from practical relations through which the agent transforms objects as intended. However, it is not clear that this does not give rise to a similar question: if we may ask what characterises reliably true observation of objects, may we not ask what feature marks out reliably true interventions on objects?

In his discussion of the issue of materialism, Suchting claims that ‘practical materialism’ is once again a stance or position taken rather than a claim about the nature of the world. It amounts to a practical refusal to entertain ‘Idealist crotchets’ or interpret the outcomes of practice and theory in their light. It is a program of enquiry into the material world, taken as independently existing, which is not limited by assumptions of the unknowability of its object or assumptions that there are boundaries beyond which these objects are unknowable.

Suchting justifies the materialist ‘line’ or stance by claiming that the Idealist line produces cognitive and practical effects that are contrary to emancipatory interests, while the materialist line has cognitive and practical effects that further such interests. This justification turns on being able to identify what forwards or constrains emancipatory interests. The difficulty in this is illuminated in Suchting’s (2004) essay, published after his death, on Althusser’s late thoughts about materialism. In this essay, Suchting recommends a form of practical materialism, which Althusser terms ‘aleatory’ or ‘chance dependent’ materialism, because it maximises ‘openness’. This form of materialism recommends philosophical ‘interventions’ directed against ‘untested—even untestable—assumptions about the possibilities for emancipation, assumptions either about what forwards or what constrains it’ (2004: 66). Suchting’s ‘practical materialism’ here seems to fall upon its own sword, since it relies on but also rejects assumptions about possibilities for emancipation.

Suchting follows Althusser in distinguishing between analyses of social change within a social system (‘synchronic’ analyses) and changes of social system (‘diachronic’ analyses). He accepts the former but rejects the latter entirely. In his discussion of historical materialism, Suchting (1993: 150–1, 154) distinguishes between real objects and ‘theoretical’ objects. Since historical
materialism employs theoretical concepts such as ‘mode of production’, ‘relations of production’ and ‘productive forces’, amongst others, Suchting claims that it is not about real history at all. It does not assert even ‘a teensy-weensy degree of directionality’ in history (1993: 153). While historical materialism abstracts from the specific circumstances and other causes of social change, it is not clear that it cannot assert a direction to history, albeit non-quantitatively, similarly to the way the second law of thermodynamics asserts a direction for change of entropy with respect to closed systems.

Ian Hunt from the discipline of philosophy at Flinders University has made a continuing contribution to Marxist philosophy and Marxist economic theory. A former student of Wal Suchting, Hunt did not fall in with the fashion of interpreting Marx from the standpoint of Althusser, which was established at the University of Sydney, or with the fashion of Analytical Marxism. However, Hunt shared with Markus and Suchting a commitment to understanding Marx’s scientific methodology, coupled with an attempt to understand its Hegelian roots.

Hunt (1986) restates Marx’s theory of exploitation in ‘A Critique of Roemer, Hodgson, and Cohen on Exploitation’, published in the same year as Markus’ and Suchting’s major books. It provides a basis for a general theory of forms of class exploitation, based upon three forms of classification corresponding to the three aspects of exploitation: its social foundation, manner of appropriation of the surplus product, and forms of coercion involved. This enables an account of the contrast between slavery and the wage slavery that Marx discovers within the capitalist mode of production. On this account, slavery and wage labour are similar in that they both involve direct appropriation of the product of labour, with no recognition of any prior claim. However, they differ in that wage labourers belong to themselves and may only be subject to the discipline of need, while slaves belong to their masters, and may thus be subject to physical coercion (Hunt 1986: 155).

Ian Hunt’s major contribution to Marxist philosophy is his book Analytical and Dialectical Marxism, published in 1993, in which he used a model of dialectical relations in Marx’s theory of society to resolve issues in the interpretation of historical materialism, Marx’s theory of capitalism and his theory of revolution. The chapters on Marx’s theory of capitalism and his theory of revolution are based on earlier articles (Hunt 1982; Hunt 1983) and arguably refute some glib critiques of Marx’s theories of capitalism and revolution. However, they have two shortcomings. The analysis of the capitalist mode of production focusses on capitalism as a form of commodity production rather than on its central feature for Marx, which is that it is a system of exploitation. The account of Marx’s theory of revolution employs an intuitive theory of free collective action. A more developed account of free collective action might have highlighted the significance of this concept.

The book’s interpretation of historical materialism is more developed. This account (Hunt 1998) was republished in a revised form to address the issues
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raised in Levine, Wright and Sober (1992), which could not be taken into account in the analysis of historical materialism in Analytical and Dialectical Marxism.

Australasian philosophy has also accommodated unfashionable developments in logic. One of these involved a contribution to Marxist philosophy by Graham Priest, who is currently professor of philosophy at the University of Melbourne. Priest argues in a number of articles and in his book In Contradiction that Marxian dialectics should be interpreted as a commitment to what Priest dubs ‘dialectic’ or non-classical logics that accommodate the truth of contradictions (see Priest 1981, 1985, 1987, 1990, 1991).

There have been fewer contributions to Marxist philosophy in Australasia since the fall of the Soviet Union. György Markus has turned away from a position sympathetic to Marxism but still engages with it in some of his publications. Some of Wal Suchting’s papers have been published posthumously. Ian Hunt has continued to work on the theory of the legal and political superstructure, engaging with theories of freedom and of justice. He is now developing positions in Marxist philosophy on the basis of this work (e.g. Hunt 2007).

Scott Mann, in Heart of a Heartless World: Religion as Ideology (1999), has provided one interesting contribution during the recent past. Mann attempts to fuse Marx’s theory of society with Freudian psychoanalysis in order to explain the enduring appeal of religious illusions, much as Chodorow (1978) similarly attempted a fusion of psychoanalysis with feminism in order to explain the enduring relationship of domination and subordination between men and women.

More recently, Scott Mann and Michael Head (2005) have written an introduction to the law as a system of ideas and institution, using Marxist ideas to put law in its social context. Michael Head now has a more direct contribution to Marxist philosophy in his book, Evgeny Pashukanis: A Critical Reappraisal (2007). After canvassing reasons why Marxist philosophy of law developed soon after the Bolshevik revolution by authors such as Pashukanis, Head argues that Marxist philosophy of law should engage with ideas of the law written from a Marxist perspective, from which, he suggests, legal institutions are regarded as a form of social regulation viable only in class societies.

These developments suggest that a resurgence of Marxist philosophy may be underway in Australasia, whose focus is on institutions of the legal and political superstructure and concepts such as freedom and justice connected with these. Marxist philosophy in Australasia has made useful contributions to debates within Marxist philosophy in the past, especially in relation to the implications of a proper understanding of science to the credibility and interpretation of Marx’s theory of society. There will no doubt be useful contributions in the future.
Massey University

Roy Perrett

Massey University is the pioneering provider of extramural (distance) education in philosophy in New Zealand and is still today the largest and preeminent such provider in the country. Instruction in philosophy has been offered there, both extramurally and internally, since 1969. The foundation professor of philosophy was the Canadian Ross Robinson (epistemology, philosophy of science). Over the next few years three new lectureships were successively taken up by John Patterson (logic), James Battye (philosophy of science) and Tom Bestor (philosophy of mind, Plato). Undergraduate student numbers grew steadily, particularly due to the introduction of a successful critical thinking course.

After Robinson’s retirement the second incumbent of the chair of philosophy was New Zealander Graham Oddie (metaphysics, ethics), appointed from the University of Otago. Oddie served as chair during 1988–94, before departing to take up a professorship at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Under his leadership the department expanded significantly to include two new lecturers: Roy Perrett (ethics, metaphysics) and Andrew Brien (ethics). Student numbers increased steadily and a more even balance between extramural and internal enrolments was achieved. Staff research productivity increased significantly at this time with work being published in a variety of fields, including metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind and Plato. A unique feature of the department’s research profile during this period was a serious concern with traditional Maori thought and its implications for social and political philosophy in Aotearoa/New Zealand, a concern reflected in a collection of essays edited by Oddie and Perrett (1992) and in work by Patterson (1992).

Oddie’s successor to the chair of philosophy was Peter Schouls (Descartes, Locke), appointed from the University of Alberta. In 1998 the philosophy department was absorbed into the School of History, Philosophy and Politics, and Schouls was appointed Head of School. In 1997 Andrew Brien left and, in a time of university retrenchment, his position was not reopened. Perrett left in 2001, replaced by Adriane Rini (Greek philosophy, logic). Patterson retired and then so too did Schouls (in 2001). The chair of philosophy was not reopened.

Instruction in philosophy continued to be offered, however, by a succession of lecturers, including Bestor, Battye and Deborah Russell (political philosophy), until their retirements or resignations. New appointments were made, including Bill Fish (philosophy of mind and perception) and Glen Pettigrove (ethics, political philosophy), though Pettigrove left for the University of Auckland in 2008.
Materialism, Australian

At the time of writing (November 2008) teaching responsibilities for the Philosophy Programme at Massey are shouldered by Rini, Fish and two senior tutors (Stephen Duffin and Stephen Chadwick). There continues to be a heavy emphasis on extramural teaching. The chair of philosophy has not been refilled, notwithstanding two unsuccessful professorial searches in recent years. However, Massey University is reportedly still committed to reviving the chair of philosophy, which has been unoccupied since Schouls’ departure in 2001.

Materialism, Australian

Peter Forrest

By ‘Australian materialism’ I mean the physicalist theory that J. J. C. Smart (1959b) inspired by U. T. Place (1956), and D. M. Armstrong (1968) inspired by Smart (1959b), argued for in the 1960s. It was significant in three ways: as a misunderstood and now under-rated philosophical thesis, as one important instance of the resurrection of metaphysics, and as marking the glory days of Australian philosophy.

Australian materialism, Central State Materialism or the identity theory, as it was variously called, was based upon two ideas. The first was to give a ‘topic-neutral’ description of mental states in terms of their causes and effects. Thus itches are that kind of state, whatever it might be, that tends to result in scratching and is caused by certain kinds of irritation. This may be contrasted with the Rylean behaviourist account, dominant until then, according to which the statement ‘I have an itch’ is to be analysed in terms of various conditionals, such as ‘If it were socially appropriate I would scratch furiously’. It may also be contrasted, though not so starkly, with the functionalist account of David Lewis (1970), according to which all the mental states are jointly analysed in terms of their causes and effects, without circularity. Lewis’ account was accepted by Armstrong as a friendly amendment.

The second idea was to argue that the types of states characterised in this topic-neutral fashion were in fact types of brain processes, so that types of mental state are identified with types of brain process, rather than being treated as special mental types as they would on, say, property dualism.

Central State Materialism was largely abandoned as a result of two objections. The first is that the same topic-neutral description might in fact pick out more than one mental state; the second is that the same topic-neutral description might be realised by more than one brain process. The first objection, pressed home by Michael Bradley (1963), is that in the case of vision the topic-neutral description only specifies colour contrasts, and so cannot distinguish what normal humans
see from the case of an inverted spectrum where red appears to the abnormal person as green and vice versa. Technically this objection fails because the abnormal person would fail to distinguish very dark green from very dark blue, but would instead wonder why we call two quite different colours brown. But that detail does not matter. For those of us, the vast majority, who lack perfect pitch, the topic-neutral account of pitch leaves nothing out, but it does for the minority with perfect pitch. This objection shows the wisdom of retaining Smart’s position that the topic-neutral description should include causes of mental states as well as effects: it is contingently the case that many tomatoes turn from green to red when they ripen but none that I know of turn from red to green. That serves to tell us which is red and which green. And if Central State Materialism is correct it follows that observing patterns of brain activity is in principle enough to discover whether we harbour inverted spectroids in our midst.

The other objection, due to Hilary Putnam (1975), is that the same mental state might be realised by different types of brain process. Colour vision has evolved at least three times, among cephalopods, among insects and among vertebrates. While we might doubt that there is something it is like to be a bee, it is plausible enough that there is something it is like to be a squid. But when squids see colour it is not likely that the same type of brain processes occur as in a human being seeing the same colour. Moreover, although close encounters with them are not reported by philosophers when sober, most of us think it likely that there are or have been many extraterrestrials out there, a long way away. They might have brain-analogs quite unlike our brains. This, the Multiple Realisation Problem, pushed most physicalists into the rather weak token-token identity thesis that merely states that any particular mental state is the same as some particular physical process. Unless persuaded by Donald Davidson’s case for anomalous monism (1980), this reaction seems too extreme. For, regardless of whether physicalism or dualism is correct, it is plausible that there is some correlation between physical processes and mental states. So even if there is a Multiple Realisation Problem the proper response is the sub-type/sub-type identity thesis that Lewis and Armstrong came to hold, namely, that the one mental type is realised by a variety of physical types. The differences between type-type identity, token-token identity and sub-type/sub-type identity may be illustrated using Frank Jackson’s example of vitamins. Vitamins may be characterised functionally as chemicals needed in small amounts in the diet. There is no one type of chemical that is a vitamin, but it would be silly just to identify some token smallest possible vitamin intakes with token chemical molecules because we deny that vitamins fall into a fairly small number of sub-types, A, B1, B2, etc. Even when a given sub-type, say Vitamin A, comprises many inter-convertible sub-sub-types, we can still list the total of types of molecule that are vitamins.

In any case, identity theorists were too quick to surrender, I say. Why suppose that an octopus or an extraterrestrial has the same type of experience a normal human being has when looking at a ripe tomato? Lewis’ Martians may well
experience something they dislike when we carelessly tread on their suckers, but why think it anything like a human pain? Why be so reluctant to admit mental states that we cannot imagine? The answer, I suspect, has nothing to do with materialism or physicalism as such, but with scientific naturalism: the language of science is colourless, soundless and scentless. That a certain pattern of frequencies (in a human brain) is the very same property (of the mind/brain) as sensing tomato-red may well be true, but if so it is not part of completed science but rather part of incomplete metaphysics. Moreover, the materialism that the identity theory was intended to support is compatible with Idealism, for maybe every physical property is also a way of appearing.

Australian materialism was part of a more general revival of metaphysics. The rather different influences of W. V. Quine and Roderick Chisholm, as well as the rise of scientific realism, also owing a lot to Smart, and in addition Armstrong’s later defence of universals were other noteworthy influences. Metaphysics had been flourishing earlier in the twentieth century but among English-speaking philosophers it had been thought outmoded by positivist, Wittgensteinian, and linguistic philosophers. The identity theory was shocking not because it was materialist (Gilbert Ryle was, I guess, a closet materialist) but because it was explicitly metaphysical.

Medical Ethics

Justin Oakley

In the early decades of the twentieth century, debates in Australasian medical ethics focussed on issues such as the permissibility of advertising by individual practitioners and the setting of standard fees to prevent undercutting by competing practitioners. After World War One, Australasian medical schools began to include brief instruction in the ethical obligations of physicians. There was also some public discussion of issues such as abortion, methods of birth control, and confidentiality in relation to patients with sexually transmitted diseases.

In the late 1940s the Labour government in Australia tried to introduce a national health scheme, which would have provided universal access to health care for the first time. However, these plans were defeated in parliament in 1949, after legal challenges and a campaign by the local branch of the British Medical Association, many of whose members saw these plans as a step towards the ‘socialisation of medicine’ (Gillespie 1991). Under subsequent Liberal governments, access to publicly-funded health care was available only to old-age and invalid pensioners. In 1975, the Labour government introduced Medibank, which provided universal access to government-subsidised health care. Although
the Liberal/National coalition government gradually dismantled this program during the late 1970s, it was reinstated as Medicare in 1983 by the Labour government, and it has continued to operate until the present.

Ethical issues in reproduction became a major concern in Australasia in the early 1980s, following pioneering IVF research by a team led by Carl Wood and Ian Johnston at Monash University Queen Victoria Medical Centre and the Royal Women's Hospital in Melbourne during the 1970s. This research led in 1983 to the world’s first live IVF births from frozen embryos and donated eggs. Victoria also introduced the world’s first legislation (the Infertility Medical Procedures Act 1984) to deal specifically with these new reproductive technologies. Among other provisions, this legislation allowed IVF to be carried out at approved hospitals, for married couples who have already sought infertility treatment for at least twelve months prior to attempting IVF.

Care for the terminally ill became another widely debated issue in Australia during the 1980s and 1990s. South Australia and Victoria passed legislation in 1983 and 1988, respectively, which allowed competent patients to refuse medical treatment in certain circumstances. In 1995 the Northern Territory became the world’s first jurisdiction to legalise active voluntary euthanasia, with the passing of the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (1995). This legislation permitted doctors to carry out voluntary euthanasia for terminally ill patients with unbearable suffering who had repeatedly requested assistance in dying, under certain specified conditions. The lives of several patients were lawfully ended under this Act before it was overruled by the commonwealth Euthanasia Laws Act in 1997.

Australasia’s first research centre in bioethics, the Monash University Centre for Human Bioethics, was established by Peter Singer, together with colleagues in medicine, science and law, in 1980, while several smaller research centres for bioethics were set up over the next two decades. Research in medical ethics has also been carried out by philosophers at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), which was established by Charles Sturt University in both Canberra and Melbourne in 2000. The interdisciplinary Australasian Bioethics Association was formed in 1990, and its inaugural conference was held in Melbourne in 1991.

Australia’s National Bioethics Consultative Committee was established in 1988 as an expert advisory committee to the federal government on issues such as access to information about their origins for children born from IVF, artificial insemination by donor, surrogate motherhood, and embryo experimentation. This committee was superseded in 1991 by the Australian Health Ethics Committee.

Australasia’s first institutional ethics committee was established by the Royal Victorian Eye and Ear Hospital in Melbourne in 1957 (McNeill 1990). In the 1980s, Australian universities began forming ethics committees to oversee medical and other research carried out at those institutions. Following wide community consultation and a 1996 federal government review, the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans was issued in 1999, as a guide for all human research ethics committees in Australia. The basic principles in
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the National Statement are integrity, respect for persons, beneficence, and justice, which are developed in more detail through their application to a variety of different types of research. The revised edition of the National Statement appeared in 2007.

In New Zealand, the Medical Research Council decided in 1968 that all research must adhere to the Declaration of Helsinki, which stressed the need for informed consent by research participants. In 1987, there was widespread public outrage after revelations of research involving clandestine selective nontreatment of women with cervical cancer, carried out at the National Women’s Hospital in Auckland from 1966 to 1981. The subsequent government inquiry resulted in an amendment to the New Zealand Human Rights Commission Act of 1977, to include a statement of patients’ rights to proper standards of care and adequate disclosures to enable genuinely informed consent (Campbell 1989).

During the 1990s there was much discussion in Australia about patients’ legal rights to treatment information, prompted by the Australian High Court decision in Rogers v Whitaker (1992), which gave legal recognition to a patient-centred standard of disclosure of medical information.

In recent years, Australasian medical schools have increased their teaching of ethics to medical students. The University of New South Wales and the University of Newcastle began teaching ethics courses to medical undergraduates in the 1970s, and the University of Adelaide’s medical school introduced ethics into the undergraduate curriculum in the early 1980s. Following the recommendations of the 1988 National Inquiry into Medical Education, many other Australian medical schools included ethics as part of their undergraduate programs. These developments in medical ethics education should help to promote vigorous discussion of medical ethics issues in Australasia into the future.

Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy

Matthew Sharpe

The Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy (MSCP) is a not-for-profit teaching institution housed within the University of Melbourne’s philosophy department.

The MSCP was founded in 2002 by a group of Melbourne philosophy graduate students and friends (Jon Roffé, Ashley Woodward, Jack Reynolds, Cameron Shingleton, Craig Barrie, Matthew Sharpe and David Rathbone). Without being bound by a shared commitment to any single philosophical doctrine or method, the school’s animating concern was that Continental or European Philosophy (roughly, continentally located philosophers since Kant) was not being widely
taught within philosophy departments in Victoria—or else that it was being taught with insufficient analytic rigour in other disciplines, thereby discrediting the work of important thinkers.

With this concern in mind, the central activity of the MSCP is to run annual summer and winter schools, open to students and the general public. These schools involve courses on key topics and thinkers in Continental Philosophy, and classes in which ideas from German Idealism, **phenomenology**, **poststructuralism**, **psychoanalysis** and critical theory are used to analyse contemporary issues and events.

The immediate precedent for the school was a two-week lecture course by Matthew Sharpe on ‘Psychoanalysis and German Idealism’ as part of the University of Melbourne’s Summer Study Program in January 2002. Given the success of this course, shortly afterwards the founders established an organising committee to be headed by a School Convenor, and a working constitution. The MSCP’s aim would be to run a program of courses on modern European Philosophy each summer and winter vacation period, and to promote the wider teaching and learning of European philosophy in Melbourne and Australia more broadly.

In December 2002, the MSCP co-hosted the **Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy** (ASCP) conference with the University of Melbourne Department of Philosophy. In January 2003, the first MSCP Summer School was held. It involved courses on W. G. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze, Jean Baudrillard, and Slavoj Zizek. The first winter school followed in July 2003. From the summer of 2003–2004, the MSCP has added an ongoing series of classes on the history of ideas to its regular curricula.

Courses in MSCP Schools involve five two-hour lectures, one per day over a week, held by one or several lecturers. Students are not assessed. Nor, unless this is stipulated on the school’s website (<http://www.mscp.org.au>), do students require prior knowledge of the philosophical topic in question. As the MSCP is a not-for-profit organisation, registration costs are minimal in comparison with similar teaching institutions, and lecturers earn around half of the standard academic lecturing rates. Courses typically attract an eclectic mix of undergraduate and graduate students, as well as members of the wider community.

Since its inception, the MSCP has expanded considerably: in terms of membership, teaching staff, and the school’s initiatives.

During 2004, founding MSCP Convenor, Jon Roffe, formally established a continuing institutional relationship between the MSCP and the University of Melbourne’s Department of Philosophy, with the assistance of Chris Cordner (then Head of the Department of Philosophy). This relationship gives the MSCP an office and a base in the department, as well as access to University of Melbourne resources and teaching spaces. In late 2004, the MSCP invited Marion Tapper of the University of Melbourne Department of Philosophy to become an honorary member.
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New MSCP members are usually philosophy Honours or graduate students. To join, they need to be recommended by current MSCP members and then to win the consensual support of existing school members. Since 2004, the school has attracted a new generation of teachers (including Bryan Cooke, James Garrett, Marc Hiatt, Alex Murray, and present School Convenor Paul Daniels), and hosted courses by a number of external lecturers, including Geoff Boucher, Andy Blunden, Fiona Leigh, and George Duke.

Following the success of the 2002 ASCP conference, the MSCP has also hosted academic conferences commemorating the 200th anniversary of Kant’s death (February 2004); ‘Sensorium’, a conference on philosophy and aesthetics (June 2005); ‘200 years since Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit’ (July 2007); and co-hosted colloquia on Jean-Paul Sartre and Jacques Derrida.

The MSCP is an evolving institution, and debate continues within it about its goals, whether the school should remain primarily a teaching organisation, and the degree to which its activities should be formalised.

Non-teaching initiatives undertaken by the MSCP to date include a Research Day on ‘Spinoza and the Infinite’ (2005); Parrhesia, an online refereed journal (<http://www.parrhesiajournal.org>) edited by Alex Murray, Matthew Sharpe, Jon Roffe and Ashley Woodward, launched in 2006; and a very successful lunch-time lecture series at the University of Melbourne on ‘The Lives of the Philosophers’. In 2008, the school began a series of courses taught by Dr Cameron Shingleton on issues surrounding global warming, and contributed support to a conference on the analytic-Continental philosophy divide held at La Trobe University. In 2009, the school co-sponsored the ASCP conference, and initiated two new events on the School calendar: annual autumn and spring workshops on particular topics (such as ‘What is philosophy?’ and ‘What are universities for?’) open to the general public.

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C. A. J. Coady

The Beginnings

Academic philosophy in Australia began at Melbourne University in 1881 with the appointment of the first lecturer in logic in the person of Henry Laurie. For more than seventy years it was home to the only philosophy department in Victoria. The Scottish-born Laurie had been editor and owner of The Warrnambool Standard, and five years after his initial appointment he was appointed to the newly created chair in philosophy, thereby becoming the country’s first professor
of philosophy. Nothing so vulgar as advertising the position had been considered by the university and the process by which Laurie slipped smoothly into the chair aroused some controversy (Blainey 1957: 102, Selleck 2003: 227–8). Longevity in office has marked the occupants of the chair since Laurie who was twenty-three years in his position. At the time of writing, there have been only seven professors in the department in its 120 years, and it has always been a single professor department. Nonetheless, it has had a powerful influence upon the development of Australian philosophy and, often enough, a significant impact upon philosophy internationally and a cultural impact on the life of the state.

Academic philosophy in Australia in the late nineteenth century was an infant phenomenon and seems to have made no impact on a well-known American philosopher who visited the country in the late nineteenth century. The Idealist, Josiah Royce, took leave from his position at Harvard to sail to the Antipodes in 1887, seeking recovery from a bout of depression that seems to have left him close to a nervous breakdown. Though greatly impressed by the civic spirit of Melbourne and particularly by its Public Library, Royce made no comment on the fledgling state of Melbourne academic philosophy, though he was greatly taken with the philosophical powers of the Victorian statesman and politician, Alfred Deakin. ‘Affable Alf’, as he was affectionately known, was to be one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the Federated Commonwealth, and eventually Australia’s second Prime Minister. Deakin seems to have drawn his own philosophical inspiration mostly from overseas, though he later developed a close relationship with one of Laurie’s star pupils, Edmund Morris Miller, whom he met in 1907. I’m told (by Bill Garner) that Miller wrote speeches for Deakin. I have been unable to discover whether Laurie himself had any contact with Deakin, but it seems unlikely since Laurie was a shy man who famously founded a monthly discussion dinner club and then was too inhibited to attend any of its meetings! (Scott 1936: 131). He had, however, considerable influence as a teacher: he was described by his former student John Latham (later Sir John, Attorney-General of Australia and then Chief Justice of the High Court) as ‘the best of the profs and the most beloved of the dons’ even though Latham as an atheist rationalist would not have been impressed by Laurie’s strong religious Presbyterian faith (Selleck 2003: 501). In spite of his reputation for shyness, Laurie was very active in the wider community; he wrote leaders for the Australasian newspaper and was particularly active in the art world. He also supported the emerging Heidelberg school and bought a number of their pictures even when they were unpopular. He was in fact the original owner of Frederick McCubbin’s now famous Lost and Tom Roberts’ Blue Eyes and Brown, and the two boys in Roberts’ The Violin Lesson are Laurie’s sons. There exist two portraits of him by outstanding artists in the Ian Potter Museum of Art at the University of Melbourne, one by Tom Roberts and one by Violet Teague.

Laurie, though an excellent teacher, had no distinctive philosophy to impart, and was content to introduce his students to the mainstream of British and European philosophy, with some emphasis on the Scottish tradition—indeed,
Laurie wrote a book on *Scottish Philosophy in Its National Development* (published in Glasgow in 1902). Aside from the Scottish influence, there were also sources from Continental Europe—Hegel, of course, but subsequently Bergson, Husserl and Eucken. These later influences were notably present in Laurie’s successor at Melbourne, W. R. Boyce Gibson. Just as there were two (unrelated) Andersons in the University of Sydney’s philosophical tradition, so there were two (closely related) Gibsons in the Melbourne tradition. The older Gibson assumed the chair in 1911 and his son Alexander followed him in 1935. The Gibson dynasty lasted fifty-four years from 1911 to 1965.

Gibson senior was an Oxford graduate who studied in Europe and, at Jena, came under the spell of Rudolf Eucken. Later, he attended Husserl’s seminars, as did the Oxford-trained philosopher William Kneale, then 21, who was to become White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford and wrote, with his wife Martha, the landmark *The Development of Logic* (1962). Gibson knew Kneale but seems to have quite misunderstood his criticisms of Husserl (Spiegelberg 1971, see esp. pp. 66 and 78n25). It is a curiosity of the history of thought that Eucken (now almost utterly forgotten) should have so influenced the older Gibson in Jena when there was in that same university at the time a European philosopher at the height of his powers, who was destined to exert a massive influence upon modern analytical philosophy. This was Gottlob Frege, who was in the process of revolutionising logic and inspiring a new approach to the philosophy of both logic and language. Of course, Frege was in the mathematics department and relatively unacknowledged, but what a difference it might have made to the development of Australian philosophy had Gibson brought Frege rather than Eucken to Melbourne! Although Gibson had a mathematics background and was to co-author a logic textbook, he seems to have known little of Frege, though he was aware of Frege’s critical review of Husserl’s *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, and would not have found Frege’s realism as sympathetic as Eucken’s highly rhetorical personal Idealism. It is also worth noting that Gibson’s admiration for Eucken was not at the time idiosyncratic. Eucken had after all been awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1908 for vindicating and developing ‘an Idealist philosophy of life’. His subsequent disappearance from intellectual history is perhaps a salutary warning about the vagaries of intellectual fashion and the ephemeral nature of illustrious prizes.

Against the Idealist trend, the University of Melbourne produced one influential anti-Idealist philosopher as a student in the late nineteenth century, in Samuel Alexander, but his fascinating career was entirely in England, especially as professor of philosophy at Manchester from 1893. I will merely note here that he influenced the philosophy of the first Gibson and of Sydney’s John Anderson; he was also on the selection committees that appointed both Gibsons and seems to have had a hand in Anderson’s appointment.

The heavily inflated language and often murky logic of much Idealistic discourse led inevitably to a powerful reaction in the realist and analytical movements in British philosophy, promoted in England by two giants of
It came much earlier in Sydney, where John Anderson brought his unusual version of realism and empiricism to the country on his appointment to the Sydney chair in 1927, but Melbourne philosophy remained largely immune to Anderson’s influence, though its commitment to Idealism faltered in the 1930s and had largely disappeared by the 1950s. The first Gibson was also interested in the phenomenological movement: he studied under Husserl, translated Husserl’s *Ideen* (1967), and rates more than a passing mention in Spiegelberg’s *The Phenomenological Movement* (1960). The elder Gibson’s orientation to current British and Continental debates established the cosmopolitan flavour characteristic of Melbourne philosophy in contrast to the more enclosed atmosphere of Andersonian Sydney. Although he wrote a lot and was well known in his day, the changing philosophical climate would not be kind to him as can be seen in the review of his early book on ethics, *A Philosophical Introduction to Ethics* (1904), by the emerging *enfant terrible* of analytical philosophy, G. E. Moore. Writing in the *International Journal of Ethics* for 1905, Moore devotes a ten-page review to a demolition of Gibson’s ideas, concluding with the sentence: ‘The book is a very poor book indeed’ (Moore 1905: 379).

A. (‘Sandy’) Boyce Gibson, W. R. Boyce Gibson’s son, was Christian and a traditionalist with Idealist leanings, but he initiated a great expansion in the size, intellectual scope and quality of the Melbourne department during his reign, appointing good people of all philosophical and ideological persuasions. He was also well known for his aphorisms, delivered with a slight lisp. (Both the older and younger Gibsons pronounced ‘r’ as ‘w’.) One I recall as characteristic: ‘Aristotle—mediocrity carried to the point of genius’. Either by design or by accident, he managed to achieve a balance of religious and irreligious in his staff appointments. When I joined the department on a full-time basis in 1966, after study in Oxford, there was a fascinating mix of Catholics, Protestants and agnostic/atheists. At one stage, after Gibson’s retirement, there were five Catholics amongst the fourteen full-time staff members, two Protestants and the rest unbelievers. When Max Charlesworth proposed a course in the Philosophy of Religion in the early 1970s, grave reservations were expressed at the Academic Board about how such a course could be given in a secular university. Even when the course was approved, a department rule was instituted (perhaps in response to such worries) that if a Christian was lecturing in the subject, it must be tutored by atheists or agnostics, and vice versa. This persisted for many years.

**The 1940s and Beyond**

In the 1940s the Melbourne department, partly because of Gibson’s ecumenical attitude to appointments, became an outpost of the new philosophical revolution associated partly with logical positivism and more significantly with the later Wittgenstein. A primary influence in this development was the arrival of
G. A. (George) Paul in 1939, fresh from Wittgenstein’s Cambridge. Stranded in Australia by the outbreak of World War Two, Paul was another Scots-born philosopher to exert a great influence upon Australian philosophy (his early education had been at St. Andrews). When Paul returned to England to a fellowship in Oxford at the end of the war, he was replaced by his friend, Douglas Gasking, whom Paul had earlier encouraged to migrate to a lectureship in Brisbane. Paul and Gasking had both studied under Wittgenstein, as did A. C. (‘Camo’) Jackson, who went to Cambridge from Melbourne for Ph.D. studies in 1946 and returned to a lectureship in the Melbourne department in 1948. Paul not only brought the new philosophy to Australia, but had an immense influence upon the development of other disciplines in the university, most notably history. In one year, all the full-time members of the history department attended Paul’s lectures on logic. Like Anderson’s, Paul’s impact could be partly explained by his being a big fish in a small pond (an especially small pond, in Paul’s case, because of the drainage of intellectual talent caused by the war in the period of his greatest influence), but he clearly was a remarkable teacher. He published little, and that before he arrived in Australia; his paper ‘Is There a Problem about Sense-Data?’ (1936) is his best-known contribution, though he also wrote on the unlikely topic of ‘Lenin’s Theory of Perception’ (1938). After he returned to Oxford he made little public impact on the subject.

Paul’s slender output was similar to many others who had been subject to Wittgenstein’s severe influence. The Master was averse to publishing and discouraged his students from doing so, indeed from becoming professional philosophers at all. He seems to have had a morbid fear of their plagiarising his (unpublished) work. Gasking’s publication record was relatively slight, though several of his papers were influential, and Camo Jackson hardly published at all in his long academic career: a short review of Norman Malcolm’s memoir of Wittgenstein and a joint obituary notice of Wittgenstein (with Gasking) were the whole of it. Yet he was an inspiring teacher and had an international reputation that resulted in his giving the prestigious John Locke Lectures in Oxford; the only other Australian so far with this honour is his son Frank Jackson, a Melbourne University graduate who also succeeded his father in the chair at Monash University. (Camo’s wife and Frank’s mother, Anne, also taught in the Melbourne department, adding to its dynastic flavour.)

Camo Jackson and Gasking had very contrasting styles. Camo was given to oracular pronouncements and lectured in a broody, questioning style that gave an audience to understand that something very deep and important was under discussion, even when they had little idea of what it might be. Gasking was clarity itself; his teaching and writing bore no relation to Wittgenstein’s cryptic manner, though he was obviously influenced by Wittgenstein’s thought. Under the spell of Jackson, one could think that Gasking moved too much in the shallows, but he was a fine teacher who influenced many good students. I once interviewed the two of them about Wittgenstein for an ABC radio program I did on analytic philosophy, called ‘The Fly and the Fly-bottle’. (Incredibly the ABC gave me over
seven hours of programming on successive Sunday nights for interviews with the likes of Isaiah Berlin, Noam Chomsky, Bernard Williams and Tom Stoppard.) Gasking was clear and poised, Jackson diffident, worried and somewhat opaque. Afterwards, Jackson, clearly relieved that the ordeal was over, said to me: ‘Thank God that’s finished; all through, I could sense him behind me, listening to hear if I got it right’.

George Paul’s interest in Lenin was an indication of something very distinctive about the politics of philosophy at the University of Melbourne. Just prior to and after World War Two, the Melbourne philosophers made a distinct shift to the political left. Sandy Boyce Gibson was conservative in politics and suffered definite discomfort all his life from the fact that his brother Ralph was a luminary in the Australian Communist Party. But Paul and his wife Margaret had left-wing sympathies, and some Melbourne staff and students played active roles in debates and intrigues about whether the university’s Labor Club should continue its association with the Eureka Youth League, which was communist-linked and so a problem for the club’s connection to the Australian Labor Party. One Melbourne philosopher, Peter Herbst, not at the time an Australian citizen, was offered a lectureship in New Zealand in the late 1940s, but had to decline when, apparently on the intervention of the Australian government, he was refused a visa on the surprising grounds that he was a well-known anti-fascist. (My source for this information is John Clendinnen, formerly of the History and Philosophy of Science Department at the University of Melbourne, who knew Herbst well at the time.) Amongst some of the staff, sympathy with the Soviet Union persisted long after it should have, even for instance well into the 1960s. But with this interest, some fascination with religion also persisted; I remember that Camo Jackson, in the 1960s, subscribed both to the liberal Catholic journal, *The Catholic Worker*, and the Communist Party paper, *The Daily Worker*.

The Wittgensteinian tradition that Paul, Gasking and Jackson established in Melbourne began with a somewhat positivist flavour, but later broadened under the impact of Oxford philosophy and the arrival of refugee intellectuals from continental Europe, some of whom had been absurdly deported from Great Britain in the ship *Dunera* and interned in Australia during much of the war. During the 1950s, the Melbourne department was host to a number of philosophers, both foreign born and locally educated, who later left to pursue philosophy overseas. These included such well-known names as W. D. Falk, Kurt Baier (his New Zealand wife Annette also worked in Australia), Alan Donagan, Brian O’Shaughnessy, Paul Edwards, and Michael Scriven. This established a trend for a later export industry, that included such Melbourne philosophers as Jenny Teichmann, Peter Singer, Mark Johnston, and Raimond Gaita, to name a few. Where Andersonian Sydney into the 1950s was confidently parochial and mostly contemptuous of recent developments in international philosophy, Melbourne stood for a more cosmopolitan and contemporary approach (though many of Anderson’s students later achieved considerable international recognition and even fame).
The influence of Wittgenstein in Melbourne was strong but not overwhelming, and indeed many of the best-known philosophers at the University of Melbourne in the 1950s and ’60s, such as H. J. (‘Honest John’) McCloskey and Max Charlesworth, were not Wittgensteinians. Charlesworth indeed was interested in what is nowadays called, after his coinage, ‘contemporary European philosophy’ and established a course of that name in 1968 that was highly popular with students. He was principally interested in phenomenology and existentialism but subsequently the course embraced Nietzsche, Heidegger and more recent French philosophers. Douglas Gasking succeeded Sandy Boyce Gibson in the Melbourne Chair in 1966 and the Melbourne department remained less metaphysically oriented than other departments in the country or indeed the new departments in the city of Melbourne, at La Trobe University and Monash University. There was less interest in the increasingly fashionable wave of ‘Australian materialism’ and later ‘Australian realism’ even though one of the pioneers, D. M. Armstrong, taught at Melbourne for several years before moving to the chair at the University of Sydney. The University of Melbourne philosophers tended to think of the mental in linguistic or social terms; they were suspicious of ontology, especially a radically simplifying ontology, though some were attracted to the ambiguous physicalism of Donald Davidson. Epistemology, philosophy of language and moral psychology were more to the fore. One product of the department who engaged with materialism directly was the expatriate Brian O’Shaughnessy, who spent most of his philosophical life in the University of London and developed a positive and original, if sometimes elusive, double aspect theory of the mind that was well reviewed internationally.

Melbourne was for a long time unsympathetic to the teaching of and research in developments in modern formal logic, preferring, under Gasking’s influence, to promote ‘informal logic’. That began to change with the creation of the new universities and changed more rapidly with the appointment of Len Goddard to the chair at the University of Melbourne in 1978. Goddard was a logician sympathetic to alternative logics, and this is a development that has been reinforced and extended under the present Boyce Gibson professor, Graham Priest, who is a leading figure in logic in Australia and internationally. His interests are complemented by his distinguished colleague, Greg Restall.

In ‘pure’ moral theory, two alumni of the Melbourne department who migrated to American universities produced significant books: Kurt Baier’s *The Moral Point of View* (1958) and Alan Donagan’s *The Theory of Morality* (1977). McCloskey published on fundamental moral theory, notably his book, *Moral-ethics and Normative Ethics* (1969), but his positive theories were basically intelligent refurbishments of intuitionism, then viewed as outlandish though in the early years of the twenty-first century becoming more fashionable. Another Melbourne product is Raimond Gaita, who lives partly in England where he is a professor at King’s College London and partly in Melbourne where he has a chair at the Australian Catholic University. His major book in moral theory, *Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception* (1990), was produced before he half-
returned to Australia. He was a student at the University of Melbourne and then Leeds, and the book shows the influence of Wittgenstein and also other unusual influences like Simone Weil. Gaita's thought is not always easy to follow, but he has the considerable virtue of a distinctive, somewhat non-conformist voice in moral philosophy in a country that tends to be dominated by more conventional outlooks. Gaita is well-known in the wider community, partly because of the huge success of his memoir, *Romulus, My Father*, as both book (published in 1998) and film (released in 2007).

In moral and political philosophy, McCloskey’s most influential work is found in his stern critiques and analyses of liberal political theory and his trenchant criticisms of utilitarianism, as, for example, in his *John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study* (1971) and his article, ‘An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism’ (1957). In spite of McCloskey’s denunciations, one notable feature of Australian moral philosophy persisting into the present century has been the prevalence of utilitarianism. The Melbourne department had seldom been sympathetic to utilitarian thought: in the early years, Henry Laurie had condemned utilitarian thinking about education and the Wittgensteinian influence tended to see utilitarianism as too crude to account for the complex, even mysterious, nature of morality. Sandy Gibson would have endorsed Eucken’s view in his acceptance speech for the Nobel prize that utilitarianism, ‘which ever form it assumes, is irreconcilably opposed to true intellectual culture’.

Nonetheless Australia’s best known moral philosopher, indeed possibly the best known philosopher anywhere outside academia, the University of Melbourne educated Peter Singer, has been an enthusiastic utilitarian and has deployed the theory in his various writings and activities in applied ethics. Singer’s books, especially *Animal Liberation* (1975) and *Practical Ethics* (1979), are amongst the few books by professional philosophers in the latter part of the twentieth century to have achieved something like best-seller status, and to be widely read well beyond academic circles. Moreover, Singer is (I think) the only Australian philosopher to have stood for Federal Parliament, with, it must be said, conspicuous lack of success. Singer was in the forefront of developing applied philosophy in Australia by establishing the Monash University Centre for Human Bioethics, and there is now a very healthy movement in applied philosophy in Melbourne. In 1990, the first institution to concentrate wholly on applying philosophy across a range of public questions, the Centre for Philosophy and Public Issues, was established within the Department of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne, with the present author as Director. This Centre existed until 2000 when it was absorbed into a Special Research Centre, funded by the Australian Research Council (ARC), for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), and jointly operating in Charles Sturt University (CSU) and the University of Melbourne, with Seumas Miller as Director at CSU and the author as Deputy Director in Melbourne. It is still running, and now involves the Australian National University as a division as well, though after 2008 its primary ARC funding ended. Peter Singer went to the U.S. to a
chair at Princeton University in the late 1990s, but is now half-time in CAPPE Melbourne, and so like Gaita he spends half his time overseas.

Public Influence

Philosophy has always had a strongly technical element, as a cursory dip into Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* will show, and so its influence on public life is often indirect. Nonetheless, philosophy at the University of Melbourne from its earliest years has exerted a more direct influence than usual upon the broader community. Henry Laurie, in spite of his shyness, gave many public lectures on important topics, but the sensitivity of the university’s authorities to anything that seemed controversial, especially in the area of religion, created a crisis when Laurie sought permission in 1890 to deliver a lecture on ‘The Teaching of Morality in State Schools’ to the Melbourne Head Teachers Association. The University Council had some twenty years earlier refused permission to the Professor of Anatomy, Physiology and Pathology to give a public lecture on Protoplasm because the Bishop of Melbourne thought it might have undesirable political and religious consequences! In light of this, Laurie’s proposal clearly meant dynamite and the chancellor declared it ‘a very dangerous subject indeed’ (Scott 1936: 44–5). Laurie was at first forbidden, but he protested that it was surprising that ‘the Professor of Moral Philosophy is not to be allowed to lecture on the teaching of morality in the schools!’ (Scott 1936: 45). In response, the University Council lifted the ban on condition that Laurie didn’t ‘introduce either party politics or sectarian discussion’ (*ibid.*). (Such nervousness re-emerged, as noted earlier, in response to Charlesworth’s proposals in the 1970s for a course in Philosophy of Religion.) Laurie also gave a public lecture on art that urged local artists to reflect the beauty of the Australian environment and may have been influential in the development of the Heidelberg school (Selleck 2003: 363). Laurie was also a strong advocate for philosophy as an important factor in the cultural and intellectual life of the wider community. In 1881, just prior to his appointment as lecturer in logic at the university, he published a paper in the *Victorian Review* entitled ‘A Plea for Philosophy’, which argued the importance of the study of philosophy against the utilitarian spirit that he thought too influential in Australia. Laurie thought that this utilitarianism (which in its emphasis might better be called philistinism and was a clear forerunner of contemporary government attitudes to universities) was actually ‘as inimical to individual or national progress’ as it was to ‘the spirit of philosophical research’ (Laurie 1881: 15–16).

In fact, several of Laurie’s pupils were active in the cultural life of the city. One form of this activity was in the area of libraries. Both Morris Miller and another philosophy graduate, Amos Brazier, worked at the Victorian Public Library, and Miller published the first Australian monograph in librarianship, *Libraries and Education* (1912), as well as being influential in founding the Library Association of Victoria in 1912. Miller and Brazier were involved in lengthy internal disputes with the chief librarian La Touche Armstrong over many things, including the
building of the famous reading room dome and the introduction of the Dewey decimal system. The philosophy graduates were hotly opposed to the Dewey system and much of their opposition seems to have sprung from the fact that philosophers were long regarded as the ideal people to classify and categorise books, and Dewey’s system would put most of them out of this enjoyable job because it could be applied fairly mechanically. Miller’s opposition was so strong that when he became Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at the University of Tasmania in 1928, and later Vice-Chancellor of that university, he used his influence to keep the Dewey system out of the university library until the 1950s.

The two Boyce Gibsons were less involved in public life but the later one gave several ABC broadcasts on topics of the day. His tolerant encouragement of a mix of philosophical and ideological outlooks in the department contributed to the department’s impact beyond the classroom. The Rationalist Society and the Newman Society had many philosophy postgraduates and staff as members. Hot debates were held at lunchtime to packed audiences between Rashos and Catholics or other Christians. One of the most notable debaters and argumentative fraternisers in local pubs was the eccentric Catholic philosophy lecturer, Dr. Vernon Rice. Vernon professed stern Catholic orthodoxy and an idiosyncratic version of Thomism, and in spite of his orthodoxy was evidently homosexual at a time when this was not something openly declared. Vernon was not out of the closet, but neither was he altogether enclosed by it. Other Catholics in the department were less concerned with combating atheism and professed a brand of liberal Catholicism that was associated with the magazines Prospect and the Catholic Worker. The latter magazine, which notably opposed Santamaria’s movement, was co-edited for many years by Max Charlesworth and the present author (with unofficial help from the journalist Paul Ormond). This led some to declare that the journal should be renamed ‘The Catholic Senior Lecturer’.

These days, philosophers like other intellectuals are frequently quoted in or write for the media, undertake consultancies (especially in the area of professional ethics), and contribute more indirectly to the public culture. In today’s globalised world, there is much less that is distinctive of Melbourne, or indeed Australian, philosophy, though contemporary Australian work in philosophy remains impressive. A well-known German philosopher once expressed his amazement to me in Berlin that such a small country could produce so many outstanding sportsmen and also fine philosophers—he didn’t mean in the same persons. But like philosophy elsewhere in the English-speaking world, the University of Melbourne practitioners have acquired the polished professionalism that is part of a relatively homogenised international product. It is often technical and can seem remote to other thinkers and laypeople, but some local philosophers are adept at communicating with a broader public.

At the time of writing, the Department of Philosophy and CAPPE have been absorbed into a wider School of Philosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry and, partly through financial stringencies imposed by the Faculty of Arts and
partly because of other funding problems, the two units have been drastically reduced in numbers with damaging effects on the program’s international reputation and its capacity to perform adequately. This dire situation became in 2009 a matter of regular media publicity and the university seems committed to remedial measures, but it is unclear how successful these will be and hence how far the proud tradition at the University of Melbourne can be sustained. It is to be hoped that future students will be able to say of their philosophy teachers what Walter Murdoch said of Henry Laurie over 100 years ago. Laurie, said Murdoch, sent out into the world ‘a little company of young men and women trained to receive with a large tolerance every idea that might be set before them; to accept nothing and reject nothing without a calm and dispassionate reflection’ (Selleck 2003: 501–2).

Melbourne, University of, Department of History and Philosophy of Science

R. W. Home

History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) was introduced into the teaching program at the University of Melbourne after World War Two, to bridge the gap that was perceived to be growing in the modern world between science and the humanities. Those responsible wanted humanities students to gain an understanding of science as a process of discovery rather than an accumulation of facts. Similar concerns prompted developments at Harvard University that provided a model for Melbourne (Dyason 1977).

In late 1945, C. E. Palmer was appointed senior lecturer in ‘General Science and Scientific Method’, to teach courses in scientific method to Arts undergraduates. He taught the first course in 1946. His appointment effectively established what was to become the Department of History and Philosophy of Science.

There was also interest in the Faculty of Medicine, which in July 1946 agreed to include lectures in scientific method in the first year of the medical degree course. Unfortunately, while attendance at the lectures was compulsory until 1953, the subject was not examinable. Predictably, discipline problems emerged. The course continued to be taught, however, into the 1960s.

Meanwhile, the Arts program expanded into a three-year sequence of subjects within the B.A. degree, while in 1954 a subject was also introduced within the Science degree, directed primarily at intending science teachers. The first postgraduates enrolled in the late 1950s, while an Honours school followed in
1959. What began as a purely pedagogical initiative was thus transformed into a distinctive academic program with its own subject-matter and standards.

The growing teaching load had staffing implications. When Palmer departed in mid 1947, Gerd Buchdahl replaced him, being joined at the end of 1949 by Diana Dyason who transferred from the Department of Physiology, primarily to teach the medical course. John Clendinnen was appointed at about the same time. In the mid 1950s, Elizabeth Gasking and Brian Ellis joined the group. When Buchdahl took a year’s leave in 1954, Stephen Toulmin, visiting from Oxford, became Acting Head of department. Then, in 1958, Buchdahl left for Cambridge and Dyason became Head of Department.

As at Harvard, the discussions of scientific method that gave the department at the University of Melbourne its raison d’être were presented in the context of historical case studies built around the analysis of scientists’ original writings. Bulky collections of source materials—extracts from the original scientific writings—were assembled for use instead of textbooks.

Gerd Buchdahl had arrived in Australia in 1940 on Dunera, one of the famous shipload of Jewish refugees who contributed so much to national life. An engineer with a passion for philosophy, he studied the latter formally at the University of Melbourne before being appointed to teach HPS, and quickly began publishing papers in the leading philosophical journals. While his later international reputation rested largely on work published after his move to Cambridge, his historically sensitive concern with metaphysics in relation to science was already evident in papers written in Melbourne.

While Buchdahl was a philosopher who looked primarily to physics for his historical case studies, Dyason’s interests were chiefly historical and related primarily to biology and medicine, especially the history of public health. The seminar she developed in the 1970s on ‘Glorious Smelbourne’ became a local institution. Gasking also worked on the history of biology, eventually publishing two well-received books, *Investigations into Generation, 1651–1828* (1967) and *The Rise of Experimental Biology* (1970). Her death in 1973 was a major loss for the department.

John Clendinnen taught almost every subject offered by the department before eventually confining himself to his primary area of interest, the philosophy of science. He, too, developed an international reputation, based on a series of publications on the problem of induction. The appointment of Brian Ellis in 1956 brought additional strength in philosophy of science. His ten years in the department before becoming foundation professor of philosophy at La Trobe University were capped by the publication of his book, *Basic Concepts of Measurement* (1966).

Three other long-serving staff members joined the Department in the early 1960s. John Pottage, a historian of mathematics, focussed on the creative process involved in reaching mathematical understanding, culminating in his book, *Geometrical Investigations illustrating the Art of Discovery in the Mathematical Field* (1983). Monica MacCallum was involved in the Department’s first-year teaching
for many years and later also taught an upper-level unit on Darwinism. Leonard Trengove published a number of papers on eighteenth-century chemistry during his eleven years in Melbourne.

The 1960s witnessed increasing specialisation and a weakening of the focus on scientific method that had earlier held everything together. While the department’s historians found challenges enough in seeking an understanding of past science, its philosophers found issues to address in the philosophy of science that had little to do with scientific methodology.

In 1967, the vacancy created by Ellis’ departure for La Trobe University was filled by a historian of science, Roderick Home, a Melbourne graduate who had recently completed a Ph.D. at Indiana University. He, too, stayed for many years, becoming the university’s first (and so far only) Professor of History and Philosophy of Science in 1975 and serving until his retirement in 2003. He published two books on eighteenth-century physics, *Aepinus’s Essay on the Theory of Electricity and Magnetism* (1979) and *The Effluvial Theory of Electricity* (1981), and also numerous papers, many later reprinted in his *Electricity and Experimental Physics in Eighteenth-century Europe* (1992).

The early 1970s saw the appointment of Henry Krips, who had studied philosophy with J. J. C. Smart while pursuing a Ph.D. on the foundations of quantum mechanics. At Melbourne, he continued working on this topic, his book, *The Metaphysics of Quantum Theory*, being published in 1987. By this time, however, his interests had moved from philosophy of science to cultural studies; in 1992 he left to take up a position in this field in the U.S.

The department’s historical coverage was strengthened by the appointment in 1974 of Homer Le Grand, a University of Wisconsin graduate whose research focussed on the eighteenth-century ‘chemical revolution’ spearheaded by Lavoisier. In pursuit of his wider interest in theory change in science, Le Grand later investigated the rise of plate tectonic theory in geology, leading to his book, *Drifting Continents and Shifting Theories* (1988). He subsequently moved into university administration, serving as the University of Melbourne’s Dean of Arts before taking up an equivalent position at Monash University.

From the mid 1970s, the number of postgraduate students in the department grew rapidly. Theses dealt with a wide range of topics; with one exception, there was little sense of a research group forming around a member of staff and focussing on a particular area of inquiry. The exception was with respect to the history of Australian science, which in the 1980s Home developed as a second major area of research. The rich archival sources available locally underpinned the research projects of a number of students drawn into working on Australian topics.

also led a team working on the life and letters of Australia’s most important scientist of the nineteenth century, Ferdinand von Mueller, that has generated numerous publications.

From the mid 1970s, the department witnessed a steady stream of postdoctoral research fellows, including Aharon Kantorovitch, Stephen Gaukroger, Keith Hutchison, Andrew Pyle, Richard Gillespie, Pierre Kerszberg and Robert Stafford. Unfortunately, in the early 1990s the University abandoned its scheme of competitively awarded fellowships and the flow of postdoctoral fellows ceased. Hutchison and Gillespie both joined the department’s lecturing staff. Gillespie later moved to the Melbourne Museum, but Hutchison continued in the department until his retirement in 2006, publishing highly regarded papers on early modern science, and others on the foundations of statistics.

The department also attracted many visitors. Some of these—including such well-known figures as Wesley Salmon, Richard S. Westfall, Larry Laudan, Bruno Latour, Sally Gregory Kohlstedt, Allan Franklin and John Henry—stayed for several months and contributed significantly to the teaching program. Others came for one of the numerous conferences hosted by the department or on study leave, often to undertake collaborative research with a member of the department.

In 1982 Home launched a monograph series, *Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, published by D. Reidel (later, Kluwer Academic Publishers), in which individual volumes focussed on particular themes within the broader field of HPS. With Home as general editor and specialist editors for individual volumes, the series had extended to seventeen high-quality volumes by the time Home passed the editorship to Stephen Gaukroger in 2002.

Alarmed by the destruction of Australia’s scientific heritage, Home in 1985 established the Australian Science Archives Project (later the Australian Science and Technology Heritage Centre). With Gavan McCarthy as archivist in charge, the project’s brief was to seek out historically significant collections of Australian scientific records and to secure their survival, sorting and listing them before transferring them to an appropriate long-term repository. The project became a world leader in providing history of science information online, while the archiving software it developed is used internationally. In 2007, it became the eScholarship Research Centre within the University Library, but retains a strong focus on the history of Australian science, technology and medicine.

Several long-serving members of the department retired in the mid-to-late 1980s, and some of their replacements took the department in new directions. The Canadian historian of twentieth-century biology Jan Sapp spent six lively years in the department, 1984–90, during which he published two notable books, *Beyond the Gene: Cytoplasmic Inheritance and the Struggle for Authority in Genetics* (1987) and *Where the Truth Lies: Franz Moewus and the Origins of Molecular Biology* (1990). Helen Verran was appointed in 1990. A belief in the social construction of scientific knowledge and a commitment to actor-network methodology have shaped both her teaching and her research, the latter being encapsulated in her
book, *Science and an African Logic* (2001). Rosemary Robins and Anni Dugdale extended the department’s coverage to the sociology of contemporary science. Dugdale did not stay long, but Robins stayed for fifteen years. Her research focussed on public perceptions of the risks associated with scientific research and gave her a public role as a member of the Australian Government’s Genetic Manipulation Advisory Committee.

A coursework Master’s program was introduced in 1990, aimed at science communicators (including teachers) and managers. The program attracted strong enrolments until a change in government policy resulted in students being required to pay much higher fees. Enrolments collapsed and the program was phased out soon afterwards.

From the early 1990s, philosophy of science was in the hands of Neil Thomason and Howard Sankey. Sankey focussed on broad epistemological questions, notably the alleged incommensurability of competing scientific paradigms, leading to several edited volumes and his books *Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability* (1997) and *Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science* (2008). Meanwhile Thomason was more concerned to analyse instances of actual scientific practice, especially in using statistics, on which he published a number of papers and attracted a lively group of postgraduate students working on related topics.

Under Warwick Anderson, appointed in 1995, history of medicine remained an important part of the department’s activities. In 1997, the Centre for the Study of Health and Society (later the Centre for Health and Society) was established, with Anderson as director, as a joint initiative of the Faculties of Arts and Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences. Anderson was joined in the centre, and in the department, by Janet McCalman, a social historian with an expanding interest in medical issues. While Anderson later moved to the U.S., McCalman stayed. Her book, *Sex and Suffering: Women’s Health and a Women’s Hospital* (1998) won a number of awards.

The transfer of Don Garden from the History Department to HPS in 2003 added environmental history to the department’s offerings. Several students subsequently pursued higher-degree theses in this area. Garden’s book, *Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific: An Environmental History*, was published in 2005. With his retirement in 2007, however, momentum in this area was lost.

From the mid 1980s, the department hosted several faculty programs including Social Theory, Anthropology, and Computer Applications for the Humanities and Social Sciences. In 1999, after an eight-year association, Anthropology was transferred elsewhere, but the other two programs remained linked to HPS. Profiting from this, the lecturer in computer applications, Michael Arnold, has pursued a vigorous research program in the sociology of modern computer technology.

In 2007, the Faculty of Arts was restructured, with the traditional academic departments being merged into larger Schools. The Department of History and Philosophy of Science ceased to exist at that time. HPS continues, however, as a
teaching and research program within the new School of Philosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry. A further wave of retirements and resignations, at a time when the faculty’s budget was in serious deficit, saw the number of HPS staff decline as positions vacated were not always re-filled. Several promising young scholars have, however, been appointed, on whom the future of the discipline at the University of Melbourne now largely depends.

Metaphysics

Brian Weatherson

The story of metaphysics in Australasia is largely a story of defences and developments of realisms. This includes both the kind of realism that is opposed to familiar anti-realisms (eliminativism, projectivism, etc.) and stronger forms of realism that are opposed to projectivism.

The story starts with John Anderson’s arrival in Sydney from Scotland in 1927. Anderson defended a strong form of empirical realism, holding that everything exists in space and time. His views on many questions anticipated contemporary physicalism about mind and value, and many of his students at the University of Sydney became central figures in the development of Australian materialism.

More significantly for our story, Anderson developed a broadly ‘propositional’ view of reality, similar to the Tractarian view that the world is constructed of facts, not of things. This view heavily influenced his most important student, D. M. Armstrong, and in particular influenced four importantly related theories of Armstrong’s.

The first of these is the reality of universals (Armstrong 1978). Unlike Plato, and like Anderson, Armstrong denied that universals exist outside of space and time. Rather, he held, universals are ‘immanent’, they exist only in their instances. But unlike certain reductionists, Armstrong does not think that universals are merely sets or classes of particulars. Rather, they are a distinct and important part of ontology.

The second is the existence of states of affairs (Armstrong 1997). Again like Anderson, Armstrong held that whenever an individual a exemplifies a property F, there exists the state of affairs of a’s being F. Moreover, this state of affairs would not have existed had a not been F, and grounds a’s being F.

The third is the view that every truth has a truthmaker (Armstrong 2004). That is, for every truth p, there is some thing x such that x’s existence makes p true. When p is a simple subject-predicate proposition Fa, the truthmaker is the state of affairs of a’s being F. In more complicated cases, e.g. when p is a quantified or modal truth, it is more difficult (and hence more interesting) to say what p’s
truthmaker is. Armstrong first deployed the idea of truthmakers to both point to the metaphysical deficiencies of Ryle’s theories of mind, and to point to a way to supplement the theory to make it more plausible.

The fourth is the view that laws of nature are in some sense necessary (Armstrong 1983b). Armstrong held that All Fs are Gs is a law of nature only if a ‘necessitation’ relation N holds between the universals F and G. The idea here is not to defend a strong form of scientific essentialism; Armstrong holds that it might be contingent that N-holds between F and G. Rather, the idea is that N can explain (and indeed make true) some of the distinctive features of laws.

Although he primarily worked in the U.S., David Lewis became a central figure in Australasian philosophy, and especially Australasian metaphysics, through his extended annual winter visits to Australasia from the 1970s to the 1990s. While he joined Armstrong in rejecting various forms of anti-realism, and defending physicalism, Lewis attempted to articulate a systematic reductionism about many things Armstrong took to be primitive. Lewis called this view ‘Humean Supervenience’ (Lewis 1986b). It held that all the truths of the world supervened on intrinsic properties of very small entities, plus spatio-temporal relations between them. Within this framework Lewis attempted to locate universals (certain sets of individuals), laws (simple and strong regularities), chances (defined in terms of laws), counterfactual dependencies (also defined in terms of these laws) and causation (defined in terms of counterfactual dependencies), and then use that analysis to analyse many concepts that seem causal, such as content and perception.

Partially in response to Lewis’ work, much work in Australian metaphysics in the later parts of the twentieth century were about the metaphysics of the nomic, broadly construed. Some of this work accepted, or at least didn’t expressly reject, Lewis’ Humean framework but argued that Lewis’ accounts of particular concepts were faulty. For example, David Braddon-Mitchell (2001) argued that Lewis was wrong to hold that it was analytic to laws that they are true. But the majority of work has centred on causation. Peter Menzies (1996) has argued that Lewis was wrong to think that causation is an extrinsic relation. And Michael Strevens (2008) has recently produced a theory of causation that revives the spirit (but not the letter) of J. L. Mackie’s idea that C causes E just in case C is an Insufficient but Non-Redundant part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient set of conditions for E to obtain (Mackie 1974). Other work on the nomic expressly aims to reject Lewis’ Humean framework. Such work includes Armstrong’s work on laws. But perhaps the most comprehensive work in this tradition is by John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter, whose book Science and Necessity sets out a comprehensively realist, and especially non-reductive, metaphysics of the nomic.

Apart from his Humeanism about the nomic, David Lewis’ other most distinctive metaphysical theory was his account of modality (Lewis 1986a). Lewis held that for every genuine possibility, there is a concrete possible world where it obtains. This view didn’t meet with great enthusiasm among Australian metaphysicians, but it did spur a lot of research on what possible worlds might
be. As with the Humeanism, some metaphysicians thought the project got off on the wrong foot. Daniel Nolan (2002) argued that it wasn’t obviously correct to analyse possibility in terms of possible worlds, whether those worlds were abstract or concrete. Many other metaphysicians agreed with Lewis about the need to explain possible worlds, but rejected the idea that these were concreta.

The theory of possibilities that D. M. Armstrong, along with Peter Forrest, developed led to one of the most striking developments in modern metaphysics (Armstrong 1989a, Forrest 1986c). Armstrong and Forrest argued that the role Lewis assigned to alternative concrete possible worlds could instead be played by kinds of universals, in particular by structured universals. Instead of thinking that each possibility matched up with a concrete, but non-actual, possible world, each possibility matches up with an uninstantiated structural universal.

But this raises an important problem for Armstrong’s metaphysics. For Armstrong universals are immanent, and hence all universals are instantiated. So it isn’t clear that universals can play the role of possible worlds, since the kinds of universals that would be (or at least play the role of) possible worlds are mostly uninstantiated.

Armstrong’s solution to this was to say that there is a fiction that these possibilities exist, and a modal claim (like There might have been talking donkeys) is true if, in such a fiction, one of the possibilities is one in which it’s true that there are talking donkeys. In the subsequent two decades there have been many attempts to apply fictionalist approaches to intractable metaphysical puzzles. Stuart Brock (2002) developed one of the most plausible such approaches—fictionalism about fictional characters—and is jointly responsible for the most famous puzzle for fictionalisms about modality. This puzzle concerns what to say about the modal status of claims made by the fictionalists’ own theory, and suggests the theory is self-undermining. Recently Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall and Caroline West (2005) outlined what a viable fictionalism about ethics might look like.

As well as working on the nature of possible worlds, Australasian metaphysicians have produced important work applying the concept of possible worlds to central metaphysical puzzles. Frank Jackson (1998) has argued that thinking about the nature of possibility undercuts the idea that there are two kinds of worlds—epistemically possible worlds and metaphysically possible worlds. And this in turn undercuts currently fashionable arguments that Kripke’s distinction between necessity and a priority undermines the traditional philosophical project of conceptual analysis.

One other important thread in Australasian metaphysics has been the insistence that metaphysics has to be scientifically, and especially physically, respectable. This idea traces back at least as far as John Anderson, and appears in Armstrong’s work as the idea that it is a scientific question which universals exist. But the most important figure in this tradition is J. J. C. Smart. Smart notably held that the idea of a passage of time is untenable (Smart 1949). The legacy of scientifically informed work on the metaphysics of time is continued in the present day at the work of the Centre for Time at the University of Sydney, founded by Huw Price in 2002.
Australian metaphysicians have also contributed extensively to debates over personal identity. In recent years, some of the most notable contributions have tended away from the kind of realism that has characterised so much of our story. So, for instance, Mark Johnston has defended a kind of relativism about personal identity, arguing that since our general concept of personal identity is indeterminate, individuals are free to some extent to adopt their own criteria for identity over time (Johnston 1989). Positions in the neighbourhood of this one have been popular in recent years, with important contributions being made by Denis Robinson (2004), who argues that we can have ‘no-fault’ disagreements about personal identity, and David Braddon-Mitchell and Caroline West (2001), who argue that this kind of relativism may require pluralism, the view that there can be a plurality of persons constructed by different person-stages.

Metascience Journal

The journal Metascience was launched by the Australasian Association for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science (AAHPSSS) in 1984. Papers from the AAHPSSS annual conferences had previously been circulated as unedited typescripts in the Association’s ‘Proceedings’, but with the advent of Metascience a vehicle was created for the publication of members’ research in a peer-reviewed and professionally edited format. Since the AAHPSSS membership fee included a subscription to Metascience, the journal also provided a tangible benefit to members and contributed to the expansion of the Association’s membership beyond those whose principal focus was the annual conference.

Much of the impetus for the founding of Metascience came from Ian Langham (University of Sydney), and it was originally expected that he would serve as co-editor with W. R. Albury, professor of history and philosophy of science at the University of New South Wales (UNSW). But the tragic death of Langham in 1984 left Albury as sole editor, a position which he held until the end of 1990. At various times during that period Ditta Bartels (UNSW) and David P. Miller (UNSW) also assisted as deputy editors.

Metascience appeared annually from 1984 to 1987, and then biannually from 1988 to 1990. During these years it published thirty articles and discussion papers by Australasian scholars in the history, philosophy and social studies of science (HPSSS), and by international visitors to conferences held in the region. A book review section was added in 1985, which gradually became a leading feature of the journal.
Modal Logic

Max Cresswell

Modal logic has been described as the formal logic of necessity and possibility, of ‘must be’ and ‘may be’. That was probably the sense in which C. I. Lewis understood it in his work beginning in 1912 (Lewis 1912). Lewis of course was reacting to the theory of implication that he understood to be presented in Whitehead and Russell 1910. However, by the middle years of the century it had become apparent that the operators ‘it is necessary that’ (‘it must be that’), written $L$ (or $\Box$), and ‘it is possible that’ (‘it might be that’), written $M$ (or $\Diamond$), could be used to study a wide variety of such notions. One of the earliest logicians to see this was A. N. Prior, whose work in the mid 1950s looked at the possibility of interpreting $L$ as ‘it is and will always be the case that’, with $M$, correspondingly, as ‘it is or will one day be the case that’ (Prior 1957). Prior was born and brought up in New Zealand, and was appointed professor of philosophy at the then Canterbury University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
Modal Logic

University College, in Christchurch, New Zealand; and it was almost certainly this fact that is primarily responsible for the early development of modal logic in Australasia.

Prior’s story is an interesting one. Originally intending a theological career, he became intrigued with the problem of how, in a non-deterministic universe, any being could have complete knowledge of the future. Prior’s *Logic and the Basis of Ethics* (1949) is not a work which involves formal logic, but it is clear that Prior was always concerned about the implications of logic in philosophy, and it is perhaps a mark of the ‘flavour’ of logic in Australia and New Zealand that it has been concerned with the application of formal methods to philosophical problems. In Prior (1957), the published version of his 1956 John Locke Lectures at Oxford, we have the first sustained exposition of the application of modal logic to issues of *time*. One of Prior’s concerns was to understand an argument put forward by Diodorus Chronos to the effect that everything is necessary, including facts about the future. The argument goes like this. Begin with the view that everything that has already happened is necessary, that what has already occurred is now unpreventable. Take anything which is now in fact so. If it is so now, then it was always true in the past that this thing which is in fact so was going to be so, and therefore, being a past truth, must have been unpreventable. From this it seemed to follow that whatever happens is necessary. Prior realised that to study such arguments as these you needed the precision found in formal logic. But not the formal logic which then dominated philosophy—the logic of Russell and Frege. What was needed is a logic which studies propositions which can change their truth value with the passage of time. Copeland (1996b) writes:

> In 1949 he had learned from Geach’s review of Julius Weinberg’s *Nicolaus of Autricourt: A Study in 14th Century Thought* [Geach 1949] that for the scholastics an expression like ‘Socrates is sitting down’ is complete, in the sense of being assertable as it is, and is true at certain times, false at others. Prior had been brought up on the view—prevalent even today—that such an expression is incomplete until a time-reference is supplied, and hence that one cannot speak of the truth-value of the expression as altering with the passage of time. This was a crucial discovery for Prior: the idea that propositions which are subject to tense-inflections are liable to be true at one time and false at another was to become central to his philosophy.

Interpreting $L$ to mean ‘it is and always will be the case that’, Prior conjectured that the logic of future time was a system which C. I. Lewis called S4 (Lewis and Langford 1932). It was subsequently shown that the correct system was stronger than S4, and the study of questions like this enabled Prior to consider how different systems of modal logic might reflect different views about time and modality. As far as logic is concerned, Mary Prior has described her husband as an ‘autodidact’. It is true that Prior credits his interest in what has come to be called
tense logic to J. N. Findlay (Findlay 1941), the professor of philosophy at the University of Otago when Prior was a student, but it seems equally true that it was Prior himself, from his own work, and through his students in Christchurch and his colleagues elsewhere in New Zealand, and in turn their students, who, even after he moved to England in 1958, is the biggest single cause of the interest in modal logic in New Zealand.

What then of Australia? One of the few workers in modal and tense logic in Australia at the time was Charles Hamblin at the University of New South Wales, with whom Prior corresponded. In looking at the history of modal logic it is important to bear in mind two features of philosophy in the mid twentieth century. One was the influence of ‘ordinary language philosophy’, with its perceived bias against any kind of formal logic. This view finds expression in such dicta as P. F. Strawson’s claim that ‘ordinary language has no exact logic’ (Strawson 1956). While the influence of the ordinary language movement was felt in both Australia and New Zealand, it is arguable that its strength in Australia, notably in the Wittgensteinianism of Melbourne, may have inhibited the development of logics of the sort that interested Prior. The other feature, of course, was the influence of W. V. Quine. One of the most powerful features of Quine’s philosophy was undoubtedly his antipathy to modal logic (for instance Quine 1947, 1953), perhaps in reaction to his teacher, C. I. Lewis, at Harvard. For whatever reasons, Quine was able to portray modal logic as somehow not philosophically respectable, particularly to those who saw the importance of philosophy in clarifying the logic of scientific discourse.

In Australia Quine’s philosophy was represented most strongly in the work of J. J. C. Smart (Smart 1987b), and it is possible that Quine’s anti-modal views, which Smart enthusiastically endorsed, discouraged the development of modal logic in Australia. Prior (1957) certainly linked Quine and Smart together as authors whom he respected, but whose views on time and modality he profoundly disagreed with. The Quine/Smart attack was on two grounds. One was the argument that modal logic was conceived in the sin of confusing use and mention, a charge that did not go away until the possible-worlds semantics for modal logic was fully appreciated. When it was appreciated, the claim was that possible worlds are metaphysically disreputable. In some moods Quine and Smart even appear to go so far as to say that modality itself is disreputable. The Quine/Smart view of time, as Prior called it, is that all times are equally real. (The analogous view of possible worlds has described them as like ‘raisins in a pudding.’) Given a view like that of Quine and Smart, it was held that if you are to discourse reputably about such things you have to replace talk about the past, present and future with ‘tenseless’ talk about truth or falsity at a time.

Prior influenced many students in Christchurch: Robert Bull, Hugh Montgomery and Jonathan Bennett, to name just a few; and his legacy is currently being kept alive there by Jack Copeland. Montgomery subsequently moved to Auckland, where an interest in modal logic had been encouraged in the 1960s by Ray Bradley. A colleague influenced by Prior was George Hughes, whose
Modal Logic

appointment as professor of philosophy at Victoria University College (later the Victoria University of Wellington), in 1951 was almost contemporaneous with Prior’s obtaining the chair in Christchurch. Hughes was strongly influenced by Wittgenstein and Wisdom at Cambridge, to the point, one often felt, of supposing that progress in philosophy was not really possible, and the that true philosopher’s mission should be to inculcate a method which would enable philosophical worries to disappear. To Hughes formal logic may have seemed a way out, an area where progress was possible. The tradition of logic in Wellington spread to the mathematics department, particularly with Rob Goldblatt, whose work encouraged mathematicians and computer scientists to take an interest in it. That work, however, is outside the purview of the present article.

One of the Wellington undergraduates in the 1950s was Richard Routley (later Richard Sylvan), who moved to Australia on his return from Princeton University. Routley, with Len Goddard, set up the M.A. in formal logic at the University of New England (UNE). Early students of this course included Malcolm Rennie, who went to Auckland and was greatly influenced by Prior and the New Zealand modal logic ethos. Rennie then took modal logic to Queensland, influencing Chris Mortensen and Rod Girle. Mortensen moved to Adelaide and Girle eventually to Auckland. Rennie imparted a special interest in weak systems like S0.5 and S1—an interest which is almost exclusive to Australasia.

It may say something about the different attitudes to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand to see how modal logic developed in Australia under Routley’s influence. New Zealand philosophy has always prided itself as not being ‘special’, as not having any distinctive ‘style’ other than to be as good as it can. Once in Australia, Routley argued strenuously that Australasia should have a distinctive style of logic—by which he seemed to mean any logic which rejected classical principles of reasoning—and on his move to Canberra he was able to make the Australian National University one of the centres of what is called ‘relevance logic’. Relevance logic rejects such principles of standard modal logic as that a contradiction entails every proposition. It rapidly became apparent that to avoid what seemed to many an unwelcome conclusion, you had to be able to imagine what would happen if a contradiction were actually true. It was then a short step, taken by Graham Priest, to thinking that perhaps at least some contradictions are true, and so Australia, though not New Zealand, became one of the leading centres of what is called ‘paraconsistent’ logic. Such logics are outside the scope of this survey.

Another area of modal logic influenced by Prior was modal predicate logic (or quantified modal logic: QML). Prior 1956 was one of the earliest to criticise a principle he called the ‘Barcan Formula’, used in Ruth Barcan’s pioneering work with Fitch at Yale in the 1940s (Barcan 1946, 1947). QML was an area which came in for particularly harsh criticism from Quine, and is still under-represented in research in modal logic. One of the graduates of the UNE logic program was Alan Reeves, who took to Adelaide an appreciation of how a careful use of Russell’s theory of descriptions could solve problems in the interpretation
of quantified intensional logics. In the 1970s, the arrival of Pavel Tichý at the University of Otago, a Czech emigré, trained in the logical tradition in Eastern Europe, a tradition Prior had had strong connections with, reinforced this development, and Tichý established a number of results in modal predicate logic. The connection between QML and metaphysics was strengthened by the association which developed between Australasia and David Lewis, whose counterpart theory attempted to address the problems of QML in a way which was at least technically more congenial to Quine’s view of it (Lewis 1968). A crucial technical issue here was the question of the expressive power of QML, and early results, using the technique of what has been called ‘double indexing’ or ‘two-dimensional modal logic’, were obtained at UCLA by, among others, Frank Vlach (1973), who subsequently joined Hamblin’s department at the University of New South Wales. It was also taken up by Krister Segerberg, though before he moved to the University of Auckland as professor of philosophy in the late 1970s. The modal version in the form of actually operators formed the basis of an article by John Crossley and Lloyd Humberstone (1977), Monash University logicians who helped foster modal logic in the Melbourne area. Another of Prior’s connections was with Pittsburgh, which was one of the few U.S. philosophy departments not under the spell of Quine’s anti-modalism. One of Pittsburgh’s exports was Allen Hazen, who brought modal logic to the University of Melbourne. Hazen later became interested in the expressive capacity of QML.

This essay has ignored the large amount of philosophical work by philosophers in Australasian philosophy departments who have used modal logic, but would not so much be regarded as practitioners. Hopefully, however, it has given something of the flavour of research in this area of philosophy in this part of the world.

Monash Bioethics Review

Justin Oakley

The quarterly refereed journal Monash Bioethics Review began life in 1981 as the newsletter Bioethics News. This newsletter publicised the research and community engagement activities of the Monash University Centre for Human Bioethics, which was established the previous year by Peter Singer. Bioethics News was edited by Helga Kuhse, and provided news and discussion of current issues in bioethics, both in Australia and overseas, during a time of considerable public debate about ethical issues raised by new reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilisation. Published several times a year, Bioethics News soon began to include some original articles, along with reprints of key articles from
international bioethics journals likely to be of particular interest to Australian readers.

There were major changes to the journal from the January 1994 issue (vol. 13, no. 1), when it moved to a new, expanded format, with a greater proportion of original articles and the new title of *Monash Bioethics Review*. Editor Helga Kuhse also put in place a refereeing process. The journal continued to be published by the Monash University Centre for Human Bioethics. These changes boosted the circulation and profile of the journal both nationally and internationally, and the submission rate of papers to the journal also began to increase. A popular feature of the journal has always been the Ethics Committee Supplement, containing original articles and news items on issues of particular interest to members of human research ethics committees. Many of these committees in Australia have been longstanding subscribers to the journal.

Udo Schüklenk took over as editor of *Monash Bioethics Review* in 1999, and introduced further improvements, including the appointment of an international editorial board and the involvement of a broad range of referees. From that point onwards, the reprinting of articles from other journals ceased and all articles published in the journal were original articles. Schüklenk also put together several special themed issues of *Monash Bioethics Review*, containing symposia with invited papers on topics such as the ethics of genetics and biotechnology. These special issues proved very popular with subscribers.

The editorship of the journal passed from Udo Schüklenk to Deborah Zion and Merle Spriggs in 2001. Zion and Spriggs also introduced many innovations, including Ethics Committee Reflections, invited debates, and review articles. Justin Oakley subsequently replaced Merle as co-editor from 2003. In the following years, *Monash Bioethics Review* published a number of articles by prominent international commentators on topics including the over-prescription of anti-depressant medications, the ethics of research involving indigenous people, and the treatment of asylum seekers.

From the March 2009 issue (vol. 28, no. 1), *Monash Bioethics Review* began to be published by Monash University ePress, in both hard copy and electronic forms. Also, Linda Barclay took over from Deborah Zion as co-editor of the journal with Justin Oakley, and the publication months moved to March, June, September, and December each year. Themed issues continued, on topics such as the clinical implications of recent brain imaging research with patients in persistent vegetative states.

As Australia’s oldest peer-reviewed bioethics journal, *Monash Bioethics Review* has done much over the years to promote community awareness and discussion of emerging issues in reproduction, biotechnology, and clinical and research practice. In these ways, the journal has helped to improve policy in these areas, and so, it is hoped, the experiences of patients, research participants, and practitioners in these fields.
Monash University
Aubrey Townsend

Monash University was the first of the ‘new universities’ founded in the 1960s; philosophy was included from the beginning. Hector Monro, the foundation professor, took up his appointment in 1961 and teaching began the following year. Monro had come to Monash from the University of Sydney and the structure of the undergraduate program he put in place in the early years followed closely the example set in Sydney under J. L. Mackie.

Growth in the first years was rapid. By 1965 there were eleven tenured staff—the professor, an associate professor (Ken Rankin), and nine lecturers or senior lecturers. There were, in addition, five full-time tutors who had fixed-term contracts. Two years later a second professor (A. C. (‘Camo’) Jackson) had been appointed and the full-time staff had risen to seventeen; it was to peak at nineteen in 1968.

Monro was primarily interested in ethics and history of ideas. His Empiricism and Ethics was published in 1967; there was a later book on Mandeville (1975) and the occasional (and unusual) flourish of verse in the philosophy journals. Ken Rankin worked in and taught mainstream philosophical logic and epistemology. John McGechie, another early appointment, specialised in logic and philosophy of mathematics. Other staff appointed in the early 1960s included Yogendra Chopra, Len Grant, Bill Joske, Harry Stainsby, John Williamson, Max Deutscher, John Mackenzie, Jenny Teichman, Tony Palma, Bruce Heron, Rusi Khan and Aubrey Townsend—a mixed bunch, from Melbourne and Oxford backgrounds, Sydney and New Zealand. Deutscher, still an analytical philosopher, was the dominant figure in the early years; but he left in early 1966 to take up an appointment as professor at the newly established Macquarie University. Williamson, Palma, Teichman, Chopra and Heron all left within a few years. The others, with the addition of Edward Khamara, were to remain on staff for twenty years or more. For years to come, therefore, change was to be almost exclusively at tutor level.

The course structure in the 1960s was based on a model under which Arts students took four subjects at first-year level—in different disciplines, like philosophy or history—three at second-year and two at third-year; all subjects involved year-long courses typically of two lectures and a tutorial weekly. Honours courses began in second year and continued to fourth year when students read usually just one discipline but might combine Honours in two. Two of the best students from the 1960s, Martin Davies and Laurie Splitter, both took double Honours in philosophy and mathematics.
The main first-year philosophy subject had two components, ‘Problems in Philosophy’ and ‘Logic’. The problems course initially followed Sydney in using a book by John Hospers, but soon changed to a text-based design, including Descartes’ *Meditations* and the *Meno*. Controversy raged over the Logic component. Stainsby insisted on a traditional Aristotelian course with a Jesuit text; Heron, who had worked with A. N. Prior, would only teach in Polish notation; Townsend, following Sydney tradition, preferred Copi-style natural deduction. So the style and character of the course varied from year to year and those who opposed logic anyway had an easy target. There were two other first-year subjects, ‘History of Ideas’ and ‘Scientific Thought’, but they could not be counted as the basis for a major sequence in philosophy.

Philosophy 2 and Philosophy 3 subjects comprised a core unit and a range of options, covering most areas of philosophy but with historical courses (on empiricism, Kant, Plato and Aristotle, Russell and Moore) given some preference. Most important was what was expected from Honours students: they took two full-year subjects in second year, three in third year and four plus a thesis in fourth year. Though there was some scope for choice, students graduating with Honours in philosophy acquired a common background, including some logic, metaphysics and epistemology, philosophical logic, Descartes, the eighteenth-century empiricists and rationalists, Kant and Greek philosophy. It was a very solid and demanding program. Martin Davies, who went from Monash to Oxford, remarked on how well his Monash experience had prepared him for what he encountered there.

There was a regular staff seminar from the beginning, attended by all staff; and there were meetings of the *Australasian Association of Philosophy* held at Melbourne.

Things changed somewhat in the 1970s. Staff numbers started to shrink, from an average of eighteen in the late 1960s to fourteen in the early ’70s, though student numbers were still growing, as was the number and diversity of subjects. So workloads were increasing way beyond the very comfortable loads of the first Monash decade, and that became a continuing concern. There were some changes to the course structure too, especially at first-year level, where the design moved to a core plus options structure—lots of options, designed to attract numbers, with logic just one among them. This had repercussions all down the track, for it was no longer the case that Honours students could be assumed to have a knowledge of logic or a substantially common background.

By the mid 1970s there was an air of depression, worries about the entrenching of mediocrity, and, as one visiting philosopher remarked, Monash had become a ‘sleepy hollow’. Hector Monro and Camo Jackson both retired at the end of 1976. *Peter Singer* was appointed to replace Monro in 1977, and *Frank Jackson* was appointed to his father’s old chair in 1978. The department was refreshed and enlivened, and not just by the appointment of two new and exciting professors. Lloyd Humberstone had been appointed to a lectureship in 1975, and there was also a crop of new tutors between 1975 and 1979,
among them Ismay Barwell, Laurie Splitter, John Bishop, Knud Haakonsen, André Gallois and Tom Karmo. David Lewis made his first prolonged visit in 1979. Martin Davies was also around. It was a time when Monash was a lively philosophical community, surely to be ranked near the best in Australia. Michael Smith, who did both a B.A. and an M.A., was a notable student in this period; there were many more.

Things barely changed through the 1980s. There were no new appointments at lecturer level, but frequent changes at tutor level continued to liven the mix: Chris Cordner, Libby Prior, Frank Snare, Michael Smith, Pamela Tate, John Burgess and John Collins all had appointments in this period. The community of researching philosophers flourished. But drastic changes were happening to the course structure, mostly triggered from outside the department. There was a shift to semester courses in place of the old full-year subjects. At second and third-year level, this meant that courses that had run with one lecture and tutorial all year now ran for thirteen teaching weeks, usually with two lectures and a tutorial or a two-hour lecture-seminar. Inevitably there was a reduction both in course content and in the time over which a student’s understanding of an area could grow. The department opposed these changes, but could not win. With the semester system went a new point scheme for determining the weighting of subjects in the degree: first-year subjects were valued at 6 points and later year subjects normally at 8 points. Thus a major in philosophy came to comprise subjects totalling 12 points at first year, 16 points at second year, and 24 points at third year, though it was always possible to do more than the minimum requirement. At the same time, a second major change involved the abandonment of the old Honours program in favour of one where Honours was just a fourth year tacked on to a normal major (with minimum entry standards, of course). Intending Honours students could be encouraged to take extra subjects, but increasingly the decision to go into Honours was made late and without preparation either by taking additional subjects or by a constrained choice of subjects. And because the number of subjects being offered had grown, the idea of a structured and common preparation for the Honours year disappeared. But by bit too, the demands of the Honours year were relaxed and content reduced. These changes were exacerbated by changes to come in 2002, when the 8-point second and third-year subjects were re-valued to 6 points, with consequent further cuts to content and assessment requirements. By then the academic content of the Honours degree had been cut to less than half what it was in the first period of the University—what remained was a lightweight Honours program that provided a much weaker foundation for postgraduate work.

Frank Jackson resigned to move to the Australian National University (ANU) in 1986 and about the same time Peter Singer moved to establish the Centre for Human Bioethics, still at Monash but independently of the Department of Philosophy. There followed a period of some upheaval. Robert Pargetter was appointed professor of philosophy in 1989 and was able to arrange two
Monash University

immediate new appointments, Michael Smith to a senior lectureship and Frank Jackson to his old chair. Jackson found the changed Monash environment uncongenial and returned to the ANU almost immediately; Smith stayed on until the ANU also recruited him in 1992. Pargetter was seconded to become Dean of the Faculty of Arts after only six months as Head of Department, but continued to exert a powerful influence until 1992. John Bigelow was appointed professor in 1991, initially for a five-year period, but made permanent in 1992 after Pargetter had resigned. Rusi Khan, John Mackenzie and John McGechie retired in 1994; Harry Stainsby died about the same time. Karen Green, Rae Langton and Richard Holton were appointed to lectureships in the early 1990s; but Langton and Holton also were seconded to the ANU in 1997. Ten Chin Liew was promoted to a personal chair in 1994 (he finally resigned in 2000). Jeanette Kennett and Dirk Baltzly were appointed to lectureships in 1995; Kennett leaving for Canberra (not the ANU) before the end of the decade. Graham Oppy was appointed, initially as a senior lecturer in 1996 and later promoted to a personal chair. There had been more changes in a five-year period than had occurred in all the preceding twenty years. But despite ongoing staff cuts and some stress, the department continued to provide a lively and vigorous environment for research in philosophy, with a large and strong graduate school. When the department was reviewed in 1996, the report recorded a remark by one external member, ‘that he had come to Monash believing this to be the best teaching philosophy department in the country and he was going away with the same impression’.

The early 1990s were a period of deep structural change in the university. Following the Dawkins ‘reforms’, Monash became a huge multi-campus university, with campuses at Caulfield, Frankston, Gippsland and Berwick added to the main Clayton campus. And, beginning around 1993 and initiated by Pargetter who was then a Deputy Vice-Chancellor, there was also an expansion into distance education. Monash acquired a Distance Education Centre with the Gippsland campus and took a leading role in the Open Learning Initiative. It also began a VCE Enhancement program offering first-year university subjects in Year 12 at secondary colleges. These were big changes made at a time of increasing cuts to university funding: the university was betting, as few others did, that its future would depend on success as a large and diverse institution.

The Department of Philosophy chose, amid much controversy at the time, to participate in all these changes. It established programs at Caulfield, Frankston, Berwick and Gippsland—all campuses where philosophy had not been taught prior to the amalgamations, and in each case a minor sequence was offered. The department developed a distance education program, initially funded by Open Learning, and by 1998 was offering a full major sequence in distance mode. It also participated enthusiastically in the VCE Enhancement program. Some of these initiatives failed: the faculty chose to pull out of the Frankston campus, severely cut back in Berwick, and finally put an end to the Open Learning project—for ideological rather than economic or academic reasons. But the
Caulfield, Gippsland, distance education and VCE Enhancement programs remain.

The expanded programs depended on the development of an elaborate resource base of teaching materials, both in print and online, that could be used for distance teaching but also enabled teaching on other campuses to be undertaken by a team mostly of graduate students working on a casual basis. Aubrey Townsend had oversight of the preparation of materials, which were paid for by a succession of major grants, and Monima Chadha was appointed to coordinate the teaching and marking program. A condition imposed by the department was that the project had to run without negative budgetary impact and with the involvement of Clayton staff only on a voluntary basis. Still it grew, and by 1996 was contributing 16% of total student load and 12% of income, a percentage that has continued to grow. The review committee in 1996 accepted the view of some members of the department that the new programs were unwise at a time of excessive workloads and not really proper work for academic philosophers. But within a year the Faculty of Arts was in financial crisis, forced to a drastic restructuring involving significant staff cuts and the grouping of departments into larger budgetary units (or schools). Because philosophy was then in a sound budgetary position and had a growing enrolment across several campuses, it escaped relatively unscathed: there were no further staff cuts beyond those that had occurred prior to 1996, and the new School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Bioethics was not too grotesque. Within a couple of years Linguistics moved to another school and the School of Philosophy and Bioethics, though small, was a coherent academic structure.

In the period since 2000, the School of Philosophy and Bioethics has had to adapt to an increasingly difficult institutional situation. There have been staff changes: Townsend retired in 2006; Toby Handfield and Jakob Hohwy were appointed to lectureships in 2006 and 2007. In research, the school has remained very productive: there have been books by Baltzly (2006, 2009), Green (2009), Handfield (2009), Howhy (2009), and Oppy (2006a, 2006b). But maintaining adequate student numbers has proved difficult. In the first years of the new century, research success helped maintain a strong philosophy program, for in this period the budgetary model in the faculty favoured schools that were successful in research. But in later years research success has been less rewarded and funding has come to depend on building student numbers, with requirements for viable class sizes growing ever more demanding. The resulting pressures, which have led to greatly increased teaching loads and a need to change course offerings, have become a greater threat than has been faced at any time in the history of the department. One has to be worried about the future.
The Centre for Human Bioethics, Australia’s first research centre in bioethics, was established by Monash University in October 1980. The important developments in life-support technology, organ transplantation, and particularly in vitro fertilisation during the late 1970s raised challenging new ethical issues, many of which crossed traditional disciplinary boundaries. Monash University, whose scientists helped pioneer IVF techniques, set up the centre to promote research on these and related ethical issues, and to develop educational programs in bioethics. The centre also aimed to raise the level of public debate and improve community understanding of these issues by providing an advisory and resource centre for government, professional, educational, and community groups. Peter Singer was the centre’s founding director, and the first research fellow, Helga Kuhse, was appointed in early 1981. Kuhse became director of the centre in 1992, and Justin Oakley, who was appointed lecturer in 1990, has been director since 1999.

Based from the outset at Monash’s Clayton campus, the centre joined the Faculty of Arts in 1990 and has been a constituent part of the School of Philosophy and Bioethics since 2002. The centre has become known for its practical and non-sectarian approach to ethical issues, with a number of its projects drawing extensively on empirical research to challenge aspects of existing medical practice and familiar assumptions in debates about reproduction. Singer and Kuhse, in particular, have been trenchant critics of a reliance on sanctity-of-human-life views by health professionals and lawmakers in justifying medical decisions at the beginning and end of life.

The novel ethical issues raised by IVF were a major focus of the centre’s early research, in the context of groundbreaking work by Monash IVF researchers Carl Wood and Alan Trounson. The centre’s projects on the ethics of IVF and embryo research resulted in some of the first published work on these topics, including Walters and Singer (1982) and Singer and Wells (1984) (see also Singer et al. 1990). Subsequently, Kuhse and Singer investigated the ethics of end-of-life decision-making, producing an innovative and controversial study into the justifiability of withholding treatment from infants born with severe disabilities (Kuhse and Singer 1985; see also Kuhse 1987; Kuhse 1994). Notable publications drawing on the centre’s empirical research during the 1990s include a study of physicians’ and nurses’ views on voluntary euthanasia and other end-of-life decisions (Kuhse et al. 1997a), and a study of partialist and impartialist approaches to ethical reasoning by health professionals (Kuhse et al. 1997b). Many of these and other projects were supported by grants from the Australian Research Council and the National Health and Medical Research Council.
During his time at the Centre for Human Bioethics, Singer produced some of the most widely-used textbooks and anthologies in applied ethics and ethical theory, including *Practical Ethics* (2nd ed. 1993), *Applied Ethics* (1986), *A Companion to Ethics* (1991), *Ethics* (Oxford Readers Series 1994b), along with several anthologies edited with Helga Kuhse, including *A Companion to Bioethics* (1998, 2nd ed. 2009), and *Bioethics: An Anthology* (1999, 2nd ed. 2006). Many of these and other works by centre staff have been translated into a number of foreign languages. Singer left Monash in mid 1999 to take up a chair in bioethics at Princeton University’s Centre for Human Values. Kuhse retired from her position at the end of 2000, remaining as an honorary researcher thereafter.

