Germany and the use of force
ISSUES IN GERMAN POLITICS
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Germany and the use of force

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This book is inspired by the often puzzling array of continuities and changes that has characterised German security policy since unification in 1990. Change has been manifest most profoundly in the lifting of the legal and political barriers which had formerly curtailed the use of the West German armed forces, a transformation which arguably reached its zenith in Germany’s military contribution to the war in Kosovo in 1999. Since then, German perspectives on the use of force became, especially in the context of the expansion of the US-led war against terrorism in 2003, more reminiscent of the restrictive, amilitaristic, foreign policy style of the pre-1990 Bonn Republic. This mixture of change and continuity also pervades the structure of the Federal armed forces and the pace of defence sector reforms. While the Bundeswehr, Germany’s armed force, has become better equipped for modern out-of-area missions, its post-1989 process of transformation and modernisation remains limited and largely inadequate due to the continuation of conscription, coupled with a static defence budget.

On a conceptual level, inspiration for this book derives from the body of literature in the field of security studies on strategic culture. Broadly speaking, strategic culture focuses on the domestic sources of security policy and attempts to identify how the past impacts and shapes contemporary policy behaviour. In contrast to some of the more traditional approaches in security studies, the strategic culture approach is interested in the subjective, nationally specific, aspects of security and defence policy and the ways in which collective historical experiences, channelled through pervading values and norms, play a role in defining interests and thus shaping policy choices.

Reflecting on the critical junctures and ruptures that characterise German history over the course of the past 100 years, the aptness of
strategic culture to a consideration of contemporary security policy is clear. The deleterious relationship that obtained between the military and politics in all former incarnations of the German State, the profound rupture brought by the Second World War, followed by the Western-sponsored rearmament of West Germany point to a highly fractured backdrop to current security policy. This book argues that in the protracted phase of West German rearmament, which stretched from 1949 to 1956, a fresh strategic culture was actively constructed. This strategic culture emerged out of the intense collective physical and moral trauma in West Germany, manifest in the notion of Stunde Null, or ‘zero hour’, combined with the expectations and demands which emanated from the Western powers in the context of the emerging Cold War. Aspects of this new strategic culture included the legally restricted role of the new West German armed forces; the full democratisation of civil–military relations; the reintroduction of conscription; and the Federal Republic’s tight integration with multilateral security institutions. Permeating all this was the widespread conviction that West Germany should maintain a low profile in security matters above and beyond the immediate task of defence of national and alliance territory, and that the ‘lessons of the past’ and ‘responsibility’ should be at the forefront of West German security policy thinking.

Bringing the discussion up to date, the idea of German strategic culture remains pertinent. The ending of the Cold War and German unification represented a further break in Germany’s fractured history. The events of 1989–90 propelled the new Germany from being a net beneficiary to a net producer of security in Europe as a radically new security environment emerged. This revolutionary change, the book argues, served to challenge many of the central tenets of (West) German strategic culture, as seen in the debates on the legality of Bundeswehr out-of-area deployments in the early 1990s, the intra-German debate over Iraq in 2002–3 and also in the emerging controversy over the relevance of conscription.

Policy-makers in Germany appear to be acutely aware of their strategic culture, regarding themselves as subject to some form of cultural boundedness which determines their choices and predisposes them to certain options. Evidence of this can be found in the language of defence white papers, speeches and debates, which are imbued with convictions of the ‘weight of the past’, ‘the lessons of German history’, ‘the defence culture of our country’, and so on.

It is surely indisputable that the past has a strong bearing on the
changes and continuities that have characterised Germany’s changing perspectives on the use of force since 1989. The nature of that complex relationship is, however, not easy to ascertain. By mobilising the concept of German strategic culture this book attempts to capture the link between the past and contemporary security policy. To do this, three distinct, yet interrelated, questions guide the course of the study. The first relates to identification: what is German strategic culture; what are its constituent parts, contours and substance? The second question refers to the notion of change: to what extent and in what form has change in the external security environment after 1989 impacted on German strategic culture? The third question is associated with the theme of behaviour: in what ways does strategic culture affect behaviour and shape policy choices in both constraining and facilitating actions?

