This book examines the connected histories of Spain, China, and Japan as they emerged and developed following the foundation of Manila as capital of the Spanish Philippines in 1571. Cross-cultural encounters not only shaped Manila’s development as a ‘Eurasian’ port city, but also had profound political, economic, and social ramifications for the three pre-modern states involved. This becomes obvious when looking into the diverse nature of long-distance trade, including trans-Pacific silver-for-silks bargaining, direct Sino-Japanese exchange, and provisions trade. In order not to overlook the role of human beings involved in proto-global struggles for power and foreign trade control, *Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 1571-1644: Local Comparisons and Global Connections* combines a systematic comparison with a focus on different actors and their agency. The author offers an example of empirical global history based on multilingual primary source research and a critical evaluation of different historiographical traditions. Integrating Manila into world history helps in revising many long held misconceptions by replacing them with a more balanced, multi-faceted view.

Birgit Tremml-Werner (PhD University of Vienna 2012) is a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Research Fellow at the University of Tokyo. Her current research focuses on intercultural diplomacy and diplomatic actors in Tokugawa Japan and the Spanish Empire.
Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 1571-1644
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Acknowledgements

This book and the initial dissertation would not have been possible without the help and support of many, who deserve my sincerest gratitude. It all began when my undergraduate exchange programme took me, a Japanese studies and history student from Vienna, to Momoyama Gakuin Daigaku (桃山学院大学) in Osaka. Soon after my arrival in the autumn of 2005 I enrolled in a class on early modern Japanese foreign relations taught by Fujita Kayoko (藤田加代子), who did a wonderful job in challenging my understanding of global connections and making me question established discourses of European expansion vs. Japan’s and China’s place in the world. Ever since, I have been determined to fill the gap of understanding between different world regions and research fields. The project took a more tentative step with the start of my doctoral studies at the University of Vienna in 2007, where colleagues and mentors encouraged me to look beyond established narratives of a so-called European expansion.

As a teaching and research assistant at the Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte at the University of Vienna I was able to carry out research in Europe, Asia, and North America. During my four-year employment until 2012 I benefitted from various opportunities to discuss, disseminate, and teach my research topic and related themes. In particular my teaching assignments in the inspiring Erasmus Mundus master programme “Global Studies: A European Perspective”, which in addition to engaging with international students in Vienna enabled me to teach a course at a summer school at Fudan University (复旦大学 Fudan Daxue) Shanghai, proved very beneficial.

Yet, the key moment for a successful book project was the choice of my advisor. I am deeply indebted to my Doktorvater in Vienna, Peer Vries, who was the ideal candidate for that job. He taught me how to think big, while introducing me to his huge global network and to the craft of global history. As a prudent mentor and honest friend he was equally patient, demanding, critical, and supportive: he pushed me to become sharper, to structure my thoughts while never interfering with my own way of working and, most importantly, always believing in me and my project.

Two other Vienna University senior colleagues became instrumental for this book: my undergraduate mentor Friedrich Edelmayer and Erich Landsteiner, who both encouraged and challenged my ideas from the very start.
I have also accumulated scholarly debts outside Vienna. Neither my dissertation nor this book would have been possible without the generous support of various institutions and individuals. Locating scattered source materials required research trips to Spain, Italy, Japan, and the United States. The Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (文部科学省 Monbukagakusho), which financed my research as a graduate student at the University of Tokyo in 2008/09, deserves special mentioning. I also received generous funding for archival research and participation in conferences from the Österreichische Gesellschaft für Wissenschaft (ÖFG), the Theodor Körner Fonds and the Newberry Library in Chicago. I would like to thank in particular the staff at the Archivo General de Indias, Seville, the Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu (ARSI) in Rome, the Histriographical Research Institute of the University of Tokyo (東京大学史料編纂所) and the Tōyō Bunko (東洋文庫), and in particular Maeda Hideto (前田秀人) for his efforts with my research at the Matsura Shiryō Hakubutsukan (松浦史料博物館).

During my year as a research student at the Japanese History Department of the University of Tokyo I benefitted from the kind efforts of my academic advisors Murai Shōsuke 村井章介 and Fujita Satoru 藤田覚: I participated frequently in their seminars and study groups and I was given access to the latest research.

As for the actual work on the manuscript and the revision process I consider myself extremely privileged for receiving a Postdoctoral Research fellowship from the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) soon after having finished my PhD. Without its generous support that enabled me to focus exclusively on writing and research while being in Japan this book would have turned out less presentable. I mostly owe this to my host and mentor Haneda Masashi 羽田正, who ever since learning about our shared interest in port cities supported me despite his incredibly busy schedule: He took time to discuss my latest findings and ideas, to polish my Japanese, and to assist with tedious paperwork. The fellowship permitted going back to the Japanese sources and delving into the interdisciplinary research community at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia (東洋文化研究所) and in particular the vibrant research group around Haneda Masashi. Regular meetings, study sessions, and workshops and their clear focus on writing new global history have been of tremendous value for sharpening my approach.
Over the years work on this book has put me in touch with leading scholars in both historical research and East Asian studies. As a PhD student I was lucky to discuss and receive critical comments from inspiring scholars including Richard von Glahn, Alejandra Irigoin, Hamashita Takeshi, Angela Schottenhammer and Eric Vanhaute. Among others they challenged me to think in new ways. Meeting Ikeuchi Satoshi 池内敏 and Takahashi Kömei 高橋公明 in Nagoya during my short academic rōnin period in early 2013, when they unhesitatingly hosted me at Nagoya University and introduced me to local academia was of great value. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to Florentino Rodao and Emilio Sola who were equally supportive when organising events to discuss my approach with the Spanish scholarly community in Madrid and Alcalá de Henares. I have received valuable remarks from a range of scholars including Tonio Andrade, Leonard Blussé, Adam Clulow, Benjamin Elman, Antje Flüchter, Benito J. Legarda, Matsui Yōko 松井洋子, Andreas Obenaus and Shimada Ryūto 島田竜登. I would like to thank in particular Igawa Kenji 伊川健二, Csaba Oláh, Shimizu Yūko 清水有子, Cheng Weichung 鄭維中, and Ubaldo Iaccarino for sharing their knowledge regarding East Asian history and primary source material. Akune Susumu 阿久根晋, Matsui Hiroe 松居宏枝, and Oshio Ryōhei 大塩量平 additionally for helping me to structure my thoughts and guiding me in complex areas of Japanese academia. Discussions with young scholars have accompanied this project; of which many took place at the Verein zur Förderung interkultureller Studien (VSIG) in Vienna, which became a great platform for disseminating and testing unconventional ideas in a constructive environment.

Many more, who I regrettably cannot mention personally, have been instrumental for completing this book, not a single one is forgotten and I hope I will be able to return all of their kindness one day.

My sincerest thanks also go to Usui Katsuki 白井和樹 and Yara Kenichirō 屋良健一郎 whose patient assistance in reading and decoding early modern Japanese sources during my stays at the University of Tokyo has been invaluable. Regular discussions in our study session encouraged me to pursue a wealth of ideas and furthermore helped me in deepening my understanding of Japanese history and broadening my perspective.

I am deeply indebted to a number of colleagues and friends who commented on or proofread parts of my manuscript: To Ashley Hurst and Emily Arthy for their quick and patient help with linguistic and terminological issues. To John N. Crossley and Andrés Pérez Riobó, who struggled through the
unpolished dissertation manuscript long before the text improved thanks to the careful reading and critical comments of Eberhard Craislheim, Lisa Hellman, and Hanna McGaughey.

I am grateful to Annelieke Vries-Baaijens, who contributed with skilful maps for a better understanding and an embellishment to my narrative. I would also like to thank the staff of Amsterdam University Press for their professional help in editing this book; I am moreover deeply indebted to two anonymous reviewers for insightful comments, as well as the anonymous jury members and awarding institutions for the Michael Mitterauer Preis, the Böhlau Jubiläumspreis, the ICAS Best Dissertation Prize and the Award of Excellence of the Austrian Wissenschaftsministerium (all of 2013), including the organisations, which generously awarded those prizes.

My husband Matti has not only continuously encouraged my writing but also unconditionally supported all my career decisions. Without his constant support I would not have accomplished combining the two things that truly matter to me: research and a fulfilled family life. Last but not least, I am deeply grateful to my parents and my siblings, whose love and support have always sustained me. Above all I appreciate the one thing they have to offer that is often missing but dearly needed when pursuing global research: a warm and stable home to return to.

Birgit Tremml-Werner
Nagoya, October 2014
Part I
The Setting
Introduction

Gradually commerce has so increased, and so many are the Sangley's ships which come to this city laden with goods – as all kinds of linen and silks; ammunition, food supplies, as wheat, flour, sugar; and many kinds of fruit (although I have not seen the fruits common in España) – and the city has been so embellished, that were it not for the fires and the calamities visited upon her by land and by sea, she would be the most prosperous and rich city of your Majesty’s domains. As I have written to your Majesty in other letters, this city has the best possible location for both its temporal and spiritual welfare, and for all its interests, that could be desired. For on the east, although quite distant, yet not so far as to hinder a man from coming hither, with favourable voyage, lie Nueva España and Perú to the north about three hundred leagues, are the large islands of Japón; on the northwest lies the great and vast kingdom of China, which is so near this island that, starting early in the morning with reasonable weather, one would sight China on the next day.

The Empirical Setting

All crucial dimensions of early modern Manila are summarised in the above-mentioned quote: the city’s cross-cultural character, her promising commercial potential, and the challenges that would determine the development of the colony. Voiced by the first Bishop of Manila, Domingo de Salazar (1512-1594), in a letter to the Habsburg King Philip II (1527-1598), it illustrates multilayered encounters in Manila at the beginning of the historical processes that serve as the frame for a ‘connected histories’ analysis. During the first decades of Spanish colonial rule (1565-1898), the far-reaching dimensions of contacts between several political economies led to a pre-modern, ‘regional globalisation’, with positive and negative features.

1 The origins of the pejorative term used by the Spaniards for members of Fujianese merchant communities are still debated among historians. It probably originated from a mispronunciation of chang lai (those who come frequently) or shang lai (those who come to trade). See Ollé (2002), Empresa, pp. 244; 263.


3 Jan de Vries has used following definition based on Manfred Steger’s short summary: ‘globalization is about shifting forms of human contact leading toward greater interdependence and integration, such that the time and space aspects of social relations become compressed, resulting in the ‘intensification of the world as a whole’. Cf. de Vries (2010), ‘Limits of Globalization, p. 711.

Soon after the arrival of Ferdinand Magellan (pt. Fernão de Magalhães, sp. Fernando de Magallanes, 1480-1521) in Cebu half a millennium ago, the absence of spices and precious metals disappointed the new arrivals. Even after the formation of a permanent colonial settlement, the Philippines remained of secondary interest to imperial Spain – not many Spaniards lived there, and those who did behaved rather independently. Yet, although developments in the Philippines did not reflect what the Spanish Crown wanted, the capital of the Spanish Philippines, Manila, happened to be the specific area where the Spanish interacted with the Chinese and the Japanese, as did their political economies. Hence global economic historians regard 1571 as the starting point for sustained long-distance trade that was for the first time truly global. Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez wrote in an article about the impact of intercontinental silver flows on world affairs that ‘Manila was the crucial entrepôt linking substantial, direct, and continuous trade between the Americas and Asia for the first time in history’. With the establishment of Manila as a permanent trading base for exchanging American (primarily Mexican) silver and Chinese silk in the last third of the sixteenth century, the economic zone grew by integrating various regions into the emerging global economy. The point of departure for this book is this Manila-based triangular trade. However, while economic historians characteristically focused on trade currents and their impact on economic long-term developments, they have failed to see the fascinating nature of Manila trade, being the ambiguous product of diverging political and ideological concepts of three powerful

5 The introductory chapters of John Crossley’s biography of the Spanish soldier and procurador general Ríos de los Coronel, outlines several determined and glory-seeking individuals who governed the colony far away from the motherland. See Crossley (2011), Ríos Coronel.


8 Alfonso Mola, Martínez-Shaw (2011), ‘Era de la plata española’.

9 In its original meaning the term refers to the Atlantic exchange of European manufactured goods, African slaves, and New World resources as well as agricultural products. Hence it differs strikingly from exchange via Manila. In the Pacific, triangular trade refers to the characteristic trade patterns that linked the China Seas to the American continent and its East and Southeast Asian peripheries.

10 Jan de Vries has early on acknowledged the global relevance of the trading route: ‘The ultimate expression of this speculative basis of international trade was the Manila-Acapulco trade. Because of the inordinate value of silver in Asia and the inordinate demand for silk in Europe, Spaniards found it worthwhile to send silver to Manila and exchange it for silk, which would be sent back to Acapulco, transshipped to Vera Cruz, and then sent on to Spain. Small changes in those conditions undermined this trade in the early seventeenth century.’ Cf. De Vries (1976), Economy of Europe, p. 115.
pre-modern states. Manila’s economic and urban development would have looked entirely different without the direct and indirect contributions from the cultural and economic spheres of China, Japan, and Overseas Spain. 

As a ‘Eurasian’ port city, early modern Manila was undoubtedly the product of a *histoire croisée* at the heyday of what Anthony Reid has termed an ‘Age of Commerce’. In this respect, several historians have tried to evaluate the Manila Galleon trade in American silver and Chinese silk, its effects on the Spanish economy, and the Philippines’ delayed economic development, as non-self-sustaining economy and a disintegrated hinterland. Valuable evaluations certainly have to go beyond hasty conclusions about laziness and human greed. Indeed, it has often been argued that the poor economic development of the Philippines was more the result of inefficient Castilian governance and less the product of the multicultural nature of the area. How remote Spain, despite her fragile political power structure in Asia managed to dominate Manila, where annually at least 100,000 kilograms of silver circulated, and where fierce competition from other powerful pre-modern states existed, had not yet been sufficiently confronted. Not only do we have to abandon the popular view that the city was nothing more than a

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11 I will here use Charles Tilly’s straightforward definition of a state: ‘When the accumulation and concentration of coercive means grow together, they produce states; they produce distinct organisations that control the chief concentrated means of coercion within well-defined territories, and exercise priority in some respects over all other organisations operating within those territories.’ Tilly (1990), *Coercion*, p. 19. David Kang has also worked with the concepts of ‘states’ by supporting his reasoning with Max Weber who defined a state as representing ‘a social community and territory, with a monopoly of legitimate violence within that territory.’ See Kang (2010), *East Asia*, p. 26. For a discussion on how to apply the concepts of early modern state and state building in a transcultural context and terminological challenges, see Flüchter, “Structures on the Move”, 1-19. The author (p. 2) defines ‘states as phenomena produced by social actions, as spaces of interaction, and as networks of institutions that structure action’.


13 See Gipouloux (2009), *La Méditerranée Asiatique*.

14 Bjork (1998), ‘Link’, pp. 51-88; Escoto (2007), ‘Coinage’, p. 213: ‘Hispanic colonial Philippines present a classic example of a nation’s commerce gone awry right from the beginning. The island colony had a flourishing foreign trade unparalleled elsewhere in Southeast Asia, but its interior commerce was generally stuck in a barter system until the mid-nineteenth century. The underlying cause of this imbalance was the lack of appropriate coinage.’ The author blames the Mexican peso’s functioning as currency not only for the continuation of the barter system but also for the Chinese monopoly of the domestic market.

15 For an overview on the political entities in South East Asia and the connections between them, at the moment of the Spanish arrival, see Reid (1999), *Charting*. 
trading outpost for the Spanish and the Chinese, but also any tentative explanation for these peculiar circumstances has to take two diverging aspects into account. Research that characterises historical aspirations and attitudes about Manila must consider both the role of environmental circumstances that included pre-existing maritime networks on the macro level and rivalry of actors and agencies ‘at home’ on the micro level.

The South China Sea offered particularly favourable conditions for the development of long-distance trade. However, considerable differences in the behaviour of states, the role of cultures represented in language, religion, and traditions, as well as political economies shaped the outcome of proto-global connections. Between 1570 and 1640 trade expanded not only because rulers showed an interest in benefiting directly from foreign commerce, but also through passive connections and interaction. Spain, China, and Japan may be described as having a period of similarities found in ‘territorial consolidation, administrative centralisation, cultural/ethnic integration, and commercial intensification’, as Lieberman has noted. Moreover, at the dawn of this period, recently described as the ‘1570s system’ by Nakajima Gakushō, of closer connections between Europe and Asia, certain parts of each of the three pre-modern states had achieved a high literary culture and civilisation and had ‘attained a high degree of socio-political organization and material culture’.

After 1570, the crossroad identity of the maritime macro region, where commercial exchange had stimulated regional networks since the first millennium, created a fluid environment, which in turn encouraged the emergence of what I hereafter will call the ‘Manila system’. The term ‘system’ here stresses reciprocal forces and long-lasting structures that overlap with

17 Serge Gruzinski has addressed the colonisation of the Philippines within the diversified frame of Iberian colonial mobility. Gruzinski (2004), Quatre Parties du Monde, pp. 30-60.
19 For the role of culture in influencing economic developments, see Vries (2003), Via Peking Back to Manchester; Jones (2006), Cultures Merging; Sanjay Subrahmanyam specifically synthesised culture’s impact on maritime relations, political economies, fiscal regimes, geography, and society in Asia. Subrahmanyam (1990), Political Economy of Commerce, pp. 9-45.
22 Darwin (2007), After Tamerlane, pp. 27; 42.
23 I am aware that the term ‘system’ is already taken and moreover problematic since the Manila system is not characterised by centre-periphery relations as stipulated by sociologists since the 1960s. My conceptualisation borrows from Braudel’s world economy definitions as well as from global history empire theories of John Darwin.
ideas about connected histories. The Manila system was characterised by multilayered connections based on negotiations, a complex market torn between protectionism and free trade, triangular circulations and bi- or multilateral communication involving different parties of the pre-modern states Ming China, Azuchi-Momoyama and later Tokugawa Japan, and the Spanish Overseas Empire.24 Contacts were not confined to Manila: ports such as Quanzhou (泉州) in Fujian/China or Nagasaki (長崎) in Kyushu/Japan, and surrounding oceanic space all the way to Mexico, also became integral parts of the network. Crucial to the understanding presented in this study is the high degree of improvisation in this formative period. The hybrid outcomes of the state-controlled exchange in silver and silk and continuous tensions caused by smuggling and corruption, linked to other systems or networks including the Japanese licensed foreign trade system from 1604-1635 (朱印船, jp. *shuinsen*), the Atlantic system, and the Chinese tributary trade system.25 S.A.M. Adshead already used the term ‘Manila system’ in 1988 in an attempt to integrate the concepts of empire, government, and statehood.26 My formulation of the concept Manila system serves as a micro model for the macro analysis of the complex entanglements and forms of competition between the states mentioned above and between the local and the central in those states. A limitation to central and local factors may indeed be too narrow and at times it will be necessary to modify the scope, adding categories such as regional and global. Moreover, this book will present several actors who simultaneously represent local and global interests as characteristic of the Manila system.

The three pre-modern states discussed here considered commercial relations as a form of ‘negotiation’, a fact that stresses the close links between diplomacy and trade. The strong role of diplomacy is a further important characteristic of the Manila system. Close diplomatic ties were just one

24 In each of these three pre-modern states we find a single hereditary ruler who reigned over a well-defined territory with a largely agrarian economy. Governance was supported by sophisticated bureaucratic structures. See Goldstone (1991), *Revolution and Rebellion*, p. 4.

25 Not far from Manila another system developed a few decades later. Paul van Dyke described it in his seminal work as the Canton system. Van Dyke (2005), *Canton Trade*. The Canton system lasted from 1700 until 1842. It required European traders to have guild merchants act as guarantors for their good behaviour and financial transactions. Describing transactions and interactions with a specific focus on the power of knowledge as well as the use of language as political tool, the meticulous study shows how foreign merchants were treated and which institutions and actors supervised and controlled them. Paul van Dyke concluded that the Chinese state was particularly interested in maintaining harmony and control in foreign trade.

26 Adshead (2001), *China in World History*, pp. 206-208. While Adshead has to be credited for a tentative comparison with Habsburg Spain, his hasty conclusions, such as calling the Manila system China’s most important link to the outside world, are problematic.
aspect of East Asian interconnectedness, complicating a clear distinction between profit-oriented commerce and political communication.\textsuperscript{27} Less acknowledged is the fact that Luzon, the largest island in the Philippines on which Manila is located, was part of the East Asian diplomatic net, to the same extent as the archipelago was part of a larger South East Asian maritime world and the Hispano-American colonial culture zone.

Historical research on the South China Sea has shown that in part because of Ming China’s restrictive policies on foreign trade, this region encouraged mainly private traders, who were calling at key Malay entrepôts such as Melaka and Chinese coastal centres prior to the arrival of the Iberians.\textsuperscript{28} Private traders included people of a range of backgrounds: Muslim, Malay,\textsuperscript{29} Overseas Chinese mostly from Southern Fujian, Ryukyuan, and merchants from the Indian subcontinent. This liberal environment fuelled the formation of loosely allied Japanese and Chinese trading groups including so called ‘Japanese pirates’ (倭寇, ch. wokou, jp. wakō).\textsuperscript{30} It is noteworthy that the latter’s maritime activities peaked around the middle of the sixteenth century, at a time when the Iberians appeared as promising business partners in East Asia.\textsuperscript{31} Together with merchants from Fujian, illicit merchant adventurers would become the pioneers of Manila trade and substantially contribute to the flourishing decades in the development of the Manila Bay.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{27} Japanese historians put particular emphasis on diplomacy and trade as overarching frame of pre-modern transnational relations in East Asia. Tanaka Takeo and Murai Shōsuke, for instance, have carried out pioneering research since the 1970s in Japanese. See Tanaka (1996), Zenkindai; Murai (1999), Chüsei nihon; Murai (2013), Nihon chüsei. English-language scholarship caught up in recent years. Kang (2010), East Asia, p. 108: ‘Trade served as a double-edged instrument of system consolidation: it facilitated both more intense state-to-state interactions and the development of domestic state institutions. The picture that emerges is one [...] governed by national laws, diplomacy, and protocols, with states attempting to control, limit, and benefit from trade.’

\textsuperscript{28} For the mobile networks in the South China Sea I refer to Lockard (2010), ‘Sea Common to All,’ pp. 219-247.

\textsuperscript{29} Anthony Reid called the term ‘Malay’ an as ‘portentous label’ as ‘China’ in the context of South East Asian history. The term’s connotations changed over time. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it commonly served the Europeans as cultural-linguistic marker for people inhabiting the area between Melaka, Brunei, and Java. See Reid (2010), Imperial Alchemy, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{30} Wokou/wakō literally means ‘Japanese pirate’. But most of the time, these associations comprised a larger number of Chinese merchants.

\textsuperscript{31} Maehira (2008), ‘Minchō’, pp. 61-76.

\textsuperscript{32} Chinese merchants calling on Manila were mainly Min people also known as Hokkien or Minnan閩南. Integration of the archipelago into macro-regional networks dates back to earlier centuries; yet the attraction of Luzon and Visayas increased enormously once the Europeans had settled there.
Map 1 The Manila System

1604-1619: 1-4 ships/year, 1620: 3000 Japanese settlers, 1637: 800 settlers

From 1586-1623 missionaries, merchants, official delegates

Since 1571: 20-40 junks/year, 6,000 - 20,000 Chinese

Occasionally missionaries on Chinese junks
Manila's economic ‘failure’ of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries contrasts sharply with developments in the early decades. The fact that most studies of pre-modern Manila fail to see local and proto-national influences from China, Japan, and Europe calls for a deeper and more systematic look into the subject. Why Manila trade (the ‘generative role of the galleons’) appeared to encourage only short-term profits invites a closer look at the role of the state in determining foreign relations and at how official decision-making affected economic possibilities. When the three political economies of Spain, China, and Japan first met, central governments did not try to monopolise power in Manila. In fact, before the sixteenth century no one nation tried to dominate Asian trade.

This research covers broad themes such as the nature of governance in early modern Manila, what sovereignty meant to each of these countries, how they applied the concept to Luzon, and to what extent the Manila system influenced maritime policies and geo-political strategies in China, Japan and Spain. My study differs from previous research in the method of analysis used to address the importance of the state for private trading patterns. The chief theme of my narrative describes interactions between local and central actors and agencies that determined most proto-globalisation processes. The multilayered Manila system of mutually influencing levels allows engaging with dynamics and hybrid processes resulting from encounters and interaction. I argue that state-local competition in China, Japan, and the Spanish Overseas Empire more than cultural aspects of these encounters added to Manila’s distinct development as Eurasian port city. These encounters’ lasting effect on both foreign and domestic policies in all three pre-modern states suggests that low-ranking actors such as merchants possessed significant passive power – both in East Asia and the Iberian Peninsula.

Noteworthy Scholarship

The majority of historical writing has looked at the Philippines in isolation and has repeated long-held misconceptions of their early modern history.

33 One of the most recent examples is Gipouloux (2009), La Méditerranée Asiatique.
35 Legarda (2001), ‘Cultural Landmarks’, p. 44: “The resulting trade between the great empire of China and the silver-rich colonies of the Americas, with the Philippines standing in the center of the whole enterprise, gave a completely new dimension, and a new direction, to Asia’s trade. It completed the circle of world trade.”
To conceive an alternative narrative, disentangling the historical processes from national history writing is essential. As indicated above, integrating a focus on Manila into world history means examining ‘large processes’ embedded in multilayered structures by (a) considering the city’s contribution to (proto-)global developments and socio-economic phenomena to understand the empirical level and (b) providing a balanced view of different narratives and discourses to understand the historiographical level. The city of Manila serves as a framework for this study’s triangular relations and thus appears as a convenient starting point. Yet this is not a straightforward task because historical research on the early modern Philippines is scattered. At first glance much of the historiography on the Philippines lacks objectivity. Often it reads as a story, history, or historiography of extremes, based on either positively or negatively prejudiced views of developments. The colonial period fared particularly poorly, biased by authors’ hidden or obvious agendas. Such prejudiced views date back to Catholic chronicles, and continued in imperialist and nationalist writing of the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Eventually, it experienced a revival in the post-colonial search for a new identity after the country’s independence in 1946. The rare examples that address triangular relations do so mostly only indirectly.

The most prominent work highlighting Manila’s role as multiethnic port city is *The Manila Galleon* by William Lytle Schurz, first published in 1939. His book gives insights into the exciting history of the ships passing between Acapulco and Manila on behalf of the Spanish Monarchy from 1565 to 1815, i.e. shortly before Mexico gained independence from Spain. French economic historian Pierre Chaunu’s *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques* deserves special credit for collecting extensive statistical data on trans-Pacific trade in Spanish archives, revealing that more than a third of American silver went to Asia before the early nineteenth century. Chaunu argued that Spanish Pacific trade largely adapted to the Atlantic system, a thesis that has been often challenged since.
Several Filipino historians have carried out internationally recognised research, although of varying quality. Benito Legarda Jr. started a trend in researching the country’s complex economic history, in the late 1960s, and Leslie Bauzon and others followed in the 1980s.42 Starting in the 1970s, William Henry Scott’s publications constructed a pan-regional model of the Philippines’ socio-political organisation, providing students of Philippine history with descriptive detail and analytical insights.43 Although attempts to place the Spanish Philippines in a bigger picture have drawn on research in geography, economic history, and social sciences, China and Japan were rather loosely linked to events in Manila in these studies.44 Popular history on the beginning of the Philippines’ triangular relations is also problematic.45 While Mexican historians rarely insert specific topics in large-scale overviews, despite their acknowledged accomplishments in emphasising the Mexican legacy in the Manila Galleon trade, Filipino historians are reluctant to neutrally address the Hispanic past of their country.46 A newer generation of scholars are committed to a more nuanced, objective view of the colonial heritage in their search for distinct features of the Philippines within the context of South East Asia.47

Within the field of macro-level perspectives in parallel or comparative histories, scholars often uncritically accepted the *leyenda negra* by painting a picture of a Spanish Crown unable to enforce efficient economic policies.48

shown that Mexican traders after 1640 enjoyed financial advantage in Manila. Consequently, Mexican traders and intermediaries became the main beneficiaries of the profits created by the Manila Galleon trade in the eighteenth century.

43 To name just the most famous of many: Scott (1994), *Barangay*.
44 Reed (1978), *Colonial Manila*; Roth (1977), *Friar Estates*.
45 The controversial question is no longer simply tackled by a few historians but has become a topic of popular interest. See Martínez Montes (2009), ‘Spain and China’ (accessed 22 November 2013); see also Vilaró (2011), *Sol Naciente*.
46 Filipino historians of the second half of the twentieth century seem to have had difficulties leaving dependency theories behind, due to ideological, racial, nationalist, or indigenist reservations. A Filipino-centric approach is notorious in the work of Teodoro Agoncillo. John Leddy Phelan’s research demonstrates that one did not necessarily have to be born Filipino in order to promote such views. See Phelan (1959), *Hispanization*. For tendentious national history discourses, see Schmidt-Nowara (2008), *Conquest of History*, pp. 175-180.
47 The trend only changed recently with scholars revisiting the multicultural heritage of various aspects of the Philippines’ cultural history. See Donoso (ed.) (2008), *More Hispanic Than We Admit*; Other works with similar intentions include Almario (ed.) (2003), *Pacto de Sangre*; Abinales, Amoroso (2005), *State and Society*.
48 The so-called black legend refers to anti-Spanish propaganda. Its origins date back to the Revolt of the Netherlands. While the original *leyenda negra* writing only focused on political and religious issues, Spain’s failing economic performance has held centre stage in more recent
Anti-Spanish propaganda has survived in the historiography to the present day. Serious scholars, in turn, over-stress a Mexican legacy and Philippine dependence in trans-Pacific contributions as expressed in the idea of the Philippines as a colony of a colony. For most of the time the question of where to place the Philippines, whether geographically in South East Asia or culturally-politically within the Spanish Empire has limited virtually all studies. Most scholarly publications regarded the Philippines as the fringe colony of an overstretched empire and missed possible considerations of contributions to South East Asian history. In this fashion, Latin Americanists have studied the trans-Pacific link. Both Vera Valdés Lakowsky’s work on Sino-Mexican relations and the flow of Mexican silver and Fernando Iwasaki Cauti’s on the early links between Asia and Peru fall into that category. Two monographs focus on the link between the Spanish Empire and Japan with a perspective shift to the Philippines, one by the German historian Lothar Knauth (1972), the other by ex-Jesuit Antonio Cabezas (1995). Both are important forerunners to the present study. Yet these too have their flaws when it comes to source criticism and interpretation.

Apart from the aforementioned Filipino and Mexican research, Spanish scholarship has carried out outstanding research in the field. Research by Maria Lourdes Díaz Trechuelo and María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso on socio-economic developments during the Spanish period and Alonso Álvarez’s work on the indigenous taxes and financial aspects of the ‘Spanish project’ in Asia are particularly noteworthy. Juan Gil’s study on Spanish relations with East Asian powers, and Emilio Sola’s work on Hispano-Japanese relations, as well as conference proceedings published by Florentino Rodao, have all contributed to a better understanding of the Asian context. It is black-painted histories. The term itself was coined by Julián Juderías in the early twentieth century and refers to the hostile writing about the Spanish Monarchy and its people. The leyenda negra accuses the Spanish of ruthlessly spreading Catholicism and political tyranny. For the impact of the leyenda negra propaganda in the days of Philip II, see Pérez (2009), Leyenda Negra, pp. 53-139. Spanish historiography responded with the leyenda rosa, a narrative that aimed at demonstrating positive Spanish contributions to colonial territories.

51 See Knauth (1972), Confrontación Transpacífica; Spate (1979), Spanish Lake; Israel (1974), ‘Mexico’, pp. 33-57; Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico. The last one is furthermore infamous for its lack of references.
52 Díaz-Trechuelo (2001), Filipinas; Pérez-Grueso (2003), Relaciones entre España y Filipinas; Álvarez (2009), Costo del Imperio.
unfortunate that academic exchange between Spanish and Anglophone researchers is still limited in this way, to the effect that the archipelago is often only relegated to a footnote in English monographs on the Spanish Empire.54

As indicated in the preceding overview, primarily Anglophone research tackled the Philippines’ connections with emerging world trade.55 Yet, although a significant share of the Manila trade entered China, insufficient attention has been paid to Manila’s overall role in pre-modern economies of the region. Spanish scholars have approached the topic via classic economic history, adding profound quantitative research to existing scholarship.56 Only in recent years a more nuanced view on transnational collaborations have highlighted the archipelago’s outstanding role within a more integrative picture, offering refreshing insights.57 Long-held criticism that historians of South East Asia consistently failed to integrate comparative approaches into their research has lately fallen silent thanks to a number of contrary attempts.58 Recent interest in the highly profitable trans-Pacific exchange of silver and silk has drawn scholars’ attention to South East Asia’s role in early globalisation processes.59 Strictly speaking, most of these works only added to the already biased view of the Spanish Philippines in world history.

54 See among others Boxer (2004), South China, pp. xl-xl. See also Kamen (2003), Empire; Parker (2001), The World Is Not Enough. One chapter is dedicated to the Philippines, called ‘The Pearl of the Orient’, pp. 197-237.


56 Martínez-Shaw, Alfonso Mola (eds) (2008), Ruta. The edition provides both a comprehensive synthesis and fascinating illustrations.


58 Reid (1993), Southeast Asia, vol. 2. For a recently published comprehensive description of the area in the early modern period, see Lieberman (2009), Strange Parallels, vol. 2; The first volume of the series focuses less explicitly on the South China Sea but provides nevertheless worthwhile insights: Lieberman (2003), Strange Parallels, vol. 1. I should also like to draw attention to Roderich Ptak’s work. Ptak (1998), China.

59 In this respect, the work by Dennis O. Flynn and Antonio Giráldez on trans-Pacific bullion flows and their impact on the pre-modern world economy has been fiercely debated amongst scholars of economic history. Flynn, Giráldez (1995), ‘Born with a “Silver Spoon”’, p. 201: ‘[Global trade] emerged when all important populated continents began to exchange products continuously – both with each other and directly and indirectly via other continents – and in values sufficient to generate crucial impacts on all trading partners.’
It goes without saying that scholarship has developed differently within the realm of Chinese and Japanese history. A distinct set of questions and politico-economic issues about interaction with the international world fostered an understanding of the period before 1639 as a rather insignificant intermezzo of heightened exchange across borders. Historians of Tokugawa Japan used to overemphasise the ‘closed-country thesis’, which influential scholars such as British historian Charles R. Boxer promoted internationally. Beginning in the 1970s, Japanese historians looking at Japan within the Asian context began to challenge the closed-country view. While Japanese historians suggest replacing the controversial term ‘closed country’ (鎖国, jp. sakoku) with the more correct ‘maritime ban’ (海禁, jp. kaikin), Ronald Toby criticised the contention that scholars had overlooked Tokugawa Japan’s relations with Asia by overrating the rupture in Japan’s relations with European powers after 1639. Other Tokugawa foreign relations experts including Arano Yasunori (荒野泰典), and Tanaka Takeo (田中健夫) refuted Boxer’s thesis on the transformative impact of Japan’s encounter with Christianity and the overemphasis of Europeans in foreign relations. In doing so, however, Toby in particular underestimates Europe in the overall picture and exaggerates early modern Japan’s position within the East Asian international system. In addition, more and more research has stressed the maritime dimension of late medieval and early modern Japanese history and thus encouraged studies on coastal interaction and foreign trade.

Nagazumi Yōko’s (永積洋子) survey of foreign traders in Japanese ports such as Hirado (平戸) and official Tokugawa trade in South East Asia has left a significant imprint on the scholarship of the past decades. Outside Japan, Leonard Blussé’s ‘large and broad’ agenda paved the way for numerous works on the interface between diplomacy and trade in the entire China

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60 Boxer (1951), Christian Century in Japan, p. 362.
61 Toby (1984), State and Diplomacy.
62 Catch phrases used by publishing houses such as ‘umi kara mita’ (Views from the sea) or ‘Ajia no naka no nihon’ (Japan within Asia) point at approaches to Japanese history as inseparable part of the East Asian macro region. Amino Yoshihiko advocated for a multiplicity of centres of medieval Japan as well as looking at Japanese history ‘from the sea’; Bruce Batten strongly focused on centre-periphery concepts when arguing against Japanese heterogeneity. Batten (2003), To the Ends of Japan. Murai Shōsuke opted for wider time frames in understanding Japanese history. Murai (1997), Umi kara mita sengoku nihon. For a synthesis of ‘umi kara mita ajia’ (Japan as seen from the ocean)-research, see Ching (2009), ‘Japan in Asia’, p. 407. He speaks of Japan’s ‘historical position vis-à-vis Asia’ and based on Edward Said, about a ‘imaginative geography’ that determines Japan’s place in a world economy. Nakajima (2007), ‘16 seikimatsu’, pp. 55-92.
Seas in relation to the Dutch East India Company. Gradually a group of scholars with a clear focus to overcome Japan-centrism in the study of foreign relations (対外関係史, jp. taigaikankeishi) and integrating Japan into world history emerged. Nevertheless, Japanese research is only gradually beginning to play a role in new scholarship in other regions of the world because of language differences.

Notwithstanding influential national history circles, an essential awareness for foreign relations in Japan dates back to the early 1900s and is reflected in a very long tradition of scholarship on early modern Japanese-Filipino relations. Since the early decades of the twentieth century, an impressive number of books and edited source translations by Murakami Naojirō (村上直次郎), Nara Shizuma (奈良静間), and Iwao Seiichi (岩生成一) have provided edited translations of European chronicles and pre-modern Japanese primary source material to students and interested readers. More recently, academic research by Hirayama Atsuko (平山敦子) and Sugaya Nariko (菅谷成子) have added to the body of available knowledge. Others have studied European presence (spearheaded by Jesuits and Portuguese merchants) and the impact of Catholicism on Japan. What all these studies have in common is an astonishing exactness and outstanding familiarity with the multilingual source material, but they often also clearly lack a solid theoretical framework, the courage to link empirical findings with big questions, or a willingness to share research results with scholars outside their discipline. Benefitting from such thorough source-based education and encouraged by gradually increasing exchange with the international academic community and participation in trans-national research projects, a younger generation of scholars has placed Japanese interaction with the

63 Colleagues and students alike honoured Leonard Blussé’s innovative scholarship including monographs and contributions to numerous source editions in Nagazumi (2010), Large and Broad; For his Japan-related research, see Vermeulen, Van der Velde, Viallé, Blussé (eds), Deshima Dagregisters (13 vols); Fernández-Armesto, Blussé (eds) (2003), Shifting Communities; Blussé (1996), ‘No Boats to China’, pp. 51-76; Blussé (1986), Strange Company.
64 See among others Ōishi (ed.) (1986), Shuinsen.
65 The majority of these play a crucial role in Japan’s historical studies up to the present day. Many were published in edited series by the Historiographical Institute of the University of Tokyo University (史料編纂所 Shiryō hensanjo). The most relevant works in the context of the Manila system include translations of Antonio de Morga, Pablo Pastells, Rodrigo Vivero y Velasco, and Sebastian Vizcaíno as well as the Nihon kankei kaigai shiryō series including volumes of Jesuit records as Jezusukai nihon nenpō and the diaries of the Dutch and the English trading factories in Japan.
66 Murakami (1929), Don Rodorigo; Iwao (1937), Ninpyō; Nara (1942), Supein komonjo; Hirayama (2012), Supein teikoku.
67 Takase (2002), Kirishitan jidai; Gonoï (2003), Daikokai jidai; Gonoï (2002), Nihon kirishitanshi.
outside world into a larger context. Their works have furthermore successfully bridged the artificial gap between foreign relations as almost exclusive domain of Japanese history (日本史, *nihonshi*) and Western history’s (西洋史, *seiyōshi*) monopoly on studies about the ‘Southern Barbarians’ (南蛮, *namban*). Of particular value to the present study are Nakajima Gakushō (中島楽章), Shimizu Yūko (清水有子), and Igawa Kenji's (伊川健二) research on communication between intruding Europeans and the old regimes in East Asia; in addition, Shimada Ryuta's (島田竜登) survey on Japanese-VOC (Dutch East India Company) trade in Asia, Oka Mihoko's (岡美穂子) study of the networks of Portuguese Nagasaki-Macao merchants, Adam Clulow's research on the Dutch East India Company in Japan and surrounding waters, Peter Shapinsky's investigations of *wakō* networks, and Ubaldo Iaccarino's work on Japanese-Spanish relations in the early Tokugawa period proved to be extremely stimulating. Shimizu Yūko's study on the impact of relations with the Spaniards in Luzon until 1625, the year of the final rupture and end of trade relations, addresses the question to what extent European military and missionary aggression spurned Japan’s transition from ‘medieval’ to ‘early modern’. The book furthermore provides a crucial analysis of trade patterns, which explain the complex relation between Luzon and Japan against the background of political modernisation.

Historical treatises on China’s role in the emerging trade relations are a slightly different, but no less complex story. Chinese historiography is still underrepresented in comparative studies of global connections. Manila-based studies are no exception, even though Zhang Weihua (張維華) has already carried out significant research in the first half of the twentieth century. While I certainly intend to once and for all leave Fairbank’s out-dated narrative of ‘Western impact and Asian responses’ behind, I am also conscious of potential new misinterpretations. According to Takeshi Hamashita, who transferred Wallerstein’s world system theories to East Asia, the rest of the world had to adapt to China. As a pioneer in


70 Zhang (1934), *Ming shì folangji*.

71 Fairbank (ed.) (1968), *The Chinese World Order*.

advocating Asia’s global integration, he overturned Marxist narratives and anti-maritime discourses that had long determined the picture of a stagnant Asia and emphasised that China was integrated in the early modern world economy, instead of having a closed economy. Despite widespread consensus on Ming China’s function as major economic drive in the macro region, the positions of historians diverge when it comes to the question of the economic spirit and the actual role of Confucian ideology in socio-economic transformation processes in the late Ming. Over the past years similar forms of outspoken Sino-centrism have been challenged. While many non-Chinese scholars have abandoned lengthy debates on oriental despotism, Chinese history finds itself still torn between older stagnation discourses, the desire to stress the values of Sino-centricism, and a new focus on the integrating dynamics of traditional tributary systems.73

Classical Chinese history tended to relegate maritime and coastal topics to obscurity. In contrast, recent historians have established a more nuanced view on China’s economic integration by focusing separately on regional and maritime developments.74 John E. Wills’s wide-ranging survey of the Chinese maritime trade and contacts with the Europeans, including a focus on late Ming/early Qing diplomatic contacts with the West, or Leonard Blussé’s efforts to understand the dynamics in the macro region between Xiamen, Batavia, and Nagasaki (social aspects of merchants communities, diplomacy of VOC personnel), have changed our understanding over the past decades. As far as the Manila system is concerned, work by Ray Huang, Lin Renchuan, Angela Schottenhammer, and Manuel Ollé offer particularly relevant insights.75 The present study moreover owes a lot to studies on the margins and periphery of the Ming Empire, including research by Timothy Brook and Cheng Wei-chung and new scholarship on Taiwan by Tonio Andrade and José Eugenio Borao.76

74 For studies on China and Japan’s role in an emerging global world around 1600, see Von Glahn (1996), Fountain; An economic focus also dominates in Kishimoto (2012), Chiiki.
76 Andrade (2006), How Taiwan Became Chinese; Borao et al. (2002), Spaniards in Taiwan, 2 vols; Borao (2009), Spanish Experience in Taiwan; Brook (2008), Vermeer’s Head; Brook (2010), Troubled Empire; Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy.
Multilingual Primary Sources

This study uses data drawn from correspondence between the Spanish Crown and the colonial government in the Philippines, seventeenth-century records of Japanese foreign affairs, and official records of the Ming dynasty. The inequality in quantity of Western and Eastern sources should not be interpreted as a sign of Euro-centrism, but lies rather in the fragmentary nature of relevant sources. Spain collected far more records on Philippine-related topics than the other countries. Even though China’s and Japan’s bureaucratic traditions also contributed to an enormous output of historical data, efforts usually excluded records on maritime ventures and the outside world.77 Furthermore, Chinese and Japanese interactions and transactions were more often carried out on an unofficial or semi-legal basis. The predominance of private merchants in all trade actions aggravates the dilemma of scholarship in that field. Very often they have left only the faintest trace in documentary records.

The Archivo General de Indias (AGI) in Seville hosts the bulk of official decrees on governing the Philippines, commercial policies, correspondence between authorities and other individuals based in ‘Asia Oriental’, and memorials and orders of the King and his councils.78 Other valuable sources can be found in the Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN), and the collections of the Real Academia de Historia (RAH), as well as in Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu (ARSI). Chinese and Japanese official records on foreign relations are largely confined to defence policies.

Despite their scarcity, Japanese primary sources on foreign relations of this period represent the second important pillar of this research, predominantly early Tokugawa information gathering about the foreign world, including about the newly arrived Europeans. Most prominent among early modern foreign relations texts are the _Ikoku Nikki_ (異国日記, Diary of Foreign Countries) and the _Tsukō Ichiran_ (通航一覧, Records on Navigation).79 The

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77 These developments were part of the seclusion policies and maritime restrictions implemented by the central government both in Ming China and Tokugawa Japan.
78 Clerks (escribanos) in all parts of the overstretched Overseas Empire were busily record-keeping in order to keep superiors and supporters in the motherland up-to-date. The voluminous document corpus of the Audiencia de Filipinas of the Archivo General de Indias holds the bulk of relevant Spanish material for this study. Other related sources can be found among documents of the Audiencia de México and the Patronato Real.
79 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), _Tsukō Ichiran_. A compilation of foreign relations documents, issued between 1588 and 1825. For the first printed edition (1911) of the _Ikoku Nikki_, see Murakami (ed.)
Gaiban tsūsho (外蕃通所, a collection of Tokugawa diplomatic documents), and a collection with the Bakufu's official daily records (大日本史料, jap. Dainihon shiryou) also provide details on relations with Luzon.80 A further remarkable document is the Ruson oboegaki (呂宋覚書), which was drafted in the 1670s, 40 years after relations with the Spaniards had come to a standstill.81 When using these materials, one must keep in mind that the majority of these sources were originally collected and compiled by order and under the supervision of the regime.82 Historically speaking, record-keeping was monopolised by Zen Buddhist monks, in particular in the realm of foreign affairs, because they controlled correspondence with Japan’s Asian neighbours. For the period of this study a very small group of individuals were involved in drafting authorised documents, including licences for foreign trade. Most famous among them are Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s diplomatic advisor Saishō Jōtai (西笑承兌, 1548-1608) and Ieyasu’s diplomatic staff Sanyō Genkitsu (三要元佶, 1548-1612) from the Enkōji (円光寺) temple83 and the Zen Rinzai monk Ishin Šūden (以心崇伝, 1569-1633), a disciple of Genkitsu.84 The language used in all official documents is classical Japanese. During the seventeenth-century Chinese-style Japanese texts (漢文, jap. kanbun) remained the language of law, and the syllabaries (仮名, jap. kana) are increasingly used for administration records and occasionally in sources drafted outside Japan.

As for Chinese data, works of interest on foreign and tributary trade include printed editions of imperial histories such as the Ming shi (明史, Ming Annals) and the Ming shi-lu (明實錄, Veritable Records). Whereas the Ming shi with its 332 volumes that were written in the first century of the
Qing dynasty (1644-1911) is part of the official 24 histories of China, the latter contains the imperial annals of the Ming emperors. After the death of each emperor, a governmental office of historical affairs would create a section about his reign using various historical sources, including, for example, the ‘daily records’. Both the Ming shi and the Ming shi-lu are designed to preserve historical knowledge under the control of the dynasty. Therefore it is only natural that records on foreign trade, in a period of rigid government control and restriction, are rare. The most valuable primary record on maritime affairs during the Ming is the *Dongxi yangkao* (東西洋考, *Thoughts about the Eastern and Western Oceans*) – first published in 1617. A study of 12 scrolls by a pre-modern scholar named Zhang Xie (1576-1640) describes the economic situation of overseas countries. One of the strengths of his study lies in its account of the collection of tax revenues from maritime trade. It comprises studies on the Eastern and Western Oceans and is dedicated to the descriptions of the regions of East Asia and their relations with China, and maritime routes. Furthermore, certain sections of provincial chronicles and annals from Fujian and Guangdong provide additional details on social and economic matters that help to elaborate on a bigger picture of foreign policies and maritime trade. Unlike Spanish, Portuguese or Italian manuscripts, a significant amount of Chinese and Japanese material has been edited and reprinted for reasons of legibility and archival maintenance.

The Spanish chronicles must also be tested for their reliability, accessibility, and relevance. Early on, members of Catholic orders published documentary records either on what they saw or considered worthwhile

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85 Thanks to the painstaking efforts of Geoff Wade, Ming shi-lu entries referring to South East Asia have been translated into English. For further information, see Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/ (hereafter Wade, MSL and URL). In this respect an open database on a large number of Ming shi-lu records is an extremely useful tool for non-Chinese speakers and provides extensive information on Ming China’s foreign policy.

86 Genealogies were essential tokens of gentry prestige in imperial China. A survey of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Fujian genealogies could add significant findings to our story. See Zhuang, Zheng (1998), *Quanzhou pu*. Coastal China has had a long tradition of migration to South East Asia. For an analysis of intercultural relations in Manila Fujian genealogies are therefore very valuable as a particular form of historiographical records that was often kept secret to the outside world.


88 Zhang (1981), *Dongxi yangkao* (hereafter: *Dongxi yangkao*). Large parts of the collection are based on records of the Ming shi.

89 Chen (1964), *Fujian tongzhi*; Ruan Yuan, Li Mo (eds) (1981), *Guangdong tongzhi*. 
Their works on the Philippines are closely linked to other potential missionary fields and projects. Thus, accounts of ‘Asia Oriental’ include extensive descriptions of countries and peoples of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although these are of undisputed interest for our purpose, the famous example of Juan González de Mendoza’s *Historia de China*, challenges their reliability. Some of them are still scattered over the globe in the original print and others have been re-edited over the years and can be found in almost any academic library. Antonio de Morga’s *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* also deserves special mention as a chronicle by a high-ranking government official in Manila, first published in 1609 in Mexico. De Morga is one of the first non-clerical Spanish writers of Philippine history. Doctor de Morga, as he is conventionally referred to in sources of his time, was a very controversial, yet well-informed, colonial figure who served as a judge in Manila from 1595 to 1602. His book, which has been widely used by critics and admirers alike, provides a detailed description of political issues, the native inhabitants, Japanese and Chinese settlers and foreign politics. Morga’s contemporary, Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, also left detailed accounts, and Miguel de Loarca, a soldier, also contributed to the corpus of early civilian Spanish accounts.

No study on the Spanish Philippines will be complete without mentioning Emma Helen Blair and James A. Robertson’s 55 volumes of translated Spanish text. Friars in all parts of the Philippines collected information and drafted chronicles from an ethnographic perspective. In chronological order of the first publication date they include Pigafetta (1534), *Primo Viaggio Intorno al Globo Terracqueo*; Chirino (1604), *Relación de las Islas Filipinas*; Pedro Chirino had worked in the hinterland of Manila until 1596 and was then transferred to Cebu, where he became the first Jesuit to administer to a community of Chinese settlers; Aduarte (1640), *Historia de la Provincia del Santo Rosario*; Colín (1663), *Labor Evangélica* (edited and re-published by Pablo Pastells in the early 1900s); de Santa Cruz (1693), *Historia de la Provincia del Santo Rosario II*.

Mendoza (2008), *Historia del Gran Reino de la China*. Originally published as *Historia de las Cosas más Notables, Ritos y Costumbres del Gran Reyno de la China* in 1586. An Italian (*Dell’ Historia de la China*) and an English translation followed in 1588. Even though it is based on eyewitness reports of Martín Rada and others, the author himself never set foot on Chinese soil. Unlike his namesake, Juan Mendoza Mate de Luna personally visited China. His global life as a New World merchant from Seville, who travelled from Peru to China, Manila, Macao and eventually Mexico, appears in various colonial records. See Iwasaki Cauti (1992), *Extremo Oriente*, pp. 65-105.

For the rise and fall of Antonio de Morga as a high-ranking Crown official in the Philippines and the American viceroyalties, see Elliott (2009), *Spain and the Wider World*, pp. 16-17.

and Filipino archival material. One of the problems of this magnus opus is that it was compiled at the heyday of American imperialism. Although its very selective contents reflect the anti-Spanish bias of the years after the Spanish-American War of 1898, the compilation is of unprecedented value.

Comparisons and Connections

Instead of using historical evidence to produce superficial, ‘flat’ generalisations of the early modern world, this book is an attempt to write global history as a combination of traditional history and broader considerations of recent research in global history. While trying to avoid lofty, unfounded theories, I also want to prove that primary source data is not reserved for micro history. In combination they help to evaluate the transforming and interconnected world of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Methodologically, this means reading sources ‘against the grain’. The method is from anthropology and describes the process of reading a text beyond its author’s intention. It encourages the reader to look for hidden views, the ‘unexpected’, what an author left unsaid, and ultimately to think of reasons for omitted information. In our specific case, it requires a very high degree

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95 Blair, Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898.
96 Prior to Emma Blair and James Robertson, the Spanish civil servant and ambiguous scholar of the Philippines Wenceslao E. Retana had busied himself in making important documents of the Spanish colonial government accessible to the public. Retana (ed.) (1895-1905), Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, 5 vols. For a critical assessment of Retana’s work, see Cano (2008), Retana Revisited; also Pastells, Torres y Lanzas (1925), Catálogo de los Documentos Relativos a las Islas Filipinas, 9 vols; Martínez de Zuñiga (1893), Estadismo de las Islas.
98 One example of recent attempts to combine both lines of research is Andrade (2011), ‘A Chinese Farmer’, pp. 573-591.
100 The term was coined by David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky. See Bartholomae, Petrosky (1993), Ways of Reading.
101 Carole A. Myescofski has summarised it as ‘a subversive approach to the official historical documents that one encounters from the early modern period. It entails using the documents contrary to the way they were designed and intended, to draw out materials, insights and understandings that the recorders never intended to preserve.’ See http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=teaching_excellence (accessed 9 March 2013).
of linguistic sensitivity. Generating data from multilingual sources poses a major risk to data interpretation. In addition to phonetic challenges, there are also specific political rhetoric and semantic problems due to concepts existing in one of the respective languages and not in another. This lexical shift from one language to the next leads to the historical development of asymmetrical perspectives.

Thanks to comparative studies, scholars are able to understand structural similarities and differences and to distinguish between the particular and the general. Manila offers a stage to analyse to what extent similar conditions for foreign trade in China, Japan, and Europe existed up until the end of the eighteenth century. The early figure of global economic history Mark Elvin wrote a famous study on technological decline in the traditional Chinese textile industry that became the base argument for his path-breaking, high-level equilibrium trap theory on the non-occurrence of the industrial revolution in China in 1973. Talking about precisely this issue of cross-cultural difference, he states that '[a]t this point our analysis becomes more complicated, essentially because we are shifting from explaining what did happen to trying to explain what did not.' Accordingly, I will also start by drawing a general picture in order to find out which institutions, ideologies, and structures were missing, both in Manila and in the political economies of the three pre-modern states. My study builds on a combination of external and internal explanations and on a comparative analysis that emphasises differences and 'parallels', to use Victor Lieberman's term. This book seeks to understand Manila-related

Michel Foucault (‘subjugated knowledges’) and Carlo Ginzburg also promoted similar methods. My own research benefits from their once revolutionary approaches.

102 This question is prominent in scholarly debates on ‘the great divergence’. Pomeranz (2000), Great Divergence, pp. 16-24; 225-263. There is a wider debate on China’s global economic integration, trade, and capital, dating back to Max Weber and Karl Marx. Leading figures of the last decades include G. William Skinner in the 1960s, and Mark Elvin, Philip Huang, Peter Perdue, and R. Bin Wong from the 1970s until the present day. Most of these authors studied the rural sector; Felipe Fernández-Armesto regularly compares developments in China, Japan and Europe (Spain in particular) and classifies them together: Fernández-Armesto (2001), Civilizations, pp. 402, 473.


104 See e.g. Rueschemeyer, Mahoney (2005), ‘Comparative Social Analysis’, pp. 3-40; Marc Bloch has already promoted the comparative method for its usefulness to elaborate on contrasts and filter unified principles from a multiplicity of circumstances. Bloch (1989), Feudal Society, vol. 1.

105 Lieberman (2003, 2009), Strange Parallels, 2 vols. His seminal work is a study of the rise and the fall of state power in six different geographical regions, in which the author applied a comparative approach to discover historical connections across separate settings.
cultural and economic developments as connected histories, while being sceptical about generalising interpretations. It is an attempt to challenge one-sided explanations of geographical contingencies or overemphasises on institutional explanations for the early modern world.

A ‘connected histories’ approach provides the framework for the analysis of historical processes. In the case of early modern Manila, the development of the first global market was a global process that was sustainable in a way that would have been impossible without interregional cooperation. Manifold contributions from different parties in China, Japan, and Spain created the characteristics of the Manila trade. Regular access to the Manila market led to far-reaching interregional encounters that consequently triggered economic, cultural, and political changes in all three pre-modern states. In response to the 1980s post-colonial critique, the ‘connected histories’ approach pays attention to a variety of subjects involved in the historical process. Emphasising coexistence, parallels, and interconnections helps highlight the reciprocal process of interaction between the global and the local, or, the universal and the particular. In contrast to ‘exceptionalist’ interpretations of the historical paths taken by Europeans, Chinese, or Japanese, the all-encompassing framework of this book is influenced by Max Weber’s attempt to illustrate the historical development of social processes on a macro level in connection with local peculiarities.

When Patrick O’Brien pleads that histories must no longer be written ‘within the parameters set by geopolitical competition for economic hegemony, backed by armed forces, among a succession of European states and cities,

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106 Eric Vanhaute has suggested two different paths for carrying out research in global history: make global comparisons or look at global connections. Vanhaute (2009), ‘Who Is Afraid of Global History?’, p. 31: ‘Human societies are interconnected on a systematic level, there exist large-scale units of analysis that condition historical developments’. De Vries (2008), Industrious Revolution, p. 4.

107 Regarding economic trends around 1600 I agree with Derek Massarella, who has argued that both Europe’s and East Asia’s contributions to long-distance trade have been misinterpreted. Massarella, ‘What Was Happening?’, http://www.casahistoria.com/happeningin1600.pdf (accessed 13 October 2013).

108 The methodological framework of ‘connected histories’ goes back to Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s manifesto for the study of connected history that became one of the leading directions in the study of global history. In that article he advocated focusing on the connectedness of different entities and areas aiming to get a broader view on early modern history. See Subrahmanyam (1997), ‘Connected Histories’, pp. 735-762.

109 Despite his efforts to explain phenomena that were in his view uniquely European, such as capitalism or bureaucracy, Max Weber remained sceptical about large-scale generalisations in his systematic comparison of economic, political, and religious phenomena in different world civilisations. Turner (1993), Max Weber, pp. 26, 32.
experiencing their own particular circles of rise, decline and revival’, he does so with good reason.\textsuperscript{110} The only way to overcome the barriers constructed with national history narratives and a strong focus on European competition as an ‘engine’ for change is by shifting one’s perspective to port cities as fluid centres of commerce that enabled exchange of all kinds of ideas. Both connected and comparative histories show that demographic and economic forces are undeniably linked with culture and are thus suitable approaches for an examination of Manila, where both Catholic and neo-Confucian morals were affected in everyday lives.\textsuperscript{111}

For quite some time port cities were primarily studied within the framework of urban history; in recent years, however, port cities have often been perceived as \textit{deus ex machina} explanations for innovative developments or exceptional developments. Often being created by outside agency, they functioned as connectors, hubs, and motors of change within their own framework. Rather than being integrated into a country or region, port cities were often closer connected to each other by the merchants sojourning freely between them, than to a metropolis.\textsuperscript{112} Despite the popularity of the buzzword ‘port city’, satisfying definitions are ironically still rare. Studies on the history of port cities have primarily focused on processes and developments after 1600 and global trade held centre stage; but there is much more to look at. Historians have credited port cities for being centres of far-reaching autonomy, ethnic diversity with astonishing organisational and singular logistical requirements, which hosted expert communities.\textsuperscript{113} Manila features Haneda Masashi’s (羽田正) broad port city characteristics as ‘important political centre’, ‘hub of regional economy’, and place ‘where new arts, ideas and technologies developed’.\textsuperscript{114} The oceans and sailing routes

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Konvitz1978} Konvitz (1978), \textit{Cities and the Sea}, p. 31. He speaks of the early seventeenth century as the ‘age of new port city’. This trend corresponds with the original conceptualisation of new port cities in Northern Europe and the classic examples of Amsterdam and London.
\bibitem{Haneda2009} Haneda (2009), ‘Introduction’ to \textit{Asian Port Cities}, pp. 3-4.
\end{thebibliography}
surrounding them were their strongest cultural, structural, and economic units, which is why port city communities’ evolution usually diverges from national history narratives.\textsuperscript{115}

The theoretical framework has been inspired not only by the cultural-linguistic and spatial turn in the social sciences but also by work on political consolidation, theories of state formation, empire building, and studies using post-modernist approaches on accommodation and appropriation. Employing these views to this project helped to replace conservative views maintaining that East Asian states were backwards, that the Spanish engaged in a rigid colonial enterprise in the East, and that the sixteenth-century Asian maritime world can be exhaustively explained with narratives of aggression and response. An actor-centred approach sensitive to the complex interactions within juxtaposed networks of interactions is of further interest for studying ‘triangular’ relations.\textsuperscript{116} Researchers using the network approach have stressed the specific nature of maritime merchants and the various types of collaborations and partnerships based on distinctive, non-hierarchical relationships.\textsuperscript{117}

Before moving on to the first chapter, a few clarifying comments will be necessary. The spelling ‘South East Asia’ is used to indicate that the term both covers regions in East and Southeast Asia. The Philippines, for instance, is a unique example. Being considered periphery or ‘rimlands’,\textsuperscript{118} Luzon stands in clear contrast to the core regions defined by the powerful international forces of China, Japan, and Spain. The ‘Philippines’ themselves are a further problematic concept, being nothing else than a sixteenth-century

\textsuperscript{115} Inhabitants of port cities and those of the hinterland undeniably differed. The earlier are sometimes classified as commercial communities while the latter are considered administrative society members. Paul Cohen distinguishes for late imperial China a littoral zone oriented towards foreign trade, where cosmopolitan ideas flourished, and a vast interior (‘hinterland’) that was landlocked, agrarian, and Sino-centric. See Cohen (2003), \textit{China Unbound}.
\textsuperscript{116} Trivellato (2002), ‘Jews of Leghorn’, pp. 59-89. Francesca Trivellato introduced an analytical use of network approach in her study of seagoing merchants. She advocates a micro-analytical approach to macro phenomena with the potential to narrow the gap between anthropological and economic historical understanding of merchant communities. Similar phenomena have been studied for trans- and cross-Pacific merchants. See Ardash Bonialian (2012), \textit{Pacífico hispanoamericano}. He also concluded that Mexican merchants dominated the thriving commerce between Manila, Acapulco, and Callao, while Spain actively sought to limit commerce in the Pacific.
\textsuperscript{118} Victor Lieberman (2009), \textit{Strange Parallels}, vol. 2, defines the rimlands as areas on the path to economic and political consolidation.
imperial Spanish construct. Strictly speaking there were no Philippines and no Filipinos before the arrival of the Spaniards.\footnote{For scholars’ ideas on the construction of this concept, see Legarda (2001), ‘Cultural Landmarks’, pp. 43-44. At present, the view that colonialism has created the Philippines is generally accepted, i.e. Francia (2010).}

As for the concept of early modern or pre-modern states, Spain, China, and Japan represent advanced administrative and hegemonic entities with clear centralising foci, including elements of Weber’s modern state.\footnote{See Darwin (2007), \textit{After Tamerlane}, p. 23.} In theory, violence was an indispensible means of political organisation. Other fitting attributes include territoriality, jurisdiction over population, sovereignty, legal personality, the ruling elite’s monopoly on foreign relations, and a compelling ideology. While sensitivity to the blurring lines between empire and state at that time cannot be harmful, one should perceive the Spanish Overseas Empire as a multinational composite monarchy with a variety of territories in which it employed fiscal military reforms and coercive exploitation.\footnote{Darwin (2007), \textit{After Tamerlane}, p. 27.} Agrarian Ming China projected power beyond its vast territorial borders, while post-Warring States Japan actively built a pre-modern state.\footnote{Yamamoto (ed.) (2003), \textit{Teikoku kenk yū}.}

Changes in South East Asia, which shifted parts of the Philippines into its proto-global age, include the arrival of the European trading nations, Japan’s appearance on the global stage, and the Ming-Qing transition, which meaningfully coincided with the ‘mid-seventeenth-century crisis in Southeast Asia’.\footnote{For the mid-seventeenth-century crisis, see Reid (1993), \textit{Southeast Asia}, vol. 2, p. 26. See also Rothermund (2009), ‘Krise des 17. Jahrhunderts’, p. 57. The period interestingly covers the peak decades (1580-1630) of the small ice age.} The focus on the period between the 1560s to the 1640s opens up for revisiting the conceptual construct of ‘early modernity’, which differs from region to region,\footnote{Goldstone (1998), ‘Problem’, pp. 249-284.} and has been criticised for its Eurocentric connotation.\footnote{Lieberman (1999), ‘Transcending’, p. 2. He argues that using the term ‘early modern’ for Asian history implies a ‘degree of comparability to Europe’. He furthermore states the interrelatedness of the ‘age of commerce’ and ‘early modern’.} Despite his critique of the concept, Jack Goldstone, for instance, admits the existence of an ‘age of transition’ that manifested in economic and socio-political dualism within centralised, bureaucratic monarchies.\footnote{Goldstone (1998), ‘Problem’, p. 253.} Notions of ‘early modernity’ change, transformation, and increased mobility are not only all too obvious in encounters in Manila but
also reflect in the Spanish translation of ‘early modernity’ into ‘edad moderna’ (1492/1500-1800). China and Japan started to apply this concept during the twentieth century. While Chinese historiography remained true to its own classical periodisation based on imperial dynasties, modern Japanese scholarship transposed date indications using traditional historical eras into the Western calendar and began applying Western historical periods.\textsuperscript{127} Generally speaking, the pre-modern era in China is often said to begin with the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and in Japan usually with the establishment of Tokugawa rule in 1600.\textsuperscript{128} Similar to such ambiguities, the concept of Spain poses further terminological challenges: I am aware of the debates about whether Spain is a proper term to use for the power that reigned over Manila in that period, given that all matters of expansionism and colonialism in the New World were subject to the Crown of Castile. Nevertheless the term ‘Spaña’ or ‘Hispana’ is regularly found in contemporary sources. For the sake of simplicity, the terms ‘Spanish’, ‘Castilian’ or ‘overseas Spanish’ will therefore be used interchangeably in this work.

This book is divided into four parts containing an introduction and eight chapters. In part I, the general context presented in the introduction and chapter 1 provides the readership with the comparative framework and relevant factors of Spain, China, and Japan’s connected history in Manila. In part II, chapter 2 sets the stage of this study by giving a general introduction into the political and economic development of early Spanish reign over the Philippines and Manila and chapter 3 evaluates the different levels of Manila trade, in order to contribute to a better understanding of the complex state relations in the early modern period. In part III, chapter 4 covers the extent to which shifts in governance and sovereignty changed self-conceptions in China and Japan as a consequence of increasing contact with ‘foreigners’ and how diplomacy and maritime trade came to play a critical role in East Asian quests for identity and polity building. Part III also includes specific case studies, presented in chapters 5 and 6, that evaluate the significance of bargaining between local and central levels for global representation. The two chapters show how global, central, and local factors co-existed and ‘controlled’ economic, political, and social developments.

\textsuperscript{127} Lieberman (1993), ‘Local Integration’, pp. 475-572, discusses periodisation and the structural changes that defined South East Asian space.

\textsuperscript{128} It is largely accepted that under the Tokugawa reign a stable political, social, and religious order was established, in particular compared to the preceding century. The time before 1570 and 1600 may therefore also be considered a critical juncture before the beginning of the early modern era. See Lewis (2009), ‘Center and Periphery’, p. 431.
In part IV, the two final chapters (7 and 8) examine how these connected histories influenced local history in Manila by pursuing what daily life in Manila looked like. Here, an actor-based approach contributes to a global social history for the sake of demystifying early modern ‘globality’. Turning global, if understood as responding to the unfamiliar, making efforts to integrate and to find peaceful solutions in a multiethnic setting, was mostly the result of bargaining on the spot.

**A note on names and places**

This research project raises some awkward issues concerning the transcription of names and places. In general, names of people are given in the order of their own cultural practice. European names are given in the order first name followed by family name. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean names are given in the common order of family name followed by first name. Place names are given in their English form, i.e. Luzon instead of Luzón and Tokyo instead of Tōkyō. Chinese or Japanese characters are indicated to avoid confusion with similar phonetic terms. Other foreign terms are transliterated using spelling as close as possible to the original, while in cases of doubt attention is drawn to the original characters.
1 The Comparative Framework

Comparing Political Economies

Encounters that led to triangular trade in the China Seas could either be told as fairy tale or horror story: Either, one that follows a story line of impoverished Chinese merchants and Japanese outcasts coming to riches and finding their happy endings, or one featuring ruthless Spanish conquistadores killing innocent indigenous people, and fearless Japanese raiding the coasts while a decadent Ming emperor faced the decline of the great Chinese empire. This chapter aims to set faulty discourses straight by exploring political and economic similarities and differences at the dawn of Hispano-Sino-Japanese co-existence in Manila. A systematic comparison of foreign trade policies and ideology helps to outline these three pre-modern states’ involvement in the wider world. Late-sixteenth-century Spain, China and Japan represented highly advanced yet diverse entities with hegemonic aspirations. Economic and political gaps between them were less prominent than in later centuries. Hereditary rulers of all three states shared a fascination for the lure of glory, trusted in bureaucracy and were confident about their own superiority. In the realm of political economy, they would assert the right of state intervention and protectionism for the sake of increasing profits.

The very existence of such similarities between disparate nations when they were first coming into contact links this study to larger debates. When looking at their encounters in Manila in the sixteenth century, we may start wondering whether a ‘striking resemblance’ thesis is tenable, or if it were rather ‘striking difference’ that shaped experiences in Manila. For a

2 Parsons (2010), *Rule of Empires*, p. 4; Burbank, Cooper (2010), *Empires in World History*.
3 I here endorse Adam Smith’s classic definition that describes political economy as ‘a branch of science of a statesman or legislator that proposes to enrich both people and the sovereign’, Smith (1981), *Wealth of Nations*, pp. 678-679.
4 For several reasons this approach can even be seen as marginally linked to the debates surrounding the so-called great divergence. Pomeranz (2000), *Great Divergence*, pp. 16-24; 225-263. For Japan and the Great Divergence, see Sugihara (2005), *Japan, China*. See also Shimada (2006), ‘Kinsei nihon keizai’, pp. 63-87. One explanation given for Japan’s extraordinary development is based on differences in consumption patterns that triggered the ‘industrious revolution’. A term coined by Hayami Akira and promoted in Western-language scholarship by Jan de Vries, it explains industrial growth and development in regions with a scarcity of natural resources. See De Vries (2008), *Industrious Revolution*. 
better understanding of both complementary and contrary dynamics this chapter examines the background of the encounters between Habsburg Spain, late Ming (明) China and Azuchi-Momoyama (安土桃山)/early Tokugawa (德川) Japan. Because the Spanish Overseas Empire was the official ruling power of the Philippines and provided the most active input for connections in the period discussed, the comparison will begin with an analysis of its power structure.

The Spanish Overseas Empire

In order to fulfil a glorious scheme of turning sixteenth-century Spain into a global power, Philip II relied heavily on the legacy of his ancestors, the Catholic Monarchs and Charles I (of Spain; also Holy Roman Emperor Charles V). Since the end of the fifteenth century, the pursuit of political agendas in and outside Europe had rested upon mutually beneficial agreements with the Pope, business deals with German bankers, and a well-funded diplomatic service. With their nuptial union in 1469 in Valladolid, Isabel I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragón consolidated power on the peninsula by creating a composite monarchy. The monarquía compuesta included kingdoms and seigneurial lands in the Castilian-Aragonese realm on the Iberian Peninsula; Italian satellites such as Naples, Sicily and Milan; the Southern Netherlands; maritime outposts Ceuta, Tripoli, and the Canary Islands, and after 1492 the newly discovered colonies in the Atlantic and Pacific. The monarquía compuesta has often been labelled the best-organised monarchy in Europe due to its bureaucratic structures and tremendous network of hierarchical administration. Complex institutions helped to keep the huge entity of the Spanish empire functioning. Parts of Castilian and Aragonese territorial policies were adapted to new administrative patterns that would later be adopted in the colonies. J.H. Elliott and others have stressed the heterogeneity of political players in Spain and her colonies: next to the Crown and the royal various councils, cities, nobilities, and other subjects

5 As represented overseas and not as European territorial power.
6 Kamen (1986), Spain, 1469-1714, p. 129.
7 For different structures of exercising power in Castile and Aragon, see Ladero Quesada (1995), ‘Spain Circa 1492’, p. 123. For the conceptualisation of Iberian territorial empires in the Americas, see Curtin (1984), Cross-cultural Trade, pp. 5-7.
8 For Spanish juridical and economic institutions, see Yun-Casalilla (2004), Marte Contra Minerva.
actively participated in ruling the Overseas Empire and negotiated complex and increasingly flexible modes of governing.9

The year 1492 heralded the high point of the Spanish Overseas Empire, when after the conquest of the last moro bastion in Granada and the expulsion of the Jews, Genoese seafarer Christopher Columbus ‘discovered’ the Caribbean for Europe under the flag of the Catholic Kings. Before long, military force turned large parts of the American continents, including the empires of the Aztecs and the Incas, into Spanish colonial territories. After founding the Spanish viceroyalties of New Spain (Mexico; 1521) and Peru (1542), establishing permanent power in Asia in 1565, the Overseas Empire reached its territorial pinnacle, which in turn caused unavoidable economic struggles. Shortly thereafter, sixteenth-century Castilian policymakers were torn between colonial and European interests and tempted to spend American silver on religious and dynastic warfare. Philip II pursued his father’s hegemonic gambling with France over dominion in Italy, struggled with the Protestant Dutch and upheld dynastic traditions of fighting the Muslims. The latter was understood a ‘primary task of a Christian prince’ and peaked in Spain’s joining forces with Venice and the Papacy in the Holy League against the Ottomans. The Battle of Lepanto in October 1571 ended in an historical yet temporary defeat over the invincible marine of the Ottomans.10

The dynastic union with Portugal from 1580 (to 1640) provided further crucial momentum for Philip II’s strategy. Spanish politics in Asia and most efforts to designate a Spanish empire on which the sun never sets were hampered, however, by Philip II’s oath at the estates of the Cortes of Tomar in April 1581 expressing the intention that governance of the overseas territories would not be joined with that of the Castilian territories, and later agreements based on the Treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Zaragoza (1529).11 Hence the Habsburg struggle to combine European and world power aspirations marked the entire 60 years of the Iberian Union. James Mahoney has noted that ‘empire building required staunch mercantilist policy, which made Spain a conquering power but ironically jeopardised long-run

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9 Elliot (2006), Empires of the Atlantic World.
10 Rodríguez-Salgado (1988), Changing Face, p. 1. For tensions with the Ottomans and other struggles to defend Spanish possessions in the Mediterranean, see Abulafia (2011), The Great Sea, pp. 446–457.
accumulation in the Castilian economy.\textsuperscript{12} Many historians conclude that Spain was in decline, pointing to economic loss due to too much hegemonic ambition, numerous state bankruptcies that occurred during the reign of the Casa de Austria and the beginning of the downturn in silver imports from the Americas in the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{13} Needless to say, the concept of decline will always be a matter of perspective. After the death of Philip II serious socio-economic struggles complicated imperial policies and weakened royal power. The reigns of his successors, the Austria Menores, who were overshadowed by their powerful ministers (\textit{validos}), such as the Duke of Lerma Francisco Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas (1552/53-1618) or Count-Duke of Olivares Gaspar de Guzmán y Pimental (1587-1645), stand for the crisis of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{14} While Henry Kamen famously advocates a backward Spain with no truly unified economy, which strongly depended on external supplies,\textsuperscript{15} recent scholarship has convincingly refuted this decline thesis by emphasising regional diversity. A relatively stable Iberian performance overseas and how well Spain played its part in the Manila system serve as a counter narrative to the fall of Habsburg Spain due to absolutist, interventionist and overly bureaucratic governance.\textsuperscript{16}

The mechanism behind Spain's political and economic decisions in overseas affairs founded upon the Gobierno Supremo y Universal de las Indias launched in 1536.\textsuperscript{17} In the process of building up an imperial administration, Spanish jurists and scholars drafted explanations to legitimise Spanish conquest and suzerainty over new territories. The Council of the Indies, launched in 1524 as Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias, enjoyed enormous

\textsuperscript{12} Citing the work of economic historian Robert S. Smith, James Mahoney stresses that ‘the absence of ... simple competition’ were the consequences of Spanish mercantilism. Cf. Mahoney (2003), ‘Colonialism’, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{13} Elliott (1963), \textit{Imperial Spain}. Next to Henry Kamen, John Elliott has strongly influenced the wide acceptance of a decline of Spain beginning after the death of King Philip II. They argue that while the sixteenth century was the century of unification, social peace, and economic wealth thanks to the inflow of American silver, the seventeenth century was shaken by revolts, loss of central power, and inflation as the Spanish fell behind the Dutch and English in terms of military and hegemonic power.

\textsuperscript{14} Validos describe royal favourites who took the position of decision-making ministers during the reigns of Philip III and Philip IV. On the history and political impact of validos, see Brockliss, Elliott (eds) (1999), \textit{World of the Favourite}; Vaca de Osma (1997), \textit{Nobles e Innobles Validos}; Williams (2006), \textit{Great Favourite}, pp. 54-78. For a broad discussion on the general crisis of the seventeenth century due to climate change and wars, see Parker (2013), \textit{Global Crisis}.


\textsuperscript{17} Lockhart, Schwartz (1989), \textit{Early Latin America}. 
influence in overseas affairs. As a bureaucratic advisory board it was part of the colonial government separated from the King, whose constitutional prerogative was to dismiss initiatives put forward by council members. Together with the right to elect new officials and to create most of the laws for the Americas, the Consejo’s political power rested on its almost exclusive control of communication channels between the motherland and distant territories. Although hardly ever setting foot on colonial territory, members (eight in 1609) of the Consejo de Indias also acted as spokesmen for the colonies presenting their issues regarding administrative and judicial accounts at the court. Understandably, communication was the biggest enemy of the system, with many intermediaries between the highest authority and the rather independent executive institutions of royal jurisdiction at the local level in the colonies. Research has also shown that institutions and laws that developed over centuries were often resistant to innovation. In later years, the most striking feature of the supposedly efficient Spanish administration was the creation of specific juntas during the rise of the so-called letrados, influential advisors with valuable knowledge or skills whose work seemed to make previous administrative institutions obsolete. Despite the competitive nature of Spanish colonial administration, Henry Kamen concluded that direct control was virtually absent and control was only possible through a set of compromises: ‘The world’s greatest empire of sixteenth century, consequently, owed its survival to the virtual absence of direct control.’

The general concept of governing the Indies was strongly linked to the Christian gospel and its Catholic interpretation, which can be seen in the rapid extension of the ideas of the Reconquista in the new territories. The dual efforts of colonisation and evangelisation were sanctioned by a binding papal decree that ensured them support and benevolence in several other imperial matters. This religiously motivated concept of governance,
widely known as Patronato Real, dated back to the Catholic Kings, who were entrusted to the defence of Catholicism within their realm my means of the Inquisition of Pope Sixtus IV in 1476. The same remit was later extended to the New World in 1493 by the papal bulls Donación Apostólica and Eximiae Devotionis of Alexander VI, a Spaniard who had issued a series of bulls aiming at extending the power of the Catholic Monarchs. The famous bulls Inter Caetera and Dudum Si quidem, or Bulls of Donation of 1493, extended the Spanish influence to all new territories that lay west of an imaginary line of demarcation a hundred leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands.25 The Portuguese, fearing Spanish intrusion in the South Atlantic, called for an adaptation of the terms of these bulls which resulted in the famous Treaty of Tordesillas 1494 that divided the world theoretically 370 leagues (1770 km) west of the Cape Verde Islands.26 The treaty was an attempt to create two separate spheres of influence following the discoveries of the Americas of 1492. It assured the Portuguese Crown a ‘direct’ route to India as well as active participation in America by way of Brazil, which Pedro Álvares Cabral discovered for King Manuel I in 1500, and encouraged the Castilians to expand via the Antilles to the American mainland. Practically, all Spanish overseas possessions enjoyed legitimisation by the Pope.27 As a consequence, the church and religious orders came to play a significant role in social matters as well as the execution of power.28 At times they collaborated out of mutual interest, at other times church and civil authorities were fierce opponents (but also mutual correctives). In the Philippines, the latter case seemed to be more common.

Institutional diversity characterised the political economy of the overstretched Spanish Overseas Empire.29 The Habsburg rulers transferred a centralised institutional framework, previously tested within various political units of the composite monarchy, to the colonies, and produced a constant demand for sophisticated operatives well trained in the latest administrative necessities.30 The Viceroy was head of a colonial macro

25 Parry (1990), Seaborne Empire, pp. 22-23.
26 The treaty was signed on 7 June 1494 in Tordesillas near Valladolid after Christopher Columbus had returned from the West Indies. Pope Julius II (1443-1513) ratified it in 1506. For a transcription of the original, see Fonseca, Asencio (eds) (1995), Corpus Documental, pp. 158-167.
27 Steinberg (2001), Social Construction of the Ocean, pp. 79-86.
28 Barrientos Grandon (2004), Gobierno, p. 75. It included the right to extract revenue of the tenth of which one-half should be used for ecclesiastical matters and the other for the Real Hacienda.
29 For further information, see Yun-Casalilla (2009), ‘Institutions’, p. 5.
unit. This office was first established in 1535 in New Spain (present day Mesoamerica); a viceroyalty followed in Peru in 1542. Viceregal duties in theory included supervising the colonial administration, controlling the treasury and dispensing royal patronage. Colonial bureaucratic and military career paths, for which social origin and ethnic background were secondary according to Bartolomé Yun, created knowledge of unprecedented value. For the organisation of colonial and maritime matters back in Spain, the Casa de Contratación (House of Trade), founded in 1503 by royal decree, played a key role. It controlled all commerce in the new territories and administration of transcontinental trade. Before long, the Casa de Contratación became integrated in the Council of the Indies, which virtually monopolised trade between Spain and America until the 1650s. This meant that the Spanish Crown took a supervisory rather than active role in maritime trade. At the same time, this monopoly hindered private initiatives. Taking measures to increase the profitability of overseas trade and reacting to changing supply and demand became increasingly challenging.

A crucial point considering the exceptional character of the Spanish colonial concept is that overseas politics followed a territorial model that brought along structural problems. Hence, the prime interest lay in subduing large territories to Spanish suzerainty by employing a combined agenda of tax collection and evangelisation of indigenous populations, followed by resource exploitation and implementation of Hispanic cultural values. Unlike the English and Dutch, whose seventeenth-century overseas enterprises are nowadays described as trading-post empires, the Spanish aspired to establish political dominance. In light of the extreme distances and remoteness within the empire, the question of how Spain administered power over areas such as the Philippines or Rio de la Plata has with good reason fascinated generations of researchers. The answer is that policymaking displayed a high degree of compromise and was often the result of good bargaining skills among different colonial authorities.

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31 Kamen (2002), *Spain’s Road*, p. 142. In the eighteenth century the Viceroyalties of New Granada and Rio de la Plata were added as administrative bodies of the Americas.
33 For the different levels of control of the Spanish Atlantic, see Macleod (1984), ‘Spain and America’, pp. 350–351.
34 This stands in sharp contrast to merchants of chartered companies, who outsmarted the Spaniards in overseas trade in the seventeenth century.
36 For a clear definition, see Curtin (1984), *Cross-cultural Trade*, pp. 137–144.
and lengthy negotiations between the metropolis in Spain and colonial representatives and settlers.\textsuperscript{37} Over the past years, several scholars have fought heated debates that elaborated on a thesis of a decentred Spanish empire where compromise won over absolutism.\textsuperscript{38} For seventeenth-century Spain, internal and European agendas naturally required more urgency than those of colonies thousands of sea miles away.\textsuperscript{39} A similar pattern determined the political economy of the Overseas Empire: metropolitan interest came first.