From the late 1990s onwards, centre staff published books taking broader perspectives on medical and nursing practice, such as Kuhse’s (1997) book on ethics and nursing, and Oakley and Cocking’s (2001) book applying virtue ethics to professional roles, along with books on the ethics of health care resource allocation (McKie et al. 1998), and on clinician accountability and informed consent (Clarke and Oakley 2007). (Oakley and Clarke [2007] includes contributions discussing the arguments in ‘Informed Consent and Surgeons’ Performance’ [Clarke and Oakley 2004], for which the authors were awarded the nationally competitive 2004 Eureka Prize for Research in Ethics.) In recent years Rob Sparrow has published influential work on disability rights critiques of pre-birth testing (Sparrow 2005) and on reproductive ethics (Sparrow 2006).

The centre has promoted bioethics research through the prestigious journal *Bioethics*, established by Singer and Kuhse in 1987 and edited at the Centre until 2000. It also publishes a quarterly journal, *Monash Bioethics Review*, edited by Deborah Zion and Justin Oakley, which began as *Bioethics News* in 1981. Also, Singer and Kuhse founded the International Association of Bioethics in 1994, whose governing body includes many representatives from developing as well as developed countries. Members of the centre have also done much consultancy work for various government bodies, and have played an influential role in public debate and law reform in many areas, including legislation governing assisted reproduction, surrogate motherhood, and end-of-life decision-making.

Centre staff have supervised many Masters by research and Ph.D. theses addressing a wide variety of ethical issues, including the ethics of biomedical research in developing countries (see Schüklenk and Hogan 1996; Schüklenk 1998; Zion 2002; Ballantyne 2005), end-of-life decision-making (see Olver 2002; Bailey 2002), and the role of patient autonomy in clinical decision-making (see Spriggs 2005; Biegler forthcoming). In 1989 the centre developed one of the world’s first Master of Bioethics programs, which has produced several hundred graduates over its twenty year existence. One particularly notable graduate is intensive care nurse Toni Hoffman, who became the whistleblower in the scandal...
involving surgeon Dr Jayant Patel at Bundaberg Base Hospital during 2003–2005, for which Toni was named Australia’s ‘local hero’ in the 2006 Australian of the Year awards (see also the ABC TV program, *Australian Story*, 26 June 2005). The centre’s students and members of its steering committee played a leading role in the establishment of the Australasian Bioethics Association, which holds an annual conference. Many of the centre’s doctoral and Masters graduates have become highly successful bioethicists in their own right, including Julian Savulescu, Udo Schüklenk, Deborah Zion, Lynn Gillam, Merle Spriggs, Leslie Cannold (see her 1998), Angela Ballantyne, Paul Biegler, and Russell Blackford. The centre has also attracted many international visitors, research fellows and exchange students over the years.

In 2005 the centre began teaching undergraduate bioethics subjects, which have been popular with students from arts, science, law, and medicine, and Bachelor of Arts students can take a Minor sequence in bioethics. The appointments of Rob Sparrow in 2004, Jo Asscher in 2005, and Linda Barclay in 2007 helped the centre expand and strengthen its offerings at undergraduate and postgraduate level.

The centre held an annual conference in each of its first fifteen years, and each year since the mid 1980s the centre has run a week-long Intensive Bioethics Course (normally held at Mt Buffalo Chalet in north-east Victoria), dealing with ethical issues in human research and clinical practice of direct concern to health professionals and members of human research ethics committees.

The Centre for Human Bioethics is part of a new international network established by the University of Tokyo Centre for Biomedical Ethics and Law, to further develop collaborative research and teaching links between eight of the world’s leading bioethics centres. Other members of the network, which will involve an annual bioethics summit at Tokyo University, include the Hastings Centre in New York, the National Institutes of Health Department of Bioethics in Washington DC, and The Ethox Centre at Oxford University.

The bioethics agenda has always been responsive to the latest developments in medical and nursing practice, genetics, research on humans, and reproductive technologies, but the field has grown remarkably to encompass a very broad expanse of issues in a way that was perhaps difficult to envisage when the centre was founded thirty years ago. Through its research output and its many graduates, the centre has been at the forefront of this field, and it continues to play a key role in driving the bioethics agenda.
Moral Psychology

Daniel Cohen

Moral psychology, as I here construe it, is an investigation of the psychological structures necessary, on conceptual grounds, for people to count as moral agents. This involves a number of distinct projects concerning, for instance, the nature of moral judgement and moral knowledge, the nature of moral emotion, the sources of moral motivation, and the nature of both weakness and strength of will. Due to limitations on space, I will focus exclusively on the last topic—weakness and strength of will—where Australians have made particularly prominent contributions.

(The term ‘moral psychology’ is sometimes used in other ways. For instance, on one prominent construal, ‘moral psychology’ consists of an investigation of the moral implications of psychological research. See Doris and Stich 2006. While relatively few Australian philosophers have engaged with empirically informed moral psychology, there is a growing list of exceptions. For instance, Levy (2007) undertakes a wide-ranging examination of the implications of recent neuroscientific research on various moral concepts.)

Frank Jackson

Frank Jackson (1984b) argues that agents are weak-willed when they irrationally change their desires. It is rational to change one’s desires, moreover, only when this change is prompted by the acquisition of new knowledge. For example, a smoker may rationally abandon the desire to smoke upon discovering that smoking causes cancer. Because the smoker had desired to smoke only on the condition that smoking doesn’t cause cancer, changing desires on the basis of this new knowledge is perfectly rational.

Two aspects of Jackson’s proposal may be distinguished. First, the account of the rational smoker (above) suggests that the acquisition of new information is a necessary condition for the rationality of desire-revision. Secondly, Jackson suggests that any revisions that don’t occur in this way are irrational and, in particular, weak-willed. Updating desires without new information is thus a necessary condition for an agent to count as weak-willed. A non-smoker, for instance, may irrationally revise her desires in the following way: imagine that this non-smoker believes that smoking causes cancer, and that she desires not to get cancer more than she desires to smoke. However, occasionally, the non-smoker experiences a craving for cigarettes which causes these preferences to reverse so that she temporarily prefers smoking over the avoidance of cancer. Insofar as this reversal of preferences is not caused by any change in belief, Jackson’s view generates the plausible result that the non-smoker, in this case, is irrational in revising her intentions; she is weak-willed.
It follows that agents may be weak-willed, on Jackson’s view, even when they act in accordance with their all-things-considered better judgements and that they may be strong-willed even when they flout these judgements. The crucial factor concerns how agents update their desires, not whether their desires align with their better judgements.

However, both of Jackson’s claims meet with counterexamples. First, consider the following counterexample to Jackson’s first necessity claim. Christopher Cordner (1985: 277) presents the case of the scholar who has devoted his life to his studies and desires, among other things, to work every day from nine to five. One day the scholar falls in love and, without changing any of his beliefs about the pleasures associated with various activities, nor any other views, re-evaluates his priorities, and stops desiring to work on weekends. Intuitively, the scholar’s revision of desires is not weak-willed despite the fact that the scholar doesn’t acquire any new information. This undermines Jackson’s claim that, in order for a change of desire to be rational, it is necessary that agents acquire new information. Cordner’s scholar seems perfectly rational despite updating his desires ‘for no reason’. In other words, it is not irrational to be weak-willed in Jackson’s sense. Thus, Jackson’s account fails to offer a normatively significant conception of weakness of will.

Secondly, John Bigelow, Susan Dodds and Robert Pargetter (1990: 42–3) present a counterexample that appears to show, contra Jackson, that weakness of will doesn’t necessarily involve an irrational change in desire. Indeed, they argue, agents may be weak without changing their desires at all. Consider the case of a coward who opts to avoid pain rather than do the right thing. While this seems to be a clear case of weakness, the coward’s behaviour may be a function of desires that he was born with: he had always desired to avoid pain more than he desired to do the right thing. Bigelow et al. suggest, given this, that the normatively significant aspect of weakness of will must involve some conflict within an agent, at one time. But Jackson’s account fails to capture this insofar as it construes weakness as essentially diachronic.

**John Bigelow, Susan Dodds and Robert Pargetter**

Both Bigelow et al. and Jackson see weakness as involving a conflict among desires. However, according to Bigelow et al., the conflict is synchronic, not diachronic. They distinguish between levels of desire (following Jeffrey 1974 and Frankfurt 1971), and analyse ‘temptation’ as the desire to do something when one desires not to act on such a desire. Thus, second-order desires are privileged insofar as strength of will involves their dominance and weakness of will involves their subordination.

Bigelow et al. argue that their account maps onto the same plausible cases that Jackson employs, at least when the stories are filled out appropriately. However, they claim, their account correctly states that there is no weakness if we stipulate that, in the relevant cases, there is no real conflict between first- and second-order desires. For example, consider Jackson’s non-smoker (who lacks even a
conditional desire to smoke, were a craving to arise). If such an agent nevertheless comes to form an effective desire to smoke upon experiencing a craving to smoke, it may seem that this agent is irrational. Bigelow et al. argue, however, that this is plausible only as long as we assume, further, that (at all relevant times) the smoker desires that she not act on any desire to smoke. Without this assumption, while the smoker’s change of desires might seem arbitrary, it is not obviously irrational. Similarly, while Cordner’s scholar seems to undergo an arbitrary change of desire, this change will seem irrational only if we assume, further, that the scholar has a continuous desire not to act on any desires contrary to his scholarly pursuits.

Bigelow et al. (like Jackson) hold that weakness does not necessarily involve a conflict between moral judgement and desire. Agents may be weak-willed (and hence irrational) even in cases where they believe they ought to be acting as they do. For instance, Bigelow et al. mention the case of an agent who believes that he ought, at least once, to do something which he judges to be seriously wrong. Suppose the agent decides to commit a murder, but finds himself unable to go through with it. If we stipulate that the agent wants to act on this desire, then this agent counts as weak-willed, according to Bigelow et al., despite the fact that he succumbs to the temptation to act rightly, by his own lights.

Jeanette Kennett (1991) suggests that the agent who desires to act on an immoral desire may seem irrational in failing to act immorally only because he judges that he ought to be acting immorally. It is consistent with the case that the irrationality of weakness of will derives from a failure to cohere one’s desires with one’s moral judgements, not (necessarily) with one’s second-order desires. Kennett goes on to present the case of an agent who dislikes strawberries, but wants to like them nevertheless. His irrationality of weakness of will derives from a failure to cohere one’s desires with one’s moral judgements, not (necessarily) with one’s second-order desires.

Jeanette Kennett, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit

Drawing on Frankfurt (1971), Bigelow et al. claim that second-order desires are closely associated with one’s self. Because one ‘identifies’ with one’s second-order desires, weak-willed behaviour involves ‘letting oneself down’, and perhaps constitutes a failure of integrity. Like Kennett, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith (1993) reject this account of the normative requirement violated by weak-willed agents. They argue that weakness involves a failure, rather, of orthonomy (right-rule). Agents are orthonomous (and, to that extent, rational) when they conform their behaviour to ‘the right’ (as they see it). This account explains why Kennett’s strawberry-eater is not intuitively weak-willed despite manifesting a failure of autonomy (as construed by Bigelow et al.). Similarly, this account explains our intuitions about Cordner’s scholar. Because the scholar experiences a shift in judgement about what he ought to do, orthonomy requires him to update his desires in light of
this shift. (The scholar would have been weak-willed had he failed to update his desires. The plausibility of this thought thus puts further pressure on Jackson’s account.)

Kennett and Smith (1994, 1996) argue that any plausible account of weakness must explain the distinction between weak-willed agents (who retain the capacity to exercise self-control, despite their failure of orthonomy) and compelled agents (who lack orthonomy precisely because they are unable to exercise control). That is, weak-willed agents must be able to desire to do what they judge to be best, even in cases where their strongest desires are to act contrary to their better judgements. But the capacity for self-control appears to be paradoxical. How is it possible that, at the very moment one most wants to act wrongly, one also successfully resists this desire, by exercising self-control? On the one hand, if the desire to act wrongly is, in fact, one’s strongest desire then self-control would appear to be impossible; but on the other hand, if one successfully resists the temptation to act wrongly, then the desire to act wrongly couldn’t have been one’s strongest desire, after all (Mele 1987). Kennett and Smith defuse this paradox by arguing that self-control does not necessarily involve performing an action (despite appearances). Rather, self-control may involve the disposition to have certain thoughts which indirectly change the weight of one’s desires. For instance, if an agent is tempted to eat too many cookies, contrary to her better judgement, she may be said to possess the capacity for self-control if she possesses the disposition to think of cookies as lumps of fat at appropriate moments of temptation. Such thoughts, we may assume, will normally have the effect of reducing the agent’s desire for cookies. (The possession of such a disposition must, however, be compatible with the disposition failing to manifest on certain relevant occasions. Otherwise, weakness of will would be impossible. See Smith (2003) for further discussion of the dispositional structures that distinguish weak-willed agents from compulsives.)

Murdoch University

Peta Bowden

Founded in 1974 with the aim of providing a fresh approach to learning that favoured interdisciplinary studies, Murdoch University initially eschewed a traditional structure of discipline-centred departments and faculties. As a result, foundation appointees, Patsy Hallen and Michael Booth—joined in 1975 by David Kipp—developed philosophically based units within the School of Social Inquiry. Units on the history of ideas, existentialism, self and society, relations between science, technology and society, and environmental ethics were linked
with social and political theory more generally. In 1987 philosophy was nominally given more prominence through the establishment of a course entitled ‘Politics, Philosophy and Sociology’. But when Jeff Malpas was appointed lecturer in philosophy in 1990 it had become apparent that philosophy required a stand-alone course. With the squeeze on the humanities in Australia under way such aspirations were truly remarkable. However, due to Malpas’ extraordinary energy and vision, and the unwavering support and drive of the professor of English, Horst Ruthrof, this well-nigh miraculous change in philosophy’s status was achieved.

In 1993 students were offered a degree in philosophy for the first time at Murdoch. Core units were developed in metaphysics, moral philosophy, epistemology and philosophy of language, with electives emphasising connections with other disciplines, such as social sciences, linguistic theory, history, education, cultural theory, science, technology and the environment. One of the highlights of these early years was the philosophy of language unit, ‘Meaning and Interpretation’, in which students revelled in the robust debates between joint coordinators, Jeff, the philosopher, and Horst, the semiotician.

The subsequent fifteen years have seen the department (or in current Murdoch parlance, the Philosophy Program) consolidate its position at Murdoch University and in the wider philosophical landscape in Western Australia. Units draw on all traditions of philosophy and are offered in both on-campus and off-campus modes. Undergraduate offerings have been particularly attractive to mature age and distance students who welcome the opportunity to study a wide-ranging set of units in an interdisciplinary context. In 1995 the program made history by winning a large government infrastructure grant, in collaboration with the University of Western Australia, for the development of the library collections in philosophy at both institutions.

Murdoch philosophers have also fostered a strong research environment in areas including phenomenology, existentialism, moral psychology and feminist philosophy. Notable books by staff include Malpas’ Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning (1992) and Place and Experience (1999), Peta Bowden’s Caring: Gender-Sensitive Ethics (1997), Ruthrof’s Semantics and the Body (1997) and The Body in Language (2000), Paul MacDonald’s Descartes and Husserl (2000), and most recently his two-volume History of the Concept of Mind (2003, 2006). The annual Philosophy Colloquium, established and hosted by Murdoch University since 2005 through the initiative of Lubica Ucnik, and attended by over one-hundred participants each year, provides a showcase for student and staff research, and a focus for academic philosophy in Western Australia.

Established against the grain of the dominant educational culture, philosophy at Murdoch University has had to struggle throughout its lifetime to maintain its position. However, the combined enthusiasm and commitment of staff and students has ensured that it continues to offer important opportunities for study and research in philosophy in a vibrant and intimate environment that fosters links with other disciplines.
Naturalism
Robert Nola

Whatever they might mean by the term ‘naturalism’, many philosophers around the world (but by no means all) regard themselves as philosophical naturalists. Several philosophers in Australia (for example, J. J. C. Smart and D. M. Armstrong) but fewer in New Zealand, were leading advocates of naturalism during the second-half of the twentieth century in conjunction with philosophers in the U.S. such as W. V. Quine or in a qualified way David Lewis. Naturalists tend to concur with the somewhat vague slogan that philosophy is, or ought to be, continuous with science and that there is no first, or a priori, philosophy, contrary to the view of many earlier philosophers that there is a privileged, a priori role for philosophy in our understanding of the world as a whole. Either philosophy is to work hand in hand with science or it stands in some relation of deference towards science, including its methods and ontology.

Naturalists refine their position by distinguishing two varieties. The first is ontological naturalism, which claims that what the world contains will be a matter for science to discover, with philosophy playing a secondary role of outlining the ontological framework of science. In this sense naturalism stands in contrast to a supernaturalism which says that there are gods, spirits, souls, thinking substances and other ‘spook’-like entities or properties in the world. One of the significant tasks that a philosophical naturalism must face is to give an account of the non-‘spooky’ but not obviously naturalistic items such as philosophical abstracta like universals and possible worlds, mathematical abstracta like numbers or sets, mental items such as sensations and thoughts, and the status of the normative whether it be in logic, methodology or ethics.

The second variety is methodological naturalism. This concerns the very methods that are to be used in determining the content of ontological naturalism. Thus it is said that the methods to be used in investigating the world are those of science; a stronger version of this claim is that there is no way of obtaining
knowledge of the world other than using the methods of science, whatever they be. Even granting this, there remains a further aspect to methodological naturalism driven by the concerns of ontological naturalism. Traditionally the classical conception of knowledge has contained a justification condition which has been understood to have normative force. But from whence this normative force? Naturalistic accounts of knowledge have been proposed in which such normativity is to be replaced by, for example, some reliability condition or causal condition linking beliefs and the world; in the case of Armstrong (1973) it is argued that there is a law-like connection between beliefs and the world. Again, there are accounts of the very methodological principles that govern the scientific enterprise, including any principle of induction, which cash out their normativity in terms of reliability, for example the reliability of the connection between the means prescribed in methodological rules and the ends or goals of science itself. An alternative approach would be to take an expressivist view of the norms of scientific rationality.

Either version of naturalism invites two questions: first, what is the ontological picture that naturalism wishes to frame, and second, what account can it give of the non-‘spooky’ but not obviously naturalistic? Here naturalism comes into its own as an adventurous and exciting philosophical program which attempts to find a place for all items within its framework, using some notion of reduction or broader notions of location or placement, or to eliminate them as items not to be countenanced in the naturalistic framework, the classic case being that of the ‘spooky’ which is to have no place at all. Once an item has been located within naturalism, naturalists take themselves to have provided an ‘analysis’ of what that item is. Failure to either locate or eliminate certain kinds of abstracta or normativity would set limits to the success of the program. But if it were to turn out that science itself found certain abstracta indispensable (such as numbers or sets), then these would arguably have to be included as part of the ontology contained in ontological naturalism, thereby leading to issues concerning its scope.

One of the earliest books to be systematically ‘naturalistic in temper’ is J. J. C. Smart’s 1963 *Philosophy and Scientific Realism*. Though naturalism takes a realist view of science, not all realisms need be naturalistic (e.g. Platonism or the alleged *sui generis* character of the flow of *time*). One important theme for Smart is the location of humans in the scientific picture of the world. For example, he argues for the replacement of certain hidden anthropomorphisms about time, such as our use of tenses to characterise the flow of time, by a de-tensed view which appeals only to temporal relations of *earlier*, *later* and *being simultaneous with*. Another aspect of his naturalising project draws on his own work in the late 1950s, and that of U. T. Place, which led to the *identity theory* of the mind. Sensations are located within brains simply because, on this theory, sensations just are identical with certain neurological processes within brains. Armstrong’s *A Materialist Theory of Mind* is a systematic working out of the identity theory by supplementing it with a causal analysis of many of our mental concepts.
In Armstrong (1978) ontological naturalism is ‘the hypothesis that nothing but Nature, the single, all-embracing spatio-temporal system, exists’ (1978: 138). This system is populated by particulars, their properties and relations (construed as universals), though in later work Armstrong replaces this by Factualism, an ontology of facts or states of affairs. This differs from yet another position, that of Keith Campbell (1990), which is naturalistic but advocates tropes or abstract particulars as basic rather than embracing objects and universals. Perhaps with the advance of science some further theory of yet unknown items emerges which explains our spacetime system. However the spacetime system is not to be eliminated but located within the items of the new theory; otherwise this conception of naturalism would run into extreme difficulties. Granted this conception of naturalism, Armstrong’s main task is to give an account of properties and laws of nature as relations between higher order universals that does not admit abstracta, such as uninstatiated Platonic universals, but favours a more Aristotelian theory of imminent universals. Armstrong (1989) is also an attempt to give an account of modality in terms of his version of naturalism. For Armstrong physicalism, or old-time materialism, is a sub-species of naturalism and is not to be identified with it.

Many naturalists have been attracted by what is known as the ‘Canberra Plan’, a style of analysis which takes its cue from David Lewis’ development of the Ramsey sentence. This involves a two-step procedure. First, a number of uncontested platitudes or common assumptions are collected about some philosophically interesting domain, e.g. colour, the mental such as sensation or belief, or the moral such as goodness or rightness. These are expressed in a language containing (i) terms which have their meaning already fixed (these can be collectively denoted by ‘O’), and (ii) ‘theoretical’ terms ‘t₁’, ‘t₂’, …, ‘tn’ which refer to the putative entities of the philosophically interesting domain (e.g. ‘red’, ‘green’ etc., or ‘good’, ‘right’, etc.). The platitudes can then be conjoined to form the long-ish sentence ‘\(Q(t₁, t₂, \ldots, tₙ, O)\)’. This determines the meaning of the ‘theoretical’ terms by specifying the role they play in the context of ‘\(\Theta(t₁, t₂, \ldots, tₙ, O)\)’. Second, the sentence is ‘Ramsified’ along the lines suggested by Lewis to become, schematically, ‘(\(∃!x₁)(∃!x₂)\ldots(∃!xₙ)[\Theta(x₁, x₂, \ldots, xₙ, O)]\’; that is, there is a unique n-tuple \(<x₁, x₂, \ldots, xₙ>\) of ‘somethings’ that play the various roles in the context \([\Theta(x₁, x₂, \ldots, xₙ, O)]\). What are the ‘somethings’ that play these roles? Typically naturalists turn to science to tell us what entities play the various roles, or in the case of norms of ethics or methodology, they look for the descriptive properties that play the roles. If the roles can be uniquely realised by some scientific, or respectively purely descriptive, entities then the ‘theoretical’ entities \(t₁, t₂, \ldots, tₙ\) have been located within the framework of scientific naturalism—otherwise they are to be eliminated. Though the details of this program cannot be set out here (see Jackson 1998 or Braddon-Mitchell and Nola 2009), it affords a new, broad approach to naturalism within many different domains.

What do naturalists say about abstracta such as mathematical entities like numbers or sets? In not being realists about such entities they might bite the
bullet and adopt an error theory of mathematics, or a fictionalist account. But others might play down the strong constraints that some place on an ontological naturalism that refuses to admit abstracta and in contrast play up methodological naturalism which requires us to take the posits of science seriously and not patronise them. Our best sciences posit not only items such as quasars and quarks but also mathematical entities; insofar as they do then methodological naturalism bids us to admit all these posits into science. Such a Quinean approach which adopts a broad methodological naturalism is defended in Colyvan (2001).

In a quite different vein Huw Price (2004) challenges the standard account of naturalism given above (which he dubs ‘object naturalism’) by claiming that science has a differential bearing on the philosophical concerns that give rise to naturalism in the first place. The prominence of object naturalism has obscured subject naturalism, viz., what the sciences tell us about ourselves as natural entities in the world and the representational, semantic and psychological relations that we bear to the world of the object naturalist. He argues that object naturalism must carry with it much semantic and other representational baggage that is not eliminable. From this Price concludes that there is an important priority of subjective over objective naturalism in the sense that the claims about the latter require validation from the stance of the former. This opens the real possibility that the latter might not receive validation from the point of view of the former. Price’s position is that object naturalism is considerably compromised and that subject naturalism needs to be given the kind of philosophical prominence that brings naturalism closer to some classical versions of pragmatism.

Newcastle, University of

Cliff Hooker & David Dockrill

Pre-History, 1954–65

Philosophy was established in 1954 as part of the Division of Arts, Newcastle University College, itself founded in 1951 as part of the University of Technology, later the University of NSW (UNSW). Initially, the University of New England provided teaching assistance in Arts subjects until they were introduced at UNSW. This period was focussed on establishing the regular activities of normal university departmental life. A traditional, British-framed and (John) Anderson-inspired, curriculum developed.

Appointments in this period, in temporal order, were Alexander (‘Sandy’) Anderson 1954, Charles Presley 1955 (resigned 1959), Alec Ritchie 1957, Bill Doniela 1959, David Dockrill 1962, all of whom (except Presley) had studied
under John Anderson at the University of Sydney and were influenced by his teaching.

**Traditional Period, 1966–79**


The teaching curriculum expanded without changing form, adding religious studies in 1979. Under initiator and mentor Bill Doniela, the student Philosophy Club was formed in 1966 with its staff-student journal *Dialectic* and remains the oldest such institution in Australia; special issues included Greek Philosophy (#24, 1985, Lee ed.), Hegel (#28, Doniela ed.) and Anderson Papers (#30, 1987).

Both research and departmental governance were conducted within a broadly British tradition.

**Modernising Period, 1980–93**

Cliff Hooker succeeded Alec Ritchie as professor in 1980, following a decade at the University of Western Ontario, Canada. The first Australian philosophy professor to hold a doctorate in science (Physics, Sydney, Australia) as well as philosophy (York, Toronto, Canada), at appointment his published research included twelve edited books and fifty-plus journal articles. Other appointments in this period were Raoul Mortley 1992–95 (while Vice-Chancellor) and John Wright 1989. Doniela retired in 1987, Anderson and Robinson in 1988 and Lee 1993.

An outward orientation, expressed in various university societies, was strengthened by Hooker in two key areas. Firstly, in interdisciplinary research engagement: the department held a national conference, Law and Social Incompetents in 1982, organised by Hooker and the then deputy chancellor Justice Michael Kirby, and it hosted an international research seminar on Evolutionary Epistemology in 1986, which Hooker organised. And secondly, in interdisciplinary teaching: a special course for Engineering students, Technology and Human Values, was developed by Hooker based on a systems approach; and later, comparable courses for Commerce, Social Work and for student groups were also developed. In the profession, Hooker, for Newcastle, held the Australasian Association of Philosophy presidency, and Newcastle hosted the annual conference in 1981 for the first time.

An open, self-initiated, consensual approach to curriculum and teaching, governance and financial support was introduced and a planned, project/grant-oriented approach to research was encouraged. Hooker obtained the department’s first Australian Research Council (ARC) major project grant (*Evolutionary Epistemology*) with Kai Hahlweg as postdoctoral researcher, 1985–89, followed by a second ARC grant (*Reason and Science*) with Bill Herfel as postdoctoral researcher, 1991–94. Hooker (1998) also founded the Complex Adaptive Systems Research Group (CASRG). During this first period Hooker published three books and forty-two research papers.

The same period saw research books published by Hooker (Hooker et al. 1981, Churchland and Hooker 1985, Hooker 1987, Hahlweg and Hooker 1989) and Sparkes (1991) and several conference proceedings were published (Dockrill and Mortley 1981, Dockrill and Tanner 1985, 1986, 1994).

Continuing Survival Period, 1994—

The period since 1994 has been marked by increasingly stressful university change and further staff turnover. The following appointments were made: Chris Falzon, 2001; Bill Herfel, 1994 (left 2004); Joe Mintoff, 1994; Colin Wilks, 2002; Yin Gao, 2006. This deliberately created a multi-disciplinary staff with Gao, Herfel, Hooker, Mintoff and Wright all possessing degrees in mathematics, physics or engineering as well as philosophy. Sparkes retired in 1996, Dockrill in 2000 and Hooker in 2006.

Reducing financial support has seen staff/student teaching ratios climb to ~30 (2.5 x 1980 levels), and often the highest in the faculty. Continual administrative re-arrangement replaced departments by multi-discipline schools, then re-branded faculties as (super-)schools and absorbed them into (super-)faculties; philosophy became one disciplinary group among many others in a School of Education and Humanities. Administration itself became more formal, time consuming and distant but more rewarded as work load. In consequence, teaching became less immediate and less individualised, with less time for casual discussion, all distinct deficits for any foundationally focussed discipline, especially one not on a recognised employment path. Research support shifted from individuals to larger groups.

Through all this interdisciplinary teaching was of necessity expanded; the Technology and Human Values course was praised by Engineering assessors and became a required component for all Engineering students (including in Singapore, 2000–2007), a first in Australia; Applied Ethics now included Design and Nursing students; a new required Philosophy of Psychology course, focussed around the art/science methodological debate, was initiated by Herfel and Hooker in 2000.

Hooker developed the CASRG program with postdoctoral researchers Wayne Christensen 1998–2001 (Bio-cognitive Organisation) and John Collier 1994–95 (ARC grant: Reason and Science) and 1998–2000 (ARC grant: Reduction/Emergence in Complex Systems), achieving nearly continuous ARC major project grants for 1985–2000 (leave periods aside). Hooker then became a program leader with the Co-operative Research Centre for Coal in Sustainable Development.
New England, University of

(CCSD), postdoctoral fellow Thomas Brinsmead, 2002–2007 (Adaptively Resilient Sustainability and Energy Policy). In the period he contributed fifty-four published papers and two books.

Now professor emeritus, Hooker is currently editing vol. 10, Philosophy of Complex Systems, of the Elsevier Handbooks in Philosophy of Science, completing books on the CCSD work (with Brinsmead) and on process models of reason and ethics (with Barry Hoffmaster, Canada), and extending published work on bio-cognitive dynamics, including of scientific research, with Robert Farrell, postdoctoral researcher 2008–2009.

CASRG-supervised doctoral students included Scott Muller, 2004, supervised by Collier; Yin Gao (Shenyang, China), 2004, supervised by Herfel; Barry Hodges, 1997, Christensen, 1998, Yanfei Shi (Beijing), 2000, John White, 2000, and Karel Grezl, 2007, supervised by Hooker. Christensen and Hodges are Newcastle University Medallists, Gao, Grezl, Muller and White also hold engineering degrees, and Shi came from the Beijing Academy of Social Science. Non-CASRG doctoral students included Keith Joseph, 2001, and Colin Wilks, 1996, supervised by Dockrill and Kenneth Pringle, 2005, co-supervised by Dockrill; Bruce Anthony 1997, supervised by Sparkes and Alex Arposio, 2006, supervised by Wright. The theses of Muller, Shi and Wilks were published as well-regarded books (Muller 2007, Shi 2001, Wilks 2002); Christensen and Hooker published nine joint research papers.


New England, University of

R. L. Franklin

Philosophy at the University of New England (UNE) has been sometimes pioneering and sometimes typical of Australian universities. A major pioneering aspect lies in its origins. Till well into the twentieth century, Australia had one university in each of its six State capitals, and education elsewhere was often limited, poor and brief. Yet a group of citizens in the little country town of Armidale in New South Wales was advocating the radical notion that tertiary education could exist there. At first they met amused if polite refusals from the NSW government (the notion that the Commonwealth might be involved in education would have been more amusing still). But persistent pressure, aided by the Minister for Education who was their local State MP, achieved in 1928 a
Teachers College awarding a two-year certificate for primary school teachers. In 1989, after much change, it was to merge into the UNE.

Meanwhile, local ambition in the 1930s grew. If a Teachers College, why not even a university? After intense lobbying and fundraising, including an offer of the vast homestead Booloominbah as a first home, a rather hesitant University of Sydney agreed to establish in Armidale a New England University College (NEUC) of the University of Sydney, which opened in 1938.

Five lecturers were appointed. Each was to teach a pair of disciplines for the first year, and to be joined by a second lecturer the next year so that the disciplines could separate once they had a first and a second-year class. The lecturers lived and worked with their students in Booloominbah, and their library was initially little more than the books they brought with them. The University of Sydney set and marked the exams, using its own syllabuses. This could be difficult for the isolated lecturers, but at least it put the results beyond question. The close personal contact led to great success. Apart from producing many distinguished alumni, the average NEUC intake mark over its lifetime was lower than that of the University of Sydney but the average results were higher.

In the 1950s a radically new issue emerged: could a university education be achieved through correspondence and books, with at most some personal contact with teaching staff? Many politicians were sympathetic to external teaching, though the University of Sydney and some staff at NEUC were opposed. In 1954 NEUC became the independent UNE, on condition that it began external teaching in 1955. The pioneering was again successful. External students had the same lecturers and courses as internal ones, and their greater maturity and enthusiasm produced results at least as good.

Pioneering is less evident in the content of the philosophy courses. Teaching at NEUC had echoed the idiosyncratic views of Sydney’s then immensely influential professor, John Anderson. After independence, content has generally been typical of Australian departments, with one exception. In the 1960s the then professor aimed to make Armidale a postgraduate centre for his own speciality of formal logic. But when he left for an overseas chair this exotic bloom proved impossible to tend in the Australian bush, and it was abandoned. On the whole, the dominant influence has been the Oxford/Cambridge tradition; but there has been a continuing capacity for formal logic, and significant emphasis at different times on other traditions from scholasticism to Continental philosophy. Today’s themes include issues such as feminism, political freedom and the needs of the environment.

Australian philosophy departments play two major roles. The professional goal is to produce postgraduate students who eventually contribute to the discipline. But for the bulk of their students philosophy is not a major study. So the second role is to acquaint those students with the long tradition of Western (and increasingly other) philosophy, and to encourage critical thinking that can be applied to any difficult issue. In addition, philosophy at UNE originally played a third role. In response to the local efforts that had made the University possible,
it was active in reaching out to the general public through non-degree lectures and discussion groups.

While passing on their cultural tradition, philosophers also extend it by research and publication in their chosen fields. When they face new developments they have three options: to ignore them; to endorse and work within them; or to critically question them. The first option ultimately abandons the search for new insight, but the tension between the other two is the creative heart of that search. There have been elements of all three attitudes in UNE philosophy, but the latter two have predominated. It has been open to, but critical of, new philosophic approaches. It also has a tradition of collaboration with other disciplines such as the social sciences and religious studies. This has extended both to joint courses and to research.

In recent times, UNE, like all Australian universities, has faced increasing pressure to teach more students without increased staff. One administrative response has been to revise the traditional faculty/department structure. In 1998 philosophy became a Section of the School of Social Science in the Arts Faculty. In 2007 it has become a sub-department in a School of Humanities in a Faculty of the Arts and Sciences. Such reorganisations absorb immense time and energy, at the same time as academic pressures have increased.

Despite this, philosophy at UNE is vigorous. The non-degree activities, being unfunded, have inevitably shrivelled, but teaching and research thrive. UNE as a whole consistently gains high recognition for its concern for students. While the reorganisations have reinforced the tradition of collaboration with other disciplines, they have not eliminated work in more traditional areas. In the period 2001–2007 UNE philosophers have published six books, twenty-one chapters in edited books and forty articles. The areas include mainstream issues in metaphysics, philosophical logic, epistemology, history of philosophy and philosophy of religion, as well as cross-disciplinary work in applied ethics and social political and economic philosophy.
science and engineering students—what would later come to be called a ‘general education requirement’. The School of Humanities included departments of Philosophy, English, History, and Politics; and the Head of School was Max Hartwell, a professor of economic history.

A Faculty of Arts came into existence in 1960, and Jack Thornton, who had been at the university since 1952, and whose interests were in the area of scientific thought, became the professor of philosophy. During the next two years, a School of Philosophy was created (Thornton was the foundation professor) and six appointments were made, all but one of whom were from the University of Sydney and had been taught by John Anderson. These were identified by Thornton as ‘seeds for the future’. The non-Sydney person was Charles Hamblin.

For reasons most closely related to his interest in the history of science and his desire to develop a program in this area and to contribute to a robust General Studies program, Thornton was instrumental in founding a new School of History and Philosophy of Science in 1967. Thornton left the School of Philosophy and became the foundation professor of the School of History and Philosophy of Science. Hamblin became the professor and Head of the School of Philosophy. Hamblin, a peculiar and a brilliant man by anyone’s standards, remained in this position until his death in 1985.

In the early 1970s, Hamblin, whose strength was formal and informal logic, appointed a logician, Frank Vlach, fresh from the University of California. Vlach was the first overseas appointment of the school. It appears that the idea was to build on the strength in logic, particularly in the area of teaching, in the UNSW environment of science and engineering students. Philosophy courses became, and continue to be, a stream, or major sequence, of courses available to science students, as well as to arts students. It is, perhaps, surprising that strong strands in logic and the philosophy of science were not, in fact, developed, even though individual courses in those areas were being taught within philosophy. There appears to have been impetus—beginning with the appointment of Hamblin—for development of these areas and serious involvement in the science and engineering faculties in those areas. But this did not eventuate.

Rather than development in any specific area, the school was more concerned to offer variety and to cover the major areas of philosophy. It has taken a more generalist approach to teaching and research, in its course offerings and in its subsequent academic appointments, including for the first time in an Australian philosophy department an appointment specifically in Chinese philosophy. In the late 1970s and early ‘80s, as with other Australian universities, there were serious discussions and arguments over how much the school wanted to steer in the direction of, or emphasise, the areas of Marxism and feminism. These were more heated discussions than table-banging; line-drawing differences of ideology, and did not result in anything like the departmental split that occurred at the University of Sydney. But there did become ‘camps’.

With the demise in 1989 of the University’s Professorial Board (replaced by an Academic Board) and of the appointment of Professor-Heads (as permanent
positions), as with other Australian universities, the position of professor within a school became a different matter from what it had been during Charles Hamblin’s tenure. An appointment of a chair was (and is still) a very big deal; but it no longer had the administrative, future-direction-determining, empowering-one-person’s-view significance that it previously had.

In 1988, Genevieve Lloyd was appointed professor of philosophy, coming to UNSW from the Australian National University (ANU). This was significant not simply because Lloyd was a woman and, whether she wanted it or not, carried the mantle of women in philosophy and feminist philosophy in Australia; but also because she was the first professor appointed to the school under the new regime. For the first time, a professor was in the role as leader not by fiat or authoritarian pronouncement, but rather by strength of persuasion. Lloyd struggled with the role.

With Lloyd’s resignation/retirement in 2000, the appointment of Paul Patton as professor was made in 2001. Patton had been at the University of Sydney. In reaching a decision on this appointment, views of the executive of the faculty, members of the school, as well as views from the university’s central administration steering the appointment, varied from ‘oil needs to be poured on troubled waters’ of divisiveness within the school, to ‘there is no problem that needs fixing’.

Philosophy at UNSW continues to view itself as generalist, although it recognises that it has particular strengths. In 1994, in addition to its complement of degree programs in philosophy, the school introduced Australia’s first graduate programs (coursework and research) in Professional Ethics. These separately named degree programs continue to be housed in philosophy and attract an international cohort of students. Since the early 1990s, the school has had a significant international presence in the area of Philosophy for Children. Philosophy at UNSW bills itself as having specialist expertise in a range of key issues and subject matters including Chinese philosophy, ethical theory and applied ethics (including business ethics and professional ethics), 19th and 20th century European philosophy (including Kant, German Idealism, Nietzsche, Heidegger, existential phenomenology, and French post-phenomenological and post-structuralist thought), Gettier problems, philosophical skepticism and varieties of non-absolute knowledge, and the rights of indigenous peoples. (from UNSW Philosophy website)

Throughout its history—certainly for at least the last twenty-five years—the academic staff numbers in philosophy have remained relatively constant (at ten to twelve full-time academic staff).

With changes in the structure of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences in 2007—diminishing the number of schools in the faculty from eleven to five—philosophy at UNSW is no-longer a school in the faculty, but is rather one of three disciplines within the School of History and Philosophy (the others being History and History and Philosophy of Science).
New South Wales, University of, School of History and Philosophy of Science

Phillip Staines

After almost forty-two years at the University of New South Wales (UNSW) as a fully independent school in the Faculty of Arts, History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) has very recently merged with Philosophy and History, forming part of the new School of History and Philosophy. For most of that time it has been the largest unit in any Australian university addressing itself generally to the meaning of science. This entry gives a brief account of its formation and trajectory through those years.

UNSW had the first chair of HPS in Australia (1966) and was the second Australian university to establish a department of HPS. How did this come about? Many factors were causally operative but three were crucial—a university policy and two people.

HPS and the School of Philosophy from which it emerged at UNSW owed, in similar but importantly different ways, their origins to the university’s policy of giving a general education to its students. UNSW began its life as the New South Wales University of Technology, established in 1949. From its earliest days the university required students to do subjects outside their faculty to broaden their education.

The foundation professor of HPS, John (‘Jack’) B. Thornton, began work at UNSW as senior lecturer in philosophy in 1952, this being the university’s first appointment in philosophy. Thornton had a B.A. Honours in philosophy and a B.Sc. Honours in physics with the University Medal, both from the University of Sydney. There was no arts faculty at UNSW at the time and his appointment effectively established the Department of Philosophy within the School of Humanities and Social Sciences. This school’s brief was to give compulsory general education courses in the humanities to all the University’s undergraduates.

1952 saw another significant university decision for HPS. Professor Philip Baxter was chosen to head the new university. In setting up the Faculty of Arts late in 1959, Baxter wanted Arts students to do some compulsory courses in general science, just as students in the other faculties were doing compulsory general education courses in the humanities. He proposed that the foundation professor of philosophy in the new faculty should be ‘a person with special interests in the History and Philosophy of Science’ (Willis 1983: 101). Thornton, who had been teaching courses in Logic and Scientific Method and Philosophy of Science in the Department of Philosophy, was appointed.
UNSW’s requirement was that arts students either do two science subjects in their degrees or where this proved impractical for them (e.g. lacking the prerequisites) a subject called ‘Scientific Thought’ taught by the philosophy department. Most arts students opted for the latter, thus leading to very large enrolments as the faculty grew. So, in 1960 the new School of Philosophy began teaching HPS to Arts students.

‘Scientific Thought’ was offered in successive years as three main courses: History of Astronomy, The Darwinian Revolution, and the Social History and Sociology of Science. The first two were effectively required for those without science prerequisites. The last, taught by R. (Bob) Gascoigne, was the first Australian course on social aspects of science and one of the earliest in an area that was to become increasingly influential.

In 1964 the School of Philosophy separated into two departments: Philosophy and HPS, and in 1966 this new department became the independent School of HPS, headed by Thornton as its foundation chair and the first Australian professorial appointment in HPS. In the meantime (1965) the ‘Scientific Thought’ subjects had been renamed as HPS I, II and III (Oldroyd 1974: 3).

Over the next several years the Faculty of Arts reduced the requirements for its students to do science and/or HPS until they were gone in 1971. Compulsion gone, the numbers dropped dramatically to about 100 for HPS I, and the school needed to rethink its teaching position to make its undergraduate subjects more attractive to arts students and bring in others from outside the faculty as well as introduce postgraduate teaching. In the same period the number of full-time members of staff had grown to around 10, a figure that was maintained with small fluctuations from then on.

George Seddon, the second professorial appointment in the school, joined in late 1971 replacing Thornton who had moved into university administration. He saw the first offering of HPS to science students with entry at Level 2 and some introductory science subjects as prerequisites. Numbers took some time to build up but twenty-five years later, although numbers in and from science were declining, they still exceeded the intake from the Faculty of Arts.

Postgraduate teaching was successfully established in 1977 in the Faculty of Science with the Master of Science and Society degree. It was interdisciplinary but co-ordinated and largely taught from HPS.

1977 also saw the second and final external professorial appointment—Jarlath Ronayne. He brought specialisation in science policy. The 1979 school entry in the Arts Faculty Calendar heralded some of the changes coming with the following inclusion: ‘In recent years there has been a subtle redefinition of the boundaries of the discipline brought about by the demand for knowledge of the social dimensions of science and technology’ (p. 104).

Randall Albury, an internal appointment, was the next professorial head of school following Ronayne’s departure in 1983. Albury had contributed new courses in the history of medicine and the social studies of science and technology.
In the next five years there were two major additions to the school’s teaching responsibilities: HPS began a continuing commitment to teaching in environmental studies with a number of important appointments, and another masters program, the Master of Cognitive Science, was set up and co-ordinated by the HPS philosopher Peter Slezak. This interdisciplinary program in the Faculty of Arts was the first of its kind in Australia.

During this period in 1988 the school changed its name to Science and Technology Studies. The change proved contentious within the school, with some strongly dissenting views. Fourteen years later, after a faculty review, the school unanimously rejected the new name and returned to the old. The last appointment to the school was in 2000.

The school has had a strong research profile across a wide range of areas. Its most prolific researcher has been the historian of science, David Oldroyd. Within the philosophical arena an early publication was W. Leatherdale’s monograph, *The Role of Analogy, Model and Metaphor in Science* (1974). Since then, the main philosophical contributions have been papers, with Peter Slezak the main contributor.

For a small school HPS contributed disproportionately to university administrations through its first four professors. All served as deans, with three becoming pro vice-chancellors and one, Ronanyne, also deputy vice-chancellor and vice-chancellor at Australian universities. Other members of the school have served as sub-deans in arts, and most recently with the amalgamation of the departments of philosophy and history in 2007, HPS’s Paul Brown became its head.

The former School of HPS continues work now as one of the three disciplines located in the School of History and Philosophy.

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**New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists**

**Bill Cooke**

The New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists is the oldest and largest association representing non-religious viewpoints in New Zealand. Freethought organisations date back to the 1850s, though few lasted long. One of
these, the Canterbury Freethought Association, formed in 1881 and became the NZ Rationalist Association in 1909. In 1923 the Auckland Rationalist Association was formed, which in 1929 became the NZ Association for the Advancement of Rationalism and in 1931 the Rationalist Association and Sunday Freedom League. In 1954 it took over the name of NZ Rationalist Association from the now-moribund Christchurch group. In 1997 the NZRA became the NZ Association of Rationalists and Humanists. The association has published the *Examiner* (1907–1917) and the *Truth Seeker* (1927–1939), afterwards becoming the *NZ Rationalist*, adding *and Humanist* in 1964. In 1997 it became the *Open Society*.

The term ‘rationalist’ was adopted in deference to the Rationalist Press Association (RPA), which had formed in London in 1899. ‘Rationalist’ was meant in the sense of honestly submitting to the dictates of reason, at the time not thought either impossible or controversial. With the name came the RPA’s definition of rationalism as ‘the mental attitude which unreservedly accepts the supremacy of reason and aims at establishing a system of philosophy and ethics verifiable by experience and independent of all arbitrary assumptions of authority’. Despite the difficulties with this definition, it remained in place until 1997 as it satisfied the two main trends within contemporary freethought: those who wanted to accept unreservedly the supremacy of reason were more inclined to emphasise the criticism of religion, while those who thought of rationalism as a mental attitude were more interested in providing a secular replacement. Since 1997 the aims of the association have emphasised stimulating rational, humane and secular views of life and promoting the open society.

The association has made a point of defending openness, as when in 1934 it funded publication of an influential pamphlet on academic freedom, then a contentious issue. It also led a long campaign for greater freedom on Sundays, including the right to attend films, for which, in 1931, it was fined £15 by the Magistrate’s Court and then the same amount again by the Supreme Court. Between 1935 and 1941 the association again ran films on a Sunday, before being shut down once more. Its Sunday evening events became known as an important venue to discuss matters of the day, and where views got a hearing denied them anywhere else. These years constitute the association’s most influential period. During World War Two the association defended the Jehovah’s Witnesses, who were banned by a government nervous of any criticism. More recently the association has assumed the role of advocate for the significant percentage of people who declare themselves in each census as non-religious.

Prominent members include Sir Thomas Hunter (1876–1953), long-time Vice-Chancellor of *Victoria University of Wellington*; John A. Lee (1891–1982), firebrand politician; R. A. K. Mason (1901–1971), poet; Sir Dove-Myer Robinson (1901–1989), long-time mayor of Auckland; and Maurice Gee (b. 1931), the country’s best-known novelist.

*(Further reading: Cooke 1998.)*
New Zealand Society for Legal and Social Philosophy

Jim Evans

The New Zealand Society for Legal and Social Philosophy was formed at Victoria University of Wellington in 1980. The aim was to bring together academics from law, political studies, philosophy and other relevant disciplines with members of the legal profession and students, to discuss theoretical issues relating to the law. (The society has always taken a broad view of its range of interests.) Central figures involved in the formation of the society in Wellington and in the progress of the Wellington branch during the 1980s and early 1990s were Paul Harris, Don Mathieson, Chris Parkin, Graham Taylor, Ian McDuff, Alan Cameron and, later, Maurice Goldsmith.

In 1982, Paul Harris persuaded John Hannan and Jim Evans from the Faculty of Law at the University of Auckland to establish an Auckland branch of the society. This was formed in June 1982, with Ted Thomas as chair, Jim Evans as secretary and John Hannan as treasurer. Other members of the committee in Auckland during the years up to 1997 included Raynor Asher, Jan Crosthwaite, Tim Dare, Margaret Lewis, Richard Mulgan, Andrew Sharp, Bob Stevens, Christine Swanton, Lane West-Newman, and Martin Wilkinson.

The society was incorporated as a charitable trust in 1986 and was granted charitable status for tax purposes in 1991. It still holds both these forms of status. Under the constitution, which was established in 1986, the primary object of the society is ‘to promote the study and informed discussion of philosophical problems of law and social organisation and of the relationship between law and society through meetings, publications and conferences’. The constitution provides for branches that are semi-autonomous, in any centre in New Zealand in which there is sufficient interest. The national executive of the society consists of the chair, secretary and treasurer of each branch.

Up until 1996, both the Wellington and the Auckland branches were active, holding between six to nine meetings a year on a varied array of topics. The speakers sometimes came from within the society, sometimes from the law profession, but were often visiting academics. Occasionally, panel discussions were held. Meetings were attended by a wide range of people, including quite a number of High Court judges or people who went on to become judges. However, around 1997, both branches ceased to be active.

In June 2006, the Australian Society for Legal Philosophy held its annual conference in Auckland, part of the purpose being to assist in re-activating the New Zealand Society for Legal and Social Philosophy. Jim Evans organised the
Non-Classical Logic

Errol Martin

This brief summary of the history of non-classical logic in Australia is more meta-history than history, for two reasons. In the first place, the history of logic studies in Australia has already been documented in Martin’s overview (E. Martin 1992) and Goddard’s personal recollections (Goddard 1992). Work in non-classical logic should be seen in the overall context described there. Secondly, and more importantly, several of the works on non-classical logic discussed in this entry are intended to be comprehensive accounts of their respective subjects. They therefore contain both detailed historical introductions and comprehensive lists of references (incidentally also serving to locate the work of the Australasian authors in the global context as well).

A. N. Prior’s *Formal Logic* (1955), written while the author was a lecturer at Canterbury College in Christchurch, New Zealand, appears to mark the beginning of detailed formal studies in logic in Australasia. This work was both influential globally and a starting point for studies in modal logic and non-classical logic in Australia and New Zealand. In the third section of this book, and among many other topics, Prior discusses alternative logical systems. Two sorts of alternatives are considered: modal logics—which can be seen as formed by adding new operators such as ‘It is necessary that …’ to a (presumably classical) logical base—and logical systems, such as many-valued logic and the intuitionist
Non-Classical Logic

A system, which Prior calls non-classical logic and which represent a variation rather than an addition to logical theory.

It is true that when modal logic is formulated as a theory of strict implication it can also be seen, particularly in the weaker modal logics, as a variation on classical logic rather than an addition to it. In practice also, the mathematical techniques used for understanding modal logics have proved to be of great value in non-classical logic as well. However, in this entry we will follow Prior’s example and restrict the discussion to systems which are primarily aimed at changing the fundamental deductive base of logic. Within Australia and New Zealand the concentration of work on non-classical logic in the last half-century, in a philosophical context at least, has been in the (related) topics of Relevant logic and paraconsistent logic. The remainder of this entry will mention and briefly discuss a number of works on these topics that have been written within Australia and New Zealand.

Relevant Logic

Classical logic is the familiar two-valued logic covering first-order predicate logic. This formal theory was developed in its present form in the fifty years around the turn of the nineteenth century. By the end of the revolution, traditional formal logic had been subsumed as a special case (so it was argued, in any case), an account of logical truth was available via the notion of tautology, and the formalisation of many of the arguments of mathematics was possible.

Classical logic is, however, counterintuitive in permitting as logically correct deductions certain forms where the premises are independent or irrelevant to the conclusion. Well-known examples include, for propositions $A$ and $B$, say: If both $A$ and not-$A$, then $B$, and If $A$ then if $B$ then $A$. These classical theorems and others like them are a consequence of the extensional semantics and the classical approach to validity, and despite attempts to explain them away in terms of ‘smoothing out the theory’, ‘being harmless’ (in never leading from truth to falsity), they remain a problem for many, and an opportunity to find an improved account of deduction and logical consequence.

One approach to reinstate relevance is to consider how premises are used in a deduction. The relevance logics of A. R. Anderson and N. D. Belnap Jr. (1975) examined a range of such systems and defined this approach. Relevant logic (as the subject is generally known in Australasia, this being the exact same subject as relevance logic when studied or described in the U.S. and elsewhere!) has come to be studied in particular in Australia and New Zealand due to the influence of firstly Richard Routley (later known as Richard Sylvan) and other workers in weak modal logics, and secondly Robert Meyer, a student of N. D. Belnap Jr., who arrived in Australia in 1974 to work with Routley.

Originally, Routley examined the concept of entailment from the point of view of weak modal logics. A new direction became apparent when Routley and his co-author Val Routley (later Val Plumwood) published their semantics for first-degree entailments (Routley and Routley 1972). The key to this semantics was
the development of incomplete and possibly inconsistent ‘worlds’ (one cannot, presumably, say ‘possible worlds’, except in very informal discussions!) analogous in their formal role to the role of possible worlds in the semantics of modal logics.

Routley and Meyer then collaborated at long distance (having never met) on a series of papers entitled ‘Semantics of Entailment’ (Meyer and Routley 1973, 1972a, 1972b). However, for a number of years much of their joint work and collaborative work with other logicians remained unpublished. Eventually some of this detailed technical work (and not a little polemic) was made available in a volume of essays, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals (Routley, Plumwood, Meyer and Brady 1982). This volume is entitled ‘Part I’. Part II, which was expected to follow shortly afterwards, suffered delays. It was subsequently published by Ross Brady in a somewhat changed form (Brady 2003). Together, these two volumes provide many further results of Routley, Meyer and several of their students and co-workers, in particular Ross Brady. The publication in this book of part of the Routley and Meyer essay on ‘Extensional Reduction II’ is also very welcome, as it contains the authors’ thoughts on the philosophical significance of their semantics, and the possibility of providing philosophical clarity through worlds-style semantics.

Paraconsistency

Whereas Relevant logic is concerned with the general problem of the connections between premises and conclusion in valid argument forms, paraconsistency zooms in on the logical properties of inconsistent propositions, in particular when they are taken together (however ‘together’ is to be understood, which of course is part of the problem) and used as premises from which further conclusions can be drawn.

Several approaches to paraconsistency are possible. Within the Australasian context, paraconsistency has been extensively studied by Graham Priest, initially independently and then later in collaboration with Richard Routley. Priest’s collaboration with Routley has resulted in the volume of essays (Priest, Routley, and Norman 1989) which combines extensive scholarly and historical essays on philosophical thinking about inconsistency with detailed technical essays by the editors and other contributors. The approach favoured by Priest and Routley is to use Relevant logics as a means of working with inconsistency, rather than for example restricting logical rules or the context of deduction as is tried in other approaches. In this sense the two topics—Relevant logic and paraconsistency—of this brief account are related. However, for Priest, Routley and Norman it is not the relevance features of Relevant logics that are considered important in paraconsistent thinking; it is simply that relevance is a by-product of an account of a genuine implication. Other essays in the volume discuss the possibility of rebuilding parts of mathematics in a paraconsistent manner (Dialectical Set Theory), and there are several essays on the philosophical significance of paraconsistency.
Recent Work

In conclusion, here are three recent works which together give a sense of the direction that current research in non-classical logic is taking in Australia and New Zealand.

Non-Classical Logic Becomes Mainstream

Graham Priest’s textbook *An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic* (2001) is intended to showcase the fact that (in the author’s opinion) non-classical logics are now sufficiently well understood that one can take non-classical logic out of the research journals and use it as a tool in normal philosophical work. To this end the author introduces a range of non-classical logics, including but not limited to relevant and paraconsistent logics, starting from classical and modal logics. Each chapter has useful references and brief discussions and exercises covering both technical and philosophical questions.

Logic as (Sub-)Structure

In certain formulations of logics based on the ‘sequent calculi’ of Gentzen, a distinction is drawn between rules governing the introduction or elimination of the logical connectives (‘&’, ‘→’, etc.), and structural rules which govern the manipulation of groups of premises. In classical logic the structural rules are very simple because the premise groups are sets. In relevant and other logics it is possible to work with essentially fixed connective rules, and vary the structural rules, indeed even omitting certain rules in some cases. The resulting study is called ‘substructural logic’. Plausibly, the intention in this way of looking at non-classical logics is that it can be argued that the meaning of the logical connectives has not changed in non-classical logic, but the variation of the structural rules allows for more subtlety in the way in which premises are used to derive conclusions.

Greg Restall’s *An Introduction to Substructural Logics* (2000) provides an extremely thorough treatise of non-classical logic based on this approach, providing proof theory and formal semantics for a range of non-classical logics. Restall uses these ideas to put forward arguments for what he calls logical ‘pluralism’, the idea that appropriate logical rules depend on ‘what one is trying to achieve’, and it is to be expected that ‘different logics give you different norms’ (2000: 346–7).

Situations as Semantics

Routley and Meyer proposed that the worlds in the semantics for Relevant logics should be interpreted as theories, i.e. sets of propositions or even sentences, as is done in the canonical model. This interpretation is not only abstract, it fails to satisfy some philosophical positions that meaning must arise through association of syntax with things ‘in the world’.
Edwin Mares’ recent text on Relevant logic (Mares 2004) offers an important additional feature to the philosophical study of Relevant logics. Mares has adapted the semantic theory of *situations* to provide an interpretation of the worlds of Relevant logics. A situation is something like a partial description of the world. Situations are generally incomplete—situations only extend so far into the actual world, and they may also be inconsistent because the situation describers may not have access to all the information they need or may be confused about the information they do have. The strength of *situations* over Routley-Meyer theories is that situations are metaphysical constructs that have been discussed independently of Relevant logic and have a separate philosophical pedigree.

**Normative Ethics**

*Steven Curry & Maria Rodrigues*

‘Normative ethics’ is that sub-set of philosophical ethics that seeks to ‘state and rationally defend [an ethic] in such a way that all rational men, after carefully reflecting on the considerations pro and con, would find it acceptable’ (Edwards 1967: 121). It can be distinguished from meta-ethics, for example, because it is not concerned with explaining what ethics ‘is’ but with how it is practiced. It is also to be distinguished from ‘applied ethics’, because it deals in the general principles that should guide action rather than with answering specific questions about how we are to live. Traditionally, analytic normative ethics has been dominated by *deontology*, *consequentialism* and *virtue ethics*, all of which have waxed and waned in importance. At the moment all three have a place in ethical debates, alongside other approaches, such as the ethics of care promoted principally in America by Carol Gilligan and Virginia Held.

**Australian Contributions**

Australian philosophers, including those born overseas but making their careers here, have made important contributions to debates of international significance, in particular in the debate between the supposedly incompatible theories of deontology and consequentialism. Among the better-known deontologists, Alan Donagan and John Finnis advocated respect for human life as a fundamental rule that dictates a set of objective moral principles (Donagan 1977; Finnis 1980; Franklin 2003). In this they have been major exponents of a ‘natural law’ and ‘sanctity of life’ position common in deontology. Set very much against the argument with utilitarianism, the work of Raimond Gaita advances a broadly deontological program, but one which is less concerned with the establishment of rules than with the inculcation
of a properly-calibrated moral sense. In arguing against a purely technical or abstract method in ethics he claimed that the advocates of a pure calculation of value ‘show no fear or even slight anxiety at the responsibility they have assumed … and [have] no sense of humility in the face of the traditions which they condescendingly dismiss’ (Gaita 1991: 326, as cited in Franklin 2003: 421).

Despite important contributions on the deontological side, Australians have been particularly prominent as consequentialists and especially utilitarians. This may in part be because of the influence of ‘Australian realism’ under the leadership of John Anderson, who while being a sceptic about moral value, certainly inculcated a generation of Australians with an empiricist, anti-Idealist ethos. H. J. McCloskey of the University of Melbourne rather controversially accepted the view that killing an innocent human being may be justifiable under certain circumstances, for example if it prevents the death of many more. He appears to have been the originator of an oft-cited thought experiment concerning a law enforcement official who executes an innocent black prisoner to prevent a racist lynch mob killing even more innocent people (McCloskey 1957). J. J. C. Smart advocated a hedonistic version of utilitarianism, defining ‘utility’ as ‘happiness’. In this version of utilitarianism, that reaches back to Bentham’s, people ought to choose the action that results in the greatest possible quantity of happiness in the world (Smart 1986; Franklin 2003). However, Australia’s best-known utilitarian, Peter Singer, defines ‘utility’ according to preference satisfaction, and argues that the most ethical action is the one that allows the greatest number of preferences to be satisfied (Singer 1979).

Australian philosophers have also made important contributions outside of the consequentialism-versus-deontology debate. J. L. Mackie argued for moral nihilism, rejecting normative ethical principles entirely (Mackie 1977). This sort of position belongs in a discussion of normative philosophy because it challenges the presumption behind the standard debates, that some kind of rational basis for moral decision-making must exist, even if we don’t know what it is.

It is slightly more difficult to determine whether the philosophy of Mackie’s notable teacher, John Anderson, would be included in the realm of normative ethics. On the one hand, Anderson believed that there was no way of arriving at objective moral judgements (Mackie 1962a; Franklin 2003). On the other hand, Mackie explains that Anderson also believed that ‘there is an ethical quality, goodness, which characterises certain human activities and social movements, but which is fully objective, natural, and non-prescriptive’ (Mackie 1962a: 273). ‘Goodness’, to Anderson, involved freedom and the ability to act with enterprise, and he particularly advocated thoughtful inquiry uninhibited by traditionalist constrictions such as religious doctrines and political coercion (Franklin 2003).

Anderson was a controversial figure who was censured in Parliament for his attacks on religion in schools, associated with the Communist Party, and later founded the Sydney University Free Thought Society, which in turn spawned the Libertarian Society, a major part of the Sydney Push that nurtured a wide range of thinkers, artists and academics including Germaine Greer, Clive James and
Robert Hughes. Anderson also promoted an empirical approach to philosophy in a time when Idealism was the dominant approach, which had a distinctive effect on ethical thinking amongst his students.

**Environmental Ethics**

Perhaps the area in which Australian thought has most distinguished itself from the rest of the world has been the application of normative ethics to issues involving ecological sustainability. Reflecting on the ‘deeply and unselfconsciously anthropocentric’ views of Europeans such as Simone de Beauvoir, Freya Matthews writes:

Such a view could never ... have emanated from Australia. Here in Australia, ‘nature’ is still bigger than ‘culture’, and on a subconscious level we Australians accordingly have no choice but to defer to it. (1999: 95)

She refers to the works of Australian Val Plumwood as tipping off an ‘international wave of radical ecophilosophy’ that began in the 1970s and continues strong today. Plumwood (1991, 1993, 2002) challenged normative paradigms that based ethical judgements on conventional conceptions of human rationality, which tend to create divisive dualisms such as ‘humanity’ and ‘nature’. She likewise rejected deep ecology movements that called for a merging of ‘self’ with ‘nature’, in favour of an ethic based on a relational account of self that admits both divisions and continuities between the human and natural worlds. John Passmore (1974) agreed that people ought to change their attitude towards the environment, but rejected claims that Western scientific rationalism would lead environmental ethics astray. H. J. McCloskey (1983) used the focus of environmental ethics to produce a normative philosophy that is ‘pluralist’ or ‘modal’, resolving normative questions by combining consequences with rights theory.

(Further reading: Anderson, J. 1943a; Goodin 1995; Singer 1976.)

The University of Notre Dame Australia (UNDA) was established in 1992 in the port city of Fremantle in Western Australia. Consistent with the liberal arts tradition in Catholic universities elsewhere, all undergraduate students are required to do core units in theology, philosophy and ethics as part of their
degree program. The School of Philosophy and Theology is also responsible for providing service units to other schools. In the School of Law, philosophers teach critical thinking, legal ethics, and legal philosophy. In the School of Medicine, philosophers teach introductory units in philosophy and ethics. In the School of Business, philosophers teach ethics units required for the post-graduate courses. Commencing in 2008, UNDA now offers a (three-year) Bachelor of Philosophy course that requires sixteen philosophy units and eight electives. At present the school at Fremantle employs four full-time philosophers and a small army of tutors to provide support for the 1,000-plus students that take philosophy units at UNDA every year. As the Sydney campus continues to grow, no doubt the number of philosophers employed will also increase in order to meet the needs of the Sydney School of Philosophy and Theology and the other schools on the Sydney campus.
Susan Moller Okin (19 July 1946 – 3 March 2004) was born in Auckland, New Zealand. After completing her Bachelor’s degree at the University of Auckland, Okin took a M.Phil. in politics (1970) at Oxford University and then a Ph.D. in government (1975) at Harvard University. She subsequently spent most of her working life at the University of Brandeis, Massachusetts and at Stanford University, California, where she became the Marta Sutton Weeks Professor of Ethics in Society from 1990. At the time of her death Okin held the Marta S. Horner Distinguished Visiting Professorship at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University. As a feminist scholar with an international reputation, Okin’s contribution to political philosophy has had a major influence in framing issues of concern to feminist social and political philosophers working in Australia and New Zealand.

Okin’s first major political philosophical work, *Women in Western Political Philosophy* (1979), set a new agenda internationally and played an important part in the early development of feminist philosophy studies in Australia and New Zealand by highlighting the significance of gender as a category of analysis and gender equality as a social value. This book examined the classical political writings of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau and Mill asking ‘whether the existing tradition of political philosophy can sustain the inclusion of women in its subject matter [on the same terms with men] and, if not, why not?’ (1979: 4). Okin’s response in the negative brought to light the problematic nature of grounding conceptions of the relationship between the domestic and the public spheres of social life on the fundamental premise that gender inequality is the natural human condition.

Okin’s second major work, *Justice, Gender and the Family* (1989a), helped to frame issues of continuing concern to Australian feminist theorists around the adequacy of liberal social and institutional arrangements and conceptions of citizenship. Here Okin argues that women’s arbitrary association with the
family explains their historical exclusion from the public sphere and this in turn explains why the domestic sphere has been excluded from public-political discourse. Within the gender-structured family not only are responsibilities, opportunities and activities assigned on the basis of gender but such organisation results in unequal and unfair distributions of power, of paid and unpaid labour, and of leisure time, to the detriment of women. For Okin, then, acceptance of the family’s gender-structure is the ultimate source of the failure of traditional liberalism to conceptualise a just society for all.

Okin’s solution to the central problem of liberal theory thus conceived is to call for the degendering of its conceptions of the domestic/private and political/public spheres by rethinking questions of freedom, equality and social justice from the perspective of women’s lives. Whereas traditionally in the public sphere liberalism has appealed to impartial principles of justice (individual freedom and equality) to regulate men’s conflicting interests, in the private sphere of family life the interests of men and women have been taken to be harmonious and complementary, leaving it to the parties themselves to work out roles and responsibilities. But this ignores the reality of the vulnerability of women (due to their economic dependence on men) and of children (due to the increasing instability of marriage) within the modern family structure. So, Okin’s call to degender the public and private spheres operates on two levels. On one level, it requires ensuring women’s equal access to public life in addition to their treatment as formal equals and, on another level, it insists that the values governing the public and private spheres ought not be grounded on claims regarding (natural) sexual difference. The rationale underpinning the argument of Justice Gender and the Family holds that ‘a just future would be one without gender’ in the sense that gender should be as irrelevant to a just institutional order as ‘one’s eye color or one’s toes’ (1989a: 171).

Unlike more radical feminist challenges to liberalism’s public/private division that aspire to reconceptualise the relationship between public and private areas of life in non-dichotomous terms, Okin’s focus is on the inappropriateness of drawing a gender line between the public and private. Whilst her approach supplies an early version of the critique of liberalism’s presumption that the public and private spheres should be regulated by different norms and principles, as a liberal feminist Okin does not see any insurmountable problems for a liberal theorisation of the public/private division, whether between society and individual, or between political and civil society or between civil and domestic life.

At the same time, unlike liberals such as John Rawls, who at best merely assume the liberal character of relations internal to a marriage contract, Okin’s innovation is to argue that strategies for liberalising gendered families are justifiable within a Rawlsian conceptual framework. That is, because the interests of family members often diverge, public recognition of family members’ equal freedom entails not only abandoning the presumption that male heads of households should represent women’s interests but also adopting the view that the state should take various measures to protect the vulnerable. So, she endorses interventionist state policies,
such as protecting family members’ equal entitlement to all earnings coming into a household and requiring men to share responsibility for children (Okin 1989a: 174–86).

Liberalism re-orientated away from its masculine bias (Okin 1989b) and towards ‘fully humanist’ ideals of social justice (Okin 1991) would endorse the application of principles of justice to the domestic sphere on the ground that ‘rather than being one of many co-equal institutions of a just society, a just family is its essential foundation’ (Okin 1989a: 17).

In a just society … families must be just because of the vast influence that they have on the moral development of children … And the structure and practices of the family must parallel those of the larger society if the sense of justice is to be fostered and maintained … A society that is committed to equal respect for all its members, and to justice in social distributions of benefits and responsibilities, can neither neglect the family nor accept family structures and practices that violate these norms. (Okin 1989a: 22)

In this way, Okin’s strategy of degendering the patriarchal institutions and practices of society translates into a state program of actively liberalising the family structure and the relations within it. As Karen Green (2006) points out, this approach leaves Okin vulnerable to a range of objections. These derive, on the one hand, from a classic liberal concern for the protection of individual liberty against external interferences and, on the other, from the concerns of multiculturalists who endorse state protection of cultures, and of feminists who represent female difference in positive terms and call for a revaluation of femininity rather than the abolition of gender differences within the established institutions of a liberal democracy. Okin addresses these issues in a series of papers without, however, being moved to question the adequacy of her Rawlsian theoretical framework or the liberal public/private distinction more deeply (Okin 1990, 1994a, 1994b, 1998, 2005).

Thus, in a third work that has provoked considerable international debate, under the title ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?’ (1999), Okin continues to represent her degendering and liberalising strategies as compatible and mutually informing. Drawing upon her brand of humanist liberal justice, here Okin tackles the question of what liberal states should do when the claims of their minority cultures clash with the norm of gender equality. Although the essay title suggests engagement with the broader question of the relationship of Western liberal feminisms to issues of cultural difference, in fact Okin focusses on rejecting minority group **rights** on the empirical ground that Western liberal cultures are less patriarchal by comparison with the ‘more patriarchal’ minority cultures whose extinction may well be in the interests of their women members (Okin 1999: 23). In arguing that it should not be the business of liberal states to protect minority cultures, Okin reproduces the rationale underpinning the argument of *Justice, Gender and the Family*. That is, she takes the view that the category,
culture, like gender before it, is ideally irrelevant to determinations of justice. Yet, Okin sees no tension in valuing certain cultural phenomena—the Western liberal cultures that have historically been subjected to liberalising forces—more highly in judgments about the requirements of justice for the members of minority cultures (Cf. Okin 2002).

Inspiring and thought provoking on many levels, Okin’s distinctive liberal feminist approach to addressing the problem of social justice in gender-structured societies inevitably confronts liberalism’s fundamental tension between the rationale that underpins liberalising strategies—the desire to design institutions and policies that fully respect individuals’ equal freedom—and the effects of state implementation of such strategies—the subordination of personal choice to state determined conceptions of human well-being, the valuing of sameness over sexual difference and of dominant Western cultural practices and assumptions over those of minority cultures within liberal regimes.

**Orr Case**

Jeff Malpas

Sydney Sparkes Orr (1914–1966) was appointed foundation professor of philosophy at the University of Tasmania in Hobart in 1952, but was dismissed for misconduct in 1956. The subsequent controversy endured until 1966, receiving national and international coverage, and causing enormous damage to the University of Tasmania, as well as to the individuals involved.

Orr came to the chair in philosophy at Hobart as successor to E. Morris Miller (who had held the combined chair of philosophy and psychology). Born in Annborough, Northern Ireland, Orr studied philosophy at Queen’s University, Belfast, graduating with a B.A., with first-class Honours, in 1939, and an M.A. in 1941. He was also enrolled as a doctoral candidate at Belfast, with a dissertation on Plato, but the degree was never awarded. Orr held academic positions at St Andrews, in Scotland (a temporary assistant lectureship from 1944), and at the University of Melbourne (appointed to an acting lectureship in 1946, made permanent in 1947). Orr’s appointment to the chair in Tasmania (out of a field including J. L. Mackie and Kurt Baier) had the support of the chancellor, Sir John Morris, who approved of Orr’s apparently more conservative philosophical views, as well as his seeming commitment to adult education. Reports from students and colleagues of the time suggest, however, that while Orr could appear as an intense figure, he was neither an especially able philosopher nor a particularly good teacher. Moreover, while he had been involved in various Christian associations, and was married from 1941 onwards (to Sarah née Davidson), Orr’s personal life
was also somewhat unorthodox, and his conduct, particularly in relation to sexual
matters, was already the source of complications prior to his arrival in Tasmania.

In Hobart, Orr became involved in the University Staff Association, and in
1954 he proposed an open letter to the Premier calling for an inquiry into the
university administration. While not supported by all, the letter, written by Orr
and signed by him and thirty-five others, was published in the Hobart newspaper,
*The Mercury*, in October 1954. Orr’s letter was not the only factor in play, but it
was the immediate trigger for the establishment of the royal commission that
opened in February of 1955 and that gave rise, amidst continuing controversy, to
a new University Act passed that same year. In December of 1955, immediately
after the proclamation of the new Act, the University Council (which had not
been reformed to the extent recommended by the royal commission) appointed
a committee to investigate complaints against Orr alleging harassment, intimida-
tion and other improper conduct from Kajica Milanov, a lecturer in Orr’s
department, W. A. Townsley, one of Orr’s colleagues in the Staff Association,
and Edwin Tanner, one of Orr’s students. In February 1956, and shortly before
the committee was scheduled to meet, Orr took out writs for libel (in relation
to rumours about certain sexual improprieties) against four of his university
colleagues, three of whom were members of the investigating committee, with
the fourth being Townsley. A further complaint against Orr was then made
by Reginald Kemp, a local businessman, who charged Orr with seducing his
daughter, Suzanne. The latter complaint was presented to the University Council
by the Vice-Chancellor in March 1956, together with a letter of resignation
received from Orr (intended, according to Orr, as a means to avoid scandal in
relation to a matter from his time in Melbourne, but not to admit guilt in relation
to that involving Kemp). Rather than accept Orr’s resignation, the council chose
to investigate the Kemp allegations. When that investigation, along with the
investigation into the Milanov, Townsley and Tanner allegations, found against
him, Orr was summarily dismissed by the university—on 16 March 1956. Orr
immediately charged the university with wrongful dismissal, but the action in the
Supreme Court of Tasmania in October and November of 1956 failed, as did a
subsequent appeal to the High Court in May 1957.

Orr did not give up, and by 1958 had gained some influential supporters.
R. D. Wright, professor of physiology at the University of Melbourne, agreed to
act as Orr’s academic ‘next friend’, while the Kirk session of the Scot’s Church in
Hobart re-heard Orr’s case, as part of an application for his readmission to the
Kirk in 1958, and found in Orr’s favour. Alan Stout, professor of philosophy at
the University of Sydney, also moved for a ban to prevent the chair of philosophy
in Tasmania from being filled. The ban was approved by the *Australasian
Association of Philosophy* at its meeting in June 1958, and by the end of the
year was supported by philosophers in Britain and the U.S. There was also talk
among university staff associations of a wider boycott on the university unless it
re-opened the case, and just such a ban was imposed by staff at the *University
of Newcastle*. There was significant division within the university on the matter,
and, in December 1959, a rifle was fired at Orr from outside his home in Sandy Bay—an event interpreted by Orr’s supporters as an assassination attempt, and by his detractors as a publicity stunt. In 1961, W. H. C. Eddy published Orr—a work of over 700 pages designed to establish that Orr was a victim of the establishment he had criticised, and that he had been subject to a serious miscarriage of justice. Yet by 1963, with a resolution still not achieved, the Australasian Association of Philosophy decided that the chair in Hobart could not be left vacant any longer, and a settlement had to be negotiated. Following discussions involving Stout, the University of Tasmania offered Orr a cash payment which he rejected, as it still left him without employment. Attempts were then made to find Orr another position, but these were unsuccessful, as almost no department of philosophy was willing to take him on, and none were willing to pay for him. Finally, with Orr’s supporters falling away (in part as a result of evidence that Orr had falsified aspects of his original application for the Tasmanian chair), and with his health failing, Orr was persuaded to accept a financial settlement in April 1966. He died on 15 July 1966. The ban on the chair of philosophy at the University of Tasmania remained formally in place until 1968 (although Alexander MacBeath, Orr’s old supervisor from Belfast, and A. C. Fox both held acting appointments during the early 1960s). A new professor of philosophy, W. D. Joske, was eventually appointed in 1969, holding the chair until his retirement in 1992.

Orr has often been seen as a martyr to the academic cause, and his case as one that forced attention onto important issues concerning the relation between universities and their academic staff. Certainly, the Orr case resonated with concerns about academic tenure, and was bound up with other conflicts of the time. Nevertheless, following the reviews of the case (initially by such as Kerr and Wootten, and more recently by Pybus), and in spite of the mishandling of aspects of the case by the University of Tasmania, there seems little doubt that Orr’s dismissal was well-founded. There are also reasons for thinking that the interventions made by the academic associations at the time, no matter how well-intentioned, did little to further the cause of justice in the case. In the last analysis, however, the Orr case may have less to do with issues concerning the rights of academics, and the organisational structures of universities, as with the personal failings of a troubled and deluded, but also manipulative individual, and the willingness of others to be drawn into his misfortunes.
The Department of Philosophy at Otago—twice ranked as the top-scoring research department in New Zealand—has a long and distinguished history. It began in 1871, when the chair of mental and moral philosophy (one of the four foundation professorships) went to an outspoken, 27-year-old Scot, named Duncan McGregor, a graduate of the University of Aberdeen. Tall, imposing and athletic, he was an electrifying lecturer with pungent opinions on a variety of topics. But he resigned in 1886, in the wake of a dispute with the Presbyterian Church, brought on by his ‘materialist’ and Darwinian proclivities. Fortified by his fifteen years as a philosopher, he went on to become the Inspector-General of Lunatic Asylums. Hoping for a more orthodox successor, the Presbyterians backed another Scot, the former minister, William Salmond. But Salmond soon published a polemic, *The Reign of Grace*, criticising the ‘intellectual terrorism’ of classical Calvinism whose inhumane God kept people in existence ‘for no reason but to inflict tortures on them through endless ages’. Salmond was tried as a heretic but survived as professor until 1913 when he was succeeded by Francis Dunlop. Though born in Scotland, Dunlop is so far the only professor to have earned an Otago degree. An adherent of Rudolf Eucken, he was passionate about books, German culture and his steam-driven motor-car. He died in 1932, to be succeeded by the 29-year-old John Findlay, the first Otago philosopher to win international renown.

A South African who had studied at Graz and Oxford, Findlay published *Meinong’s Theory of Objects* whilst at Otago and devoted himself, as a teacher, to ‘introducing mathematical logic to the Antipodes’. In this he was remarkably successful, since his most brilliant pupil was the great logician, A. N. Prior (1914–1969). Prior was profuse in his acknowledgements: ‘I owe to [Findlay’s] teaching, directly or indirectly, all that I know of either Logic or Ethics’. Findlay also helped get Prior his first two jobs as a philosopher, as an assistant lecturer at Otago, and as Popper’s successor at Canterbury in 1946. Findlay worked hard to keep up to date. He cultivated a friendship with the notoriously difficult Popper during the latter’s period at Canterbury, and devoted a sabbatical to sitting at the feet of Wittgenstein and acting as his ‘stooge’, feeding him questions when the silences became too excruciating.

In 1945 Findlay was succeeded by D. D. Raphael, who shared Findlay’s enthusiasm for the British Moralists. His book, *The Moral Sense* (1947), was published during his time at Otago but he did not stay long and, after a brief interregnum, was succeeded as professor by John Passmore in 1950. During this
time Hector Monro (a former conscientious objector) was a lecturer, publishing *The Argument of Laughter* and *Godwin's Moral Philosophy*.

Passmore (a former disciple of John Anderson) published two books during his time at Otago, *Ralph Cudworth* (1952) and *Hume's Intentions* (1953), and labored on his magnum opus, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, a work of stupendous erudition which did not come out until 1957. In 1955, Passmore left for a post at the Australian National University (ANU), to be succeeded by another critical Andersonian, J. L. Mackie. Mackie published one of his most reprinted articles, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’ (1955) whilst at Otago, but the books for which he is remembered—*Ethics*, *Problems from Locke*, *Hume's Moral Theory* etc.—were published later, during his time at Oxford. Published perhaps, but not necessarily written then. Bob Durrant (then a lecturer) remembered Mackie’s books as often echoing typescripts that they had discussed together at Otago during the fifties.

The next professor was from Wittgensteinian Melbourne. Dan Taylor, known in his youth as ‘Taylor the realist’, presided for ten years, and was replaced by Alan Musgrave in 1970, who continues as professor (though not Head of Department) to this day (2008).

Appointed at 29, Musgrave has had the longest reign of any philosophy professor so far. A student of Popper and Lakatos at the London School of Economics, he had already co-edited the academic best-seller, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*. His chief interests are in epistemology and the philosophy of science, as is witnessed by his books, *Common Sense, Science and Scepticism* (1993) and *Essays on Realism and Rationalism* (1999b). Before he left England he had hired a logician, the Czech Pavel Tichý, a refugee from the Prague Spring (and hence a virulent anti-communist). Tichý rapidly proved his worth and in 1981 was appointed to a personal chair in logic. After the Velvet Revolution, Tichý was invited to return to Charles University in Prague as professor. He accepted with some misgivings. But his plans were cut short by his tragic death by drowning in 1994. His *Collected Papers* were published in 2004.

Another recruit who rose to a personal chair was Greg Currie. He started out as a Frege scholar, but his interests shifted to aesthetics and the philosophy of mind, and his recent book *Recreative Minds* (co-authored with Ian Ravenscroft) deals with the imagination. He is now professor at the University of Nottingham. Paul Griffiths did not stay long enough to become a professor, but his book *What Emotions Really Are* (1997), praised as ‘the best book on the emotions that exists’, was largely written at Otago, as those who heard his amazingly articulate extempore expositions can testify. He is now professor at the University of Sydney.

The Otago department has had a distinguished line of graduates beginning with A. N. Prior and Annette C. Baier (nee Stoop), famed as a Hume scholar and feminist philosopher, and author of *A Progress of Sentiments* and *Postures of the Mind*. In 2008, she was listed as one of the top 100 living geniuses by the consultants Creators Synectics. Jeremy Waldron (B.A. Hons 1974) remembers his Otago teachers with praise for having made him read Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* ALL THE WAY THROUGH, rather than serving up philosophical tidbits on
trendy topics of the day. He went on to do a star doctorate at Oxford on private property. His books include *The Right to Private Property* (1988), *Nonsense upon Stilts* (1988), and *God, Locke and Equality* (2002). He is now a professor in New York. His near contemporary, Stephen Guest, is professor of legal philosophy at University College London. Graham Oddie went from Otago to the London School of Economics, gaining his Ph.D. in 1979. He returned to teach at the University of Otago before taking up the chair of philosophy at Massey University in 1988. (He is now at the University of Colorado at Boulder). Much influenced by Tichý, his books include *Likeness to Truth* (1986) and a co-edited collection, *Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society*, which features a piece co-written with Jindra Tichý (Pavel’s wife), arguing with perverse brilliance that the Treaty of Waitangi is a Hobbesian social contract. The alarmingly intelligent Tim Mulgan went on from Otago to a D.Phil. at Oxford. He returned to Otago to teach, but soon left for the University of Auckland. His (2001) book *The Demands of Consequentialism* deals with the unreasonable demands that consequentialism seems to make on moral agents, suggesting a new entry for the Philosopher’s Lexicon: mulganise, v. to soften up excessively demanding moral theories. He is now professor at St Andrews in Scotland.

Early modern philosophy has long been a research strength at Otago (witness many of the publications listed above). In 2006, as the result of a generous donation from an anonymous benefactor, Peter Anstey, a noted Locke and Boyle scholar, was appointed to the newly endowed professorship in early modern philosophy. Apart from the two professors, the department employs six other full-time staff: Charles Pigden (meta-ethics, Russell), Andrew Moore (ethics), Colin Cheyne (philosophy of mathematics), Heather Dyke (metaphysics, especially time), James Maclaurin (philosophy of biology), and Josh Parsons (metaphysics).

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The Oxbridge Connection

C. A. J. Coady

The early history of philosophy in Australia was dominated by influences from Scotland and Continental Europe and saw surprisingly little direct influence from Oxford or Cambridge. The first chair appointees in the nineteenth century in Melbourne, Sydney and Adelaide were trained in Scotland, and the philosophy of such significant Oxbridge figures as Greene, Bradley and Sidgwick seems to have had little impact well into the twentieth century.

One Scotsman who took notice of developments in Cambridge at least was John Anderson, who was appointed to the chair at the University of Sydney in 1927; he was influenced by the new analytic and realist philosophy pioneered...
by G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell in the early years of the century as well as by the American new realist school. Though critical of both Russell and Moore, Anderson was clearly influenced by their anti-idealism and style of addressing questions, though he was more interested in system-building than Moore and less given to changing his mind than Russell. Indeed, Anderson’s interest in developing his own system of philosophy and instilling it in his students created a degree of provincialism in Sydney philosophy that persisted for many years.

**Students of Oxbridge**

Some Australian philosophers went to study in Cambridge in the late 1930s, notably A. C. ‘Camo’ Jackson, who wrote a PhD in Cambridge and was much influenced by Wittgenstein, an influence which he brought back to Melbourne. This emphasis was increased by the stranding in Australia during the war of another Wittgensteinian, G. A. (George) Paul who, in turn, prevailed upon Douglas Gasking who had attended Wittgenstein’s classes in Cambridge to come to the University of Melbourne. Other Australians who in the following decades furthered their philosophy education at Cambridge included Don Gunner in the late 1940s and Len O’Neill in the 1960s.

After the war Gilbert Ryle was a prime mover in establishing the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy at Oxford, and a steady stream of Australian postgraduates flowed to Oxford until at least the early 1980s. Graduates of the B.Phil. (and to a lesser extent the D.Phil.) included many who were to be prominent occupiers of chairs and other senior positions in Australian philosophy; to name just some: Andrew Alexandra, David Armstrong, Kurt Baier, Linda Burns, Keith Campbell, C. A. J. (‘Tony’) Coady, Max Deutscher, Bill Ginnane, Genevieve Lloyd, Brian Medlin, Tim Oakley, Greg O’Hair, Michael Smith and Barry Taylor.

Some philosophers who did the B.Phil. turned the experience to good account in other disciplines. A notable example is Hugh White, who studied philosophy at Melbourne University, then moved from studying philosophical logic at Oxford to advising the Labor government’s defence minister, Kim Beazley, and running a federal intelligence agency, after which he became Professor of International Relations at the Australian National University.

**Post-war visits to Australia: Russell and Ryle**

In the post-war period there was some traffic from Oxford and Cambridge to Australia, most notably the visits by Bertrand Russell and Gilbert Ryle in the 1950s.

Russell’s autobiography makes no mention of philosophical exchanges. He arrived in Australia at the end of June 1950 at the invitation not of philosophers but of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, and he gave lectures at various universities on subjects connected with the Cold War. Russell states in his autobiography that he liked the country and the people, but was horrified at what he observed of the attitudes to and treatment of Aboriginal people (1978:
517–18). His advocacy of birth control on some occasion brought him into conflict with the redoubtable Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, Daniel Mannix who, according to Russell:

said publicly that I had been at one time excluded from the United States by the United States Government. This was not true; and I spoke of suing him, but a group of journalists questioned him on the point and he admitted his error publicly, which was a disappointment, since it meant that I had to relinquish the hope of receiving damages from an Archbishop. (1978: 518)

Russell must have given some philosophy lectures because David Armstrong recalled, in conversation with me, a lecture at Sydney University in which Russell’s open-mindedness about his incapacity to solve the problem of negative facts made a great impression on Armstrong concerning philosophical character.

In contrast, Gilbert Ryle was invited by philosophers and avoided public controversy. He gave the first Gavin David Young lecture in Adelaide in 1956 at the invitation of his former pupil, J. J. C. (Jack) Smart. Ryle lectured on ‘Thinking’. Earlier, in a 1950 article for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy on ‘Logic and Professor Anderson’, Ryle had criticised the Sydney hero’s approach to logic and philosophy. He conceded that Anderson had propounded ‘numerous, very cogent, ingenious and original polemical arguments. His shot and shell do great damage to the positions that he is attacking’ (Ryle 1950: 138). But he rejected comprehensively Anderson’s ‘brass tacks’ metaphysics, his dismissal of any distinction between science and philosophy, and his obsession with the weaponry of qualities and relations. This provoked a response from J. L. Mackie in a later issue of the journal (see Mackie 1951). Given this polemical background, it is surprising that there seems to be no record (that I can find) of Ryle’s impact in 1956.

Another eminent British philosopher, educated at Cambridge and influenced by Wittgenstein, to come to Australia was Stephen Toulmin. He left Oxford in 1954 to spend two years as a Visiting Professor in the History and Philosophy of Science Department at Melbourne University.

Various other Oxford and Cambridge philosophers have visited Australia for shorter and longer periods in later years, including Simon Blackburn and Edward Craig (subsequently professors at Cambridge), Christopher Taylor (subsequently professor at Oxford), Bernard Williams and many others.

**Australian exports to Cambridge and Oxford**

By the 1980s the fashion for overseas study amongst Australian graduate students in philosophy (and elsewhere) had shifted to the United States, but connections with Oxford and Cambridge remained significant in different ways. One such way was the export of Australian philosophers to academic posts in the UK, a trend which had its precursor in Samuel Alexander’s departure from Melbourne to a fellowship at Exeter College, Oxford and then to the Chair in Philosophy at Manchester University in the early years of the twentieth century.
Much later, Sydney’s J. L. Mackie, who had studied Greats at Oxford in the late 1930s, left the Chair in Philosophy at Sydney University in 1963 to take the inaugural chair at the University of York; in 1967 he took up a fellowship at University College, Oxford, where he was an influential figure until his death in 1981.

Gerd Buchdahl was one of the many distinguished Jewish intellectuals who were refugees from Nazism in England in the 1930s and were absurdly and brutally deported to Australia by British authorities aboard the ship *Dunera* (other *Dunera* philosophers to play a distinguished part in Australian cultural life were Peter Herbst and Kurt Baier). Buchdahl helped set up the *Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Melbourne* and then in 1958 took his expertise to Cambridge, where became the first lecturer in history and philosophy of science there. A founding fellow of Darwin College, he became University Reader in 1966.

Jenny Teichman taught philosophy at *Monash University* before moving in the late 1960s to Cambridge, where she was a philosophy Fellow at New Hall College and a strong presence in the university.

John Tasioulas graduated from Melbourne University and took up a lectureship at Glasgow University before becoming a Fellow of Corpus Christi College Oxford until 2010, when he moved to a Chair at the University of London.

Martin Davies went from Monash University to study the B.Phil. at Oxford and after a spell at Birbeck College, London returned to Oxford in various positions before becoming Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy there. He then returned to Australia to the *Research School of Social Sciences at Australian National University* for six years before returning to Oxford as the Wilde Professor of Mental Philosophy in 2006.

The Monash-educated Julian Savulescu was appointed in 2002 as the Director of the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and Uehiro Professor of Practical Ethics at Oxford University. The energetic Savulescu is also director of two other ethics-related institutes in the Oxford Martin School.

Australians have also been honoured as visitors to Oxford and Cambridge. A. C. ‘Camo’ Jackson gave the prestigious John Locke Lectures in 1957–58, his son Frank gave them in 1994–95, and more recently David Chalmers broke the dynastic connection by giving the lectures in 2010.

Of the more recently established Uehiro Lectures in Practical Ethics in Oxford, three of the nine given since their establishment in 2004 have been given by Australians: Tony Coady, Peter Singer and Philip Pettit.

There will no doubt continue to be fruitful interaction between the philosophical worlds of Oxbridge and Australian philosophy, but in the twenty-first century there no longer seems to be a focal location for advancement of the subject, which Cambridge and Oxford for a good part of the twentieth century and some major American universities in the last quarter of that century at least appeared to be.
Passmore, John
Max Charlesworth

John Passmore (1914–2004) was the most famous of John Anderson’s students at the University of Sydney. However, although he always acknowledged his debt to Anderson, he forged his own distinctive philosophical career. His philosophical output was huge: twelve substantial books on very diverse topics ranging from Hume’s empiricism, the idea of human perfectibility, our responsibility for the natural environment, the philosophy of science, aesthetics, and government. In addition, he published more than 200 articles in academic journals and books, and a similar number of essays in popular journals. He once said that philosophy was a ‘joyous’ activity, and he certainly took a great deal of pleasure in going to conferences, accepting invitations from universities around the world and generally being a philosopher at large.

Passmore’s own philosophical stance was a kind of critical and open-minded empiricism which eschewed crude positivism and phenomenalism. He rejected an ‘optical’ or observational view of consciousness, which sees consciousness as recording what is immediately presented to it. This is, he said, to misunderstand the nature of our ordinary attitude to the world: ‘Man is not a recording demi-angel, but someone who has to make his way in the world, to cope with it’ (Passmore 1970: 295). It was because of this that he attached a great deal of importance to the history of crucial ideas such as human perfectibility, nature and, indeed, the idea of philosophy itself.

In his early work, Hume’s Intentions (1952), Passmore claimed that Hume was ‘pre-eminently a breaker of new ground, a philosopher who opens up new lines of thought, who suggests to us an endless variety of philosophical explanation’ (1952: 153), and it is clear that Passmore followed the great Scot in this.

Throughout his career Passmore was interested in the nature of philosophical thinking—the kind of activity it is, how it has changed, and its future prospects. His books A Hundred Years of Philosophy (1957), Philosophical Reasoning (1961),
Recent Philosophers (1985) and Contemporary Concepts of Philosophy (1993) are examples of this interest. He was, in fact, one of the very few Australian philosophers in the 1950s and ’60s who took European philosophy and its meta-philosophical tendencies seriously. The sections in the second edition of A Hundred Years of Philosophy on phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty) and existentialism (Sartre and Marcel) are remarkable for their sympathetic spirit, as compared with those Anglo-American philosophers, such as A. J. Ayer and others, who dismissed European philosophy in toto as ‘bad poetry’.