In order to address these questions, the book is organised in the following way. Chapter 1 introduces and develops the theme of strategic culture as an approach in security studies. Utilising a number of existing studies and conceptions of strategic culture, the chapter formulates a definition of strategic culture and designs a conceptual framework adapted to the case of Germany. Chapter 2 places some empirical matter onto this conceptual frame by focusing on the construction of West German strategic culture through a consideration of aspects of the process of rearmament in the 1950s. By extrapolating and examining both internal and external factors in the rearmament of West Germany, the book identifies the antecedents of West German strategic culture and draws out its composite elements and characteristics. Chapters 3 and 4 address the implications for strategic culture of the events of 1989–90 through an examination of German perspectives on the use of force: chapter 3 takes as a case study the period up to 1999, which saw the playing out of the legal–political out-of-area debate, the transformation of the Bundeswehr and Germany’s engagement in a full combat mission in Kosovo; chapter 4 continues the chronological sequence and brings analysis up to date to include a discussion of German perspectives on the events of September 11 2001, Afghanistan and the Iraq War of 2003. By thus tracking the post-Cold War transformation of the Bundeswehr’s role in the 1990s it is possible to assess both the extent and the nature of change in German strategic culture and also how strategic culture affects policy behaviour.

Further evidence regarding the questions of change and the impact of strategic culture on policy behaviour is considered in chapters 5 and 6.
Chapter 5 takes as its focal point a case study of the reform of the German armed forces. By appraising the numerous attempts during the 1990s to transform the Bundeswehr from its Cold War configuration into a modern military, equipped for a wider array of missions, the chapter highlights the internal and external impulses for defence reform and discusses the various factors that have slowed the momentum of policy change. Chapter 6 reflects on a contrasting aspect of security policy thus far characterised by non-change, namely the practice of conscription. This case study provides a vivid illustration of the power of strategic culture to actively obviate or hinder policy change. The continuation of compulsory military service in Germany, despite the enlargement of the Bundeswehr’s mission, constitutes an interesting case study, especially when considered against the pattern of change across Europe, where conscription seems to be in terminal decline. The concluding chapter considers the issues and debates presented in the preceding chapters through the prism of the book’s key questions and concerns.
On strategic culture

The decision making process in matters of defence is not an abstract construct based purely in the present moment but is, rather, steeped in the beliefs, biases, traditions and cultural identity of the individual country—all of which feeds into its strategic culture. Rather than obedience or disobedience to an abstract set of stipulative requirements, in times of war what really makes the difference is how a nation state, as a collective identity, ‘behaves’ is the structure of that nation’s history and experience—its strategic culture, if you will.

Key issues and developments in German security policy since 1989 form the overall focus of this book, while the more specific question to be dealt with relates to the evolution of German perspectives on the use of military force in international politics in the post-Cold War period, using the concept of strategic culture to interpret the subject matter. As argued in the Introduction, that concept is useful in yielding insights on both theoretical and empirical issues relating to developments in German security policy since 1989. The aim of this chapter, consequently, is to consider the concept of strategic culture in greater detail and to locate it within the field of security studies.

Contending approaches

Neo-realism and German normalisation

As the Cold War came to a close, a frenzy of analysis on the future of German security policy emerged. Consideration of how German post-Cold War security policy might develop reflected a far broader and fundamental discussion, within the discipline of international
relations (IR) and the subdiscipline of security studies, about the utility of existing theoretical paradigms and assumptions. At the crux of reflections on Germany lay the debate about how the ending of the Cold War and national unification would affect German foreign and security policy; more specifically, disputes arose as to whether the recent past would serve as a source of continuity or a force for change in the new Germany’s post-Cold War foreign and security policy behaviour.