**Overseas Colonies and the Spanish Political Economy**

The Iberian strategy to exhaust the new territories’ resources by any possible means earned the Spanish and Portuguese colonial trade the unflattering description ‘exploitative trading system’.\textsuperscript{40} In essence, conquerors, colonial officials and merchants robbed and shipped what seemed lucrative and suitable as \textit{quinto real} (royal fifth) back to the Crown. The discovery of enormously rich silver stocks in Mexican mines (Zacatecas and Guanajuato) and the veins of Potosí (Cerro Rico) in the Viceroyalty of New Castile in 1545, together with the introduction of mercury for amalgamation in the 1560s, increased the speed and profitability of Spanish silver production tremendously.\textsuperscript{41} Mass production of silver moreover allowed seaborne trade with the Philippines.\textsuperscript{42} Within a few decades, the \textit{peso de ocho reales}, coins minted in Peru and Mexico, became a globally recognised currency and

\textsuperscript{37} Lockart, Schwartz (1995), \textit{Early Latin America}, p. 127. For a lively introduction into the modi vivendi of the Spanish project overseas, see a compilation by Schmitt (ed.) (2008), \textit{Indienfahrer} 2, p. 7. For the different implications of early modern colonialism, see Raman (2001), \textit{Framing ‘India’}, p. 5, where the author described the particular relationships between the colonised and the centre and stressed that new territory was not directly incorporated into the colonial empire.

\textsuperscript{38} Grafe, Irigoin (2008), ‘Bargaining for Absolutism’, pp. 173-209. Grafe and Irigoin refute Douglas North’s model of inferior economic development due to exploitation and regulation by the Crown by showing that the administration of the Spanish Empire was anything but centralised or absolutist, but rather the product of major negotiations between different political actors. See also Marichal (2008), ‘Rethinking Negotiation’, pp. 211-218.

\textsuperscript{39} For the conflicts with Catalonia, see Yun-Casalilla (2004), \textit{Marte Contra Minerva}, pp. 364-376.

\textsuperscript{40} De Vries (1976), \textit{Economy of Europe}, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{41} What was of further advantage to the Crown was its monopoly on mercury resources in Spain and Peru; see Burkholder, Johnson (2001), \textit{Colonial Latin America}, p. 135.

\textsuperscript{42} The American silver trade was the undisputed backbone of the entire Spanish oceanic trade of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Marichal (2006), ‘Spanish-American Silver Peso’, pp. 25-52.
enabled rapid commercial expansion.\textsuperscript{43} Even so, Spanish maritime trade followed a simple reciprocal pattern of annual shipments of American silver to the Spanish mainland and the monopolised export of manufactured European goods to the overseas colonies.\textsuperscript{44} Organising trade with the Indies in a mercantilist fleet system known as \textit{carrera de Indias}, helped to preserve the illusion of control.\textsuperscript{45} Regulations included that foreign ships were prohibited from entering colonial ports even though the metropolis could not completely satisfy consumer demands in the vast Overseas Empire.\textsuperscript{46} Regular commercial traffic was carried out between fixed harbours in the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico and Seville under the supervision of the Casa de Contratación. Its agents were in charge of securing commercial exchange, providing access to agricultural products from a wealthy hinterland, offering sufficient services for ships on the Guadalquivir, as well as financial services.\textsuperscript{47} The Spanish trans-Atlantic trade, which exceeded the Portuguese trade with the Indies in scale and value, kept foreign merchants out despite constant struggle to satisfy the needs of a growing colonial market.\textsuperscript{48}

Thus consumer behaviour could not develop freely nor was the mercantile class always able to respond to market changes. Telling indications for loopholes in mercantilist state interventionism are reactions in Spain. In the 1620s, the Castilian protectionist movement campaigned vigorously for the exclusion of Portuguese merchants from the commanding positions they had won for themselves in the economic life of both Spanish America

\textsuperscript{43} Alonso Mola, Martínez-Shaw (2008), ‘El Lago Español’, pp. 47-64.
\textsuperscript{44} Parry (1990), Seaborne Empire, pp. 105-110.
\textsuperscript{45} Fisher (1997), Economic Aspects, pp. 43-68; McAlister (1984), Spain & Portugal, p. 426, summarises regulations of the fleet system including ‘limiting its ports of call; the restraints placed on trade between the Indies and Manila and between Mexico and Peru; the expansion of the function of the House of Trade and the Merchant Guild of Seville; the chartering of merchant guilds in Mexico City and Lima; the limitations placed on the production of silk, olives, wine, and textiles in America; and the establishment of royal and private monopolies for the sale of essential monopolies’. For the financial issues of the Spanish Empire, see Barrientsos Grandon (2004), Gobierno, pp. 131-147; and on hacienda: pp. 183-194.
\textsuperscript{46} John Lynch also stresses the high number of regulations in sixteenth-century Spanish protectionism. Lynch (1992), Hispanic World in Crisis.
\textsuperscript{47} Parry (1990), Seaborne Empire, p. 102.
\textsuperscript{48} Despite obvious loopholes, historians even speak of a ‘completely mercantilist Hispanic model’. Cf. Picazo Muntaner (2012), ‘Ports, Trade and Networks’, p. 256. For a concise description of Spanish-American mercantilism, see Mahoney (2003), Colonialism, pp. 36-44; For the Spanish silver trade and the role of Seville, see Cipolla (1998), Conquistadores, Piratas y Mercaderes. Regina Grafe has recently debunked the narrative of early modern Spain as a backward state. She argues that Spain did not lack intellectual initiatives for economic or administrative reforms. See Grafe (2014), ‘Polycentric States’, pp. 241-267.
(including Peru and the Philippines) and the Iberian Peninsula.\textsuperscript{49} These Portuguese merchants controlled a network with other private foreign merchants (residing in Seville and later in Cadiz) participating in Atlantic trade, whose number would increase significantly during the eighteenth century with the establishment of a \textit{consulado de cargadores}, a body of registered merchants entitled to load their goods on ships to Spanish America.\textsuperscript{50} Rivalry and intrigues with powerful guilds lobbying in order to secure income for the Crown and overseas Spanish citizens in influential positions in the colonies were unavoidable.\textsuperscript{51}

The narrative of decline mentioned earlier has further roots in naval developments, in the sense that Spain enjoyed a reputation of a great seafaring nation for more than a century before stagnation and losses in naval battles evoked mischievous critics.\textsuperscript{52} The prime example of Spain’s dire straights was the defeat of the Spanish Armada by the English naval forces in 1588. Causes and consequences have been revisited in recent years and several historians now disagree with the general decline narrative, since Spanish sea power recovered within a year after the lost sea battle.\textsuperscript{53} Moreover the royal government invested in competitive shipping by ‘defining ship sizes, configurations, and operating norms for voyages between Spain and America’ in 1607, 1613, and 1618.\textsuperscript{54} However success also depended on the effort of many individual groups – such as sailors, miners, and mule drivers who operated between the main American ports of Veracruz in Mexico and Portobelo in Panama, and the colonial centres. Shipping was furthermore determined by the weather: while rainfalls were crucial for the silver mining process, favourable winds were important for a safe journey back to Europe.\textsuperscript{55} In Asia, being inconsiderate of monsoons or typhoons could easily spell disaster.

Once the silver flows from the Americas drained off to other parts of Europe, state bankruptcies recurred. Moreover manpower decreased in traditionally productive areas such as central Castile and Andalusia, causing

\textsuperscript{49} Cf. Pellicer de Ossau (1640), \textit{Comercio Impedido}.  
\textsuperscript{50} Crespo Solana (2006), ‘Iberian Peninsula’, pp. 6–8; Lamikiz refers to the system as Colbertian model of mercantilism; Lamikiz (2010), \textit{Trade and Trust}, pp. 14-16.  
\textsuperscript{51} Lamikiz (2010), \textit{Trade and Trust}, p. 50.  
\textsuperscript{53} Edelmayer (2009), \textit{Philipp II}, pp. 254-257. Referring to Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Edelmayer has shown convincingly that it was not as much the military failure as it was the lost propaganda battle that harmed the image of the Spaniards.  
\textsuperscript{54} Phillips (2007), ‘Organization’, p. 73.  
\textsuperscript{55} For a good account of the general facts on the Atlantic trade, I refer to Macleod (1984), ‘Spain and America’, pp. 341-388.
previous mercantile adventures to take a toll on a weakened economy.\textsuperscript{56} This period, commonly referred to as the ‘seventeenth-century crisis’, was characterised by economic and demographic stagnation (as forces impeding sovereignty), rebellions, and a crisis of absolutism.\textsuperscript{57} Contemporaries in Spain were well aware of the recession. The arbitristas (projectors), a group of scholars or ‘economic projectors and moralists’,\textsuperscript{58} dwelt on how to solve Spain’s overall crisis with numerous suggestions for reform during first decades after the reign of Philip II.\textsuperscript{59} Yet neither their suggestions nor recommendations from the Junta de Reformacion, established in 1623, affected the privileged society in a time when increased revenue extraction weakened the rural society even further and ultimately jeopardised the whole economy on the peninsula.\textsuperscript{60} Simultaneously, losses were feared and felt in all Spanish territories and the gap between a small wealthy merchant class and the rest of the population widened throughout the entire Overseas Empire.\textsuperscript{61}

Repositioning in an Emerging Global World: European Conflicts in an Overseas Context

What exacerbated the Crown’s poor economic standing, aside from the high costs of hegemonic policies, was domestic friction deriving from unsolved problems on the Iberian Peninsula, such as the repression of the Catalans in 1578, and continuous disputes with Barcelona’s elite. With regard to socially motivated conflicts in Andalusia, it is important to remember that the economically strong parts of the former Emirate of Granada were only integrated into the Catholic monarchy a few decades before. Religious

\textsuperscript{56} This paragraph is based on De Vries (1976), Economy of Europe, pp. 27-28. State bankruptcies under Philip II and Philip III occurred in 1557, 1560, 1576, 1596, and 1607. See Braudel (1995), Mediterranean, vol. 1, pp. 505-512.

\textsuperscript{57} For a discussion, see Parker (2001), The World Is Not Enough; and more recently Global Crisis (2013) by the same author.

\textsuperscript{58} García Sanz (1998), ‘Contexto Económico’, pp. 17-42. Elliott (2009), Spain, Europe and the Wider World, p. 140; Navarrete (1792), Conservación.

\textsuperscript{59} For rational scripts of the arbitristas and a history of the movement, see Bonney (1995), ‘Early Modern Theories’, pp. 162-230. They particularly criticised the selling of offices, a policy that was also common in the Philippines. For an overview of Spanish intellectual life in the seventeenth century, see Robbins (2007), Arts of Perception. Some arbitristas, such as Juan Antonio de Vera y Zuñiga y Figuera de Roca also tackled the state of Spanish diplomatic relations of the time.

\textsuperscript{60} Spanish literature often speaks of a decadent monarchy for the time of growing influence of validos.

\textsuperscript{61} On illusion and disillusionment of the Spanish in the Indies, see Elliot (2009), Spain, Europe and the Wider World, p. 142.
intolerance, which dated back to post-Reconquista Christian laws, further jeopardised domestic stability. Muslim converts were believed to pose a serious threat to national security. They were widely considered a ‘fifth column’ and potential allies of the Ottomans. Although pressure from the Eastern Mediterranean could be banished temporarily in 1571, Catholic Spain had just lost an ideological and political battle against the Protestants in the Low Countries in an extremely revenue-consuming agenda. Maintaining empire-wide security, against the background of ideological and political struggles with Muslims and Protestants, whilst at its pinnacle as an imperial power after 1580 resulted in Philip II’s foreign policy being deliberative and defensive.

The English, French, and Dutch started to attack Spanish possessions in the Americas by the end of the sixteenth century. The Protestant Dutch and English, in particular, were determined to break the Iberian monopoly in the Atlantic trade, if necessary by extending systematic assaults to the Pacific and ultimately the Asian arena. The Caribbean was by nature vulnerable to foreign intrusion, and Northern European privateers became a potential threat to all ships passing there. Aggression continued even after European conflicts had officially been settled in separate peace treaties and truces. On his Atlantic voyages, Francis Drake (1540-1596) plundered the Spanish settlement of Cartagena de India, from where the silver fleets usually started their journey across the Atlantic, in 1572 and 1586; in the following year (1587) Thomas Cavendish (1555-1592) seized the Manila Galleon *Santa Ana* off Cabo San Lucas in Baja California/Mexico. Maritime attacks experienced an upsurge in the 1620s when the Dutch West Indies Company in the Antilles and other European powers established hegemony over vast territories in

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62 Including uprisings in Aragon between 1580 and 1590 and waves of famine in Valencia when the rural population was hit by the breakdown of the irrigation system after Philip III had decreed the expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609-1614. See Pérez (2007), *Aragón en la Monarquía de Felipe II*; Lomas Cortés (2008), Expulsión de los Moriscos. At the same time, the composite empire was shaken by the 80 years’ war with the Netherlands following the revolt of the Dutch beginning in 1568 of an autonomy-seeking population that made the overseas routes of the Iberians extremely vulnerable after 1600.


66 For a detailed description of the events in the Atlantic and political reactions in Europe, see Parry (1990), *Seaborne Empire*, pp. 254-256.

67 Ladero Quesada (2008), *Indias de Castilla*. 
the Caribbean Rim and North America. Simlar developments in the China Seas will be discussed separately in the following chapters.

**Ming China**

Giving a brief introduction into the main factors influencing the foreign policy of the Middle Kingdom during the reign of the Ming dynasty – nowadays considered the last stage of a strong Chinese empire – is a difficult undertaking, for one because of simplistic failure narratives fed by imperial myths and Cold War-era historiographic constructs. The universal Middle Kingdom with its pyramid-like bureaucratic organisation of vast territory existed with minor changes since the end of the Warring States period and the foundation of the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE). Its long history of political stability has encouraged the view of an ethnically and culturally homogenous empire. Since the nineteenth century it has been popular to attribute the beginning of decline (of universal rule and economic independence) that would ultimately hit rock bottom during the reign of the Qing (清, 1644-1911) to the Ming (1368-1644) period. More recent scholarship has challenged such views by highlighting China’s multiple identities as the interplay of various actors co-existing in relative social stability. From the early seventeenth century onwards, complex relations between the late imperial state (the Emperor and his court eunuchs, officials in the bureaucracy) and gentry elites in (coastal) cities had created a public sphere for negotiation and compromise. In fact, unique political and social compromises for the sake of a certain degree of local autonomy between the imperial dynasties and the elites date back as far as the Song dynasty (960-1279).

Geographically far-reaching economic and diplomatic relations and cultural guidance stand in sharp contrast to the notion of a conservative, despotic and inflexible agrarian state burdened by a protectionist economy,
without serious maritime agendas, and with little interest in the world beyond its vaguely defined borders. In a similar fashion as Habsburg Spain, narratives on Ming China also have to be put into the perspective of the Manila system. Towards the end of the dynasty, growing private maritime trade in the South East Asian macro area challenged China’s traditional foreign exchange patterns. When Asian trading groups established new markets more or less at the same time as certain European regions and Japan became globally integrated, official China was only able to react slowly, if at all.

The Ming rulers inherited political institutions from former dynasties, such as the Yuan dynasty’s elaborate administrative systems. They also adopted the geographic units of the Mongols and adapted them to their own needs: a hierarchical regional government subdivided into provinces, prefectures and sub-prefectures that split up into counties governed by individual magistrates. Another heritage from former dynasties was social stratification in four occupations, or classes, based on neo-Confucian values. The state ideology was not without contradiction: Although all members of society should have been equal, the hierarchical social class structure with different rules for different classes was prejudiced against certain professional groups such as merchants, who were considered a non-productive class. The highest class of intellectuals (師, ch. shì) served as state officials and pulled the strings in court bureaucracy, and enjoyed economical advantages as major landlords, which differentiated them from officials (官, ch. guàn) and people (民, ch. mín). Outside traditional structures of elite culture, different actors from various regions managed to successfully control sea lanes, coasts and maritime trade networks, often embodying the ambivalence of the local/central, official/unofficial, or maritime/domestic. The Emperor, in contrast, eagerly adopted older governing concepts, regarding his power as absolute, unlike European monarchs who negotiated it to some extent with those they ruled.

In light of China’s technological advancement and accomplishments in mastering the sea, generations of historians wondered why the Iberians

71 For a discussion of the frontier debate, see Crossley (ed.) (2006), Empire at the Margins.
73 For more details, see Brook (2010), Troubled Empire, pp. 39-41.
74 Mote (1999), Imperial China, pp. 757-761.
explored America and not technically advanced China. What is more, pioneering Chinese inventions (including the compass and gunpowder) would become symbols of Iberian expansionism, following the Ming decision to withdraw from maritime enterprises after the seven great voyages of the Chinese explorer Zheng He between 1405 and 1433. During the progressive maritime reign of Emperor Yongle (永楽, r. 1398-1424), so-called treasure fleets successfully sailed distances of similar length to those of Iberian sailors and their logistic achievements exceeded those of European seafaring projects by far. Nonetheless, the benefits of these expeditions would prove unsustainable and recruiting new tributary trade partners did not achieve the expected results. As for the question why technologically advanced China did not launch its own industrial revolution, a broad stagnation during the Ming was held accountable. While many scholars see a repressive effect in this sudden withdrawal from the sea, a second line of explanation employs Mark Elvin's 'high-level equilibrium' trap thesis. Mark Elvin convincingly showed that it was China's very wealth and stability that impeded further commercial, economic and technological development after an economic revolution had already occurred under the Southern Song (1127-1279).

Official Chinese anti-maritime attitudes manifested in the Ming’s retreat within China's territorial borders after the construction of the Forbidden City (1406-1420). With loosely defined and constantly changing borders, defence forces became occupied with fighting back the Mongols and the Vietnamese, which accelerated the complete withdrawal from maritime activities. External intervention ended in 1449 with a last border conflict between Burma and Shan. That year is commonly considered the turning point in foreign policies in the south. Thereafter an inwardly oriented Ming dynasty developed its court monopoly on foreign trade, which prohibited all

76 Both David Landes and Eric Jones came to the conclusion that China lacked interest and capacity deriving from the idea of cultural superiority. See Landes (1998), Wealth and Poverty; Jones (2003), European Miracle.
77 The seven sponsored expeditions of Zheng He are often referred to as ‘Eunuch Sanbao’s Voyages to the Western Ocean, 1405-1433’ in popular history. They are also a proof of China’s detailed geographical knowledge at the time.
78 During these expeditions Chinese subjects acted as hegemon abroad: ‘During these voyages Zheng’s fleet subdued a misbehaving Chinese enclave in Sumatra; intervened in a civil war in Java; invaded Sri Lanka and took its captured ruler to China; and wiped out bandits in Sumatra’. Cf. Mann (2011), 1493, p. 124.
79 See Elvin (1973), Pattern of the Chinese Past, pp. 137-172. For a further study see Deng (1999), Premodern Chinese Economy.
Map 2  Ming China
private maritime exchange. While it is often claimed that piracy provoked such drastic steps, a new political-ideological raison d’état initiated by the first Ming Emperor probably played an equally decisive role here.\textsuperscript{80} Considering private overseas trade a major risk to domestic stability, Ming China’s official foreign policies became strongly concerned with security.\textsuperscript{81} As a passive geopolitical player, China prioritised national security over profits from maritime trade.\textsuperscript{82} Since from this perspective the sea presented problems, not opportunities, the state restricted dealing with maritime issues to a trickle. Barbarians were therefore to be dealt with far away from the centre.\textsuperscript{83} Speed in responding to border troubles and keeping foreign matters outside China’s political agenda were both of major importance to the court.

A certain notion of decline, precisely during the reign of Wanli (萬曆, r. 1572-1620), caused by weak imperial leadership, decreasing rural revenue and disobedient court eunuchs, are believed to have had negative effects on late imperial rule.\textsuperscript{84} Ideologically, late Ming patronage of Buddhism is also believed to have affected economic and political decisions.\textsuperscript{85} Although the brisk population increase to 100-150 million people in 1650 spurred by the introduction of crops from the New World may well be considered a sign of prosperity, it primarily meant that imperial bureaucracy would soon lag behind.\textsuperscript{86} With the introduction of more efficient taxation, the dynasty retreated gradually from local affairs and was replaced with a mediating gentry-landlord elite that was neither stagnant nor decadent.

In its own eyes, Ming China remained the centre of its own world, nourished by a centuries-old tradition of Confucian thought.\textsuperscript{87} The concept of the ‘Middle Kingdom versus Barbarian states’, as self-proclaimed hegemony over everything under the sky (天下, ch. \textit{tian xia}), and passive

\textsuperscript{80} Schottenhammer (2009), ‘Vom Mongolischen’, pp. 370-373.
\textsuperscript{81} A report of the Ministry of War of the year 1604 states that South China’s coasts must be cleaned up from evil people, including private traders from Luzon. See Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3135 (accessed 14 March 2013).
\textsuperscript{82} Kang (2010), \textit{East Asia}, pp. 110-112.
\textsuperscript{83} Wills (1979), ‘Maritime China’, p. 215.
\textsuperscript{84} Lieberman (2009), \textit{Strange Parallels}, vol. 2, pp. 504-524; 576-622; Cohen (2000), \textit{East Asia}, p. 221.
\textsuperscript{86} Perkins (1969), \textit{Agricultural Development}, p. 216.
\textsuperscript{87} For the historiography on this phenomenon, see Huang (1988), ‘Lung-Ch’ing’, pp. 511-581. For contemporary scholarship dealing with the historiography on Imperial China’s worldviews, see Ge (2010), \textit{Zhai zi zhongguo}, pp. 116-125.
participation in external trade were the pillars of foreign affairs.88 China’s idea of the world outside its borders is understandable only against the Confucian background of tributary relations and formal acknowledgment of the dynasty that was of extreme significance to the early Ming rulers. According to Wang Gungwu, historian of the Chinese diaspora, the ideological construct described above was the reason why Ming authorities limited their efforts geographically.89 Tribute missions should ideally adhere to the classical pattern of one mission every three years for neighbouring countries and one mission every generation for tribute bearers from distant lands. Foreign relations were limited to exchange with tribute paying states, whose number increased and became a normal means of political interaction. In the course of the fifteenth century, South East Asia increasingly sparked China’s interest and several new tributary relations were established.90 Two crucial doctrines determined the history of the dynasty: First, the non-interference clause of not attacking countries overseas, and second, the maxim that tribute trade should not be exploited for economic gain.91

Ming China’s Political Economy

Ming anti-maritime policies stood in sharp contrast to those of previous dynasties: The Mongols, for instance, allowed private traders to move freely along China’s coasts, before forcing their ever increasing number


89 Wang (1998), ‘Ming Foreign Relations’, pp. 307-308; 311-313: ‘The overseas foreign countries like An-nan, Champa, Korea, Siam, Liu-ch’iu (Ryukyu), Western Oceans, Eastern Oceans (Japan) and the various small countries of the southern man (barbarians) were separated from us by mountains and seas and far away in a corner. Their lands would not produce enough for us to maintain them; their peoples would not usefully serve us if incorporated. If they were so unrealistic as to disturb our borders, it would be unfortunate for them. If they gave us no trouble and we moved our troops to fight them unnecessarily, it would be unfortunate for us. I am concerned that future generations might abuse China’s wealth and power and covet the military glories of the moment to send armies into the field without reason and cause a loss of life.’ This rhetorically interesting quotation is a passage of the opening section of the ancestral injunctions.

90 For a concise summary of the scattered discourses of tributary trade, see Kang (2010), East Asia, pp. 11-13. Kang distinguished between the functional focus of Fairbank’s thesis and a symbolic one as in John E. Wills’s and Keith Taylor’s research.

91 Danjyō (2012), Eiraku tei.
into government service and sending out diplomatic missions to invite foreign traders. In the thirteenth century, coastal ports such as Quanzhou (the ‘Zaitun’ of Marco Polo’s reports) – sometimes referred to as the starting point of the Maritime Silk Road – became a thriving harbour for spice trade and eventually a vibrant centre of trade with South East Asia.92 With the maritime trade proscription policy (海运政策, ch. haijin zhengce) under Emperor Hongwu (洪武, r. 1368-1398), the Chinese state first sought to entirely replace private foreign trade with official government-controlled tribute trade in 1371. An imperial edict of 1436 banned the construction of ocean-going vessels and prohibited maritime activity under the threat of death, before the remaining records of Zheng He’s treasure fleet were destroyed in 1477.93 Foreign countries willing to trade with China were asked to send tribute embassies to the Ming court, where they then had to present themselves as subordinates paying tribute to the Ming Emperor.

Tributary trade was first and foremost a diplomatic act. Giving tribute was considered an act of submission. Its ideological importance expressed itself in the Ming Emperor’s formal investiture of local rulers. The ceremony itself reflected the principle of the relationship that ‘was characterised as one between a superior and subordinate power’.94 In addition, these loyal principalities could hereafter count on China as a protective power in the event of an external attack. Hence expensive tribute trade enterprises became a long-term investment. Any contact with foreign states was institutionalised and nothing was left to chance. A number of supervising institutions, including the Superintendencies of Maritime Shipping (市舶司, ch. shibo si) and the Ministry of Rites (礼部), one of six ministries, as well as native officials guarding the regulations of tribute of the Ming Code, regulated the frequency of contact with ‘Barbarian’ states, the number of embassy staff and travel routes. At the end of the sixteenth century, a further tax-supervising institution was added to the list.95

Whereas only certain commodities were officially traded by means of tributary exchange, the system included an option for less-restricted exchange: tribute goods were divided into ‘official tribute goods’ (sent to the Emperor) and ‘private commodities’ for commercial exchange in the Beijing Assembly Hall (北京礼堂) and could be sold at its port of entry.

92 Lin (1987), Ming mo, pp. 38-42, illustrates how Portuguese private traders used Quanzhou as market place. For more detail, see the contributions to Schottenhammer (ed.) (2001), Emporium of the World.
after the payment of a commission. As a rule, 60 per cent of the cargo was bartered with by the Superintendency. The office already existed in Quanzhou in the Song period.96 Under its supervision, foreign trade was possible as long as the rules and rites set up by the Chinese authorities were obeyed. In the course of Ming rule these offices were repeatedly closed and re-established, sometimes coming under the control of eunuchs. According to the Dongxi Yangkao official goods entering China via the tributary route at the beginning of the seventeenth century included rhinoceros and water buffalo horns, bird nests, tortoise shell, aromatics, decoration, sulphur, precious woods, rare minerals, herbs, and fabrics.97

During the course of the sixteenth century, foreign trade policies gradually changed. According to John E. Wills, in the first two decades of the sixteenth century ships from South East Asian tributary states were allowed to come as often as they wished without regard for limitations of time and number specified in the regulations of the tribute system, and their trade was taxed. They were directed by eunuchs, who were especially interested in obtaining rare imports for the palace.98 From the 1530s onwards, trading ships other than tribute-carrying vessels were allowed to trade with private merchants (e.g. Portuguese) after part of the cargo had been appropriated to pay for the import tariff.99 The Ming introduced a system of licensed trade based on certificates (勘合, ch. kanhe, jp. kangō) certificates.100 These certificates were issued in duplicate: one was kept with the Superintendency in China, the other with the licensed foreign ship.101 In compliance with former tribute trade, the modified licence system continued to exclude Japan from official exchange and functioned until around 1620.102 It helped the court to monopolise the sale and distribution of certain products and to collect taxes on trade and transportation to a certain extent. At the same time

96 Schottenhammer (2002), Songzeitliche Quanzhou, pp. 88-145.
100 Schottenhammer (2007), ‘East Asian Maritime World’, pp. 24-25. The author summarises late Ming foreign affairs. She distinguishes three types of maritime trade administration: ‘(1) the administration of tribute ships in the traditional sense; (2) the administration of Chinese ships sailing overseas from Haicheng in Fujian, which were obliged to pay taxes there; and (3) the administration of merchant ships that came to Guangzhou and Macao to trade their commodities’.
time, China’s foreign economy gradually displayed a non-Beijing-centred spirit driven by complex dimensions on the local level.103 In terms of internal dynamics, various studies have emphasised the gradual integration of local production and distribution centres into a larger market. Particular focus has been laid on the Yangzi delta.104 It is fair to conclude that the arrival of Europeans contributed to a liberalisation of maritime trade in coastal China, although that certainly did not happen overnight.

Because the traditional tribute trade framework had become unsustainable by the early sixteenth century, trade relations must be treated with caution when drawing conclusions regarding the Manila system. In a similar fashion, scholars remain sceptical about the role of tributary trade for economic developments, which, according to Takeshi Hamashita, remained important for China’s maritime sphere long into the seventeenth century.105 Stressing tremendous amounts of smuggling and other forms of non-state trade, Gang Deng provocatively speaks of ‘disguised staple trade’ in his study on the ambiguous relationship between state and merchants in China,106 while David Kang even doubts the tributary trade’s mere existence (ironically, despite believing in its stabilising effect).107 Timothy Brook, in turn, insists that ‘tribute and trade were able to sustain each other so long as state diplomacy and foreign trade did not run into conflict’.108

Repositioning in an Emerging Global World

Recurring inflation and destabilisation of the Ming paper money-based monetary system after the 1450s triggered changes in the ownership of land. A permanent outflow of copper coins increased the demand for silver all over the country.109 Limited domestic resources stimulated demand for importing ever-increasing amounts of silver, so that in 1567 the Ming reign under Emperor Longqing (隆慶, r. 1567-1572) ultimately suspended the official prohibition on foreign maritime trade. Emperor Longqing took over

105 Hamashita (2008), ‘Despotism and Decentralization’, p. 29. He argues that by the end of the sixteenth century the tributary system was firmly established as external administrative order with a high amount of interdependence from the Ming and its loyal neighbours.
108 Brook (2010), Troubled Empire, p. 220.
109 Schottenhammer (2007), ‘East Asian Maritime World’, p. 19: ‘The opening of trade was not a reaction to piracy but the consequence of socio-economic transformations inside the country, in particular land loss of small peasants.’
from the decadent rule of cruel Emperor Jiajing (嘉靖, r. 1521-1567), who was said to have shown little interest in state affairs. From the 1560s onwards, a change in the fiscal system stipulated that in principle all land taxes were to be paid in silver. Tax payments were converted into silver (一条鞭法, ch. yitiao bianfa, literally ‘single whip’) in the 1570s.110 Between 1550 and 1645 approximately 7300 metric tons of New World and Japanese silver were imported to China. This development motivated scholars of previous decades to speak of a ‘silver century’ for the period of China’s large-scale imports,111 when the country became globally integrated due to monetary transactions based on silver.112

Gradually, maritime trade prohibitions (海禁, ch. haijin) were suspended for Fujian province and the policy of opening maritime commerce (开海, ch. kaihai) was introduced.113 Cumbersome pirate raids, constant pressure on the north-western border and the eventual arrival of the Mongol leader Altan Khan in the outskirts of Beijing in 1550 were the main reasons why the Ming permitted mutual and visiting trade that would come to exist simultaneously with tribute trade practices. As a consequence of the Ming government’s new orientation towards foreign trade, 50 licences per year were handed out to private merchants for overseas trade with South East Asia. In 1575, 100 licences (the number was restricted to 88 by 1589) were issued for vessels containing some 20,000 tons of cargo space.114

Hereafter, a minor proportion of the formerly illicit trade activities of the South and East China Sea were technically given official approval. Haicheng (海澄, a.k.a. Moon Harbor, 月港, ch. Yuegang/Yüeh-kang) near Zhangzhou (漳州) in Fujian, a former outlaw entrepôt, was opened for maritime trade in 1567.115 In such coastal peripheries, smuggling trade and the construction of junks with double masts had flourished for decades. Private merchants circumvented the tight restrictions and offshore China’s exchange with Siam and Japan prospered. The court was aware of the permanent private exchange, but turned a blind eye to it as long as private foreign traders were

111 Of this amount, Japanese silver totalled between 3622 and 3803 metric tons. Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 120.
115 Brook (2010), Troubled Empire, pp. 223-224; Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 24; Haicheng’s eventual opening to maritime trade has been considered crucial for the economic transformation of the Fujianese coast.
hindered from entering the hinterland and social peace was maintained.\footnote{Clark (2002), Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 167: ‘There was a direct connection between the growth of the local pottery industry and the expanding volume of South Seas trade through Quanzhou. Pottery [...] was sent throughout the South Seas trade routes. The Zhufan Zhi, for example, lists pottery among goods sent to destinations in modern Indonesia, the Philippines, Indochina, and the Malay Peninsula.’}

One exception occurred in 1547 when the court in Beijing ordered a blockade of illegal trade in Fujian after a number of former high officials became deeply involved in private trade.\footnote{Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 34.} However, the Fujianese coastal defence was weak and dependent on poorly skilled military personnel that lacked proper war junks.\footnote{Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, pp. 14-15.}

The century-long quasi-rejection of foreign trade is also reflected in the Ming court’s failure to turn the pirates of the Southern Seas into merchants, a popular strategy within state-building processes in other regions.\footnote{Braudel (1982), Civilization and Capitalism, vol. 2, p. 164; Andaya (2004), ‘Interactions’, pp. 1-57.} Actors of illicit trade networks trying to profit from their skills in less complicated systems included outlaws, business people and sailors.\footnote{Ptak (2007), Maritime Seidenstraße, pp. 277-289; Reid (1999), Charting, pp. 1-14.} While the line between legal and illegal foreign trade remained blurred, people who simply wanted to escape the burden of the strict societal system went with the tide.\footnote{The situation is nowadays often bluntly described as ‘merchants were pirates, pirates were merchants’. Mann (2011), 1493, p. 126.}

John E. Wills once remarked, ‘to the Chinese state all these people were “pirates”’.\footnote{Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 34.} By definition, the interaction, collaboration, and links within these private networks are difficult to trace due to a scarcity of written sources and the overlapping levels of business, smuggling and raiding. The latter included attacks on Chinese cities with the help of Japanese sailors \textit{(倭寇, jp. wakō)}, the archenemies of the Chinese regime.\footnote{Wo kou (ch.) or wakō (jp.) or wae-gu (kor.) literally means ‘Japanese bandit’. But most of the time, these groups had more Chinese sailors than Japanese sailors.} The question of how these permeable Chinese trading communities merged with Japanese wakō, resulting in Sino-Japanese joint ventures, will accompany us throughout this book. Their network-like structures facilitated transportation and communication, most notably thanks to naval collaborations based on an elaborate junk trade.\footnote{For the development of Chinese vessels (junks) and their operations in the China Seas, see Kojima (2006), Umi kara mita, pp. 28-29.} While the ban on foreign trade for ships of various sizes and cargoes was lifted in 1578 and taxation on foreign trade regulated,
the export of nitrates, sulphur, copper, and iron from China remained officially prohibited.125 At the end of the sixteenth century, maritime trade remained severely controlled with trading regulations, examinations, and reports of cargoes and guarantors.126

In this (unstoppable) process of integrating the Chinese economy globally via Asian port cities, the interplay between silver and silk cannot be stressed enough. In fact, I dare say Chinese silk played a similarly important role as the notorious American and Japanese silver flows to China. Permanent foreign demand for silk was said to have encouraged Chinese peasants to give up rice growing for the sake of mulberry cultivation, while others commercialised rice production in order to feed those working in sericulture.127 Sericulture reached a new level in both quantity and quality during the Ming period. Silk weaving, export, and quality increased, and especially skilful embroidery, brocade silk, and satin robes became extremely popular.128

Organised smuggling became particularly notorious along the southeastern coast around the mid-sixteenth century when wealthy smugglers of coastal regions such as Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang were integrated into prosperous trade relations in the China Seas and against government officials.129 In that period, the Chinese outlaw Wang Zhi (王直, jp. Ō Choku, a.k.a. King of Huizhou to the Iberians) controlled an impressive commercial network, including the waters between China and Japan, and attacked the Korean Peninsula in 1555.130 Sea rovers and pirates were not the only group eroding trade restrictions. Local authorities openly voiced discontent with court authorities towards the end of the sixteenth century. For instance, Zhang Han, Governor of Guangdong and Guangxi, considered liberal trade with South East Asia a mutually beneficial alternative to the practice of exchanging silver and silk for Mongolian horses.131 This dualistic seesaw of restrictive regulations and unattended loopholes in the last third of

129 For a summary of the events, see Mann (2011), 1493, pp. 130-133. See also Deng (1997), *Chinese Maritime Activities*, pp. 88-90, where he discusses the frequency and strength of armed smuggling, international connectedness, and support from government officials and influential families.
131 Horses were a very important commodity in maritime exchange, especially in Ming tributary trade. Roderich Ptak has surveyed the logistics and driving forces behind it. He showed
the Ming dynasty eventually also benefited other marginal groups in the China Seas. The Portuguese presence on Macao, where they had established a permanent trading outpost for an annual rent of 500 taels, further accelerated regional economic liberalisation.\(^{132}\) Although the Portuguese settlement was small – a few hundred Europeans lived among the local Chinese and their slaves – and although its political and economic elites were heavily supervised by Chinese authorities and trade often interrupted by commercial restrictions (as in 1631), the Portuguese played a key role in integrating Cantonese trade in the East China Sea.\(^{133}\) In contrast, Fujianese private traders came to dominate South East Asian markets and to partially control commercial exchange. Increased trading activity led to the emergence of the famous Chinese overseas communities (華僑, ch. huaqiao),\(^{134}\) populated by the first wave of Chinese emigration to South East Asia.\(^{135}\) Huaqiao proto-colonies emerged in major trading centres such as Ayutthaya, Melaka (Malacca), and Manila, all essential stopping points for European seafarers.\(^{136}\)

A few final comments on Fujian as the equivalent for local/peripheral China in the Manila system are necessary. Tasked with restoring peace along the coast, Fujian’s supreme commanders and Grand Coordinators (巡撫, ch. xunfu) enjoyed an unprecedented military and financial autonomy on the provincial level. Cheng Wei-chung (鄭維中) described how they collaborated with locals in order that local mercenaries could enjoy the right to levy and reinvest revenue from new taxes independently from Beijing.\(^{137}\) Despite its rather distinctive cultural and socio-political features, Fujian was not a society defined by its avoidance of the state, and

133 Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 35 has stated that the date 1557 no longer counts as certain. In Chinese sources that date is only found once in relation with the Portuguese acquisition. The name of the settlement derives from ‘Amagao’ (Cape of Ama). Ama was a nickname for the goddess Mazu.
134 Huaqiao (ch.) or kakyō (jp.) originally refers to Chinese migrants of Han origin including Cantonese, Hokkien etc.; It is still used for Chinese ethnicities residing outside China. For the historical development of Overseas Chinese communities in South East Asia that gained specific momentum during the eighteenth century, see Sugaya (2001), ‘Tōshobu’, pp. 211-238.
135 For the economic importance of the sixteenth-century Southern Chinese diaspora, see Wang (2008), ‘China Seas’, pp. 7-22.
no tendencies towards separation existed.\textsuperscript{138} Ng Chin-Keong’s study has shown that in rural Fujian agricultural output increased due to innovation and the gradual introduction of cash crops such as indigo and tobacco in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, despite the region’s mountainous topography. Subsequent mid-seventeenth-century growth of market relations allowed the Fujianese economy to prosper once foreign trade was possible; but only then.\textsuperscript{139} A lack of serious investment in land and competition in the manufacturing sector with other parts of China were two factors limiting wealth deriving from intra-village commercial agriculture. Moreover, success abroad depended on integrative patterns of domestic silk trade, supply, and transportation from sericulture centres in Eastern China.

\textbf{Azuchi-Momoyama/Tokugawa Japan}

Early modern state formation, as one of the key concepts of the Manila system, also took place in Japan, even if many scholars doubt whether Tokugawa period (1603-1868) and even less so Azuchi-Momoyama period (1573-1603) Japan can be considered a state due to the absence of a national judiciary.\textsuperscript{140} Since a consolidation of power was still underway at the end of the sixteenth century, Japan indeed differed from the two other entities. Nonetheless, at the end of the century widespread economic and political transformation processes accomplished countrywide unification, while Asian and Western rulers recognised Japanese military leaders as central authorities.\textsuperscript{141}


\textsuperscript{139} Ng (1983), \textit{Trade and Society}, pp. 9-30: Noteworthy agricultural innovations include terrace building for increased rice harvest and the introduction of both sweet potatoes and peanuts from Luzon in the late sixteenth century, granting high yield (p. 10).

\textsuperscript{140} See among others Jansen (2002), \textit{Making}, p. 60; Lieberman (2009), \textit{Strange Parallels}, vol. 2, p. 437. Lieberman points out that regional integration and the idea of ‘one state’ in Japan was not yet very advanced even in the mid-Tokugawa era. The word ‘\textit{kuni}’ still referred less often to Japan as a whole than to one regional domain.

\textsuperscript{141} I endorse Michael Lewis on the subject of the Tokugawa central power in foreign affairs, when he notes: ‘The bakufu usually spoke for an entire “country” in conducting diplomacy in Asia and later with Western nations. Although a few domains at times engaged in “foreign” contacts […] mainly for trading purposes, this was usually done with bakufu permission, or at least its sufferance. The fact that regional Asian and Western states recognized that the bakufu represented "Japan," and that domain governments acceded, however passively, to Edo’s right to
The century before that was all but stable as civil war ravaged the entire archipelago during the Warring States period (戦国, jp. sengoku).142 During the Ōnin War (1467-1477), when two members of the ruling Ashikaga family (leaders of the Ashikaga 足利 a.k.a. Muromachi 室町 shogunate, 1336-1573) struggled over succession to the shogunal title, two camps of major regional lords (守護, jp. shugo, a.k.a. constable daimyō) emerged in central Japan. Many shugo, who were traditionally based in Kyoto, left the capital and returned to their provinces where they battled to increase their individual influence. In a period of political fragmentation and social unrest both smaller local lords (大名, jp. daimyō) and local organisations grew stronger. With the breakdown of both shogunal and imperial power at the beginning of the sixteenth century, huge parts of Japan came under the control of several warring local lords (戦国大名, jp. sengoku daimyō), who managed to subdue large contingents of warriors into vassals.143 Economic advancement in certain regions, such as the Kinai area on Western Honshū, was a further by-product of these political shifts that led to a heterogeneous net of influential stakeholders and supra-regional corporations,144 as well as Buddhist military elites.145

In the second half of the sixteenth century, Oda Nobunaga (織田信長, 1534-1582), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉, 1536-1598), and Tokugawa Ieyasu (徳川家康, 1542-1616) eventually overcame power struggles within the military-feudal system thanks to clever military strategies and the economic strength of their domains.146 The Oda-Toyotomi hegemony and the formative period of the Tokugawa shogunate both overthrew older ruling

set “foreign policy” further attests to the emergence of a new center of unprecedented political authority.’ Lewis (2009), ‘Center and Periphery’, p. 431.
142 The Warring States period was a time of warfare and social disruption. The main characteristic of the period was local autonomy that enabled local lords to extend their territorial power by vassalage/land tenure. For a history of the political and economic turnover, see Nagahara, Yamamura (1981), ‘Sengoku Daimyō’, pp. 27-63.
143 Souyri (2001), World Turned Upside Down. Although his work has sometimes been criticised for being not empirical enough and providing too little evidence, it ranks with good reason among leading scholarship in Japanese anthropology. For influential regional families such as the Oda, Shimazu, Gohōjō, Uesugi, Takeda, Imagawa, and Mōri, see Ōishi (1991), ‘Bakuhan System’, p. 12.
144 They were often comprised of commoners, bandits, and free peasants active in economic or village affairs, as well as urban communities and pirates. For further details, see Kade Troost (1997), ‘Peasants, Elites, and Villages’, pp. 91-109.
principles and reunified the country. Technically speaking, however, the civil war continued (although with longer periods of peace) until the end of the summer campaign at Osaka in 1615 that marked the beginning of more than two hundred years of the Pax Tokugawa (天下太平, jp. tenka taihei), mainly understood as a framework for early modern growth.

Oda Nobunaga extended his power from Shiba in Owari province (present-day Aichi prefecture) by defeating Imagawa Yoshimoto, lord of the Tōkaidō area, in 1560. After proclaiming his loyalty to the Ashikaga Shogun, he moved into Kyoto and built a castle at Azuchi in 1576. From there he launched his campaign to unify the country. Until his assassination by a vassal in 1582, he partly accomplished the disempowerment of militant Buddhist forces (一向宗, jp. ikkō shū). After having unified vast parts of the country, he proclaimed his intention to conquer China (天下統一, jp. tenka tōitsu) in 1582. He was also the first central ruler who took up communication with Europeans and negotiated with Christian missionaries – most likely because of his fascination for European weaponry that had proved to be advantageous for his military campaigns. Moreover, historians claim that European missionaries served as a welcome counterbalance to strong Buddhist ikkō sects.

As early as 1567, Oda Nobunaga passed an order for free markets and guilds that technically legalised earlier trade practices of powerful daimyō. In addition, he introduced a uniform grain measurement, which is considered the first step towards national economic growth. The process of standardisation of weights and measures was just one of Nobunaga’s initiatives completed by his successor Toyotomi Hideyoshi (r. 1582-1598), who avenged Nobunaga’s murder before defeating his own opponents across the archipelago. In 1584 Hideyoshi subdued Tokugawa Ieyasu, who sought to extend his power from the Mikawa region (also in modern Aichi prefecture), in 1585 Chōsokabe in Shikoku, the Shimazu in Kyushu in 1587, and the

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149 Owada (1989), Okehazama.
150 Azuchi and Momoyama stand for the castles in which the two unifiers resided.
151 Such as an association on Mt. Hiei or the ikkō sect that had been active throughout the country. See Ooms (1985), Tokugawa Ideology, pp. 21: 35-39.
152 In this context, it bears mentioning that Japan became the only early modern gun-manufacturing country in East Asia. For the introduction of rifles and weapons into Japan and Nobunaga’s early successes, see Varley (2007), ‘Oda Nobunaga’, pp. 105-125.
Gohōjō of Odawara (Kanagawa) in 1590.\textsuperscript{156} Becoming imperial regent (関白, jp. kanpaku) in 1585, Hideyoshi could henceforth count on the patronage of the imperial court in Kyoto. Acting in the name of the Emperor (天皇, jp. tennō, a.k.a. 内裏, jp. dairi, in many Iberian sources referring to the imperial palace in Kyoto), he was eventually appointed lord of the lords (太閤, jp. taikō), underlining his military strength in 1592. Although these titles did not provide him with a legitimate position for acting as central ruler, he issued numerous decrees aimed at economic and social reforms as primus inter pares between 1582 and 1598. With the help of the military class and by reinforcing the neo-Confucian idea of four castes, samurai, farmer, artisan and merchant (士農工商, jp. shi-nō-kō-shō), later simplified to a distinction between warriors and peasants, Hideyoshi established firm control over a stratified society. Only the top samurai caste was entitled to use weapons, following the so-called sword hunted edict of 1588 in which Hideyoshi prohibited private warfare.\textsuperscript{157} When Toyotomi Hideyoshi passed away in 1598, his life-long opponent, Tokugawa Ieyasu, another vassal of Oda Nobunaga, seized the opportunity to rise to power by succeeding Hideyoshi as dominant leader over vast parts of the unified Japan.\textsuperscript{158}

**Political Economy – Tokugawa seiken**

In the long run, the Toyotomi-Tokugawa regimes managed to eliminate opponent regional centres and installed firm control from bases in central Honshu. Despite being traditionally portrayed as counterparts, Hideyoshi’s and Ieyasu’s politics reveal astonishing parallels: they both focused on turning Japan into a maritime player, on monopolising foreign trade, and eagerly redefined Japan’s relations with China. In addition, several of Hideyoshi’s unfinished state-building projects such as the yield system (石高, jp. kokudaka), a means for taxation of farming based on land measurement and fiscal reforms in the 1590s, as well as the separation of warriors and peasants in the status system (身分, jp. mibun) were eventually realised by the Tokugawa shogunate.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{156} For a more detailed description of Hideyoshi’s efforts to secure absolute power, see Asao (1991), ‘Sixteenth-Century Unification’, pp. 53–55; Asao (2004), Toyotomi, Tokugawa no seifu kenyoku.

\textsuperscript{157} Umi no katanagari (maritime disarming), see Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 2.


\textsuperscript{159} On how the war and innovations in the tax system transformed the Japanese state in that period, see Nakabayashi (2012), ‘Rise of a Japanese Fiscal State’, pp. 380–381. For more elaborate Tokugawa economic reforms, see Robert Bellah’s classic Tokugawa Religion. He argues that Ishida
Map 3  Azuchi-Momoyama/Tokugawa Japan

- Han name (Daimyō name)
- Town

Scale 1:20,020,000
Tokugawa Ieyasu enforced law and order throughout the country and established his political supremacy based on the shogunate system of rule (幕藩, jp. *bakuhàn*). Accordingly, individual rights and political freedom of the *daimyō* had to be curtailed in favour of the predominance of the Shogun. In all these years, the preeminent authority of the Emperor, with his divine lineage similar to the Chinese emperors, formally stood above any other stakeholder in the country. Although weakened by various factors, in reality the Emperor was a crucial factor for improving Ieyasu’s power base inside the country. In 1603, three years after the Battle of Sekigahara in which the Tokugawa warriors and allies defeated their opponents, the western army of Ishida Mitsunari (石田三成), the Emperor granted Tokugawa Ieyasu the title Great Barbarian-Suppressing General (*sei’i* *taishōgun*).

Being accepted to the independent position of Shogun laid the foundation for the political framework that would back his power. Marius Jansen has pointed out the importance of keeping the court in Kyoto out of all military affairs. In theory, Ieyasu administered the policy of direct land holdings (天領, jp. *tenryō*) on behalf of the Emperor, which covered about one-fifth of Japan, including the major cities. Thereafter, Edo was chosen as the shogunal residence and new military capital. Together with numerous other castle towns all over the archipelago, it hosted an emerging merchant class and boosted the domestic economy, which benefitted from other reforms, such as the minting of a national currency. In a further step, Ieyasu turned the shogunate into a hereditary office: After only two years in office he passed the title of Shogun to his third son, Hidetada. Nonetheless, Ieyasu continued to pull the strings as retired Shogun (大御所, jp. *ōgosho*) from his residence in Sunpu 駿府, in today’s Shizuoka prefecture. In 1613, relations with the court were regulated by a set of decrees, including instructions for court officials and the restriction of the Emperor’s military involvement.

The Emperor was widely deprived of his political powers and his duties were

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Baigan’s efforts in co-opting merchant productivity and eventually revitalising merchants was instrumental for seventeenth-century economic growth in Japan.

161 The term stands for ‘barbarian-subduing general’.
165 The system of primogeniture was established to avoid future dynastic conflicts. Hall (1995), ‘Bakuhan System’, pp. 164-165.
restricted to symbolic and ceremonial tasks, such as assigning era names (年号, jp. nengō) and cultural obligations.\textsuperscript{167} For the years prior to 1615, the presence of Hideyoshi’s underage son and his mother overshadowed the Tokugawa regime by continuing to claim their right to govern the country and were therefore kept prisoners in the Castle of Osaka. Tokugawa manoeuvring power remained limited until they eventually defeated the Toyotomi loyalists in the previously mentioned Battle of Osaka of 1614-1615.\textsuperscript{168}

By introducing an all-state economy, the Tokugawa regime reorganised political administration and consolidated the domestic economy, largely based on the Kanto-Kyoto axis.\textsuperscript{169} Subsequent reforms were further backed by neo-Confucian principles of morality.\textsuperscript{170} By 1600, after having seized the lands of 91 daimyō who had opposed him prior and during the Battle of Sekigahara, Ieyasu and his clan controlled over a quarter of Japan’s agricultural production.\textsuperscript{171} Mining was another source for shogunal revenue. Bullion mines throughout Japan, confiscated by Hideyoshi as part of his economic consolidation program, were increasingly exploited under the Tokugawa. In the 1610s, they had access to 50 gold mines and 30 silver mines, of which the mines of Iwami, Ikuno, and Sado were the most productive.\textsuperscript{172} The Tokugawa gained control over the silver and copper that was refined in Nagasaki.\textsuperscript{173} These commodities would help them to become an important player on the Asian market at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

167 Japanese historians have argued that pre-modern Japan was politically characterised by a separation of authority and power between the tennō and the ruling warrior class. Takagi (2003), \textit{Shogun kenyōku}.

168 For a comprehensive account on the establishment of the Tokugawa reign and the conflicts with Hideyoshi’s party, see Hall (1993), ‘Bakuhan system’, pp. 149-161.

169 Ōishi summarises the key elements of the bakuhan system, the Tokugawa polity that was firmly consolidated by Tokugawa Iemitsu, as follows: ‘manipulating daimyō, managing the imperial court, controlling foreign relations, and sacralizing the Tokugawa legacy’. Ōishi (1991), ‘Bakuhan-System’, p. 22; Sakudo (1989), ‘Search of the Origins’, p. 40.

170 A new branch of secular intellectuals, most famously Hayashi Razan, who served the Bakufu as advisor for more than 50 years until his death in 1657, propagated teachings of neo-Confucian morals. For a concise summary see Ooms (1985), \textit{Tokugawa Ideology}, pp. 63-79.


173 The export of huge amounts of Japanese silver led to bottlenecks in Japan’s domestic supply and in 1688 eventually to an export prohibition. As a consequence, copper export increased during the eighteenth century. For Dutch participation in this lucrative commerce, see Shimada (2005), ‘Intra-Asian Trade’.
ruled their individual domains, to swear alliance to the Tokugawa.\textsuperscript{174} Those *daimyō* did not only differ according to the size of their domains (藩, *han*) and annual income, but also by prestige and influence. Both direct vassals (譜代, *fudai*), who descended from Ieyasu’s retainers before Sekigahara, and the old-established Tokugawa clan members of Owari (western part of Aichi prefecture), Kii (around present day Wakayama and Mie prefecture), and Mito (Ibaraki) enjoyed greater political influence than ordinary vassals outside these areas (外様大名, *tozama daimyō*).

Restricting power on the local level was by nature the most important step towards effective central rule for the Tokugawa lords, who were only the dominant leaders of the *tenka* (天下, here referring to the whole country) and largest landholder in the feudal state. Measures included that *daimyō* were no longer allowed to deal with foreign powers, nor could they build new fortifications or undertake military action without authorisation. Instead, they had to commit their resources to the Bakufu by supporting construction projects or submitting information.\textsuperscript{175} Most *daimyō* realised the advantages of the new system in terms of political and economic security, and came to terms with it by finding ways to retain considerable autonomy.\textsuperscript{176} Further intrinsic principles of the *bakuhan* order included the alternate attendance (参勤交代, *sankin kōtai*) of all *daimyō* after 1634. This measure required every *daimyō* to spend alternate years in Edo and to leave his family as hostage behind when in his own domain and has been regarded a further reason for economic, institutional, and intellectual growth on a countrywide level.\textsuperscript{177}

On this account, common labels like ‘centralised feudalism’ or static absolutism are ill suited for the *bakuhan*. Historian John Whitney Hall emphasises strong uniformity in social, economic, and religious matters under Tokugawa rule as evidence for national entity.\textsuperscript{178} In contrast, recent

\textsuperscript{174} Fukaya (1981), *Bakuhansei*, pp. 2-5.
\textsuperscript{175} Hall (1991), ‘Bakuhan System’, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{176} Lieberman (2009), *Strange Parallels*, vol. 2, p. 442.
\textsuperscript{178} The concept has been heavily debated among scholars and is no longer considered state-of-the-art. Hall (1991), ‘Bakuhan System’, pp. 128-182. Hall argued that Japan was not a feudal system. However, given that domestic political structures of Tokugawa Japan play no particular role here, I use it for pragmatic reasons. For a discussion of the topic and more accurate concepts, I refer to Lewis, ‘Center and Periphery’, pp. 431-432. See also Ikegami (1995), *Taming of the Samurai*. Hayami (2004), ‘Introduction’, pp. 18; 22; 31, describes how this error occurred: Rai Sanyo argued in the early nineteenth century in a popular history book that the traditional Japanese system was that of *hōken* polity. During the Meiji restoration, the term *hōken* was translated to ‘feudalism’ by Western historians. Hayami Akira criticised describing the Japanese rural order as feudal,
scholarship, for instance research by Mark Ravina, has challenged the notion of a centralised Tokugawa Japan that set the policies for religion, taxation, and commerce for the entire country, by revealing independent developments in local domains and shedding light on feudal structures based on politico-economic conjunctions. While Ravina does not question the Bakufu’s monopoly over foreign relations, Robert Hellyer extended the decentralisation thesis to Tokugawa foreign relations. A similarly distinctive dual nature of local-central dynamics also holds centre stage for Japan’s integration into the Manila trade.

Repositioning between two Worlds

Despite China’s indirect impact on Japan’s trade and diplomacy and regardless of a far-reaching Sinification over the centuries since the introduction of rice, script, governing institutions, and religious trends from or via the Middle Kingdom, the popular image of Japan as China’s little brother did not exist in early modern Asia, nor was Japanese identity based on China. Indeed, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu accepted the symbolical title ‘King of Japan’ after 1402 and thereupon the Ashikaga shogunate sent 11 official missions through authorised ships until the middle of the sixteenth century. Politically the Japanese were never really at ease with Chinese leadership over the Confucian society in East Asia and during the entire period studied here, Japan was reluctant to accept the Middle Kingdom’s claim to superiority. In fact, the Japanese habit of placing themselves on the same level as the

despite admitting parallels of Tokugawa Japan and Europe such as powerful lords who ruled over territorial domains and a society in which military and agricultural classes were not yet separated. See also Ching (2009), ‘Japan in Asia’, p. 432.

179 For institutional diffusion of power, see among others Ravina (1999), Land and Lordship.
181 In the realm of Japan’s China trade, we must not underestimate the enormous potential of indirect contact in port cities. See Okamoto (2008), ‘Foreign Policy’, pp. 35-55. As for the common view of Japan as China’s little brother, historians like John W. Hall and George Elison shaped that image in the West during the second half of the twentieth century. Elison (1972), Deus Destroyed.
182 Kang (1997), Diplomacy and Ideology, pp. 32-33: Although Ashikaga Yoshimitsu desired to establish formal relations with Ming China, initially he was not accepted as head of Japan. Only after providing an appropriate letter (票, ch. piao) in which Japan accepted Chinese centrality and the Chinese calendar for official correspondence did the Ashikaga became a tributary of the Ming in 1402 and were allowed to send state letters with the title of ‘King of Japan’ (日本国王, jp. nihon koku ō). See also Imatani (2000), Muromachi jidai.
Chinese Emperor dates back to the seventh century. 183 For most of history, Sino-Japanese relations remained ambivalent. 184 Csaba Oláh has shown that 'diplomatic disagreements' already existed during Ashikaga rule, when the warrior class developed a 'Sino-Japanese diplomatic culture' of foreign exchange. 185 The Japanese applied a specific procedure when preparing and sending embassies to the Ming court, that included diplomatic documents and certificates (勘合, ch. kanhe, jp. kangō), also known as tallies. 186 In his brilliant study, Csaba Oláh has demonstrated how at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Japanese envoys became increasingly irritated about how they were treated by Chinese officials. 187

Amidst the confusion of the civil wars in Japan, the powerful Ōuchi clan seized the tallies from the Ashikaga and thereafter established a monopoly on tributary trade with China, which the shogunate acknowledged in 1516. 188 A crucial moment in the process of Japan's repositioning and breakaway from the Middle Kingdom's system of tribute was the so-called Ningbo Incident. 189 In 1523, when the tribute missions of two different Japanese noble families, Hosokawa (細川) and Ōuchi (大内) arrived at Ningbo (宁波, in Zhejiang province, 浙江), the official entry port for the Japanese, a dispute broke out between the two rival groups. When they were consequently denied access, several of the desperate Japanese traders and sailors plundered the nearby area. Once the Ming court was informed about this violent incident, it ordered a suppression of all trade with the Japanese. This incident had

183 Leading research on these matters has been carried out by Tanaka Takeo. See, for instance, the 2005 edition of Zenkindai.
184 See Schottenhammer (2007), 'East Asian Maritime World', pp. 22-23: According to Chinese sources, exaggerated striving for tribute caused the incident. The Japanese were accused of being solely interested in trade and profit, and not showing sincere subordination to the Chinese Emperor. As a result, trade relations with Japan were suspended until 1539-1540.
185 Oláh (2009), Räuberische Chinesen.
186 The same monks would also draft Hideyoshi’s correspondence with foreign rulers. See Asao (1991), ‘Sixteenth-Century Unification’, p. 69.
187 Oláh (2009), Räuberische Chinesen, pp. 55-57: Correspondence between these two parties (1539) reveals the very inflexible rules that were applied in dealings with Japanese merchants. Other recent research on the development of diplomatic relations in East Asia include Itō (2008), ‘Japan and Ryukyu’, pp. 79-99.
188 Sugimoto, Swain (1978), Science.
189 Zhu (2013), Xing guan zhong guo. Zhu Lili revisited Sino-Japanese relations within the framework of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century tributary relations with a specific focus on the actors in thriving port and temple cities.
a lasting impact on official relations: tributary trade ended when the last mission was received in China between 1547 and 1549.\textsuperscript{190}

During the following decades, a newly awakened self-conscience in diplomatic relations that was expressed in advances towards the Ming and entirely new Japanese diplomatic adventures in South East Asia grew in conjunction with the warlords’ success in centralising Japan.\textsuperscript{191} Toyotomi Hideyoshi provoked China with his infamous invasions of Korea in 1592 and 1598 (文禄の役, jp. \textit{bunroku no eki}, and 庆长の役, jp. \textit{keichō no eki} in Japanese sources and the Imjin/Chouyu War in Korean and Western sources, discussed later). Long before, the revival of pirate raids (labelled late \textit{wakō} activity in Japanese historiography) determined official trade with the Ming. It reached its peak when unemployed warriors who were well trained in the use of weapons and experienced at sea after Nobunaga’s success in maritime battles raided the China Seas in the 1560s and 1570s.\textsuperscript{192} We may therefore say that these groups show overlapping features with the Spanish \textit{hidalgos}, equally characterised by a high level of independence, a strong will and a high degree of adaptability to unfamiliar surroundings and unexpected circumstances. For several decades, the notorious \textit{wakō} remained the main agency of pre-modern Japan’s maritime integration before Hideyoshi passed a law against privateering in the South China Sea in 1588, also known as ‘sword hunt at sea’ (海の刀狩り, jp. \textit{umi no katana-gari}), a term coined by Nagazumi Yōko.\textsuperscript{193}

Japan’s debut in early modern maritime trade was only one step away from welcoming foreign traders on Japanese soil. Portuguese merchants first landed on the island of Tanegashima in 1542/43 in Southern Kyushu, where an annual festival still celebrates the meaningful encounter with the Europeans and their peculiar weapons. The first ambitious Jesuit missionaries of the Estado da Índia, including the Basque Francisco Xavier (born Francisco de Jasso y Azpilicueta, 1506-1552), followed in the year 1549.\textsuperscript{194} After initial setbacks, dedicated missionaries managed to gain a

\textsuperscript{190} Lidin (2002), \textit{Tanegashima}, p. 41. In 1549, a delegation sent by Sakai merchants for tributary trade was prohibited access to the tributary protocol by Chinese officials. ‘Three new great merchant ships were about to set sail to the South for Great Ming China. Also, about 1,000 young men, sons of rich families of the Kinai area and of the area West of Kinai, set out to be merchants.’
\textsuperscript{191} Mizuno (2004), ‘China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations’, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{192} Hashimoto, Yonetani (2008), ‘Wakōron no yukue’, pp. 80-90; Tanaka (1963), \textit{Wakō to kangó böeki}.
\textsuperscript{193} Nagazumi (2001), \textit{Shuinsen}, pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{194} For a synthesis of their spiritual work in Japan, see Takizawa (2010), \textit{Historia de los Jesuitas}. 
foothold on the archipelago. They benefited not only from the political instability and support from disintegrating Kyushu daimyô, but also from their close ties to merchants in other Portuguese trading posts in Asia. Trade with foreign nations had become very appealing to local lords such as the Shimazu clan of Satsuma, of whom some had sponsored wakô trade in previous decades. The fact that major ports for wakô operations, such as Hirado, also came to play a crucial role in subsequent peaceful trade speaks for both flexibility and continuity of private commercial structures. Thus it cannot be stressed enough that not all private traders from Kyushu and Fujian were malicious pirates, but rather skilled entrepreneurs, who, for instance, guided Francisco Xavier and his fellow Jesuits to Japan on board a Chinese wakô junk.

Along the lines of this flexible maritime exchange in Kyushu, trade with the ‘Southern Barbarians’ (南蛮, jp. namban) emerged under European and Kyushu daimyô participation. Portuguese and Spanish merchants were dubbed ‘Southern Barbarians’, because they arrived from the south. Kyushu silver enabled prominent figures such as Arima of Shimabara, Ōtomo of Bungo and Ōmura of Hizen to collaborate with wakô, Portuguese, and towards the end of the century, also with Spaniards from Luzon. Within a few years, missionary bases emerged in Yamaguchi, Kyoto (Miaco to the European friars), and Funai before the fathers of the Society spread over large parts of Kyushu where several daimyô were baptised: Ōmura in 1562/63, and the ‘King’ of Bungo, Ōtomo Yoshishige, followed as convert in 1578. To reap the benefits of the Macao trade with the Portuguese, the

195 Shimizu Yûko has shown how large the number of baptised Christians was already during the 1590s: Shimizu (2010), ‘16seiki’.
196 The area stretches from Hakata in Kyushu to Korea. The abundance of Ming porcelain on tiny islands such as the Goto archipelago is a telling indication for thriving exchange. For centuries, the islands served as smuggling and wakô centres.
197 For the context of pirates’ global economic importance, see Anderson (2001), ‘Pirates and World History’, pp. 107-124.
198 An early observation by Charles R. Boxer suggests that wakô were not just pirates, but often operated as free merchants. Boxer (1953), South China, p. xl; For an overview of the heterogeneous wakô phenomenon, see Elisonas (1991), ‘Christianity and the Daimyo’, pp. 321-326.
199 The term was apparently only used for the trade that emerged after the arrival of the Iberians at the midst of the sixteenth century and not for earlier exchange with South East Asian traders via the Ryukyu network.
200 The term developed strong cultural connotation in the course of the seventeenth century and also served as distinguishing marker for Protestant Europeans, who became known as ‘red-haired people’ (紅毛人, jp. kômôjin) at the beginning of the seventeenth century.
daimyō of Arima, Harunobu, also became a baptised Christian.201 This reflects the Jesuits’ strategy to seek converts in the ruling class in the fashion of *cuius regio, eius religio*. Rivalry among these local lords benefited the Europeans in the early decade: Prospects of regular access to trade with China granted the missionaries from Goa and Macao support of the lords from Kyushu. In 1580, the Jesuits received Nagasaki as a permanent base from Ōmura Sumitada, the first noble convert to Christianity, who was known as Dom Bartolomeu in European sources.202

After Hideyoshi had defeated the Shimazu of Satsuma in 1587, a powerful domain in Southern Kyushu and technically subordinated the entire island, he would become more closely involved with European issues and in the process aware that Christian missionaries and converts interfered with his political agenda. Ironically, Hideyoshi granted free trade to Portuguese merchants before he released a ban on Christianity and proposed the friars’ expulsion (伴天連追放, jp. *bateren tsuihōrei*) in July of the same year.203 Given the chronology, the motivation behind these acts was first and foremost politico-economically motivated and only secondly anti-Christian. Moreover, while foreign merchants remained unaffected, most Jesuits found a way to remain in Japan. Following the incorporation of Kyushu into one centralised Japan, Nagasaki, originally a domain of the Society of Jesus, was placed under direct control of the Toyotomi administration as a direct landholding (直轄領, jp. *chokkatsu ryō*) belonging to Hideyoshi that passed to the Tokugawa Bakufu after 1600 and assigned to the Nabeshima clan in 1588. As such it remained an important setting for the growing overseas trade.204

Despite its island character and geographical location, Japan was a late bloomer in maritime development. Needless to say that individual early seafarers, who operated in surrounding waters, possessed a solid knowledge of navigational winds, and the Chinese compass was widely used. China was an inward-oriented country to a large extent, and so the ruling elite had shown little interest in encouraging its people’s presence on or control of the surrounding waters, neither in navigational nor in political terms.

201 For the daimyō’s involvement with Jesuit missionaries on Kyūshū, see Pacheco (1971), ‘Europeans in Japan’, pp. 52-55. See also Kirsch (2004), *Barbaren aus dem Süden*, pp. 53-60.
204 Kisaki (2005), *Kinsei gaikō*. 
This explains why navigation was limited to coastal shipping until the arrival of the Europeans.

The Tokugawa initially kept an open mind towards maritime trade, as long as they could manage to monopolise it.\(^{205}\) The most prominent measure taken by the Tokugawa in that respect was licensed trade based on vermillion-seal passes (朱印状, *shuinjō*) holding the seal of the Tokugawa shogunate, a system first tested by Hideyoshi.\(^{206}\) Apart from their diplomatic character, the licences aimed at restricting Japanese foreign trade to authorised merchant ships.\(^{207}\) During the active years between 1604 and 1635, the shogunate issued a total number of 356 licences to Japanese, Chinese, and European traders and captains for trade between Japan and South East Asian destinations.\(^{208}\) Allocation was relatively simple in Ieyasu's time: *Daimyō*, private individuals, and temples allocated *shuinjō*. Eventually *shuinjō* trade was limited to a small number of shogunate-loyal merchants in later years. In total, 43 passes were issued for Chinese captains, 38 for Europeans, and 259 for Japanese, who carried an average crew (including merchants) of 225 men.\(^{209}\) This was not only a means to guarantee the ruling nobility a share in lucrative foreign transactions but also to protect Japanese maritime trade against unfair competition on the sea. Until the year 1613, Manila was one of the most popular destinations.\(^{210}\) Among the earliest issued vermillion-seal passes, 4 out of a total number of 29 were for trade

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\(^{205}\) Hoping the lay brothers would help to integrate the Japanese more directly into the Manila system, Ieyasu originally showed a welcoming attitude towards mendicant missionaries.

\(^{206}\) Nagazumi (2001), *Shuinsen*, pp. 2-5; Gono (2008), *Betonamu*, p. 45. Japanese researchers have furthermore found a record in the seventeenth-century-drafted, 16-volume *Nagasaki shi* (長崎志) that indicates that Toyotomi Hideyoshi made an early attempt to control foreign trade by distributing licences to selected traders from Nagasaki, Kyoto, and Sakai.

\(^{207}\) Murai (2013), *Nihonshi*.

\(^{208}\) Gono (2008), *Betonamu*, p. 46.

\(^{209}\) Jansen (2002), *Making*, p. 19. He was also reported to have been in favour of Manila. See ARSI Jap/Sin 32, f. 3: ‘Qué es el que tiene a cargo los negocios de las Filipinas, y el que las ha favorizado siempre antes.’ ARSI Jap/Sin 32, ff. 3 v-4: ‘Para que el sobre que le guardese una provisión que en su lengua llaman xuyri, y por otra lengua chapa por lo cual el dicho Taycosama daba licencia para que los españoles libremente pudiesen andar por sus reinos, así por la mar, como por la tierra.’

\(^{210}\) Nagazumi (2001), *Shuinsen*, p. 41; Jansen (1992), *China in the Tokugawa World*, p. 19. To get an idea of scope and scale of the vermillion-seal trade we have to consider that 29 licences were issued in the first year already. Until the abolition of the system in 1635, 350 permits had been issued, interestingly enough, 43 were granted to Chinese and 38 to European captains and merchants.
with Manila.\textsuperscript{211} It will be worth keeping in mind that trade activities between Japan and the Europeans in fact increased after 1615, at a time when the role of the Spanish had already become peripheral. Within the next two decades the English and Dutch established permanent trading factories on Hirado and trade with Macao also increased in volume.\textsuperscript{212}

The yarn allotment (糸割符, jp. ito wappu) was a further mercantilist measure of the shogunate, which felt encouraged by its connected history with China and the Iberians. In order to extend control over silk imports, the Tokugawa shogunate demanded the leading merchants of Kyoto, Sakai, and Nagasaki in 1603-1604 to form a thread guild that was joined by traders from Osaka and Edo a few years later. Selected Japanese silk dealers thereupon bought silk exclusively from Portuguese or Chinese brokers in bulk for a previously fixed price before distributing it to local merchants. While the system hindered foreign traders from bargaining and from creating too close ties with the local people,\textsuperscript{213} in turn wholesale bargaining created a new class of Japanese brokers and powerful middlemen.

Over the decades of increasing exchange with several trading nations and experimenting with various commercial practises, Japanese maritime trade became standardised and gradually came under state control by means of shogunate officials in the 1620s. In the late 1630s, an entirely new trading period that was no longer ad hoc and excluded Iberian merchants began.\textsuperscript{214} Portuguese trading ships were banned from landing in Japan, and all Portuguese residents, 287 Portuguese and their wives, were expelled to Macao in 1636. In 1641, Dutch East India Company (VOC) merchants, as the single remaining European trading nation in Japan, had to close their trading factory in Hirado and were ghettoised – as were Chinese merchants – in Nagasaki. Nevertheless, regular voyages of Chinese, European, and Siamese trading parties to Japan show that Japan remained a ‘significant strategic fact in East Asia’ for several decades.\textsuperscript{215} A real change in foreign trade in terms of exported goods and trading volume only occurred towards the end of the seventeenth century, when the shogunate, worried about an ongoing outflow of silver (the shogunate eventually prohibited the export of

\textsuperscript{211} Japanese in Manila and in Ayutthaya were extremely influential in regional trade thanks to the silver-silk axis with China and thus challenged policymakers and other merchants on site. Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{212} Totman (1995), Early Modern Japan, pp. 141-142; Shimada (2005), Intra-Asian Trade, pp. 5-21.

\textsuperscript{213} See Atsushi, Kobata (1978), ‘Edo Shoki’, p. 130.


\textsuperscript{215} Toby (1984), State and Diplomacy, p. 5.
Encountering the Other

Next to being a thriving commercial area, sixteenth-century China Seas offered opportunities to encounter, study, and analyse the ‘other’, overcome stereotypes and broaden horizons. Yet history has shown that areas that functioned like cultural melting pots often had contrary effects. Spanish perceptions of the ‘other’ had many facets and served several political agendas. Overseas such perceptions were encouraged through intentional othering of religious opponents and uneasiness about obvious cultural, political, and moral differences. In Asia, the ‘others’ included the autochthonous population (sp. indios or naturales), Muslim moros, chinos (a.k.a. sangleyes), as well as Dutch corsarios or other ‘heretics’; to a lesser extent, Jewish merchants and traders from other European countries and the surprisingly large number of Basques in the Philippines also represented a marginal group with a measure of stereotypical attributions.

Individual sensitivities often reflected a broader political trend. The political motto of Charles I (V), ‘plus ultra’, was still a valid marker of imperial Spanish foreign policies at the end of the sixteenth century. The ultimate goal for all operations overseas was simply to gain control. The strong notion of Christian superiority and Eurocentric self-aggrandisement were rather commonly found in Hispanic dealings with the ‘other’. What made Hispanic aggressive expansion possible was early knowledge gathering, illustrated by the huge number of chronicles published in the early decades of colonialism. For the Roman Empire as for the Middle Kingdom, the imperial ideology was based on ‘civilisation’, for the Spaniards it was the Catholic faith. Although China and Japan did not hold centre stage in

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218 Borja (2005), Basques. Even though not directly relevant for the present study, I consider it worth mentioning that famous colonial actors during the early colonising period of the Philippines, including Juan Sebastián Elcano, Miguel López de Legazpi, Domingo de Salazar, and Martín de Rada, were native Basques.
219 Mahoney (2003), Colonialism, p. 2: ‘In modern world history, colonialism is marked by a state’s successful claim to sovereignty over a foreign land.’
220 Spanish chronicles related to the Philippines are listed in the introduction of this book.
221 Elliott (1989), Spain and Its World, p. 9.
Hispanic imperialism, they were certainly areas of major concern. Both were not entirely new to the Spaniards, due to Marco Polo’s accounts of Cathay and Zipangu and the Portuguese presence in Asia for decades. Both countries were first and foremost considered important areas for continuing the spread of Catholicism. Their high degree of civilisation was often highlighted and they were instantly favoured as permanent business partners in the Far East. Hence, the incorporation of the Philippine archipelago into the Catholic world was also of a strategic nature: Luzon would serve as the Spanish missionaries’ gateway to China and Japan.

In the case of Ming China the issue of official wakō policies has shown that the regime could use an unlawful counterpart for the sake of upholding sovereignty. The image of the ‘other’ was effectively constructed. ‘Barbarian’ was a well-established umbrella term for people of non-Chinese origin and a flexible concept with numerous nuances, which did not necessarily have pejorative connotations. The idea of being in the centre (中華, ch. zhonghua) was of utmost relevance for interpreting activities of others. According to the ideology of the Middle Kingdom, the world was divided in concentric circles of Barbarian states (華夷, ch. hua’i, jp. ka’i). Historian Geoff Wade has studied the impact of rhetoric and images in elite Chinese

222 Jesuit descriptions (i.e. the records of Luís Froís, Alessandro Valigano, or João Rodrigues) dominated the information flow about Japan in the second half of the sixteenth century. Thereafter Spanish laymen such as Bernardino de Avila Girón, Rodrigo de Vivero y Velasco, and Sebastián Vizcaíno and Northern European merchants such as William Adams, John Saris, and Richard Cocks contributed to travel accounts as described by Cooper (1965), They Came to Japan, pp. 99-100; 119: ‘If Frois was the chronicler of stirring events and Cocks the recorder of daily life, João Rodrigues was par excellence the exponent of Japanese language and culture.’ With regard to other Europeans in early modern Japan, Cooper’s work has shaped the view of uncouth Europeans who encountered a high civilisation in Japan.


224 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 105 (1600), Pedro de Acuña informed the King about regular communication with Chinese and Japanese in Manila: ‘Estando como están las Islas Filipinas tan apartadas y remotas, y rodeadas de tantos y tan grandes reinos de infieles con la entrada y comunicación que tienen en Manila los Chinos, y Japonés e inteligencia de los naturales se puede receler que aliados con los de la tierra podrían intentar alguna novedad a que son inclinadas y porque la mayor seguridad y fuerza que puede tener la tierra es la población de españoles.’

225 Kang (1997), Diplomacy and Ideology, pp. 8-12; 14. ‘Ethnocentric ideologies manifested in this Chinese world order […] Once tributary relations were established with China, tributary states used the Chinese era names and China offered abundant presents.’

representations of the outside world and has concluded that it displayed a remarkable degree of consistency.\textsuperscript{227}

Beyond a doubt, Zheng He’s voyages expanded Chinese awareness of the outside world as books such as Xiyang chaogong dianlu by Huang Xingzeng, which was drafted in the early 1520s (but not printed), show. This work is based on travel accounts of Zheng He’s companions on the Great Voyages, such as Ma Huan.\textsuperscript{228} Focusing on the Western Ocean, he described places as far west as Hormuz and traditionally referred to the Indian Ocean as the ‘West’ and everything east as the ‘East’. Luzon is strikingly not among the countries he described.\textsuperscript{229} According to Chinese geographical understanding, Luzon and Pangasinan were located in the Eastern Ocean (東洋, ch. dongyang), from where tally (tributary) trade missions had sporadically been sent to the Middle Kingdom.\textsuperscript{230} During the Ming period a new categorisation came into existence: ‘South’ or ‘South Seas’ (南洋, ch. nanyang), roughly indicating what we understand today under the terms the South China Sea and the South East Asian archipelago.\textsuperscript{231} Thus, from a broader angle the Philippine chiefdoms were of little significance to the Emperor of China.\textsuperscript{232} During the sixteenth century, a combination of lax border policies and the unexpected arrival of offensive Europeans challenged traditional Chinese perspectives of foreigners. Thus contact with the Franks (佛郎机, ch. folangji), as the Portuguese were described in Chinese sources, and the Dutch, descriptively called red-haired Barbarians (ch. hong-man-fan), had an altering effect.\textsuperscript{233} Despite official information gathering policies, Ming China’s dealings with foreigners were mostly a local affair in the ports of coastal provinces such as Quanzhou and Guangzhou. It is noteworthy that knowledge of ‘others’, particularly the Europeans, was less readily available than it was in Spain or in Japan. Circulation of knowledge differed for a couple of reasons: Few foreigners lived within the borders of the Chinese state, and Chinese contemporaries hardly ever published their experiences abroad.\textsuperscript{234}

\textsuperscript{229} Hamashita (2008), ‘Despotism’, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{230} Zhang (1981), Dongxi yangkao, 4.7, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{231} Hamashita (2008), ‘Despotism’, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{232} Junker (1999), Raiding, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{233} Zhang (1982), Ming shi ou zhou; Zhang (1934), Ming shi folangji.
\textsuperscript{234} See Lehner (2011), China in European Encyclopedias, pp. 73-76, on the formations of knowledge and on how knowledge was promoted. He distinguishes between hypotext and hypertext in
Encounters with Europeans were characterised by ambivalence and recurring restrictions long into the Qing period. Although the Manchus are considered less hostile to foreign trade as their predecessors, they were still deeply mistrustful.\(^{235}\) Despite the opening of Macao to the Portuguese (海禁, ch. *haijin*) was still considered an effective measure. After the arrival of the Spaniards in Manila, several Chinese captains refused to take Spanish friars as envoys back to Fujian in the 1570s as a consequence of severe border controls and a general suspicion towards Christians in their home country.\(^{236}\) The *Dongxi yangkao* is particularly interesting when it comes to Chinese perception of the *folangji* and the people from the South Seas (ch. *yi* or *fan*). Drafted under the presumption of a universal civilisation, a significant part of the piece covering the Philippines offers useful accounts on the Chinese settlements there.\(^{237}\) The *folangji* are significantly featured with animalistic characteristics, and emphasis is placed on the important role of monks, who are portrayed as senior advisors of the ruling class.\(^{238}\) As far as information on the Portuguese of Melaka was concerned, official Ming views were largely incorrect.

How Japan’s policymakers perceived the outside world correlated with the political identity building of the new ruling elite. The outside world was initially viewed through the China lens with occasional references to India as the origin of Buddhism. A three-countries theory, including Japan (我朝, jp. *waga chō*), China, Korea, and South East Asia (震旦, jp. *shintan*, or 唐, jp. *tō*), and India (天竺, jp. *tenjiku*), determined the Japanese worldview prior to first direct contact with the Europeans.\(^{239}\) For instance, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who had access to previously gathered information, was well aware of the size of China and its maritime affairs. He also understood that *wakō* were in regular contact with Chinese merchants in Sakai and Hyogo.\(^{240}\) By the middle of the sixteenth century, geographical knowledge broadened, as


\(^{237}\) The work was republished in 1981. Zhang (1981), *Dongxi yangkao*, 12 vols, juan 4, deals with the Philippines, juan 5 with Japan, juan 7 includes the overview of import taxes.


\(^{239}\) See Toby (2008), 'Sakoku’, pp. 184-210. Toby based his arguments on the analysis of early modern illustrations of foreigners. This paragraph is largely based on Toby’s explorations.