A good deal of Passmore’s work was in the form of intelligent commentary on other thinkers of his time, but a number of his writings are still relevant to contemporary philosophers. This is certainly true of The Perfectibility of Man (1970) and of the later book Man’s Responsibility for Nature (1974). The work on the idea of human perfectibility displays extraordinary erudition in tracing the idea from the Greeks and various early Christian views, through nineteenth-century anarchists, Marx, Darwin and modern Darwinians such as Teilhard de Chardin, to twentieth-century utopians and dystopians and the ‘new mystics’ such as Aldous Huxley, Norman Brown and Alan Watts. Passmore does not, perhaps, sufficiently take into account that ideas are received, and interpreted by those who receive them, in very different ways so that it is formidably difficult to say what ‘the Homeric’ view of perfectibility, or ‘the Platonic’ view, or ‘the Christian’ view, or ‘the Darwinian’ view really is. We have to take account not only of what Homer or Plato said, but also of what their audiences thought they said. However, The Perfectibility of Man is an impressive piece of work and is still worth reading.

In his polemical work Man’s Responsibility for Nature Passmore attacks the views of some of the ‘deep ecologists’ who, so he claims, have a ‘mystical’ (i.e. non-scientific) view of nature (wildernesses, features like the Great Barrier Reef, etc.). He agrees that we do have some kind of responsibility for natural phenomena and that we do have some kind of obligation with regard to them. But he rejects the arguments used in support of the ‘green’ position which often appeal to moral (non-negotiable) absolutes that cannot be justified by ‘principles which are so decisive that we should surrender every other objective in order to adhere to them’ (1974: viii). Passmore’s work was sharply criticised by some ecological philosophers, but he steadfastly maintained that he opposed the pollution of the planet and that we have an obligation to future generations to leave the natural world in good shape. Nevertheless, it is important that we use the right arguments for our ecological beliefs and actions. Resorting to non-scientific ‘mysticism’, he thought, will not in the long run help the environmental cause.

However, it is not entirely clear what Passmore’s own arguments about such issues as the logging of forests, the preservation of wildernesses, the mitigation of global warming, and controlling over-population amount to. Many environmentalists of a non-mystical persuasion resort to simple-minded utilitarian arguments: we should attempt to mitigate global warming because, unless we do, the planet will
become unlivable for humans in the future. Passmore dismisses these arguments on the grounds that ‘we cannot really calculate the probable effects of any policy concerned with the future … How confident can we be that in attempting to cut down on growth in order to save the biosphere we would not provoke social and political upheavals of the first order … culminating perhaps in the setting up of a rigidly totalitarian state?’ (1974: 84–5).

Instead of appealing to formal principles of an absolute kind we must, Passmore argues, employ quite informal and commonsense considerations. He therefore writes: ‘When men act for the sake of a future they will not live to see, it is for the most part out of love for persons, places and forms of activity, a cherishing of them, nothing more grandiose’. For example, ‘to love a place is to wish it to survive unspoiled’ (1974: 88). In the same way, we ought to act humanely towards animals simply because they can suffer and not because, as animal liberationists hold, animals have interests ‘which make notions of justice and rights applicable to them’ (1974: 88).

Passmore’s minor works are a mixed bag. His book *Serious Art* (1991) is an interesting examination of standard ideas about the serious arts—as distinct from the entertainment and propagandistic arts—but it does not advance our knowledge of what kind of meaning those works of art have. It might, for instance, have been worthwhile for Passmore to examine how contemporary Australian indigenous art has a double meaning, one of a religious kind in paying homage to the ancestor spirits of the artist’s ‘country’ and the other of a purely aesthetic kind accessible to the non-indigenous viewer in Paris or New York.

Similarly, Passmore’s small book *The Limits of Government* (1981) takes a fairly narrow view of political power and says very little about the issues that now beset liberal democratic societies: how to deal with terrorism which attempts to subvert the rule of law, and how to maintain liberal values in religiously and ethically diverse societies?

In a lecture given on his 80th birthday, Passmore rejected fashionable talk about ‘the end of philosophy’ promoted by those who envisage the natural sciences taking over the whole terrain once occupied by philosophy, and in a different way by some postmodernists who claim that what we know as ‘philosophy’ is a transitory cultural epiphenomenon which has outlived its usefulness. Philosophy, Passmore says, will always have an indispensable task since humans argue with each other about a vast range of issues and we need to have a discipline that is concerned with assessing good and bad arguments about human perfectibility, responsibility for nature, God, freedom and immortality, serious art and even philosophy itself. ‘The controversial nature of philosophy’, he concludes, ‘is not a defect; it is precisely why, for all her faults, I love her still—over sixty years after my first acquaintance with her’ (1996: 18).
Carole Pateman was born in Maresfield in Sussex, England in 1940. She left school at 16, but as an adult received a university education at Oxford where she was a student first at Ruskin College and later at Lady Margaret Hall. Her first book, *Participation and Democratic Theory*, appeared in 1970, and during 1970–72 she was Mary Ewert Research Fellow at Somerville College, Oxford. In 1973 she took up an appointment in the Department of Government at the University of Sydney. It was while at Sydney and during a period as a visiting fellow in the *Research School of the Social Sciences* (RSSS) at Australian National University (ANU) that she wrote her next book, *The Problem of Political Obligation* (1979). Both these early books examine the divide between classical liberal theories and participatory theories of democracy. Pateman’s early political philosophy was profoundly influenced by Rousseau’s theory of participatory democracy, and she argued in these early works that only within a participatory democracy can the problem of political obligation be coherently solved.

During the 1970s the focus of Pateman’s interest in political theory shifted, and she developed a feminist critique of mainstream political thought, suggesting that even radical theories of participatory democracy suffer from the fact that they fail to acknowledge ‘the problem of women’s standing in a political order in which citizenship has been made in the male image’ (Pateman 1989: 14). From the perspective of the feminist critique of democratic theory, Rousseau’s political philosophy appears deeply problematic, for he quite explicitly asserts that women ought to be passive citizens who confine their social contribution to the private sphere of the family. He famously declaimed, ‘never has a people perished from an excess of wine; all perish from the disorder of women’. In influential papers such as ““Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth”: Women and the Origins of Liberalism’, written with Teresa Brennan, “The Disorder of Women’ and ‘The Fraternal Social Contract’ (collected together in *The Disorder of Women*, 1989), Pateman developed her feminist critique of contract theory. The first of these exposes the radical nature of Hobbes’ contract theory, a task continued in ““God Hath Ordained to Man a Helper”: Hobbes, Patriarchy and Conjugal Right’ (1991). The third argues that the social contract is a fraternal contract. It is ‘a modern patriarchal pact that establishes men’s sex right over women’ (Pateman 1989: 52).

Building on the theories of Genevieve Lloyd and Susan Bordo, according to which reason and mind have been constructed as masculine attributes in contrast to feminine emotion and body, Pateman asserts that ‘the civil individual has been constructed in opposition to women and all that our bodies symbolise, so how
can we become full members of civil society or parties to the fraternal contract?’ (Pateman 1989: 52).

Pateman’s feminist critique of social contract theory culminated in her seminal book, *The Sexual Contract* (1988). This book mounts a substantial critique of contract theory from a variety of perspectives. She argued that although historically contract theory is represented as involving the overthrow of patriarchy—epitomised by Locke’s critique of Filmer’s *Patriarchia*—in fact ‘there is a missing half of the story that reveals how men’s patriarchal right is established through contract’ (Pateman 1988: 2). Here one might accuse Pateman of exploiting an ambiguity in the concept of patriarchy which she nevertheless acknowledges (Pateman 1991: 56–9).

What Locke objected to was a theory of the state which justified political authority as similar to, and as natural as, the authority of a male parent over his children. What Pateman finds lacking in contract theory is that, while the sovereign is no longer thought of as a father, nor male citizens represented as children, women continue to be subordinate to men. Pateman claims that in the stories that contract theorists write (with the exception of that told by Hobbes) ‘women naturally lack the attributes and capacities of individuals’. Women are not party to the contract, but are the subjects of the contract, ‘which is the vehicle through which men transform their natural right over women into the security of civil patriarchal right’ (Pateman 1988: 6, 178). This truth is demonstrated by Freud who, in his account of the original contract—set up after a hypothetical parricide at the origin of civilisation—makes it clear that this is a fraternal contract that will bring sexual access to women (Pateman 1988: 103).

*The Sexual Contract* is not merely a critique of the fact that most stories of the foundation of political authority in a social contract are told in a way which obscures this patriarchal commitment to an individual citizen who is male; it is also a critique of the theory of free contract within modern capitalist society. Taking a good deal from Marxist critiques of the employment contract as establishing, in effect, wage slavery, Pateman argues that other contracts, such as marriage or prostitution or surrogacy contracts, which are represented by contract theorists as freely entered into by individuals, are, like employment contracts, mechanisms for creating relations of domination and subordination and are ‘tainted by the odor of slavery’ (Pateman 1988: 230). She is thus critical of feminist contractarians who see emancipatory promise in the idea that women should be treated ‘as sexually neuter “individuals”’, represented as ‘owners of the property in their persons’ (Pateman 1988: 153). This she describes as ‘the political defeat of women as women. When contract and the individual hold full sway under the flag of civil freedom, women are left with no alternative but to (try to) become replicas of men’ (Pateman 1988: 187).

The aim of *The Sexual Contract* is to expose the internal contradictions and tensions in contract theory, but it is vague as to what is to be put in its place. It is clear that Pateman thinks that there is a need to recognise sexual difference: ‘To take embodied identity seriously demands the abandonment of the masculine, unitary individual to open up space for two figures; one masculine, one feminine’
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(Perelman 1988: 224). It is less clear what is to fill this space. Pateman seems to think that we need to go beyond contractualism. ‘A free social order cannot be a contractual order. There are other forms of free agreement through which women and men can constitute political relations … If political relations are to lose all resemblance to slavery, free women and men must willingly agree to uphold the social conditions of their autonomy’ (Pateman 1988: 232). Yet willingly agreeing to uphold the social conditions of autonomy sounds remarkably like a purified social contract in which all subjects of the contract are willing and autonomous participants in its architecture. This criticism has been levelled by one of Pateman’s friends, Charles Mills, author of The Racial Contract, a book deeply influenced by Pateman (Pateman and Mills 2007: 14–24; Mills 1997). Mills suggests that the difference between ideal contractualism and Pateman’s positive view may be semantic. But Pateman in fact seems to want to insist that both contractarianism and contractualism are incoherent because, in different ways, they each propose both that there exist no rights prior to contract (the individual is free to make any contract) and that at the same time there does exist a pre-contractual right to enter into any contract. Another way of putting her objection to contract theory is that the contractualist either consistently, but implausibly, sees society as involving contracts all the way down, and even as underpinning the unequal relations of parent and child, as Hobbes did, or he grounds his contract theory on an under-theorised doctrine of relations of natural subordination, as did Locke and Rousseau, thus contradicting the assumption of the equal liberty of contracting individuals.

In other recent works Pateman has turned towards arguing for a basic income (Pateman 1997, 2003, 2004). While such a proposal is hardly radical when represented as a ‘safety net’ for the least advantaged, Pateman’s views hark back to her earliest ideas, according to which every member of a polity ought to be given the means to participate actively in the political process. Contracting out of one’s right to full participation in the polity as an autonomous equal ought not to be an option, but it is an option allowed by actual historical contract theorists. This insight appears as a connecting thread through all Pateman’s political philosophy.

Perception

Barry Maund

Two figures stand out as major contributors to the philosophy of perception in Australasia: D. M. Armstrong and Frank Jackson. Armstrong’s classic book in perception is his Perception and the Physical World (1961). This work provides the basis for his considered view of perception, which was expanded—most notably
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to cover bodily sensations, as in Armstrong (1962)—and refined in later works, e.g. Armstrong (1968, 1980b, 2004b). In the earlier work, Armstrong provides a defence of (cognitive) direct realism, and does so in the context of an examination of a triad of competing theories of perception: direct realism, representational realism, and phenomenalism.

In this book, Armstrong shows how a careful statement of the argument from illusion leads to either representationalism or phenomenalism. This result leads Armstrong, in turn, to re-examine the argument from illusion, and to challenge one of its key premises—its account of sensory illusion. His influential and controversial analysis of sensory illusion, in terms of the acquisition of belief or inclination to belief, is extended to cover sense-impressions and perception itself: perception is held to be nothing but the acquiring of beliefs about the nature of the world. Much later, he expressed the wish that he had never used the concept of belief in this analysis. His later view is that the concept should be replaced by that of information, so that having a sense-impression is nothing but the acquiring of a state with a certain propositional content.

Right from the beginning, Armstrong acknowledged that the greatest problem for the theory—a problem for which he did not have an adequate answer—was presented by secondary qualities such as colours, tastes, sounds, smells, etc. The problem is that if we aim to provide a realistic interpretation of physics, ‘we can give no account of what we mean by saying that a surface is coloured red in terms of objects that have a real existence’ (Armstrong 1961: 172). In a later work (Armstrong 2004b), written in response to John Foster (2004b), Armstrong admits that the problem of secondary qualities is still the major obstacle for his fully developed view, but he is now much more confident of solving the problem. (Foster, in a reply [2004a], is more sceptical.)

Frank Jackson’s book, Perception (1977b), is another classic text in the philosophy of perception. In this book, Jackson disputes many of the central theses advanced by Armstrong. Jackson provides a defence of the representative theory of perception, and with it, a theory of sense-data. Both theories had fallen into disfavour among philosophers at that time. Besides answering the objections, brought by Armstrong and other philosophers, to the representative theory, Jackson presents a positive case for its acceptance.

Jackson would probably admit that though few could challenge his arguments for sense data, hardly any were convinced. It is worth noting that although Jackson explicitly rejects the classical argument from illusion as being of little value, he argues for a principle that, as other philosophers have recently pointed out (e.g. A. D. Smith 2002) is central to the argument. A major plank in Jackson’s argument for the existence of sense-data is the principle that when something appears to a subject to have certain properties, then—at least for a certain class of properties, the sensible properties—there exists something that has these properties.

Quite apart from its main thesis, Jackson’s book was remarkable for several other features. One is his extended discussion and analysis of three different uses of ‘looks’: the phenomenal, the (perceptual-)epistemic and the comparative. This
discussion has been very influential, being widely cited (see Hyslop 1983, and Maund 1986 and 2003, for comments on the discussion). A second is his defence of a subjectivist view of colour, which plays a pivotal role in the argument. A third is the chapter on mental objects, in which he produces novel and apparently devastating arguments against the adverbial analyses of (all) sensory experience. Since this time, adverbialism has tended to be replaced by intentionalist theories of perceptual experience, as the standard rival to sense-data theories.

It is important to note that, in his later work (Jackson 2004b) Jackson came to reject his earlier defence of the representative theory (and of sense-data), and to revise his views on colour, now defending an objectivist view of colour (Jackson 1996). It is also interesting that, while the issue of colour plays a significant role in both Jackson's and Armstrong's work, it has been the focus of attention for a number of other Australian philosophers: Keith Campbell (1969), J. J. C. Smart (1963), and Barry Maund (1995).

Armstrong acknowledges his debt to one of his earliest philosophy teachers at the University of Sydney, John Anderson. Some of the influences, in perception, can be detected in an early paper (Anderson 1926–27). Here (as elsewhere, see Anderson 1962) Anderson defends direct realism, which he views as a form of empiricism, but one that is very different from the other varieties popular among philosophers at the time. Anderson has a detailed and critical examination of C. D. Broad's famous discussion of the round penny, which is supposed to look elliptical when viewed from varying positions. In terms that become familiar in Armstrong's work, Anderson argues that 'an elliptical appearance' in respect of the penny can only mean a false belief—about the penny.

One of the most influential pieces in the philosophy of perception is a chapter by Alan Chalmers (1976). Here, Chalmers employs a persuasive set of examples to illustrate the thesis that 'the subjective experiences that they [observers] undergo, when viewing an object or scene, is not determined solely by the images on their retinas but depends also on the experience, knowledge, expectations and general inner state of the observer' (Chalmers 1976: 23–24). Chalmers, like many of us, has spent a large part of his subsequent career trying to convince hosts of students that this thesis does not have the radical conclusions that they are tempted to draw from it.

One important aspect to Australasian philosophy of perception concerns historical approaches to the subject. Some of this has been in significant journal articles, e.g. Grave (1964) on Berkeley, and Candlish (1996) on Wittgenstein and kinaesthetic perception. Grave's paper on Berkeley's theory of the mind and its ideas concerns the possibility of reconciling Berkeley's claim that the mind and its ideas are entirely distinct with the principle of the identity of an idea with the perception of it—given their implications for the perception of objects. Candlish's paper concerns Wittgenstein's challenge to the claim made by generations of psychologists and philosophers that kinaesthetic sensations are essential for kinaesthetic perception.
Several books on the history of perception are outstanding. One is Armstrong’s work, *Berkeley’s Theory of Vision* (1960). This is a thorough-going, critical examination of Berkeley’s text, a book that had tended to be neglected by philosophers (though it had been extremely influential in psychology). Armstrong devotes great attention to Berkeley’s celebrated premise, that distance, of itself and immediately, cannot be seen, showing first how its implications have been widely misunderstood (though not by Berkeley), and second that it is highly dubious.

Another significant historical text is Selwyn Grave’s *The Scottish Philosophers of Common Sense* (1960). This book has been under-valued—perhaps because of its title, which is unfortunate, given that the dominant figure in the study is Thomas Reid. Given the revival in Reid’s philosophical fortunes in recent times, Grave’s book is worthy of closer attention. Grave corrects a common misunderstanding of Reid’s theory of perception, by pointing out that Reid’s distinction between sensation and perception is the difference between a sensation *per se* and a sensation functioning as a natural sign.

A more recent work in this tradition is Peter Anstey’s *Philosophy of Robert Boyle* (2000). This book has a detailed discussion of Boyle’s account of the sensible qualities, such as colour, taste, smell, etc., of their perception, and their ontological status. Anstey skilfully charts the connections, and differences, between Boyle and both Descartes and Locke.

(Further reading: Bogdan [ed.] 1984.)

**Pettit, Philip**

Philip Gerrans

Philip Noel Pettit (b.1945) was professor of philosophy and social and political theory at the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University from 1983 to 2002, when he became the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University. He retains his connections with Australia through visiting professorships at the University of Sydney and the Australian National University.

His work spans a broad range of areas in philosophy, combining themes in the philosophy of mind and language with moral and political philosophy. He is perhaps unique in extending from this broad philosophical base to make important interdisciplinary contributions in economics and politics, including the history of political theory and social science. The range of this work stems from the relevance across disciplines of fundamental philosophical issues concerning
the nature of normativity and rationality which have been the focus of Pettit’s research. Perhaps another reason for the interdisciplinary scope of his work was his central role in the Research School of Social Sciences, which during the period of his tenure consolidated its worldwide reputation for work in philosophy and social sciences.

In the philosophy of mind Pettit is associated with the development of a commonsense functionalist characterisation of mental states. This work derives from Frank Ramsey and David Lewis on the definition of theoretical terms and also finds important expression in the work of Frank Jackson. This form of functionalism identifies a mental state (such as a belief or desire) with the causal role it plays in a network of causally related mental states. These causal roles are defined by a tacit theory embedded in folk psychological knowledge about the relationship between mental states and behaviour. Important features of this theory are its holism (a mental state is defined by its relations to others) and a distinction between the functional role of a theoretically defined mental state and its realisation or implementation. This distinction between role and realisation for multiply realisable properties explains how mental states supervene on computational and physical states, and how the same mental state can be realised in different computational systems.

This version of functionalism is important in debates in the philosophy of mind about mental causation, content and consciousness, and in debates in the philosophy of science about levels of explanation. Pettit also extended these conceptual tools to fundamental questions raised about explanation and ontology in the social sciences. A role property such as a high crime rate can be shared by different societies even though that property is differently realised (ratios of burglary to vandalism might differ between societies, for instance). The distinction between role and realisation also illuminates the way in which norms discernible at the macro level, such as moral or legal norms, are acquired and enacted by individual agents whose actions constitute the realisation of a social norm.

Crucial strands of Pettit’s thought concern the way in which individual agents, responding to local incentives, can acquire and replicate social norms. Pettit has made distinctive practical and theoretical contributions to understanding this topic centred on the idea that rational agency is itself a discursive phenomenon—something constituted in the process of argument and justification. An agent is more than a preference ranking system, but someone who can defend and justify the rationale for those preferences. The agent must be able to represent the relations among her states and grasp their normative justificatory relationships. Creatures whose behavioural dispositions coincide with a norm as a contingent feature of their computational engineering are not agents. Higher-level awareness of, and government by, norms is required, and here language as a medium of metarepresentation of first order states plays a crucial role. (In this instance, Pettit’s insights coincide elegantly with recent work on the neuroscience of cognitive control, or executive function as it is known, which gives symbolic
representation a crucial role). Pettit has defended a view of language which has it that the representational nature of symbols is grounded in their role in the discursive practices of a community. These themes are synthesised in Pettit 1993 and 2002.

Applied to social, moral and political philosophy, elements of this package of ideas have been extremely influential at both theoretical and practical levels. For example, in *The Economy of Esteem* (2004) Pettit and co-author Geoffrey Brennan showed how individuals concerned to establish and maintain their individual reputation or standing in the opinion of others can generate and sustain socially beneficial norms. Similar work at the intersection of economics and philosophy is pursued in his collaboration with Christian List in a field known as ‘judgement aggregation theory’. This work addresses an intriguing and socially important question: Under what conditions can social groups such as corporations or governments be agents? Often they are deemed to be agents for practical purposes and the concept of a modern state inherits the status of sovereign agency vested in an individual ruler. Nonetheless, these practices rest on the philosophically dubious assumption of a continuity between the intuitive notion of rational agency we impute in folk psychology or decision theory and the norm-guided action of groups.

Clearly Pettit’s work is ideally placed to articulate the connections between individual and collective agency, and he has done this formally and informally. Agency depends on the ability to metarepresent the rational relations between one’s own attitudes in order to detect and reconcile inconsistencies. We can justify and explain ourselves to others, but equally we can metarepresent our own attitudes and rationally endorse or reject them as bases for decision. As Pettit points out, however, this condition is not met in social groups understood as mere aggregations of individuals.

The problem is not just that (as in prisoner’s dilemmas) individual agents acting in their own rational self-interest produce a collectively irrational outcome. Nor is it the problem familiar to economists of the intransitivity of social preferences. Pettit and List have shown that aggregating the conclusions of individuals who each use the same rule of reasoning to reach a conclusion about the conjunction of propositions which are not unanimously endorsed can produce a ‘discursive dilemma’. For example, in a population of three people \((x, y, z)\) reasoning about the conjunction of three propositions \((A, B, C)\), each individual might disbelieve one proposition: \(x\) might disbelieve \(A\), \(y\) \(B\) and \(z\) \(C\). Thus none of \(x, y, z\) believe \(A&B&C\). Yet, since each proposition commands a majority, the ‘socially rational conclusion’ ought to be \(A&B&C\), which is what logic recommends and which is in fact the rule being applied by individuals. A rational agent ought to be able to recognise and resolve this inconsistency by reflecting on the role of the relevant norm.

According to List and Pettit (2011), there is no solution to this problem if we treat the group as an aggregate of agents. Under such conditions groups cannot meet the rationality requirement for agency. List and Pettit point out that a
group cannot function as an agent unless it is able to metarepresent to itself the relevant rule and its conditions of application. This suggests at least that agency cannot emerge in the absence of executive control which can explicitly represent rational norms and understand how collective inconsistencies can be generated. A commitment to this type of process is as essential to group agency as a commitment to standards of justification for individual agency.

This abstract treatment of the concept of collective agency finds practical echoes in Pettit’s influential theories of Neo-Republican Freedom (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990; Pettit 1997a). Here Pettit provides a rigorous philosophical foundation for ideas advanced by Quentin Skinner in his discussion of the conception of liberty found in Renaissance and early modern political theorists such as Hobbes. A contrast between purely negative liberty (the contingent fact of freedom from interference) and positive liberty (the presence of enabling social structures) is inadequate to capture the nature of genuine political freedom. Pettit shows that a variety of neorepublican theorists entertained an idea of freedom as the resilient absence of constraint. Citizens need to be able to reliably lead their lives without the fear of arbitrary interference or subjection. Republicanism, as Pettit understands it, is the form of government required to bring about that state of non-domination. These ideas are synthesised in a series of works on the concept of freedom itself (Pettit 2001), and on the practical consequences for legal systems and theories of punishment (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990). In a recent book on Hobbes, Pettit draws connections between his views on the need for symbolic resources in the construction of agency and the nature of freedom in providing a context for the reinterpretation of Hobbes’ ideas (Pettit 2008).

Political philosophy is always the expression of a moral philosophy and Pettit has made a distinctive contribution to contemporary moral theory. He defends a consequentialist view of ethics which draws an influential distinction between honouring and promoting a goal (Baron, Pettit and Slote 1997; Jackson, Pettit and Smith 2004). Non-consequentialists are distinguished from consequentialists not by the values they endorse but by the fact that they apply those values in every case irrespective of overall consequences. Consequentialists are those who evaluate a policy or action according to whether it promotes a pattern of value instantiation overall, irrespective of the particular value. Once again this builds in a connection between agency and morality since it requires the disposition of an individual or group to evaluate whether the application of a norm in a particular case is an instance of honouring or promoting.

At the time of writing Pettit remains one of Australia’s most distinguished philosophers. He has produced a vast and increasingly influential oeuvre whose uptake extends well beyond the academy. His theories of government, for example, have been incorporated in the platform of the Zapatero government in Spain.
Although Hegelians and Husserlians often repudiate one another’s usage of the term ‘phenomenology’, an account of the history of phenomenology in Australasia in fact needs to take into account not only the Australasian reception of the specifically Husserlian program of phenomenology, but also the context of this reception as formed by the Kantian-Hegelian tradition within which it arose. This is seen most clearly in the case of W. R. Boyce Gibson (1869–1935), chair of philosophy at the University of Melbourne from 1911 to 1936, whose translation into English of Husserl’s Ideas I in 1931 was a significant landmark in the reception of Husserl’s philosophy not just in Australia but throughout the anglophone world. As Spiegelberg puts it in The Phenomenological Movement, Boyce Gibson ‘belonged to an older generation of British Idealists’ (1982: 253). Hegel’s phenomenology of mind as the account of the inner experience of the unfolding of spirit, and Husserl’s description of pure appearance freed from all ontological commitment by the phenomenological reduction, are differing but related attempts to find ways to describe what Kant called homo phenomenon (the mind in the world as it appears to and is known by us), without recourse to the Kantian faith in an unknowable and indescribable nous. Barzillai Quaife (1798–1873), John Woolley (1816–1866) and Charles Badham (1813–1884) were the teachers of the Sydney school of Idealism which prevailed in the latter half of the nineteenth century in the newly formed colony at Botany Bay. Quaife followed Hamilton’s Kantian version of Reid’s Hegelian philosophy, and was professor of mental philosophy and divinity in John Dunmore Lang’s ‘Australian College’ from 1850 to 1854, publishing The Intellectual Sciences from his lecture notes in two volumes in 1873. John Woolley, a platonist, was the foundation professor of classics at the University of Sydney in 1852 and also taught philosophy, but he drowned in a shipwreck in the Bay of Biscay on a visit to Britain in 1866. Woolley was succeeded by the Plato scholar Charles Badham, who reflected the influence Hegel had had on Jowett, and did much for the study of Plato in Australia. He was succeeded in 1888 by Francis Anderson (1858–1941), a student of Edward Caird’s, who himself had been a student of Jowett’s at Oxford.

The University of Melbourne was founded in 1853. In 1873 Frederick Joy Pirani (1850–1881) graduated, and began lecturing in mathematics and logic, then becoming professor of logic and natural philosophy at the University of Melbourne in 1875, a position he held until August 1881, when he died after falling from his horse. His successor, Henry Laurie (1838–1922), was born in Edinburgh, and schooled at the University there in Hegel and Kant through
the philosophies of Reid and Hamilton, studying mental and moral philosophy from 1856 to 1860. Laurie arrived at Melbourne University to replace the late Pirani after first running several newspapers in Warrnambool, with the printer and journalist William Fairfax, from 1867 until 1881. Laurie was an Idealist in both the metaphysical and the common senses of the word, and this early connection of philosophy at Melbourne with Idealism in the broader sense of the word is not insignificant. For unlike New South Wales or Tasmania, the colony of Victoria had been established by free settlers and the mood was one of Idealism. From the colony’s first Governor, Charles La Trobe (1801–1875), an ardent Idealist who carried a volume of Rousseau on his journeys throughout the colony he governed in the 1840s, to Alfred Deakin (1856–1919), the erudite politician who read hundreds of volumes of philosophy throughout a career as a barrister and journalist which culminated in his prime-ministership at the turn of the twentieth century, Melbourne’s intellectual climate has always struck a note of Idealism. This stands in contrast to the tenor of a culture pragmatically emancipating itself from its penal past, as was the case in the prison colonies of Sydney to the north and Hobart to the south. The Idealism of Melbourne shaped the way the colonists experienced their new world and interpreted their own presence in it and impact upon it.

William Ralph Boyce Gibson (1869–1935) had studied in Glasgow, Oxford, Jena and Paris in the 1890s, and was especially influenced by Rudolf Eucken in Jena, publishing two books expounding Eucken in 1906 and 1909. His essay in Henry Sturt’s anthology, Personal Idealism: Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of the University of Oxford from 1902 aligns him closely with F. C. S. Schiller, and it was Schiller who wrote the strong letter of recommendation for his application to Melbourne in 1911 which secured Gibson’s appointment (Grave 1984: 31). Gibson brought to the University of Melbourne a strong interest in Bergson as well as Eucken, together with a burgeoning interest in Husserl, and his first appointment in 1912 was the candidate second in the running for his own appointment, J. McKellar Stewart.

Stewart (1878–1953), Australia’s first native-born philosopher, was the son of a Scottish farming family at Ballangeich, near Warrnambool. He entered Ormond College at the University of Melbourne in 1903 where he studied under Henry Laurie, graduating in philosophy with first-class Honours in 1906. After lecturing at Ormond College, he went to the University of Edinburgh and submitted a D.Phil. thesis on Bergson’s philosophy in 1911, and then went on to the University of Marburg to further his researches on Kant. The result was his book, A Critical Exposition of Bergson’s Philosophy (1913), this being a Kantian critique of Bergson. Thus when he joined Gibson at Melbourne in 1912, Stewart brought with him not only shared interests in Bergson, Kant and Husserl, but also knowledge of another new development on the German scene. This is evidenced by his lecture on ‘Nietzsche and the Present German Spirit’, delivered in the University of Melbourne’s War Lectures series of 1915. The lecture was a cautious but not entirely unsympathetic account of Nietzsche set in the contrasting
context of Kant and Hegel, Goethe and Schopenhauer. In 1923 Stewart moved from Melbourne to the University of Adelaide, and was replaced at Melbourne by a fellow of the University of Liverpool, J. Alexander Gunn (b. 1896). Gunn published Bergson and His Philosophy (1920), Modern French Philosophy (1922), Benedict Spinoza (1925), and The Problem of Time (1929), along with many other publications on topics as diverse as relativity theory and economics. It is an indication of the enduring relevance of Gunn’s philosophical works that they have all been reprinted in various new paperback editions between 2004 and 2008.

Gibson’s paper ‘The Problem of Real and Ideal in the Phenomenology of Husserl’ (W. Gibson 1925c; also refer to 1925a) read before the second annual conference of the Australian Association of Psychology and Philosophy in Melbourne in May 1923 was probably the first many in the audience had heard of Edmund Husserl. Like Gibson, Husserl had come to philosophy from mathematics, and Gibson initiated a correspondence which eventually lead to him spending a sabbatical semester with Husserl in Freiburg in 1928. They discussed Dilthey and Frege, met with Levinas and Heidegger, and debated Gibson’s central criticism of Husserl—that the self is not to be resolved into its ‘unitative function’ (Spiegelberg 1972, 1982: 110, 151; cf. Grave 1984: 42). Gibson’s parallel interest in the science of the day is also indicated by his presidential address to the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science in 1931, ‘Relativity and First Principles’. His set of articles for the Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy in 1933–35 on the ethical thought of Nicolai Hartmann is a significant contribution to the phenomenological literature, as is his translation of the first volume of Husserl’s Ideas (published in 1931). Gibson also contemplated translating Sein und Zeit, and discussed with Levinas the possibility of a visit to the University of Melbourne, unfortunately neither project eventuated before the political situation in Germany worsened. In his final years, Gibson was dismayed when the Eucken Society in Germany, of which he was a prominent member, sent him Nazi propaganda in the mail, and he immediately resigned from the society in protest. Like Husserl himself, his premature death on the eve of World War Two saved W. R. Boyce Gibson from having to experience first hand the horrors about to unfold.

From 1923 to 1950 J. McKellar Stewart held a chair of philosophy at the University of Adelaide, publishing a pair of articles on Husserl in 1933 and 1934; sadly, the manuscript of his book on Husserl was destroyed in a house fire in 1939, never to be rewritten. Stewart served as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Adelaide from 1945 to 1948, then died in 1953 (see Miller 1929, 1954). When W. R. Boyce Gibson died in 1935, he was succeeded by his son, Alexander (‘Sandy’) Boyce Gibson (1900–1972). Maintaining his father’s pluralistic spirit, Sandy Gibson appointed a balanced and diverse collection of philosophers, including a branch of the newly formed ‘analytic’ school of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, through the appointment in the 1940s of the student of Wittgenstein, A. C. (‘Camo’) Jackson. Although Sandy Gibson published on existentialism (A. Gibson 1948), phenomenological and Idealistic thought...
moved temporarily into the background at Melbourne in the post-war era, to be later revived by Max Charlesworth when he completed his doctoral studies in Leuven and returned to teach at Melbourne in 1958. Charlesworth introduced the question of indigenous perspectives into his uniquely Australian take on phenomenology, his lectures and radio appearances attracting a large following (Harney 1992: 141). He was also the first to apply the label ‘Continental’ to his courses as an ideological rather than merely geographical designation, teaching not only Husserl, but also Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Camus and de Beauvoir (Bilimoria 1997: 40). Mary McClosky, Graeme Marshall, Jan Srzednicki and Andrew Theophanous continued the strong Kantian tradition at Melbourne, while Catherine Berry and Maurita Harney joined Brenda Judge in maintaining Melbourne’s phenomenological tradition throughout the 1960s and ’70s. Berry completed a Masters degree on the question of the body in Merleau-Ponty at Melbourne in 1962, and also edited the collection of essays Ten Lectures on Contemporary Continental Philosophy that year (Berry 1962; cf. Harney 1992: 134).

The focus on idealism and phenomenology thus divided between McKellar Stewart in Adelaide and Charlesworth in Melbourne. Stewart’s successor at the University of Adelaide, J. J. C. Smart, added an analytic flavour to a syllabus including Kant’s first Critique and Husserl’s Ideas in Gibson’s translation (Grave 1984: 111). Among the students produced by this department in the 1950s was Max Deutscher (b. 1937), who after graduating from Adelaide in 1959 studied and lectured at Oxford, Johns Hopkins and U. C. Irvine, and then became foundation professor of philosophy at Macquarie University in 1964, where he was subsequently joined by Luciana O’Dwyer. Deutscher’s initially analytic approach gradually evolved into the unique blend of phenomenology, existentialism and a robust commonsense characteristic of the later Wittgenstein, which he presented in Subjecting and Objecting (1983) and Genre and Void (2003). Jeff Malpas and Henry Krips are two more graduates of the Adelaide department, Malpas going to the University of Tasmania via the Australian National University (ANU) and the University of New England (UNE), and Krips to the University of Melbourne Department of History and Philosophy of Science before moving to the U.S. in the 1990s, and both working extensively on Husserl and Heidegger.

Although he is not usually classified as a phenomenologist, the influence of Nietzsche must also be included in this sketch of the history of phenomenology in Australia. Nietzsche’s realisation in Twilight of the Idols that ‘the inner world is an appearance too’; his incisive meditations on our concepts of appearance, being and becoming as evidenced in Human All Too Human (I, §§15–18), Gay Science (§354) and Genealogy of Morals (II, §16); his ‘pleasure in foregrounds’ (Human All Too Human preface, §1); these and many other passages locate Nietzsche’s thought squarely in the field of phenomenology demarcated by the attractions and repulsions operating between Kant and Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. This is significant, for as S. A. Grave puts it, ‘From the end of the nineteenth century, for thirty years or so, Nietzschean ideas were in the heads of poets, painters and novelists’ (1984: 2); ideas showing them new ways of seeing their
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world and interpreting themselves in it. The influence was focussed upon Norman Lindsay’s *Creative Effort: An Essay on Affirmation* (1920), his son Jack Lindsay’s *Dionysos: Nietzsche Contra Nietzsche* (1928), and the Fanfrolico Press edition of P. R. Stephenson’s 1928 translation of Nietzsche’s *Antichrist*, illustrated by Norman Lindsay (see J. Lindsay 1948, Stephensen 1954, Macainsh 1975). Nietzsche increasingly gave Australian philosophers, poets and artists a new experience of the inextricable entanglement of appearance and reality, of the inseparability of being and becoming, and of the interaction of the way a story is told, with the reality it tells of. His influence cannot be ignored if the specifically Australasian developments in phenomenology are to be brought into view. Paul Crittenden at the University of Sydney and Robin Small at the ANU were two notable Australian academic philosophers working on Nietzsche.

The *University of Tasmania* was founded in 1890, and the classicist R. L. Dunbabin was foundation professor of mental and moral science from 1902, followed by E. Morris Miller (1881–1964), who arrived from the University of Melbourne in 1913. Miller was a working-class man who had won a scholarship to Wesley College thanks to help of the Moonee Ponds Mental Improvement Society (Franklin 2003: 120n.33), and began at the University of Melbourne as an undergraduate in 1900. He was taught Kant by Henry Laurie, and also came under the influence of John Smyth, principal of the Melbourne Teacher’s College, author of *Truth and Reality* (1901) and also close associate of Alfred Deakin, then prime minister (Grave 1984: 34). Miller published four works on Kant’s moral theory between 1911 and 1928, and was a significant figure in Tasmanian public life. In 1952, Sydney Sparkes Orr filled the chair vacated by the retiring Miller, a controversial choice as J. L. Mackie had also applied for the job, he then going instead to Dunedin in New Zealand. The controversy deepened as Orr became embroiled in controversy only one year after arriving there (see Franklin 2003: ch. 3), and as a result philosophy at the University of Tasmania fell into abeyance and the chair remained vacant, with the machinations of the Orr affair continuing until Orr’s death in 1966: a situation not entirely remedied until the appointment of Jeff Malpas to the chair in Hobart many years later. After doing postgraduate work as the ANU, Malpas went to the University of Tasmania in the 1990s via stints at U.C. Santa Cruz, the University of New England, and Murdoch University, and his early work on Davidson’s holism has dovetailed into his extensive subsequent work on Heidegger (see Malpas 1992, 1999, 2006; Malpas and Wrathall 2000).

A chair in philosophy was among the foundation chairs at the *University of Western Australia*, and in 1913 P. R. Le Couteur travelled from Melbourne to take up the position. A graduate of the University of Melbourne and a Rhodes scholar to Oxford, he had also spent 1910–11 in Bonn studying under Külpe, a student of Wundt. Le Couteur resigned in 1918, and a disciple of Anderson’s from Sydney was appointed, a dominance that lasted until 1960 and ensured the decline of phenomenology and Idealism there. This was also the case at the *University of Queensland*, founded in 1910, with Elton Mayo being foundation
professor, one of Mitchell’s students from Adelaide. Anderson’s analytic influence also dominated in Canberra, where his disciple Percy Partridge was appointed professor of social philosophy in preference to Karl Popper in the Research School of the Social Sciences at ANU. Quentin Gibson, younger brother of Sandy Gibson, was the first full-time lecturer in philosophy at ANU on the teaching side, this school pioneering the approach of divorcing teaching from research ‘centers’. Teachers with a phenomenological interest included Genevieve Lloyd, William Ginnane, Kimon Lycos, Maurita Harney, Richard Campbell, Robin Small, Ros Diprose, Penny Deutscher, and Claire Colebrook.

Scottish Idealists held the chair of philosophy at the University of Otago at Dunedin on New Zealand’s south island from its foundation: Duncan McGregor from 1871 to 1886, William Salmond from 1887 to 1913, Salmond then being succeeded by another Scot, Francis Dunlop, in 1913. Dunlop was also a student of Eucken’s from Jena, and he taught at Otago until his premature death from heart attack in 1932, when he was succeeded by the South African born Oxford graduate J. N. Findlay (1903–1987). Arriving in Dunedin in 1934, Findlay had done his doctorate at the University of Graz with Ernst Mally, the student of Meinong, and translated Husserl’s first work, the two volume Logical Investigations. He published a major study of Hegel, and also contributed an extensive forward and long post-script ‘Analysis of the Text’ to A. V. Miller’s translation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind, and also published works on Kant, Meinong, Wittgenstein and Plato. When Findlay moved to a chair in the U.K. at Newcastle-upon-Tyne in 1945, interest in Idealism shifted to Auckland on New Zealand’s north island, when K. B. Pflaum moved from Europe and Clive Pearson moved from Australia to teach phenomenology and existentialism at the University of Auckland in the 1960s. As attested by their extensive bibliographies of works on Heidegger, on Nietzsche and on Schopenhauer, Julian Young and Robert Wicks, together with Matheson Russell continue this strong focus in Auckland today.

The post-war era was a time of growth in Australia, and along with Macquarie University, the University of New South Wales (UNSW) had been founded in 1949, and in Melbourne, Monash University in 1959 and La Trobe University in 1964. S. A. Grave (1984: 205–6) reports that A. M. Ritchie had been writing on existentialism before he came to the University of Newcastle in 1950, work carried on by William Doniela there in the 1970s after studying at Freiburg for his dissertation, while Ritchie moved to UNSW. Philosophy was established at the University of Wollongong in 1975, and has been taught at UNE since before the war, although like Perth, Canberra and Sydney itself, Anderson’s dominance had had a stultifying influence. At La Trobe University, the students of Lukacs’, Agnes Heller and Ferenc Feher joined the Icelandic emigré Johann Arnason, a student of Habermas’, as professors of sociology, arriving in Australia in 1977 after fleeing the fall of Hungary to the Soviet totalitarians (along with György and Maria Markus, who went to Sydney). The study of Hegel and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School found new life in Bundoora, until Heller in 1986 took up
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the late Hannah Arendt’s chair at the New School for Social Research in New York. Out of this milieu arose major figures of the Australian sociological scene such as Peter Beilharz, Julian Triado, Alistair Davidson, Leslie Bodie, Jillian Robinson, David Roberts, and John Rundell. Charlesworth moved to Deakin University (Geelong campus) in 1977, and worked there with Jocelyn Dunphy and Purushottama Bilimoria. Dunphy had studied hermeneutics with Ricoeur in Paris, while Bilimoria brought a concern for Indian and comparative studies to bear upon phenomenology. In line with phenomenologists such as J. N. Mohanty and Don Ihde, Bilimoria has explored the significance of the multicultural nature of Australian society, which has in fact been multicultural ever since 1788, a phenomenon not effaced despite the various efforts to promulgate the insidious myth of a ‘white Australia’.

In the 1980s, phenomenology and Idealism moved out of the background and back into the foreground at the University of Melbourne, through the teaching of Brenda Judge, Kimon Lycos, Marion Tapper and Damien Byers in the philosophy department, and of Geoff Sharpe, Henry Krips, Kevin Hart and later John Rundell in the Ashworth Program for Social Theory, housed in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science. Kevin Hart’s 1988 Melbourne Ph.D. ‘The Trespass of the Sign’, supervised by Kevin Presa, led to his founding Monash University’s Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies in the early 1990s with Elizabeth Grosz, before both Hart and Grosz left in the mid 1990s for positions in the U.S. The centre continues to flourish under the direction of Andrew Benjamin, bringing together a diverse group of thinkers and writers all of whom, together with Karen Green, Robert Sparrow and Nick Trakakis in Monash’s School of Philosophy and Bioethics, pursue interests related to the phenomenological and Idealistic traditions in philosophy.

Phenomenology and Idealism are alive and well today across many Australian universities, thanks to the efforts of Jeff Malpas, Marcelo Stamm, Undine Sellbach and Ingo Farin in Tasmania; Robin Small, Fiona Jenkins, Bruin Christensen and David West at the ANU; Toula Nicolacopoulos, George Vassilacopoulos, Jack Reynolds and Phillipa Foot at La Trobe; Stan van Hooft, Geoff Boucher and Matthew Sharpe at Deakin; Lubica Ucnik at Murdoch in Perth; Julian Young, Robert Wicks and Matheson Russell in Auckland; Aurelia Armstrong, Michelle Boulous Walker and Marguerite La Caze in Brisbane; Paul Patton, Moira Gatens, Paolo Diego Bubbio, Simon Duffy, Justine McGill, Damien Byers and John Grumley in Sydney; Paul Redding, James Phillips, Rosalyn Diprose, Simon Lumsden, Joanne Faulkner, and Miriam Bankovsky at UNSW; Robert Sinnerbrink, Nick Smith, Jean-Phillipe Deranty and Catriona Mackenzie at Macquarie; and Marion Tapper and the lecturers of the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy at Melbourne, founded by David Rathbone, Cameron Shingleton, Matt Sharpe and Jon Roffe in the summer of 2002, with courses on Hegel, Nietzsche, Zizek and Deleuze. As this long list indicates, new generations of philosophers have arisen throughout Australasia who aim to combine an awareness of the importance of the two-and-a-half thousand year tradition in
Idealism with an understanding of the significance of the phenomenological movement as it evolved throughout the twentieth century, and a firm grasp of the imperative to remain relevant to the actual experience of both the wider community of scholars in the academy, and to twenty-first century Australia as a whole.

Philosophical Methodologies

Andrew Brennan & Y. S. Lo

Methodology is understood here to include methods, approaches, and styles, which are not always easy to separate. This article deals with all three, focussing on ones that have been influential in Australasia, or have developed there, through the efforts of thinkers who have either been born in Australasia, or trained or worked there for a significant period.

A combination of several methodological trends characterises much of recent Australian philosophy. A prominent one is conceptual analysis, a core component of the ‘Canberra Plan’ championed by a leading group of Australian National University philosophers in the 1990s (Jackson and Pettit 1995; Jackson 1998; and for a summary see Eagle 2008 and compare Braddon-Mitchell and Nola 2009). The method involves identifying a wide range of ‘folk platitudes’ about a concept to be investigated. These are statements that typically locate the concept in question within a larger network of other concepts, and are regarded as undeniable by competent users of the concept. For example, suppose we are interested in the concept of memory. The instruction for conceptual analysis will be to locate the concept by collecting folk platitudes about it in relation to such other concepts as knowledge, truth, the past, experience, testimony, and imagination. This collection of folk platitudes may then support a certain analysis, in the form of a definition or a characterisation, of memory. A good conceptual analysis should capture the core platitudes about the concept under investigation, and it should be able to distinguish the concept from other closely related or easily confounded ones. But the analysis that best captures the folk platitudes about a concept might still not give rise to the best theory about the thing that the concept is supposed to capture, all things considered. For folk platitudes might be naive, unjustified, or erroneous. Furthermore, a good theory needs to cohere with the wider body of knowledge we have about other things.

The technical aspect of conceptual analysis (particularly its treatment of folk concepts in a similar way to how meaning is given to theoretical terms in philosophy of science) resonates with work by Frank Ramsey and David Lewis (1970, 1972). The appeal to folk platitudes, however, is reminiscent of the
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Wittgensteinian ‘use theory’ of meaning and the ‘ordinary language’ school in post-war Oxford. The teachings of G. A. Paul, who was a student and follower of Wittgenstein and was marooned in Melbourne during World War Two, along with the teachings of A. C. (‘Camo’) Jackson (also a student of Wittgenstein), made a significant impact on students and a swathe of Melbourne-trained philosophers, several of whom rose to prominence in academic positions outside Australia.

Reflective equilibrium is a second method widely used in Australian philosophy, particularly in the area of ethics. Popularised by John Rawls (1999), ‘narrow’ reflective equilibrium is the requirement that our endorsement of a general theory must cohere with our judgments on particular cases. For example, if we endorse a moral theory of maximising overall happiness come what may, then, to be coherent, we must judge it to be morally acceptable to torture innocent people if doing so would maximise overall happiness, even if we find this particular moral judgment abhorrent. Likewise, if we decide to reject the judgment, then, to be coherent, we must also abandon or at least revise the general theory accordingly, even if we find the general theory itself appealing. According to this picture, neither the theory nor the set of particular judgments is taken to be the foundation of moral knowledge. Rather, coherence between the two is the criterion for knowledge. However, by reaching our own narrow equilibrium between the general theory we endorse and the particular judgments we make, we have not yet reached a theoretically satisfactory situation. For others may likewise be able to reach narrow equilibrium between an alternative general theory and their particular judgments. Narrow or individual equilibrium provides no means of comparing competing theories. So, ‘wide’ reflective equilibrium aims to correct this deficit by looking for comprehensive principles that apply to the choice of theory and to the procedures for harmonising theory and data. To reach wide equilibrium, we need to find some higher-order principles with which others would also agree and which will generate a theory that is likely to be accepted by as many other people as possible, including those who hold competing theories.

The search for such wide equilibrium draws from classic methodologies in philosophy of science and epistemology, for example Hempel’s (1967) hypothetico-deductive method, Goodman’s (1979) approach to the problem of induction, and Quine’s account of how consistency is achieved in the web of beliefs that we collectively share (Quine and Ullian 1978). All of these accounts have a holistic orientation, or involve a broad form of reflective equilibrium. For example, Quine’s naturalised approach to epistemology and science sets out higher-order principles for managing competing theories within our webs of beliefs. Seen in this way, Rawls’s appeal to reflective equilibrium in moral theory is an application of a method which has its roots in epistemology and philosophy of science.

Naturalism is a third popular approach which—while by no means a universal methodological commitment—certainly characterises a great deal of Australian philosophy. There are at least two ways in which philosophy can be naturalistic. First, whatever theory we propose has to be able to stand without assuming
the existence of anything supernatural or magical. Second, any puzzling or apparently non-natural property is reducible to something natural. Such a reductive form of naturalism is typified by J. J. C. Smart’s (1963) defence of the view that consciousness is nothing but a brain state. Smart’s ‘scientific realism’ involves looking for ways to identify and reduce all properties to those that can be deemed ‘real’ in a natural scientific sense. Likewise, for David Lewis (who was a frequent visitor to Australia and widely admired member of the Australasian Association of Philosophy) facts about values are nothing more than empirical facts about our psychological dispositions, while Michael Smith regards facts about values as nothing more than facts about the desires of fully rational agents, naturalistically understood (Smith 1994). Other examples of reductive naturalism include Brian Ellis’ scientific materialism (1990).

The combination of conceptual analysis and naturalism can lead to interesting results, for example J. L. Mackie’s ‘error theory’ of moral properties (Mackie 1977). These properties turn out on analysis to be ‘queer’ in that their supposed objective existence combined with their supposed ‘to-be-pursuedness’ seem to resist scientific explanation and are at odds with a wider naturalistic outlook on the world. So Mackie declares that the folk understanding of value properties is an error, moral concepts correspond to nothing real in the world, and therefore all moral claims are arguably false.

A further salient feature that characterises much contemporary Australian philosophy is a certain hard-headedness and unorthodoxy in style. The radicalism in Australian philosophy can be seen as a maverick rejection of British commonsense philosophy combined with a willingness to embrace what commonsense might regard as absurd conclusions. Smart’s defence of materialism, Mackie’s error theory, and Lewis’ modal realism are all examples of this style. Likewise, a widespread tendency to utilitarianism in ethical theory (Smart and Williams 1973), and a willingness to embrace its radical implications for animals, euthanasia, abortion and sexual ethics in general (Singer 1976, 1993; Tooley 1972) have been distinctive in the work of a number of Australian writers. The same maverick character is also reflected in an openness among logicians in both Australia and New Zealand to explore non-classical systems, particularly in relevant and paraconsistent logic (for example, Routley, Plumwood and Brady 1982; and Priest 2008).

Many of these contemporary features can be traced back to the influence of John Anderson’s scientific empiricism. Anderson taught at the University of Sydney from 1927 until 1958 when D. M. Armstrong, his former student, succeeded him as Challis Professor of Philosophy. Anderson’s rejection of religious or supernatural metaphysics yielded a strong form of empiricism (an early version of reductive naturalism), which was subsequently championed by Armstrong (1968). Anderson’s empiricist rejection of G. E. Moore’s non-naturalistic account of goodness bore fruit in the error theory of Mackie, also a former student, although Mackie’s career took him also to New Zealand and the U.K. Anderson’s stolid rejection of religion and advocacy of individual
freedom contributed to a cultural climate in the 1940s and 1950s from which emerged the radical social movement, the 'Sydney Push'. Later developments of the movement in the 1960s saw the appearance of a range of libertarian public intellectuals and social reformers such as the feminist Germaine Greer, and sowed the seeds for critical feminist philosophies (for example, Gatens 1996; Grosz 1995; Plumwood 1993).

While Paul spread the doctrine of Wittgenstein to Melbourne in the 1940s and Anderson created an increasingly strong empiricist climate in Sydney between the 1930s and 1950s, the presence of Karl Popper at the then Canterbury College from 1937 to 1945 meant that a kind of Popperianism became well established in New Zealand and flourished up to the 1980s. New Zealand thinkers influenced by Popper’s emphasis on ‘falsifiability’ as the criterion of empirical significance, later extended their attention to the study of what it is for a theory to be ‘truthlike’. The broad debates about the scope and applicability of the notion of truth as verisimilitude was for a time the central focus of some work in New Zealand (for example, Oddie 1986). Contemporary scientific realism in New Zealand shares many features in common with Australian realism, but with a Popperian twist (Musgrave 1999). Under the influence of Australasia’s first formal logician, A. N. Prior (1955), logic took a central place in both teaching and research in New Zealand, and logicians contributed to developments in classical and modal logic and their applications (Prior 1957; Hughes and Cresswell 1968). One of the important Australasian Relevant logicians, Richard Routley (later known as Richard Sylvan), was born in New Zealand and did his undergraduate work there. Less inclined to adopt the maverick posture of its Australian counterpart, New Zealand philosophy can be said to be generally less radical in its conclusions.

Both Australia and New Zealand have been home to a variety of other kinds of philosophical methodologies apart from the ones discussed here. Although analytic approaches have dominated the methodology of much Australasian philosophy, a distinctively Australian form of hermeneutics has emerged as a result of reflecting on and reacting against the highly reductivist and modernist character of parts of the local tradition. Adopting a self-reflective, historically situated and holistic stance, Australian hermeneutics has engaged closely with important thinkers of the past, finding in them sources of philosophical insight and guidance. For instance, Paul Redding’s attempt to provide an account of ‘mutuality’ in understanding subjectivity and inter-subjectivity—one where the individual is not understood atomistically but essentially in a network of mutual relationship with others—draws on a form of Hegelian holism (Redding 1996). Likewise, Jeff Malpas’ work on Heidegger, Davidson and the topology of concepts defends the view that concepts can never be properly understood except in a wider network of other concepts, a network that itself has historical dimensions (Malpas 2007). Such approaches are traceable to the Hegelian and Marxist influence of György Markus (who arrived as a refugee from Hungary in 1977, at the same time as Agnes Heller), and his insistence that philosophy is irreducibly historical (Markus 1986). Despite their apparent differences, both the dominant analytic
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Ian Gold

‘A well-known British philosopher said to A. C. Jackson who was in England at the time [the 1950s]: “What’s happened to [J. J. C.] Smart? I hear he is going about saying that the mind is the brain. Do you think it might be the heat?”’ (Grave 1984: 112). In analytic philosophy of mind, and the sub-discipline sometimes referred to as ‘philosophical psychology’, a more dramatic turnaround can hardly be imagined. These days, it is those who espouse dualism whose brains—and therefore minds, of course—are more likely to be thought addled.

Although similar views were being developed in the U.S. (especially by Herbert Feigl; see, e.g. Feigl 1958), the claim of mind-brain identity, often called ‘Australian materialism’, is possibly Australasia’s single most important contribution to contemporary philosophy because it signalled a sea change in thinking about the metaphysics of mind. It also ushered in a new period in the interactions between analytic philosophy, on the one hand, and psychology and neuroscience on the other. Australian philosophers initiated this change and continue to be among the leaders in the current scene.

The identity theory was developed by the psychologist U. T. Place (see Place 1956) and J. J. C. Smart (see Smart 1959b), both British expatriates working in Adelaide in the 1950s, in collaboration with C. B. Martin, also then at Adelaide. Its central hypothesis was that sensations—paradigms of conscious experience—could be reduced to brain processes. It thus anticipated the concern with consciousness that is the most active area of philosophical psychology today. The other pillar of Australian materialism is found in the work of D. M. Armstrong (see Armstrong 1961, 1962, 1968), which provides a systematic account of mental concepts in physicalist terms.
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The materialism of John Anderson is sometimes thought to have had an influence on the development of Australian materialism, but this seems unlikely given what is known about the details of Anderson’s views. More importantly, Smart was not a student of Anderson’s, and Armstrong seems to have moved away from Anderson before the development of his own views (Franklin 2003).

The identity theory ceded its dominance to ‘functionalism’ as first proposed by Hilary Putnam (see Putnam 1960), although the views are much closer than is often thought. Here too, however, an Australian influence was felt. Armstrong developed a version of functionalism which emphasised the causal roles played by mental states. That these states are realised by brain states is the basis on which mental states and brain states can be identified (at least within species, assuming a neural uniformity therein). This view was independently developed by the American philosopher, David Lewis (1966, 1983), whose connection to, and influence on, Australian philosophy is well-known. (Lewis was a student of Smart’s at Harvard and made annual visits to Australia until shortly before his death.)

Debates about materialism—or ‘physicalism’ as it has come to be called more commonly—remains front and centre in the philosophy of mind in Australia and elsewhere, though Australia is justifiably as famous for the backlash against physicalism as for its invention. Frank Jackson’s 1983 paper, ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, presented one of the most important arguments against physicalism which turns on the idea that ‘qualia’, the phenomenal properties of experience, cannot be reduced to the physical. This article is a contemporary classic and continues to stimulate significant debate and substantial literature.

David Chalmers’ book The Conscious Mind (1996) represents the other most significant assault on physicalism. It develops a powerful modal argument against physicalism which has, like Jackson’s, been highly influential. Nevertheless, physicalism (of a non-reductive variety) remains the dominant position in analytic philosophy of mind and continues to be defended by Australian philosophers, including Frank Jackson himself (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996), who went on to reject his earlier anti-physicalist position. It is noteworthy that these anti-physicalist works also represent some of the most important contributions to consciousness studies, which has undergone an explosive resurgence in the last twenty years.

In the fifty or so years since the establishment of this ‘scientific’ conception of the mind, the philosophy of mind remains central to Australian philosophy and retains its interest in the psychological and brain sciences.

Following Armstrong, perception—and, in particular, colour perception—became an active area of philosophical research. Frank Jackson’s Perception: A Representative Theory (1977b) remains an important contribution to the contemporary debate. The topic of colour perception, in particular, has benefited from significant Australian contributions. Smart himself presents a physicalist conception of colours which he attributes to David Lewis (1975). Keith Campbell’s early paper ‘Colours’ (1969) has had a powerful and long-lasting
influence in the field, and a book by Barry Maund (1995) develops an important ‘anti-realist’ theory of colour. Armstrong’s own views on colour foreshadow the most important version of contemporary colour realism, that of David Hilbert (1987), according to which colours are to be identified with the surface spectral reflectance of opaque objects.

As the cognitive and neural sciences have become better known by philosophers, Australian philosophy has engaged with a variety of topics of mutual concern to philosophy and psychology. Australian philosophers have also taken up the methods of ‘neurophilosophy’ and investigated questions in the philosophy of mind which overlap with cognitive neuroscientific research. The materialist and scientific orientation of philosophy established by Smart, Armstrong and others thus continues to characterise a great deal of Australian philosophical psychology.

**Philosophy, Drama and Literature**

Eugenio Benitez

Philosophical interest in drama and literature occupies a small but noteworthy part of the landscape of philosophy in Australasia. In addition to the more than fifteen academics currently researching, publishing and teaching on philosophy and literature, the region produces two international refereed journals and sponsors a number of distinctive activities that are academic and community oriented.

*Philosophy and Literature* is an internationally renowned refereed journal founded by Denis Dutton at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch. It is now published by the Johns Hopkins University Press. Since its inception in 1976, *Philosophy and Literature* has been concerned with the relation between literary and philosophical studies, publishing articles on the philosophical interpretation of literature as well as the literary treatment of philosophy. *Philosophy and Literature* has sometimes been regarded as iconoclastic, in the sense that it repudiates academic pretensions, insidious jargon and institutional vogue. Dutton, who remains the editor, still writes a regular column. A distinctive feature of *Philosophy and Literature* was the annual Bad Writing Contest, held from 1995–98, which sought to identify (and publish) the ‘most stylistically lamentable passages’ of academic prose, often to great amusement.

*Literature and Aesthetics* is a refereed journal, published from the University of Sydney since 1991. It was the creation of first editor and foundation president Catherine Runcie (University of Sydney), whose aim was to bring together works of philosophy, literature and creative writing. *Literature and Aesthetics* publishes papers in philosophical aesthetics on any of the arts, on literature and literary
theory, and includes ‘Hands On’ work in the form of short poems, stories, essays, and black-and-white art. The ‘Hands On’ section is a distinctive feature of the journal, providing international exposure for Australasian writers and artists. It has been acclaimed in the British Journal of Aesthetics and the International Association of Aesthetics Yearbook. Literature and Aesthetics is currently edited by Associate Professor Vrasidas Karalis.

The nexus between philosophy and drama was explored by the acclaimed Philosophy Nights series, begun at Steki Taverna in Newtown, Sydney by Eugenio Benitez, Lloyd Reinhardt and Edward Spence, all at that time of the University of Sydney. The Philosophy Nights presented philosophical ideas in dramatic form, often accompanied by an academic talk and dialogue with the audience. The program ran for ten years, from 1997 to 2007, and was produced by Edward Spence (Charles Sturt University). Over the course of its lifetime, more than eighty original ‘Philosophy Plays’ were performed. Some of these were featured in segments of Insight (SBS Television) and Lateline (ABC Television); they received critical attention in the Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian newspapers, as well as in The Journal of the Philosophy Society (U.K.). The Philosophy Plays have been performed in the Sydney Festival, the Greek Festival of Sydney, the Adelaide Festival and elsewhere.

Another community event that merges philosophy with literature is the Byron Bay Writers Festival, which has operated annually since 1997. Although the focus of the festival is on Australian writing, events and workshops encourage intelligent discussion of wider issues, including ethics and the philosophy of life. Workshops on ethics have been part of the festival since its inception, and speakers have included philosophers Peter Singer and Raimond Gaita.

Finally, in 2008, the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (with sponsorship also provided by La Trobe University) hosted the International Association for Philosophy and Literature Conference, with the theme of ‘Global Arts, Local Knowledge’.

Among those academics in Australasia who specifically list philosophy and literature (or near equivalent) as a research interest are: Paolo Bartoloni (University of Sydney), Ismay Barwell (Victoria University of Wellington), Stuart Brock (Victoria University of Wellington), Diego Bubbio (University of Sydney), George Couvalis (Flinders University), Steven Davies (University of Auckland), Denis Dutton (University of Canterbury), Robyn Ferrell (University of Melbourne), John Holbo (National University of Singapore), Michael Levine (University of Western Australia), Aditya Malik (University of Canterbury), Justine McGill (University of Sydney), Timothy O’Leary (University of Hong Kong), James Phillips (University of New South Wales), and Michelle Walker (University of Queensland).
‘Philosophy for Children’ (Australia)

Laurence J. Splitter

Laurence Splitter first encountered ‘Philosophy for Children’ (P4C) during a sabbatical in the U.S., in 1982. Meeting with Matthew Lipman and, later, Ann Sharp, he quickly realised that they had hit several nails on the head: creating a series of carefully crafted stories as vehicles for bringing the joys of philosophy to children; addressing the elusive question of how to teach thinking skills in a meaningful context (by modelling them in the narrative dialogue); and constructing classroom environments based on care, respect and a shared sense of our common humanity. The core idea was to work with classroom teachers to help them transform their classrooms into ‘communities of inquiry’ as the students pick up the philosophical ideas and begin to think critically about them, creating their own dialogue out of that modelled in the stories.

Returning to Australia, Splitter began to ‘spread the word’, visiting schools, giving classroom demonstrations from grades K through 10, and setting up teacher workshops—first, in Sydney, where he was then living, and later, in all capital cities—based very much on the Lipman model. He learned several things the hard way, including: the futility of approaching administrators and bureaucrats (top-down) in order to explain the merits of including philosophy in the curriculum before getting teachers on-side (bottom-up); the reluctance of Australian teachers simply to embrace an American ‘program’, and a corresponding desire to make P4C their own; a fairly clear division between educators who had an appreciation of philosophy and the ‘Socratic’ model of dialogue exemplified in the community of inquiry, and educators for whom this was, at best, just another thinking skills program that would eat into an already crowded curriculum; and the gap between the ideal of fifteen eager students sitting in a circle engaged in meaningful dialogue, and the reality of twenty-five easily distracted kids who did not know how to combine open discussion with respectful and caring behaviour, and who were often willing to express their own views but rarely willing—or able—to engage in the hard meta-cognitive work of connecting their ideas, reasoning, challenging, self-correcting, etc.

From 1988 to 2001, Splitter was Director of the Australian Centre for Philosophy with Children and Adolescents within the Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER). He acknowledges an enormous debt to the then-Director of ACER, Barry McGaw, who went against the grain within the tradition of educational research to hire a philosopher (which worked well until the money ran out!). The centre became one part of a growing network of individuals and associations (under the then-Federation of Australian Philosophy for Children Associations or FAPCA) committed to bringing
philosophy and the community of inquiry to children across Australia and, later, to New Zealand and the Asia-Pacific region (the name and structure of the emerging regional network is currently under discussion). There were—and are—challenges aplenty; for example, the task of constructing an ‘outcomes-based’ curriculum framework for philosophy, and a professional development model that recognised the dual contributions of teachers and philosophers, to name a couple. But there have been great achievements as well. Both primary and secondary schools are starting to take philosophy more seriously; and a generation of teachers, students, parents and philosophers no longer raises its collective eyebrows incredulously when ‘philosophy’ and ‘children’ are mentioned in the same sentence.

Those in control of educational policy and funding are not easily persuaded that children have as much right to explore the ‘big questions’ and ideas that arise in philosophy, as they do to develop competencies in literacy and numeracy. But we live in uncertain and problematic times, and we need citizens who are both willing and able to respond to them with enthusiasm, creativity and skill. These are among the attributes that philosophy, taught as collaborative inquiry, seeks to cultivate.

‘Philosophy for Children’ (New Zealand)

Vanya Kovach

‘Philosophy for Children’ (P4C) is an internationally practiced approach to enabling young people from five to eighteen years old to engage in philosophical thinking. Its principal pedagogical tool is the ‘Community of Inquiry’ in which the students generate their own questions in response to philosophically rich stimulus materials, and then collaboratively propose, explore and test their own answers to those questions. They are assisted by their teacher who ensures that the resulting inquiry is characterised by caring interaction, rigorous thinking and reflective practice. Most children delight in exploring the ‘big questions’ in their own terms, and they typically gain confidence and a range of important cognitive and social skills.

P4C was first introduced to Aotearoa/New Zealand in 1990 by James Battye (Philosophy, Massey University) and he was joined in later years by fellow P4C practitioners and trainers Vanya Kovach (Philosophy, University of Auckland), Clinton Golding (now in Education, University of Melbourne), Anne-Maree Olley (Mercury Bay Area School, Whitianga) and Marilyn Stafford (Mangere Bridge School, Auckland). From very small beginnings in a few classrooms, P4C has grown to include whole schools who commit to regular philosophical inquiry
for all age levels. P4CNZ, the New Zealand associate of FAPSA (Federation of Australasian Philosophy in Schools Associations) was set up in 1999, and this organisation offers training to teachers and schools.

Philosophical inquiry is an activity which is appropriate for students of all abilities and backgrounds. This is reflected in the mix of state and independent schools that adopt the process. In the last few years in New Zealand, schools have been required to offer special education for gifted students, and P4C has become a much-used approach in this area, as well as in mainstream classrooms.

The Community of Inquiry fits easily into New Zealand school culture, where critical thinking and inquiry-based learning are enshrined in curriculum documents, and where collaborative learning is valued. It also seems to sit well within Maori culture. Teachers of Maori and Pacific Island children report that philosophical inquiry is particularly welcomed by their students, because it offers opportunities to question, because it creates greater connections between students, and because these cultures have a tradition of caring deeply about questions concerning value. The very first P4C-style philosophical community of inquiry (that we know of) conducted entirely in Te Reo Maori (the Maori language) occurred in Finlayson Park School in South Auckland in 2006. Mauri ora ki a koutou! (Life and health to you all!)

Publication of P4C material by New Zealanders has been limited, but of excellent quality. Connecting Concepts by Clinton Golding (2003), which is a collection of conceptual exploration exercises, has been a great resource for countless classrooms, along with his Thinking With Rich Concepts (2005). Anne-Maree Olley has produced for primary school classrooms: Time to Think 1 & 2 (2003, 2006c), Thinking about Picture Books 1 & 2 (2006a, 2006b), and the Thinking about Journal Stories series (2001a, 2001b, 2002), which provides philosophical support for selected stories in the New Zealand School Journal.

**Philosophy in Primary Education**

Philip Cam

In recent years philosophy has made its way into primary education in Australia. As in many other countries, this development has been inspired by the work of the American philosopher and educationalist Matthew Lipman and his colleagues at the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children in New Jersey (Lipman 1980). From the early 1970s, Lipman began publishing philosophical programs for use in schools, and these were taken up by a small number of schools in Australia in the 1980s. Lipman’s work struggled to gain a foothold in our secondary schools, but it was far better received in the primary sector. As
interest spread during the early 1990s, organisations offering training programs that were largely targeted at primary school teachers began to appear in many parts of the country. This was soon followed by the development of Australian materials for use in primary schools, the start of research, and attempts to find a place for philosophy in the curriculum (Sprod 1993; Cam 1995).

Lipman’s approach to what he called ‘Philosophy for Children’ owes a great deal to the educational thought of John Dewey (Dewey 1916), and this may serve to explain much of its appeal to primary school teachers. Lipman placed the development of thinking at the heart of education, where Dewey said it belongs, and he followed Dewey in conceiving of the classroom as an open and inquiring community, as befits education in a democratic society. These conceptions resonate with current approaches to teaching and learning that especially appeal to primary teachers.

The philosophical exploration of open questions and significant concepts through discussion in the classroom provides a means of fulfilling the educational desire for intellectual inquiry and student dialogue. It develops the art of questioning and provides students with reasoning and conceptual tools, while helping to make them more open-minded and reasonable in their dealings with one another. These are significant educational outcomes for primary education that are increasingly seen to be as basic as traditional forms of literacy.

Although many primary school teachers have been attracted to philosophy, it is still exceptionally rare for it to be integrated into the teaching program across the school, let alone to find the scope and sequence that exists for most areas of the standard curriculum. Where philosophy has been integrated into the program, however, there is evidence that it improves both academic and social outcomes, and this is beginning to encourage systematic research into the contributions that philosophy may make to primary education (Hinton 2003).

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**Philosophy in Professional Education**

Anna Corbo Crehan

‘Professional education’ can refer to a range of courses and qualifications; however, it will be limited here to those offered by universities. While debate is ongoing about the nature of a profession and the occupations that should be identified as professions, the focus here will be broad, taking into account all those occupations which now require a university qualification. Included, then, are the ‘traditional’ professions such as medicine and law, but others too such as journalism, policing and allied health (e.g. occupational therapy, physiotherapy, etc.).
Philosophers are involved in a number of areas of professional education. These include business, medicine, nursing and other allied health areas, law, journalism, defence (military ethics), and environmental science. While it is difficult to be specific, it appears that this move of philosophers into areas of professional education began in Australia in the 1980s, with the earliest date mentioned being 1982. In most instances, philosophers working in professional education are based in a philosophy department and undertake professional education via some sort of arrangement with the relevant professional school. A few philosophers are employed solely in the relevant professional school, rather than in a philosophy department. Less often, philosophers hold a joint appointment in both a philosophy department and a professional school. These individuals most usually have dual qualifications, one in the professional area and one in philosophy.

Philosophers teach in a range of both undergraduate and postgraduate level subjects. Two key areas of involvement are ethics (applied ethics, professional ethics) and practical reasoning more generally. A few philosophers are also involved in the teaching of leadership subjects, particularly where leadership is understood to have a specifically ethical bent. While practical reasoning subjects are not uncommon in professional education, they are considerably less common than ethics subjects. Importantly, however, many of the latter incorporate a practical reasoning component, introducing students to some basic principles of argumentation which are then applied in the subject to ethical issues relevant to the respective profession. Additionally, at least one university (at the time of writing) includes philosophers teaching history and philosophy of science subjects to science and engineering students.

Common to all of the professional ethics subjects is engagement with the problems of practice. This engagement occupies more or less time in the subject, depending on a number of factors such as where the subject is placed in the respective course (e.g. a level 1 subject or a level 3 subject) and the academic background of students undertaking the course (some professional courses recruit students who would not normally have obtained entry into a university course). In some of these subjects, the problems of practice drive the whole subject, with theories and concepts being introduced as needed to resolve these problems. In others, some of the main moral theories are introduced upfront, usually along with some basic principles of argumentation, and these then inform the later engagement with specific professional issues.

Teaching arrangements for philosophers in professional education vary. Some philosophers are involved in professional education via a joint teaching arrangement with the relevant professional course. This may be in the form of a teaching team which includes a mix of philosophers and non-philosophers teaching the subject, or it may be that the philosophers themselves deliver the respective subject in its entirety. As well as those directly teaching in areas of professional education, still other philosophers interact with staff from the respective
professional area during the development stage of the subject, contributing their expertise to determining subject content and teaching strategies.

Notwithstanding this involvement of philosophers in professional education, a number of universities offer professional ethics subjects taught by faculty from the respective course (the situation regarding practical reasoning subjects is less clear). Most often, these non-philosophers are practitioners turned academics, and while some consult with philosophers on an ad hoc basis, this appears to be the exception. These types of situation seem to be prompted by one of two broad pragmatic considerations: the link between student numbers and funding, and therefore the financial impact of schools using faculty from another school to teach on ‘their’ subjects; and the view that those with the relevant professional background and experience are best placed to teach all and any subjects in a professional course. Interestingly, this latter consideration appears to weigh more heavily in areas which might best be termed emerging professions, perhaps reflecting the various degrees of cultural change and transformation being undertaken.

Two interesting points about philosophers’ involvement in professional education warrant special mention. Firstly, in some universities with cohorts of international students (particularly students from various parts of Asia), philosophers are revising their professional ethics subjects to include less about Western values and more about Confucian and other Eastern ethical perspectives. Secondly, when philosophers are involved closely with practitioners in a professional education context, compromises often need to be made in relation to what counts as a technical issue and what counts as an ethical issue. Similarly, many students of professional ethics subjects need to be ‘steered away’ from the purely technical aspects of an issue to be able to engage with its ethical aspects. While this can be a source of both tension and frustration, it also has the potential to contribute to professional education more broadly by developing the profession’s own sense of the ethical dimensions of their practice.

**Philosophy in Public Spaces**

Michelle Irving

This entry documents some of Australia’s most prominent public philosophers and highlights the benefits and opportunities for further engagement by the philosophical community in public spaces.
Historical Overview

Australia’s first philosophy professor, Henry Laurie, was a journalist by trade and owned the *Warrnambool Standard*. It was his own successful campaign for extended teaching of philosophy and the establishment of a chair of philosophy that led to his appointment first as lecturer in logic at the University of Melbourne and subsequently to the newly created chair of mental and moral philosophy in 1886. Laurie engaged the public in philosophical and other issues throughout his academic career, writing several articles for the *Australasian* newspaper during the 1890s and delivering public lectures.

In 1895 Sir William Mitchell took up the chair in English language and literature and mental and moral philosophy at the University of Adelaide. Mitchell considered himself primarily a philosopher, and in his first public lecture he emphasised the importance of analysis, criticism and the development through philosophy of understanding and interest in one’s daily work. Mitchell rose to public prominence through his contribution to education.

John Anderson was professor of philosophy at the University of Sydney and an influential figure in Australian political and cultural life through his lectures between 1927 and 1955. As Tony Coady (2004) has noted, ‘Anderson’s early radicalism (he began as a communist sympathiser and ended as a Cold Warrior), his critique of religion and advocacy of free love gave him a certain public notoriety and saw him censured in the New South Wales parliament in 1943 for attacking religious education’. Anderson’s emphasis on critical thought influenced his students, many of whom went on to become leading philosophers in their own right (including D. M. Armstrong, David Stove, J. L. Mackie and John Passmore) and some to become poets and prominent public figures.

The professionalisation of academia and philosophy throughout the twentieth century meant that Australian philosophy began to focus its efforts on its technical aspects. The capacity of philosophers to hold complex arguments in view at any one time requires a technical expertise built over a lifetime of research and debate with other technically proficient colleagues. Thus the focus of contributing to public debate can easily become less urgent.

As the last century progressed, philosophical work continued to retreat from public view and became increasingly concerned with professional activities. From the 1950s onwards, philosophers were more interested in the analysis of concepts and returned to traditional fields of inquiry rather than engaging the public on matters of practical ethics. With few exceptions, philosophers did not take philosophy out into the world, by either placing their work under the critical public eye or demonstrating the importance of what philosophy does and how it could contribute to the wider community’s concerns.

There is no question that technical rigour produces well reasoned and sound philosophy on all manner of metaphysical and ethical questions. However, for philosophical projects to have meaning, they must contend with ‘important’ issues. Philosophers must consistently confront the difficult question, Why is it important to know this?. Without a well formulated answer, the philosophical
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project is in serious doubt. This notion of importance points beyond the academic environment to the wider society. Two prominent Australian philosophers who have taken up this challenge are Raimond Gaita and Peter Singer.

Gaita is perhaps best known to the public through the recent success of his book, Romulus, My Father (1998), and the subsequent award-winning film based on the book. Gaita details a childhood of terrible events, and transforms these tales to demonstrate the profound influence his father’s example of integrity has had on his own values and perspectives as a moral philosopher. Gaita is also well known to the public through his regular opinion and editorial pieces on political issues.

Currently the best known Australian philosopher is Peter Singer. Through his extensive publications, newspaper articles, interviews and public lectures he has engaged the public in many high profile ethical debates, including his arguments concerning speciesism, abortion, euthanasia, infanticide, various bioethical concerns and world poverty. Singer’s general aim, as he describes it in his intellectual autobiography, is that of ‘reaching beyond professional circles in order to encourage a public debate on important ethical questions’ (Singer unpublished 2009a: 74).

There is a legitimate role for philosophers to enter the public intellectual sphere with the dual aim of influencing current debates and, perhaps more importantly, actually shaping debates. Singer’s career is a clear example of both these agendas. However, his widespread success has not been without controversy. His writings and public career have been accompanied by public protest campaigns and boycotts, which highlight the power that contested philosophical views, especially moral perspectives, can have on the public imagination.

With the expansion of higher education to larger sectors of the population, the public is now increasingly interested in engaging with questions of a theoretical and philosophical nature. The continuous supply of publicly available intellectual products includes popular books that deal with theoretical and philosophical content, television series that deal with the findings and theories of academics, and public lectures. There is a role for philosophers in guiding the public in their own philosophical projects, demonstrating that philosophy does not require technical expertise but is a disposition in the world, or a way of engaging with ideas and handling them carefully. People’s inner lives and life experiences are rich and full of potential points of contact with philosophy. The purpose of these public dialogues and ruminations is both meaningful discussion and the discussion of meaning.

Some philosophers have sought to meet these needs and to offer individuals the ideas and tools with which to develop and examine the thoughtful part of their lives. John Armstrong, who while British by birth has adopted Australia as his home, has sought to make philosophical ideas accessible through his popular books and lectures. As Armstrong puts it,

… philosophy is an extension of what happens when ‘ordinary’ people begin to wonder about the world and their place in it. Philosophy is the name for a basic human activity: wondering,
thinking, having opinions, justifying opinions, speculating, and holding your experience in some sort of framework. This activity has origins in a widespread normal human behaviour that is linked to conversation, exploration, and knowledge. Philosophy is the extension of something that happens anyway. (Quoted in Irving 2008)

Over the last decade Edward Spence’s ‘Theatre of Philosophy’ plays introduced philosophy to the general public through drama and audience participation and discussion. The Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE) has an explicit agenda to engage in public debate. Many of the centre’s philosophers give public lectures and work with local communities to promote philosophy. One such member of CAPPE is Steven Curry, who has worked with the Mornington Peninsula Shire over several years to engage the public in philosophical conversations shaped by local community issues, including environmental ethics, and notions of community, tolerance and diversity.

Also, the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) has made a concerted effort to take philosophy to the public. For example, the AAP awards an annual media prize to the best philosophical piece published by a professional philosopher in the popular media in Australasia. In 2007 the AAP, in partnership with the National Gallery of Victoria, hosted a series of public discussions at the gallery. The focus of this activity was small group discussions about cutting edge philosophical issues led by philosophers, enabling an interface between philosophy, public art and the wider community.

Increasingly the community is extending invitations to philosophers to speak and work in public spaces. A case in point is Alan Saunders’ radio program, ‘The Philosopher’s Zone’, a weekly show on ABC Radio National which features interviews with philosophers on both historical and topical issues. Other examples include the Blackheath Philosophy Lecture, and the smattering of philosophy cafes, philosophy dinners, and philosophy and film events throughout Australia. These forums and events also provide individuals with the opportunity to belong to a community of thoughtful people, thus creating an interface between philosophers’ projects and the broader public.

**Conclusion**

For philosophy to have sustained and ongoing relevance in society, it must continue to reach beyond the bounds of the academy. Philosophers are the custodians of the history of ideas and guides for using philosophical tools for serious contemplation. There are opportunities for philosophers to engage and influence the public through their work on important moral and metaphysical debates. There is also a critical role for philosophers to engage the public in the practice of philosophy, to tease out arguments through discussion with the public rather than just lecture at an audience. This enables the philosophical community to expand, to include those with an interest in the practical application of philosophical ideas to their everyday lives and societal concerns. At a time in
Australia when university funding and the structure of academic philosophy are under threat, public support can be a significant factor in philosophy’s survival. The challenge for philosophy is to recognise the ways in which people become interested in philosophy and to build on this interest through public activities.

Philosophy in Secondary Education

Janette Poulton

By the first decade of the twenty-first century philosophy had been introduced into the senior years of secondary school in all Australian states, with the support of the respective Departments of Education. In 1994 in New South Wales, a Distinction Course for exceptionally gifted and talented students was offered at Higher School Certificate (HSC) level. These courses required a minimum of 120 hours study time and were well above the usual HSC standard, being comparable with a first-year university course. The course was delivered by the University of New England in Armidale and covered metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and political philosophy. In addition to the Distinction Course, some schools offered the subject Philosophy and Theory of Knowledge as part of the International Baccalaureate (IB) curriculum, and some private schools taught philosophy as a separate subject, usually as part of a gifted and talented program.

In 2001, philosophy was added to the suite of Victorian Certificate of Education (VCE) subjects. This study consists of four units delivered over two years: Introduction to Philosophical Inquiry, Philosophical Issues In Practice, The Good Life, and Mind and Knowledge. Extensive benchmarking was undertaken against courses around the world, including the IB, and the initial curriculum was influenced somewhat by the Ontario course in Canada. The curriculum was reviewed in 2006 for teaching over 2008–2012. In 2004, in Victoria, philosophy was also formally included as one of the subject areas in the Key Learning Areas (KLAs) called ‘Studies of Society and the Environment’ (SOSE) in the Victorian Curriculum and Standards Framework (CSF) delivered during the period of compulsory schooling (Years Preparatory to Ten). However, philosophy is not an explicit domain with the Victorian Essential Learning Standards (VELS) that replaced the CSF in 2005. Philosophy as an approach to thinking has some very clear links with VELS Thinking Processes and in particular the reasoning, processing and inquiry dimension. The Philosophy for Children (P4C) program also has links with the Interpersonal Development domain. Philosophy has a potential place in the curriculum across a range of disciplines, but its uptake will depend on teacher interpretation of the curriculum.
South Australia introduced philosophy into its upper secondary ‘Society and Environment’ strand in 2003. The first stage of the course required students to become familiar with ‘community of inquiry’ methodology, thus allowing students to familiarise themselves with key philosophical ideas and strategies and to apply philosophy to specific issues. In stage two, illustrative programs provided by the state Senior Secondary Assessment Board built a community of inquiry into the pedagogy (SSABSA Philosophy Assessment Report 2004).

In 2004, the Queensland Studies Authority (QSA) offered ‘Philosophy and Reason’ as a strand of the Mathematics syllabus. The three main areas of study were: Critical Reasoning, Deductive Logic, and Philosophy. The emphasis was on the development of rational thought and the skills of analysis, argument presentation and rational justification. In the philosophy unit, students studied three options from a range including philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, moral philosophy, social philosophy, philosophy of human nature, philosophy of education, history of Western philosophy and Eastern philosophy. The syllabus sought to ‘provide a vocally interactive classroom’ (Queensland Studies Authority 2004: 26).

In 2005, ‘Religion and Philosophy’ was added to a pre-existing Studies in Religion syllabus for the Tasmanian Certificate of Education, to create the subject ‘Religion and Philosophy 5C’. The style of learning philosophy described in the syllabus (‘doing philosophy’) was influenced by the P4C program methods. Large parts of the syllabus were also quite similar to the IB Diploma Philosophy course, including the five themes: Introduction to Traditions, Comparative Studies in Religion, Contemporary Issues in Religion and Philosophy, Christian Perspectives on Religious Issues, and Ways of Knowing.

The Western Australian course in Philosophy and Ethics was trialled in 2006 with a view to full implementation in 2008. This course of study was made available as a choice for all upper secondary students, whether they were heading for university, the workplace or further technical education. It fits within a restructured state-wide curriculum framework based on the principles of Outcomes-Based Education (OBE) that is mandated for all schools. The Western Australian course has four outcomes as well as required content. The outcomes are: Philosophical Inquiry, Philosophical and Ethical Perspectives, Philosophy and Ethics in Human Affairs, and Applying and Relating Philosophical and Ethical Understandings. Key players in the Western Australian P4C movement were part of the reference group writing the new course, which embedded the requirement that students demonstrate that they can engage in philosophical communities of inquiry (Millett 2006).

(Research for this article was based in part on email interviews with Monica Bini, Tim Sprod, and Alan Tapper.)
Philosophy of Biology

Justine Kingsbury

Philosophy of biology is a thriving area of research in Australasia, and it is very much part of the philosophical mainstream. Philosophy of biology is taught in almost all of the larger Australasian philosophy departments, and the annual conferences of the Australasian Association of Philosophy typically include a philosophy of biology stream, as do the conferences of its New Zealand division. Perhaps because philosophy of biology has such a high profile in Australasia, much Australasian work in other areas of philosophy such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of art and applied ethics is biologically informed.

J. J. C. Smart published ‘Can Biology Be An Exact Science?’ in Synthese in 1959 (Smart 1959a), but philosophy of biology did not gain momentum in Australasia until thirty years later. To a large extent the recent flourishing of Australasian philosophy of biology is due to the influence of Kim Sterelny. Sterelny began as a philosopher of mind and language. His first encounter with the philosophy of biology occurred when he became involved in the supervision of Karen Neander’s La Trobe Ph.D. thesis (completed in 1983) on functions in biology, but it was not until another of his students, Peter Godfrey-Smith, lent him a copy of The Extended Phenotype (Dawkins 1982) that he became a convert. In the late 1980s he co-wrote two articles with Philip Kitcher, ‘The Return of the Gene’ and (also with C. Kenneth Waters) ‘The Illusory Riches of Sober’s Monism’, both of which appeared in The Journal of Philosophy, and since then his output of books and articles in the philosophy of biology has been prodigious. Sex and Death (1999), an opinionated overview co-written with Paul Griffiths, remains one of the standard textbooks in the area. Thought in a Hostile World (2003) presents an account of the evolution of human cognition which provides an alternative to the claim (advanced by most evolutionary psychologists) that the mind is massively modular. More recently Sterelny has been researching the evolution of culture (Sterelny 2006a, 2006b). Sterelny took up a position in the philosophy department at Victoria University of Wellington in 1988, which became part-time in 2001 when he took up a fractional appointment in the Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS) at Australian National University; he is now full-time at the RSSS. For some years Sterelny has been editor-in-chief of the premier journal in the field, Biology and Philosophy.

Former students of Sterelny’s are active, and indeed eminent, in philosophy of biology throughout Australasia and beyond. Karen Neander (now at Duke University) explicates and defends an etiological account of functions (Neander 1991a, 1991b), defends a biological account of mental representation (Neander
1995a), and also writes on explanation and classification in biology (Neander 1995b, 2002; Neander and Rosenberg 2009). Peter Godfrey-Smith (now at Harvard) writes on, amongst other things, natural selection (Godfrey-Smith and Lewontin 1993; Godfrey-Smith and Kerr 2002; Godfrey-Smith 2007a, 2009a) and the concept of information as it is used in biology (Godfrey-Smith 2000, 2004b, 2007b; Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny 2007). Paul Griffiths, who now divides his time between the University of Sydney and the University of Exeter, ranges widely in his work in the area: he writes on innateness (Griffiths 2002, 2009; Griffiths and Machery 2008), gene concepts (Griffiths 2006; Griffiths and Neumann-Held 1999; Griffiths and Stotz 2004a, 2004b, 2007), the emotions from a biological point of view (Griffiths 1997, 2004a, 2004b), and functional explanation (Griffiths 1993, 1994). With Russell Gray, a psychologist at the University of Auckland, Griffiths has also written on developmental systems theory, according to which genes are just one developmental resource among many (Griffiths and Gray 1994a, 1994b, 1997, 2004, 2005). James Maclaurin (at the University of Otago) works on innateness (Maclaurin 2002, 2006) and on biodiversity (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008); John Wilkins writes on species concepts (Wilkins 2003, 2006, 2007); and Brett Calcott is currently working on the evolution of complexity and has recently published on the evolution of cooperation (Calcott 2008) and on explanations of how biological mechanisms change (Calcott 2009).

Not every Australasian philosopher of biology is a former Sterelny student. Exceptions include Karola Stotz (currently a research fellow at the University of Sydney) who writes on genes (see Griffiths and Stotz references above; also Stotz 2006, 2008), and Derek Browne (University of Canterbury) who writes on instincts and animal cognition (Browne 2004). But the exceptions are few: it is striking how many Australasian philosophers (at home and abroad) belong to the same philosophical lineage.

In spite of this, there is nothing particularly distinctive about the views of Australasian philosophers of biology as a group—there is not, on any of the big questions in philosophy of biology, an Australasian view. (Compare ‘Australian materialism’ in the philosophy of mind: although the view was not shared by all Australian philosophers of mind, many identified with the label and the association was strong in the eyes of the rest of the philosophical world.) Perhaps the variety within Australasian philosophy of biology is not surprising: like most areas of philosophy in the twenty-first century, the philosophy of biology is international. What is most striking about philosophy of biology in Australasia is the quality of the work being produced and the sense of a thriving and exciting philosophical community: both of these things encourage students to work in the area and encourage expatriates to return.
Philosophy of Education (Australia)

Megan Laverty

Philosophy of education comprises one of the many sub-disciplines of traditional Western philosophy. Canonical philosophers—like Plato, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and John Dewey—address education as it relates to epistemology, aesthetics, ethics and other sub-disciplines. They think philosophically about education’s aim and methods, the nature of learning and thinking, the character and status of knowledge, and the nature of educational responsibility. They address questions that have come to define philosophy of education: what is teaching and who is the teacher? What is it to become a better human being? And, what is the character of maturation from childhood into adulthood? Philosophers’ answers to these questions define key periods in the history of philosophy of education such as the Enlightenment, Romanticism, Democratic, Postmodern and Critical.

Contemporary professional philosophers tend to specialise in one of philosophy’s sub-disciplines. The profession includes ethicists, political theorists, philosophers of art and philosophers of education. Philosophical activity within a sub-discipline is likely to wax and wane over the years due to a range of mitigating factors. Recent developments in technology, globalisation and environmental instability have created an urgent need for innovative ethical and political thought. This has led to a renaissance in moral and political philosophy which, in turn, has fuelled interest in philosophy of education. Philosophy of education is important when we recognise that our aspirational values—our views on how we should live—do not emerge de novo but must be cultivated in individuals; education is the means by which a society renews and improves upon itself.

Philosophy of education became a recognisable academic discipline in the U.S., with the inception of the John Dewey Society in 1935. This society was formed by academics committed to creating a role for education in the reconstruction of American society. As teacher education expanded to meet the escalating demand for elementary and secondary teachers after World War Two, it integrated philosophy of education into its programs. In 1941 the Philosophy of Education Society (PES) was founded. In England, the integration of philosophy of education into teacher education was inspired by R.S. Peters (1983) in the mid 1960s. Australia followed suit in the early 1970s, with the founding of the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia (PESA) in 1971, just two years after the launch of the journal, Educational Philosophy and Theory.

Philosophers of education generally work in colleges of education. Their audience is principally teachers, teacher educators, school administrators, policy makers and other philosophers of education. The marginal position of philosophy
of education—as a field made up of philosophers working in, and for, professional schools of education—sometimes causes suspicion: academic philosophers question the field’s philosophical rigour and purity; and teacher educators question its relevance and application. In the 1950s, analytic philosophers of education, like Paul Hirst, R. S. Peters, Israel Scheffler and Denis Phillips, responded to their field’s marginal status by carving out its new role to: overcome confusion, ambiguity and self-contradiction in educational theory and research by clarifying concepts and dispelling logical fallacies. This role had two components: the application of general philosophical theories such as freedom, punishment and authority to educational contexts; and the analysis of such educational concepts as knowledge, teaching, and learning. Analytic philosophy of education achieved some success in clarifying the limits of education and educational research. Despite its success, however, analytic philosophy of education precipitated its own demise. The analytic preoccupation with logical and conceptual groundwork diverted philosophical attention away from significant, substantive issues engulfing schools and society such as: increasing cultural and linguistic diversity; the achievement gap; the digital divide; urban schooling; as well as social, racial and economic inequalities.