The first take on this debate drew its logic from the traditional neorealism in IR. This view tends to see military behaviour as quite separate from the milieu in which it is formed; in other words, neorealism is based on a belief that there is a ‘universal science that explains the generation of military power in all countries, without regard to their internal societies’. Drawing from this assumption, a number of scholars posed a ‘normalisation’ thesis, the essence of which was that in the context of multipolarity, German foreign and security policy would develop a far less restrained and benign character. Throwing off the constraints laid down by the Cold War, German policy would accrue a more assertive national flavour, focused on strategic interests and backed by the threat of the use of force. A number of scholars produced commentary on Germany from such a perspective: Philip Gordon, John Mearsheimer, Volker Rittberger and Geoffrey van Orden have, in various ways, sought to draw out neo-realism’s assumptions to explain and predict Germany’s post-1989 foreign and security policy behaviour. Underlying such analysis was the assumption that Germany would seize advantage of the new balance of power in Europe and would inevitably develop a greater ability and willingness to wield its power, including military power. Furthermore, Germany would be actively compelled to elucidate its interests – which might come to differ considerably from those of its allies – more assertively.

Characteristic of such reasoning in the early 1990s was John Mearsheimer’s prediction of the ‘Balkanisation’ of Europe and the central problem of containing German power. The problems of creating a counterbalance to Germany would be similar to those experienced in the 1930s, when Germany, surrounded by weaker East European states, experienced a resurgence of nationalism. Similarly, writing in 1992 the German historian Michael Stürmer argued that the profound changes brought to Germany’s geostategic location would signify abrupt changes in German policy and perspectives on the use of force. For Stürmer, like Mearsheimer, the ending of the Cold War would herald a further break in German history, obligating Germany to ‘embrace
realism’, ‘clarity of goals’ and a ‘predictability of means’. Sustaining such arguments, others stressed the point that since the Bundeswehr owed its creation, rationale and role to contingent forces and factors quite exogenous to Germany, with the ending of the Cold War and the acquisition of full sovereignty, German security policy was now set to develop a more normal relationship to the use of military power. In this vein, in 1991, Geoffrey van Orden asserted that German defence policy, having been ‘unnaturally constrained for 40 years’, can now ‘aspire to a normal level of great power activity, pursuing national interests which may differ from those of its allies and demanding a voice commensurate with its economic and political standing’. Subsequently, Philip Gordon identified a normalisation of German security policy, which would involve ‘the gradual attenuation of the particular restrictions that have influenced and constrained Germany’s international actions since, and because of, World War Two’.

Certainly, German security policy has travelled great distances since reunification and perspectives on the use of force have, in many ways, changed in a revolutionary way. The changes seen in the role of the German armed forces, especially after 1994 through the reinterpretation of the Basic Law, have lessened the extent to which German security policy can be described as ‘singular’ or indeed reminiscent of a ‘civilian power’ in the classical sense. Such transformations notwithstanding, the power of neo-realism as a theoretical tool with which to understand these changes remains rather weak, principally because it side-steps the complex and arguably more interesting constitutive factors of policy such as the domestic context and other less tangible sources of interest formation. Neo-realism takes its cue from changes in the international system, focuses on observable capabilities and material potential, and consequently makes a rational assessment or prediction of Germany’s past, present or future policy behaviour. An appraisal of German security policy more than a decade after the end of the Cold War shows the serious deficiencies in neo-realist prognoses, especially regarding the ability and actual desire of German elites to pursue a more assertive nationally focussed ‘normal’ security policy as Mearsheimer, Van Orden and others have proposed.

Neo-realism’s negation of the historical and domestic constitutive factors essentially delivers an inadequate analysis, whereas reinstating and bringing to centre stage the milieu in which German thinking about security and the use of force is produced, as an alternative, promises a far richer understanding. Importantly, here, analysis of German
security using such an approach would question one of the chief assumptions of neo-realist analysis, namely the inevitability of Germany’s ‘emancipation’ from history as a by-product of the end of bipolarity.

How might such an approach to Germany be configured? What follows is a survey of the various attempts within the field of security studies to understand national security policies by adopting a cultural variable. This survey will then provide the basis on which an approach to understanding German security policy through the prism of strategic culture will be synthesised.

**Strategic culture and security studies**

Strategic culture was first introduced to the field of security studies in the 1970s. Born of a concern with the ‘skewing’ effects of ethnocentrism prevalent within US strategic thinking, Jack Snyder, writing for the RAND Corporation, warned of the dangers of assuming that the Soviets would have the same set of values and beliefs as the US strategic community. Crucially, Snyder challenged the view that the Soviets would play the same nuclear war ‘game’ as the US, as existing ‘generic rational actor paradigms’ and game theoretical modelling suggested.