\(^{240}\) Boscario (1975), *101 Letters of Hideyoshi*, p. 45.
China’s role in cultural policies diminished. Politically, the Chinese ideal became increasingly attractive. Despite the geographically misleading denomination as ‘Southern Barbarians’, Europeans were recognised as coming from a very distant place. Upon the arrival of ‘black ships’ (黒船, jp. kurofune) in Japan, both central rulers and local daimyō were curious to find out more about these potential negotiating partners.241 After the Europeans were initially pressed into familiar categories and labelled as coming from India (jp. tenjiku), the Japanese worldview gradually changed from the ‘three-countries’ to a ‘many countries’ view.242 With Tokugawa rule, a new age of understanding the outside world and categorising the ‘other’ began. Tokugawa officials actively collected information on foreign countries, particularly about potential diplomatic and commercial partners. Furthermore, government officials such as Ishin Süden kept accounts of communication with foreign countries and their people.243

During the transformative period discussed here, the political idea of a homogeneous Japanese culture became a unifying element and a factor for legitimising power.244 As a result, engaging with strangers from the West paved the way for early modern Japanese nation building based on proto-nationalistic accounts of the outside world. The most prominent tool in that respect was a fabricated state ideology based on the Land of the Gods-Writ (神国, jp. shinkoku) and the attempt to create a model of Japan-centrism similar to the Chinese concept of the Middle Kingdom.245 In theory, the ideology dated back to the ninth century, when it was implemented to defend Japanese independence with regard to China and Korea.246 Before the Tokugawa shogunate institutionalised the idea of a mandate of heaven (天命, ch. tianming, jp. tenmei) for the Emperor, or ‘Son of Heaven’ (天子, ch. tianzi, jp. tenshi), it served the Ashikaga shogunate and Hideyoshi as powerful propaganda in communication with foreign nations.247 The basic idea of the

241 For the Manila Galleon, we have an example of autumn 1601. Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/567. The first kurofune to enter Japan was a Portuguese nau that anchored in Nagasaki in 1571. Thus the beginning of the Macao-Nagasaki trade is dated to that year. Originally, they were even believed to come from India, as Ronald Toby has shown in a fascinating article. Toby (1994), ‘Indianess’, p. 326.
244 Watanabe (2010), Nihon seiji, pp. 12-30.
246 Murai (2013), Chūsei nihon, p. 147.
247 See Laver (2011), Sakoku Edicts.
concept was to place Japan on top of a hierarchical system of states. In addition, it served as a counterbalance against the rapid spread of Catholicism.

Despite measures such as the anti-Christian edicts of 1612 and 1614, described in later chapters, and shinkoku propaganda, foreign powers’ unfettered influence worried Japanese rulers, and trade restrictions eventually followed. In 1633, the shogunate introduced its own law on maritime restriction (海禁, jp. kaikin). In historiography, the combination of anti-foreign propaganda and strict maritime control encouraged the view of a ‘closed country’ (鎖国, jp. sakoku). Restrictions were based on five consecutive edicts issued between 1633 and 1639; it goes without saying that the actual term ‘closed country’ was not in use then. These regulations included a ban on leaving Japan, a ban on intermarriage between Japanese and foreigners, the prohibition of Christianity and eventually ended commercial interaction with Portugal, Spain, and England. Economic and cultural exchange with the outside world was granted to the famous Dutch outpost Dejima, a man-made island off the port of Nagasaki that was initially built for the Portuguese in 1636, as well as to regular visits of Chinese, Koreans, and Ryukyuans to Tokugawa Japan, all of which were strictly regulated by the shogunate. Similar to the Chinese model, interaction with the outside world became strictly limited to specific ports. Satsuma served as the gate for Ryukyu merchants, Nagasaki for Chinese and Dutch traders, Tsushima...
for Korea and Matsumae for exchange with the Ainu of Hokkaido. Examining the image of foreigners in early modern Japan, Ronald Toby argues that during the seventeenth century East Asians were deliberately depicted as foreigners and considered exotic.

Concluding Remarks

Understanding sovereignty as the central government’s sphere of influence, including political economy, information gathering, and the power to mobilise people according to the ruler’s will, Spain, China, and Japan displayed both similarities and differences. Spain’s active expansion and its rulers’ power to move people differed particularly from China. Japan at least on the surface resembled Spain. Focusing on the early years of triangular contacts in Manila, similarities in foreign policies were closely linked to concerns of governance in pre-modern Spain, Japan, and China. All three pre-modern states had an interest in controlling foreign trade, either for the sake of enriching their treasury or for the sake of guarding their territorial borders. Yet a strong state accomplished more than just keeping trouble out; it ultimately succeeded in creating cooperation with its society and transformed or unified it for the benefit of gaining access to profits from foreign trade. All forms of state intervention should be understood as regulating and controlling measures, not as restrictions or total prohibitions.

251 In terms of these restrictive policies it will be interesting to note that they were tightened up in 1715, when trade with the Chinese and Dutch (limited to two vessels from Batavia annually) was defined in a catalogue of laws known as 正徳新例, shōtoku shinrei. Thus the initial ‘maritime ban’ had a comparatively flexible character. A period of conservative economic thought followed, promoted by the famous bullionist advisor Arai Hakuseki, who warranted against exporting precious metals.

252 For the controversial case of the Kingdom of Ryukyu, see Lewis (2009), ‘Center and Periphery’, pp. 424-443; Toby (1984), State and Diplomacy; p. 48; See also Watanabe (2007), ‘Ryūkyū wājin ka’. The article discusses the sensitive issue of Ming officials who confused Japanese with Ryukyuans. For the Tokugawa Bakufu it became important to stress the ‘foreignness’ of Ryukyuans. Next to inventing a certain ‘foreignness’ as necessity for their tributary status, a further question has been raised: How did Ryukyuans see themselves and what was their feeling of belonging based on? See Watanabe (2012), Kinsei ryūkyū, pp. 2-3.


Despite striking cultural differences, Spain, China, and Japan shared various political features. One of them was the policy of creating foreign enclaves. The Spaniards created ethnic settlements outside the city walls of Manila, the Japanese sealed off Dejima in the Bay of Nagasaki and the Chinese sealed off Macao, just offshore from Guangdong province, for the very same reason: to ensure that foreign traders would not pose a threat to the social order. Yet, while all three pre-modern states tried to restrict free interaction with foreign merchants, potential economic advantages were just too big to fully forgo them: Proto-global processes made it impossible to shut off an economy or people entirely. More striking similarities abound in the sphere of foreign trade that should ideally be in the hands of the central authorities. Control, limitations and bans were omnipresent, yet occasionally relaxed, while in particular Spanish monarchs more regularly offered rewarding commercial opportunities to their subjects. Questions of what states did for their merchants and whether central governments should be considered an encouragement or an obstacle to successful connections will be examined below.

Religion was a political tool that helped to organise the state. Despite rational governing concepts, rulers of all three states claimed to have special relations with a divine power, a useful tool when claiming identification as the universal ruler. Spiritual support, religion, and philosophy were used and abused to satisfy imperial designs and legitimisation. Japan was rooted in a trinity of moral Confucianism, mythical Shinto, and metaphysical Buddhism as functionalist units of deities and an imperial tradition of the tennō. China’s ideological framework was also rooted in a trinity: Buddhism, local traditions, and strong Confucian concepts shaped the famous ‘Son of Heaven’ dogma. Early-seventeenth-century Spain was less complex in its religious devotion as the only accepted belief was the Roman Catholic faith. Their desire to spread the word of their God for political reasons was supported by the Papacy and by close political and spiritual ties to Rome. Nonetheless, the Spanish monarch understood his role as defender of the faith, not as impersonator of the divine.255

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Part II
Cross-cultural Encounters in the Philippines
2 The Foundations of a Global Stage

The Early Modern Philippines

The Philippines were, according to the abovementioned quote by Governor General Santiago de Vera (r. 1584-1590), as fragile as a flower bud. De Vera's credo became a motto for the early decades of the Spanish period. The colonisation of the Philippines differed in many respects from what were seemingly similar projects in the Americas. In Asia, Spanish colonisation had less drastic demographic and ecological effects. Nonetheless, the application of similar administrative patterns as in the New World created a picture of a 'coercion-intensive state'. Indeed, early conquest under Legazpi and his men did not differ much from what had happened in the Americas: soldiers were stealing, raiding, and exploiting the natives, as criticised by the Augustinian friars Martín de Rada and Diego de Herrera. Yet, in contrast to leyenda negra scholarship, the local population of the Philippines experienced more humane Spanish colonising methods. John Crossley has emphasised that Philip II, strongly influenced by the teachings of Bartolomé de las Casas, was determined to prevent a repetition of the bloody conquest of Mexico. The strong impact of the church was another distinguishing feature of historical treatises on the Spanish Philippines. They state that the islands were first and foremost a Catholic project because the colonisers’ religion had greater effect on the population than their language, their institutions, or even their food. 

1 AGI Filipinas i8 A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 1587.
3 AGI Filipinas 84, n. 9, ‘Carta de agustinos sobre situación en Filipinas’, 8 June 1576. Martín de Rada complained that Spanish soldiers and officials did not observe the kings’ instructions for peaceful conquest, collected tribute from the indigenous people and gave them a hard time in general.
5 On the question why Castilian was never established as an official lingua franca in the Philippines, I refer to Phelan (1955), ‘Philippine Linguistics’, pp. 153-170. See also Rafael (2005), Contracting Colonialism; Díaz-Trechuelo (2002), Filipinas.
archipelago was far less Hispanicised than certain regions of the Americas. Many imperial goals were never accomplished, which made giving up the colony a permanent option of various Spanish governing bodies. In 1647, after almost one hundred years of active colonisation, Philip IV (r. 1621-1665) concluded that their colonial efforts in the Philippines were inefficient and that the conversion in the Far East was nothing but a disappointment. The Philippines remained under Spanish rule only because they never were a purely Spanish project.

The positive reputation the islands enjoyed among friends and foes alike, regardless of whether these had actually set a foot on Philippine soil or simply judged based on hearsay, had roots in Manila's character as a cross-cultural arena. There were always enough influential supporters in favour of the colony's future as part of the Spanish territories. Ríos Coronel, for example, named evangelisation, political reasoning in connection with trade with China and Japan, and the need to secure Portuguese India as important reasons not to abandon the colonial project in Asia. Such propaganda was necessary due to the widespread view in Spanish governmental circles that the colonial effort in the Philippines was a heavy financial burden. Against a background of silver flowing out to China, numerous petitions to give up the colony reached the Spanish King, because it was nothing but a losing deal for the royal treasury.

**The Islands in Pre-colonial Times**

Approximately one to two million people with different languages, life styles, customs, traditions, and physical appearance inhabited the archipelago by 1550. After first contact with the autochthonous population, the Spanish divided them into two groups, indios and moros, thereby disregarding their heterogeneous origins. The distinction was based on religious beliefs: Moros were Muslims and indios members of local tribes of Polynesian

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8 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 4, n. 52, ‘Carta de Ronquillo sobre armada de Carrión contra Japón’, 1 July 1582. In this letter to Philip II, the Governor invoked the King to abandon the Philippines for causing nothing but deficits.
9 The word ‘Filipino’ was not in use as generic term in the early modern period but only emerged during the nineteenth-century national movement. The term usually refers to the mestizo civilisation born in the Philippines. For the semantic development and historical denominations, see Scott (1994), Barangay, p. 5; Zaide (1949), Filipinos, pp. 6-8.
origin worshipping native deities. In terms of the language diversity, 170 languages and dialects survived over the years. Many of them, including the eight major tongues (Cebuano, Tagalog, Hiligaynon, Waray, Ilocono, Pangasinan, Bicolano, and Kapampangan) show a dominant influence of the Austronesian language tree. Since Tagalog, with its Malay, Chinese, and Sanskrit loan words, became the historic lingua franca of colonial Manila, it also forms the basis for today’s national language – Pilipino. Literacy was not widespread in the pre-colonial Philippines, contrary to polemics in early Spanish chronicles (e.g. Pedro Chirino’s). Indeed, early Spanish observers were impressed by the natives’ use of writing skills, their Baybayin script to be precise. The script consists of 20 letters comprising syllabary for only three vowels and no letter for ‘r’, and showed Arabic and Sanskrit influence.

Islam had arrived on the islands from regions of present-day Malaysia and Indonesia around 1380. First the Sultanate of Sulu was founded under Sharif ul-Hashim, a second followed under Sharif Muhammad Kabungsuan in Maguindanao, from where Islam spread north to Mindoro Island, Maynila, and Batangas. The archipelago’s native population lived together in the barangay (conventionally, even if etymologically incorrectly, translated as village), a socio-political unit of between 30 and 100 families under the rule of a petty chief (tl. datu, meaning ‘leader’ rather than ‘ruler’). Not only were these villages constantly competing with each other, decentralization and the limits of subsistence agriculture further hampered growth in pre-Hispanic times. According to Philippine historians, a datu ruled over common people (tl. tao) and was the only person who could accumulate wealth because theoretically everything belonged to him. A datu possessed

11 Barrón (1992), Mestizaje, pp. 101-103.
13 Examples can be found in Juan de Plasencia’s Doctrina Christiana, printed by woodblock in Tagalog in 1593.
14 Crossley (2011), Ríos Coronel, p. 11.
15 Scott (1994), Barangay, p. 5; Zaide (1949), Philippines, p. 67.
political, military, and religious power and his distinguished appearance depended to a large degree on his charisma. Similar to other pre-colonial South East Asian domains, servitude and slavery were common across the islands and often resulted from debt bondage, judicial punishments, inheritance, and capture in warfare. The traditional social hierarchy included a datu, a non-chief elite, commoners, and slaves.

Maritime people had been attracted to the Philippines long before lucrative interregional trade flourished in the Spanish colony. During several periods in history inhabitants of the archipelago participated in Asian long-distance trade. Although reliable written data is scarce, evidence for commercial contacts with China exists for the tenth century, when Chinese and Muslim trading networks connected the South East Asian archipelago with the mainland. The first secured Chinese record is part of the official Song Shi and dates back to the year 972, when people from Ma’i (probably located on the southern coast of Mindoro) are mentioned together with other Barbarian tribute bearers, whose trade passed through Guangzhou (Canton). In 982, traders from Ma’i brought goods, including pearls and sea and forest products, to the Superintendent of Guangzhou. In 1001, the King of the city-state of Butuan, named Kiling, sent two tribute missions of gold to Beijing. The superintendent of maritime trade and customs inspector in Quanzhou, Zhao Rugua (趙汝适), includes detailed descriptions of Ma’i, which he located north of Borneo, in his Zhufan Zhu (諸蕃志, Chu Fan Chih, An Account of the Various Barbarians) of 1225. Accordingly, they had brought beeswax, pearls, tortoise shell, medicinal betel nuts, and cloth. In return, they received porcelain, iron pots, lead, iron needles, and coloured glass beads. Archaeological evidence furthermore backs a long history of trade with incoming Chinese junks in the regions of Pangasinan, the coast of Lingayen Gulf from Bolinao (Zambales) to Balaoan (La Union), and the

17 Abinales, Amoroso (2005), State and Society, p. 28.
18 Junker (1999), Raiding, pp. 131-137.
19 For pre-Iberian Muslim and Chinese trade routes between Borneo and Luzon, see Ptak (1992), ‘Northern Trade Route’, pp. 38-41.
23 William Henry Scott translated Zhao’s record. Scott (1984), Prehispanic Source Materials, pp. 68-69. Another Chinese official, Wang Da-yuan 汪大淵, composed a treatise 125 years later, Daoyi zhilüe 島夷志略 (Description of the Barbarian Isles), which included accounts on trading nations from several islands that form part of the modern Philippines.
delta of the Agno River.\textsuperscript{24} From China's Song period onwards, people in Pangasinan used porcelain jars for wine, and according to an early Spanish account in the sixteenth century, even ordinary people were wearing Chinese silk and cotton garments.\textsuperscript{25}

Miguel de Loarca's bold statement that 'people of Pangasinan were more intelligent due to their contact with Chinese, Japanese and Bornean merchants' comes to mind.\textsuperscript{26} It not only summarises Spanish stereotypes but also encourages speculation about the significance of Chinese and Japanese traders before the arrival of the Spaniards. In the case of Japan, commercial contacts certainly did not evolve before the sixteenth century. As for China, when the Ming dynasty rose to power a ruler of Luzon responded to their diplomatic initiative by sending a tribute mission in 1373.\textsuperscript{27} Following the promotion tours of Zheng, the smaller kingdoms of the Philippine archipelago began to send tributary missions to the Middle Kingdom in the early years of the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{28} According to the \textit{Ming Shi}, Emperor Yongle sent an officer with orders to establish Chinese suzerainty in 1405.\textsuperscript{29} Henry Scott claims that the Muslim ruler of Mao-li-wu on Mindoro visited China in 1405.\textsuperscript{30} The little that is known about direct interaction between Mindoro and China is that petty rulers soon lost interest in this demanding foreign trade pattern and stopped sending tributary missions to China.\textsuperscript{31} In the meantime, Chinese private maritime ventures started to arrive regularly in Visayas, Luzon, Pangasinan, and Mindanao.

\textsuperscript{24} For pre-Hispanic relations between China and ‘Lüsong’, see Wang (1970), ‘China and Southeast Asia’, p. 375.
\textsuperscript{25} When the Chinese-speaking father Bartolomé Martínez was shipwrecked on the coast nearby he was able to baptise 20 Chinese traders he found there. Scott (1994), \textit{Barangay}, p. 248.
\textsuperscript{26} Cf. Scott (1994), \textit{Barangay}, p. 248.
\textsuperscript{27} Scott (1984), \textit{Prehispanic, Source Materials}, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{29} BR 34, p. 189; Guerrero (1966), ‘Chinese in the Philippines’, p. 16: ‘The Ming annals mention that in the second year of his reign, the Emperor (Yung Lo) sent an Admiral Cheng Ho to Luzon to establish Chinese suzerainty over the island. Cheng Ho’s fleet of 60 vessels thrice attempted to reduce Luzon and the neighboring islands to vassalage. However, this attempt at dominion was discontinued after the death of Yung Lo and his admiral.’
\textsuperscript{30} Scott (1981), \textit{Boat Building}, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{31} One of the most illustrious descriptions of pre-Hispanic interactions between the archipelago and East Asia and how it allegedly contributed to the archipelago's pre-Spanish economic history comes from the advisors to the US Chamber of Commerce of 1905: See Regidor, Jurado, Warren, Mason (1925), \textit{Commercial Progress}, pp. 6-8. Their peculiar narrative stressed Chinese and Japanese contributions to the development of certain modes of production such as breeding fish or working in metals. For the origins of Chinese interest in the islands, see also Von den Driesch (1984), \textit{Grundlagen}, p. 291.
The Arrival of the Spaniards

As a consequence of Ferdinand Magellan’s discovery of the passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean in 1520-1521 in the service of the Castilian Crown, the first group of Spaniards landed in the Visayas, the central region of today’s Philippines. The Portuguese explorer himself died in battle on the island of Mactan, ironically before being able to finish his journey around the world.32 Yet not the Islas San Lazaro, as his expedition corps called the realm at first, but the nearby Moluccas (Spice Islands) caught the Spaniards’ fancy. The original target of exploring and gaining territory had overtones of the hegemonic dispute between the Castilians and the Portuguese that dated back to the beginning of the European expansion in the Atlantic. Magellan’s arrival in Cebu (also in the Visayas) shook the newly established balance of power between the two Iberian sea powers, who could not agree in whose sphere the Moluccas were located. Mathematicians, cartographers, and Crown officials came into action but a first attempt to solve diplomatic disputes in Badajoz and Elvas in 1524 failed. In the meantime the Habsburg court under King Charles I (V) quickly commissioned further expeditions. A delegation led by Fray García Jofre de Loaysa set out to explore the Pacific in 1525. For a large percentage of the crewmembers, this adventure ended in a disaster even before reaching the Strait of Magellan. Under the command of Hernando de la Torre, 127 men eventually reached the Moluccas. However, the Portuguese from Melaka, a permanent Lusitanian trading colony in Malaysia since 1511, thwarted Spanish disembarkment.

A similar project, initiated by Hernán Cortes in New Spain fuelled tensions with the Portuguese even further.33 A bilateral treaty was eventually concluded and signed on 22 April 1529 in Zaragoza. The imaginary line of the Treaty of Tordesillas was virtually extended to the Pacific and laid down 297.5 leagues to the east of the Moluccas. The Portuguese received exclusive rights to take action in the Moluccas and the Spanish Crown abandoned her claims on the Moluccas in return for 350,000 ducats and the right to colonise what a few years later would be named the Islas Filipinas in honour of the Habsburg heir to the Spanish throne.

32 It was Magellan’s naval commander Juan Sebastián Elcano who completed the first world circumnavigation.
33 Hernán Cortes, in 1526 Governor and Captain General of New Spain, claimed that Spain should broaden its influence across the Pacific. Charles I provided him with a royal charter (cédula) dated 10 June 1526. See the articles in the following compilation: Martínez-Shaw, Alfonso Mola (eds) (2008), Ruta de España.
Conventionalising the Pacific as Spanish Lake (*lago español*) or *mare nostrum*, like the Romans used to call the Mediterranean, the Spanish Crown organised further explorations in the ‘new’ ocean. A Mexican viceroy keen on direct access to the spice trade commissioned Ruy López de Villalobos’s expedition in 1542-1543, sailing with six ships from Navidad, New Spain, to Mindanao, and Leyte. Local hostility and a shortage of food supplies obliged the explorers to abandon their attempts to found a colony and to prepare the ground for a future Christian mission. Seeking sanctuary on the Moluccas, they finally surrendered to the Portuguese before Villalobos died in Ambon in 1546.

For decades Castilian explorers failed to establish a return route (*tornaviage*) to New Spain as an alternative to the Cape Route, which had been reserved for the Portuguese since the Treaty of Tordesillas. King Philip II had explicitly listed the establishment of a ‘return route from the western isles’ that he deemed ‘fairly short’, as a condition for future intervention in the East. Andrés de Urdaneta, who had not returned to Spain from the Loayza expedition for 11 years until 1536, was able to lay the foundation for the trans-Pacific trade by establishing a feasible return route free of Portuguese interference on the galleon San Pedro in 1565.

On 8 May 1565, Miguel López de Legazpi’s expedition founded the city of San Miguel from where Legazpi started the conquest or ‘pacification’ of Cebu. In light of assaults by the indigenous population, he deemed it impossible to follow the King’s instructions to avoid bloodshed. Continuous struggles, conspiracies and a Portuguese attack in September 1568 persuaded him to move the colonial centre to the northern island of Luzon. The following year Legazpi, who was originally not equipped with the necessary order to

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34 Steinberg (2001), *Social Construction of the Ocean*, pp. 62-65; Such views, however, have lost ground in modern scholarship. To the contrary, the historical Pacific is nowadays widely understood as open, centreless space, where peoples, goods, and ideas moved rather unrestrictedly. See Matsuda (2006), ‘The Pacific’, pp. 758-780.
36 Steinberg (2001), *Social Construction of the Ocean*, pp. 75-84.
39 Schurz (1985), *Manila Galleon*, p. 81: Heading towards the northeast, Urdaneta and his crew arrived on the 39th degree. From there they crossed straight to the coast of California on the 34th degree from where they would continue southwards and finally reached the port of Navidad on 1 October and Acapulco on 8 October the same year. See Macías Domínguez (2003), ‘Presencia española’, p. 35; See also Spate (1979), *Spanish Lake*, pp. 104-106.
41 According to Spanish sources, a fleet under the command of Gonzalo Pereira supported by war prahu from the Moluccas led an unsuccessful attack.
conquer or colonise,42 was appointed *gobernador general* of the Philippines, and finally received a royal charter that gave him the title *adelantado* and the right to found cities and distribute trusteeships (*encomiendas*)43 among his people.44 Following Urdaneta's nautical achievement, the first group of Spanish and Mexican merchants and soldiers arrived with military supply in Cebu. When Spanish *conquistadores* spearheaded by Martín de Goiti and Juan de Salcedo reached the far more attractive Manila Bay in 1570 for the first time, they burned Muslim Maynila in a battle and left again. The following year Legazpi returned with 27 vessels and Visayan support to the Maynila area. In the meantime, local Muslim rulers had rebuilt the town but only to once again accept defeat on 3 June 1571.45

**The Castilian Territorial Model**

**Land Seizure and Regional Administration**

After the victory in Manila, Spanish rule gradually extended over Luzon and partially over the Visayas, while large parts of the rest of the islands remained outside of the Spanish sphere of influence throughout the entire colonial period.46 Manila offered particularly favourable conditions for a permanent settlement, a productive hinterland, a considerable number of inhabitants, a strategic position, and existing trading structures.47 After having outwitted the Muslim ruling elite, the Spaniards began systematically to suppress the independent *barangay* in order to enforce Spanish authority.48 The use of a divide-and-conquer (*divide et impera*) strategy and the implementation of colonial policies, which included the establishment

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43 *Encomienda* refers to the labour system that was employed in the Spanish overseas colonies in the Americas and the Philippines. It was a sort of feudal right granted by the King to the colonial elite to obtain tribute or service from the native population in exchange for protection and indoctrination.
44 Written in the *cédula real* of 14 August 1569 that reached the Philippines at the end of the same year.
46 This study does not allow looking at early colonising efforts in detail. For a concise overview, I refer to Gorriz Abella (2010), *Filipinas antes de Filipinas*. The author summarises and re-interprets the far-reaching studies by early Spanish reports by Miguel de Luarca, Santiago de Vera, and Pedro Chirino.
of permanent bases with political, military, economic, and religious centres, helped to impose Spanish rule. Unlike the Portuguese in Melaka, who used the existing structures of the Muslim outpost, the Spaniards built a new network of cities in the Philippines, all of them dependent on the central government of Manila.\(^4\) Nonetheless, even if Spaniards were the nominal rulers of the Philippines Spanish colonial rule in sixteenth-century South East Asia remained characterised by a very fragile power structure at the periphery of influential actors.

Early centralising measures failed due to the disunity of the population and ethno-linguistic differences. As was often the case with imperialist constructs, ethnic heterogeneity proved originally favourable to the Spaniards. It enabled them to manipulate the situation by initiating wars between the local tribes and collaborating with antagonistic local leaders, the aforesaid divide-and-conquer strategy. Although the majority of the Spaniards believed in destroying traditional structures for the sake of minimising indigenous resistance, after the conquest they had to rely on a mediating native elite and its existing socio-political organisations. Moreover, for the purpose of consolidating their rule it was necessary to grant special rights to the natives in urban centres, which ultimately assured the survival of their traditional culture. Datu who deliberately brought their people into Spanish settlements received the reward of being appointed gobernadorcillos. Natives who collaborated with the Spaniards were often given the task of demanding tribute from the local population and therefore enjoyed certain privileges and formal authority over the others, which gave them an opportunity to enrich themselves.\(^5\) These practices created a new class with principalía status.

Towns or pueblos were managed by native principalías, often under the strong influence of a parish priest. Provinces and municipalities, in turn, were administered by the mostly Spanish-born so-called alcaldes-mayores.\(^5\) The administration of the Manila region was divided among alcaldes. Inhabitants of the municipal quarters were legally and officially considered subjects of the local alcalde, who functioned as political official,

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4 For Portuguese Melaka, see Pinto (2006), *Portuguese and the Straits of Melaka.*

5 For a synopsis of the lives of indigenous population under Spanish rule, see Newson (2009), *Conquest and Pestilence.* Newson argues against the common belief that the indigenous suffered a demographic decline, although to a less lethal extent than in the Americas, the reason being the complicated transport and communication networks that left many regions of the archipelago largely unaffected by Spanish conquest. For Spanish direct interaction with the native population, see Alatas (1977), *Myth of the Lazy Native.*

5 Álvarez (2009), *Costo del Imperio,* p. 134.
Map 4  The Philippines under Spanish Rule

www.cartographicstudio.eu, 2014

Scale 1:11,400,000
military leader, and financial manager. The office was an easy source for revenue and consequently enjoyed great popularity. For the same reason the offices and their distribution mostly among Spaniards constituted a very controversial matter, and over the years accusations of corruption filled hundreds of court pages.52

Spanish economic structures did not directly affect the subsistence of the natives, and the pre-Hispanic political organisation of cabezas de barangay continued to serve social order more than decisions of the Manila government did.53 Social and juridical matters were also subject to bargaining. Consultation of public opinion, interrogation, and questionnaires were typical tools of a reasonably democratic colonial administration between Hispanic and indigenous agencies. Inhabitants of the nearby Tagalog region were furthermore integrated into Spanish affairs by supplying Manila with necessities. We may conclude that this experience of administrative bargaining and constant compromising between the Spanish ruling elite and various indigenous agencies created an important condition for the development and maintenance of cross-cultural relations. Even if we accept that the role the colonial state played was comparatively strong, there is no way of denying that Manileños and surrounding peoples shaped and reshaped foreign maritime relations.

Regardless of economic dependence on foreign trade, politics were primarily based on the land-oriented encomienda system, without paying much attention to a region’s specific conditions. The encomienda was a ‘well-defined institution in which the holder performed certain governmental duties and in return received tribute’.54 After having been introduced in the Americas by the early conquistadores, it developed into a genuine tax resource for the Spanish Crown, funding both administration and exploitation of the new territories.55 In the year 1576, an official count listed as many as 143 encomenderos in the Philippines, yet with limited rights. Between 1574 and 1576, the monarch rejected two requests for further encomiendas.
and grants.\textsuperscript{56} In combination with collecting indigenous tribute, \textit{alcaldes mayores} and \textit{gobernadorcillos} were granted major competences as heads of the indigenous communities.\textsuperscript{57} Although missionaries had long criticised the \textit{encomienda} system for exploiting and abusing indigenous labour, their number grew.\textsuperscript{58} In 1591, \textit{270 encomiendas} forced 668,000 natives to work for the colonial economy.\textsuperscript{59} Upset by a growing rich land-owning class with the potential to undermine political power, they soon imposed restrictions and furthermore promoted the cultivation of agricultural products and thereby hoped to boost exports, although it never materialised.\textsuperscript{60} Private \textit{encomiendas} were gradually confiscated and, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the colonial government appointed officials and priests instead of \textit{encomenderos} to administer the indigenous people. However, these reforms did not change the social welfare of the locals.\textsuperscript{61} In the long run, friar estates were not a perfect solution either.

By and large, Iberian colonisation-cum-evangelisation followed the doctrines of Tomas of Aquin and Francisco de Vittoria, which stipulated that force was only justifiable when the sovereign of a territory refused conversion of the people living in his realm.\textsuperscript{62} Vittoria’s claim ‘that under the law of nations Spaniards had the right to trade with them and preach Christianity’ became the basis for famous debates between Las Casas and Sepúlveda in Valladolid in 1550-1551. Similarly, in the Spanish Philippines indigenous people were theoretically only forced into a tribute relationship after they had had the opportunity to hear the gospel. The entire process, ironically referred to as ‘pacification’, forced the indigenous people to pay tribute. As indicated earlier, friars were the first to advocate better social conditions of the local population under Spanish rule, long before the

\textsuperscript{56} Kamen (2012), \textit{Spain’s Road}, p. 202; De la Costa (1961), \textit{Jesuits}, p. 13: ‘In the 1580’s, the area within five leagues [approx. 20 kilometres] of Manila was divided into four private encomiendas with a total population of 3,500 and one Crown encomienda with a population of 4,000.’

\textsuperscript{57} For a detailed description of the colonial administration, see Von den Driesch (1984), \textit{Grundlagen}, pp. 268-270; His study reflects common narratives of contradictory views on how the indigenous should be dealt with.


\textsuperscript{60} Hausberger (2008), ‘Reich’, p. 352.

\textsuperscript{61} Yun-Casalilla, Comín Comín (2012), ‘Spain’, pp. 234-244.

Audiencia decreed in 1598 that ‘Indians’ must not only be treated better but also instructed in the Catholic faith as ‘free vassals’. 63

Another matter for constant debate was whether tribute should be paid in cash or kind. Although often paid in kind, it ‘forced the colony to produce for the market’. 64 Thus, especially during periods of inflation, the system caused much hardship. 65 Rates were not fixed but varied depending on the prosperity of a region. The clergy warranted against increasing indigenous tribute that would throw a large number of indigenous into slavery for not being able to afford higher taxes. Although slavery was generally forbidden based on the maxim that a Christian must not own anyone, a maxim introduced to the Philippines by order of the King in 1583, occasional exceptions were made for moro slaves. 66 Slavery moreover continued to exist in indigenous circles since it was impossible to wipe out a socio-economic system that had functioned for centuries.

The average annual tax rate was changed to between 4 and 6 reals at the end of the sixteenth century. 67 Hernando de los Ríos Coronel (1560–1623), procurador general and advocate of the rights and the well-being of the native population, carried out a thorough investigation of their living conditions, published in his 1621 memorial to the King. 68 He concluded that the indigenous population paid 2 reals annually. 69 Tribute was always a burden for large parts of the indigenous population, but was particularly high during the armed maritime conflict with the Dutch from 1610 to 1640. 70 This was also a period when food became scarce, because peasants had to leave their farms as they were forced into labour, often for shipbuilding. 71 With
an ever-growing unproductive population that required food, substantial shortcomings led to rising prices of commodities and goods. The US-trained Filipino historian Leslie Bauzon has illustrated the financial misery of the Spanish Philippines in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, concluding that the Filipinos were largely ‘paying for their own colonisation’. Bauzon furthermore argued that the colonial economy was dependent on financial aid from New Spain, the so-called situado real. Deriving from the treasury of New Spain, this imperial approach significantly helped to fund the colonial government by transferring financial surpluses. Between 1610 and 1640, the situado included the ad valorem tax collected from the Manila Galleon trade in Acapulco, as well as 40 ducats per ton collected in Acapulco, and amounted to an annual average of 300,000 pesos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Collected tribute (in pesos)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1584</td>
<td>22,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1588</td>
<td>30,404</td>
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<tr>
<td>1590</td>
<td>26,364</td>
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<tr>
<td>1591</td>
<td>36,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1592</td>
<td>69,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1595</td>
<td>88,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1603</td>
<td>38,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1604</td>
<td>34,667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colonial Offices

Three types of high officials administered the colony: (1) the Governor General, (2) the judges and fiscals of the Supreme/High Court (sp. Audiencia), and (3) the Archbishop and the bishops. The hierarchical structure

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74 Meaning subsidy, income, or appropriation. A general fund created to support ‘non-self-supporting Spanish imperial outposts’. It was ideally raised from the returns from the Manila Galleon trade and freight duties in Acapulco. Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, pp. 56-60.
75 The system was not exclusive for the Philippines, but generally applied to help regions with perennial deficits. Grau y Monfalcón (1640), Justificación, pp. 9-10.
77 Source: AGI Contaduría 1200-1206, cf. Álvarez (2009), Costo del Imperio, p. 166.
of governing institutions had proven their efficiency in Spain and Spanish America. The Governor General acted on behalf of the King and held executive authority in the Philippines. His far-reaching competences covered judicial and administrative affairs as well as military duties as captain general. Acting as royal vice-patron his relationship with the church in the colony equalled the King’s back in Spain. Financial matters were usually taken care of in the Governor’s weekly meeting of the Council of the Royal Treasury (Junta de Real Hacienda). The average tenure of a governor was short and many candidates saw this job as part of a tour of duty (royal authorities’ *cursus honorum*) prior to a more prestigious post on the other side of the Pacific, rather than building a permanent residence in Manila – even though this often remained a remote dream for many.79

Established in 1583, following the intervention of Gabriel Ribera, envoy of Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa to Spain in 1582, the Audiencia was set up as court of appeal, with a board of *oidores* (judges). Being in charge of civil and criminal affairs, entitled to intervene in both state and religious affairs, and even entitled to take over the government in the absence of the Governor, members of the Audiencia enjoyed undisputed political influence.80 In addition to the Audiencia, city councils (*cabildos*) were established in the major colonial centres.81 As a general rule of royal control each Audiencia consisted of senior officials sent from Spain. They should not develop too close ties to the region they were working in. A peculiarity that illustrates the fragile character of Spanish rule was the abolition of the Audiencia between 1589 and 1595.82 Its failure has been explained with a general unpreparedness for the situation in Manila, plus an unfitting personnel and undefined laws. Reopening the Audiencia after seven years was both a decision to keep the Philippines a part of the Overseas Empire and a clear initiative to demand serious commitment from the Spanish settlers to the colonial project in the East. The King urged Governor Tello de Guzmán and the judges to collaborate in creating a stable

79 Cunningham (1919), *Audiencia*, pp. 32; 195-197. In the later period of our study the average time in office amounted 4.5 years, until 1609 it was only 3.5 years. For a list of Governors see BR 17, pp. 285-312.
80 AGI Patronato 25, r. 2, ‘Expediente sobre gobierno Islas Filipinas’, 1583; In the year of its establishment Governor Vera and three other auditors became the supreme organ for decision-making in colonial matters. See Cunningham (1919), *Audiencia*, pp. 99-119.
82 Alonso Sánchez, an ambitious Jesuit, whose scheming will receive more attention in subsequent chapters, was one of the driving forces behind the temporary abolishment of the Audiencia.
government in light of growing trade with China.\textsuperscript{83} Control over colonial officials was thereafter secured by the institution of the residencia – a body that scrutinised evidence for potential corruption and fraud against the Crown at the end of each official’s term in office, as well as occasional visits by inspectors (visitadores).

Spanish spiritual conquest went hand in hand with ecclesiastical administration.\textsuperscript{84} In 1579 Philip II established the first diocese in Manila, the Dominican Domingo de Salazar was chosen as the first Bishop. Before his arrival, Augustinians controlled correspondence with the King and informed him about the needs of the islands. The Manila Synod of 1581/2 was the first systematic step in that direction, being launched to solve growing dualism in handling interactions with the indigenous population. The outcome had only limited effects on politics and justice in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{85} With the foundation of further dioceses, such as Nueva Segovia (Cagayan) under its first Bishop Miguel de Benavides in 1595, Manila was promoted to an archbishopric. Before long, the far-reaching political powers of the clergy caused friction with the civil government. The latter harshly criticised that ‘ecclesiastics and religious quietly take away from and add to the instruction at will, and without the supervision of the Governor and the ecclesiastical superior, contrary to his Majesty’s orders’.\textsuperscript{86} Deciding which areas would be designed as joint agendas and in which fields prelates and bishops were not to meddle with the government was a complex matter. The Crown aimed at keeping the bishops from overusing their power of excommunicating government officials and also at limiting the secular power of ordinary priests by prohibiting their active participation in foreign trade.\textsuperscript{87}

Within the Overseas Empire, the Philippines were subordinate to the Viceroyalty of New Spain and strictly speaking it was only after 1821 that the Philippines were ruled directly from Spain. Nevertheless the Philippines were not exclusively treated as a dependency of New Spain, or a colony under the auspices of another colony, as often proclaimed in historical

\textsuperscript{83} Cunningham (1919), \textit{Audiencia}, p. 79.

\textsuperscript{84} Hausberger (2000), \textit{Für Gott und König}; The Spanish Inquisition had not been officially introduced in the early decades and no independent tribunal existed in the Philippines. Mexico was responsible for religious control or heretic trials. Yet that did not mean that the Philippines would have been spared religious intolerance: revisionist work has dug up shocking inquisition files on Filipino cases in Mexico, crushing the narrative of a bloodless conquest of the Philippines.

\textsuperscript{85} Camuñez (1980), \textit{Sínodo}.

\textsuperscript{86} BR 10, p. 80. A quote by Antonio de Morga.

\textsuperscript{87} Cunningham (1919), \textit{Audiencia}, p. 80.
writing.\textsuperscript{88} In fact, the Crown tried hard to restrict the growing power of the Viceroy. In 1607 Philip III (r. 1598-1621) issued a decree ordering his highest representative in Mexico to ‘give aid to the governor and captain general of the Philippines in whatever may occur’ and to send him the necessary amounts of arms, men, munitions, and money for the conservation and management of those islands.\textsuperscript{89} The King’s intervention has to be understood in the context of lingering Dutch naval aggression in the China Seas. With regard to the question of the role of Mexico, it is particularly crucial to distinguish between financial and political agendas. Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin argued in 2008 that ongoing internal struggles over who would finance overseas politics characterised colonial reality in the Spanish Overseas territories, emphasising that any ‘legislative initiative […] was subject to influences from multiple players’.\textsuperscript{90} Their assumption holds major relevance for the Philippines: Both the colonial authorities of the Philippines and their Mexican colleagues ultimately had to bend to the wishes of the Habsburg monarch. Yet, since colonial staff did not always feel obliged to carry out missives from above, I agree with Leslie Bauzon that ‘the Philippines were practically independent and self-sufficient in the consideration of matters purely political in nature’.\textsuperscript{91} Royal orders were ignored in places far away from central control.\textsuperscript{92} Several scholars have suggested that the Spanish administration indeed worked according to the principle \textit{se obedece, pero no se cumple} (‘one obeys but does not comply’), a tactic that naturally invited conflict, and was all too present in such geographically remote place.\textsuperscript{93}

**Secular and Ecclesiastical Administration**

Prospects of spreading Roman Catholic Christianity in the region was without any doubt a fairly strong imperialist impulse behind the colonisation and friars were often regarded as particularly reliable colonisers. The Catholic mission has often been ideologically linked to the spirits of the

\textsuperscript{88} Among others by Villiers (1987), ‘Portuguese Malacca’, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{89} Bauzon (1981), \textit{Deficit Government}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{90} Grafe, Irigoin (2008), ‘Bargaining’, pp. 178; 204.
\textsuperscript{91} Bauzon (1981), \textit{Deficit Government}, p. 8: ‘The only years during which the Philippines colonial regime can be said to have been subordinated to the viceregal government of Mexico were those from 1565 to 1583 and between 1589 and 1595, when no audiencia existed.’
\textsuperscript{92} Nuchera (1995), \textit{Encomienda}, p. 188.
\textsuperscript{93} AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620; Phelan (1960), ‘Authority and Flexibility’, p. 59.
crusades and occidental fights against Islam. Although the Roman Catholic faith is indeed the most visible heritage of the Spanish colonisation, I would not go as far as nineteenth-century American historian Edward G. Bourne, who stated that the Philippines were ‘more of a mission outpost than a colony’.\textsuperscript{94} During the early colonial period, friars were easily lured to the Philippines: Eager to work in the promising fields in China or Japan many aimed to use the Philippines as a way station but these hopes were mostly dashed by reality and doors to China and Japan were kept shut. Even so, any official Spanish action in Asia also has to be regarded in the context of regular endeavours to spread and protect Catholicism globally. The King initially hesitated before finally decreeing on 8 June 1585 that passages to China were prohibited for any Spanish missionary without explicit permission given in the Philippines to enter China for conversion.\textsuperscript{95}

Collaboration with Catholic missionaries was conveniently institutionalised through the \textit{patronato real}, an agreement between the pope and the Spanish Crown that gave the Spanish monarch and colonial authorities power over the clergy and churches in the colonies.\textsuperscript{96} In return for Rome’s support, it was the King’s duty to provide financial support and protection to the church in its overseas possession and to pay the friars’ passage to the Indies.\textsuperscript{97} In the Philippines, clergymen often depended on the favour of willing \textit{encomenderos} for covering missionary expenses,\textsuperscript{98} which to some degree made them ‘salaried employees of the Spanish Crown’, as Luis H. Francia has termed them.\textsuperscript{99} The situation changed once Catholic priests had found profitable ways to sustain themselves in form of friar estates, where they virtually governed absolutely.

Catholic friars’ governance had far-reaching effects on the indigenous population. With a desire to translate the Christian gospel and occidental values into local languages, clerics early on showed interest in learning indigenous languages. Juan de Plasencia was one of the first friars to master Tagalog, determined to integrate the indigenous into the colonial society.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{94} Bourne (1907), \textit{Discovery, Conquest and History}. Both John Leddy Phelan (1959) and Vicente Rafael (1993) have extensively studied forms of syncretism and so-called Philippine ‘folk Catholicism’.
\textsuperscript{95} BR 25, p. 137.
\textsuperscript{96} Lach, Vankley (1993), \textit{Asia}, vol. 3, book 4, pp. 202-204. Pope Leo X granted the Jus patronatus to the Portuguese Crown in 1514; For the religious orders’ contribution to the administration of Manila see AGI Filipinas 77, n. 15; 1602; see also Montalbán (1930), \textit{Spanische Patronat}, pp. 108-110.
\textsuperscript{98} Montalbán (1930), \textit{Spanische Patronat}, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{99} Francia (2010), \textit{History}, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{100} Camuñez (1988), \textit{Sínodo}, pp. 29-30. His early efforts in collecting material on the Tagalog language and producing material for the conversion of the native population are part of Plasencia’s legacy.
In their function as the educating class, the clergy took care of moral issues such as guarding the residents against forbidden gambling and indulging in immoral practices that were common among the Chinese. Nonetheless it is hard to deny the double standards and blackmailing tactics behind charitable work. On the one hand, the native population was often lured into moving into church estates by being promised titles and presents, and if that did not help, friars sought the help of soldiers. On the other, missionaries were of utmost economic and social importance for infrastructure projects such as building roads, bridges, irrigation canals and dams, introducing new plants from New Spain and Europe, and for providing for social welfare by running orphanages and hospitals. They were the only source of organised education and the first to found schools and universities. Needless to say, only a small percentage of the native population benefitted from the like.

Despite the friars’ undisputed importance as Spanish colonisers, in the long run, Catholic celibacy hindered active integration of indigenous communities. Early on, they were requested to employ a more bureaucratic approach to accelerating indigenous acceptance of Spanish rule across the archipelago. Implemented jointly by church and state, resettlement programs (reducciones) from barangays to newly built towns with a church in the centre should serve religious submission for better access to work force and more efficient taxing. In social terms, the all-encompassing power of the friars was particularly harmful to women and their important social status alongside their healing practices in the pre-Hispanic traditional society. Since religious administration was an entangled political issue, baptism determined the status and treatment of the settlers from East Asia. Economically speaking, however, conversion to Christianity was not a requirement for a fruitful life in Manila. The majority of migrants from China did not convert to Catholicism and kept their status as sangleyes infieles, as we shall see later.

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102 Filipino historian Vicente Rafael has claimed that Catholicism was the integrating element for the Filipino nation and that especially conversions of Tagalogs accelerated that process. See Rafael (1993), Contracting Colonialism, pp. 6-19. Phelan (1959) analyzed the filipinisation of Catholicism in Hispanization of the Philippines. The first school for indigenous children opened in 1589 in Manila (San Ignacio) and was run by the Jesuits. A university was added in 1621. The oldest university of Manila is Santo Tomás, a Dominican establishment of 1611. See Barrón (1992), Mestizaje, p. 108.
Between 1575 and 1596, a total of 454 members of mendicant orders reached the Philippines. As soon as the strategically gifted Dominicans obtained the Episcopal See in Manila power struggles with the Augustinians, as the first Catholic order on the archipelago, became obvious and with the arrival of the Jesuits debates on who used the better proselytising methods did not come to a halt anymore. The government of Philip II felt impelled to intervene on 27 April 1594: Doctrines were unified for the entire colony in order to avoid confusion among the natives and the orders’ competences were geographically divided. Only in the Tagalog provinces around Manila were all the orders represented. This measure both increased clerical power in the countryside and affected the linguistic development of the archipelago since friars could concentrate on the language(s) of their realms. However, with the exception of Tagalog most efforts were inefficient, as John L. Phelan concluded.

Table 2 Catholic Friars in the Spanish Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Time of first arrival</th>
<th>Number of towns founded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Augustinians</td>
<td>1565</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franciscans</td>
<td>1577</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesuits</td>
<td>1581</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominicans</td>
<td>1587</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recollects</td>
<td>1606</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

106 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. ccxlix: In 1625, archbishop Don Fray Miguel García Serrano requested from the King to assign the entire missionary work exclusively to the Jesuits.
107 Chirino (1969), Relación de las Islas Filipinas, p. 20.
109 Phelan (1955), ‘Philippine Linguistics’, pp. 158-159. In order to facilitate the spread of the gospel among the native population, four different printing presses were established: the Dominican press in 1593, the Franciscan press in 1606, the Jesuit press in 1610, and the Augustinian press around 1618.
110 Data is based on De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, p. 9: The first four Jesuits who arrived in the Philippines in 1581 from Mexico travelled at the King’s expense and were given additional 1500 pesos for their journey. They left Acapulco on the galleon San Martín, the same vessel on which the first bishop of Manila travelled. The passengers of that year’s Manila Galleon are representative and underline the political importance of evangelisation at that time: Next to 96 officers, about 100 passengers including Domingo de Salazar and his secretary, Fray Cristóbal de Salvatierra, eighteen Augustinians and six Franciscans and the four Jesuits were on board.
In terms of religious practise, the Philippines did not differ much from other colonial stages: Christian belief blended with native religious rites, and the longer the engagement the more hybrid forms of worshipping and celebrating emerged.111 The native society had to no other means than understanding the new religion through familiar concepts.112 What is more, the Spaniards did not succeed to integrate the entire population. While the Igorotes north of Luzon resisted all evangelisation efforts,113 Islam remained the biggest challenges for the new ruling elite. Backed by the Sultanate of Sulu, a fierce enemy of the Spaniards, Islam was disseminated in the southern Philippines, where Muslim datus united against the Spanish.114

Crown Monopolies: Overseas Spain’s Political Economy

It goes without saying that a territorial colony of a size and scope of the Philippines was not easy to maintain and caused considerable financial drawbacks in the long run.115 During the whole period, Spain failed to make the islands self-sufficient and struggled with expenditures higher than income. In 1584 the colonial government spent officially 41,231 pesos and, had pending bills of 30,000 pesos, while only 30,000 pesos had entered the royal treasury.116 Between 1608 and 1637 expenditure exceeded income twice; under these circumstances the colonial government was permanently indebted to the people and the church organisations of Manila such as the Hermandad de la Misericordia (est. 1594). Alonso, who criticised Bauzon’s established study for not using primary sources, argued – based on analysing contaduría data – that after initial low income the royal treasury annually gained an average of 560,000 pesos between 1604 and 1648, coinciding with increased military spending due to conflicts with the Dutch.117 Records of 1611 confirm that declining income from indigenous

112 According to Vicente Rafael the Tagalog society viewed Christianity through cultural lenses of ritual debt. On religious authority and clerical privileges, see Abinales, Amoroso (2005), State and Society, p. 50.
116 Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, p. 110.
taxation was compensated by licence fees collected from incoming Chinese merchant ships.\textsuperscript{118}

Next to military expenses embassies to neighbouring countries were financially challenging.\textsuperscript{119} By 1608 costs incurred for diplomatic exchange had gone up to 6000 pesos but were cut down to 1500 pesos the following year.\textsuperscript{120} Even if placed in context of a peak in diplomatic exchange with Japan (discussed in depth in the following chapters), these numbers are telling. It would be wrong to understand them as mere expenses in the sense of spending with no return; instead they are a sign of Spanish adaptation to the profitable framework of East Asian diplomacy and trade. They were classified ‘extraordinary expenses’ and reasonably considered a necessary means to ‘maintain friendship’, in other words peaceful trade relations with China, and in particular with Japan.

Table 3 Revenues and Spending of the Manila Treasury in 1611\textsuperscript{121}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>in pesos</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>in pesos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>Official salaries</td>
<td>37,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribute</td>
<td>20,223</td>
<td>Extraordinary expenses for Manila</td>
<td>177,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situados</td>
<td>10,904</td>
<td>War expenses</td>
<td>41,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary revenue</td>
<td>172,208</td>
<td>Factory</td>
<td>86,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almojarifazgo</td>
<td>31,725</td>
<td>Doctrines</td>
<td>14,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade fines</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>Sailors</td>
<td>6,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice fines</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>Wage labour</td>
<td>14,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth in gold</td>
<td>2,888</td>
<td>Mercies</td>
<td>1,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecclesiastic tenth</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>27,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>6,556</td>
<td>Jurisdiction</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refunds</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>War with the Moluccas</td>
<td>40,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver from New Spain</td>
<td>295,776</td>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>131,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight</td>
<td>4,170</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sold offices</td>
<td>2,320</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licence fees for sangleyes infieles</td>
<td>23,032</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>572,911</td>
<td></td>
<td>580,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{119} Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, pp. 43-45. In 1580, these embassies cost the Philippine’s treasury 1500 pesos.


\textsuperscript{121} AGI Contaduría 1609, fs. 464-464v, cf. Álvarez (2009), Costo del Imperio, p. 157.
Philip II’s secretary Juan de Ledesma’s memorandum of the Council of the Indies of 1586 neatly summarises the economic dilemma. He stressed that the royal treasury had spent more than 3,000,000 pesos on the discovery, settlement and maintenance of the Philippines, whilst only 12 pesos were levied on one tonelada of export and import. Early on, a remarkable gap existed between political theory and economic reality. Very different from his two direct predecessors (Gonzalo and Diego Ronquillo were active investors in the trade between Peru and China), Governor Santiago de Vera (r. 1584-1590) exhibited a surprisingly conservative economic understanding. In the year 1586, he claimed that colonisation should be encouraged by the abundance of a country’s natural resources as well as the good prospects for future discoveries, not by the profits of commercial exchange. Therefore, he concluded, trade with China had to be stopped. As we will see, trade with China did not come to an end, nor was the monopoly officially abolished; in fact, after 1587, Vera himself became a great supporter of triangular trade relations.

Mexican merchants were particularly interested in keeping good trade relations with China. In the 1590s, Spanish officials commonly believed that integrating the hinterland and its people would help to improve the economic situation of the Philippines. Yet, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries only 10 per cent of exports leaving the Philippines were of native origin, mostly harvested forest and sea products. Measures aiming to prevent the outflow of silver pesos to China remained the most prominent economic policy, resulting in a strictly controlled Manila trade. The Manila Galleon regulations of the years 1593 and 1604 (discussed in more detail in the next chapter) have to be considered against this background. The perception of the economic possibilities of the Manila market was also a matter of biased, public discourse fuelled by the idea that liberalisation would cause high expenditures either for Madrid or Mexico City. Indeed, in sharp contrast to the Portuguese Estado da Índia, the Philippines were

123 Ratified by the King in June 1586. BR 6, pp. 297-298.
124 Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, pp. 118-119.
125 Legarda (1999), After the Galleon, pp. 101-145. The end of the galleon trade and export of cash crops changed the number to 90 per cent after 1840.
126 Grau y Monfalcón (1640), Justificación, pp. 11-14.
not maintained merely through profits from maritime trade. Here, of course, the question arises how feasible it is to compare the Philippines as territorial colony with a trading post. The Crown did not provide much support for the few Spaniards who traded in Manila, let alone invested in creating institutions for the trans-Pacific trade. In light of this official attitude the Philippines may have lacked the same ideological rank as the colonies in the Americas. The fact that the metropolis had shifted important issues of finance and human resources to the viceregal authorities is just one example for their negligence of the Philippines.

Crown intervention undeniably had an inhibitive impact on foreign trade. Yet it must not be overlooked that Manila trade grew rapidly, largely beyond the Crown's supervision. Fully aware of these dynamics the Crown consequently aimed at channelling profits from the colonial economies to the motherland. Control was pursued with the help of expanding functions of the Casa de Contratación in Seville. In fact, the Crown aimed at monopolising the entire Manila trade since the very day when Legazpi established a customhouse (real hacienda) right after the foundation of Manila. An ad valorum tax on both imports and exports, the almojarifazgo, was established for all Spanish colonies. In Manila it was collected from Chinese and Portuguese traders, initiated by Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa in 1581 as a 3 per cent tax on in- and outgoing Chinese commerce that netted about 30,000 to 40,000 pesos a year during the 1590s.

128 Subrahmanyam (2007), ‘World in Balance’, pp. 10-11. For the organisation of the Portuguese realms in Asia with the largely autonomous Estado da India that financed the enterprise with customs, taxes and other tributes, see Feldbauer (2005), Portugiesen in Asien, p. 82: ‘Was die Portugiesen so zäh verteidigten, war keine Kolonie im spanisch-lateinamerikanischen Sinn.’ They only had sovereign power over Ceylon, the Moluccas, Goa and the coastal region of Gujarat.
129 See, among many others, Gipouloux (2009), Méditerranée Asiatique, pp. 144-148; 160-161. However, most scholars who praise the first outpost empires in Asia overlook the fact that the Portuguese came under totally different conditions, with different aspirations, and were in many cases only successful until the Dutch arrived with more elaborate means of coercion.
130 Burkholder, Johnson (2001), Colonial Latin America, p. 146; Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, p. 90.
131 Mahoney (2010), Colonialism, pp. 37-38; AGI Filipinas, 339, l. 1, f. 41v, ‘Petición de cuentas detalladas de la Hacienda de Filipinas’, 4 June 1572.
132 AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 6, n. 43, ‘Carta de Ayala sobre ventas de oficios, encomiendas’, 29 June 1589. The Leyes de Indias (Laws of the Indies) are a set of commands and decrees for the overseas territories. Originally passed by the Catholic Monarchs, the Laws of the Indies have often been considered an inefficient instrument to assert real authority in the New World. However, in economic terms they helped to levy revenues (such as the quinto real) in the name of the king.
Mainly imposed on luxury goods, it was quickly promoted as a safe source of revenue and a backup in case of failing encomienda policies. In 1609 the almojarifazgo changed from 3 to 6 per cent in 1609.134 Pierre Chaunu calculated for the period between 1600 and 1640 that almojarifazgo revenues annually ranged between roughly 17 and 27 per cent of the royal treasury (caja real).135 Supervision and trade control began with Spanish soldiers inspecting the junks from Fujian before anchoring in Manila Bay. No merchant was allowed to step on the mainland before the registration of all the merchandise had been concluded. In the seventeenth century a judge (juez de visitas), often together with a clerk (escribano) and a resident Chinese or Chinese mestizo as interpreter, replaced the ordinary soldiers. This pattern of port control became a lucrative business for the inspectors who had the chance to enrich themselves through bribery.136

The Pillars of the First European Capital in the East

What has not been mentioned yet, promising trade relations with China were the strongest impetus for Legazpi and his followers to found the colonial capital at the site of Manila; the initially small trading port offered optimal conditions for foreign trade with East and South East Asia and guaranteed supply from outside.137 Within a few years Manila transformed into a European colonial city with native elements. Before long the city would be replete with typical Spanish colonial features such as parallel and perpendicular straight streets, a cathedral, and government buildings made of stone in the centre. Urbanisation has often been regarded as a major accomplishment in Spanish colonial settings and the key in understanding Spanish imperialist success. Towns and cities efficiently accelerated centralisation and control through the colonial architecture of power, resettling the native population, which could also be interpreted as effort to keep ethnic groups ‘governmentally, ecclesiastically, socially, and

134 AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 6, n. 43, ‘Carta de Ayala sobre ventas de oficios, encomiendas’, 29 June 1588. Data collected by Ríos Coronel in 1621. Cf. Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, pp. 232-233. For the year 1626 the same author listed only 22,000 pesos.
135 Chaunu (1960), Les Philippines, p. 92.
136 Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 36-49.
137 Illustrated in the foundation document by notary Hernando Riquel, 19 June 1572. Cf. Díaz-Trechuelo Spinola (1959), Arquitectura Española, p. 7. Three years later, on 20 June 1574, Manila received the title insignie y leal and in 1595 cabeza de Filipinas, capital of the Philippines. Its coat of arms composed of half lion and half dolphin with a castle and a crown as imperial symbols was created in 1596. See also BR 9, p. 211.
spatially separate’. Spanish architecture was unsuitable for the climate, fires and earthquakes that destroyed large parts of constructions made of ill-suited traditional materials such as reed and local wood, jeopardising early Spanish urban planning.

In any newly founded city of the Overseas Empire, a municipal government (sp. *cabildo municipal*, or city council) oversaw the development and administration of the new community. Carla Rahn Phillips has stressed the importance of ‘municipal identity’ for the organisation of any Spanish colonial society. The municipal government was Manila’s first governing institution and linked the overseas community and the metropolis to each other. During the early years, the small *cabildo* of Manila of only two mayors (sp., *alcaldes*) and a varying number of municipal councils or aldermen (sp., *regidores*), one *alguacil mayor* (judge in charge of peace and order), and a clerk, met twice a week. Being in charge of guaranteeing the city’s supply *cabildo* members were instructed to collaborate with native and Chinese residents.

**Vicious Demographic Circles**

Early modern reports on living conditions in Manila create a confusing image: While many settlers seemed unhappy and disillusioned, the outside world envied their prospects of allegedly easy access to huge profits. In reality, the tedious migration across the Pacific and the high mortality rate

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138 Doeppers (1972), ‘Development’, p. 769; Reed (1978), *Colonial Manila*, p. 65: ‘Just as writers on Southeast Asian urbanism seem inclined to ignore or to give only passing reference to the pivotal role of hispanized towns and cities in facilitating the early transfer of a Great Transformation nurtured in Iberia to the Philippines, so have they failed to adequately depict the revolutionary impact of Spanish resettlement programs in inaugurating the colonial urbanization of Filipinos before most Western power had even acquired a tenuous foothold in lands to the east of the Cape of Good Hope.’
139 Colín (1900-1902), *Labor Evangélica*, vol. 1, p. 53.
141 Díaz-Trechuelo (2003), ‘Legazpi’, p. 51. For a list of all *alcaldes* and *regidores* see Merino (1980), *Cabildo*, pp. 120-124. Jurisdiction lay in the hands of *alcaldes ordinarios*, who were usually not part of the municipal government.
142 For a general study of the Philippines’ demographic development, see Merino (1980), *Cabildo*, pp. 35-36. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the number of Spaniards in the whole colony including soldiers amounted to some 2200, at best. Three hundred households were registered in Manila. In the same period already more than 20,000 Chinese lived in the area around Manila, despite the official order from Spain that their number must not exceed 6000.
of Spanish settlers made circumstances in Manila difficult: the entire colony suffered from a shortage of willing, well-educated settlers and Manila would indeed not have survived without input from China. Yet, this must not be overrated. Urban history research has made it clear that no major city in the sixteenth and seventeenth century was able to reproduce its population without external help. A permanent surplus in the male population was another factor shared by many cities, including Manila.

One of the earliest accounts we have is a record of Governor Francisco Sande (r. 1575-1580), who counted 500 Spaniards in the entire colony in the year 1576. In 1581, the city hosted between 300 and 400 Spaniards, of whom only 50 were adult females. Of around 1000 new Spanish settlers who were sent from New Spain to colonise the archipelago in 1585, 800 were garrisoned in Manila. About 20 years later, Governor Tello (r. 1596-1602) estimated that 1200 Spaniards lived on the islands, lamenting the lack of military men in Mindanao and Cagayan. Forty per cent of the Manila Spaniards at the beginning of the seventeenth century were encomenderos and more than 30 per cent soldiers or ordinary citizens. In the 1620s, 2400 men and women, including some mestizos, were registered in the Manila parish. In 1637, more than 65 years after the foundation of the city, Manila only counted 150 households. Due to a dearth of Spanish women, the Spanish-indigenous mestizo population grew rapidly. Comparatively speaking, these numbers were not so much smaller than the Spanish population of Peru in the first 40 years of colonial rule, however in the Americas it grew at a much faster pace during the following century.

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144 Knittler (2000), *Europäische Stadt*, pp. 43-44, lists garrison cities, university cities, and port cities as well as ecclesiastical centres as places with significant male overpopulation. For demographical data and a general lack of women in Hispanic realms, see the pioneering work of Boyd-Bowman (1973), 'Patterns of Spanish Emigration', pp. 580-604.
145 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 3, n. 23, 'Carta de Sande sobre jornada de China', 2 June 1576.
147 AGI Filipinas 18B, r. 7, n. 61, 'Carta de Tello sobre posible ataque de Japón', 19 May 1597.
148 Merino (1980), *Cabildo*, pp. 35: 57-58; for a list of the Spanish citizens in Manila see ibid., documental supplement: pp. 77-119.
151 Mahoney (2010), *Colonialism*, p. 67: 2000 in 1536 and about 5000 in the 1540s but already about 8000 by 1555. Even though the situation in certain places in the Americas seemed more favourable to the Spaniards, one should in general not overestimate the number of Spanish settlers. John Elliott, who based his estimations on the emigration statistics by Peter Boyd-Bowman, speaks of 240,000 settlers for the sixteenth century and 400,000 for the seventeenth
While the number of colonists from Spain was stagnating, people from Southern China began to arrive in large numbers. By the year 1600, hundreds of Fujianese and Japanese merchants would not only supply the Spanish colony, but also settle in large numbers around the walled Spanish city, and thus became the real colonial settlers of the Manila Bay area. The following numerical data has to be regarded as approximate, often exaggerated for various political reasons. An early account by Juan Ramón Bautista states that after the devastating fire in Manila of 1583, 2500 Chinese were waiting in Cavite to trade with the Castilians. Curiously, the number of Chinese is mentioned directly after a petition for financial and military support for the hard-pressed colony. According to a letter of Santiago de Vera to the King in 1589, 4000 Chinese lived permanently in and around Manila. The size of the Chinese community was usually fluctuating along with economic prospects and reached 30,000 in peak years. A resident of Manila noted in 1614 that during March and July, the period of the Manila Galleon trade (feria), about 16,000 Chinese (including hibernating and visiting merchants) lived in Manila while between 8000 and 9000 were permanent settlers. Registers of licence fees (or poll taxes) for the Chinese sangleyes give us a more accurate estimation of the size of the Chinese community. In 1621, there were over 21,000 licensed Chinese residents in Manila and approximately 5000 who were unlicensed. The Chinese community came to dominate the majority of the business sectors, ranging from retail to the building and the service industries. By way of a macro-regional comparison: In Nagasaki the number of Chinese is reported to have increased in ten years from 20 to 2000 in 1618. The number of Japanese residents in Manila rose steadily too. Evidence for their rapid increase, including the frequently quoted number of 3000 Japanese settlers in the year 1606, can be found in various sources,
Map 5 The South China Sea, ca. 1571-1644
including Japanese ship registers.¹⁵⁹ Many passengers were Japanese and a remarkable number settled in the urban surroundings.¹⁶⁰

Elsewhere I will analyse the wavering attitude of the metropolis towards the ever-growing number of Chinese and Japanese in Manila against the background of a stagnating Spanish population. Chinese and Japanese immigrants were certainly less marginalised than members of different Filipino tribes and an integral part of the city and its society. A trend that reminds us of the study by Carla Rahn Phillips where she has detected a similar phenomenon with regard to Africans in the Spanish Americas.¹⁶¹ Needless to say that as ‘others’, they constantly faced constraints, discussed in detail later.

Towards Manila’s Global Integration

What justifies calling early modern Manila a global enterprise are the manifold contributions of geographically dispersed actors and agencies that turned it into a thriving melting pot of people, cultures, and ideas. Despite their differences, when meeting in Manila they acted in concert when transforming it. While individual settlers, disconnected from their native states, did so actively at the end of the sixteenth century, political units chose a far more passive way. Referring to Japan and China, Henry Kamen called it ‘the tolerance of the two major powers in Asia’.¹⁶² Shimizu Yūko, in turn, stressed that misleading interpretations of Hispano-Japanese relations result from using the state as model of analysis. Instead she urges a focus on the actual actors, such as friars and merchants.¹⁶³

Other researchers suggest thinking of Manila as an entrepôt rather than a failed capital of a territorial colony. Spanish historian Manuel Ollé has

¹⁵⁹ Murillo de Velarde, Historia, libro 18, cap. 20: ‘En noviembre de 1606 había en Manila mas de 3000 Japoneses pues se fuja allí este numero como limite en que debieran en cerrar los gob - ernadores a esta población extranjera.’ Murillo de Velarde was an eighteenth-century chronist, whose compilation is based on letters between the Philippine domains and missionaries from China and Japan to Manila. With regard to the number of Japanese immigrants, Gonoi Takashi calculated that an average of 236.5 people travelled on board of merchant junks from Japan to destinations in South East Asia between 1593 and 1633. Gonoi (2008), ‘Betonaumu’, p. 51.

¹⁶⁰ See an anonymous report on early trade relations between Japan and Spain. Tōyō Bunko,’Filipinas y el Japón’, p. 15; Iwao (1937), Nanyō nihonmachī, pp. 292-300.


¹⁶² Kamen (2002), Spain’s Road, p. 206. The number of factual and spelling mistakes in the chapter on the Philippines could be taken as indication for the obvious disinterest in this area.

¹⁶³ Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon.
argued that the multicultural setting of the China Seas hindered the initially pursued territorial model. Using the entrepôt thesis as a way to understand proto-globalisation, he argued that the city stopped ‘acting according to the logics of territorial domination’ and instead ‘respond[ed] to the mercantile logics of the region’.\textsuperscript{164} For me this explanation is not sufficient: the incontrovertible limits of mercantilism have to be emphasised in light of the ambivalent balance of power between the state and the market in the colonial setting; in particular, when taking into account that mercantilism is nowadays no longer understood as ‘top-down, state-building enterprise’, but rather ‘a product of the private and public pleading [and] lobbying’.\textsuperscript{165} Against that background, attention has to be paid to Manila’s colonial urban context under the presumption that in early modern South East Asian market economy, the state existed because of trade, not trade because of the state.\textsuperscript{166}

In essence, understanding Manila merely from the logic of being part and parcel of the emerging world economy falls short in many respects\textsuperscript{167}: First of all because the territorial model did not lose significance during the period of my study, nor in later decades. Regardless of the importance of foreign trade for the survival of the colony, high-ranking Spaniards preferred strong military command to liberal trade. The Jesuit friar Juan José Delgado, who spent over half of the eighteenth century in the Philippines, insisted that the ‘islands need disinterested military governors, not merchants; and men of resolution and character […], not students, who are more fit to govern monasteries than communities of heroes’.\textsuperscript{168} The constantly felt need for displaying military strength has often been explained as a result of the proximity of Japan and China. Such a view not only misinterprets East Asian

\textsuperscript{164} Ollé (2006), ‘Formación’, p. 27: ‘Este inicial optimismo se vería transformado a las pocas décadas en un estrategia defensiva, con rápida construcción de murallas, con adopción de una posición pasiva y receptiva, que convierte a Manila en un entrepot, una ciudad de enlace, que no actúa ya según la lógica de dominación territorial importada de América sino según la lógica mercantil de la región, con captura de plazas clave, que marcaba las interacciones de competencia y rivalidad entre comunidades mercantiles en el sureste asiático.’

\textsuperscript{165} Stern (2014), ‘Companies’, p. 178.

\textsuperscript{166} The Melaka sultanate is a typical example for a South East Asian mercantilist state that dealt with commerce and movable wealth more or less in the way traditional agrarian states did with real estate. See Reid (1993), Southeast Asia, vol. 2, p. 205. Abu-Lughod (1989), Before European Hegemony, p. 303.

\textsuperscript{167} For Asian and European contributions to flourishing Southeast Asian port city communities, see Andaya (2004), ‘Interactions’, pp. 1-57.

foreign policies but also overlooks aggression from neighbouring Muslim communities, the long years of Dutch attacks, and the Spaniards’ own unwillingness to give up its claims on the Moluccas.\footnote{AGI Patronato 24, r. 61 ‘Cartas a los capitanes mayores de Macao, Ambon, Molucas’, 1582; AGI Patronato 47, r. 21, ‘Relación de las islas Molucas’, 1606.} Expeditions from the Philippines to the Spice Islands, including claims on Tidore, continued until 1662. In the context of European hegemonic battles on the Asian stage, the Philippines moreover served as stronghold for America against Asian forces.\footnote{Crailsheim (2014), ‘Las Filipinas’, pp. 139-141.} Second, similar to other port cities such as Hoi An in modern Vietnam or Ayutthaya in Thailand, Manila attracted Japanese and Chinese traders as a ‘neutral setting’.\footnote{Von Glahn (1996), \textit{Fountain}, p. 121.} With Japan’s debut in maritime commerce in South East Asia such neutral settings were booming.\footnote{Wills (1979), ‘Maritime China’, p. 211.} Ultimately new forms of connections and trans-regional exchange of new qualities and quantities prospered.
3 The Trilogy of Triangular Trade

Junk Trade, Trans-Pacific Trade, and Provision Trade

Manila greatly mattered to everyone who traded there. It was the point of commercial contact between the economies of seventeenth-century Europe and China, and once silver was flowing, not even a massacre could break the contact. Each side brought to the table what the other one wanted to buy and could afford, and took from it what it could use.¹

The Manila System

Thus reads an enthusiastic account by China historian Timothy Brook in his study on the characteristics of global trade in the seventeenth century. His overall positive evaluation echoes the views of many sixteenth-century observers.² What sounds like the description of a market economy 'Mecca', without any government intervention, indeed reflects some of Manila's free market-like structures, as an entrepôt for an entirely new type of commerce – the trans-Pacific exchange that at the same time enabled and encouraged Sino-Japanese direct exchange. As the title of this chapter suggests, the focus lies on the galleon trade and Manila. In the manner of global history trade patterns are painted with a thick brush, presenting the background image for detailed case studies on connections with China or Japan in the subsequent chapters.

Contemporary historical discourse on mercantile exchange in Manila has created the illusion that silver was the only driving force behind sixteenth-century commercial exchange. The fame of the Manila Galleon is indeed closely linked to enormous amounts of world silver that eventually ended up in China. Silver flows arguably even converted Ming China into the strongest economy of the time.³ This discourse, which spread on behalf

1 Brook (2008), Vermeer's Hat, p. 170.
2 Chinese literati Xu Guanqi (1562-1633), promoter of an open-door policy and translator of Matteo Ricci’s work was one of the sixteenth-century admirers of the dynamics of exchange in Manila. Cf. Zhao (2013), Qing Opening, p. 52. For a similarly enthusiastic evaluation see Alfonso Mola, Martinez-Shaw (2011), ‘Era de la plata española’. For the impact of silk imports on the late Ming economy see Li (2005), Wan Min.
3 For an overview of the debates see Atwell (2004), ‘Another Look at Silver’, pp. 467-491. As for the thesis that China was the ultimate beneficiary, I refer to California School scholars such as
of Sino-centrists and California School scholars, however, has at least two shortcomings: First, it degrades Manila to nothing more than a way station to China and second, it categorically denies benefits for Spain or other nations involved.\(^4\) While the present study argues in line with the reasoning that American (mainly Mexican) silver flows were the backbone of the Manila market during the last decades of the sixteenth and the first decades of the seventeenth centuries a comparative view on exchange patterns additionally aims to debunk previously described contentions.\(^5\)

Starting with scale, we should keep in mind that at the end of the sixteenth century Manila was ranking among the primary ports in South East Asia, measured by trade volume and the number of Asian ships calling at the port.\(^6\) Since the 1570s, several dozen Chinese junks annually carried silver back to Fujian. Observing their successful bargaining, the Dominican friar Juan de Medina called the Chinese traders in Manila ‘dear friends of silver’ and their business deals with the Spanish the ‘richest and most opulent of any known’.\(^7\) Referring to China as ‘silver’s prison’, he can even be called the first ‘silver-sink’ theorist.\(^8\) That said, even if the Spanish had nothing to offer but silver, it was precisely what China needed most, right after the Single Whip Reforms turned tax payments and wages into silver, as we have seen elsewhere.\(^9\)

Andre Gunder Frank. For a synthesis of the ideas of the California School, whose research tends to downplay human agency, see Vries (2008), ‘California School’, pp. 6-49. The article discusses the danger of overlooking institutional differences between China and the West. I endorse his critique and add that much of the confusion about Manila comes from that very omission.\(^4\) Prakash (1976), ‘Bullion for Goods’, pp. 159-187.\(^5\) I use Wallerstein’s definition that classifies a market as ‘both a concrete local structure in which individuals or firms sell and buy goods, and a virtual institution across space where the same kind of exchange occurs. How large and widespread any virtual market is depends on the realistic alternatives that sellers and buyers have at a given time.’ Wallerstein (2007), \textit{World-Systems Analysis}, p. 25.\(^6\) AGI Filipinas, 339, l. 1, f. 41v, ‘Petición de cuentas detalladas de la Hacienda de Filipinas’, 4 June 1572.\(^7\) Medina (1630), \textit{Historia}, p. 86. The seventeenth-century author furthermore criticised the Spanish for being bad businessmen: ‘Y si los españoles no fueran tan arrojados, es cierto que el trato les hubiera salido más barato y los chinos no hicieran lo que quieren de ellos.’\(^8\) Medina (1630), \textit{Historia}, p. 69: ‘De suerte, que no me engañaré en decir, que el reino de la China es el más poderoso que en el mundo hay, y aún le podemos llamar el tesoro del mundo; pues allí se aprisiona la plata y se le da cárcel perpetua.’ For the ‘silver sink’ narrative, see Flynn, Giráldez (1995), ‘Born with a “Silver Spoon”’, p. 201-221; as well as Frank (1998), \textit{ReOrient}, pp. 131-165; The ‘silver sink’ theory is closely linked to the ‘silver junkie’ discourse by L. Eastman introduced by Von Glahn (1996), \textit{Fountain}, p. 245. Oidor Gaspar de Ayala claimed in 1584 that every year the Chinese take all the money in the city with them. See Gil (2011), \textit{Chinos}, 66.\(^9\) Schottenhammer (2007), ‘East Asian Maritime World’, p. 19; Li (2007), ‘Song, Yuan and Ming’, pp. 124-128; Ming (2005), ‘Monetization of Silver’, pp. 27-39.
Records of contemporary officials suggest that the outflow of silver – based on the Manila Galleon trade – amounted to 5,000,000 pesos (127,800 kg) in peak years. Richard von Glahn calculated that silver entering China from Manila amounted around 584,000 kg between 1572 and 1600, or roughly 21,000 kg annually. While he admits that the actual trade volume was by far higher due to smuggling and unregistered trade, he puts exaggerated high numbers into perspective. By way of contextualisation one should keep in mind that between 1500 and 1800, 80 per cent – or 150,000 tons – of the world’s silver was mined in Latin America, of which an annual average of 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 pesos (25,000 to 50,000 kg) was shipped across the Pacific. In comparison, Artur Attman has calculated that an average of 150,000 kg left Europe towards Asia annually by land and sea and via manifold channels during the seventeenth century.

On a micro level it will be crucial to analyse what was driving Japanese, Castilian, and ultimately Portuguese traders and intermediaries when quenching late Ming China’s thirst for silver. At this point it seems that in particular the role of Japanese trade can highlight the system’s complex transactions. Governor Tello (r. 1596-1602) reported in 1598 how the royal

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11 The reason why so many different estimates exist for the trans-Pacific silver trade lies in the scarcity of precise sources and records. Von Glahn (1996), *Fountain*, p. 138, presumes that ‘the actual scale of silver imports [from the Philippines] to China could easily have been three or four times as great. Most of the reports from Manila in the 1620s and 1630s estimated the volume of silver exported to China at roughly 2 million pesos (51,100 kg) annually.’ He also speaks of more conservative estimates of 1.5 million pesos (38,325 kg) annually.
12 Chuan Han-Sheng’s comparative analysis for the seventeenth century confirms that 50,000 kg were shipped across the Pacific and ended up in China after a short stop in Manila. See Chuan (2001), ‘Arbitrage’, pp. 241-260. See also McCarthy (1993), ‘Between Policy and Prerogative’, p. 178. For more observations from early modern Manila, see BR 20, pp. 51; 69-70.
13 Attmann (1986), *American Bullion*. A number of contradictory estimates exist. According to official accounts from Acapulco for the 1580s and 1590s about three tons of silver bound for Manila were registered in an average year. In the 1620s, the official amount of silver had increased to 20 tons a year, and eventually settled around 10 tons. For the entire galleon trade, official records speak of about 700 tons of American silver carried to Manila. A synthesis of silver circulation debates including Earl Jefferson Hamilton, Dennis O. Flynn, William Atwell, Niels Steengaard, John J. TePaske, Han-Sheng Chuan, Ward Barrett, and others can be found in Alfonso Mola, Martínez-Shaw (2011), ‘Era de Plata Española’. Alfonso Mola and Martínez-Shaw criticise the figures put forward by Flynn and Giráldez as far too high and those of TePaske as too low, while considering Han-Sheng Chuan’s estimations most reasonable. The quantities of American silver sent to China according to Chuan are as follows: 1598: 1,000,000 pesos; 1601: 2,000,000 pesos; 1602: 2,000,000 pesos; 1604: 2,500,000 pesos, 1620: 3,000,000 pesos; 1633: 2,000,000 pesos.
finances suffered from Chinese visiting merchants, who gained more than 100 per cent within ten days in Manila.\textsuperscript{15} Even the situado-subsidy sent to the Philippines from Mexico often ended up in China, missing its actual purpose of supporting the colony. For Spanish settlers of Manila, seeing riches passing in all directions, the galleon trade soon became a mixed blessing. Nonetheless, fellow Castilians on the Iberian Peninsula were in no different situation. In the midst of all the debates about the outflow of silver and whether it should be taken as sign of decline or result of wrong institutions one tends to forget that those trading silver got plenty in return, from valuable luxury goods to desperately needed tax revenue.

Extending the comparative focus to Lusitanian Macao (1557–1997) helps tracking the characteristics of the Manila trade. Although a substantial comparative study between the two ‘Eastern pearls’ is not achievable, occasional references to the situation in Macao shall help us to understand the characteristics of the Manila trade.\textsuperscript{16} Macao’s closeness to China and the special contract that permitted the Portuguese access to the Chinese market and the annual official voyages to Nagasaki are significant elements of the privileged Lusitanian position in East Asia. As the centre of the Jesuit mission in the East and as the hub for communication of the Estado da Índia, the small island furthermore manifested its cross-regional influence. Given the relative closeness between Manila and Macao, commerce, at times authorised, at times clandestine, existed during the entire colonial era and was equally essential for both Iberian strongholds. Nevertheless, Luso-Spanish rivalry and mutual suspicion more than once harmed the trading climate in the China Seas. A further crucial element for comprehending the dynamics of this global silver trade is Japan’s exclusion from official Chinese trade, and that China – time and again – renewed prohibitions on maritime trade, most famous under the early Qing reign.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} BR 10, p. 179.
\textsuperscript{16} Luke Clossey also mentioned the high potential of comparing Macao and Manila. Clossey (2008), Salvation and Globalization, p. 169. For a detailed analysis of Macao’s global economic integration in later centuries see Van Dyke (2011), Merchants. As a matter of trivia, the flattering attribute ‘Pearl of the Orient’ has in fact been used both with regard to Manila and Macao.
\textsuperscript{17} Zhao (2013), Qing Opening, p. 35. When Chinese maritime trade was re-opened under Emperor Kangxi in 1684, large amounts of silver started to enter the country again.
How It All Began

The galleons’ annual passage between Acapulco and Manila provided the Spanish colony in the Philippines with silver and necessities, in addition to new settlers, missionaries, colonial officers, and royal orders. The galleon’s lonesome journey across the Pacific to Acapulco was – with sailing times of up to a year – the longest of its era, and ironically the Philippines’ only bridge to both the American and European mainland. For the mainly Spanish passengers and their Asian staff on the eastward route, the journey was a particularly dramatic adventure. Weather conditions and perilous currents were one challenge, shortage of supply (often for the sake of more cargo space) another. In certain periods English or Dutch attacks posed an extra risk.¹⁸

During its first decade, Manila Galleon-based trans-Pacific trade showed a largely unrestricted, laissez-faire structure under the patronage of the King in Madrid. In 1577 the Viceroy of Mexico, Martín Enríquez de Almanza (r. 1568-1580) uttered his concern regarding the Nao de China, as it was commonly referred to in Hispanic circles. Those were the days when relatively free trade with China was possible.¹⁹ Relative openness in the early, testing phase of the trans-Pacific galleon trade can be seen in the fact that the Crown tentatively sanctioned voyages between Lima and Manila in 1579. The following year Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa (r. 1580-1583) sent the first ship with spices and other luxury goods from Manila to Callao in Peru; a second was to follow in 1581 with merchandise from several Asian regions.²⁰ Only one arrived, however. Ronquillo, a member of a rich merchant family from Segovia with strong connections to Peru, not only earned cheers for his initiative. Critique came from Mexico and Spain and the way he defended his step implies that he was aware of empire-wide disapproval of direct trade between Peru and the Philippines. Although significant parts of the cargo consisted of Chinese merchandise, including silks, porcelain, pepper, and cinnamon, he claimed the main purpose for the dispatch was mutual support in artillery.²¹ When the Atlantic trade lobby in Spain intervened, the King issued a series of propitiatory decrees to stop

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¹⁸ Most of the data on the Manila Galleon come from the standard literature: Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon. For recurring losses, see McCarthy (1995), ‘Spectacle of Misfortune’, pp. 95-105; MacLeod (1984), ‘Spain and America’, p. 354. MacLeod compared the passage with trips to the moon in our time.

¹⁹ AGI Mexico 20, n. 1, ‘Carta del Virrey Martín Enriquez’, 19 October 1577.

²⁰ Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 9 (1582).