From the 1980s, philosophers of education became inspired by the politicisation of knowledge and identity that occurred with Marxism, the Frankfurt School, and some postmodern strands of contemporary philosophy. They wanted to shift the emphasis in teacher education from reasoning and truth to justice and equity. Foundations courses in philosophy of education and/or critical thinking were replaced by courses on diversity, multiculturalism and social justice. Philosophers of education returned to reckoning with education’s implications in broad socio-political issues. Their work was enriched by advances in feminism, critical theory, queer theory and race theory. Indeed, educational theory has become much more multi-disciplinary, with particular advantage for the disciplines of anthropology, sociology and political science. Teachers are being prepared to be more ‘cultural responsive’, to beware of oppressive curricula and pedagogy, and to prepare their students to be agents of social change.

Two inter-related disadvantages of anti-foundational philosophy of education are: first, that it can develop into value relativism; and second, that it often loses sight of the importance of reason and other methods of inquiry that aim at objectivity. Some philosophers of education have responded by reconstructing analytic theories and methods of critical thinking. For example, bell hooks (1994) articulates a theory of critical thinking as a collective liberatory practice; Matthew Lipman (2003) has a tripartite conception of critical, creative and caring thinking; and Barbara Thayer-Bacon (2000) incorporates pragmatist, analytic and feminist epistemologies into her theory of ‘constructive thinking’. These approaches view critical thinking not as a discrete set of universal and value-neutral skills and procedures, but as methods of discourse useful for certain, limited culturally valued operations. They emphasise dialogue as the ideal discursive format for critical thinking.
Given that an innovative aspect of the critical thinking movement in the 1970s was that to bring some aspects of philosophical practice not only to teachers but also to students, it is noteworthy that Australia has had considerable success in introducing philosophy into primary and secondary schools. This success has given Australia a leadership role within the international community involved in the teaching and development of pre-university philosophy. Inspired by the curriculum and pedagogy of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) at Montclair State University, Professors Laurance Splitter and Phillip Cam did much to disseminate the program in Australia, and to train teachers in the 1980s and 1990s. The Philosophy for Children (P4C) program is designed to expose children to central philosophical concepts as they learn how to reason cooperatively and make sense of their experience. Its successful implementation in schools created the need for curriculum to support the teaching of philosophy in an Australian context—a need to which Phil Cam, Gilbert Burgh and Timothy Sprod responded by developing materials for the teaching of philosophy and values. Today, the commitment to practicing philosophy with children has strengthened and diversified.

Philosophy of education continues to flourish despite the pressures of diminishing teacher education programs, and increasingly career-oriented students. While the 1990s saw an interest in feminist epistemologies and ethics, pragmatism and identity politics, contemporary philosophers of education elucidate the importance of postmodern theory (most notably that of Giles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida and Michael Foucault) and turn their attention to philosophers not traditionally associated with education (Martin Heidegger, Hans-Gorg Gadamer, Friedrich Nietzsche and Emmanuel Levinas). Although theories of teaching and learning remain significant, the horizons of philosophy of education are expanding in new and illuminating ways.

Philosophy of Education (New Zealand)

John Clark

Philosophy of education is a bit of an anomaly, in New Zealand as elsewhere. This gives it some strengths but also a few limitations.

The Anomaly

Philosophy of education, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. John Dewey), is located outside of the philosophical mainstream. This is so for New Zealand as it is for most other countries, at least in the English-speaking world. In universities, where it is mainly found, philosophy of education is housed in faculties
of education and rarely in philosophy departments. The teaching of philosophy of education tends to be aligned with other disciplines in the foundations of education, especially the history, psychology and sociology of education. One welcome benefit of this interdisciplinary mix is the opportunity it provides to influence, and be influenced by, other disciplines of an empirical sort. The object of educational study does not exist in philosophical isolation. On the contrary, educational policies and practices have rich historical antecedents, are shaped by powerful sociological forces, and are subject to the vagaries of various psychological processes. There is much to be gained from philosophy of education having to take account of these companion disciplines, for they not only give philosophical work a hard empirical reality with which to connect, they also provide an anchor as a bulwark against the Idealism which has, from time to time, gripped the philosophical study of education.

The leverage also works in reverse, albeit not always successfully. The more extreme sociological cultivations of, for example, relativism, have been blunted by the philosopher’s pen, even if not always disposed of. Likewise with some less than desirable psychological fads, behaviourism among them. So, to its advantage, philosophy of education is well-placed to cast a critical gaze on the musings of other disciplines even if this is not always well-received, and to it credit it has not flinched from regularly doing so.

One of the more serious consequences of philosophy of education being cast adrift from philosophy proper is the difficulty it poses for maintaining a close link with what is going on in the parent discipline. Philosophy in the university usually consists of several, even many colleagues bound by a common interest in philosophy. Lose one philosopher to retirement or promotion elsewhere and the department remains. But life is very different for the philosopher of education. All too often in education, the philosopher is alone as one, and in several New Zealand universities, not at all. Lose the philosopher of education and the chances are either the position is lost or if retained then allocated to something other than philosophy. Once the philosopher of education has gone then in that university philosophy of education too has gone.

But for philosophy of education the separation runs even deeper than this. It has, to a very considerable extent, cut itself off from the rest of philosophy. It has its own societies, journals, and conferences. So, the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia provides the organisational umbrella, the journal Educational Philosophy and Theory is the society’s organ, and there is an annual conference, usually held in Australia and sometimes in New Zealand (e.g. 2007). It would probably be fair to say that without the support of the Australian side, philosophy of education in New Zealand would have long ceased to exist as a flourishing community of scholars.

Philosophy of education has the two faces of Janus. It looks one way to philosophy as the source of intellectual inspiration, of new theories, arguments, ideas and the like, and seeks to emulate the rigorous standards and traditions of philosophical inquiry. How well it achieves this is a matter of ongoing
debate amongst philosophers of education. However, philosophy of education does not address itself directly to philosophers and philosophy students, but turns its attention to those in education whose interests are pulled by practical relevance. And herein lies a fundamental tension for philosophy of education to be philosophically competent but also practically relevant.

From There to Here to Where?

The origins of philosophy of education in New Zealand, in any significant sense, lie in three academic appointments in the 1960s. Jim Marshall at the University of Auckland, Stuart Ainsworth at the University of Waikato and Ivan Snook at the University of Canterbury. They brought with them a shared approach to philosophy of education, one shaped by conceptual analysis. So, such concepts as education, indoctrination, needs and democracy were subjected to systematic analysis to lay bare the necessary and sufficient conditions for their use.

As time passed and further philosophers of education joined the academic ranks, new influences were brought to bear. Michael Peters and Peter Roberts at Auckland, Graham Oliver and Debbie Hill at Waikato, and John Clark and John Codd at Massey University, with their by now well-established colleagues, in the late 1980s onwards turned their attention to the ‘reform’ of education and launched a sustained attack on the policies of neoliberalism, managerialism, marketisation, individualism and competition driving the reshaping of schools and universities. Whether this critique blunted the sharp edge of the ‘new right’ agenda is hard to tell.

The current shape of philosophy of education in the early twenty-first century has become diffused. Some academics bring their work to bear in a range of disciplines including the arts, business and early childhood education. Others, and only a few, continue to keep philosophy of education alive in papers of that name where their intellectual labour is shaped by a variety of philosophical ‘greats’: Robin Small (Auckland) – Nietzsche; Debbie Hill (Waikato) – Gramsci; John Clark (Massey) – Quine; and Peter Roberts (Canterbury) – Freire. The recent departures of Jim Marshall and Michael Peters have robbed the discipline of their work influenced by Wittgenstein and postmodernism.

And so, what of the future? As philosophers of education age, and move on to overseas positions or retire, and are not replaced, the future is starting to look rather bleak. There is the very real possibility that the death of philosophy of education will come to pass and few will mourn its demise. If there be such a day it will be a sad day indeed.
Traditionally the philosophy of history has been concerned with two broad, quite distinct, forms of discourse, as famously articulated by W. H. Walsh (1967): firstly, speculative philosophising about the historical processes of the world and, secondly, analytical enquiries into the ontology and epistemology of explanation and writing. Speculative philosophy of history has been the main concern during the last century not of philosophers as such but of historians, and it overlaps a good deal with historical theory so that by the late twentieth century those two forms of discourse became indistinguishable. In addition to Walsh’s separation of the two forms of philosophising, we must add a third mode of discourse—the production and critique of historical writing as a form of culturally and socially-embedded quasi-philosophical ideology that is designed to impact upon social and political beliefs and behaviour.

Analytical philosophy of history in Australia in a formal, explicit sense has always been a very small sub-discipline with few practitioners. In a less explicit sense, however, there have been and are many more scholars whose work within social science disciplines, including history, can be understood as contributing to a broader field of historical philosophy, methodology, and theory. But these social scientists and historians, often being ‘unschooled’ in philosophy in a formal sense, usually have little new or profound to contribute to discussions about and the solving of problems within historical explanation. They tend to be ‘users’ of philosophy of history rather than contributors to it. Nevertheless, there have been significant quasi-philosophical contributions to social theory that sometimes verge on being speculative philosophy of history (see below).

Analytical philosophy of history is a twentieth-century discourse internationally, especially from the 1920s and ’30s onwards. In the interwar period in Europe historical enquiry and explanation were subject to some limited attention, via the same sort of rigorous analysis as other branches of empirical explanation, in the leading analytical schools of Vienna, Berlin and Oxford, among other places. These thinkers in this movement were concerned to reveal the logic of enquiry of all empirical knowledge and thereby to remove all elements of speculation and a priori metaphysics.

In Australia it seems to have been the radical University of Sydney philosopher John Anderson (1962) who was the first to make some formal discussions of historical explanation. He adopted a critical, sceptical, and generally materialist approach to philosophical analysis and was close to the Communist Party for a time in the 1920s (cf. Passmore 1967). Anderson was an influential figure in the genesis of the most significant group or school of Australian philosophers—
the Australian analytical and realist school—many of whom were his students, including D. M. Armstrong, J. L. Mackie, E. Kamenka, P. Partridge, and John Passmore (cf. Baker 1986). Of these, John Passmore was the only one to write systematic studies of historical explanation, from the 1950s (Passmore 1958, 1962), influenced by the contemporary debate over the logic of historical explanation conducted by, most notably, Carl Hempel (1942, 1965) and William Dray (1957). Passmore was one of the founders of the leading journal in the field, History and Theory, but his main interests lay at a tangent, in the history of philosophy and the practical applications of philosophy to problems about human nature and humanity’s place in the natural environment, rather than in the philosophy of the history of society as such (for example, Passmore 1970).

The arrival in New Zealand in the late 1930s of two central European refugees from Nazism who later became famous philosophers raised the profile of New Zealand philosophy of history: Karl Popper at the University of Canterbury and Peter Munz, his student at Canterbury and later a professor at Victoria University of Wellington. At Christchurch during the war Popper wrote The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), a critique of what he saw as totalitarian thought, but he departed permanently for Britain in 1946. Munz studied in Cambridge and returned to Wellington for the rest of his career, and while essentially a medieval historian he also wrote several works on the philosophy of history from an Idealist perspective (Munz 1953, 1956, 1977).

More recently, several contributions to analytical philosophy of history have been made in Australia. The most important have been the extensive writings of C. Behan McCullagh of La Trobe University and Christopher Lloyd of the University of New England. McCullagh, the sole example of an avowed and ‘professionally focussed’ philosopher of history within a philosophy department, has produced an impressive body of careful, empirical work that falls squarely within the tradition of analysis of the logic of historical writing and methodology. McCullagh’s subject-matter and the material he has dissected and analysed into its logical components has been a vast range of historical writing. Through this work he has established himself as one of the world’s foremost logical critics of the structure of historical reasoning (see for example McCullagh 1984, 1998, 2004, 2008, 2009). No other contributions to the philosophy of history in Australia have been so forensically focussed on historical logic.

McCullagh’s most developed theme has been to defend the possibility of historical truth against relativism and its latest manifestation as postmodernism. The reliability, credibility and objectivity of historical accounts have to be defended, he argues, if historical knowledge is to be taken seriously and upheld as a truth-seeking and truth-finding empirical discipline. He holds that a critical theory of truth is necessary to this task and that theory is akin to the Peircean ideal or goal of universal explanation towards which we strive. The nature of the external world makes possible at least partial knowledge of itself and we can test, verify and build on our knowledge in a cumulative manner. In 2008 he wrote:
It is my dream that history will eventually come of age. Historians will not only think rationally, as the best do today, but come to recognise the standards of rationality that distinguish professional history. And rather than writing simply to entertain, or to create and test novel interpretations of historical evidence and historical events, they will acknowledge their obligation to help society understand itself. Then, when students see how rational and valuable history is, they will be drawn into a profession upon which the health of our civilization largely depends. (McCullagh 2008: 279)

Christopher Lloyd has primarily been an economic historian who has explored, with an aim somewhat similar to McCullagh’s, the philosophical foundations and logic of socio-economic history and historical social science in a series of works (see for example Lloyd 1986, 1993, 2005, 2008, 2009). Lloyd has been a defender and interpreter of critical realism in historical social science and has striven to articulate the foundations of unification of the historical and social sciences, as sciences. Like McCullagh, he has been concerned with the goal of knowledge-building through the interconnection between empirical study, concept and theory-building, and new study, in an ongoing process of accumulation and improvement through constant critique. Jeff Malpas, a University of Tasmania philosopher primarily of mind and knowledge, must also be mentioned as a contributor to the analytical philosophy of history in several articles (Malpas 2005; Levine and Malpas 1994).

Other philosophical contributions have come from historians and social scientists whose prime concentrations have been on actual historical enquiry and writing. Martin Stuart-Fox, a historian of South East Asia at the University of Queensland has produced several works of analytical philosophy of history, mostly focussed on the issue of the use of evolutionary theory in historical research (Stuart-Fox 1999, 2005). Marnie Hughes-Warrington, a cultural historian at Macquarie University, has published two books on the philosophy of history: one summarising the views of fifty philosophers and historians on history (Hughes-Warrington 2000) and an important study examining R. G. Collingwood’s views of history and historical education (Hughes-Warrington 2003).

Two other contributions deserve mention. Firstly, Keith Windschuttle’s vehement critique of postmodernist relativism (Windschuttle 1994), while seemingly philosophical in intent, is more a polemic than a work of careful analytical philosophising. This critique is part of his wider contribution to the recent Australian ‘history wars’ in which he has combated several forms of Australian scholarship that he considers to be misguided and somehow anti-Australian in virtue of their relativism and lack of archival precision about Australian history. Secondly, from an opposed perspective, Ann Curthoys and John Docker (2005) have defended a postmodern marriage of historical and fiction writing as sharing a similar methodology and purpose of story-telling.
Speculative philosophy of history, which often has a close interconnection with broad social theory and theology, has not been much in evidence in Australia, perhaps because of the resolutely empirical and materialist character of Australian culture, society and intellectual endeavour. The most significant current of thought that could be described as speculative has come from Marxism and some of its conservative/religious opponents. But even the form that Marxism has taken in Australia has been empirical and materialist, in contrast with some of the Marxist traditions of Western Europe and the U.S. Marx was, himself, an opponent of speculative Hegelian philosophy, but in Western thought from the ‘rediscovery’ of the early writings of Marx in the 1960s there emerged a strong current of quasi-speculative, ‘humanistic’ Marxism, very critical of Soviet-style Marxism. In Britain and Australia, however, the main route taken by Marxist thinkers was closer to the thrust of Marx’s central themes on historical materialist political economy and the analysis of long-run history as the foundation of the analysis of contemporary capitalism. The British Marxist Historical School of the post-war decades (including Dobb, Hill, Thompson, Hilton, Kiernan, Stedman Jones, and others) had one distinguished member in Australia in the work of R. S. Neale, an English immigrant who had his Australian career at the University of New England. In the course of researching aspects of English and Australian social history, Neale wrote at length about the Marxist methodology and theory of history that he employed throughout his work (Neale 1985).

Not all theoretical and speculative history writing is Marxist and there has always been a rich tradition in the Western world, ever since Vico, Kant, Herder and Hegel, of what can be called ‘conservative’ thought that examines the long-run history of the West since ancient times as a civilisation, sometimes with religious and teleological foundations. In Australia this tradition has been well represented in the work of John Carroll of La Trobe University (e.g. Carroll 1998, 2001, 2004), who has developed a form of anti-humanist critique of modern Western civilisation. Carroll has also played a significant role in the ‘history wars’ over Australia’s past (see below) through his chairing of the review of exhibitions and programs of the National Museum of Australia (Carroll 2003), a review prompted by the Howard Government’s discontent with the way in which the themes of settler colonisation and Indigenous dispossession were presented by the Museum.

The critique of historical writing from socio-politico-cultural points of view has grown rapidly in recent decades to now be the major form of meta-writing about historical writing and knowledge in Australia. The vigorous prosecution of debates and even ‘history wars’ about the place of historical writing and knowledge in national life has been concerned primarily with two overlapping issues: the socio-political character of the country as, variously, a settler, convict, monarchical, radical, conformist, egalitarian, Anglo or Asia/Pacific, society; and the dispossession, destruction, and marginalisation of Indigenous Australians. This first debate is a long running one, traceable back even to the early nineteenth century, taking its impetus from the British Protestant settler
versus convict (significantly Catholic) nature of the early society, and continuing to the present and including the issue of republicanism. The second only rose to national prominence from the late 1960s and gathered steam in the 1990s during the Keating and Howard Governments (cf. the important salvo by Blainey 1993). Indeed, the extent to which political leaders have become participants in these debates in recent times is quite remarkable. Historical and cultural disputes over the appropriation of Australia’s past for present purposes is now a central feature of Australian intellectual life, perhaps to an extent matched in only a few other countries, such as South Africa and Germany.

The history debate over the impact of settler colonisation on Indigenous Australians began with C. D. Rowley’s work (Rowley 1970) and was continued by Geoffrey Blainey, Bain Attwood, Henry Reynolds, Tim Rowse, Lyndall Ryan, Robert Manne, Stuart MacIntyre, Dirk Moses, Keith Windschuttle, and others. A recent collection of essays about Reynold’s contribution to Australian historiography and national consciousness (Attwood and Griffiths 2009) makes a significant contribution to the metastudy of Australian historiography and to the public role of history wars.

Philosophy of Language

Barry Taylor

From its origins in the late nineteenth century, until almost the middle of the next, Australasian philosophy followed the mainstream of the established tradition, relegating matters semantic to the second rank. Thus in one of the major centres, the University of Melbourne, language was treated with aristocratic Idealistic disdain. In another, the University of Sydney, the redoubtable John Anderson sketched a view of meaning as consisting in a referential relation between language and facts. While his line has obvious affinities with the Tractatus, the resemblances are superficial. For Anderson never develops his view in Wittgenstein’s detail—no accident, but a consequence of the fact that for Anderson the application to meaning is a mere detail, a secondary deployment of apparatus developed to explore the primary areas of epistemology and metaphysics.

In the wider world, this order of priorities was reversed in the notorious ‘linguistic turn’, the movement inspired by Frege, fired by Russell, Wittgenstein and the logical positivists, and culminating in the classic works of Austin, Ryle and Quine, which relocated matters of meaning to centre stage. Early apostles of the movement in Australia were Douglas Gasking, who arrived at the University of Melbourne from Cambridge before the war; and George Paul, who arrived
from Oxford in the early fifties. Such voices combined with the accumulating weight of the international literature to turn Australasian philosophy too towards language. This tendency was accelerated by the expansion of the university system in the 1960s, with the consequent appointment of young lecturers with modern ideas gained abroad. Powerful though this impetus may have been, however, resistance remained, particularly that mounted by such Andersonians as D. M. Armstrong, who stubbornly refused to allow metaphysics to play second-fiddle—except, perhaps, to their preferred conception of science.

The linguistic turn made philosophy reflective about its own discourse, which it subjected to constant analysis; and it imparted to general philosophical discussion a semantic twist, often separable from the substantive issues. This poses a problem for the current article, in distinguishing ‘philosophy of language’ from exercises in conceptual analysis, or metaphysical discussion cast in the formal mode. The problem is compounded by the explosion of interest in formal logic, roughly contemporary in Australasia with the linguistic turn; for this raises the question of when formal semantics counts as philosophy of language. In this article, ‘philosophy of language’ will be narrowly construed as the study of the systematic theory of meaning for natural languages, either debating the form such a theory should take, or advancing specific proposals for the detail of such a theory. Even this narrow construal is vague; by authorial fiat, we shall interpret it in such a way as to exclude from consideration much work of undoubted interest to the philosophy of language, to render our material more tractable.

Subject to these reservations, we may distinguish three broad movements in the philosophy of language in Australasia: Possible World Semantics; the Davidsonic Boom and its Aftermath; and Causal Semantics.

Possible World Semantics in Australasia has been dominated by the New Zealander Maxwell J. Cresswell, a modal logician who became convinced of the relevance of modal apparatus to the semantics of natural languages through contact with Richard Montague, on a sabbatical visit to UCLA in 1970. Cresswell’s leading idea was to take the underlying structure of a natural language to be that of a lambda-categorial language, in which sentences are represented as having an underlying composition out of functors and terms, with their world-relative truth-values, and hence (Cresswell argues) their meanings, algorithmically determined by corresponding functions and arguments defined across the structure of possible worlds. The basic framework is set out in his Logic and Languages (Cresswell 1973); later works discuss such problem areas as the proper treatment of anaphora, tense, and the propositional attitudes (Cresswell 1985a, 1985b); and the framework and favoured analyses are defended against rival accounts in Semantic Essays: Possible Worlds and their Rivals (Cresswell 1988). Early work by John Bigelow, then a colleague of Cresswell’s at Wellington, contributed to the program (see in particular Bigelow 1975 and 1978.)
A quite independent use of the possible worlds framework is to be found in the work of Charles Hamblin of the **University of New South Wales**. Hamblin’s main work, in computer science and logic, is peripheral to our current concerns; but his book *Imperatives* (1987) is a highly original contribution to possible worlds semantics of natural language. In it, Hamblin argues that the extension of possible worlds theory to the case of imperatives requires that worlds be construed as complex structures, comprising times, states, deeds, doers and happenings, these components linked by a relation of **causation** making room for a distinction between physical and agent causation.

The work of Cresswell and Hamblin illustrates the natural transition between modal semantics and the philosophy of language, and much work bearing on the study of meaning has been done by Australasian logicians working within a possible worlds framework. The bulk of this we deem beyond our current brief, but the work of Lloyd Humberstone is worth singling out as of particular relevance (Humberstone 1979, for example, is a classic paper with obvious ramifications for the treatment of tense).

In addition to this use by logicians, possible worlds came to figure extensively in the general Australasian philosophical vocabulary, through the enormous influence exercised in the region by **David Lewis**. But this casual use of terminology does not indicate a serious widespread commitment to their serious use in a systematic philosophy of language. Rather, ironically enough, Lewis’s influence had the effect of decreasing interest in philosophy of language, in possible world terms or any other; of which more below.

*The Davidsonic Boom* first hit Australia in 1969, when Donald Davidson was invited to Adelaide as a Gavin David Young lecturer, and later toured the country, introducing his conception of Tarskian truth-theory as the basis of the theory of meaning. (The arrival at about the same time of the young Gary Malinas, then a Davidson enthusiast, as a lecturer in Brisbane, proved a further catalyst.) The subtle attraction of the Davidsonian blend of apparent rigour with nuanced subtlety seemed to hold a particular attraction in Melbourne, where it was reinforced through traditional ties with Oxford, where Davidson’s ideas were enthusiastically embraced; Sydney, more scientistic as ever, was less impressed.

Martin Davies, a product of **Monash University** and Oxford, has oscillated between Oxford and his native country since the 1970s. His book, *Meaning, Quantification, Necessity: Themes in Philosophical Logic* (Davies 1981) is a sympathetic, detailed presentation of an interpretation of Davidson’s general position, followed by an examination of the technical problems in forging a truth-theory apt to accommodate the more subtle features of quantification, anaphora, and modality. In a number of papers around this time Davies explored both the technicalities of truth-theory and the wider issues of its relation to meaning and semantic competence; the latter interest presaging his later concentration on the philosophy of mind. Again, the Davidsonian airs of Oxford had their effect on the Melbourne-based Barry Taylor. His *Modes of Occurrence* (Taylor 1985) makes use of an account of tense and of facts to obtain a theory of events,
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which is then deployed to yield a truth-theory for adverbs. These two ocker Davidsonians bounced off each other over a number of points in truth-theory and its interpretation (see for example Taylor 1980 and Davies 1981, on complex demonstratives).

Another reading of Davidson was presented by Jeff Malpas, a New Zealander now holding the chair of philosophy in Tasmania. He added a Continental spin, his Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning (Malpas 1992) proposing that Davidson’s use of the notion of truth requires a Heideggerian interpretation.

What is here called the Davidsonian Aftermath comprises the area of critique of truth-based semantics of the Davidson style, and assessment of such critique, as exemplified by, but not restricted to, the work of Michael Dummett and the latter-day Hilary Putnam. (The terminology is inaccurate insofar as it suggests such critique necessarily postdates Davidson’s work—as Dummett makes clear, it could equally take Frege as its target. But it correctly represents the Australasian context on which the critique impacted.) An important contribution in this field by Huw Price (1988) develops a critique independent of the big names just cited; Price argues that the truth-theoretic account of meaning depends on the unsustainable assumption that assertoric discourse can be clearly distinguished from the rest. Linda Burns’ book, Vaguenes: An Investigation into Natural Languages and the Sorites Paradox (Burns 1994), derives its initial impetus from the case developed by Dummett and his follower Crispin Wright against standard models of language based on their alleged incapacity to handle vagueness, and goes on to develop an original account of the phenomenon. Green (2001) provides a critical account of Dummett’s theory of language, whilst Khlentzos (2004) and Taylor (2006) examine the case for antirealism arising out of the views of Dummett, Putnam, and associated views on language—the former finding against antirealism, the latter in its favour.

Causal Semantics was the robust response of Sydney Andersonianism to fashionable foreign-inspired heresies, and urged that meaning assume a proper subordinate position within the context of a sober scientific realism. Michael Devitt emerged as its great champion. Devitt (1981) argues for a theory of meaning based on a causally-defined reference relation linking singular terms, and terms of other grammatical categories such as observational natural kind terms, to things in the world; truth is defined using Tarski’s truth-definition interpreted in Field’s way. Differences of sense are explained as variations in the shape causal reference relations might assume. Importantly, semantic competence does not consist in propositional knowledge, but in practical abilities which a mechanism suitably related causally to the world might exhibit. Devitt’s Realism and the Truth (1984), whilst avowedly a work of metaphysics, takes time off to mount a vigorous attack on rival accounts of meaning, such as those of Davidson, Dummett, and the later Putnam. These ideas, both positive and negative, are further elaborated in a book co-authored by Devitt with his then colleague Kim Sterelny (Devitt and Sterelny 1987), which constitutes an ‘opinionated introduction’ to the philosophy
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Devitt has continued to develop his position from these early formulations. Thus Devitt (1996) argues that meaning must consist in nonholistic ‘localist’ properties, which can be explained only within the framework of a causally-cashed representationalism; whilst he later (Devitt 2006) puts the case for a nonpsychologistic account of linguistics, allowing it to account for semantic competence without imputing propositional knowledge.

The novelty of the linguistic turn, in Australasia as elsewhere, has faded; indeed, its gloss hereabouts was tarnished with a special rapidity thanks to the influence of David Lewis, who deliberately opposed its charms, asserting the primacy of independent metaphysics. So interest in the philosophy of language has declined, with metaphysics and philosophy of mind in particular taking its place. But true believers like Devitt continue to pursue it; and philosophising in general has been irremediably altered by its influence.

An inescapable conclusion of this survey is that Australasian philosophy of language, like Australasian philosophy in general, is inextricably bound up with, influenced by, and contributing to, philosophy in a global context. This holds even of Causal Semantics, superficially the most antipodean of the movements surveyed; for its origins lie in the work of Kripke and the early Putnam. We can only expect this tendency to accelerate, as technology diminishes the tyranny of distance yet further.

And a good thing, too.

Philosophy of Law

Jeff Goldsworthy

The philosophy of law (which lawyers often call ‘jurisprudence’) deals with a wide variety of analytical, conceptual and normative questions. Some of them concern the law as a whole, inquiring into the nature of law or the meaning of ‘law’, the relationship between law and morality, the foundations and structures of legal systems, the nature of legal rules and principles, and the methods of legal reasoning. The two major rival theories concerning these questions are known as ‘legal positivism’, which regards law as ultimately a matter of social fact that is conceptually separate from morality, and ‘natural law’, which maintains the opposite view. Other questions concern particular areas of law, inquiring into
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both the actual and ideal normative foundations of criminal law, contract law, torts and so on. A third group of questions is more concerned with moral concepts and norms that are closely associated with law, such as authority, rights, justice, the obligation to obey the law, and the political ideal known as the ‘rule of law’.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, legal philosophy in Britain and its overseas dominions was dominated by the writings of John Austin, one of Jeremy Bentham’s disciples, who built classical legal positivism on the foundation of the political theory of sovereignty first developed by Bodin and Hobbes. According to Austin, a legal system is one of commands emanating from a sovereign, who is habitually obeyed by most members of the community and does not habitually obey anyone else. Although not without its critics even in the nineteenth century (Rumble 2005), Austin’s version of legal positivism remained very influential until it was replaced by the more sophisticated legal positivism expounded in H. L. A. Hart’s *The Concept of Law* (1961). Hart argued that mature legal systems rest not on habitual obedience to a legally unconstrained sovereign, but on fundamental rules, including a ‘rule of recognition’ that governs the validity of all the other rules of the system. The existence of these fundamental rules consists in their being accepted as binding and applied by senior legal officials.

The first Antipodean legal philosopher to attract international attention was J. W. Salmond, a New Zealander who probably remains that country’s ‘most influential and renowned jurist’ (Frame 1995: 11). As a young lawyer practising in New Zealand, he published *First Principles of Jurisprudence* in 1893. Appointed professor of laws at the University of Adelaide in 1897, he published during his tenure there *Jurisprudence, or the Theory of the Law* (1902), which was republished in six subsequent editions in his lifetime and another five after his death. Like other books on jurisprudence of its generation, this book combined a discussion of the nature and foundations of legal systems with analysis of central legal concepts such as ownership, possession, obligation and liability. Salmond was one of the first philosophers to break with Austin’s theory that law consists of the commands of a sovereign, and he anticipated some key aspects of Hart’s theory by insisting that law rests ultimately on principles whose existence depends on their being recognised and acted upon by those who represent the State (Frame 1995: 50–1, 65–6). Indeed, Hart acknowledged Salmond’s influence in that regard (Hart 1961: 245).

Professor G. W. Paton of Melbourne Law School later produced a book in the same genre as Salmond’s, titled *A Text-book of Jurisprudence* (1946), which was republished in two subsequent editions. This was more a textbook for undergraduate students, introducing them to the leading contemporary theories of law, rather than an original contribution to the field. It had less influence on subsequent developments than Salmond’s work. But Paton discussed American contributions to legal philosophy that had appeared since Salmond’s death, such as sociological jurisprudence and legal **realism**. Sociological jurisprudence was concerned with empirical study of the actual purposes and functioning of law...
in society, while legal realism was sceptical about the capacity of law to provide judges and other decision-makers with determinate guidance.

Sociological jurisprudence found its Australian champion in Julius Stone, dean of law at Auckland University College from 1939 until 1942, and professor of jurisprudence and international law at the University of Sydney from 1942 until his retirement in 1972. A disciple of the American Roscoe Pound, who pioneered sociological jurisprudence, Stone was also influenced by legal realism. In 1946, he published *The Province and Function of Law*, which established his international reputation in jurisprudence. It was divided into three parts, dealing respectively with ‘Law and Logic’, ‘Law and Justice’, and ‘Law and Society’. The first two parts dealt with the more traditional questions of legal philosophy, while the third and larger part dealt with how social behaviour and law affect one another. In the early 1960s, Stone published an updated and greatly expanded version of this work, in three volumes that each dealt with one of these broad topics (Stone 1964, 1965 and 1966). These books were sometimes criticised for devoting excessive attention to the exposition of the ideas of past thinkers, at the expense of original contributions to the field. Stone emphasised the law-making role of judges, and the way it is obscured in their reasoning by what he labelled ‘categories of indeterminate reference’. The judges’ law-making role was controversial in the legal profession at the time, but already well-accepted by legal philosophers. For them, Stone’s 1960s volumes were eclipsed by Hart’s hugely influential *The Concept of Law*. There are few references to Stone in more recent legal philosophy, although he remains well known in Australian legal circles. He is the subject of a biography by Star, published in 1992.

One of Stone’s research assistants, Ilmar Tammelo, was employed by the Sydney Law School in 1958 to teach legal philosophy, which he did until 1972 when he took up an academic position in Salzburg. His work on the role of logic in law included *Outlines of Modern Legal Logic* (1969) and *Modern Logic in the Service of Law* (1978). Tammelo and Stone established the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy in 1961. The Sydney Law School included another legal philosopher, who was a former student of Stone’s but not a member of his group. W. L. Morrison, known primarily as a torts lawyer, was a staunch legal positivist who in 1982 published a book-length defence (although not an uncritical one) of the philosophy of John Austin. David Hodgson, a 1962 graduate of Sydney Law School who became a Justice of the New South Wales Supreme Court, published *Consequences of Utilitarianism* in 1967, as well as many articles and a book on the nature of consciousness and free will.

Meanwhile Samuel Stoljar, in the Research School of the Social Sciences (RSSS) at the Australian National University from 1954 until 1985, published several books and many articles in the area of legal philosophy, although his primary areas of specialisation were contract and related areas of private law. His philosophical books include *Groups and Entities: An Inquiry into Corporate Theory* (1973), *Moral and Legal Reasoning* (1980), and *An Analysis of Rights* (1984). More recently at the RSSS, Peter Cane published *Responsibility in Law and
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Morality (2002), and Jane Stapleton, an expert on tort law, has made important contributions to the philosophical foundations of the common law.

The Faculty of Law at the University of Adelaide has produced two prominent natural lawyers. One of its graduates, John Finnis, was appointed professor of law and legal philosophy at Oxford University in 1989, after teaching there since 1966. In 1981 he published Natural Law and Natural Rights, which expounded a theory of natural law inspired by the Catholic theologian Germain Grisez’s interpretation of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Finnis’ theory proposes that law, political authority and morality itself are ultimately based on a limited number of ‘basic goods’ that are self-evident, and also on some basic principles of practical reasoning. The author of other books including Fundamentals of Ethics (1983) and Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (1998), Finnis has been widely credited with reviving the influence of natural law theorising in contemporary legal philosophy. He has also been active in applying his theory to important practical questions such as nuclear deterrence, contraception and discrimination against homosexuals.

Another Adelaide law faculty graduate, Michael Detmold, who taught legal philosophy there until his retirement in 2007, also defended a natural law philosophy in The Unity of Law and Morality (1984) and other works. Detmold’s conception of law is based on the inherently practical nature of judicial decisions, which can have drastic effects on people’s lives. Those decisions can aspire to genuine justification, he maintains, only if the most fundamental legal norms on which they are based are moral norms.

But legal positivism has not lacked champions in Australia and New Zealand. Tom Campbell, formerly professor of jurisprudence at the University of Glasgow, held a chair in law at the Australian National University from 1990 until 2001, and subsequently a professorial fellowship in the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE) at Charles Sturt University. Campbell’s international renown in legal philosophy is based partly on his defence of legal positivism on moral, rather than analytical or conceptual, grounds. In The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (1996), and the essays collected in Prescriptive Legal Positivism: Law, Rights and Democracy (2004), Campbell argues that the requirements of the rule of law, and of democracy, are best satisfied if law consists of clear rules, enacted by democratically elected legislatures, that are faithfully interpreted and applied by judges without any need for value judgments.

Jeremy Waldron, a New Zealander who has achieved international eminence as a legal and political philosopher, is also an ethical legal positivist and a defender of the authority of democratically elected legislatures. Waldron has held chairs at the University of California Berkeley, Princeton, Columbia and (currently) New York University. Perhaps the best known of his many books is Law and Disagreement (1999), in which he famously defends ‘the dignity of legislation’ that is enacted by democratically elected legislatures, and criticises judicial review of legislation on the ground that it violates the right of all citizens to participate equally in political decision-making. In many other books and publications
Waldron has made major contributions to other philosophical topics, especially the nature and justification of rights and particularly of private property, the political philosophy of John Locke, and the rule of law.

James Allan and Jeffrey Goldsworthy are also legal positivists who have argued against subjecting the lawmaking authority of elected legislatures to judicially enforceable bills of rights. Allan, a Canadian who taught at University of Otago for ten years until his appointment in 2004 as Garrick Professor of Law at the University of Queensland, is the author of *A Sceptical Theory of Morality and Law* (1998) and *Sympathy and Antipathy; Essays Legal and Philosophical* (2002). Goldsworthy, who has held a personal chair at Monash University since 2000, is the author of *The Sovereignty of Parliament, History and Philosophy* (1999).

Wojciek Sadurski, who currently holds chairs in legal philosophy at both the University of Sydney and the European University Institute in Florence, has also expressed scepticism about the judicial protection of constitutional rights. He is a prolific writer whose books alone deal with such diverse subjects as desert and social justice, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the rule of law, and the judicial enforcement of constitutional rights, particularly in Eastern Europe. He has sometimes collaborated with Professor Martin Krygier, who has taught legal theory and law and society at the University of New South Wales for many years. Krygier has made major contributions to our understanding of the rule of law, and of its practical implementation, particularly in post-Communist societies.

Australian legal philosophers who have departed from the mainstream include Charles Sampford of Griffith University, whose book *The Disorder of Law* (1989) argued against the assumption made by most legal philosophers that law is found in legal systems, and proposed instead a ‘melee theory of law’. Margaret Davies at Flinders University has worked at the forefront of postmodern legal theory in Australia, developed principally in her books *Asking The Law Question; the Dissolution of Legal Theory* (3rd ed., 2008) and *Delimiting the Law: Postmodernism and the Politics of Law* (1996).

Several Australians and New Zealanders have contributed to the philosophical analysis of legal interpretation: Professor Jim Evans of the University of Auckland, most notably in his book *Statutory Interpretation: Problems of Communication* (1988), Jeffrey Goldsworthy in many articles and book chapters dealing with constitutional interpretation; and Natalie Stoljar, the daughter of Samuel Stoljar.

Among the younger generation of expatriate Australian legal philosophers are Liam Murphy at New York University, co-author with Thomas Nagel of *The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice* (2002); John Tasioulas at the University of Oxford, who works on human rights, particularly in criminal law and international law; Grant Lamond, also at Oxford, who has published on coercion and precedent in law; and Natalie Stoljar, currently at McGill University.
Philosophy of Mathematics

A. P. Hazen

Australia is a small country, with roughly a tenth the population of anglophone North America, but it has consistently ‘punched above its weight’ in some areas of analytic philosophy, notably the philosophy of mind. Australian contributions to the philosophy of mathematics have not been as influential, but the historical reasons for this disparity are not clear. It is tempting to think that institutional factors, such as the deeper split between arts and science faculties in Australian universities as compared to American, has something to do with it, but such an explanation is unsatisfying for a number of reasons. The barriers between faculties would only prevent Australia from playing a prominent role in the philosophy of mathematics if it kept Australian philosophers ignorant of mathematics, and many leading Australian philosophers (including, as would be expected, some of the logicians, but not only logicians) have had extensive mathematical training. Again, if the impermeable barriers between faculties are supposed to have prevented Australian philosophers from making major contributions to the philosophy of mathematics, the rich Australian tradition of work in the philosophy and history of natural science becomes a mystery.

Perhaps a more relevant factor has been the dominance, in Australian academic philosophy, of empiricist and physicalist or naturalist approaches. Now, it may be that empiricism and physicalism are right, and that the best hope of philosophical progress lies in working from empiricist and physicalist premises: I certainly don’t wish to mount any general attack on them here. But mathematics is an embarrassment to empiricism and physicalism, an area of human intellectual life which is particularly difficult to accommodate in a generally empiricist or physicalist framework: after all, mathematical statements seem (at least on a naive and superficial analysis) to describe non-physical objects, and our grounds for accepting them are not (in any straightforward way) sensory! So perhaps it is only natural that Australian philosophers have, by and large, chosen other topics to concentrate on.

Let me adduce one anecdote in support of this explanation. A simple (perhaps simplistic) statement of Gödel’s (first) incompleteness theorem is: mathematical truth is not the same as proof from stated axioms. The laborious technical part of Gödel’s paper establishes that the notion of a provable sentence (or, if one is fussy, that of the Gödel number of a provable statement) is definable in arithmetic. The lesson of the semantic paradoxes (distilled, by Gödel’s trick for establishing self-reference, as Tarski’s theorem), on the other hand, is that a notion of true sentence of arithmetic, with logical features we would naively expect such a notion to have, is not so definable. So the two notions cannot be identified. In the 1980s I
heard a talk by a well-known Australian philosopher of science (now retired) that made very heavy weather of this. It was as if his empiricist or physicalist faith that mathematical truth had to be something empirically recognisable like formal provability made it impossible for him to grasp the simple logical point!

This is not to say that there have been no Australian contributions to the philosophy of mathematics. A noteworthy early paper is Gasking (1940), reprinted in the classic anthology of Benacerraf and Putnam (1964). In it Gasking, a former student of Wittgenstein, attempts to defend a conventionalistic account of arithmetic laws: it would be possible to adopt a ‘deviant’ arithmetic and even, if we made compensating changes in, e.g. our habitual procedures for measuring things, use it successfully in application. Gasking’s paper was criticised by Castañeda (1959), also reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam (1964): working out the compensating conventions that would allow successful application of deviant arithmetic is not as easy as it initially looked! Oral tradition records that Gasking came to recognise Castañoeda’s criticisms as just. (Conventionalism is a recurrently tempting position for empiricists: it promises an explanation for mathematics with no appeal to non-empirical facts. Gasking’s version of Witttgensteinianism was very Australian in spirit.)

One very influential empiricist account of mathematics that avoids the conventionalist trap is that of W. V. Quine. Quine’s response to the philosophical puzzle presented by mathematics is to emphasise the systematicity of scientific knowledge. A statement gains its content by being part of an articulated body of theory, and a statement that describes non-empirical objects can be a part of a theory which, as a whole, is empirical. Mathematics, for Quine, is raised from the status of a jeu d’esprit to that of a science by (and only by) being an indispensable part of empirical science: acceptance of the existence of mathematical objects becomes an aspect of scientific realism, akin to the acceptance of the unobservable physical objects mentioned in atomic theory. It is not surprising, then, that there is a long tradition of Australian Quineanism. J. J. C. Smart, for example, was both a personal friend and a philosophical ally of Quine’s, and has for several decades, in print and in discussion, defended broadly Quinean positions on a variety of philosophical issues, including Quine’s conjecture that the part of set theory that really deserves to be thought of as part of science is represented by Zermelo set theory: it postulates the sets needed for the definition of numbers and other mathematical objects mentioned in physical theories (and a bit more, but is simple and coherent in its axiomatic structure in a way a system of more strictly limited ontological commitment wouldn’t be), but avoids the postulation of the seemingly useless larger infinite sets that can be proven to exist in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. This particular line between set theory as science and set theory as ‘recreational metamathematics’ is probably not one to which either Quine or Smart is strongly committed, but it neatly illustrates Quine’s general philosophical stance. It limits set-theoretic ontology to what gets mentioned in empirical theories (letting in other sets only if this simplifies the axiomatic theory). Most set theorists prefer the stronger, Zermelo-Fraenkel, axioms, and
Philosophers sympathetic to them allow purely mathematical considerations greater autonomy from empirical science in suggesting axioms.

Central to Quine’s philosophy of mathematics is what is called his *indispensability argument*: abstracting from the particular choice of axiomatic system, some part of set theory ought to be accepted as true and as part of science simply because mathematics forms an essential part of what are more generally empirical theories. In the 1980s this argument was criticised from several standpoints. Even when a physical theory mentions both atoms and numbers (would, that is, quantify over them if formalised), the roles played by the two sorts of empirically unobservable objects differ (numbers, for instance, aren't seen as causing observable phenomena, or as being parts of macroscopic objects), weakening the analogy Quine draws between scientific and set-theoretic realism. Again, it was argued that the fact that something is the best available scientific theory in some domain is not always sufficient ground for believing in the existence of the objects it postulates: a number of scientists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seem to have agreed that no better theory for explaining the gas laws was available than molecular theory while still wanting to deny the reality of molecules. The discussion on these points is international in scope, but one of the strongest defences of the Quinean viewpoint has been from an Australian: Mark Colyvan (see Colyvan 2001).

Quine’s student David Lewis, who visited Australia annually for the last two decades of his life and had many Australian friends, almost deserves to be deemed an ‘honorary Australian’ for his active participation in, and influence on, the philosophical life of the country. His major essay in the philosophy of mathematics is the monograph, *Parts of Classes* (1991); partly summarising it and somewhat extending its argument is Lewis (1993), which is reprinted in Lewis (1998). Most of the content of this monograph was first presented at Australasian Association of Philosophy conferences, and one of the co-authors of a technical appendix was a University of Melbourne philosopher who had heard these presentations and discussed them with Lewis. Standard systems of axiomatic set theory are formulated in first-order logic; higher order logics can be construed naturally as very weak subsystems of Zermelo set theory, too weak (if not supplemented by axioms of infinity) by themselves to serve as foundations for mathematics. Lewis argued that what was in effect a weak higher order logic (approximately equivalent to monadic third-order logic) could be understood and justified (by appeal to the mereological notions of part and fusion, and to a logic with irreducibly plural quantification) independently of general set theory. Working in this stronger logic, he was able to give an elegant re-axiomatisation of (a strong version of) standard set theory, using as his only properly set-theoretic primitive a special case of the set-theoretic membership relation: the relation of an object to its unit set. Since the higher order logic he endorsed allows the interpretation of quantification over relations, he was further able to ‘Ramsify’ this primitive, yielding a formulation with no set-theoretic primitives: the new axiomatisation says merely that there is some relation organising the objects in
its field in the way the original one says membership organises sets. The Ramsey sentences formed from a series of successively stronger variants of standard set theory can be shown to be equivalent to sentences in the higher order logic making successively stronger claims about the size of reality (= total number of objects of any kind existing). The final vision of mathematics is reminiscent of the logicism of Whitehead and Russell: no specifically mathematical concepts need to be taken as primitive, since mathematical theories reduce to theories formulated in a purely logical (though not first-order) language, and the content of mathematics consists of (higher order) logical consequences of hypotheses analogous, in that they make claims about the population of the universe, to the Infinity Axiom of Principia Mathematica.

For all its consonance with Australian empiricism and physicalism, Quineanism is a northern hemisphere school in origin. A more native tradition stems from the work of David M. Armstrong, and particularly from his efforts to develop a theory of universals. Many philosophers have thought of the theory of universals as a field for a priori theorising, and as closely related to semantics: properties are postulated as items designated by predicates. Armstrong, in contrast, wants to make the question of what universals there are a matter for empirical science (broadly conceived) to decide, and his program for a sparse theory of universals—one postulating no more universals than needed—explicitly rejects the link with the semantics of predicates: one can define a complex predicate as the disjunction of two simple ones, but Armstrong and his followers deny that the disjunction of two properties corresponds, in general, to a genuine property. In seeking to ground the ontology of abstract universals in empirical science, and in its concern for ontological economy, Armstrong’s approach parallels Quine’s, even though the details of the resulting theories are very different. Perhaps the best worked out application of Armstrongian ideas to philosophical concerns about mathematics is in John Bigelow’s The Reality of Numbers (1988). Numbers and other fundamental mathematical objects are construed as universals, and it is argued that these universals should be thought of as physical entities since the particulars instantiating them (or related by them, since the universals in question are sometimes relational) are physical objects. This argument for the physicalistic acceptability of mathematical universals iterates: ratios and real numbers are construed as relations between relations (harking back to parts of Frege’s work and of Principia Mathematica not often read by modern students), but a higher-order relation is physical if the relations it relates are physical.

It is, I think, worth comparing this argument to one which might be given on behalf of standard set-theoretic Platonism. Assume a version of standard set theory that allows for urelements, and stipulate that the urelements are some sort of physical things: atoms, perhaps, or subatomic particles. It is trivial to reformulate the system so it no longer postulates the existence of the null set (or other ‘pure’ sets), and with minor changes the standard textbook development of mathematics within set theory can be retained. A set theoretic Platonist, therefore, might try to argue that the ontology of the resulting system was physicalistic, on
the grounds that a set should be considered physical if its members are, so that the sets postulated all inherit the physicality of their ultimate grounding particles. I think this argument would be treated as a joke! Bigelow’s version, assuming an Armstrongian conception of universals, seems more compelling: the distinction is hard to formulate precisely, but it seems more intuitive to say that the nature of a physical object is constituted by the universals it instantiates than by the sets to which it belongs, and so more plausible to claim that a universal with physical instances is physical than that a set with physical members is.

Bigelow’s analysis in terms of (Armstrongian) universals is an attempt to answer one of the deep, recurring philosophical puzzles about mathematics: in what sense can mathematics be true, be about the real world, given that the objects mathematical theories are about don’t seem to be found in the physical or empirically given world? Something analogous to Bigelow’s proposed solution can be seen in earlier logicism: sets are not postulated in *Principia Mathematica*, but set-theoretic notation is explained as a system of ‘incomplete symbols’, defined ultimately in terms of quantification over properties. How successful this kind of program will be in providing a physicalist philosophy of mathematics depends, of course, on the theory of properties needed to carry it out. Bigelow’s discussion of a number of elementary case studies is quite convincing. (One of the delights in reading his book is his loving description of a variety of constructions in geometry and elementary algebra.) Extending the story further may, however, be problematic. In *Principia Mathematica* much of advanced mathematics depends on the Axiom of Reducibility (giving the effect of postulating sets that cannot be defined predicatively) and the Multiplicative Axiom (a form of set theory’s notorious Axiom of Choice). The prospects of defending these assumptions on the basis of an Armstrongian ‘sparse’ theory of universals seem dim. (Allen Hazen, along with a number of logicians outside Australia, has investigated the mathematical strength of *Principia Mathematica* without the mentioned axioms, with mixed results. Grade-school arithmetic can be obtained, along with limited forms of mathematical induction, but even full first-order Peano arithmetic, asserting the principle of mathematical induction for conditions containing quantification over numbers, cannot. Cf. Burgess and Hazen 1998.)

Logic in the twentieth century has been closely associated with the philosophy of mathematics: not surprisingly, given that modern formal logic was developed by Frege and others specifically in order to allow the precise formulation of foundational systems for mathematics, and the metatheory of formal logic was developed by Hilbert’s school, Gödel and others largely with the aim of investigating mathematical axiom systems. It is surprising, therefore, that Australia’s flourishing tradition of logical research has had so little connection with the philosophy of mathematics. This can, perhaps, be explained historically. The modern logical tradition in Australia dates only from the 1960s, a period in which activity in the philosophy of mathematics was at a temporary ebb. (Subjects titled ‘Logic’ taught in Australian philosophy departments before that tended to be informal, or to cover a wide range of epistemological topics, with
only minimal mention of modern symbolic logic.) In addition to this general, environmental, condition, there was a more specific ‘founder effect’ (to borrow a term from population genetics): the most creative researchers (and inspiring role models) as Australian logic was getting underway—notably Richard Routley (later known as Richard Sylvan) and Robert K. Meyer, who were the dominant figures in the Logic Group in the Research Schools of the Australian National University—were primarily interested in topics in logic that were not closely connected to research in the foundations of mathematics. Much, though not all, of their work, and that of their postgraduate students, was in the area of Relevance/Relevant logics: systems of formal logic which were designed to avoid the so-called paradoxes of material implication, but which were not initially employed in the formalisation of mathematics. (It can be argued that work in this field represents a return to an older tradition of logical research, one temporarily eclipsed by the enthusiasm of Frege and others for mathematical foundations: theories of implication were central topics of research and debate among the ancient Stoic logicians!)

Connections were, however, ultimately made between Relevant logic and mathematical foundations. Meyer, for example, investigated a series of axiomatic systems for arithmetic based on Relevant logic, and discovered that their metamathematical properties were strikingly different from those of systems based on classical logic: contrary to what one would expect from Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, for example, the consistency of Relevant arithmetic (in the sense of the unprovability within it of \(0=1\)) has an almost trivially easy finitistic proof! For several years in the 1970s and 1980s there seemed to be hope that these results would lead to new avenues of attack on open questions in classical mathematics, but much of this excitement has since died down: Relevant and classical Peano arithmetic are different enough that unprovability results about the first do not automatically carry over to the second. There is a brief, not overly technical, account of this work in section 72 of Anderson, Belnap and Dunn (1992).

Work in Relevant logic has inspired a largely Australian-based project in the foundations of set theory. A characteristic feature of these logics is that the principle ex falso quodlibet—that from \(A\) and \(\neg A\) an arbitrary \(B\) may be inferred—fails in them. As a result, an inconsistent theory based on one of these logics is not necessarily trivial in the way an inconsistent theory formulated in classical or intuitionistic logic is. (Trivial can be given a precise technical meaning in this context: a theory is trivial just in case every sentence of its language is provable in the theory.) Quite early in the history of work on Relevance logics this led to the dream that an interesting (or at any rate nontrivial) set theory based on the inconsistent naïve comprehension axiom could be developed on the basis of one of these logics. This turned out not to be a simple exercise. There is a variant of Russell’s Paradox (known as Curry’s Paradox) that does not involve negation, and as Routley, Meyer and Dunn (1979) showed, it suffices to render trivial any
set theory based on naive comprehension in the standard Relevant logics. This trivialisation depended, not on *ex falso*, but on the principle of *contraction*,

\[(P \rightarrow (\neg Q)) \rightarrow (P \rightarrow Q),\]

which was provable in the Relevance logics most studied at the time (in particular the standard systems E and R). Turning, then, to ‘naive’ set theories based on weaker logics without contraction (or similar principles), a number of positive results have been obtained, most notably by Ross Brady. Brady’s first paper in this area (Brady 1971) is perhaps best thought of as showing that the quest for a non-trivial naive set theory isn’t completely hopeless: as Solomon Feferman pointed out in a review comparing Brady’s work with similar results obtained by many non-Australian logicians, no operator in the three-valued logic has the logical properties one expects in an implication connective, with the result that ‘nothing like sustained ordinary reasoning can be carried out’ in it (Feferman 1984). Brady has since gone on to explore a variety of Relevant logics without contraction (but containing implication connectives well-enough behaved to look useful), and by the early 1980s had proved the consistency of naive set theory formulated in one: details and discussion may be found in his book *Universal Logic* (2006).

Philosophical arguments commending the virtues of set theory based on the naive comprehension principle saved from triviality by a **non-classical logic** have long been prominent on the Australian philosophical scene: cf. Priest (1983). Comparatively few set theorists and philosophers of set theory in the rest of the world have been converted. The formal development necessary to show that a mathematically interesting set theory is genuinely forthcoming on the new basis has been very slow: proof even of elementary results while reasoning within the limits of a restricted logic is hard! (The strongest results so far are in the 2008 Melbourne Ph.D. thesis of Priest’s student Zach Weber, who—somewhat alarmingly—made use at some points of a logic somewhat stronger than that proven safe by Brady.) Although Brady has argued that his chosen logic has an independent motivation (showing that the meaning of the conclusion is in a precise sense contained in that of the premise in an implication it deems valid), many logicians and set theorists would probably see it as an *ad hoc* response to the paradoxes. On the other side, defenders of naive set theory claim that the axiomatic restrictions placed on logically classical set theory in an effort to avoid the paradoxes—Russell’s theory of types, or its liberalised version, the iterative conception of set implicit in Zermelo’s set theory—are equally *ad hoc* attempts to escape paradox. There is a clash of intuitions here. The classical logician and set theorist can point to the intuitive semantic naturalness of classical logic, but their opponents can hope that with additional experience (so far only a tiny minority of the world’s logicians have worked with logics like Brady’s) their logic will come to seem more natural: intuitions can and must be schooled. The classicist can insist that the iterative conception of set is not *ad hoc*, that it provides assurance that work in classical set theory is an exploration of a structure that is independent
of the linguistic particulars of their axiom systems, but the friends of naive set theory can remain sceptical.

The interrelationships of paradox, contradiction and logic are complex. The project of developing set theory on the basis of naive comprehension and a weakened logic is historically associated with Graham Priest’s thesis of *dialetheism*, the view (itself largely motivated by reflection on the paradoxes) that there are true contradictions. This connection is not necessary, however: Brady has shown that naive set theory in his favoured logic is *negation-consistent*: it has no theorem whose negation is also a theorem. (By a similar proof, however, he has also shown that naive set theory in a slightly stronger logic is, though negation-inconsistent, non-trivial.) Again, the main effort of fans of naive comprehension in the Relevance logic tradition has been to find a logic weak enough that comprehension is safe in it, but there is a bit of evidence suggesting that no logic can support a naive *set* theory. Set theories have traditionally had, in addition to comprehension or some other set existence principle(s), an axiom of *extensionality*: if every member of a set *x* is also a member of a set *y* and *vice versa*, then *x* and *y* are identical: *x = y*. (*Property* or attribute theories formalised in modal logics often have a weaker but analogous *intensionality* principle by which necessarily equivalent formulas, if they express properties at all, express the same property.) Greg Restall (2010) has recently discovered a variant of Curry’s Paradox containing *no* logical connectives which seems to threaten most naive set or property theories containing extensionality or intensionality principles with triviality.

One can, of course, believe that there is a role for logics without *ex falso quodlibet* in mathematics, without committing oneself to a foundational system of set theory based on such a logic. Mortensen (1995) presents a number of plausible grounds for adopting such a position. A computer used as part of an automatic control system, for example, calculates an appropriate response to conditions reported to it by sensing devices; the algorithm embodied in its program for doing this can be thought of as representing deduction in some mathematical theory. It is practically important for control systems to be fault tolerant: we do not want one defective sensor (one, perhaps, of many) to ‘delude’ the computer so as to cause catastrophic failure of the whole system. It is, however, easy to imagine sensors providing inconsistent data to the computer, and so, perhaps, control computers should be programmed with algorithms representing deductions in a logic in which contradictions don’t imply arbitrary conclusions. It seems a pity that Mortensen’s book hasn’t attracted more attention: its examples might do more than manifestoes about naive set theory to convince the mathematical community of the value of Relevance logics.

As the title of Priest’s 1983 paper cited above suggests, the naive set theory program is most at home with a general anti-realist stance in the philosophy of mathematics: put bluntly, if reasoning by classical logic can lead from axiomatic premises to contradictory conclusions, then the axioms must not be true descriptions of objects that exist in any straightforward ordinary sense.
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Priest has made his anti-realism abundantly clear: one particularly strongly worded statement is in section 10.4 of Priest (2006), where he characterises the mathematical realism of, e.g. Gödel as mystification in the Marxist sense of the term. Realism and anti-realism, however, come in many varieties, so we should try to be more specific. Realism about perceived material objects, or about the postulated micro-particles of physical theories, sees the objects as outranking our beliefs about them: our beliefs don’t determine what the objects are like, but rather our beliefs are justified—to the extent that they are—by events of perception which are termini of causal processes starting with the objects. (The water molecules jiggle the dust-motes, their jiggling causes variations in the light reflected from them, these variations lead to chemical processes in the retina of the eye looking into the microscope … and that is why we are right to believe that the molecules exist. Roughly.) On the account of set theory described above, things are the other way around. Sets are not thought of as objects that can in any way influence our beliefs about them, but rather their nature is determined by certain beliefs—the comprehension and extensionality axioms, which, in Priest’s words, ‘characterise our intuitive notion of set’. Sets—to which Priest denies ‘existence’—have something like the status of fictional characters: their properties are what the story says they are (or at least what statements somehow inferred from the story say they are). If the story turns out to be inconsistent, then the characters just have inconsistent properties: Priest’s view is that the Russell set both is and is not a member of itself. At a high level of abstraction, then, Priest’s philosophy of mathematics attempts to explain away traditional puzzles about mathematical objects by assimilating them to a broader category of nonexistent items.

Starting in the 1970s a number of logically-trained philosophers, including Routley and, following him, Priest in Australia, but also Terence Parsons and Edward Zalta in the U.S., have revived Meinong’s idea of a domain of nonexistent objects, giving it a more rigorous formulation than Meinong did in order to defend it from Russell’s (plausible, given Meinong’s less than formal presentation) charge of logical incoherence. Neo-Meinongianism does not necessarily require a non-classical logic: the American writers have generally kept to classical logic, allowing for objects with contradictory properties by a general stipulation that the properties a Meinongian object has (in the relevant sense of ‘have’: the theories differ in their details) need not be closed under logical consequence. Having a contradiction-tolerating logic handy, however, gives a Neo-Meinongian theorist additional flexibility. Routley presented a version of Neo-Meinongianism in his mammoth Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond; Priest develops such a theory in Towards Non-Being.

To a philosopher raised in a Quinean tradition, however, Meinongianism can seem to have a basic incoherence that no adjustments to the logic or other provisions within the theory can eliminate. Never mind what Shakespeare said about Hamlet or what the naive set theorist said about the Russell set: the Meinongian theorist, analyzing their discourses as referring to nonexistent
Danes or sets, has to talk about nonexistent objects, and will use quantificational constructions in doing so. But, the Quinean will think, ‘to be is to be the value of a bound variable’: how can the Meinongian quantify over these objects and still say they don’t exist? ‘Some things don’t exist,’ the Meinongian says, but to the Quinean the ‘don’t exist’ simply contradicts the ontological commitment undertaken with the quantificational ‘some’. Routley and Priest have attempted to pre-empt the objection by saying that their quantifiers are not to be understood as ontologically committal (and, to emphasise the point, called the dual of their universal quantifier *particular* rather than *existential*). It is not clear how successful this response to the Quinean’s objection is (wouldn’t it be too easy to avoid unpleasant commitments if all you had to do was to say that the—ordinarily committal—things you say are intended in an ontologically neutral sense?), but it also not clear that any such response is needed. David Lewis, having distinguished in the context of his own metaphysics between a narrow sense of ‘exist’ (in which talking donkey’s don’t exist) and a totally unrestricted sense (in which they do: just not in our possible world), argued that Routley’s denial that the Meinongian ‘items’ he quantifies over exist and Lewis’s own affirmation that sets and unactualised possibilia do exist (but are abstract or otherworldly) differ only verbally (see Lewis 1990a). There are certainly what seem to be substantive differences between Routley’s and Lewis’s philosophies—Lewis, who followed Quine in thinking classical logic canonical, did not countenance objects, even in non-actual worlds, with contradictory properties—so a change in vocabulary would not be enough to eliminate the disagreements between them, but once it is made clear that Lewis’s preferred sense of ‘exist’ does not imply any sort of physical or empirical or causal or spatio-temporal reality, it is not clear why Meinongians should be concerned to deny that all of their items exist in this sense. Perhaps we can characterise Lewis’ (and Quine’s) general sense of ‘exist’ by saying that an existent is something it would be a lacuna, in a supposedly complete philosophy, to leave unmentioned. Routley and Priest think the analysis of intensionality is a serious philosophical task, and that a theory of Meinongian objects (or ‘items’—Routley preferred the latter term as less suggestive of ontological commitment) is the right way to give such an analysis, so they are committed to the existence of such objects in this (perhaps unnaturally attenuated) sense.

Returning to the vague statement two paragraphs back, we can now say that Priest gives an account of the ontology of mathematics on which mathematical objects have exactly the same status as fictional characters: mathematical theories are *about* objects, but they are Meinongian objects. Such a view can obviously accommodate the sets of naive set theory, but it is more inclusive than that. There are different fictions, and a Meinongian will say that Sherlock Holmes and Oliver Twist, say, are both (nonexistent) Londoners, though (since they get their properties from different stories) perhaps not related to each other in the ways two existent Londoners might be. A Meinongian view of mathematical objects is similar: some items are the sets of naive set theory, others are the sets of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, others again the sets of Quine’s New Foundations. Perhaps
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the greatest weakness of the position (and of similar accounts of mathematical objects developed in recent years by philosophers outside Australia) is the reverse side of its greatest strength. Meinongianism is catholic, providing objects for all mathematical theories to be about, but by the same token it is uncritical: it provides no standpoint from which to evaluate the theories, no grounds for preferring one system of axioms to another. Mathematicians in fact have strong preferences among systems: these preferences might, of course, be mere fashions and historical accidents, but if they are not, one could hope for a philosophy of mathematics that had more to say about the grounds for them than Meinongianism does.

Finally, a surprising absence. One of the major traditions in the philosophy of mathematics in the twentieth century was that of Brouwer’s intuionism (and related forms of constructivism). My personal impression is that the philosophy of mathematics was not a very active field in the 1960s and early 1970s, and that its revival since was stimulated by Michael Dummett’s writings on intuitionism and related topics. A number of Australian logicians have done technical work on intuitionistic logic, but intuitionism or constructivism as philosophies of mathematics have not been much discussed in Australia. This is particularly surprising since a number of Australian philosophers (notably Barry Taylor and Karen Green) have been strongly influenced by Dummett. Their interest, however, has been more in Dummett’s general ideas, including his efforts to apply concepts originally inspired by intuitionistic ideas to the semantics of non-mathematical language, than in mathematical intuitionism itself.

Philosophy of Mind (Analytic)

Steve Matthews

What explains the nature of our conscious minds, and what is the relation between minds and the physical world? These questions are prompted by the sense that what goes on in minds and what goes on in nature are irreconcilably different. Yet, science tells us that the universe is causally closed, and governed by a single set of laws, and minds and physical bodies seem subject to these laws; they interact, and the neurosciences do not discover anomalies in the physical laws governing brain processes. The history of the central debate in the philosophy of mind is the attempt to reconcile a seemingly impossible difference between the mental and the physical. The contribution to this debate through philosophical work done in Australasia, and by Australasian philosophers, has been striking, to say the least. It has been striking for its influence, its originality, and its variety, especially given its ‘per capita’ philosophical resources.
One well known strand of thought, dubbed Australian materialism, properly begins in the mid 1950s with U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart. It continues to resonate today. The last forty years have been equally famous for the influence of a non-materialist suite of positions characterised early on by the epiphenomenalism of Keith Campbell and (the early) Frank Jackson, and more recently by David Chalmers’ denial that materialist theories really address what’s at the core of the problem of the nature of human minds.

The work of Place, Smart and Armstrong emerges from the realist and empiricist stirrings in Australasian philosophy in the early part of the twentieth century. Samuel Alexander was an Australian philosopher who, after studying at the University of Melbourne in 1875, moved to Britain, taking up a scholarship at Oxford. His career culminated in the publication of *Space, Time and Deity* in 1920, earlier presented as the Gifford Lectures in Glasgow. It was a work of speculative metaphysics, yet, set against the predominantly Idealist trend at the time it was, he thought, part of a widely spread movement towards realism in philosophy. Alexander represented an early antecedent of realist and materialist thinking in Australia, and almost certainly came to influence Sydney’s John Anderson, who had attended the Gifford Lectures and made transcriptions of them. Clearly, Anderson had internalised some of this material, later giving lectures on Alexander. Anderson’s realism was so thoroughgoing that Ralph Blake (1928: 623), commenting on a paper by Anderson, said he was ‘determined to be a realist until it hurts’. This certainly had a bearing on Armstrong’s approach, as did Anderson’s advice to ‘have a position’. Of Anderson’s influence in regard to questions of the mind, Armstrong notes that ‘[m]ental pluralism … the struggle of different desires and tendencies in the one mind, has remained permanently with me’ (Jobling and Runcie 2001: 324).

In 1950, J. J. C. Smart, a student of Ryle’s in Oxford, took up the chair in philosophy at the University of Adelaide. He appointed U. T. Place and C. B. Martin; the former also had come under the influence of Ryle, but was unsatisfied with Ryle’s scepticism about the inner causes of our mental life. Martin’s influence cannot be underestimated here. For Martin is credited with the truthmaker principle: a statement requires the existence of some fact, event, or property in order that it should be true. This clearly sits ill with Rylean behaviourist analyses of mental concepts, for statements explaining mental goings-on in physical terms are conceptually ruled out—that would be a ‘category mistake’ according to Ryle—and so such statements, it turns out, are really just ways of speaking about dispositions to behave or patterns of behaviour. The Adelaide philosophers wanted a theory that de-bunked the Cartesian myth; they wanted a theory that was scientifically respectable; and they wanted a theory that, contra Ryle, acknowledged the reality of inner causes. Place was the first one out of the blocks. In 1954 he published ‘The Concept of Heed’, which was a refutation of the dispositional account. The final sentences of the article included the following, for-the-time, fabulously tantalising and veiled promissory note. It read:
‘What are these curious occurrences within ourselves on which we can give a running commentary as they occur?’ Lack of space precludes any discussion of this fascinating problem here. It is my belief, however, that the logical objections to the statement ‘consciousness is a process in the brain’ are no greater than the logical objections which might be raised to the statement ‘lightning is a motion of electrical charges’.

Place then published, in 1956, ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’ The view put forward there, as with the 1954 article, accepted some Rylean analyses of cognitive and conative states, but the great advance was the suggestion that notions like consciousness, experience, sensation and mental imagery had to involve internal processes. The sticking point was finding a way of explaining the identification of something like a mental image with a neural state that did not sound instantly absurd. Cartesians in particular, wedded to the idea that such mental items as these are always fully transparent, could hardly take on board the identification. Am I aware of a brain process when aware of a mental image? Place thought that this assumption would constitute what he called a phenomenological fallacy.

J. J. C. Smart, in ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ (1959b), carrying further this line of thought, said we needed a distinction between what we mean by statements involving, e.g. reports of sensations, and the facts lying behind such identities. Here we encounter the famous and controversial idea of contingent identity statements. The strategy was to point to other examples of natural identities, as Place had intimated in 1954. The task was then to offer a positive account of how the identities could be explained. Smart famously interpreted the seeing of a certain orange after-image as ‘something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me’ (1959b: 149). A feature of this analysis, important for what lay ahead as Central State Materialism, is the topic neutrality given by the description. What is going on is neural activity; but what might have been going on was some other kind of activity, or causal pattern, associated with the same mental phenomena; or so it is argued by causal theorists of the mind.

Smart had argued for the view that, as a matter of contingent fact, sensations were strictly identical to brain processes, and in the acknowledgements to A Materialist Theory of the Mind Armstrong cites Smart as the person who converted him to this view. He goes on: ‘for the most part I conceive myself only to be filling out a step in the argument to which [Smart and Place] devoted little attention: the account of the concept of mind’ (p. xi). This modesty, however, disguises what in Armstrong was a more ambitious program. Although both Smart and Armstrong were keen in their philosophical analysis on topic-neutral specifications of what was to play the empirical role in that analysis, Armstrong diverged in two ways from his predecessor. First, he wanted to move away from Rylean behaviourism which featured in the analysis, at least in limited form. Second, he wanted a more general account of mental states, not one focussed on a subset of the mental such as sensations.
Armstrong thanks C. B. Martin for making him aware of the importance of the role of *causality* in the characterisation of mental concepts. At this point in the history of the philosophy of mind a shift was taking place away from dualistic ontologies, and simultaneously away from behaviourist accounts of the analysis of mental terms. 1959 was an important year, for it spawned two important works. One was Smart’s account of sensations as brain processes. The other was Chomsky’s famous review of B. F. Skinner’s *Verbal Behaviour*, in which he attacked scientific behaviourism. The move ‘inside the head’, ironically, was now going to make understanding the nature of mind simultaneously more and less comfortable for the dualist. More, since analyses of mental concepts could now eschew the restrictions of behaviourism; less, since identifying the mental with physical brain states squeezes the ghost out of the machine.

Armstrong took his brief, then, to be an analysis of mental concepts in which it was assumed that mental states were identical with brain states; hence the name Central State Materialism. Armstrong’s main argument has two steps. First, he offers a ‘logical or conceptual analysis of the mental concepts’, as he likes to put it. This is a causal analysis to the effect that mental states are states apt for producing a range of behaviour and states apt for being the outcome of a range of stimuli. Second, the question arises as to what in fact plays the causal roles assigned within this functional analysis, and that is a matter of empirical discovery. Armstrong’s view, then, can be taken as an early expression of what is sometimes called multiple realisability. (David Lewis had almost simultaneously (1966) arrived at the same conclusion.) For as a philosophical treatment of the mind–body problem it retains elements of the topic-neutrality evident in Place and Smart, since, in theory, causal realisers besides brain states would also be apt to play the mental functional roles.

Armstrong qualified various aspects of his view. He emphasised the contingency built into the account: physical descriptors of mental states are non-rigid designators of those states. This led him away from a type-type *identity theory* to a view in which mental types are correlated with a disjunction of physical types. The view thereby avoids what is regarded as an implausible humanistic chauvinism. He softened the philosophical account by downgrading its *a priori* status, preferring it perhaps as a ‘theory of the mental’ rather than a set of conceptual truths. Also, he made clear his theoretical priorities, claiming in 1992 that were he ever to have doubts about his materialism he would then be drawn, reluctantly, to *dualism*, as opposed to eliminativism. The existence of pains, beliefs, etc., he thought too much a part of bedrock, Moorean commonsense.

Epiphenomenalism is a kind of dualism, but one which tries to accommodate the dualist intuitions while retaining a largely scientific view of a causally closed universe. It denies that aspects of consciousness are causally efficacious. My feeling itchy does not cause me to scratch; rather, my scratching and the feeling are distinct outcomes of a single physical cause, presumably some neural event. The trouble is: it sure doesn’t seem like the itchiness is causally impotent; it looks like the clearly obvious candidate for the cause of my scratching. Keith Campbell,
writing in 1970, recognised the problem, distinguishing between mental states and mental properties. The mind-brain events implicated in the causal nexus between the mosquito’s biting me and my scratching remain, just as the best scientific accounts would have them. However, riding above the fray is a certain quality given off at the neural stage—the quality of its feeling itchy. Campbell’s *new epiphenomenalism* required the efficacy of mental states, and so the state of pain (a brain state) had a causal role. One could take what one wanted from the Central State Materialism of Armstrong, and add in phenomenal properties. Campbell appears to get the best of both the scientific and dualistic worlds. Pain states cause and are caused; pain qualities cause nothing but are caused. We seem to have a nice reconciliation between science and intuition.

As Campbell still acknowledges, his choice to go epiphenomenal was in a sense forced upon him, for on the one hand a commitment to a causally complete physics seems unavoidable, while on the other, the attempted reductions of sensations and emotions were unconvincing. This time there just isn’t enough room for safe passage between Scylla and Charybdis. But the forced alternative path is epiphenomenalism, ‘with all its problems’, as Campbell still recognises. Woodhouse (1974: 166) writing at the time noted: ‘… to insist that pains are causally efficacious generates the appearance of an advantage only if the same sense of “pain” is at issue [as state and as quality].’ If so, contradiction looms, since our evidence of pains points to a single phenomenon, not split phenomena in which one aspect occupies the physical universe, the other does not. How, for example, are pains with the second aspect known, and how are judgements regarding their quality made and reported?

In 1982 Frank Jackson published ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’. His central argument is that the existence of qualia—the qualitative aspects of certain experiences—remains as items that a complete physical science cannot capture. No amount of physical information furnishes an individual with complete information about the mind. In Jackson’s words,

> Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the kind of states, their functional role, their relation to what goes on at other times and in other brains, and so on and so forth, and be I as clever as can be in fitting it all together, you won’t have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky.

(1982: 127)

This position was motivated by what has become one of the most well known arguments in analytic philosophy of mind in the twentieth century, the so-called Knowledge Argument. Jackson’s central rhetorical devices are the characters Fred and Mary. Fred experiences a colour the rest of us do not; yet no amount of physical information can give us his experience. Mary sits in a black and white room and comes to know all the physical information there is to know
explaining the human experience of seeing red; yet only upon leaving the room and experiencing for herself the quality of a red tomato does she complete her knowledge of seeing red.

Jackson’s argument has been influential and persuasive, and has formed part of a suite of arguments resisting physicalist positions by appeal to phenomenological irreducibility. The paper contains a focus on the incompleteness of physicalism given such irreducibility vis-à-vis qualia. Yet Jackson, like Campbell, was acutely aware of the need to defend the epiphenomenalism built into the position, arguing that certain properties of mental states, the qualia themselves, and only the qualia, are caused but inefficacious.

Jackson is no longer persuaded by the view set out in 1982, abandoning the position in 1998. In a recent article he wrote:

> Although I once dissented from the majority [by going against science] I have capitulated and now see the interesting issue as being where the arguments from the intuitions against physicalism … go wrong. (2003: 251)

Jackson now thinks there is a ‘pervasive illusion’ involved in thinking about what it is like to have a colour experience. He now argues that once we have a full understanding of a representational state’s content—such as the state Mary finds herself in after her release from the black and white room—‘we get the phenomenology for free’ (2003: 265). Mary’s problem is to confuse ‘seeing red’, an intensional property, with an instantiated property, regarding the former as absent from the inventory of physical properties that fully characterise the world. But this is an illusion. Mary does not learn any new proposition about how things are; rather, by representing to herself the state of seeing red she acquires a procedure for the recognition, memory, or imagination of that very state. Thus, Jackson now accepts a well known response to the knowledge argument based on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, but it is accepted via the more complicated route of representationalism.

David Chalmers (1996) proposed a challenge to those offering physical or functional explanations of consciousness, or conscious experience. He claimed that virtually all attempts to explain consciousness failed because they were aimed at a different problem, the problem of awareness, which included such notions as discrimination, integration of cognitive information, reportability of mental states, and so on. A typical paper on consciousness might imply it was tackling the very difficult issue of how experience seems to the subject, but turn out to supply a mechanism constituting a function related to, e.g. reports of the self-concept. The problem he thinks is there has been a consistent error resulting in a gap between the *explanadum*—conscious experience—and the *explanans*.

Chalmers is not impressed by those who deny there is a problem of consciousness, and he suggests those who think our minds too limited to understand a solution to the problem have given up too soon. Chalmers’ *naturalistic dualism* is motivated by the thought that we are not facing up to what is centrally
puzzling about conscious experience. Using three strategies—arguments from con-ceivability, epistemology, and analysis—the case is made against reducibility. A well known centrepiece of the strategy is the thought that a physically identical world to ours might have contained my zombie twin, someone bereft of phenomenal feel.

Is Chalmers’ dualistic stance a rejection of the sciences of the mind? Not for a second; his point is simply that the current resources of science are ill-equipped to account for conscious experience.

The Australasian contribution to the world debate in the philosophy of mind really cannot be overstated. Open almost any reputable collection in the field and it will contain articles from the authors discussed here. Of course, these contributions arise also from institutional support, a rich intellectual tradition, and many philosophers whose names are far too numerous to list here. I originally thought I might finish this entry with such a list, but the impractical nature of that idea quickly became obvious after assembling over thirty names. That in itself says something about philosophy’s strength in Australasia on questions about the nature of mind.

(My thanks to David Armstrong, Stuart Brock, Keith Campbell, David Chalmers, Steve Clarke, and Charles Pigden.)
‘analytical’. For a couple of decades after the War, the almost automatic choice for postgraduate study was a British university, typically Oxford. In consequence, those with that background found it a difficult experience to read, for professional purposes, the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, or Merleau-Ponty. It was both a help and a hindrance to be imbued with techniques of reading and of thought developed in dealing with Wittgenstein, Ryle and the other ‘conceptual analysts’.

Concurrently with this revival of interest, closer connections were being made between analytical philosophy in Australia and the U.S. It was many years, however, before there was a full recognition of the contemporary resources of European-oriented philosophy in English available from the U.S.—and from some countries of Europe itself. The extent of these resources became evident as teaching courses became established and library searches revealed to those of us who were newcomers to the ‘European’ scene what we had to take account of as already achieved. And yet this greater contact with the U.S. by both analytical and European-based philosophers did nothing to improve relations between ‘analytical’ and ‘European’ philosophy in Australia. With rare exceptions, a situation of incomprehension at best and at worst a scene of outright antagonism persisted until very late in the twentieth century.

Philosophical change and progress does not wait upon any resolution of such antagonisms, of course. There was such a delay in the reception of European philosophy within analytical circles that phenomenology was being supplanted by new developments even as it began to bear fruit in its new country. This became evident with the arrival of translations of acerbic feminist critiques within France of Sartre (and of Beauvoir)—signs of how philosophy had progressed in European countries such as France and Italy. And then there was the intense interest—particularly in departments outside philosophy ‘proper’—in the work of Foucault, then Derrida, Deleuze, Le Dœuff and Irigaray (to cite a few illustrious names). So it has become part of the tradition of ‘European’ philosophy of mind to come to terms with the work of such figures, too, though they would not style themselves as philosophers of ‘mind’. To choose just one (in)famous example: Jacques Derrida takes himself to be ‘erasing’ and ‘writing over’ that very area of concerns that used to be called ‘mind’ (‘esprit’, ‘Geist’). Like an eliminative materialist in the analytical tradition, he attempts to replace notions of a ‘mind’ and of ‘consciousness’, not with equivalents, but with other figures that do the necessary conceptual work. So we find his well-known tropes of the ‘trace’ and of ‘différance’ as a fused act of differing and deferring, and of ‘repetition’. Such philosophy engages in a ‘deconstruction’ of concepts rather than a search for the ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ that is typical of the ‘analytical’ ambition.

**Some Main Issues of ‘Mind’ in the ‘Continental’ Style**

The proceedings of the Australian Association for Phenomenology and Social Sciences, formed in 1976, exemplify the themes and controversies typical of the Australian scene in its first phase after World War Two. A number of papers in *A Hundred Years of Phenomenology* (2001) were developed directly from the work of that first
Philosophy of Mind (Continental)

conference and a subsequent one in 1980. Luciana O’Dwyer plumbed the issue of ‘reality and realism’ in Husserl’s ‘transcendental’ phenomenology, arguing that Husserl was displacing that empiricist framework of Locke, Berkeley and Hume within which the relation of our ‘ideas’ or ‘impressions’ of reality to reality itself is posed as the prime problem about ‘mind’ and its apparent ‘objects’. It is from experience itself that we get the idea of the reality of what we experience. It is not as if we have some separate access to ‘reality itself’ so that we could compare that with ‘what we experience’ and decide how well they fit. We do not come to Berkeley’s conclusion, however—nor to some position that remotely resembles that. It is from experience that we understand, partially, the very idea of reality, along with the distinctions we make between ‘how it seems’ and ‘how it is’. In understanding experience, we understand a reality revealed in experience. Indeed, we could not understand some ‘experience in itself’, were there such a thing. That experience is intentional is not merely some formal point, as it tends to be interpreted within linguistically oriented philosophies of mind. It is a declaration that what is fundamental about the reality and structure of experience is that it is of something not itself. O’Dwyer argued:

There was no question for Husserl of denying the reality of the world [merely because] we cannot find the ground of our experience of what is real in a reality which is conceived of as an external object. (O’Dwyer 2001: 45)

The point is not, as Berkeley had taken it, that our idea of reality is that of an object ‘within the mind’. We do not have to take some impossible leap ‘outside experience’ to gain the idea of reality as not itself experience. Rather, we dispense with the metaphysical metaphor of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ as a way of indicating the ‘merely experiential’ as against what is ‘concerned with things as they are’. It is only by locating thought and experience within a framework that derives from the dualism of a Descartes or Locke that we think of the mind and its experiences as a sort of ‘inner’ place. Only within that framework does the denial of the externality of reality amount to Idealism. It is in the face of that dilemma for empirical dualism that Husserl challenges the idea of perception as an ‘inner’ process concerned with its ‘inner’ objects, and claims that, consequently, reality is not something external to it, either. Perception is the achievement we can make as a perceiving body-subject that locates and interconnects the intentionally comprehended objects of its various sensory organs and modalities. This helps Husserl in explaining his problematic notion of our ‘constituting’ what we perceive:

In this regard we speak of the ‘intersubjective constitution’ of the world, meaning by this the total system of givenness … Through this constitution … the world as it is for us becomes understandable as a structure of meaning formed out of elementary intentionalities. (Husserl 1970: 168)
O’Dwyer was a particularly rigorous Husserlian, and determined not to deny or to trivialise Husserl’s ‘transcendental’ turn. In reading him as taking this direction, the vital clue she notes is his disagreement with Descartes’ interpretation of the results of his ‘radical doubt’. Her critique shared a point with the physicalism then current in Australia. Descartes mistakenly inferred that in attending to his own experiencing being he had discovered a special substance. O’Dwyer saw Husserl as correcting that error. Descartes’ method of ‘doubting’ what he perceives becomes a ‘bracketing out’ of the ‘natural objects’ of perception. Husserl turns not towards some immaterial substance that projects a material world, but to a change in attitude by which we attend to the logical structure of our modes of experience. Descartes’ error was to reify his discovery of a new field of exploration.

William Doniela joined in this debate about the status of Husserl’s ‘transcendental’ turn (Doniela 2001: 29–42). Like O’Dwyer, he suggested that Husserl’s position is still a kind of realism. He saw a threat of relativism in Husserl’s emphasis on the ‘transcendental ego’ as conferring sense on a multitude of intentionalities, but attempted to meet Kolakowski’s reservations about Husserl’s method, as ‘[yet] another example of the logical hopelessness of … starting] from subjectivity and try[ing] to restore the path to the common world’ (Kolakowski 1975: 79). There are new problems about perceptual knowledge within phenomenologies with origins in Husserl’s system. To meet these requires new ideas about what philosophers still tend to reify as ‘mind’. The very word ‘mind’ does not reside comfortably within phenomenology, whose first aim is to dispel Cartesian dualism, even while resisting what analytical philosophy would call ‘reductive’ materialism.

Robin Small (2001: 53–69) pointed out that Husserl’s phenomenological approach had appealed to Ryle early in his career. Ryle agreed with and built upon Husserl’s critique that in shifting attention to the structure of our experience of objects, Descartes had taken the wrong turning in reifying mind. Max Deutscher (2001: 3–24) further argued for this Rylean interpretation of Husserl’s ‘transcendental’ move. In speaking of a ‘transcendental’ dimension to the ego and its experience, Husserl claimed to be not speculating metaphysically, but naming a hitherto ‘anonymous’ attitude to experience and the ego that subtends it. Deutscher pointed out that in the Crisis, Husserl on occasions states outright that his ‘transcendental ego’ is the functioning human body itself, in its capacity to stand aside from its experience.

If this issue is settled then the spectre of solipsism that haunted Husserl’s ‘ego-logy’ is banished, and it becomes possible to synthesise his attention to immediate experience and his ideal of a ‘communalisation’ in which ‘occurs an alteration of validity through reciprocal correction … an intersubjective unity’ (Husserl 1970: 163). In The Life of the Mind, Hannah Arendt works out this tension in terms of the ‘privacy’ of thinking and the publicity of involvement in shared action. Deutscher has developed this in contemporary terms, drawing upon phenomenology, Arendt’s mutation of it, and analytical philosophy (Deutscher 2007).
In a response to a naturalising emphasis on the transcendental as an imaginative detachment found within experience rather than a speculative metaphysical construct, Maurita Harney took up a new consequence for Husserl’s philosophy. Particularly in earlier formulations, Husserl’s language had suggested an image of the transcendental ego as a pure point from which it practised an absolute detachment from natural objects and events. As a natural process, however, it is an exchange of an involvement with the natural objects of perception for an involvement with one’s modes and structures of experience of them. If detachment may be radical without being absolute then Husserl is relieved of his most pressing theoretical difficulties. Harney and Deutscher argued that to take Husserl’s approach in this direction amplifies and enriches it, in fact. Small argued not only that Ryle’s *Concept of Mind* helps us elucidate and amplify Husserl’s phenomenology, but that reading Ryle back from Husserl gives us a richer philosophy than is usually read in Ryle’s work (Small 2001: 53–69).

Both Harney and van Hooft concentrated on intentionality, emphasising how Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology could enrich the linguistic interest concerning intentionality within analytical philosophy. Recent work by Vladiv-Glover (2007) has traced the post-war development of Husserl’s thought in Eastern Europe. She thereby renew our understanding of Descartes’ ‘dualism’. In another line of attack, Semetsky (2006) has approached phenomenology’s innovations through the work of Deleuze and Peirce. She argues that the phenomenological approach is important in recognising that intentionality must exist pre-linguistically, and may be described in terms of the world that a child structures before and during the formation of language.

An important part of the later ‘European’ work as from the last decade (about) of the twentieth century has been done within feminist philosophy. Behind that feminism lies a critique of dualism found in Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex*—a critique that is part and parcel of feminist philosophy’s attack on the dualism of the sexes. Institutionally, there is a strong tendency to regard feminist critique as moral, social and political rather than as epistemological and ontological. But the ‘European’ side of feminist philosophy has taken a lead in attacking dualist pictures and theories of ‘mind and body’. Rather than using the language and category of ‘mind’ and then reducing or identifying it with brain function, these feminists have produced various kinds of philosophies of the body. This is not a reversion to reductive behaviourism, but a consideration of the body in its mindful behaviour and social relations.

Many Australian philosophers now work with an eye on the legacy of phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre/Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty), and have also followed poststructuralist ‘deconstructive’ trends. This work is a recognisable alternative to the preoccupation with a dilemma that has beset physicalist theories of mind. Cartesian arguments for a separation of mind and body have been refuted decisively, but the spectre of ‘mental properties’ has hung over every variety of physicalist theories of mind. The language of mind that ‘ascribes’ those properties is not reducible in meaning to that of physiology, let alone physics.
Within post-phenomenological contemporary philosophy there is, deliberately, no single word for what is still called ‘mind’ within the analytical tradition. Rather, one speaks of the capacities, skills and activities—both socially expressed and personally contained—of the perceptive, thoughtful and sensitive human body. ‘Body’ includes ‘brain’, of course, but the brain is not the metaphysical site of the mysterious operations of a ‘consciousness’ that seems forever irreducible to the ‘merely physical’ properties of the brain—if one may for the occasion thus compress the conundrums of analytical physicalism and its neo-dualist doppelganger.

Certainly, the metamorphosis, in 1995, of the Australian Association for Phenomenology and Social Sciences into the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy signified a change in how recent European philosophy was viewed and used. A new generation of philosophers use classical phenomenology as but one of the forms of discourse in European philosophy. In the proceedings of the old Association one could already observe, in the various approaches to the themes of ‘mind’, an increasing shift of interest to include the work of Beauvoir alongside Sartre, and to go beyond phenomenology into the new movements, deconstructionist and otherwise, represented by such names as Derrida, Deleuze and Le Dœuff.

Feminist philosophers with intellectual origins in the phenomenological tradition have already done a great deal that can be deployed against various forms of dualism. Within the high tide of phenomenology, Beauvoir already had written against the mystification of others (including women) that made them appear as ‘Other’. This work against dualism has been broadened in concept and intensified in method in recent and contemporary works by philosophers such as Genevieve Lloyd (1994), Rosalyn Diprose (1994), Moira Gatens (1996), Vicki Kirby (1997), Catherine Vasseleu (1998) and Penelope Deutscher (2008). The aim is to find new directions for philosophy that will take us clear of the morass that dualism and its antagonists co-inhabit. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas may have come close to escaping the old dualism but an ‘Other’ haunts their systems. Descartes’ mind would steal content from matter in not being material: phenomenology’s ‘Other’ tries vainly to gain content as what is ‘not-myself’. A ghost outside the machine, perhaps.

Jack Reynolds has attempted to co-ordinate phenomenology and deconstruction (Reynolds 2004). He couples Derrida’s ‘de-minded’ language (my neologism) of writing and différence with Merleau-Ponty’s language of the self as embodied and essentially inter-related with the ‘Other’. Reynolds uses a Derridean language of inscription and difference in co-ordination with Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to ‘flesh out’ both self and other. He is looking for new directions out of phenomenology.

Events in the late 1990s through to the 2000s indicate a more active co-ordination of European-based philosophy and philosophy based in cognitive science. For instance, in the 1990s Gerard O’Brien and Rosalyn Diprose prepared an annotated bibliography on the interface between philosophy of mind and philosophy of body. On another front of the interaction between phenomenology
Philosophy of Politics

Fred D’Agostino

Philosophy of politics in Australia stands in an uneasy relationship with Australian politics properly speaking. In particular, while political philosophy has flourished in Australia during the post-War period, both intellectually and, especially since the 1980s, institutionally, while Australian political institutions present many notable features, and while Australian academic philosophy has been politicised in several striking developments, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, very little of the political philosophical work of Australian and Australian-based thinkers has engaged with the specificities of their cultural and institutional locale.

Australian Political Philosophy since World War Two

Intellectual Developments

Already in 1955, P. H. Partridge, in inaugurating the chair of social philosophy at the Australian National University, laid out an agenda for political philosophical enquiry that has a good claim to anticipate most subsequent developments. He asked (quoted in Muschamp 1992: 84):

What is the function which the State ought to fulfil? What is the rational basis for the supreme authority the modern State claims to exercise over us? Why, therefore, have we a moral duty to obey the State and its laws? What are the proper limits to the function and to the authority of the State? What are the rights which individuals ought to possess in a properly constituted State?, and how can the validity of these rights be demonstrated?

While the questions posed by Partridge were and remain a standard list, they were posed, at this time, in opposition to a dominant philosophical movement—i.e. ordinary language philosophy in the specific form of T. D. Weldon’s destructive critique in *The Vocabulary of Politics* (Weldon 1953)—from which, say, American political theory was only rescued, somewhat later, by the work of John Rawls and others of his ilk. Partridge, in any event, had the wit and wisdom to see the
value of substantive political philosophising rather than the meta-philosophical backwaters into which political philosophy was elsewhere led by a dominant paradigm. Australian political theorising has, ever since, taken this robustly substantive form and has made many important contributions to anglophone philosophy of politics, tackling the sorts of questions which Partridge articulated.

Selwyn Grave anatomised much of this subsequent discussion in this way: ‘Two themes have prominently engaged philosophical social thought in Australia, liberalism—both ethical and political—and Marxism’ (Grave 1984: 156). Indeed they have.

Perhaps more subtly, many Australian contributions to the understanding of Marxism themselves reflect a broadly liberal concern with freedom and individualism. Exemplary in this regard are: Eugene Kamenka, whose The Ethical Foundations of Marxism (1962) was an early re-reading of Marxism in terms of ‘the early Marx’; Graeme Duncan, whose Marx and Mill (1973) represented a daring and widely admired (and debated) attempt both to undermine a too-easy dichotomisation of these key thinkers and to more clearly identify their unresolvable points of difference; and David Tucker, whose Marxism and Individualism (1980) seeks a reconciliation between the Marxist critique of capitalism and Rawlsian concerns with individual liberty.

On the broadly liberal side of Grave’s taxonomy, the key contributors are more numerous and even more influential in world philosophy of politics. Of H. J. McCloskey, especially his ‘The Problem of Liberalism’ (1965), David Muschamp (1992: 85) later said: ‘No political philosopher in, and very few outside, Australia has done more to develop a careful and consistent analysis and appraisal of liberalism’. Partridge himself achieved a wide, cross-disciplinary and probably largely undergraduate readership with his Consent and Consensus (1971), a useful, historically inflected discussion of these two key concepts for liberal thinking about the state. Robert Young’s Personal Autonomy (1986) and Stanley Benn’s A Theory of Freedom (1988) gave accounts of personal autonomy which nicely complemented one another in their approaches.