As part of his critique, Snyder promoted a form of analysis of Soviet behaviour and strategic thinking which could take more fully into account the particular Soviet historical experiences of war which, he argued, shaped Moscow’s perspectives on contemporary security issues. Subsequently, he saw that a unique Soviet strategic culture had developed through a particular historical process, forming a perceptual prism through which strategic issues were viewed by Soviet decision-makers. This Soviet strategic culture, Snyder maintained, was passed on to subsequent generations of policy-makers through a socialisation process. It affected policy by setting the parameters of national debates and consequently guided and shaped policy choices. Snyder defined Soviet strategic culture as the sum total of ‘ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy’.

Snyder’s notion of strategic culture prompted other scholars to build on his assumptions and ideas, and that has led to the emergence of a not insubstantial body of literature on strategic culture. Subsequent waves and phases of thinking about strategic culture, while clearly
advancing the concept and bringing it into the mainstream of security studies, has resulted in a rather atomised research agenda. Strategic culture analysis advanced in the 1970s and 1980s, driven primarily by a concern with misunderstandings and misrepresentation in superpower relations and especially in connection with nuclear strategy. Writing in 1979 Ken Booth sought to alert strategists to the ‘fog of culture’ and its distorting effects on the making and study of strategy. Echoing Snyder’s words, Booth argued in *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* that better strategies would result only if assumptions based on ‘rational’ strategic man were supplanted by those based on ‘national’ strategic man. In a similar vein, Colin S. Gray equated strategic culture with the notion of ‘national style’ in a comparison of the US and Soviet Union. Gray defined strategic culture as ‘referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derive from perceptions of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behaviour in national terms … the civic culture and way of life.’ For Gray, strategic culture was the milieu within which strategy is debated; it provided a ‘semi-permanent influence upon policy behaviour’ and, in the absence of a ‘new historical experience’ that challenged existing modes of thought and action, national style would be an enduring explanation of state behaviour. While being one of the strongest advocates of strategic culture and its explanatory potential at this time, Gray was also sensitive to the problems and weaknesses of the concept. He saw that strategic cultures produced tendencies but did not totally determine behaviour and that if seen as too deterministic, strategic culture could be overused to explain anything and everything, and so become analytically useless in its tautology. Gray posed a further set of questions and continued to call for the refinement of the concept, especially in terms of how to address the issue of change or fragmentation within a strategic culture. With such fundamental questions surrounding strategic culture at this time, the concept remained highly vulnerable.

The introduction of strategic culture into the parlance of security studies in the 1970s undoubtedly created a momentum which in no small way informed the wave of culture-inspired challenges to prevailing modes of analysis that transpired after the end of the Cold War. In this primordial period the concept of strategic culture was very much in gestation, with analysts tending to overemphasise the utility of the concept without sufficient accompanying thoughts on methodology and the actual functioning of the nexus between policy behaviour and
strategic culture. Writers also tended to make sweeping statements about time periods rather than pinpointing specific formative periods and the sources of a strategic culture. Nevertheless, this first wave of strategic culture analysis was important in that it began to question dominant modes of analysis and to raise some crucial questions about the sources of a state’s behaviour in the security realm. What followed after 1989–90 was the advent of strategic culture literature, which, while drawing on the work of the 1970s and 1980s, sought to address many of the problems associated with the concept.

**Conceptual developments in the 1990s**

As noted earlier, at the core of the re-examination of theories within the discipline of IR after 1989 lay a fundamental reassessment of the utility of neo-realism as the dominant paradigm in security studies. Out of this reappraisal emerged a resurgence of interest in culture in security studies, inspired to a large extent by the rise of constructivism, with its emphasis on identity and interests as being socially constructed. On the back of these developments came a new generation of literature applying to various regions and case studies the concept of ‘strategic culture’, as well as cognate notions of security culture, political–military culture and national security culture.