²¹ AGI Filipinas 6 (20 July 1580), AGI Patronato 263, n. 1, r. 2 (28 May 1581) cf. Iwasaki Cauti (1992), Extremo Oriente, pp. 32-34.
direct commerce between Manila and Callao in 1582, as it would seriously harm commerce in the Americas. Yet, before the royal charter (cédula; dated 11 June 1582) could reach Lima, Roquillo’s ship, the *Nuestra Señora de la Cinta*, had been dispatched for a long-anticipated mercantile mission from Peru to Manila and China. These developments have to be understood under the pretext of a quintessentially mercantile society in Peru, whose members often maintained close personal links with the Spanish residents of Manila. An attempt to send a ship from Lima to China by Martín Enríquez in 1583 (then already Viceroy of Peru) failed. After a ship from Peru laden with silver, had arrived in Macao in 1590, the Crown took more rigid measures. The trip of that vessel is the strange tale of Peruvian trader Juan de Solís, who arrived in Macao via Panama with 6000 ducats and determined to buy silk straight from the Chinese brokers, before he ended up in Satsuma. What he had not anticipated was Portuguese opposition; nonetheless, his fearless fight for free trade that made him report Portuguese intrigues to the authorities in Manila after his money had been confiscated in Macao and nasty clashes with Jesuits and Portuguese merchants had followed in Japan. Eventually even Toyotomi Hideyoshi interfered in the intrigues against the Peruvian merchant and ordered the Portuguese in Japan to return the 6000 ducats they had confiscated from Juan de Solís.

In the meantime, Spanish merchants in the Philippines also accentuated the need to prohibit direct commerce between America and China for the survival of the colony. Although merchants from New Spain were subsequently banned from building factories in the Philippines, independent attempts to circumvent Crown intervention persisted. As a result, trade restrictions between Peru and the Philippines had to be reissued in the years 1593, 1595, and 1604, and eventually again in 1640 when in theory all trade between the two American viceregalities was prohibited. In
1626, Governor Tavora sought royal permission for reopening direct trade between Manila and Peru but did not succeed, yet in vain.28

With regard to the Manila trade, there were also other incentives to strictly define the trading route: Urgently needed revenues, such as the 3 per cent almojarifazgo that government authorities collected from merchant ships in Manila and Mexico, and an additional cargo charge (anseaje; introduced in Manila under the governorship of Francisco Sande (r. 1575-1580) in the style of Macao’s anchorage tax) of 12 pesos were meant to support the non-self-sustaining Philippines.29 This made the Manila Galleon the third royal grant after encomienda and situado. Any loss – for instance, when ships failed to make their annual voyage from Mexico – would hit the colonial economy badly.30

In strictly economic terms there was also a fear (even if hard to comprehend in the twenty-first century) that the American colonial market would be flooded with Chinese goods on expense of precious metals. Hence the Crown implemented the so-called permiso as regulatory mechanism to fix the value of Asian goods shipped annually from Manila. Proclaimed by Philip II on 11 January 1593 and confirmed in a series of later decrees, it moreover established the maximum carrying capacity of officially only 300 tons per galleon.31 In addition both the amount of silver sent from Acapulco (as not more than 1,000,000 pesos annually) and the number of galleons to two per year were strictly defined.32 In most years these restrictions were nothing but political theory. Supply and demand dominated the galleon

29 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 9 (1582). Other sources speak of a practice of collecting a higher amount of tax from Chinese traders based on the Recopilación de Leyes de Indias book 8, title 15, law 21. Guerrero (1966), ‘Chinese in the Philippines’, p. 31, speaks of up to 10 per cent of the total value. BR 8, pp. 316-318. A quantitative study should also consider that new fiscal measures were introduced in Mexico at that time; the alcabala, a general sales tax of 2 per cent in 1575 that doubled to 4 per cent in 1636 is the most famous example. See McAlister (1984), Spain & Portugal, p. 363.
30 Merino (1980), Cabildo, p. 53; Ayer (ed.), Manila mal gobernado: ‘Daño muy considerable que se haré en las islas es permitir que los sangleyes chinos lleven todos los años para China casi un millón en plata podiéndose modificar tanta saca con que lleven mitad engendros o que los españoles sean mercaderes que entonces quedara la mas de la plata en tierra y no como se experimenta que no viniendo un año la nao de México no se halla un real en todas las islas.’
32 For the two royal decrees of early 1593, see Spate (1979), Spanish Lake, pp. 161-164; BR 8, pp. 316-318; BR 17, pp. 29, 33-34, 41-44.
trade: the following decades vessels carried between 700 and 2000 tons across the Pacific.33

After King Philip II had personally commented on the economically harmful participation of rich Mexican merchants in the galleon trade, *boletas* (passes) were issued with the intention of equally dividing cargo space amongst the citizens of Manila.34 Yet before long these regulations turned into a monopoly of a few liquid businessmen from Mexico and government officials who managed to acquire enough *boletas* for the passage of their merchandise.35 Here too, the supervising Audiencia judges were accused of corruption and unfair collaboration with Chinese merchants.36 Ultimately dependence on the galleon trade limited the Manileños’ scope of intervention so that the *boleta* system in fact only undermined Spanish control.37 The system, nevertheless, was efficient enough to keep unwelcome competition to a minimum. When the Florentine merchant Francesco Carletti (1573-1636)38 visited Manila in 1596/97 in the course of a private circumnavigation, he was clearly surprised by the difficulties he and his father faced to get permission for their enterprises. This shows that foreign trade at Manila was heavily restricted for non-Asian visitors.39 The main reason being English privateers preying on Spanish vessels40

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34 The monarch’s concerns are expressed in Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), *Cédulas reales*, no. 30 (1589). For regulations, see Pastells (1925), *Historia General*, vol. 1, p. 265; Bernal (1966), ‘Chinese Colony’, p. 61: ‘These were valuable and were given to the recipient purely because he was a Spaniard.’
36 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620; see also Bauzon (1981), *Deficit Government*, p. 14: Archbishop Santibañez concluded in a letter to the King in 1599 that the Spanish colony in the Philippines would not survive without the galleon trade.
37 Merino (1980), *Cabildo*, pp. 54-56: ‘It caused an uncontrollable speculation on the part of the capitalists of Nueva España, who were using the boleta, through their agents in Manila, to import goods from China at an enormous profit, to whom they paid up to 8 or 10 per cent of the capital invested.’ The most important commercial lawsuit tried by the Audiencia dates back to the year 1656 when several residents of Mexico were excluded from galleon trade. Cunningham (1919), *Audiencia*, pp. 114-115.
38 Francesco D’Antonio Carletti. See also Colla (2005), ‘Shonin Carletti’.
40 See Elizalde Pérez-Grueso (2008), ‘Filipinas’, p. 122. In early November 1587, Thomas Cavendish captured the 600-ton Manila Galleon *Santa Anna* off Cabo San Lucas in California, where he took its cargo of 122,000 silver dollars. Paradoxically Cavendish’s ship was too small to carry the entire cargo he had captured from the Spaniards. As a consequence, the colonial government listed English Protestant corsairs among the biggest threats for the Philippines in the 1590s. See Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), *Cédulas reales*, no. 30 (1589). For reactions in Manila, see AGI Filipinas 34, n. 79, ‘Carta de Santiago de Vera sobre el corsario inglés Cavendish y otros asuntos’, 25 June 1588.
and fear of Dutch attacks. In comparison with East India Company merchants, who enjoyed not only relative freedom in foreign trade, but also the opportunity to choose legally between commerce and privateering, Spanish traders were clearly disadvantaged. One of the few times that royal intervention was efficient was in preventing the establishment of an independent chartered trading company based on private capital. Being bound to the law of the Crown, merchants sailing on Spanish ships could only choose between lengthy negotiations or committing crimes against the state. Last but not least weather and typhoons should also be taken into consideration as worthwhile explanation for the general decline thesis with regard to the larger context of cross-regional connections of the galleon trade.

Restrictions failed to work on Mexican merchants, who either exclusively controlled silk distribution in Mexico or travelled to Manila, enriching themselves in the fashion of treasure fleet brokers on the Atlantic. Much to the royal authorities’ regret they neither settled, nor invested in Manila but eventually opted to return to more comfortable areas in the empire, leaving behind creed, hatred, and the spirit of symptomatic competition within the Spanish Overseas Empire, as an account by Governor Tavora shows:

> Everyone knows how much money is brought to the Philippines each year, just as everyone knows that most of this money belongs to the people in Nueva España and elsewhere. This is the real reason why prices are so prohibitive here in Manila and so low in Nueva España, despite the profits of so many middlemen. The truth is that when, after a period of two years the accounts are settled, very few of us have made some profit, and in many cases not even the investment is recovered. This is the reason why we are always forced to dig into our capital to pay for living and other expenses and why our wealth is dwindling, as is well known.

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South China Sea Trade in the Sixteenth Century

A Vast ‘Chinese’ Network

We have learnt earlier that Chinese merchants were anything but passive carriers of silk, lured to Manila by precious metals. Manila was not the only option. Vital multiethnic networks had shaped the commercial nature of the silk and spice trade in the South China Sea region for centuries. Alongside fifteenth-century developments on the Maritime Silk Road Chinese trade became globally connected. Multiethnic trading networks technically connected the Philippine archipelago via Chinese private maritime ventures and Muslim trading networks with the China Seas and the Indian Ocean. The fluid identity of these merchant groups confused early Spanish observers as a report from Mindanao, quoted by Scott, illustrates: ‘boats from Borneo (Brunei) and Luzon are called Chinese junks in these islands, and even the Moros themselves are called Chinese, but in fact Chinese junks do not reach here’. In addition, Ryukyu merchants linked Japan internationally with coastal and insular South East Asia, including Java and Palembang, since the 1450s. During the sixteenth-century Sino-Japanese trade embargo the Ryukyu network connected the economies of China and Japan and stimulated Japan’s integration in Asian trade. It is not unlikely that merchants from Ryukyu even managed to connect to Manila’s silver trade in second half of the sixteenth century.

In the macro region, an undefined mix of tally trade and private enterprises flourished in entrepôts like Melaka, Ayutthaya, and Cantonese.

46 Muslims from Mindanao and Sulu made regular visits to Manila in order to buy Chinese silk. ‘Their monopoly of silk, both raw and finished, their numerical superiority of vessels, their long experience in South East Asia and their geographical nearness gave the sampan traders an initial advantage which the Europeans did not have in the earlier phase of the Western expansion.’ See Quiason (1966), ‘Sampan Trade’, p. 166.
47 Reid (2010), Imperial Alchemy, p. 86.
48 The last ship from Ryukyu was sent to Siam in 1570. Maritime activities of Ryukyu merchants and formal diplomatic exchange of the period are well documented in the Rekidai Hōan, a source analysed in detail by Chinese and Japanese historians alike. For an overview see Uchida, Takase, Ikeya (eds) (2009), Ajia no Umi.
and Fujianese coastal centres such as Quanzhou.\textsuperscript{51} Spice trade had turned Quanzhou into a multiethnic, hybrid trading port during the rule of the Mongols, who favoured loyal Muslim merchants of various places of origin, including Persia and South East Asia. Handicraft industries flourished since the Song period and stimulated overseas trade and shipbuilding and Quanzhou even benefitted from silk deliveries from the neighbouring silk dye centre of Zhangzhou.\textsuperscript{52} On the one hand, Quanzhou suffered the effects of Chinese hostility against Muslims and gradually lost its significance after the Ming's rise to power and at the beginning of the sixteenth century, official Chinese tally trade had declined dramatically.\textsuperscript{53} On the other hand, private and contraband traders were able to circumvent Ming foreign trade restrictions (\textit{海禁}, ch. \textit{haijin}). Families from Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang province, among others, made decent livings as secret traders outside China's official trade relations with Barbarian states. Some of them were Sinicised Muslim merchants, others local Fujianese or Cantonese who went south in order to escape the strict Ming bans. A record in the \textit{Ming shi} clearly states the existence of a colony of Fujian people on Luzon before the arrival of the Spaniards.\textsuperscript{54} Scholars have arrived at two conclusions from this record: First, that vivid maritime trade of Quanzhou or Zhejiang during the Song and Yuan period showed a certain degree of continuance in the form of junk trade in the \textit{Nanyang}.\textsuperscript{55} Second, it underlines official China's sufficient awareness of such developments.\textsuperscript{56} Whereas the first aspect reshapes the view of the commercial conditions that enabled Iberian (and later Northern European) traders to participate and eventually fill niches, the second – in stark contrast to despotism and decline during the later Ming period – is

\textsuperscript{51} For the development of flourishing exchange in the region, see Andaya (2004), ‘Interactions’, pp. 2-17.


\textsuperscript{53} For an overview of Muslim networks in Quanzhou, see Donoso (2011), \textit{Islam}, pp. 190-213.


\textsuperscript{55} For sampan vessels, see Van Tilburg (2007), ‘Vessels of Exchange’, p. 42: ‘Originally, the term comes from the Chinese language, meaning three (san) boards (ban), and describes a small simple skiff. The authoritative \textit{Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea} defines these craft as ‘typical small and light boat; [...] the coastal sampan [is] fitted with a single mast and junk-type sail.’ East Asian maritime history research has contributed to a better understanding of very open and active exchange patterns. See Hayasaka (ed.) (2013), \textit{Bunka toshi}.

\textsuperscript{56} Clark (2002), \textit{Community}, p. 167.
a telling indication for Ming China's potential to monitor the seascape during times of closure.

Fujianese junk traders coming to Luzon in large numbers enjoyed a reputation as gifted businessmen, able to adjust their strategies to local requirements. They earned respect for their knowledge of market and customs conditions in all major ports.57 From their home country they shipped in particular silk and porcelain. Both raw and manufactured silk were distributed inside China from the manufacturing areas of Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Nanjing; Fujian has its own porcelain production but also benefitted from its closeness to Jiangxi (江西) province, home to the historical pottery production of Jingdezhen (景德镇市).58 Their merchant network based on kinship ties spread over the entire seascape and made them the best-connected merchants of the commercial clan system (公司, ch. gong si, also meaning ‘company’ in modern Mandarin). It is absolutely crucial to understand that those fuelling the first Chinese diaspora in South East Asia remained connected with their homeland in Fujian. The Fujianese commercial network enabled smooth exchange, due to mutual business confidence.59 Thoroughly established strong bonds with relatives and their hometowns (關係, ch. guan xi) gave them a major advantage in any type of transaction outside imperial China. In a recent study, Anthony Reid discussed the far-reaching connections of Overseas Chinese huaqiao, emphasising their Sino-Southeast Asian identities, as well as their strong pre-Hispanic link to Luzon. According to the New Zealand-born historian, people active in maritime trade at the beginning of the sixteenth century belonged to one of four different groups: the Malayos of Melaka, Jawi, Jawa, or Luzones who, most strikingly, all had Chinese ancestors.60 Traders called Luzones referred to Sino-Southeast Asian elites from Brunei and Manila, indirectly integrated into trade with China via Melaka and Siam prior to the arrival of the Spaniards.61 Reid stresses the Chinese element of maritime traders arguing that

60 Reid (2010), Imperial Alchemy, pp. 49-56; 86 discussed huaqiao identity and their historical role as ‘other’.
61 Tomé Pires (Suma Orientalis) also describes this region, referring to the Luzones as ‘robust and hardworking, but possessing no more than 200-300 ships for trade with Borneo and Malacca […] Luzon lies ten days beyond Borneo, has plenty of foodstuffs, wax and honey, and enjoys inter-island trade and direct Borneo purchases of local gold’. Cf. Scott (1984), Prehispanic, p. 84.
managing China trade was difficult if not impossible for those unfamiliar with Chinese dialects, written Chinese and the habits of local officials and brokers. The Luzones who played a role in both the Manila-Melaka and Melaka-China trade around 1500 are easiest to understand as successors of those who managed the Brunei-Manila-China trade 80 years earlier.\(^\text{62}\) Considering the relatively large amount of Muslim traders among them the Spaniards at first probably categorised these traders as Moros.

### Integrating Manila

Hamashita Takeshi has opposed Fairbank’s thesis that Ming and Qing changed significantly under European impact, arguing instead that the rest of the world adapted to China as the centre. If Manila followed that contention it could only have adapted to a passive China.\(^\text{63}\) Victor Lieberman has also underlined that Ming China indirectly coordinated production in South East Asia and even in Japan to some extent, in addition to transfer of nautical and metallurgical technologies, ceramics and textile products.\(^\text{64}\) When the Chinese economy prospered at the end of the sixteenth century and developed further in the seventeenth this was to a certain extent also thanks to notable contribution from Manila. Hence, Manila and China’s integration into global trade mutually influenced one other.\(^\text{65}\)

During the first half of the sixteenth century, incentives would also emanate from Japan. Once the Muromachi Bakufu’s tributary status was not renewed by the Celestial Empire, after the tributary mission debacles of 1523 and 1542/43 official trade with China had to be circumvented. Soon piracy and smuggling carried out by merchant adventurers, the *wakō* mentioned above, re-emerged.\(^\text{66}\) In less abstract terms it meant that foreign commerce laid in the hands of Chinese and Japanese private merchants and pirates, who often enjoyed support and protection from *daimyō* (local

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\(^{62}\) Reid (2010), *Imperial Alchemy*, p. 86.


\(^{64}\) Lieberman (2009), *Strange Parallels*, vol. 2, pp. 419-420.

\(^{65}\) While Flynn and Giráldez have suggested that the silver traded with China should be considered a commodity rather than a currency, we find ample evidence for the use of silver as currency. See, for instance, Grau y Monfalcón (1640), *Justificación*, pp. 11-21. Chaudhuri made similar claims for India. Conclusions are based on the accounts of David Ricardo, who proposed considering silver a so-called high cost commodity. Chaudhuri (1978), *Trading World*, pp. 100-104.

\(^{66}\) Many of them were proficient with European firearms and experienced at sea, especially after Nobunaga’s success in maritime battles.
lords). Although it has been argued that ‘classic’ wakō raids had come to an end in the 1560s, thanks to Ming trade relaxations in the China Seas there is evidence that coastal authorities remained on alert, not surprisingly, since Japan remained unaffected from China’s licensed maritime trade. Japanese pirate traders with their ability to switch between raiding and trading, continuously upset the Ming authorities. Wherever private Chinese commercial activities increased outside imperial supervision the wakō joined in. Arano Yasunori has stressed the flexibility of such communication networks in the South China Sea, which prospered at the junction of tally trade to illegal private trade and benefitted from a well-functioning transport network, which he calls wakō-teki jyōhō. For example, in 1589 the Fujian Grand Coordinator (巡撫, ch. xunfu) Zhou Cai reported: ‘The coastal residents of Zhang-zhou go to trade with the various fan. The major traders illicitly link up with the Japanese yi who spy on our coasts.’ The same writ furthermore indicates that these illicit trading networks were linked to the Manila trade. Namban trade between Macao, Manila, and Japan would have been unthinkable without allied Japanese and Chinese clandestine maritime activities.

Piracy was not only a profit-seeking enterprise but also a socio-economic phenomenon. First, as indicated above, local authorities sponsored many of these enterprises. Hence, the Spaniards were not all wrong when they

68 Brook (2010), Troubled Empire, p. 224.
69 See Ming-shih, ch. 322 of the 1779 edition. Cf. Boxer (1963), Great Ship, p. xxiv: ‘The “wa” (Japanese) were shrewd by nature; they carried merchandise and weapons together, and appeared here and there along the sea-coast. If opportunity arrived, they displayed their weapons, raiding and plundering ruthlessly. Otherwise they exhibited their merchandise, saying that they were on their way to the Court with tribute. The south eastern coast was victimised by them.’
70 Arano (1987), ‘Nihongata ka’i’.
72 ‘Pirates’ importance for the growing commercial exchange between the Philippines, China and Japan has recently been illustrated by Igawa (2010), ‘At the Crossroads’, pp. 74-84.
73 Maehira (2008), ‘Minchō no Kaiken’, pp. 61-76; AGI Filipinas, 18A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 1587. The existence of a settlement of Japanese sojourners in Cagayan, on the northern edge of Luzon, which according to contemporary records hosted the unlikely number of several hundred Japanese, also proves the existence of early links between Japan and Luzon. See Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 245-247. See also Pastells (1995), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 294: He mentioned a report by Legazpi of the late 1560s, in which the Governor claimed that Japanese came together with the Chinese on the same trading vessels and went as far South as Mindoro.
referred to them as *corsarios*. Second, many illegal seafarers landed in Manila, driven by their struggle to survive. An account by Padre Juan de Medina, based on hearsay and first published in 1630, illustrates the fate of the Fujianese immigrants’ in China. It suggests that overpopulation forced people to live on the sea. Joint enterprises with other seafaring groups would have guided these floating people to the Philippines as soon as they got wind of easy gains or a better living. In the fashion of promoting a glorious life under Christian rule, the Catholic father insisted that roaming around the South China Sea would make their lives a misery, but once they came to Manila they were assured a prosperous future.

In essence, the complex combination of lawlessness and lack of central power stimulated the development of flexible commercial networks that changed the nature of regional trade and Manila before the establishment of regular commerce with Mexico or Spain.

The Spanish settlers of Manila initially welcomed the incoming traders, and happily enjoyed the benefits of commercial shipping within the flexible structures of Fujianese and Japanese maritime networks. Dissatisfaction about products of mediocre quality was only an issue during the early years of Spanish presence. Once the Chinese merchants came to realise the purchasing power of the emerging Manila market they adapted to the demand there:

They do not bring to sell the silks and beautiful things that they take to Malacca. They say that, if there were any one to buy them, they would

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74 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 6, n. 61, ‘Carta de Vera sobre pobreza de la gente de guerra’, 26 June 1586.  
75 BR 10, pp. 212-213: ‘On account of suspicion which arose a long time ago regarding the Chinese, and because the Japanese pirates brought Chinese pilots and seamen, I made some investigations [with] Alonso Sauyo, governor of the sangleyes, but nothing of importance was discovered.’  
78 Upon his arrival in Manila, Legazpi informed Philip II about the Chinese calling on ports in Luzon. AGI Filipinas 6, r. 1, n. 7, ‘Carta de Legazpi sobre falta de socorro y descubrimientos’, 23 July 1567. See also BR 3, p. 181: ‘The Chinese have come here on trading expeditions, since our arrival, for we have always tried to treat them well. Therefore during the two years that we have spent on this island, they have come in greater numbers each year, and with more ships; and they come earlier than they used to, so that their trade is assured to us.’ Miguel López de Legazpi moreover mentioned that Japanese frequented the islands.
bring all we wanted; and so, since trading with the Spaniards, they bring each year better and much richer wares. If merchants would come from Nueva España, they might enrich themselves, and increase the royal customs in these parts – both through trade and through the mines, the richness of the number of which are well-known to us. \textsuperscript{79}

Chinese private traders shipped ever-growing numbers of Chinese products and bartered them with American and Japanese silver. \textsuperscript{80} Depending on monsoon conditions, a sea journey from Fujian took between ten and fifteen days. \textsuperscript{81} Before long, Spanish traders and royal authorities in Manila feared that dealing with the Chinese would be unprofitable, since the Chinese only gave cheap quality silk and ceramics in return for silver. \textsuperscript{82} The 2000 to 4000 ducats gained from the anchoring fee were not enough to bring growth to the settlement. Reacting to Manila's residents' complaints, the King's councils in Spain came up with the idea of abolishing direct trade with the Chinese at Manila by no longer exporting silver from Mexico. \textsuperscript{83} Needless to say, this step was never undertaken. Yet it shows that other factors than official Spanish trade policies kept Manila trade alive.

Last but not least, through its attractiveness the galleon trade triggered change in Chinese and Japanese central regimes' attitudes towards foreign trade and related exchange. \textsuperscript{84} The huge number of trading passes or licences for Manila issued in both China and Japan reflect shifts towards more foreign-trade-oriented political economies in both countries. It is noteworthy that the Spanish Crown also intended to distribute licences among the settlers of the Philippines for inter-Asian trade but the plan was

\textsuperscript{79} BR 3, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{80} For the goods and commodities traded in Manila in the early trade with China, see Ch'en (1968), Chinese Community, pp. 78-83. For Japanese silver, see Sugaya (1998), ‘16 seikigo no supeinryō’, pp. 21-47.
\textsuperscript{81} Quiason (1966), ‘Sampan Trade’, p. 161; For the number of Chinese junks anchoring at Manila, see Chaunu (1960), Philippines, pp. 149-192: 1581-1590: 102, 1591-1600: 119, 1601-1610: 290, 1611-1620: 49, 1621-1630: 73, 1631-1640: 325, 1641-1650: 162 (including Macao). The journey of 400 Spanish leagues (approx. 1600 km) from Manila to Nagasaki took about 15 to 20 days. AGI Filipinas 6, r. 7. n. 110, ‘Carta de Pedro González Carvajal sobre su viaje’ 1594.
\textsuperscript{82} BR 6, pp. 279-280: The Spanish at Manila regretted that only a very small amount of the silver sent from the Americas stayed in the Philippines, while the settlers of Mexico complained about the bad quality of Chinese silk products that would cause price drops for their own silk manufactures.
\textsuperscript{83} AGI Filipinas 339, l. 1, f.332v-333v, ‘Prohibición del comercio entre China y Nueva España’, 19 June 1586.
Map 6  Triangular Trade

*plus: saltpetre, copper, iron, other handicrafts, fabrics, wheat flour, earthenware, etc.

** plus: sugar, wax, wine, Spanish curiosities, sappan wood, honey, etc.

***plus: wheat flour, dried meat, tuna, traditional weapons, military supply, folding screens, knives, arms, armour, lacquerware, porcelain, etc.
never implemented. Beginning with the boletas for the Manila Galleon, trade licences issued by a central authority became the symbol for the shift from private maritime trade to exchange under the control of the state.

Integrating the Manila Galleon into South East Asian Trading Networks

Indigenous Participation and the Origins of Sino-Japanese Trade in Luzon

A few words have to be said about the role of indigenous Filipinos’ role in cross-cultural trade under Spanish colonial role. As already indicated, certain native groups were well integrated in foreign maritime trade with visiting East Asian traders by exchanging domestic products, including gold, wax and deerskin, followed by sappan wood and honey. Laura Lee Junker’s study has stressed that during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Philippine chiefdoms were intensifying their participation in long-distance maritime trade. To the ruling elite it presented a welcome source for luxury goods, such as Chinese silks, which next to locally produced status goods, including decorated earthenware, served as the distinguishing element for a datu’s spiritual rule. Although it goes without saying that indigenous foreign exchange suffered from Spanish interference with the islands’ economy, two aspects should be taken into consideration when drawing a general picture. First, in several regions separated from Manila, pre-Hispanic exchange continued without major interruption. Pangasinan, a region rich in game, for instance, continued to entertain direct foreign trade relations. Yet only a small share of the population was logistically able to participate and benefit from foreign exchange. Second, during the entire Spanish period, the indigenous population of Luzon had access to Chinese merchandise and at times acquired it in exchange for American silver. In this regard it helps to recall that many natives served as intermediaries and benefitted from indigenous integration into the colonial society. In fact, that development had far-reaching consequences. When merchants and craftsmen in Luzon no longer considered manufacturing a viable option, it not

85 Ayers (ed.) (1700–1746), Cédulas reales, no. 22 (1589).
86 Agoo (La Union) close to Cagayan was an emporium for the exchange of Igorot gold.
87 Junker (1999), Raiding, pp. 122; 193.
89 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 294. For a revision on the classic view that the natives had no access to silver, see Cruikshank (2008), ‘Silver in the Provinces’, pp. 124-151.
only forced them into making a living as day labourers but also discouraged export-oriented production. We may therefore conclude that flourishing triangular trade harmed the traditional structures of Philippine society in various aspects.

There is moreover no denying that the Spaniards, in imperial fashion, sought to place any form of lucrative indigenous trade under their own control. For instance, once they got wind of gold resources in Bicol (in today’s Camarines Norte province) in the south of Luzon, gold mining and distribution were quickly placed under Spanish supervision and Villa Ferdinandina was founded.\textsuperscript{90} A further lucrative trading good locally produced in Luzon was deerskin. After the 1570s large amounts of leather were exported to China, Mexico, and Japan and in the seventeenth century up to 80,000 deer were annually hunted for that purpose.\textsuperscript{91} Deerskin was highly valued in Japan’s leather manufacturing (for shoes and samurai armour) and trade between the indigenous population and Japanese traders continued into the seventeenth century before Japan replaced Philippine deerskin imports with Taiwanese ones.\textsuperscript{92} Some research suggests that as a result of over-export, deer became almost extinct on the Philippines.\textsuperscript{93} In any case, in light of uncontrollable Sino-Japanese competition for these export products, Spaniards urged a ban on the export of deerskin.\textsuperscript{94} In a similar fashion Chinese consumers were accused of causing ecological harm to the island by loading their ships with too much lumber and thus causing wood shortages in Luzon.\textsuperscript{95} Recurrent Spanish restrictions on direct exchange between the Chinese and the indigenous reflect sentiments of economic rivalry and the colonial elite’s disapproval of cooperation between East Asian traders and indigenous people.\textsuperscript{96} The elite’s uneasiness regarding the local populations’ participation in Sino-Japanese trade was closely connected to a stubborn belief in the laziness of the indigenous population. In particular in periods of silver shortness, the Spaniards in the Philippines blamed the Filipinos for spending money without much consideration. Critics of free trade were moreover convinced that if the ‘Indians’ had been more active in agriculture

\textsuperscript{90} AGI Filipinas 27, n. 6, ‘Carta del Cabildo Secular de Manila sobre Conquista’, 17 July 1574.  
\textsuperscript{91} Okada, Katō (1983), Nichiō kōryū.  
\textsuperscript{92} Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 251; Oka (2010), Shōnin, p. 109.  
\textsuperscript{93} Jansen (1992), China in the Tokugawa World, pp. 20-21. Deerskin was the principal trading good from Siam to Japan.  
\textsuperscript{94} Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 30 (1589).  
\textsuperscript{95} BR 10, p. 84.  
\textsuperscript{96} Álvarez (2009), Costo del Imperio, p. 64.
and cotton weaving there would have been no need for the Chinese to come to the Philippines, and American silver would stay on the archipelago.\(^97\)

In fact, the role of the American market for Chinese luxury items was far more essential than petty exchange in and around Manila. Significant amounts of silk and porcelain shipped from Manila to the Americas profoundly changed consumption patterns in the Spanish overseas economy and production patterns in Asia. Together with cargo registers of the Manila Galleon, archaeological findings illustrate the high demand for Chinese earthenware in the Americas.\(^98\)

**Fujianese Trade with Manila**

In light of the huge number of Fujianese traders travelling to Manila annually, it still stands to question if and how these private merchants and licensed silver carriers were integrated in the galleon trade. In a way official Spanish policies set that trend. King Philip II commanded in January 1593 that his vassals should no longer go to China to buy merchandise there, and further decreed that if the Chinese wanted to sell goods, they should come to Manila at their own risk.\(^99\) Ironically only one year after the Spanish Crown had forbidden trade in China, Dasmariñas complained about the Chinese dictating the rules.

> They do not permit us [...] to go to their country, nor may a Spaniard go thither to invest one real – a custom entirely contrary to the freedom of trade. Therefore in order to avoid other undesirable results, I have decreed that Chinese traders shall not live here under the pretext of being merchants.\(^100\)

\(^97\) BR 8, pp. 81-85.  
\(^98\) The Yuchengco Museum in Metro Manila hosted an exhibition of Zhangzhou ware discovered in the Philippines. The exhibits cover blue-and-white items of Fujian manufacturers that were produced especially to meet European demand. The Spanish galleon *San Diego* sunk in the year 1600 due to a military clash with the Dutch navigator Olivier van Noort off the coast of Manila and was excavated in 1991. See Desroches, Casal, Goddio (eds) (1997), *Schätze der San Diego*. For the first Dutch-Castilian sea battle in Philippine waters, see Schmitt (ed.) (2008), *Indienfahrer*, vol. 2, pp. 224-229. Research by Nogami Takenori from the Arita Folk and History Museum furthermore stressed the widespread use of Japanese porcelain in the Philippines, as a newly excavated collection in southern Cebu shows. Introduced at the Latin American Seminar, Kyoto Foreign Language University, 26 February 2014.  
\(^99\) Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), *Cédulas reales*, no. 49 (1593): ‘Y mandar de que adelante ninguna persona trate, ni contrate en parte alguna de China ni por cuenta de los mercaderes de los dichas islas se traiga ni pueda traer hacienda alguna de aquel reino a ellas sino que los mismos Chinos las traigan por su cuenta y riesgo.’ Together with the *pancada* the rule was officially abolished in 1696 but most of the time successfully circumvented by private traders. See also BR 25, p. 137.  
\(^100\) BR 8, p. 274.
Soon after the opening of Yuegang (Haicheng) in 1567 and thus many years before the above-mentioned royal decree, a remarkable number of official Chinese traders came to Manila. Some researchers speak of 30 permissions every year for ships from Yuegang to Luzon. According to Spanish data, an average of 30 to 40 ships of 100 to 300 tons each arrived every trading season during the peak years between the 1590s and the 1610s. In combination, the numbers indicate that by around 1590, the bulk of Chinese junks sent to Manila were licensed ones and when annual silver imports were carried out with official sanction between Manila and China.

With regard to silver imports to China data presented by Richard von Glahn suggests that before 1600 China imported on average 46,600 kg of silver per year, of which about 60 per cent came from the Iwami mines of Japan that were opened in the 1530s. The rest originated from mines in the Americas and primarily entered via Manila. Merchants engaging in East Asia’s silver trade in Asia’s sixteenth century benefitted from diverging silver-gold ratios in Spain, China and Japan, known as arbitrage in economic history. Due to a devaluation of silver in relation to gold, in 1566 and 1608, the silver–to-gold ratio was 12:1 in the Castilian Empire, in China it rose from 5:5:1 to 8:1. In the 1590s the value of silver was still about twice as high in China as in other regions. While the present study aims to analyse neither long-term economic development nor the beneficiaries of arbitrage deals, some general explanation patterns and research figures will be helpful. The opening of Yuegang (1567) and the foundation of Spanish Manila (1571) are popular starting points. The later date moreover coincided with the beginning of annual Portuguese intermediary trade on the Macao-Nagasaki route, which created a permanent Portuguese foothold in Japan.

101 Remarkably, some Manila Galleons were of the same size (300 tons).
104 The ratio data is based on a famous report by Pedro de Baeza of the year 1609 in which he also described arbitrage practices based on an alleged abundance of gold in China; Cf. Boxer (1970), ‘Plata es Sangre’, p. 461. See also Atwell (1998), ‘Ming China’, p. 404.
105 Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, pp. 53-54, acknowledged that the Seville archives are a disappointment when it comes to the quantities of traded goods in Manila. I can only agree and have no choice but using Chaunu’s figures, despite the criticism of changing collection practices.
106 For a recent synthesis of the Macao-Nagasaki trade, see Loureiro (2011), ‘Macau-Nagasaki Route’, pp. 189-206, in which he divides the commercial interaction of the kurofune into four stages, analysing the varying success of the enterprise. For prices of the Luso-Japanese trade in these decades, see AGI Patronato 46, r. 31, ‘Memoria de mercaderías de nao portuguesa: de China al Japón’, undated.
A lot has been written about profitability and popularity of the Portuguese-Japan trade, whose main winner was the capitão moro or capitán mayor with gains of about 10 per cent of the entire cargo sold.¹⁰⁷ Strong Portuguese interest in keeping the Castilians out of Japan and China determined patterns of silver trade in the macro region. While they failed in Japan, for China they achieved that the Spanish did not receive ‘their Macao’. For instance, in 1575 two Augustinian friars Rada and Marín made attempts to settle in Amoy, a garrison since the early Ming. As we shall see later arrangements for the ‘Chinese enterprise’ under the governorship of Francisco de Sande failed, due to the opposition of the Habsburg monarch, who did not want to endanger fragile Iberian relations.¹⁰⁸ Before long Fujianese traders themselves – unhappy about the arrival of two Portuguese ships in Manila during the trading season – invited Governor Santiago de Vera in 1587 to build a Spanish trading outpost in ‘Chincheo’ (Yuegang).¹⁰⁹ That year more than 30 ships came from China and Macao, laden with horses, cattle and other merchandise, which were all sold very cheaply. Many were from ‘Chincheo’, equipped with Ming licences.¹¹⁰ Archival records suggest that Japanese traders were also involved in arbitrage deals. About 1575, Juan Pacheco Maldonado reported to Philip II that Japanese vessels visited Luzon every year for the purpose of exchanging silver to gold.¹¹¹ This backs the neutral trading spot thesis and underlines Manila’s potential in enabling Japanese traders to circumvent Portuguese intermediaries as well as Chinese trade prohibitions. Time and again, the anti-Japanese regulations of Macao turned into Manila’s comparative advantage. Manila became the only port in the region that provided a free, liberal market for independent merchants from China and Japan.¹¹² In 1614 the Governor of Guangdong and

¹⁰⁷ Disney (2009), History of Portugal, pp. 182-191.
¹⁰⁸ AGI Filipinas 339, l. 1, ff. 80r-82r, ‘Instrucciones de gobierno a Francisco de Sande’, 29 April 1577. The royal government informed Sande that it wished to maintain friendship with China instead of conquering it. For the failure of Rada’s and Loarca’s missions to Southern China, see Ollé (2002), Empresa, p. 64. Martín de Rada’s own account (AGI Patronato 24, r. 22, ‘Fray Martín de Rada a S. M. sobre la jornada de China’, 1 April 1576) of the journey that includes various details on China would thereafter serve European writers as important source for China studies.
¹⁰⁹ AGI Filipinas 34, n. 75, ‘Carta de Santiago de Vera sobre situación general’, 26 June 1587.
¹¹⁰ The term ‘Chincheo’ was common among European traders to refer to the main port from were Fujianese traders left for Manila. Historians have been debating whether it referred to Zhangzhou 漳州 or Quanzhou 泉州 but it is now commonly accepted that it refers to Yuegang. Ptak (2005), ‘Image of Fujian’, p. 307. AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 32, ‘Copia de Carta de Vera al virrey sobre situación, japoneses’, 26 June 1587.
¹¹¹ BR 3, pp. 295-303.
¹¹² Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 335. The commodity is referred to as chokidan. Tax was collected from the Japanese merchant Leon Mangobeo, who sold steel in 1617. He paid 2 pesos 2 tomin and 69
Guangxi introduced a new set of regulations for the Portuguese settlement, requiring that Macao must not harbour Japanese, the purchase of Chinese (i.e. slaves) was forbidden, and other regulations on anchoring of ships, the payment of duties in Canton, and restrictions on new constructions should altogether ensure ultimate Chinese sovereignty.113

To briefly recap, instead of becoming direct intermediaries like the Portuguese or later the Dutch, the Spaniards provided an advanced framework for continuous visits from the Chinese and Japanese: a port of call. In doing so the colonial government not only saved overhead costs but was furthermore able to skim off money from incoming trade.

Table 4 Chinese Trading Ships to Luzon114

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1581-1590</td>
<td>102</td>
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<tr>
<td>1591-1600</td>
<td>119</td>
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<tr>
<td>1601-1610</td>
<td>290</td>
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<td>1611-1620</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>1621-1630</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>1631-1640</td>
<td>325</td>
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<tr>
<td>1641-1650</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have heard that the Manila Galleon officially did not ship more than 1,000,000 pesos annually across the Pacific. Chinese goods brought to Manila during the same period must have valued some 1,300,000 pesos.115 In 1598 Governor Tello informed the King that junks carried between 800,000 and 1,000,000 pesos back to China every year and added that merchants earned more than 100 per cent during a ten-day stay.116 However according to data generated at the Archivo General de Indias, annual income based on almofarifazgo only amounted 23,000 pesos.117 This explains official records on Chinese traders who came to the island and did not register properly.118

*grano* per picul. The Japanese captain Luis Melo who brought 173 silver bars the same year, paid for 3 real each bar, for normal gold the same tax as the Chinese 224 pesos.

116  BR 10, p. 179.
117  Bernal (1966), ‘Chinese Colony’, p. 44.
118  For instance: Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), *Cédulas reales*, no. 71 (1594).
Irregular Beginnings and Institutionalising Attempts of Hispano-Japanese Exchange

Scholars inspired by Iwao Seiichi’s research on early modern Japanese trade in South East Asia have emphasised that adventurers from Japan frequented Cagayan and the Pangasinan region – geographically perfectly located for the Japanese – even before the arrival of the Spaniards.119 The existence of an outpost of Japanese sojourners in Cagayan, on the northern edge of Luzon, backs this claim. According to contemporary records, this Japanese settlement around the castle in Aparri hosted 600 residents who traded weapons for gold (from Igorot) under the command of their pirate-captain, Taifusa (also: Taifuzu).120 When the Spaniards discovered the settlement in 1581, they concluded that this illegitimate Japanese camp at Puerto de Japón – as they called it – had to disappear.121 The following year, Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa urged a military intervention, which resulted in around 200 Japanese deaths and Japanese defeat at the hands of Captain Carrion.122 That Cagayan was more than just a temporary wakō hub and that Spanish fear of further attacks were not just hysteria or propaganda will become clear later.

Despite being considered illicit traders or even pirates, Japanese were allowed to support the Spanish community in Manila with goods. An eyewitness reported that Japanese settlers from Cagayan came on friendly trade missions to Manila to sell their weapons. Governor Vera stated that prosperous trade relations could be of further benefit for the archipelago, while being afraid of their skilled use of weapons.123 Iwao Seiichi’s survey stressed that the pre-shuinsen trade settlements (first in Cagayan and later in Manila) were almost exclusively based on private trade.124 During the early decades they did not act in the name of any Japanese authority.

120 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 245-247; See also Borao (2005), ‘Colonía de Japoneses’, pp. 25-53.
121 The term was probably coined by Miguel de Loarca who reported that Japanese traders visited Pangasinan regularly for trade. Cf. Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 250.
124 See Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 249. Vigan (美岸, Bee-gan), the original toponym of the settlement, is etymologically reminiscent of Southern Fujianese merchants and is a telling indication for
foreign authorities, such as Ming officials or Spanish colonial personnel, labelled them Japanese only served as distinguishing feature from Chinese sojourners. However, both behind the ‘Chinese’ trader and private Japanese merchants various identities could be found. The latter came to Luzon under the patronage of Kyushu daimyō, from Satsuma, Higo, Hirado, Nagasaki, and Hakata. Some of them flirted with Christianity, while others, such as Katō Kiyomasa (加藤清正), an ardent follower of the Buddhist Nichiren sect, just feigned interest. The year 1587 can be regarded as the beginning of official Japanese participation in triangular trade, as an account by Francisco de Vera, the incumbent governor, shows.125

Although Spanish vessels travelled to Japan prior to the period of licensed trade, written records are difficult to locate.126 What is certain is that private enterprises were usually carried out in collaboration with the Portuguese.127 We know from fragmented evidence that individuals such as Bernardino Avila Girón, Pedro González de Carvajal, or Antonio Duarte sailed to Japan from Manila between 1592 and 1596, and also temporarily settled in Nagasaki. From its very beginning and far into the seventeenth century many of these private commercial projects were linked to provisions trade.128 Prominent examples included Alonso de Ulloa and Francisco Maldonado in 1602; Captain Nicolás de la Cueva in 1603 and 1604, Captain Juan Rodríguez Bermejo in 1605, Captain Francisco Moreno Donoso in 1606 and 1607, Captain Juan Bautista de Molina in 1608, Captain Juan de Cevicos in 1610, and Captain Domingo Francisco in 1612 and 1613.129

The nature of Japanese trade in Manila changed essentially with the introduction of the Shogun’s vermilion-seal trade (朱印船貿易, jp. shuinsen bōeki). From the point of view of private namban trade it meant

125 AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 32, ‘Copia de Carta de Vera al virrey sobre situación, japoneses’, 26 June 1587.
126 Filipinas 6, r. 7, n. 110 ‘Carta de Pedro González de Carvajal sobre su viaje a Japón’, 1594.
128 It should be emphasised that Japanese, Chinese, and Spanish ships were involved in that missions: ‘El Santiago el Menor, que el año pasado envié a Japón, trajo pólvora, balas, hierro, y clavazón, de que teníamos gran necesidad para los almacenes reales, a causa de lo mucho que se gastó en la guerra de los sangleys; también trajo cantidad de harinas particulares, que fue grandísimo provecho, y se cobró de flete a razón del tercio o cuarto, con que se suple un pedazo del gasto de navío.’ Cf. Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico, p. 447.
129 Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon, pp. 303-313.
an elite attempt to cut, re-channel, and even usurp individual profits. Starting in 1601, Tokugawa Ieyasu sent a letter to the Governor of Manila, introducing his wish for regular trade both with Luzon and New Spain. Three years later, Ieyasu and Pedro Bravo de Acuña (r. 1602-1606), who had followed Francisco Tello as Governor of the Philippines, standardised trade between the two islands: three ships per season and mutual protection by law for the merchants and their property. The following year a further agreement between the same parties determined that four Japanese ships could enter Manila Bay, while Spanish traders also received official permission for four ships to do business in Japan annually. This institutionalisation of foreign trade in the form of merchants operating under Tokugawa licences led to an increase of the Japanese commerce volume with Manila. Acuña's statement that Japanese ships 'provided with the seal of the emperor [were] warmly welcomed' confirms that Tokugawa foreign trade regulations initially brought a stabilising effect on the Manila market.

At the heyday of Japanese participation in the Manila trade, Japanese shuinsen merchants benefitted from catering to the luxury needs back home as well as from serving the daily needs of the Spanish community. So, before long, Spanish authorities feared Japanese dominion. Aiming at the restriction of Manila-based Japanese trade, a law enacted on 25 July 1609 required that Spanish vessels should exclusively carry merchandise between the two countries. The plan never materialised.

130 Nakajima Gakushō provides us with thorough research on Kyushu-Fujian-Luzon trade and gives particularly enlightening details on Japanese warlords’ participation in the 1590s, showing that regular foreign trade relations were established before the Tokugawa reign. Nakajima (2008), ‘Invasion of Korea’, pp. 145-168.
132 Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku Nikki shō, pp. 202-209; AGI Filipinas 6, r. 9, n. 175, ‘Copia de carta del obispo de Japón al governador sobre Dayfu Sama’, 1601.
133 For official trade agreements, see Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku Nikki shō, pp. 46; 62; Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsukō ichiran, 179/569 and 571. Sola (1999), Historia de un Desencuentro, p. 95.
136 Schurz has stressed the importance of silk exports for changing consumption in the New World. Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 32.
137 Recopilación de Leyes de Indias, book 9, title 44, law 2 (29 July 1609): ‘La contratación, comercio y navegación que hubiere desde las Filipinas al Japón, se hicieron por los vecinos de los islas para no dar lugar a que los japoneses vengan a ellos.’
Commercial Gifts: Peculiarities of Hispano-Japanese Trade

Understanding the full spectrum of the Manila system requires examining its intercultural dimension, in other words, why the dynamics of combined diplomacy and trade mattered to the Manila market. Therefore, before studying trade flows and merchandise, I would like to discuss one peculiarity of triangular trade of the early 1600s. In doing so we find that most Spanish merchant ships sent to Japan were equipped with presents for the Shogun. What appears bribery was in fact the hybrid result of overlapping European and East Asian traditions, where embassies and gift-giving were fundamental for commercial expansion. Without them merchants were hardly likely to master difficult trading environments and negotiating patterns. As Adam Clulow explained, it was customary for Europeans arriving in Asia to seek ‘access to the highest authority […] by dispatching embassies armed with official letters and bearing gifts’. In this fashion, opportunist Spaniards adopted a combination of commercial interaction and diplomatic codes in order to secure access to the Japanese market; Since commercial gift-giving had a random character, and was applied as opportunity presented, goods were often simply labelled as gifts. The above-mentioned private Spanish merchants seemed to have been equipped with sets of gifts for high-ranking Bakufu officials and local lords. Japanese historian Takase Kōichiro (高瀬弘一路) has discovered a document of a financial officer of Manila of 1607 stating that it was customary to send ships from Manila to the Japanese ruler along with an ambassador and highly priced gifts.

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138 Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico, pp. 447-448, quoted a letter of the Audiencia in Manila of 8 July 1608, which describes regular gift exchange: ‘Cada año se ha enviado un navío, en el cual van cartas y un presente de pañolos y algunas piezas de seda, vino y otras menudencias, que todo cuesta menos de ochocientos pesos; y es tan necesario esto, que si las cartas no fuesen a esta sombra, serían mal recibidas: recibenlo allá con voluntad, y el gobierno (japonés) he enviado cada año cinco de armas, a su usanza, que son de poca defensa y valor, aunque parecen bien.’

139 Martha Chaiklin concluded: ‘The bestowal of gifts to smooth diplomatic negotiations, from ruler to ruler, and between envoy and ruler, was a common practice in most parts of the world until well into the nineteenth century.’ Chaiklin (2012), ‘Merchant’s Ark’, http://worldhistoryconnected.press.illinois.edu/9.1/chaiklin.html (accessed 13 March 2012).


141 Avila Girón’s account indicates that early private merchants already followed that practice. Girón (1965), Nihon, pp. 270-275. After the 1640s similar practices were institutionalised for the Dutch in Japan. One of the pillars of VOC trade with Japan was the annual journey to Edo (hofreis naar Edo) where a Dutch delegation offered exclusive gifts to the shogun. For a description of the ceremony, see Goodman (2000), Japan and the Dutch, pp. 24-28.
(valuing between 800 to 1000 pesos).\textsuperscript{142} Usually gifts consisted of Chinese silk, Castilian clothes, and wine; glass items, wax, and earthenware found in Luzon were also repeatedly recorded.\textsuperscript{143} Regardless of being considered an inappropriate gift, weapons were commonly sent to Japan. Sending wine was likewise not without irony. Exporting wine from Spain (a common good on ships to the Americas) was already a trans-Atlantic challenge, due to the problematic storage in the unbearable heat. A similar story could be told for olive oil that was much in demand for baptism but would arrive rancid.\textsuperscript{144}

Thus sending these Spanish products to the Philippines was in fact a waste of resources and cargo space. Certainly, when Castilian wine reached the shogunal court after at least two years of travel it was essentially vinegar. Unfortunately we do not know anything about the use of the items in Japan.

Understanding the reciprocal principle of gift bestowal also explains why merchants adopted it in the first place. The inventory of the first vessel sent to Manila by Tokugawa Ieyasu shows that this trade pattern could be very lucrative for the Spaniards. It listed an extensive range of both symbolic gifts and practical goods, including 500 swords, different metals and 10,500 blankets. Goods like two toilette mirrors and 30 golden folding screens give reason to believe that it was not a standard commercial transaction. Apart from exchanging presents, merchants accompanying the delegation used the opportunity to barter with local dealers.\textsuperscript{145} Another account by Antonio de Morga that mentioned Japanese folding screens

\textsuperscript{142} Takase (2002), Kirishitan jidai, p. 102; See also AGI Filipinas 329, l. 2, f. 100v, ‘Petición de informe sobre regalo al emperador de Japón’, 25 July 1609. According to Juan de Silva, presents for the emperors of China and Japan cost 1633 pesos.

\textsuperscript{143} For Castilian wine sent to Japan, see Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/575; Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku Nikki shō, pp. 44; 69. AGI Filipinas 19, r. 3, n. 51; For an overview of gifts sent to Japan on various occasions between 1592 and 1623, see Contaduría 1206 (Caja de Filipinas, Cuentas). See also Shimzu (2012), Kinsei nihon, pp. 342-244; Sola (1999), Historia de un Desencuentro, pp. 204; 210-211.

\textsuperscript{144} Murdo J. Macleod described how church elites lamented over the fact that wine sent from Spain had already gone bad when it got to the Americas. Macleod (1984), ‘Spain and America’, pp. 334-335; 367-369.

\textsuperscript{145} AGI Filipinas 7, r. 7, n. 88, ‘Memoria de mercaderías que trae el embajador de Japón’, 1600. See also Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku Nikki shō, p. 68: Five golden folding screens are mentioned in a register on goods sent to New Spain in the year 1612.
and swords among imports to Manila falls into the same category.\textsuperscript{147}

Although such records are not necessarily accurate in quantitative terms they doubtlessly shed light on Hispano-Japanese exchange patterns. It highlights both the Filipino-Spanish attempt to circumvent royal orders and has to be seen as yet another Japanese attempt to put the Middle Kingdom system upside down by imitating Chinese practices. As far as Spanish contributions – often explicitly improvised – are concerned, tributary items listed in official Japanese records fall into the category of exotic items; next to it we find various types of silk and other clothes.\textsuperscript{148} Silk goods, of course, originally came from China and were purchased in Manila, either because of the limited availability of other presents or because the Spaniards knew what was most appreciated in Japan. When it comes to Spanish perception, not all active participants seem to have been aware of their strategic acting. In the year 1615 a Spanish envoy to Tokugawa Japan referred to the gifts for the Shogun as ‘useless things’ (‘cosas sin provecho’).\textsuperscript{149} And then there were also those Spanish actors who ignored the power of material gesture, for one reason or another. If we are to believe one of Alessandro Valignano’s (a controversial Jesuit Visitor to the Estado da Índia) famous polemic pamphlets, mendicant orders, especially Franciscans were ridiculed for not bringing any gold or silver on their missions to China and Japan.\textsuperscript{150}

The Spirits That They Called – Bargaining on the Spot

While highly symbolic exchange patterns with gifts and gestures were a form of trade that happened mainly outside Manila, we now return to commercial exchange on the spot, yet not without being reminded that it must not be disconnected from the situation described above. If we are to believe Padre Juan de Medina, prior of the Augustinian convent in Cebu, trade with

\textsuperscript{146} Some folding screens were sent to Europe and thanks to Habsburg connections even ended up in Graz. The Ōsakajō-zu-byōbu is still part of the rich furniture of the Eggenberg Castle. See http://www.kleinezeitung.at/steiermark/graz/graz/1484215/index.do as well as http://www.museum-joanneum.at/upload/file/Schloss_Eggenberg[0].pdf (both accessed 23 February 2013).

\textsuperscript{147} BR 10, pp. 81-85.

\textsuperscript{148} Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, p. 69.

\textsuperscript{149} AGI Mexico 28, n. 49, ‘Carta del virrey marqués de Guadalcázar’, 13 March 1617.

\textsuperscript{150} Cf. Álvarez-Taladriz (ed.) (1973), Relaciones, p. 69.
China was beneficial for everyone in 1630: not only for those living on the islands, but also for the whole of Spain. Because in China, ‘everything and as much as desired was available’ and the number of merchant ships was uncountable. Father Medina underlined the fluidity of the network and the mobility of the merchants who also went to Siam, Cambodia, Moluccas, Makassar, and Japan and thus secured Manila’s provisions in everything needed, including iron, mercury, silk, rice, pork, gold, and a thousand other things that were all exchanged against silver.

Fujianese and Japanese merchants dominated the most lucrative trade branches, while their business deals under Spanish supervision followed the logic of constant bargaining ‘on the spot’, as supported by two aspects: First, Manila reflected laissez-faire structures despite constant control from above. The small number and mostly only light punishments for smuggling unregistered goods into Manila, as indicated by Juan Gil, furthermore emphasises the liberal trade atmosphere. Second, trading conditions were often influenced by external developments. Numerous records about huge possible profits during the earlier stage stress a minimum of government intervention. In light of potential Spanish control, customs and other taxes that went straight into the caja (colonial budget) calling Manila a Sino-Japanese intermediary port falls short. Instead, I suggest speaking of a neutral trading spot supported by Iberian merchants and policymakers, resembling neighbouring port cities. In addition, I have found that at the height of triangular trade, active intermediaries were practically absent from Manila. In reality, Fujianese traders dealt with the Fujianese market, shuïnsen traders with Japan and Spaniards and criollos with Mexico, and increasingly after 1610, the Portuguese with Manila and Mexico. The setup was surely not without critics. Antonio de Morga worried about what he referred to as chaotic economic profile. He complained about the lack of fixed laws, high prices of provision and counterfeiting merchants, for which he blamed the unfair strategies of Chinese and indigenous Filipinos. Moreover, he accused rich Spanish encomenderos and Chinese of

151 Medina (1630), Historia, pp. 68-69.
152 Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 70-72.
153 John Darwin emphasised in his recent book the ‘play of economic and geopolitical sources’ as crucial for understanding the dynamics of empires. Darwin (2009), Empire Project, p. 7.
154 Summarised by Grau y Monfalcón (1640), Justificación, pp. 11-21.
155 Seijas (2008), ‘Portuguese Slave Trade, p. 21. In the 1630s, the Portuguese kept the Spanish colony supplied with merchandise and slaves and the Spanish were willing to turn a blind eye to violation of trade prohibitions.
156 BR 10, p. 81.
manipulating rice prices.\textsuperscript{157} In any case, limited availability of goods and the high level of competition and the unpredictable bargaining process made Manila an expensive place. In addition, a saturated market often caused price falls, as happened in the 1590s.\textsuperscript{158} Reoccurring rampant inflation, partially as a consequence of silver in transit, as well as fluctuating prices in particular for Chinese silk demonstrate that protectionism failed. Since prices on the Manila market were conditioned by the availability of silver, the market remained vulnerable to external factors for the entire period of our study. Serafin Quiason has shown how a ‘starved Manila or Acapulco market would induce a rise in prices’; in 1628, when official Japan had already stopped sending vessels to Manila, prices for silk and other Chinese commodities increased sharply due to the scarcity of silver coming from the Americas – according to one witness up to 400 per cent.\textsuperscript{159}

We may assume that top-notch bargaining in bulk happened at the notorious fair of Manila, reminiscent of what Fernand Braudel described for late-sixteenth-century Europe, and not yet manipulated by emerging merchant capitalism.\textsuperscript{160} It would not be too far-fetched to trace similarities between Fujianese bargaining tactics and elaborate traditions of Chinese haggling that can still be experienced today.\textsuperscript{161} The ultimate example of top-down bargaining was the institution of \textit{pancada},\textsuperscript{162} which existed for several years with varying success. King Philip II ordered the introduction of the \textit{pancada} system for Chinese merchandise between 1589 and 1591.\textsuperscript{163} As an instrument for wholesale (or purchase in bulk) the \textit{pancada} fixed prices for Chinese imports based on negotiations in advance. Such a procedure was believed to ensure that the Chinese did not cream off the profits of this lucrative exchange and to improve the Spanish merchants’ profits.\textsuperscript{164} The \textit{pancada} gave rise to a form of collective bargaining prior to the actual trade. The captain or head of a Chinese merchant ship bargained with a committee of Spanish officials or merchants (sp., \textit{cargaderos de la nao}),

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{157} BR 10, pp. 84-85.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Quiason (1966), ‘Sampan Trade’, p. 169.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Cf. Quiason (1966), ‘Sampan Trade’, p. 168.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Braudel (1977), \textit{Afterthoughts}, p. 40.
\item \textsuperscript{161} Bernal (1966), ‘Chinese Colony’, p. 45, pointed out that the Chinese were skilful bargainers.
\item \textsuperscript{162} Although some sources suggest that \textit{pancada} was a Manila neologism of unknown origin, the term was also used in Macao with regard to Portuguese trade in Manila. See Álvarez (2009), \textit{Costo del Imperio}, p. 65; Souza (1986), \textit{Survival of Empire}, pp. 58-62.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Curtin (1984), \textit{Cross-cultural Trade}, pp. 134.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), \textit{Cédulas reales}, no. 45 (1593). The suggestion for such policy initially came from Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas in a letter dated 20 June 1591; Philip II confirms his order once again in a cédula written on 11 June 1594.
\end{itemize}
who represented the municipality of Manila. The fixed price could not be changed once the investment had been placed.\textsuperscript{165} Any delay in the arrival of the galleon increased the opportunity for private merchants to ‘make their own deals on the side’, leading to flourishing ‘smuggling and contraband trade’.\textsuperscript{166} Thus by the turn of the century, the \textit{pancada} was gradually replaced by a free market environment, the \textit{feria} (fair).\textsuperscript{167} Luis Alonso Álvarez has concluded that since the \textit{pancada} did not stop the drain of Chinese silk to the Philippine provinces, \textit{encomenderos} and the indigenous population were the greatest losers of trade with the Chinese because they were soon excluded from the Manila market; it is furthermore worth mentioning that Álvarez considers the Dominicans, who supported the Chinese residents of Manila, winners.\textsuperscript{168}

I would like to add Japanese merchants, thanks to their extraordinary purchasing power, as the second winning team in the period between 1590 and 1610. They took a particular interest in Manila because of the easy access to Chinese products, including silk for the Japanese domestic economy.\textsuperscript{169} Their competition for Chinese silks and their superior purchasing power on the Manila market led to sudden price increase that negatively affected Spanish performance and the \textit{pancada} system.\textsuperscript{170} Imports from Manila included silk yarn in the amount of 400 to 500 \textit{picul} before 1600, compared to 1000 \textit{picul} annually from Macao: white and raw silk were mainly purchased in Guangdong and directly shipped to Japan.\textsuperscript{171} Before the seventeenth century, the bulk of Chinese silk from Manila reached Japan on board Portuguese ships.\textsuperscript{172} In 1598 the Japanese reportedly bought up all silk from China. In light of high quantities of silk exports to Japan, the Spaniards feared that too many Japanese traders in Manila would cause the silk supplies to New Spain and Europe to fall tremendously, and thus directly harm the income for the Crown.\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Recopilación de Leyes de Indias}, book 9, title 45, law 34.
\textsuperscript{168} Álvarez (2009), \textit{Costo del Imperio}, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{169} For the unfair practices of Manila Galleon officials, see BR 10, pp. 81-85.
\textsuperscript{170} See Schurz (1985), \textit{Manila Galleon}, pp. 74-78; 115. 133.
\textsuperscript{171} For the larger context of the trade system, see Oka, Gipouloux (2013), ‘Pooling Capital’, pp. 75-91.
\textsuperscript{172} Oka (2010), \textit{Shōnin}, pp. 99-100. Extensive lists of goods of \textit{namban} and Portuguese trade in Asia including scope and prizes are a particularly noteworthy contribution of her book.
\textsuperscript{173} Morga (1890), \textit{Sucesos}, pp. 350-351; Iwao (1937), \textit{Nanyō}, p. 334 based on Retana (ed.) (1895-1905), \textit{Archivo}, vol. 3, p. 84. Louis Cullen classified the Spanish in Manila among Japan’s competitors
Katō Eiichi has pointed out that sixteenth-century Japan’s readiness to buy large quantities of silk yarn was linked to the growing market that developed in castle towns at that time.\(^{174}\) Thus, occasional silk shortages in Manila are not at all surprising.

The comparatively larger effort Japanese had to make to reach Manila implies proper gains. The vermilion-seal ship’s principal cargo consisting of Japanese silver and everyday commodities was always quickly sold. As Chinese high-quality silk was the chief commodity for Japanese brokers, my hypothesis is that Chinese silk yarn and other silk products were the driving force behind Japan’s efforts in maintaining regular relations with Manila. The fact that Japanese trade in Manila was integrated in a network of more than ten overseas Japantowns in South East Asia by the 1610s is a further reason to speculate about who pulled the strings behind the scenes. According to Charles Boxer, the Japanese enjoyed a much greater freedom of trade at Manila than the Chinese.\(^{175}\) However, a closer look suggests the opposite. Contrary to previous assumptions, they were not exempted from paying the *almojarifazgo* to the royal treasury.\(^{176}\) Nevertheless there were times, for instance in 1607 and 1608, when they did not pay taxes because they did not bring any goods to declare.\(^{177}\) Moreover direct Sino-Japanese barter certainly offered ways to avoid tax payment. The arbitrary attitude of Manila authorities who tended to make decisions without the King, jeopardised Hispano-Japanese trade relations. Finding out about untaxed trade with Japan, the Spanish monarch accused colonial authorities of trying to enrich themselves illegitimately and called for moderation.\(^ {178}\)

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**Provisions Trade**

The above-mentioned quote by Juan de Medina clearly hints that private traders and brokers from China and Japan were taking care of the material for Chinese silk. See Cullen (2003), *History of Japan*, p. 22.


175 Boxer (1963), *Great Ship*, p. 73. Contaduría registers show that officials in Cavite regularly collected *almojarifazgo* from Japanese mercantile vessels.

176 Around the year 1600, 218 tributes were collected from Japanese households in Manila. BR 27, pp. 79:135.

177 AGI Filipinas 29, n. 94, ‘Carta de los oficiales de la Real Hacienda de Filipinas’, 14 July 1607.

178 AGI Filipinas 329, l. 2, ff. 97r-98r, ‘Ordenes sobre comercio con China y Japón’, 25 July 1609; as well as a petition drafted the same day: AGI Filipinas 329, l. 2, f. 100r, ‘Petición de informe sobre regalo al emperador de Japón’, 25 July 1609.
welfare of Manila before and after the restrictions of 1593. Merchandise brought to Manila from Hirado by a Sino-Japanese crew in the year 1593 included tuna, ham, 300 bags (picos) of flour, 20 of copper, 1600 blankets, and three sets of *catanas*. The goods had to be declared before the Governor and his clerk.\(^{179}\) One product was particularly crucial: flour. As important staple nutrition on the Manila Galleon and for Spanish soldiers stationed in the region, it furthermore enjoyed great popularity among the settlers who had processed it into bread in one of Manila’s many bakeries. Being easily available in Southern Japan, wheat flour enabled even smaller lords to participate in foreign trade.\(^{180}\) The first cargo from Hirado, which arrived at Manila in 1587, registered wheat alongside salted fish, weapons, silk, and handicrafts.\(^{181}\) Governor Acuña stressed in 1604 the importance of the arrival of a private flour cargo, together with munitions, gunpowder and significantly also many gifts as sign for friendly relations, from Japan.\(^{182}\) Next to occasional supplies from Japan, Fujianese traders were the ones ensuring the colony’s survival. Spanish authors ranking from missionaries to the King in Spain described how Chinese settlers fed Manila by providing bread, pork, chicken, and fish for virtually everyone for little money.\(^{183}\) Food cargoes became a vital part of the Manila system. Such convenient imports allowed the Spaniards, in a way similar to the socio-economic conditions in the Americas, to focus on less tedious, non-producing tasks.

Private traders from East Asia moreover took initiatives to provide arms and other materials for munitions due to the Spaniards’ constant need to defend and occasional desire to expand their political influence in the region.\(^{184}\) As examined above, cargoes from Japan also often included traditional weapons, swords and military supplies, such as iron, iron bullets,
saltpetre, copper, and nails. Moreover hemp for ropes and sails was also imported from Japan. Both in 1586 and 1587, Japanese ships with weapons arrived in the Philippines. At times, Spanish ships were sent to Japan to buy necessities. One such example is a vessel of 1608, whose cargo consisted mainly of raw silk. In Japan, colonial officials and merchants bought iron, saltpetre, hemp, flour, and blankets for the Manila warehouses (reales almacenes) with the returns from silk trade. Iron shipped to the islands from China and Japan was another such necessity that helped the Spaniards to cut down on their expenses. Being mainly used for nails for shipbuilding, 25 pounds (11.5 kg) could be bought for 8 reals, whereas nails from New Spain cost more than twice as much. Fujiang, being rich in raw materials such as wood or iron, supposedly catered to similar Spanish needs.

Japanese historian Maehira Fusaaki (真栄平房昭) carried out a survey on weapon transport in the China Seas. At the beginning of the seventeenth century weapons ranged from traditional Japanese swords to manufactured European-style rifles. The latter found a ready market in Fujian, despite the Ming prohibition on purchasing firearms, and were likely to be carried back by Fujianese traders from Manila. As regional hub for military supply Manila’s reputation soon spread to Japan. During the war with Korea (1592-1598) Katō Kiyomasa (1561-1611), one of the Japanese senior commanders, sent ships to Manila to acquire Chinese copper and saltpetre. Trade in saltpetre (potassium nitrate) – the most important gunpowder substance – reflects the ambiguous roles of certain agencies of the Manila trade. Successfully used as chemical explosive in China since the Song period, European history was determined by both a constant need and chronic shortage of the nitrated salt. In China, export was historically forbidden, the Ming notoriously feared to arm potential enemies. Albeit such prohibitions, Antonio de Morga declared that Chinese captains and merchants should be ordered, under penalty of imprisonment, to bring saltpetre, iron, copper, and other metals, which they had until then refused

185 Morga (1966), Firipin shotō, pp. 391-392.
186 Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 163.
188 Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico, p. 448.
189 BR 18, pp. 175-176.
190 Van Dyke (2005), Canton Trade, p. 15.
191 Maehira (2008), ’Minchō’, pp. 61-76.
192 Nakajima (2008), ’Invasion of Korea’, p. 156. For Katō Kiyomasa’s correspondence with the Governor of the Philippines, see Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, pp. 82-83.
193 Saltpetre functions as oxidizer, while sulphur and charcoal are used as fuels.
194 See Needham (1986), Science and Civilisation, p. 126; Souza (1986), Survival of Empire, p. 76.
to bring. Indeed, private merchants found ways to supply the Spanish Pacific over the years.\(^{195}\)

Being part of intra-Asian junk trade, only few ships were exclusively dedicated to transporting provision to Manila. Provisions trade was well integrated into the bargaining system, however under special conditions. His Majesty had ordered that no custom duties must deter Asian traders from selling their goods in Manila and provisions were hence excluded from any trade regulations, including the *almojarifazgo* tax.\(^{196}\) This certainly was an incentive for smaller traders to visit the city and encouraged others to stay and to help colonising the archipelago.

There were times when external influences harmed the smooth system. For instance, when the Dutch François de Wittart kidnapped three richly laden Chinese merchant ships on their way to Manila during the trading season 1609/10 before being defeated by a fleet led by Juan de Silva offshore Manila in April 1610.\(^{197}\) Over the years multifaceted supply patterns ensured the maintenance of the colonial infrastructure. In years when the Fujian-Manila route was interrupted, Fujianese merchants sent ships from Japan or Taiwan.\(^{198}\) In addition, the Portuguese of Macao also happily filled in as intermediary carriers. Their efforts date back to the 1580s when they supplied Manila with construction material from China and saltpetre from Siam.\(^{199}\) In periods of plummeting Chinese supply the Spaniards actively encouraged other South East Asian rulers to provide them with military supply. For that very reason embassies were dispatched to Cochinchina, Camboya, and Siam around the year 1628, when triangular trade relations had been in its last throes.\(^{200}\)

Various historians have found strong evidence for Portuguese traders’ significant role in provisions trade. John Villiers found that African slaves, Indian cottons, spices, amber, ivory, precious stones, toys, and curiosities from India, Persian and Turkish carpets and gilded furniture made in Macao were shipped on Portuguese ships to Manila.\(^{201}\) A more recent study by

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\(^{195}\) Filipinas 34, n. 24 ‘Relación de las cosas que se han de enviar a Filipinas’, 1578; AGI Filipinas 29, n. 33, ‘Carta de los oficiales reales sobre varios asuntos’ (1580).

\(^{196}\) Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), *Cédulas reales*, no. 71 (1590); BR 7: 89; Gil (2011), *Chinos*, pp. 50-52.

\(^{197}\) Gil (2011), *Chinos*, p. 91.


\(^{199}\) AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 1587.

\(^{200}\) AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 6, ‘Carta de Niño de Tavora sobre materias de gobierno’, 1 August 1629.

\(^{201}\) Villiers (1987), *Silk and Silver*; For the slave trade, see De Sousa, Beites Manso (2011), *Os Portugueses*. 
Amélia Polónia and Amandio Barros on individual networks and Iberian agents in trans-Atlantic trade revealed that Portuguese were albeit continuous prohibitions an integrative part of the system. The Portuguese kept the colony supplied with merchandise and slaves and the Spanish were willing to turn a blind eye to violation of trade prohibitions. Oka Mihoko’s and Lúcio de Sousa’s research on Portuguese slave trafficking from Japanese and Chinese points of origin leaves no doubt that after slave trafficking became forbidden in Macao, Manila became the new transit port from where Chinese, Japanese, and Korean slaves were shipped to other continents. Their findings have great potential for future studies on the nature of slavery and servitude in the Spanish Philippines, under the pretext of protecting the native population versus reoccurring Moro slave raids in Luzon and Visayas.

Connections between Manila and Macao

When employing the lens of longue durée the impact on China’s economy of several hundred Iberians in Asia might have been marginal. Yet American and Japanese silver flows to China sustainably changed global economic connections of the pre-globalised world and many individual actors thrived as silver-gold intermediaries between China and Japan. The assertion that the Ming dynasty collapsed under the pressure of increased military spending and decline in silver imports from Japan and Manila between 1635 and 1644 has been heavily debated over the past three decades. We will not be able to fully grasp the complex nature of the silver trade without looking at both the ideological background and changing Japanese and American consumption patterns. While both Japan and Spain provided silver bullion for China, the Ming, ironically, looked down at her suppliers, constantly mocking that they brought nothing but silver in exchange for high-quality Chinese manufactures. Silk and ceramics production were indeed not yet similarly advanced in the Iberian realms. Japan used to earn similar disapproval from China. Indeed, although manufacturing

204 Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 131.
206 Cf. Murai (1997), Umi kara mita, p. 164; Zhang (1934), Ming shi folangji, pp. 81-83.
techniques had advanced by 1600, costs for domestic products exceeded Chinese imports by far.

Late-sixteenth-century Japanese silver exports to China are commonly associated with the Macao-Nagasaki route. The annual ship from Macao usually left China in June and returned in March. For several months up to 200 Portuguese stayed in Japan, where they willingly spent money and enjoyed themselves.\textsuperscript{207} Compared to the Spaniards of Manila, a much higher number of Portuguese visited Japan.\textsuperscript{208} Some of them belonged to the military Order of Jesus and, as a rule, they were known for their inappropriate behaviour. They benefitted from the privileges of knighthood: A royal letter of appointment (\textit{alvará}) was the necessary patent for the so-called \textit{capitan moro} to carry out the Macao-Japan journey; it was the most important document of the Portuguese maritime empire in Asia during the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{209} The same lucrative silver business secured the Jesuits’ foothold in Japan. Padres of the Society of Jesus actively participated in Sino-Japanese arbitrage trade based on an agreement between Alessandro Valignano and Macao-Nagasaki silk traders in 1578. That deal, for which they would later receive the approval of Superior General Claudio Aquaviva, Pope Gregory XIII and the royal officials in Macao and Goa, won the Society 100 of the 96,000 kg of silk sent annually and was possible thanks to a fairly liberal royal church patronage known as \textit{padroado}.\textsuperscript{210} What is more, over the years the Jesuits were often the ultimate beneficiaries of Portuguese trade with Japan: as cross-cultural brokers their skills were often indispensable for Luso-Japanese business deals; the Jesuits ensured gains of Christian merchants in Nagasaki in order to secure the future of their own missionary work.\textsuperscript{211} This was a stark contrast to Spanish mendicant friars active in Japan after 1590.

Luso-Spanish tensions differed geographically, depending on the external setting: The Portuguese in the Moluccas, their weakest spot, showed themselves far more tolerant than their countrymen in Macao. Occasionally they would even ask the Spaniards for help. In 1582 the \textit{capitan mayor} of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{208} Macao’s sudden growth and the enormous profits of its resident merchants as intermediaries in the official Macao-Nagasaki trade have always been undisputed. Chaunu (1962), ‘Manille et Macao’, p. 579; Gipouloux (2009), \textit{Méditerranée Asiatique}, pp. 142-143.
\item \textsuperscript{209} Hesselink (2012), ‘Capitães Mores’, pp. 8-9: The position was popular among Melaka captains, \textit{casados} (Sefardic Jews), and Cantonese merchants.
\item \textsuperscript{210} Boxer (2002), \textit{Portuguese Merchants}; BR 10, pp. 192; 198-201; De la Costa (1961), \textit{Jesuits}, pp. 55-56.
\item \textsuperscript{211} Hesselink (2012), ‘Capitães Mores’, p. 2.
\end{itemize}
the Moluccas, Diego de Azambuza, asked for 1000 men to assist fighting the ‘Rey de Ternate’ and Manuel Pereira de Villasboas visited personally to the Philippines to ask Ronquillo for support. Yet, the Governor could not afford to commit himself fully to supporting the distressed Portuguese.212

Macao, as an informal Portuguese trading centre, was an entirely different story. According to Paulo Jorge de Sousa Pinto, Macao’s secret was a strategy of accommodation to the diverse interests of the local elites, the expectations of the consortiums of Portuguese-Chinese-Japanese merchants, the positions and politics of the Crown, the interest of the Portuguese nobility in the King’s service, the aspirations of the Company of Jesus in China and Japan, and finally the reservations, oscillations, and expectations of the provincial authorities of Guangdong and, above them, of Beijing.213

Although the separation of two overseas zones remained in effect afterwards, the implementation of the personal union between Portugal and Spain in 1580/81 was a new boost to Manila-Macao relations, economically speaking, with more success than with regard to evangelising. The Spaniards being well aware of the restrictions for their overseas territories, hoped their situation in the Far East would improve thanks to cooperation with the Portuguese; any sign in that direction, in return, made the Portuguese suspicious of losing their independence.214 Although Macao appealed to Goa and Lisbon to keep the Spaniards out of their spheres of interest, Bartolomeu Vaz Landeiro, one of the richest merchants in Macao, inaugurated the Manila-Macao route in 1583/84.215 Before long Portuguese merchants sailed between Nagasaki and Manila, carrying Asian as well as European goods between the two trading centres.216 Politically speaking, less pragmatic Portuguese of the Estado da Índia feared to lose their autonomy. In particular in Japan and China, the Portuguese made great efforts not to lose their undeniable comparative advantage to the Spaniards, or that is at least what Manila Spaniards sensed:

213 Pinto (2008), ‘Enemy at the Gates’, p. 16.
214 Boyajian (1993), Portuguese Trade.
216 Álvarez-Taladriz (ed.) (1973), Relaciones, pp. 11-13. In 1596, for instance, Portuguese Vasco Diaz’s ship carried Franciscan friars to Japan.
If any of the Spaniards who went to that land received ill-treatment at
the hands of the Chinese, it was due to the evil reports of us which the
Portuguese spread among them, warning them to be aware of Castilians
as a people addicted to stealing and seizing foreign kingdoms; and who
as they had become masters of Nueva España, Peru and the Philippines,
would strive likewise to obtain China.  

In the meantime, Macao had acquired full city status with a municipal
council, or Senate Council, as the representative body of Macao in 1585.  
The ruling Portuguese there were, unlike in Goa, not fidalhos but mainly
merchants acting as agents and spice brokers. This special character of
the outpost limited Crown intervention. In the early 1600s the Portu-
guese residents from Macao insisted on access to trade with Manila due
to decreasing returns from trade with Japan. Arguing that as ‘vassals of
the same king’ they should be entitled to contracts with Manila and with
other parts of the Spanish Empire. In 1608 the Crown officially allowed
Macao-Manila trade for provision and protection. From the turn of the
century until the 1620s, Portuguese vessels carried merchandise between
Manila and Nagasaki/Hirado and Manila and the Moluccas. This became
particularly important when Dutch raids intercepted Fujianese-dominated
trade in Manila. Thus, during the Dutch offensive of 1620, nine ships from
Macao (seven Portuguese, one Spanish, and one Japanese), three vessels
from Japan, one from Melaka, seven from India and one from Cambodia
arrived in Manila in support of the distressed Spaniards.

While the scale of Portuguese commercial activity in Manila increased
in the 1620s, trading conditions remained unstable. A silver crisis occurred
in Ming China when silver exports from Spanish America and Japan into
China decreased dramatically. George Bryan Souza claimed that officially
taxed Portuguese imports may even have surpassed mainland Chinese

217 BR 7, p. 216. See also Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 30, XI. For the activities
of Portuguese traders, see De Sousa (2010), Early European Presence.
218 Barreto (2006), Macau. For Valignano’s involvement, see Moran (1993), Japanese and the
Jesuits.
221 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 95.
222 Boyajian (1993), Portuguese Trade, p. 155: Estimated Portuguese investment in Asian Trading,
ca. 1600-1620.
224 For the debate on the Ming-Qing transition on whether there is a connection between
the decline in silver flows into China and the Ming-Qing transition, as well as the Ming-Qing
imports in the 1620s, while a substantial value of goods traded in Manila continued to come from Portuguese carriers in the following decade.\textsuperscript{225} James C. Boyajian’s study explains that the Manila trade was one more ‘profitable avenue of Asian trade’ for the especially resourceful and mobile casados.\textsuperscript{226} In particular, the Nuevo(s) Convertidos’ (Jewish converts) economic potential in the East, as discussed by Boyajian and Lúcio de Sousa, deserves special mention. What is more, the Portuguese global network even drew merchants from Seville, who increased their investment in the Manila Galleon trade in the 1620s, closer to Asia.\textsuperscript{227} In the following decades agents were sent from Seville to Manila to handle China trade for the Portuguese New Christians in Asia.\textsuperscript{228} With what Juan Gil calls the ‘hour of Macao’ a very different trading age had begun in Manila.\textsuperscript{229} This Portuguese trade in Manila peaked when Dutch fleets in the Strait of Melaka disturbed trade with India and Fujianese shipping suffered from the chaotic years before the fall of the Ming dynasty in the 1630s. The Spaniards still little appreciated the Portuguese contribution. Following a series of complaints, 17 articles were issued in 1632 for the purpose of prohibiting Portuguese trade at Manila.\textsuperscript{230} Yet, a few years later the Portuguese crisis in South East Asia, including the end of Macao-Japan trade in 1635 and Melaka’s fall to the Dutch in 1641, connected Lusitanian traders even closer to Manila: in 1640 half of Manila’s imports by value came from Macao.\textsuperscript{231} Interestingly, wars from 1619 to 1689, see the different standpoints of Flynn, Giráldez (2002), ‘Cycles of Silver’, pp. 391-427.

\textsuperscript{225} Souza (1986), Survival of Empire, p. 83.
\textsuperscript{226} Boyajian (1993), Portuguese Trade, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{227} Boyajian (1993), Portuguese Trade, p. 239. The author introduces the merchant Antonio Martins d’Orta who received in 1629 in Seville on the annual fleet from America a shipment of Chinese silks, pearls, musk, and amber valued at 200,000 cruzados. Other Mexico agents of Boyajian’s study, active in Manila in the 1630s, include Sebastián de Jaureqí and Francisco Fernandes Pereira (both sent by Amaro Dias of Mexico City), as well as António and Sebastião Vaz d’Azevedo; Francisco da Silva and Manuel de Granada represented Simão Vaz Sevilha in Manila in the 1630s and 1640s. Manuel Baptista Peres of Lima also invested in the Manila trade through Simã and others in Mexico.
\textsuperscript{228} Boyajian (1993), Portuguese Trade, p. 240. 1630s: António Soares was dispatched to Manila to handle China trade for New Christian merchants. New Christians in Manila maintained direct contact with New Christians in Macao and Goa. Jorge Dias de Montoia resided in Macao during the 1630s and 1640s and traded with his brothers Franciscan Dias de Montoia and other New Christians of Manila and Melaka. Francisco da Silva from Manila invested in the Far East in conjunction with his in-laws Manuel and Gaspar da Costa Casseres of Goa and Cochín.
\textsuperscript{229} Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 95-98.
\textsuperscript{230} Spate (1979), Spanish Lake, p. 228.
\textsuperscript{231} According to observations recorded in Domingo Navarette’s travel accounts and translated by Charles Boxer (1975), p. 91: ‘Macao […] throve so much with the trade of Japan and Manila,
the period between 1631-1636 saw the peak of multiethnic trade, with an increased number of other European and South East Asian trading vessels registered in Cavite.\footnote{Muntaner (2012), ‘Ports, Trade and Networks’, p. 266.}

A few examples highlight what was different about the Spanish path, which did not follow the trail of arbitrage profits. Looking for explanations why the Spaniards did not benefit financially from trade with East Asia, an early-seventeenth-century Spanish observer believed that the Portuguese advantage lay in denying the Japanese access to their market in Macao, while the Spanish allowed the Japanese to buy directly from Chinese merchants.\footnote{Cf. Gil (2011), Hidalgos y Samurais, p. 236.} The constant presence of a relatively large number of Japanese and Fujianese in Manila was not the only difference within the Castilian model. Unlike the Portuguese, the Castilians never developed institutionalised inter-Asian trade. Moreover Spanish performance on the Asian maritime stage differed from other Europeans by a minimum use of coercion in order to enforce trade deals.\footnote{For instance, in 1641, when the VOC had finally succeeded in seizing Melaka it introduced measures to make it the leading trading centre of the wider region by forcing merchant ships to pass the strait by use of maritime violence. See Clulow (2010), ‘European Maritime Violence’, p. 77.}

The quantity of Japanese silver ending up in China was high. As a result of intensified mining in Iwami and other Japanese mines, output increased significantly.\footnote{Nagazumi Yōko calculated that during the shuinsen trade period a total of 2000 tons (2,066,556 kg) of Japanese silver was exported. While shuinsen transported 843,000 kg, Portuguese ships carried 650,700 kg to Macao, Chinese junks 343,860 kg and Dutch ships 228,996 kg. Cf. Murai (2013), Tomi to yabô, p. 23.} Through transactions with foreign traders in Macao and Manila, primarily Japanese silver, refined by the haifuki (cupellation) method ended up in China.\footnote{It is believed that the technique was introduced to Japan from Korea in the 1530s and refined with Portuguese aid in following decades. Nanbanbuki was an improved liquidation process used in refining of gold and silver. See Souza (1968), Survival of Empire, p. 48.} During the active shuinsen trade period (1604-1636), when in certain years more than 30 Japanese vessels sailed to South East Asian trading hubs, they carried as much as 30,000 to 40,000

that it grew vastly rich, but never would vie Manila, nor is there any comparison between the two cities for all their analogies. I find as much difference, in all respects betwixt them, as is betwixt Madrid and Vallecas, and somewhat more, for the people of Manila are free, and those of Macao, slaves to the Chinese.’ Soon after the end of nominal Spanish rule over Portugal, the Spanish Crown once again decreed in protectionist fashion that Portuguese were no longer allowed to enter Manila. AGI Filipinas 330, l. 5, ff. 14v-15r, ‘Orden sobre comercio de los portugueses con Manila’, 10 December 1652.
kg of silver annually. Following export prohibition by the Bakufu in 1609, inferior quality coins also began to circulate.\textsuperscript{237} In the peak years between 1615 and 1625 silver exports even reached the formidable value of 130,000 to 160,000 kg. Neither private Chinese merchants trading in Japan, nor Spanish in Manila controlled such high amounts at any time, not to mention that Japan’s export volume increased after the rupture with Spain and again after the expulsion of the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{238}

Concluding Remarks

The aim of part II of this book was to outline Manila as centre for triangular trade between 1571 and 1644 from the perspective of connected histories. As such, early modern Manila remained a challenge for all parties and participants. The Castilians, for instance, aimed at creating a more liberal atmosphere from time to time – but in doing so never overcame their ad hoc attitude. At the turn of the seventeenth century after the \textit{pancada} system was abolished, merchants in Manila rejoiced in almost unrestricted commerce for several years before reinforced royal restrictions brought about a sudden end. Crown intervention hindered economic developments and numerous laws caused only moderate return to the colonists. Spain was the only early modern European trading nation granting the Japanese direct access to their market and at the same time they were the only early modern European trading nation that did not establish permanent or temporary factories in Japan or China.