From the middle of the 1980s, and reflecting Benn’s influence, both institutionally and intellectually, the Australian National University’s Research School of Social Sciences became a key centre, internationally, of political philosophical thinking and in nuanced opposition to a broadly liberal tradition. Gerald Gaus’ The Modern Liberal Theory of Man (1983) provides a nice historicising counterpoint to the work by Young and Benn, while his Value and Justification (1990) represents a sustained attempt to cash out two key elements in broadly Rawlsian liberalism. Later, Fred D’Agostino’s Free Public Reason (1996) takes up the theme, from McCloskey, but now in a different idiom, that liberalism is best understood as a family of theories rather than a discrete and definite position.

Casting himself in good-natured opposition to these developments, Philip Pettit’s Republicanism (1997a) gave solid intellectual foundations to the historicising work of Quentin Skinner and W. G. Pocock, and delineated an alternative to mainstream Rawlsian liberalism that, as with the earlier work of Duncan and
Tucker, though in a quieter way, engaged with themes more often discussed in Marxist than in liberal contexts. In this respect, he follows earlier, perhaps less good-natured criticism of the prevailing liberal position by, for example, Carole Pateman, especially in her *The Problem of Political Obligation* (1979). This latter work shares some thematic elements with Peter Singer's *Democracy and Disobedience* (1973), which brought Singer's argumentative abilities to international notice at the start of his career. Pateman's earlier work on participatory democracy (Pateman 1970) codified important practical political developments and anticipated and influenced much subsequent discussion. Her book *The Sexual Contract* (1988) represented an important contribution both to contract thinking, then very much in vogue, and to feminist philosophy.

**Institutional Developments**

In 1992 David Muschamp could write: ‘Every one of the established 20 Australian Universities offers political philosophy as a part of at least one undergraduate degree. It is also offered in many of the 35 (at the time of writing) degree awarding colleges’ (1992: 81). Very little has changed in the meantime, except for the institutional structure of the Australian academy. Political philosophy, and political theory (as political philosophy is sometimes denominated in Political Science or Government departments), is a mainstay of respectable university curricula.

The *Journal of Political Philosophy* has been edited at the Australian National University (ANU) by Bob Goodin since 1993 and the journal *Politics, Philosophy and Economics*, founded by sometime Australian-based philosopher Gerald Gaus and now edited by Fred D’Agostino, is about ten years younger and reflects the broadly interdisciplinary interests of Australian philosophers of politics, as is also evident in the ANU’s Social and Political Theory Program, which is headed by Goodin, Geoff Brennan, and John Dryzek. Indeed, Goodin is a key figure, institutionally, as General Editor of the *Oxford Handbooks of Political Science* and, with Philip Pettit, of the Blackwell *Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Pettit and Goodin 1993) and of the Blackwell *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology* (Pettit and Goodin 1997), both of which have had recent second editions.

**The Politics of Australian Philosophy**

Perhaps to a degree which is unusual elsewhere in the English-speaking academy, Australian philosophy has been both a provocation to and a site of direct and sometimes highly charged political action. Key elements are described in Grave (1984: ch. 11) and in James Franklin’s widely-read *Corrupting the Youth* (2003). These include, in particular: ‘The Knopfelmacher Case’, as Grave (1984: 209ff) calls it, in which, in 1965, the anti-Marxist Frank Knopfelmacher was denied appointment to a position at the University of Sydney despite the recommendation to appoint of the selection committee; Maoism at Flinders University,
under the leadership of Professor Brian Medlin, culminating, as Franklin (2003: 291) reports, ‘at the Australasian philosophy conference of 1970, when Medlin draped a red flag over the lectern before giving his talk on “The onus of proof in political argument”; and, especially, the ‘Sydney split’, or rather splits, when Wal Suchting and Michael Devitt’s 1971 proposal to introduce courses on Marxism-Leninism led in due course to the establishment of two departments, General Philosophy and Traditional and Modern Philosophy (see Grave 1984: 213ff, and Franklin 2003: ch. 11).

Later developments encompassed lively debates, and occasional institutional rearrangements over feminist philosophy, notably marked in the Spring 2000 issue of *Hypatia*, devoted entirely to Australian feminist work in philosophy, in the formation of a Women in Philosophy stream often run as part of the annual conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, and, of course, in the influential publications of feminist writers, especially in political philosophy, some of which is well represented in the collection edited by Carole Pateman and Elizabeth Grosz, *Feminist Challenges* (1986).

**Untheorised Aspects of the Australian Polity**

One of the most puzzling features of Australian philosophy of politics is the degree to which Australia’s key, and somewhat peculiar, political institutions have received so little philosophical attention. David Farrell and Ian McAllister (2003: 287, 301) make a very persuasive case for, if you will, the ‘genius’ of the Australian electoral system:

> Australia has made a long and distinguished contribution to the development of electoral institutions … Australia is also the home of the preferential electoral system … Preferential voting is perhaps the most distinctive and innovative characteristic of the electoral systems of Australia …

> Australians have been more willing to experiment with democracy than many of their contemporaries: in no other liberal democracy, it seems safe to say, have the permutations and combinations of electoral reform been as great.

Notwithstanding the interest and importance of these developments, there is little contribution by Australian philosophy to their analysis, justification, or critique. On this basis, the political scientist Graham Maddox (2005: 327) concludes that ‘Australian society is pragmatic, lacking in principles and instructed by no great philosophies … [t]he charge of pragmatism … [being] supported by the dearth of great political writings in this country’. This is, of course, not quite right, as the survey of worthy political theoretical writing sketched here clearly shows. What is right, arguably, is that the best political philosophy written in Australia has not, to any significant degree, engaged with the specificities of Australian political institutions, despite their distinctiveness and inherent interest.
Philosophy of Religion

N. N. Trakakis

Australia and New Zealand are often portrayed (by secularists and church figures alike) as godless nations where materialism, in both its philosophical and sociological guises, runs rife (see, e.g. Frame 2009). Census reports on religious identity are sometimes used to substantiate this image (e.g. the ‘No Religion’ category rose in Australia from 0.3% in 1947 to 18.7% in 2006, and in New Zealand from 0.7% in 1945 to 29.6% in 2001). Despite this, it has been argued—by, e.g. Bouma (2006) and Matheson (2006)—that religion has not died out in Australia and New Zealand, but shows signs of renewal and revitalisation. In Australia in particular, a distinctive religious and spiritual ethos seems to have emerged. Borrowing the phrase ‘a shy hope in the heart’ used by Manning Clark to describe the ANZAC spirit, Bouma writes that this phrase aptly expresses the nature of Australian religion and spirituality: ‘There is a profound shyness—yet a deeply grounded hope—held tenderly in the heart, in the heart of Australia’ (2006: 2). Perhaps something similar can be said about the way in which the philosophical study of religion tends to be approached in Australasia: a spirit of openness and tentativeness, as opposed to one that is doctrinaire and dogmatic, has prevailed.

Early Contributions

If Samuel Alexander can be considered an Australian philosopher, despite leaving his home town of Sydney at the age of eighteen for Oxford, and never to return, his Space, Time, and Deity (1920) would count as the first substantial Australasian contribution to the philosophy of religion. Alexander developed a grand system of speculative metaphysics, one of the last of its kind, that was part of the widespread movement towards realism, and against Idealism, in philosophy. In Alexander’s system the basic reality is spacetime, out of which everything evolves. This evolutionary system is marked by an ongoing process that is driven towards the production of new and increasingly complex qualities, particularly one that has yet to be realised, called ‘Deity’. As in the process theism developed by his contemporary, A. N. Whitehead, Alexander thought of God as both existent and forever in process of realisation: ‘God as actually possessing deity does not exist but is an ideal, is always becoming; but God as the whole Universe tending towards deity does exist’ (1921: 428).

On the Idealist side, W. R. Boyce Gibson arrived in Victoria in 1912 having already published God With Us (1909), a work heavily influenced by the German Idealist philosopher, Rudolf Eucken, and advocating a theistic version of ‘personal Idealism’ in opposition to both Absolute Idealism and naturalism.
(See also Gibson’s four-part series on ‘Problems of Spiritual Experience’ in the 1924–25 issues of the Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy [1924a, 1924b, 1924c, 1925b]). Alexander (‘Sandy’) Boyce Gibson succeeded his father in the chair of philosophy at the University of Melbourne in 1935 and also took a strong interest in the philosophy of religion, publishing after his retirement one book on the interplay between religious faith and doubt in Dostoevsky’s life and novels, and another on becoming empirically acquainted with the non-empirical and thus overcoming the divide between theism and empiricism (Gibson 1970; 1973).

Although John Anderson had little to offer the philosophy of religion, his atheism played an important role in setting up naturalism as the dominant paradigm in subsequent Australasian philosophy. Anderson rejected the traditional arguments for the existence of God (e.g. in a 1935 paper he discusses, and seeks to strengthen, the critique of the design argument offered in Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, though curiously he makes no appeal to evolutionary theory), but he did not attempt to derive his atheism from any arguments in the philosophy of religion, such as the argument from evil. Rather, his atheism was the product of a thoroughgoing empiricism and realism, according to which there is only one way of being, that of ordinary things in space and time, and hence there are no supernatural beings such as God. But it was Anderson’s resolutely secular conception of education that was to give him greatest notoriety. Education, Anderson argued, is essentially concerned with free inquiry and critical thinking, whereas religion promotes dogmatism, servility and indoctrination, and so the two are flatly opposed. After public addresses espousing such views, Anderson was condemned by the Sydney press and church officials, and was even censured by the NSW Parliament (Baker 1979: 118–21).

Natural Theology and Atheology

Over the last few decades Australasian philosophers have made significant contributions to the projects of natural theology and atheology, where the case for and against the existence of God is assessed on the basis of rational argumentation alone, unaided by religious faith or divine revelation. A case in point is Peter Forrest (1996a), who under the banner of ‘scientific theism’ has attempted to show that belief in God is the best explanation of various features revealed by, or implicit in, modern science. Forrest engages in what he calls ‘the apologetics of understanding’, the project of defending theism by showing that it enables us to understand or explain various things (such as the world’s beauty and its suitability for life) better than its rivals, especially naturalism. But the explanations posited by Forrest are not supernatural explanations: ‘I am an antisupernaturalist without being a naturalist’, he writes (1996: 2). Forrest’s theism avoids the supernatural insofar as its eschews any violations of the laws of nature and any entities that do not have a precedent in well-confirmed scientific theories. More recently but more controversially, Forrest (2007) has defended a highly speculative and unorthodox conception of divinity where God (and not simply our conception
of God) develops over time. On this view, God initially is neither personal nor lovable, but is pure will and unrestricted agency. A series of events, however, results in God becoming a community of divine love, the Holy Trinity, with one of the Persons of this Trinity becoming fully human to show us divine love.

Important contributions to each of the big three arguments for the existence of God have been made by Australasian philosophers. Barry Miller (1992) defends a version of the cosmological argument, relying not on the principle of sufficient reason, but on the premise that the existence of the universe or any of its parts (logically) could not be a brute fact. Subsequently, Miller went on to argue that the creator of the universe whose existence his earlier work attempted to demonstrate is not to be identified with the anthropomorphic God of perfect-being theology, but with the Thomistic God conceived as Subsistent Existence (identical with his existence) and thus as radically different from any other being, possible or actual (Miller 1996). In the final part of his trilogy (Miller 2002), he defends the view, presupposed in the idea of Subsistent Existence, that existence is a real property of individuals and ‘exists’ is a first-level predicable.

Graham Oppy, on the other side of the theist/atheist divide, engaged in prolonged debate in the journals during the 1990s with William Lane Craig and others over the kalam cosmological argument. A useful but neglected question in debates of this sort is: When should someone who presents a philosophical argument be prepared to concede that their argument is unsuccessful? Oppy (2002) takes up this topic, and argues that Craig ought to admit that his kalam argument is a failure. Oppy has also considered and criticised some new versions of the cosmological argument advanced by Robert Koons, Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss.

Mark Wynn (1999), at the time at the Australian Catholic University, offered a defence of the argument from design. But unlike traditional formulations of this argument, Wynn’s argument is rooted in features of the world that are charged with valuational significance (e.g. the world’s beauty and its tendency to produce richer and more complex material forms) and attempts to break away from anthropomorphic conceptions of God as a human artisan writ large. Nowadays, however, design arguments usually make appeal to fine-tuning, the fundamental structure and properties of the universe that are finely adjusted to allow for the existence of life. Fine-tuning arguments have come in for some heavy criticism at the hands of Australasian philosophers, including M. C. Bradley (2001) and Mark Colyvan, Graham Priest and Jay Garfield (2005).

Somewhat peculiarly for a nation that takes pride in the empirical, Australia has witnessed a flurry of activity over the a priori ontological argument. Max Charlesworth (1965) led the way with a new translation of, and a running commentary on, Anselm’s Proslogion and the texts of the subsequent debate between Anselm and Gaunilo. Soon thereafter Richard Campbell (1976) presented a new interpretation of Anselm’s argument, and defended it against the objections of Gaunilo, Kant and others. But it was Graham Oppy’s Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (1996) that raised the discussion to new heights, providing the most
detailed and rigorous examination of the ontological argument to date. In this work Oppy develops and defends a general objection that is intended to apply to all formulations of the argument (though this general objection was later recanted in Oppy 2001 and 2006), and concludes that ‘ontological arguments are completely worthless: While the history and analysis of ontological arguments makes for interesting reading, the critical verdict of that reading is entirely negative’ (1996: 199). An equally negative conclusion is reached in Oppy’s follow-up study, Arguing about Gods (2006a), where he examines classical and contemporary arguments for and against the existence of God, and concludes that ‘no argument that has been constructed thus far provides those who have reasonable views about the existence of orthodoxly conceived monotheistic gods with the slightest reason to change their minds’ (2006a: 425). The meticulous and thorough scholarship that lies behind these verdicts justifies the remark Paul Helm once made that, ‘an “oppy” is clearly a creature with the eye of an eagle and the pen of a ready writer’ (Helm 1997: 477).

Across the Tasman, John Bishop in Believing by Faith (2007a) also thinks that the arguments of natural theology and natural atheology are unsuccessful. Specifically, Bishop holds that the core theistic truth-claims are ‘evidentially ambiguous’ in the sense that our total available evidence is equally viable interpreted either from a theistic perspective or an atheistic perspective. Given the evidential ambiguity of theism, argues Bishop, it can under certain circumstances be morally permissible to ‘believe by faith’, or to ‘make a doxastic venture’ in the direction of theistic faith-commitment. Bishop thus defends a modest version of fideism that is inspired by William James’ 1896 lecture ‘The Will to Believe’, and defends it against various objections, including those put forward by ‘hard-line’ evidentialists, who insist that commitment to religious belief without evidential support can never be justified.

Arguments from evil, of course, often play a crucial role in the atheologian’s case against God, but since Australasian philosophers have made a quite distinctive contribution to this topic, it is dealt with under a separate entry.

**Miracles**

Australasian philosophers have also been active in discussions of miracles. Bruce Langtry, for example, challenged the arguments Hume and Mackie put forward against miracle-reports as evidence for theism (Langtry 1972, 1975, 1985, 1988). Levine (1989) offers a more systematic explication of Hume’s argument against justified belief in miracles, showing how it follows from Hume’s analysis of causation. Hume’s position on miracles, according to Levine, has not been properly understood, since its connection to his views on causation has never been adequately examined. Levine also argues, against Hume, that a justified true belief in the occurrence of an event justifiably thought to be a miracle is possible. Stephen Buckle (2001) also takes up Hume’s case against belief in miracles as developed in Section X of the *Enquiry* (as well as Hume’s case against the design argument in Section XI). Buckle spends much time in contextualising Hume’s
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critique of religion, showing that the critique can properly be understood only if it is placed within the context of the wider sceptical argument of the *Enquiry*.

**History of Philosophy of Religion**

Apart from these studies of Hume, other historical studies in philosophy of religion include Julian Young’s *Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion* (2006). According to Young, Nietzsche’s early thought, or his ‘Wagnerianism’, is *communitarian* (in the sense that the highest object of its concern is the flourishing of the community as a whole), and *religious* (for it holds that a community cannot flourish without a festive, communal religion). Young argues that this religious communitarianism is not, as is often thought, something that Nietzsche went on to renounce, but persists through the entirety of Nietzsche’s writings. Young therefore interprets Nietzsche as a religious reformer rather than an enemy of religion, and as someone deeply concerned with community rather than an individualistic philosopher. Mention may also be made of the five-volume *History of Western Philosophy of Religion* (2009), edited by Oppy and Trakakis, and consisting of over 100 essays on philosophers and religious thinkers from ancient to contemporary times.

**Continental Philosophy of Religion**

A seminal publication in this area, in Australasia and beyond, is Kevin Hart’s *The Trespass of the Sign* (1989, reissued 2000). At the time of publication, Hart was lecturing in Literary Studies at Deakin University, though he was already well-versed in both philosophy (completing his Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Melbourne in 1986) and theology. By this time, also, Hart had converted to the Catholic Church (having grown up in an Anglican family), and he had (as he put it) ‘gone continental’ in his philosophical orientation, ‘yet without repudiating what I had learned in the analytic tradition’ (2000: xii). In many ways, then, Hart was well-positioned to see past the misconceptions about deconstruction and religious faith prevalent at the time. Unlike those who saw deconstruction as directed against theology as such, or as a refinement of the Nietzschean doctrine that God is dead, Hart offered deconstruction as ‘an answer to the theological demand for a “non-metaphysical theology”’ (2000: xxxv) of the sort that is found in the mystical and apophatic traditions of Christianity, thus rejecting Derrida’s view that even mystical theology is embroiled in metaphysics.

Since leaving for the U.S. in 2002, Hart has authored or edited works on Blanchot and the sacred (Hart 2004), on Derrida and religion (Hart and Sherwood 2005), on the experience of God (Hart and Wall 2005), on Marion’s phenomenology and its relation to Christian theology (Hart 2007), and on the implications of Levinas’ philosophy for Jewish-Christian dialogue (Hart and Signer 2010). Hart’s students in Australia have gone on to make important contributions of their own, particularly Robyn Horner. In *Rethinking God as Gift* (2001), Horner looks at the two main protagonists in phenomenological discussions of the gift, Derrida and Marion, and the theological implications of the debate, particularly as it bears on the possibility of conceiving God as pure gift. (The ‘theological turn’
in **phenomenology** was made the subject of a special issue of *Sophia* in 2008, guest edited by Jack Reynolds.) Horner (2005) also wrote the first introduction (at least in English) to Marion’s phenomenology and theology, and she translated (with Vincent Berraud) Marion’s *In Excess* (2002).

**Indigenous and Non-Western Religious Traditions**

The leading voice in the philosophical study of indigenous (especially Australian indigenous) religions has been Max Charlesworth, formerly Professor of Philosophy at Deakin University. Through a series of influential studies and edited collections, Charlesworth has sought to make the study of Australian Aboriginal religions, and primal religions in general, an important area of research within philosophy of religion. Indeed, he has championed the idea that Aboriginal religions are belief-systems of considerable sophistication and seriousness, worthy of the same attention given by philosophers to the major world religions (see, e.g. Charlesworth, Kimber and Wallace 1990; Charlesworth 1997; Charlesworth 1998; Charlesworth, Dussart and Morphy 2005).

**Asian philosophy** of religion is also a growing field in Australasia, led by the work of Purushottama Bilimoria on Indian philosophy and religious thought (see, e.g. Bilimoria 2005), and Jay Garfield on Buddhist and cross-cultural philosophy (see, e.g. Garfield 1995, 2002).

**Journals and Events**

Australasia’s first (and only) journal dedicated to the philosophy of religion is *Sophia*. Although now published overseas (by Springer), the journal retains a strong connection with Australasian philosophy: its editorial office continues to be housed in Melbourne; its three editors-in-chief (Purushottama Bilimoria, Patrick Hutchings, and Jay Garfield) have affiliations with Melbourne institutions; and Australasian philosophers continue to regularly contribute to the journal. Another Australian journal that often publishes articles in philosophy of religion is *Pacifica*. First issued in 1988, *Pacifica* serves primarily as a forum for theologians in Australasia, though articles on Continental philosophy of religion are a regular feature: Martis (2005), for example, discusses the fact of death and its implications for religious faith, drawing on the work of Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot, Lacoue-Labarthe and Caputo, while Curkpatrick (2004) examines the theological significance of the metaphor of insomnia as it occurs in Levinas’ philosophy.

The Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association (APRA) was established in 2008. Its inaugural conference was held the same year at St Mark’s National Theological Centre (Canberra), with keynote addresses delivered by Peter Forrest and Max Charlesworth. Also, a biennial conference in philosophy, religion and culture has been held at the Catholic Institute of Sydney since 1996.

(Thanks to Peter Forrest, John Bishop and Bruce Langtry for reviewing an earlier draft of this article.)
Philosophy of Science

Philip Catton

Philosophers look to the pinnacle of the human condition and of course see philosophers there. Yet, near-to-the-top they see others. The others may be artists, or moral and political leaders, or scientists. Philosophers are typically very different from one another who see pinnacle humans these three different ways. Are artists the top other people? In the minds of really very many philosophers in Australia-and-New-Zealand (hereafter, ‘Australasia’), they are not. Are moral and political leaders tops? Again, not. In the minds of really very many Australasian philosophers, the top other people are scientists.

Distinctive Australasian Accomplishments

Australasia has sported many distinguished philosophers who ruminate about science in a thus appreciative way, a lot of their work broadly metaphysical, a lot broadly epistemological, Australasian work typically sharply distinct from positivist-influenced philosophy of science of the Americas, typically sharply ill-disposed to the German Frankfurt School on one hand and to all varieties of postmodernism on the other, and often touched by particular Australasian penchants (for example, for vigorous realisms, and for an ontology-semantics-epistemology direction of investigation), yet always with break-away developments that defy these generalisations and sometimes establish new trends.

To pick some beginning dates we shall consider first Karl Popper’s arrival to Christchurch in 1937 and then Gerd Buchdahl’s to Melbourne a decade later. Those were heady days when scholars ruminated chiefly about what they took to be the whole defining nature of science. As philosophy of science has developed, its practitioners have generated ever more reason to suspect that there is no one single-self-consistent thing that science is, and indeed that reductive accounts are similarly not possible of theory, commitment, evidence, explanation, cause, law, meaning, reduction itself, and so on. Consequently, the questions themselves that were key within the heady days of mid twentieth-century philosophy of science have paled. In recent decades, much Australasian work concerns specific theoretical sciences and the conceptual and epistemological issues that they produce. While classical physics and relativistic spacetime theory (about which realism seems possible) eclipses quantum theory (about which realism seems impossible) as an Australasian preoccupation in philosophy of physics, there are exceptional Australasian philosophers who do both; biology has come on strongly as science of choice in the Australasian philosophical arena (philosophy of biology now a vibrant down-under subdiscipline very high in its international standing) and is a science which in its nuances pushes back in its way against philosophical-
banner-carrying either for realism or for anti-realism; and distinctive Australasian forms of philosophical thinking about materiality, complex systems, mathematics, logic, universals, ontology, causality, time, possibility, meaning, mentation, and who is who in the history of philosophy, including in recent and contemporary philosophy, have all marked philosophy of science from these parts in ways that the rest of the world truly recognises and truly cares to know about.

**Karl Popper**

To defend reason *is* to champion philosophy, which philosophers are especially wont to do. One philosophical strategy in modern times is, in this pursuit, to champion science. Granted, if a philosopher champions science, then this surely comes from the heart; for philosophers generally are genuine in ways that go deep, it being deeply against a philosopher’s wont ever to be disingenuous. In any case, given nothing more than the evident might of science in modern times, philosophers will some of them of course have come to consider, among human pursuits, science to be pre-eminent. Still, when philosophy produces special love of science, this production partly epitomises clandestine self-love. Just as philosophy’s own pride consists (as Socrates’ did) in its humility before reason, philosophers oft construct scientist-heroes in the image of this pride of their own. Within the shores on either side of the Tasman Sea, the first appointed philosopher of science was Karl Popper. He is an illustration.

Propelled (in 1937) to Christchurch by a darkening Europe, Popper toted to these parts a clarion pen and an incandescent passion against human irrationality. Popper wrote in Christchurch *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945). In its idiosyncratic terms, it rails against Plato, Hegel and Marx. Yet its true target is Hitler. It is a war effort. And large it looms, certainly as one of the great literary accomplishments of the twentieth century.

If Popper is correct, then Plato, Hegel and Marx all are intellectuals in the style of artists. Their purpose is not so much to understand the world as to change it. Art that is any good transforms its audience without explaining itself at all let alone explaining in so many words that or how it does this. Art is in this way an insult to a certain kind of piety about reason. Popper chooses to see in his antagonists unreasoned manipulation of their audience. His contempt for this is visceral. A singular image of science is implied in his response.

A moral or political leader must inevitably mobilise inner conviction and unshakeable self-determination. Such would be the leaders whom Plato, Hegel or Marx would help set up. Popper effects to speak truth against such power. Where Popper had fled from, the Establishment was sick to the core. In Popper’s homeland, evil had permeated authority. However mighty his own inner conviction, however unshakeable his own self-determination, Popper stands passionately against authority-as-such. Again, a singular image of science is implied in his response.

Popper estimates to be scientists only persons who possess proper humility before reason. Scientists are, in Popper’s estimation, ever willing to criticise any of
the convictions that they possess. They seek to explain, but they acknowledge the likelihood that they have as yet failed in this task. Scientists are worthy because they practise unworthiness. They stand not as authorities. They possess instead the mode of knowing—that-they-do-not-know. It is in this way only that reason shines forth from them. (At any rate, all this is what Popper insists is needed if a person should truly count as a scientist.)

Gerd Buchdahl

In Melbourne, an equally eminent philosopher of science—Gerd Buchdahl—arrived to Australasia ten years after Popper. There are many reasons to compare these two giants. Each understands that the very aspiration for science is coeval with philosophy and that, in the West at least, this aspiration is importantly defining of the philosophical spirit. Each proceeds from an admiration for science to a point of view upon the condition of Western philosophy quite generally. Each was (from his love for philosophy) manifestly unimpressed with positivism (an anti-philosophy philosophy) and was early within the community of philosophers to criticise it. Each explored certain kinds of connections between ‘metaphysical’ and ‘methodological’. With each there is his own particular understanding of Kant’s critical philosophy, and of its enduring significance.

But if Popper lambastes historicism and professes in his way the impossibility of truly reasoned conviction in any connection, Buchdahl explores instead how the connection historically between philosophy and science produces the potentiality for just such reasoned conviction. Metaphysics and reasonableness can coincide and the way that they can concerns the historical inseparability of philosophy and science. Buchdahl professes that history-of-philosophy and history-of-science wholly come together, so that indeed, in a certain sense, all history of philosophy and indeed all history of science broadly comprises history-of-philosophy-of-science.

Descendents, Mixed and Unmixed

Intellectual descendents of these two giant figures have much enlivened the Australasian academy. Stephen Gaukroger at Sydney advances, with prodigious effect, the approach of Buchdahl. In Dunedin, descendents of the opposing progenitors have even come together, in the coincidence there of Alan Musgrave (Popper) and Peter Anstey (Buchdahl).

Still, the rubric ‘philosophy of science’ as that has mostly been understood in Australasia has not ever quite accommodated Buchdahl. Although Buchdahl’s department at the University of Melbourne was the Department of History and Philosophy of Science (nearly the first such department in the world), in Australasia as in the world over (efforts of Buchdahl, Gaukroger, Anstey and their like notwithstanding), the two fields mostly mix like oil and water.

The issues here are two. First, history of science has been its own field, brought to professional standing initially by efforts of scientists turned historians (to the outstanding among whom would then be bestowed a professorship in history of
science), and later through assimilation (of the units created to surround these figures) into the broader academic discipline of history. Since history mostly studies the past in socio-political terms, the study of the history of science consequently became steadily less as scientist-scholars would do it and instead ever more socio-political. Such is the fate of the field as it has been professionalised. Thus as time wore on the view of science among historians of science contrasted ever more acutely with that of philosophers, for philosophers’ interests in science little touched politics or sociology but rather chiefly included epistemology (methodology) and also metaphysics of science. (Indeed, the trend in history of science eventually brought its professionals mostly to view philosophers’ study of the history of philosophy as seriously lacking historiographical mettle. So, work like Buchdahl’s, which refuses to separate history of philosophy and history of science, has become quite exceptional.) Second, for quite contingent reasons the self-understanding of English-language ‘philosophy of science’ stretches not at all to political or ethical debate. Many concerns that the public expects should fall under such a rubric, in English-speaking academic contexts mostly do not. For example, in the English speaking part of the academy at least, professional philosophers of science are rare who sport much interest in ethics, and those who do, do so, when they do, with a different hat on. As the tendency advanced itself among historians of science to consider science critically in socio-political terms often with a seeming agenda to ‘knock science down to size’, philosophers of science were mostly flabbergasted and horrified. They were with Popper, to the extent at least that they conceived as their task to defend science and publicly vituperate those who would knock science down.

A very public late-1960s debate between Popper-the-philosopher-of-science (by then in Britain) and the (American post-positivist) historian-of-science Thomas Kuhn crystallised the tensions and radicalised the schism between those two communities. Australasian philosophers generally were disdainful of Kuhn’s views. Yet a lesson of Kuhn’s is important to ponder: that, pace Popper, science is much an establishment activity. Like the theory of moral development according to Aristotle, Kuhn teaches how new experts are made only when there are already-extant experts to emulate. Kuhn wrongly construes exemplary expertise narrowly as ‘puzzle-solving’, when in fact the creative, open-textured performance of ingenious, telling measurements is key. Yet measurement-making could come to nothing without established expertise. So, while Kuhn misconstrues and inadequately appreciates measurement and so wrongly concludes that establishment science will for the longest while be closed to substantial theory revision, still, even if in fact establishment science is typically open not closed, it carries a form that the anti-establishment Popper cannot begin to fathom.

**Political Plot Lost**

The Australian and New Zealand science establishments themselves grew enormously in the 1950s, ’60s and ’70s. In these decades the science establishment mostly comprised public science, unshackled by the public purse from private
money interests. Like other parties to the Cold War, Australia and New Zealand sent public money into science with few but military, health and agricultural strings attached. This was the capitalist West’s way to demonstrate its superiority to the system on the far side of the iron curtain. Meanwhile communist nations, with the like goal of demonstrating superiority, likewise sent public money into science with few but military, health and agricultural strings attached. Support for pure science was a way to show off. In the West, Australasia included, even before the Cold War ended however, money was much speaking against curiosity-driven science, and much instead shackling science to profits. And by the present day, well into post-Cold-War conditions, the showing-off is altogether abated, so that science in Australasia and elsewhere is profoundly shaped either by corporate interests or by government estimations of how the economy best can grow. Philosophers of science in the English-speaking academy, the Australasian academy included, in their stance against the historians, who were themselves thinking seriously about sociology and politics of science, significantly flat-footed themselves in this connection. Australian science and New Zealand science have evolved palpably altered institutional forms at an extraordinarily rapid clip. The politics of science in these parts are impressively different from what they were one decade, let alone two or three decades ago. Whether its epistemic integrity remains up to snuff is a vastly important issue. Whether the morals within science remain kosher let alone any kind of ideal for us all is a further, vastly important issue. Philosophers of science in Australasia and elsewhere are insufficiently able to comment intelligently concerning this. This is because their approach has too much been to discover simply the best reasoned grounds to laud science. These philosophers have also inconveniently sidelined ethics, as not their job.

**Worries about Analytic Dispositions**

We will end with one further set of concerns about Australia and New Zealand. Analytic dispositions predominate in Australasian philosophy. Acknowledging the worth and interest of the many significant Australasian accomplishments of an analytic kind in the philosophy of science, still we must worry about the limits of such work. Are analytic dispositions consistently helpful, for fathoming what makes science work well (to the extent that that is what science does)?

Philosophy of science led philosophy into its analytic phase, and then, with developments post-positivism, has also significantly pulled upon philosophy to exit this phase. Setting-it-up questions have been steadily displaced in philosophy of science by getting-it-together ones. For instance, adequacy-to-evidence questions have been displaced by questions about harmonising phenomena. Picturing what evidence itself even is shifts, for this reason, to what is practical; that is, to what is through and through an achievement of getting-it-together. Phenomena that condition the theoretical intelligence of science mostly obtain in the practical circumstance of controlled experimentation and measurement. The need for synthetic-philosophical reflection upon science should not have come as
a surprise: for science succeeds chiefly when it discovers concerted traction for the practical activity of measurement.

Analysis is a taking-apart and can come to rest only when it meets what enters our situation seemingly as elementary or given (thus from below). Analytic metaphysics thus explores the setting-up of things from those foundational starting-points. That is why analytic philosophers understand metaphysics as ontology. Admitting something to an ontology is like taking it aboard from below as a given. No other first move is possible for the setting-it-up approach.

Such novel ideas as that laws obtain because of extra plumbing in the universal-basement of reality, or that heavy things fall because there is something, space, that, in its own intrinsic geometry, tells them to do so, proceed from careful prosecution of reflection that has an analytic form and that therefore must thus achieve its resting point in ontology. From thence, the setting-it-up work for philosophical explanation reaches back to the level of our experience. Yet do we see, as a result of this effort, the way the world is, or rather mere exigencies of our own philosophical dispositions? Australasian philosophy of science can reflect upon the many enthralling chapters it has written during its six or seven decades. But by now it much owes attention as well to higher-order questioning of the analytic dispositions that have so far so significantly defined it.

Philosophy of Sport

Michael Burke & Dennis Hemphill

Introduction

Most of Australia is desert. Closely matching its geographic desolateness, when it comes to the philosophy of sport, the land ‘down unda’ is at least as arid, bleak, and inhospitable. Apart from one major program … and a few lone individuals working in isolation, there are virtually no signs of life across its vast expanses. (Roberts 1993–94, 113)

While philosophy of sport clings for life, sport in Australasia has undergone a significant transformation since the early 1990s. Sport is now considered ‘more than a game’. That is, elite, high-performance sport is now big business that is also perceived as a powerful instrument for the expression of national identity and pride. This has resulted in a growing scientific and management focus in university level sport, exercise and physical education related courses (McKay
et al. 1990). This reflects a similar trend in universities in North America and the U.K.

Moreover, the mounting pressure on Australasian universities to seek external research funding has meant that research strategies tend to concentrate on the science of elite sporting performance (Whitson and Macintosh 1990). The growing emphasis on science and management in sport studies affects not only the research foci and the content of the units of study offered in undergraduate courses, but also the staffing profile and budgets of faculties and schools in universities. This contributes to the inhospitable climate for humanities-based programs generally, and for philosophy of sport in particular within university programs in Australia and New Zealand.

Undergraduate Units of Study

Margaret Thornton (2002) laments the fact that certain undergraduate law courses in Australian universities can be completed in two years, made possible by stripping the sociological, cultural and philosophical content of law studies. This managerial version of undergraduate study in law has been mirrored in many undergraduate exercise science, sport management and, to a lesser extent, physical education related courses. Most students in these types of courses either have little or no contact with the social sciences and humanities. At best, students are offered an introductory unit that combines sociological and psychological content or a unit that combines law and ethics.

In recent years, unit offerings have been constrained by external accreditation bodies and by funding cuts to universities that have necessitated the ‘streamlining’ of courses. For example, the Australian Academy for the Exercise and Sport Sciences requires that undergraduate courses in exercise and sport sciences have considerable depth and breadth in biological science areas, as well as clinical practice. As a cost saving measure the typical three-year undergraduate degree program now requires 18–24 units of study, as compared to over 30 units a decade ago. In light of these developments, it is often the units in the humanities and social sciences that are the first to go.

Even the flagship programs at Victoria University have not gone unscathed. Up until the early 1990s, students had to complete three philosophy of sport units of study as part of the Physical Education course. The introduction of the generic Human Movement course in the 1990s, with streams in Physical Education, Exercise Science, and Sport Management, still required students to undertake two philosophy units. As each stream was converted into a course in its own right, there has been growing pressure to increase the discipline foundations in either science or management, limiting the ability of courses to offer more than one philosophy unit of study.

Apart from Victoria University, there are few philosophy of sport related units of study offered in Australasian universities. The University of Western Australia offers an elective unit, ‘Sport and Spirituality’, which combines ethical and religious viewpoints on sport. The University of South Australia
offers an elective unit called ‘Philosophy of Sport, Play and Physical Education’. The University of Technology Sydney offers an elective unit called ‘Social and Philosophical Aspects of Secondary Education’. Many other teacher education Physical Education courses have a similar unit. The University of Ballarat offers a third-year core unit, ‘Philosophical and Contemporary Issues in Human Movement’. The Australian Catholic University offers a core unit in ‘Ethics, Law and Exercise Science Practice’ to its exercise science students. There appeared to be no philosophy of sport units of study offered in New Zealand, although the University of Otago has a stronger focus on sociocultural studies of sport than almost any other program we looked at.

Aside from these slim offerings, most other programs in sport and exercise sciences, human movement and physical education offer no philosophically-based units, or submerge ethics content within broad, thematically organised sociocultural units. At the University of Newcastle and elsewhere, ethics is addressed in the context of research design and methods within exercise and sports science units. We could find no unit of study within mainstream philosophy departments in Australasian universities that investigates the philosophy of sport.

Research Outputs

In spite of the limited number of units of study related to philosophy of sport, the research output from Australasian academics within this area has been significant. The flagship publication within the area is the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport. This international, peer-reviewed journal is published for the International Association for the Philosophy of Sport by Human Kinetics. The journal has been published annually since 1972 and semi-annually since 2002. Since the article by Roberts appeared, there have been 19 issues of the journal, with Australasian based authors producing 17 of the 140 articles. The authors of these articles were Terence Roberts, Dennis Hemphill and Michael Burke from Victoria University, Christopher Cordner and Chuck Summers from the University of Melbourne, Adrian Walsh from the University of New England, Aidan Curzon-Hobson, Rex Thomson and Nicki Turner from the UNITEC Institute of Technology in Auckland, and John Hughson, who has since moved on from both the University of New England and University of Otago. Articles with a philosophy of sport focus have also appeared in other international, refereed journals, including Sporting Traditions; Sport, Ethics and Philosophy; and Sport in Society.

Other research concerning the philosophical and ethical dimensions of sport has been produced by Fred D’Agostino at the University of Queensland; Jim Daly, an adjunct scholar at the University of South Australia; the late Robert Paddick, who was at Flinders University of South Australia; John Sutton at Macquarie University; Damon Young at the University of Melbourne; Camilla Obel at the University of Canterbury; and Tara Magdalinski and Karen Brooks at the University of the Sunshine Coast. We should also continue to claim several prominent philosophers. Peter Singer, who is now at Princeton University, is a laureate professor at University of Melbourne, and has recently produced a
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commentary on the ethics of doping in sport. Julian Savulescu, now at Oxford University but previously at the Murdoch Institute, together with Bennett Foddy and Megan Clayton, from the Murdoch Institute in Melbourne, also write about doping in sport (2004).

Future Considerations

Exercise science, sport performance, and sport management related courses dominate the sport studies landscape in Australasian universities. At the same time, sport is rife with problems. There has been growing public concern about issues in sport such as drug use and drug control, gene doping, racial vilification, gambling, HIV/AIDS, homophobia, gender discrimination, violence and injuries, athlete rights, and the public subsidisation of sporting events. In spite of these glaring issues and problems, there are few educational programs in Australasian universities that devote serious critical attention to them.

The linking of sport and philosophy may be considered incredible by some, but sport resonates in Australasian culture like no other activity and is fertile ground for philosophical analysis. However, this will require a greater acknowledgement of the role of sport in human affairs and also the resolution of the traditional divide between those in the ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ areas of philosophical endeavour. While the situation for the philosophy of sport may seem bleak at times, there is no shortage of issues in sport that could benefit from collaborative work between philosophers and their sport philosophy colleagues.

Philosophy of Statistics

Neil Thomason

To the outsider, ‘philosophy of probability’ and ‘philosophy of statistics’ might appear to be almost synonymous. To the cognoscenti, however, they are strikingly different, although obviously covering some common ground. Philosophy of probability deals primarily with conceptual issues in probability theory, especially the meaning of probability statements (the so-called ‘interpretations’ of probability) and the philosophical underpinnings of probability theory’s formalism; it also shades seamlessly into various philosophical problems in decision theory ranging from Bernouilli’s St. Petersburg paradox of the early eighteenth century to Nover and Hájek’s recent Pasadena paradox.

Philosophy of statistics, on the other hand, deals primarily with conceptual and other difficulties involved in statistical inference; it deals with choosing the best hypothesis (‘indirect inference’). A major topic of philosophy of statistics is what one means by ‘best’, which in turn helps distinguish philosophy of statistics from
statistics. Philosophy of statistics is controversial to its core and its convoluted metaphysical debates have considerable practical implications for how science should be done.

Arguably the world’s outstanding—certainly the most influential—contributor to the philosophy of statistics was the pipe-smoking polymath, Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher. Fisher enters this article because he left his Cambridge professorship in the late 1950s to become a senior research fellow with the CSIRO in Adelaide. Among non-statisticians, he is perhaps best known during this period for his articles and letters questioning the causal link between smoking and lung cancer (Fisher 1957, 1958a, 1958b, 1958c, 1959).

While, as often, his rhetoric became a bit strident (‘… surely the “yellow peril” of modern times is not the mild and soothing weed but the original creation of states of frantic alarm’), his methodological points remain interesting and ingenious: e.g. ‘Is it possible, then, that lung cancer—that is to say, the pre-cancerous condition which must exist and is known to exist for years in those who are going to show overt lung cancer—is one of the causes of smoking cigarettes? I don’t think it can be excluded’ (Fisher 1958a: 162).

In his The Design of Experiments, Fisher made the provocative, clearly overstated claim that, ‘Every experiment may be said to exist only in order to give the facts a chance of disproving the null hypothesis’ (Fisher 1935: 18). This claim for the centrality of null hypothesis testing, although strongly challenged by Bayesians among others, has been immensely influential. In Adelaide he continued his bruising battles with Jerzy Neyman, Egon Pearson and others over the nature of statistical inference and appropriate statistical techniques. Calling Birnbaum ‘a very bewildered type’ over the likelihood principle is a nice example of his rhetorical style during his Australian years (Fisher 1962). As Savage wrote, ‘[Fisher] was often involved in quarrels, and though he sometimes disagreed politely, he sometimes published insults that only a saint could entirely forgive’ (Savage 1976: 446). For Neyman’s side of the story, see Neyman (1961). Fisher died in Adelaide, not of lung cancer.

Much of Australasian philosophy of statistics has focussed on critiques of null hypothesis testing, to which Fisher contributed so much, and its complex relationship to Bayes’ Theorem, which he denounced so strongly. Bayes’ Theorem follows from the standard axioms of probability and is, in itself, more-or-less unproblematic. However, there are great debates about how to apply the Theorem and, indeed, whether it can or should be applied in virtually any practical cases at all. While all agree it can be used for urn and such cases, applying it to scientific theory choice has proven immensely difficult. Nonetheless, in recent years philosophies sympathetic to Bayesianism have been in the ascendancy in Australasia.

Perhaps the outstanding Australasian contribution to philosophy of statistics has been Minimum Message Length (MML), developed primarily by Monash University’s foundation professor of computer science, Chris Wallace (Ph.D., Sydney). The fundamental idea, to simplify wildly, is that data compression, when properly done, and Bayesian analysis, when properly done, are the same
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thing. Or, as Wallace put colloquially in ‘A Brief History of MML’, a poignant, informal talk delivered not long before his death:

... it turns out that when you look at it, the strings which went into the computer which have most effect on making the predictions of future data are the strings which encoded the available data most concisely. In other words data compression. And the better the compression the more weight was given to that string in making the predictions as to what’s happening next. (Wallace 2003)

‘A Brief History of MML’ contains Wallace’s own view of the history, with an emphasis on the relationship between MML, data compression and Bayesianism. (For a description of Wallace and his work, see Dowe 2008.)

More technically, MML is an invariant Bayesian method of model selection and point estimation. ‘Invariant’ here means that MML will not change its answer (estimation, model selected) when the scale or co-ordinate system is changed. It is also a plausible information-theoretical reformulation of Ockham’s Razor, holding that the best explanation of the data is found in the shortest message, where the message length includes both the statement of the model as well as the data encoded most concisely in the model. For a far more technical working out of Wallace’s insight, its consequences and its applications, see the posthumous Wallace (2005).

I cannot help but believe that MML has been the victim of the tyranny of distance. I believe that if Wallace been at a major northern-hemisphere university, MML would be a major, perhaps the major, approach to statistical matters, at least in those areas where the appropriate data is available. Still, in recent years, it has been considerably developed, particularly at Monash University. (For some examples see Korb and Nicholson 2004: ch. 8; Dowe et al. 2007; and Twardy et al. 2005.)

Peter Walley’s (Ph.D. UWA) monograph, Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities, is an influential extension of the Bayesian theory of robustness, focussing on that much-discussed Achilles heel of Bayesianism, prior probability distributions (Walley 1991). Walley gives many arguments for the need for ‘imprecise’ probability assignments, represented not with single real numbers but with ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ probabilities. He develops the philosophical and mathematical underpinnings of his theory in great detail.

Jason Grossman (Ph.D. Sydney) reformulated Barnard’s and Birnbaum’s likelihood principle and provided it with its most extended philosophical defence. On this basis, Grossman argued that one does not have to be Bayesian to show that central frequentist concepts such as p-values, confidence intervals, power, and bias are incoherent—or at least pragmatically incoherent (Grossman, 2011).

Claire Leslie (Ph.D. Melbourne; Swinburne) follows Cox’s 1958 demonstration that standard frequentist measures such as the p-value do not describe evidence, on any plausible understanding of evidence. She showed how frequentism can be modified to produce results that are evidentially optimal and that such results
bear a greater resemblance to the likelihood measures of I. J. Good and Hacking than to the products of conventional frequentism (Leslie 2008).

Geoff Cumming (D.Phil. Oxford; La Trobe), working closely with Neil Thomason (Ph.D. Berkeley; Melbourne) and Fiona Fidler (Ph.D. Melbourne; La Trobe and Melbourne) to reform statistical practices in the social sciences, has done some interesting philosophical work on the way. His (2008) showed that the $p$ value given by a replication experiment often is very different indeed from the original experiment’s $p$-value. For example, if your initial experiment obtains $p=.05$, then the 80% $p$-interval, meaning the 80% prediction interval for the $p$-value, is (.00008, .44). That is, there is a 10% chance that, on replication, $p<.00008$, and a 10% chance $p>.44$! This is true, regardless of sample size (Cumming 2008).

Kevin Korb (Ph.D. Indiana; Monash) applied causal protocol theory to computing likelihoods to Hempel’s paradox, and is working on extending this to a more general Bayesian account (Korb 1994).

Finally, Thomason and Elizabeth Silver (Melbourne) are critiquing the philosophical and empirical foundations of intention-to-treat (ITT) analyses of medical randomised control trials (RCTs). ITT analyses all (available) data from RCTs, regardless of whether the subjects followed the assigned protocol (i.e. took their medicine) or not. They (we) claim that the hegemony of ITT can seriously undermine medical progress by, *inter alia*, substantially understating the intervention’s effect size as well as substantially understating an intervention’s unfortunate side-effects. The alternatives to ITT have generally been almost completely neglected.

Esoteric though it is, philosophy of statistics is flourishing in Australasia.

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**Place, U. T.**

David Armstrong

W. G. Lycan said, ‘in my considered opinion, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” [by U. T. Place] is the most important philosophy of mind article published in the 20th century’ (taken from the jacket of George Graham and Elizabeth Valentine’s very useful collection, *Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place*). This article launched among philosophers the so-called *identity theory* (not mere correlation of mental and brain processes, but identity).

Ullin Thomas Place was born on 24 October 1924 in Northallerton, North Yorkshire and died in Thirsk, North Yorkshire, on 3 January 2000. In a very interesting intellectual autobiography he tells us of a Quaker heritage, leading to an early interest in mysticism and to conscientious objection in wartime (Graham
and Valentine 2004). After an earlier year at Oxford devoted to social anthropology, he enrolled in 1947 for the new PPP degree, psychology combined with philosophy or physiology, his choice being philosophy. Place always remained both a psychologist and a philosopher, and a genuinely interdisciplinary one at that. An important influence was Brian Farrell, Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy, who, incidentally, first raised the question what it was like to be a bat.

In 1951 the newly appointed young professor of philosophy at the University of Adelaide, J. J. C. Smart, needed a psychologist because his department was also responsible for that subject. Smart had known Place at Oxford and appointed him to fill the needed position. Place must be credited with introducing scientific psychology to the University of Adelaide, rats in mazes and all, and after his time psychology became a department in its own right.

But Place also continued with his philosophical thinking. Like Smart, Place had been greatly influenced at Oxford by Gilbert Ryle’s behaviourism or quasi-behaviourism, with its emphasis upon dispositions to behave in certain ways as the key to the mental. Place, however, was increasingly unwilling to allow that consciousness could be treated in the Rylean way. At the same time he was unwilling to accept a dualist position. Materialism about the mental seemed the only scientifically plausible position. Perhaps, then, consciousness could be identified with purely physical processes in the brain? Over time he converted Smart from his Ryleanism, and Smart always emphasised that it was Place that was there first. Place’s paper was rejected by Mind (personal communication of Place to Elizabeth Valentine) but then accepted by the British Journal of Psychology, appearing in 1956 (and reprinted in Graham and Valentine 2004).

Even as a second-best, this was not a very happy outcome. Psychologists were, one supposes, not very interested, and philosophers did not even read the journal. (Smart, by contrast, signalled his own later conversion in The Philosophical Review, at that time read by most analytical philosophers.)

But there was a much more serious obstacle to the view’s gaining a degree of acceptance. This was that Place argued that the identification was a contingent matter. His model was ‘lightning is [is identical with] an electric discharge’, which was once a scientific hypothesis, though now established. In the same spirit, he was putting forward a hypothesis about the mental. (A few years later, under the influence of Kripke, many would come to think that the proposition about the nature of lightning was a necessary one, though one known only a posteriori.) But at the time Place was writing, analytical philosophers were treating contingency and knowability a posteriori as pretty much extensionally equivalent. Philosophers at that time, furthermore, tended to think that philosophical truths were established a priori or not at all, a tendency only strengthened by the widespread conviction that philosophy could not advance beyond linguistic or conceptual analysis. (Recall that the title of Ryle’s book was The Concept of Mind.)

In addition, many thought that Place’s contention could be refuted by the consideration that one could be aware of one’s own consciousness while totally unaware of one’s own brain processes. Taken by itself this is a patently invalid
argument, but taken along with the submerged, and so largely unexamined, Cartesian doctrine of self-intimation (nothing in the mental is hidden from us) the brain process hypothesis could seem to be refutable a priori.

At any rate, Place’s hypothesis was met with widespread incredulity and incomprehension, not to mention rather indifferent jokes. He never resiled from his view, but he became for a number of years rather detached from the ongoing discussion of it. In part this was personal—he resigned his lectureship at the University of Adelaide in December 1954 to return to England largely for family reasons—and so did not participate in the vigorous debate going on in Australia, a country to which he returned only once for a brief visit. (He did, however, maintain a connection with Smart both as philosopher and friend. When Smart was in England they would walk on the North Yorkshire moors.) But the more important reason was that he was out of sympathy with the way that the identity theory subsequently developed.

The theory that Place put forward was a limited one, a mixture of central-state theory and a Rylean view. In his article he said:

In the case of cognitive concepts like ‘knowing’, ‘believing’, ‘understanding’, and ‘remembering’, and volitional concepts like ‘wanting’ and ‘intending’, there can be little doubt, I think, that an analysis in terms of dispositions to behave … is fundamentally sound. On the other hand, there would seem to be an intractable residue of concepts clustering around the notions of consciousness, experience, sensation, and mental imagery, where some sort of inner process story is unavoidable. (Place 1956: 44)

Smart went along with this in his 1959 paper, not adding very much to Place’s position. He did contribute a very important clarifying piece of terminology. Ordinary statements about the mental, he argued, were topic neutral between dualism and materialism. (The phrase came from Ryle, although Ryle used it to describe logical terms.) The having of an orangey after-image, for instance, was analysed as (roughly) the having of something going on in one like what went on when in good light an actual ripe orange acted on one’s eyes. If this style of analysis was correct, then it sets up a level playing field where dualist and material theories of what the actual nature of the ‘something going on’ was could be decided on empirical grounds, grounds which favoured materialism. Place accepted this idea, indeed he considered it was already present in his own paper (see Graham and Valentine 2004: 110–11).

Later work, however, by David Lewis (1966), D. M. Armstrong (1966, 1968) and Brian Medlin (1967) sought an identity or central-state theory for all mental states, events and processes. Furthermore, Smart quickly came to accept this widening of the scope of the theory. Place never did; see for instance his 1988 paper, ‘Thirty Years on—Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process?’ (reprinted in Graham and Valentine 2004). Place’s identity theory was always and only an identity with consciousness.
On his return to England Place worked for six years in the midlands as a clinical psychologist, touring in a caravan that doubled as a consulting-room. In January 1968 he joined the psychology department at Leeds University working on operant responses in manic-depressive psychosis, but in October 1969 he transferred to philosophy. Retiring in 1982 he came back as senior fellow in 1983.

He married twice, first to Anna Wessel, and in 1964 to Peggy Kay. He and Peggy drove in a camper-van all over Europe to philosophy conferences. When he knew he was dying he went on working steadily at his intellectual projects while he could, until the last two weeks. He left his brain to the University of Adelaide—where it may be seen in the Anatomy Museum with his own caption: ‘Did this Brain Contain the Consciousness of U. T. Place?’

Because his identity theory was an identity with consciousness only, he remained sympathetic to behaviourism, particularly the work of B. F. Skinner. Since mental dispositions were so important for his theory, his metaphysics of dispositions kept developing. He took from C. B. Martin the view that the marks generally given of mental intentionality may also be found in dispositions. This suggested that intentionality with its direction upon objects that need not exist (as in, say, false belief) can be explained as being no more than a certain sort of physical disposition (Martin and Pfeifer 1986). (Martin was a member of the philosophy department at the University of Adelaide during the period that Place was teaching there.) He retained to the end the view that philosophy was conceptual or linguistic analysis, but he thought that this analysis was an empirical matter. Blind-sight and other evidence convinced him of the existence of a second mental system within us, inaccessible to consciousness, which he felicitously called ‘the zombie within’. The sweep of his work may be surveyed in the Graham and Valentine collection.

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Plunkett Centre for Ethics

Plunkett Centre for Ethics

Bernadette Tobin

The Plunkett Centre for Ethics was the first research centre to be created by the Australian Catholic University. It grew out of two initiatives. The first was that the Catholic College of Education, Sydney (a predecessor institution of the Australian Catholic University) had begun to offer short courses in bioethics in the Catholic tradition to doctors and nurses, most but not all of whom worked in the Catholic health care sector. The second was the decision of the Sisters...
of Charity to appoint a hospital ethicist to the staff of St Vincent’s Hospital in Sydney in response to the challenges occasioned by rapid technological advances in medical treatment and the worsening financial constraints on the availability of care in hospitals. The centre was formally opened in 1992. Location on the campus of the hospital meant that at least some staff of the centre would be able to make philosophically-trained contributions to the intellectual life of a teaching hospital, both at the level of what is now called ‘ethics consultations’ and at the level of institutional practice.

The centre’s aim, from the beginning, has been to promote intellectual excellence in ethics in the service of compassionate and equitable health care informed by reflective, critical engagement with the complex Catholic philosophical and theological tradition. Its primary focus is to realise these values in its reflection on some contemporary questions in moral philosophy and in the provision of health care. This is done through research, teaching, and community engagement. The centre conducts, publishes and promotes research; provides research training and supervision; develops and teaches courses and conducts ethical reviews of professional practice; offers an ‘ethics consultation’ service and participates in public discussions.

The aim has changed little over the years, although (as the publications of the staff reveal) the way that aim has been pursued reflects the intellectual interests of individual members of the centre. An early focus was on the contribution of virtue ethics to medicine, law and society (see, for example, Buckle 2002). This has recently evolved into an examination of the intellectual origins of, and challenges to, contemporary Australian consequentialism in ethics (see, for example, Tobin 2005). An abiding interest continues to be the study of what the Catholic philosophical and theological tradition can learn from, and offer to, contemporary moral philosophy, together with the study of the distinctive insights of the Judeo-Christian tradition (e.g. Gleeson 2002). Staff helped to write the first Code of Ethics for Catholic Health and Aged Care Services in Australia. And staff often collaborate with doctors, nurses, lawyers and administrators in multi-disciplinary considerations of difficult moral choices in health care (see, for instance, Isaacs et al. 2006).

The centre is named after John Hubert Plunkett, the first Catholic Solicitor-General and then Attorney-General of New South Wales. An Irishman by birth, and a great friend of the first five Irish Sisters of Charity to come to Australia to offer health care to the poor, he drafted Acts which abolished summary punishment and the administration of justice by private householders, extended the protection of the law to convicts as well as emancipists, and disestablished the Church of England. Today he should be remembered for extending the protection of the law to the aboriginal people: in 1838 he secured the conviction of seven white men for the killing of an aborigine—in fact a whole tribe had been massacred at Myall Creek. His sense of the common humanity of indigenous and non-indigenous Australians did not reflect the spirit of his times!
Postmodernism

Philipa Rothfield

‘The language-game of legitimation is not state-political but philosophical …’
(Lyotard 1984, 33)

Although postmodernism is also associated with art and architecture, its philosophical roots are more closely aligned with poststructuralism and the events of May 1968 in France. These movements—in turn, philosophical and political—have made an impact on the way in which philosophy conceives itself, raising important questions about rationality and the nature of subjectivity. Postmodernism is one way of framing that shift.

Postmodernism has often been characterised as against modernism, against the enlightenment and against modernity. The postmodern cultural condition is famously said to involve what we might now call the globalised experience of consumer capitalism—the monetary access to a simultaneous diversity of products and experiences from all corners of the globe. But for all its oppositional rhetoric and cultural criticism, postmodernism can also be construed as a sustained critique of philosophy’s meta-discursive role.

This can be elaborated in relation to Jean-Francois Lyotard’s distinction between two philosophical fields—speculative and emancipatory—which were nominated in connection with his oft-cited remark that the ‘grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses’ (Lyotard 1984, 37). Speculative philosophy pertains to metaphysics, ontology and epistemology, that is, the way in which philosophy deals with the big questions of reality and knowledge. The emancipatory label refers to discourses of liberation; ethical and political projects that aim to put an end to oppression or domination. Marxism and feminism have been the prime interlocutors of Lyotard’s political critique.

The attribution of a fictive element (‘narrative’) alongside the moniker of speculation captures Lyotard’s suggestion that philosophy is less about truth than it is a kind of production of ‘truth’. Lyotard’s comment, originally published in 1979, represents the accumulated impact of several philosophers, notably Foucault, Irigaray, Derrida and Deleuze, many of whom built on the twentieth-century interpretations of Nietzsche inaugurated by Bataille. Irigaray, Derrida and Deleuze, each in their own way, read the classical texts of philosophy, jointly provoking the legacy which Lyotard addressed. Taken together, their work could be said to have undermined the key tenets of Enlightenment thought. Although better known for his allegiance to pragmatist philosophy, Richard Rorty’s (1980) book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, resonates with this trajectory in also questioning the nature of truth.
The ‘grand’ part of ‘grand narrative’ can be elaborated in relation to notions of universalisation and totalisation. What entitles philosophy to make universal claims that speak for everybody and everything? Is it legitimate or desirable for philosophy to attempt to cover the entire field, that is, to totalise? To what extent is philosophy able to furnish the epistemological bases of other disciplinary practices? These questions concern the character and role of philosophical discourse. Indeed, some would argue that this calls into question the very identity of philosophical thought: abstraction, argument, meta-thinking, logical form. The controversy addresses the scope and nature of philosophical thinking, and more generally, the legitimacy of universalised forms of theory.

These arguments have been conducted in a number of fields. In the philosophy of science, for example, one could imagine that universalisation and totalisation were accepted norms. Yet postmodern philosophers of science have rejected these concepts. Nancy Cartwright’s (1983) book, *How the Laws of Physics Lie*, illustrates an attempt to account for the laws of nature in a non-universal, non-totalising manner. Latour and Woolgar (1979) have weighed into the debate through treating science as a form of social construction. The universalism of scientific theory has also been discussed in epistemological terms: Joseph Rouse (1987) developed a notion of ‘local knowledge’ as an alternative to the universality of science, whilst Donna Haraway (1988) replaced the ‘God’s eye view’ of science (the ‘view from nowhere’) with a situated conception of knowledge. In these examples, the universal dimension of science has been reformulated so as to conceive it as a practice that is specific, situated, localised and particular. The question then becomes: how does science generalise or adapt local forms of knowledge in order to achieve its breadth of scope?

Feminist and Marxist philosophers have also engaged with postmodernism, largely via the politics of enlightenment thought. Here the argument clusters around the implied subject of political discourse. To what extent do emancipatory narratives presume a universal subject of oppression/emancipation? Inasmuch as universalism prevails, the emancipatory subject is conceived in humanist terms: ‘humanity as the hero of liberty’ (Lytard 1984, 31). This also has feminist implications. Having exposed the inherent masculinity of the humanist subject (for example, Lloyd 1984), some feminist approaches sought to ‘restore’ universal subjectivity via egalitarian means, whilst others denied the feasibility of such a move. Many of these debates have been framed around the status and desirability of the universal, woman. Ought feminism to pursue the liberation of women in universal terms? What theoretical implications accrue from the marginalisation of women of colour, third world women and other minority groups? Does the existence of hegemonic feminism suggest that universality itself is the problem?

Some feminists have expressed skepticism towards the apparent disinterestedness of postmodernism, speculating that its critique of the category ‘woman’ has arisen just as women are making real gains as citizen-subjects. Is postmodernism a (white, male) ruse concocted to deflect women from their political goals?
Postmodernism

Meaghan Morris (1988) argues that feminism is not external to postmodern thought but is equally found within postmodernist forms of discourse. Other feminists have further embraced the postmodern critique of enlightenment universality, claiming that feminist discourse has never adequately represented the entirety of women, and that difference is a better figure around which to organise (Young 1990, Yeatman and Gunew 1993).

The question of difference within the political arena owes a great deal to the work of the French feminist, Luce Irigaray. Irigaray (1985) posed the question of sexual difference in relation to a number of key philosophical texts, arguing that each in its own way reduces (sexual) difference to a version of (masculine) sameness. Irigaray argued the point with respect to discourses overtly concerned with sexuality and sexual difference (Freud, Lacan) but also with respect to philosophical texts that purport sexual neutrality (Plato, Merleau-Ponty). Phallocentrism pertains to (philosophical) systems of representation which manifest a certain kind of patriarchal structure organised around sameness. Sameness, in this context, refers to an economy (order) of representation based upon the primacy of masculine subjectivity (whether explicit or not). However elaborated, whenever ‘the two sexes are conceived as identical, as opposites or complements, one of the terms defines the position of the other’ (Grosz 1989, 105). Universalism and totalisation are manifestations of phallocentric thought inasmuch as they are forms of representation which are organised around a univocal perspective. Feminists have drawn on Irigaray’s work to articulate a feminism which resists the urge to erase differences amongst women, whilst feminist philosophers have taken up her critical account of phallocentrism in relation to philosophical systems of representation.

Michel Foucault is also a key figure of postmodernist thought. Although Foucault (1985) resisted any simplistic opposition to the Enlightenment as such, the breadth of his work poses a sustained, critical engagement with notions of rationality, knowledge and subjectivity. His work on sexuality and subjectivity casts doubt on the sense that there is a universal, ahistorical human subject beyond the specificities of time and place. His writings on the discourses of biomedicine, sexuality, the prison system and the rise of modern psychiatry traced the contours of a variety of knowledges, each with its embedded, institutionalised forms of truth. By teasing out the very different understandings that permeated different epochs, Foucault promoted the view that epistemological difference produces truth-effects rather than external grounds which supply what might be called truth conditions. His work marks a break with structuralist linguistics which tended to focus upon relations of language, moving towards a complex elaboration of power, discourse and the body.

Along with Irigaray, Foucault emphasises the body’s role within the social formation, a mark of difference from classical Marxism. Where Marxism might have emphasised ideology as the means by which social subjects take up their place in the world (via false consciousness or ideological subject-production), Foucault looked to the ways in which human bodies come to be socially inscribed
Postmodernism

as the means by which subjectivity is produced. For Foucault, like Irigaray, the body-subject needs to be approached in socio-cultural terms. Consciousness is no longer regarded as a universal, unmarked facility whose transcendental structure can be analyzed *a priori* (Kant) or by bracketing the empirical world (Husserl). Their common emphasis on the body as a site of social elaboration enters the postmodern critique of (in this context, disembodied) universal, totalised knowledge.

Postmodernism was initially introduced to the Department of General Philosophy at the University of Sydney in the late 1970s, when Foucault, Lacan, Habermas and Derrida were first discussed by Wal Suchting, Paul Crittenden, John Burnheim and Michael Stocker, amongst others. From 1974 onwards, a ‘Working Papers’ collective formed under Feral Publications to publish the work of many French philosophers associated with postmodernism, including and especially Foucault. This group consisted of Paul Foss, Graeme Tubbenhauer, Terry Bell, Andrew Benjamin, Meaghan Morris and Elizabeth Grosz. A Sydney-based publication, entitled *Local Consumption*, also published on questions of representation, semiotics and sexuality.

Postmodernism made a palpable splash in the Australian philosophical scene in the shape of the ‘Futur*Fall, Excursions in Postmodernity’ conference which was held at the University of Sydney, in July 1984. More than 700 people attended this event, which featured international speakers, Jean Baudrillard and Gayatri Spivak, and disseminated the work of Foucault, Deleuze, Irigaray, Kristeva, Derrida and Lyotard (Grosz 1986a).

Between them, Elizabeth Grosz, Moira Gatens, Paul Patton, Julian Pefanis, Meaghan Morris and Terry Threadgold wrote on many of the central authors associated with postmodernism. Grosz and Gatens were key figures in circulating French feminism. Gatens’ (1996) work on Spinoza, ethics and corporeality was influential, as were Grosz’s engagements with Irigaray, Kristeva, Foucault and Derrida. Paul Patton’s (1993) edited collection, *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*, brought to the fore Nietzsche’s influence on postmodern thought. Ros Diprose and Robyn Ferrell (1991) and Penny Deutscher (1997) have likewise published on the work of Nietzsche, Derrida and Irigaray. It is difficult to contain postmodern theorising within the confines of philosophy, as many other disciplines have engaged with its debates and contributed in theoretical terms. Several of the above philosophers participated in or provoked these debates. For example, Patton’s (1988) Deleuzian critique of ‘the will to totalise’ confronted Marxism with questions regarding the character of Marxist theory, while Grosz’s ‘Conclusion: What is Feminist Theory?’ (1986a) could be viewed as a postmodern reformulation of feminist theory in strategic terms.

These academics have since forged their own intellectual pathways in a diversity of directions. There is now a generation of younger philosophers who are heir to these discussions and the work of the philosophers, here and abroad, who engaged in them. Ultimately, postmodernism functioned as a catalyst for critical debates regarding the status and nature of philosophy, theory, politics and knowledge.
Poststructuralism

And although it drew on the work of many important philosophers, it did not exhaust their relevance.

Poststructuralism

Jack Reynolds

While it is difficult to precisely define poststructuralism, we can begin ostensively by noting some of the philosophers who are most consistently and famously associated with the term. This includes Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, and Jean-François Lyotard. As such, poststructuralism refers primarily to those philosophers working in France who contested and problematised the reigning orthodoxy in the humanities and social sciences in the early 1960s, which at that time was structuralism. Before positively considering their work and the way in which their overlapping but not univocal interests came to form what we today refer to as poststructuralism, it is important to consider their immediate predecessor on the French scene, structuralism.

Structuralism was both a methodological mode of analysis as well as a more thoroughgoing metaphysical and ontological position, and it was widespread in the 1950s and ’60s, whether it be Roland Barthes employing structuralist techniques in literary theory, Claude Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, Jacques Lacan in psychoanalysis, or Louis Althusser in relation to Marxism and class analysis. The linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure was also garnering renewed attention. Structuralism sought to arrive at a stable and secure knowledge of a system or a structure, by charting differences within that structure, and it sought to do so without any references to subjectivity and consciousness.

Philosophers like Foucault (at least in his middle and later work), Lyotard, Deleuze and Derrida, along with some of the major French feminists including Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, were all important in challenging the ‘centrist’ assumption of structuralism that an understanding of one key element of the structure—whether it be kinship laws, the workings of language, the educational system, or the devices employed in a literary text—allows for an explanation of the entire system. Many of these poststructuralist thinkers also cast into question structuralism’s rather strict determinism (for Althusser, for example, subjects are ‘interpellated’ or produced to fit certain socially defined roles). Rather than reinvent a philosophy of freedom in order to challenge this, they instead insisted upon the role of unpredictable forces in the genesis of any structure, law, or norm. Opposing structuralism’s quasi-scientific claims to objectivity, rationality and intelligibility, poststructuralists tended to point to certain moments, or ‘events’, that disrupt any stable and secure sense of meaning and identity. The student
revolutions in Paris in May 1968 were an enduring and formative influence upon their work, but for all of them some kind of rupture is a transcendental necessity for the event and not merely a contingent fact. Although they could not be said to be irrationalists, their work consistently pointed to the limits of rationality, reason, and knowledge. On their view, these limits are not merely peripheral but come to constitute and problematise any so-called core, and the sometimes polemical debate between Derrida and John Searle on the Austanian distinction between normal and parasitic speech (i.e. playful, theatric speech) is exemplary in this regard (for Derrida's version of events, see *Limited Inc.*).

To briefly provide a couple of further examples, we might also think here of Lyotard's concept of the *differend* and Derrida's thematisation of the undecidable (his more famous neologism, *différance*, requires more explanation than space allows here). The *differend* is Lyotard’s term for a dispute in which two (or more) parties cannot agree on a common rule of judgement, or a metanarrative which would act as a tribunal of arbitration. This may seem a rare occurrence, but, for him, *differends* are in fact ubiquitous, prevailing whenever one phrase is linked onto another, and where language is used in mutually exclusive ways (e.g. denotative vs. prescriptive). For Derrida, so-called ‘undecidables’ are part of each and every text, and some of his most famous examples include the motif of the ghost in Marx, the *pharmakon* in Plato, and the hymen in Mallarmé. An undecidable cannot conform to either polarity of a dichotomy (e.g. present/absent, cure/poison, and inside/outside in the above examples) and this kind of oscillation between two determinate possibilities breaks open the meaning that an author seeks to impose upon their work, exposing it to alternative understandings that undermine the explicit authorial intention. While meaning has a context that saturates it, on this view it is nonetheless never secured once and for all. As would be apparent, philosophies of language played an important role in these two thinker’s work.

Genealogical, archaeological, dialectical, and deconstructive analyses of the history of Western philosophy were also important to all of the poststructuralists in their efforts to transform and make new. These engagements were never intended to constitute simple critiques of this tradition, however, but as sustained efforts to inhabit from within and to open up space for new possibilities by showing possibilities that have been covered over. While appropriations of their thought have sometimes resulted in a monolithic treatment of this history, it is important to note that a revaluation of difference and an ongoing concern with marginality also characterised their work. This helps to explain why poststructuralism has often been allied with leftist causes, despite retaining a more critical relation to doctrinaire Marxism, which is yet another ‘grand narrative’ according to Lyotard. Drawing on structuralism, psychoanalysis, *phenomenology* (especially Heidegger), and a Kantian-inspired preoccupation with transcendental arguments, poststructuralists have continued to endorse the structuralist idea of ‘the death of the subject’, and have continued to highlight problems with, and the limits to, humanism. This simply means that it is spurious to begin from the assumption that consciousness and subjectivity are fundamental when they are
in fact socio-culturally produced, albeit not in as over-determined a way as the structuralists might have thought.

**Poststructuralism in Australasia**

Having schematically defined poststructuralism, we cannot consider the history of this movement within Australasia without simultaneously considering the history of Continental or European philosophy in the Antipodes. In this regard, as with most English-speaking countries, Continental or European philosophy has not been the dominant kind of philosophy taught in Australasian universities and it has, sometimes, been treated with disdain. Nonetheless, phenomenology and existential philosophy became increasingly popular in the late 1950s and ‘60s (and organisations like the Australasian Association for Phenomenology appeared, later to become the Australasian Society of Continental Philosophy). Shortly after, the student revolutions around the world began—May 1968 in France, just afterwards in Australia. These events had a profound influence upon academic philosophy, as did the Vietnam War, which likewise polarised the academic philosophical community. Indeed, in the early 1970s the structuralist Marxism of Althusser (who taught Derrida and Foucault) was one of the major factors behind a rather acrimonious split of the philosophy department at the University of Sydney into the Department of General Philosophy and the Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy. But it was not just adherence to the tenets of Althusser’s Marxism that was responsible. It also involved a dispute between those who thought that feminism, Marxism, and Continental philosophy were worth pursuing, and those who did not, or at least did not think that they were appropriately classified as philosophy, which on the analytic understanding ought to be bound up with a respect for clarity and a commitment to argumentation conforming to various logical or probabilistic norms—suffice it to say that the poststructuralist concern with style and manner of expression often meant their work contravened these norms, notwithstanding the difficulties of translation.

Indeed, at the same time the first breaths of French poststructuralism were also beginning to have an influence. Although many of the canonical texts were written during 1966–69 (think of Derrida’s *Speech and Phenomena, Of Grammatology*, and *Writing and Difference*, Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense*, and Foucault’s *The Order of Things* and *Archaeology of Knowledge*), it took some time for these texts to be translated and to begin to make an impression in Australasia. Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s provocative experimental text, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, had also just come out (1972 in French, 1977 in its English translation) and brought the authors immediate fame. Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton edited and translated pieces on Foucault and Deleuze in the late 1970s, inspiring all kinds of people, including the film critic Adrian Martin. Various independent publishing houses cropped up and briefly flourished (Intervention Publications, Feral Publications), and Lyotard’s highly influential book, *The Postmodern Condition*, was published in French in 1979.
Much of this growth happened in and around Sydney. Indeed, despite the fact that W. R. Boyce Gibson (University of Melbourne) translated the work of Husserl, historically it is difficult to deny that Sydney has been the centre of Continental philosophy in Australasia, and this is arguably particularly so in regard to poststructuralism. The input of philosophers like Max Deutscher and Genevieve Lloyd was very important in this regard, but so also has been the work of Ross Poole, Max Charlesworth, György Markus and others coming from Marxist and critical theory traditions. Since the 1970s, the University of Sydney, the University of New South Wales (UNSW) and Macquarie University have all had programs that were strong in Continental philosophy for substantial periods of time. In relation to poststructuralism, Paul Patton (UNSW) translated one of the most important books of this period, Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*, and has done influential work on both Deleuze and Foucault. Lloyd (UNSW), Moira Gatens (Sydney), Elizabeth Grosz (Sydney, then Monash University), Rosalyn Diprose (UNSW), Rosi Braidotti (Australian National University (ANU)), Penelope Deutscher (ANU) and Robyn Ferrell (Macquarie, then Melbourne), among others, have all been highly influential both here and overseas, with their diverse feminisms. These Australian feminists, drawing on the insights of poststructuralist philosophers (particularly their complication of either/or, oppositional logics) and focussing upon the body, have been major players in enumerating a different feminism that avoids the weaknesses of first and second wave feminism, egalitarian feminism and social constructionist feminism respectively.

These days, most major philosophy departments in Australia (although not New Zealand) have one philosopher who teaches material related to poststructuralism, or the broader term of which it is a specific philosophical manifestation, *postmodernism* (many who accept the term ‘poststructuralism’ are reluctant to be designated as postmodernists). More recently, the University of Queensland and La Trobe University have become stronger in this regard. Murdoch University has had a presence in this area since its inception, through the work of Horst Ruthrof, Niall Lucy, Jeff Malpas and others. Marion Tapper and Chris Cordner have been stalwarts at the University of Melbourne, ensuring that Continental philosophy receives fair treatment, although one could not call either of them card-carrying poststructuralists. The University of Auckland has been one of the few institutions in New Zealand to accord any attention to either Continental philosophy or poststructuralism (through Julian Young, Robert Wicks, Stefano Franchi, Lisa Guenther, Matheson Russell and others), but it has generally been ignored by the rest of the New Zealand academic philosophical community.

Excepting a brief period in the mid 1990s, the prestigious journal that represents philosophy in this region, the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (*AJP*), has been focussed on analytic philosophy. Nonetheless, as Foucault would have us believe, forms of resistance will always be produced within any given social system and there have been several interesting journals concerned with poststructuralist thinkers and themes that have come to flourish in the gap left by the *AJP*’s
apparent reluctance to publish such material. These include: *Foucault Studies* (Queensland University of Technology), *Contretemps* (University of Sydney), *Colloquy* (Monash, CCLCS), and *Parrhesia* (affiliated with University of Melbourne and the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy). Many of these journals and organisations have been effectively run by postgraduate students of philosophy, and are evidence of an ongoing passion for poststructuralist philosophy in Australasia that has managed to flourish somewhat rhizomatically, to borrow the term that Deleuze and Guattari have made their own, in that they have often been promulgated without major publishers, or major academics, behind them. Indeed, it should also be noted that some important work on poststructuralism has been done outside of those employed to teach philosophy. Recently, Justin Clemens has done important work translating and speaking about the philosophy of Alain Badiou, as has Julian Pefanis in relation to Lyotard, Ian Buchanan in regard to Deleuze, and Kevin Hart on both Derrida and Maurice Blanchot.

While poststructuralist philosophy remains popular with students in Australasia, it is interesting to note that many influential Australian philosophers with expertise in this area have moved to overseas positions (including Braidotti, Grosz, Deutscher, Buchanan, Claire Colebrook, and Andrew Benjamin—before his return to Monash University). While some of these may have gone for promotional reasons, young academics in this area are also moving overseas. It is hoped that they can one day return to a philosophy community with more space for them. With all of the major poststructuralist philosophers now dead, and the French nouveaux philosophes not garnering anywhere near the same critical purchase and attention internationally, questions abound about what is postpoststructuralism. While phenomenology, critical theory, and poststructuralism will all remain powerful theoretical forces on the Australasian philosophical scene, let us hope that the next ‘new philosophy’ manages to both engage with, and problematise, the enduring analytic/Continental divide.

**Price, Huw**

Cathy Legg

Huw Price did not plan to go into philosophy originally—as an undergraduate at Australian National University (ANU) he hoped initially to become an astronomer. However his interests turned to pure mathematics then to philosophy, and he completed his B.A. with Honours in both subjects. During his philosophy Honours year he encountered both the philosophy of time, which was to become a long-term interest, and Hugh Mellor (then visiting ANU), who
was to become his Ph.D. supervisor at Cambridge. Moving to Cambridge after an M.Sc. in Mathematics at Oxford, he wrote his Ph.D. thesis on the question of factuality versus non-factuality in talk of probability, leading to a series of published articles (including Price 1983; Price 1984b; Price 1986). By this stage, he had held a Rothmans postdoctoral fellowship at ANU, and an Australian Research Council (ARC) research fellowship at the University of New South Wales (UNSW).

Price’s work divides into two main areas. The first is a cosmological inquiry into the asymmetry of time and related issues. His key work here is his book, Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point (1996). There he argues that our thinking about time (not only in armchair philosophy but even in theoretical physics) is crucially and inappropriately anthropocentric. We experience time as asymmetric because we act into the future, not the past, which leads us to project this asymmetry onto reality in ways which are not warranted by the facts. For instance, we like to think of time as ‘flowing forwards’, we fail to see that some of the arguments which support a Big Bang at the ‘beginning’ of the universe would equally support a Big Crunch at the ‘end’, and we fail to consider the possibility of backwards causation where it might be helpful. As a remedy for such anthropomorphism, Price advocates a position which he calls the ‘view from no-when’.

Somewhat controversially, he uses a commitment to backwards causation (earlier broached in Price 1984a) to frame an interpretation of quantum theory which he claims solves the problem of non-locality, whereby particles widely separated in space appear to be causally entangled. Many philosophers have praised this book for its provocative originality and rich and complex discussion. Some physicists, however, have claimed that it makes controversial empirical claims that are insufficiently worked out in actual physical equations to yet deserve credence. After publication of the book Price has further pursued its themes in many papers, including Price 1997b, 2002, and 2006.

Price has done much related work on causation, arguing that causal asymmetry also is merely an artifact of the agent-perspective with which humans view the world (Price 1991; Price 1992). In Price and Menzies 1993, he defends a general theory of causation defined in terms of agency—a version of the so-called ‘manipulability’ view of causation (albeit probabilistic rather than deterministic). This work on causation connects to the second major strand of Price’s research, which developed from his early defence of a non-factualist account of single-case probability—the nature and tenability of the general distinction between factual and non-factual uses of language. In his first book, Facts and the Function of Truth (1988), he argued that the distinction is ungrounded, and began to propose in its place a kind of global expressivist pluralism about the uses of declarative language, reminiscent of the later Wittgenstein. These researches then sparked an interest in pragmatism. Price’s pragmatism is derived much more from Ramsey, Blackburn and the later Wittgenstein than from James, Dewey or Peirce (though lately he does react against and discuss the American pragmatists Rorty and Brandom). It may be characterised by a strategy which he applies to a wide variety
of philosophical problems. The strategy involves taking traditional questions of
the form, ‘What is X?’ which he often characterises as ‘metaphysical’ questions,
and arguing that our focus should be shifted to ‘non-metaphysical’ questions of
the form, ‘What use is the concept of X to creatures like us?’. He characterises this
approach as producing explanations of the use of terms, rather than philosophical
analyses.

He has applied this strategy most sustainedly to truth, initially in Price (1988).
In answer to the question, ‘What use is the concept of truth to us?’, he suggests
that the concept encourages speakers to resolve their disagreements. In later
work (including Price 1998a, 2003), he distinguishes three ‘norms of assertion’
which he claims generate increasing levels of objectivity in discourse. The first
norm, ‘subjective assertibility’, merely recommends sincere avowal of assertions,
resulting in a community which expresses mere opinions of equal apparent value.
The second norm, ‘objective assertibility’, recommends that assertions be justified
by reasons, but if two people make assertions which disagree this is unproblematic
if they both have reasons for them. Only the third norm, seeking the truth,
requires that disagreements be resolved (although at this point providing a non-
question-begging account of what might constitute ‘resolution’ of a disagreement
will be crucial).

As already noted, Price has also applied his pragmatist strategy to causation,
thus connecting his pragmatism to his interests in such issues as time-asymmetry.
Thus in Price (2001), he writes that a philosophical account of causation ‘needs
to begin by playing close attention to the role of the concept concerned in the
practice of the creatures who use it’. These ideas are developed at greater length
in Price (2007a). In Price (1998b), he makes use of pragmatism in discussions of
response-dependence, arguing that the biconditionals used by response-dependence
theorists to define concepts do not give content-conditions but usage-conditions. As
an example he discusses the difference in ethics between self-descriptivism, the
view that when we make moral claims we are talking about our own attitudes of,
say, approval or disgust, and expressivism, the view that we can explain moral
claims as expressions of, say, approval or disgust.

As a pragmatist he positions himself as something of a renegade against main-
stream Australian analytic philosophy. He does retain a strong commitment
to naturalism, though he is adamant that it is not a metaphysical claim. It does
however lead him to problematise any normative claim which is not derivable
from current scientific theory. Thus in Price (1997a), he singles out ‘morality,
modality, meaning and the mental’ as ‘threatened by the rise of modern science’.
He attempts to rescue them by claiming that ‘these descriptive utterances are
functionally distinct from scientific descriptions of the natural world … ’ Rather
than ceding these ‘M-worlds’ any ontological status, however, he invokes Carnap’s
claim in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ that judgments of ontological
status cannot be made from an epistemic stance independent of choices to
participate in a given theoretic framework (such as contemporary physics, ethics,
and so on). This view is presented again and related to Quine’s naturalism in
Priest, Graham

Price (2007b). As noted earlier, Price contrasts himself with his fellow–pragmatist Rorty. One key point of difference is that (as noted above) he wishes to retain the idea that truth is a normative constraint on assertion. At the same time, however, he contrasts himself with Brandom insofar as he does not wish to ‘build a substantial notion of representational content from expressivist and pragmatist raw materials’ (Price 2008).

Price has worked at the University of Sydney since 1989, except for a brief period as professor of logic and metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh. He is now an ARC Federation Fellow and Challis Professor of Philosophy, and heads the Centre for Time in the Department of Philosophy. This centre was established in 2002 in association with his Federation Fellowship, and awarded continued funding in 2007. He is a Fellow and Member of Council of the Australian Academy of the Humanities, and a past president of the Australasian Association of Philosophy. He was consulting editor for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy during 1995–2006, and is an associate editor of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, as well as a member of the editorial boards of Contemporary Pragmatism, Logic and Philosophy of Science, and the Routledge International Library of Philosophy. A collection of his essays on pragmatism and naturalism, Naturalism Without Mirrors, was published in 2011 by OUP, and he is also co-editor (with Richard Corry) of Causation, Physics and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited (2007).

Priest, Graham

Greg Restall

Graham Priest (born 1948 in London), currently the Boyce Gibson Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne, and distinguished professor of philosophy at the Graduate Centre of The City University of New York, is a philosopher active in the fields of logic, metaphysics and the history of philosophy.

Priest is most famous for his radical view that some contradictions are true. This view is radical because it offends both standard logical theory and common sense. It has been a fundamental tenet of logic since the time of Aristotle that if a statement (say, there will be a sea battle tomorrow) is true then its negation (there will not be a sea battle tomorrow) is not true (Priest 1979). Priest’s straightforward claim is that this fundamental tenet is wrong.

According to Priest, the logic of truth, of sets, of reference—and of many other fundamental notions besides—forces us to concede that some contradictory pairs of statements are true. Consider the paradoxes of self-reference, such as Epimenides’ liar paradox:
Priest reasons as follows: if that sentence is true, then it is not true, for that
is what it says of itself: that it is not true. So the supposition that it is true is
self-defeating, and as a result, it is not true. Notice that this is exactly how that
sentence describes things to be. So, since matters are how the sentence says they
are, the sentence is true. If it is true, it isn’t, and if it isn’t true, it is.

Most agree that this reasoning shows that something in our everyday
understanding of logic and truth needs revision. Priest’s radical proposal is that
the argument I just presented is perfectly acceptable, and that the contradictory
conclusions—that Epimenides’ sentence is true, and that it is not true—are both
to be accepted. Our principles of logic should not prohibit true contradictions.
Insofar as the dominant theories of logic do not allow for this, they are to be
revised. In the monograph *In Contradiction* (1987, 2006), Priest argues that a
‘paraconsistent’ approach provides the right way to deal with a range of phenomena
difficult to handle consistently.

If Priest is right about this, logicians have a great deal of work to do, because
the idea that contradictions cannot be true has been logical orthodoxy for over
two thousand years. Overturning orthodoxy and developing an understanding of
how truth and logic work in the presence of true contradictions is not straight-
forward. Much of this hard work has been done—starting with the work of
logicians such as da Costa in Brazil, and Anderson and Belnap in the U.S.—but
a great deal of it was Priest’s own labour. The new field of paraconsistent logic
has found its place in the vocabulary of logicians, largely due to Priest’s work, and
that of his friends and collaborators, many of whom work in Australia and New
Zealand. (Collaborators and fellow-travellers include Richard Routley (later
known as Richard Sylvan), Robert K. Meyer, John Slaney, Ed Mares, Greg
Restall and J. C. Beall.)

It is one thing to defuse paradoxes and reform the shape of logic. Priest’s recent
targets have broader significance. *Beyond the Limits of Thought* (1995, 2002), is a
tour through the history of philosophy from the Pre-Socratics and Nāgājūrṇa to
Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Along the way, Priest shows that the generation
of contradictions is not a trifle, restricted to puzzles which we can safely ignore.
Instead, the kinds of contradictions forced on us by the paradoxes are littered
throughout philosophy, to be found wherever a theory talks of particular totalities,
like all statements, all ideas, all numbers or all meanings. A tempting response
may be that of Wittgenstein’s quietist, according to whom one must refrain from
making these general claims: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be
silent’. Priest rejects quietism, because it doesn’t avoid the problem. One should
always refrain from making general claims—isn’t this another general claim? For
Priest, all general approaches to the world, or to meaning, or to truth—even
quietist ones—are tied up in contradictory knots. Instead of seeing these knots as
to be untangled or cut away, we should accept these knotty contradictions as an
inevitable aspect of our thought.
More recent still, Priest’s work has concentrated on issues in metaphysics and the nature and logic of being. His *Towards Non-Being* (2005) is an contemporary recovery of Meinong’s view that descriptions purporting to characterise an object (say, the golden mountain) actually do describe an object, which does not exist. This is a difficult view to maintain, for though we may agree that the golden mountain is indeed golden, and is a mountain (while also maintaining that it also fails to exist), it is less clear that we should happily agree that the round square is both round and not round (thereby being contradictory), or that the shortest proof that $2+2=5$ is indeed a proof that $2+2=5$, albeit a nonexistent one—since the only way that anything can be a proof that $2+2=5$ is when $2+2$ actually does equal 5. So it seems that not all descriptions purporting to characterise an object actually describe the object so characterised. Priest’s ingenious solution to this problem in *Towards Non-Being* is to conceive of the object as literally satisfying the characterising condition (so the proof that $2+2=5$ is indeed a proof that $2+2=5$, and hence, from that proof it follows that $2+2$ does equal 5), but not here in this possible world. Instead, when I think of the golden mountain, I am thinking of something that is gold and is a mountain. However, since there are no golden mountains, there is no golden mountain in this world, but there are plenty in other possible worlds. Proofs that $2+2=5$ are perhaps harder to come by, since it appears to be necessary that $2+2\neq 5$, and so a proof that $2+2=5$ is not to be found in any possible world. Here, however, Priest’s previous work comes to the fore, since he holds that not only are there possible worlds, but there are also impossible worlds in which the laws of logic break down. This means that for any characterising conditions, there will be some world (possible or not) in which those characterising conditions are satisfied, and so there is an object characterised by those conditions.

Priest’s current research has focussed on the metaphysics of the One and the Many. Here, he connects themes from Buddhist philosophy with contemporary Western logic and metaphysics, to address longstanding issues on the nature of identity, objecthood and individuation (Priest 2001b, Garfield and Priest 2003).

Priest’s insights into logic and the nature of reality are not only challenging and exciting, providing much grist for the philosophical mill, they are also a contemporary example of the healthy dialogue between logic and philosophy. From Aristotle’s pioneering logic and its influence on his metaphysics, to Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, to the work of Frege and Russell at the start of the twentieth century, ushering in what we know think of as analytic philosophy, different views on the nature and structure of our judgements have both influenced, and been influenced by, the great questions in philosophy. Priest’s work stands within this tradition, and is a prime exemplar of the fruitful connections between logic and philosophy for the new century.

While Priest’s positions on these issues are by no means mainstream, he is not isolated in the discipline in Australasia. On the contrary, he has been an influential figure in philosophy in Australasia in the 1990s and beyond, not only through his philosophical contributions in research and teaching (Priest 2000,
Princeton University and Australasian Philosophy, Links Between

Michael Smith

When people talk about the links between philosophy in Australasia and philosophy at Princeton University, they usually have in mind the influence that David Lewis, the great metaphysician who taught at Princeton from 1970 until 2001, had on a host of Australasian philosophers, and the influence that they in turn had on him. In fact, however, the links are more extensive, and they begin not with David Lewis, but with J. J. C. Smart in the 1950s.

Just after publishing ‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’ (Philosophical Quarterly, 1956), Smart, then at the University of Adelaide, went to Princeton as visiting professor. It was the Fall Semester of 1957 and he was in the throes of developing his own version of the identity theory under the influence of his colleague, U. T. Place (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ appeared in The Philosophical Review two years later [1959b]). Though advertised as being about Wittgenstein and Ryle, his graduate seminar inevitably ended up being about the identity theory. Jerry Fodor and Jerry Katz, both graduate students, were in attendance. Years later, when delivering the Jack Smart Lecture at the Australian National University, Fodor paid tribute to Smart’s seminar at Princeton. Carl G. Hempel and Hilary Putnam, the latter still a junior professor, were on the faculty and sympathetic. Both subsequently visited Adelaide to deliver the Gavin David Young Lectures, as did Donald Davidson when he taught at Princeton some years later. Richard Brandt and R. M. Hare were visiting professors too: Smart remembers long conversations with Brandt about act vs rule—in Smart’s terminology, ‘extreme’ vs ‘restricted’—utilitarianism and with Hare about their mutual opposition to cognitivism in metaethics.

It was Smart who was later responsible for introducing David Lewis to Australasian philosophy. They met in 1963 when Smart spent a semester at Harvard as visiting professor. Lewis, at that time a second-year graduate student, attended his graduate seminar, as did Lewis’ wife-to-be and sometime co-author, Stephanie, then a sophomore at Radcliffe majoring in mathematics. Smart later famously remarked that he ‘learned much more from [Lewis] than he did from me’ at this seminar. Lewis’ first trip to Australia was at Smart’s invitation to
deliver the **Gavin David Young Lectures** at Adelaide in 1971. From then on the Lewises visited Australasia during the northern summer nearly every year, and for longer stints when Lewis was distinguished visiting professor, first at **Monash University** and later at **La Trobe University**, and when he was visiting fellow at the **Research School of the Social Sciences** (RSSS), at the Australian National University (ANU). His final trip, shortly before his death in 2001, was to deliver the Jack Smart Lecture at ANU.

Though Lewis usually based himself at the **University of Melbourne**, he was well-known to many Australasian philosophers. Each year he agreed to give talks at many universities and contributed a paper to the annual **Australasian Association of Philosophy** (AAP) conference. The influence of Lewis on the likes of D. M. Armstrong, John Bigelow, David Chalmers, Alan Hájek, Allen Hazen, Peter Forrest, **Frank Jackson**, Philip Pettit, Denis Robinson, J. J. C. Smart, and Michael Tooley, and the influence of many of them on him, is clear from the bibliographies to their published work. But the more indirect influence that Lewis had on the way a whole range of Australasian philosophers do philosophy is just as profound. For example, the so-called ‘**Canberra Plan**’, despite being named after the philosophers at RSSS, ANU, who supposedly executed it, is thoroughly Lewisian in its inspiration.

Such was the affection of philosophers in Australia for Lewis that he was made an Honorary Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities; he was awarded an honorary D.Litt. by the University of Melbourne; and, after he died, a special issue of the **Australasian Journal of Philosophy**, edited by Frank Jackson and Graham Priest (2004), was devoted to his work. The definitive guide to his philosophy, *David Lewis*, was written by Daniel Nolan (2005), an Australian philosopher working in the U.K. There are plans to publish the extensive correspondence between Lewis and D. M. Armstrong, the subject of a presentation by Stephanie Lewis at the annual AAP conference in 2005. It is thus no surprise that people have Lewis in mind when they talk of the links between Princeton and Australasia. But he isn’t the only Princeton faculty member with such links, and there are links in the other direction as well, as many Australasian philosophers did their graduate work at Princeton.