Perhaps the most noteworthy major study on strategic culture to have emerged in this period was Alistair Iain Johnston’s *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, which attempted to deal with a number of the key altercations within the strategic culture school. Johnston pointed to the pros and cons of various existing strategic culture studies, and sought to formulate an entirely new approach. Essentially his aim was to construct a notion of strategic culture that was falsifiable; Johnston therefore sought to separate strategic culture from strategic behaviour in order to assess the impact of the former on the latter. A host of other authors writing in the 1990s sought to further the study of strategic culture by applying it to national or regional case studies, as a means of investigating continuities and change in national security policies or of finding more authentic answers as to why certain policy options and not others were pursued. In 1992 George Tanham wrote an article on Indian strategic culture, which, although not particularly strong conceptually, raised interesting ideas about the connection between certain cultural beliefs and Indian security policy.
also advanced the idea of a distinctively British strategic culture as a tool with which to understand significant choices in British strategic history. A further piece worthy of note is Desmond Ball’s 1993 study of the strategic culture of the Asia-Pacific region. Ball noted that strategic culture analysis had given too much attention to the strategic cultures of states and especially to studies of the US and the Soviet Union. To address this, Ball posited that while national differences did certainly exist between the states of the Asia-Pacific region a broad study of the area as a whole would be more useful.

Peter J. Katzenstein’s edited collection of 1996 made a further important contribution to the development of strategic culture and related concepts. The Culture of National Security brought together many of the concerns and preferences for sociological issues of identity and its nexus with security by developing the notion of ‘political–military culture’. Through the contributions of some notable scholars, the volume sought to explicitly tackle what were seen as the deficiencies of constructivism by adding greater empirical content. The thrust of the investigation was to illustrate how ‘social factors’ could often shape policies in ways contradictory of those which other theories would normally suggest. In this pursuit Katzenstein et al. identified two determinants of national security policy-making: the ‘cultural–institutional’ and the broader ‘national identity’ aspect. The volume made a welcome contribution to thinking on culture and security, and also went some way towards developing a convincing and workable methodology with which to overcome the imprecision of earlier strategic culture works without relying on the overly positivistic approach of some of the later ones.

The ‘cultural’ sources of German security policy

Within this broader revival of cultural explanations of national security policies and the critique of neo-realism, a substantial body of literature focusing on German security policy has emerged. The fact that Germany provided the inspiration for such approaches comes as no surprise given that for many scholars Germany’s behaviour in the realm of foreign and security policy after 1990 had largely confounded the expectations of the neo-realists and, in particular, the emphasis on the resurgence of German military power and unilateralism. Thus, seeking an alternative and more authentic form of explanation, scholars
have capitalised on the growing body of culture-inspired theories and concepts.

In 1998 Thomas U. Berger considered national security policies in both Germany and Japan through a culturalist perspective in a major volume entitled *Cultures of Amilitarism*. Rather than use strategic culture – which Berger rejected because, he argued, it did not pay enough attention to broader societal and cultural shifts and their impacts on national defence – the concept of ‘political-military culture’ is mobilised, being defined as a subset of a broader culture dealing with those elements that shape defence and security policy formation. Berger attempts to track and explain the emergence and longevity of the profound antimilitarism in (West) German security policies both before and after the ending of the Cold War. Berger rejects monocausal explanations of German antimilitarism such as those based on the notion that the damage inflicted by Nazi atrocities runs so deep in its psyche that German society is now unwilling to sanction the use of force, or that it is the Federal Republic’s entanglement in multilateral frameworks that stymies its ability or desire to develop a more independent defence capacity. Nor does Berger accept reasoning based on the features of Germany’s geostrategic position and role as a trading state or the notion that US tutelage in security matters precludes the perceived need in Germany to develop a more active security policy. Crucially, Berger sees that these forms of explanation are all important ‘structural determinants’ of German approaches to national security, and that they have, at different points, helped facilitate the conditions for it to emerge and be sustained, but they do not fully explain the strength of Germany’s aversion to the use of force. Moreover, Berger holds, there were events and periods when it would have been possible to pursue more independent and active military policies, but Germany (and Japan) chose instead to enact only incremental changes that did not serve to question the underlying antimilitarism. Explanation of this phenomenon is best sought by invoking the idea of a ‘culture of antimilitarism’, the existence and functioning of which, Berger sees, has been confirmed by the ending of the Cold War which opened opportunities for Germany to expand and break from its restrained security policies, opportunities that have not been pursued.