The Chinese inability to pull the strings in triangular trade by channeling gains made in Manila into their home economy is as striking as the fact that they did not send their own ships to the Americas: a bold step that the Japanese were keen to take as we shall see hereafter. For the Japanese, the greatest challenge was a combination of structural problems and bad timing. Speaking of timing it seems noteworthy that the peak of Japanese trade in Manila was around 1607 and thus occurred several years before the peak of Japanese maritime trade in South East Asia.

With regard to Manila’s multilayered dynamics as a system, Manila did not connect as a core of a semi-dependent periphery but triggered lasting global impact in various parts of the China Seas and the Pacific. The fluidity of the system allowed rapid change and led to the parallel existence of

protectionist commerce and *laissez-faire* exchange. While the Manila Gal- leon trade was a Crown monopoly, in reality this monopoly was not as strong as the word suggests, but instead left plenty of room for triangular exchange at a neutral spot. As one of the consequences, cheaply available Chinese commodities enabled all classes and ethnicities to change consumption patterns. And yet, when measuring Manila’s significance for early modern global trade, merchant interests were not the exclusive stimulus for Manila’s development. The main challenge for Spain’s political economy was reacting to well-established, century-old concepts (i.e. tributary trade) that could not be easily outsmarted by mercantile protectionism. Spanish legacy suffers from the fact that the majority of contemporaries and historians alike assess its performance by success and failure of the state and blame the latter for applying unfit mercantilist policies. Mercantilist or governmental control institutions were not a Spanish invention: the *shuinsen* trade and the Chinese Superintendency serve as equivalents of the Atlantic system or the Manila Galleon trade.

It is furthermore crucial to focus on how trade was driven by market demand; logically not all trade policies were introduced by the central government. The market in Manila illustrates how these forms of proto-capitalism flourished. Merchants became the wealthiest class in Spanish colonial towns. Unlike in the Spanish Americas, where official Castilian traders monopolised Atlantic trade, in Manila Asian traders did so to a remarkable extent. The latter’s reluctance in enhancing their political position and reinvesting it in their home economy (both aspects are discussed in more detail in the following chapters) can only be understood in the embedded nature of the Manila system: When things became too rough other attractive port cities were easily found. It also points to the unaggressive atmosphere of these triangular relations: while contemporaries in Manila were not fully interested in the actual dynamics of trade with China, Fujianese lacked interest in starving out Manila.

The ultimate aim of this comparative study is to undermine the myth of a monopolising Spain, a backward, uninterested Japan and an agrarian, isolationist, or even despotic China. For more in-depth reflections on their political economies it will be necessary to shift analysis to state competition and discuss why the three states failed to take advantage of the location’s obvious qualities and whether official and unofficial encounters, foreign policies, power relations and political interaction jeopardised the city’s long run commercial development.
Part III
Zooming Out: Local, Central, and Global Connections
Triangular Foreign Relations

Intercultural Diplomacy in the South China Sea

Manila-centred triangular trade between China, Japan, and Spain was not only imbedded in the interplay of trade and diplomacy, but also depended on a whole range of contingent external factors, casually described as foreign relations. A growing number of studies, including Zoltan Biedermann’s study on Portuguese diplomacy in Asia, has created an awareness for diplomacy as a means of (re-)determining globalised foreign relations in recent years.  

Although embassies are regarded as essential instruments of expansion, little attention has been paid to the concept of ‘ambiguity’ for understanding intercultural encounters on a political level in a period when ‘practical and symbolic values’ controlled diplomatic exchange.  

On its most basic level, ‘information-gathering, representation and negotiation’ determined the outcome of intercultural diplomacy between different political cultures that still lacked a uniform etiquette. In most cases they were the first state-level contacts beyond culturally similar neighbouring countries.

While direct Castilian contact with Japan and China were entirely new in the history of diplomacy, relations between China and the West were not.  

With the spread of European influence over South East Asia the number of undefined and unsettled political and economic claims increased. This new type of Eurasian dealings asked for mutually suitable rules, which in a way became models for the early modern regional international system.  

Given that the establishment of European rule over Philippine territories coincided with governmental changes in China and Japan it seems only logical to question how contact with the Iberians affected diplomatic encounters.

The focus essentially shifts to reciprocal processes of commercial relations and diplomatic triangular foreign policies, instead of revisiting a mere Iberian impact or outdated narratives of an arrogant West versus

1 For some aspects of an interpretative framework, see Watkins (2008), ‘Toward a New Diplomatic History’, pp. 1-14. Over the past decade, researchers have shown that there was no such thing as straightforward diplomacy for the Europeans in Asia. See also articles in Suzuki et al. (eds) (2013), International Orders; Barbour (2003), Before Orientalism; Hevia (2009), ‘Ultimate Gesture’, pp. 212-234; Clulow (2014), Company, pp. 26-30.


4 Most prominent are Franciscan missions to China in the thirteenth century. See Arnold (1999), Princely Gifts, pp. 43-54.

5 For regional international systems in Asia, see Suzuki (2009), Civilization and Empire, and on the sixteenth-century East Asian world system, Murai (2012), Sekaiishi, pp. 22-27.
an ignorant rest.\textsuperscript{6} Several examples of diplomatic protagonists’ accomplishments prove the opposite. That said I should also caution against the occasional revisionist tendency to exaggerate smooth communication while lumping together all types of interaction.\textsuperscript{7} While it is commonly accepted that maritime merchants quickly developed an informal working vocabulary that permitted mercantile communication via a lingua franca (often in form of pidgin languages), finding a mutually comprehensible language for formal communication was far more complicated. Unsurprisingly, sufficient information for evaluating official acts of communication that involved parties or speakers from different social, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds is scarce. Government officials and diplomatic advisors were first and foremost interested in safeguarding the political realm against potential risks from outside and to guard against potential military aggression or unreliable knowledge.

One major challenge to such diplomatic encounters was a partial understanding of the protocol, for instance with regard to the question of establishing equality and maintaining friendly relations.\textsuperscript{8} On the one hand, while in sixteenth-century Europe, ‘parity’ or ‘eye level’-communication happened between two \textit{inter pares} parties, such practices were absent in China and Japan.\textsuperscript{9} On the other hand, the elaborate symbolic culture of Asian nations strongly affected Europeans, who were often fascinated with distinct ceremonial.\textsuperscript{10} Yet while European trading nations in Asia were commonly desperate to adapt, adopt, accommodate, or even blend in, they failed to understand implicit non-European diplomatic circuits. At the same time striking similarities existed: Spain, China, and Japan did not differ


\textsuperscript{7} In his recent book Adam Clulow stressed that diplomatic relations were not a straightforward process and smooth negotiations remained an illusion. He furthermore argued that all Europeans arriving in new Asian ports sought ‘access to the highest authority’, usually by sending official letters and bearing gifts. Clulow (2014), \textit{Company}, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{8} When the doctrine of encounters on an equal level spread with the Peace of Westphalia in Europe, the idea of equal negotiating parties differed largely from our present notion of equality of the same bilateral rights granted to every nation-state regardless of size or economic power. Only after the Congress of Vienna of 1815, when diplomatic language became European, would diplomacy include the correspondence between equal states. For the development of modern European diplomacy, see Black (2010), \textit{Diplomacy}, introduction, chapters 1 and 2. See also Hamilton, Langhorne (2011), \textit{Practice of Diplomacy}; For China, see Shin (2006), \textit{Making of the Chinese State}.


\textsuperscript{10} Auslin (2004), \textit{Negotiating with Imperialism}, p. 4; Antje Flüchter’s theoretical approach – in particular, her ideas on the circulation of political knowledge between Asia and Europe has been very inspiring. For more details, see Flüchter (2008), ‘Sir Thomas Roe’, pp. 119-143.
much when it came to the representation of the sovereign and the basic requirement that only the head of the state should perform diplomacy.  

What Spain, China, and Japan furthermore had in common, were ideologies resting on feelings of being superior to the outside world. Spaniards were spurred on by the alleged cultural hegemony of the Catholic Church. A complex body of thought positioned China into the centre of the universe and above other civilisations, whom they called and considered Barbarians. The Middle Kingdom ideology (中華思想, jp. chūka chitūjo; 中國中心主義, ch. zhongguo zhongxin zhuyi) was incompatible with other claims of sovereignty. Since Japan was mostly reluctant to fulfil its imposed duties as a Barbarian state within the Sino-centric world, historians even like to picture the Japanese as the counterpart of the Koreans, who enthusiastically subordinated themselves to the Ming. Japan’s disobedient reputation developed further in the course of the seventeenth century, when Tokugawa foreign advisors fabricated a progressive model of international relations based on Chinese neo-Confucian ideology, combining it with restrictive foreign relations principles and ensuring Japanese sovereignty.

**Diplomatic Shifts between Japan and Ming China**

Introducing China’s traditional Middle Kingdom system and tributary trade concept in chapter 1 it has been mentioned that Japan as close neighbour and member of the ‘Chinese character-sphere’ (漢字圏, jp. kanjiken) has played a particular role in China’s international relations of the time. In a nutshell, Japanese international relations were exclusively defined from Japan’s status vis-à-vis China, the *ka’i* (jp. 華夷) worldview, which defined China’s position as Middle Kingdom surrounded by Barbarians.

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11 China, Korea, and Japan used state letters (国書, jp. kokusho) for official correspondence. The three states shared a mutual understanding of the importance and special character of the document. Tanaka and Ishii stated that a kokusho has to carry the name of the central ruler, while dates are ideally written according to the traditional Chinese calendar. They furthermore argued that leyasu employed kokusho to legitimise his position as unifier over Japan via foreign diplomatic correspondence. See Tanaka, Ishii (2009) *Taigai kankeishi*, p. 280. Based on the concept of *jinshin ni gaikō nashi* (人臣に外交なし) as part of the Ming diplomatic protocol a kokusho could only be sent from a central ruler or monarch to another.

12 Hsu (2010), ‘Writing’, p. 329. The author emphasises the Habsburg King’s claim for ‘sovereignty over the Old World as well as the New’.

13 Toby (1984), *State and Diplomacy*, p. 139.


Sino-Japanese tensions within this century-old setup, closely entwined with Korea, had undeniable consequences for the Manila system after the rupture of 1523 and 1549, respectively. Speaking of Japan's role in tributary trade with the Middle Kingdom, it is crucial to remember that Japanese rulers did not manage to establish diplomatic relations after the final tributary trade mission (kangō bōeki 勘合貿易) in 1541 until 1871, when Meiji Japan signed a friendship treaty with the Qing.

Both Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa rulers desired to reopen formal diplomatic relations with China, or at least to be duly recognised by the latter. At the same time they displayed intentions to turn Japan into a regional maritime power and to redefine their position within the Sino-centric world: a rejected and deeply offended Hideyoshi was eager to impress the Ming court with his military power between 1592 and 1598. Japanese historians have stressed how Hideyoshi's large ego and warrior mentality determined his inconsiderate behaviour in foreign relations. Unwilling to subdue to the Ming, Hideyoshi turned his back to the traditional Chinese system. A new understanding of the world stressed the superiority of Japan. Its establishment already dated back to the time of the preparation for the Korea invasion. Early on he expressed his outspoken interest in conquering Ming China (唐国, jp. tōkoku as he called it) in a correspondence with the King of Korea. In 1591/92 he demanded tribute and subordination from the rulers of Taiwan and Luzon. We note that Hideyoshi's foreign relations were characterised by new diplomatic methods based on older ideology.

In its totality, Hideyoshi's progressive foreign relations have often been considered a manifestation of his aspiration to challenge China's hegemony in Asia. The invasion to Korea that will later be examined in detail backs that hypothesis. After the King of Korea had thwarted Hideyoshi's plans to invade China, the latter launched an invasion with around 160,000 men. In May 1592 they overcame a militarily unprepared and poorly equipped Korean army and took Pusan, Seoul fell in June. Only when marching towards Pyongyang did Japanese troops encounter major resistance. On the naval side Hideyoshi had to cope with massive losses thanks to the tactics

16 Hashimoto (2011), Chūka, pp. 244-256.
17 Swope (2009), Dragon’s Head, p. 230.
18 Asao (1993), Tenka; Hideyoshi’s large ego, which is believed to originate from his low birth, reflected in his custom to stress his grandness with the presence of big items.
19 See Murai (2013), Tomi to yabō, p. 51.
20 Murai (2013), Tomi to yabō, pp. 25-32.
22 Fujita (2012), Hideyoshi to kaizoku daimyō.
of Yi Sun-sin (李舜臣), a Korean royal messenger, who outsmarted the Japanese navy with the use of turtle boats. He successfully cut the Japanese supply lines, giving the Korean population some breathing space before Ming China sent an army in support – as they were acting as protectionist power of their loyal Chosŏn vassals.23

Although during this infamous attempt to conquer China through Korea, Japanese troops never reached the Chinese mainland, the Ming court grew nervous. The Ming court not only offered rewards for the head of Hideyoshi and his generals but also invested in intelligence activities in Japan.24 Here China’s maritime periphery assumed a political role: The Governor of Liang-guang (两广 = Guangdong and Guangxi) and Fujian, and ultimately even the King of Ryukyu dispatched spies. A record in the Veritable Records (Ming shi-lu) of Emperor Shenzong (神宗, a.k.a. Wanli) moreover stresses the trans-national impact of Hideyoshi's hostilities. It proposed to inform the Portuguese of Macao about ‘the aggressive purpose of Japan, and convince them to assassinate Hideyoshi for a reward’.25

During the 1592 peace negotiations with the Ming the Japanese side clearly prioritised reopening tributary trade relations (勘合貿易, jp. kangō bōeki). What appears ambiguous to the contemporary observer was not the case for Japan at the time. Since no clear distinction between diplomacy and trade existed, nothing spoke against having it both ways. This suggests that the nature of East Asian foreign relations provided more room for interpretation than commonly believed. After the first Japanese defeat in Korea, Hideyoshi’s diplomatic solution included a list of bold conditions for his surrender to the Ming. In the year 1593 Hideyoshi’s naval troops leader Konishi Yukinaga (小西行長, 1558–1600),26 one of the so-called ‘Christian

23 Swope (2009), Dragon’s Head, pp. 286–288.
24 Ng (1997), ‘Maritime Frontiers’, p. 248. The author summarised Ming China’s considerations on how to pacify the Japanese. Suggestions included studying them well, getting their superior weapons such as canons, and trading with them. Zheng Jiexi has located evidence for a Ming attempt to assassinate Hideyoshi. Chinese information gathering about Japan consisted of three elements: the tribute system (based on information delivered by Korean and Ryukyu merchants), intelligence gathering by Chinese private merchants, and communications on the battlefield. Information was certainly also collected in places like Manila and Nagasaki. Zheng (2010), ‘Wanli jiki’, p. 344.
25 Ming-shi lu, 242, 20 November Year 19.
26 Konishi Yukinaga was a later-born son of a merchant family of Sakai. He entered Hideyoshi’s service at a young age and was baptised in 1584. For his merits during Hideyoshi’s Kyushu expedition in 1587, Konishi Yukinaga was rewarded with the southern part of Higo province including the island of Amakusa. The representative of the Ming demanded that Konishi Yuskinaga’s vassal Naitō Jōan (1550–1626) should be sent as envoy to Beijing. Fighting alongside Toyotomi loyals in the Battle of Sekigahara, Konishi Yukinaga was defeated and eventually killed by members
daimyō" forged a letter suggesting that Hideyoshi was interested in being invested as King of Japan, following the example of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (足利義満). They did so in all conscience for the sake of a successful peace treaty with the Ming arguing that the re-establishment of tribute relations would be in the best interest of both parties. The following year Konishi Yukinaga even claimed that it was the disobliging behaviour of the Koreans regarding Japanese attempts to revive tributary relations with the Ming that led to the armed invasion. Konishi’s scheme was successful and the Ming issued a traditional Chinese document of investiture (冊封, jp. sakuhō) addressed to Hideyoshi. The arrival of an embassy of the Ming court in 1596 with the intention of officially acknowledging him as ‘King of Japan’ under Emperor Wanli’s edict, however, upset Hideyoshi. Although he accepted the sakuhō, he was furious that the Ming Emperor had not considered any of his other peace conditions. After chaotic negotiations, he refused to become a vassal of the Ming Emperor and strongly opposed the title ‘king’ because it implied that the Japanese ruler was inferior to the Chinese Emperor.

Eventually Hideyoshi’s sudden natural death settled the situation in the region. The war ended in a huge debacle for the Japanese and in great human losses on all side. For Korea various sources speak of up to 1,000,000 people killed and 80 per cent of the arable land destroyed. Both Kenneth Swope and Cheng Wei-chung conclude that the construction of ships had increased in Southern China in order to meet the demands for maritime battles and that additional taxes on merchants and ships were collected to finance the war.

of the Eastern Army (1600). For further details see Nakanishi (ed.) (2014), Takayama Ukon. For Julia Naitō and other leading female Christians, see Ward (2009), Women Religious Leaders. 27 Hashimoto (2003), Nihon kokūō, pp. 75-97. 28 Miki (1997), Konishi Yukinaga. 29 Under the pressure of allied Chinese-Korean forces’ military advances Hideyoshi received two Chinese envoys in his military headquarters in Nagoya (now Saga prefecture) in 1593. A personal letter to his wife indicates Hideyoshi’s illusive view on the relations with China and the outcome of the 朝鮮出兵, jp. chōsen shuppei, as the invasion is misleadingly called in Japanese, while the more correct term is 朝鮮侵略, jp. chōsen shinryaku: ‘The envoys of the throne have come here from the Great Kingdom of the Ming Empire offering peace negotiations, and I have given them a note stipulating our conditions. If they agree to them all, I shall accept their apology, leave the Great Ming Empire and Korea to act just as such foreign countries please, and then make a triumphal return. However, I have given orders to my men to do some construction work and other things in Korea, and it will take a little more time to complete this work.’ Cf. Boscaro (1975), 101 Letters, p. 56. See also Hentona (2008), Mindai sakuhō. 30 Kitajima (2012), Chōsen shinryaku. 31 Tanaka (ed.) (1995), Zenkindai, p. 19. The two envoys were Xie Yongzu (jp. Sha Yōshi) and Xu Yiguan (jp. Jo Ikkan). 32 Swope (2009), Dragon’s Head; Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy.
Recent research has emphasised the world historic importance of these events, which harmed Korea’s economic development and jeopardised the future of the Ming dynasty. For the Japanese, the invasion had positive economic long-term effects. Soldiers transported valuable technological knowledge that benefitted, for instance, the domestic ceramic production back to Japan.

Initially Tokugawa rulers aimed at restoring tribute trade relations (朝貢, jp. chōkō) with China.\textsuperscript{33} In the year of the Battle of Sekigahara (1600), a delegation was sent to the Ming court aiming at opening trade with Fujian. Emperor Wanli did not react to Japanese assaults but agreed on sending merchant ships twice a year to Satsuma. However the plan never materialised and chances of opening regular trade gradually faded.\textsuperscript{34} As another token of good will, Katō Kiyomasa returned 87 Chinese prisoners of war in 1602. Even though the first Tokugawa rulers were interested in distancing themselves from Hideyoshi and his political rhetoric, they could not accept a subordinate status towards the Ming either. In fact, Tokugawa Ieyasu challenged the primacy of the Chinese world order in terms of state-to-state relations. Three letters addressed directly from the Bakufu, signed by Minamoto Ieyasu as Privy Minister or Minister of the Interior (内大臣, jp. naidaijin), were sent to the Ming court. Significantly none of them were styled as formal kokusho (国書, official state letter), a necessary condition within the Chinese diplomatic protocol.\textsuperscript{35} In addition, presumptuous diplomatic operations by local Japanese lords puzzled Ming authorities. In 1603 the Shimazu Clan sent a mission inviting Chinese merchants to several ports in Kyushu. After the Shimazu had subdued to the Tokugawa, the Bakufu attempted to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Ming via Ryukyu, now under nominal control of the Satsuma daimyō. Ryukyu became another issue in Sino-Japanese relations, even if the Ming court maintained tributary relations with the Okinawan rulers on the surface.\textsuperscript{36} While official Sino-Japanese negotiations eventually failed, the number of private Chinese, who had secretly travelled to Japan and of whom many operated on shuinsen, increased rapidly.\textsuperscript{38} Being a welcome alternative

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Kang (1997), Diplomacy and Ideology, p. 85.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Saishō no Shōkokuji 西笑相国寺 consulted the Zenrin kokuhi 善隣国宝記 when preparing the letter for China. The 1600 letter to China left Japan on a ship of Satsuma merchant Torihara Sōan 鳥原宗安 together with Chinese war captives and envos including Mao Guoqi. See Mizuno (2004), ‘China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations’, p. 118.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Katō (1986), ‘Bahansen, Shuinsen, Höshosen’, pp. 120-134.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Watanabe (2012), Kinsei ryukyū, p. 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Jansen (1992), Making, p. 86; For the complex role of Okinawa in Chinese-Japanese relations, see also Suzuki (2009), Civilization and Empire.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa’, pp. 512-513.
\end{itemize}
to trade that depended on tedious diplomatic relations, Ieyasu actively sought to strengthen ties with Chinese merchants for the sake of direct access to Chinese silk production.\(^\text{39}\) And yet, commercial exchange was not easily detached from the traditional diplomatic framework, as the following episode shows. In 1611 a certain Zhou Xingru (周性如), probably a merchant from Nanjing who first landed on the Goto Islands and was then ordered to Sunpu, suggested during a visit to Edo to ask the Grand Coordinator of Fujian, Chen Zizhen (陳子貞), to issue a kango. Ieyasu ordered Honda Masazumi (本多正純) to have an official letter offering licences (shuinjō) for trade with Nagasaki prepared.\(^\text{40}\) Two letters were thereafter drafted: one by Süden and one by neo-Confucian scholar Hayashi Razan (林羅山), neither was signed by Ieyasu or Hidetada.\(^\text{41}\)

Regardless of the diplomatic debacle, the project failed, when Fujianese authorities noticed that Chinese people travelled to Japan despite the strict ban.\(^\text{42}\) Cantonese authorities severely pressed the Portuguese Senate Council regarding 96 Japanese who were registered as settlers of Macao in 1612.\(^\text{43}\) The following year, Ming China forced the Portuguese at Macao to expel them before reviving the law that Japanese must not enter Macao.\(^\text{44}\) In 1612 the Ming court in Beijing moreover understood from a visit of a Ryukyu mission that the Japanese had no intention to revive formal tributary relations but only aimed at unrestricted trade with China. Unwilling to accept the Japanese request for equal relations or to grant a modification of tribute relations, a new ban on China’s east coast (Jiangsu and Zhejiang) was issued.\(^\text{45}\) The Japanese side tried again in 1613 and 1625, but to no avail.\(^\text{46}\) A mix of seemingly careless documentary practices and increased self-confidence towards China overthrew these last Japanese attempts, aggravated by advances on Taiwan under the leadership of Murayama

\(^\text{40}\) Honda Masazumi drafted the letter on 16 December 1611; For a transcription of the letter in which Honda refers to himself as Fujiwara Masazumi, see Rekishigaku Kenkyukai (2006), *Nihonshi shiryō*, pp. 121-122; Mizuno, ‘China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations’, pp. 119-120.
\(^\text{41}\) Hayashi Razan bunshū in *Dai Nihon shiryō*, pp. 845-849. The second letter was signed by Hasegawa Fujihiro.
\(^\text{43}\) Boxer (1963), *Great Ship*, p. 82.
\(^\text{45}\) Ming authorities recognised that most of the active ‘wokou’ were Chinese. TWYH *Ming shi-lu min-hai*; 106-110. Cf. Cheng (2013), *War, Trade and Piracy*, p. 21.
\(^\text{46}\) Asao et al. (2000), *Nihon tsūshi*, vol. 12, p. 35.
Tōan (村山等安) in 1616/17. This led to further Sino-Japanese negotiations. Talks were carried out between Fujianese authorities and the Tokugawa’s envoy Akashi Michitomo (明石道友). While the Chinese side requested the Japanese to stay away from Taiwan the latter asked not to be persecuted as pirates anymore. Despite mutual agreements regarding future commercial relations, it was again a dead-end path.

With regard to the Bakufu’s abuse of diplomatic relations for consolidating domestic rule, Ronald Toby has attested profound consequences ‘for Japan’s approach to international relations’. Next to Ryukyu, the Bakufu manipulated diplomatic relations with Korea and furthermore intimidated the Middle Kingdom. Following the rupture caused by Hideyoshi’s invasion, relations with Korea had been restored based on the Treaty of Kiyu (1609). The Sō family of Tsushima and Ieyasu’s clever tactics persuaded Korea into performing a key part in Tokugawa Japan’s foreign relations after 1617. Officially, Korea represented by Chosŏn envoys 朝鮮通信使, was the only foreign country accepted directly by the Bakufu in Edo. Ceremonial embassies from Korea and Ryukyu helped the Tokugawa clan and its loyal vassals to maintain a monopoly over foreign trade and served as a useful tool for claiming international legitimacy. Both Ryukyu and Korea were considered extremely trustworthy members of the Middle Kingdom system by the Ming. These new diplomatic regulations gave the incentive for what Toby calls the Japan-centred Middle Kingdom system (日本型華夷秩序, jp. nihongata ka’i chitsujo), which virtually placed Japan at the centre and therefore made recognition from China obsolete. Over the past years Japanese historians have debunked Toby’s strong claim and called for limiting the thesis to the ideology inside Japan (日本的型華夷思想, jp. nihonteki gata ka’i shisō). In terms of diplomatic exchange similarities existed between the Ryukyu embassies and the ceremonial visits of VOC representatives after 1634. Yet in the case of the annual homage (hofreis) of the VOC general (opperhoofd or Oronda kapitan) to Edo with unimaginable
pomp and solemnity prior to a silent audience with Bakufu authorities, subtle differences existed. The trip of the VOC general in fact equalled the *sankin kōtai* visit to the Shogun’s court.54

Sino-Japanese relations changed drastically in the aftermath of the Manila system as a consequence of the Ming-Qing transition. Between the late 1630s and the 1660s, when the Southern Ming needed foreign assistance against the Manchus, they turned to Japan and Portuguese Macao for help. Written requests were sent to Edo and the Nagasaki Governor/Magistrate (*bugyō*). Initially, both the Tokugawa as well as the Shimazu were sympathetic, but they eventually sent only ambiguous replies instead of viable support.55

### Foreign Relations between China and Overseas Spain

The Ming’s idea of how to pursue universal rule differed strikingly from that of their predecessors, the conquering Yuan (兀, Mongol) dynasty.56 National security – in the sense of guarding and defending the country’s frontiers and domestic stability – remained a major concern for the Ming dynasty after the relaxation of maritime trade in the 1560s.57 The interplay between diplomacy and trade shaped foreign relations. If, as Wang Gungwu maintains, the court at times regarded foreign merchants as trading on behalf of their rulers and therefore as diplomatic representatives,58 then Sino-Spanish mercantile interaction must have been considered tributary trading by Ming authorities. A record of the Assistant Censor-in-chief Liu Yao-hui, Grand Coordinator of Fujian, confirms this assumption. He noted in 1576: ‘Further, the tribute memorial and local products brought by those of Luzón are submitted herewith.’59 While official China considered early Iberians as tributary traders (for the same reason the 1521 embassy of pharmacist Tomé Pires failed), the Castilians were unable to see the benefits

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54 These observations date back to Kämpfer’s description of the VOC presence in Japan. For more details, see Clulow (2014), *Company*, pp. 108-114.
of such distinction and dismissed it as humiliation. Unlike the Portuguese, who requested permission for official tributary trade in Beijing in 1556, or and the Dutch, who even occasionally enjoyed tributary status (for instance at Guangzhou between 1656 and 1667), the Spaniards never achieved official access to the Middle Kingdom, nor were they ever allowed to go to Beijing. Precisely the absence of direct bilateral negotiations between China and Spain determined the colonial policies of Overseas Spain in Asia.

Yet, as indicated earlier, a narrow view on diplomatic relations as the direct, formal exchange of letters and ambassadors between the heads of states (or their representatives) obscures other significant facets of official contacts. For instance, a first direct encounter between Ming China and the Overseas Spanish Empire dates back to 1574, when a group of pirates led by the Cantonese outlaw Lin Feng launched an attack on Manila following frustrated attempts to conquer the Guangdong Coast and Hainan Island. The story of Lin Feng (林鳯, a.k.a. Limahon in European sources) has mostly been presented as a Chinese outlaw attempt to conquer the fledgling Spanish settlement. According to European records, the Spanish commander Juan de Salcedo and his men fought for Spanish sovereignty: they defeated Lin Feng’s pirate force of 70 ships and more than 3000 invaders, before a fleet under squad leader Wang Wanggao (王望高, a.k.a Wan Kao, Omocon, or Homocon in Spanish sources) was sent from China to support the Spaniards. Scrutinising Chinese records Igawa Kenji discovered evidence for Lin Feng’s incorporation into wakō networks, represented by a Japanese general called Sioco who also fought against the Spaniards, reportedly killed Martín de Goiti, maestre de campo, and his wife before dying in battle.

The pursuit of the ‘Guangdong bandit’, as Lin Feng is called in Chinese sources, all the way to Luzon by Ming military forces culminated in the first ‘treaty’ between Spain and China. A common interest in law and peace in the South China Sea resulted in a successful joint Sino-Spanish initiative of mutual recognition. Official China initially approved of the measure to burn the ships of Lin Feng, taken by the ‘yi troops of Luzón’.

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60 Ollé (2002), *Empresa*, p. 68.
63 Igawa (2010), ‘At the Crossroads’, p. 80. For the mysterious Sioco, see Tōyō Bunko, ‘Filipinas y el Japón’, pp. 19-20; see also San Agustín (1698), *Conquistas*, pp. 401-405.
The events nourished Spanish hopes to get access to China by establishing official relations with the Ming. Governor Guido de Lavezaris (r. 1572-1575) seized the opportunity of having an envoy of the Viceroy of Fujian (the high-ranking admiral Wang Wanggao) in Manila in 1575. From eye-level communication with the help of interpreters Lavezaris concluded that the ‘king’ of China was interested in friendship with the Spaniards. We may assume that this was one of the defining moments of profound confusion regarding the friendship concept in the East Asian context. A Spanish delegation consisting of two Augustinian friars, Martín de Rada and Jerónimo Marín, joined the returning Fujianese officials to Zhangzhou and Fuzhou. They carried Lavezaris's letter to the Emperor – translated by the Chinese Manila merchant Sinsay – soliciting friendship and trade. Before their departure, Governor Lavezaris gave them detailed instructions not to mock the religious cult, speak with women or walk alone by night, displaying sensitivity to intercultural contacts. Studied from a broader angle, Spanish diplomatic activity shows similarities and continuity to

66 What shaped this narrative was Governor Francisco Sande’s bold plan in 1576 to conquer China with a force no larger than 6000 men, as well as obtrusive attempts by Padre Alonso Sánchez to establish missionary posts in China. See AGI Filipinas 6, r. 3, n. 26, ‘Carta de Sande sobre corsario Limajón, reino de Taibin’, 7 June 1576.


68 Retana (ed.) (1895/96), Archivo, p. 30: ‘El Rey de China haría con nuestros grandes amistad y hermandad y se pondrían en lugar donde el Rey vive y en los otros lugares públicos padrones de piedra y en ellos escrito la hazaña de los castillas que no se habían querido hacer con Limahon antes le avan muerto para hacer bien al Rey de China el cual Omocon como vio al cosario tan destroçado y sin esperanza de navíos en que se ir el sabía.’

69 AGI Filipinas 34, n. 12, ‘Copia de la carta de Lavezaris al Rey de China’, 1575; The letter was drafted by a certain Sinsay and stated the Spanish commitment to friendly relations with China. See also Retana (ed.) (1895/96), Archivo, pp. 43-46, where we read about a disappointed Lavezaris, complaining about the Ming’s failure to acknowledge the proper status of the Spanish colony in the Philippines and accusing Wang Wanggao of having forged the letters, which he took from Manila back to China.

Philip III’s friendly correspondence with Ieyasu, and similar remarks on Cambodia and Borneo.\(^{71}\)

Upon their arrival at the Fujianese coast, Chinese authorities reportedly treated the Spaniards well and allowed them to trade along the coast, but opposed a settlement like Portuguese Macao.\(^{72}\) The two delegates returned to Manila in 1576 with an escort of Chinese soldiers and gifts.\(^{73}\) But when word spread that the Spanish troops were unable to capture and hand over Lin Feng, the Fujianese authorities changed their friendly attitude and stopped supporting a Spanish establishment in China.\(^{74}\) The failure of the first Spanish attempt to form bilateral relations with China is prototypical for sixteenth-century approaches in the East. The Spanish advance stresses the constant dialectic of evangelisation and conquest in Sino-Spanish foreign relations, as illustrated in the choice of envoys.

Three years later a Franciscan friar called Pedro de Alfaro took up the ‘Chinese enterprise’ (empresa de China).\(^{75}\) Together with a handful of Franciscan friars he secretly set out for Zhangzhou. After having been distracted from the initial course they landed in Guangzhou only to learn that evangelising China was more complicated than previously assumed.\(^{76}\) Unable to convince the Cantonese authorities, Pedro de Alfaro was soon expelled and thereafter tried his luck in Macao, where cold and mixed reactions awaited him from the Portuguese.\(^{77}\) The distressed friar eventually turned to the Philippine Governor, pleading for a retroactive approval of his plan.\(^{78}\) Yet an upset Governor Ronquillo decreed instead that no friar was ever again to leave the Philippines for China without his licensed permission.\(^{79}\) When Alfaro returned to Manila in the middle of 1580, he

\(^{71}\) BR 27, p. 126.
\(^{72}\) Hsü (2000), Rise of Modern China, 94.
\(^{73}\) Hsu (2010), ‘Writing’, p. 325.
\(^{74}\) Boxer (1953), South China, p. xlviii.
\(^{76}\) AGI Patronato 46, r. 11, ‘Relación de viaje a China de Pedro de Alfaro y religiosos’, 1578; AGI Filipinas 79, n. 4, ‘Carta del franciscano Pedro de Alfaro sobre su llegada a China’, 12 October 1579.
\(^{77}\) Mendoza (2008), Historia, pp. 251-253. Being denied official permission from the Governor they decided to go on their own initiative, before Ortiz eventually backed off. Alfaro managed to sneak into Canton with the assistance of a Chinese captain. Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, p. 101.
\(^{78}\) AGI Filipinas 79, n. 4, ‘Carta del francisco Pedro de Alfaro sobre su llegada a China’, 12 October 1579.
\(^{79}\) AGI Filipinas 6, r. 4, n. 46, ‘Pregón de Ronquillo prohibiendo salir sin licencia’, 2 March 1582.
encountered a rather strong lobby, which saw in a conquest of China the solution to the Philippines’ financial disaster.\footnote{Iwasaki Cauti (1992), \textit{Extremo Oriente}, p. 60.}

That government intervention did not easily curtail the individual missionary zeal will be discussed below. As soon as Spanish missionaries targeted China, the Portuguese Jesuits were on alert. In 1582, Michele Ruggieri (1543-1607), a Jesuit from Macao, visited the seat of the Provincial Governor of Canton, where he was informed about the violation of Ming rules by a Spanish group, led by a Jesuit from the Philippines. Fluent in Chinese, Ruggieri, who was later even invited to take up residence in a Buddhist temple,\footnote{Within the next years it became common for some Jesuits to dress and style like Buddhist monks. For their short hair and special robes, Buddhist monks were regarded as ‘others’ by commoners. See Peterson (1994), ‘What to Wear?’, p. 414.} saved the Spaniards from an awkward situation.\footnote{Peterson (1994), ‘What to Wear?’, p. 408.}

Shortly afterwards, Pope Gregory XIII barred mendicants from going to China and Japan and restated this privilege to the Jesuits in a papal bull of 28 June 1585.\footnote{Montalbán (1930), \textit{Spanische Patronat}, p. 102.}

In the meantime in Spain, a plan was hatched in 1577 to send an embassy to Emperor Wanli in the name of King Philip II.\footnote{Ollé (2002), \textit{Empresa}, p. 137. The second embassy consisted of six discalced Franciscans with Jerónimo de Burgos as their spokesman. Neither the delegation, nor the letter reached Beijing due to a delayed arrival of the friars in Manila. See Hsu (2010), ‘Writing’, p. 328. According to Hsu a first letter was written in 1580 and a second, one year later.} This diplomatic initiative included two letters drafted between 1580 and 1582.\footnote{Ollé (2002), \textit{Empresa}, p. 102.} Juan González de Mendoza, selected as envoy, was equipped with the letter and diplomatic gifts for the ‘king’, Emperor Wanli. With this diplomatic act Philip II explicitly sought to secure the Ming ruler’s friendship for the sake of the Philippines’ welfare and peace.\footnote{Mendoza (2008), \textit{Historia}, pp. 149-150.} In addition, he insisted on China’s opening to the word of God in the future. Since Mendoza himself never set foot in China,\footnote{Mendoza (2008), \textit{Historia}, pp. 259-263. The compendium is based on the eyewitness reports of his fellow Augustinian friars, such as Martín de Rada, as well as on reports by Miguel de Loarca. Several editions were published in Europe up to the year 1655 and translated into 38 different languages including Spanish, English, Italian, French, Latin, German, and Dutch. See Lehner (2011), \textit{China in European Encyclopedias}, p. 74.} Emperor Wanli never received the letters from Spain and if he had he would
probably have rejected them for lack of protocol. Not only the script was inadequate and rude, but the gifts were also inappropriate. 88

The project is nonetheless telling with regard to Philip II’s diplomatic strategy. Philip’s understanding of diplomacy was based on his ancestors’ experience on the Mediterranean and to a lesser degree the Atlantic stage. 89 While Philip II, by nature devoted to morality, on the one hand prudently warned Mendoza to not offend the Chinese authorities, 90 the letters on the other hand clearly indicate how Philip misinterpreted his own position vis-à-vis the Son of Heaven. 91 In this regard, Carmen Y. Hsu has warned not to overstate the Crown’s adoption of Chinese standards and Philip’s friendly approach, but instead acknowledge his diplomatic and pragmatic attempt to gain control in Asia. 92 Eventually the embassy failed neither because of Spanish over-ambition nor because of Chinese reluctance in dealing with the Barbarian visitors but due to a strong anti-Chinese lobby in Mexico and the Philippines. At the sharp end ex-Governor Francisco Sande (r. 1575-1580) opposed the project as being too costly and to great a risk for Spain’s honour. He feared that the Chinese Emperor might misinterpret the presents as a gesture of subjugation by the Spanish King and an involvement in tally trade, even for mere opportunistic reasons, should be avoided by all means. 93 Critics finally succeeded in convincing the Viceroy and the King to give up their plans to initiate friendly relations with China. 94

88 AGI Patronato 24, r. 51, ‘Carta de Felipe II al Rey de la China’, 11 June 1580. For the register of gifts see AGI Patronato 25, r. 3, ‘Memoria de las Cosas que su M/d puede embiar al Rey de Thaibin’, 1583. According to a record on royal finances, the King spent 3,880,215 reals on the gifts including mainly Iberian cultural goods such as heavy woollen fabrics and floral velvet, Dutch canvas, heavy bedclothes with gold adornments, two Castilian-style suits, Spanish-style leg dresses, a doublet, a beret, nightgowns, twelve packsaddles, six sets of horse harness, a Venetian mirror, porcelain and glassware, as well as a painting showing his father Charles V with the infant King and Virgin Mary.

89 Rodríguez-Salgado (1988), Changing Face, pp. 7; 33.


91 For the letter to Emperor Wanli, see AGI Patronato 24, r. 51, ‘Carta de Felipe II al Rey de la China’, 1 June 1580.

92 Hsu (2010), ‘Writing’, pp. 323-344. What I found striking is that the author attributed the act of sending lavish gifts exclusively to Philip’s hidden agenda of convincing the Chinese Emperor to accept missionaries, without taking into account East Asian traditions of gift-exchange. Moreover the author omitted political and economic considerations of the Spaniards in Asia.

93 See Ollé (2002), Empresa, 68.

94 I found one sound explanation for Sande’s hostile feelings towards China: hurt pride. When the Chinese embassy of 1575 was hesitant in handing over the presents intended for his predecessor, the late Governor Lavezaris, Sande took it personal. See BR 4, pp. 38-40.
During his period in office Sande developed formidable anti-Chinese propaganda full of absurd accusations, which would defend a ‘just war’ against the heathen Chinese. In combination with influential lobbies throughout the Spanish empire, his propaganda shook up Manila’s foreign relations. Although a small minority a few Spanish individuals repeatedly sought to expand the empire by conquering China, Cambodia (the Spanish were infamously involved in the struggle for succession in Cambodia in 1598 – that even lured ex-Governor Luis Pérez Dasmariñas into South East Asian geopolitics), and other regions in the East. Their arbitrary actions stand in contrast to the majority of colonial subjects, who respected and supported Habsburg Spain’s cautiously defensive foreign policy. The King as the head of the Overseas Empire was not interested in adventurous expansionism. In this regard, historians used to disconnect Governor Francisco Sande’s naïve dreams of conquering China from the historical context and misinterpret official Castilian policies. The fact that King Philip II expressively prohibited an armed invasion, and nipped any bold venture in the bud, essentially to avoid costly conflicts with the Portuguese, has been widely ignored.

The issue of a Spanish military intervention in China, the empresa de China, is closely linked to the controversial Spanish Jesuit padre Alonso Sánchez, whose two journeys to Southern China between 1582 and 1584 further affected Spanish reputation in Asia. On his first trip to Guangdong in March 1582, he took the opportunity to inform the Portuguese of Macao
about the union of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns under Philip II. He found support with Governor Diego Ronquillo (r. March 1583-May 1584) and even Bishop Salazar. On his second mission at the end of 1583 together with the Spanish merchant Juan Bautista Ramón, Sánchez was not only equipped with a mixed Filipino-Spanish crew and Alonso, a Christian interpreter of Bengali origin, but he also carried a sealed letter written in Chinese, signed by Governor Ronquillo. Horacio de la Costa claims that the letter, which was drafted by the captain of a Chinese junk and addressed to the Viceroy of Guangdong, moreover ‘accredited Sánchez as ambassador with powers to negotiate’. Yet he neither accomplished sealing a ‘friendship’ deal for future commerce nor did he receive permission for a Spanish trading post on the Chinese coast. After his diplomatic failure in Canton he was harshly criticised by the residents and padres of Macao, including Visitador Alessandro Valignano. Humiliated by the failure of his China project, a frustrated Sánchez reported very negatively about the luxurious lives of the Jesuits in Macao, relations with China in general and about huaqiao/kakyo residents in Manila during a trip to Spain in 1587.

In the period of Luso-Spanish rivalry in the East, which was moreover characterised by recurring failures to dominate the Moluccas – Philip II’s cosmographer and advisor, Giovanni Battista Gesio, assured the King that Luzon was strategically as important as Flanders or Italy and that it would be a perfect base for reaching out to China and Japan, an opinion shared by Francisco de Sande, the third Spanish Governor of the archipelago. Sande, notorious for downplaying Manila’s economic potential and for spreading stereotypes, feared an invasion from China after having been sold a European-style arquebus by a Chinese merchant. Both Sande and Gesio deals with Sánchez’s fund raising and persuading efforts for a Castilian intervention in China for the benefit of the Catholic religion.

102 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 401; In a proposal sent to the King in Spain, Ronquillo even volunteered to organise and recruit people by himself. Cf. Iwasaki Cauti (1992), Extremo Oriente, p. 62.
103 De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, p. 39. ‘Alonso of Bengal had only a smattering of Chinese, but was the best Ronquillo could provide.’
105 Both Sánchez and Valignano implicated higher authorities in their disagreements; for years the debates continued between Claudio Aquaviva and Alonso Sánchez, see ARSI Phil 9.
106 Cf. Kamen (2002), Spain’s Road, p. 225.
107 Cf. Retana (ed.) (1895/96), Archivo, p. 42: ‘La contratación con los de China es muy dañosa para los españoles y para los de estas yslas porque solamente traen hierro que es útil y otra cosa no porque sus sedas son falsas y sacan de acá plata y oro y cuanto mas durare la comunicación con nosotros sin guerra tanto mas platicos se irán haciendo. [...] Aquí me han dicho indios japones
were still driven by the relics of sixteenth-century *conquista* mentality, systematically targeting at territories in the South China Sea. Similarly, during the Synod of Manila (1581-1586), Archbishop Domingo de Salazar proposed the conquest of neighbouring territories for ‘religious propagation purposes’.\footnote{\textit{Spanish Experience in Taiwan}, p. viii.} Advocating a *guerra justa* (just war) against China, Sánchez found support for his ideas among intellectuals in various parts of the empire, lobbying for the spread of Catholicism, dissemination of occidental values, or even further conquest.

Regardless of largely non-violent relations with China and Japan, Spanish foreign relations in South East Asia fundamentally rested upon military superiority. The primary ‘enemies’ in this period were surrounding Muslim rulers, all above the Brunei Darussalam, whose claims on the area around Cebu led to conflicts in the later 1570s. Governor Sande’s allegedly peaceful initiative of negotiating for an end to Muslim proselytising on Spanish territory failed.\footnote{AGI Filipinas 6, r. 3, n. 18, ‘Carta de Sande sobre jornada de Borneo y pidiendo hábito’, 29 July 1578.} In 1578, a colonial force launched what they called an expedition to Brunei, while being known as Castille War (Perang Kastila) in Borneon collective memory: In March a Spanish-Filipino mixed force led by Sande and supported by two usurping noblemen of Brunei, conquered the capital Kota Batu and forced the sultan into exile. Several campaigns followed until June of the same year, when a cholera outbreak eventually compelled the diminished Spanish force to return to Manila.\footnote{\textit{History of Brunei}, pp. 54-60.} After a while trade relations recovered thanks to thriving contacts on a private level.

Anthony Reid has argued that under the pressure of Spanish aggression city-states in South East Asia were forced to adopt a more defensive military system and develop new trading patterns, often outside the European sphere of influence.\footnote{\textit{Charting}, p. 225.} While Manila-centred foreign affairs were marked by suspicion and insecurity (which at times was nothing but imaginary), a remarkably well-functioning information network within the Spanish Overseas Empire developed. As a result, Philip II designed a general plan for the Philippines’ relations with her neighbours in 1589 with a primary focus on external trade in foreign matters, acknowledging the coming and
going of Chinese, Portuguese, Japanese, Siamese, and Malays for commercial reasons and expressing need for uniform customs.\textsuperscript{112}

In 1598 the next diplomatic encounter between the Spanish Philippines and coastal China – very different from all previous and later encounters with the Middle Kingdom – took place. That year Governor Tello sent Juan Zamudio to Canton with the target of receiving permission to settle along the coast. Curiously, Cantonese provincial authorities gave in to the Spanish petition and assigned them to a small island offshore Canton, yet did not allow them to enter the mainland.\textsuperscript{113} The existence of contradictory sources on the matter means that it is impossible to identify the exact geographical position of what the Spanish referred to as ‘El Piñal’ and where they stayed less than two years.\textsuperscript{114} Tello and Zamudio’s approach was an attempt to get similar access to the Chinese market as the Portuguese had in Macao; but in doing so they bypassed the King in Spain and violated the royal decree of 1593. Based on accusations made by the Viceroy of Goa in a letter to Philip III, Paulo Jorge de Sousa Pinto has argued that the Cantonese authorities accepted the Spanish because the latter bribed them with silver.\textsuperscript{115} He furthermore convincingly linked the episode to changing Spanish foreign relations in the East, under the impact of the Cambodia expedition and Japanese aggression in the China Seas. After the foundation of the minor foothold on El Piñal, the Spanish petitioned the Cantonese authorities for access to the Chinese market. What is noteworthy about their request is that they wanted to be treated on the same footing as were the Siamese, just as the Portuguese Leonel de Sousa had requested in 1554 before securing Macao.\textsuperscript{116} Boxer writes that the Chinese translations of the Spanish petition include arguments in favour of the Spanish and against the Portuguese. In reaction, the Portuguese discredited the Spanish with the Cantonese

\begin{footnotes}
\item[112] Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 30 (1589).
\item[113] In China the island was known as Hutiamen. See Ollé (2002), Empresa, p. 254, ‘In 1598 the Spanish of Manila attempted to establish their trading point in the Canton Estuary. They were well received in Canton, spent about 7000 reals on presents, and were told they could establish themselves at a place they called El Piñal, the location of which is unknown. The Portuguese having failed to persuade the Canton authorities that they should exclude the Spanish, took different action, launching an unsuccessful fireship attack, but desisted after the Chinese reduced Macao’s food supply.’ Cf. Wills (1998), ‘Relations’, p. 349.
\item[114] Pinto (2008), ‘Enemy at the Gates’, pp. 11-43.
\item[115] Pinto (2008), ‘Enemy at the Gates’, p. 22.
\item[116] ‘In 1554, the Portuguese commander, Leonel de Sousa, claimed to have registered a verbal agreement with Wang Po, the acting commander of the coastguard fleet permitting the Portuguese to trade in Kwangtung on terms similar to those of the Siamese.’ Cf. Souza (1986), Survival of Empire, p. 17.
\end{footnotes}
authorities by describing them as ‘harmful thieves’, the same stereotypes they had used in Japan in 1596. The El Piñal episode certainly marked the peak of Luso-Spanish rivalry, comprehensively since one of its immediate effects was a significant rise in silk prices in Macao in 1599. Nonetheless, the Macanese reportedly traded with a ship from Manila that same year. Despite the fact that secret circles in Manila discussed taking similar steps again in 1603 and 1609 and despite the legislation of Spanish trade in China and Japan by royal decree of 25 July 1609. I disagree with those who claim that El Piñal was part of a larger Spanish territorial initiative and instead argue that El Piñal was nothing but a mercantile project.

Taking curiosity as an indicator for considerate foreign policies, we encounter major differences between China and Spain. Ethnographical studies carried out by missionaries about power relations and customs in East Asia addressed the increasing metropolitan interest in information on China and Japan. Official Chinese interest in improving their knowledge of the new rulers of Luzon or the origin of the new Barbarians remained limited. Rare official Chinese policies oscillated between anachronism and ignorance: Whereas formal diplomatic relations in form of tributary trade did not exist, coastal bureaucrats occasionally classified the new rulers of Luzon as tributary partners. Late Ming dealings with Luzon were by all means unsystematic: The earlier cited Ming shi-lu record of 1576 shows that the Chinese state was not entirely sure about the status of Luzon. Restrained conduct continued largely unaltered until the end of the dynasty. Reactions to urgent events such as the 1603/4 and 1639 ‘Chinese mutinies’ of Manila triggered hardly more than conflict-avoiding approaches. But there

117 ‘Eram ladrones y levantados, y que eran gente que alçauan con los regnos donde entravan.’ Cf. Boxer (1963), Great Ship, p. 61.
118 BR 27, p. 110. See also AGI Filipinas 329, l. 1, ff. 54v-56r, ‘Orden de tratar sobre la entrada en China’, 15 October 1603.
119 Pinto (2008), ‘Enemy at the Gates’, pp. 11-43. The author demonstrated that Spanish and Portuguese sources on the event reflect major contradiction as to the question whether the Spanish had been granted the right to settle or simply trade there. Similarly, the true objectives of the Spanish approach are also disputed.
120 Vande Walle/Kasaya (eds) (2001), Dodonaeus in Japan, pp. 104-105, pointed out that early modern communication comprised of three elements: information, utterance, and understanding.
121 Luis Frois, who spent many years in Japan, compiled an early ethnographic study on Japan. He was the first author of a Japanese-Portuguese dictionary and benefitted from close contacts with noblemen such as Oda Nobunaga. See Frois (1599), Rebus Iaponicus. Before the first Vocabulario da Lingoa de Iapam was printed by the Jesuit press in 1604 several unpublished manuscript aids to language study circulated among Jesuit missionaries. See Ebisawa (1971), ‘Meeting of Cultures’, p. 127.
were also times when the Ming authorities intervened: following a Spanish commercial initiative to settle on Taiwan, a mandarin was dispatched to Manila. In reaction to a sudden Dutch expansion in South East Asia, the Governor of Fujian also dispatched two ambassadors to Batavia in 1624 to discuss recent developments on the Penghu Islands.

In trying to explain Ming China’s reluctance towards Luzon we have to take a look at China’s traditional understanding of the world as tian xia (all ‘under heaven’). Chinese self-perception was one of being ideologically superior and therefore responsible for the peace and order on earth. In this tradition, the first Ming Emperor, Hongwu (r. 1368-1398), drafted a list of 12 states that were not to be invaded by future generations. These states included Vietnam, Korea, Japan, and Luzon. An account of the early seventeenth century shows that the Chinese court did not even bother to clarify the Spaniards’ status. Describing them as Western yi the Chinese used to encounter similarities between the people from Luzon and the Japanese:

Some Japanese ships drifted to Xiao-cheng in the Fu-jian seas. Naval forces pursued them to Zhang-zhou Port and Xian-qi, where 27 yi persons were captured. Through interpreters it was learned that they were Japanese merchant yi who travelled to foreign lands, and that they had been blown ashore by the winds. [...] Also, there were Luzón people and Western fan people, some of whom had sold themselves as servants and some of whom were returning home on the ship. The Fu-jian Grand Coordinator Xu Xue-ju advised and noted: [...] The Western fan are not tributary yi, but rather are a rebellious tribe. As to [those persons from] Luzón, in past years, they killed almost 10,000 of our merchants. Its people must not be treated indulgently. As long as they have no rebellious desires, we cannot be too severe on such people.

This passage summarises official China’s ambivalent stance. On the one hand, Chinese authorities condemned the savage behaviour of the ‘men of Luzon’, on the other they were reluctant to seriously deal with the latter. Immanuel Hsü argued that the Chinese did not distinguish the Spaniards

123 AGI Filipinas 30, n. 12 ‘Carta de Niño de Távora sobre la expedición a Isla Hermosa’, 4 August 1628.
from the Portuguese, sometimes referring to both as *folangji* (佛郎機 a.k.a. Franks). If true at all, it was certainly not the case for all of China. Provincial authorities in Guangdong already experienced rivalry between Portuguese and Spaniards in the 1580s resulting from an outspoken Macanese opposition to mendicants from Manila – even if such friction between Jesuits and mendicant orders could have been dismissed as religious dispute and not necessarily understood as a matter of national politics. In addition to official records, private Fujianese and Cantonese merchants clearly distinguished between the Portuguese of Macao and the Spaniards of Manila. Under these circumstances, generic terms such as *fanseng* (番僧) as well as *fantu* (番徒) for foreign missionaries coming from Luzon were probably used as a distinction from *falongji* used for the Portuguese. 

To sum up, Spanish attempts to establish bilateral relations were constantly frustrated. With regard to Manila private Chinese traders indirectly respected Spanish suzerainty and their rules, despite the prevalent dualistic nature between popular and official discourse in official China. As for the latter, Sino-Castilian relations were unsustainable. Despite remaining outside the Ming’s sphere of interest or influence, a Chinese government document of as late as 1631 referred to Luzon as a subordinate country. 

During the Qing period, Luzon was officially listed among ‘foreign countries’, along with Macao, Japan, Siam, Portugal, Spain, England, or France.

### Diplomatic Relations between Japan and the Overseas Empire

#### Irregular Beginnings

Unlike China-related foreign affairs, encounters between Japan and Luzon were regular and increasingly systematic. Yet, similar to the case with China,
diplomatic or semi-official relations started off at the periphery, after the Franciscan friars Diego Bernal and Juan Pobre Díaz Pardo landed in Hirado in 1582. The island of Hirado had been an important, interregional base for maritime trade since the days of the prominent Chinese wakō Wang Zhi, introduced earlier. They landed there by chance on the vessel of the private Portuguese captain Antonio Garcés.¹³³ At that time Spanish friars in Manila had no concrete plans for a Japan mission but exclusively focused on China. Fray Pobre returned to Hirado two years later together with the Augustinian Francisco de Manrique, again due to an unexpected change on the initial course to China.¹³⁴ Daimyō Matsura Shigenobu (松浦鎮信) welcomed the capsized and invited them to stay on the island while waiting for the proper seasonal winds. During that time the Spaniards received help to repair their vessel.¹³⁵ Matsura Shigenobu, in Spanish sources often referred to as ‘king of Firando’, sought the opportunity to express his desire to establish relations with the ‘other’ Iberians and regularly met with the stranded friars. Eventually he drafted a letter to the Spanish Governor in Manila assuring him friendship and expressed his hope for the future evangelisation of his people.¹³⁶

Finding themselves both delighted and suspicious about unexpected interaction with Japan, the Spaniards were soon to receive more encouraging lines from Japan.¹³⁷ The same year, Jesuit vice-provincial Gaspar Coelho wrote to the Governor of the Philippines asking for support for the Japan mission and against the Shimazu of Satsuma.¹³⁸ In 1586, Ōmura Sumitada (大村純忠), the lord of Nagasaki, sent 11 Japanese, who claimed to be Christians, to Manila.¹³⁹ The Spaniards learnt about the lack of priests in Japan and soon after their arrival a delighted Governor Santiago de Vera reported

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¹³³ AGI Filipinas 34, n. 64, ‘Carta del Pablo Rodríguez sobre el Rey de Firando’, 7 October 1584; Uyttenbroeck (1959), ‘Early Franciscans’, p. 128.
¹³⁴ AGI Filipinas 84, n. 46, ‘Carta del franciscano Juan de Plasencia sobre varios asuntos’, 18 June 1585.
¹³⁵ AGI Filipinas 34, n. 64, ‘Carta de Pablo Rodríguez sobre el rey de Firando’, 7 October 1584.
¹³⁶ AGI Filipinas 34, n. 63, ‘Traslado de carta del rey de Firando’, 17 September 1584. See also Dainihon shiryō, 11, 7, p. 595; Nihon gakujitsu fukyukai, appendix 5-6. The letter and the presents sent by Matsura were carried on a Portuguese ship.
¹³⁸ ARSJ Jap-Sin, 9, II.
this promising encounter to the King in Spain. As a sign of accepting Ōmura’s friendship, the Governor sent presents to the Christian lord and to two of the leading Portuguese Jesuits. The fact that the Japanese local lord asked for support for the Christian mission in Japan speaks for the Kyushu daimyō’s diplomatic skills in dealing with the Iberians: a future Catholic mission had potential to increase foreign commerce in the realm.

The following year another vessel from Japan arrived in Manila. It brought a letter of Matsura Takanobu (松浦隆信; Shigenobu’s father) from Hirado, and was laden with merchandise and weapons to display the commercial potential of the Matsura realm. Together with the Christian daimyō, Konishi Yukinaga, also known as Don Agustín, Matsura Takanobu offered to send troops without asking for anything in return. On 26 June 1587, Governor Santiago de Vera (r. 1584-1590) reported the good news to the King in Madrid. Requesting permission to open a trading route between Japan and the Philippines, and with the empresa de China in mind, he pointed out that the Japanese were enemies of China and therefore offered military help at a very low cost. This points at the beginning of Japanese mercenaries in South East Asia. Right on the day of the arrival of the envoy from Hirado, Santiago de Vera made preparations to send the Japanese a letter together with presents – which he considered to be of great value, and moreover immediately informed the King in Spain.

The aforementioned dynamics suggest a certain rivalry among the Kyushu daimyō when it comes to foreign trade. Competition triggered a special interest in Luzon and loose contacts with the Spaniards prospered before Japan’s central ruling elite tried to formalise trade relations. A similar rivalry eventually also affected central Japanese foreign policies. Between 1591 and 1593, Toyotomi Hideyoshi sent letters to the Spanish Governor in Manila, informing the latter about his enormous power and his intention to conquer the Philippines, unless the Spanish paid tribute to Japan. The diplomatic tensions with China, as introduced above, served as the setting

140 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 6, n. 61, ‘Carta de Vera sobre pobreza de la gente de guerra’, 26 June 1586.
142 AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 32, ‘Copia de Carta de Vera al virrey sobre situación, japoneses’, 26 June 1587.
143 AGI Filipinas 34, n. 75, ‘Carta de Santiago de Vera sobre situación general’, 26 June 1587. For mercenaries from Hirado in South East Asia, see Clulow (2010), ‘Maritime Violence’, p. 83.
145 AGI Filipinas, 18B, r. 2, n. 12, ‘Carta de G. P. Mariñas enviando cartas de Japón’, 11 June 1592. BR 8, pp. 260-261. Letters were sent to the Philippines in 1591, 1592, 1593, 1597. The first three letters were similar to the one sent to Taiwan.
for requesting tribute from Luzon (in those days called Shōryūkyū 小琉球 in Japanese sources) and Taiwan (a.k.a. Takasago, 高砂). Political scientists have argued that this advance should be understood as part of a so-called kanpaku diplomacy characterised by Hideyoshi’s expansionist ideas that could be interpreted both as attempt to control the Asian sea trade and to increase Japan’s political position in Asia, diplomatic encounters with the Spaniards have been presented over the centuries as a story of conflicts. What has largely been overlooked is that it was not only statesmen who pulled the strings based on handbook conventions in this diplomatic communication. Thus, an alternative view on this formal yet improvised element in Spanish-Japanese relations is overdue. Transnational diplomacy of the 1590s shows a rather official character: formal exchange of letters and envoys, the participation of central rulers (if only passively, in the case of the Spanish sovereign), and, last but not least, impromptu audiences in Manila, Nagoya, and Kyoto.

The Spanish answer to Hideyoshi’s first advance of 1591 was vague. Although the fear of a Japanese invasion under Hideyoshi and his followers (especially under the impact of the growing number of Japanese in the city) remained vague, authorities decided to just wait and see. Returning the delegation by sending the Dominican Juan Cobo as envoy to Japan was rather an attempt to win time than an act of submission. What all Spanish delegations to Japan had in common was a determination to negotiate. Given their limited language and cultural skills they sometimes accomplished noteworthy results. The second officially dispatched envoy from Manila, a Franciscan friar called Pedro Bautista, even signed a kind of treaty on behalf of Governor Dasmariñas in 1593 on Japanese soil. This agreement was the beginning of licensed trade aiming at getting piracy under control and strengthening mutual trust. This act was later interpreted as the beginning of the short-lived bilateral relationship between Japan and the Philippines, in which Hideyoshi was acting as the ruling power of the entire country and the Governor of the Philippines represented the Spanish King.

146 Asao et al. (1994), Iwanami kōza nihon tsūshi, vol. 12, p. 42.
147 Previous scholarship has frequently stressed the opposition of Hideyoshi’s aggressive foreign relations and Tokugawa Ieyasu’s wise advances to foreign rulers. This tendency dates back to contemporary Spanish accounts. Both the volumes of Pablo Pastells, and of Emma H. Blair and James A. Robertson give but accounts of failed communication between the two parties. Another example is the work of the Spanish Franciscan Lejarza (1961), Bajo la Furia de Taikosama. The encounters are more neutrally addressed in Bernard (1938), ‘Débuts des Relations’, pp. 99-137. See also Nara, Supein komonjo (1942), and Ogura (1989), Shuinsen jidai, p. iii.
148 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 51; Morga (2008), Sucesos, p. 230.
In the course of the 1590s, a Portuguese intermediary carrier and merchant active in the Japan trade named Pedro Goncalves Carvalhais (sp. Pedro González de Carvajal), who had travelled to Japan with Pedro Bautista, claimed to have received a letter from Hideyoshi addressed to the King of Spain. When reporting to Madrid, Carvajal cautioned against a potential Japanese attack and stressed that Hideyoshi was desperately waiting for an answer from Spain. He claimed to have been chosen by Hideyoshi to inform the King about the Japanese ruler’s wealth and might and suggested cooperating with the Bishop of Macao in proselytising matters. However, the accuracy of this report is doubtful. In 1594, Hasekawa Sōnin (長谷川宗仁), a close confident of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (who was present during Cobo’s stay in Japan and also mediated between Harada Kiyemon and Hideyoshi), went to Luzon to submit Hideyoshi’s letter following the audience with Bautista. He also drafted a message for Governor Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, affirming that Japan would not send any military expedition but would maintain peaceful trade relations with Luzon. This was already the beginning of typical intermediary diplomacy between Japan and foreign policy players in Asia: A high-ranking official (daimyō) would act as the main authority in diplomatic correspondence, while he in fact expressed the wish of the Japanese ruler. It was an explicit expression of the Japanese ruler’s superiority. We have already seen a similar approach in the 1611 letters to Fujian, described above. In later decades Honda Masazumi (本多正信), one of Tokugawa Ieyasu’s senior advisors, and Nabeshima Katsushige (鍋島勝茂), daimyō of Saga, fulfilled similar functions in diplomatic correspondence with Manila, while the Matsura of Hirado took such role in negotiations with VOC officials.

Getting back to the events of the 1590s, the next step was sending Jerónimo de Jesús to Japan to relate the news that Luis Pérez Dasmariñas had taken

149 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 7, n. 110, ‘Carta de Pedro González de Carvajal sobre su viaje a Japón’, 1594.
150 The letter ends without a signature or any of the usual formal wishes.
151 For Hasekawa’s involvement in namban trade see Ōishi (1986), Shuinsen.
152 See Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku ōfuku, pp. 102-104.
153 Honda Masanobu Saño no kami 本多正信佐渡守 enjoyed Ieyasu’s favour as loyal and politically gifted advisor since his time as daimyō of Okazaki. Being Ieyasu’s first advisor in external affairs he was often involved in dealings with the Spaniards. After Masanobu’s death most of his tasks passed on to his son Honda Masazumi Közuke no suke 本多正純上野介, who had accompanied Ieyasu to Sumpu in 1606. As Ieyasu’s personal minister he was together with the gozan monks Genkitsu and Sōdōn in charge of drafting and distributing licences for maritime trade. Shōzaburō Mitsutsugu, a rich merchant from Kyoto, was in charge of Bakufu finances. Mukai Masatsuna Shōgen 向井正綱将監 held the office of fune bugyō (jp.) 船奉行 and was responsible for maritime trade.
office as new Governor following the unexpected death of his father in 1594. Half a year later (1595), Jerónimo de Jesús informed the Governor in a letter written in Satsuma about his impression that Hideyoshi indeed showed great interest in conquering the Philippines. At the same time Spanish mendicants managed to create a foothold in Japan. Supported by Christian Franciscan friars received the right to settle in Kyoto where they founded a modest church and a hospital, and soon afterwards a convent and a church in Osaka followed.

In addition to the events outlined above, a series of shipwrecks along the Japanese coast constituted early Hispano-Japanese diplomatic relations. The first major incident fell right into the tensions with Hideyoshi. In autumn 1596 the Manila Galleon San Felipe capsized on the coast of Shikoku in 1596 and gave rise to a dramatic episode in the history of early modern Japanese-Spanish relations. After losing control over the vessel and seeking shelter in Japan, the distressed Spanish captain Matías de Landecho also lost control over the cargo of the galleon: Neither the local residents nor Hideyoshi himself could resist the temptation of the rich freight of Chinese silks aboard. Within days the confiscation of the cargo caused widespread social unrest, which stirred up Japan-based Europeans and newly converted Japanese. In the midst of these turbulences, Hideyoshi – who had issued an unsuccessful ban on Christianity in 1587 – saw that the time was ripe for bearing down on the intruding Spaniards and the spread of Christianity. In February 1597, one Mexican, one Portuguese, and six Spanish friars, as well as eighteen Japanese Christians, were crucified in Nagasaki and became known as the first Christian martyrs on Japanese soil. Hideyoshi's harsh reaction points to the hostile atmosphere of namban trade at the end of his reign. If we are to believe Landecho's Christian Japanese interpreter Antonio, Portuguese merchants from Macao even added fuel to the fire. They reported to Hideyoshi 'that the Portuguese were no vassals of King Don Felipe who was a bad person, but that the Portuguese had another King

154 Jerónimo de Jesus from Nagasaki warned his fellow Franciscan brother Francisco de las Misas of a possible conquest by Satsuma. Iwao (1937), *Nanyō*, p. 262. Based on an account of Pastells, Iwao reported that the third Japanese ambassador, Hasegawa Sōnin (Pedro Karubaharu), stated in a letter of 1593 that if trade between the two countries was cut off, troops would be sent. See Kishino (1986), 'Firipin böeki', p. 43.


156 Morga (2008), *Sucesos*, pp. 78-84.
with whom Taycosama had [already] made peace'. With regard to the San Felipe incident researchers have often referred to the role of the Jesuits and their reluctance in sharing Asian proselytising territory with mendicant friars. Spanish contemporaries, to some extend wrongly, criticised the padres for not using their connections in Japan and not stepping in for their ‘brothers’.

When word of the escalation reached Luzon, officials saw their long-nourished fears confirmed and immediately garnered further military support from Spain. In principal the colonial government reacted very pragmatically to Hideyoshi’s provocation. Without losing time, Governor Tello sent his ambassador, Luis de Navarrete, with presents (that famously included the elephant nicknamed ‘Don Pedro’) in July 1597. On behalf of Tello, Navarrete requested the return of the cargo from the shipwrecked San Felipe and the bones of the martyrs. It was not only that smart diplomatic manoeuvre that helped to stabilise trade relations between Manila and Japan in 1598, but also Hideyoshi’s death. However, since 100,000 Japanese soldiers returned from the Korea invasion, Governor Tello remained on alert: A report to the King states that out of a total of 16 merchant vessels calling at Manila that year roughly half of them carried pirates, who plundered the natives.

158 For a the controversial picture of the events by Franciscan and Jesuit observers and for Valignano’s harsh critique of the Franciscan methods, see Álvarez-Taladriz (ed.) (1973), Relaciones, p. 69. During the Tokugawa reign Franciscan friars became important mediators between Japan and Luzon. Legally, the Jesuits were right: It was only in 1600 that Pope Clement VII’s Onerosa pastoralis gave all mendicant orders the right to enter Japan, yet under the condition that they operated via Portuguese India. Pope Paul V removed all restrictions as late as 1608. See Reis Correira (2005), ‘Rivalries’. Pope Sixtus V published the brief ‘Dum ad uberes fructus’ conferring the right to found missions in the ‘Indias’ and China upon the Franciscans in the Philippines in 1586.
159 Girón (1965), Nippon, pp. 172-176. Morga also mentioned the elephant. Morga (2008), Sucesos, p. 81. Don Pedro prominently features a namban byōbu by the famous artist Kanō Naizen 狩野内膳, now part of the Kobe City Museum collection.
160 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 9, n. 146, ‘Carta de Tello sobre abandono de Mindanao, embajada a Japón’, 23 June 1598.
161 BR 10, p. 211: ‘But, as it happened that the pirates came after them, as we suspected that they were not all of the same understanding and alliance, several investigations were made in regard to them, and their commanders arrested, although nothing of importance was found. I sent general Don Joan Ronquillo and Captain Joan de Alcega to attack the enemy with a galley and a galliot; and although they came within sight of them, they did not effect the desired purpose, because their vessels were not suitable, and heavy storms were threatening. I sent Captain Gaspar Perez […] he had better luck, for, having met with two of the Xaponese ships,
In their efforts to unify the country, both Hideyoshi and Ieyasu were eager to gain control over Japan’s external commerce. Two aspects of Hideyoshi’s international dominance seeking were inherited by Tokugawa Ieyasu and remain crucial for the empirical analysis of the following subchapter. First the question of an Iberian impact-discourse and second the problematic concept of friendly relations (sp. amistad or pt. amizade) within early modern intercultural diplomatic relations. Because of its frequent use by Spanish and Portuguese political actors in and outside Europe it can easily be called the ideological backbone of pre-modern Iberian diplomacy. Hideyoshi also used friendship rhetoric when asking the Spaniards to prove their good intentions. Yet, the only kind of friendship between states known to Hideyoshi was based on a hierarchical concept of subordination and thus meant obediently sending tribute.

Diplomatic Relations between Tokugawa Japan and the Spanish Overseas Empire

Tokugawa foreign policies are conventionally considered as significant improvement for Japan’s international relations. When Ieyasu took the reins in foreign affairs after winning the Battle of Sekigahara (1600), he at once got in contact with neighbouring countries. For this reason, post-1598 foreign policies have often been regarded as completely different from Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s aggressive stance. The number of international negotiating partners and letters exchanged with foreign rulers increased dramatically during the first years of Tokugawa rule. Between 1601 and 1614, 67 official letters were dispatched to 12 different foreign entities, of which 48 were signed by the Shogun. At first sight, Ieyasu’s foreign policies also settled

he overcame the one which awaited him, and killed the whole crew. He brought one Xaponese of this city here alive, who was executed in the sight of the Xaponese and the Chinese.’

162 The Crowns of Castile and Aragon used the concept of diplomatic relations to consolidate power on the Iberian Peninsula and in Europe in the late medieval period, as I have shown at a presentation at the Tokyo University Chūseishi Kenkyūkai on 13 December 2013. Disney discussed the Portuguese use of amizade in Asia. Disney (2009), History of Portugal, p. 138.

163 For misleading translations of the term ‘friendship’ in the course of the 1590s diplomatic correspondence, see Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 3, pp. 56-57; 60. With regard to the Japanese envoy Harada on 27 April 1593 he summarised: ‘A lo que el emperador Cambacondono mi señor me envía con título de embajador a V. S. como a persona que está en nombre del Rey Felipe es a pedir y ligar desde ahora en adelante las paces que el estrecho vínculo de verdadera amistad y fraternidad.’ For theoretical considerations of terminology and connotation, see Fraser (1994), ‘Genealogy’, pp. 309-315.

relations with Luzon. Soon after taking up leadership, he took steps to comfort the Spaniards in Manila after several years of distress. Aware of the benefits of long-distance trade, Ieyasu soon targeted the Castilians of Luzon for collaboration on a trans-national level. Herein lies the major difference with Ming China. Early modern Japanese pluralistic Bakufu aspirations even included a desire to integrate Japan into trade with Mexico. As far as the Manila trade was concerned Ieyasu’s goodwill politics remained ambivalent and were hard to match with the already complex official foreign relations portfolio.\textsuperscript{165}

One of the first things Ieyasu did to appease the Spaniards of Manila was to issue a new ban on piracy. This was a smart move, which also allowed him to reconfirm his interest in direct trade relations with the Castilians. Only a few months after Hideyoshi’s death in October 1598, Ieyasu sent the Sakai merchant Goro Emon (五郎右衛門) to invite the Spaniards to trade in the Tokugawa domain in Kanto. The Bakufu had established its headquarters there and founded a new capital in Edo.\textsuperscript{166} Since nothing happened for months, Ieyasu impatiently dispatched the Franciscan friar Jerónimo de Jesús Castro, a Portuguese, as envoy to Manila. In an official letter, conventionally described as \textit{kokusho} in Japanese sources, Ieyasu expressed his sincere wish to establish regular trade with the Philippines and New Spain.\textsuperscript{167} Jerónimo de Jesús returned to Kyoto via Hirado in 1601 together with the Franciscan friar Pedro Burgillos, who became Ieyasu’s third envoy to Manila in 1602. In their audience with Ieyasu in Fushimi, the two clergymen not only offered tobacco as diplomatic gift but also formally agreed upon regular commercial exchange: each season three Japanese trading ships of definite size should call at the port in Manila.\textsuperscript{168}

Another subject of common interest in those days was fighting piracy: All illicit traders should be rounded up and punished.\textsuperscript{169} After two Chinese


\textsuperscript{169} Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), \textit{Tsūkō ichiran}, 179/570.
ships had been attacked by Japanese pirates while loading their cargo in the Manila Bay, the Spanish Governor ordered their punishment. Upon receiving Tello’s protest against the piratical practices of the Japanese people, Ieyasu blamed merchants from Satsuma and put between 50 and 400 people to death.\textsuperscript{170} He moreover encouraged the Spanish authorities in a letter to execute any Japanese troublemaker and even petitioned them to transmit the names of Japanese rebel merchants disturbing the Philippines.\textsuperscript{171} Desiring that the pirates who used to operate around Luzon should be punished without exception,\textsuperscript{172} he further commanded that the Chinese among them were to be sent back to Dai Ming (大明, ch., Great China) since they did not have anything to do with Japan.\textsuperscript{173} Governor Acuña (following Tello in office in May 1602) approved, calling Ieyasu ‘a just and wise king’ (un Rey tan justo y prudente) in June 1602.\textsuperscript{174} With an increasing number of people crossing maritime frontiers rather freely, the legal treatment of people from one country coming to or living in another country became important for bilateral relations. Several official letters sent from Japan to Manila granted the Spanish Governor the right to administer justice over all Japanese misbehaviour occurring in Manila, according to the local law.\textsuperscript{175} In this regard, Ieyasu, usually eager to underline his superiority, placed himself on a par with the Governor of the Philippines. In line with this logic, Spanish long-term visitors to Japan would neither be granted juridical freedom

\textsuperscript{170} Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa’, p. 509. According to a different version, Ieyasu ordered the seizure of six ships that had cleared from southern ports of Japan to plunder in Philippine waters, and had more than 200 of their crewmembers crucified as a warning (it was 100, according to Jesuits sources).

\textsuperscript{171} Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 47; Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/576. AGI Filipinas 19, r. 3, n. 36, ‘Traducción de carta de Tarazaua Ximono Cami a Acuña’, 1 June 1602. Ieyasu’s letter came together with a letter of his vassal Terazawa Hirotaka, called Ximonocami in the Spanish sources. Emilio Sola called his style blunt. Ieyasu insisted on an answer on the matter of direct trade with New Spain and urged a rapid reply from the Governor in Manila. Sola (1999), Historia de un Desencuentro, pp. 94-96. For the Japanese original, see Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku ōfuku, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{172} Ieyasu showed generally little tolerance for illicit maritime merchants. During the 30-odd years of active foreign policies the Bakufu invited several South East Asian rulers to punish misbehaving Japanese merchants according to local law. For Cambodia, for instance, see Kondô (1983), Gaiban tsūsho, p. 181; Takeda (2005), Sakoku, pp. 7-27; Kuno (1940), Japanese Expansion.

\textsuperscript{173} Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/570.

\textsuperscript{174} AGI Filipinas 19, r. 3, n. 38, ‘Carta del fiscal Salazar sobre llegada de Acuña’, 20 June 1602: ‘En nombre de Dayfusama habia escrito Fray Jeronimo de Jesus al Gobernador de Manila sobre el trato y comercio entre japones y españoles, manifestandole haber preso y castigado a los japones y sangleyes, que en años precedentes habian ido a hacer daño a Filipinas.’

\textsuperscript{175} See, for instance, a letter from 1608 in Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, pp. 13-14.
nor extraterritoriality. Spanish missionaries and merchants should be punished according the Japanese law, while the Bakufu held the right to expulse and punish when facing imminent danger.

If we are to believe the records of the Tsūkō ichiran, Ieyasu also proved capable of dealing with unexpected events better than his predecessor. When the Spanish galleon *Espíritu Santo* on its way to Acapulco was shipwrecked in Tosa (Shikoku) in September 1602, the Japanese ruler proved his good intentions. Memories and hearsay of 1596, when similar circumstances forced the *San Felipe* to land in that region, were vivid and caused panic among the passengers as well as in Manila, once news had travelled back there. While in Japan, Lope de Ulloa, the captain of the galleon, sent his brother Alonso and Francisco de Maldonado with the most precious items of the merchandise to Ieyasu in Fushimi. Although the crew of the galleon clandestinely fled from Tosa and returned to Luzon, things settled peacefully. Ieyasu bestowed Ulloa with a letter addressed to the Spanish Governor, in which he emphasised that no Spaniard had to fear losing his property in Japan. In response to Ieyasu’s letter, Governor Acuña even apologised for what happened in Tosa and suggested sending more ships from Manila to Japan.

In 1605, Spanish merchants from Manila received official permission to send four trading ships to Japan annually as part of vermillion-seal trade controlled by the Bakufu. While suspicions remained, most authorities in the Philippines came to appreciate the advantages of regular contact with Japan. Even the King in Spain deemed stable relations with the Japanese as a guarantee for the Philippines’ prosperous future. Being informed about annual supply from Japan and the sympathy of the ‘emperor’ for the Castilians, he insisted on maintaining peaceful relations with Japan, for the sake of

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176 Massarella (1990), *World Elsewhere*, pp. 115-116. In the early seventeenth century English and Dutch merchants enjoyed a certain extraterritoriality. The Bakufu decreed in 1613 that crimes committed by EIC employees should be punished by the head of the English factory. The latter, however, had to obey the Bakufu.


the Castilians in Asia in the light of a possible retaliating attack from China after a bloody clash between Spanish authorities and Fujianese settlers in 1603/4.\textsuperscript{182} The issue was also tackled during the diplomatic-commercial expeditions of Captain Francisco Moreno Donoso in 1606 and 1607, who was chosen twice as bearer of presents to the ‘emperor’ of the ‘Reyno del Japón’ and whose on the spot negotiations with the Japanese reportedly led to a proposed military alliance against China.\textsuperscript{183} In that period polemics of Dutch merchants, Jesuits from Macao, and Franciscans from Manila would come to dominate foreign affairs on Japanese soil, where authorities became aware of Catholicism.\textsuperscript{184}

A particularly delicate matter was a Spanish attempt to negotiate a ‘Dutch-free’ Japan. In his first reply to Ieyasu in June 1602, Governor Acuña described the Dutch as rioting and rebelling vassals of the King of Spain, compared them to pirates and boldly demanded that all Dutch should be sent to the Philippines.\textsuperscript{185} Although similarities to a previous Japanese request to send all wakō (pirates) from the Philippines to Japan were obvious, Ieyasu ignored Acuña’s allegations and argued that the Dutch were very committed to him.\textsuperscript{186} Ieyasu, knowing the Dutch version of the story, counted on their future usefulness and soon equipped them with official Japanese trading licences: In 1604 a ‘Dutch’ shuinjō was issued to Captain Jacob Janszoon Quaeckernaecq, who sailed on behalf of Tokugawa Hidetada to Patani.\textsuperscript{187} A comparative approach shows that Acuña – just as Ieyasu – also played double agent since his correspondence with China also included anti-Dutch sentiments. In 1606 he remarked in a letter to the Viceroy of Fujian:

The penalty imposed on the Sangleys who piloted the two Dutch ships that were on the coast of Chincheo was very just. These Dutch are not

\textsuperscript{182} Cédula real of Philip III (Segovia, 4 July 1609) to Don Juan de Silva. Cf. Tōyō Bunko, ‘Filipinas y el Japón’, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{183} The accomplishments in foreign relations of the ‘ambassador’ are well documented in AGI Patronato 53, r. 24; ‘Méritos y servios: Francisco Moreno Donoso: Filipinas’, 27 April 1620. He supported the Catholic mission by building two churches in Bungo with his own money.