Mark Johnston, a University of Melbourne undergraduate, entered the graduate program at Princeton in 1981. He was appointed to the Princeton faculty in 1984, serving for some years as its chair (1999–2005). Johnston’s early work on response-dependence and personal identity also had an influence on Australasian philosophers from the periods he spent as visiting fellow at RSSS, ANU in 1989, and visiting professor at Monash University in 1991. **Michael Smith**, an undergraduate at Monash University, was on the Princeton faculty 1985–89. He subsequently taught at Monash and RSSS, ANU, but returned to Princeton in 2004. **Peter Singer** joined Princeton in 1999 after spending many years at Monash. Philip Pettit, formerly RSSS, ANU, joined Princeton in 2002. Frank Jackson, after several visits to Princeton—to give the Three Lecture Series (now known as the Hempel Lectures) in 1987–88; as visiting fellow with the
Prior, A. N.

Humanities Council in 1989–90; and to give the Inaugural David Lewis Lecture in 2006—joined Princeton on a part-time basis in 2007. Others with links to Princeton include Martin Davies, now at Oxford but formerly at RSSS, ANU, who gave the Hempel Lectures in 2004, and Lloyd Humberstone, currently at Monash, who was visiting professor in 2007.

Australasians with Princeton Ph.D.s who have gone on to careers in philosophy include Stuart Brock, John Collins, Fiona Cowie, Antony Eagle, Alan Hájek, Richard Joyce, Simon Keller, Fred Kroon, Rae Langton, Jonathan McKeown-Green, Michaelis Michael, Graham Oppy, Nicholas J. J. Smith, Natalie Stoljar, and the late Richard Sylvan (originally Richard Routley). Princeton Ph.D.s not from Australasia, but currently working here, include John Campbell, Jennan Ismael, Chris Martin, Cei Maslen, and David Lumsden.

Prior, A. N.

Per Hasle

Arthur Norman Prior was born in Masterton, New Zealand, on 4 December 1914. His mother died shortly after his birth. His father was a doctor and served as a medical officer during World War One. Hence, Prior’s early years were spent in the care of his aunts and grandparents. Both of his grandfathers were Methodist ministers, and he was brought up as a Methodist.

Prior went to the University of Otago at Dunedin in 1932. He set out to study medicine, but after a short time he instead went into philosophy and psychology. During this time, Prior left Methodism in favour of the Presbyterian denomination, whose intellectual systematicity appealed more to him than the Methodist emphasis on religious experience. During his B.A. studies he also took courses at Knox Theological Hall, with a view to entering the Presbyterian ministry. This intention was never realised, but he was for many years a practising member of the Presbyterian community. In particular, he became a very active member of the Student Christian Movement (SCM), and was attached to the student periodicals The Student (the SCM magazine), The Review and The Critic.

Prior was influenced by socialism and pacifism. Major theological influences on him were Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and to some extent Søren Kierkegaard. Another crucial intellectual influence was the New Zealand philosopher John Findlay. In 1934 Prior attended Findlay’s courses on ethics and logic. Through Findlay he became interested in the history of logic and was introduced to Prantl’s textbooks.

In 1937 Prior was awarded his M.A. in philosophy and psychology, and the same year he married Claire Hunter. The years 1937–40 were spent in Europe.
Prior had various minor jobs, but he hoped to make a living out of religious journalism. In 1938 he attended the 4th International Congress of Calvinists in London, and he wrote proceedings for various journals. During this period he studied and commented on several theological issues, especially a proposed revision of the (Presbyterian) Westminster Confession. In 1940 he returned to New Zealand.

Early in the 1940s he found himself in a crisis of belief, not least because of his reading of Freud’s theories around this time. This found expression in ‘Can Religion Be Discussed?’ (1942), Prior’s first paper to be published in a major philosophical journal. However, he continued to be a practicing Presbyterian and wrote a considerable number of papers for The Student. Later in the 1940s he again wrote papers in defence of predestinarian theology. His last contribution to this magazine was written as late as 1955. In the long run, the decisive challenge to Prior’s Christian beliefs proved to come neither from Freudianism (in which he entirely lost interest) nor from socialism, but from the very core of Presbyterian theology, namely its teaching of predestination and its rejection of free will. He became agnostic. But he continued to treasure his theological library and he often made reference to theological problems in his work on logic, time and ethics. A crucial example of this is his 1962 paper ‘The Formalities of Omniscience’, which makes theological, logical and philosophical considerations bear on each other. In fact, Prior’s preoccupation with questions concerning predestination, determinism and free will became central also to his development of tense logic and thus connects his early theological interests with his later logical and philosophical work.

In March 1943 he was divorced from Claire Hunter, and in October 1943 he married Mary Wilkinson. Nazism and World War Two led Prior to give up his pacifist leanings, and from 1943 till the end of the war he served in the Royal New Zealand Air Force.

In February 1946 he became employed at Canterbury University College, (now the University of Canterbury) filling a vacancy opened by the departure of Karl Popper. In 1952 he became professor of philosophy there and retained this position till 1958.

In March 1949 the Priors’ house burned down. At that time Prior was working on a book on the history of Scottish theology. However, after the fire in which some of his drafts perished he gave up the project. His main intellectual interest from then on veered towards philosophy and logic.

In 1949 Prior was appointed senior lecturer at Canterbury University College, and the same year he published his first book, Logic and the Basis of Ethics. During 1950–51 he wrote a manuscript for a book with the working title, ‘The Craft of Logic’. This book was never published as a whole, but P. T. Geach and A. J. P. Kenny later edited parts of it and published it as The Doctrine of Propositions and Terms (1976). In the first chapter of the book, ‘Propositions and Sentences’, the author among other things analysed Aristotle’s view on some of the problems concerning time and tense. Prior found that according to the ancient as well as
the medieval view a proposition may be true at one time and false at another, an
insight into the relation between time and logic that was to become central to
Prior’s later development of tense logic.

Around 1953 Prior realised that it might be possible to develop a calculus which
included temporal operators analogous to the operators of modal logic. Mary
Prior has described the first occurrence of this idea: ‘I remember his waking
me one night, coming and sitting on my bed, and reading a footnote from John
Findlay’s article on Time, and saying he thought one could make a formalised
tense logic’. This must have been some time in 1953. A major inspiration in
this process was apparently Benson Mates’ 1949 paper on Diodorean logic.
Mates’ paper was concerned primarily with Diodorus’ definition of implication.
Prior realised that it would be possible to relate Diodorus’ considerations to
contemporary works on modality by introducing tense operators analogous to the
classical modal operators.

From 1952 to 1955 Prior published seven articles on the history of logic. Four
of these were concerned with medieval logic and one with the logic of Diodorus.
His interest in the history of logic is also evident in his Formal Logic, published in
1955. According to Mary Prior, his resurging interest in the history of logic (and
Polish logic) was very much due to the fact that the university library acquired
Bochenski’s Précis de Logique Mathématique (1949).

The whole year of 1956 was spent in Oxford, where Prior had been invited to
give that year’s John Locke Lectures. These lectures formed the basis of Prior’s
book Time and Modality (1957), wherein modern tense and temporal logic was for
the first time presented systematically.

In 1958 Prior received a letter from Saul Kripke who suggested the idea of
branching time, where time is conceived not as a linear but rather as a branching
structure, allowing for numerous different temporal courses of events. Prior
took up this idea and developed it in great detail. Branching time proved to be a
conception particularly well suited to discussions of philosophical issues, allowing
for instance a significant formalisation of Peirce’s ideas regarding possibility,
necessity and human freedom.

In December 1958 Prior left New Zealand in order to take up a professorship at
the University of Manchester. In 1960 he became one of the editors of the Journal
of Symbolic Logic, a position he held till his death in 1969.

In the early winter of 1962 Prior was visiting professor at the University of
Chicago. In 1963 he was appointed Fellow of the British Academy. In July–
August 1965 he was British Council Visiting Professor at Victoria University
of Wellington, New Zealand. During this period Prior gave talks at all New
Zealand universities (Auckland, Hamilton, Otago, Victoria, and Canterbury).
From September 1965 to January 1966 he was Visiting Flint Professor at the
University of California, where his most famous book Past, Present, and Future
was drafted. It was published in 1967.

In 1966 Prior was elected Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, and appointed as
a reader in the University of Oxford. Prior’s last years were characterised by an
increasingly abstract interest in and use of formalism; but at the same time, he was developing a generalised interest in the philosophical questions of *Worlds, Times, and Selves* (1977). In 1968(b) he also published his book *Papers on Time and Tense*.

As a teacher Prior was very inspiring. He was always able to find nice and understandable illustrations of the logical systems he wanted to introduce. It seems clear that he very much liked teaching and lecturing. He was not ‘the Oxford type’, but it appears that he almost immediately built up a reputation as one of the best lecturers in Oxford.

Prior died on 6 October 1969, whilst on a lecture tour in Scandinavia. On the day of his death he was visiting Trondheim in Norway. Prior had by then accomplished an impressive production. His philosophical works comprise more than 150 titles. Prior’s greatest contribution to philosophy and logic was without doubt his development of tense logic, which has proved to be of considerable and lasting importance. However, other aspects of his work such as his early theology and his studies of the concept of the proposition have also gained increasing attention in recent years.

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**Probability**

Alan Hájek

The philosophy of probability has been alive and well for several decades in Australia and New Zealand. Some distinctive lines of thought have emerged, resonating with broader themes that have come to be associated with Australasian philosophers: realist/objectivist accounts of various theoretical entities; an ongoing concern with logic, including the development of non-classical logics; and conceptual analysis, rooted in commonsense but informed by science. In this article I concentrate on work by philosophers on the interpretation of probability, its logical foundations, and its philosophical applications (thus, for example, I will not discuss the pioneering research of R. A. Fisher in statistics at the University of Adelaide).

My nomination for the earliest major Australasian philosopher of probability may surprise some readers: Karl Popper. He counts as Australasian by dint of his employment at the University of Canterbury from 1937 until the end of World War Two; he counts as a major philosopher of probability by any estimation. Two of his contributions have initiated research programs in the foundations of probability that are still thriving: his (1959a) axiomatisation of primitive conditional probability functions (so-called ‘Popper functions’), and his ‘propensity’ interpretation of probability (1959b), intended to illuminate single-
Probability

case attributions of objective probabilities, as are putatively found in quantum mechanics.

David Lewis’ place in this article is also beyond dispute, although it too may surprise some readers—while American, and based for most of his career at Princeton University, he paid annual visits to Australasia over a period of almost thirty years, and he embraced and enormously influenced its philosophical culture. During this time he produced such classic papers as ‘Why Conditionalize?’, ‘Causal Decision Theory’, and ‘Desire as Belief’ (and its sequel, ‘Desire as Belief II’). Arguably, his most seminal contribution was ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’ (and its sequel, ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’), whose Principal Principle famously codifies a certain harmony between a rational agent’s subjective probabilities (degrees of belief) and her opinions about objective probabilities (chances). See Lewis 1986, 1998, and 1999 for reprintings of these articles.

Hugh Mellor has been another regular visitor to Australasia, and indeed his robustly realist conception of single-case chance and its relationship to rational credence (1971) anticipates some of Lewis’ work. By contrast, Mellor’s doctoral student at Cambridge, Huw Price, has argued for non-factualism about single-case chance (1983). Price has also contended that conditional probability should be taken as a primitive notion (1986). This view has been further defended by Alan Hájek in a number of papers (especially 2003a).

Perhaps the most important trend in Australasian philosophy of probability has been the rehabilitation and defence of broadly logical conceptions of probability. According to this interpretation of probability theory, advocated by Keynes and Carnap, deductive logic and its notion of entailment can be generalised to inductive logic and a notion of partial entailment; probabilities capture strength of entailment, or degree of confirmation. This interpretation lends itself naturally to an account of rationally constrained degrees of belief in propositions that suitably incorporate the bearing of one’s evidence on those propositions. For example, in his ‘Subjective Probability’, Douglas Gasking (1996) argues that probability judgments reflect the exercise of skilled judgment, the tenability of any given judgment consisting in a (possibly partial) consensus among independent judges in accord with that judgment.

David Stove’s (1986) conception of probability comes closer still to that of Carnap, and it has proved to be influential on a number of Australian authors. Stove insists, for example, that the premise ‘x % of F’s are G’s’ bestows logical probability x% on the conclusion ‘a randomly chosen F is a G’. He has also argued that the problem of induction can be solved by a combinatorial argument (inspired by D. C. Williams) that is tacitly probabilistic: most samples from a given population of F’s are representative—that is, their proportion of G’s approximates that of the population—and so it is rational to believe that an inference made on the basis of sampling is reliable. In the background there is an appeal to the principle of indifference, a cornerstone of logical interpretations, which assigns equal probabilities to evidentially balanced alternatives. John Bigelow and Robert
Pargetter (1997) apply a version of the principle of indifference to the problem of induction, arguing that an inductive argument becomes deductively valid when augmented by a premise encapsulating one’s total evidence, and when the conclusion asserts what it is reasonable for that person to believe on the basis of that evidence. Patrick Maher, a student of Stove’s at the University of Sydney as an undergraduate, maintains that the so-called ‘interpretations’ of probability are best understood as attempts to explicate probability concepts of ordinary language, and that there are two such concepts: inductive probability and physical probability. He argues that the usual objections to inductive logic rest on a failure to grasp this conception (2006). Stove’s doctoral student Peter Forrest has proposed an intuition-based account of rationality constraints on otherwise subjective probability (1986b), building on the work of Brian Ellis. Later in his career, Forrest has subscribed to a theory of logical probabilities similar to that of Richard Swinburne, who has appealed to them in the service of theism.

This brings us to another important strand of probability-based research in Australasian philosophy: probability theory’s application to problems in the philosophy of religion. J. L. Mackie (1982) and Hájek (2003b, 2008) view Pascal’s Wager and Hume’s miracles argument through the lens of Bayesian decision theory and confirmation theory. Bruce Langtry also employs probability theory in his work on miracles (e.g. 1988), and in his discussion of the problem of evil in his book on divine providence (2008). Mark Colyvan, Jay Garfield and Graham Priest (2005) argue that probability theory is misused in various design arguments for theism.

The relationship between probabilities and the logic of conditionals has preoccupied various Australasian philosophers. In his path-breaking ‘Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities’ (and its sequel, ‘Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities II’), Lewis offers ‘triviality results’ against the hypothesis (associated with Ramsey, Stalnaker, and Adams) that

$$P(A \rightarrow B) = P(B | A) (P(A) > 0),$$

where ‘$\rightarrow$’ is a conditional connective. (Reprinted in Lewis 1986 and 1998 respectively.) These results have subsequently been strengthened and generalised in Hájek (1994) and in Peter Roeper’s co-authored book (Roeper and Leblanc 1999). Bigelow and Pargetter (1991) argue that ‘probably’ can modify the subjunctive conditional connective itself, rather than modifying either the antecedent or consequent or an entire ‘if-then’ proposition. Frank Jackson (1979) has used the fact that $P(p \rightarrow q | p) = P(q | p)$ to explain why the assertibility of an indicative conditional equals the probability of its consequent given its antecedent.

Non-classical logics have flourished in the antipodes, so it is only natural that probabilities based on such logics, and other heterodox accounts of probability, have been studied by Australasian philosophers. Ed Mares (1997) has written on paraconsistent probability measures—probability functions that sometimes give positive values to contradictory propositions—and he has discussed how they should be updated in that context. Brian Weatherson (2003a) has advocated a
probability theory that is underpinned by intuitionistic logic. He has also argued (2005) that there are several philosophical applications of imprecise (also called ‘vague’) probabilities—for example, that imprecise probabilities, rather than indifference principles, offer the best hope for capturing the idea that a priori states of opinion should be symmetric over possible outcomes. Colyvan has contributed to debates on non-classical approaches to credence (2004), and he has appealed to imprecise probabilities in co-authored, interdisciplinary work in ecology (available at Colyvan 2009).

There are now several departments in Australasia with a serious interest in the philosophy of probability. Its continued flourishing Down Under is—probabilistically speaking—a safe bet.

(I am grateful to John Bigelow, Mark Colyvan, Peter Forrest, Frank Jackson, Patrick Maher, Ed Mares, Ralph Miles, Len O’Neill, and Brian Weatherson for their help.)

Psychoanalysis and Philosophy

Russell Grigg

Interest in psychoanalysis came quite early to philosophy in Australia. The first (1923) volume of the Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy published no less than six articles on Freud, mostly critical. H. T. Lovell stresses that everything in Freud is expressed in vague and unscientific language, and anyway it can all be found in classical psychology. J. McKellar Stewart raises the already familiar objection that unconscious thought is a contradiction in terms: ‘the theory presents the unconscious as too nearly an imagined duplicate of the conscious’ (1923: 197). All but one of these articles are incapable of acknowledging the radical novelty of Freud’s work. The exception is J. P. Lowson, who displays a fine understanding of the details of Freud’s views and gives evidence of a close and interested reader.

Sydney philosopher John Anderson became interested in Freud early on (see, for instance, his 1936), and while critical of Freud he nevertheless understood the radical implications of Freud’s discovery of the unconscious. In later life he would still refer to a ‘Freudian revolution’, even advocating a ‘back to Freud’ as an antidote to contemporary ‘loose thinking’ about human affairs (Anderson 1953). Anderson never entered analysis himself and displayed little interest in or knowledge of the actual practice of psychoanalysis. There appears to have been no contact with analysts Roy Winn and Paul Dane practicing in Sydney at the time; for him, as for his students such as John Passmore (1936), philosophy was interested in psychoanalysis as a theory and body of knowledge. Nevertheless, Anderson took
an interest in discoveries of a more personal kind that psychoanalytic practice can bring; for instance, his correspondence and personal records reveal extensive dabbling in analysis of his own and others’ dreams. Yet, when Anderson’s student **D. M. Armstrong**, not generally given to hyperbole, compares Anderson’s following to that of Socrates among the youth of Athens, he thereby suggests both the loyalties and resentments evoked by a man who understood the value of transference.

Anderson’s case touches on the two sides of psychoanalysis. As a theory, psychoanalysis is a challenge to the transparency of consciousness and raises questions about the wellsprings of human motivation, even as it opens up issues over the validity of the claims it makes. The philosophical Freud is a moralist who, in a lineage descending from La Rochefoucauld, raises uncomfortable questions for the narcissistic creatures that we are. There is, however, a second aspect to psychoanalysis, which is the *sui generis* practice, dubbed the ‘talking cure’ by one of Freud’s patients, from which its discoveries flow. That psychoanalysis is a dialogue or conversation was largely ignored by philosophers before Jürgen Habermas (1987).

By the 1950s the centre of interest in psychoanalysis had moved to Melbourne, no doubt as a result of the arrival of the Hungarian-trained psychoanalyst Clara Geroe and the establishment of the Melbourne Institute for Psycho-Analysis in 1940. Philosophy at the **University of Melbourne** was unusual for its exchanges with the psychoanalytic community, both Geroe and fellow psychoanalyst Rose Rothfield giving classes and papers there. The face of psychoanalysis was itself changing and, mirroring developments in psychoanalysis in Britain and Australia, interest in psychoanalysis broadened out to include the growing significance of object relations and the work of Melanie Klein. Several members of the Melbourne department introduced psychoanalytic ideas in courses on aesthetics, ethics and continental European philosophy, though this led to few publications.

The more serious and sustained turn to psychoanalysis started to take place in the 1970s. I think we can identify two currents to this. The first was theoretical: the influence of French feminism and the interest of a younger generation of philosophers in post-existentialist French thought necessarily confronted them with psychoanalysis, and the work of Jacques Lacan was crucial to the place that psychoanalysis came to occupy in these debates. Lacan’s own philosophically informed work interrogated philosophy directly, and was often cast in philosophical language, thus giving philosophers a familiar, even if difficult, entry into psychoanalysis. His ‘return to Freud’ produced a reappraisal of the philosophical significance of Freud’s work and thus produced a way of reading Freud that was both fresh and compelling. Also, for the philosophical exploration of feminism in France, post Beauvoir, Lacan became an essential, if contested, reference.

At the **University of Sydney** these currents came together in Elizabeth Grosz’s *Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction* (1990), which gave an overview of Lacan’s contribution to psychoanalysis and its philosophical implications along with a
critical analysis of Lacan’s ‘phallocentrism’ that was influenced by the French feminism of philosophers and psychoanalysts Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray. Whereas the first feminist response had initially considered Freud something of a bète noire, Lacan managed to reinterpret Freud’s position on, inter alia, female sexuality in a way that was important for feminist thinkers, even as they remained critical of his conclusions. Nevertheless, the light it was hoped Freud or Lacan would throw on these issues ended up proving elusive. Critiques of psychoanalysis had a way of resurfacing or echoing debates internal to psychoanalysis itself. For instance, Grosz criticises Lacan for his commitment to the Oedipus complex, apparently unaware of Lacan’s (2007) moves ‘beyond the Oedipus complex’.

The second current in this turn to psychoanalysis in the 1970s arose out of the interest in psychoanalysis particularly at the University of Melbourne. Contact between psychoanalysts and philosophers increased and, with clinical psychoanalysis no longer in its infancy in Australia, it is no surprise that philosophers entered analysis. Some philosophers even considered training as analysts, even if few ended up going down this path. At Melbourne the substantial clinical presence of psychoanalysis was both enriched and rendered more complex by the establishment of Lacanian psychoanalysis. The founding of the Psychosocial Group by Alan Davies, John Cash and Douglas Kirsner, who also ran the annual Freud Conference, provided a forum for academics from various disciplines and clinicians of different orientations to debate new, old and emerging ideas within psychoanalysis.

This more direct engagement with psychoanalysis at the University of Melbourne in the 1970s and 1980s is reflected in the work of several contemporary philosophers. Graeme Marshall has worked on what happens to issues in the philosophy of action when the motivation of actions is unconscious, in the Freudian sense of this term. Marshall (2000) dismisses the charge that ‘unconscious motivation’ is a contradictio in adjecto; the paradox of action that is both intentional and involuntary is merely apparent and results from an inadequate philosophical theory of action. The small number of analytic philosophers interested in Freud, of which Marshall (2000) is one, is well represented in the collection edited by Michael Levine (2000c). Several of the papers here address the difficult issue of unconscious intentionality in different ways. Pataki argues against the thesis that when unconscious wishes are fulfilled, as in dreams, the dream activity by means of which the wish is fulfilled cannot be fully intentional and must be ‘sub-intentional’. Michael Stocker (2000) argues that Aristotelian akrasia can be fruitfully understood as something like Freudian regression. Other themes in this collection are Marguerite La Caze’s (2000) contribution on sublimation, Michael Levine’s (2000b) analysis of love, in which it is claimed that what we love another for has hardly anything to do with what we think we love them for, and Paul Redding’s (2000) discussion of Freud’s theory of consciousness.

Tamas Pataki’s (2007) draws on psychoanalysis to explain the enduring attraction of religious belief, specially the content of religious belief, as a sign of an enduring unconscious need for attachment. The deep libidinal attachments that
should be established in childhood have not been adequately instituted, and a later attachment to God provides the religious person with the secure attachment to a parent absent in their formative years. Pataki sees aggressive and destructive unconscious impulses directed at the figure of Christ in the split between Father and Son.

Mention should also be made of Malcolm Macmillan's (1996) critical study of Freud's theory and technique, which concludes that Freud's method of free association can neither produce objective data about mental processes nor be used to turn psychoanalysis into an acceptable historical or humanistic discipline.

Since the 1980s philosophy at Deakin University has held a unique place for research in psychoanalysis in Australia. Douglas Kirsner's *Unfree Associations* (2000) is a major study that examines four of the leading American training institutes of psychoanalysis. Kirsner arrives at the damning conclusion that psychoanalysis is an essentially humanistic practice that, at least in the U.S., has misrepresented itself as a science while adopting the organisational structure of the church. Deakin University is also strong in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Paris trained psychoanalyst and philosopher Russell Grigg, through his publications (see Grigg 2008), translations of Lacan's seminars and involvement in psychoanalytic practice, has promoted the Lacanian orientation both within the clinical context and in the philosophy program at Deakin University. Matthew Sharpe, also at Deakin, has produced a critical study of Lacanian philosopher Slavoj Zizek (Sharpe 2004) and, with Deakin colleague Geoff Boucher, an edited collection on Zizek (Boucher, Glynos and Sharpe 2005).
Queensland, University of
Gary Malinas

The First Fifty Years: 1911–1961

Elton Mayo was appointed to a lectureship in 1911. He became the foundation professor of mental and moral philosophy in Queensland following the publication of his monograph *Democracy and Freedom* in 1917. Mayo took up positions in North America in 1923 where he became a seminal figure in industrial psychology from his chair at the Harvard School of Business. A theologian, Michael Scott-Fletcher, replaced Mayo, and Marquis Kyle was appointed to lecture in philosophy. Kyle published two articles on eighteenth-century British moral philosophers before his appointment to the chair following Scott-Fletcher's retirement in 1938. Douglas Gasking, then a recent graduate from Cambridge, was appointed to a lectureship. His widely discussed article, ‘Mathematics and the World’, was published shortly thereafter. Gasking moved to Canberra and later to a chair in philosophy at the University of Melbourne. Until Kyle's retirement in 1961, philosophy in Queensland was mainly focussed on the subject’s history.

1961–2000

C. F. Presley succeeded Kyle when he retired from the chair of Philosophy in 1961. At the time of Kyle's retirement, the Department of Philosophy listed five Reverend gentlemen as staff who serviced the sub-departments of Theology and Scholastic Philosophy. Presley shed the sub-departments and oversaw the appointments of recent philosophy graduates from leading anglophone universities in Australasia, Great Britain, and North America. By the mid 1960s, the research programs, curriculum, and publications of staff were continuous with the wider anglophone philosophical community.

The annual meeting of the Australasian Association of Philosophy was hosted by the University of Queensland for the first time in 1964. This event marked
Queensland’s emergence into the wider philosophical community. A series of papers on the identity theory of mind were the centrepiece of the 1964 meeting. These were collected and edited by Presley who also wrote an introduction to them. They were published under the title The Identity Theory of Mind in 1967. Each of the essays explores the prospects and problems of a materialist account of mental states and experience.

The staff numbers in the department remained small by comparison to philosophy departments in Sydney and Melbourne. They peaked at nine, but averaged seven staff over the decades between the 1960s and 2000. In the areas of metaphysics and epistemology, Andre Gallois published two books, Occasions of Identity and The World Without, the Mind Within. The first argues that identity statements are contingently true and there can be temporal gaps in the existence of objects while the gaps do not perturb their continuing identity. In the latter he argues that there is no fundamental asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others. In the area of philosophy of science, Ian Hinckfuss published The Existence of Space and Time. There he argues for the ontologically deflationary thesis that space and time do not exist independently of the spatial and temporal relations that objects stand in to each other. Hinckfuss was also deeply interested in ethics, despite being a self-described moral nihilist. His defense of moral nihilism is developed in his monograph, The Moral Society. Roger Lamb’s edited collection Love Analyzed contains his essay that looks at the question, ‘Why would people take different attitudes to a loved partner and an exact duplicate of the loved partner?’.

Studies in the foundations and applications of logic have been a core area of research and teaching in Queensland. Staff who developed its programs include Brian Medlin, Malcolm Rennie, Rod Girle, Graham Priest, Dominic Hyde and Ian Hinckfuss. Most of the research by them appeared at least initially in the form of journal articles. Rennie and Girle published an introductory textbook, Logic: Theory and Practice, and Girle published a text for use in secondary schools that offered logic as part of their curriculum. The dominant view of the scope and limits of logic during the latter half of the twentieth century was that developed by the Harvard philosopher, Willard Van Orman Quine. Quine took the natural sciences to be the final arbiter of what there is and what logical resources are required to reason about the world. By Quine’s reckoning, quantification theory and set theory were all the logic required for the formulation and application of scientific theories. Extensions of quantification theory, e.g. modal logics, were at best based on equivocations between using sentences and mentioning them, and at worst they were committed to an essentialist view of the relations between natural kinds that echoed an obsolete Aristotelian metaphysics. Further, formalisms that purported to be alternatives to or rivals of classical logic, Quine argued, simply changed the subject or were unintelligible. (C.f. Presley’s entry on Quine in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy.) Rennie, Girle, Priest and Hyde disagreed. Reasoning about possibilities and necessities, the subject matter of modal logics, raised issues on which classical logic was silent. In their
research papers, Rennie and Girle explored the properties of modal logics then on offer and the systematic relations between them. Rennie also began work on representing systematic features of syntactic and inferential structures of natural languages within a formal theory. His monograph, *Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language*, was published in 1974. Priest and Hyde focussed on rivals of classical logic. It is a well known feature of classical logics that inconsistent premises entail every proposition: e.g. ‘A & ~A’ entails B, for all B. This has no parallel in reasoning, and a range of Relevant logics were developed that blocked inferences to conclusions that bore no relevance to the premises from which they were derived. Some of the systems of Relevant logic allowed some contradictions to be true (as well as false). Priest took this to be a strength of them insofar as they provided a novel and elegant way of managing logical paradoxes, i.e. the conclusions of at least some logical paradoxes were true (as well as false) and some arguments that entailed inconsistent conclusions were sound. Priest mounts a spirited and widely discussed defence of this view in a series of articles and books that include his book *Beyond the Limits of Thought*. Hyde’s focus has been on the sorites paradox and the roles that vague terms play in generating paradoxical arguments. He has recently published his book, *Vagueness, Logic, and Ontology* (2008). In it he codifies and refines the views he developed in a series of papers. As well as looking to the roles Relevant logics can play in reasoning with vague terms, Hyde proposes that the world itself is vague and systems of representation and their underlying logic need to mirror the vagueness of the world without lapsing into intolerable inconsistency.

While research in logic is located at the theoretical end of the philosophical spectrum, research in environmental philosophy joins public debate and sentiment concerning survival, flourishing, or more generally, humankind’s place in nature. In 1979 the university funded a conference on environmental philosophy that Don Mannison organised. Papers from the conference were published under the title *Environmental Philosophy*, edited by Don Mannison, Michael McRobbie and Richard Routley (later known as Richard Sylvan). The following year a three-year program was funded that brought William Grey (nee Godfrey-Smith), Robert Elliot, and Arran Gare into the Environmental Philosophy program of research and teaching. As well as Mannison, Grey, Elliot and Gare, Roger Lamb and Gary Malinas published research papers and contributed to the teaching of courses devoted to issues in environmental philosophy. This concentration produced a steady flow of journal articles, conference papers, and book chapters. Elliot and Gare organised and edited a collection of new essays that was published in 1983 under the title *Environmental Philosophy* as well. The issues that were canvassed ranged from the general question of whether Western culture needs a new environmental ethic that supersedes anthropocentric theories of value to comparatively specific issues about the use of pesticides in agriculture and the role of the Precautionary Principle.

From the 1960s to the mid 1980s most of the staff at Queensland pursued questions and employed methods that were located within the traditions of
analytic philosophy. Beginning in the mid 1980s, Tuan Nuyen, Marion Tapper, and Michelle Walker introduced courses on Continental philosophy and feminism. Their courses brought students into contact with French and German writers who are largely neglected by the analytic tradition. Tuan’s articles reflect a sympathetic, yet external, standpoint toward the texts and their treatment of themes by philosophers in the Continental tradition. Walker’s (1998) book, *Philosophy and the Maternal Body*, explores the theme of males’ co-option of pregnancy. Recent publicity of a male pregnancy in the U.S. lifts the theme from the realm of biological science fiction or metaphor into the realm of public debate. Dean Wells also discusses the possibilities of male pregnancy in his book (co-authored with Peter Singer), *The Reproduction Revolution*.

**2001 – Present**

The Department of Philosophy at the University of Queensland ceased to exist on 1 January 2001. Its members were amalgamated into a School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics. It occupies the position of a discipline within the newly formed school, but it has lost much of the autonomy regarding academic decisions that it had in the previous forty years. Of its staff on continuing appointments in 2008, three work mainly in the areas of Continental philosophy, one in logic, one in philosophy of science, one in social and political philosophy, one in history of philosophy and philosophy of mind, and one in environmental philosophy and metaphysics. In 2004 the philosophy program was ranked with the best in Australia by the Leiter Report. (The Leiter Report is a peer-based survey of philosophy programs across the anglophone world.) It has not been ranked since, mainly due to the loss of staff whose positions have not been filled.
The Rationalist Society of Australia (RSA) had its origins in a meeting of freethinkers in November 1906 in the study of Kerr Grant, a resident tutor at Ormond College in the University of Melbourne. The meeting was called by John Latham, who later had a distinguished career in Australian public life, including Leader of the Opposition in Federal Parliament and Chief Justice of the High Court. Other freethinkers from outside the university gravitated to the group, including Edward Higginson, and Monty Millar who fifty years earlier had helped to defend the Eureka Stockade. After meeting informally for a while, the group set up a formal Rationalist organisation in July 1909, with Latham as president and Higginson as secretary. In 1925 this morphed into the two arms of the Rationalist movement which still exist today: the Rationalist Association of Australia (RAA), an incorporated association limited by guarantee with restricted membership, which effectively acts as a board of trustees and holds most of the Rationalist assets; and the Rationalist Society of Australia, which anyone supporting its aims can join and which carries out the activities of the movement. Their inspiration was the Rationalist Press Association (RPA) in London, from whom they took their definition of rationalism: ‘the attitude of mind which unreservedly accepts the supremacy of reason, and aims at establishing a system of philosophy and ethics independent of all arbitrary assumptions or authority’. It needs to pointed out that rationalism here is not philosophical rationalism of the kind associated with inter alia Liebniz and Spinoza, where reason is opposed to experience as a source of knowledge. Rather, reason for the RSA is opposed to revelation on the one hand and arbitrary authority on the other, and is taken to be predicated on inputs from experience.
In order to promote a rational society, the RSA further aims to:

- stimulate freedom of thought;
- promote inquiry into religious and other superstitious beliefs and practices;
- encourage interest in science, criticism, history and philosophy, as connected factors in a progressive human culture, independent of theological creeds and dogmas;
- promote the fullest possible use of science for human welfare;
- promote a secular and ethical system of education.

Over the past century the RSA has campaigned vigorously on many issues, including protesting against the introduction of Bible classes in government schools; opposing laws making blasphemy a crime; promoting science and in particular evolution, especially against creationism and its recent clone ‘intelligent’ design; advocating the clear separation of church and state, and especially combatting state aid for religious schools; contesting the prohibition of non-religious activity on Sundays; resisting the institution of chairs of divinity or theology at Australian universities; and opposing censorship in all its forms in support of freedom of expression, especially the right to criticise religion robustly. In promoting its interests it has sometimes allied itself with other organisations, including the Council for Civil Liberties (now Liberty Victoria) and the Defence of Government Schools (DOGS), helping to fund the latter’s unsuccessful appeal to the High Court. In pursuit of a public hearing for its views, it and its members have sometimes suffered abuse, persecution and prosecution for blasphemy, and been banned from using public buildings for meetings. Because it was seen in the past as a dangerous radical organisation, many of its members, including the current President, have been singled out by ASIO for investigation.

Between the wars the RSA received substantial financial support from Walter Cookes, the owner of the Easywalkin’ footwear chain, and since then a number of substantial bequests have established its financial security. Over the years it has been stimulated by the energy and hard work of a host of prominent individuals, including: Alf Foster, who later served as a judge on the Arbitration Commission for many years; John Langley, an enthusiastic organiser and speaker who ran the RSA between the wars; and W. G. (‘Bill’) Cook, who dominated the Society in the post-war years and was a well-known media personality, writing articles and appearing on radio programs such as The Brains Trust. There has also been a close connection between the RSA and university philosophy departments, with many philosophers being members or supporters: for example, vice-presidents of the RSA have included the late A. C. (‘Camo’) Jackson, the late John McCloskey, and most recently Brian Ellis.
Realism

Drew Khlentzos

To some, Australian realism and Australian materialism are one and the same. However in contrast to ‘Australian materialism’, the term ‘Australian realism’ connotes an attitude as much as a doctrine: a no-nonsense approach to a cluster of tangled philosophical questions issuing in a blend of common-sense realism, scientific realism and materialism.

In fact, realism and materialism are not the same. There is no reason why metaphysical realism or its specification as ‘common-sense’ realism should commit its adherents to scientific realism. Nor is there any reason why realism should assume a materialist form. Still less that a no-nonsense approach to science, metaphysics and mind should inevitably result in commitment to either realism or materialism. That one still encounters the three doctrines confounded is largely the result of a historical contingency: that the powerful intellects and personalities that shaped the small community of Australasian philosophy all happened to be forceful advocates of realism both metaphysical and scientific, and also of materialism.

History of Realism in Australia

Nothing could have prepared 1920s Australia for John Anderson’s arrival to its shores. Free-thinking, politically radical, morally libertarian and materialist, the new appointee to the Challis Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney represented ideas and ideals all but incomprehensible to the conservative Christian consensus of the time.

Australian philosophy was no better prepared. In metaphysics, Idealism ruled by default. It wasn’t just that the first Australian philosophers, including Sir Francis Anderson at the University of Sydney and Sir William Mitchell at the University of Adelaide, were Idealists. Nor was it that Idealism only appealed to theists and the ‘vast flood of intellectual refugees from Christianity’ for whom ‘the problem was how to part with Christianity, while keeping cosmic consolation’, as David Stove (1991: 87–8) poignantly expressed it. Whilst the early Australian philosophers did link Idealism to theism, the intellectual appeal of Idealism derives not from angst about God or morality, nor any need for cosmic consolation, but from another source entirely: the difficulty of conceiving of the world our senses reveal to us as existing independently of any conception we might have of it. Mustn’t a mind-independent world either be unknowable (Kant) or an illusion (Berkeley)? The reason metaphysical realism claimed no adherents at that time was simple—no-one had the faintest idea how it could be true. How was one to abjure Idealism without renouncing the mental?
Whilst not renouncing the mind, John Anderson denounced its Idealistic pretensions. Far from being a force that conceptually constituted the world, the human mind was simply one empirical phenomenon amongst others, no different from the weather and the tides, to be studied as such by the methods of science. With the mind deflated, Anderson rounded on the Idealist’s notion of constitution: there were, he asserted, no entities constituted by their relations to the mind or indeed by relations to anything else. Whence, there were no sense-data nor any other mental contents qua objects of human perception or conception, neither were there any values comprising the ends of human conduct. Indeed, there was no such thing as consciousness if by ‘consciousness’ one meant something whose nature it was to represent the things in the world and/or the sensory disturbances at one’s nerve endings. The mind was characterised by feeling or emotion and was comprised of a network of conflicting dispositions.

Anderson’s anti-representationalism was systematic. He rejected propositions as intermediaries between thinkers and things. As a consequence, logic, in Anderson’s view, must deal directly with facts or states of affairs rather than their linguistic or mental representations in sentences or propositions. His views on ontology were egalitarian and pluralist: all that exists are objects and their properties in space and time. There is only a single level of being, so all spatio-temporal existents are on a par. However there is not only an unlimited multiplicity of things but each thing is infinitely complex, according to Anderson. By the end of Anderson’s thirty-year tenure at the University of Sydney, Idealism was no more: exposed by Anderson as a pernicious illusion. The foundations for realism, along with those for materialism, had been laid.

Things were very different in Melbourne during this period. There philosophy was thought of as something more than metaphysics. In contrast to their parochial Sydney counterparts, Melbournian philosophers were receptive to outside influences, particularly from Cambridge and Oxford. Yet they were no more capable of making sense of the metaphysical views of the Andersonians than Andersonians were of their linguistic views—where Andersonians thought realism clearly true, Melbourne’s Wittgensteinians found it incomprehensible.

The arrival of J. J. C. Smart in 1952 to take up the University of Adelaide chair deepened the divisions between Sydney realists and their critics. Smart had studied under Ryle in Oxford, accepting the latter’s behaviourism. Since the Adelaide department at the time was a joint philosophy and psychology one, Smart appointed a psychologist, U. T. Place. Place persuaded Smart that sensations were real mental processes that Rylean behaviourism could not explain. Most importantly, he convinced Smart that sensations were brain processes. Thus was born Australian materialism.

Smart played a pivotal role in establishing scientific realism in Australia. Thus, he argued that the success of physics would be inexplicable unless the entities it posits exist and the laws governing those entities are true. One consequence he drew was that the passage of time is an illusion. Time is nothing more than a series of events ordered from earlier to later. The common perception of temporal
becoming, of the special immediacy and reality of an ever-changing present in comparison to the inaccessible past or the indefinite future, were expressions of a pervasive illusion, telling us something about human psychology rather than the nature of reality.

Smart’s many heirs include Graham Nerlich and Huw Price. In *The Shape of Space* (1994a), Nerlich persuasively argued for the reality of space as an entity and its indispensability in non-causal explanation of spatio-temporal phenomena. Huw Price took Smart’s B-theory arguments a step further in his *Time’s Arrow and Archimedes Point*: not only the passage of time but also its direction are anthropocentric illusions. Temporal symmetry then permitted a novel and ingenious defence of realism about quantum theory.

Another philosopher influenced by Smart was D. M. Armstrong, John Anderson’s successor in the Challis Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. Armstrong’s *A Materialist Theory of Mind* provided the seminal exposition of the Smart-Place view that mental states are brain processes identified by their causal roles. Smart’s realism was naturalistic: our grounds for believing in a mind-independent world are *a posteriori* and derive from science. Following Quine, Smart rejected *a priori* theorising—in particular he had no time for the traditional view of philosophy as conceptual analysis. Neither did Michael Devitt, who set out to answer the anti-realist critics of both common-sense realism and scientific realism in his influential book *Realism and Truth*.

Armstrong, on the other hand, was more sympathetic to traditional philosophy, regarding science’s theoretical posits as too important to be left to the scientists. In this he was influenced by David Lewis, who sought to rehabilitate conceptual analysis in the teeth of Quine’s arguments against analyticity: the task of conceptual analysis is to identify key terms within folk theories and to seek entities in the light of science that best deserve their folk appellations. Lewis’ influence on Australian realism was immense. The sub-title of *From Metaphysics to Ethics* (1998b) Frank Jackson’s compelling articulation of physicalism, bears testimony to this influence: ‘A Defence of Conceptual Analysis’.

**Philosophical Issues Concerning Realism**

The very fact ‘common-sense’ realism is seen as a species of metaphysical realism reveals the censure in store for those who demur from the latter. Few Australian philosophers dared. But there have been some. Brian Ellis, influenced by Hilary Putnam, defended the idea that truth is ideal verification. More recently Barry Taylor in his *Models, Truth and Realism* has mounted a detailed and powerful case for a non-realist theory of truth, following the lead of Putnam and Dummett.

Dummett’s heterodox view that the debate between realists and anti-realists is really about the right model of meaning for a disputed class of statements ruffled the feathers of metaphysicists who’d thought the ghost of linguistic philosophy had been laid to rest, but within Australia it resulted in no new program to investigate the foundations of metaphysical realism.
Hilary Putnam’s views (1994a, 1994b), on the other hand, were far harder to ignore. For Putnam, the philosopher who had done more than any other to expound the case for metaphysical realism, had then shocked his followers by declaring it to be untenable. In fact, both Dummett and Putnam asked good questions of the metaphysical realist.

Consider the sentence $s$: ‘Julius Caesar’s heart skipped a beat just before he crossed the Rubicon’. Realists think either $s$ or $\neg s$ is made true by events for which we neither have nor can ever be expected to have, any evidence. Dummett asked how it could even be plausible, let alone correct, to explain speakers’ tendencies to agree that either $s$ or $\neg s$ is true as a response to (or as otherwise directed onto) states of affairs they cannot detect? Yet it is precisely undetectable worldly conditions such as Caesar’s ectopic beats that metaphysical realists mean to countenance in declaring the nature of the world independent of our beliefs about it. Dummett’s challenge extends beyond linguistic behaviour to cognitive behaviour in general: why think it plausible that an agent’s belief that exactly one of $s$ or $\neg s$ is true is linked in a semantically appropriate way to the states of affairs $S_s$ and $S_{\neg s}$ given that s/he can detect neither $S_s$ nor $S_{\neg s}$?

Putnam’s challenges to metaphysical realism are more diverse, but underlying their diversity is the same question that exercises Dummett: how is mental representation of a mind-independent world supposed to be achieved? The problem is not so much the realist’s metaphysics of a world unconstrained by our beliefs about it, but rather the rationality of belief in such a world. Thus to provide reasons to accept the metaphysics, the realist apparently has to explain how our words or mental symbols lock onto the right mind-independent objects and properties. There may be some unexpected indeterminacy of reference but not of the type that would allow ‘cat’ to refer to cherries or ‘cherry’ to cats, a result that would subvert the whole notion of reference. Yet Putnam’s model-theoretic argument purports to show that referential relations between our symbols and mind-independent objects is indeterminate in just this way, a reductio of realism in Putnam’s view. This argument has prompted vigorous responses from realists such as David Lewis and Michael Devitt, but the underlying challenge to explain how semantic links are forged between mental symbols and mind-independent things remains unresolved.

Scientific realism has also attracted its fair share of critics, none more determined than Bas van Fraassen (1980). Whilst metaphysical realists of a more rationalist persuasion might be sceptical of the theoretical posits of science and the finality of its methods, van Fraassen’s critique is driven by a thorough-going empiricism: scientific realism is the result of unwarranted metaphysical assumptions. Here ‘metaphysics’ is used in the pejorative sense the positivists gave to it. Like them, van Fraassen is prepared to believe only in the observable; unlike them he holds no reductionist hopes for translating theoretical terms into observational ones. He is thus agnostic about electrons, black holes, gravity and evolution. Empirical adequacy rather than truth is the criterion by which scientific theories should be judged:
Relevant Logic

If I believe a theory to be true and not just empirically adequate, my risk of being shown wrong is exactly the risk that the weaker entailed belief will conflict with actual experience. Meanwhile by avowing the stronger belief, I place myself in the position of … having a richer, fuller picture of the world … a wealth of opinion I can dole out to those who wonder. But since the extra opinion is not additionally vulnerable, the risk is … illusory and so is the wealth. It is but empty strutting and posturing, this display of courage not under fire and avowal of additional resources that cannot feel the pinch of misfortune any sooner. (van Fraassen, in Churchland and Hooker 1985: 255)

Relevant Logic

Edwin Mares

Introduction

Australasian logicians are internationally famous for their work in Relevant logic. In this article, I give a brief history of Relevant logic in Australasia. After a short introduction to Relevant logic, I look at three central themes in the history of the field in Australasia: (i) the development of its model theory; (ii) the development of its proof theory; (iii) the construction and examination of relevant mathematical theories.

What is Relevant Logic?

Relevant logic is a non-classical logic. It rejects certain of the inferences and theses that classical logic makes valid. In particular Relevant logic makes invalid the following ‘paradoxes of material implication’:

\[ p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p) \]
\[ p \rightarrow (\neg p \rightarrow q) \]
\[ (p \land \neg p) \rightarrow q \]
\[ p \rightarrow (q \lor \neg q) \]

And, similarly, it rejects the following ‘fallacies of relevance’:

\[ p / \therefore q \lor \neg q \]
\[ p \land \neg p / \therefore q \]

According to Relevant logicians, what the paradoxes of material and strict implication have in common is that they treat the implication connective as indicating a rather weak bond between the antecedent and consequent of the conditionals. Consider, for example, ‘\( p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p) \)’. This thesis (taken as a
valid formula) tells us that a proposition need only be true for any proposition whatsoever to imply it.

One way of avoiding some of the paradoxes of material implication is to treat the arrow as strict implication (as necessary material implication). This avoids making valid ‘\( p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p) \)’ and ‘\( p \rightarrow (\neg p \rightarrow q) \)’, but not the other two paradoxes. The problem with ‘\( (p \land \neg p) \rightarrow q \)’ and ‘\( p \rightarrow (q \lor \neg q) \)’ is that the antecedent and consequent seem to have nothing to do with one another—they are irrelevant to one another. And the same is the case for the premises and conclusions of the inferences given above.

Relevant logics are logical systems that avoid all such paradoxes and fallacies. They are weaker than classical logic in the sense that they do not include all the theorems of classical logic. It is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition of a propositional logic to be a Relevant logic that it has the variable sharing condition: if \( A \rightarrow B \) is a theorem of the logic, then \( A \) and \( B \) must contain at least one proposition in common. (For a more technical overview of Relevant logic, see Routley et al. 1983 and Brady 2003. For a philosophical discussion, see Mares 2004.)

**Theme 1: The Semantic Tradition**

When Relevant logics were introduced in the 1950s, they were presented in terms of various proof theories. Philosophers (then and now) have been reluctant to accept logical systems unless they have model theoretic semantics. Consider, for example, modal logic. Although modern modal logics were introduced in the early part of the century, they did not gain widespread acceptance among philosophers until Kripke (and others) produced possible world semantics for them in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

There are two central problems in providing a semantics for Relevant logic: (1) the difficulty of finding a treatment of negation; (2) the problem of finding a treatment of implication.

The problem of negation becomes clear if one considers how validity is treated in modal logic. An inference from \( A \) to \( B \) is valid in a modal logic if every possible world (in every model for that logical system) which makes \( A \) true also makes \( B \) true. The semantics for Relevant logic are based on the possible worlds semantics of modal logic. In order to adapt this semantics to Relevant logic, and hence to avoid the fallacies of relevance, one needs worlds in which contradictions are true and worlds in which the law of excluded middle fails.

One of the now standard ways of doing this was first developed by Richard and Val Routley (then at the University of New England) in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Routley and Routley 1972). The Routleys (later to become Val Plumwood and Richard Sylvan respectively) added an operator, \( ^* \), to a set of worlds. A negative statement \( \neg A \) is true at a world \( x \) if and only if \( A \) fails to be true at world \( x^* \). Now it is easy to make a contradiction true at a world. Consider a proposition \( p \). Let \( p \) be true at \( x \) but fail to be true at \( x^* \). In the Routleys’ model, \( x^{**} = x \). Thus, \( \neg p \) is also true at \( x \), but \( \neg p \) fails to be true at \( x^* \). Thus, we now have one
Relevant Logic

world in which a contradiction comes true and one in which the law of excluded middle fails. The operator $*$ has become known as the Routley star. The use of the Routley star is known as the Australian plan in the semantics for Relevant logic.

Instead of calling the elements of their model ‘worlds’ (and hence conjuring up the notion of a possible world), the Routleys used the term setup. A possible world is supposed to be consistent and complete, and hence would not allow the violations of the laws of consistency and bivalence that the star was invented to enable. Later, however, Richard Routley at least came to believe that there are true contradictions and that there are possible worlds (one of which is the actual world) at which the law of consistency is violated.

The behaviour of negation in Relevant logics makes them paraconsistent logics. A paraconsistent logic is just a logic in which not every proposition can be inferred from any contradiction. As we have seen, this inference is one of the fallacies of relevance. In part because Relevant logics have been so well studied, and in part because they are often supposed to have virtues other than their paraconsistency, they are considered to be among the most important paraconsistent logics. Thus, Relevant logics and their semantics have become closely connected with the very strong tradition of paraconsistency in Australia. Among the more radical paraconsistent philosophers are Richard Routley and Graham Priest, who have developed a view called dialetheism, which holds that there can be true contradictions. Interestingly, although Routley first developed the ‘star semantics’ for relevant negation, the preferred semantics of dialetheists is usually the so-called American plan semantics (because it was originally developed by Mike Dunn in the U.S.), in which statements can have more than one truth-value. Ironically, Routley (who was born in New Zealand and became an Australian) was responsible for the completion of the American plan as a semantics for all of Relevant logic, not just relevant negation (Routley 1984).

Routley was also instrumental in finding a solution to the problem of implication. Once again consider the semantics for modal logics. If we take $A \rightarrow B$ to be true in a world if and only if in all accessible worlds in which $A$ is true, $B$ is also true, then we naturally find that $A \rightarrow A$ is true in every world. This leads us to accept that this formula follows validly from every other formula, but this is a fallacy of relevance. So we need setups in our semantics in which $A \rightarrow A$ fails. In the early 1970s, Routley and Robert Meyer (who was then at Indiana University) developed a semantics for implication based on a three-place relation on setups. A formula $A \rightarrow B$ is true at a setup $x$ if and only if for all setups $y$ and $z$ such that $Rxyz$, if $A$ is true at $x$, then $B$ is true at $z$ (Routley and Meyer 1973). This semantics separates the indices at which the antecedent is evaluated from those at which the consequent is evaluated, and provides an extremely flexible tool for the analysis of implication and can be used to treat a very wide range of logical systems.

By the mid 1970s both Richard Routley and Bob Meyer had moved to the Australian National University. There they formed the core of an extremely influential school of Relevant logicians. Together with their many excellent
students—John Slaney, Michael McRobbie, Paul Thistlewaite, Steven Giambrone, Errol Martin, to name just a few—they developed the model and proof theory of Relevant logic into the rich and active field of research that it is today. This school has also hosted a large number of Relevant logicians visiting from elsewhere in Australasia—such as Ross Brady, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, and Chris Mortensen—and from around the world—such as Nuel Belnap, Alasdair Urquhart, Mike Dunn, Kit Fine, and myself.

**Theme 2: The Proof-Theoretic Tradition**

Although the dominant tradition in Australasian Relevant logic is model theoretic, there has been some interesting and important work in relevant proof theory in this region.

In the 1980s, Paul Thistlewaite, Bob Meyer, and Michael McRobbie constructed a sequent-style proof theory for the Relevant logic RL, which does not contain the distribution of conjunction over disjunction (and which, unlike the stronger system R, is decidable) (Thistlewaite et al. 1988). They used this proof theory as the basis for an automated reasoning program (a computer program that produced automated proofs), called Kripke.

In his (1990) paper, ‘A General Logic’, John Slaney sets out a very easy way of understanding the proof theories of the various Relevant logics that combines techniques from natural deduction with some from the sequent logic tradition. Greg Restall has developed and further examined Slaney’s systems, adding new connectives (such as modal operators) to the logics and placing them in context with other substructural logics (Restall 2000). A substructural logic is a logical system that rejects one or more of the structural rules of proof that are valid in classical or intuitionist logic. For example, some of these logical systems will not allow us to add arbitrary (irrelevant) premises to a valid inference and retain its validity, some systems will not allow us to change the order of premises in a valid inference, and so on.

Although the tradition in relevant proof theory is less well developed in Australasia than model theory, there is much interesting work to do and I am sure that it will increase in size and importance in the future.

**Theme 3: Relevant Mathematics**

The use of Relevant logics as bases for mathematical theories has been well explored in Australasia. Bob Meyer created R# which is a version of Peano arithmetic based on the strong Relevant logic R. Meyer gave a finitary proof that R# is absolutely consistent, that is, one cannot prove 0=1 in it (Meyer 1976). This proof opens up extremely interesting questions as to the status of Gödel’s second theorem in R#.

Ross Brady of La Trobe University has formulated set theories with naive comprehension axioms (which state that the extension of any formula constitutes a set) and shown that they are non-trivial and in some cases they are even consistent. A theory is non-trivial if and only if it does not entail every formula.

Chris Mortensen at the University of Adelaide has constructed a variety of relevant and paraconsistent mathematical theories and set out their uses in his book, *Inconsistent Mathematics* (1995).

**Summing Up**

The Relevant logic tradition in Australasia has been fruitful. Not only has it been a source of interesting developments in the logic itself—in the creation of systems, theories, and theorems—but in its interaction with the rest of philosophy. As a logical basis for dialetheism, Relevant logic has helped this view become a focus of serious discussion amongst philosophers of logic and metaphysicians. As a basis for mathematical theories, it has added to and helped to create new positions in the philosophy of mathematics.

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*Res Publica* Journal

Bruce Langtry

*Res Publica*’s main focus is the application of philosophical skills and insights to public policy issues. The magazine is intended for a general readership.

It was founded in 1992 by the University of Melbourne’s Centre for Philosophy and Public Issues, one of the parent organisations of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), which has had overall responsibility since 2000. Although both Centres have been primarily research-oriented, they also have had ‘knowledge transfer’ aims, which *Res Publica* has helped to fulfill.

*Res Publica* was initially distributed mainly to paying subscribers, but has for some time been distributed free in hard copy to journalists, members of parliament, academics, and people who have asked to receive it. Most issues since 2001 are also downloadable from the CAPPE website (<http://www.cappe.edu.au/publications/res-publica-past-issues.htm>).

Some of *Res Publica*’s authors have been eminent in Australian public life. They include Barry Jones, Michael Kirby, Davis McCAughhey, and Ninian Stephen. Some contributors have been based overseas. Many have been well-known Australian academics—a majority have been philosophers, but there have also been people drawn from law, political science, anthropology, and other disciplines. Most contributions have been solicited by the editors, Kit Keuneman (1992–1994), Bruce Langtry (1995–2006) and Adrian Walsh (from 2007).

Volume 13 (2004) gives a good indication of the magazine’s range. In Vol.13 No.1, Igor Primoratz assesses different varieties of patriotism, and argues in
favour of an ‘ethical patriotism’ which focusses not on the political, economic and cultural interests of one’s country and its people, but instead on its distinctively moral well-being.

Janna Thompson points out that at least some varieties of radical politics can play a valuable role in a liberal democracy, by criticising dysfunctional or unjust institutions and unidentified forms of oppression, and by thereby making it easier for people to contemplate substantial changes. She considers how various dangers can be avoided.

Adrian Walsh is concerned by the growing practice of policy makers to use assignments of cash values to goods and services, even ones which will not be bought or sold, such as volunteer work and parenting. Is it ethically acceptable to use a single metric to measure the value of everything—even, say, the value of a child? The use of such a metric fosters the idea that everything is replaceable, in the sense that its loss can be offset by the substitution of a good of a relatively similar kind. Ascribing prices to everything also involves talking as if prices and ultimate values are correlated, and in fact financial cost-benefit analysis frequently becomes the only, or at least the dominant, consideration in discussion of policy issues.

John Kleinig’s short paper looks at codes of ethics in forensic science, and indicates some problems arising for forensic science practitioners in relation to such values as truthfulness and competence.


Of the eight papers published in 2004, five were by philosophers and three by lawyers.

Frequency of publication has recently been reduced to one issue a year.

Rights
Jacqueline Laing

The modern language of rights provides a contemporary idiom for certain ancient and perennial questions about the nature of morality. These include debates about the objectivity and universality of ethics and the nature of human obligation, freedom and action. Jeremy Bentham famously denounced natural rights, arguing that if morality was founded upon pain and pleasure, then there could be no such thing as natural rights: ‘Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural
and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense—nonsense upon stilts’ (Bentham 1970: 30–1).

A subject of historical dispute concerns whether the human rights tradition is one that draws upon ancient and global sources that are religious, legal and philosophical in character, or whether it is a peculiarly post-Enlightenment creature that springs from conceptions of the democratic nation-state. There is certainly support for the claim that the notion of ‘\textit{ius}’ developed from its more general definition in the middle ages as ‘the just thing in itself’ and ‘the art by which one knows or determines what is just’ (Aquinas 1920: II-II, q. 57, a. 1c, ad 1 and ad 2) to a more individualised ‘kind of moral power [\textit{facultas}] which every man has, either over his own property or with respect to that which is due to him’ (Suarez 1965: 282). Whatever the truth of the historical debate, the intellectual antecedent to any discussion of rights or natural rights conceived precisely as objective and universal must include a discussion of natural law thinkers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine and Aquinas. Within their diverse theories is to be found agreement that one problem with the idea that ‘\textit{ius}’ is the product of human consensus, whether populist or elitist, is that an authoritative consensus can logically agree to impose injustice. The objection is summed up by Cicero: ‘Most foolish of all is the belief that everything decreed by the institutions or laws of a particular country is just. What if the laws are the laws of tyrants?’ (Cicero 1998: 111). Insofar as a rights theory purports to lay claim to universality and objectivity, it falls within this more ancient and international tradition from whose foundations, arguably, the modern realist conception of human rights has emerged. The trouble with the classical natural law tradition for many moderns, however, is that the source of the natural moral law is also regarded as the source of physical law and creation itself, a divine source. Nonetheless, the individualised rights theories of Francisco Suárez, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel von Pufendorf, and John Locke are far less hostile to established religion than are the writings of Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu in France and many of the American founders. It is against this intellectual backdrop that the Australian dialogue about rights is placed.

**Australian Contribution**

Australian philosophy has been in the forefront of contemporary philosophical debate about whether rights are indeed illusory, who may be regarded right-holders or ‘persons’, and whether legally speaking there ought to be a Bill of Rights. J. L. Mackie (1991), under the influence of John Anderson, used an argument from queerness to defend a species of what he calls ‘moral scepticism’. John Finnis, by contrast, expounds an account of rights in the natural law tradition. In \textit{Natural Law and Natural Rights} (1980) Finnis outlines a theory of ‘natural’, ‘human’ or ‘moral’ rights grounded in the requirements of practical reasonableness. Developing a theory of natural law and natural rights based on basic human goods like life, knowledge and friendship, he identifies the rational
foundations of moral judgement and shows that there are human goods that can only be secured via the institutions of man-made law.

Accounts of rights outside the natural law tradition dominate contemporary Australian philosophy. Tom Campbell (2005) defends a version of democratic positivism, insisting that ‘[o]nce we say that there are moral rights which somehow or other exist whatever the social and legal realities of life … then we are on the way to destroying the distinctive usefulness of the idea of rights’ (2005: 196). At the same time, he admits ‘we need rights to limit and control democracy’ (2005: 197). Edmundsen (2006) argues that this admission involves Campbell in unavoidable circularity.

Jeremy Waldron (1993) defends a liberal version of rights. Perhaps recognising the need to ground the duty to promote communal goods in an adequate characterisation of them as desirable in terms of their worth to members considered as a group rather than as individuals, his analysis meets potential internal conflict with his further insistence on the truth of legal positivism, whether normative or otherwise.

Part of the problem is what the rights debate encompasses. If it amounts to the basic proposition that there are objective values that imply obligations for individuals, then the debate is part of a broader contest between so-called deontologists and consequentialists. Perhaps Australia’s best known successor to Bentham’s consequentialism is Peter Singer. Although often cited as the father of the animal rights movement, Singer uses the term ‘rights’ as ‘shorthand for the kind of protection that we give to all members of our species’ (1990: 8). He, like Bentham, rejects the notion that any creature, human or non-human, has any natural or moral right. This feature of his theory has triggered much discussion in the animal rights movement. Tom Regan, an American animal rights defender, asks whether Singer can be regarded a defender of animals given his preparedness to believe any right defeasible upon the demonstration that a better state of affairs would obtain. Others like Jenny Teichman (1996), Suzanne Uniacke (1992), and this author (1997) argue that Singer’s position on who is to constitute a ‘right-holder’ or ‘person’ is internally inconsistent given his queasiness about harvesting the organs of deliberately brain damaged infants. Elsewhere in her work, Uniacke (1996) in a manner reminiscent of Hohfeld’s correlations between claims, duties, liberties, no-rights, powers, liabilities, immunities and disabilities, defends a concept of rights forfeiture where one becomes an aggressor.

Perhaps the greatest need for an adequate foundation for rights is to be found in the writings of those keen to defend certain classes against injustice. Women’s rights, the rights of the unborn, and the rights of individuals irrespective of disability, race or sexual orientation depend upon rights grounded in reality and, moreover, rights of a less defeasible character than that propounded by the consequentialist. Accordingly, feminists like Germaine Greer (1970), Genevieve Lloyd (1984) and Nicola Lacey (2004) rely on an account of rights that cannot allow for the kind of defeasibility defended by Singer.
Rights

Whether the language of rights is adequate to meet the demands of social and inter-generational justice is widely debated. Defenders of distributivism like Campbell (2006) argue that rights are too individualistic and egoistic a notion to achieve social justice, while on an altogether distinct front, opponents of reproductive human cloning, for example, hold that these techniques compromise a person’s beginnings and thus the demands of inter-generational justice without necessarily involving a breach of an existing person’s rights. Likewise, those concerned to prevent the erosion and eradication of cultures may not find much solace in the language of individual rights (Laing 2004). Finally, rights discourse is unlikely to answer the needs of deep ecology, with its respect for nature, the universe and living things (Mathews 1991). However, with increasing funding for population control and sustainable development, whether the less metaphysical and more utilitarian implications of the environmental calculation will ultimately imply an erosion of the rights and dignity of the most vulnerable and unproductive of humans is a matter that will doubtless emerge in the near future.

An Australian Bill of Rights?

Non-cognitivism, rights scepticism and consequentialism aside, the incontrovertible barbarities of the twentieth century have inspired much international law and a modern-day insistence that rights, like thought itself, may be real albeit intangible. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights signed in 1948 shortly after World War Two, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) all contribute to this discussion. At the same time, there is ongoing controversy as to whether Australia should adopt a Bill of Rights or whether doing so would undermine individual freedom, the rule of law and democratic accountability by placing power in the hands of an increasingly politicised and unelected judiciary. This political scepticism about the rationale of any charter or Bill of Rights is distinct from the moral scepticism about rights outlined so fulsomely by Bentham. Among Australia’s legal academic proponents of the Bill of Rights are Hillary Charlesworth (2002) and George Williams (2007). Opponents of constitutional reform include Gabrielle Moens (1994), James Allan (1998), Tom Campbell (2006) and Greg Craven (2004).

St James Ethics Centre was established in 1989. The clear intention of its founders, a group of business and professional leaders working in association with the Anglican parish of St James, King Street, Sydney, was that the centre should be an apolitical and independent charity—open to people of good will from all faiths (or no faith at all). The founders’ purpose in establishing the centre was to provide an active and accessible forum for the promotion of business and professional ethics in the city of Sydney. That objective has since been expanded to include an attention to ethics in all aspects of life and beyond Sydney—to include people throughout Australia and, as required, abroad. Philosophy has always been and remains the core discipline informing the centre’s work. Although drawing to some degree on the canon of ‘Eastern’ philosophy, the core intellectual framework at work within the centre is predominantly ‘Western’ in character. The Socratic notion of the importance of an ‘examined life’ is especially influential within the centre. The centre is also strongly inclined to the traditional role of philosophy as a public activity—inviting active engagement with the widest possible selection of people. As such, it is often the task of the centre (where possible) to ‘translate’ the insights of philosophy into language that is meaningful to the wider population. Thus, the centre aims to advocate the ‘examined life’, stimulating popular reflection on issues of the day. Contributing disciplines include: psychology, law, economics, social ecology and management. The mission of the centre is to help people to include the ethical dimension in their lives. To that end, the centre provides practical assistance to individuals and organisations, focussing particularly on building their capacity to deal with the issues and dilemmas they confront from time to time. To this end, the centre developed and continues to offer the world’s only free, confidential, national counselling service for people needing assistance with ethical issues and dilemmas. At a more proactive level, the centre provides education and training for individuals and organisations.
with its national, ‘flagship’ program, the Vincent Fairfax Fellowship, aiming not only to develop the generic skills of leadership, but also to foster the knowledge, skills and dispositions required to exercise ethical leadership. The breadth and depth of the centre’s work is distinctive, with its practitioners actively engaging with issues ranging from ‘stem cells to soldiers’. For example, across this span, the centre: works with the military in Australia and its wider region, provides support to decision-makers in hospitals, participates in the design and review of ethical frameworks for the development of new technologies (specifically gene technology and nanotechnology), and is engaged with issues arising in almost every aspect of life in Australia—sport, commerce, the professions and so on. The centre has also played a formative role in promoting the concept and practice of corporate responsibility in Australia. In recent years, the centre has been invited to contribute to work internationally, most notably in the establishment of the Military Leadership Forum and through the centre’s involvement with The Genographic Project. It is planned that the next stage in the centre’s development will see the appointment of individuals specialising in particular fields of applied ethics who are willing and able to take on the task of engaging with the widest possible audience.

Singer, Peter

Udo Schuklenk & Christopher Lowry

Life

Peter (Albert David) Singer is best known for his work in applied ethics on the moral status of animals, the obligations of citizens of the developed world to the global poor, and issues in medicine at the beginning and end of life. His ability to write on timely topics with philosophical rigour and far more accessibility than is common within the academy, combined with his tenacity in defending controversial positions on these topics, has earned him considerable influence within and beyond professional philosophy, evidenced by his inclusion in Time Magazine’s 2005 list of the world’s 100 most influential people. He has authored or edited forty books and has published over 200 articles. His principal publications, many of which have been translated into multiple languages, include Animal Liberation (1975, 2nd ed. 1990), Practical Ethics (1979, 2nd ed. 1993b), How Are We to Live? (1993a), Rethinking Life and Death (1994), A Darwinian Left (1999), One World (2002a, 2nd ed. 2004), and The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty (2009b). Critical discussion of his views can be found in,
for example, Jamieson (1999), Uniacke (2002), and a special issue of *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 26, no. 3 (2005).

He was born on 6 July 1946 in Melbourne, Australia to parents of Jewish descent who had fled Vienna eight years earlier to avoid Nazi persecution. He was educated first at the *University of Melbourne* (B.A. 1967, M.A. 1969), where his interest in ethics was awakened by H. J. McCloskey, and then at Oxford (B.Phil. 1971), where he was strongly influenced by his mentor R. M. Hare. He spent most of his career at *Monash University* in Melbourne (1977–99), although he also taught briefly at *La Trobe University* (1975–76). At Monash, he founded the Centre for Human Bioethics in 1980 and served as its director until 1991. He was also the co-director of the Institute for Ethics and Public Policy (1992–1995). In 1987 he co-founded (with Helga Kuhse) the journal *Bioethics* and served as its co-editor until 1999. He was a leading force in establishing the International Association of Bioethics in 1992, serving as its first president. In 2004, he was named Humanist of the Year by the Australian Humanist Association. He is currently Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at *Princeton University*’s Centre for Human Values (since 1999) and Laureate Professor at the University of Melbourne’s Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (since 2005).

**Ethics**

Singer explains his approach to ethical analysis in *Practical Ethics* as preference utilitarian. He follows Hare’s proposal, in *Moral Thinking* (1981), that we should distinguish between an everyday, common sense, intuitive level and a reflective, critical level of moral reasoning. The intuitive level is more or less what should guide us in our daily lives, and is perhaps what we might teach our children. However, there is also a need to reflect more critically on what is the best thing to do (Singer 2002b). Like all utilitarians, preference utilitarians aim to maximise the good and minimise the bad. In addition, preference utilitarians essentially remain neutral with regard to what the best good would be for particular individuals. What they are certain about is that we should seek to maximise the satisfaction of individual preferences and minimise the frustration of preferences. Simply put: a world in which preferences are maximally satisfied and minimally frustrated is preferable to a world where the opposite is the case. Singer has argued in favour of an impartialist stance in ethics, requiring us to treat our own interests or those of our loved ones no different than the comparable interests of others, even others in a far-away corner of the world. This has been criticised most prominently by virtue ethicists as an undesirable, overly demanding standard (Wolf 1982). Singer responded in *Practical Ethics* to this charge with his now famous suggestion that we should aim for ‘more than a token donation, yet not so high as to be beyond all but saints’ (Singer 1993a: 246).

**The Moral Status of Animals**

Singer is arguably best-known for his book *Animal Liberation*. He takes a strong stance against ‘speciesism’ (the view that moral status is based on membership in
a particular species) in favour of the claim that moral consideration is owed to beings in virtue of whether (and in what degree) they possess morally relevant characteristics. He argues that sentience, self-consciousness, rationality and autonomy are important in this regard. Since many non-human animals possess the relevant characteristics to a sufficient degree (and some to a greater degree than some humans), Singer concludes that the interests of non-human animals deserve moral consideration. He argues that what matters is the kind of interests at play, rather than whose interests they are. Human interests will tend to outweigh animal interests only insofar as most humans have more diverse and complex interests than most non-human animals. Critics of his approach to defending animal ethics include Tom Regan (1983) and Martha Nussbaum (2006).

In writing *Animal Liberation*, Singer was especially concerned to condemn the practices involved in factory farming, as well as animal experimentation that proceeds without any reasonable expectation of significant benefit to humans or non-human animals. As in many of his writings, he demonstrates an aptitude for bringing the tools of philosophy to bear on decisions that many people face in modern life, and an evident desire to persuade a broad range of people to question the conclusions of ordinary morality. His book has been credited with largely launching the animal liberation movement, and thirty years after its publication it remains an essential text in the debate.

**World Poverty**

One of Singer’s earliest articles, and probably his most widely read one, is ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ (1972), in which he argues that anyone who can afford to purchase luxury goods has a moral obligation to instead assist the global poor by donating to international organisations that provide emergency relief and development aid, such as Oxfam and UNICEF. This paper has strongly influenced many other works on world poverty (Unger 1996). Singer’s aim is to challenge the ordinary view that such donations are supererogatory acts of charity. His position follows from his commitment to the claim that competing interests should be weighed via a comparison of the kinds of interests in play, rather than by whose interests they are. The locations of and distance between donors and recipients of aid has little or no moral importance compared to the kinds of interests at stake. Since the suffering and premature deaths caused by extreme poverty frustrate major interests, whereas only comparatively minor interests are furthered by luxury goods, Singer concludes that people who choose luxury goods over poverty reduction are morally blameworthy. With this article and his other efforts to promote international aid organisations, he has succeeded in generating debate within academic philosophy and has persuaded many people to adopt more globally responsible patterns of giving.

In *One World* Singer extends his discussion of international morality to address climate change, humanitarian intervention, and globalisation. With this broader discussion, he aims to challenge even more forcefully the ordinary view that a person’s moral obligations are greatly lessened outside of her nation’s borders. In
line with his preference utilitarian thinking he argues in favour of a cosmopolitan ethic that promotes a global conception of community. The most urgent problems we now face, such as climate change, are global problems that require, he argues, investing greater power in international institutions and demanding greater democratic accountability from them. His most prominent critic on this topic is Thomas Pogge (2002).

**Life and Death Decisions in Medicine**

Many of Singer’s writings are controversial, but none more so than his arguments about euthanasia. In defending women’s abortion rights, he concludes that a being should be considered a person with a right to life only if it is both sentient and aware of itself as having a life of its own. Since foetuses (when moderately developed) are sentient but not self-conscious, they are owed moral consideration, but do not have a right to life. So if, because of some defect, the foetus would have a life not worth living (e.g. it would never develop self-consciousness or would almost exclusively experience suffering), then, all other things being equal, it should be killed. Furthermore, if the lives of persons (especially the mother) would be improved by killing the foetus, even if it would have a satisfying life, then the mother can morally choose to abort. Singer follows this line of argument to justify infanticide in certain cases. He argues that parents, in consultation with their physician, are morally entitled to decide to kill an infant less than a month old, who, due to severe disability, would have a life not worth living. He also argues that in cases of less severe disability, in the absence of willing adoptive parents or robust state support, parents are morally entitled to choose (on the basis of the impact on their lives and/or the lives of their existing children) to kill an infant less than a month old, especially if doing so would prompt them to try to conceive a healthy child in its stead. Although Singer insists that many parents can, with faultless rationality, choose to raise children who have disabilities, and although he argues that everything feasible should be done to make the life of every person, whether disabled or not, as satisfying and as rich as possible, his defence of euthanasia for disabled infants has raised tremendous controversy. Prominent critics include Eva Feder Kittay (2005) and Adrienne Asch (1999). Singer has also received fierce political protest. In 1989 and for several years thereafter, he was prevented from publicly speaking on these issues in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, where several of the conferences to which he was invited, and even the courses that used *Practical Ethics*, were forced to be cancelled. His appointment at Princeton in 1999 was greeted initially in much the same way for similar reasons. In the end, this publicity likely served his objectives better than silence, as it lead to a much wider discussion of his views.

**Defending the Ethical Life**

Reconciling prudential considerations with moral ones was an early topic of interest to Singer (his 1969 Master’s thesis is entitled *Why Should I be Moral?*) and it is one that he has repeatedly revisited during his career. Appealing to
the paradox of hedonism and other considerations, he argues that choosing an ethical life provides the best chance, all things considered, for having a satisfying life. He concedes that this will not convince everyone, but he contends that it should have force for those with at least moderately reflective tendencies. His concern to draw connections between self-interest and ethics is very much in line with the practical outlook of his theorising more generally. This desire to defend ethics in a way that is fully connected to concrete reality also prompted him to draw on evolutionary psychology, which is most evident in *A Darwinian Left*. He explains that understanding the evolutionary forces that have largely shaped our tendency towards selfishness and our capacity for reciprocity and altruism is crucial to creating a credible defence of the kind of radical social progress—on our view of animals, of distant others, of the global community, and so on—that he has urged throughout his career. Although his views are hotly contested and often very controversial, it is fair to say that more than any other ethicist of his generation, he has succeeded in encouraging, even forcing, large numbers of people to reflect on what the ethical life requires and to bring their behaviour to a closer approximation of what that reflection yields.

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**Smart, J. J. C. (‘Jack’)**

Graham Oppy

John Jamieson Carswell (‘Jack’) Smart was born in Cambridge, England, in 1920. His father, William Marshall Smart (1889–1975) was then the John Couch Adams Astronomer at the University of Cambridge. From 1937 until 1959, William Smart was Regius Professor of Astronomy at the University of Glasgow; he was also president of the Royal Astronomical Society in 1950. Jack’s mother was born Isabel Carswell; like his father, she was a Scot.

Smart was the oldest of three brothers, all of whom became university professors. Alastair Smart (1922–1992) was professor of art history at Nottingham University; and Ninian Smart (1927–2001) was professor of theology at the University of Birmingham (1961–67), professor of religious studies at the University of Lancaster (1967–92) and professor in the comparative study of religions at the University of Santa Barbara (1988–98).

After boarding at the Leys School in Cambridge, Smart commenced undergraduate studies—in mathematics, physics and philosophy—at the University of Glasgow. Smart’s undergraduate studies were interrupted by five years of military service during World War Two; nonetheless, in 1946, he completed his B.A./M.A., and moved on to the Queen’s College in Oxford. After the completion of his B.Phil. in 1948, Smart became a junior research fellow at Corpus Christi

In 1950, Smart was appointed Hughes Professor of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide. Honours students whom Smart taught while at Adelaide include: Brian Ellis, Graham Nerlich, Michael Bradley, Brian Medlin, Ian Hinckfuss and Max Deutscher. Staff who had important influences on Smart’s philosophical thought included U. T. Place and C. B. Martin. The Gavin David Young Lectures also brought a host of significant figures to Adelaide from the mid 1950s, including: Gilbert Ryle, W. V. O. Quine, Anthony Flew, Herbert Feigl, Donald Davidson, David Lewis, Peter Hempel, Daniel Dennett and Hilary Putnam.

In 1972, Smart moved from Adelaide to a readership at La Trobe University (where his colleagues included Frank Jackson, Peter Singer and John Fox); then, in 1977, Smart moved on again, to a chair in the Philosophy Program in the Research School for the Social Sciences at the Australian National University. Although he retired from this chair in 1986, Smart remained an active ‘visiting fellow’ in the Philosophy Program until 1999, when he moved to Melbourne and became an honorary research fellow in the School of Philosophy and Bioethics at Monash University. He remained in this position until his death in 2012.

As Philip Pettit noted in his introduction to the Inaugural Jack Smart Lecture—an annual lecture in the Philosophy Program at the Research School for the Social Sciences, first held on 15 October 1999—one can think of Smart’s overall philosophical orientation as turning on three fundamental assumptions. *First*, that the theories of natural science, under serious and metaphysically realist interpretation, offer our best account of the fundamental constitution of reality. *Second*, that our ‘commonsense’ views about the world cannot all simply be dismissed as errors or illusions, since they provide the foundations for the successful carrying out of our day-to-day projects. And, *third*, that it is not a straightforward matter to reconcile our ‘commonsense’ views about the world with the theories of natural science. Along with Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Armstrong, and others, Smart was in part responsible for developing a conception of philosophy on which the primary philosophical task is the development of a comprehensive theory that effects the best possible ‘rounding out’ of commonsense and natural science. This conception of philosophy is articulated in Smart’s *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* (1963), and updated—as least in some respects—in *Our Place in the Universe* (1989).

In philosophy of mind, Smart is perhaps best known for his paper ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ (1959b), in which he argues for a version of the view that mental states are identical to brain states. Under the influence of Ryle, Smart had been a philosophical behaviourist; however, as the result of a three-way discussion with Place and Martin, Smart eventually came to adopt a variant of Place’s identity theory. While some critics have disagreed, Smart has always held
that his version of the identity theory is compatible with a functionalist account of mental states, and that the identities that hold between mental states and brain states are contingent in nature.

In **metaphysics**, Smart is widely known as a defender of a constellation of controversial views about the nature of time. On Smart’s account, the best interpretation of physical theories of time—in particular the special and general theories of relativity—should lead us to accept the view that the past and the future exist, that reality is framed by a four-dimensional manifold with three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension, and that the belief that time *really* passes is a mistake that can be explained in terms of facts about human psychology (or—on an earlier view that he subsequently discarded—in terms of facts about the use of human temporal language). These views about time might be thought to comport well with what Smart took to be one of the principle objectives of metaphysics, namely, to try to see the world ‘under the mirror of eternity’.

In metaphysics, Smart is also well known as a defender of a physicalist account of colours. On Smart’s reckoning, colours are *identified* by reference to the properties that explain the discriminatory behaviours of normal human percepts with respect to colour—and, as it turns out, the properties that in fact explain the discriminatory behaviours of normal human percepts with respect to colour are physical properties of the surfaces of objects.

In ethics, Smart is renowned for his role in the resuscitation of utilitarianism. Reworking material from *An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics* (1961), Smart co-wrote *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (1973) with Bernard Williams. In this work, Smart argues for a version of act utilitarianism, and then Williams critiques the account that Smart offers. One of the distinctive features of Smart’s utilitarianism is that it gives primary place to satisfaction of preferences (and not merely to enjoyment of pleasure and avoidance of pain). This adjustment to classical utilitarianism helped to suggest more generic formulations of *consequentialism*, and to smooth the way for the view—recently defended by, among others, Frank Jackson and Michael Smith—that pretty much any ethical theory can be given a consequentialist formulation.

In **philosophy of religion**, Smart is perhaps best known for his co-authored ‘debate’ with John Haldane. Their book, *Atheism and Theism*, was first published in 1996, with an updated second edition appearing in 2003. In this work, Smart defends atheism, a position that he had accepted—perhaps initially with some feelings of regret—since the late 1950s. In 1955, Smart contributed two papers to the very influential *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, edited by Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre. Subsequently, Smart said that he was ‘ashamed’ of these two papers, and that ‘emotional attachment to my parents … caused me to hang on to the church long after it was really incompatible with my philosophical and scientific beliefs’.

Under the influence of Quine, Smart had an antipathetic attitude towards ‘extensions’ of classical logic, including modal logic, tense logic, logic for counterfactuals, and so forth. While he had a great admiration for A. N. Prior, and while
he learned a lot of logic in the course of extensive correspondence with Prior, he never came to share Prior’s ‘eclectic appreciation’ of systems that ‘extended’ classical logic (never mind appreciation of systems—such as intuitionistic logics, relevant logics, quantum logics, paraconsistent logics, and so forth—that are in conflict with classical logic).

Of course, there are many other areas of philosophy in which Smart also made significant contributions. His other books include: *Between Science and Philosophy: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (1968), *Ethics, Persuasion and Truth* (1984) and *Essays Metaphysical and Moral* (1987a). The papers in *Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart* (1987) give further indication of the range of his influence.

Smart was a member of the Australian Academy of Humanities for many years. He was invested in the Order of Australia for his services to Australian philosophy, and received many other honours the world over. He held numerous appointments as visiting professor at other universities, particularly in the U.S.: for example, *Princeton* (1957), Harvard (1963), Yale (1964), and Stanford (1979). He corresponded at length with many of the best philosophers of the age—including Quine, Lewis, and Sellars—and much of this correspondence has been preserved. On top of all this, he provided leadership for Australian philosophy, not only at the institutions at which he happened to have appointments, but right across the country. He is clearly one of the very greatest figures in the history of Australasian philosophy.

Smith, Michael

Michael Andrew Smith was born in Melbourne on 23 July 1954. He studied for both a B.A. and an M.A. at Monash University, finishing there in 1980. His subsequent studies at the University of Oxford led to him being awarded a BPhil in 1983 and a D.Phil. in 1989. As a graduate student in Oxford, he was supervised by Simon Blackburn. Smith taught philosophy at Wadham College in Oxford (1984), at Monash University (1984–85 and 1989–94), and at Princeton University (1985–89), before spending almost a decade at the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University (1995–2004). He returned to Princeton University in 2004, where he is the McCosh Professor of Philosophy.

Smith’s most influential work is *The Moral Problem* (1994), but he has also authored or co-authored more than ninety papers, a selection of which were published in a second book, *Ethics and the A Priori* (2004). A number of the papers
he co-authored with Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit were collected together in Mind, Morality and Explanation (2004). Smith has also edited or co-edited four volumes. In addition to his well-known work on metaethics and moral psychology, he has made important contributions to normative ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action. His contributions to philosophy led to him being awarded an American Philosophical Association book prize in 2001 (for The Moral Problem), and a Centenary Medal for services to Australian society and the Humanities in 2003. Earlier, he was elected Fellow of the Academy of Humanities in Australia in 1997, and Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in 2000. It is safe to say that Smith is one of the most important moral philosophers of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

The problem that Smith confronts in The Moral Problem is the puzzle of how to reconcile moral realism with two theses that together provide us with a highly attractive story about how moral motivation, moral judgment and action are related to each other, and together seem to be inconsistent with the cognitivism required for moral realism (moral realists take moral judgments to be beliefs that are sometimes true). The first thesis, which goes by the name of internalism, states that a person who judges that it is right to do a particular act will, ceteris paribus, be motivated to do that act. This idea can be traced back to David Hume, but it was given special prominence in the work of two twentieth-century Oxford philosophers, J. L Mackie and Bernard Williams, who took it to pose a serious challenge to moral realism. Mackie argued that it is essential to the moral enterprise that we take there to be properties in the world that motivate us when we come into contact with them, and that a commitment to such ‘queer’ properties is not consistent with a naturalistic worldview (hence, morality involves a fundamental error). Williams argued that internalism places constraints on the practical reasons individuals can be thought to possess for acting in one way or another, and that putative moral demands cannot provide practical reasons for action for any individuals that do not already possess psychological states that could lead them to be motivated to act on such demands after a process of rational reflection (where this process, while it might lead to the creation of new desires, is understood to always be constrained by the desires that the individual already possesses).

The second thesis that Smith focusses on when setting out his main problem concerns motivation. This thesis, the Humean theory of motivation, consists of a sharp distinction between the belief states and desire states that are thought of as together explaining human actions (a desire is an ‘original existence’, to echo Hume on the passions), in combination with a contention that while desires play a crucial direct role in human behaviour, beliefs alone are not capable of moving us to act. Belief is in the business of merely representing the world, rather than attempting to change it, whereas desire contains no ‘representative quality’ (to echo Hume again; see Treatise 2.3.3).

Cognitivism, internalism, and the Humean theory of motivation seem to form an inconsistent triad, since cognitivism states that a person who judges
that it is right to do a particular act believes that it is right to do that act, and internalism seems to imply that such a person will be motivated to do that act, but the Humean theory of motivation denies that there is any necessary connection between believing that it is right to do a particular act and being motivated to do it. In other words, internalism and the Humean theory of motivation seem to together imply that non-cognitivism is true, since if it is both true that moral judgments motivate us and that only desires motivate us, moral judgments cannot be beliefs.

Something has dropped out of this little argument for seeing the three main claims as inconsistent (as I have just presented it), and that is the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause that must be included in the definition of internalism in order to ensure that the thesis is attractive, instead of implausible. Without such a clause, internalism would rule out the possibility of akrasia: judging that it is right to do a particular act, yet not being motivated to do it. But it is clear that people do suffer from akrasia and other forms of practical irrationality that prevent them from being motivated to act on their best judgments. Although Smith initially states the internalist thesis by using a ‘ceteris paribus’ clause, he goes on to argue that internalism can be understood, more specifically, as a conceptual necessity claim of the form, ‘If an agent judges that it is right for her to φ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to φ in C or she is practically irrational’ (1994: 61). In other words, all things are equal just when an individual is being practically rational.

It is important to note that Smith doesn’t think that merely recognising that the most plausible form of internalism is a weaker thesis than one might have initially supposed when setting out the main problem (ignoring the ceteris paribus clause, as I did above when explaining why the three main claims seem to be inconsistent) will enable us to avoid his trilemma. In a symposium on Smith’s book published in Ethics, David Brink contends that this is all that is needed to avoid the trilemma, since only a strong internalist claim is inconsistent with the conjunction of cognitivism and the Humean theory of motivation (Brink 1997). Smith rejects this claim in his symposium response (Smith 1997), but even if Brink is right about what is required for there to be strict inconsistency here, Smith’s project can still be appreciated for the way in which it attempts to give an account of how, contrary to appearances, the three main claims harmoniously cohere with each other (as well as for many other reasons).

The solution Smith provides to his main problem has many parts, but, in essence, it takes the following form. We can accept that belief and desire are distinct existences, and that no belief can directly lead to action, while rejecting Hume’s contention that desires are not rationally criticisable and thus not answerable to beliefs. In particular, we can form beliefs about what our idealised selves would desire that our actual, non-ideal selves do in the circumstances we find ourselves in, where our idealised selves posses fully rational beliefs and desires (so far as their desires are concerned, this means that they have a set of desires that are maximally unified and coherent). In forming such beliefs we are, in effect,
forming beliefs about what we have most reason to do. We are also forming beliefs that can play a special role in shaping our actual desires, since it is necessarily practically irrational for me to not want to do what I judge I would want myself now to do if I were only more rational. This last claim is particularly interesting and original. Beliefs about what a fully rational version of myself would desire my present rationally imperfect self to do seem to be just the right kinds of beliefs to play a strong normative role in relation to my desires.

Apart from providing a solution to the problem of reconciling cognitivism with internalism and the Humean theory of motivation, *The Moral Problem* also provides an account of the moral facts that make moral beliefs true (when they are true). Smith argues that when I imagine becoming more rational and more informed I must *perforce* also think of myself as converging with others in my fundamental desires. It is this convergence that assures us of the objectivity of morality. Facts about our normative reasons are facts about what we would all want our non-ideal selves to do if we were fully rational and fully informed, and moral facts are facts about what we would all desire that are of the appropriate substantive kind (where our understanding of this kind is fixed by moral platitudes that are required for possessing the very concept of ‘right’ to begin with).

Mackie’s concern that moral facts (if there are any) must be very ‘queer’ since they motivate us whenever we encounter them is squarely dealt with, since to encounter a moral fact (as a moral fact) is just to encounter the sort of thing that it now naturally makes sense to think of as making it rational to desire to act in one way or another, i.e. a fact about what our more rational selves would want us to do. Williams’ contention that moral demands will not necessarily provide every person with reasons to act (because some of us may not have desires that such demands can ever latch onto) can be rejected, without rejecting the spirit of Williams’ defense of internalism, because moral demands just are the demands (of the appropriate substantive kind) that all rational people will converge on.

In his work after *The Moral Problem*, Smith focuses on a wide range of different problems, some of them fairly unconnected to the concerns of his first book. For example, the topics of freedom, responsibility and self-control are explored in the essays in *Ethics and the A Priori*, alongside essays closer in their concerns to his earlier work (essays that are concerned with moral realism and its alternatives, the nature of moral judgments, and the nature and demands of practical rationality). When it comes to normative ethics, Smith has elsewhere developed and argued for a type of actual-value consequentialism that incorporates the agent-relative goods traditionally thought to be incompatible with consequentialism.

In his metaethics, Smith’s more recent work is somewhat continuous with the position mapped out in *The Moral Problem*. Two closely related ways in which he has moved away from the first book—possibly due in part to responses from critics—are that he is now less sanguine about the possibility of convergence in fundamental desires under conditions of increasing rationality, and he has developed a more substantive and dynamic conception of rationality. Where he earlier sees it as a fairly easily recognisable conceptual truth that we would all
converge in our fundamental desires were we to become fully rational, Smith has come to view this issue as presenting us with something more akin to an open question. He continues to hold that either we would converge, or there are no moral facts (externalists, on the other hand, would contend that there is a third possibility here), but his later work can be viewed as taking the threat of nihilism more seriously than his earlier work does.

It is particularly tempting to think we would not in fact converge in our desires were we to become fully rational as long as one sticks to a fairly thin notion of what rationality requires in relation to our desires—i.e. as long as one sticks to the original idea that what we are after is simply a maximally coherent and unified desire set (although it should be said that Smith was already adamant in his earlier work that it is not possible to provide a reduction of the concept of rationality to other concepts). Smith argues in ‘Internalism’s Wheel’, reproduced in *Ethics and the A Priori*, that we should think of our understanding of rationality as itself open to rational revision in a way that is very much susceptible to being influenced by our substantive judgments concerning our normative reasons and the demands of morality (he admits that there is thus a degree of circularity in his theory, but he contends that this circularity is virtuous, rather than vicious). If the later Smith is right that philosophical accounts of rationality and morality cannot be developed independently of each other, then the claim that we would all converge in our fundamental desires under conditions of full rationality—a claim whose truth Smith still believes to be necessary for there to be any moral facts—is an attractive claim indeed.

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**Social Philosophy**

Ross Poole

The term ‘social philosophy’ does not have the currency of, say, ‘political philosophy’, ‘moral philosophy’, or even ‘legal philosophy’. It does not, at least so far, figure in the list of entries for the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* or the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Indeed, there is disagreement about what social philosophy is. If we conceive the ‘social’ as covering all aspects of interactive human life, then presumably social philosophy would embrace both moral and political philosophy, and a fair bit else besides. However, it is convenient to begin with a narrower understanding (one familiar to those planning undergraduate philosophy programs) in which social philosophy is concerned with those relationships that, for whatever reason, are not included in the more established areas of specialisation. This may seem a rather rough and ready way of marking out a major sub-disciplinary area. However, the situation is
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not dissimilar in the social and human sciences generally, where the distinctions between psychology, sociology, economics, politics and law reflect historical and institutional contingencies, not matters of ground-level principle. What this suggests is that any demarcation is a provisional one and that we should not take border disputes too seriously.

By and large social philosophy in Australia and New Zealand has had much the same marginal status as in North America and the U.K. Indeed, a quick survey of the last ten years of the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* suggests that there has not been a single substantial article that falls clearly in the area. Even before that, its presence on the philosophy scene has been somewhat intermittent. The presence of Marxism on the philosophical scene in the 1930s and again in the late 1960s and ’70s encouraged philosophers to engage with questions of social structure and social change. However, all too often, Australasian Marxist philosophers were more engaged with questions of epistemology and philosophy of science, rather than with social philosophy. It is also true that Marxism has failed to establish a continuing presence within Australasian philosophy. ‘European’ philosophy (in the Australasian context this usually means French and German philosophy) has always been more comfortable with an association with social philosophy than its ‘anglophone’, i.e. analytical, counterpart. However, whilst Australasian philosophers have done important work on or inspired by Habermas, Honneth, Foucault and Deleuze, and this is represented in the teaching programs of larger philosophy departments (as well as in departments of politics, sociology, cultural studies, etc.), it is more likely to be represented in overseas publications, often of an interdisciplinary nature, than in the Australasian philosophical mainstream. Feminism has been more successful in establishing an ongoing tradition of research and publication within philosophy, but after important early critiques of the limitations of Marxism and liberalism, the most significant contributions of feminist philosophy have been to the history of philosophy, ethics and political philosophy, rather than to social philosophy.