Taking this further, Berger saw that what best accounts for Germany’s antimilitarism is its ‘struggle to draw lessons from its troubled past’. These lessons, he holds, were shaped by the political debates of
the early post-war period, which ultimately flavoured the antimilitary sentiments prevalent in West Germany. Central to this antimilitarism was a fundamental reappraisal of German identity, as a result of the nation’s confrontation with the atrocities of Nazism and dealing with collective guilt. These factors then compelled the political leaders of the new Federal Republic to approach rearmament in a way that would clearly limit the size and remit of the Bundeswehr. Berger’s mobilisation of political–military culture is accompanied by an elaborate conceptualisation of how this culture impacts on behaviour. He seeks to avoid the problems of tautology and to this end sees that a political–military culture influences policy in a number of ways: by supplying the goals and norms of political actors; by determining how actors perceive the domestic political environment; by influencing actor’s assessments of the international environment; and by conditioning their ability to garner national resources for military purposes. These propositions are then conflated in to a ‘culturally bound actor model’, in which he positions socioculturally defined norms and perceptions (the political culture) as integral to the process through which national interests are defined. The culture acts as the milieu through which objective domestic conditions and capabilities, as well as pressures in the international system, are mediated, prior to policy execution by actors engaged in the policy process. Seen in this way, Berger’s notion of the national interest is not taken as a given, but rather as a ‘construct emerging out of contingent historical, social, and rational processes that can vary considerably across different states at different points in time’.21

On the issue of change Berger sees that transformations in the international system may lead to change in the culture, in the sense of ‘change in the normative and interpretative schemes of its political actors’, though this will most probably be neither quick nor easy, and cultures may therefore represent a force of inertia. Change will occur as the ‘cultural core’ responds to ‘historical pressures’, and it will be incremental in nature with new institutions not being created de novo but being ‘likely to follow previously established patterns’. Lastly, Berger sees that only in very traumatic situations will change in the core values and beliefs of a given culture be abrupt, and then only in instances of total discreditation and when society is under great strain. At the crux of Berger’s reasoning is the hypothesis that if new policy initiatives are proposed which violate ‘existing cultural values’ then resistance to them will become evident in the form of
demonstrations and party-political altercation. If, on the other hand, major changes occur without generating any resistance, Berger holds that the relationship between political–military culture and defence policy can then be seen to have been falsified or at least weakened. In his conclusions, Berger sees that Germany’s behaviour in the security realm is testimony to the existence and functioning of a political–military culture. This has been further confirmed after the ending of the Cold War, when during the Gulf War the ‘antimilitary animus’ ‘continued to pose potent barriers to increased activism in the area of national security’.

John S. Duffield’s World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification, also published in 1998, made a further valid contribution to understanding the cultural sources of German security policy. Duffield’s exposition attempts to explain the profound continuities and restraint prevalent in German security policy after the Cold War by way of a framework of analysis that combines influences from Germany’s external environment as well as its domestic political setting. At the international level Duffield identifies a dense web of institutions which have both actively constrained German security policy while also providing channels through which Germany could pursue its interests in ‘predictable, non-threatening directions’. These influences at the international level are bolstered, Duffield holds, through the effects of Germany’s ‘distinct post-war national security culture, which was little changed by unification and the end of the Cold War’. This culture comprises a discernible set of beliefs and values relating to scepticism about the use of military force, a preference for multilateralism, a desire to be perceived as a reliable partner and an aversion to leadership in security matters, values which are widely shared by elites and society at large. The combination of these international institutional and domestic cultural factors, Duffield argues, determines the continuities and the restraint in Germany’s security policy since 1989.