\textsuperscript{184} For a synthesis of the lengthy disputes, see Reyes Manzano (2005), ‘Mitos y Leyendas’, pp. 62-63.

\textsuperscript{185} AGI Filipinas 19, r. 3, n. 35, ‘Copia de Carta de Acuña al emperador japonés Dayfu Sama’, 1 June 1602.

\textsuperscript{186} Torres-Lanzas (1928), Catálogo, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{187} The important pepper port Patani in present-day Thailand played a crucial role in early Tokugawa foreign relations. The sultan of Patani was the first recipient of a Tokugawa diplomatic letter in 1599.
friends of the Castilians, but bitter enemies; for, although they are vassals of the king of the Hespánas, my sovereign, they and their country have revolted, and they have become pirates like Liamon [Limahon] in China.\textsuperscript{188}

The Chinese authorities were unimpressed, not only since the Dutch fell into the category of unknown (non-trustworthy) foreign Barbarians. The Dutch, the former vassals of the Habsburg King, on the other hand, cautioned the Japanese sovereign to guard against Spain's desire for universal power. In an official state letter to the Bakufu, Stadhouder Maurits ferociously attacked the Spanish King and the Portuguese in 1609 and urged him to resist illegitimate claims.\textsuperscript{189}

Shimizu Yūko has stressed how Catholic friars represented Spain in foreign relations with the Bakufu and consequently argued against over-emphasising the role of the state within these special relations.\textsuperscript{190} Indeed, due to their permanent presence – in some cases it is even fair to speak of a residential status – in Japan missionaries played leading roles as intermediaries and envoys between Manila/Mexico/Madrid and Japan. In order to understand their privileged status it is necessary to look at how they established themselves. When in 1601 the aforementioned breve by Clemens VII was brought to Japan, Spanish friars saw the legitimacy confirmed; in 1602 members of all mendicant orders entered Japan. Yet their overall number remained low compared to the Jesuits. When a larger group of Franciscans, Dominicans, and Augustinians landed in Nagasaki on a Japanese ship in 1602 they immediately followed a similar pattern as in the Philippines and clearly divided their missionaries’ territories. The Franciscans moved to Kyoto, where members of their order had already established a small outpost and enjoyed the favour of Ieyasu; in 1604 an envoy of the 'King of Luzon', Governor Pedro Bravo de Acuña, made a straightforward demand: He asked for Ieyasu’s permission for Spanish missionaries to evangelise in Japan.\textsuperscript{191} Although Ieyasu did not make any clear concessions, the number of Spanish missionaries arriving in Japan increased in the years to come. The missionary field was extended to Edo and eventually to Sendai. The Dominicans (headed by Francisco de Morales) settled in Satsuma, where they temporarily enjoyed the support of the

\textsuperscript{188} BR 14, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{189} For a transcription and translation of the letter, see Clulow (2014), Company, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{190} Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon.
\textsuperscript{191} Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/571 (1604).
Shimazu clan, and the Augustinians focused on Bungo. The Jesuit Bishop Luis de Cerqueira pressed the mendicant friars hard to leave Japan soon afterwards but the latter endured until 1608, when Pope Paul V officially opened Japan to the mendicant orders from Manila. Rome’s blessing was not worth much in Japan. The Dominicans lost support from the Shimazu family the same year and Father Morales and two other brothers left Bungo for Nagasaki, while other Dominicans struggled to found churches in Hizen, Kyoto, and Osaka. The Augustinians moved from Bungo to Nagasaki in 1611-12. Although some of these friars enjoyed Ieyasu’s favour, mendicants only spent few safe years in Japan. In 1612 the Bakufu eventually not only changed its attitude towards the Hispanic presence in Japan but also lost patience with Christians for the first time.

The very issue of direct trade with Japan became a further stumbling block in Hispano-Japanese relations. It began with what may be cautiously referred to as Ieyasu’s overambitious global projects, establishing a direct trading route between New Spain and Japan, first in 1599/1601. Yet over the years, constructive Japanese suggestions hinting at mutual profits and the prospect of a safer journey for the Manila Galleon did not change Spanish determination to deter Japanese merchants from crossing the Pacific. The Spanish attitude can partly be explained by continuing Japanese pirate attacks along the Philippine coast. In 1609, the year of Grotius’s publication of *Mare Librum*, a Japanese pirate vessel was overcome and its crew killed by the Spaniards. Several sources suggest so much friction with the Japanese in Manila between 1605 and 1609 that Spanish authorities avoided pledging anything that might satisfy Ieyasu’s delicate aspirations. Ironically, bilateral negotiations reached their pinnacle in the year 1609, as a result of an unexpected audience of Vivero y Velasco, retired Governor of the Philippines, one of the fiercest critics of the Japanese in Manila while in

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195 In 1604 Pedro de Acuña informed the Spanish King that Japanese pirates were again operating around Luzon. See Schurz (1985), *Manila Galleon*, p. 102. From a Spanish point of view, Japanese and Chinese pirates were one of many risks to the colony’s security in the 1590s that resulted in constant vigilance. See Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), *Cédulas reales*, no. 30 (1589).
196 For the original letter sent by Ieyasu in 1609 see AGI MP-Escritura_Cifra 30, ‘Carta original del Universal Señor del Japón, Ieyasu Tokugawa (Minamoto Yeas), al duque de Lerma, en la que autoriza a los navíos españoles procedentes de Nueva España a tocar puertos japoneses, dejando los pormenores del asunto al franciscano Fray Luis Sotelo’, 28 December 1609. For Hidetada’s letter dated 4 May 1610, see AGI MP-Escritura_Cifra 31.
the Philippines,197 with Tokugawa Ieyasu in Japan. Their talks were only a short-lived blessing in disguise: the Bakufu agreed to tolerate Spanish friars on condition that regular trade would finally be established between New Spain and Japan. For the sake of economic advancement of his nation, Ieyasu further requested the services of 50 Spanish miners from Mexico who would introduce Western methods of mining silver. To increase the maritime capacity of his country, he asked for shipwrights who could instruct the Japanese in the construction of ocean-going vessels.198 Given that an anti-Dutch article was again omitted neither Manileños nor Mexican Spanish were in favour of that arbitrary treaty. In particular the Japanese wish to enhance overseas trade met no approval.199

The events following Vivero’s shipwreck shed light on a peculiar short-term cooperation between the Spanish and the English in Japan. The San Buenaventura, the vessel that took Vivero and his people back to Mexico had been constructed by the Kentish pilot William Adams (a.k.a. Miura Anjin, 三浦按針),200 Ieyasu’s closest non-Japanese advisor, conventionally regarded an enemy of the Spanish. Next to Vivero and the other castaways from the shipwrecked galleon, 23 Japanese merchants under the leadership of Kyoto merchant, Tanaka Shōsuke, and Father Alonso Muñoz, as Ieyasu’s designated envoy to the court in Madrid, boarded the ship in Uraga (浦賀, in present-day Kanagawa prefecture) on 1 August 1610 and landed in Acapulco safely three months later.201 William Adams’s generous deed leaves room for speculating about regular European cooperation in East Asia and puts narratives of hostilities into perspective.202

Demonstrating gratitude and respect for helping his people, the Viceroy of Mexico sent an official delegation with a letter and gifts to Tokugawa Ieyasu and Tokugawa Hidetada. Sebastián Vizcaíno (1548-1624) was chosen to head the delegation from Mexico and became known as New Spain’s ambassador to Japan. What seemed like a remarkable accommodation of

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197 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/574: He expelled Japanese merchants with the reason that they ‘stay[ed] behind without any special purpose’ and that ‘they do not know what they want’, but disturbed the social order in Manila.
198 AGI Filipinas 1, n. 133; ‘Consulta sobre carta de emperador de Japón’, 13 May 1611. Dainihon shiryō 12, 6, pp. 658-667; Massarella (1990), World Elsewhere, p. 79.
199 For diplomatic considerations following Vivero’s negotiations with Ieyasu, see AGI Filipinas 1, n. 133, 13, ‘Consulta sobre carta del emperador de Japón’, 13 May 1611.
200 William Adams became known as Miura Anjin after having been ennobled by the Tokugawa as the only European in history.
202 In 1616 the same ship crossed the Pacific to the Philippines, where the Spanish Governor purchased it eventually. Sudō (1968), Fune, pp. 115-118.
East Asian diplomatic protocol in fact pursued a fairly provocative hidden agenda, which I will address later. For now it is sufficient to place the episode into the chronology of Hispano-Japanese foreign relations. Vizcaíno landed in Uraga on 10 June 1611, from there he continued to Edo, met Tokugawa Hidetada on 22 June and was received in audience with Ieyasu in Sunpu two months later (on 27 August). In the course of these meetings, the parties renegotiated a trade agreement based on friendly relations, as well as the future of the Christian mission in Japan. After meeting Date Masamune, daimyō of Sendai, Vizcaíno spent almost a year with his coastal expeditions before he received negative replies from Ieyasu and Hidetada on 16 September 1612.

Zen monk Ishin Sūden, diplomatic advisor of the Bakufu, played a significant role in creating a new culture of foreign correspondence. Not only was he involved in communications with the Spanish authorities in Manila, but some of his political work became also the backbone of anti-Christian legislation and part of a broader concept of foreign relations. Starting with the prohibition of Christianity in Bakufu realms in 1612 (禁教令, jp. *kinkyōrei*) the law was extended to Nagasaki and Kyoto in 1613, before being introduced all over Japan in 1614. That year, loyal authorities of the Bakufu expelled friars and Japanese Christians to Macao and Manila. At the beginning of the year 1613 the Bakufu requested Sūden to compose a law forbidding Christianity in Japan (commonly known as 伴天連追放令, jp. *bateren tsuihōrei*). Legend has it that Sūden drafted its text overnight. The idea for such measures did not come overnight. In the past, various scandals such as the Madre de Deus/Nossa Senhora de Graça incident of 1608/9, when the Portuguese attacked a vermillion-seal ship, or the Okamoto Daihachi incident, or the incident in which the last Christian daimyō Arima Harunobu fell into disgrace with the Bakufu for bribery stimulated anti-Catholic sentiments. In their totality, they affected the nature of foreign relations and in particular maritime trade with the Spaniards.

In the long term, Hispano-Japanese bilateral endeavours of the early seventeenth century hardly accomplished anything on the state level. Yet, despite meagre results, Hispano-Japanese official relations show a variety of remarkable accomplishments on the micro level. The majority of contacts happened during Ieyasu’s lifetime when no embassy was turned away, as Adam Clulow remarked. The tone in formal correspondence also differed

203 For Christianity in Japan see Takase (2002), *Kirishitan jidai*.
204 Clulow (2014), Company, p. 51: ‘Incoming letters that failed to meet the Tokugawa conventions were rejected out of hand while embassies dispatched by rulers with unsettled claims
from that of Hidetada and Iemitsu (in office 1623-1651), who set more rigorous standards after Ieyasu’s death in 1616. Hidetada’s distinction between trade and diplomacy reflects in his strategic dismissing of earlier diplomatic advisors such as Itami and Matsudaira, who had been involved in foreign trade. Once Hidetada exclusively controlled foreign relations, true anti-Spanish sentiments surged and became visible in official correspondence with Manila. Analysing Tokugawa foreign affairs during Hidetada’s term as Shogun (1605-1616) we discover that no other country received as many letters as Luzon.205

to legitimacy were stopped at Japan’s borders and sent back without an answer.’ As happened to Siamese embassies, Jan Nuyts, envoy of the Governor General of Batavia in 1627, and the delegation sent by the King of Portugal in 1644. For the latter, see Boxer (1979), Portuguese Embassy, p. 205.

205 Nagazumi (1990), Kinsei shoki no gaikō; The turning point for direct relations with Spain coincided with Diego de Santa Catalina’s visit to Japan.
5 Local and Central Dualism

In the last chapter I portrayed the official diplomatic framework for the sake of contextualising Manila-based foreign affairs. Foreign relations doubtlessly shaped Manila’s early modern development but they often existed parallel to private unofficial encounters. Such unofficial exchange – sometimes in competition with the central government – constituted the bulk of early modern cross-cultural contacts and had a far greater impact on Manila’s economic and political reality. To be more concrete, early Hispano-Japanese diplomatic relations were not initiated by the central authority but by local powers and a variety of actors. At the end of the sixteenth century Kyushu *daimyō* were still largely at odds with the central elite. Fearing to be cut off from maritime trade they clandestinely courted foreign powers. Profits from maritime trade would eventually increase their stance inside Japan. The Matsura of Hirado were the Bakufu’s first obvious rivals in this respect. By far the largest number of Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese ships from Manila called at Hirado around 1600. Exchange between colonial officers with local lords differed both from official diplomatic exchange between central authorities (in Beijing, Kyoto/Osaka/Edo and Valladolid/Madrid/Seville) and from communication with private merchants.

Supposing that the key to understanding triangular relations lies in disentangling central from local factors, then state formation processes and other formative developments will have to be taken into consideration. If we consider the pre-modern state as an actor, we need convincing answers to this question: For what purpose and to what extent would a central government intervene in functioning patterns of maritime commerce and why? Naturally all parties engaging professionally in trade had a strong interest in making profits and therefore based their economic decisions on the prevailing circumstances. Considering each party’s exact expectations and aspirations helps to reset some of my earlier conclusions and to restate them in greater detail. Central governments’ intervention ranged from institutionalising, and restricting measures and usually occurred when private foreign trade was profitable enough to change a state’s political economy. Thus, the ups and downs of Manila-centred triangular relations were not simply a ‘clash of European mercantilism with oriental despotism’, as Patricia Carioti once put it.1 By the mid-sixteenth century, all three countries saw the emergence of

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state-sponsored enterprises in the shadow of private maritime initiatives. When government officials unhesitatingly abused the intellectual property of generations of free-spirited seafaring merchants for introducing ambivalent control and trade restrictions, tensions were a logical consequence.²

Yet, when studying the history of political economies, scholars have focused primarily on central powers and the importance of structural developments. The majority of these studies have failed to understand local and central performances in foreign exchange as connected, mutually inspired processes. State and private actors are conventionally placed in opposition to each other.³ Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, who denied the existence of a global market and an integrated world economy prior to the nineteenth century, for instance, argued that there would have been a bigger trade boom without the state.⁴ That would probably have also been true for early modern Manila but it does not seem the most relevant question in the context of triangular relations. It is more important to de-centre the state by looking at connections between individuals and groups operating beyond state control, while still being indirectly encouraged by it. Recent scholarship on maritime politics in Asian waters has picked up that approach. The works of Zhao Gang and Cheng Wei-chung explored how maritime enterprises outside state control not only dominated import and export channels in Southern China but also challenged the Ming and Qing courts to react.⁵ Hence, the Qing opening to the ocean, to use Zhao’s terms, is just one example for the logical consequence of reciprocal central and local initiatives.⁶ It would be wrong to view the decisions of early modern entrepreneurs from a solely economic perspective of profit seeking, even though profit-related aspects were overwhelmingly assertive. Such a narrative casts aside any political aspect of commercial networks in the China Seas.

² Many historians have discussed the role of mercantilism in Spain and reached controversial conclusions. Focusing on arbitirastas, actors, and agencies Regina Grafe most recently stressed the notion of contractual monarchy in early modern Spain. See Grafe (2014), ‘Polycentric States’, pp. 242-244; Other studies include Kamen (1993), Crisis and Change; Smith (1971), ‘Spanish Mercantilism’, pp. 1-11.


⁵ Zhao (2013), Qing Opening; Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy.

⁶ Other studies on the China Seas and new research perspectives feature contributions to Nakajima (ed.) (2013), Namban.
In the realm of overlapping diplomacy and trade we are well advised to consider Robert Hellyer’s study on local diplomatic actors of the Edo period such as Satsuma and Tsushima, who ‘accomplished foreign relations in conjunction with the central Tokugawa authority’. Previous diplomatic exchange with the Spanish in Manila made use of similar intermediary diplomacy, as represented by various actors, including Bakufu officials and senior advisors such as Honda Masazumi. Similarly, Spanish negotiating practices rarely distinguished between central and local authorities. Hellyer’s study demonstrates that foreign relations were divided among several actors and included ‘multiple voices and agendas which went beyond a single and commonly held ideology of seclusion’. The early years of relations with Luzon show clearly how local daimyō and the Tokugawa equally struggled for recognition, as will be discussed in more detail as part of an analysis of the ‘Kanto issue’. The Tokugawa celebrated their first victory in October 1602 when the Manila Galleon Espiritú Santo was shipwrecked: In the course of these events, two Spaniards who had just arrived in Hirado from Manila (Nicolas de Cueva and Diego de Guevara) used a previously issued written permission by Ieyasu, as warrant against the local lord of the Tosa domain, Yamauchi Kazutoyo (山内一豊).

Manila Trade-related Central and Local Dualism

If institutions really made the difference, how did they affect triangular relations? When focusing on the Manila system in its entirety, we note that institutional boundaries between local and central were often unclear. As we have seen, not all commercial shipping to Manila was state-sponsored. In fact, the several dozen Fujianese ships calling at Manila’s port annually were exclusively in the hands of private traders – at least as far as financing and operation were concerned. Most of them were equipped with official licences but could not count on any financial or legal support from the government. Circumstances could differ from region to region. While Guangdong developed a working system to control trade in Macao (and later Canton), Fujian’s bureaucracy first struggled with integrating the Manila

7 Hellyer (2009), Defining Engagements, p. 7.
8 Hellyer (2009), Defining Engagements, p. 11.
9 Cf. Iaccarino (2013), ‘Comercio y Diplomacia’, p. 81. The literal proof was a letter of invitation stating that the Spanish galleons on route to Acapulco were permitted to land at any Japanese port without having to fear any harm. For the shipwreck, see Kishino (1974), ‘Tokugawa’, pp. 21-36.
trade and later with keeping the Dutch at a safe distance. Simultaneously, the entire coastal region from Xiamen (厦門) to Ningbo experienced a sharp increase in private journeys to South East Asia and Japan, where many private merchants came to enjoy greater success than average members of the state-run maritime projects of Spain and Japan. In the case of Chinese maritime shipping, trade permits only served as authorisation. By contrast, the Manila Galleon as a state-owned enterprise – as well as the vermillion-seal (shuinjō) – included legal protection and financial support. In both cases a central government utilised the licences to protect maritime trade from both domestic and foreign competition. As a system of controlling foreign trade it served to benefit directly from imports.

For the macro region we may conclude that regular access to the Manila market led to far-reaching political changes in all three pre-modern states. Initiatives taken by local actors clearly outnumbered operations of the state. Politically and economically interrelated attitudes towards Manila differed largely among Chinese, Japanese, and Spanish actors and agents. Global players were, at the same time, local actors. On its most basic level, a ‘local’ actor can be defined as counterpart of a representative of the central state. The latter involved rulers, government officials, state-sponsored merchants and to a certain degree members of the church, whose actions, depending on the affiliation and position, could be bound by instructions of the King or the Pope. Local actors are easily associated with liberal trade. As has been indicated, central and local factors often overlapped in multilayered interactions. Instead of forcefully disentangling them it seems useful to consider hybrid existences. To name a few: regional officials’ political initiatives grew due to increased foreign trade. Thus Fujian officials, Kyushu daimyō, and Spanish authorities alike supported private commercial enterprises in Manila while – somewhat ludicrously – acting on behalf of their rulers.

In light of the strong network character of the triangular Manila trade it seems strange that ‘classic’ intermediaries were largely absent in the ports involved. With the exception of the Portuguese, who occasionally sailed from Manila to Hirado and Nagasaki at the end of the sixteenth century and Chinese ports in the 1620s, only native merchants shipped merchandise or silver from Manila to their home countries. The absence of intermediaries is closely linked to the diversity of the trading parties operating and collaborating in

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11 As discussed in the first chapter of Zhao (2013), Qing Opening.
12 Adam Clulow warrants against the view that the Bakufu was interested in institutionalising foreign trade for the sake of benefitting economically. Clulow (2006), ‘Pirating’, p. 76.
Manila, ranging from pirate-cum-smugglers (wakō), Overseas Chinese (ch. huaqiao, jp. kakyō) to licensed Japanese and Chinese merchants, Spanish colonial authorities, and random Manila residents of the Overseas Empire. This is not to claim that all groups were equally strong or equally successful: In Manila huaqiao benefitted from their business acumen, while Mexican merchants held a privileged position in the galleon trade. Once Japanese foreign trade became restricted to Nagasaki linguistically gifted merchants from Southern China (some of them with links to Manila) managed to further increase their power by serving Bakufu authorities as tsūji (jp., 通譯, official interpreters) and supervising the rest of the Chinese communities.13

Hispanic Actors and Trans-Pacific Silk Bartering

Spaniards in different parts of the empire knew about the potential riches in South East Asia and intended to tap into their full potential by copying the example of Portuguese trade in luxury goods, spices, and precious metals. Chinese silk was a convenient option and served the Manila Spaniards as a long-distance luxury commodity. While the trans-Pacific silk trade exemplifies triangular connected histories, it is striking that the global role of Chinese silk has often only been relegated to a brief mentioning. Compared to the attention silver has received in recent years it seems particularly imbalanced. Taking into account that Chinese raw silk (of which large amounts originated from the area around Suzhou, Nanjing, and Hangzhou next to what came from an indigenous production in Fuzhou) had a significant impact on the emerging Mexican and Japanese market and domestic production of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, scholars’ lack of interest is even more surprising.14 Chinese silk cargoes to Mexico covered various kinds of manufactured silk, including satin, brocades, damask, coloured, light and heavy silk fabrics.15

A few decades before the inauguration of the Manila Galleon trade, the Overseas Empire’s sericulture and silk manufacturing had achieved a

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13 Carioti (2010), ‘Focusing on the Overseas Chinese’, pp. 62-75. Patrizia Carioti stresses the diversity of Chinese migrants to Japan in this period. While the bulk of late-sixteenth-century Chinese newcomers could be labelled low-ranking coastal ‘outlaws’, after the 1630s they also included refugees from educated classes fleeing the Manchu.

14 For Chinese integration into global silk trade, see Cheong (1997), Hong Merchants. The author examined the connectedness of European and Chinese traders in Canton at different stages in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Canton trade.

15 Different types of Chinese silk imports to Manila in the 1580s are registered in AGI Patronato 24, 66. f. 8, cf. Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 62. They included damask, taffeta, bundled silk thread, white silk, brocade, raw silk, and linen. For Chinese silk and Japanese demand as understood in Manila, see also Morga (1890), Sucesos, p. 351.
status as joint project between the motherland and the Mexican colony. Of course, under terms favourable for the producing elite in the metropolis: While a large amount of silk was shipped from Seville, lower quality products were produced locally in obrejas that traditionally catered to the needs of the colonial society for European clothing. Spain itself possessed one of Europe’s most important silk industries of the time. Finished silk products were exported from Toledo, Granada, Seville, Valencia, and Murcia. At its height at the end of the sixteenth century, Toledo was reported to have employed some 20,000 people in the silk sector. Furthermore colonial production was partially in Castilian hands since many artisans from Castile did not have to pay taxes in the Americas. The church as the main consumer of these luxury goods encouraged the development of silk weaving in certain regions such as in the industrial centre of Puebla.

Workers and brokers involved in the trans-Atlantic silk business suffered from the trans-Pacific silk flows: Earlier studies have revealed that prices on the Mexican silk market increased sharply in the second half of the sixteenth century. In 1579, the price of raw silk was roughly seven times higher than 40 years before. Under these circumstances certain colonial entrepreneurs were optimistic about the prospects of the silk industry in New Spain on the eve of Chinese silk imports. Early profit-oriented considerations included sending special cargoes of Chinese silk to Peru with a possible net gain of 2,000,000 pesos for 1000 picos of raw silk and 60,000 pieces of satin, damask, and other valuable fabrics. Collecting data from the Spanish and Latin American archives, Fernando Iwasaki Cauti has shed light on the different types and prices of Chinese silks sent on the notorious 1581 galleon from Manila: Silk products, including damask (in bulk), were sold for little more than 2 pesos and various other qualities of silk for 10 pesos in bulk.

Many merchants in Seville, who had a monopoly on the silk trade with the Americas relied economically on selling silk to the colonies and thus felt uncomfortable about the influx of cheaper and often better quality Chinese

16 Borah (1943), Silk Raising.
20 BR 19, pp. 304-307. This report deals with speculations about the amount of money that could be earned from controlling trade between China and the Americas. For Chinese merchandise on colonial American markets, see Mazumdar (1998), Sugar and the Society, pp. 154-155.
fabrics. As a consequence a large group opposed the development of trans-Pacific trade, as soon as imports of raw silk, silk stockings, shirts, as well as vestments and tapestries for churches and convents, reached the Americas. Han-Sheng Chuan’s study has shown that losses in the silk industry had the potential of turning into a fundamental problem for the Crown. As a result of trans-Pacific Chinese silk imports, parts of the silk sector in Granada and Valencia even went bankrupt. When those living off Spanish sericulture started protesting against the influx of cheap Chinese silk during a period that coincided with civil protest and high military spending on the peninsula, the central government had to take action. Restrictions of the galleon trade in the 1580s and 1590s were part of early Crown intervention. Given Spanish information policies it is hardly surprising that early cédulas sent from Madrid to Manila instructed colonial officers on this matter. Increasing rivalry over profit should be controlled and curtailed.

Silver-silk controversies of the early colonial period reflect conflicts of interests within the overstretched Spanish Overseas Empire. Metropolitan Spanish restrictions and prohibitions were probably a concession to Philip II’s newly acquired Portuguese vassals, who saw their privileged position in Macao at stake. During these early decades of trans-Pacific trade, the Viceroy of Mexico remained the driving force in promoting the China trade, despite protests from his own people. When the Spanish settlers of the


23 See Ho (1994), ‘Ceramic Trade’. Art historians have made important contributions in that field. The Metropolitan Museum of Art has even dedicated a small collection to Manila Galleon artefacts, including Chinese ceramics and Sino-Chinese sacral art, http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/mgtr/hd_mgtr.htm (accessed 20 November 2013). The mantón de Manila, still part of flamenco, is in fact a token of Sino-Spanish cultural transfer. The silk shawls are traditionally decorated with floral motives. Chinese landscapes are not uncommon either. A particularly fascinating example from the early nineteenth century can be admired in the Museo de Artes Decorativos in Madrid, labelled ¿China o Filipinas?’ See also http://www.passimblog.com/de-china-a-sevilla-pasando-por-manila (accessed 27 February 2013).


26 BR 8, pp. 316-318.

27 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 3 (1577).

28 Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, p. 113. A Manila Galleon – directed by Francisco de Mercado – stranded in Nanao, an island of Guangdong close to the borders with Fujian in 1583. For a comprehensive list of all Manila Galleons including their arrival dates see http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxtYW5pbGFsYXsZW9ubGlzdGluZ3xneDoxNzhiZWQ3NDkwZzIwMzIwNTA3 (accessed 7 June 2014).
Philippines petitioned the King in Spain to order the Viceroy of New Spain to prohibit trade with the Philippines because of a disturbing silver drain to China, the latter, Alvaro Manrique de Zuñiga (r. 1585-1590), wrote a very convincing plea in favour of sustaining shipping silver to the Philippines.²⁹ Yet the situation was more complex. A 29-point declaration of the Council of the Indies regarding the future of the Manila Galleon trade in 1586 reveals that the secretary of the council was in favour of the Philippines. This means that even in Spain a pro-Philippine party, interested in liberal trade with China existed, just as it did in Mexico and Manila.³⁰ It also means that the gap between theory and reality widened, while debates about abolishing trade with China became increasingly complex.³¹

²⁹ BR 6, pp. 279-280.
³⁰ Cf. Montalbán (1939), Spanische Patronat, p. 115.
³¹ AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 1587.
Probably the most interesting feature of the 1593 restrictions was an attempt to protect the profits of the Manila Galleon trade ‘from above’. That year, King Philip II commanded that his vassals should no longer go to China to buy merchandise, but that Chinese were to come at their own risk to Manila. Chinese merchants were officially prohibited from travelling to Mexico. Robert Reed has argued that all these regulations ‘gradually led to a highly institutionalised, closely supervised, and extremely restricted trade’. Indeed, we have seen that prices for selling goods in Manila were fixed and defined in advance by means of the pancada system until 1600. However, evidence for exactly the opposite exists. First, taxes and customs led to different prices and profits for each trading party. Second, non-Crown merchants soon strengthened their grip on lucrative overseas commerce. Within a few years, Mexican merchants (mercaderes de plata) dominated the silk trade. In that function they competed with Seville-based companies as well as common traders in Manila. The effects of Sino-Mexican exchange were indeed problematic for Manila: Neither members of the indigenous population nor ordinary Spanish citizens (vecinos) were no longer able to purchase silk products. Since the limited cargo space on the Acapulco-bound galleons was largely reserved for silk, Manila merchants became entirely excluded from trans-Pacific commerce. Hence, the royal government responded by restricting participation in trans-Pacific trade to those Spaniards from Mexico who were willing to settle in Manila for at least ten years. In addition the Governor designated oidores to inspect outbound ships in order to minimise smuggling and to protect passengers against ill-treatment. It was a half-hearted attempt that above all encouraged contraband trade and corruption. Many merchants soon circumvented Crown intervention by bribing officials or forging cargo registers.

33 BR 25, p. 137.
36 Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, endnote 19.
38 Ayers (ed.) (1700–1746), Cédulas reales, no. 30 (1589).
39 Ibid.
40 Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, p. 158.
41 A galleon merchant’s account neatly summarises the enormous profit margin of the early years: ‘[T]wo hundred of ducats in Spanish commodities and some Flemish wares which I carried with me thither [to Manila] I made worth 1,400 ducats there in the country. So I make account that with those silkes [sic!] which I brought with me from thence to Mexico I got 2,500 ducats
Han-sheng Chuan demonstrated that in 1620, one picul of raw silk was sold in Manila for 200 pesos (approximately 3.3 pesos per kg) while the price for the same picul was 1950 pesos in Lima. He further estimated a 100 to 300 per cent average profit margin for silk sent from Manila to the Americas. Fear that Chinese goods would swamp the American markets remained alive until the late seventeenth century. Even if royal trade monopolies limited opportunities of the Manila market, regulations to prevent the developing maritime linkage between Peru, Macao, and the Philippines, failed to intercept Peruvian traders’ commercial participation in Asian trade or other forms of competition. In terms of the Manila system private Mexican and Fujianese merchants’ activities were influential enough to cause social change and economic liberalisation in Acapulco, Mexico City, and Puebla.

Japanese Silk Imports and Macro-regional Consequences

Contemporary visitors from the West detected a silk addiction in Japan and observers like Richard Cocks, head of the EIC (English East India Company) trading post in Hirado, complained about the Japanese lack of interest in wearing broad cloth. Fernando de Silva (r. 1625-1626), Governor of the Philippines, remarked in 1626 that the Japanese could not live without it. And still, Japanese shipping to Manila decreased in the second half of the 1610s, while Japanese domestic silk production only increased slowly in the 1620s and 1630s. Despite a thousand-year-old history of wearing...
silk kimonos, sericulture and mulberry growing, Japanese domestic raw silk production remained inferior to Chinese products both in quality and quantity. The importation of Chinese raw silk was therefore vital to the Japanese economy, politics, and culture. The flourishing silk weaving in Nishijin (西陣) in Kyoto, for instance, which served the imperial court and the warrior class, was heavily dependent on damask silk and white silk imports from abroad.49

With regard to the profitable exchange of Japanese silver and Chinese raw silk, the Japanese historian Nakajima Gakushō has re-emphasised impressive gains made by Chinese and Japanese pirate-smugglers in the late sixteenth century before Portuguese intermediaries institutionalised silver-for-silk exchange between Macao and Nagasaki in 1580. Nakajima has furthermore pointed out that both the Ming and the Toyotomi regimes failed to reap direct profits from this exchange of the most precious commodities of their countries.50 Nakajima indirectly suggests that the lack of regulating mechanisms in the second half of the sixteenth century, such as laws that defined and institutions that supervised commercial exchange, harmed the pre-modern economies of China and Japan. Once private Chinese and Japanese merchants found a safe haven for direct exchange in Manila, the Toyotomi regime and the Ming continued to be excluded from the profits made there. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, however, had an explicit interest in monopolising silk imports and soon took measures to control foreign trade by issuing licences and after 1589 he became the largest investor in silk-silver exchange.51 Engaging with the Portuguese of Nagasaki and negotiating with the envoy from the Governor of the Philippines, Pedro Bautista, in 1593, Hideyoshi's understanding of overseas trade developed and ultimately explains his obsession with the cargo of the capsized galleon San Felipe at the end of 1596.52

As for the confiscation of the cargo of the Spanish trading vessel 1596/97, the Tsūkō Ichiran reports of namban goods that were stored in Hideyoshi's depots in Osaka while the ship was repaired.53 One of the Japanese interpreters claimed that the Castilian captain wanted to bestow the cargo of his ship to Hideyoshi.54 We know today that the rich cargo, of which the value exceeded 1,000,000 pesos, helped to finance Hideyoshi's last desperate

49 Hayami (2004), 'Introduction', p. 16.
53 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/567.
54 The freight was later distributed among nobility and allegedly even the tennō received some items.
military interventions in Korea. Silk was the main reason for friction between different agencies. Thus what happened after the shipwreck of the San Felipe was essentially a continuation of Hispano-Japanese bargaining for Chinese silk. What has often been overlooked is the geographical surrounding – the Spanish ship capsized in Shikoku (Tosa), a region infamous for wakō operations. Unlike Kyushu, however, Shikoku domains never became integrated in namban trade. Hence we have reason to believe that local interest motivated the local daimyō Chōsokabe (長宗我部) to take advantage of the helpless Spaniards after being stranded in Urado (in present-day Kōchi). The Jesuits’ inglorious involvement in the events moreover hints at economic rivalry. The Portuguese, who objected to Japanese-Spanish trade, were clearly intimidated by the voluminous silk cargo of the Manila Galleon and feared that oversupply would cause prices to fall. We may conclude that the San Felipe incident was neither religiously nor geopolitically motivated. It was the result of ‘connected’ economic Luso-Castilian and Sino-Japanese competition, which testifies to the huge quantities of Chinese silk being sent to the Americas.

In light of escalating Hispano-Japanese relations one tends to agree with Lothar Knauth, who concluded in the 1970s that it was a mix of military and commercial interests among the daimyō that guided the Japanese southwards. As a consequence of Japan’s growing silk trade, the position of Chinese traders in Hirado and Nagasaki became increasingly important at the beginning of the seventeenth century. A pragmatic Tokugawa Ieyasu then insisted on a concentration of Chinese trading ships in Nagasaki in order to secure the Bakufu’s direct share in the silk trade. Chinese junk trade in Kyushu increased further after 1610, due to special contracts and agreements with private traders. Direct Sino-Japanese trade in Manila could no longer sustain the needs of the inhabitants of the island, nor of the rest of the Overseas Empire. In 1609, the Crown intervened. In a disposition to the Governor of the Philippines, King Philip III demanded that commerce and navigation from the Philippines to Japan should ‘be made by the citizens of the former

55 Uyttenbroeck (1959), Early Franciscans, pp. 22-33; Gil (1991), Hidalgos y Samurais, p. 75.
57 The Jesuits paid a lot of attention to the issue of confiscation and who was to take the blame for the fate of the 26 Christian martyrs, as interrogations in the port of Nagasaki following the crucifixions show. See ARSI Jap/Sin 32, ff. 6-40.
58 Knauth, Confrontación Transpacífica, p. 21.
59 Oka (2010), Shōnin, pp. 130-135.
islands, and the Japanese [should] not be allowed to go to the islands’. Freight charges should be kept to a minimum. In light of Manila’s dependence on provision from Japan, the King’s policies did not match the colonial reality.

During the period of political tensions between Edo, Manila, Mexico, and Madrid shuinsen trade was partly redirected from Manila to Hoi An, Tonkin, and Siam. With a huge number of both resident and travelling merchants from coastal China, the Vietnamese port of Hoi An offered similar conditions as Manila. After the Tokugawa’s final break with the Spaniards, Hoi An (ruled by the Nguyen dynasty) became Japan’s primary location for silk acquisition abroad. Between 1615 and 1633, Taiwan became another source to quench the Japanese thirst for Chinese silks. Annual shuinsen voyages – encouraged by Chinese traders, who had reoriented to Taiwan and Xiamen (Amoy) during unstable times in the China Seas when Dutch ships preyed on Fujianese vessels heading for Manila – added a further chapter to Manila’s silk narrative. Yet, while unauthorised Japanese mercantile activities in and around Manila continued for several years, significant price fluctuations changed the profit margin on silk yarn.

Having said that, we should place Manila’s silk trade into an even broader context of global consumption and desire. In early modern Manila, theoretically everyone could afford and everyone was allowed to wear silk. This was not the case in Qing China or pre-modern Europe, where dress codes and a prohibition on wearing silk existed for certain groups, based on sumptuary laws. Silk was attributed to luxury, and often related to China, in most parts of the world and for most of the time in the history of clothing. Even the Ancient Romans talked about the high cost of silk imports and acknowledged the draw of this luxury commodity. According to Pliny the Elder, Romans spent a hundred million sesterces annually on silks from Seres (China). The example of silk consumption suggests that in Manila rules of class, race, and social status followed less rigid patterns than elsewhere.

60 BR 17, p. 50.
61 Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 49.
63 Cocks (1893), Diary, p. 339: ‘Silk at present is not worth so much as it was at the arrival of our fleete, yet we have made away most of ours which rested, the presentes being geven out, and trusted it out till the next monson; as the Hollanders have done the like.’
64 Plinium the Elder, Naturalis Historia, vol. 12, p. 84. I have been inspired by the inaugural lecture of Thomas Ertl at the University of Vienna, ‘Die Seidenmetapher. Fäden eines sozialen Diskurses im europäischen Mittelalter’, 31 October 2012.
Private versus Shuinsen Trade with Luzon

Of all three countries, the case of Japan provides the best illustration of the competition between local and central actors. As we have seen, long before the leading Tokugawa elite organised foreign trade, regional competition dominated trade with Luzon. Initially, the transitional period of the Warring States accelerated early modern economic Japan’s decentralisation. Daimyō not only monopolised resources in close collaboration with peasants and merchants but also participated in foreign trade. Overseas silk, woods, spices, and ceramics offered desired revenue for local investors and enabled potential military ventures. When during the 1580s trade between Manila and Kyushu started to prosper, rivalry between two daimyō, ‘Don Bartolome’ (Ōmura Sumitada) of Nagasaki and ‘Don Agustín’ (Konishi Yukinaga), spread south. Yet neither of them understood how to benefit from namban trade as much as Matsura Shigenobu from Hirado did. Matsura not only pioneered semi-official Japanese trade with Luzon but also managed to attract all four seventeenth-century European trading nations and host factories of the Portuguese, Dutch, and the English during the 1610s and 1620s. In addition to the events of 1584 and 1587 the Spaniards of Manila benefitted from the Portuguese withdrawal from Hirado following hostilities against the Jesuits. Although Matsura was never seriously in favour of any Christian order, he encouraged Iberian mendicant friars to step into his domain. Another diplomatic strategy included anti-Ming propaganda, which he employed to persuade the Spaniards to serve as middlemen in the China trade. Matsura Shigenobu’s strategy was successful, given that private Spanish merchants – ironically often enlisted on Portuguese vessels and Chinese junks – shipped Chinese merchandise from Manila to Hirado during the following years. At the same time ships from Hirado were welcomed in Manila. In the trading season 1591/92 at least four private

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66 AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 32, ‘Copia de Carta de Vera al virrey sobre situación, japoneses’, 26 June 1587.
68 Toyama (1987), Matsurashi, p. 168.
69 See Laures (1941), ‘Ancient Document’.
70 AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 5, n. 32, ‘Copia de Carta de Vera al virrey sobre situación, japoneses’, 26 June 1587. For Kyushu-Hirado relations, see also AGI Filipinas 34, n. 64, ‘Carta de Pablo Rodríguez sobre el rey de Firando’, 7 July 1584.
71 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, pp. 47-49.
trading vessels from Hirado were expected in Manila. The hybrid merchant Silvestre Rodriguez, a baptised Japanese captain and temporary resident of Manila, who participated in the 1592/93 mission to Manila, led one of them.72

Another important ‘glocal player’ was Shimazu Yoshihisa (島津義久), daimyō of Satsuma, the leading power in Kyushu at the end of the Toyotomi reign. The Shimazu clan was also interested in regular trade with Luzon and sent vessels and letters to Manila at a time when the Matsura had already stopped doing so.73 Japanese researchers agree that the Shimazu’s short but intense participation in early modern trade in the South China Sea was a reaction against the unification process originating in Honshu.74 The Shimazu were eager to remain politically and economically independent by maintaining their hold on overseas trade. After an attempt to establish official relations with Fujian by exchanging gifts with the viceroys there,75 an envoy was sent to Luzon in 1601.76 In a letter to the Dominicans of Manila, Shimazu Yoshimune warmly invited Spaniards to his realm. A particularly notable aspect of his letter is his subtle reference to his suzerainty: ‘I have been told by [the Japanese] living there that you are treating those of my kingdom well.’77 The passage indicates that the Shimazu as previous allies of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who did not subdue to Tokugawa Ieyasu until the year 1603, were able to carry out sovereign foreign policies behind the Tokugawa’s back. This further suggests that Luzon and the relations with the Spaniards played an important role for political transitions in Japan. However, once the Shimazu clan realised the limitations of private initiatives, Shimazu Yoshihiro (島津義弘) requested a Luzon-bound shuinjō from the Bakufu for merchants of his domain (藩, jp. han) in 1604; He indeed received it soon afterwards for a vassal called Yamaguchi.78 With regard to his aspirations in China, the Shimazu had to accept temporary defeat. The subservient status vis-à-vis the Tokugawa as tozama limited their scope for action.

72 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 50.
73 Maehira Fusaaki applied a local-central perspective by exploring Shimazu’s trade with Luzon as foreign trade at the periphery. Maehira (2004), ‘Kinsei shoki’.
74 Nagazumi (1990), Kinsei shoki; Katō (1968), ‘Bahansen’, pp. 120-134.
75 Mizuno (2004), ‘China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations’, pp. 111; 116; Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa seiken’, pp. 509-510: In his first letter to China in 1600, Ieyasu demanded the restoration of tally trade. Yet, instead of personally directing his request to the Emperor, he had his letter signed by three daimyō (Terasawa Masanari, Shimazu Yoshihiro, and Shimazu Tadatsune) and addressed to the military commander of Fujian province, Mao Guoqi 毛国器.
77 Author’s translation based on Aduarte (1640), Historia, p. 251: ‘Yo he oído que tratas muy bien a los que van ahí deste mi reino, y se les ha dicho a los que viven en él, para que lo sepan.’
Indeed, the Shimazu’s position was particularly tenuous after 1600. Beaten by Ieyasu’s troops at the Battle of Sekigahara, Shimazu Tadatsune (島津忠恒) withdrew to his domain in Southern Kyushu and was thereafter – similarly to other tozama daimyō such as Tosa – considered a potential opponent to the Tokugawa’s centralisation plans.\(^79\) Once the Shimazu admitted to not being in a position to establish direct trade relations with the Ming, they focused on Ryukyu instead. Thanks to Satsuma’s exceptional role in foreign relations as overlord of Ryukyu after 1609, they exclusively enjoyed indirect access to Chinese products.\(^80\) Yet, not being entirely satisfied, the Shimazu tried to circumvent the authority of the Bakufu in foreign trade in the years following. For instance, they widely ignored the 1616 edict that all Chinese ships were to land at Nagasaki and even employed their own Chinese interpreters thereafter.\(^81\)

Spanish records allow us to contextualise the Kyushu lords’ attempts to maintain autonomy. Intended secret collaborations with the Spanish in the Philippines date back to the 1590s. Back then, the Spanish regarded lords from Kyushu – some of them sympathised with Christianity – as allies against potential military threats from neighbouring countries. Governor Tello informed authorities in Spain in 1598 that he was friendly with ‘several prominent persons’ in Kyushu. He added that ‘the one who [was] most friendly [was] the general of Coria [Korea], named Gentio’. Tello claimed that this ‘Gentio’, a ‘friend of Christians’ was close in order of succession to Hideyoshi. The memo ended saying that communication between Tello and ‘Gentio’ was secret ‘being without the knowledge of the Conbaco [Toyotomi Hideyoshi], who is very hated in the kingdom, because of his great tyranny’.\(^82\) Tello refers here to Katō Kiyomasa, lord of Kumamoto and one of the major generals in the Korea invasion, who had sent Gotō Kanbei to Manila in 1597.

The quote indicates that Spanish officials were not only aware of internal power struggles in Japan but also tried to take advantage of them.\(^83\)

\(^79\) Jansen (2002), Making, p. 53.
\(^80\) For Satsuma-Ryukyu relations, see Watanabe (2012), Kinsei ryūkū; Okamoto (2008), ‘Foreign Policy’, pp. 35-55.
\(^81\) Hellyer (2009), Defining Engagements, pp. 46-47.
\(^82\) BR 10, p. 171. AGI Filipinas 6, r. 9, n. 146, ‘Carta de Tello sobre abandono de Mindano, embajada a Japón’, 23 June 1598. We have reason to believe that Tello refers to a letter he received one year earlier. The sender is referred to as Cata Canzuyeno Camidano (Katō Kiyomasa); See AGI Filipinas 6, r. 9, n. 140, ‘Carta de Tello remitiendo copia de Cata Canzeyuno Camidon’, 13 June 1597.
\(^83\) AGI Filipinas 6, r. 9, n. 175, ‘Copia de carta del obispo de Japón al gobernador sobre Dayfu Sama’, 1601. In April 1601 the Jesuit bishop of Japan sent a letter to Governor Tello reporting about the Battle of Sekigahara and the remaining resistance against Ieyasu (‘Dayfusama’), especially pointing out that opposition from Satsuma posed a major threat to the Christians there.
Having said that, it becomes more and more obvious that Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu's eagerness to gain control over Japan's external relations and maritime trade was domestically motivated. Given that neither Hideyoshi's ban on private trade in the South Chinese Sea 1588 nor the *shuinjō* system managed to centralise foreign relations entirely it is hardly surprising that both unifiers felt uneasy about Kyushu *daimyō* who had made attempts to formalise foreign trade. Ieyasu's petitioning of the Spanish authorities to report unlicensed traders so he could take the necessary measures was part of pursuing sovereignty on the sea. Rivalry furthermore explains the Bakufu's hesitant behaviour regarding the *daimyō*’s participation in foreign trade. As for Luzon, Matsura Shigenobu was the only *daimyō* to obtain a *shuinjō* – the rest were reserved for members of wealthy merchant clans from Kinai (Osaka, Sakai, and Kyoto) and Kyushu. As a result, other *daimyō* sought to hold close ties with merchant families, such as Oda, Chaya, or Gotō (who sailed to Luzon in 1604) to secure access to the Manila market. An overview of captains and *shuinjō* holders involved in Japanese trade with Manila, painstakingly collected and generated by Ubaldo Iaccarino, reveals that over the first year of *shuinsen* trade, all official Japanese *shuinjō* captains were private Japanese seafarers with Spanish or Portuguese aliases, but probably not Christians; this pattern changed and leaned more towards the participation of Christians in years to come. Some of them acquired enough wealth to support local construction work in Japan, others held important administrative posts that secured their influence on foreign affairs by receiving foreign envoys and or assisting with diplomatic correspondence. In her study on the impact of Luzon on the Tokugawa politics of national seclusion, Shimizu Yūko distinguishes between public and private Japanese trade with the Castilians between 1586 and 1625. Furthermore, she points out that these two forms did not influence each other, for they never existed simultaneously. Spanish sources, however, frequently refer to private Japanese traders operating in Manila, even after 1604. It suggests that loopholes continued to exist. *Shuinsen* traders did not refrain from doing business on the side. Miguel Iloya (a Japanese merchant),

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84 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), *Tsūkō ichiran*, 179/570 (1602): ‘What [I] tell your country, in case illicit [ayashii] traders from Japan are spotted along the Philippine coast, take their names, create a list, and forward it to [Ieyasu], who will take necessary measures. The Spanish should not trade with bad people, not even if they are equipped with a [trading] permit!’
85 Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa seiken’, p. 511. Merchants from Hakata were also among them.
for instance, sold mirrors and bells to the value of 1194 pesos. Another Japanese vermilion-seal captain, Luis Melo, invested private money in Manila.

Table 5: Japanese Ships to Luzon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Ships</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of shuinsen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1567</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1604</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1572</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1605</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1575</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1606</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580/81</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1607</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1582</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1609</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1585</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1586</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1611</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1587</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1612</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1589</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1613</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1614</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1615</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1592</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1616</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1617</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1599</td>
<td>≤18</td>
<td>1618</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1619</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1601</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1620</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>≥48</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Private merchants’ fate in local-central competition is vividly reflected in the trade of earthenware from Manila to Japan. In the 1580s, some Japanese who discovered old Chinese earthen vases in Manila recognised these clay jars’ value for the tea ceremony (茶の湯, jp. chanoyu), which enjoyed.

89 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 335-336. Sebastian Ciomon sold 25 tinaja of biscuits for 3 pesos each and earned a total 525 pesos in gold.
major popularity within a sophisticated bushi culture. These jars became known as *luson tsubo* (呂宋壷). Wealthy Japanese, including Toyotomi Hideyoshi, spent substantial sums on utensils for tea consumption. Those clay jars, which were believed to be a rare kind that made storing teas for several years possible, were no exception.92 Thus when the private Manila merchant Naya Sukezaemon (納屋助左衛門), sometimes referred to as Ruzon Sukezaemon, shipped a considerable number of *tsubo* back to Japan in the early 1590s he caught the kanpaku’s fancy. Hideyoshi ordered that all *tsubo* had to be sold to his agents in Nagasaki.93 The future Bakufu became involved in the year 1599, when private merchants operating on behalf of the Shimazu brought back a cargo of 121 *tsubo* from Luzon; the daimyō of Satsuma sent the entire cargo to Ieyasu, who acted as if he had inherited the monopoly on *tsubo* trade from the Toyotomi regime. Thereupon Tokugawa Ieyasu banned Satsuma’s trade with Luzon and in *tsubo*.94

When the Tokugawa demanded the leading merchants of Kyoto, Sakai, and Nagasaki to form a thread guild in 1604 in order to set prices for silk imports in Nagasaki, the local lords’ obligation to yield to the Shogun’s economic policies was implied. This standardisation introduced a new type of influential foreign trade merchants, known as *goyōshōnin* (御用商人).95 Japanese silk dealers (糸年寄り, *ito toshiyori*, high-ranking officials of the Shogun) bought silk exclusively from Portuguese and sometimes Chinese brokers in bulk at a previously fixed price before distributing it to local merchants. The system originally only applied to Portuguese ships from Macao, supervised by the Nagasaki *bugyō* who registered all incoming goods after 1606.96 The *ito wappu* system deprived many foreign traders of their foothold in the Japanese economy and asked those who were able to defend their position to adhere to the rules dictated by the Tokugawa. Price-fixing and supervision harmed the liberal atmosphere of Nagasaki and Manila: private merchants’ opportunities to bargain and to have contact

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92 Tokugawa (1986), ‘Luson no Tsubo’, pp. 64-65: According to art historian Tokugawa Yoshinobu, *luson tsubo* served as generic term in the sixteenth century for all Chinese *tsubo* jars acquired by Japanese in South East Asia. He furthermore criticised how media had created a misleading picture of *tsubo* trade during the time of the kingin no hibi-hype, a NHK TV series of the 1960s featuring the adventures of maritime merchant Ruzon Sukezaemon.

93 Cooper (1989), ‘Early Europeans and Tea’, p. 116; Hideyoshi’s obsession with the *tsubo* is even recorded in his biography, *Taikō ki*, first published in 1626.


95 Yoshinaga (1972), *Shiro shitamachi*.

96 Gomi et al. (1998), *Shōsetsu nihonshi*, p. 244. In 1631 the same system was introduced for Chinese and 10 years later for Dutch traders. As for the position of Nagasaki *bugyō*, Hideyoshi created the position in 1592 and assigned it to the *daimyō* of Hizen, Terazawa Hirotaka.
with local people decreased significantly.97 At the same time the new system enlarged the margin for smuggling between China and Japan. Time proved the success of the institution: in 1631 merchants from Osaka and Edo were allowed to join, while the Bakufu officially integrated Chinese and Dutch merchants in 1633 and 1635, respectively.

During the early years various actors understood how to make use of loopholes in the system. When ships from Manila brought Chinese raw silk in the years 1605, 1606, and 1612, the Shogun's merchants bought large amounts; brokers from Macao consequently complained about higher import duties.98 Certain private merchants received orders from local lords and other officials. Such tactics were by no means limited to Japan. Spanish colonial officers used to commission private Japanese, Chinese, or Portuguese merchants to provide certain products, such as salt petre or gunpowder, from Japan. Colourful examples include the Japanese merchant Silvestre Rodriguez and Li Tan, later ‘captain’ of the Chinese community in Nagasaki. Japanese sources also mention a ‘señor’ from Luzon (呂宋ノしんによる), Bartolomé de Medina, who served as a clerk in namban business transactions in Japan between 1602 and 1606. Cooperating with Japanese officials, they all enjoyed benefits from the silk trade.99 Within this loose Manila-Kyushu axis, compared to Japanese and Spanish traders, unaffiliated Portuguese merchants probably made more money on a more regular basis. Portuguese residents of Manila Luis Manoel, Antonin Garces, and Jerónimo de Rocha were involved in Manila and shuinsen trade, and later moved to Nagasaki.100 Official shuinsen records leave no doubt that Manila was one of the first and until 1616 a very important destination for outgoing vermillion-seal vessels, with a total number of 34 ships, a number only surpassed by 56 passes for Siam. However, after 1616 it degraded to a secondary destination in Japan’s foreign trade, outrivaled by Hoi An, Ayutthaya and Taiwan.101 The Bakufu was directly involved in that trade by giving orders for imports.102

97 Honda Masazumi on 3 May 1604. For a copy of the original, see Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (2006), Nihonshi shiryō, p. 130.
98 Dainihon shiryō, vol. 12, no. 8, p. 652.
100 Iaccarino (2013), ‘Comercio y Diplomacia’, p. 121; Luis Vilango in Cocks’s diary. Other Portuguese active in the Manila trade included Jorge Pinto Barbosa, resident of Manila, who travelled to Japan with Bautista; and Domingo Pérez (Pires), native of Macao, as well as Vasco Diaz.
102 Boxer (1963), Great Ship, p. 88.
Along with a decline in private trading operations in the China Seas, mutually benefitting relations with the Iberians started to soar to some extent. Controversies increased once the Japanese stood up against the latter. A particularly startling incident involved Arima Harunobu’s vermilion-seal ship and Portuguese merchants. After becoming stranded in Macao on its way back from Cambodia in 1608, its crew got caught in a quarrel with the Portuguese and one Japanese crew member was killed.\(^{103}\) Since the captain of the vessel carried a shuinjō the insult meant infringing the sovereignty of the Shogun, the Bakufu willingly approved retaliation: When the annual carrack from Macao arrived in 1610 in Nagasaki, Arima forces destroyed the Portuguese vessel *Madre de Deus*.\(^ {104}\) Following the harsh Japanese reaction the surprised Portuguese from Macao ratified a statement by the Nagasaki bugyō forcing them to renew annual commerce on terms dictated by the Japanese.\(^ {105}\) The incident illustrates the Bakufu’s growing awareness of superiority and was a clear turning point for relations with all Europeans. With regard to the Spaniards in Luzon, the Japanese side became increasingly suspicious not least because of their solidarity with the Portuguese. Twenty years later the Spaniards confirmed Japanese suspicions when assisting the Portuguese in a strike against Japanese vermilion-seal traders in Siam.

The shift of control over maritime trade from the periphery to central Japan was all but smooth. In his first letter to Manila, Ieyasu already specifically invited the Spaniards to send ships to Uraga in Kanto, as part of his strategy to turn the region surrounding present-day Tokyo into a centre of maritime trade. Yet his plan did not materialise. Against Ieyasu’s express wish, Spanish ships continued to land in Kyushu instead of Uraga: not for political reasons but rather because of force majeur, in terms of insuperable currents. Willing to comply with the Japanese ruler’s demand Governor Pedro de Acuña, for instance, dispatched a small galleon, the *Santiago el Menor*, to Kanto in 1602. After an unsuccessful struggle against unfavourable winds, the vessel eventually landed in Hirado.\(^ {106}\) After Acuña’s second attempt of 1603 failed as well, Ieyasu impatiently insisted on an explanation. When in 1604 still no Spanish ship had landed in Kanto he urged the Franciscan friar Diego Bermeo to investigate the Governor’s

\(^{103}\) See Boxer (1963), *Great Ship*, pp. 77-78.

\(^{104}\) See also Clulow (2010), ‘Maritime Violence’, p. 84. In 1610, Arima’s troops attacked the Portuguese vessel (*Nuestra Senhora da Graça*) of Andrea Pessoa and destroyed it on behalf of Tokugawa officials.


position. Yet it could not be helped, not even when a letter of Shogun Hidetada made very clear that ships from Luzon were only to enter other Japanese ports when bad weather impeded a passage to Kanto. By the time a ship from Luzon eventually landed in Uraga in 1608 the Bakufu had already successfully channelled overseas trade profits via their privileged merchants to Edo. The Tokugawa elite had abandoned the idea of turning Uraga into an international port despite Northern European merchants’ efforts in receiving permission for a stronghold in the vicinity of Edo. Unlike a few years earlier in the case of the Spaniards, the Bakufu encouraged neither the Dutch East India Company (VOC) nor the English East India Company (EIC) merchants to opt for Uraga. On the contrary, the English had to open their factory in Hirado against William Adams’s insistence on Uraga. When between 1610 and 1615 delegations to and from New Spain and Europe respectively left from and landed in Uraga, the port experienced a short period of international shipping. Yet at that time, the more glorious days of Hispano-Japanese cooperation were already over.

**Competition between Beijing and Fujian**

Dialectics between central and local actors were not confined to the fledgling Tokugawa Japan but also a feature of dualism between the official of the unofficial in Ming China. Merchants, who left their native soil, became frontier traders, often linked by a common language, culture, and religion. We have reason to believe that the frontier traders, usually embedded in a clan system, whose networks were introduced elsewhere in this book, obeyed internal rules. In the context of the Manila system Chinese dualism hindered both institutional transformation and reinvesting in the home economy. The differences between Beijing’s official policies and actual circumstances in coastal regions were, due to disintegration, bigger than in

108 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/574.
110 Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa seiken’, p. 506. The Bakufu’s decision to give up Kanto as the centre of maritime trade is striking. It seems a contradiction to assign the small Kanto-based peninsula of Miura to William Adams, designating the latter pilot of Miura as a countermeasure to Portuguese black ships’ frequenting Kyushu. See also Tokoro (1989), Komonjo, vol. 6, pp. 168-169.
111 Gomi et al. (1998), Shōsetsu nihonshi.
112 Kishimoto (2012), Chiiki shakairon, pp. 19-25. Kishimoto Mio has pointed at similarities with the system of Magreb traders described by Avner Greif.
Japan or even Overseas Spain. In 1979, John E. Wills explored this issue in an influential paper, arguing that China’s maritime zone remained peripheral because of the limited opportunities for positive interaction between profit and power at the state level. He claimed that ‘Luzón and Taiwan [were] only marginally attractive as entrepôts and sources of a few mineral and other natural products, very promising for rice- and sugar-farming colonisation, but requiring a very substantial concentration of economic and military power to transport colonists and protect them from the natives.’

Late Ming China’s maritime policies might best be summarised as a mix of ‘official and elite efforts’, as Roy Bin Wong has described them. Now, who exactly were the ‘Chinese’ counterparts and trading partners of Japanese private merchants in Luzon? Lin Renchuan’s study on maritime actors stressed the diversity of seagoing enterprises. At the top of his categorisation we find the feudal type, a cooperation between local nobility with the sons of poorer families, who were adopted for overseas trade. One merchant group equalled a lineage organisation, whose members bore the same surname. Merchant capital derived originally from prominent land-owning families who tried to monopolise great profits by sending out relatives or servants. Becoming ever richer, the sons of gentry, military families, and merchants were able to pass the empire-wide civil examinations based on the teachings and interpretations of Confucius. Merchants also gradually engaged with the literati elite. The same practice eventually led both to ‘adopting foster children’ and certain forms of slavery. It moreover helped to circumvent trade restrictions and allowed maritime China a fluid transition from maritime prohibitions (海禁, ch. haijin) to ‘liberal’ private foreign commerce. The second category involved trade with borrowed capital and rented ships. This practice integrated the entire region into maritime trade by interdependency based on the duty to pay back the loan and to declare

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115 Wong (1997), ‘Confucian Agendas’, p. 303, where he remarked that ‘no other state in world history has ever enjoyed the challenge of creating instruments of local rule over two millennia’.
116 Lin (1990), ‘Fukien’s Private Sea Trade’, p. 186: ‘The rich and powerful families of the coastal region of Fukien had large seagoing vessels built illegally and provided venture capital, but sent their adopted sons out to sea to carry out the dangerous actual trading. Therefore we call this the feudal type of management.’
118 Ng (1983), Trade and Society, pp. 26–29.
119 Lin (1990), ‘Fukien’s Private Sea Trade’, p. 189. The article summarises Lin’s 1980s research on the commercial characteristics of Overseas Chinese communities. He connected the ‘sprouts of capitalism’ thesis to the local gentry’s struggle against maritime prohibition. See also Lin (1987), Ming mo.
goods from overseas trade.\textsuperscript{120} Finally, a third, independent type developed: traders who were able to engage in trade with their own capital.\textsuperscript{121}

Late Ming sources show that on a local level, even government officials were very much in favour of permitting controlled foreign maritime exchange. For the sake of preventing piracy both outgoing and incoming trade should be encouraged.\textsuperscript{122} Fujianese officials and merchants took progressive initiatives and collaborated closely with European merchants, including Portuguese, Castilian, and Dutch traders.\textsuperscript{123} Next to European-dominated port cities, illicit trade with Western merchants centred around Penghu, also known as the Pescadores – a group of 36 islets off the Western coast of Taiwan where the Ming established a patrol post in 1597 after acknowledging it as constant target of wakō. Lured by huge benefits from overseas trade they not only engaged in smuggling but also benefitted from licensed trade agreements.\textsuperscript{124} Attitudes towards European trading partners evidently differed at the court in Beijing. The imperial court constantly feared foreign trade would corrupt the morals of ordinary merchants and government officials alike. Hesitation about what arrangements should be made in Fujian for the Luzon fan and Japanese yi indicate that reforms in official dealings with foreigners were frequently postponed.\textsuperscript{125}

It has been pointed out elsewhere that the terms ‘Chinese’ maritime trader or ‘Chinese’ private merchant merely serve as auxiliary terms, whilst categories corresponding to ‘Chinese’ only existed outside China at that time. Yet, neither contemporary non-Chinese writers nor Western scholarship have paid much attention to the diverse origins of traders from China. Taking regional heterogeneity into consideration makes it easier to comprehend why Cantonese and Fujianese merchant groups competed

\textsuperscript{120}Lin (1990), ‘Fukien’s Private Sea Trade’, p. 191.
\textsuperscript{121}Lin (1990), ‘Fukien’s Private Sea Trade’, p. 192.
\textsuperscript{122}Fujian authorities described in chapter 2 of Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy. The Dutch would be added to the list of potential threats after 1622.
\textsuperscript{123}Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3169 (accessed 11 March 2014); Ng (1997), ‘Maritime Frontiers’, p. 235: In 1608, Ming local government officials still complained about the dreadful dealings of the taxation supervisor Gao Cai, accusing him of filling his own pocket’s with tax money amounting to 30,000 silver coins collected from illegal trade with the Dutch as well as people from Luzon.
\textsuperscript{124}Ng (1997), ‘Maritime Frontiers’, p. 245: ‘In Luzon, skilled labor was in great demand, and the place attracted many Chinese migrants who could easily earn a living there with what they had learned at home.’ According to a Ming primary source, ‘evil people’ (chien-min) monopolised profits on foreign trade because of too severe trade restrictions; Cf. Brook (2008), Vermeer’s Hat, p. 170.
fiercely over foreign trade. Accordingly, Fujianese traders (in particular, Haicheng merchants) tried to win the Spaniards’ favour for the sake of getting exclusive access to trade in Manila. Thus they actively opposed Portuguese competition in Manila. Even Spanish officials recognised their envy, as two Portuguese vessels from Macao had arrived in Manila in 1587. Some of these Fujianese private traders went one step further in their ‘monopolising’ efforts by inviting the Spaniards to establish a similar settlement on Fujianese soil along the lines of the Portuguese enclave in Macao. Obviously a leading authority of Zhangzhou shared this view and was willing to issue licences for the sake of mutually safe and beneficial trade. This project never materialised due to the brisk change in the late 1580s and early 1590s. In Yuegang a ship tax known as ‘water prohibitions’, an import tax (‘land prohibitions’), and ‘added provisions’, a tax levied on ships returning from the Philippines, were collected from incoming and outgoing ships. From 1594 onwards, the annual tax earnings in Yuegang ranged about 30,000 taels. Nevertheless, official Chinese attitudes towards maritime trade remained unstable, regardless of a rather steady number of Fujianese junks calling at Manila over the decades. In 1610, the imperial government again tried to restrict ocean-going trade and the building of tall-masted ships once it came to realise that trading with Japan had become more profitable than business in Luzon. Yet this did not mean that officially China approved of trade with Japan; hence a comprehensive set of imperial prohibitions stood in sharp contrast to regular private Fujianese journeys to Nagasaki. Chinese traders’ rights as foreign traders manifested in several decrees issued against the background of Japan’s demand for raw silk. In 1616, Ieyasu stipulated that Chinese merchants were to take up residence in Nagasaki instead of Hirado. Yet, regardless of the port of entrance (be it Nagasaki, Hakata, or Satsuma), merchants on Chinese ships had to report

126 Local competition between Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, as well as an active controversy over Xiamen, were further features of Fujianese trade with Manila, as Lucille Chia pointed out at a conference in 2011. Chia (2011), ‘Beyond the Coast’.

127 AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 1587. ‘Junto a nosotros no hacemos también lo mismo en la provincia de Chincheo de adonde ellos traen tanta hacienda a esta tierra que si allá estuviese españoles enviarán a esta tierra sus haciendas con las cuales y con las que ellos traen no sería necesario que Portugueses viniesen aquí.’


130 Li (2010), Qing dai, pp. 26-27. According to Li’s list of Chinese junks in Nagasaki, between 20 and 70 anchored each year. In some years a certain percentage was explicitly registered as ‘Fujianese’ vessels.
their cargo to the Bakufu, which is another indication of an increase in state-controlled trade.\textsuperscript{131} Although Manila lost significance as a triangular port, silver from Mexico continued to flow in: and so did Fujianese traders, even if in slightly smaller numbers and with certain interruptions. Hence, the effects of Fujianese relocation must not be overestimated. After the peak years of Fujianese shipping in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, anchorage gradually declined to an average of one-third.\textsuperscript{132}

Maritime Insecurity and Shifts in the Manila System

Over the course of the 1610s, Dutch presence in the China Seas and Spanish resentment turned Manila into a focal point of maritime conflicts. Notwithstanding Dutch merchants’ inclination to use violence and menace to accomplish better trading conditions all over Asia, VOC officials accused the Spanish and Portuguese of generally applying unfair means in East Asia in their negotiations with the Shogun.\textsuperscript{133} Indeed, the arrival of the Dutch brought a gradual change to the trading environment of South East Asian waters. The Spaniards, in turn, unrelentingly defamed the Dutch as pirates (\textit{corsario}) whenever an opportunity presented itself.\textsuperscript{134} Maritime and geopolitical challenges impinged upon the initially open nature of Manila as a trading port. After the first incident, the sea battle against Olivier van Noort (sp. Oliver de Noord), initially opportunistic Spaniards restricted access to Manila in a similar fashion to Seville or Veracruz.\textsuperscript{135} After 1609, a general feeling of insecurity spread over the archipelago and the Chinese coast. Maritime insecurity lasted for several years.\textsuperscript{136} In 1615/16 a Luso-Spanish naval intervention set out for a strike against the northern European troublemakers who planned to construct forts around the Straits of Melaka. In 1616 Juan de Silva commanded a fleet to Melaka, while the Dutchman Joris van Spielberg arrived off the shore of Manila. Since the Spanish commander Juan de Silva died at Melaka the Spanish Armada

\textsuperscript{132} Chaunu (1960), \textit{Philippines}, pp. 202-205.
\textsuperscript{133} Adams (1850), \textit{Memorials}, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{134} Spanish propaganda in Asia frequently included the ‘\textit{corsario}’ discourse during the seventeenth century. In addition, inter-imperial correspondence referred to the Dutch as ‘\textit{enemigo holandés’}.
\textsuperscript{135} AGI Filipinas 19, r. 3, n. 54, ‘Relación de Morga de la jornada del corsario Noord’, 20 November 1602.
\textsuperscript{136} AGI Filipinas 27, n. 124, ‘Petición sobre comercio de Filipinas con China’, 21 July 1621. The author of the petition claimed that trade with the Chinese had already stopped for three years by then.
was forced to retreat. In 1620 the Dutch attacked Manila three times and blockaded Cavite between January 1621 and May 1622.\(^{137}\)

Joint Manila campaigns were feared the most. News of Dutch negotiations for collaboration with Japanese or Fujianese mercenaries further poisoned the climate. After an unfortunate sea battle off Manila in 1618, the Dutch turned to the English for support.\(^{138}\) In a general council, EIC and VOC members – based in Hirado – agreed in 1620 to send ten ships.\(^{139}\) The entire project was part of a larger strategic approach that included the entire China Sea region. Richard Cocks (1566-1624), head of the English factory in Hirado, was supposed to sail to the Chinese coast in advance and look out for Chinese junks and take care of them.\(^{140}\) They failed and tried again in October 1621, when eight ships were sent to the ‘Manillas’, where they attacked passing vessels. Most of the time the Spanish eventually overcame the aggressors; sometimes they were supported by Fujianese maritime merchants.\(^{141}\) Nevertheless, the Manila system hit rock bottom during an Anglo-Dutch blockade of Manila in 1622. Fortunately for the Spaniards, an even larger advance failed in 1623 after Maurice of Nassau had dispatched 13 ships to reach Manila Bay via South America. He ordered an auxiliary fleet from Taiwan and aimed at intercepting the galleon trade.\(^{142}\) Dutch and English practices of naval coercion damaged Iberian and East Asian trading nations alike, yet they did not destroy them: The VOC never succeeded in creating a monopoly in trading with the Fujianese, nor in keeping the Iberians out. Moreover, cooperation between Northern European trading nations was short-lived. Not only were the English reluctant to support the Dutch after peace arrangements with Spain, but there was also the fierce rivalry between Dutchmen and Englishmen in Asian waters, which escalated in the Massacre of Ambon (1623), when several EIC merchants were executed by VOC agents.\(^{143}\)


\(^{138}\) Cocks (1883), *Diary*, p. 171.

\(^{139}\) Ch’en (1968), *Chinese Community*, p. 126: ‘Governor Dasmariñas made every endeavour to build large galleys. This kind of ship was badly needed for the defence of the Philippines to replace lost ships, to cruise around the archipelago, to keep away the plundering English privateers and Japanese pirates, and thus to maintain the security of the sea routes between the Philippines and Mexico.’

\(^{140}\) Cocks (1883), *Diary*, p. 209.

\(^{141}\) Cocks (1883), *Diary*, p. 302.


\(^{143}\) Borschberg (2010), *Singapore*, p. 61.
In this rough maritime climate some Fujianese private maritime merchants accumulated large sums of silver for further investments.\textsuperscript{144} Illegal Chinese merchant magnates such as Li Tan (李旦) or Zheng Zhilong (鄭芝龍) collected protection money from other Chinese merchants operating in the South China Sea after 1625. They were among those to benefit from the system the most, due to their flexibility.\textsuperscript{145} Changes in maritime commerce therefore were mainly linked to the rise and fall of illicit merchant networks.\textsuperscript{146} Sufficient negotiating skills in Japanese and Portuguese enabled Li Tan to advance as sneaky maritime merchant. To the Europeans he became known as ‘Captain China’. The title reflects their respect for Li’s outstanding organisation skills and power to control.\textsuperscript{147} He accumulated essential knowledge in Macao and Manila, and after falling out with the Spaniards he cooperated with the Japanese and the Dutch. Zheng Zhilong (or Iquan in Dutch sources), another famous ‘Chinese pirate’, based in Taiwan during the late 1620s, was part of Li Tan’s network.\textsuperscript{148} Eventually, Li Tan, whose brother was headman of the Chinese at Nagasaki, became the chief of a pirate community in Taiwan, where he died in 1625.\textsuperscript{149} Having inherited the leading position from Li Tan, Zheng Zhilong controlled the already impressive number of 120 ships in 1626. In 1628 the Governor of Fujian estimated that the same network had incorporated up to 1000 ships.\textsuperscript{150}

In terms of official Chinese trade policies, the Ming Court renewed trade prohibitions in the second half of the 1620s as a reaction to the aggressive forms of trade utilised by the Dutch and an increase in smuggling.\textsuperscript{151} With regard to Japan it is noticeable that trade with the Japanese on a local level was not affected. As indicated earlier, private merchants and captains kept their business deals with Nagasaki, including Chinese residents there. It is moreover noteworthy that local authorities did not consider the Japanese in Manila as enemies. Although the ban on maritime trade was reimposed at the end of the Ming period, Manila re-emerged a popular destination for Fujianese traders after an official relaxation of this policy in 1631.\textsuperscript{152}

\textsuperscript{144} According to Deng (1997), \textit{Chinese Maritime Activity}, p. 101, ‘ultrafamily business organisations’ were Chinese maritime merchants’ the key to success.
\textsuperscript{145} Borao et al. (2001), \textit{Spaniards in Taiwan}, vol. 1, p. x.
\textsuperscript{146} The maritime empire of the Zheng has recently gained attention. See among others Hang (2010), \textit{Between Trade and Legitimacy}.
\textsuperscript{148} Boxer (1941), ‘Rise and Fall’, pp. 401-439.
\textsuperscript{151} Von Glahn (1996), \textit{Fountain}, p. 123.
that period authorities in Manila even received a Chinese delegation, asking for the continuation of trade after the interruption caused by Dutch attacks on Chinese merchant vessels on their return trip from the Philippines.\footnote{San Agustín (1698), Conquistas, p. 265: ‘También llegó otra embajada del Mandarín o Gobernador de la Provincia de Tochen en China pidiendo la continuación del comercio, porque se había interrumpido mucho por temor de las correrías que hacían los holandeses, apresando los Champanes de China que volvían del comercio de Manila, que es para los Chinos el mas acomodado y rico, y para los españoles el más necesario por la variedad de mercadurías que conducen el señuelo de la plata que viene de la Nueva España que es el metal que más estiman por no correr en China otra moneda, usando del precio intrínseco de este metal, sin cuño ni forma de moneda. Fue esta embajada bien despachada como sobre materia en que tanto se interesaba.’}

A random sample of the number of registered ships from coastal China shows that in 1607 and 1642, 37 and 34 ships were listed respectively. Yet fluctuations were common: 13 ships in 1620 and 8 in 1644.\footnote{Chaunu (1960), Filipinas, pp. 222-225. Between 1663 and 1673, 104 registered Chinese vessels came to Manila; idem pp. 165, 168.} By way of comparison, the number of only 3 Chinese junks in 1572 had increased to 20 ships in 1581.\footnote{Cf. Ch’en, Chinese Community, 64-70.} While Pierre Chaunu’s figures indicate that trade precipitously dropped after 1640s, William Atwell denies this.\footnote{Atwell (2005), ‘Another Look’, pp. 467-491.} Given that in 1644 the colonial government earned 113,668 pesos (18 per cent of the total income) from Chinese licences, a sharp drop in the number of incoming ships is indeed hard to imagine.\footnote{Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 234.} Yet 1639 was a good year for the mid-seventeenth century: 34 arrivals from the Chinese mainland were recorded in Manila’s port registers.\footnote{Chaunu (1960), Filipinas, p. 148.} Officially sanctioned junk trade may have been about half of the total. With the beginning of the Qing dynasty in 1644 collapse was inevitable. An average of only seven vessels reached Manila in the period 1644-1681 from Chinese ports, figures that equalled those of the 1570s.\footnote{Reid (1993), Southeast Asia, vol. 1, p. 288.} In particular after 1650 the decline of trade volume was reflected in the decline in tax income for the colonial government.\footnote{Chaunu (1960), Filipinas, pp. 114-115, 123-125; Pierre Chaunu’s figures indicate a significant decline in tax income from trade with the Chinese after the 1650s.
6 Local-Central Tensions
Geopolitical Strategies, Intelligence, and Information Gathering

Geopolitical Shifts

Over the course of the seventeenth century, politics and geopolitical motivations overshadowed functioning mercantile patterns in Manila. Yet, such unrest was certainly not an exclusive European import to Asia; nor was it the result of local Asian reaction to foreign intrusion. On a political level, the most outstanding accomplishment of the Manila system was Chinese and Japanese emancipation from aggressive European advances in the China Seas to that effect that the Japanese eventually dictated terms to the Europeans. Yet only those who could live with the new rules survived relatively unharmed. The Spaniards were not among them. Thus, the first part of this chapter tackles the impact of these shifts on Manila. The second part, in turn, pinpoints information flows within the broader Manila system and seeks to provide answers to the question as to what extent pre-modern states managed to benefit from the availability of knowledge.

China: Taiwan and the Zheng

Whereas changes in the China Seas and especially along the Fujianese coast and in Japan have been discussed in detail, Taiwan as a ‘backup Luzon’ will receive more attention below. Needless to say, explaining Spanish interest in Taiwan with typical conquest ideology would create a rather misleading picture. From the very beginning, Spanish advances were but economic-strategic reactions: First, to the pressure felt by Japanese advances under Hideyoshi and later, by the Dutch intrusion. As early as 1596, Spanish authorities suggested taking over Taiwan as a countermeasure against a suspected Japanese takeover.1 By that time, Taiwan (la Isla Hermosa, sp., or la Isla Formosa, pt., as the Iberians called it) was still outside the Chinese sphere of political influence.2 Manileños accused the Japanese

2 Ng (1997), ‘Maritime Frontiers’, p. 238, states that Taiwan was ‘beyond the reach’ for the Ming.
envoy Harada Kiyemon (原田喜右衛門) of planning to conquer Taiwan and feared that such a scenario would bring an end to Chinese trade in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{3} Spanish mistrust was strong after word of Harada’s participation in plundering Cagayan several years earlier, spread in Manila.\textsuperscript{4} Governor Tello (spurred on by Luis Pérez Dasmariñas’s Sino-phobic expansion mentality) feared an enforcement of the Cagayan-Taiwan axis and demanded support for a Spanish invasion of Taiwan in 1597.\textsuperscript{5} With Hideyoshi’s death the following year, the project became superfluous and Taiwan remained off the Spanish radar for more than 20 years.

The second period of Spanish Taiwan policies was even further economically motivated. In the year 1619, policymakers in Manila expressed their wish to circumvent Chinese taxes and to make trade with Fujian more profitable by establishing a trading outpost in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{6} Spanish commercial interest and a desire to expel the Dutch from Asia were the two strongest motivations behind investing in the Taiwan project. Evangelisation of the natives came third despite various determined endeavours. Members of the Dominican Order, who hoped to use Taiwan as gateway to China first and foremost pushed the ambivalent matter.\textsuperscript{7} Once the Dutch had built a small fortress on Taiwan and Japanese traders frequented Taiwanese ports, Spanish concerns about their position in the China Seas increased even further. Licenciado and Procurador General Hernando de los Ríos Coronel and the Archbishop of Manila, Don Miguel García Serrano, voiced the necessity of taking military steps.\textsuperscript{8} Not long after, in 1622, the Dutch built a fortress on the Pescadores (Penghu) with the aim of receiving official permission to trade with the Fujianese. The Fujianese Grand Coordinator negotiated a Dutch withdrawal from Penghu to Taiwan in 1624 in exchange for better trade opportunities within trade between China-Japan.\textsuperscript{9} This happening straight after the peak of Hispano-Dutch naval clashes in the China Seas the Spaniards could not afford to lose time. The King first nominated Juan de Zamudio, who had been sent to Canton by Tello in 1598, for the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{3} Reprinted in Borao et al. (2001), \textit{Spaniards in Taiwan}, vol. 1, pp. 21-22.
\item \textsuperscript{4} Iaccarino (2013), ‘Comercio y Diplomacia’, p. 38.
\item \textsuperscript{5} Kuno (1940), \textit{Japanese Expansion}; Pinto (2008), ‘Enemy at the Gates’, p. 27.
\item \textsuperscript{6} Borao et al. (2001), \textit{Spaniards in Taiwan}, vol. 1, pp. 41-48.
\item \textsuperscript{7} Their attempts were harshly criticised by the Augustinians Medina (1630), \textit{Historia}; cf. Borao et al. (2001), \textit{Spaniards in Taiwan}, vol. 1, pp. 79, 84, 95, 114-115, 153.
\item \textsuperscript{8} His attitude towards the Dutch and how they should be driven away from Asia are well documented in his Memorials of 1621. See Crossley (2011), ‘1621 Memorial’, http://www.csse.monash.edu.au/~jnc/Rios/1621Memorial.pdf (accessed 12 June 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{9} Blussé (1981), ‘Sorcerer’s’, p. 93.
\end{itemize}
expedition to Hermosa. The arrival of Spanish armed forces in Jilong (基隆, also Keelung) in 1626 initiated the Spanish colonisation of Taiwan. Soldiers, missionaries, and a few civilians were sent to Taiwan and founded Santo Domingo and Jilong as Spanish settlements, administered and financed by Manila. Conversion of the indigenous and Chinese populations was left to a small number of Dominican and Franciscan missionaries. Both Christian and non-Christian *sangleyes* from Manila were involved in constructing the rectangular, stone-built Fort San Salvador. Their services fell into the category of paid labour, as was the case with Fujianese mariners and pilots who were employed for their local knowledge.