If, despite its marginal and fragmentary status, social philosophy is deserving of an entry in a *Companion to Australasian Philosophy*, this is largely because two important local philosophers have made contributions to this field, contributions that are distinctive, not only in an Australasian but also in a global context. The philosophers I will discuss are John Anderson and Philip Pettit. They are, of course, in no way typical, and there are enormous differences between them. However, they have both played an enormously influential role in Australasian philosophy; they both aim to provide an overall philosophy which not merely includes but integrates its various different branches; they both see social philosophy as an important part of that enterprise; and they both make contributions which deserve to receive critical attention.

Let us, as befits an entry on social philosophy, say something about the different contexts in which Anderson and Pettit worked. Both were immigrants—Anderson from Scotland, Pettit from Ireland—and though they became closely identified with Australian philosophy, both retained traces of their national
origins (not least, in their accents). However, the philosophical worlds they inhabited were very different. Anderson taught in a small department, mostly to undergraduates. In the thirty years in which he taught at the University of Sydney, contacts with overseas philosophy were mostly by mail and print, and travel overseas was infrequent. Anderson himself returned to Scotland only once in the thirty-five years he lived in Australia; other local philosophers might spend a sabbatical year in Britain (usually at Oxford or Cambridge). Anderson’s main intellectual contacts were in Australia, and these were not only philosophers but also lawyers, judges, psychologists, historians, poets, journalists, trade union officials and political activists.

Pettit, on the other hand, came to the Australian National University just as philosophy was becoming truly global. Email and web communication were becoming the norm; distinguished overseas philosophers were happy to spend time in Australia, and particularly at the Australian National University; and Pettit himself was a constant overseas traveller. His students were postgraduates, the majority of whom became academic philosophers, not merely in Australia but also in Britain and the U.S. While Anderson wrote almost entirely for the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology*, Pettit has published in international journals and with international publishers. While Anderson was a large fish in a rather small pond, Pettit was to become a major philosopher in an international field.

These different social contexts had their influence on the content of Anderson’s and Pettit’s work. Anderson was committed to the enterprise of philosophy, and his presentation made no concessions to style or accessibility. However, his audience was not just his disciplinary colleagues, nor even other lecturers and professors: it was the educated public. The disputes that inspired some of his most lasting contributions were local and specific: university and state government politics, acts of censorship, attempts by church leaders to influence public morals, and the like. No doubt Pettit is as much concerned with contemporary political issues as was Anderson; however, his audience is the globalised academy, and his views have been developed in dialogue with fellow philosophers, and also (though to a lesser extent) theorists from related disciplines. Though Pettit’s project is much more ambitious than that of most of his peers, it has been worked out through a critical engagement with them.

Both Anderson and Pettit are concerned to develop a systematic and comprehensive philosophical position. For Anderson, this ambition was never itself presented systematically, though it is often taken for granted, and—somewhat less often—argued for in lectures and articles. (Anderson 1962 is his own selection from previously published work; Anderson 2003 provides a fascinating selection of political writings from 1927 to 1969. Baker 1979 and 1986 provide systematic presentations.) Anderson’s main doctrines were straightforward: there is only one way of being—existence in *space* and time—and only one form of knowledge, of what is the case in the real world. Consequently, there are no categorial distinctions between social and historical knowledge and other forms
of knowledge. These days, philosophers would expect more by way of heavy lifting in support of these doctrines than Anderson ever provides; indeed, it is fair to say that Anderson spent more time deploying them rhetorically against the fallacies and obscurantisms of his opponents than he did providing arguments for them. But he also displayed a much more acute insight into society than most other philosophers. Although he argued that the one set of categories defined the field of all knowledge, these were broad and flexible, so that he was never tempted by reductionist programs, e.g. to explain institutions and their associated ways of life in terms of facts about individual psychology. Indeed, he strongly rejected what he called ‘atomism’, and argued that if we are to understand the individual we must take into account the social context in which the individual exists. But the alternative to atomism was not ‘holism’, i.e. the assertion of the conceptual priority of the social whole to which individuals belonged. This was a dangerous piece of philosophical mythology. For Anderson, the key to understanding individual and social life was the existence of a number of distinct groups or—more perceptively—of distinct ways of life. A key doctrine was that social life was—and would always be—the site of conflict, and the attempt to deny this in the name of ‘solidarity’ or the ‘common good’ was always an illusion, and more often than not an attempt to impose a particular sectional interest on those who might otherwise oppose it. Anderson argued that conflict is an inevitable concomitant of social life, and while it can be suppressed, it can never be eliminated. More importantly, it is also a condition for the existence of those very characteristics of social life that were of value.

Anderson rejected prescriptive moralities (as involving ‘relativist confusions’, i.e. the conflation of a relationship with a quality); so for him, goods were characteristic of certain ways of life. He argued strongly, for example, that criticism was characteristic of the life of inquiry, and—at east in his early days—that productivity, creativity and cooperation were involved in working class life and struggle (here the influence was not so much Marx as Georges Sorel). These and other goods, which included aesthetic creation and appreciation, courage, freedom and the like, were always involved in struggle with other opposed ways of life. However, it was a mistake to think that the existence of this struggle was an obstacle to the achievement of the good life; on the contrary, it was a precondition for it. This is not the place to pursue the details of Anderson’s case. However, his arguments against the concept of a universal and prescriptive concept of the good have much in common with Nietzsche (his occasional sympathetic references suggest an affinity that deserves more exploration, though see the suggestive remarks in Baker 1979: 36–7) and, more recently, with Bernard Williams’ critique of the ‘morality system’. For Anderson, morality does not occupy a privileged place of judgment outside social life; it is an aspect of it. It is fair to say that for Anderson, moral philosophy was social philosophy.

Philip Pettit’s social philosophy is still a work in progress, so any characterisation of it must remain provisional. It will be sufficient here to point out some of the main directions. Pettit’s instincts are, both normatively and analytically,
individualistic. If ‘atomism’ was never a temptation for Anderson, it clearly was for Pettit. One reason for this was that the sophistication and precision of economic theory provided him with an initial model of what a social theory should look like. Like the economists, Pettit’s starting point was (and is) the more or less rational individual. Pettit’s account of rationality is complex and sophisticated, but it is, he believes, implicit in commonsense notions of agency (‘folk psychology’). Why should we not, like the economists, be able to work towards an understanding of social life from the characteristics of the individual? The temptation becomes particularly strong given the philosophical program of providing a physicalist account of the individual, which would allow the theorist to envisage, at least in principle, the unification of knowledge. However, Pettit resists the temptation. He argues (Pettit 1993; see also Pettit 2002) that the reflective thought necessary for practical rationality can only be acquired though participation in certain forms of social life. For this reason we must reject the atomist assumption of pre-social but rational individuals, and recognise that at a quite fundamental level individuals are socially constituted—a view that Pettit, idiosyncratically, calls ‘holism’. However, if Pettit rejects atomism, he affirms individualism against what he, again somewhat idiosyncratically, calls ‘collectivism’. This second contrast is one of causal priority. The collectivist, according to Pettit, is someone who argues that certain social regularities impose themselves on the individual, determining how he or she acts. It is this Durkheimian thesis that Pettit is concerned to reject. Talk of social forces must ultimately be understood in terms of the interactive behaviour of individuals.

Given his rejection of collectivism, it is perhaps slightly curious that much of Pettit’s more recent work in social philosophy (see, e.g. Pettit 2007) has been concerned with the conditions under which collectives might operate as responsible individuals in their own right. That they do so is hardly surprising: corporations, trade unions, governments, even states, are often enough held accountable for their actions, and sometimes even punished for them (i.e. they count as legal persons). But, as Pettit has convincingly shown, it is easy enough to point to circumstances where collective decision-making procedures (even or especially democratic ones) lead to judgments that violate the most elementary norms of reason, at least as they are understood to apply to individuals. It becomes then a matter of some nicety—and of considerable political relevance as well—to work out the conditions under which a collective can be both minimally rational and maximally democratic. Further details on this program are provided in Pettit’s co-authored book with Christian List, Group Agency (2011). However, there may also be a need to look at more amorphous and less formally structured groupings if we are to understand the role of collectivities in social life. Certainly, where groups are to be held legally accountable, there needs to be some form of rational decision-making procedures in force. But many groups are not like this: families, religions, neighbourhoods, nations, ad hoc groupings of environmental activists, etc. all have significant impacts on social life, and may even be held accountable in some loose sense for certain
outcomes, without having procedures of this kind. Here one would like to see, something that was at least promised by the Andersonian program, an exploration—or even a recognition—of the different ways of life associated with different kinds of social collectivity. Here too one might find more truth than Pettit is prepared to allow in the collectivist claim that social forces as such inform the behaviour of individuals, both members and non-members of these groups, in ways that are not easily explicable in individualistic terms. In this case, as in many other areas, it would be a fascinating and productive exercise to bring Pettit and Anderson’s conceptions of social philosophy into critical dialogue with each other.

**Socratic Dialogue**

Stan van Hooft

Modern Socratic Dialogue is a structured method for philosophical discussion that was developed in the early twentieth century by a group of German thinkers and educationists surrounding the philosopher Leonard Nelson (1882–1927). It assumes that everyone has an inborn aptitude for philosophical thought and that no specific book learning is required for pursuing philosophical insights. All that is required is a facilitator who is trained to bring out this ability in all of the participants. Groups ranging from six to twelve gather to discuss a topic that is couched as a general question and proceed through a number of stages that conclude when consensus is reached on an answer to that question. It takes time and perseverance to reach such a result and the quest for consensus ensures that the group explores everything that is contributed to the discussion thoroughly. It is an important rule of the procedure that everyone persists in seeking understanding. It is also a requirement that everyone makes themselves clear and that they do not invoke unexplained book knowledge.

Although the name given to the process alludes to Plato’s dialogues, the structure of a Modern Socratic Dialogue does not follow the method of elenchus. Suppose that the topic for a given dialogue was ‘What is courage?’ The session would begin with the facilitator asking the group to bring forward examples of incidents that they have themselves experienced in some way and which are germane to the question. The group then discusses the examples that have been offered in order to choose one to concentrate upon. Themes will emerge as participants compare the examples and note similarities or differences between them. Having chosen the example the group then explores it by asking the example-giver for more details. The aim of this phase is for each participant to be able to imagine themselves in the incident. They then seek to understand,
from their own perspective, how the incident illustrates what courage is or what the example says about courage. It is only when the group has understood what courage is in relation to the specific example, and what features of courage might be specific to the example, that the facilitator will introduce the last phase of the dialogue: the phase in which the question is explored in its more general form.

Modern Socratic Dialogue was introduced into Australia by Stan van Hooft in 1998 and he has conducted dialogues with students in the higher education sector and in secondary schools, along with professional groups and members of the public. The method is fruitful in relatively casual settings such as ‘Socratic Dinners’ and in more formal settings such as weekend sessions held in libraries. In 2001 van Hooft conducted a demonstration workshop on the Modern Socratic Dialogue method at the annual conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy in Hobart. Dialogues have also been held in conjunction with conferences such as those of the Australian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics. The method has also proved useful as a qualitative research method, with one of van Hooft’s graduate students producing a successful thesis using data gathered from dialogues with relevant professional groups.

Sophia Journal

Purushottama Bilimoria & Max Charlesworth

Sophia began forty-two years ago at the University of Melbourne in very humble circumstances. For the first few years it was produced on a primitive Gestetner machine. Then it was printed for many years by a charmingly eccentric one-man Polish press in a Melbourne suburb. Much later it went upmarket and was stylishly published by the well-known U.K. firm, Ashgate. More recently still, it began its career with Springer, which has given it access to a global audience.

Max Charlesworth and Graham de Graf were co-founders of the journal, in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne, which was then largely dominated by Oxford/Cambridge linguistic analysis of a partly Wittgensteinian and partly logical positivist kind. In this context there was very little interest in the philosophy of religion, since religion was deemed to be in the sphere of ‘that whereof one cannot speak’. There was also some old-fashioned feeling within the University of Melbourne that, since it was a ‘secular’ body without any kind of religious affiliation, it was in some way prohibited from providing courses in religion!

At all events, when Graham de Graaf returned from Oxford in 1960, he and Charlesworth decided to form a Society for Philosophical Theology with the
express intent of publishing a journal for discussion in philosophical theology. They wrote to friends and colleagues in British universities asking them to contribute to the new journal and were extremely chuffed when a number of them obliged. Peter Geach (who thought that the journal should be called *Sophisma*) was especially encouraging, and later Paul Edwards (from New York University) and Ninian Smart (from the University of California, Santa Barbara) also helped greatly, with Smart serving as the journal’s international editorial advisor from 1992 to 2001.

The first years of *Sophia* were focussed on philosophers from the Anglo-American analytical tradition. Charlesworth, who assumed full editorial responsibility for the journal, later enlarged the scope of the journal by introducing other philosophical approaches to the amorphous sphere of what is called ‘religion’. His own fledgling work on Australian Aboriginal religions encouraged this move. When he retired from Deakin University, where the journal had moved to in 1976, Purushottama Bilimoria took over the editorship of the journal, and with help from Patrick Hutchings (as associate editor) and Ian Weeks, moved the journal back to the Department of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne where it found a sympathetic haven. The society also renamed itself to include Philosophy of Religion, which became the main focus of the format of the journal, and it found a new publisher in Ashgate in 2000. The journal expanded its scope further to include discussions in philosophy and religion in the interstices of analytical, Continental and cross-cultural philosophies. In 2007 Springer took over publishing the journal, adding Patrick Hutchings and Jay Garfield as editors-in-chief along with a rolling slate of guest editors and an expanded editorial board.

It is the view of the editors that both philosophy and the study of religion are in an interesting state at the moment in that they are unencumbered by previous models or paradigms. It is understood that ‘religion’ is not a unitary phenomenon—‘the Holy’, ‘the Sacred’, ‘the Transcendent’—but a very vaguely defined area where diversity reigns. It is also an area where philosophers have to work with anthropologists, sociologists, aestheticians, textualists, hermeneuticians and theologians. It is also recognised that the distinction between ‘primitive’ religions and other ‘world’ religions is not very important; and that there might even be a healthy symbiotic connection between art and religion. *Sophia* has proved that the prophesies of Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud that religion and philosophy of religion would wither away were quite wrong. The ‘Big’ questions will not go away, and the perspectives from philosophy of religion as practiced in traditions other than those of Western and modern philosophy might indeed enrich the philosophical tapestry of contemporary philosophy. *Sophia* has had an important role to play here, both within Australasian philosophy and internationally.
The history of philosophy within the University of South Australia and its precursor teacher training institutions, colleges of advanced education and institutes of technology reflects broader social and intellectual currents. In the 1960s and early '70s our teachers’ colleges were home to a Philosophy of Education which identified philosophical method with conceptual analysis. At the same time, mainstream analytic philosophers moved towards the view that philosophy is concerned as much with the formulation of a worldview as with the clarification of meaning, so that in this period the work of philosophers of education became increasingly cut off from philosophy proper.

It was not until the late 1970s, with the appointment of a number of young philosophers including William (Bill) Wood, Peter Woolcock and Sue Knight, that the focus of Philosophy of Education within the University turned to substantive questions of epistemology, ethics and logic. The period also saw the appointment of Michael Rowan, Edwin Coleman and Chris Starrs to the then College of Advanced Education’s Communications School. The institutional amalgamations which established the University of South Australia in the late 1980s (part of the Dawkins reforms) allowed this largish group of philosophers to build on Peter Lavskis’ earlier work at the South Australian Institute of Technology, establishing critical thinking and introductory philosophy courses as part of the General Studies requirement that all students in the university had to meet, regardless of their field of study. The group was also able to mount a sequenced three-year philosophy major, encompassing a number of strands including ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, political philosophy and philosophy of science. Negotiation with the philosophy departments of Flinders University and the University of Adelaide led to the creation of the informal ‘South Australian Philosophy Department’, under which the University of South Australia’s philosophy major was accepted for entry into the older universities’ Honours programs. A number of students from the University of South Australia went on to complete Honours and in some cases a Ph.D. in philosophy.

Towards the end of the 1990s, partly at least as a result of the continued squeeze on university funding, the university reaffirmed its emphasis on applied research and vocational programs, and abolished the philosophy major and some philosophy positions despite continuing strong student interest in the discipline. At the same time, a number of the philosophy staff retired, and those remaining were encouraged to teach Continental philosophy as part of the university’s communications degree. This led to a period of unrest and further retirements, with the result that although philosophy subjects are still offered as electives and
broadening undergraduate courses, as well as professional ethics components of programs such as business and journalism, the bulk of philosophy teaching within the university is offered within teacher education programs. Working within the university’s School of Education, philosophy staff, in cooperation with Lynda Burns from Flinders University, were active in establishing philosophy as a matriculation subject. More recently, remaining philosophy staff argued successfully for a compulsory philosophy course as a component of all University of South Australia education programs, with the result that approximately 700 students a year now take the subject. This led to a further appointment, that of Carol Collins, who has expertise in educational psychology as well as philosophy. Sue Knight and Carol Collins, together with a number of doctoral students, are currently working on an interdisciplinary project, the ‘Cultivating Reason-Giving Project’, which has as its aim the integration of philosophical inquiry into the curriculum areas of mathematics, science, history, geography and English, across all schooling levels. (See, for example, Knight and Collins 2005.) Further philosophical work is being carried on by adjunct lecturers Peter Woolcock, in the field of meta-ethics (for example, Woolcock 2006) and Peter Lavskis, in relation to ethical issues raised by ethnic pluralism (see, for example, Lavskis 2007).

Space and Spacetime

Graham Nerlich

This entry concerns the nature, ontology, and the explanatory role in physics of space and spacetime. It also mentions the problems and paradoxes of motion and of continuity versus discreteness in basic spatial structure.

The earliest Australians to work significantly on space and ‘spacetime’ were Samuel Alexander (1920) and his distinguished critic, John Anderson (2007). Alexander was born in Australia but won a significant reputation (Gifford Lectures) abroad; Anderson was a Scot whose dominant but sketchily written work was done in Sydney. He deeply influenced philosophy in Australia in the first half of the last century.

Alexander’s ‘spacetime’, like Anderson’s, owes nothing to Minkowski’s conception of it in relativity theory. Spacetime is fundamental to Alexander’s ontology. His contention is that space and time cannot be separately conceived: space is necessary for the continuity of time by securing its divisibility; time is necessary for the continuity of space by securing its connectedness. Further, the three dimensionality of space intimately reflects three core properties of time. Spacetime is the ‘stuff’ from which the categories are formed. Broadly, Alexander
aimed at a realistic interpretation of many of the structures drawn in the metaphysics of Kant.

It was Anderson’s method to develop his views through a critique of others whose work he respected. Thus his overall aim has some analogy with his critical target in Alexander’s. He, too, works within a broad context of Kantian structures taken realistically. The foundation of Anderson’s thought lies in his picture of the proposition. Propositions are all of Aristotelian form and are fact-like. They are metaphysically basic items in the real world. Spacetime, in a sense close to Alexander’s, gave in its unity the subject-predicate form of propositions and is therefore of fundamental significance. But this propositional structure is empirically found, not imposed, and not ideal. Space, or regions of it, gives the general structure of the subject term, the predicate structure is temporal, while the copula denotes what goes on between subject and predicate.

From a contemporary perspective, both assumed without significant discussion that space was Newtonian and Euclidean—physically real and geometrically flat.

The revolution in our understanding of the role and structure of these concepts came in 1905 (Einstein, in Lorentz 1923, 35–65) and 1908 (Minkowski, in Lorentz 1923, 73–91). J. J. C. Smart (1963, 1968) introduced and explained the broad metaphysical significance of spacetime and of the relativity theories to Australasia in the 1950s. Smart is a realist about space and spacetime, as are all of his students who have contributed to this area of philosophy of science. They include Ellis, Hinckfuss, Nerlich and Mortensen. Mortensen and Nerlich collaborated on work in the area.

In the 1960s and ’70s, the post-Reichenbach philosophy of conventionalism dominated the literature of space and spacetime. Brian Ellis and Peter Bowman (1967) challenged the central example of this, the conventionalism of the relativity of simultaneity in special relativity. They developed an argument, foreshadowed by the operationalist physicist P. W. Bridgman, that simultaneity could be objectively established in an inertial frame of reference by the slow transport of a clock. This confronted the widespread support for the conventional status of this relation in special relativity. Ellis’ arresting claim was ably defended in depth in Ellis’s and Bowman’s widely noticed paper. A large panel of philosophers of science from the Pittsburgh School, dominant in this area at the time, attacked the paper at length (Grünbaum and Salmon 1969). Ellis (1971) replied. It was a celebrated issue at the time and is still debated. Ellis’s view was later defended, in rather different terms, by Nerlich (1994, 91–118).

In the mid 1970s two of Smart’s former students each wrote books in the area, quite independently; both took a realist stance on the existence of space and spacetime. Ian Hinckfuss (1975) argued that the reality of space hinged on physicists’ ascribing to space such properties as permittivity and permeability in terms of which the constant velocity of light may be defined. These properties are primarily ascribed to substances and this suggests a view of space as a substance. Although any one of these properties might be explained without acknowledging
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a real substantial space, a unified treatment along these lines is unintuitive. This has drawn less attention than it merits.

Nerlich (1976), somewhat in contrast, developed the role of geometrical explanation in space as well as in the spacetimes of relativity theory. He rehabilitated Kant’s arguments for spatial realism based on the phenomenon of handedness. This led him to stress the metaphysical importance of non-Euclidean topological properties such as non-orientability, since handedness fails without orientability. This influenced subsequent debate on this difficult and puzzling issue. Much more broadly, he stressed the changed perspective on the uniqueness, scope and power of geometrical explanation that arises from non-Euclidean structures for space and spacetime. He has argued at length that this style of explanation is not causal. That theme is especially important in the relativity theories of physics.

The title of Harvey Brown’s 2005 book, Physical Relativity, captures the very different and opposing perspective of his work in general. He left New Zealand for Oxford early in his career. Brown’s theme in numerous papers on relativity theory is that the explanatory power of space and spacetime is illusory, disguising the far more significant role of the properties of matter in such prominent features of relativity as Lorentz invariance. He argues that the more complex explanatory role for Riemannian geometry often ascribed to general relativity is incoherent in itself and disguises the dominant role of matter-causality in the theory. Spacetime is a non-entity. His work is rich in its details of the philosophical importance of the more physical aspects of relativity theory. Thus Brown opposes the spacetime realism of most Australasians writing in the area.

John Norton’s distinguished and prolific studies in the history and philosophy of relativity, the Einstein papers and the theory broadly have been outstanding. He is a leading authority on Einstein and the history, interpretation and metaphysics of general relativity (Norton 2003). Often in collaboration with John Earman, both working in the Pittsburgh Centre for History and Philosophy of Science, he has been a prominent figure in philosophy of science for over two decades. He has explored in depth and subtlety such fundamental yet confusing issues as the generally covariant formulation of general relativity: Norton and Earman’s development of the ‘Hole Argument’ dominated discussion of the realism of spacetime throughout the 1990s, and its implications are still far from exhausted (Earman and Norton 1987). Norton’s work explores the physics of the theories in great depth and is fertile in finding interesting philosophical issues there. He has also written some excellent introductory papers (e.g. Norton 1992). In metaphysics, Norton has a basic sympathy with the realism so common among Australasian philosophers.

Some notable individual contributions in this area include C. A. Hooker’s (1971) trenchant examination of spatial relations as a tool of reduction for space and Adrian Heathcote’s (1988) critique of light-cone based topologies for spacetime. Peter Forrest (1996b) pursued the ontologically interesting and surprising difficulty of comparing directions at different places in a curved space or spacetime. The paradoxes of motion, infinite divisibility, discreteness, boundaries in space
and occupation of it together make up the problems of the microstructure of space and spacetime. They include questions within set theoretic analysis and mereology. Such puzzles have lived long in the history of philosophy. There is no sustained, united body of Australasian work on these topics, but there are most interesting and penetrating individual papers. Mortensen and Nerlich (1978) canvassed the possibility of placing the microstructure of physical space on the more concrete basis of mereology, hence concreteness, rather than on the abstractions of set theory. They also considered the question of handedness in special relativity. Peter Forrest (1995) has pursued at length the issue whether spacetime is discrete or continuous. Various Zeno-like paradoxes and problems arise out of discrete or continuous space; they are considered in work by Forrest, Graham Oppy (2006b), and Graham Priest (1987). Priest has argued that motion is best understood from the viewpoint of inconsistency, so that a moving thing is at once both in a place and not in it.

Sterelny, Kim

Peter Godfrey-Smith

Kim Sterelny is one of the world’s leading figures in the philosophy of biology. He has also done extensive work in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. His approach to philosophy is naturalistic, emphasising continuities between philosophical work and the empirical sciences. He has won the Lakatos Prize (2004) and the Jean Nicod Prize (2008). Since 2001 he has been the editor of the journal Biology and Philosophy. He is presently professor of philosophy at the Australian National University.

Sterelny was born in Tamworth, Australia, in 1950, and grew up in Sydney. His B.A. and Ph.D. are both from the University of Sydney. His Ph.D. was supervised by Bill Bonney and was in the philosophy of language. Sterelny then taught for four years at La Trobe University in the Departments of Philosophy and Linguistics. He returned to Sydney in 1982, and then took a five-year research position at the Research School of the Social Sciences (RSSS), Australian National University (ANU), between 1984 and 1987. He moved to Victoria University of Wellington (VUW), New Zealand, where he taught from 1988 to 2008, earning a personal chair in 2001. In 2001 he was also President of the Australasian Association of Philosophy. From 1999 to 2008 Sterelny divided his time between VUW and a research position at ANU, and since 2008 he has been full-time at ANU.

Sterelny’s initial research was in the philosophy of language, where he defended a causal theory of reference and a largely Chomskian approach to syntax.
Sterelny, Kim

*Language and Reality* (1987), co-authored with Michael Devitt, was an influential textbook. In the philosophy of mind Sterelny developed a naturalistic approach which became increasingly biological in its orientation. He focussed especially on problems of meaning and representation, and his second book *The Representational Theory of Mind: An Introduction* (1990) surveyed functionalist and representationalist positions, defending a partially ‘teleofunctional’ theory of the semantic properties of thought. From the mid 1990s, however, his primary area of research has been the philosophy of biology. Here he has worked mainly in evolutionary theory, though he has contributed also to discussions of genetics, developmental biology, and ecology.

Sterelny’s first major work in the philosophy of biology was a classic paper with Philip Kitcher, ‘The Return of the Gene’ (1988), which defended a ‘gene’s eye view’ on evolution by natural selection, in a way influenced by Richard Dawkins’ *Extended Phenotype* (1982). Since that time Sterelny has become more sympathetic to ‘multi-level selection’ hypotheses, including the idea that natural selection can operate on groups as evolutionary units. But he has taken a pluralist attitude to many of the problem cases about which the question of the ‘unit of selection’ has generated vociferous debate. Influenced by Dawkins and Hull, Sterelny accepts a ‘replicator/interactor’ conception of evolution, but has argued that not all replicators in biological (as opposed to cultural) evolution are genes. Some reliably transmitted non-genetic developmental factors which have the function of producing particular features of organisms should also be seen as replicators (see Sterelny, Smith and Dickison 1996, Sterelny 2004). He also defends a teleofunctional approach to the informational properties of genes themselves.

In more recent work Sterelny has looked closely at the idea of cultural inheritance, and resulting processes of cultural evolution, especially in humans. He has argued that human groups, as opposed to individuals, are likely to be important units in cultural evolution processes. He has also argued that artifacts (such as tools) may qualify as cultural replicators (or ‘memes’), especially in small pre-historical societies (see Sterelny 2006). In 1999, Sterelny and Paul Griffiths published a widely-used textbook in the philosophy of biology, *Sex and Death*. In 2003 Sterelny published *Thought in a Hostile World*, a book which examines the evolution of advanced and distinctively human cognitive skills. This book, along with Sterelny’s other recent work (2001), is notable for its close engagement with work in comparative psychology, primatology, and anthropology. Sterelny develops hypotheses about how simple ‘detection systems’ in animals could be elaborated into faculties for ‘decoupled representations’, internal states which represent the world but are not tied to any particular action. Such an explanation is central to understanding how the sorts of mental faculties recognised by common-sense or ‘folk’ psychology came to exist. Sterelny argues that a central role in the explanation of complex forms of cognition is played by complex and ‘hostile’ biological environments, environments comprised of other agents whose interests are served by *not* being easily detected and predicted.
Sterelny also argues that simple treatments of the distinction between ‘innate’ and ‘learned’ traits do not take into account the important role of ‘scaffolded learning’, in which an older generation engineers the learning environment of young individuals in a way that facilitates the acquisition of information. This kind of learning, along with some other faculties, gives rise to the capacity for ‘cumulative cultural evolution’, in which successive generations gradually improve the behavioural skills, artifacts, and symbol systems which are passed down within human groups over time. Thought in a Hostile World won the Lakatos Prize in 2004, a prize awarded for an outstanding book in any area of the philosophy of science. Sterelny’s work in this area also led to his being awarded the Jean Nicod Prize in 2008.

Sterelny’s approach to philosophy is characterised by close contact with the empirical sciences, including a willingness to draw on the details of current scientific work and to judge which empirical avenues and arguments are most promising. He is a strong critic of a priori methods in philosophy.

Sterelny has been the person most responsible for developing philosophy of biology as an active area of research in Australasia. He has edited the journal Biology and Philosophy since 2001, a period of steady growth in the influence of the journal. Sterelny’s Ph.D. students who are presently active in philosophy include Karen Neander, Paul Griffiths, James MacLaurin, Brett Calcott, and Ben Jeffares. Philosophers who worked with him extensively as undergraduates include Fiona Cowie, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Roger Sansom, and John Matthewson.

Swinburne University of Technology

Maurita Harney

The distinguishing features of philosophy at Swinburne were dictated by the institution’s status first as an institute of technology, and second, as a vocational institution (which included industry-based learning programs). In 1973, it was decided that history and philosophy of science would be a major study in the Bachelor of Arts degree to be introduced in 1974. Originally a history of ideas unit introduced by Harry Kannegiesser in 1969, the area was expanded when Rosaleen Love joined Swinburne in 1973. Philosophy, which was planned to become a second major study area, evolved in a similar way. General philosophy subjects taught by Phillip Kent were augmented when Philip Fleming was appointed in 1977. The philosophy strand was designed to give students an introduction to what were then considered to be the main areas of philosophy: epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, social and political philosophy.
Subjects were designed to be vocational or practical (applied) in the sense of having actual and perceived relevance to other studies in the curriculum and to the workplace. The student clientele comprised mainly Arts students, although subjects were available as electives to students in science and engineering. Staff had always been prominent in communicating science and technology to the public: Harry Kannegiesser’s publications included a book addressing new reproductive technologies; Rosaleen Love, a frequent commentator on science in the electronic and print media, later moved into using speculative fiction as a vehicle to address philosophical and futurist issues relating to science.

By 1990, the department was represented by five full-time staff, all with established research and publication records, and well-positioned to offer Masters and doctoral degrees in both philosophy and history and philosophy of science. Opportunities to do so were severely limited until Swinburne acquired university status in 1992. Undergraduate teaching was supported by a community of dedicated part-time staff, many of whom were new graduates from neighbouring universities.

In 1992, an Honours program was introduced, convened by philosophy but servicing other Arts disciplines, including literature, media and politics. Themes of original teaching subjects were augmented and modified according to the changing social and intellectual context and the expertise brought by new staff. In general, there was a move from the history/study of ideas to a theme of natural philosophy and the cultural relations of science and technology. The department’s change of name from ‘Historical and Philosophical Studies’ to ‘Philosophy and Cultural Inquiry’ reflected this transformation.

Subjects on the philosophy of nature and environmental philosophy were introduced by Arran Gare, whose published work in these areas was already attracting international acclaim. Maurita Harney, who had joined as Head of Department in 1990, taught the philosophy of culture, and philosophies of mind and cognition; Paul Healy’s teaching on rationality and epistemology introduced the hermeneutic dimension reflecting his published research in this area. Healy also introduced the teaching of critical thinking.

The unifying theme underlying this diverse range of subject areas is a shared commitment to phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophies which see the study of science as inextricably linked with the study of culture. In attitudes to science and technology, there is also a shared affinity with process-based approaches associated with Alfred North Whitehead and C. S. Peirce. The Joseph Needham Centre for Complexity Research established by Gare in the 1990s reflected these orientations, and provided a lively forum and a research base for participants from across a range of disciplines and universities, and a valuable resource for graduate students.

Successive university restructurings from 1995 saw Philosophy and Cultural Inquiry become a ‘discipline’ or ‘subject area’ in the School of Social and Behavioural Sciences (1995–2004) and, later, in the Faculty of Life and Social Sciences (from 2005). Throughout these transformations, it has continued to offer two
majors in the Bachelor of Arts degree as well as studies at Honours, Masters, and Ph.D. level. Philosophy subjects are also included as options in the programs of the more specialist or vocational arts and social science degree courses which evolved over this period. Philosophy at Swinburne did not escape the funding constraints experienced by humanities departments in many universities from the late 1990s. These constraints prevented significant growth in staffing levels, and the number of full-time staff in Philosophy and Cultural Inquiry remains at three. In 1999, Gare and Healy were joined by Michael Dix who had earlier, on a part-time basis, taught across a range of philosophy subjects. His subsequent work, including research on complexity theory in natural systems and in education, has helped to deepen and extend the distinctive orientation that philosophy at Swinburne has fostered.

**Sydney Push**

**Anne Coombs**

The Sydney Push was not a particular ‘school’ of philosophy. The theoretical underpinnings of the Push were both broad and loose. Yet it is true that at its core were a set of beliefs that were cogently argued over three decades by a coterie of philosophers, psychologists, jurists and political scientists, and which is best represented by Sydney Libertarianism.

Libertarianism was an offshoot of the teachings of John Anderson, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney from 1927 to 1958. But it was Andersonianism taken in a new direction. While Anderson was a politically engaged professor who often used contemporary events as a springboard for his thinking and writing, and while what he wrote was often considered radical, he was still a traditionalist in his commitment to university life and scholarship. His followers, however, took his ideas far beyond the university grounds and disseminated them among a generation of bohemians and radicals, creating in the process a brand of political philosophy with a distinctly Australian complexion.

Anderson’s freethinking views were seen by the Establishment as corrupting the young people who were his students. Twice he was censored in State Parliament for his anti-State, anti-church, and anti-patriotic views. This only served to increase his popularity among students.

Two statements of Anderson’s stand as mottoes for the Push: ‘Freedom in love is the condition of other freedoms’ (1941: 262), and ‘The desire for security and sufficiency is the very mark of the servile mentality’ (1943: 119).

In his long tenure at the University of Sydney, Anderson moved away from his original pro-communist position to that of a democratic pluralist, and it was the
latter phase which had most impact on the generation who took and expounded his views to a wider audience. Both Marx and Freud were enormously important to Anderson and to the Push. Marx’s class struggle and the rejection of ideology, Freud’s discovery of the neuroses associated with sexual repression, and Anderson’s pluralism and anti-authoritarianism were the basis for the theories of the Sydney Push. They adopted Marx’s critique of ideology and his belief in class struggle, while rejecting what they saw as his utopian socialism. Anderson was a realist and empiricist who set great store by science and rejected metaphysics. The principle intellectual sport among Libertarians was critiquing the social illusions of others.

One of Anderson’s most influential expositions of his ideas can be found in the 1943 essay ‘The Servile State’:

> The scientific student of society, then, will not be concerned with reform. What he will be concerned with is opposition—what he will be above all concerned to reject is ‘social unity’. And he will reject it not merely as a description of present conditions but as a conception of a future society. The doctrine of history as struggle is at once the liberal and the scientific part of Marxism; the doctrine of Socialism as something to be established (‘classless society’) is its servile part. The point is not merely the drabness that might result from attempts to eliminate social struggles, but the impossibility of eliminating them—and, therewith, the loss of independence and vigour that can result from the spreading of the belief that they can be eliminated. (1943b: 131)

Another influential essay was ‘Freudianism and Society’, in which Anderson argued that Freud placed too much emphasis on the individual—the view that individuals form society rather than society forming the individual. This, to Anderson, ignored the role of social movements as independent of individuals, that social movements could affect an individual without them needing to be either an agent or a victim: ‘unless we consider the activities which pass through him (in which he participates without being either the agent or the patient), we cannot even give an account of the activities which go on within him’ (1940: 52).

Such questions as ‘Do individuals shape social movements or do social movements shape individuals?’ were of great interest to the Libertarian philosophers Jim Baker and George Molnar.

The philosophical and political views of the Libertarians were articulated and argued in their journal *Broadsheet* and occasional journal *Libertarian*. One of the principal proponents of ‘the Sydney Line’ was the philosopher and Anderson student, A. J. (Jim) Baker. Baker parted company with Anderson because of the latter’s growing conservatism. Yet ‘the great man’s’ work was inseparable from the Push. According to Baker, the principal influences inherited from Anderson were a criticism of metaphysics, religion and traditional moral values, as well as a critical interest in Marx and Freud.
Also under the influence of Anderson, the Push rejected ‘careerism’. Having ‘a career’ was seen as self-serving and corrupting. Those who had most prestige within the Push were people who deliberately rejected ambition.

There were some, of course, who were destined to go on to highly prominent careers, such as Germaine Greer, Robert Hughes and Clive James. Of these three, all of whom credit the Push with being an important part of their young adulthood, only Greer had status within the Push. And certainly Greer’s style as a writer and polemicist fits the Libertarian mould: anti-authoritarian, highly critical, unpredictable and often shocking. When Greer moved from Melbourne to Sydney in 1959 she discovered a natural home in the Push.

Both Hughes and James were drawn more to the literary and artistic types who hung around the Push, attracted, Hughes has said ‘by the general anti-authoritarian atmosphere of The Royal George [the Push pub]’ (letter to author). They were never considered serious enough by the Push philosophers. By the early 1960s large numbers of rebellious kids were being drawn to the Push by its reputation. The outraged comments of people like Archbishop Gough, who in 1961 accused the Department of Philosophy of corrupting the youth of Sydney, only increased the Push’s allure.

Other Influences

For many years, Jim Baker published an occasional journal called Heraclitus. Heraclitus was something of a talisman to the Push. His central idea, that all things are in a state of flux, reinforced for them the futility of trying to effect change. The Push was very politically engaged but politically inactive. So much time was spent discussing the futility or otherwise of political action that Libertarians very rarely actually did anything. As a result, they were sometimes called ‘Futilitarians’.

When the Libertarians broke away from Anderson and took his ideas downtown in the 1950s, they drew their inspiration from a range of other thinkers, among them Nomad, Reich, Marcuse, Pareto and Michels. From Max Nomad, they took their call for ‘permanent protest’; from Pareto their belief in a ‘circulation of elites’; and from Michels, the ‘iron law of oligarchy’.

The Push was developing a political philosophy that was anti-authoritarian, sceptical of attempts at reform, and highly critical of the various illusions in which human beings wrap themselves. Like Anderson, they prided themselves on being realists. They were anarchists but pessimistic anarchists, suspicious of the utopian Idealism inherent in much Marxist and anarchist thinking.

Nomad’s books Aspects of Revolt and Apostles of Revolution were passed around the Push. In a piece for the Libertarian Broadsheet, Nomad wrote:

I evolved a theory of my own that was a combination of Michel’s ‘iron law of oligarchy’, Machajski’s idea about intellectual workers as a privileged (or potentially privileged) neo-bourgeois class, and my own version of the ‘permanent revolution’ (or rather permanent
protest) which excludes any definite or final solution of the class antagonisms. (1973: 3)

Such ideas became one of the justifications for the Push’s lack of involvement in political action.

The work of Wilhelm Reich became pivotal to Push thinking on sexuality, primarily his two earlier works, *The Sexual Revolution* and *Character Analysis*. Reich went well beyond Freud in his espousal of sexual freedom, linking sexual freedom with social and political freedom. This was of particular importance to the Push for whom sexual and political freedom were inseparable.

It was in the monthly meetings of Freud’s group in Vienna in the 1920s, and at specific seminars devoted to therapeutic technique, that Reich developed his theories of the orgasm, of character and character analysis. Reich’s orgasm theory stated that all neuroses were linked to a disturbance of genitality, or in other words an inability to experience satisfying orgasms. One of his intentions was to develop a synthesis of Marxism and Freudianism, and this is one reason his work received serious attention by Sydney Libertarians.

Reich’s politics was inexorably linked to his analytic work. His analysis of the link between Nazism and the psychology of the German masses, in his book *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, was very influential within the Push, particularly its delineation of the way repression and ideological beliefs were transferred from one generation to the next.

Jim Baker was the principal articulator of Libertarian philosophy in the early years. But in the late 1950s another philosopher came to the fore: George Molnar. Molnar was born in Hungary and arrived in Sydney post-war. At the University of Sydney he switched from economics to philosophy and proved to be adept at it. Molnar, along with Baker, developed and disseminated Libertarian ideas at the downtown pubs and at regular Libertarian meetings at the university. Regular weekly meetings began in 1956, but it was not until 1958—after Anderson retired—that they were able to use the Philosophy Room.

Among the people who attended the weekly meetings, at which papers were given and debated, were many who were not philosophy students. Some, such as the ‘Princes of the Push’—Darcy Waters and Roelof Smilde—had dropped out of university years before. (At the time the regular Libertarian meetings began, both were working as wharfies—this was seen as the epitome of anti-careerism.) They were both very active in debating the ideas of the Push. But the informality of these debates, and the shortage of actual scholarship, is one reason that it is not possible to say that the Push constituted an actual school of philosophy, notwithstanding that they were followers of Anderson, inheritors to some extent of his Freethought Society, and that at least several of them were philosophers. Another difficulty is that, while Libertarian philosophers held Push political positions, their actual philosophical interests often had very little to do with Libertarian thinking. Molnar, for example, developed an interest in metaphysics while a lecturer at the University of Sydney in the 1960s, through his collaboration with C. B. Martin, then second professor in the department.
Other philosophers associated with the Push included D. M. Armstrong, David Stove and Eric Dowling, who were part of the early Andersonian Push but never joined the Libertarians—Tom Rose, Bill Bonney, Ross Poole, Tony Skillen, Kim Lycos and Paul Thom.

While well-known to the Libertarian Push, Armstrong and Stove’s more conservative political views made for a gulf between them. This was starkly shown in the early 1970s with the split in the University of Sydney philosophy department. George Molnar joined the new, radical Department of General Philosophy with enthusiasm. But some time later he resigned as a matter of principle because he believed it corrupt to be paid to work in such an institution—anti-careerism again.

Molnar worked as a public servant for more than two decades but never lost his interest in philosophy. After his retirement he was appointed the first Anderson Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. He’d gone full circle.

In 1977, fifty years after John Anderson took up the chair of philosophy, a series of public lectures were given to commemorate the event. Among the two dozen people who took part were philosophers, psychologists, jurists and writers, most of whom had at some time rubbed shoulders as part of the Sydney Push.

A disparate lot, one thing united them: the legacy of John Anderson.

Sydney Society of Literature and Aesthetics

Carole M. Cusack

The Sydney Society of Literature and Aesthetics (SSLA) began in 1990 with Catherine Runcie (Department of English, University of Sydney) as foundation president, and a seventeen-member executive comprised mainly of academics from the various departments of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Sydney. The SSLA was inspired by the aims of the British Society for Aesthetics: ‘to promote study, research and discussion of the fine arts and related types of experience from a philosophical, psychological, sociological, scientific, historical, critical and educational standpoint’ (cited in Runcie 2006: 2). SSLA was deliberately inclusive of literary theory and approaches other than philosophical or analytic aesthetics, although many philosophers have participated in conferences and published in its journal, Literature and Aesthetics. In early years, SSLA’s activities consisted of evening seminars and two conferences per year. The first SSLA conference was held in October 1990, with an opening keynote by Professor Eric J. Sharpe on ‘Intercultural Interpretation’.

In 1992 the Australian and New Zealand Association of Literature and Aesthetics (ANZALA) was formed by Catherine Runcie, Lloyd Reinhardt
Arguments about the philosophy curriculum, forms of assessment, and departmental democracy took place in many philosophy departments in the early 1970s and were resolved in one way or another without the world being turned upside down. The University of Sydney proved to be different. After three years of turmoil in which the tide ran in favour of change, the Vice-Chancellor took the advice of Keith Campbell, the Head of Department, and set up a School of Philosophy in 1974 in which the warring parties would form separate departments with provision for separate programs. D. M. Armstrong, the Challis Professor of Philosophy, Keith Campbell, David Stove and others, hoping to go forward from something like the antebellum situation, formed the Department of Traditional
and Modern Philosophy. Those who had promoted the changes, and others who at least accepted them, formed the Department of General Philosophy, choosing the name, it is said, for want of being able to agree on anything more precise. John Burnheim became Head. (Graham Nerlich, who had overseen many of the changes as newly appointed professor and Head of Department from early 1972, was on leave in 1973, and moved that year to the chair at the University of Adelaide.)

Courses in Marxism and feminism were notable elements in the General Philosophy curriculum from the beginning, for these fields had been major focuses of dispute from 1971 through to the winter of 1973 when there was a strike in support of the proposed feminism course. But the educational ‘philosophy’ of General Philosophy embraced the idea of offering, beyond first year, a wide range of options in a flexible structure. Even in the early years when the Marxist group of staff and students was dominant, the second and third year options consisted of courses in philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophy of science, language, law, ethics, phenomenology, and the history of philosophy, along with feminism and Marxism. Student interest had a part in this choice; so too did the diverse interests of the staff. At another level of continuity, General Philosophy inherited and extended the recent democratic policies of the ‘old’ department in a Constitution according to which all staff and students could vote at departmental meetings to settle policies and recommendations. This constituted a major site of tension and occasional upheaval over the coming years largely because of an original mismatch between the ideal and the conditions for its practice.

By 1977 Bill Bonney and George Molnar had left the university, and Michael Stocker, Michael Devitt and John Mills had transferred to the Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy. The remaining tenured staff—John Burnheim, Wal Suchting, Alan Chalmers, and Milo Roxon—were joined in 1978 by György Markus, Lloyd Reinhart, Jean Curthoys (who had been one of the teachers of the original Feminism course), and Paul Crittenden. By that time, the once dominant Marxist ‘caucus’ was under challenge from various quarters, especially a group associated with French feminist thought. Argument, focussed at a practical level on the allocation of teaching funds, ran on for many months until, in October 1979, Alan Chalmers, acting Head of Department, suspended the Constitution. The promise was to look for an arrangement that would provide for student participation while avoiding the problems inherent in the old order. Nothing gained support, and General Philosophy moved to the standard pattern of departmental government (which by now made provision for student representation).

The arrival of new staff in 1978, and the appointment of Stephen Gaukroger in 1981, helped to consolidate the emerging shape of teaching and research in General Philosophy. The department took a pluralist, broadly Continental approach in the primary fields of philosophy, with a focus on questions relating to the natural and social sciences, ethics and political philosophy, modern and contemporary movements in European philosophy, and the history of philosophy,
especially German Idealism. This led quite soon to a greater emphasis on structure in the curriculum. There was scope too within a few years for a strong History of Philosophy program offered jointly by the two departments.

Internal tensions re-surfaced in 1984 related to the curriculum, especially recent French philosophy, and forthcoming appointments. Late in the year, on advice from Traditional and Modern Philosophy and three General Philosophy staff, the Vice-Chancellor thought first to effect an immediate amalgamation; having consulted the Head of General Philosophy, Paul Crittenden, and other senior General Philosophy staff, he thought again and called for a year of negotiations. An acrimonious dispute ran on through 1985 until the proposed unification collapsed. Towards the end of 1984, Stephen Gaukroger, Lloyd Reinhardt and Jean Curthoys had transferred to Traditional and Modern Philosophy. Towards the end of 1985, Elizabeth Grosz and Denise Russell were appointed to continuing positions in General Philosophy.

As the dust settled, it gradually became clear that a decade or more of upheaval had come to an end. In the following years, the departments extended earlier common programs into a single joint undergraduate course, with provision for a range of shared courses at the Honours year. These were years in which General Philosophy had many first-class Honours and doctoral students and in which staff, in books and articles, maintained the strong research record that had begun in the late 1970s. The later appointments of Paul Redding, Paul Patton, Moira Gatens and John Grumley ensured that a strong teaching and research program would continue. In the 1980s and through the 1990s, there were notable publications in social, political and cultural theory, philosophy of science, studies in post-Kantian German Idealism and Marxism, ethics, the history of modern philosophy, feminist philosophy, and twentieth-century European philosophy.

Over the years, General Philosophy’s campaign for approval to fill the vacant chair in philosophy had come to nought. Finally, a new Vice-Chancellor approved the proposal in the expectation that amalgamation would follow. Paul Crittenden, who had moved from being Head of General Philosophy to become Dean of Arts, was appointed to the chair in 1992. At much the same time Keith Campbell became Challis Professor in Traditional and Modern Philosophy. The two departments subsequently entered into an arrangement that brought full cooperation within the School, though amalgamation was held at bay for seven more years by residual concerns on each side. Finally in February 2000, Stephen Gaukroger, the Head of School, closed the small but persistent gap, just in time for philosophy to be swept up in a large School with History, Classics, and several other departments in a major restructuring of the Faculty of Arts.
A Companion to Philosophy in Australia & New Zealand

Sydney, University of, Department of Philosophy (Origins – 1974)

James Franklin

Philosophy, especially logic, had a presence at the University of Sydney long before there was a formal department. John Woolley, the dominant figure among the first staff of the university in the 1850s, perished at sea along with the manuscript of his book on logic. (Cable 1976). His effective successor as intellectual leader of the university was Sir Charles Badham, professor of classics and logic and editor of Plato’s *Philebus* (Radford 1976).

Philosophy was formally inaugurated with the appointment of Francis (later Sir Francis) Anderson as lecturer in 1888 (Challis Professor of Philosophy, 1890–1921). He wrote little strictly on philosophy but was active as what would now be called a ‘public intellectual’. His choice of progressivist causes was inspired by his Christian Idealist philosophy, which saw the universe as unfolding towards a higher stage of development. ‘History’, he wrote, ‘is a great adventure in which man sets out to discover himself and the secret of his personality’ (Anderson 1922: 22). With his wife, the pioneer feminist Maybanke Anderson, he was particularly active in education reform, favouring ‘inquiry’ and freedom over rote learning (Franklin 2003: ch. 6; O’Neil 1979; Roberts 1997: ch. 6). His service as first editor of the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* launched that journal as an organ of high quality and wide scope.

His successor, Bernard Muscio, a philosopher of talent though largely known for work in industrial psychology, died young in 1926. That left the way open for a complete change of style in Sydney philosophy with the appointment of the Scottish radical and realist, John Anderson (Challis Professor of Philosophy, 1927–1958).

John Anderson was an original and powerful thinker who developed his own realist metaphysics and became Australia’s best-known philosopher in the mid-twentieth century, both in philosophical circles and outside. His engagement in public controversies, especially against religion, gave him public notoriety. As his department expanded from the 1930s, he appointed his disciples to it, notably John Passmore, Percy Partridge and, more dubiously, his mistress Ruth Walker (Franklin 2003: chs 1–2; Baker 1998; Kennedy 1995: chs 6–15; Passmore 1997: chs 5–10; Weblin 2003).

In the late 1930s, concerns about the effect of the atheism and radicalism of the only professor of philosophy in the state of New South Wales led to the
Sydney, University of, Department of Philosophy (Origins – 1974)

establishment of a chair of moral and political philosophy, whose professor was intended to have views that would ‘balance’ Anderson’s. However, Anderson secured the appointment to the position of Alan Stout, who proved to be generally supportive of Anderson (Franklin 2003: ch. 5).

By the 1950s Anderson’s long reign and principled decision to appoint only philosophers of like mind (so as not to unduly confuse students) had given the University of Sydney a reputation as something of a philosophical backwater; the same was true of its Andersonian ‘colonies’, the philosophy departments at the University of New England and University of Newcastle. The situation was relieved by the appointments of J. L. Mackie as Challis Professor of Philosophy from 1959 to 1963 and of D. M. Armstrong in 1964. Though both were students of Anderson and adopted a realist perspective, they were independent thinkers of international reputation.

The department figured in a number of public controversies, such as Stout’s support of the Melbourne Peace Conference of 1959 which resulted in a visit from the Director of ASIO, the ‘Gough Affair’ of 1961 where the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney criticised the effect of the department’s teaching on the morals of youth, and most spectacularly the Knopfelmacher Affair of 1965. Dr Frank Knopfelmacher, a conservative polemicist from Melbourne, was chosen by a selection committee for a position in political philosophy in the department, but his appointment was overturned by the Professorial Board after complaints from the left. His case became a cause célèbre in the press and Federal Parliament, but the rejection of his appointment stood (Franklin 2003: chs. 5, 11).

In the politically charged atmosphere of the late 1960s and early ’70s, tempers frayed, but the department was the scene of notable philosophical work of a generally realist nature—much more realist than the linguistic philosophy common overseas or the Wittgensteinian currents dominant in Melbourne. The best known of such work was D. M. Armstrong’s classic statement of the mind-body identity theory, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (1968). Other examples included Armstrong’s preliminary studies towards a realist theory of universals, work by C. B. Martin and George Molnar on causality, Graham Nerlich’s realist theory of space, and David Stove’s defence of induction in reply to Hume.

Political tensions came to a head in 1971 with the proposal by Wal Suchting and Michael Devitt of second and third-year courses in Marxism-Leninism. After vigorous objections to the inclusion of Lenin and Mao in the courses, one course on ‘Marxism’ was approved. The department was ‘democratised’, allowing for undergraduate student participation in meetings that extended to appointments. A further dispute arose in 1973 with the proposal by two postgraduate students, Liz Jacka and Jean Curthoys, of a course on feminism. A strike with tents in the quadrangle and a ban by the Builders Labourers Federation ensued, with the course eventually going ahead. In 1974, the university administration accepted the argument of the conservative philosophers, especially Armstrong and Stove, that work could only proceed with a split into two departments.
The Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy included the metaphysicians and logicians, while the Department of General Philosophy pursued Marxism and newer Continental themes (Franklin 2003: ch. 11; Rayment 1999; Curthoys 1998; Armstrong 1984b; Burnheim 1999).

**Sydney, University of, Department of Philosophy**  
(Reunification – 2009)

Duncan Ivison

In 2000, the Faculty of Arts at the University of Sydney was restructured into four Schools. This precipitated the demise of the School of Philosophy, then consisting of the Departments of General Philosophy (GP) and Traditional and Modern Philosophy (T & M), and the (re)birth of the Department of Philosophy. Although the process was not without acrimony, due mainly to the unhappiness of a small number of staff being forced to merge into one department, reunification proceeded relatively smoothly and was supported by an overwhelming majority of staff and student representatives.

Part of the reason for this was due to the fact that the departments were already cooperating in various ways leading up to the amalgamation. Members of both departments had been seeking ways of knitting various aspects of the programs together (including a common undergraduate program since the 1980s), and the original grounds for the split were increasingly irrelevant to the work actually going on in the departments. If the controversies that led to the original split were to be located in disputes over the teaching of feminism and Marxism in the 1970s, among other things, and if they continued throughout the 1980s and ’90s in the form of a split between so-called ‘Continental’ and ‘analytic’ philosophy, then these differences were even less relevant at the turn of the century. Although separate administrative arrangements remained throughout the 1990s, increasing efforts were made to cooperate across philosophical (and ideological) divides. With a number of retirements between 1998–2000, and the appointments of Duncan Ivison, David Braddon Mitchell, Caroline West, David Macarthur, and Nicholas Smith not long after, a new generation of Sydney philosophers were arriving with much less invested in the earlier battles, along with new areas of teaching and research expertise.

Although there were tentative moves afoot to effect an amalgamation just prior to the major structural change in the faculty (initiated by Stephen Gaukroger, then Chair of School), the crucial institutional context in which reunification occurred was a financial crisis in the Faculty of Arts, and the decision to move
to a school-based structure. The schools were to become the main administrative centres for the departments, replacing many of the functions previously carried out at departmental level. The idea was that this would enable the faculty to exert greater financial control over the departments, as well as streamline the delivery of administrative support. The amalgamation into schools was accompanied by a squeeze on hiring and a dramatic cut in part-time teaching budgets, which meant that departments were under enormous pressure to rationalise their curricula. All of this made it difficult to justify continuing with separate administrative and teaching arrangements for two relatively small departments within the same field, such as General Philosophy and Traditional and Modern Philosophy. The changes also meant that delegated authority from the dean now flowed through the heads of school rather than chairs of department and thus, at least from an administrative point of view, made departments less relevant as sites of institutional authority.

Philosophy joined Ancient History, Archaeology, Classics, Gender Studies, and History in the new School, which eventually became known as the School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry (SOPHI). Many administrative functions were centralised at the school level, run by a new head of school, working with a School Executive made up of chairs of department. The transition was not always easy, and departments often chafed under the new regime, but by and large the schools slowly became accepted.

The Department of Philosophy, meanwhile, continued to evolve and thrive. In 2002, Huw Price returned from a chair at Edinburgh to take up a prestigious Australian Research Council (ARC) Federation Fellowship. With that he established the Centre for Time, which quickly became a leading centre for research in the foundations of physics, among other related themes. Along with supporting a raft of distinguished short-term visitors, the Fellowship also enabled Price to appoint a number of research fellows. During the first few years immediately after reunification, with Moira Gatens as chair (followed by Rick Benitez), great efforts were also made to secure new appointments in key areas (e.g. ethics, logic, epistemology), to re-design the first-year program to reflect the new ethos in the department, and to work generally at integrating staff into a revamped department and school.

In 2006, Paul Griffiths, Mark Colyvan and Richard Joyce joined the department via the university’s Research Fellowship scheme. This was a scheme that provided new senior research-only positions in a bid to secure the university’s position as the leading research institution in Australia in expectation of a national Research Assessment Exercise. Griffiths and Colyvan both had strong research track records in the philosophy of biology and mathematics, respectively (as well as in other areas), along with extraordinary success in securing Australian Research Council (ARC) funding. The ARC, the University’s Postdoctoral Research Fellow scheme, along with Price’s, Griffith’s and Colyvan’s various projects—including a new Centre for the Foundations of Science, led by Colyvan—were the source of a burst of new, fixed-term appointees from
2006 onwards. Indeed, by 2008 more than half of the department consisted in research-intensive staff of one kind or another.

Other areas of research strength to have (re)-emerged since reunification include the history of philosophy, German Idealism, ethics, moral and political philosophy, and metaphysics. Moira Gatens and Stephen Gaukroger both won Australian Professorial Fellowships: Gatens for work in the history of philosophy and philosophy and literature; Gaukroger for work on early modern philosophy. Paul Redding won a series of ARC grants for projects on German Idealism and contemporary philosophy. A host of postdoctoral fellows working in metaphysics and philosophy of mind have also continued to seek out the department. A steady stream of major publications in all of these areas continued to flow, making the department one of the most prolific in the faculty. The one area that has not recovered ground since reunification is contemporary French philosophy, previously a major strength, especially since the departure of Paul Patton to the University of New South Wales in 2002.

Almost ten years since reunification, the strengths of the Department lie across the broad core of the discipline. In this sense it has, for the most part, transcended the narrow confines of the original disputes that drove it apart in the 1970s, and which kept it apart, to varying extents, throughout the 1980s and ’90s.

Sydney, University of, Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy

Keith Campbell

The Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy (T & M) at the University of Sydney came into existence at the beginning of 1974, but its origins lay in the latter years of the 1960s. Deeply held differences over the Vietnam War, between strong personalities among the academic staff, had created tensions that exacerbated differences across a range of questions more directly concerning the University and the pursuit of philosophy.

The period of student unrest across the Western world, culminating in the events of 1968 and after, included a strong impulse towards a wider distribution of power, and against traditional hierarchical social and institutional structures. In universities, this at first took the form of moves away from the monopoly of professors and heads of department over leading roles in academic boards, faculties and departments, towards arrangements under which all full-time members of the academic staff held equal voting rights. The University of Sydney’s Department of Philosophy was an early leader in making such changes at the departmental
level, and this ensured ongoing divisions among its staff over the extent to which a departmental meeting’s majority decisions were binding on a dissenting head, who continued to hold the formal authority within the university’s administrative arrangements.

In this connection there was also an issue over the presence of student representatives at departmental meetings, their number, the range of questions on which they would be entitled to vote, and so forth.

Beyond such formal matters, there were deep differences over the curriculum and the manner in which teaching should be provided. The content of courses and the manner of their assessment (by exam, or essay, or take-home exam, or even joint oral presentation) became vigorously contested matters.

Although the genuinely radical members of staff were in a minority, a larger generally liberal-leaning group were unwilling to reject decisively the left-oriented changes put forward. A proposal by more radical staff members to introduce courses in Marxism aimed not only to broaden the curriculum in the areas of post-Hegelian and contemporary political philosophy, but also to introduce a much more engaged style of instruction than the detachment in approach characteristic of the classic liberal university. It provoked conservative opposition largely for this reason, but was accepted into the program once the component covering the thought of Ho Chi Min was deleted.

It was the rise of feminism during this period that lay behind the formal split that resulted in the creation of the Department of General Philosophy, and the Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy (T & M). Feminism or ‘women’s lib’ was a well-established social phenomenon, but theoretical feminism was in its infancy. It was a new subject, with few if any established texts or agreed content, and there were no teachers with established credentials. Nevertheless, in part because of its progressive decision-making structure, the department put forward a proposal for an engaged course in feminism, to be taught by two postgraduate students.

The feminist course content was eventually approved by the faculty, but the proposed appointments were vetoed by the Academic Board. This provoked a strike by a majority of the Philosophy Department staff, and a boycott of philosophy classes by a majority of the students enrolled in them. This strike enjoyed the support of students in some other departments, and was sufficiently effective to cause the Academic Board to reverse its original decision, on the undertaking that a permanent member of the academic staff in philosophy would oversee the feminism course.

The momentum behind transforming the curriculum was intensified by this outcome, and at the first departmental meeting after the end of the strike further changes were foreshadowed. In these circumstances, Keith Campbell, the Head of Department at that time, came to the view that the delivery of a mainstream philosophy program in a mainstream manner was fatally jeopardised. With the other staff members committed to providing a mainstream program, he convinced
the Vice-Chancellor to divide the department. The immediate effect of this was to insulate the more conservative approach from all the radicalising pressures.

The two new departments began operations in 1974, with John Burnheim, Alan Chalmers, Michael Devitt, George Molnar, and Wal Suchting prominent among those in General Philosophy (GP), and D. M. Armstrong, Keith Campbell, and David Stove leaders on the T & M side. Among others there at the beginning of T & M were Michael McDermott and Ann Dix, the only two to remain active in the teaching program of the department from its inception to the very end. Among other long-serving members were John Bacon, Francis Snare, and Adrian Heathcote.

The new departments were of course in competition with each other, and at first complete rival programs were instituted. Even at the beginning, however, some crossover in option selection was possible, and in some cases both programs counted towards an undergraduate degree. Co-operation in teaching was in part mandated by the fact that T & M, as the smaller of the two departments, with an academic staff of just six full-time members, was stretched to offer a properly comprehensive curriculum, and some of the GP offerings fitted well enough into a mainstream program.

Relations between the two departments, so far from settling down, became more fraught when in 1977 three members of General Philosophy’s staff, disillusioned with both the methods and the content of decision-making in that department, transferred to T & M. In reference to events in the wider world, these were known as The Gang of Three, or boat people. Their arrival caused no disturbance to T & M’s internal tranquility, and enabled the department to strengthen its offerings, especially in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of science.

During the next few years both departments established undergraduate programs based on strands—the T & M program in second and subsequent years would typically be presented as comprising options in Logic and Language, Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Ethics and Political Philosophy. This structure permitted an evolution towards more collaborative teaching, a development which took an important step in 1983 with the introduction of a strand in the History of Philosophy, required for all Philosophy students, taught jointly by academic staff from both departments.

At the Honours and postgraduate level, T & M was careful to maintain a clear brand differentiation, so that the wider philosophical community would be in no doubt as to the type of training which its advanced students had been given, and this strategy met with success.

The evolutionary convergence in the teaching program, and to some extent in matters of departmental governance, might have continued but for a second round of defections from GP in 1985, when three further staff members re-located—the Gang of Three More, or the second wave of boat people. The effect of this was to give T & M, for the first time, a majority of the full-time academic staff. Sharing the concerns of the newest arrivals from GP, the T & M Department
proposed a merger, which would be on the majority’s terms. The Vice-Chancellor at first agreed to do this, then changed the decision to allow a year of negotiations to reach a consensus outcome. That year produced no consensus, and the merger failed. The effect was to re-invigorate mutual animosities, but the common First Year and the strand structure centred on the History of Philosophy continued.

Throughout these permutations on contested conceptions of the content and delivery of an education in philosophy, T & M established itself and continued as a productive research department. A steady stream of books and articles appeared, and the department became one of the centres in Australia for the revival of the classical program in philosophy after the waning of the linguistic and conceptual emphases in the analytic philosophy of the mid century. There was a significant effort in metaphysics, both cosmology (realism, materialism, causation) and ontology (the problem of universals, other categories, truth), in epistemology (induction, laws of nature), and in the study of modern philosophy (Bacon, Locke, Descartes, Hume). Six members of the department were or became Fellows of the Australian Academy of the Humanities.

The 1990s at the University of Sydney saw a decline in the importance of departments in the administrative structure, and by 2000 the Arts Faculty had been re-structured into Schools—both T & M and GP were collected up into the School of Philosophical, Gender, Historical and Ancient World Studies (SPGHAWS), later mercifully renamed ‘SOPHI’, the School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry. Separate departments would still have mattered on questions of recommending appointments or promotions, but in 2000 the then chair of philosophy, on his own initiative, declared the split at an end, and GP and T & M no longer extant. So the Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy, which had come into existence in response to an excess of the democratic impulse, ceased to be on account of a deficiency of the same.

Sydney, University of, History and Philosophy of Science Unit

Alan Chalmers

From the early 1950s an introductory course in history and philosophy of science (HPS) was taught in the Science Faculty of the University of Sydney on a somewhat ad hoc basis. From 1966 a lecturer was appointed to teach an Intermediate course for science students. An account of these arrangements up until 1985 has been published by Alison Turtle (Turtle 1987). The history that follows, tracing the emergence and expansion of what has become known as the Unit for History
and Philosophy of Science (Unit for HPS), takes up the story where Turtle’s account leaves off.

Following the death in 1984 of Ian Langham, a senior lecturer and responsible for the Intermediate HPS course, Alan Chalmers was seconded from the Department of General Philosophy to the position in 1986. The arrangement was made permanent in 1988. At that time the Intermediate HPS course attracted about seventy science students. With the help of two very supportive Deans, of the Faculty of Science (Arnold Hunt) and the Faculty of Arts (Sybil Jack), the HPS course offerings were extended to make them available to arts students and to introduce a Senior course as a follow-up to the Intermediate one. A second position was approved to provide the additional teaching involved in the extended program. Michael Shortland, with a Ph.D. from Leeds, was appointed to the new position in 1990.

During the 1990s there was a steady expansion of the number of students enrolling in HPS courses. By 1994 over forty students were enrolled in the Senior course and the number taking the Intermediate course had risen to well over 200. A third position was advertised and Nicholas Rasmussen (Stanford, Cambridge, Princeton) joined the staff in 1995. Honours and postgraduate programs were introduced in 1996. The first Ph.D. in HPS at the University of Sydney was awarded in 1999 to John Wennerbom for his thesis ‘Charles Lyell and Gideon Mantell, 1821–1852: Their Quest for Elite Status in English Geology’, supervised initially by Shortland and then by Chalmers.

Chalmers retired in November 1999, following the publication of the third revised edition of What Is This Thing Called Science?, the book that continues as the text for introductory philosophy of science teaching in the Unit and is now published in nineteen languages. There were soon to be structural changes and also further expansion of the Unit as it responded to new needs. When it was first introduced, the Senior course, HPS III, was a twelve unit course constituting half the workload of a full-time student taking it. Offering this course involved cooperation with a range of other departments, especially the departments of General Philosophy, Traditional and Modern Philosophy, History and Psychology. Course components from offerings by these departments were listed as options for HPS III students, and vice versa. With the modularisation of course offerings introduced by the university around the turn of the century, these cooperative arrangements with other departments became unnecessary.

Another important development was the need, recognised in a number of sectors of the university, for teaching and research in the area of the ethics of science and medicine. The Unit for HPS responded to this need by devising and offering courses in those areas. In particular, a Junior course in bioethics was introduced and also a Postgraduate Coursework Program constructed and taught in coordination with the Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine. An additional appointment was made, half in the Unit for HPS and half in the Faculty of Medicine. Increase in student numbers resulting from these innovations led to the appointment of an additional lecturer, raising the number of
full-time academic staff to four by 2008. By that stage advertised positions were attracting very strong fields of international candidates.

Around the mid 1990s there emerged the custom of referring to the HPS set-up as a Unit, and to the coordinator of its activities as the Director of the Unit. Positions are advertised as appointments in the Unit for HPS. A ‘Unit’ is not defined in the University Statutes. Given its mode of operation the Unit is a de facto Department, but its official status is not clear. Chalmers and Shortland alternated as Directors in the 1990s. After this, Paul Griffiths was Director for two years, followed by Rachel Ankeny and Hans Pols and then the current Director, Ofer Gal.

The steady expansion in the teaching program of the Unit has been matched by its research output. The main research contributions in philosophy of science, as opposed to history of science, have come from Chalmers (philosophy of physics), Rasmussen (contemporary biology), Griffiths (evolution, genetics), Anstey (the philosophy of Robert Boyle), Ankeny (models in biology, bioethics), Ofer Gal (origin of experimental practice, realism and constructivism), Dean Rickles (quantum gravity and spacetime) and Charles Wolfe (materialism and philosophy of mind). Staff members have also been successful in attracting research grants, with Pols and Gal currently in receipt of Australian Research Grants (ARC) Grants, the latter’s being large enough to make possible the appointment of a postdoctoral fellow.

Throughout the staff changes that have taken place during the history of the Unit there has been one constant factor. Stephen Sheely, who was a tutor for Ian Langham, helped with tutoring in the Unit from its initiation until the end of 2007.

Sylvan (né Routley), Richard

Dominic Hyde

Richard Sylvan was born Richard Routley in Levin, New Zealand, in 1935. At the time of his death in June 1996 he had published as sole author, joint author or editor, ten books, sixteen booklets and nearly 200 articles in academic philosophy—as well as numerous unpublished academic articles and more general publications contributing to public debate on social policy and environmental matters. Much of this work was innovative and included landmark papers in a number of areas—particularly logic, metaphysics and environmental philosophy.

One of Australasia’s most wide-ranging and systematic philosophers, the astonishing breadth of his philosophical work includes writings on logic, metaphysics,
philosophy of language, epistemology, environmental philosophy, social philosophy, political philosophy, ethics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind and computation theory. ‘The same mistaken philosophical moves … appear over and over again in different philosophical arenas … in metaphysics, in epistemology, in the philosophy of science … in ethics, in political theory, and elsewhere, in each case with serious philosophical costs.’ What was required was nothing less than ‘logical revolution’ and the abandonment of ‘the main philosophical positions of our times’ (Routley 1980: ii–iii).

His work was also distinctive in character. Since he thought that mainstream philosophical thinking was doomed to failure, the theories he argued for were accordingly unorthodox. Moreover he took the view that philosophy ought to strive for uniformity in its resolution of problems. Accordingly, his work is characterised by the attempt to develop and apply these unorthodox theories—especially those he viewed as foundational from logic and metaphysics—in a wide range of contexts. Thus his work represents a broad, uniform and unorthodox approach to philosophical problems.

His first notable work was submitted as part of an M.A. in Philosophy from the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand in 1958—a 385-page thesis, Moral Scepticism. Despite Oxford University Press agreeing to publish a condensed version of the thesis as a book, Routley never undertook the requested editing and the manuscript was never published. (It was one of a dozen or so book manuscripts left unfinished at the time of his death.)

After a brief period working as a junior lecturer at Victoria University of Wellington, designing and constructing a small mechanical–electronic computer, he headed to Princeton University to begin a Ph.D. After only a couple of years, he left Princeton in 1961 with an M.A. The awarding of his Ph.D. from Princeton was to come twenty years later when, after developing work begun in Princeton on theories of implication and nonexistent objects, he submitted the voluminous work Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond for examination. The work, published in 1980, was 1035 pages in length and examiners for Princeton awarded him a doctorate in 1981 on the basis of the first lengthy chapter.

He was, by this time, working as a research fellow at the Australian National University, having arrived there in 1971 and remaining until his death. Before arriving he had already made significant contributions to teaching and research. Some of this research was later drawn together in the aforementioned 1980 publication. There he attempted what most other philosophers had long since given up, namely a rehabilitation of Meinong’s theory of objects ‘but in a modern logical presentation’ (Routley 1980: iv). His early work and subsequent collaboration with Val Routley (later Val Plumwood) had convinced him by the mid 1960s that much modern philosophy suffered from flawed metaphysical foundations and in the Jungle book he sought to set things right. (This work in metaphysics continued unabated until his death, with his last major contribution—published posthumously—Transcendental Metaphysics: From Radical to Deep Pluralism, 1997.)
The associated ‘modern logical presentation’ of Meinongian theses drew on work pioneered with Val Routley, Len Goddard, Bob Meyer and others in non-classical relevance logic and logics of significance. After two years as a lecturer at the University of Sydney following his return from Princeton, in 1964 Routley had moved (with Val Routley) to an appointment at the University of New England and joined Goddard there. With the additional appointment of David Londey, Goddard had the critical mass required to achieve his ambitious aim of establishing a centre of logic in what was then ‘a tiny university set in a rural community whose dominating interests were in sheep ticks and wool’ (Goddard 1992: 174). Thus began a long collaboration and extremely fruitful teaching program that laid the foundations for a generation of influential research into non-classical logics in Australia.

Not only did Goddard, Routley and Londey establish Australia’s first Master’s program in Logic, but they were also instrumental in the formation in 1965 of the Australasian Association for Logic. They and their students—the New England Group—focused on analyzing classical logic, revealing its problems, and sought to develop superior non-classical alternatives. It was ‘heavily philosophically oriented … [and] included work on modal logic, on the theory of implication and Relevant logics and overshadowing all these, on significance and incompleteness, on logical paradoxes and many-valued resolutions of them and other puzzles’ (Routley 1983: 133). An eventual outcome of this work was the 1973 publication of Goddard and Routley’s The Logic of Significance and Context.

Moving on in 1968 to a research position at Monash University, Richard and Val had continued work in modal and non-classical logic. By 1969, work on the perceived deficiencies of classical logic began to bear significant fruit with the development of a formal semantics for the logic of a ‘paradox free’ implication system, the logic of first degree entailment (see Routley and Routley 1972). Then in 1970 Richard circulated a groundbreaking semantics for the relevant logic R (see Routley and Meyer 1973). Here was what Meyer has described as ‘the giant step’ marking the beginning of a breakthrough in logical research, research that brought Meyer and Routley together in another fruitful collaboration. Routley’s arrival at the Australian National University in 1971 was followed by Meyer’s appointment a couple of years later, resulting in the formation of another strong logic research group at ANU. Notable output from this period by the Canberra Group was the 1982 publication of Relevant Logics and Their Rivals I, and, after the arrival of Graham Priest on Australian shores in 1976, Paraconsistent Logic in 1989. (Goddard (1992: 179) notes that in the decade 1971–1980 the Canberra group put out 124 articles and five books on logic. By 1986 its output amounted to 175 articles, sixteen monographs and seven books.)

By the mid 1980s the Canberra Group had begun to disperse, with a healthy community of non-classical logicians scattered amongst Australasian universities. About this time, Richard and Val also went their own ways under the new names Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood. Their collaboration had not only produced much research of interest in logic and metaphysics, but also in
environmental philosophy. In the early 1970s their attention had been drawn to issues concerning forestry practice in Australia, and in 1973 they published their landmark book, *The Fight for the Forests*. In an analysis of the economics, ethics and social policy then underpinning forestry practices in (particularly) South-Eastern Australia, the Routleys roundly condemned then-current policy and practice, providing an impressive array of arguments that found willing ears amongst those then beginning the fight for the old-growth forests along Australia’s South-East coastal ranges. The book, published locally through the ANU Press, underwent three editions and attracted considerable criticism from many in the forestry industry who felt under attack.

But this was just the beginning. Sylvan also commenced a fundamental reappraisal of the foundations of environmental theory (particularly value theory), with attendant work in social, political and economic theory. His attack on anthropocentrism in ethics was launched with the 1973 publication of the groundbreaking paper, ‘Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental, Ethic?’, including a presentation of ‘the last man argument’—still a landmark in debates concerning anthropocentrism in ethics. Further criticism of the error of ‘human chauvinism’ was pursued in Routley and Routley (1980). The search for a ‘deeper’ and more adequate value theory to underpin social and political action continued with increased intensity right through to his death, including the 1994 publication (with David Bennett) of *The Greening of Ethics*, and leaving unfinished at his death a working typescript entitled *Deep-Green Ethics*.

For over thirty years Richard marked out distinctive ground in Australasian environmental philosophy and provoked considerable debate. Added to this was his brilliant work in non-classical logic and very distinctive Meinongian metaphysics, along with much more—both published and unpublished. As a philosopher he was impressive indeed. His other interests in alternative lifestyles and technologies, bushwalking, field biology and forest ecology and frequent house-building combined to produce, not just an examined life, but a life where theory and practice combined.
The teaching of philosophical subjects at the University of Tasmania predates the establishment of a chair of philosophy by more than fifty years. Logic was taught from the beginning (1893) under the auspice of mathematics. In 1902 Robert Dunbabin, an Oxford educated Tasmanian, was appointed to lecture in mental and moral science (as well as classics and modern history). He instituted courses in ethics and in the history of philosophy. Logic was also expanded into a second-year course. In 1913 Edmund Morris Miller, a Melbourne graduate with a D.Litt., arrived and largely took over the teaching of philosophy (and psychology). Dunbabin later became professor of classics. In 1928 Morris Miller was appointed professor of psychology and philosophy.

A separate chair of philosophy was established in 1952, with Sydney Sparkes Orr as the foundation professor. While far from being the best qualified candidate for the chair Orr, as a Presbyterian Lay Preacher, was deemed free from the taint of atheism. Notwithstanding, his appointment turned out to be singularly unfortunate. The controversy following upon his dismissal in 1956 on grounds of professional misconduct led to a black ban, endorsed by philosophers in Britain and America, being placed on the chair by the Australasian Association of Philosophy. The subsequent interregnum lasted until 1969 (See ‘The Orr Case’). During this period philosophy was kept alive primarily through the efforts of Kajika Milanov who had been the sole lecturer in Orr’s department. Two visiting professors, Alexander MacBeath from Belfast and, later, Arthur Fox from Western Australia, also taught in the department in the early 1960s. Logic was taught by Charles Hardie, the Professor of Education. The ban was finally lifted in 1968, and the following year W. D. Joske was appointed to the chair.

Joske quickly built up a department offering a full range of undergraduate courses. He was a hugely popular lecturer. Student enrolment increased dramatically and philosophy gained a prestige it had not had before. While the
department was well equipped to supervise postgraduate work, research students were generally encouraged to undertake higher degrees at another university, a practice common at that time. Joske must be credited not only with rebuilding the department following the Orr debacle, but with establishing it as a true centre for philosophical teaching and research. Following Joske’s retirement in mid 1992 the chair was held by Frank White. In 1995 the American philosopher Jay Garfield was appointed. He established the Buddhist Studies Exchange Program between Tasmania and the Tibetan University in India. The program brought Tibetan students and academics to Tasmania and enabled Tasmanian students to study in India. He increased the number of undergraduate courses while also building a strong postgraduate research program. He left Tasmania for a professorship at Smith College in 1998, and since 1999 the chair has been occupied by Jeff Malpas. He continued the program in Buddhist philosophy, as well as the undergraduate and postgraduate expansion (in 2009 the department had some thirty-five student enrolled in postgraduate studies), while also building connections with other parts of the university, and including Gender Studies within what was by then the School of Philosophy. In 2000 he established the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Ethics (CAPE) with support from a number of prominent Tasmanians. In 2007, a new Professor of Humanities, Wayne Hudson, was added to the staff.

Philosophy had for a number of years been taught by John Norris and Francisca Touber at the Launceston College of Advanced Education (later Institute of Technology). On its merger with the university, the Department of Philosophy (now School of Philosophy) operated on two campuses. Since 1999 Gender Studies has also been taught within the department.

Is there anything distinctive about philosophy in Tasmania? During the period prior to Orr’s appointment philosophy (as distinct from the history of philosophy) was generally Idealist in tone. Morris Miller was a Kantian but rejected Kant’s unknowable noumenon. In 1915 he taught a course entitled ‘Advanced Psychology and Metaphysics’ and T. H. Green’s *Prolegomena to Ethics* was the set text for advanced Ethics. Orr’s course in first-year philosophy consisted of Plato and Plato. Milanov had studied in Vienna and Belgrade and had a doctorate from Berlin. He wrote a number of articles before the war which earned him some reputation. (See Maurice Mandelbaum’s citation of Milanov in *The Problem of Historical Knowledge*, p. 267.) Milanov also translated some of Kant’s work into Serbian. (The remarks on Milanov’s academic qualifications in W. H. C. Eddy’s *Orr* are purely scurrilous.) Philosophy during the interregnum was hardly at the cutting edge of philosophy in Australia but this was not the dark age it is sometimes painted to be. Milanov was a more able philosopher than Orr, and while students heard little of Ryle, Austin, Quine or the identity theory, they did learn a good deal about Kant and something of Husserl, Sartre and Heidegger.

Joske, who came to Tasmania from Monash, introduced the analytic tradition. His book *Material Objects* was influenced by Strawson’s *Individuals*. He also published on the meaning of life and instituted a highly popular course—which
Philosophy in Tasmania has a high public profile. The annual James Martineau Memorial Lecture given by selected speakers from Australia and overseas was established in 1972. In the 1990s the department began a five-week series of public lectures given by members of staff. These elicited a response far beyond expectation and continued for several years. Jeff Malpas instituted the ‘Philosophy Café’, held monthly in Hobart and Launceston, as well as a variety of public seminars and forums. David Coady initiated ‘Philosophy and Film’. Such activities have generated enormous and often loyal support from the wider community. They have been coordinated by the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Ethics, which also coordinates the Buddhist Studies Exchange Program. The centre is now headed by Anna Alomes and also undertakes consultancy and training work, including cadet training for Tasmania Police. The weekly philosophy seminars—though the papers are sometimes quite technical—are also open to the public. Members of the department have also been active for a number of years in Adult Education.

Since the 1990s Tasmania has attracted a large number of visiting philosophers, some of whom teach for a semester in the department. Staff were quick off the mark in the race for ARC grants and have had considerable success. A significant number of graduates have gained academic appointments at home and in other universities. For a relatively small department (approx. twelve staff) philosophy in Tasmania has had an extraordinary level of success.
Philosophy in theological institutions has been largely a Catholic concern. The Catholic Church has emphasised ‘reason’ relative to faith to a much greater extent than Protestant or most non-Christian traditions. Protestants insist on faith, especially in Scripture, as the starting-point of all doctrine. But the Catholic tradition, centred in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, gives considerable weight also to philosophical ‘preliminaries’ to faith, such as arguments for the existence of God and objective natural law foundations of ethics, as well as to replies to objections such as the problem of evil.

Vatican directives of the late nineteenth century required that training in all Catholic seminaries include extensive compulsory courses in philosophy. Thus all Catholic seminaries maintained staff trained in philosophy, teaching (up to the 1960s at least) a generally strict form of Thomism. That applied not only to diocesan seminaries such as St Patrick’s, Manly, but to all the seminaries of individual orders of priests, such as the Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, Marists and Missionaries of the Sacred Heart. (Many Jesuit philosophy teachers are profiled briefly in Strong 1998). The more senior of the staff in these institutions were trained in the philosophy faculties of European Catholic universities such as the Angelicum University in Rome and the University of Louvain (Franklin 2003: ch. 4).

Prominent seminary teachers included Church leaders such as the first two Catholic Archbishops of Sydney, who were philosophy teachers before coming to Australia (Franklin 2003: 68) and Justin Simonds, Archbishop of Melbourne in the 1960s and earlier a Louvain philosophy graduate, professor of philosophy at Springwood seminary and author of several philosophy articles (Vodola 1997: 8–16; Simonds 1933); Dr P. J. (‘Paddy’) Ryan, philosophy lecturer at the Sacred Heart Monastery in Kensington, Sydney, who was the founder of the anti-Communist ‘Movement’ in Sydney and spoke prominently on Communism in the 1940s and 1950s (Franklin 1996; Franklin 2003: 72–80); and Austin Woodbury, a graduate of the Angelicum, who founded the Aquinas Academy in Sydney in 1945 as a philosophy school for lay people and ran it for thirty years, with attendance of some 500 a week at its high point in the early 1960s (Franklin 2003: 80–2; Thornhill 2002).

Seminary instruction did not always adapt to the realities of a conscripted audience more interested in preparation for parish work than in philosophical subtleties. For example, lectures were often in Latin (examples in Muldoon 1958),
and there were frequent student complaints about the dryness and irrelevance of the material (Geraghty 2003: 37–42, 141–51; Windsor 1996: 117). Despite such communication difficulties, seminary philosophy through its formation of church leaders had an impact well beyond the world of theological and philosophical speculation, since natural law ethics underpins characteristically Catholic stances on such controversial topics of 

**applied ethics**

as abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, contraception and stem cell research (Franklin 2003: 88–91, 403–28; Franklin 2006). Among the most philosophically informed work on such topics is that of Norman Ford. (e.g. Ford 2002). Catholic philosophy of law, which sees law as ideally based on objective ethical principles, also migrated from its home in seminaries to legal practitioners such as the High Court judges who decided the Mabo case (Franklin 2003: 388–98).

Seminary philosophers had heavy teaching, administrative and sometimes pastoral loads and usually conceived their main role as teaching rather than research and publication. However a number did publish, mostly on topics related to ethics and religion. The Jesuit Basil Loughnan published in the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* in the 1930s (Loughnan 1933; Loughnan 1936), while another Jesuit, T. V. Fleming, wrote a substantial introduction to philosophy (Fleming 1949). There were two studies by Franciscans of medieval Franciscan 

**theories of knowledge**


Interaction between philosophy in seminaries and that in university philosophy departments was minimal. On the one hand, there was clerical suspicion of ‘atheist’ university philosophy likely to corrupt the youth—particularly in Sydney where John Anderson really was a crusading atheist—combined with a Thomist view that most modern philosophy was infected with empiricist and Kantian errors. On the other side, university philosophers tended to take a disdainful view of a philosophy that appeared to have reached its conclusions prior to considering the arguments (e.g. Oppy 2001a). In one of the few instances of direct interaction, the Dominican Fr Patrick Farrell published in *Mind* a reply to J. L. Mackie’s views on the problem of evil, then complained that the lack of reaction to his article was a sign of the incompetence of university philosophy, especially in Melbourne (Farrell 1958; Franklin 2003: 82–5; later work on the topic in Cowburn 1979).

In the years after the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s, seminary philosophy became less significant because of a precipitous decline in seminary enrolments, but also because ‘Thomism was identified with the ‘old order’ of pre-Conciliar ‘triumphalism’. Nevertheless a commitment to teaching philosophy, especially ethics of a loosely natural law orientation, remained important in seminary curricula (Rheinberger 1970; Hill 1979). Catholic strands in philosophy, both more and less conservative, are still strongly represented at the **University of**
Notre Dame (Australia), the Australian Catholic University, and the Catholic Institute of Sydney, where Gerald Gleeson, Andrew Murray and John Lamont have published on a range of philosophical topics related to religion.

Protestant theology in Australia has been of a generally evangelical flavour, taking to heart St Paul’s warning against the dangers of ‘vain and deceitful philosophy’ (Colossians 2:8). Protestant theology colleges have thus generally avoided philosophy (Sherlock 1993). Even so, evangelical theology typically has a definite philosophical commitment. Broughton Knox, Principal of Moore Theological College from 1959 to 1985 and the main intellectual force behind Sydney’s peculiar form of Anglicanism, emphasised strongly the propositional nature of revelation, a position at the opposite end of the spectrum from the Wittgensteinian one that religion may be a ‘form of life’ without truth commitments. Knox’s position thus has certain parallels with John Anderson’s propositional view of reality, and the result was to encourage Sydney–Melbourne differences in theology parallel to those in philosophy (Knox 1960; Cameron 2006: 209–11).

Two Melbourne theologians with backgrounds in philosophy helped to broaden the Protestant perspective. David Stow Adam, Presbyterian minister and professor of systematic theology and church history at Ormond College, had taught logic and metaphysics at the University of Glasgow, and the progressive neo-Hegelianism he absorbed there found expression in the liberal and ecumenical tone of his Cardinal Elements of the Christian Faith (1911) and Handbook of Christian Ethics (1925). (Adam 1911; Adam 1925; Chambers 1979). Eric Osborn was professor of New Testament and Early Church History at the Uniting Church Theological Hall and the United Faculty of Theology in Melbourne from 1958 to 1990. His eight books published by Cambridge University Press on the thought of the early Christian fathers included two on their philosophy (Osborn 1957; Osborn 1981).

Theological Institutions (New Zealand), Philosophy in

John Owens S. M.

The history of philosophy teaching in theological colleges in New Zealand parallels the Australian story, with philosophy as an explicit subject confined to Catholic institutes. From the late nineteenth century there were two of these, Holy Cross College, Mosgiel, the seminary college of the New Zealand Catholic Bishops’ Conference (Norris 1999), and Mount St. Mary’s Scholasticate, Hawkes Bay, a college owned and run by the New Zealand Province of the Society of
Theological Institutions (New Zealand), Philosophy in

Mary, a religious order. Each of these had about a hundred-year history until they came together in Auckland in 2001 to form Good Shepherd College Auckland. Until about 1970, both ran programs in philosophy of a traditional Thomist stamp, whether taught directly from the Catholic textbooks known as ‘manuals’, or from private course notes which represented an updated form of the scholastic system. Even in the 1950s, textbooks at Holy Cross were still in Latin, with students expected to know enough of the language to make their way through the three-volume *Summula Philosophiae Scholasticae* of J. S. Hickey, or, if this was beyond them, with the simplified ‘dog Latin’ of the *Manuale Philosophiae ad Usum Seminariorum* of Giovanni di Napoli. At the end of the 1950s, diocesan philosophy teaching was taken over by Holy Name College, Christchurch, which boasted the Jesuit philosopher Bernard O’Brien S.J., a man of broad interests and education who had studied in Germany, where he had the later renowned Catholic theologian Karl Rahner S.J. as a fellow student. Until the early 1950s philosophy at Mount St. Mary’s was in the hands of G. H. Duggan S.M., a noted letter-writer on controversial topics, and author of a characteristically polemical work against evolution as a philosophical worldview (Duggan 1949). He was also an early critic of the Catholic theologian Hans Küng (Duggan 1964). His successor was Kevin Bonisch S.M., who taught for about twenty years from the early 1950s, and developed an interest in the emerging area of bioethics.

The curriculum and teaching style changed during the upheavals following the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s. Diocesan philosophy teaching moved back to Mosgiel, where Vincent Hunt brought a sense of the *humanum* to the Thomist tradition, as well as a dry Irish humour. The professional background of teachers became more varied. Patrick Bearsley S.M., who taught in the 1970s at Mount St. Mary’s, had studied Wittgenstein at Oxford. His successor, John Owens S.M., studied twentieth-century Continental philosophy at the University of Munich. Both promoted an Aristotelian approach in continuity with traditional Catholic views, but with a renewed interest in its relation to other streams of thought, and a cautionary sense of the controversial nature of all philosophical theses. Gregory McCormick O.P., who taught in the 1990s at Mosgiel (by this time part of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Otago), completed doctoral studies on the twentieth-century French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. All of these contributed to academic journals, something rare in earlier decades when the academic work of lecturers was often limited to their teaching activity, and they were burdened with substantial additional duties of a pastoral or formational nature.

The situation in Anglican and Protestant theological colleges was more diverse. While philosophy was not taught as a separate discipline, philosophical questions and themes often made an appearance in theological courses, usually in the area of systematic theology or ethics. These might take the form of apologetic reflection, identification of philosophical influences (especially Platonic) in the history of Christian theology, or critical analyses of classic or contemporary philosophical approaches. Such interest was understandably episodic, usually
reflecting the interests of particular lecturers. The 1840s curriculum of the Anglican college, St. John’s Auckland, included classic Christian apologetic works such as Paley’s *Evidences of Christianity* and Butler’s *Analogy of Religion*. St. John’s was still examining in natural theology and moral philosophy in the 1970s. The Thomist philosopher Selwyn Grave taught for a time at the college after World War Two, before joining the philosophy department of the University of Western Australia (see Davidson 1993). Presbyterian theological education was centred at Knox College Dunedin (see Breward 1975). While it eschewed anything approaching natural theology, it often included theology teachers with strong general philosophical knowledge and interests. Examples would be J. M. Bates in the 1930s, who was an early influence on the noted logician A. N. Prior, and in later decades Frank Nichol and Alan Torrance. Methodist theological education was based at Trinity Methodist College Auckland, which joined with St. John’s College in 1973 to form a joint faculty. The Methodist faculty at this time included John Silvester, who had studied with Karl Popper at the University of Canterbury (NZ) in the 1940s.

The rather low profile of philosophy teaching in theological colleges in New Zealand partly reflects the general status of philosophy in New Zealand society, where it is not much noticed outside of the professional university environment. Teaching in theological colleges has also had to contend with an ethos of church life that is overwhelmingly practical in orientation. In view of such obstacles to what is the reflective subject *par excellence*, it is hardly surprising that its history should be a low-key affair, owing its existence largely to church requirements in the Catholic case, and the piecemeal pursuits of individual lecturers, in the case of the others.