Although the Spaniards had high hopes to channel Chinese and Japanese traders to their bases in Taiwan, such trade prospects proved to be disappointing. Moreover, the location of the Spanish fortress in Jilong was all but ideal to attract traders from Fujian. Initial hopes to lure silk-hungry Japanese merchants into the port eventually turned into fears of attack. The first cargo of silk and provisions brought back to Manila in 1628 was of inferior quality. What was more: Spanish merchants were forced to pay *almojarifazgo* for their shipments to Manila, while the Council of the Royal Treasury (Junta de Real Hacienda) even discussed additional transport duties. Regardless of its eventual failure and decreasing returns, the period until 1642 integrated Spanish Manila closer into networks of the China Seas: As a consequence information flows and widespread connections to Goa, Melaka, and Cambodia increased significantly. Eventually, however,

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10 Borao et al. (2001), *Spaniards in Taiwan*, vol. 1, pp. xxvii-xxxii.
12 For the period of this study and in particular the years of trade with the Zheng, *sangley infieles, sangleyes cristianos*, and *mestizos de sangleyes* were recorded in large numbers. See AGI Contaduría 1230-1237, cf. Gil (2011), *Chinos*, pp. 715-723.
14 VOC 1092, 1628 II, ff. 404-406, ‘A description of the fortress and the strength of the Spaniards in Formosa by David Pessart and Vincent Romejin. Based on the information they obtained from some Spaniards in Cambodia’, 10 September 1627. Cf. Borao et al. (2001), *Spaniards in Taiwan*, vol. 1, pp. 91-92. For preparations for trade with China, see ibid., p. 70.
16 Cf. Borao et al., *Spaniards in Taiwan*, vol. 1, pp. 126-129. It happened, for instance, in 1628 to the vessel *Nuestra Señora del Rosario* in 1638.
fierce Dutch harassment and the Zheng’s well-organised maritime violence forced the Spaniards to surrender.17

The first Chinese proposal for the systematic colonisation of Taiwan came from privateers, namely from the above-mentioned Zheng Zhilong in 1628.18 Based in Fujian province, the Zheng clan controlled large parts of East Asian maritime trade from around 1627 to 1683. In addition to collaborations with the Dutch in the 1620s, Zheng Zhilong aimed at increasing his power by cooperating with Manila Chinese under his pseudonym Nicholás Gaspar, the Christian name he received at his baptism in Macao.19 As supreme commander of Fujianese military forces he worked as a translator for the VOC in Taiwan and after having been involved in long-distance trade in Manila and Nagasaki, he eventually became the new pirate chief in 1624.20

Over the course of the Ming-Qing transition of 1644, after the capture of Beijing by the Manchu, the Southern Ming (1644-1662) closely collaborated with the Zheng. In the first half of the 1640s, Zheng Zhilong even planned a formal alliance with Japan and sent his naval generals equipped with a letter to the Shogun. The letter was rejected by the Council of Elders (老中, jp. rōjū).21 A further attempt with a personal letter to the tennō and the Shogun was also rejected. Attempts by the Zheng to project sovereign power to Luzon by extending their control over the South China Sea brought a real change to Sino-Spanish relations and the rise to the power of Zheng Zhilong’s son, Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功, a.k.a. Koxinga or sp. Cogsen/-ia). The Zheng claimed the right to govern and administer justice over the Fujianese trading population in Manila. Consequent events led to various direct negotiations between the two parties. In 1656 two Spanish captains, Andrés de Ceuto and Pedro de Vera Villavicencio, reportedly even signed a peace treaty with a Zheng representative for which the mestizo sangley Miguel de Legazpi served as the interpreter.22 In 1662, shortly after Koxinga had ultimately defeated the Dutch, he dispatched Vittorio Riccio,
O.P. (1621-1685) with a letter to Manila. Varying relations with Zheng rulers had determined Riccio’s seven years in Xiamen, before being selected as Chenggong’s ambassador to Manila. The bold message reminds us of Hideyoshi’s diplomatic strategies. By asking for tribute and submission to their sovereignty, both Hideyoshi from Japan, Zheng Chenggong and later his son Zheng Jing (鄭經) from Fujian/Taiwan applied a model of Sino-centred foreign relations to strengthen their position against internal and external forces. What is more, both Juan Cobo and Vittorio Riccio employed Dominican friars as linguists and cultural mediators.

During the Zheng’s embargo on Fujianese trade with the Philippines, frightened Spaniards quickly assembled military support from Mindanao and the Spice Islands and even improved the city walls of Manila, by means of forced Chinese labour. Together with the general strain, these rushed actions fuelled mutual ill-feelings between Spanish and Chinese settlers in 1662, ultimately causing the third big ‘massacre of Chinese’ in Manila. Although, this time the colonial government gave the Chinese some time to leave the island before they took up arms. As a result, the Zheng showed a directness and determination in foreign relations that was unknown to both the Ming and the Qing. Unlike the Ming authorities after the 1603 mutiny (tackled in detail in the final chapter), the Zheng vowed to avenge the expulsion of their vassals. Nonetheless, similar to previous clashes, peaceful relations were re-established the following year. After Chenggong’s death Vittorio Riccio was sent to Manila a second time, yet upon his

23 Riccio assured the Spaniards that Zheng Chenggong was indeed interested in friendly relations and claimed that all military forces were prepared against the Tartars and not against Manila: AGI Filipinas 331, l. 7, ff. 178v-179v. Riccio’s biographical data has comprehensively been presented by Eugenio Menegon http://ricci.rt.usfca.edu/biography/view.aspx?biographyID=1377 (accessed 7 February 2014). See also González (1955), Misionero Diplomático. The Florentine Dominican Vittorio Riccio was designated for the Dominican Province Holy Rosary in the Philippines. He reached Manila in the year 1648 and was assigned work in the Chinese hospital of the parish of St Gabriel in Binondo between 1652 and 1654, where he learnt the dialect of Xiamen. The following year, Riccio arrived as part of a Dominican mission with four brothers in Fujian and settled in Xiamen, where he took care of Fujianese returnees from the Philippines.


25 AGI Filipinas 201, 1, ‘ Expediente sobre el restablecimiento del presidio de Zamboanga’, 1665/1686 (fols. 109r-111v), 30 July 1663.

26 Referring to the 1762 edition of the Hai-ch’eng hsien chih, Van der Loon stated that 80 per cent of those killed were from Haicheng. See Van der Loon (1966), ‘Manila Incunabula’, p. 1; However, Zhang Xie’s Dongxi yangkao (1618, 5.5b) does not imply that a large proportion of the 25,000 victims came from that region.

return to China, Zheng leadership had changed again and constant pressure from the Qing troops caused turbulent years for Riccio. When he ultimately landed on a Dutch ship in Manila, colonial authorities accused him of treason and banished him to life in isolation in a convent outside Manila.

After a short break in the China-Manila trade, following Zheng Jing’s occupation of Xiamen, the flow of goods and people between Manila and Fujian increased again.28 After hearing rumours about an invasion, Governor Manuel de Leon (1669–1677) sent General Francisco Enríquez de Losada together with two interpreters (Francisco de Mendoza and Santiago de Vera) to Taiwan to settle things peacefully.29 Maritime commerce recovered only for a short period before being restricted by the Manchu regime.

Japanese Advances in New Spain

Just as economic and geopolitical considerations motivated the Spaniards and the Zheng clan to improve their positions in the China Seas, certain Japanese parties tried to expand further into the Pacific. One local actor with a peculiar interest in the Pacific was Date Masamune (伊達政宗), daimyō of Sendai. Being one of the few non-Kyushu-based foreign players, he only became active in a period that marked the beginning of irreparable tensions between Overseas Spain and Tokugawa Japan. Date Masamune clearly aspired to increase the political power of his realm with the help of Mexican merchants and Franciscan friars. With Ieyasu’s permission, he sent an embassy to Mexico, Spain, and Rome.30 The project marked both the beginning and the end of entirely new Hispano-Japanese relations. For the first time negotiations were spearheaded by the Mexican government and Spain (represented by the Duke of Lerma and the Council of the Indies) and not the Governor of the Philippines. A Franciscan missionary by the name of Luis Sotelo (1575–1624) played a leading role in this plot. Driven by a strong desire to establish a Franciscan diocese as a stronghold against the Jesuits in Nagasaki he allied with Date Masamune (1566–1646). Date Masamune’s collaboration with Luis Sotelo resembles Ieyasu’s earliest official foreign policies. Although neither of their sovereigns was largely willing to support

30 Gonoi (2003), Hasekura Tsunenaga. For the Hasekura mission to Spain, see also Torres-Lanzas (1928), Catálogo, pp. clxxxi -ccxv. Original records of Hasekura’s embassy were published in Spain in 2012: Oizumi, Gil (eds) (2012), Historia de la Embajada.
their projects a short-time fortune favoured Sotelo’s and Masamune’s debut in foreign affairs.31

As fierce critics of the Jesuits, the Franciscan friars had been mocking the Jesuit method of ‘cultural compromise’ and dubious morality (due to their direct involvement in trade with Macao since the 1590s). But the frailes idiotas, as they were polemically called in disputes on Japanese soil, were in fact the only mendicants in Japan who imitated the Jesuit model: in order to get support from the influential elite and to protect their stronghold on Honshu, they offered help in securing trade with Manila, promised assistance for similar arrangements with New Spain, and even brought gifts. Luis Sotelo, who was introduced to Date Masamune in Kyoto in 1603 by the Christian daimyō Gotō Joao, was the most calculating figure in this regard: Close collaboration between the lord of Sendai and the Franciscan friar culminated in official permission to proselytise in Oshu in 1611 in exchange for carrying Date Masamune’s letters campaigning for a trade agreement with New Spain across the Pacific and the Atlantic.32 Historians have stressed Sotelo’s self interest in what looked like a highly professional act of trans-oceanic diplomacy. He ignored, for instance, a call from his superiors in Manila following rumours of Ieyasu’s serious resentment.33 As a matter of fact the first anti-Christians edicts, introduced in chapter 4, were drafted at the very time of Sotelo’s scheming.

Even if the Date/Sotelo collaboration sounds like the utopia of two minor players, it hit the sore spots of both the Japanese and the Spanish central governments. In a way it served as follow-up mission to the delegation of the Franciscan Alonso Muñoz as the Bakufu’s ambassador to New Spain and the court of Philip III in Madrid. Sending Muñoz with state letters to the King and Viceroy was the Bakufu’s last serious attempt to establish permanent relations with New Spain. We have heard that Viceroy Luis de Velasco arranged a mission as a token of gratitude for assisting Vivero, by appointing the Spanish military merchant Sebastián Vizcaíno, a famous explorer of the Californian Coast, as ambassador to the Tokugawa court. Curiously, Velasco also assigned Vizcaíno to explore the legendary ‘gold islands’ (Islas Rica de Oro y Rica de Plata) north of Japan.34

31 Torres-Lanzas (1928), Catálogo, pp. clxxii-clxxxiii: The authorities in New Spain and Vizcaíno mistrusted Luis Sotelo profoundly.
32 Sotelo’s efforts to establish a Catholic mission in Sendai are summarised by Scipione Amati. Amati (1615), Historia.
34 The strange mission was not unnoticed by other European traders in Japan. Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 283. For the Spanish initiative that began with a cédula real to the Viceroy of Mexico,
Vizcaíno and his crew landed in Uraga on 10 June 1611. A first audience with Hidetada followed less than two weeks later. Visiting Ieyasu in Sunpu at the end of August, Vizcaíno received an opportunity to discuss certain matters directly. Matters addressed included the future of Christian missionaries in Japan as well as a trade agreement based on friendly relations, which implied a trade prohibition for the Dutch. Sebastián Vizcaíno was probably the worst candidate for the audiences with Hidetada and Ieyasu. Much in the style of Lord McCartney in Qing China 180 years later, he was unwilling to follow Japanese diplomatic protocol and insisted on meeting face to face as was the custom in Spain. Although irritated by such presumptuous behaviour, the Japanese eventually acceded to Vizcaíno’s request.

In November the delegation from New Spain continued their journey from Kanto to Sendai, from where they started their coastal expedition after an audience with Date Masamune. After a lengthy but unsuccessful expedition, Vizcaíno received word from Hidetada in September 1612: the Tokugawa ultimately rejected Vizcaíno’s demands and the latter was forced to seal a deal with Date Masamune and Luis Sotelo. Date Masamune’s vassal Hasekura Tsunenaga would accompany Vizcaíno and continue his journey as the official envoy to Madrid and Rome. Vizcaíno’s expedition was a failure from the point of view of the viceregal government. Not only did they not find the Islas Rica de Oro y Rica de Plata, they also failed to adhere to Viceroy Velasco’s express order not to bring any Japanese to New Spain. The letters from the Bakufu were also a disappointment: While Hidetada only reconfirmed interest in direct trade with New Spain, Ieyasu’s did not beat about the bush regarding Japanese aversion to Christianity.

When the Hasekura embassy reached Seville in 1614, its mayor was the first to receive gifts and a letter from the ‘king of Sendai’ (also referred to as

see AGI Filipinas 329, l. 2, ff. 72r-73v, ‘Orden de descubrir y poblar Isla Rica de Oro y Rica de Plata’, 27 September 1608. Another noteworthy episode in Vizcaíno’s biography is his history as Manila Galleon merchant in the years 1586 and 1589.


36 Sola (1991), Historia de un Desencuentro, p. 129. Some sources even suggest that he threatened he would return to Mexico without meeting the Shogun.

37 AGI Escritura_cifra, 30, ‘Carta original del Universal Señor del Japón, Hidetada Tokugawa (Minamoto Hidetada), al duque de Lerma, en la que autoriza a los navíos españoles procedentes de Nueva España a tocar puertos japoneses, dejando los detalles del asunto a los padres franciscanos Fray Alonso Muñoz y Fray Luis Sotelo, que llevan cinco armaduras japonesas de regalo’, 4 May 1610.
Further recipients of letters from Date Masamune included Francisco Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas (1553-1625), as the most important advisor of King Philip III and the Pope, who all received the ‘exotic’ envoy in audience. Although Date Masamune promised the conversion of his entire realm under the condition that direct trade was established between Sendai and New Spain, the King showed little interest. Spanish authorities were intimidated by the unexpected arrival of the Japanese delegation and wished for its speedy departure. Tensions grew along with financial concerns. Disputes about who would come up with the funding for the mission’s expenses soon dominated everything. After a journey to Rome, where the Japanese envoy received all possible ambassadorial honour from the Pope and other high-ranking church officials, the delegation could finally be persuaded to return to Mexico in 1617. Their onward journey brought them to Manila where Sotelo’s hopes for the necessary support were ultimately dashed.

One may argue that the whole episode had nothing to do with Manila. But it did, quite simply by avoiding it. Spanish policymakers, such as Francisco Gómez Sandoval de Rojas, first Duke of Lerma, would have gone as far as trading the Philippines in exchange for complete peace between the Netherlands and Spain and direct trade between Mexico and Japan. We can only speculate about the incentives behind this ‘betrayal’ of the Philippines. While Hasekura solicited closer connections between Sendai and New Spain and Lerma negotiated with the enemy, Governor Juan de Silva received the last official letters from the Tokugawa Bakufu in 1612 and 1613 in Manila. In the autumn of 1615, New Spain sent one final mission under

39 Gonoï (2003), Hasekura Tsunenaga, pp. 103-107; AGI Filipinas 1, n. 172, ‘Consulta sobre regalo y carta para el rey de Boxi’, 1616.
40 See, for example, AGI Contratación 5352, n. 21, ‘Francisco de San Martín’, 23 June 1616. AGI México 28, n. 46, ‘Cartas del Virrey Marqués de Guadalcazar’, 1 December 1616; AGI Filipinas 37, n. 13, ‘Petición de Mariana de Espina de los gastos del embajador de Japón’, 20 May 1615; See also Rodríguez-García (2005), Armas Japoneses, p. 46.
41 Gonoï (2003), Hasekura Tsunenaga, pp. 200-209.
Father Diego de Santa Catalina to the Tokugawa court.\textsuperscript{44} Yet the mission was no longer received by the Tokugawa in Edo; the humiliated Spaniards had no choice but to return to New Spain in autumn 1616, despite a viceregal order not to come back before meeting the Shogun.\textsuperscript{45} An impatient Date Masamune left the political stage after speculations of his involvement in a plot against the Bakufu in 1618.\textsuperscript{46} When Hasekura Tsunenaga returned to Japan in 1620 there was no longer mention of friendly trade relations. The tables had turned and the Tokugawa, as most powerful lords of the \textit{tenka}, set the terms for diplomatic exchange. An age of more systematic foreign relations that left no space for improvising – one that intimidated the Spaniards – had begun.

\textbf{Japan and the Philippines: Alienation and Its Consequences}

Without doubt, Hispano-Japanese estrangement was closely connected to the anti-Christian propaganda and gradual restrictions on missionary activities. On 12 April 1612 Ieyasu forbade Japanese nationals from being Christians.\textsuperscript{47} Further regulations followed in 1614 and 1616. By that time, William Adams and EIC representatives such as John Saris and Richard Cocks had already successfully established an identity of an ‘anti-Catholic’ kingdom and explicitly fuelled anti-Iberian sentiments of the Bakufu. When William Adams was interviewed by Hidetada after the Dutch had taken a Portuguese ship on the Japanese coast in 1615, he gave a detailed account of European affairs, claiming that

\begin{quote}
[the King of] Spaine did think hym selfe to have more right [in these] partes of the world then any other Christian prince, by [reason] of the footing he had gotten in the Phillippinas and in other partes of the Indies, and thereafter per force ment to keepe all other nations from trading into these partes.
\end{quote}

The Shogun naturally disagreed and on the same occasion publicly contradicted the policy of enslavement upon military victory that was not only common among the Dutch and the Iberians but also in South East Asia.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{44} Cocks (1883), \textit{Diary}, p. 274. AGI México 28, n. 49, f. 13, ‘Carta del virrey marqués de Guadalcazár’, 13 March 1617.
\textsuperscript{45} Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), \textit{Tsūkō ichiran}, 185/54.
\textsuperscript{46} Zaidè (1949), \textit{Philippines}, p. 356.
\textsuperscript{47} The original treatise is recorded in the \textit{Sunpu ki} 駿府記.
\textsuperscript{48} Cocks (1883), \textit{Diary}, p. 281.
When in 1616 VOC merchants suggested an attack on Luzon from Taiwan to expel the Spaniards from Asia, Hidetada was not ‘unwilling to listen’. 49

The Spanish envoy Diego de Santa Catalina already noticed changes in foreign policies, and they doubtlessly worsened after Ieyasu’s death in 1616. Although trade was in theory not affected by anti-Christian propaganda, the Bakufu’s restricted European trade to Hirado and Nagasaki and hostility towards the Iberians increased. 50 The early 1620s saw drastic confiscation and persecution of Catholic friars and their Japanese accomplices as result of centralising efforts. 51 In particular, captains carrying Spaniards to Japan were severely punished. 52 In 1621, the Bakufu prohibited the export of weapons and the voyage of Japanese on foreign ships. Other provisions were not immediately affected: In 1621 Japanese exports to Manila included 947 bags of wheat flour (for 10,705 pesos) as well as 49,900 pieces of biscuit (for 12,554 pesos), soy beans, oil, and pig’s trotters. 53 Yet when a Spanish intrigue against the Bakufu was reported in 1624, the Shogun closed all Japanese ports to Spanish ships. 54 The last four shuinsen called into the port of Manila that year, while the Spanish made a last attempt in 1625. 55

The significant decrease in trade showed the Spaniards how dependent they were on supply from Japan. The King and his councils belatedly called for maintaining secular trade relations with Japan for the sake of the islands’ welfare, while high-ranking Spaniards in the Philippines even displayed a new economic spirit by suggesting to adopt a system of port-to-port intermediary trade with Japan, carrying Chinese silk there and exchanging it for Japanese silver, a strategy that would decrease the necessity of silver cargoes from the Americas. 56 For the sake of reviving friendly relations with Japan Fernando de Ayala, a military officer who had fought back maritime attacks of the Dutch for many years, was chosen as ambassador to Japan. Equipped

49 Cocks (1883), Diary, pp. 283-284.
50 Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (2006), Nihonshi shiryō, p. 130.
51 Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 334.
52 Cocks (1883), Diary, pp. 248-249. On 11 March 1622 he wrote: ‘Torazemon Dono sent for Capt. Camps and me to com to hym, for that he had something to tell us from Oyen Dono, temperours secretary. Soe we went to his howse, where we mett Cacazemor Dono, Stroyemon Dono, and Jentero Donos secretary. And they tould us that, tuching the priz goodes ir the friggot, the Japons, said it was theirs, and not the Spaniardes or Portingales, but temperour would not beleeve them, for that we had proved them tretors in bringing padres into Japon, contrary to his comandement.’
53 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 338.
54 Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon, pp. 253-256; Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 120.
55 Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon, pp. 234-236.
56 AGI Filipinas 85, n. 34 and Filipinas 20 (1618).
with a proper cargo and almost 300 passengers Captain Antonio de Arceo guided them to Satsuma in August 1623. A delegation continued the journey from Nagasaki to Edo in February 1624, but ultimately did not meet the Shogun, since Bakufu authorities forced them to return to Manila. Being denied access to Edo, they left empty-handed and blamed the failure on the false accusations (made by the Dutch) that covert missionaries were sneaking onto the islands. Governor Tavora (r. 1626-1632), knight of the Order of Calatrava, concluded that a trade prohibition equalled a conscious Japanese choice to be an enemy of the Castilians. But he also promised King Philip IV that he would do everything to promote friendly relations.

Facing cold Bakufu authority and opposition from the Dutch welded Spanish and Portuguese relations in the East. In 1628 Spanish forces sent by Governor Don Fernando de Silva, assisted the Portuguese in retaliating against the actions of the Japanese merchant Takagi Sakuemon (高木作右衛門). The maritime battle ended with Juan de Alcarajo burning Takagi’s vermillion-seal ship (according to Spanish accounts it carried a cargo of about 25,000 pesos) in Ayutthaya. Strengthening the Catholic alliance ultimately had negative consequences for the Iberian foothold in Japan and moreover reflects a general downturn of Spanish foreign policies in the East. As news of the incident reached Japan a furious public (spurred on by the Dutch) called for revenge for this major offence against the Bakufu’s maritime sovereign rights, represented by the shuinjō. Japanese authorities remained hesitant. The Portuguese, who still had access to Japan, were punished when their merchant vessel Trinidad was seized at Nagasaki in retaliation in 1630. With regard to Luzon, once more local agents were used for a half-hearted diplomatic solution: Iemitsu and the Governor of Nagasaki dispatched the lord of Hizen, Shimabara Matsukura (松倉重政) to Manila. Thus an apparently well-meaning mission and the invitation to revive trade in Nagasaki surprised the Spaniards in Manila, who had been ill at ease learning about increased shipbuilding activity in Japan in

57 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 5/6.
58 Medina (1630), Historia, p. 264; Zaide, Filipinas, 356.
59 AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 6, “Carta de Niño de Távora sobre materias de gobierno”, 1 August 1629.
60 AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 17, “Carta de Niño de Távora sobre materias de gobierno”, 8 July 1632.
61 See AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 6, “Carta de Niño de Távora sobre materias de gobierno”, 1 August 1629. Medina (1930), Historia, pp. 263-264.
62 Spate, Spanish Lake, p. 227, based on BR 23, pp. 112, 114; BR 24, pp. 218-220.
63 Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 96.
64 BR 23, pp. 93-94; Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, pp. 83; 121; Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 97.
65 Iwao (1958), Shuinsen; Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, pp. 240-241.
the aftermath of the Siam affair. Yet, while Matsukura sent merchant ships to Manila, Taiwan, and Macao during his reign the Shogun and his senior council (rōjū) strongly opposed his plea for continuing trade, still fearing a clandestine return of the Catholic missionaries. His suggestion to prepare an invasion of Manila, on the other hand, was apparently well received. In Manila Matsukura’s second embassy was received with far less pretensions: Governor Juan Niño de Tavora although accusing the embassy of a hidden agenda of a potential invasion discussed the burning of the vessel in Siam with his Japanese visitors, who reportedly aimed at soothing hard feelings with rich presents. When Matsukura Shigemasa died soon afterwards his dubious mission left no replacement for organising and executing an attack on Manila.

Although Spaniards from Manila had been accommodating the altered relations with Japan in the 1630s, they suspected the Dutch of promoting a strike against Manila among Bakufu authorities. In fact it was the other way around. In the second half of 1637, officials in Nagasaki began to hint that the Dutch should volunteer to attack Manila and styled it as righteous punishment for the 1628 sinking of the shuinsen in Thailand. Apparently, the Nagasaki governors had learned from captured Dominican friars ‘that the colonial government in Manila was planning to send a steady flow of missionaries into Japan’. After the petition had been discussed among the VOC factory council in Hirado, the Dutch eventually assured support for a potential invasion of the Philippines. However, the outbreak of a violent peasant rebellion in Kyushu interrupted the Manila campaign.

In the meantime, licences for foreign trade had been restricted to a select group of seven families or individuals, each with personal connections to the Tokugawa. The hoshō or guarantee system inaugurated in 1631

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66 Nagazumi (1990), *Kinsei shoki*, p. 54.
67 San Agustin (1698), *Conquistas*, pp. 263-265.
69 Nagazumi (1990), *Kinsei shoki*, pp. 81-82.
71 Clulow (2014), *Company*, p. 123. Under these circumstances Japanese authorities tried to persuade the Dutch to attack Manila as a faithful act to the shogun. Although VOC officials remained hesitant because of Manila’s strong fortification, Nicolaes Coukebacker, captain of the Hirado factory, reported on the current circumstances in Manila in detail.
72 The episode is also surrounded by debates. Assumptions are based on Murdoch’s speculations and a scholarly debate between a certain Watanabe and a certain Prof. Tugi in the 1920s. Watanabe (1929), ‘Japan Did Plan’. The VOC’s struggle is recorded in the company’s Japan Dagregisters. cf. Clulow (2014), *Company*, pp. 123-125.
tightly the reins further. A shipowner now needed specific authorisation from the rōjū, as well as from the Nagasaki bugyō, to leave the country. In a critical analysis of Bakufu laws, Matsui Yōko has shown that laws regarding the treatment of foreigners in Japan between the years 1633 and 1634 contain the provision that ‘those who have resided abroad for unavoidable reasons and return to Japan within five years will be allowed to stay, but those who wish to leave again will be executed’.74 She further showed that the following order of 1635, when shuinsen trade eventually ended, no longer included this passage because no more Japanese travelled abroad. Macro-regionally speaking, it is important to re-emphasise that Japan’s maritime trade, by volume, reached its peak between 1636 and 1639 despite severe maritime controls.75

In 1638 the Portuguese experienced a similar fate as the Spaniards, which they were equally unwilling to accept. After having been banned from Japan in 1635 and officially expelled in 1639, when peasants of Shimabara (島原) and Amakusa (天草) initiated an uprising against their new lords Matsukura Katsuie (松倉勝家) of Shimabara and Terasawa Katataka (寺沢堅高) of Amakusa. The social rebellion against high taxes and religious persecution shocked the Tokugawa, who found it hard to curb the unsuspected domestic opposition. In fact they only succeeded with the help of the Dutch, who provided gunpowder, cannon, and vessels.76 This demonstrative strike against Catholic peasants convinced the Bakufu of the Dutchmen’s commitment and granted them permission to stay in Japan, in a period when the third Shogun Iemitsu even broke off mercantile ties with Tonkin and Siam fearing they would transport Spanish or Portuguese missionaries.77 The issue of taking over Luzon was brought up again in the 1640s, when Tokugawa Iemitsu and Itakura Shigemune clandestinely planned to send troops to China in 1646.78 Although none of these projects ever materialised, Japan’s geopolitical interest in the Philippines remained, as works published on Luzon and the Bakufu’s obsession with updates on political circumstances in Manila and Macao, as part of a new intelligence service, indicate.79

75 Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 137.
76 Tsuruta (ed.) (2005), Amakusa Shimabara. The Bakufu’s troops of about 125,000 soldiers only managed to besiege the 27,000 rebels thanks to the Dutch support with canons.
77 Nagazumi (1990), Kinsei shoki, p. 61.
79 For instance, Kawabuchi (1671), Ruson oboegaki (Memoirs of Luzon) or the eighteenth-century compilation Gaiban tsūshō by Kondō Morishige.
Due to the strong Catholic dimension of the Shimabara/Amakusa events, the Portuguese were ordered to leave the country and never to return; disobedience would be punished with death. An ambassador sent from Macao in 1640 was killed, while the new King’s diplomatic intervention of sending an official ambassador from Lisbon (Captain Gonçalo de Siqueira de Souza) in 1644 failed.80

Early Modern ‘Capacity Building’: Transfer via Manila

Next to geopolitical tensions and strategic intelligence building, the elites’ pursuit of useful knowledge – sometimes referred to as empire building – frequently reflected central-local dualism. In many cases cultural and technological exchange happened much faster within merchant networks.81 Information gathering from below, in turn, is closely linked to cultural transfer and as such includes elements of adapting knowledge to existing worldviews. In recent years a growing number of studies has focused theoretically on the various aspects of the relationship between knowledge and power within information-based governing systems. Some scholars studied the systematic collection and documentation of knowledge and the question of how information was dealt with and communicated.82 It goes without saying that the closer a study is located to the age of information the more fruitful the indicators for the power of knowledge and dissemination will be. Yet examples from the early modern period show that information spread rapidly despite less advanced means of transport, printing techniques, or media. Yet it followed different patterns and served limited purposes. Around 1600 Manila-related information transfer targeted primarily maritime and military technology. Political facts for diplomatic relations, business strategies, and arts and crafts were of great interest to the ruling elites and their advisors. Spanish bureaucratic governing tools, including the image of a knowledgeable ruler (Philip II as ‘paper king’, sp. rey papelero), have been studied in detail in previous years.83 Around 1600, Japan’s elite was more receptive to foreign know-how than their Chinese counterparts. After the introduction of maritime restriction policies in the

80 Boxer (1979), Portuguese Embassy.
81 Kerry (2009), Networks of Empire, p. 64.
82 For information transfer through mobility, see Friedrich (2010), Lange Arm. For a more general study of the conception and spread of knowledge, see Burke (2000), Social History of Knowledge, vol. 1.
83 Brendecke (2009), Imperium und Empirie.
1630s, the Tokugawa regime was particularly keen to gather information from Chinese and Dutch traders in Nagasaki.

Ming China and Information Gathering

The Ming dynasty, unlike the Qing, was infamous for taking few initiatives to learn about the world outside the Sino-centric cosmos. However, it would be wrong to label Ming China totally ignorant of the outside world. The Ming not only shaped security policies and information gathering but also encouraged interest in territories within the Middle Kingdom (zhonghua), which were traditionally of more concern than other regions. In contrast to certain emperors’ and literati’s fascination with Western science, knowledge about Europe – be it of a political or ideological nature – was not sought actively in the Middle Kingdom. A lively interest in classical knowledge, science, and arts are vividly reflected in a long tradition of translation. The first institution for studying foreign languages was established in 1276, as the Office of Interpreters (會通館) which was followed by an Office of Translators (四夷館) in 1407. These offices prepared Chinese/Barbarian-language dictionaries (華夷譯語) for neighbouring languages such as Mongolian, Tibetan Sanskrit, Persian, and Siamese. Knowledge of Japan increased further with the constant wokou/wakō threat during the sixteenth century. The Chinese reaction to friars coming from Manila indicates an awareness of Luzon and the new settlers in the Southern Sea. Mendoza’s report (based on Martín de Rada’s observations) includes references to several friars from the Philippines being accused as spies by Chinese officials. In more economic terms, the Ming court’s attitude towards trade between Fujianese and Japanese traders in Manila is a further source for the official understanding of the outside world. Cheng Wei-chung quotes a reference to the Dongxi yangkao of a Ming coastal defence officer, Han Chung-yung, who implied in 1610 that business deals within the proximity of offshore China

84 For Emperor Kangxi’s initiatives to modify China’s foreign trade system by using information from abroad, see Gang (2013), Qing Opening; For the spread of information in early modern China, see Ge (2000), Zhong guo de zhi shi.
85 Brook (2009), ‘Europaelogy?’, pp. 269-294; Blussé (2003), ‘Kongkoan’, p. 98: ‘China’s official and dynastic histories have never shown much interest in overseas trade or commercial records unless the latter happened to impinge on some political or ideological concern of the imperial administration.’
were not illegal, if the Chinese involved happened to be living abroad. With reference to the annual licensed 16 junks for Manila he wondered whether it was ‘really possible that such large amounts of Chinese goods [were] all consumed by the limited population [of Manila]?\(^{88}\)

Dispatching spies abroad was the most famous Ming intelligence strategy applied both in European dominions in Asia, including Manila, and in Japan during Hideyoshi’s Korea invasion.\(^ {89}\) Spying on a foreign country’s political situation was for the Ming one of the very few plausible reasons to send people (disguised as merchants or monks) abroad. In light of the Ming’s concerns with national security there can be little doubt that for official China, information gathering had a different value and followed different purposes. The efficiency of the system and the constant availability of potential candidates partially explains why China did not see any need for direct contact with foreigners for information gathering, an attitude that can again be linked to the question of building trust. Paranoia was the flipside of these foreign policies: Chinese officials used to suspect every private merchant of being a political spy, who would take Chinese military secrets back to their native country.\(^ {90}\)

In light of Chinese information gathering, maritime issues are of particular interest. Against a popular narrative of Ming China’s nautical passiveness and weak coastal defence, Fujianese seagoing merchants were widely known for their navigating expertise and solid knowledge of sea routes.\(^ {91}\) In this regard it can be helpful to try and understand the Chinese case from a comparative perspective: Unlike in Europe, where rulers, the educated class, and adventurers often collaborated in maritime enterprises, Chinese maritime people were coastal settlers, whose networks did not reach out to the governing elite. The bulk of seafaring traditions were clearly rooted

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89 Cocks (1883), *Diary*, p. 285: ‘But, howsoever, these men [Chinese merchants] follow the matter hardly, and tell me that the Emperour of China hath sent espies into all partes wheere the Spaniarde, Portingales, Hollanders, and we do trade, in these partes of the world, only to see our behaveours on towards an other, as also how we behave our sevles towardes strangers, especially towardes Chinas. And som have byn in this place and brought by our frendes to the English howse, where I used them in the best sort I could, as I have advized to Bantam, Pattania and Syam to doe the lyke to all Chinas.’
91 Leonard Blussé has stressed the notable lack of Chinese shipping accounts because Chinese sailors did no leave any travel writings behind. Blussé (2011), ‘Junks to Java’, p. 222: ‘Chinese sailors themselves may have been accustomed to life at sea that they saw little use in writing up experiences that they took for granted, assuming that they could write at all.’
in information gathering at the local level; Out of habit and for reasons of illiteracy they left only a faint written imprint.

A fascinating example of Chinese maritime awareness is John Selden’s map of China, located today in the Bodleian Library. Historians believe that it was created and used by a mercantile network of Fujianese traders between 1618 and 1622. Printed in China, the map displays both the waters surrounding China and late Ming Fujian cartographic tradition without the usual European touch in map-making. Both Luzon and Nagasaki are marked on the map. The map offers useful insights regarding Sino-Spanish relations: The Spanish are indicated as huaren (ch., 花人) and the author of the map is likely to have taken his reference from the Dongxi yangkao. The map provides detailed information on the route of the Manila Galleon, as well as on silver and gold mines in Japan and thus stresses the importance of bullion trade for Fujian. Since some of the information is reminiscent of a pilot manual the map was clearly used in private merchant shipping and is not the result of governmental information gathering.

**Technological Transfer: Case Studies from Japan**

Historians have called for a re-examination of the long-held standard argument that Japan was backward in shipping technology until the early seventeenth century. In particular, unwritten seafaring knowledge and the wakō’s accomplishments in controlling the sea encourage overthrowing misinterpretations of Japan’s ‘nautical backwardness’. This is not an easy task because these myths have a long history. The Chinese geographer Zheng Ruozeng (鄭若曾, 1503-1570) described the differences between Chinese junks and traditional Japanese ships in 1563, in the military treatise Chouhai tubian (ch., 筹海圖編, Illustrated Book on Maritime Defence). Zheng Ruozeng concluded that Japanese ships were not qualified for off-shore journeys because their hulls were too flat. His evaluation reflects the
common understanding that Japanese mariners were only able to sail under the conditions of a favourable wind.\textsuperscript{98} Another Chinese source, the Riben kao 日本考 (Thoughts on Japan), published around 1593, stated that the Japanese received assistance from Chinese carpenters to build large ships for several thousand taels.\textsuperscript{99} A Korean who accompanied a vermillion-seal ship recorded: ‘Japanese possess only small ships incapable of traversing the great ocean. So with 80 pieces of silver, they purchase passage on Chinese ships.’\textsuperscript{100} Such understanding spread to European observers, who liked to underestimate early modern Japanese shipbuilding efforts and navigation skills. Pablo Pastells quoted a Spanish account that claimed in 1592 that because of the small size and capacity of Japanese ships – most of them being simple constructions for rowing crews – a journey from Japan to the Philippines was very unlikely.\textsuperscript{101} Given that in the same year the Japanese had transferred thousands of soldiers and battleships to Korea, while the Spaniards prepared for a possible invasion, the bias of the record is striking. Other accounts hint at Japanese collaborations with Fujinaese seafarers. In 1605 a Spaniard praised the ‘vessels built after the fashion of China and Japon are very good with both oar and sail, and have greater capacity and accommodation for carrying provisions than any other kind.’\textsuperscript{102} Already in the 1590s a Castilian seafarer who visited Japan noted that the ‘emperor’ of the islands commanded over two hundred ships and a huge artillery.\textsuperscript{103}

During the sixteenth century, it was indeed common Japanese practice to enlist Chinese and Ryukyuan assistance in order to reach ports in South East Asia. Hence many Japanese merchants calling at Manila came on foreign ships.\textsuperscript{104} They often employed Portuguese pilots, for instance Vasco Diaz, who regularly directed Japanese vessels to Manila in the 1590s.\textsuperscript{105} At the same time, Japanese ships coming to Manila before 1600 were described as being of rather big size, each carrying a cargo of 1500 to 2000 picos of wheat flour.\textsuperscript{106} In 1592, Juan Cobo reported of three newly built sea-going vessels and Harada’s ship to Manila of the same year was described as having

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{101} Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, pp. 50-51.
\footnote{102} BR 14, p. 69.
\footnote{103} AGI Filipinas 6, r. 7. n. 110, ‘Carta de Pedro González de Carvajal sobre su viaje a Japón’, 1594.
\footnote{104} For a history of pre-modern Japanese navigation, see Iida (1980), Nihon kōkai jutsushi.
\footnote{105} Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico, pp. 267-268. He listed Bartolomé Vez Landeiro (‘namban-king’), Sebastián Jorge Maxar, Pedro González de Carvajal (who took Pedro Bautista back to Japan), Manuel Luís, Pedro Camello, Jorge Pinto Barbosa, Domingo Peres.
\footnote{106} Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 50.
\end{footnotes}
carried 150 people.\textsuperscript{107} Such observations match Iwao Seiichi’s explanation of a boom in the construction of offshore ships during Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea.\textsuperscript{108} While ship technology, with certain regional variations, had improved during the battles of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, increasing maritime trade led to adaptations for cargo ships and the construction of hybrid-style vessels, including indigenous Japanese, Chinese, and European elements, of about 500 tons around 1600.\textsuperscript{109} Regarding ship design, the earliest \textit{shuinsen} (ship used for the overseas vermilion-seal trade) showed similar characteristics as the Chinese junk. Over the following decades, European shipbuilding knowledge entered Japan and a hybrid type with Chinese, Mediterranean, and indigenous Japanese elements was developed.\textsuperscript{110}

Hideyoshi displayed an outspoken interest in Iberian shipbuilders. From his reign onwards, Japanese deficits in offshore navigation and maritime technology played a crucial role in their interactions with the Spaniards.\textsuperscript{111} Desire to catch up and make Japan competitive was not limited to maritime technology. Japanese rulers moreover insisted on mining experts to be sent from New Spain.\textsuperscript{112} After being denied help by the Spaniards, the Japanese sought assistance from other Europeans.\textsuperscript{113} Two European-style trading ships were built under the supervision of William Adams in 1604 and 1605 in Uraga.\textsuperscript{114} He pointed out that good quality timber, hemp, and iron made it possible.\textsuperscript{115} Ironically, the Spaniards were to buy one of them several

\textsuperscript{107} AGI Patronato 25, r. 50, ‘Trato del embajador del Japón con Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas’, 1593. See also AGI Filipinas 6, r. 7, n. 107, ‘Testimonio sobre embajador de Japón, Faranda y Juan Cobo’, 1 June 1593: ‘El portador de esta es Faranda Quiemo Xapon el qual va en un navio nuevo pintadas unas ojas coloradas en la popa es navio seguro y llevo ciento y veinte hombres chinos y xaponeses.’

\textsuperscript{108} Iwao (1958), \textit{Shuinsen}, pp. 24-27.


\textsuperscript{110} Prominent elements came from the Chinese junk and the Iberian galleon. Vivid examples include the Suetsugu ship and the Araki ship. For the fascinating story of the Hakata-based Suetsugu clan’s involvement in Japanese overseas trade in the 1630s, see Oka (2001), ‘Great Merchant’, pp. 37-56.

\textsuperscript{111} Vivero (1988), \textit{Relaciones}, pp. 149-157; 165; Morga (2008), \textit{Sucesos}, p. 143; See also Massarella (1990), \textit{World Elsewhere}, p. 79.

\textsuperscript{112} Gomi et al. (1998), \textit{Shōsetsu nihonshi}, pp. 216-219.

\textsuperscript{113} For \textit{shuinsen} constructions in the context of nautical developments, see Nakamura (1965), \textit{Goshuinsen kōkai shutsū}; Murai (1997), \textit{Umikara}, p. 165; Japanese ships sojourning to China and Korea, laden with silver, where referred to as \textit{soma-sen} by early Europeans. These ships are sometimes considered Chinese constructions of 500 to 600 tons.

\textsuperscript{114} Private ventures even date back to the 1580s, as was the case in Bungo.

\textsuperscript{115} Adams (1850), \textit{Memorials}, p. 71.
years later and admitted its robustness.\textsuperscript{116} It was around the same time that interim Governor Vivero y Velasco proposed buying Japanese vessels for local use, arguing that the construction costs in the Philippines were intolerable.\textsuperscript{117} Spanish officials are reported to have made similar suggestion once again in 1623.\textsuperscript{118}

The need to construct a ship in Japan was only one of the many irritating elements of Sebastián Vizcaíno’s stay in Japan and his controversial collaboration with Date Masamune. After Vizcaíno’s ship had been destroyed by the Keichō Sanriku earthquake (慶長三陸地震) of 1611, Tokugawa Hidetada offered to build a ship at his own expense, on the condition that Vizcaíno would lend him ship carpenters and take some Japanese merchants to New Spain.\textsuperscript{119} Yet the Spanish general could neither agree to Hidetada’s offer nor afford the highly priced material. Eventually he accepted Date Masamune’s offer. The story of Date Masamune’s 500-ton Western-style vessel, named \textit{San Juan Bautista}, is thought-provoking: 180 Japanese carpenters built a Western-style ship in only 45 days in the port of Tsuki-no-ura (月の浦) far from the usual foreign maritime interaction centres.\textsuperscript{120} In a way the episode highlights the unpredictable dynamics of technology and knowledge transfer.

Other examples point at knowledge exchange as part of everyday maritime life around Manila, a Mecca for shipbuilders.\textsuperscript{121} A certain Ikeda Yoemon (池田与右衛門) from Nagasaki visited Manila as part of a \textit{shuinsen} crew in 1616 and 1617 before drafting the \textit{Genna kōkaiki} or \textit{kōkaisho} (元和航海書) (1618/23).\textsuperscript{122} His navigational treatise included explanations on the quadrant and astrolabe, a guide for using solar and nautical calendars, instructions on how to determine positions at sea by the sun and the stars, as well as navigational charts of the waters between Japan and South East Asia.\textsuperscript{123} In addition, maritime charts and hybrid maps featured reciprocal maritime collaborations. \textit{Namban} cartography and Matteo Ricci’s ‘Chinese’ maps of

\textsuperscript{116} For a discussion on these points, see Tremml (2009), ‘Neuzeitliche Schiffahrt’, pp. 179-208.
\textsuperscript{118} Quoted from Sugimoto, Swain (1978), \textit{Science}, pp. 177-178.
\textsuperscript{119} Murakami (1915), ‘Japan’, p. 473.
\textsuperscript{121} Iwao (1958), \textit{Shuinsen}, pp. 231-232.
\textsuperscript{122} Ikeda (1943), \textit{Genna kōkaisho}.
four seas and six continents strongly influenced Tokugawa maps with a small and large Eastern Sea.  

Japan's information gathering from above changed during the 70 years of the Manila system. I have argued earlier that encounters with the Europeans encouraged the Japanese to pull away from a China-centred cosmos that would eventually lead to the creation of a Japan-centred world system modelled on the traditional Chinese *ka'i* order. Tessa Morris-Suzuki has stressed the steady decline of Chinese hegemonic power as the main reason for this development. Ethnographical charts illustrate how Japan's worldview, although based on a Chinese model, altered thanks to knowledge accomplished from the Europeans. A particularly interesting example is the *Chart of All Nations* (*万国人物図*, *bankoku jinbutsuzu*) printed and published in Nagasaki in 1645, demonstrating Japan's place in a wider world. As illustrations of Japan's newly defined position in the world they contributed to a sense of nationality. Yet, despite the newly implemented seclusion policies in Japan, symbolism was clearly inspired by a European perspective. Japan was placed on top of all nations but not in a classic hierarchical composition. Significantly, European peoples were painted with white skin; each 'ethnic representative' was equipped with characteristic cultural objects of his country. This chart also gives insights into the Philippines' position in Japan's geopolitics after 1639. While the Spaniards were illustrated together with Italians in the chart's penultimate section, just before the giants and the dwarfs, the inhabitants of Luzon were

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125 Morris-Suzuki (1996), 'Frontiers of Japanese Identity', pp. 46-65; 50: The Japanese perception changed by two forces. 'The first was the force of Japan's changing relationship with China; the second, the force of the encounter with the European powers.'

126 Berry (1999), 'Was Early Modern Japan Culturally Integrated?', pp. 103-126; Berry (2006), *Japan in Print*.

127 Morris-Suzuki (1996), 'Frontiers of Japanese Identity', p. 46; Toby (2008), 'Sakoku', pp. 196-198: Later similar charts were printed in Edo and Kyoto. Only in the second half of the seventeenth century would larger parts of the society learn about the *bankoku* concept. Toby also showed that East Asia remained the centre of the earth in these global illustrations.


129 The Kyushu University Museum presents the masterpiece on its homepage and gives a fairly substantial description of the 40 nationalities displayed. See http://record.museum.kyushu-u.ac.jp/bankoku (accessed 11 December 2013). Depicted in a table of several lines and columns are 40 nations beginning with Japan, followed by Ming China, the Tartars, Taiwan, and other South East Asian nations. Only further down in the chart we find European nations known in Japan, beginning with England.
tackled as an independent ethnic group. The Luzon male was dressed in European style trousers, while the Luzon female covered her hair casually with a long scarf reminiscent of the common image of the Virgin Mary.\textsuperscript{130} China held a prominent position right next to Japan and was explicitly labelled Ming, the name of the dynasty that ironically had been replaced just one year before the first publication of the chart. While Ronald Toby remarked that ethnic categorisation charts existed in China in the form of \textit{ruisho},\textsuperscript{131} I am reminded of similar cartographic designs published in Europe,\textsuperscript{132} as well as parallels with the illustrations in the Boxer Codex printed with Chinese help in late-sixteenth-century Manila.\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{Concluding Remarks: Local-Central Dualism in Foreign Relations}

An appropriate starting point in summarising the essence of the last three chapters is a consideration of the general nature of diplomatic exchange in East Asia. Official commercial exchange was initially restricted to tributary trade. This practice was inseparably linked to diplomatic duties, which were a necessary precondition prior to the take-off of triangular relations. In light of evidence already mentioned with regard to the take-off of triangular trade relations, the augmentation of exchange at an ‘unorthodox’ or ‘unofficial’ level marked a significant turning point in both trading and diplomatic relations. Consequently, after the 1570s only a minor percentage of exchange (be it of an economic or political nature) fell into the category of tribute exchange. Of course, reflecting analytically on the nature of diplomatic exchange in sixteenth-century East Asia is not a simple task. There has been a contradictory binary concept of hierarchical and \textit{inter pares} foreign relations associated with this field of study which rather adds an element of confusion.

The key question on the impact of local-central competition on Manila’s long-term development has brought to light the intervention of external factors which caused a political overhaul in Manila. Key economic processes

\textsuperscript{130} What is most striking about the chart is the image of Native Americans with stereotypical ‘Indian’ symbolism including feathered headdress, bow, and arrow.

\textsuperscript{131} Toby (2008), ‘Sakoku’, p. 198.

\textsuperscript{132} See Blaeu (1644), \textit{Nova Totius Terrarum}.

\textsuperscript{133} The Boxer Codex is an ethnicity chart found in the Philippines. It is believed that Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas commissioned the project, which probably built upon the studies of Miguel de Loarca and the Franciscan friar Juan de Plasencia of the 1580s. For the illustrations, see http://www.filipeanut.com/2011/09/the-boxer-codex (accessed 11 May 2014).
shifted from influential actors on the ground to various other stakeholders. Thus, there was a change of ‘connectors’ to ‘dis-connectors’ in the 1620s and 1630s. It was the beginning of a new age of which the consequences for Manila were threefold. Japanese trade with Manila ended, there was a steep decline of Fujianese shipping to Manila and the Union of Crowns between Portugal and Spain ceased to exist after 1640. Such change to Manila’s economic development stood as a microcosm for wider change in the whole macro region during the years of intense power shifts in the South China Sea, arguably against the background of Dutch maritime aggression and operations of the Zheng Empire. It was now more lucrative for Fujianese traders to head straight to Japan, Taiwan, or other fledgling Southeast Asian ports.

Comparing operations of the local and the central shows how triangular histories connected predominantly in peripheral regions, where functioning cross-cultural operations developed parallel to encounters on official levels. While local initiatives rarely represented official policies, they often indirectly pushed the ruling elites in their monopolising efforts. The needs of the central government in Spain and those of the colonial officers in the Philippines were very often incompatible and more than once caused imperial dilemma. Likewise, Ming China should not be considered a backward anti-foreign trade empire. What characterises early modern China’s foreign trade is a disconnection between official views in the capital and local reality and a very complex diplomatic protocol that left no space for double-edged inter pares relations, to which both the Spanish and the Japanese aspired.

It goes without saying that the central governments of Ming China and Imperial Spain faced different constraints than the local merchants in Fujian and Manila. While the lack of government support encouraged private Chinese traders to create a distinguished mercantile network spanning from Japan via the Philippines and Indonesia to the Southeast Asian mainland, local Spanish merchants in Manila often had to give in to government demands aiming at maintaining hegemony in and outside Europe. By the time of intensified Japanese participation in the Manila trade, the newly established military-aristocratic government was occupied with building a stable pre-modern state. For that project the Bakufu competed with local landlords and merchants for the favour of foreign merchants. At the end of the day, sovereignty on the Japanese archipelago proved to be more important than overseas expansion. Edo managed to turn economic drives into political benefits for the central government. The Bakufu monopolised foreign trade by means of the vermillion-seal system. This can be regarded
as a major difference to the other two pre-modern states where competition between local and central levels was never overcome.

During the early decades of trans-Pacific trade, both Chinese and Japanese merchants had incentives to meet and trade in Manila. Japan’s withdrawal and her rigorous foreign policies, including a self-imposed maritime embargo after 1639, served to obscure the ability of historians to see its relevance to early modern economic history. When reassessing Manila’s role in global history, however, we must not overlook that as a consequence of successful state formation and economic restructuring, Japan’s aspired position in East Asia was redefined. Through interactions with Spain and China in the decades prior to her ‘closure’, Japan managed to become an independent economic player and what one may label the first real pre-modern state in East Asia in the seventeenth century, all thanks to efficient institutions.

Having said that, all other cases described suggest the predominance of local agency in the Manila system. Fujian, for instance, unlike the Ming court in Beijing generally acted as a state. Similarities can be found in late-sixteenth-century Japan, when peripheral players from Kyushu made similar advances as would be demonstrated in later decades with the example of Zheng rulers ruling from their bases in Xiamen and Taiwan. What is crucial in all of this is the Spanish reaction: their giving-in to and obedience to non-sovereigns.
Part IV
Zooming In: Early Modern Manila
and Regional Globalisation
Manila as Port City

It has almost always been true that colonial schemes or their commercial equivalents were devised not by government but by private enthusiasts in search of wealth, virtue or religious redemption.¹

Cohabitating East Asians', Castilians', and natives' bargaining experiences were momentous for the urban development of Manila.² In particular, members of the trading community possessed profound economic insider knowledge, intercultural understanding, manufacturing techniques, and language skills. Shifting focus from dualism between local and central interests to the impact of socio-political aspects, I will now add to a comprehensive picture with concrete examples of encounters on the ground. Hence, an actor-based approach centred on the actual settlers and sojourners of the 'ecumenical maritime trading zone', as Philip Curtin would have called the South China Sea,³ will stress Manila's outstanding position within sustained pre-modern global exchange. Against this background we have to ask whether and how 'cross-cultural brokers',⁴ seafaring people, colonial officials, licensed merchants, or religious personnel influenced transactions in the course of daily business on the ground.⁵

In recent decades, economic historians inspired by Fernand Braudel's approach to understanding the Mediterranean world have applied geography-based methods for studying the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic, or East Asia.⁶ Similar to other maritime macro regions, the China Seas hosted centres of far-reaching autonomy characterised by ethnic diversity,

¹ Darwin (2009), Empire Project, p. 3.
² Over the past decade a variety of studies on intercultural trading centres in East and South East Asia has revealed the political and cultural importance of such port cities for entire regions. Haneda (2009), 'Introduction' to Asian Port Cities, pp. 3-4.
³ Phillips (2007), 'Organization', pp. 71-86. Focusing on transport and communication networks in the administration of the Spanish and Portuguese 'oceanic empires' from 1580 to 1640, the author argued that the Habsburg rulers managed to control their vast territory thanks to the great number of Spanish-born families involved and a substantial net of vessels, as well as strong Catholicism ties.
⁵ For Spanish actors and settlers, see the appendix to Merino (1980), Cabildo, pp. 77-109.
⁶ Several interdisciplinary projects tackled the worlds of waters from various angles. See Andaya (2006), 'Oceans Unbound', p. 685; Sutherland (2008), 'Southeast Asian History'; Wills (2008), 'South China Sea', pp. 1-24; Gipouloux (2009), Méditerranée Asiatique, p. 161.
a large volume of products traded, and astonishing organisational and logistical facilities since the tenth century. These characteristics facilitated the creation of networks. Networks are a good point of departure when trying to understand the singular structure of seascapes. Xabier Lamikiz claims that networks in the Atlantic trade, mostly composed of autonomous or at least very flexible trading families, depending on trust, loyalty, and mediation, while its members were strong at cultural assimilation. Dennis Lombard has studied similar phenomena in large parts of maritime Asia. In addition, Jeppe Mulich’s inter-imperial micro-regional approach on the connections between peripheries provides some thought-provoking aspects on the relationship between networks and authorities. Such considerations seem to be useful for the historical context of the Manila system, as long as we remain sensitive to the impact of resistance, absolutism, and best policy practices. Broad perspectives on possible differences and similarities help us to shape our understanding of socio-cultural transmission within trans-national communities. Whole areas were stimulated by cross-cultural trading activities, while members of maritime networks themselves depended largely on climate and wind systems that influenced navigating conditions and their lives on board. The crossroad character of the China Seas and the Indian Ocean affected the Philippines long before the arrival of the Spaniards. Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso speak of the archipelago’s fluid civilisation open to influence from the outside world and willing to enhance existing institutions with ideas from overseas. It was not before the 1590s, however, that Manila established its port city status. When talking about port cities, we are easily tempted to perceive them as centres or key cities but very few ever were. According to Braudel, centres control world economies. Staying in the region, we find the formidable international port cities of Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, or

8 The concept of maritime space here includes not just the ocean but also other locations inseparably linked to it such as ports, ships, markets, and workshops. Scholars have been sympathising with the idea of ‘regional globalisations’ in the early modern period. Iberian imperialism is one of the topics tackled in that field. See, for example, Hopkins (ed.) (2006), Global History.
9 Lamikiz (2010), Trade and Trust.
10 For Asian merchant networks, see Lombard, Aubin (eds) (2000), Asian Merchants.
12 For examples of colonial policies of European Overseas Empire, see Daniels, Kennedy (eds) (2002), Negotiated Empires.
13 Abinales, Amoroso (2005), State and Society, p. 24.
Nagasaki; yet regardless of their florescence neither ever established itself as a political centre. ¹⁵ However, there are also indications that the case of Manila was different. Beyond doubt, as home to an early modern colonial trade diaspora, where ‘foreign’ Europeans ruled over a merchant settlement, Manila classifies both as multicultural trading hub and as a classic Spanish colonial city. ¹⁶ As the macro-regional centre, Manila attracted attention beyond religious, ideological, or sovereign borders.

Similar to other port cities all over the world, Manila’s society did not grow organically. Consequently, its market did not follow the usual development paths. Strictly speaking, strong stimuli of overseas commerce contributed to a strong external market and a neglected domestic economy. As a consequence, port cities were always vulnerable to sudden decline and loss of influence. Historically speaking this was by no means an uncommon urban fate – since neither systems nor their centres were static. ¹⁷ Exchange triggered a number of independent processes, which to a certain extent showed characteristics of hybridity or related developments. ¹⁸ Manila’s cross-cultural character is best illustrated by the city’s ‘Sino-European co-colonialism’. ¹⁹ In Manila – as well as in other South East Asian port cities – Eurasian interdependence led to constructive negotiations between Overseas Chinese, Iberians, and others and offered immigrants remarkable social mobility. ²⁰ Spanish, Fujianese, and Japanese people in Manila assumed new roles by responding to the necessities of the colonial society and the market, something they would not have done in a different context. ²¹ Since immigrants undertake certain economic tasks in their host countries,

¹⁵ Merchants of both Fujianese cities invested their gains abroad or moved to other booming Chinese ports such as Xiamen.
¹⁶ For definition of ‘trade diaspora’, see Curtin (1984), Cross-cultural Trade, pp. 2-12. He defines them as ‘communities of merchants living among aliens in associated networks’. The common notion of diaspora is broader and therefore only partially suitable for the Chinese and Japanese in early modern Manila. What is true is that as individuals they defined themselves in opposition to their host society, identified themselves with their homelands although contacts often remained on an ‘irregular and indirect’ basis. See Lovejoy (1997), ‘African Diaspora’.
¹⁷ Abu-Lughod (1989), Before European, pp. 6; 37; 303. Melaka is a prominent example for the decline of a centre. The Straits entrepôt lost significance after Muslim intermediaries had been replaced by local merchants.
¹⁸ I do not see a way to strictly distinguish between different categories of cultural blends such as creolité, mestizaje, accommodation, imitation, or glocalisation in early modern port cities. For a discussion of the concepts, see Burke (2009), Cultural Hybridity, pp. 35-112.
²¹ For Chinese early migration to South East Asia, see Chang (1995), ‘First Chinese Diaspora’.
socio-political representation is closely linked to their integration into the labour market. 22

Despite Manila's strong dependence on external trade and her importance as an intermediary port, I argue that if we want to reach an understanding of the essence of the Manila system, limiting our study to trade would ultimately not suffice. 23 Therefore I consider the term 'emporium', as Manila has sometimes been labelled, problematic. Unlike the Dutch at Batavia, the Portuguese at Macao, or the English in India, the Spanish did not develop Manila as an emporium for the export of goods to European or Asian destinations. 24 The Spaniards were not the dominating trading nation and Manila's institutions remained fragile. 25 Yet they possessed significant political and spiritual control.

New Communication Patterns and Early Modern Globalisation

Manila's overall setting for human interaction is reminiscent of Marie Louise Pratt's research on asymmetrical encounters between the old core and new territories. In her seminal work on transculturation, the American philologist insisted on the improvisational character of colonial encounters, an explanation that also applies to interaction in Manila. 26 In and around the city walls, knowledge gathering and implementation of European ideas was piecemeal and 'created in chaotic, improvisational contact zones'. 27 Both 'foreigners' and Spaniards had to adapt to cultural and political influences; if successful, their encounters would take place between equals. 28 However,

22 Migration studies in global history still have a lot of untapped potential for comparative surveys. In global social history quantitative and qualitative studies have profoundly changed our knowledge and understanding of historical migration. A recent paradigm in the field is the human-centred approach to migration. It stresses emotional, spiritual, and intellectual aspects next to material security. Hoerder (2002), Cultures in Contact, p. 15; see also Lucassen et al. (eds) (2010), Migration History; Wang (ed.) (1997), Global History.
23 Ollé (2008), 'Relaciones', p. 75.
25 Villiers (1987), 'Portuguese Malacca', p. 52: 'The Spanish did not develop Manila as an emporium for the export of Southeast Asian goods to the west, and Manila was never a centre of any consequence for local inter-island trade or for goods produced in the Philippines.'
26 Pratt (1992), Imperial Eyes, pp. 38-68.
27 Musselman (2009), 'Indigenous Knowledge', p. 32.
28 Williard J. Peterson's interpretation seems relevant for all groups that flocked together in Manila: 'On a more general level, it also seems to show that an "outsider" might move from being an observer to being more a participant in his host's community, regardless of where he starts on some imaginary axis between the stranded victim of a shipwreck and the immigrant eager
the Spaniards had a certain comparative advantage in this regard: as the ‘ruling class’ they had access to more systematic knowledge. Yet the question, whether the Spanish inside the Manila system developed an equation of power with knowledge, as the British did in India, remains. Knowledge doubtlessly shaped the perception of the colonisers and influenced their attitude and their policies. Pratt and others have stressed the importance of the colonial periphery for representation ‘at home’, which spread feelings of superiority over native people. But what did that mean for the people on the ground? Understanding that a certain level of inequality was rooted in the very difference of encounters, we should ask which party enjoyed advantages as a result of having regional or local knowledge and how were knowledge differences dealt with? Manila possessed various qualities, proving that the Manila system worked in terms of communication and cooperation; it was not a tale of permanent misunderstanding or miscommunication, but rather Manila was a node in a widespread information network, which benefitted from frequent contact with Chinese, Portuguese, and South East Asian navigators and merchants. A 1616 diary entry by Richard Cocks underlines Manila's key role in supra-regional communication. When the Portuguese cargo ship from Macao failed to call at Nagasaki that year he noted: 'This news is come per a galley and a galliot which are arrived at Lanagasaque [Nagasaki] and came from the Manillas.'

In Manila trans-regional communication obstacles were less numerous than one would expect. What deserves extra mention is that the Castilian language was not abused as an imperial tool for discrimination within triangular relations, unlike in other colonial settings. Direct multilingual communication patterns were available for all members of the colonial society without being discriminated against or forced into imperial linguistic structures. Intermediary forms of communication were developed during the early decades. Pidgin Hokkien or Pidgin Spanish with Tagalog elements were commonly used in daily encounters. In addition, slightly different types of lingua franca, including Mandarin, Portuguese, and

to be assimilated, with tourists, conquistadores, merchants, missionaries, and ethnographers arrayed between the poles.’ Peterson (1994), ‘What to Wear?’, pp. 403-421.
29 For considerations on the ‘economy of knowledge’ of an empire, see Bayly (2003), Empire and Information. For the construction of knowledge and information transfer, see Stutchey (ed.) (2005), Science. For the Spanish case in particular, see Navarro Brotons et al. (2007), Más Álala de la Leyenda Negra.
30 Cocks (1883), Diary, pp. 135; 175.
31 For a discussion of these developments see Rafael (1993), Contracting Colonialism, pp. 23-26.
Malay elements circulated on the surrounding seascape. At the same time, Chinese and Japanese were spoken in areas with a primarily East Asian population. The silk market, for instance, was a multilingual quarter, with shops kept by Fujianese serving Fujianese, Spanish, Japanese and other local customers. Still, intercultural awareness and willingness to interact were often overshadowed by the lack of structured internal communication. The system largely maintained its improvised character far into the seventeenth century. It did however have its weaknesses in the form of strong church authorities, and random interpreters though.

**East Asian Human Agency**

While Manila undeniably showed characteristics of a cosmopolitan trading metropolis it maintained the character of a local community. It has been mentioned that Manila could not have survived, let alone turned into an internationally recognised city, without steady contributions and human migration from the hinterland, from China, and to a lesser extent from Japan and other parts of South East Asia. Ideas on migration of that particular region are closely linked to diaspora – a regionally scattered community, sharing language, culture and religion, and often kinship ties. Prototypical diaspora would retain close ties with their homeland, while often being unable to return there.

33 Shapinsky (2006), ‘Polyvocal Portolans’, p. 19: The author mentioned Nagazumi Yōko’s emphasis on the importance of Southern Chinese (Min Nan) dialects, such as Hokkien, spoken by the people from Zhangzhou and Quanzhou.
36 Wang Gungwu, Lynn Pan, and Carl A. Trocki have brought to light many aspects of Chinese overseas history over the centuries: Wang (2004), ‘China Seas’, pp. 7-22; Trocki (1999), Opium, p. 15. He divided Chinese migration to South East Asia from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries into five periods. See also Pan (1990), Sons of the Yellow Emperor. As indicated earlier, the pioneering efforts of Iwao Seiichi also dominate research on early modern Japanese overseas ventures. See Hirayama (2003), ‘Firipinasu sōtoku’, pp. 67-91.
Residents of the fluid community differed based on their geographical origin and cultural background. All Manila residents were port city migrants with a close, but sometimes problematic, relationship with the seas, as a source of new riches. The sea was a (sometimes a ramshackle, or even burned) bridge between their old and new lives. For many there was no going back once they had decided to start a new life in Manila. The strict ban on foreign trade, including a ban on returning home, made Chinese sojourners very adaptive to the influences of their host societies. This explains why the huaqiao of the early period rarely considered themselves as ‘Chinese’, after having left their native country. Fujianese members of migrant merchant clans put the well-being of their own kind above individual gain. Their Japanese counterparts came from diverse backgrounds, both geographically and in terms of social rank and religious belief, as I will show below. Next to Spanish and Mexican residents, who showed the greatest interest in political influence, Malay mestizo and members of the indigenous population found their niches in the urban society, providing a labour force and even replacing East Asian professionals in times of crisis.

The line between sojourners and settlers was a thin one and it remains difficult to assess to what extent and at what point a certain migrant population was absorbed by the colonial society. Others never did, taking the opportunity to relocate to even greener pastures, if circumstances required it. This is what happened in Manila in the 1630s: Knowing there would not be much to gain due to losses on the trans-Pacific route, Fujianese traders stayed away and probably relocated to other markets in Japan and Taiwan. Yet they would return, as soon as Manila had recovered.

The above-mentioned actor-based approach enables us to learn more about the Fujianese and Japanese communities of Manila. Most actors of previous chapters were either Christian missionaries or related to maritime trade. The latter ranged from captains and traders, navigators, sailors and ship owners, to those involved in building or rigging ships; linguists and government officials. With regard to Fujianese members of the urban society, Lin Renchuan has summarised a Ming period classification which distinguished between (1) regular merchants who left Manila again after business was finished, (2) merchants who stayed for a certain period,
hibernating in Manila and (3) those who settled permanently. Fujianese maritime merchants were part of a larger business organisation, sometimes referred to as ‘family-cum firms’ headed by an adult male and dominated by hierarchical structures based on seniority. In this regard, Gang Deng speaks of Chinese proto-companies, of which two types seem to have been relevant for Manila: joint ventures, arrangements between government and traders that date back to the days of the Song dynasty, and ship-bound partnerships with the ability to provide and maintain large ocean-going ships for several hundred passengers. These vessels’ captains were wealthy merchants who acted as managers. All crew members were paid regardless of their individual status. At the same time, they were all members of several family-cum-firms, who controlled their separate cargo and business accounts. Overheads, such as tolls, were shared among all passengers. Many of those who settled in Manila came from mountainous regions with minor agricultural yield, multiple landownership and various unequal dynamics.

An advanced entrepreneurial spirit made the Chinese the number-one maritime agents in the contact zone in Manila. Catering to the needs of the Spaniards in Manila and the elites of the Americas, they adapted quickly to their potential customer’s demands and tastes. Imitation became a special pattern of transfer that incorporated both cultural and technological elements, which eventually reached the hinterland and other places along maritime routes. Kären Wigen’s plea for ocean-oriented research stressed that ‘maritime-based social formations have long served as models for social change in landed societies’. Legal intermediaries or travelling agents with language proficiency are of particular interest for socio-political dimensions of this study. No doubt, huaqiao played an outstanding role in this regard as

44 Ming shi, Biography of Luzón, juan 323, 8730, cf. Lin (1990), ‘Fukien’s Private Sea Trade’, pp. 167–215. The term ‘hibernating’ was also used by Zhang (1617), Dongxi yangkao, for merchants who were 壓冬 ya dong, literally ‘pressing the winter’. Cf. Santamaria (1966), ‘Chinese Parián’, p. 71. Díaz-Trechuelo (1966), ‘Role of the Chinese’, p. 176: Among the Fujianese there were many who involuntarily had to stay because of meteorological conditions. As monsoons only permitted travel between May and July, there was often not enough time for trade transactions.
48 Sucheta Mazumdar discusses Manila’s function as gateway for trans-Pacific technology transfer: Mazumdar (1998), Sugar and the Society in China, pp. 75-79.
50 Niels Steensgaard and others have shown that the concept goes back to the Medieval Mediterranean ‘commenda’ agreement between Christians and Muslims. See Steensgaard (1973), Carracks.
well. Traditionally good relations with the indigenous population soon led to a sharp increase in intermarriages, linking Chinese settlements to the local community. Mestizo members of their community acted as interpreters for the ships arriving from China and in daily operations with the Spaniards.51

After having built a solid town to meet the needs of the Castilian ruling elite, settling policy for visiting traders remained vague for decades. Finding a balance between keeping unwelcome European trading nations’ out of Manila and assuring steady support from East Asia was one of the biggest challenges.52 As Manila Spaniards did not bother to alter the status quo during the first century, the system seemed to have worked. Nonetheless their attitude was also harshly criticised. Easy access to everything they desired made engaging in agriculture or industry superfluous.53 Contemporaries’ harsh judgement of the slothful Manila Spanish as malicious swindlers and gamblers, who abhorred physical work, may indeed contain a grain of truth.54 A combination of unwillingness and inability of the Overseas Empires’ administration increased discontent among Spanish citizens who soon earned a reputation as decadent merchant soldiers who competed with two other groups of actors: powerful New Spain capitalists and Manila merchants who were the politico-economic elite of all Overseas Spain.55 Inter-imperial correspondence points to a complicated fate of lower-class Spaniards in the colony; it suggests that soldiers were badly paid (the average monthly salary for a soldier was 6 pesos and for a musketeer not more than 8) and their provisions insufficient.56 Under these circumstances the socio-economic integration of Fujianese and Japanese remained a complicated venture. Most aspects of everyday life were either an incentive for or the product of bargaining on the spot. Strong interdependence characterised the urban society, of which all members bargained for improved living conditions. After a relatively liberal and unrestricted Chinese and Japanese presence in Manila during the first decades of Spanish reign, colonial authorities began to take steps against

51 Only a few names have been recorded: For instance, those of Juan de la Cruz, Agustín Carpio, and Juan Sansón, who were part of a flexible network of intermediaries. Cf. Slack (2010), ‘Sinifying New Spain’, p. 11.
55 Merino (1980), Cabildo, pp. 54-56.
56 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 9, n. 173, ‘Carta de Tello sobre asuntos de guerra; Borneo, Japón’, 1600. We have reason to believe that Japanese aggression was exaggerated in order to get more support for the struggling colony.
the growing number of East Asian settlers. In particular Fujianese traders’ strong position in commercial bargaining called for stricter policies.

The feeling of insecurity during the first decade of the seventeenth century, described in chapter 5, in fact, went beyond the Dutch threat. Fear of Japanese or Chinese conspiracies, revenge, or violent outrages dominated the colonial agendas, next to economic concerns. Attempted conflict-minimising policies reflect the social consequences of undying prejudice and the ambivalent relationship with the East Asians. In this regard the question, whether the Spaniards thought of East Asian residents as their vassals or whether they saw them as Chinese or Japanese subjects, arises. With regard to Japanese settlers, for instance, the attitude of powerful Manila-based Spanish actors, including the church, changed frequently. Pleas for expulsion took turns with pleas for friendly relations and closer collaboration. In general, memoranda of Castilian bureaucrats lack evidence that East Asian settlers would have been regarded as subdued to the Castilian Crown. Hernando de los Ríos Coronel is a crucial figure when it comes to understanding Spain’s varying attitudes in administering the multicultural society of Manila. In a period when the Spanish Philippines rejoiced in mutually beneficial trade and the beginning of rather stable relations with Tokugawa Japan, Ríos Coronel tarnished the metropolis in Madrid with an anti-Japanese spirit: In an audience with the Consejo de Indias in Madrid in 1603, he promoted expelling all Japanese ‘because they were thin-skinned people who easily get caught up in rows with the Spanish’.57 This xenophobic period had already begun a few years earlier, when the interim Governor Antonio de Morga expelled 12,000 Chinese in 1596. Such recurring repression usually followed minor clashes between Spanish and East Asian settlers.58

By the end of the 1580s, both a Chinese and a Japanese town existed in Manila. Both grew fast compared to the Spanish settlement in Intramuros (literally, ‘inside the city walls’).59 The scarcity of settlers negatively affected the Spanish governing power. Demographic trends contributed both to xenophobia and to attempts to live in peace and harmony. Although

57 Tōyō Bunko, ‘Filipinas y el Japón’, pp. 22-23; author’s translation.
58 Cf. Zaidé (1949), Philippines, p. 341. It remains doubtful whether Morga’s account is reliable. BR 10, pp. 81-82: ‘It would be very advantageous forcibly to eject all the Sangleyes who are scattered throughout the islands – namely, those who are protected by the alcalde mayor and the religious – because of the money that they take out of the country, and the injury they cause to it.’ Antonio de Morga further reported that a minor argument between a Japanese and a Castilian settler had led to a major armed battle. See also Tōyō Bunko, ‘Filipinas y el Japón’, p. 24.
most Spaniards understood that with a de facto presence of strong states nearby, systematic discrimination policies bore little fruit; rampant suspicion inhibited sustainable multiethnic integration. Tactics of demonstrating power and grandeur, as had been tested in the Americas did not have the desired effect, nor could the colonial government always afford it. More money was needed for imperial representation, as Governor Tello hinted in a letter to Spain. The meagre output of his encomienda was not enough to represent the glory of his king in light of the daily coming and going of subjects of grand kings and nations in Manila. The absence of Iberian cultural representation, as hinted by Tello, gave rise to a more dominant East Asian atmosphere in Manila.

**Intramuros**

One of the characteristics of Manila that it shared with other enclaves in Asia was the walled city. Immediately after its establishment, Spanish Intramuros was considered the social, religious, and military capital of a territorial colony. Like other Spanish colonial capitals, Manila was also considered a ciudad de españoles. A special body of law was fashioned exclusively for Spanish settlers and silver merchants from Mexico. In an average year about 200 Spaniards came to Manila, yet a large number also went back to Mexico or Spain. The fortified centre, that reflected sixteenth-century rational Spanish urban design with regular and broad streets, squares for representation, and the cathedral, hosted both the headquarters of the colonial government and the residential area for higher-ranking Spanish townspeople.

Manila’s stone walls replaced spiritual walls to a large extent. The concept of ‘spiritual walls’ or religious frontiers, a major success in American settlements, was clearly inadequate for the Philippines, where strong opposition from neighbouring Muslim domains challenged Spanish spiritual rule. The existence of walls is interesting in terms of creating space: it served

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60 AGI Filipinas 18B, r. 7, n. 61, ‘Carta de Tello sobre posible ataque de Japón’, 19 May 1597: ‘Y certifico a Vuestra Magestad que el sueldo que aquí tengo no me alcanza al gasto y presentación de casa y creados y todo es necesario a quien aquí representa la real persona de Vuestra Magestad avista de tan grande reinos y tantas naciones extrañas como aquí entran y salen cada día.’
62 Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, p. 15.
64 See also Kagan (2000), ‘World without Walls’, pp. 117-152. Manila is not even mentioned in the study. For the history of conflict and compromise between Spaniards and neighbouring Muslims, see Majul (1973), Muslims in the Philippines.
geopolitical purposes and empowered religious orders over non-Spanish settlements. Backed by the King, who had assigned friars an intermediary position between the Spanish colonisers and other ethnicities, clergymen used to settle outside the stone barriers. This step allowed them to place their missionary projects right in the settlements of the indigenous or migrants from East Asia. Yet, constructing urban space for the sake of controlling multicultural neighbourhoods ‘from above’ was by no means an Iberian peculiarity. In Bantam (prior to the arrival of the Dutch in 1596) and Ayutthaya, a walled centre was surrounded by separate quarters for ethnic neighbourhoods of different origins, including Chinese, Malays, Chams, Japanese, Indians, Arabs and Persians. Similar policies were also common practice in Macao and Nagasaki, and in the eighteenth century in Dutch Batavia. Ordinary Portuguese in Macao were not allowed to enter Chinese mainland without special authorisation. A strictly controlled gate impeded interaction between Cantonese and Portuguese citizens. In Canton, ethnic Chinese were for a long time not allowed to stay within the foreign quarters after nightfall. For Anthony Reid, the European-ruled port cities Manila, Batavia, Melaka, Makassar, Penang, and Singapore all shared a history of ‘racial discrimination by the ruling class and eventual collaboration with the Chinese middlemen minorities’.

**Parian**

Before long, the large numbers of private Fujianese traders attracted to Manila made the Spanish authorities suspicious. Once their number had reached several thousands in the early 1580s they were assigned their own quarter, the Parian, located just outside Intramuros. The Parian became

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66 The Batavian government put heavy taxes on the practice of Chinese rites; moreover, at times, women were not allowed to immigrate. See Blussé (2003), ‘Kongkoan’, p. 96.
69 Reid (2010), *Imperial Alchemy*, p. 56.
70 Regarding the origin of the term ‘parian’, an early Chinese settler, Miguel Onte, claimed that the word derived from Tagalog, meaning the same as *alcaicería* (silk market) in Castilian. According to James Warren, ‘parian’ means ‘marketplace’ in Tagalog. Warren (2012), ‘Weather’, p. 188. Earlier generations of scholars have debated whether the word is of Chinese or Mexican origin. Evidence that it is not a Chinese word can be found in the fact that the Chinese referred to the Parian as *chien-nei*: Santamaria (1966), ‘Chinese Parian’, pp. 68-69.
71 Records on the exact date for the establishment of the first Parian vary between 1576 and 1581. In the course of the seventeenth century not only did the number of Chinese settlers
the official silk market and theoretically the exclusive district for Chinese retail and artisans’ shops. For easier distinction, colonial authorities encouraged clear spatial boundaries between Christian and non-Christian Chinese. Binondo became the first quarter for Christian Chinese settlers. Baybay and Tondo hosted 2000 Chinese in 1589. In 1594 the parish of St Gabriel was founded for the Christian Chinese with Filipino wives and their children, mestizo de Sangley, across the Pasig River.

A church was one of the first proper constructions in these neighbourhoods. In 1597 both Binondo and Baybay had one church offering the Christian doctrine in Chinese, by Castilian friars, for instance, by Fray Juan de San Pedro Martir, vicar of the villages San Gabriel and Tondo. There are few accounts on the exact number of Christian Chinese; according to the first baptism register of Santos Reyes kept in the Dominican Convent in Quezon City/Manila, 155 Chinese were baptised from 1618 to 1619, whereas Diego Aduarte spoke of a total of 4752 until 1633. The Spaniards understood that the Parian of Tondo was home to Christian Chinese, whereas the parians just outside Intramuros, Baybay and Binondo, were inhabited by non-Christian Chinese (sangleyes infieles). The Parian of Santa Cruz, for instance, remained under Jesuit supervision. In the early years, the Parian was supervised by the Dominicans and guarded by watchmen, whose number could be increased if necessary. Following an order by Governor Santiago de Vera, they built a wooden church and houses in the alcaicería. Over the years, parians would grow in number, yet the number of parians as well as houses inside these Chinese quarters would be limited in order increase, but so did the number of their settlements. Santamaria (1966), ‘Chinese Parian, pp. 84-90; According to one Chinese settler, the first Parian was already opened in 1576: See Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620.

72 According to a letter by Governor Dasmariñas to King Philip II of the year 1591, cf. Santamaria (1966), ‘Chinese Parían’, p. 90: ‘Within the city is the silk-market of the Parian where the Chinese merchants trade. They have 200 stores which probably employ more than 2,000 Chinese.’ For a detailed synthesis of the history of the Parian, see Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 142-194. A concise and compelling study based on ample, multilingual material with fascinating visual sources is Ollé (2008), ‘Relaciones’, pp. 65-80.
73 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 128.
75 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620, f. 103; BR 36, p. 91.
76 Torres-Lanzas (1928), Catálogo, p. 259.
77 Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620: In 1595 Antonio de Morga founded a Parian in San Gabriel, which also happened to burn down. Thereafter a new Parian was built about 600 steps away from the main gate.
78 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 506.
to minimise Chinese expansion all over the archipelago and into regions with only a small number of Spaniards.\footnote{Cf. Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 294, based on a cédula of 1606.}

The original Parian was rebuilt several times from 1581 until 1595, when it eventually settled outside the city walls. Originally, houses were built of wood and reeds and thus easily destroyed by fire. Some scholars have argued that the Chinese were not allowed to build using stone, either due to a shortage in construction material or because of outright Spanish discrimination.\footnote{One of them is Daus (1987), Manila, pp. 40–41. He suggests the concept of architectural boundaries.} Bishop Salazar acknowledged that under the governorship of Santiago de Vera, many Chinese houses were covered with fire resistant tiles; as a consequence of the solid building policy the parian of the Chinese became an eyesore, if not a sight worth visiting for its beauty, than for curiosity thanks to signs and placards written in Chinese characters and lanterns decorating its alleys.\footnote{BR 7, p. 225.} A 1638 document explains that the Parian hosted a specific street for every craft or trade. Early in the morning the streets were filled with Chinese people praising their goods.\footnote{Cf. Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 321.} The Parian was also famous for its well-functioning canals used for transporting goods.\footnote{BR 7, p. 228; See also Domingo de Salazar, O.P., letter to the King on 24 June 1590, cf. Retana (ed.) (1895/96), Archivo, vol. 3, p. 68: ‘In the remaining space within the four fronts of the Parián is a large pond, which receives water from the sea through an estuary. In the middle of the pond is an islet, where the Sangleys who commit crimes receive their punishment, so as to be seen by all. The pond beautifies the Parián and proves to be of great advantage, because many ships sail into it through the aforesaid estuary at high tide, and bring to the Parián all the supplies, which are distributed thence all over the city.’} Being a centre for proselytising ‘heathens’ it hardly seems surprising that the church was described as a magnificent structure partially as a result of financial support for the building from the Chinese community. The ‘common money pot’ (Chinese public budget) mentioned in this context is of major interest. Allegedly Christian and non-Christian Chinese deposited altogether no less than 20,000 pesos annually.\footnote{Medina (1630), Historia, p. 101: ‘tenían una caja de comunidad, para gastos que se ofrecen’. Gil describes a similar phenomenon as ‘Caxa del Parian’. See Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 290–297. The institution started in Binondo and used to sustain the hospital and to support members of the community in need. Initially 2 reals were collected from all inhabitants. Governor Silva approved of the project in 1609. Similarities exist with the original kongkoan, the Chinese Council of Batavia, described by Blussé (2003), ‘Kongkoan’, p. 96.} Additionally, like in other Chinatowns in South East Asia, cultural life focused on ancestor worshipping.\footnote{Reid (2010), Imperial Alchemy, p. 55.}
The numbers of shops grew rapidly from 185 in 1588 to 200 in 1591. Other sources claim that the hundred shops of 1595 had quadrupled by 1603, when according to Governor Acuña 4000 Chinese permanently crowded in the Parian. For their shops they had to pay rent; during the seventeenth century rent remained with the Chinese possession, which speaks in favour of their quasi property rights. The Parian of Salazar's account was reported to be much larger than the first Parian 'because on the firm ground where the four rows of buildings are located they have built their houses and the streets leading through the Parián, a separate street for each row of buildings. There are long passages and the buildings are quadrangular in shape'.

All Chinese neighbourhoods were secluded areas to which the residents had to return at night with the exception of bakers, gardeners, and domestic staff serving Spanish households, who could stay within the city walls. The Parian's ghetto-like characteristics are one of the reasons why migration scholars are sceptical about Spanish achievements in the treatment of Fujianese settlers. Indeed, the ruling class explicitly hampered assimilation: The Chinese should remain Chinese. Dirk Hoerder even went as far as comparing sangley policies with the pogroms of the Jews and Moriscos in Spain, due to constant pressure to convert to Catholicism, the use of spiteful stereotypes, a heavy tax burden, and forced labour. While Spanish authorities wished all Chinese to be good Christians, at the same time they preferred them not to become too 'Hispanicised' but easily distinguishable. However, seclusion policies were only effective to a limited extent. Clear evidence of rigid confinement to the Parian is missing and many accounts suggest that they were easily circumvented: Many Chinese settlers found a modus operandi to keep their shops within the city walls and return there on a daily basis. Their daily life happened among Spaniards inside the city walls, until the evening prayer that called them back to their allocated Parian.