**Theories of Knowledge**

Stephen Hetherington

Perhaps the most influential Australasian philosophical theory of knowledge is Armstrong’s (1973) *reliabilism*. Among the earliest reliabilisms, his theory’s impact was mainly as an account of *non*-inferential knowledge. Its motivating metaphor compares individual knowers to reliable thermometers: like a reliable thermometer, a perceptual knower is thoroughly reliable in pertinent ‘readings’ of the environment. How reliable is ‘thoroughly reliable’? Armstrong demands *nomic* reliability: the belief must be formed in circumstances which, as a matter of *natural law-like* necessity, were going to render it true. Reliabilist ideas are routinely called upon when epistemologists attempt to explain knowing’s nature.
Epistemologists have striven mightily to ascertain that nature, often confronting ‘the Gettier problem’. Gettier (1963) described two striking counterexamples (successful ones, accept most epistemologists) to a supposedly traditional analysis of knowledge as a well-but-fallibly-justified true belief. How have Australasian philosophers contributed to ‘the Gettier debate’? Bigelow (2006) lays out the Gettier problem’s conceptual structure, comparing the problem with Russell’s paradox for Frege’s set-theoretic logicism. Heathcote (2006) and Gallois (2006) propose solutions to the problem—Heathcote in terms of truthmakers, Gallois by following Ayer (1956) in talking of ‘the right to be sure’. In contrast, Hetherington (1998; 2001: ch. 3) and Weatherson (2003b) dispute the standard interpretation of Gettier cases. Each provides reasons for continuing to understand knowledge as justified-true-belief. (Hetherington sees Gettier cases as including luckily formed knowledge. Weatherson evaluates criteria for choosing between a theory and competing intuitions.) Jackson (1998b: 32, 36–7, 47) defends the usual interpretation of Gettier cases, as being conceptually decisive falsifiers of the traditional theory of knowledge. Work continues on fashioning a ‘Gettier-proof’ theory of knowledge.

Work also continues on sculpting ‘sceptic-proof’ theories of knowledge. At present, there is much discussion of contextualism. Why (as it seems) can a person, in respective contexts, be accorded or denied knowledge of a particular truth—when the only pertinent difference between those contexts is the respective epistemic standards operating within them? This question arises because some contexts seem to make demanding sceptical standards apt, while others leave those standards to one side. Should a theory of knowledge be contextualist, to explain scepticism’s appeal in some settings plus its apparent irrelevance in others? Some Australasian philosophers, such as Oakley (2001) and Weatherson (2006a), doubt contextualism’s viability. Dickerson (2006) outlines an older-fashioned contextualism, an Australian one.

Distinguish contextualism from knowledge-gradualism. Contextualism requires each context’s epistemic standard to be completely satisfied, if knowledge is to be present there. Gradualism allows knowledge to admit of grades or degrees, even within a single context. Weiler (1965) endorses knowledge-gradualism; as does Hetherington (2001), arguing that it clarifies and defuses both the Gettier problem and sceptical challenges. Coady (2002: 359–60) supports gradualism’s basic idea, as did the counterpart Australasian philosopher David Lewis (1999: 438–9).

Those approaches, like most philosophical theories of knowledge, claim to elucidate propositional knowledge—knowledge-that (-some-particular-truth-p-obtains). Standardly, epistemologists inquire into knowledge’s nature by distinguishing knowledge-that from knowledge-how (-to-perform-some-particular-action). Nonetheless, that distinction has been questioned. Hetherington (2006b) argues that knowledge-that is a kind of knowledge-how. Note also two other ways of theorising about knowledge, advocated by Australasian philosophers. Hooker (1995) conceives of knowledge as an evolutionary product. On his picture, we know
within regulatory systems, complete with their fallibility dynamics. Hooker’s theory, like Armstrong’s, is a naturalism about knowledge. Musgrave (1999a) portrays knowledge as conjectural, understandable accordingly in Popperian terms. On his picture, we know only by inquiring critically, remaining open to being mistaken. Musgrave’s theory is an instance of Popper’s critical rationalism.

Several theories of knowledge are gestured at here. How deeply do they compete with each other? Mackie (1969–70: 256–7) concluded that the concept of knowledge allows for different senses, able to be modelled by congruent theories of knowledge. He described two such senses. Intellectual autonomy was the key to one of them (a phenomenon which Coady argues cannot do justice to all knowledge: 1992). Reliability was the heart of the other (a phenomenon which Armstrong argues does justice to all knowledge). Mackie’s suggestion remains apposite. Many epistemologists, such as Oakley (1988) and Jackson (2005), are tempted by some such vision of plurality when constructing a theory of knowledge.

**Thesis Eleven Journal**

Peter Beilharz

*Thesis Eleven* was founded in 1980 by Alastair Davidson and his postgraduates, Julian Triado and Peter Beilharz at the politics department at Monash University. The journal self-published through collective forms for ten years. In 1990 *Thesis Eleven* took up with MIT Press in Cambridge, and in 1996 shifted to Sage, publishing out of London, California and Delhi. The shift to Sage coincided with the relocation of the journal to the sociology department at La Trobe University. The Thesis Eleven Centre for Critical Theory, now Cultural Sociology, was established at La Trobe in 2002.

The purpose of the initial project was to position itself globally, as an alternative to journals such as *New Left Review* and *Telos*, publishing out of the antipodes, exporting as well as importing ideas. Western Marxism and critical theory were the most significant early influences, this along with the desire to make sense of the antipodes historically and culturally. The journal’s original points of location were also local, constituted by a radical culture in Melbourne dominated by *Arena* and in Sydney by *Intervention*. Its original constituency was to the left of the Melbourne Communist Party, until the local Communist Party disappeared into the Victorian Labor Party in 1984. The journal’s global distribution expanded from this point, but before international publishing and the internet, distribution from the antipodes was a nightmare. Gramsci was the most significant early influence. The journal’s project was then much influenced by the arrival of Lukács’
students, the Budapest School in exile, from 1978. Being peripheral also meant being interested in other peripheries; so the journal took a stand outside the gladiatorial Habermas vs Foucault stoush, and instead published other voices, from Castoriadis to Bauman, Touraine and Gauchet, Luhmann, Alexander and Calhoun, and studied other cases, from Latin America to India and with strong interests in the Philippines. In substantive terms, the project came to take in whatever the editors considered interesting and innovative.

Shifts in the project itself can be tracked through the various subtitles of the journal, from ‘Socialism and Scholarship’ to the present ‘Critical Theory and Historical Sociology’, which still fails to capture the breadth of the journal’s endeavours. The journal has always been interdisciplinary, taking in social and political theory, social and Continental philosophy, geography, history, culture and political economy. What is clear is that the journal has become a leader in its field, connecting back to Marxist and socialist origins but also keen to embrace the present and to anticipate and fan out into the future. *Thesis Eleven* set out to be global as well as local; most of its readers and users are now global. Collaboration with global publishers and electronic access have given the journal the editorial independence to continue on its own way.

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**Tichý, Pavel**

Graham Oddie

Pavel Tichý, who taught at the University of Otago from 1971 to 1994, was born in Brno, Czechoslovakia, in 1936, and studied at Charles University, Prague. Nurtured by logical positivists, his philosophical heroes were Russell, Frege, Gödel and Carnap. After completing his doctorate in 1959—an application of Gödel’s techniques to the simple theory of types—he taught at Charles University until 1968, when he took up a two-year fellowship at the University of Exeter. With the Russian invasion, he decided not to return, was convicted in absentia by the communist regime for illegal emigration, and sentenced to hard labour. At Exeter Tichý collected another doctorate and wrote a first paper on his new approach to intensional analysis (1971). In 1970 he accepted a position at the University of Otago and was promoted to a personal chair in 1981. It wasn’t until 1992, after the Velvet Revolution, that he was able to return to Prague. In 1993 he was offered the Headship of the Department of Logic at Charles University, but he died tragically, by drowning, on 26 October 1994, before being able to take up his new position.

For Tichý the aim of **metaphysics** was a comprehensive ontology—a theory of the logical structure of all the entities that we have to countenance. His
A proposal—called Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL)—evolved over thirty years, but there are certain assumptions which define its core.

1. **Realism about abstracta**—including, *inter alia*, properties, propositions, worlds, fictional entities, events, actions, numbers, procedures, offices and so on. Although not aversive to the economies of reduction, Tichý rejected nominalistic eliminativism as inadequate to the philosophical task.

2. **Functional type theory.** Tichý embraced *functions* as the foundations of object theory, and *type theory* as the most promising response to the paradoxes. He built on Church’s formulation of the Simple Theory of Types, but he developed an extraordinarily broad framework—a rich, ramified theory of entities (1988).

3. **Procedures and constructions.** Although Tichý took an objectual approach to semantics—viz. linguistic units are meaningful in virtue of picking out certain *entities*—the relevant entities are *procedures*, and procedures are a certain kind of abstract action type, which he called *constructions* (1986a, 1988). *Adding five and seven* is a typical mathematical construction, which, if carried out, constructs (yields) the number twelve. The complex symbol ‘[+57]’ depicts this way of arriving at nine (the *application* of the addition function to the two numbers) rather than the number nine itself. A different way of arriving at that number is [×34]: the application of multiplication to three and four.

4. **Intensions as offices.** Tichý argued that many of the puzzles in philosophical logic arise from the failure to recognise the ubiquitous distinction between objects and the offices they occupy. (His 1987 exposition of office theory is a translation of the introduction to an unpublished book ms, which was complete by 1973. The original is printed in his *Collected Papers* [709–48] as ‘Individuals and their Roles’.) The denotation of ‘The U.S. President’, for example, is not an individual (Barack Obama, say) but rather, an office. The truth condition for *the U.S. President is smart* is simply that *whoever* occupies the office is smart. The office, occupied by different individuals at different world-times, induces a function from world-times to individuals. Offices that are necessarily co-occupied are one and the same—hence the office is identified with its associated function. This is a development of Carnap’s account of extension and intension. Properties of individuals are functions from world-times to collections of individuals; propositions, functions from world-times to truth values, etc. In general, intensions are offices—functions from world-times to objects of a certain type.

5. **Transparency.** Opacity—the apparent failure of principles of substitutivity in ‘opaque’ contexts—has become practically synonymous with intensionality. Tichý argued for a transparent intensional logic. The apparent opacity in intensional contexts is the result of a puzzling
and somewhat gratuitious suppression of implicit variables in logical analysis—variables ranging over worlds and times. It is his bringing bound variables to the surface of logical analysis that sets his approach apart from that of Richard Montague (1971, 1978d).

6. Partiality. With his background in recursion theory Tichý embraced partial functions, and although this seems an obvious move it opened up rich possibilities. If the office of the King of France is unoccupied at some world-time, then the associated function is undefined at that world-time. It yields nothing. The proposition that the King of France is bald is consequently also a partial function. If the office is empty at some world-time then there is no object to which to apply the extension of the property at that world-time to arrive at a truth value, so the proposition yields no truth value there.

Tichý is perhaps better known for some of his other work—for example, his refutation of Popper’s content account of truthlikeness (1974), which spawned the likeness approach to the problem (1976b); and his critique of Kripke on necessity a posteriori (1983a), which ricocheted off in a direction of which he would not have approved at all (two-dimensional semantics), to name just two. But while these were valuable, TIL was Tichý’s most significant systematic contribution to philosophy.

TIL is based on a hierarchy of types $\Gamma$, over four collections of basic types. Tichý expanded the basic types of Church’s Theory—individuals ($\iota$) and truth values ($\omicron$)—with worlds ($\omega$) and times ($\tau$). $\Gamma$ is defined recursively—given types $\eta$ and $\xi$, $(\eta\xi)$ is the type of any function which takes $\xi$-objects to $\eta$-objects. Functions from individuals to truth values (sets) are of type $(\omicron\iota)$, individual offices of type $((\iota\tau)\omega)$, properties of type $((\iota\iota\tau)\omega)$, and so on.

The collection of constructions over $\Gamma^{(*)}$ is also defined recursively. There are two kinds of simple construction (trivialisation, and variables) and two ways of building constructions out of other constructions (composition and closure).

Trivialisation is the simple procedure which ‘constructs’ an object in one step. Where $X$ is an entity over $\Gamma$, the trivialisation of $X$ can be thought of as a one-step procedure: take the entity $X$. Variables are also simple constructions. This will sound odd to those who think of variables as syntactic items—letters in a formal language. Tichý’s variables are the objective correlatives of syntactic variables. They are simple constructions which yield objects, but they do so only relative to valuations—complete assignments of appropriate objects to all variables.

Given two constructions $F$ and $X$, the composition of $F$ and $X$ (denoted $[FX]$), is the procedure: carry out $X$; carry out $F$; apply result of latter to result of former. This procedure may abort. Either $F$ or $X$ may not construct anything, and if they do construct objects ($F$ of type $(\eta\xi)$ and $X$ of type $\xi$) then $F$ may be undefined at argument $X$. If $F$ is defined at $X$, and it yields $Y$, then $[FX]$ constructs the $\xi$-object $Y$. So $[+57]$, for example, is the construction apply addition to the five and seven, which yields twelve.
Composition takes us down the type hierarchy. What takes us up is the variable-binding procedure of closure. Where $C$ is any construction of type $\eta$ containing a variable of type $\xi$, the closure of $C$ with respect to $x$ ($\lambda x C$) constructs a function of type $(\eta \xi)$. So, for example, the closure of $[\text{+1}x]$ with respect to $x$, $(\lambda x [\text{+1}x])$, constructs the successor function. Other variable binding procedures (like quantification) resolve into combinations of composition and closure.

During the 1970s and early 1980s Tichý applied TIL to a raft of problems—e.g. conditionals (1978a, 1984), questions (1978c), $de\ dicto$ $de\ re$ (1978b), the ontological argument (1979), time and tense (1980a, 1980b, 1980c), freedom (1983), the indiscernibility of identicals (1986b), to name a few—but like others at the time he realised the limitations of a purely intensional framework, and the necessity for hyperintensionality. In fact TIL contained the seeds of just such a framework. Construed as functions from world-times to truth values, there is just one logically necessary proposition, for example. But one may prove that $five \text{+}\text{seven} \text{=}\text{twelve}$, without proving that $three \times four \text{=}\text{twelve}$. So proving cannot be a relation to a proposition on pain of opacity. If proving were a relation to a propositional construction, then the problem dissolves, for there are clearly two different constructions at issue here. The initial typed hierarchy does not contain constructions themselves—they do not feature among the objects—nor types involving constructions. To solve the problem Tichý turned to a ramified hierarchy of ever expanding types and constructions (1988).

Tichý’s last work is an unpublished manuscript titled *The Logic of English: Meaning Driven Grammar*. In it Tichý tackles the task of generating a grammar for English itself—the code that generates sentence–meaning pairs, where the meanings, are, of course, specific constructions. This work is currently being edited with a view to publication.

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**Time**

Neil McKinnon

Australasian activity has contributed a rich and influential body of work in philosophical treatments of time, especially from the 1950s to the present. I shall (mostly) use the labelling conventions that appear in Markosian (2008) for the various philosophical positions discussed; for reasons of economy, I also direct the reader to this source for details about the content of these positions.

**Tense Logic**

Australasian philosophy has played a central role in both the genesis and the development of logics of tenses. J. N. Findlay remarked that our conventions
regarding the use of tenses are already systematic to the extent that they contain the material for a formal calculus (1941: 233, fn. 17). *A. N. Prior* was inspired by this passage, along with medieval views of propositions (according to which ‘Lucy is feeling sheepish’ does not require supplementation with a time-reference in order to express a proposition), to begin work on tense logic. For Prior, atomic propositions were present-tensed, and he introduced both metrical and non-metrical past and future tense-operators. Much of this work was published in Prior 1957 and 1967. C. L. Hamblin corresponded with Prior during the 1950s and ’60s, and this collaboration of sorts produced significant results on implicative structures for the tenses (Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1993: 28–30).

**Metaphysics of Past, Present and Future**

What is the nature of the passage of time? Australasian philosophy has made solid, indeed, sometimes spectacular, contributions to discussion of this question.

Perhaps the most famous and influential argument against the B-theory of time appears as a brief remark in Prior (1959: 17). Prior wonders about the appropriateness of relief. It is appropriate to feel relief just after an unpleasant experience has ended, and not while it is in progress, nor before it has started, nor years after its completion. The worry is that the B-theory seems to lack the resources to account for these appropriateness-conditions. For instance, the fact that there is a time at which you are located, which is, say, a second later than the cessation of the experience, is a fact that, for the B-theorist, merely expresses an eternal relation between two temporally-located items. So, on what basis can the B-theorist say that relief is (i) about this eternal fact, and (ii) appropriate only very soon after the event has ended? G. N. Schlesinger proposes related arguments against the B-theory in his (1982: 510–12).

Prior’s argument has generated a library of responses. And some Australasian B-theorists have had distinctive things to say. Dyke and Maclaurin (2002) argue that other B-theorists have provided suitable objects of relief, but have not offered good accounts of relief’s appropriateness-conditions. They seek to fill this gap with an evolutionary story. Reflecting on time-travel examples, André Gallois (1994) argues that attitudes like relief can be appropriate before an unpleasant event has occurred. This suggests that the appropriateness-conditions of relief are not temporally asymmetric, and that, as a result, considerations surrounding relief do not cause trouble for the B-theory.

In ‘The River of Time’ (1949), *J. J. C. Smart* claims that the A-theory of time is attractive only insofar as we allow ourselves to take seriously various metaphors about the passing of time. We have images of time being like a river that rolls ever-on, as something that flows, passes, hurtles, creeps along, and so on. To think of time in this way, where events, for instance, are constantly changing with respect to presentness, degrees of pastness and degrees of futurity, is to think of time itself as something that changes. Since all changes occur in time, this means that these special changes require a second-order time series with respect to which they occur. These considerations iterate, and we are on our way towards
an infinite hierarchy of distinct time series. But that seems absurd, so perhaps we should stop taking the metaphors of passage so literally.

The A-theory divides into several variants. Prior’s presentism afforded him a means of avoiding Smart’s concerns about meta-time series. Prior (1968a) urges against reifying events. Talk about events, he claims, is merely convenient shorthand; there are things, and things undergo change while they exist, and then cease to be. Since there are no events, we don’t need further series of time to ‘explain’ how it is, say, that they recede further and further into the past.

While Prior’s tense logic can be viewed as offering a presentist-friendly story about propositions, and how they change with respect to truth-value as time passes, one might wonder about the ontological underpinnings of this picture. What makes it true now, for instance, that Ned Kelly was hanged? Bigelow (1996) looks to the Epicurean, Lucretius, for enlightenment. Bigelow urges that truths about (for instance) Kelly’s hanging can be secured by appealing to facts about things that existed contemporaneously with the hanging, and still exist now. Drawing inspiration from Bigelow’s paper, Keller (2004) considers and discusses a broader range of truthmaking options for the presentist.

Some A-theorists are more ontologically generous than are presentists. According to the Growing Universe view, reality accrues. Things, facts and events are ‘birthed’ in the present, and thereafter recede into the past, but contra presentism never pass out of existence. Some other A-theorists hold that reality doesn’t accrue, but that past, present and future things are equally real, while differing only over whether they possess intrinsic properties of pastness, presentness or futurity. David Braddon-Mitchell (2004a) raises an epistemological objection to both of these views. If you know anything, then surely you know that you are present. But since, according to the views under consideration, there is nothing ontologically unique about presentness, past things exist, and perhaps future things exist also. Given that this is the case, what are the chances that you are present? They are vanishingly small. So you really ought to believe that you are not present. But this seems an exceedingly unhappy conclusion to be forced to draw.

**Anthropocentrism and Spacetime Philosophy**

As we have already observed, J. J. C. Smart has been a staunch opponent of the A-theory. He stresses that the seeming attractiveness of the A-theory can be diagnosed as being caused by an unwarranted strain of anthropocentrism within metaphysics. And, more generally, he holds that anthropocentrism is the root cause of a large number of metaphysical maladies (Smart 1963). As an antidote to this, in the case of time, Smart has done a great deal to introduce philosophers of time to Minkowski’s (1952) interpretation of Special Relativity, whereby not only the correct applications of the notions of past, present and future, but also those of earlier and later, are treated as perspectival matters. The underlying invariant measure is that of *spacetime* intervals, which do not vary with shifts in perspective. Smart does, however, retain an objective direction of
Time, agreeing with work by other authors—for instance, Reichenbach (1956) and Grünbaum (1963)—who make out the direction of time in terms of physical asymmetries.

Huw Price (1996) takes this anti-anthropocentrism further still. He urges that even when we think we have removed anthropocentric thinking from our physics and philosophy, we are often mistaken. In particular, he argues that attempts to account for the direction of time in terms of physical asymmetries (such as those endorsed by Smart) are often plausible only insofar as they implicitly (and illicitly) appeal to the very temporal asymmetry that they seek to explain. That this hidden dependence has been so little noticed is diagnosed in terms of the tenacious hold that our human temporal perspective has on our thinking.

Time as Substance?

Graham Nerlich has made a number of important contributions to the debate over whether times are substances or whether they are reducible to facts about temporally-located things. For much of the twentieth century, the reductionist view predominated. Nerlich played an important role in resuscitating substantivalism, by emphasising its explanatory power. Here are just two of his contributions. Nerlich emphasises that differences in the curvature of spacetime imply differences in the geometrical properties of things in spacetime. He argues that this blocks influential arguments according to which substantivalism is a theoretically idle postulate; an example here is the argument that if substantivalism were true, the world could double in size without having any non-trivial consequences for any of the things in the world and their relationships to other things (Nerlich 1991). Nerlich also argues that the non-Euclidean nature of spacetime breathes new life into Kant’s argument that there is a difference between left and right hands which cannot be accounted for without substantivalism. Handedness can be explained in terms of the shape of the space in which hands are embedded (Nerlich 1994a: ch. 2).

Other Australasian Philosophers

Some further Australasian philosophers who have published in the field include: Samuel Alexander, Maxwell J. Cresswell, Phil Dowe, Heather Dyke, Peter Forrest, William Grey (formerly known as William Godfrey-Smith), Ian Hinckfuss and Josh Parsons.

Australasian Contributions to Non-Australasian Work

A number of important monographs have been partially written or developed by non-Australasians during stays in Australasia. These include Mellor (1981), McCall (1994), and Tooley (1997).
Two-Dimensional Logic and Semantics

Laura Schroeter

Two-dimensional semantics is a formal framework for characterising the meaning of certain expressions and the entailment relations among sentences containing them. There are three influential types of semantic application of the two-dimensional framework (2D framework). First, logicians such as Hans Kamp, Lennart Åqvist, and Lloyd Humberstone have used the 2D framework to explain the workings of quasi-logical vocabulary such as temporal and modal operators (e.g. ‘now’, ‘actually’, ‘necessarily’) as well as indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Second, David Kaplan’s influential account of indexicals uses the 2D framework to explain the meaning of expressions whose reference shifts depending on the context in which they are used (e.g. ‘I’, ‘this’, ‘tall’). Third, theorists like Frank Jackson and David Chalmers suggest that the framework can be used to explain the meaning of words whose reference is determined in part by external facts about the subject’s physical or social environment (e.g. ‘water’, ‘Gödel’). In contrast with these three semantic applications, Robert Stalnaker and his followers use the 2D framework to characterise subjects’ imperfect understanding of what is semantically picked out by a referring expression and to depict what is pragmatically communicated when there is the potential for semantic ignorance and error (Stalnaker 1978, 1999). Although these applications all rely on the same formal framework, the interpretation of that framework differs significantly depending on the explanatory aims.

Philosophers from Australia and New Zealand have been at the forefront in developing two-dimensional modal logic and semantic applications of the 2D framework to externally determined reference. In the 1970s and ’80s, antipodean theorists (including Krister Segerberg, John Crossley, Lloyd Humberstone, Allen Hazen, and Martin Davies) played a key role in applying the 2D framework to modal logic and the interpretation of modal operators. Since the late 1990s, two-dimensional semantics (2D semantics) is often equated with the most ambitious semantic applications of the 2D framework, which provide an integrated treatment of modal and epistemic operators, indexical expressions, and words with externally determined reference. Australians Frank Jackson and David Chalmers are the standard-bearers for this generalised 2D semantics. Their applications of the 2D framework are bound up with ambitious, controversial and sometimes divergent philosophical agendas, and their work has attracted a great deal of philosophical attention, both favourable and critical. Antipodeans who have made contributions to developing or criticising generalised 2D semantics include Martin Davies and Lloyd Humberstone (1980), David Braddon-Mitchell (2003, 2004b), Berit Brogaard (2007, forthcoming), John Hawthorne (2002), Fred

**Logical Applications of the Two-Dimensional Framework**

Krister Segerberg (1973), later based in Christchurch, was the first along with Lennart Åqvist (1973) to lay out a 2D framework for modal logic and to explore different operators that could be defined in that framework. The basic idea behind two-dimensional modal logic is that some operators may require us to take into account how things stand in more than one possible world in order to assign a truth-value to sentences containing them. These operators would allow us to form sentences which are evaluated for truth with respect to a pair of worlds, rather than a single world. The familiar 2D matrices, with possible worlds aligned along both axes, provide a systematic characterisation of how truth-values for sentences containing such double-indexed operators vary depending on the values assigned to the indices. Åqvist originally proposed the double-index framework as a more elegant formal system for capturing the semantics of subjunctive conditionals (Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 1970a); while Segerberg inspired in part by parallels with contemporary work on temporal operators (Kamp 1971; Vlach 1973) developed the properties of modal operators that exploit the extra expressive power introduced by the second modal index. Both Åqvist and Segerberg were primarily concerned with characterising the formal systems that could be defined on the double-index framework.

Do we really need two-dimensional modal operators or are they mere logical curiosities? Working independently, John Crossley and Lloyd Humberstone of Monash University (1977) and Allen Hazen (1978, 1976), subsequently of University of Melbourne, argued that the expressive completeness of modal logic requires double indexing: to fully capture our ordinary understanding of modality as expressed in natural language we need to introduce a logical operator ‘Actually’ which specifies that the material in its scope should be evaluated at the possible world assigned to the actual-world index. To see why this is required, consider the sentence:

> It is possible for everything that is red to be shiny.

There are two different ways of reading this claim. The first reading can be modelled in terms of a single possible world: there is a world in which the set of red things is coextensive with the set of shiny things. But the second reading involves a comparison among different possible worlds: the idea is that everything that is red in the *actual* world is shiny in some *other* possible world. In order to verify this second reading, we need to identify the set of red things in the actual world and then to determine whether there is any possible world where all those things are shiny. What this shows is that our intuitive understanding of the modal claim requires us to keep track of two different possible worlds playing different roles. If we want our possible world semantics to fully capture
our ordinary understanding of modality, we need to posit two independent modal indices: one for the world designated as the actual world, and one for an arbitrary possible world. The first index reflects the possible contexts from which we might evaluate the sentence, while the second index reflects the possible circumstances that might make the sentence true or false. We can then introduce an ‘Actually’ operator, ‘A’, which requires us to evaluate the embedded sentence with respect to the world designated as actual. However it is embedded within the scope of other modal operators, ‘Actually’ always takes us back to the world representing the real world. Thus, the semantic role of the modal operator ‘Actually’ here is formally analogous to the role of ‘now’ in the two-dimensional temporal logic developed earlier by Kamp (1971) and Vlach (1973).

One awkward consequence of this modal logic for ‘actually’ is that the following claim comes out as logically valid:

If John Howard was actually defeated in 2007, then it’s necessary that he was actually defeated in 2007.

But intuitively it’s a contingent matter how the 2007 elections in Australia actually turned out: Howard was not destined by logical necessity to be swept from office. To mitigate this counterintuitive consequence, Crossley and Humberstone introduced a new logical operator, ‘Fixedly’ (F), which yields the value ‘true’ for a sentence S just in case S is true no matter which world is designated as actual. When we combine the two operators, ‘Fixedly Actually’ (FA), they behave like a necessity operator ranging over possible worlds playing the actual world role. Crossley and Humberstone suggested that ‘Fixedly Actually’ models the sense of necessity we intuitively have in mind when we deny that it’s necessary that Howard actually lost the 2007 elections. (See Humberstone 2004 for an overview of developments in two-dimensional [2D] modal logic.)

Necessity and a Priority

This suggestion was highlighted and elaborated in Martin Davies and Lloyd Humberstone’s influential paper, ‘Two Notions of Necessity’ (1980). (Davies later held a professorship at the Research School of the Social Sciences at the Australian National University.) Davies and Humberstone suggested that the operator ‘FA’ provides a formal semantic model of Gareth Evans’ notion of ‘deep necessity’, which he had contrasted with the ‘superficial necessity’ given by the standard possible world operator ‘□’ (Evans 1979).

Davies and Humberstone were the first to bring formal developments in two-dimensional modal logic to bear on philosophical debates about reference, modality and a priority initiated by Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity (1980 [1972]). Kripke had convinced most of the philosophical community that the necessary/contingent distinction does not line up with the a priori/a posteriori distinction—contrary to what the traditional descriptivist theories of meaning predict. In particular, Kripke argued that many identity claims involving names or natural kind terms, like ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’, express necessary truths that
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are only knowable \textit{a posteriori}; while stipulative definitions, like ‘this stick is one meter long’, may express contingent truths that are knowable \textit{a priori}.

Such combinations can seem puzzling: if the public meaning of one’s words does not serve to rule out any possible situation, then how can this fact fail to be accessible on the basis of linguistic competence? Davies and Humberstone note that their 2D framework affords a straightforward explanation of certain contingent \textit{a priori} and necessary \textit{a posteriori} claims. In their modal logic, any contingent \textit{a priori} sentence, such as ‘Howard lost in 2007’, can be transformed into a necessary \textit{a posteriori} sentence or a contingent \textit{a priori} sentence by using ‘Actually’ and other logical vocabulary. Knowing the meaning of the logical operator ‘A’ puts one in a position to know \textit{a priori} that a claim of the form ‘As ↔ s’ must be true no matter which world is actual (i.e. it’s fixedly actual); yet such claims are contingent in the standard sense of ‘\&’. Similarly, a claim of the form ‘As’ will either be necessarily true or necessarily false in the sense of ‘\&’; yet it can only be known \textit{a posteriori} since there is no guarantee that s will be true of the actual world (i.e. it’s not fixedly actual).

This 2D modal logic can be used to explain Kripke’s examples of necessary \textit{a posteriori} truths involving proper names, if one takes the names and natural kind terms to be equivalent in meaning to rigidified definite descriptions. For instance, Evans (1979) suggested that one can introduce a proper name ‘Julius’ by stipulating that it is equivalent in meaning to ‘the actual inventor of the zip’. The 2D logic for ‘actually’ can then be used to explain why claims involving this name are necessary \textit{a posteriori} or contingent \textit{a priori}. However, Davies and Humberstone are sceptical that ordinary proper names such as ‘John Howard’ can be analysed in this way—and so they do not take their 2D framework to explain all of Kripke’s examples.

Generalised Two-Dimensional Semantics

However, the idea that names and natural kind terms resemble rigidified definite descriptions later found powerful advocates in Frank Jackson (1994, 1998b, 1998d) and David Chalmers (1996). By the 1980s, Kripke’s (1972) and Putnam’s (1972) famous ‘externalist’ thought-experiments were widely accepted as refuting traditional descriptivist theories of reference for names and natural kind terms. To replace descriptivism, many theorists proposed ‘pure’ externalist theories of reference (e.g. Devitt 1981; Dretske 1988; Millikan 1984), according to which a subject’s own understanding of a word plays no decisive role in determining its reference. Jackson and Chalmers argued that such ‘pure’ externalist accounts were epistemologically implausible. Their key claim was that speakers can always know the precise reference-fixing conditions for their own words solely on the basis of \textit{a priori} reflection. So, contrary to Hilary Putnam’s famous dictum (1972), the core aspect of meaning really is ‘in the head’ after all.

Jackson’s and Chalmers’ generalised 2D semantics was inspired by David Lewis’ approach to theoretical terms (1970b), and by earlier applications of the 2D framework by Robert Stalnaker to assertions (1978), David Kaplan to indexicals
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(published 1989, circulating a decade earlier), and Davies and Humberstone to modal vocabulary (1980). Jackson was also influenced by the Dunedin-based Czech logician, Pavel Tichý (1981), who used a two-dimensional analysis of meaning to argue against the Kripkean idea that there are contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori truths.

Jackson and Chalmers contend that that the meaning of a proper name or a natural kind term can be factored into two components. The first a priori accessible component specifies what it takes to fall into the extension of the term in any possible world considered as one’s actual environment. For instance, they suggest you can know a priori that to be water is to be the stuff that actually satisfies certain core descriptive and indexical criteria you associate with the term ‘water’ (e.g. being the clear, potable, tasteless liquid of your acquaintance that falls as rain, flows in rivers, and fills the oceans, that is causally responsible for most of your past ‘water’ classifications, etc.). This sort of definition, they suggest is available simply through armchair reflection on hypothetical cases: e.g. what would count as water if your actual environment turned out to be like Putnam’s twin earth? The a posteriori component of meaning specifies the essential nature of the object, kind, or property actually picked out by your term—i.e. what it takes to be the very same thing in counterfactual situations. It’s widely accepted, for instance, that water is H₂O in all possible worlds (given that H₂O is the stuff that actually satisfies your implicit criteria for being water, nothing could count as water unless it were H₂O). These two components of meaning can be modelled as functions taking one from possible worlds to extensions: the a priori aspect (water = the actual stuff that … ) is given by a function taking one from a world considered as actual to an extension within that world; the a posteriori aspect (water = H₂O) is given by a function from a world considered as counterfactual to an extension in that counterfactual situation. Thus, their semantic approach is two-dimensional because it requires us to take into account two distinct modal indices in order to assign an extension to the term ‘water’: possible worlds considered as ways the world might actually be and possible worlds considered as ways the world might counterfactually have been.

Jackson and especially Chalmers have argued that their 2D framework can be used as a general semantic model, capturing key aspects of the meaning of any expression (Jackson 1998b; Chalmers and Jackson 2001; Chalmers 2002d, 2004a, 2006). For instance, descriptive terms like ‘square’ or ‘philosopher’ can easily be represented within this 2D semantic framework—it’s just that the two aspects of meaning will coincide for these terms, since which property they pick out does not depend on contingent facts about one’s environment. Jackson and Chalmers need the 2D framework to capture egocentric criteria for identifying objects or natural kinds (e.g. your term ‘water’ refers to stuff around here), so they stipulate that the possible worlds considered as actual must have a designated ‘centre’ marking a time and location for the speaker within the world. With this centring, their two-dimensional model (2D model) can be generalised to depict the reference of indexicals like ‘T’ or ‘now’ along the lines outlined by Kaplan.
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(1989). This 2D model can also be used to capture something like the two notions of necessity proposed by Davies and Humberstone, and even extended to reflect de re necessities (Chalmers 2002b). In a similar spirit, in work done during his Monash Ph.D., Brian Weatherson has argued that the 2D framework can be used to give a neat semantic account of the distinction between indicative and subjunctive conditionals (Weatherson 2001).

The central motive behind Jackson’s and Chalmers’ 2D semantics is their shared conviction that there must be an a priori aspect to meaning—i.e. an aspect of understanding which explains how one can know the precise application conditions of one’s own words through armchair reflection on possible cases. Beyond this core epistemological thesis, however, their philosophical agendas diverge. Jackson is interested in public language and communication (Jackson 1998b, 2004c). He argues that 2D semantics is needed to fill a crucial gap in David Lewis’ (1969) famous account of linguistic conventions—for the 2D framework allows us to specify the core sets of ‘analytic’ commitments for names and natural kind terms that are mandated by linguistic conventions. Chalmers, in contrast, denies that 2D semantics can capture linguistic conventions governing public language expressions (2002d). Instead, Chalmers aims to vindicate a rationalist approach to meaning and modality: 2D semantics is needed to show how we can have a priori access to what we mean and to what is metaphysically possible (2004a, 2006). These rationalist assumptions are crucial to Chalmers’ use of 2D semantics to establish that phenomenal properties are irreducible to physical ones (1996, forthcoming). In addition, Chalmers takes his 2D semantics to provide a viable interpretation of Fregean sense and narrow content (2002a, 2002d).

Other Australasian philosophers have played important roles in developing and criticising different aspects of the generalised 2D semantic program. Jackson’s longtime colleague at the Australian National University’s Research School of the Social Sciences (RSSS), Philip Pettit, co-authored the influential ‘Canberra Plan’ approach that applies the 2D idea to moral terms (Jackson and Pettit 1995), and Pettit has also defended a version of 2D semantics from Stalnaker’s criticisms (2004). David Braddon-Mitchell of the University of Sydney has been an important advocate of the use of 2D semantics to explain thought contents, but he has argued that the framework cannot ground the strong metaphysical conclusions about dualism Chalmers hopes to draw from it (2004b, 2003).

John Hawthorne, who has held appointments at both the University of New South Wales (UNSW) and the RSSS, raised a similar objection to Chalmers’ dualist argument (2002). Fred Kroon of the University of Auckland has argued forcefully that 2D semantics cannot be used to capture public language meaning (2004a, 2004b), though he embraces 2D semantics as a way of cashing out the insights of his earlier work on causal descriptivism (1987). Laura Schroeter of the University of Melbourne has criticised the epistemological ambitions of the 2D semantic program (2003, 2004a, 2006) and has raised worries about the presuppositions behind Chalmers’ 2D framework (2004b, 2005). In work stemming from his doctorate at the RSSS, Kai-Yee Wong developed a version of
2D semantics as a way of explaining the necessary *a posteriori* (1991, 1996, 2006); while Michaelis Michael of the University of New South Wales has criticised uses of the 2D framework to characterise necessary *a posteriori* and contingent *a priori* truths (1998, 2004). Berit Brogaard, who has held a position at the RSSS, defends a version of 2D semantics and argues that the two-dimensional approach is particularly suited to characterising epistemic modals (2007, forthcoming).

(I'd like to thank David Chalmers, Allen Hazen, and Lloyd Humberstone for helpful comments and suggestions.)
Universals, properties wholly present in all instances that have them, may have come to Australia in 1939, when A. K. Stout was appointed to the chair of moral and political philosophy at the University of Sydney, and his father G. F. Stout followed him, publishing ‘Things, Predicates and Relations’ in the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* one year later (cf. Passmore 1944: 5). At the University of Sydney, A. K. Stout joined the famous Challis Professor of Philosophy, John Anderson, whom D. M. Armstrong (2005) has called ‘the most important philosopher who has worked in Australia’. Armstrong himself—who has likewise been described as having a ‘claim to being the greatest philosopher produced by the young and vast country of Australia’ (Mumford 2007: vii)—became Anderson’s successor as Challis Professor of Philosophy in 1964, and very much created the contemporary discussion of universals in 1978 (*Universals and Scientific Realism*, in two volumes), turning Australia into the homestead of both friends and enemies of universals. Together with David Lewis, who dedicated his *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology* to the ‘philosophers, past and present, of Sydney and Canberra’, Armstrong continues to have a formative influence on the discussion of the age-old problem of universals (a good presentation of his overall position is his 1989a; cf. also Oliver 1996).

Armstrong defends an *a posteriori realism* about universals, citing Anderson as a fellow *a posteriori* realist (1978: 109). It is up to our best science to determine which universals exist, i.e. which resemblances are grounded in the presence of one and the same universal in the resembling particulars. Science not only discovers what things there are, but also how they are. Armstrong then proceeds to put universals to work in his theories of *laws of nature* (1983), of non-actual possibilities (1989), and of states of affairs (1997). In his 1978 work, Armstrong presents three arguments in favour of his *a posteriori* realism about universals: the One over Many, the argument from logical form, and the truthmaker argument.
The One over Many starts from the allegedly Moorean fact that ‘many different particulars can all have what appears to be the same nature’ (1978: xiii). It then proceeds through a number of Nominalist accounts of this fact, arguing that they do not succeed. Armstrong criticises Predicate, Concept, Class and Mereological Nominalisms on the grounds that they involve a regress (on pain of accepting universals like falling under, applying to, being a member of or being a part of), cannot distinguish between coextensive properties, and cannot account for the causal efficacy of (instances of) universals. He argues against Resemblance Nominalism that it too involves a regress (on pain of accepting a universal of resemblance) and that it inverts the order of explanation: a’s being F cannot be grounded in a’s resembling other particulars—rather a resembles the other Fs in virtue of being F itself. Armstrong concludes that ‘this appearance cannot be explained away, but must be accepted’ (1978: xiii). As he puts it elsewhere, ‘if the notion of non-numerical identity turns out to be unanalysable, then presumably we ought to accept it with natural piety as an irreducible feature of the world. And to accept irreducible non-numerical identity is to accept universals’ (Armstrong 1984a: 251).

The argument from logical form is that apparently true sentences quantify over properties. Armstrong now accords this argument only subsidiary status (1997: 48), partly in response to Lewis’ remark (1983: 16) that the paradigm sentence ‘A red thing can resemble an orange thing more closely than a red thing can resemble a blue thing’ (cf. Jackson 1977c) may, assuming an ontology of possibilia, be paraphrased as ‘Some red thing resembles some orange thing more than any red thing resembles any blue thing’. In addition, and more importantly, Armstrong’s reassessment of the argument from logical form was motivated by his replacement of the Quinean criterion for ontological commitment with the more general truthmaking principle. Requiring some thing in the domain of quantification is just one way for the truth of a sentence to depend on the existence of an entity: not just ‘Redness is a property of this tomato’ but also ‘This tomato is red’ commit us to redness as part of the truthmaker of these sentences.

Armstrong’s main argument for the existence of universals thus starts from the fact that particulars resemble. Relying on the truthmaker principle which he attributes to his former Sydney colleague C. B. Martin, Armstrong argues that such resemblance facts have to be accounted for: if it is true that both a and b are red, for example, there must be an entity, the truthmaker for this truth, the existence of which necessitates this truth. Truth is not brute: it is grounded in reality. The importance of the truthmaker principle for Armstrong’s philosophy can hardly be overestimated: he devotes his latest book to its elaboration and defence (2007). We should believe in the existence of universals because they are required to ground the truth of statements of objective resemblance.

Over the years Armstrong vigorously defended both the truthmaking principle and his realism about universals against a number of opponents, many of them in Australasia and including figures on both sides in the Sydney philosophy disturbances that led to a division of the philosophy department into two (see
Besides the five versions of Nominalism already outlined, we should perhaps include a sixth: Ostrich or Cloak-and-dagger Nominalism. I have in mind those philosophers who refuse to countenance universals but who at the same time see no need for any reductive analyses of the sorts just outlined. There are no universals but the proposition that \( a \) is \( F \) is perfectly all right as it is. [ … ] What such a Nominalist is doing is simply refusing to give any account of the type/token distinction, and, in particular, any account of types. But, like anybody else, such a Nominalist will make continual use of the distinction. Prima facie, it is incompatible with Nominalism. He therefore owes us an account of the distinction. It is a compulsory question in the examination paper. (Armstrong 1978: 16–17)

Against Devitt, Armstrong (1980: 443) argues that Ostrich nominalists give the predicate ‘what has been said to be the privilege of the harlot: power without responsibility. The predicate is informative, it makes a vital contribution to telling us what is the case, the world is different if it is different, yet ontologically it is supposed not to commit us’. As ‘continually to raise the truthmaker question about properties makes for ontological honesty’ (Armstrong 2004: 43), the truth-making principle commits us to realism about properties.

Subsequently, and most prominently in his (1997), Armstrong argues that the truthmaking principle leads us, further, to the acceptance of the existence of states of affairs, such as \( a \)’s being \( F \). Universals are then reconstructed as ‘state-of-affairs types’: ‘The universal is a gutted state of affairs; it is everything that is left in the state of affairs after the particular particulars involved in the state of affairs have been abstracted away in thought’ (Armstrong 1997: 29). If we want truthmakers for all truths (and thus uphold truthmaker maximalism), just the ‘normal’ states of affairs will not suffice: to account for general, and negative, truths, we also need so-called ‘totality states of affairs’. That \( a, b \) and \( c \) are all the black swans there are, for example, is made true by the totality state of affairs \( a, b \) and \( c \)’s totalling the property being a black swan. Such totality states of affairs are highly problematic, however, and have come in for much criticism: ‘Armstrong has become a bit pregnant. He has lost his empiricist virginity and subscribed to the existence of abstract and non-spatio-temporal general factness’ (Martin 1996: 59, cf. also Keller 2007). Other reactions from members of the ‘Australian school’ of metaphysical realism are well documented in Monnoyer (2004) and (2007).

Realism about properties is not yet realism about universals. Universals are characterised by their being wholly present in all their instances: one and the same numerically identical universal accounts for the redness of all red particulars. An alternative view is that different rednesses, all exactly similar, do
this job. G. F. Stout attributes to Anderson such a view that ‘the characters of particular things are themselves particular’ (1940: 119, cf. also 1921 and 1923 and Anderson 1929). According to D. C. Williams (1953 and 1966), such ‘tropes’, as he calls them, form the very ‘alphabet of being’. Australian philosophers—most notably Keith Campbell (1990), an ally of Armstrong in the Sydney troubles and his successor as Challis Professor of Philosophy, C. B. Martin (1980), and John Bacon (1995)—have developed this idea into a respectable rival to realism about universals (cf. Lewis 1986: 64). According to trope theory, resemblance facts are not to be accounted for in terms of the exemplification of one and the same universal, but rather in terms of the exact resemblance of numerically distinct property instances, each depending on the particular in which it inheres.

According to Armstrong, trope theory faces two main problems, to do with relations and laws of nature respectively. If, as is usually done, tropes are taken to be located in space and time, relations will end up having one leg in one and another in the other relatum, as Leibniz remarked in his correspondence with Clarke. According to Armstrong’s non-Humean theory of laws of nature, a law of nature is the exemplification of a necessitation universal by two or more universals, grounding the truth of empirical generalisations over all their instances. Tropes cannot account for this generality, and are unsuitable to provide the required unity to the variety of cases to which the law applies.

Armstrong is an immanent, Aristotelian realist about universals, holding that only exemplified universals exist. This sets him apart from Peter Forrest (1986), one of his pupils, and John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter (1990), his colleagues in Melbourne, who believe in unexemplified universals as well. While Forrest wants unexemplified universals to do the work of unactualised possibilities, Bigelow and Pargetter use them to provide an ontology for mathematics. Another exchange with Forrest, Bigelow and Pargetter concerns the thorny topic of structured universals, like being a methane molecule. Structural universals provide structure to the particulars that exemplify them, and are composed out of simpler universals in some non-mereological way. The structural universal being a methane molecule, for example, contains the universal being a hydrogen molecule four times over. While Lewis (1986a) rejects non-mereological composition as unintelligible, Armstrong (1986), Forrest (1986a), Bigelow (1986), and Bigelow and Pargetter (1989) accept it, Armstrong (1989: 42) accepting it for states of affairs as well.

Against C. B. Martin (1993), Brian Ellis (2001), and George Molnar (2003), another opponent in the Sydney troubles, Armstrong deploys the truthmaker argument against ungrounded dispositions: dispositional properties need categorical bases. If ‘to say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if submerged anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water’ (Ryle 1949: 125), ascriptions of solubility and especially of causal powers to soluble things need actual, categorical truthmakers; in this sense, solubility is derivative from, and depends on, its categorical basis, the molecular structure of soluble things. Armstrongian universals are categorical: they characterise how things
Universals

actually are, not how they would be under non-actual circumstances (see, for discussion, Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996).

Apart from powers, two other classes of universals have been intensively discussed recently, primarily though not exclusively between Australian philosophers: quantities and vectors. Mass universals, for example, resemble each other. Armstrong (1978: 120–7, 1989a: 105–6) accounts for this resemblance in terms of mass universals sharing constituents: however, as Pautz (1997) and Eddon (2007) have argued, this account has serious problems. As an alternative, Bigelow (1988) and Bigelow and Pargetter (1989) have defended a relational account of quantities (cf. also Armstrong 1988), but the issue remains very much alive today (see Nolan 2008 for some other problems concerning quantitative universals).

Vectors present another set of problems. The directionality of vectorial universals raises the question whether or not they can be intrinsic (Robinson 1989). If some universals are vectorial and vectorial universals are identical only if their directions are the same, then it is unclear when two vectorial universals exemplified in a curved space are identical (Forrest 1990; see also Weatherson 2006b and the contributions to the special issue of dialectica 2009(4) for some other problems involving vectorial universals).

Together, these philosophers have made and still make the problem of universals a very much Australian topic, offering us a discussion that lives up to the highest standards of rigour of our discipline, thus living up to Armstrong’s dictum that ‘philosophy is not meant to be easy’ (2004: 117).
Philosophy as an autonomous department of Victoria University of Wellington was established in 1952 with George Hughes as its inaugural professor. Previously there had been a philosophy presence in the university only because history of philosophy was taught by Henry Hudson. Hudson and Hughes were joined by Michael Hinton and David Londey. Michael Hinton left in mid 1958 and was replaced firstly by David Lloyd Thomas and then by Chris Parkin. David Londey left in 1962 and was replaced by Maxwell J. Cresswell in 1963.

In the years between 1963 and 2000 the department was transformed. The number of staff and students doubled, the range of courses tripled, interdisciplinary connections were established, a steady stream of masters and doctoral theses were awarded and publications increased. This expansion has continued. In 2004 the department moved from the Victorian house on Kelburn Parade, which had been its first home, to Murphy building where it occupies two floors.

By 2000 there were eight tenured positions. These were filled by Nicholas Agar, Ismay Barwell, Ramon Das, Maxwell J. Cresswell, Edwin Mares, Ken Persyck, Jay Shaw and Kim Sterelny. In the interim George Hughes had retired, Chris Parkin had left, and John Bigelow, Tim Dare, Maurice Goldsmith, John Iorns, Gordon Matheson and Shivesh Thakur had held positions for a while. Maurice Goldsmith remained associated with the department as a research fellow and from 2003 was editor of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Between 2000 and 2005 Stuart Brock, Sondra Bacharach, Josh Glasgow, Cei Maslen and Nick Smith were appointed to places in an establishment which had eleven positions in 2007.

In the 1950s and ’60s the range of undergraduate courses was very limited. In the mid 1960s the undergraduate course offering was one two-paper ‘unit’ at introductory level, two papers at second level (epistemology and metaphysics as
one and logic as the other) and at the third level three papers (metaphysics, ethics and history of philosophy). By 2005 the range had increased to enable specialisation in logic, aesthetics, ethics, politics, philosophy of science and biology, or metaphysics and epistemology, but not history of philosophy, which had almost disappeared from the curriculum.

In 2005 there were six introductory level courses, eleven at second level and thirteen at third level. The range of topics offered reflected the diverse interests of the staff. For example, the 200-level courses included Indian Philosophy, Feminist Theory, Ethics and Genetics, Ethics and Social Evolution, Contemporary Political Theory, Irrationality, Philosophy of Literature, Philosophy of Language, Logic and Computation and a Special Topic which, in 2005 was Society, Power and Knowledge. A wide range of course was also offered at Honours level. The extent of this range was possible because some second and third level courses and some third level and Honours courses were taught together and courses alternated. For example, in 2005 students were able to take Philosophy of Literature as either a 200-level or 300-level course and Philosophy of Literature was replaced in 2006 with Philosophy of Popular Art and Culture. In the same year students could take Alternative Realities as a 300-level or Honours course.

During the 1970s, ’80s and ’90s interdisciplinary links were established with several other departments. The connections with the departments of Politics, Women’s Studies, Mathematics and Linguistics were the most extensively developed and continued to exist into the new millennium. Courses which could be included as part of a degree specialising in either Politics, or Philosophy or Women’s Studies began to be taught in the 1980s and were still being taught in 2007. During the 1970s and ’80s a fortnightly logic seminar was held and in 2006 Edwin Mares with Robert Goldblatt (Mathematics) and Neil Lesley (Computer Studies) developed an Honours program in logic and computation.

In the mid 1960s an Honours program in philosophy involved five papers, to be chosen from a range of six or seven and completed in one year. By 2000 Honours required only four papers, which could be taken part-time over four years and were chosen out of a range of seven or eight in any one year. These included a research essay of about 10,000 words and a supervised reading course which enabled a student to follow a specific interest. Until 2000 in any one year there were seldom more than five Honours students, two or three M.A. students and one Ph.D. student enrolled. In 2008 there are fifteen Honours students and seventeen thesis students enrolled. Moreover, as well as those who have joined the postgraduate program at Victoria, many graduates from the standard Honours and the specialist logic and computation program have gone on to pursue postgraduate research at universities in the U.S. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Rutgers, North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Stanford), Britain (Cambridge), Australia (Australian National University), Japan (University of Tokyo) and Holland (University of Amsterdam).

The publication in 1968 of Introduction to Modal Logic, which was the product of a collaboration between Maxwell J. Cresswell and George Hughes, was not
the first book published by members of the department, but it is one of the most significant. With this book the tiny department acquired an international reputation. The first book was George Hughes and David Londey’s *Elements of Formal Logic*. When Hughes retired Cresswell became the sole professor. Cresswell produced a steady stream of articles and books—the most widely read being *Introduction to Modal Logic* and its successor in 1979, *New Introduction to Modal Logic*, again with George Hughes. *Logics and Languages* was published in 1973 and *Structured Meanings* in 1985 (1985b). Cresswell left the department in 2000 but has remained associated as emeritus professor.

The publication by Edwin Mares of a succession of articles and a book *Relevant Logic* shows that the department continued to be a centre of excellence in logic. In addition, it became a centre of excellence in philosophy of science, metaphysics, and political, moral and aesthetic theory. This is demonstrated by the following examples of published research in these areas.

In *The Representational Theory of Mind*, Kim Sterelny defended a physicalist account of the mind and in *Sex and Death*, he and Paul Griffiths discuss issues in evolutionary biology. In 2003 Sterelny received the Jean Nicod prize for *Thought in a Hostile World*. Sterelny has edited *Biology and Philosophy* since 2002 and with Robert Wilson he is the co-editor of the MIT series, *Life and Mind*. In Joshua Glasgow’s article, ‘On the New Biology of Race’, he debates the biological reality of race.

In *Nonexistent Objects* Ken Perszyk follows Meinong about objects of thought which do not exist. Stuart Brock has made a significant contribution to the understanding of fictionalism with articles such as ‘Fictionalism about Fictional Characters’ and with *Realism and Antirealism*, which he co-authored with Edwin Mares. Cei Maslen’s interest in causation and conditionals is expressed in ‘Counterfactuals as Short Stories’. Jay Shaw has concentrated on comparative philosophy and was co-author of *Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective*.

In *Life’s Intrinsic Value* Nicholas Agar discusses ethical issues arising from the new genetics. In *Liberal Eugenics* his focus is the limits of procreative freedom. In 1999 Maurice Goldsmith’s edition of Bernard Mandeville’s *By a Society of Ladies* was published. Others have had articles on normative issues published in anthologies and scholarly journals. Sondra Bacharach’s ‘Towards a Metaphysical Historicism’ won the Fisher memorial prize in 2003. Ismay Barwell’s interests in aesthetics and feminist philosophy are represented by ‘Who’s Telling This Story Anyway?’ In ‘Virtue Ethics and Right Action’ Ramon Das evaluates the claims of virtue ethics.

In 2008, philosophy is a considerable presence in Victoria University of Wellington because of its significant contribution to undergraduate teaching and to the university’s research profile through its postgraduate program and staff publications.
Virtue Ethics

Daniel Russell

Virtue ethics is a species of normative ethics in which the concept of virtue is central to the account of rightness. It is one of the three major approaches to normative ethics in contemporary philosophy (alongside consequentialist and deontological theories), with roots in ancient Greek philosophy. Australasia is home to some of the chief contributors to contemporary virtue ethics, particularly (in alphabetical order) Rosalind Hursthouse, Justin Oakley, and Christine Swanton.

Rosalind Hursthouse is professor of philosophy at the University of Auckland. Like her mentors Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot, Hursthouse has been a pioneer of modern virtue ethics, devoting herself mainly to demonstrating the practical value of virtue ethics, something several early critics of virtue ethics had insisted was impossible. Especially noteworthy in this respect is Hursthouse’s article ‘Virtue Theory and Abortion’ (1991), where she argued that whereas most discussions of abortion focus on rights to make decisions regarding the foetus, virtue ethics observes that a decision made within one’s rights could still be callous, say, or cowardly. Such decisions, she argued, would be ethically problematic and potentially devastating for those making them, whatever the status of the foetus and the reproductive rights of women. Hursthouse’s emphasis on the practical nature of virtue ethics is also evident in her books Beginning Lives (1987) and Ethics, Humans, and Other Animals (2000), as well as in numerous articles. Hursthouse’s work is deeply grounded in the history of philosophy and especially in Aristotle’s ethics, on which she has written extensively. However, Hursthouse’s greatest single contribution to modern virtue ethics is her book On Virtue Ethics (1999). This book explores the structure of virtue ethics as a distinctive action-guiding theory, the relationship between virtue, the emotions and moral motivation, and the place of the virtues within an overall account of human flourishing. On Virtue Ethics also expands her well-known formulation of right action in terms of what a virtuous person would characteristically do. Hursthouse is the world’s best-known virtue ethicist working today.

Australian philosopher Justin Oakley is Associate Professor, Director of the Centre for Human Bioethics, and Deputy Head of the School of Philosophy and Bioethics at Monash University. Oakley’s research focusses on applied virtue ethics, particularly in bioethics and ethics for medical professionals. In addition to his many articles, his chief contribution to virtues-based professional ethics is his book Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles (2001), co-authored with Dean Cocking (Australian Defence Force Academy) and a leading book in the field of applied virtue ethics. This book focusses on the role of virtues in the relationships
of professionals with clients, arguing that virtue ethics offers a compelling understanding of such issues as professional detachment and integrity. In an earlier book, *Morality and the Emotions* (1992), Oakley defended the Aristotelian thesis that moral goodness requires not only acting well but also having appropriate emotions about the right things and in the right way, and that virtue ethics is in a particularly good position to accommodate such a thesis.

New Zealander Christine Swanton is retired from philosophy at the University of Auckland, where she continues to lecture. Swanton’s chief contribution to modern virtue ethics is her book *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View* (2003). Swanton understands a virtue to be a disposition of character to respond in a sufficiently appropriate way to those things with which it is characteristically concerned; an action is right when it is the or a best action with respect to the ‘target’ of a virtue (e.g. making others feel welcome is a target of the virtue of kindness). Modern virtue ethics has typically focussed on Aristotelian ethics and psychology, but Swanton also draws on a variety of other sources, including Kant, Nietzsche, and the mental health literature. Her view of the appropriate responses characteristic of virtues draws heavily upon the idea of psychological strength, and she argues that aspiring to a degree of virtue beyond one’s psychological strength can be both psychologically and morally ruinous. Accordingly, Swanton eschews idealised accounts of the virtues, and does not define right action in terms of the virtuous person. These themes also connect with her many papers on satisficing in normative ethics, the relation between virtue and psychological strength, and the virtue theories of Nietzsche and Hume. Swanton’s recent work has expanded into *applied ethics*, focussing on the relation between the virtues of character and virtues associated with particular professional roles.
The foundation professor of philosophy, A. J. (Jim) Baker, was appointed in 1965 and, with the arrival of Geoff Reid and Alan Olding, philosophy was taught at the University of Waikato for the first time in 1966. In fact, 1966 was the first year of teaching at the university generally, although a few subjects had been taught in the Hamilton branch of the University of Auckland since 1960. Rudi Ziedins replaced Jim Baker as professor in 1969. By 1971 the complement of philosophy lecturers was five and it remained at that level until 1992 when it grew to six, and it has remained about six to seven since then. The third professor was Ben Gibbs, who held the chair from 1992 to 2002. In 2001 the Religious Studies Programme joined the department, which was reflected in the new name of the department in the Calendar from 2005. By the 1990s the university practice was that a chairperson in a department need not be a professor. Since the departure of Rudi Ziedins, there have been various chairpersons and acting chairpersons: Ben Gibbs, David Lumsden, Alastair Gunn, Tracy Bowell and Douglas Pratt.

Up until 1993, all the lecturing staff were male, but the appointment of Tracy Bowell in that year was the start of the feminisation of the department, which has continued so that currently four-and-a-half of the six-and-a-half philosophy lecturing positions are held by women, an unusual statistic. Many of the staff have come from overseas, as their degrees largely make clear, with staff originating from Australia, Hong Kong, Latvia (Rudi Ziedins), South Africa, U.K., U.S. and Yugoslavia, as well as New Zealand.

Over the years, members of the department have become known for their commitments and principles. Jim Baker, while still in Sydney, had been part of 'the Sydney Push', a group with a libertarian orientation. In the early days of the University of Waikato, he became well known for the lively expression of his ideas.
Professor Ben Gibbs took public stands against two vice-chancellors, against one over pronunciation (‘collegial’ does not have a hard ‘g’, as the word derives from ‘college’) and against another on a graver matter, the ‘Kupka affair’, which concerned a neo-Nazi student at the University. Mane Hajdin spoke out against aspects of ‘political correctness’ and also addressed matters of pronunciation, defending in the university newsletter the use of an English pronunciation of ‘Waikato’.

**The Teaching Curriculum**

The undergraduate curriculum has been largely typical of a department with an analytic focus, covering logic, the philosophy of science, epistemology and metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, ethics, and some other areas from time to time such as the philosophy of law and aesthetics. One point of difference, though, has been the early introduction by Alastair Gunn of courses in applied ethics. The first of these was Social and Moral Philosophy, first introduced in 1976. This was followed later by Environmental Ethics, Ethics in War and Peace and Business and Professional Ethics. Liezl van Zyl and Ruth Walker as well as Al Gunn currently teach in the area of ethics.

The department has had a special relationship with the School of Computing and Mathematical Sciences since its inception, and this has involved some joint teaching of logic and contributions to programs such as ‘Artificial Intelligence’. From this department’s side Edwin Hung led that involvement, along with David Lumsden and more recently Cathy Legg, who has an IT background. The teaching of critical reasoning has been an important part of the undergraduate curriculum in recent years. This began in 1996 when Gary Kemp and Tracy Bowell trialled a course in the area in summer school. This became a regular part of the curriculum and led to their jointly authored textbook (Bowell and Kemp 2005), which is soon to have a third edition. While Gary Kemp left all too soon, we now have Justine Kingsbury who has a particular interest in that area and who shares the teaching with Tracy Bowell.

From 2000, Ruth Walker, Alastair Gunn and a computer savvy graduate student, Tery Hardwicke, started to develop the internet as a mode of delivery of courses. The department now offers a range of courses delivered through the internet at first and second-year levels. Some occurrences of these courses take place in summer school and these have proved particularly popular. Another distinctive part of the undergraduate teaching program is a version of Social and Moral Philosophy which is offered to high school students. This was initiated, in a slightly different form, in 2000 by Alastair Gunn in conjunction with Marg Coldham-Fussell from Religious Studies and Tery Hardwicke. Students take this course not only from Hamilton but also from further afield. There is a backbone of internet provision which is supplemented by face to face teaching at a frequency depending on the size of the class and proximity.
Research

In 2006 Philosophy at Waikato scored a PBRF (Performance-Based Research Fund) rating of 4.5 (on a weighted basis). Though not as stellar as some Philosophy Departments in New Zealand, this is well above average both for the faculty and the university, indeed higher than the average score of any university in New Zealand. Research areas have been various. Ethics, both applied ethics and ethical theory, has been prominent. This includes work by Alastair Gunn on environmental ethics and engineering ethics in particular (including Gunn and Vesilind 2003), and Liezl van Zyl’s work (including Van Zyl 2000). Mane Hajdin during his time in the department worked both on ethical theory (notably in Hajdin 1993) and on applied ethics, including the topic of sexual harassment. Gary Kemp published in aesthetics as does Justine Kingsbury.

Philosophy of science, the area of the long-serving Edwin Hung, has also been prominent, represented notably by Hung (2006). Various members of the department over the years have researched in the contemporary analytic areas of language, mind, epistemology and metaphysics. These include Rudi Ziedins, Geoff Reid, David Lumsden, Tracy Bowell, Gary Kemp, Cathy Legg and Justine Kingsbury.

There has not been a great emphasis in the department on historical figures within philosophy, but Ben Gibbs’ work on Plato provides an exception. Also we might include under this heading Tracy Bowell’s work on Wittgenstein and Cathy Legg’s work on Charles Sanders Peirce.

Research in the philosophy of religion brings into focus elements of the Religious Studies Programme, notably the work of Douglas Pratt, including papers on aspects of philosophical theology (e.g. Pratt 2002), together with work on interfaith issues (as exemplified by Pratt 2005). Ruth Walker has also published on the philosophy of religion.

The department has seen the successful completion of a diverse range of philosophy doctorates: Ron Smith, Alastair Gunn, Stephen Foulds, Rosemary de Luca, Tery Hardwicke, and Mark Smith, with Mashitoh Yaacob’s currently under examination.

Moving On

After the first few years of the department, which saw the return of Jim Baker and Alan Olding to Australia, there was not a great turnover of staff, but there have been some departures. Brian Lawrence left for the U.K. Gary Kemp left to join the University of Glasgow. He has continued to publish work in the philosophy of language, twentieth-century analytic philosophy and aesthetics (including Kemp 2006). Mane Hajdin, who left to go to San Francisco, has continued to work in moral philosophy and to teach in various institutions in the area.

Some of our students moved on to doctoral study overseas. Megan-Jane Johnstone received a doctorate from La Trobe University and is currently professor of nursing at RMIT University, Melbourne. Patrick Blackburn proceeded to a Masters at the University of Sussex and a doctorate at the University of
Edinburgh and is currently research director at INRIA, France’s national organisation for research in computer science. Michael Fleming received a Ph.D. from the University of British Columbia and now teaches philosophy at Capilano College in British Columbia. David Rodin was awarded a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University, where he took a B.Phil. and then a D.Phil. and now pursues his philosophical career at Oxford University and the Australian National University (ANU). Lee Churchman and Stephanie Gibbons pursued doctorates at the University of Toronto and Lee currently teaches philosophy in Seoul. Andrew Jorgensen’s doctorate was from Temple University and he currently holds a postdoctoral position at Trinity College, Dublin. Kelly Roe is currently working on a doctorate at the ANU. Other students have pursued doctoral study elsewhere in New Zealand.

Western Australia, University of

Stewart Candlish

The University of Western Australia (UWA), situated in the state capital of Perth, began teaching in 1913. Although the eight foundation chairs were mostly in modern utilitarian disciplines, philosophy (joined with psychology, as was then common practice) was taught from the start, with the appointment of P. R. Le Couteur, an Australian Rhodes Scholar, as lecturer in mental and moral philosophy. Le Couteur had studied under Otto Külpe and Karl Bühler in Bonn; he later claimed to have established the first experimental course in psychology in Australia, while somehow managing also to be the university’s foundation lecturer in French and German. The departments of Psychology and Philosophy, formally separated in 1930, were still yoked together in a ‘School of Philosophy and Psychology’ as late as 1951.

In charge of the teaching of philosophy from his initial appointment in 1921 until his retirement in 1960 was a pupil of Francis Anderson from Sydney, A. C. Fox, who was eventually appointed to the university’s first chair of philosophy in 1945. By modern standards, Fox published comparatively little (though occasional articles can be found in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy from the 1920s to 1950); rather, he was a wide-ranging scholar, a tireless and principled contributor to the running of the university and the intellectual life of its student body, and a champion of free thought who frequently incurred the displeasure of political worthies. Illustrations of his willingness to perform valuable but thankless tasks are his compilation of the first consolidated index to the AJP and, more controversially, his three years as visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Tasmania, to keep the subject alive there during the period when
the chair was under black ban from the Australasian Association of Philosophy because of the sacking of Sydney Sparkes Orr.

Fox’s successor in the chair was S. A. Grave, after the initial appointee, George Hughes, returned promptly to New Zealand following a brief exposure to one of Perth’s fiercer summers. Grave’s first book, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, despite its dispiriting title, brought him an international reputation and helped to revive serious interest in the philosophy of Thomas Reid, while a subsequent article on Berkeley became a standard reference. Among his later books, A History of Philosophy in Australia is most relevant in this context, containing a wealth of information unavailable elsewhere. No academic politician, Grave was fortunate to head his department during a period when universities were expanding. He led by example: a man of iron self-discipline, he carried a teaching load usually heavier than those of his colleagues, and combined in discussion a gentleness of manner with a formidable learning and knack for posing questions that often seemed naive but usually went to the heart of the matter.

At this period, decisions on appointments (except for chairs) were effectively made within departments. For a number of reasons, among them the fact that the department rarely appointed its own graduates, the Philosophy Department was insulated from the various enthusiasms that from time to time had gripped its eastern counterparts, and as a result its appointments and its teaching remained free of the philosophical and (more damagingly) political commitments that produced various kinds of conflict and decay elsewhere.

Despite the need, felt very strongly in what was then the state’s sole university, to cover as wide a range as possible in its teaching, appointments were typically made by picking the best person regardless of speciality and adjusting the responsibilities of existing staff to fit. As a result, the modestly-sized department had a surprising proportion of people whose impact was more than local. Appointed during the Fox era was R. L. Franklin, a former lawyer, author of the well-reviewed book Freewill and Determinism, who took up the chair of philosophy at the University of New England. From the same period, and well known locally for his contributions to art criticism, was Patrick Hutchings, who, as Brian de Garis remarked (1988: 238), ‘more than any of his colleagues fulfilled lay expectations of how a philosopher should look and behave’ (and eventually took this demeanour to a new post at Deakin University). Of those appointed during the Grave era, the best known for a while was Julius Kovesi, whose book Moral Notions, published in the influential Routledge series, Studies in Philosophical Psychology, received an extremely enthusiastic Critical Notice in Mind. For a time it looked as if the book might overthrow the then dominant paradigm in moral philosophy, but Kovesi never followed it up and it is now almost—albeit undeservedly—forgotten. (Though his idiosyncrasies are not: for example, he had unusual opinions about Plato’s Forms; faced at a conference with the challenge that Aristotle, who had after all attended the Academy, had a different view, he responded by saying that the Academy’s curriculum was diverse, and he believed that Aristotle must have left immediately after the dancing.) Then there
was George Seddon who, after gaining a Ph.D. in geology while lecturing in the English Department, joined the Philosophy Department as senior lecturer in history and philosophy of science. Although his publications in philosophy were few (notably a very original essay on logical possibility), Seddon was quickly snapped up by the University of New South Wales as professor of history and philosophy of science, before his appointment as Director of the Centre for Environmental Studies at the University of Melbourne, thus leaving philosophy behind and making full-time his commitment to the field for which he is now remembered and which brought him many awards including membership of the Order of Australia.

Among others appointed during Grave’s tenure of the chair were Stewart Candlish, who became an explorer of the early history of analytical philosophy and went on to be the first member of the department to be elected Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities and editor of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy; R. E. Ewin, who produced a string of stylishly written and compellingly argued books on moral philosophy from 1981 onwards; J. B. Maund, a colossally hard-working colleague now well known internationally for his work on perception; and B. H. Slater, who published voluminously in logic and aesthetics and became an advocate of the merits of Hilbert’s epsilon calculus. Eventually the best known by far, however, was Graham Priest, whose notorious defence of dialetheism was first developed systematically at UWA. A string of articles in distinguished journals was followed by his first book, In Contradiction; the difficulty he experienced in finding a publisher (now documented in the book’s second edition, published by a press that had rejected the first) showed that philosophers are just as resistant as anyone else to taking seriously a well-argued case for radical change. Priest left in 1989 to take up the chair of philosophy at the University of Queensland.

Departing around the same time was Michael Tooley, who had replaced Grave as professor of philosophy. Tooley’s appointment, because of the position he had taken in his book Abortion and Infanticide, provoked some local Catholic hostility. He turned out to be no Herod, but rather an agreeable and co-operative colleague whose next book, Causation: A Realist Approach, was a seminal work in the area, still constantly cited. Temporary appointments to cover Tooley’s departure included Scott Shalkowski, who moved on to a much sought-after position at Leeds, and Michael P. Levine, who stayed, eventually reaching the rank of Professor and becoming well known for a long book on pantheism. Tooley’s successor in the chair was Andrew Brennan, who stayed for a very active fourteen years, publishing and editing extensively in environmental ethics, before moving to La Trobe University.

Over this period the department had broadened and strengthened its teaching, and had been regularly sending well educated and highly talented Honours graduates into postgraduate places both overseas and ‘over east’. Nevertheless, there remained a sharp tapering of numbers from first year onwards, and this long-
standing but financially unprofitable student enrolment profile became a cause of difficulty in more straitened times.

The trouble began with the foundation of Murdoch University in the mid 1970s. Government policy decreed that growth at UWA should be restricted until Murdoch had reached a viable size. As Murdoch’s courses were mostly in the arts and sciences, UWA reduced its intake in those areas. When combined with a series of internal restructures and, most significantly, various federal government measures from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s, these pressures eventually produced budgetary crises across the humanities, which in Philosophy were exacerbated by an absurd but damaging quarrel between two senior members of the Department, whose effects were still felt ten years later. Across Australia, Departments were abolished and their members collectivised into Schools. Philosophy at UWA, despite growing enrolments, reached a low point in both morale and staff numbers before the situation stabilised. At the time of writing, a largely fresh generation of staff has brought prospects of renewal.

Wittgenstein in the Antipodes

Graeme Marshall

Wittgenstein’s philosophy first became known beyond Cambridge through the publication (in English) in 1922 of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which was widely received without much doubt as a work of genius but also, apart from the Vienna Circle, without much real comprehension. It was reviewed in the first volume of the Australian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy (June 1923) with little comment but the right quotations.

In 1912 on Frege’s suggestion Wittgenstein left Vienna to study logic with Bertrand Russell. Ten years later, which included service during World War One, the Tractatus appeared. In the Preface Wittgenstein wrote: ‘the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems’ (1974: 4). Whereupon he left Cambridge and philosophy. He was just thirty years of age.

That was no boast. He believed he had shown how to secure the bounds of sense for any possible sentence of any language. Beyond the bounds was nonsense in thought and word; without them meaning could not be definitely determined at all and therefore must remain unacceptably vague. That consequence was to be avoided by finding, first, a logically isomorphic unmediated relation between the words of elementary sentences of a defined form—atomic propositions—and the states of affairs or facts in the world those propositions pictured; and
then reducing by truth-functional analysis the sentences of ordinary language to logical combinations of elementary sentences.

During the next seven years, however, flaws began to show themselves and Wittgenstein’s doubts grew to match the breadth, scope and profundity Russell had remarked on in the *Tractatus*. The elementary sentences were concatenations of names for irreducibly simple objects, which remained unidentified, and how in any case could names name anything *ab initio*? Did analysis preserve the meaning and truth of what we say in ordinary language? Was it even possible to subject *any* ordinary language sentence to such analytical reduction? This was a theory of meaning only for factual sentences, so what of others such as those expressing judgements of value or belief? What of the very sentences of the *Tractatus* itself which are not factual at all?

Wittgenstein had not ignored these and other difficulties, but his attempt to solve them by means of the distinction between what can properly be *said* and what is thereby *shown* and not said, left much more to be said which, given the theory, seemed already bound to be senseless. He saw this too. He concludes:

> My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (Wittgenstein 1974: 89, sect. 6.54)

But his beautiful tower was too fragile for the rough ground of real life. As he told his students later, philosophy required one always to be prepared to begin again from scratch when problems persisted despite one’s best efforts to solve them. This he himself did after trying different moves which only turned out to be mere shibboleths.

In 1929 he returned to Cambridge, feeling able to do creative work again, and in 1933 began giving classes on what became known as his later philosophy. This is what was brought to Australia and New Zealand by those who had attended his classes and who came, or came back, as it happened, to Melbourne in Australia and Wellington in New Zealand.

**Wittgenstein in Australia**

Most influential among them were Douglas Gasking and A. C. (‘Camo’) Jackson. They later wrote a joint obituary when Wittgenstein died in 1951, where they stated:

In the last twenty or so years of his life Wittgenstein turned his back on the *Tractatus* and went on to produce and to teach at Cambridge a whole new way of philosophising. None of this later work has been published. Yet its effect on Australasian and American philosophy and its enormous effect on philosophy in Britain is apparent to anyone familiar with it who compares the
Wittgenstein in the Antipodes

sort of thing philosophers used to write twenty years ago with what very many of them write today. It is perhaps even more evident if one compares the technique of oral discussion then and now. (Gasking and Jackson 1951: 73)

They also note a not uncommon response:

The considerable difficulty in following the lectures arose from the fact that it was hard to see where all this often rather repetitive concrete detailed talk was leading to—how the examples were interconnected and how all this bore on the problem which one was accustomed to put to oneself in abstract terms. (Gasking and Jackson 1951: 75)

The first to come with the new work was George Paul. He and Gasking had attended Wittgenstein’s classes during the years before World War Two and had been much influenced by them. Paul’s impact was remarkable, not just within the Department of Philosophy but also in the Department of History and the University of Melbourne in general. One can hear his infectious excitement coming through a lecture he gave later about Wittgenstein:

Philosophy is not just any description of uses of language, however extensive, various, and exact … The very nature of philosophical investigation compels a man to travel over a wide region of uses, criss-cross in every direction, the same use being approached again and again, each time from a different direction, from a different point of view, from a different use. These various sketches do not of themselves fall together to form a picture, or even a map, of a place or region; they have to be arranged ‘so that if you looked at them you could get a picture’ of the landscape there, and so to some extent get to ‘know your way about’. ‘Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases.’ Only by this finding, inventing, and arranging of views, not by an inactive observation of all equally that happens to come before my eye, do I get to know my way about … Here is why Wittgenstein presents no method in philosophy; there is no method for inventing cases, no method for arranging them. And there is no method for ‘being struck by’ one fact rather than another. (1956: 94–6)

Stephen Toulmin sums up well those Pauline times. He writes:

Through a coincidence of two distinct historical accidents, the Philosophy Department at the University of Melbourne, in the 1940s, was the focus of a vigorous conversation and a great place to be drawn into the traditions of philosophical literature and debate. This conversation began early in World War II, with the arrival from Cambridge of a newly appointed lecturer in philosophy. This was George Paul … Who were George Paul’s students at Melbourne?
... at the core, was a group of Germans and Austrians who had chanced to go to Australia at the height of the war, having first been interned in Britain as ‘a threat to national security’ and later deported to get them out of the way. The fact that many of them were from Jewish families and had well-established records as anti-Nazis, was not enough to save them from being deported—or, as we might say with greater historical resonance, ‘transported’. Reaching Australia, the internees were initially taken to a camp far inland, at Hay, in Western New South Wales. But, after a while, it was so clear that they could do no harm that they were allowed to move to Melbourne and resume normal civilian lives. There—among others from Europe—Kurt Baier and Gerd Buchdahl, Peter Herbst and later David Falk from London, found themselves working in the Melbourne philosophy department along with such Australian-born students as Camo Jackson, Don Gunner, Bruce Benjamin, Michael Scriven, and Alan Donagan. They were exposed to the impact of ‘analytical’ philosophy in its most vigorous, original and creative stage. (1993: 143–4)

Paul left in 1945 for a fellowship at Oxford and Gasking came to Melbourne as his replacement. Gasking used to describe himself as an old Bolshevik Wittgensteinian: he was there at the beginning of the revolution when the move from simples to samples was made and the exploration of the manifold consequences begun. The meaning of words was not to be secured by their reduction to an absolutely determinate relation between simple symbols and simple logical pictures of possible worldly states of affairs, all not further analysable, but by sampling their deployment in ordinary sentences used in a great variety of familiar states of affairs by people at home in the world talking in one way and another in the natural course of lives.

Everyone, colleagues and students alike, remarked upon Gasking’s clarity, directness and lucidity. The activity of philosophy was carried on almost entirely by discussion, seldom solemn because it was vigorous, positively co-operative, and with no room for grandstanding. This is the change in oral discussion noted by Gasking and Jackson in their obituary. It also partly explains the want of publications. If in following Wittgenstein one is constantly trying to grasp the proliferation of relations between particulars in an expanding world without the false certainty of philosophical theories, and at the same time keeping the size of conceptual families manageable, surveyable, then without Wittgenstein’s genius one’s work is going to be frustratingly incomplete. The strong temptation nonetheless to declare completion is irresistible only for the faint-hearted. Gasking never left behind the importance and illumination of particular cases.

There were agreeable enough battles, of course, especially with the Sydney Andersonians. Gasking published an article, ‘Anderson and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: An Essay in Philosophical Translation’, in the 1949 Australasian Journal of Philosophy. The article may have been written evangelistically, but
Gasking’s concern was genuine that terminological differences between the *Tractatus* and philosophers in Sydney might make it difficult for them to grasp fully its ‘philosophically illuminating’ doctrines. He wanted serious discussion but regrettably failed to achieve it.

Jackson had dropped out of the university when he first met Paul, who forthwith encouraged him to return, which he did, and then completed his Honours degree, went to Cambridge where he embarked on a Ph.D. and attended Wittgenstein’s classes. Towards the end of the 1940s he returned to the University of Melbourne with his wife, Ann, both to positions in the philosophy department. Grave (1984: 82) wrote:

> Though he published nothing, A. C. Jackson was to become one of the most influential philosophers in Australia. His reputation was carried abroad, and in 1958 he gave the John Locke Lectures at Oxford. Of all philosophers in Australia, he most conveyed a sense of the complexity of philosophy, and it was largely his own sense of this complexity that held him back from publication. He was ‘the great technician’, in the words of one of his former students. He worked minutely, conscious at the same time of vast problems such as that of the connection of thought and reality (‘A very curious connection it is, because you can’t crash through the symbol’).

Jackson’s total attention to fine particulars and their significance in what absorbed him was part of the deeply satisfying pleasure, no matter how hard won, he both derived from the activity in play and gave to those with whom he was sharing it. **D. M. Armstrong**, who attended as many did Jackson’s seminars at the end of the 1950s, caught well his effect. He observed that Jackson ‘was oracular and obscure. But in his famous Philosophical Psychology seminar, the effort of understanding him, and the effort he put into understanding others, acted as a philosophical catalyst for generations of Melbourne philosophy students’ (Armstrong 1983a: 95). Much of that effort for both Jackson and his students went into finding and seeing the significance of the cases that filled the gaps intermediate between where he and they began and where he had got to. ‘Catalyst’ is good; he very much wanted his students to remain independent of mind and worked hard to enable them to be so while helping them avoid pitfalls, blind alleys, simplistic solutions and superficialities.

The difference between Gasking and Jackson perhaps comes down to this: using the distinction between saying and showing, which in all Wittgenstein’s thought ‘stood fast’ for him though under a variety of interpretations, Gasking said how things stood when expounding his thinking while Jackson showed it. It may be that each condition is necessary for the possibility of the other; the difference is where in any particular case the emphasis rests. Through both Gasking and Jackson, Wittgenstein’s influence was felt in Australia under each aspect.
Wittgenstein in New Zealand

Wittgenstein’s influence in New Zealand began when George Hughes took the newly established chair of philosophy at the Victoria University of Wellington in 1951. J. N. Findlay, professor of philosophy at the University of Otago, was well placed much earlier to introduce his colleagues and students to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, having visited Wittgenstein several times and attended his classes, but it appears he did not do so, either positively or negatively. His ‘transports’ remained unshared. As he put it in the introduction to his Wittgenstein: A Critique,

"It will be plain to readers of this book that I am deeply critical of almost anything Wittgenstein said on almost any topic whatsoever. I have, in fact, systematically used him to climb on to contrary, rather traditional opinions, which have seemed to me truer and better. But without the stimulus of his teaching I should not have arrived at these contrary opinions at all, nor at my general view of metaphysics as being quite fairly describable as the most exciting and richly various of all language-games. (1984: 20)"

George Hughes had attended Wittgenstein’s last classes. Michael Hinton was Hughes’ first appointment and arrived two years after him, coming from Cambridge where he had been doing his Ph.D. under John Wisdom’s supervision. Wisdom had been elected to the chair after Wittgenstein and then von Wright had resigned. It was a happy coming together. Hughes soon instituted for interested students, in addition to set courses, readings of Wisdom’s Other Minds (1952). Wisdom’s philosophical writing is inimitable. The philosophy owes much to Wittgenstein, as he acknowledges, and it is Wittgenstein most profitably mediated by his own sparkling insights and understanding, orderings and interpretations, backed by his well-honed erudition.

This was an excellent introduction to Wittgenstein’s philosophical style and ideas. It used to be said in Cambridge that if you wanted to understand what Wittgenstein meant, then ask Wisdom (and if you wanted to understand what Wisdom meant, then ask Renford Bambrough). With Hinton to help, the results were quick in coming. It became second nature, for example, to be immediately wary of any philosophical theory and to be alert to the issues very likely being dodged, principally where, beyond the theory, was to be found its justification. The significance of particular cases was paramount. Wisdom explained that Wittgenstein’s ‘substitution of “ask for the use” for “ask for the meaning” is linked with the procedure of explaining meaning by presenting not a definition but cases, and not one case but cases and cases. And this is linked with dealing with the philosophical, metaphysical, can’t by presenting cases and cases’ (Wisdom 1967: 47).

But Wisdom (1952: 18–19) had also said assumingly that after working through such complexities and achieving the required grasp of the philosophical problems in question, one would find that their answers became matters for decision or cheerful indecision. Cheerful indecision? And what is the required grasp? Perhaps
it is one’s knowing how to go on from what one can defeasibly conclude from what one can so far survey. Presumably that depends on the content of the defeasance presented, in which case Wisdom’s assurance vanishes into the platitude that all is never done. He did warn us:

It’s this way in metaphysics. Its doctrines are paradoxes when they aren’t plaitudes … Metaphysical questions are paradoxical questions with the peculiarity that they are concerned with the character of questions, of discussions, of reasons, of knowledge. But this peculiarity does not make it impossible to carry through the reflection they call for so as to reveal the character of that with which they are concerned and thus, indirectly, the character of that with which that with which they are concerned is concerned—time and space, good and evil, things and persons. (1952: 258–59)

Within a decade or so of these early times, Michael Hinton had returned to England for a fellowship at Oxford, George Hughes had published two books on logic with two different collaborators, Londey and Cresswell, and continued working on his commentary and translation of John Buridan on self-reference. Logic had become the particular excellence of the Wellington department. Hughes had also managed to manoeuvre his way through the complexities of establishing a chair in theology. With all this it would not be unlikely that, in the best literal sense, there was scarce time for Wittgenstein.

It was much the same in Melbourne. In 1969 Alan Donagan wrote the ‘Introduction’ to Contemporary Philosophy in Australia (edited by R. Brown and C. D. Rollins). He says at one point: ‘As for the Wittgensteinian tradition at Melbourne, superficially it has left no trace in this volume at all. No doubt it has borne fruit … but it has done so like the grain of wheat in the Scriptures, by falling to the ground and dying’ (1969: 17). Perhaps so, but the explanation is probably more general. Wittgenstein’s philosophy was being doubly outflanked: on the left by literary theory, flourishing on the Continent through Derrida and Lacan; and on the right by the reaffirmation of metaphysical theory under American hegemony through especially Quine. It was further confronted head on by burgeoning formal semantics, truth-conditional possible world semantics for natural languages, particularly here in the antipodes through David Lewis, a frequent visitor. There was little time any more for attention to particulars, for close reading from the first, the ‘don’t cares’ from the second, and metaphorical creativity from the third.

Wittgenstein did not dismiss the practical and philosophical significance of generality but only our craving for it. This is the real source of metaphysics, he said, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. Philosophical insights do not come from, and cannot find their proper expression in, any kind of theory (Wittgenstein 1958: 18). Philosophy neither is, nor is like, a science, real, social, or ersatz. Like art and unlike any science, philosophy cannot ignore idiosyncrasies and ought really to be written only as a poetic composition (Wittgenstein
Wisdom tempered this by saying that philosophy is where logic and rhetoric meet. But with the temptations of the new, few here wanted to heed Wittgenstein’s voice. Armstrong echoed the common view when he remarked that Wittgenstein is now a great philosopher in the past, like all the others. Only for the few he was, and is, still singular, and continues to bear fruit.

**Wollongong, University of**

David Simpson

A philosophy department was established at the University of Wollongong in 1975, the same year that the university itself was established as an institution independent of the University of New South Wales. The foundation professor was Lachlan Chipman. Chipman was joined in 1976 by Suzanne Uniacke, and then in 1977 by Laurance Splitter, Barbara Davidson, and Harry Beran.

The University of Wollongong was set up to service the Illawarra region, and the then steel city of Wollongong in particular. To a large extent this defined the early role of the philosophy department. Lecture theatres were often dominated by the blue shirts of BHP trainees; many students were the first in their family to attend university; and for many philosophy was a fairly alien discipline. As the city and the university changed, so has the role of philosophy in the university, becoming more ‘normal’.

Nevertheless, throughout its history, philosophy at the University of Wollongong has shared many of the pressures of similar departments. It has had a significant dependence on service teaching (e.g. ethics for nursing and environmental science students, logic for engineering students), difficulty in attracting postgraduate students, and a university management that was not always sure that philosophy was part of its ‘mission’. And in common with all philosophy departments, it has had to deal with the university’s version of the restructuring enthusiasm. It changed from a department to a stand-alone ‘program’, and then to a program as part of a school.

The program has survived all of this. After dropping from seven established positions down to four, it is now back to six, and appears to have an acknowledged place within the Faculty of Arts and the university. It has, for example, been able to develop a curriculum that is not merely an exercise in crisis management, as was the case around the turn of the century, when reduced staffing and uncertain funding made planning difficult.

The core style of philosophy practiced at the University of Wollongong has been broadly analytic. However, this has not been dogmatic, and there have always been subjects and research interests as exceptions. Furthermore, diversity
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has been encouraged by the many philosophers who have passed through the university on fixed-term contracts.

There has always been a strong emphasis, both in teaching and research, on applied and theoretical ethics, moral psychology, political philosophy, and philosophy of law. Past members of the program have made several contributions in these areas: Sue Uniacke’s work on the intersection of philosophy of law and moral theory, Harry Beran’s discussions of secession, Robert Dunn’s examination of expressivism from within moral psychology, Susan Dodds’ work on selfhood and ethical responsibility, and on the notion of democratic deliberation, and John Burgess’ application of his background in philosophical logic to issues in applied ethics.

These areas continue to be taken up by the recent group of philosophers at the university—by David Neil, Sarah Sorial and Keith Horton. But with the arrival of Richard Menary and Patrick McGivern, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy of language have taken a more significant role in the Program’s research profile.

Women in Philosophy

Moira Gatens

In contrast to Britain and North America, Australasia does not have an official Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP). The British SWIP was formed in 1989 although women philosophers had been meeting informally before then. American SWIP was formed in 1972 and Canadian SWIP in 1990. The Australasian Women in Philosophy (WIP) group does not have office bearers or formal membership. Nevertheless, women in philosophy in Australasia have been holding dedicated annual conferences since the momentous meeting of women in philosophy at La Trobe University in 1982. The single sheet of paper that announces that event is headed ‘Women in Philosophy’. Part of the aim of the meeting was to facilitate discussion among women of the first report on the status of women in the philosophy profession in Australasia (Lloyd et al. 1982). This report was formally tabled at the 1982 Annual General Meeting of the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP), held during the AAP conference that year at La Trobe University. In addition to the discussion of the report, two papers were presented to the women in philosophy meeting. Genevieve Lloyd read a paper entitled ‘Masters, Slaves and Others: Variations on a Theme in Hegel, Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir’ and Denise Russell presented a paper entitled ‘Philosophy, Feminism and Madness’. The women’s meeting decided to hold a two-day conference for women in philosophy the following year at the
Women in Philosophy

University of Adelaide, immediately prior to the AAP conference. The program for that conference was headed ‘Women’s Philosophy Conference’. At the end of the first decade of the Australasian WIP meetings the number of papers presented had jumped from two (at La Trobe in 1982) to twenty-five (in Adelaide in 1993), with typical conference registrations regularly being over 100.

The WIP conference has almost always tracked the venue of the AAP conference to enable women philosophers easily to attend both. Men have never been excluded from attending the WIP conference, but from 1984 the program included the statement: ‘The Women and Philosophy Conference is intended primarily to provide opportunities for women to explore questions and problems that arise from the predominantly male character of professional philosophy. Although men will not be excluded from the sessions, they are asked, if they do attend, to keep this in mind’. In 1987 a further sentence was added to this statement: ‘In discussion, priority will be given to women’.

The WIP meetings played an important role in making philosophy a more welcoming and supportive environment for women philosophers. These occasions provided not only the chance to exchange ideas but also the rare opportunity to receive peer validation for feminist research projects. The annual WIP meeting also began to attract renowned international women philosophers such as Helen Longino (in 1988) and Iris Marion Young (in 1993), whose presence confirmed the growing international reputation of Australasian feminist philosophy. In 1986, a dedicated supplementary issue of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy on feminist philosophy, edited by Janna Thompson, afforded further recognition.

A noteworthy feature of the WIP conferences during the early years is that they were interdisciplinary in character. Those presenting papers included scholars from politics, women’s studies, and literature, as well as philosophers. It was a recurrent theme of the early WIP annual general meetings whether the conference should be named ‘Women in Philosophy’ or ‘Women and Philosophy’. An important question lay behind this apparently trivial distinction, namely, should the conference be primarily for women working in the profession of philosophy (a rather small cohort) or rather should it be conceived as a venue for all women interested in the still emerging field of feminist theory? The complexity of this issue deepens when one takes into account that the distinction between feminist philosophy and feminist theory has not always been a sharp one. The uncertain identity of feminist philosophy was exacerbated by the fact that few professional philosophers took seriously the idea that philosophy was vulnerable to feminist critique and so doubted that there could be a distinctively feminist philosophy. (I recall one senior male philosopher reprovingly announcing that ‘truth has no sex’ and so feminist philosophy must be nonsense.) The problem of the naming of WIP eventually resolved itself as feminist theory in the 1990s became more specialised and conference venues dedicated to feminist research within the various humanities disciplines became more common.

In its first decade, especially, Australasian WIP offered a critical but encouraging context in which typically isolated female postgraduates and academics could
present their research to an audience that was both theoretically informed and appreciative. The associated informal WIP dinners and lunches provided women with an opportunity to discuss issues in a constructive way, including such things as ideas for the content of feminist courses and the particular problems involved in teaching feminism, strategies for dealing with sexism in philosophy, and the sharing of experiences and advice for survival within a predominantly male workplace. The annual conference event allowed women in philosophy to organise for change within the broader philosophical community by, for example, the formation of committees to monitor the gender balance in philosophy departments, to argue for more equitable procedures in appointing processes, and to attempt to increase awareness of the phenomenon of sexual harassment and its damaging effects.

By the 1990s there were indications of a significant shift in attitudes towards feminist research in mainstream philosophy in Australia. The AAP began actively to solicit presentations from women for the annual conference and WIP papers began to appear as a named ‘stream’ within the AAP conference (along with Logic, Ethics, and Political Philosophy). The informal nature of the Australasian WIP means that it is at the discretion of the organisers of the annual conference to determine whether to program the WIP speakers as a stream or to hold a separate conference. In recent years streaming feminist research papers within the annual AAP conference appears to have become the norm, although the audience for this stream remains predominantly female.

The WIP group in Australasia remains an important resource for women in philosophy. However, I think it is reasonable to hope that improvements in communication (decreased telephone costs, email), greater interstate and international mobility, the greater number of national and international journals and conferences dedicated to feminist research, and the recent institutional practice of providing junior staff with a mentor, have decreased the feelings of isolation of some women working in philosophy in Australasia in the early twenty-first century. The 2008 AAP report on women in philosophy in Australasia offers some ground for cautious optimism. It states that, in general, the position of women philosophers within Australasia has improved. In 1981, women occupied 8% of all continuing positions in philosophy. By 2006 women held 23% of continuing positions. This report may be found on the AAP website under ‘women’.
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Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand has for some time now been experiencing something of a ‘golden age’. The richness of Australasia’s philosophical past, though less well known, should also not be forgotten: heavily indebted to overseas trends, Australasian philosophy includes much distinctive and highly original work.

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