88 BR 7, p. 224.
89 The Jesuits employed 500 Chinese for the cultivation of their gardens in the surroundings of Manila. See BR 10, p. 150: ‘They give each Sangley, for the portion of the garden which he works, one peso and one fowl each month.’ For the fascinating story of Sino-Jesuit co-operation in the Philippines I refer to De la Costa (1961), *Jesuits*, pp. 68-69. Father Sedeño, who decided that instead of Tagalog, the newly arrived Chinese should be ministered in Chinese, should receive special mention in this respect. Ollé (2006), ‘Formación’, p. 28.
90 Reid (1993), *Expansion and Crisis*, pp. 311-319.
91 Hoerder (2002), *Cultures*, 179.
92 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), *Cédulas reales*, no. 91 (1597).
93 Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620.
The outstanding role of Manila's expat Fujianese community even features in Ming Chinese accounts; official China was well aware of the Spanish desire to keep the number of *huaqiao* as small as possible, as well as of Spanish attempts to expel them, if felt necessary.\(^{94}\) Based on the official Chinese perspective it is indeed doubtful how tolerant the atmosphere was in multicultural Manila. An evaluation and comparison with the situation of Japanese settlers follows in the next chapter.

**Japanese Towns**

Legend has it that the Japanese used to live among the Spaniards of Intramuros before they were assigned their own residential district.\(^{95}\) Yet already in the 1580s and thus much earlier than *shuinsen* trade set people in motion, the Spanish ruling elite felt the community of ‘arrogant’ sojourners from Japan was too large and too difficult to control and designated them a separate quarter called Dilao in 1585.\(^{96}\) Dilao was close to the Chinese Parian in San Gabriel, where Fujianese and Japanese used to trade silk. The Japanese lived under the supervision of the Franciscan Order, whose members would become the most influential ‘Spanish’ missionaries in Japan a few years later. One significant difference with the Chinese Parian was that the Japanese actively tended to seclude themselves and build their own settlements, as we have seen with the case of Aparri. For that reason, scholarship on Dilao, (a.k.a. the ‘Parian of the Japanese’\(^{97}\)) has created an image of a fairly independent village.\(^{98}\) Within a few years, the place turned into a lively Japanese town. When in June 1606, the fiscal of the Audiencia, Rodriguez Diaz Guiral, visited the Japanese settlement for an inspection, he counted 91 shops and lodgings.\(^{99}\) The Overseas Japanese who lived there were granted a certain form of self-governance over the following decades.\(^{100}\)

\(^{94}\) Ch’en, *Chinese Community*, p. 143, summarised records of the *Ming shi* and *Dongxiyangkao*.

\(^{95}\) Ortiz Armengol (1958), *Intramuros*.

\(^{96}\) Colin, *Labor Evangelica* (1900-1902), vol. 1, p. 37. ‘Dilao’ was a Tagalog word for yellow and also refers to a medical plant with yellow flowers.


\(^{98}\) Iwao (1937), *Nanyō*.

\(^{99}\) Pa-stells (1925), *Historia General*, vol. 5, p. 101; Wray (2001), ‘Japanese Diaspora’, p. 23: ‘The Japanese in Manila were at one point much more numerous, reaching a peak of about 3000 residents in the early 1620s. However, following the suspension of the vermilion-seal ships their numbers fell more quickly than those of other towns [e.g. Batavia, Ayutthaya, or Hoi An]. By 1637, there were only 800 compared to 2000 Spanish residents, and 20,000 Chinese, but they also seem to have survived longer than Japanese in other towns.’

Even though the number of Japanese residents was much smaller than that of the Chinese, they are said to have caused serious trouble for the Spanish authorities. In particular, tensions with Hideyoshi and Spanish encounters with wakō tarnished the image of the inhabitants of Dilao. In the period between 1605 and 1609, a series of riots occurred. After an uprising in 1606, the Jesuit Gracián described them as the ‘Spaniards of Asia’. A further aspect of their troublemaker image rooted in the merchants’ request for extraterritoriality in Manila, a claim no other trading nation made at that time. Often turbulent and resentful to controlling measures, they generally conducted themselves as though they were conscious of the support of their rulers at home, who were known for taking ‘national’ honour very seriously. Hence, Japanese settlers could act more independently than Fujianese settlers, who could not count on the patronage of the Chinese authorities. After a Japanese riot in 1607 the settlement was temporarily destroyed but soon re-erected. A second Japanese quarter, known as San Miguel, followed in 1615 and lasted until 1768. It belonged under the jurisdiction of Tondo and hosted exiled Christian Japanese men and women under Jesuit supervision. William D. Wray has divided Japanese emigrants in three categories: (1) the vermillion-seal ship businessmen, (2) Christian refugees, and (3) military people, including mercenaries and low-rank samurai. The last group left the country due to increasing political and social pressure and consisted mainly of opponents of the Tokugawa clan.

Similar to Fujianese merchants, sea-going Japanese brokers’ high degree of mobility raised suspicion among the colonial officers. For almost 50 years the Japantowns or nihonmachi (日本町) Dilao, San Miguel, and a third settlement in Cavite, retained a cultural atmosphere reflective of Japan. Its residents continued to use their mother tongue, to wear kimonos and other traditional dress, and to maintain their native cooking. Curiously, the community managed to preserve certain Japanese customs and traditions for many years, as a Chinese record of the early eighteenth century

106 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 342, refers to an account of 1621.
107 For the success stories of other Japanese overseas communities in Ayutthaya, Hoi An, or Tonkin, see Iwao (1958), Shuinsen.
108 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 282; Morga (1890), Sucesos, p. 367.
indicates. This indeed implies that most Japanese in Manila were not willing to assimilate to the society of their new home country and shows that they did not experience a lot of pressure to intermarry since a relatively large number of Japanese women migrated together with Japanese men.

A Flexible Labour Market?

What is even more interesting than the question of how East Asians ended up in Manila, is why they stayed and under what circumstances. In order to provide reasonable answers it will first of all be necessary to differentiate between the East Asian migrants’ backgrounds. Even within that comparatively small group one encounters various types, which moreover changed considerably over time. The largest group was the above-cited maritime actors, namely sailors, merchants, and fishermen, who spent parts of their lives at sea. Members of this group flocked to Manila mainly from Fujian and a lesser degree from Guangzhou, Kyushu, and Sakai for the prospect of a steady income and a better living standard. Quantitative data offers insights into their rags-to-riches stories. When the Ming Ministry of War estimated in the 1630s that 100,000 Fujianese came to Manila annually, we must not take it literally. Nevertheless, it gives a rough idea of the number of Chinese workers, as well as of the availability of work in Manila. Fujianese port city dwellers provided abundant skills to satisfy colonial demand. A maritime curriculum vitae could turn from piracy to a settled life of security and stability. Towards the end of the sixteenth century when jobs were easily found in Spanish construction projects, agriculture, or in the harbour, day labourers without a secure position or fixed income became a common sight in Manila. The daily wage of non-professional East Asian workers was 1 real without meals. Discussing Chinese indentured labour in British colonial settings, Adam McKeown defined Chinese labour as a commodity. His assertion that ‘mobilization and exchange of labour were indispensable aspects of expanding markets and trade’ also makes a valid point for Manila. We may even assume that mobile labour was a specific

109 Iwao (1937), Nanyo, pp. 365-367.
110 Brook (2010), Troubled Empire, p. 225: ‘For the people living along the coast have no other way to make a livelihood’, wrote a Fujian petitioner in 1639. ‘The poorest always band together and go to sea to make a living. The most coastal restrictions are tightened, they have no way to get food, so they turn to plundering the coast.’
111 BR 7, p. 229.
development in Manila and that during the early decades the existence of an abundant workforce replaced slave labour of previous, and the indentured labour of later centuries. These circumstances even inspired the Crown to revise the old system of *repartimiento* in 1609. Modifications foresaw the integration of East Asian settlers into work for the Crown, such as personal assistance, public construction and naval services for a ‘just salary’.

A second group, whose members were all resident Fujianese, consisted of retailers and artisans; many of them managed to open their own businesses in Manila. They dominated all important service branches, worked as gardeners, carpenters, bakers, butchers, painters, smiths and goldsmiths, or produced bricks and lime. Although Japanese likewise engaged in Manila’s service sector, without Chinese diligence and commitment, the Spaniards could not have built fine houses at low cost. Fujianese residents were fully aware of how essential they were to the material welfare of the islands, in an urban climate dominated by ad hoc cooperation and improvised cooperation. In fact, the circumstances in early modern Manila gave the allegedly exploited and suppressed power over the ruling elite. Chinese control of the majority of respectable professions, including shipbuilders, translators, or linguists (*jurebassos*, *naguatatos*, or *lenguas*), put them into influential positions in the urban community. Linguists, in particular, had the means to manipulate information in favour of their community or benefactors. In theory, a rise in their social status was only possible if the East Asians were to convert to Christianity. But even if they

113 See Seijas (2008), ‘Portuguese Slave Trade’, p. 21: Portuguese became the primary suppliers of slaves (both Black and Asian) for the Spaniards beginning as early as 1580s; For the general situation of slaves in the Philippines, see Scott (1991), *Slavery*.
115 AGI Filipinas 36, n. 62, ‘Carta de Miguel Talledo pidiendo empleo’, 9 November 1611.
116 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleitos de Manila, 1614/1620, f. 109: Capitán Juan de México, 1614: ‘En esta ciudad no hay personas que usen los oficios que son necesarios en una republica sino son los sangleyes los cuales los usan y van a parar a sus manos todas las cosas que son necesarias para los dichos oficios y así de ninguna suerte se puede excusar el trato y comercio con los dichos sangleyes.’ See also BR 7, pp. 228-229.
117 According to records in AGI Escribanía 403B some Castilian inhabitants of Manila employed up to eight Chinese in their households.
118 The word was commonly used for ‘interpreter’ in early modern South East Asia. See Kaisla -niemi (2009), ‘Jurebassos and Linguists’, pp. 60-73. For *jurebassos* in Manila, see Cocks (1883), *Diary*, p. 334, where he mentioned Hernando Ximenes as a jurebasso who offered his service in Bantam and Manila in 1622. Early Spanish colonisers in the Philippines used the term *naguatatos* for Chinese interpreters and linguists, deriving from Mexican Nahuatl. See Gil (2011), *Chinos*, p. 784.
did, baptism hardly ever made them devoted Christians. Some Japanese residents managed to accumulate a certain amount of wealth and social status by running their own shops, trading the cargo of the Japanese ships or finding employment as captains, sailors, soldiers, personal assistants, or mercenaries for the Spanish.\footnote{Okada, Katō (1983), *Nichiō kōryū*, p. 157.} Initially, control was linked with strategic evangelisation, for one part because it was believed that Christians were theoretically more submissive and for another part because only Christians could legally be integrated into forced labour arrangements. However, the Philippines proved to be very different from other Spanish colonial experiences despite the efforts of numerous friars so that even Philip II lamented that not a single Chinese on the island was a believer anymore.\footnote{Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), *Cédulas reales*, no. 91 (1597).}

A third group consisted of (maritime) mercenaries. The phenomenon dates back to the *wakō* raids along coastal China in the 1550s, when mercenaries, who were recruited from the civilian population, became the backbone of coastal defence. It re-emerged with slightly different characteristics in the 1620s during the smuggling boom on the Fujianese coast and Dutch collaborations with Chinese illicit traders.\footnote{Cheng (2013), *War, Trade and Piracy*, pp. 13; 42.} Japanese maritime mercenaries, whose members often came from *rōnin* (jp., 浪人), samurai without a lord, who emerged during the Warring States period and in particular after the Battle of Sekigahara (1600) and the Battle of Osaka (1615). They had offered their services a few decades earlier – for instance, in the infamous Cambodia expedition of Diego Belloso and Blas Ruiz in 1598.\footnote{Morga (1890), *Sucesos*, p. 43.} In 1615, Governor Silva employed Japanese military personnel of several hundred on a fleet of 15 ships against the Dutch, who penetrated the Moluccas.\footnote{Iwao (1937), *Nanyō*, p. 291. According to Iwao, Silva’s squadron consisted of 15 ships, for which he took 500 Japanese into his service.} Military assistance was one specific form of semi-private Hispano-Japanese collaboration. The Japanese also offered their service to the Dutch and to the Portuguese in Macao.\footnote{In this context, see also Clulow (2007), ‘Japanese Mercenaries’, pp. 15–34. See Iwao (1937), *Nanyō*, pp. 246–256, for the fascinating example of Yamada Nagamasu, who commanded 700 Japanese mercenaries. Boxer (1963), *Great Ship*, p. 82: In 1612 many Japanese served as personal assistants, replacing black slaves.} As far as maritime mercenaries were concerned the line between voluntary and indentured service was
particularly blurred, as an example of a Chinese mutiny on the Moluccas expedition of 1593, discussed below, will show.  

A common paradigm in migration studies is that work is the key to positive social integration. The picture above obscures certain ambiguities of the system. Although the division of labour in Manila indicates an advanced economic structure that allowed the integration of the Chinese work force, official policies remained conservative, stipulating that only those absolutely necessary for services the Spanish could not perform should remain in Manila.

It goes without saying that the indigenous population played a vital part in Manila. The indigenous did affect social policies despite their marginal role in foreign trade. The manner in which this happened under less deliberate and less free conditions as for East Asian settlers has already been discussed in chapter 2. Only when the Chinese were unwilling or unable to satisfy the demands of the labour market could the Governor assign native people. Through intermarriage parts of the indigenous community became linked to the Chinese population. Such bonds were already common among Chinese traders visiting the archipelago in pre-Hispanic times. The number of Sino-Filipino families grew and with the *mestizo de sangley*, an entirely new group of colonial settlers, appeared. Thanks to a high level of bilingualism, their familiarity with the Hispanic culture compared to people born outside the Philippines, the Spaniards found it easier to trust them. Hence they qualified as linguists for the colonial government as *ladino en lengua castellano* (sp., ‘Castilian language experts’) and accompanied the judges on their inspections of incoming merchant vessels from Fujian.

Spanish and Portuguese accounts are filled with references to Chinese and Japanese servants, usually with Christian names, who worked as interpreters and we have reason to believe that some of them were unfree individuals as recent research has shown that the Portuguese slave trade.

126 ARSI Phil 16, ff. 157-161v: Esc il Gov. G.P. ‘Dasmariñas per andare a Maluco: egli avienne una violenza e disgratiata norte.’
127 BR 10, pp. 8t-85.
128 Cf. Nuchera (1995), *Encomienda*, p. 241: ‘Si estos no quisieran o no pudieran satisfacer las demandas laborales, se facultaba al gobernador para que convenciese a los naturales a que acudiesen a tales trabajos.’
130 Famous interpreters include Nicolás Ramírez from Binondo and Juan Sanson/Sauson, both *mestizos de sangley* fluent in Castillian. Cf. Gil (2011), *Chinos*, p. 41.
in South East Asia included people from China and Japan. Shipbuilding in the yards of Cavite was a further example of close collaboration between Chinese and Filipino labour under the supervision of Spanish experts, with fixed wages. For that reason, members of all Catholic orders were present in Cavite for the spiritual welfare of indigenous and foreign labour. Those who did not find employment with construction worked as ironsmiths, forging nails and bolts, tacks, and other things needed. According to a Spanish record of 1619, ‘the native Indians who are smiths are paid twelve reals per month, and the [S]angley Chinese smiths twenty-eight reals per month, and their ratio of rice which is equivalent to one-half a Spanish’. In comparison Chinese wages had barely changed in 30 years. Next to Filipino shipwrights, Filipino mariners were sought after on all Spanish maritime enterprises in Asia. Their nautical knowledge, in particular of the perilous seas surrounding the archipelago, made them indispensable. Both Chinese and natives signed on the trans-Pacific galleons, and a significant number used that position to remain in New Spain. Edward R. Slack has thus argued that the Chinese were remarkably mobile within the Spanish Pacific. In Mexico they left their imprint in urban handicrafts and social institutions.

The strong position of Chinese in Manila is particularly evident in their insufficiently studied role as moneylenders. On a temporarily expanding Manila market with increasingly elaborate exchange they were sought after by Spaniards short of money. Ironically, Chinese moneylenders stood in for those waiting for the silver carried on the galleon as the following example shows: In 1610, about 480 borrower’s notes (for 3 pesos each) from the Chinese to the Spanish were outstanding. This led to the curious situation that Chinese merchants acted as capitalists offering loans to Spanish merchants, and unmistakably demonstrate how Spanish attempts to monopolise the galleon trade failed.

131 De Sousa, Breites Manso (2011) ‘Os Portugueses’; BR 9, p. 45: For instance, Luis, who worked as servant for the Spanish merchant Juan de Solís, served as interpreter during Juan Cobo’s embassy to Japan 1592.
133 BR 36, p. 95.
134 BR 18, pp. 175-176.
135 Scott (1981), Boat Building, p. 19: The author argues that in particular the Bernardino Straits between Luzon and Samar were hard to cross without local knowledge.
137 Medina (1630), Historia, p. 102.
138 Morga (2008), Sucesos, p. 183; BR 13, p. 219.
The fact that the Chinese dominated several sectors implies their swift adaptation and appropriation of necessary skills that corresponded to any change in material culture or modified practices. This inevitably leads to such fancy concepts as cultural transfer. In the context of this study the definition of ‘cultural transfer’ clearly needs to be questioned. While it is commonly understood as the adaptation of knowledge to established ideas and practices it implies a willingness to learn. Foreign residents of Manila doubtlessly acquired new skills when working for the Spaniards, yet the degree of unconscious accommodation must have been very high, as the example of worship paintings and church furniture implies. Bookbinding is another particularly interesting example of Chinese adaptability: although a new craft that the Chinese learnt in Manila, they mastered it quickly thanks to their familiarity with Asian traditions of paper, letters, and scripts. Within a few years, they gained a reputation of being very gifted with their hands, industrious and moreover produced goods cheaply. Their ability to copy almost any product after a short period of time was admired by many Spaniards. Manila’s overall positive climate for cultural exchange gradually increased the quality of the products manufactured there. Sangley manufactures enriched Manila’s urban society. Yet while Chinese entrepreneurs created a vibrant economic climate, the Spanish production sector remained small and was no competition for the Chinese. Spanish residents held positions as encomenderos, landowners, merchants, bureaucrats, or ecclesiastical authorities, but only very few made money by providing their fellow countrymen with daily necessities. This being the job of the Chinese, the Japanese, and the indigenous population, primary and secondary sectors depended almost entirely on what was regarded as ‘second-class citizens’.

139 For some effects of cultural transfer, see Osterhammel (1998), Entzauberung Asiens, pp. 25; 29; 64–68; Osterhammel (2009), Verwandlung der Welt, pp. 28–45.
142 BR 7, p. 225: ‘They make much prettier articles than are made in España and sometimes so cheap that I am ashamed to mention it.’ BR 7: 226: Bishop Salazar praises their virtue of ‘produc[ing] with exactness’.
143 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620: Miguel Onte noted that ‘non-Christian sangleyes have taken all jobs of the republic; they are shoemakers, tailors, smiths, carpenters, embroiderer goldsmiths, hatter, and all other necessary professions and the Spanish do not provide them, nor do they have more than five or six shops where they only send Castilian goods and presents’.
This chapter on the Manila dream would not be complete without mentioning its dark side. For many people from mainland and insular Asia, who did not travel to Manila voluntarily, life in Manila ended in the nightmare of permanent servitude. Slavery was not new in insular South East Asia at the end of the sixteenth century. Enslavement of war captives continued without Spanish participation but as a by-product of Spanish colonial rule, challenged by the so-called Moro raids. Slaves from abroad challenged Spanish morality. Bishop Salazar asked the King’s advice on slaves from Melaka and India, whom the Portuguese brought to Manila to sell, wondering whether these people were free in the eyes of the King.\textsuperscript{144} In the seventeenth century, under unsolvable demographic pressure, Spanish demand for slaves, either for employment as house servants (owners included even the church) or for work on the galleys, increased. Under these circumstances humans became a commodity on the Manila market. Portuguese maritime traders sustained the Spanish in the Philippines with unfree labour from China, Japan, and other Asian ports. Tatiana Seijas claimed that Hispanic purchasers in Manila preferred Asian over African slaves.\textsuperscript{145} She has furthermore shown that trafficking in slaves continued far into the seventeenth century despite legal barriers. By 1621, almost one-third (or 1970 out of a population of 6110) of the population of Intramuros was unfree. Fifteen years later, the number of slaves and black freedmen was such that the Governor actually recommended that 400 to 500 of these ‘disorderly’ men be forcibly relocated to a nearby island under the care of Jesuits.\textsuperscript{146} Most recently, Lúcio de Sousa’s remarkable research on Portuguese slave trafficking practices in East Asia has stressed the firm ties with the market in Manila.\textsuperscript{147} Portuguese merchants started as early as in the 1550s to buy and sell Asians. At the turn of the century, Manila became increasingly involved. Trafficking practices relocated huge numbers of Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans; many of them women and children, either came to Manila on transit or found their new home there.\textsuperscript{148} Some of them even ended up in Europe or were shipped to Mexico, while members of the church often collaborated with the slave traders to legalise transactions.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{144} Camuñez (1988), \textit{Sínodo}, pp. 77-78.
\textsuperscript{145} Seijas (2008), ‘Portuguese Slave Trade’, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{147} De Sousa (2013), ‘16-17 seiki’, pp. 229-281.
\textsuperscript{148} Lorenzo (1996), \textit{Manila-Acapulco Slave Trade}.
8 Actors and Agency

Everyday Life Constraints: Head Taxes, Revenues, Residence Permits

Shifting focus to a micro history of social constraints of individuals in Manila ideally involves access to local voices. Yet, early modern local voices have hardly survived in written sources. So, if we want to study individuals in Manila we have to approach them through the institutions, which determined their lives. Controlling Fujianese settlers in Manila was closely intertwined with benefitting from them financially: colonial leaders charged various taxes and Chinese residence permits were mandatory.\(^1\) Collecting revenue from the Fujianese hardly ever followed a clear pattern. When in 1593 word of Fujianese grievances reached Madrid, the King decreed a more subtle way of taxation for the first time: Instead of paying the Governor, the *alcalde mayor* as direct Parian authority should be paid. Being a mere lip service the reform did not bring any real improvement. Colonial authorities continued to embezzle, while the Chinese often refused to pay their *alcalde mayor* in the early seventeenth century.\(^2\)

Colonial officials, such as Antonio de Morga, criticised the lack of clear, transparent book-keeping with regard to Manila’s external trade revenue, including *almojarifazgo*.\(^3\) Concerned about the migration of silver to China, Spaniards tried to cut potential losses with a complex system of different sums of poll tax for the indigenous, the Chinese, and the Japanese populations. After they had experienced the first major wave of Chinese migration, 64 reals were charged for the privilege to stay, 12 reals for owning a house, and 5 reals as tribute.\(^4\) After 1611, per capita tribute was levied on the Chinese.\(^5\) Rafael Bernal stated that 8 pesos were collected annually from non-Christian Chinese. The tax burden imposed by Governor Juan de Silva (r. 1609-1616) brought in 80,000 pesos in 1621.\(^6\)

The early-twentieth-century Japanese historian Murakami Naojirō presented quantitative data based on a compilation of decrees by Philip IV

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1 *Audiencia oidores* were in charge of issuing those permits. AGI Filipinas 76, n. 53, ‘Carta del Obispo de Nueva Segovia Diego de Soria, sobre alzamiento de sangleyes’, 8 July 1594.
of the year 1627. He acknowledged that newly converted Chinese were exempted from the payment of tribute for ten years. This points to an acknowledgment of their necessity and proves that foreigners could live comparatively freely in Manila; even if the ruling elite would not want to admit it. Along with the 1630s crisis in the South China Sea trade, the Spaniards seemed to try even more actively to lure Chinese to Manila, as can be seen in the significant increase of residence permits. In the year 1636, Governor Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera (r. 1635-1644), who, on a slightly different note, was fined for the loss of Taiwan in 1645, prided himself on his collection of between 11,000 and 13,000 licences. His diligent efforts in collecting head taxes gained the hacienda 170,000 pesos. Revenue from residence permits indeed peaked at 135,904 pesos in 1634, almost twice the amount of an average year in the 1610s.

Although Chinese and Japanese are often mentioned together, we have reason to believe that the latter were treated differently. Spanish officials used to complain that the Japanese merchants did not pay any custom fees when exchanging their silver for Chinese silk in Manila. While Iwao’s claim that Japanese traders had to pay the same entrance fee as the Chinese is convincing, there is no clear evidence for a head tax. Besides, Spanish authorities deliberately drew a clear line between Chinese and Japanese policy. Nothing served that purpose better than manipulating public opinion. In the early days, Chinese settlers were described in the brightest of colours as easy-going neighbours, being clean, well-educated and above all industrious. Stereotypes changed from ‘very unassuming and modest people’ and diligent, hard workers to ‘an unscrupulous race’ famous for adultery and sodomy. Twentieth-century scholarship likewise backs up a discourse of cultural clashes due to Spanish ignorance or arrogance, while

7 Siehe Recopilación de Leyes de Indias, book 6, title 18, law 7 issued by Philip IV, 14 June 1627, cf. Murakami (1915), ‘Japan’s Early Attempt’.
9 Pastells (1933), Historia, vol. 8, p. 246.
11 AGI Filipinas 29, n. 94, ‘Carta de los oficiales reales sobre varios asuntos’, 14 July 1607.
12 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 335.
13 Japanese residents certainly paid tribute in the 1630s. Iwao, p. 298. 218 tribute paying Japanese households were registered for the year 1637. Cf. Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 298.
15 BR 3, pp. 168; BR 7, pp. 228-229.
16 Morga in BR 10, pp. 83; 150. The archbishop of Manila, Ygnacio de Santíbañez, wrote the account in June 1597 to Philip II. Medina (1630), Historia, pp. 68-69.
more positive narratives of a mutually enriching port city environment are rare.17 Similar wavering tendencies can be traced for the ‘belligerent’ Japanese, a recurring label probably influenced by the Chinese, since Ming sources commonly describe the Japanese as always carrying weapons.18 Contemporary Japan experts such as Francisco Xavier, Luís Frois, or Diego de Santa Catalina treated the same discourse as common knowledge.19 To be fair, Chinese stereotypes of the folangji were hardly more flattering. Sixteenth-century Portuguese merchants were accused of kidnapping and eating children. This reputation goes back to an incident with Simão Andrade who purchased underage Chinese in Guangzhou to sell them as slaves in 1517; the rumour spread to the court in Beijing where it harboured ill feelings for many decades.20

Juridical Issues and Multicultural Conflicts

Diverse actors of different ethnicities, ranks, and religions required specific legal and administrative institutions. Similarly to commercial exchange policies, legal, and administrative institutions changed as a by-product of bargaining on the spot. Immigration and geopolitical threats created peculiar social, urban, and juridical models. Manila’s ruling class initially set out to build a functioning multilayered urban society based on an elaborate administration and a specific juridical body, which was negotiated with the Crown over the years. Complex legal standards for different ‘nationalities’ were the consequence. The application of ethnic jurisdiction was assigned to the Governor.

The fact that representatives of the church became self-appointed guardians of the Chinese in Manila in the late 1580s meant constant potential for friction with the civil government. Friars eagerly protected Chinese merchants’ interests and protested against unfair intervention of the colonial authorities. In an attempt to solve some of the problems of Philippine society, Bishop Domingo de Salazar gathered together intellectuals and policymakers in 1582 to discuss new strategies for evangelising the Philippines and empowering the Spaniards in the East.21 One of the questions

18 Watanabe (2012), Kinsei Ryūkyū, p. 42.
21 Camúñez (1988), Sínodo.
addressed was whether the Governor should punish crimes according to Spanish law (Leyes de Indias or Laws of the Indies) or consider localist ethnic measures. Such dedicated efforts to integrate or at least consider ‘other’ legal traditions were a novelty in Spanish imperial politics, differing fundamentally from earlier conquests on the Iberian archipelago or the Americas. All in all, the attitude of the metropolis concerning the jurisdiction of the Chinese and Japanese was wavering and got constantly mixed up with the question of restricting Chinese financial gains in Manila. Over the years reports on abuse increased and reformers in Spain, worried about an economic and moral collapse, joined in. Memorialists from the Philippines, including Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, or arbitristas such as Duarte Gomes Solis (Portuguese New Christian), who published a speech in favour of the East India Company in 1628, warned of worsening conditions and increasing social distress and urged the King to react. Duarte Gomes Solis even urged the King to invest in Far Eastern trade between Acapulco, Manila, and Goa.

**Overseas Chinese (Huaqiao) in Manila**

According to China historian S.A.M. Adshead, Overseas Chinese communities in South East Asian Chinatowns had criminal potential because of the high number of small-scale, non-established private enterprises and unwelcome, plebeian emigrants. Indeed, contemporary observations mostly

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23 Ladero Quesada (1995), ‘Spain circa 1492’, p. 100; BR 7, p. 221; Dasmariñas to Felipe II on 20 June 20 1591. BR 8, p. 274: ‘From the pulpits they say that the governor is going to hell, because the Chinese have their laws, and we cannot dictate them unless we first govern ourselves according to the laws and customs which we found among the Indians of that country, because it was and is theirs.’ AGI Filipinas 76, n. 41, ‘Carta del obispo de Nueva Segovia Miguel de Benavides sobre quejas de los chinos’, 5 July 1598.
24 BR 7, pp. 154-155; BR 10, pp. 83-84: ‘The Sangleys should not be allowed to have Pariáns in certain towns of the islands, where there are but few Spaniards. The justices harbor them there for their own profit, and the harvests that they gather from them and their ships, as in Manila. This might prove very harmful and injurious, and renders it necessary that, at the very least, the ship coming to trade shall dispose of its cargo as quickly as possible, and return to China with all those who come in it. It is only just that, when the Sangleyes arrive with their ships, they should observe the proclamations issued which prohibit them from bringing many people. Penalties should be exacted, and when the Sangleyes return they should take as many people as they can, thus relieving the country from the many here who are an injury to it.’
deny the possibility for acculturation and this, the Spaniards believed, would justify the means for legal discrimination against the Chinese. It is important to note that legal discrimination was simply an administrative tool, which had hardly any impact on maritime trade. Initial resistance against Spanish trade control policies introduced in the days of Governor Ronquillo (r. 1583-1584) were soon replaced by resilient compromises. Neither restricting freedom of trade, nor the oppressive behaviour of Parian supervisors, stopped the Fujianese from frequenting Manila. As early as 1586 positive steps towards a more peaceful co-existence led to the establishment of a protector of the natives and a protector of the Chinese (protector de los sangleyes). The position dated back to the governorship of Francisco de Sande, who appointed Benito de Mendiola as the first protector of the native population of Manila, had a two-folded agenda: on the one hand, protectors were in charge of controlling ethnic groups so they would not disturb Christian, social order; on the other hand, they assisted members of ethnic minorities in legal and political affairs and made sure they would not be cheated by other functionaries. In the case of the protector de los sangleyes, the office (with an average annual salary of 800 pesos) was often combined with the post of the fiscal officer of the Audiencia. Benito de Mendiola, was the first protector de los sangleyes and he described abuses of Chinese by Spanish officials. The case of Juan de Alvarado Bracamonte, official protector of the Chinese in the seventeenth century, shows that in certain cases the Chinese would have been better off without him. As we have seen, friars were also committed to the non-Spanish population. Dominican friars made special efforts to administer the huaqiao in Mandarin. Juan Cobo was one of the first four Chinese-versed priests. The issue of attending to the Chinese was politically of ever-growing importance.

27 Chunquian, governor of the sangleyes, was excused of exploitation, fraud, and a general arbitrariness in dealing with Chinese residents. Cf. Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 47.
28 See BR 6, pp. 167-168; Ch’en (1968), ‘Chinese Community’, p. 73: ‘A Protector of the Indians should be appointed, a Christian man, and with authority to defend them, and prosecute their suit [...] The alcaicería and the care of the Chinese residing in Manila, be annexed to his office.’
29 Camuñez (1988), Sinodo, p. 75-76.
30 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 215; Camuñez (1988), Sinodo, p. 75. Usually they were of Spanish decent and enjoyed a fixed income.
31 AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 12, ‘Carta de Távora sobre la India, conflictos oidores’, 27 November 1630.
32 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 75.
34 San Agustín (1698), Conquistas, p. 381.
and fuelled conflict between the church and the royal government. A few years later, Philip II sided with the friars, rejoicing that

they have started to preach the *sangleyes* in their language with a lot of success because they were docile people with good intentions, I order to favour and honour in everything that happens and animate them to continue so that it serves God most and before long a good number of religious would exist.\textsuperscript{35}

Philip II intended to act as a just king in all matters concerning the Chinese in Manila. Relying on Bishop Salazar’s accounts, the Spanish monarch suggested providing the Chinese with legal representatives such as *alcaldes mayores* (sometimes referred to as *capitanes*) and *regidores*; he furthermore ordered that Christians among them should be allowed to elect their own mayor and municipal councils.\textsuperscript{36} But while the King was literally far away, his protégés were subject to discrimination. Chinese intellectual superiority especially distressed the Spaniards in Manila. Militating against an excessive number of Chinese interpreters, Antonio de Morga insisted that ‘these Sangleys should not be afflicted as at present by any judges, constables, and interpreters – who, by various pretexts and calumnies, cheat and rob them, and perpetrate much fraud, coercion, and bribery’.\textsuperscript{37} And he urged stricter control of Chinese merchants whom he accused of ‘robbing the country, enhancing the value of articles, and imparting many bad habits and sins to the natives’. Having his own view on well-organised Chinese mercantile networks, de Morga furthermore interpreted their mobility on the islands as indication for spying activity likely to be used against Spanish sovereignty.\textsuperscript{38} Given the persistent fear of a Chinese invasion, the government held exclusive responsibility and jurisdiction over the Chinese during these early years. Obedience and disobedience were closely intertwined in the realm of Chinese administration. While many deliberately subordinated to the will and jurisdiction of the colonial government, others took advantage of

\textsuperscript{35} Ayers (ed.) (1700–1746), *Cédulas reales*, no. 45 (1593).

\textsuperscript{36} See Ayers (ed.) (1700–1746), *Cédulas reales*, no. 71 (1591): ‘Por ser ya esta población de sangleyes de muchos vecinos, y que cada día se van aumentado se les podría conceder que hiziesen elección de alcaldes y regidores y otros oficiales de justicia y gobierno mayormente que es gente que vive con publicia.’ For election rights see ibid: ‘Que hiziesen elección de alcaldes y regidores y otros oficiales de justicia y gobierno mayormente que es gente que vive con publicia, y tienen discreción para governarse.’

\textsuperscript{37} BR 10, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{38} BR 10, p. 81.
corrupt officials. In addition, collaborations with indigenous people or the church were tempting due to these two groups’ access to the hinterland that would often serve as a welcome hideaway.

The agenda of multilayered jurisdiction stretched from settling regulations to political competition between government officials. The king’s act of good intentions of 1594 granted the Chinese their own alcalde capitán, a Castilian who often held other appointments such as e.g. regidor or procurador.39 Ten years later, the Governor, who had been in charge of issuing residence licenses, was appointed protector of the Chinese. In terms of executing power, the capitán of the Parian had to obey the instructions of the King, respectively his representative in the Philippines, the Governor; and technically the Audiencia, who monitored him and could report abuse of authority.40 The earliest legislation to be found in the Laws of the Indies dealing with the government of the Chinese was enacted on 15 April 1603.41 Although the Chinese had the right to appeal against their alcaldes, only a single judge was in charge of both civil and criminal cases of a total of 20,000 settlers.42

Among other things, accumulation of offices naturally had a negative impact on social and legal affairs in the Chinese community.43 Injustice has to be traced within the system.44 To begin with, the colonial government did not pay the alcalde of the Chinese a regular salary. Instead he was

40 For instance in the case of Marcos de la Cueba as recorded in AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620: ‘En ir a hazer causas de diputación al dicho Parián siendo contra cédula expressa de Su Magestad que les prohibe al hazerlo y manda que privativamente el alcalde que fuere del Parián tenga el conocimiento de todas las causas de sangleys que se ofrecieren sin que otra ninguna justicia se entremeta a conocer de ellas las qual dicha cédula esta mandada guardar y cumplir por la real audiencia y así no se puede decir exceder yo sino antes los dichos alcaldes y diputados pues van contra tantos mandados y provisiones.’
42 Merino (1980), Cabildo, p. 213.
43 BR 10, p. 83. In 1598, Morga urged that ‘action should be taken, so that these sangleys should not be afflicted as at present by any judges, constables, and interpreters – who, by various pretexts and calumnies, cheat and rob them, and perpetrate much fraud, coercion, and bribery.’ See also Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 261.
44 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620, f. 100: A Christian sangley beyond the jurisdiction of the alcalde mayor of Tondo did not pay for their alcalde mayor. Instead, the King had to pay him a salary. ‘Los sangleys cristianos que están en la jurisdicción del alcalde mayor de Tondo pagan ninguno alcade mayor de aquella jurisdicción sino que Su Magestad paga a el dicho alcaldes mayor y sin el dicho salario el dicho alcaldes tiene sus aprovechamientos de poyos y firmas que es de consideración y esto sabe y responde a esta pregunta.’
supposed to collect 2 pesos from every single shop in the Parian. The system enabled the *alcalde* to establish Spanish norms and standards in direct interaction with the Chinese entrepreneurs’ business. Consequently, officials must have been tempted to increase their salaries by fining retailers for not adhering to Spanish standards whenever the opportunity presented itself. Bakers, fishermen, and butchers complained regularly about the unfair tax-collecting methods and attempts to increase the amount of money to be paid.

A local Chinese authority, the ‘governor of the *sangleys*’ or *alguacil mayor* with legal capacities, co-existed with Spanish oversight. The office of the ‘Chinese governor’ was the only one within the Chinese administration exclusively held by a native of China. He received a regular salary, as did his proxy and his clerk. Yet the position came with one condition: the aspirant had to be a Christian. A similar office existed in other port city communities: a Hokkien merchant captain administered, for instance, the Chinese quarter Tay Kie Ki (Tin Kap) in Melaka. In Manila, his office indicates a certain degree of Chinese self-governance and political representation. In 1590, the Christian Chinese Don Juan Zanco was the first publicly acknowledged person to hold that office. Juan Bautista de Vera held the position in 1603 and closely collaborated with Governor Acuña. Restricted self-governance and ethnic jurisdiction were not compatible. A certain paragraph in the law regarding the Audiencia’s non-intervention in the jurisdiction of the Chinese rendered almost every attempt to reform

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45 The regular price for the post of *alcalde* in the early decades was 2000 pesos while it is reported that they were often sold for only 1000 pesos, which meant a major loss for the royal treasury. See AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620.
46 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620: f. 95; For controversial policies, see Pastells (1925), *Historia General*, vol. 6, p. 208.
47 Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620: Between 1611 and 1614 four *alcaldes* (Antonio Arzeo, Hernando de Avalos, Luis de Contreras, and Marcos de la Cueva) were publicly accused by high-ranking members of the Chinese population, including Christians and esteemed interpreters, of abusing their offices.
48 Guerrero (1966), *Chinese in the Philippines*, pp. 30-31; Gil (2011), *Chinos*, pp. 237-244. Appendices IX and XI mention the names of many Chinese who held the office of ‘governor of the *sangleys*’. Gil (pp. 237-238) describes the raison d’être of the office as follows: ‘Era una cómoda manera de ejercer un control más riguroso sobre ese grupo por medio de una persona integrada en él y afecta al poder, una persona a quien, llegado el caso, se pudieran exigir responsabilidades.’
49 Gil (2011), *Chinos*, p. 47. In 1619 Chunquian was governor of the *sangleys*.
50 BR 16, p.197: ‘The Chinese have a governor of their own race, a Christian, who has his officials and assistants.’
52 Gil (2011), *Chinos*, p. 239.
their administration useless. It said: ‘unless in case so extraordinarily necessary and imperative that it may appear convenient to limit this rule’.\textsuperscript{53} Other circumstances, such as allegiance and social pressure, impinged upon Chinese self-determination, as we will see below.

A secretary for the Chinese community, the \textit{escribano público}, was established in 1608, for the large number of administrative issues.\textsuperscript{54} In 1614 laws regarding Overseas Chinese administration were once again slightly modified. The fiscal of the Audiencia, the highest court in Manila, became their legal protector while an \textit{alcalde mayor} continued to supervise legal matters. Thereafter no other judge was allowed to deal with Chinese legal matters, or even to enter Chinese shops.\textsuperscript{55} In the late 1620s, when the number of Chinese settlements around Manila numbered at least six, Governor Tavora made attempts to increase church taxes imposed on the Chinese.\textsuperscript{56} Not surprisingly, the missionaries too tried to finance their work with revenues taken from the newly converted and potential converts, or by paying church expenses from money from the \textit{caja de sangleyes}.\textsuperscript{57}

At times the Chinese faced difficulties in defending their property within the linguistically challenging environment. The Bishop of Nueva Segovia, Miguel de Benavides, as head of the principal self-declared protecting institution for Chinese settlers, wrote to Philip II in July 1598 about ‘the grievous injuries that [the Chinese] suffer daily from [his] Majesty’s officials and other Spaniards’. A group of Christian and non-Christian Chinese had expressed their feelings in their language and characters in two letters addressed to the Spanish King, which were added to Benavides’s account. The Bishop claimed that the King’s own vassals were the greatest enemies of the Christian law since they violated the royal decree of leaving Chinese property untouched.\textsuperscript{58} Ill-treated Manila Chinese would again appeal directly to the monarch in Spain in later decades, for instance in 1630 with

\textsuperscript{53} Cunningham (1919), \textit{Audiencia}, pp. 250–251.
\textsuperscript{54} AGI Filipinas 36, n. 62, ‘Carta de Miguel Talledo pidiendo empleo’, 16 July 1610.
\textsuperscript{55} Von den Driesch (1984), \textit{Grundlagen}, p. 301.
\textsuperscript{56} BR 23, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{57} As described for the year 1631: ‘Cien pesos y cien fanegas de arroz en cáscara y dos arrobas de vino de Castilla para celebrar, que es la mitad que se da a los dos religiosos que administran en la Iglesia de Parián, y se le pague de la caxa de dicha comunidad de los sangleyes; por haber constado por los papeles que presentó tenerlos en doctrina y administrándoles los santos sacramentos y para ella tomen la razon los dichos tenedores de la orden en los papeles de dicha caxa de comunidad, para que en todo tiempo conste.’ Cf. Pastells (1925), \textit{Historia General}, vol. 1, p. 255.
\textsuperscript{58} BR 10, pp. 166-167. According to the Bishop the two Chinese petitions were sent to Spain and delivered by the Dominican Soria who acted as envoy. The petition only reached Philip III in April 1600.
a plea to be governed by mandarins or *alcaldes mayores* of the Chinese nation.\(^{59}\) The same year the Chinese of Manila presented a petition in which they requested the fiscal to act as their protector.\(^{60}\) Philip IV apparently did not comply with their requests.

At times wealthy Chinese merchants, such as the above-mentioned Li Tan (‘Captain China’), became politically influential in the Chinese community in the Parian.\(^{61}\) His intervention during the peak of his merchant career coincided with the flourishing years of the Japan-Taiwan-Fujian network, when Nagasaki ultimately replaced Manila as the port for Sino-Japanese trade. As trafficker of porcelains and silks, he served as ‘governor’ of the *sangleyes* in Manila, before he fled to Hirado after allegedly being forced to work on the galleys by the Spanish. Historian John E. Wills reported of a Spanish merchant who searched for him in Hirado to try to collect on a debt for which he had earlier stood surety in Manila.\(^{62}\)

### The Japanese in Manila

We have seen in various contexts that contemporary sources draw a rather ambivalent picture of the Japanese presence in Manila. Firstly, Japanese were perfectly connected with their compatriots in other South East Asian Japantowns and Japan. Secondly, historically close ties between seagoing merchants and local lords in their motherland let them appear to be a potential threat to Manila’s social order. Another obstacle for peaceful integration must have been the fact that several of the earliest settlers of Dilao were said to have come from the *wakō* settlement of Aparri, in the province of Cagayan.\(^{63}\) Encounters with these self-declared rulers, military conflicts, and the strong personalities of some, had a strong impact on the Spanish perception of the Japanese.\(^{64}\) Yet despite defamation and regular

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60 AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 12, ‘Carta de Niño de Távora sobre La India, conflictos oidores’, 27 November 1630.
61 Ollé (2009), ‘Manila’, p. 91; For other individual Chinese in Manila, see Gil (2011), *Chinos*, p. 123.
63 Some sources and historians like to refer to it as ‘Kingdom of Cagayan’. See Zaide (1949), *Philippines*, p. 346.
64 Tōyō Bunko, ‘Filipinas y el Japón’, p. 11.
stereotypical labelling, strikingly no pejorative term such as ‘sangley’ existed for the Japanese.

When the first Spaniards arrived in Manila in the late 1560s, they found a community of 20 Japanese, including a Christian named Pablo, a convert of the Jesuits in Japan. Early on individual Japanese entrepreneurs actively sought to gain control in Manila. Over the course of a joint Japanese-Filipino conspiracy of 1585 that started in Pampanga, the first Spanish province on Luzon, from where it ultimately spilled over to Tondo just outside the colonial capital. There, in the outskirts of Manila, some Japanese merchant settlers collaborated with Magat Salamat (datu of Tondo and son of a pre-Hispanic leader) and Agustin de Legazpi, both former indigenous chiefs of the region. Dissatisfied with power loss they had asked the Japanese to send soldiers for a strike against the Spaniards. Indeed, a Japanese squadron arrived in 1587 and brought a large provision of arms, including arquebuses. Captain Juan Gayo, a Christian from Hirado, who came to Manila on a Japanese ship that year, was also implicated in the plot following the conspiracy of Tondo. Ultimately all suspected traitors down to their interpreter Dionisio Fernandez, another Japanese Christian, were executed.

Thereafter Spanish suspicions were hard to allay. Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas declared in a letter dated 1592, that those 30 or 40 Japanese, who were dressed as pilgrims and pretended to visit the church in Manila, were in fact spies who came to study the port facilities. Rumours about the ambition of Hideyoshi’s ambassador, Harada Kiyemon, to become captain of Dilao fit perfectly into the picture. In particular, once we accept that the same Harada was among the 11 merchants sent from Nagasaki in 1586/87. An eyewitness of the time warned about the ambivalent relationship between Japanese and heathen Chinese settlers, and that the latter were not to be trusted because most of them had previously done business in Japan. He insisted that many Japanese

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66 Agoncillo (1960), Short History, p. 135.
68 AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 1587; BR 7, pp. 95-110.
70 BR 9, p. 48; For more details on the Japanese conspiracy, see BR 9, p. 40: Antonio López cautioned against the infidel sangleyes who collaborated with the Japanese.
72 This was all learnt from interpreter Antonio López, who had discussed the matter with a Japanese called Don Baltasar. Don Baltasar by then had been travelling from Japan and Cagayan via Ryukyu for seven years. See AGI Patronato 25, r. 50, ‘Trato del embajador del Japón con Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas’, 1593.
from Cagayan were now in Manila and that Harada Kiyemon himself had been involved in wakō trade in Cagayan. Prior to the first of a total of three expulsions in 1597, Bishop Benavides described relations with Japan as ‘war’ and lamented the Governor’s reluctance in taking the Japanese threat seriously. He complained of insufficient measures in fortifying the city, while individuals reconstructed their houses as fortresses with the help of cheap Chinese labour. Following Ieyasu’s encouragement for anti-piracy campaigns, the Spaniards considered it necessary to punish Japanese troublemakers publicly. In 1599 a small Spanish squadron under the command of Captain Gaspar Pérez chased illegal Japanese ships off the shore of Luzon. Of the pirate ship he captured, he killed all the Japanese crew except one, who was taken to Manila and ‘executed in the sight of the Xaponese and the Chinese’.

With an increasing influx of Japanese settlers during the first decade of the seventeenth century friction increased and attempts were made to decrease the number of settlers. In the years 1606 and 1607 Japanese residents revolted against deportation and the Audiencia’s order to work in the suburbs. Whilst in the first incident, Franciscan fathers managed to settle the conflict, the Japanese were defeated by joint Spanish-Filipino troops, who are reported to have burnt down the houses of the Japanese during the second. Thereafter Japanese intending to stay on the island had to surrender their weapons before stepping on the mainland. A royal order of 1608, issued in response to reports of Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, charged the Governor with the task of restricting the Japanese population, but directed him at the same time to exercise all care to avert any clash with them and not to do anything that would arouse the resentment of the Japanese ruler. The following year (1609) the Japanese reportedly joined forces with the Chinese and are said to have killed numerous Spaniards, including Captain Cardoso, in a riot. A letter by Philip III, which reached Manila in 1611, urged the local authorities to ban the Japanese from the Philippines, but obviously no concrete steps were taken in Manila.

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73 BR 9, p. 40.
74 BR 10, p. 164.
75 BR 10, p. 211.
76 Cf. Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 286.
77 Morga (2008), Sucesos, p. 248.
78 Schurz (1939), Manila Galleon, p. 248.
79 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 261-265.
80 Schurz (1939), Manila Galleon, pp. 100-101; BR 10, p. 211.
81 Cf. Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 287.
82 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 289. No evidence was found in the available Spanish data. All records between 1607 and 1612 emphasise the good relations with the ‘emperor’ of Japan.
Dilao’s administration is sometimes referred to as self-governance, under supervision of the Franciscans who were watching over Dilao from a nearby convent – which reflects parallels with Dominican and Jesuit cooperation with the Chinese. It has not yet been fully resolved, whether a Japanese or a Spaniard governed them. In 1627, a certain Capitan Juan Suion (probably the shuinsen merchant Itoya Zueimon) is mentioned as head of the Japanese in Manila.83

As indicated earlier, persecutions of Christians in Japan brought new impetus to the Japanese community in Manila. In autumn 1614 a large group of Japanese Christians fled to Manila to settle there permanently. Naitō Tadatoshi (内藤忠俊, 1550-1626; also known by his baptismal name Juan), a so-called Christian daimyō and commander of the Korea invasions, who had assisted Konishi Yukinaga in peace negotiations with the Ming, became a leading figure of the Japanese community. His noble travel companion to Manila was Takayama Ukon (高山右近, 1552-1615), Don Justo, daimyō of Takatsuki (高槻) in Osaka and later of Akashi (明石) before being disempowered by Tokugawa Hidetada.84 Both were warmly welcomed by Governor Juan de Silva and the Bishop and settled in San Miguel. In 1616 a group of Jesuits fleeing repressions landed in Manila with numerous Japanese Christians unwilling to give up their faith.85

Consequently, the number of Japanese immigrants in Manila grew and exceeded 3000 in 1623.86 The new Japanese Christian community in Manila attracted the Jesuits of the Philippines – who until then had stayed in the background in Japanese matters and had not crossed the seas northwards to join their Portuguese brothers ‘in the field’. With the arrival of the first refugees in Manila, they started to administer the new community in Japanese.87 Manila became a spiritual centre for newly converted Christians from the entire region and served as a portal to other Catholic cities in the Americas for some of them, as the example of a chapel in the cathedral of Mexico City, built for the first Japanese martyrs by a relative of executed Japanese Christians, proves.88 Devoted Japanese Christians did not lack spiritual guidance in Manila either. In 1629, for instance, Jesuits organised spectacular festivities for the beatification of the 1597 martyrs: the bulk of

83 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 209-213.
85 ARSI Phil. 9, f. 246.
86 Zaide (1949), Philippines, p. 351.
88 AHN Diversos, ‘Documentos de India’, f. 329 (1637).
the expenses was covered by the municipal government. Two more ships with a total of approximately 200 Japanese religious refugees, many of them sick, landed in 1632. During the same period many Japanese Christians, encouraged by the expelled Jesuits from Japan, also moved to Vietnam instead of Manila. With no more new arrivals, the number of Japanese settlers gradually decreased after the 1640s.

Despite these new settlers’ devotedness – praised by their supporters within the Society of Jesus – civilian Spaniards did not see much of a change in mentality and stayed alert. In fact, their arrival meant growing complexity and increasing trouble for the colonial government in Manila. In 1620, Philip III ordered that the Governor and the Audiencia should adopt whatever measure they saw fit for minimising the risk of insurrections. He warned them not to harm the relations of trade and friendship. Before this letter could reach Manila, Governor Fajardo wrote to the King: ‘A large part of the Japanese had been expelled, so that for a long time there have not been so few of them as now.’ However, a royal decree of the following year was critical to the fact that the Japanese were allowed to stay because of the ‘negligence and carelessness’ of the authorities in Manila. The number of Japanese should not exceed 500, according to royal decrees.

Cultural and Social Issues

Concrete case studies are a second possible way to get access to local, individual voices within controversial matters of the multicultural administration. Integrating micro history into the bigger picture creates an entirely new context, for instance, when we look at the strange tale of the seemingly minor aesthetic peculiarity of Chinese Christians’ hairstyles. The question, whether the Chinese should be allowed to grow their hair long or cut it after having received baptism, resulted in a serious conflict between

89 AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 12, ‘Carta de Niño de Távora sobre La India, conflictos oídores’, 27 November 1630.
90 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 294-297.
93 AGI Filipinas 74, n. 94, ‘Carta de García Serrano sobre incidente de Dilao’, 1 August 1622. It is not entirely clear whether the incident can be related to Japanese settlers.
the ecclesiastic and the civil government in Manila. They debated whether hairstyle was a matter of rite and habit. The stumbling block in Manila and Madrid was whether converted Chinese should be forced to cut their hair short in ‘Christian fashion’. A pro and a counter party argued heatedly until the King himself lay down the law. On 23 June 1587 he commanded Governor Santiago de Vera not to cut the new converts’ hair against their will under any circumstances.95 Yet the fussy issue was taken up again, when Bishop Salazar argued in 1590 that not cutting Chinese pigtails posed a major risk for Christianity. Neither did circumstances on the ground change during the tenure of Bishop Miguel de Benavides: When two principle members of the Chinese community (Lorenzo Ungac and Don Salvador Tuigam) were to receive baptism in Cebu, he urged the priest in charge not to cut their hair by any means, but in vain.96 Most friars did not see the bigger picture and stubbornly insisted on the haircut far into the seventeenth century. Multiethnic governing continued to lack a general level of continuity.97 With a short, ‘Western-style’ haircut there was no way for Chinese Christians to go back. Given that the measure was only applied to converts it is difficult to understand why of all people those who were willing to compromise and adapt were punished? The hairstyle issue remained a recurring theme in social policies and therefore serves as a significant example for the phenomenon of ‘dis-learning’. It moreover stands in sharp contrast to Spanish attempts to impede full assimilation, illustrated in Antonio de Morga’s remark of 1596 that ‘it would be much better for the Chinese who become Christians not to dress like Spaniards’.

Civil government’s conflict with Catholic missionaries peaked with Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas’s philanthropic, but ambivalent, stance regarding Chinese ethics: He intended to permit local non-Christians to celebrate their heathen deities, and permitted fireworks during the Chinese New Year.99 On other occasions his harsh conduct and short temper threatened their lives, while the fact that he was killed at the hands of the same Overseas Chinese he had defended in his period in office, puts things into perspective: In 1593 he requested 250 Chinese as rowers on the Spanish

95 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 22 (1587); see also Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 429.
97 For the controversy between Bishop Salazar and Governor Vera, see AGI Filipinas 34, n. 75, ‘Carta de Santiago de Vera sobre situación general’, 26 June 1587.
98 BR 10, p. 83.
galleys in return for a monthly salary of 2 pesos from the royal treasury.100 When the Chinese merchants refused, they were taken by force and as a reaction they killed the Spaniards, including the Governor, who served as military general of the expedition, on 25 October 1593.101 Upon request of Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, the deceased Governor’s son, a Chinese war fleet with seven mandarins arrived in Manila Bay a few months later.102 Claiming to have come in search of the Chinese renegades and to recall Chinese settlers, the interim Governor and other high-ranking Spaniards received them politely, while suspecting them of preparing an invasion.103

From a socio-economic perspective, it is interesting that a comparatively high number of Chinese settlers were literate, as Lucille Chia has plausibly shown.104 Indeed, in late imperial China merchant class and gentry increasingly participated in classical learning and acquired elaborate writing skills (for drafting genealogies, taking care of accounting, and mortgages); this corresponds with Spanish observers’ frequent admiration for the high command of writing of the Chinese in Manila.105 Although controversial scholarly views persist, what speaks in favour of a higher degree of education of the Chinese was their quick appropriation of sophisticated techniques, their involvement in printing in Manila and their reliable work as linguists, including teaching calligraphy and Chinese classics to interested Spanish parties.106 The latter point is illustrated by works produced in the printing press of the Parian run by the Dominicans. The first books were published in the late 1590s, though just like in other Asian missionary centres, translations of spiritual works were common.

One question that is still open for debate is, whether cultural and political divergences between the Catholic Castilians and the Confucian Chinese had any consequences for intercultural communication in Manila. One way

100 Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleitos de Manila, 1614/1620, f. 96.
101 The Dongxi yangkao 5 and the Ming shi-lu describe the events, referred to as P’an Ho-wu incident, in detail.
102 Ch’en (1968), Chinese Community, p. 143. Ch’en calls this act of protecting the huaqiao ‘a remarkably new phenomenon in the history of the Chinese immigration abroad’.
105 For learning traditions in late imperial China, see Elman (1990), Classicism, p. 23; For Spanish accounts, José de Acosta, author of Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias (1590), who wrote about the cultural and social importance of books and written documents for Chinese settlers while in Peru in De Procuranda Indorum Salute (1588). Cf. Camuñez (1988), Sínodo, p. 209.
106 Van der Loon (1966), ‘Manila Incunabula’. The printing press of the Parian, run by the Dominicans, published its first books in the late 1590s. Just like printing presses in other Asian missionary areas it mainly covered translations of spiritual works.
to understand the impact of non-verbal communication is re-examining the uprising of the Chinese in 1603 and its infamous reaction by Spanish forces. I have referred to the incident sporadically but left the analysis of events for this section. The early seventeenth century was a period when tensions between the Overseas Chinese and colonial officials surged. When three mandarins arrived in Manila in 1603, ostensibly searching for the legendary gold mountains of Cavite, anxious Spanish leaders misinterpreted it as a sign of a long-feared Chinese invasion. Much has been written on the severe punishment handed out by the Spaniards, who were accused of having slaughtered several thousand people. It is hard to ascertain what exactly happened, since accounts on the event differ largely depending on the standpoint of the authors.

The Spaniards are reported to have burnt the Chinese silk market, the alcaicería, after having noticed that inhabitants of the neighbourhood were preparing for an attack. During the following weeks, joint Spanish-Filipino and Japanese forces supposedly killed between 15,000 and 30,000 Chinese. There is no concrete evidence to support the large number of victims claimed in both Chinese and Western circles. The Spanish refuted the allegation of having killed as many as 30,000 in an official letter to China, claiming that the total number was less than half of that. Not only is reliable data for the exact figure of Fujianese settlers in 1603 unavailable, but the Chinese and the Spanish (the latter because they were in permanent need of financial and military support from their mother country and the Mexican viceroyalty) also had good reasons to exaggerate.

107 The following paragraphs are largely based on my article in the Journal of World History 23/3. For a chronological overview of the events, see Borao (1998), ‘Massacre’, pp. 22-29. For the Chinese view, see Zhang (1934), Ming shi folangji, pp. 90-101.

108 For explanations regarding the legendary gold mountain, see Zhang (1934), Ming shi folangji, p. 91.

109 AGI Filipinas 7, r. 1, n. 12, ‘Carta de Acuña sobre sublevación de sangleyes, galeras’, 8 August 1603; AGI Filipinas 35, n. 68, ‘Carta de Juan de Bustamante sobre la sublevación de los sangleyes’, 18 December 1603; AGI Filipinas, 19, r. 6, n. 91, ‘Carta de audiencia sobre asuntos de gobierno’, 30 June 1605.

110 AGI Filipinas 84, n. 118, ‘Carta del cabildo eclesiástico de Manila sobre sublevación de sangleyes’, 11 December 1603.

111 AGI Filipinas 7, r. 1, n. 28, ‘Carta de Acuña al virrey de Ucheo sobre castigo al sangleyes’, 1 July 1605; Merino (1980), Cabildo, p. 36. A first hand source of Manila’s municipal government indicates that 20,000 Chinese revolted.

112 In Chinese records numerical data vary between some 10,000 and 30,000. See Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3169 (accessed 10 September 2013).

113 AGI Filipinas 7, r. 1, n. 28, ‘Carta de Acuña al virrey de Ucheo sobre castigo de sangleyes’, August 1605. Jesuits’ reports in the annual letters to Rome reflect a critically different notion of the events. See ARSI Phil 1, f. 22, P. Angelo Armano (Manila).
Even if the number of Fujianese settlers had doubled the officially permitted 6000 and if we add several hundred visiting merchants we do not reach such a high number. Insufficient munitions are a further stumbling block. After all that we have heard about shortcomings in weapons, gunpowder, and men, it is hard to believe that the Spaniards, despite Japanese and Filipino support, were able to hand out such a drastic punishment. What certainly helped the Spaniards was that the alcalde of the Parian, a Chinese Christian called Juan Bautista de la Vera transcribed as Eng Kang, was loyal to the colonial government and thus fuelled opposition.114

What might have caused social unrest of such a degree? Firstly, the Chinese had been subjected to extra taxes, were ghettoised and had been suppressed by the government and church. Secondly, Spanish envy of Chinese settlers who dominated large sections of the Manila market and accumulated increasing wealth could be a reasonable explanation.115 Gatherings of the Chinese were interpreted as a violation of a cédula real of Philip IV that prohibited the Chinese from leaving their parian. Anti-Chinese propaganda accused the Chinese of having destroyed sacred items, of collaborating with the Dutch, and of having killed a provincial Castilian alcalde mayor.116 A document about the administration of a hospital run by the Dominicans, the Hospital de San Gabriel, reveals that a necessary condition to receive medical treatment was baptism.117 What does this mean in light of the earlier considered notion of tolerance? Again, the friars of the Catholic orders had a hard time fulfilling expectations for their role as protectors of the non-Spanish ethnicities living in and around Manila. The more they became involved with daily politics the less empathetic they became to the needs of their protégés.

The events of 1603/4 caused by no means a caesura for Sino-Philippine relations, as one would assume. Judging from the number of Chinese vessels calling at Manila, a sharp increase to 39 is noticeable in 1607, after fluctuations around 15 and 18 between 1602 and 1605.118 Influential Fujianese

115 Juan Gil has identified several Chinese merchant captains for the decade between 1590 and 1600. A certain Guansan was the richest and most influential of them. In 1599 he had goods for 137,761 pesos registered in Cavite. See Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 79.
116 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 248; vol. 9, p. 305: Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera (r. 1635-1644) defended the cruel Spanish reprisal of setting fire to the Parian as an inevitable reaction to the violent outrage of a heavily armed mob of 24,000 Chinese.
118 Chaunu (1960), Philippines, pp. 148-160; BR 14, pp. 50-52: A letter to Philip III of 1605 also confirms that 18 ships arrived with merchandise and 5500 Chinese on board.
merchant captains who had been dominating trade with Manila for years, such as Guansan, Sinu, and Guanchan, convinced other merchants in 1605 to return to Manila. Guansan, who submitted both the letter of the mandarin and the Spanish response, was one of the Chinese traders who collaborated with Spanish officials.119 In 1606, Chinese merchants revived trade with Manila, resettled in the rebuilt parian, and started working for the Spaniards again.120 Official records show that in 1606, 6533 Chinese came to Manila when 1500 received permits of residence and approximately 2000 stayed.121 In 1607, Spanish officials reported that 14,000 Chinese merchants had come to Manila.122 The Spaniards more than welcomed this rapid recovery of the status quo ante since the city and its inhabitants had faced lean years after the entire Chinese supply network had collapsed after the revolt.123 Nevertheless, they neither admitted the necessity of allowing Chinese settlers, nor refrained from maligning the Chinese thereafter.124

Reactions from the mainland to the infamous incident unmistakably hint at cultural and political divergences between the Catholic Castilians and the Confucian Chinese. Given the big losses on the Chinese side, most people would expect the Chinese Emperor to seek revenge for the injustice that had happened to his people. Yet, whilst still opposing private foreign trade vigorously, the Ming court did not consider the settlers of these overseas communities as Chinese subjects any longer. Although the events were discussed among Ming officials, who resented the fact that the ‘Luzon chieftain’ punished Chinese merchants without permission, the Ming never took action against the Spanish.125 The Emperor made it clear that he would not wage war for the sake of ordinary merchants, even less to avenge something that had happened outside China.126 This reflected not only Confucian social hierarchy but also the bitter feeling of betrayal felt by the great Celestial Empire that

121 BR 14, pp. 186–191; Díaz-Trechuelo (1966), ‘Role of the Chinese’, p. 184; Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 100: ‘Y que toca a las licencias para venir de China navios a contratar a Luzon, no esta tan mal el darlas, que ni el Rey ni los demas quieren perder el mucho provecho que tienen con la mucha plata que de aqui se llevan cada año; pues esta se queda en china sin salir de alla un real, y las haciendas que nos dan en trueque della se consumen y acaban en muy breve tiempo, y asi podemos decir que son en esto tan intresados o mas los chinos que los Castillas.’
122 AGI Filipinas 29, n. 94, ‘Carta de los oficiales reales sobre varios asuntos’, 14 July 1607.
123 AGI Filipinas 27, n. 48, ‘Copia de cédula aumentando derecho sobre mercaderías chinas’, 20 November 1606.
124 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620.
in centuries to come would stigmatise Chinese migrants as traitors to their motherland.\textsuperscript{127} The Emperor’s only reaction was to ask the Audiencia in Manila to deliver justice.\textsuperscript{128} Chinese authorities are believed to have defamed South East Asian \textit{huaqiao} as having abandoned ‘the tombs of their ancestors’. Suchlike accusations remind us of lineage and kinship (家 ch., \textit{jia}) traditions, and the principal Confucian concept of ancestor worship.\textsuperscript{129}

From a more neutral point of foreign relations, we note that the incident did encourage one of the rare direct acts of correspondence between the Ming and the Spaniards in the Philippines. It has been claimed that Ming emperors were eager to maintain military supremacy in East Asia. Comparing China’s reaction during the Imjin War to official China’s reluctant behaviour after the 1603 ‘mutiny’ indicates that tributary countries and the maintenance of the status quo were dearer to the Ming than to its own people. Korea had been one of China’s oldest and most loyal tributary partners and therefore Hideyoshi’s invasion brought the Chinese into the picture. At the same time offending Overseas Chinese was not considered a direct insult against the country or a potential threat.

Since similar massacres occurred in 1639, 1662, 1686, and 1762, we have to understand the revolts as cyclic dynamics of unsolved social conflicts provoked by juridical discrimination and external factors. In Manila discrimination led to uprisings, which were followed by reprisals.\textsuperscript{130} Clashes commonly originated from the numerical disequilibrium between Chinese and Spanish settlers. In 1639, the rebellion was stimulated by the loss of two Manila Galleons and subsequent economic deprivations.\textsuperscript{131} Spanish chronicles refer to it as \textit{guerra} and are once again full of praise for the heroic Spanish victors as well as questionable exaggerations.\textsuperscript{132} Between 17,000 and 22,000 of 26,000 revolting Chinese were reported to have been killed by 300

\textsuperscript{127} McKeown (2011), ‘Social Life’, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{128} AGI Filipinas 74, n. 60, ‘Testimonio de memoriales de Benavides sobre sangleyes’, 7 July 1605.
\textsuperscript{129} MacNair (1923), ‘Relation’, p. 30; Elman (1990), \textit{Classicism}, pp. 19-25; Freedman (1966), \textit{Lineage and Society}.
\textsuperscript{130} For further reference, see Andaya (2004), ‘Interactions’, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{131} BR 29, pp. 194-196; 168-171: The larger of two Manila Galleons was wrecked in 1638 en route to Acapulco with the loss of its entire cargo.
\textsuperscript{132} Pastells (1925), \textit{Historia General}, vol. 1, p. 249. Fire always meant a threat to the Spaniards in Manila and in case of doubt they blamed the Chinese. On the uprising of 1639 a Manila citizen reported: ‘Al principio del alzamiento, dió orden al Gobernador por atajar el fuego, que pasasen a cuchillo a cuantos sangleyes gentiles o cristianos vivían en los pueblos cercanos a Manila, por la sospecha que de ellos se tenía executóse en muchos este rigor, y socorriendo la gracia de Dios a algunos, no quisieron perder las almas con las vidas, y así recibieron antes el bautismo.’
Castilian soldiers and their 300 Filipino supporters.\textsuperscript{133} Given that both in 1603 and 1639, Japanese residents provided major assistance and made materials available to the Spanish, a more nuanced consideration of continuous inner-Asian conflicts complements the narrative.\textsuperscript{134} The 1639 rebellion against social injustice and high economic pressure took place in the hinterland and spread over to the Parian, where the armed conflict eventually escalated.\textsuperscript{135} Combat lasted between November 1639 and March 1640 and devastating fires harmed large parts of the city. In 1662, unstable geopolitical conditions in the China Seas had once again an impact on a violent Sino-Hispanic clash. The Zheng clan, who then claimed sovereignty over the Chinese Seas and Fujian, threatened Spanish sovereignty in Manila and on top of that sent Fujianese authorities to administer justice in the Parian.\textsuperscript{136}

**Maritime Manila’s and Post-1624 Developments**

Port cities have the tendency to become unattractive at certain points in history. The 1620s were doubtlessly a turning point for Manila. Manila’s ‘decline’ shows parallels to the economic cycles of urban centres in Europe such as Venice or Antwerp at certain points in history.\textsuperscript{137} In the short run, Manila simply lost its previous popularity to fierce competition with Taiwan or Nagasaki, while in the long run the trading systems of the macro region changed over the seventeenth century. Exterior developments, including militarily stronger ‘Chinese’ merchant communities, the rise of the Dutch in Japan, Taiwan, Batavia, and Melaka, explain Manila’s downturn well. Manila was no longer another as an intermediary port for Sino-Japanese bartering, while alongside a general destabilisation of Iberian trade in South East Asia, naval clashes with the Dutch coincided with the growing influence of Portuguese traders in Manila.

The loss of locational advantage is closely linked to declining interest from Japan. Accordingly we may argue that Manila turned into a semi-periphery of a new maritime space. VOC and EIC accounts show that Manila and the Spaniards became somewhat more passively involved in

\textsuperscript{134} AGI Filipinas 7, r. 1, n. 18, ‘Carta de Acuña sobre temas de gobierno’, 15 July 1604.
\textsuperscript{135} Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, pp. 59-60.
a new triangular trade network towards the end of the second decade of the seventeenth century. The position of the Castilians in Japan gradually became complicated, while both the Dutch and English were determined to control foreign trade off the coast of Japan after the establishment of the Dutch and the English Factory in Hirado in 1609 and 1611 respectively, were happy to see the Spaniards losing ground in Japan.\textsuperscript{138} Constant remarks on what was going on in Manila suggest that it was far too important to be ignored.\textsuperscript{139} A complete downturn can also be ruled out. The English seemed particularly interested in the Spaniards and the role of European realpolitik played in East Asia, which is also reflected in the impressive evidence of an efficient English global information network.\textsuperscript{140}

Other examples of external interest testify to the importance of the port city. The Dutch blockade of Manila, between the years 1619 and 1621, targeted the Spanish and the Chinese. Thus it would be too simple to conclude that this resulted from political conflicts in Europe. Dutch assaults should be considered a commercial strategy and a simple consequence of an expanding Manila system that had become more competitive and more violent.\textsuperscript{141} Within the limits of the Asian setting, the trading companies put in a major effort to disturb Sino-Spanish trade. In 1621 the Protestant merchant alliance was equipped with as many as nine ships.\textsuperscript{142} Manila’s political importance received further impetus by Dutch and English privateering practices during the first decades of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{138} Massarella (2001), ”Ticklish Points”, pp. 43-50.
\textsuperscript{139} Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 50, 8 July 1618: ”Also, that the fleet in Manillas, which fought with the Spaniards the last yeare, is all cast away per stor wether, many Mores, Chinas, and 50 Spaniard being drowned in it; and that their in 8 new gallions built theare in place thereof. For the 8 gallions, I esteem it a lie, that on such a sudden they canor be made. Also, that the Frenche have sett out 8 gallions, or men or warr, to aide the Spaniardes in the affaires. And that the King of Spaine had ordayned a fleete of gallions to have com by Cape Bona Speranza, to have joyned with them at Manillas, to have gon for the Molucas; but had staid them to make warrs against the Duke of Savoy.”
\textsuperscript{140} Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 55: ”He writes also how the King of Spaine maketh sharp warrs against the Duke of Savoy, and that the Venetians and the Turk take the Savoyans part. Allso that Prince Charles of Englond hath maried or is made sure to the King of Spaines daughter.”
\textsuperscript{141} Cocks (1883), Diary, pp. 325-326; Even Cocks criticised Dutch barbarian behaviour in Manila and their cruel treatment of Chinese captives. Ibid., p. 327: ”But the barbarousnesse of the Hollanders at Manillias the last yeare is much; for, after they had taken the China junkes and that the pore men had rendred them selves, the Hollandars did cut many of them in peeces and cast many others into the sea; whereof our men saved and took many of them up into our shipps.”
\textsuperscript{142} Cocks (1883), Diary, pp. 172; 187: Another campaign of 14 ships was planned the same year.
\textsuperscript{143} Kempe (2010), ”Remotest Corners”, p. 353.
Twelve Years’ Truce, agreed in Antwerp in April 1609 between Philip II and the United Provinces, aimed at officially ending such actions by granting the Dutch the right to trade in Asia except in Spanish and Portuguese ports.144 But as we have seen, reality was different in Asian waters, where the situation started to escalate again in 1618, and the Anglo-Dutch siege disrupted junk trade to Manila until 1622.

Even in the 1640s, it would be wrong to speak of a decline of Manila. It is more appropriate to speak of stagnation relative to other trading centres in South East Asia that developed after Manila. Galleons from Acapulco – as well as Fujanese junks – came in smaller numbers but Manila’s role for silver exchange remained mostly unchanged. Since Chinese settlers stayed after 1644, the main characteristics of port cities did not change either. Evidence is found of an attempt of the English East India Company at Bantam to establish trade between Tonkin and Manila as late as in 1673. The endeavour to obtain a trade licence for Manila in London followed a fruitless attempt to reopen trade with Japan that failed over a diplomatic misadventure. It was then when a company merchant wrote that Manila ‘proves almost as good as Japon’. Maintaining that trade there was ‘free for all nations’ he suggested selling cheap raw silk from Tonkin ‘could reap of very high profits [...] where the local Chinese could weave it into beautiful cloth for garments to be exported to New Spain’.145 Even though, the English project never materialised, the consideration testifies for Manila’s importance as a liberal global trading centre and indicates that Asian merchants thus clearly remained attracted by the American market. Altogether, the facts and figures presented should encourage revisiting the thesis of general decline in the 1630s.

**Concluding Remarks**

Does the specific development of social and juridical affairs at Manila’s micro level during this period deserve the label of a pioneering early modern port city? A word of caution regarding Manila’s exclusiveness shall be raised here. It has never been my intention to suggest that Manila was more open, more important, or more successful, let alone superior of other port cities in the region. Yet, certain peculiar developments due to its involvement in formal and informal networks as well as its geographical and imperial nature are undeniable. In short, Manila’s global accomplishments found

their expression in the specific seascape centre, with more egalitarian political structures. The lack of evidence that East Asian settlers would have been regarded as subdued to the Castilian Crown is just one implication of Manila's free spirit. When it comes to extraterritorial rights however, little was achieved for foreign traders. Nor did Asian merchants insist on such. Instead, the signals their rulers sent were exactly the opposite. Holden Furber has already concluded that extraterritorial rights accorded to foreign merchants were a matter of custom and that rulers assumed that foreign merchants would respect the local rules and therefore in turn did not ask for such privileges for their outgoing traders either.\(^\text{146}\)

Agency was one factor that negatively affected economic institutions. Unlike in other port cities, there was no particular group of merchants acting as primary mediators or intermediaries in dealings with the outside world. However, this does not mean that cultural or political intermediaries did not exist. One of the outstanding accomplishments of the multiethnic environment was its potential to create global intermediaries. Their fluid identities indirectly demonstrate the lack of uniform procedures. The urban society was characterised by constant change, the ability to adapt, and permanent bargaining on the spot. The port city positively affected social mobility. A remarkable number of migrants found ways to improve their chances and even to move to a different place within the social hierarchy. The nature of Manila’s multicultural society has to be understood exactly against this background. Friction that resulted in bloody mutinies was rooted in unsolved, and often even unexpressed problems. It was the imbalance of settlers, some discriminated against by law or social policies, and the permanent lack of manpower that represented the biggest challenge for the urban society.

The stumbling block for Manila was the arrival of the Protestants. A critical turning point, therefore, was the establishment of trade factories in Hirado that inspired the Fujian-Kyushu-\textit{nihonmachi} network and circumvented Manila. From the perspective of locational advantage, we may conclude that it was lost in times of change; thus Manila had to cope with successful rivals and the burden of the bulky Overseas Empire at the same time. We may say that after the 1630s, Manila was no longer considered a South East Asian port city, but instead became an intermediary port or Iberian outpost for largely two-dimensional operations. To what extent it is appropriate to speak of a multicultural society when different ethnic communities remained largely segregated in their ethnic quarters still needs to be critically evaluated in the future.

\(^{146}\) Furber (1976), \textit{Rival Empires}, p. 311.
Conclusion

The encounters between Spain, China, and Japan in Manila between 1571 and 1644 played an important role in shaping the political and economic development of all parties involved. Chinese demand for silver, Japanese interest in Chinese silk, and Spain's need to maintain a colony separated from the rest of its vast empire by thousands of miles, became the building blocks for Manila-centred triangular relations. Using micro studies as a base for such a broad topic enabled a nuanced view on the macro processes; embedding case studies into the bigger picture of cross-cultural trade and early modern state formation has simultaneously provided a contextualised view of seemingly minor events. In short, combining comparisons and connections has proven to be an efficient approach in dealing with complex questions without over-generalising. As such, it is not individually tailored for early modern Manila but applicable for various regions, periods, and topics. Many of the factors mentioned above help to explain why Manila was different. Unlike in other European-ruled port cities, there was no uniform group of merchants acting as intermediaries. The multiethnic environment created remarkably adaptive, mobile and flexible global actors. Against this background, high social mobility may be expected, but to what extent it actually existed still needs to be studied in further detail. In a future study, a systematic comparison with other port cities will hopefully provide us with new answers.

The Manila system mattered for the formation of cross-cultural trade between the Philippines, China, Japan, the Americas and eventually the Iberian Peninsula. The bridging of micro and macro histories, in order to grasp the essence of complex historical encounters, enabled the four main findings of this study, emphasising the validity of the chosen approach of comparison and connections.

My first finding stresses the lofty roles of politics, culture, and mentality for early modern trade and business relations. In other words, the case of Manila shows that economic developments can never be fully understood by exclusively focusing on strictly economic arguments and quantitative data. Although there is no denying that China's demand for silver was the driving force behind most commercial interaction, the actual exchange patterns were hardly ever solely determined by supply and demand. Hidden agendas of trade missions, bargaining traditions, politically or culturally motivated obedience or resistance to trade regulations became the real determining factors for success or failure of all operations. Despite the efforts of different central governments to regulate and control maritime
trade, non-state actors managed to circumvent state control through various loopholes and niches.

My second finding is that the dualism between the ‘local’ and the ‘central’ had a major impact on various processes in the South China Sea during the entire period. The examples range from illicit traders who could act as semi-integrated suppliers, to local authorities who simply acted as if they were a sovereign power. Connections can be traced between Fujianese fisher villages, Japanese ports, and Mexican towns, while exchange and collaboration occurred parallel to the central governments’ efforts to suppress them. Although extra-governmental groups hardly ever followed the official policies of the ruling elite, these and the allegedly peripheral regions turned into fundamental pillars of the system. While the lack of government support encouraged private Fujianese traders to create a mercantile network spanning from Japan via the Philippines to the Asian mainland, most Spanish merchants in Manila subjected themselves to the desire of their government to maintain a strong political position inside and outside of Europe. By the time Japan began to intensively participate in the Manila trade, its newly established military-aristocratic government was very much occupied with building its own stable state. That it eventually became the strongest of these three states becomes clear from the focus on comparisons and connections applied in this book.

My third finding is that diplomacy, with its manifold features such as language, communication, knowledge gathering, and representation, actually shaped foreign affairs. The ambivalent role of official and diplomatic exchange has always been underrepresented in studies of Manila’s role in world history. Even rather frequent encounters, however, did not automatically result in stable foreign relations. While official Sino-Spanish relations never reached any serious level, relations between Japan and the Castilian Empire switched between promising stages of mutual agreements to ignorance and aggression. For Japan, the intensified contacts with Spanish and Chinese officials positively stimulated the Bakufu’s state formation and economic restructuring. The Spanish Empire and Luzon, in particular, offered a welcome testing field for new forms of diplomatic contact and also at times as a target for aggressive geopolitical activities.

A local-central duality was also prominent in most diplomatic encounters. Whenever convenient, the Spaniards addressed or responded to non-sovereigns. Initially, Japan showed similar tendencies of pragmatism or diplomatic calculus, as I have indicated with the example of intermediary diplomacy, when localising its new position in international relations. What all three states had in common was a fear of displaying inferiority.
Ideological similarities, however, stood in sharp contrast to the crucial differences in the way they collected information, disseminated knowledge, or perceived others.

Successful negotiations were usually dominated by themes of mutual interest. Fighting piracy was clearly the most vivid example of a shared goal, with means and measures easy to agree on. The nature of negotiations offers a great deal of challenges such as the question of how to create legal space and trust, as well as the choice of cultural, mercantile, and political intermediaries in intercultural correspondence. In general, the impact of language and communication has been underestimated in previous research. Linguistic issues such as language proficiency, different writing styles, recording cultures, rhetoric, and terminology, had a much stronger impact on Manila than previously assumed. Risks of abusing interpretations and unstable transportation were just two of many obstacles that all parties involved had to face. At the same time we, as historians, have to be careful not to renarrate incorrect tales of constant misunderstanding and unwillingness to learn about or from the ‘other’.

The final finding features Manila’s ‘open zone’ character for multiethnic neighbourhoods. As a port city, Manila displayed a special environment, characterised by a hybrid social and juridical setting, despite ethnic segregation and thus only limited social integration. As a regulatory power, colonial Spain in theory controlled urban administration and social interaction. Imbalance of power between the different parties naturally encouraged compromises between various actors. Hence, despite legal discrimination Fujianese and Japanese nationals supported the colony. Still, Overseas Chinese seem to have adapted better to the situation, as the ever-growing number of settlers from China suggests. Neither social pressure nor any form of tribute kept them from returning or even permanently immigrating to the Philippines.

A historical study like this has to tackle questions of continuity and change of interconnectedness between the global and the local. While global flows and demands deterritorialised local spaces, they created new ones at the same time. Only by taking local history into account can global history truly reveal the multifaceted interdependence and imbrications between different world regions and their effects on shaping local and national histories. In doing so, we are incidentally reminded of the many shifts and disruptions that took place. The period between 1571 and 1644 was neither static nor displayed linear development. All dis-learning processes were rooted in the ambiguity of the triangular relations. Prominent examples are the events surrounding the Chinese uprisings and their violent
demise, the Dutch blockades, and the changing patterns of official contact with the Japanese. After each massacre, Fujianese traders came back, after each display of Japanese aggression the Spaniards (be they missionaries or colonial authorities) sought a revival of friendly relations and the local Japanese population would continue to sail to Manila after the official trade ban had been introduced. Yet, Manila's locational advantage was certainly fragile and its other appeals were easily lost in times of friction or change.

In that respect, however, it remains unclear whether we should regard the 1640s as a turning point. Both from the point of view of Japanese and Chinese history there are strong arguments in favour of a 1640 caesura. But zooming in on Manila suggests the opposite. In passing, I have shown that, from a Spanish perspective, things were different. Intellectuals and government authorities suggested strengthening universal Catholicism, a prudent diplomacy with neighbouring countries and the relaxing of trade prohibitions between China and New Spain. Motivated by material and spiritual desires the Spaniards were back to where they had started 70 years earlier.
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