On the back of this hypothesis Duffield’s study proceeds with the construction of a framework of analysis to explain national security policy. Within this survey, Duffield details a number of categories under the main headings of ‘the international setting’ and ‘the domestic setting’. Under the latter the notion of ‘national pre-dispositions’ is posited, in which he incorporates the important role played by political culture. Duffield’s conceptualisation revolves chiefly around the notion that political culture is the property of a collective rather than
of the sum of the individuals comprising it; that it is distinctive vis à vis other political cultures; and, finally, that it is highly stable in comparison to ‘material conditions’. From this outline of the general nature of a political culture Duffield draws out the specific components that are relevant to national security policy. These consist of worldviews, issues of loyalty and attachment, conceptions of the national interest and the effectiveness of the use of force and appropriate political behaviour.

Subsequently Duffield, like Berger, constructs a detailed model of how he sees the relationship between culture and behaviour. Firstly, the existence of a given culture delineates the scope of what it is that policy actually focuses on by highlighting certain issues and marginalising others. Secondly, a culture affects the perception and interpretation of the external environment, thus shaping the design of security issues. Thirdly, by shaping conceptions of the national interest, the functioning of a culture helps to determine policy objectives. Fourthly, a culture delineates and limits the range of legitimate policy options open to policy-makers. From this understanding of the nexus between culture and behaviour Duffield concludes: ‘The overall effect of national security culture is to predispose societies in general and political elites in particular toward certain actions and policies over others.’

Sometimes culture will not determine policy options so tightly, but will narrow the range of policies that are likely to be adopted, because the conditions of a culture’s influence will depend on the external context; in instances when the international environment is characterised by complexities and uncertainties or when a policy issue involves a large group of actors the influence of culture may be high.

In his final analysis Duffield attributes many of the continuities and forms of restraint prevalent in German security policy since 1989 as determined, in large part, by ‘peculiar national pre-dispositions’. Some of these, he suggests, reside in the constitution, especially in its pre-1994 reading regarding out-of-area Bundeswehr deployments, while others are institutionalised in the armed forces’ limited capacities or in German public opinion. However, he regards Germany’s post-war political culture, especially in the form of elite attitudes, as a far more fundamental and comprehensive source of the national predispositions shaping security policy. Duffield’s reasoning is grounded in his assertions that German society and elites hold a very distinctive set of beliefs and values of relevance to national security issues and that the actuality
of this specific political culture has constrained Germany’s potential for unilateral and aggressive security policies, instead facilitating the continuation of a security policy characterised by restraint. The particular elements of this culture that have been so influential are viewed by Duffield as the widespread antimilitarism and a rejection of unilateralism, and an attendant preference for multilateral solutions. These elements, Duffield holds, certainly reinforced one another during the Cold War period, and largely after 1989 as well. However, on the issue of Bundeswehr out-of-area deployments after 1989–90 these elements offered contradictory prescriptions, as different sectors of society and elites came to interpret and apply them in different ways.

German strategic culture: a framework for analysis

This brief overview of some of the key studies that have attempted to mobilise the concept of strategic culture and related ideas over the past three decades confirms the highly stimulating yet rather disparate research agenda that persists. The survey demonstrates the variety of ways in which strategic culture has been interpreted and employed as a tool with which to understand national or regional security policies and policy behaviour. It also brings into focus just how vibrant and appealing the key assumptions of the strategic culture approach are for further conceptual development and refinement, and for empirical exploration, in the case of Germany. Clearly the devising of an analytical framework with which to examine contemporary German security policy using strategic culture must take into account the strengths of existing studies, while at the same time engage with some of the questions they raise.

Questions and controversies persist within the literature on issues relating to the referent group for strategic culture, namely whether the focus should be on states, societies, elites or, perhaps, the armed forces. A second contestation relates to the origins and roots of a strategic culture: where do they lie, what are the most important sources and how might these be traced and profiled? A third concern revolves around the question of how to establish the existence of the core beliefs and attitudes relating to the use of force that lie at the centre of a strategic culture. A fourth unresolved issue relates to the relationship which strategic culture has to actual policy behaviour, or to the influence of the former on the latter, including the thorny issue of whether that
influence is falsifiable or not. A final, enduring, question is that of change in a strategic culture, specifically how and under what conditions change might come about. Such questions are far from arbitrary. As Alistair Johnston noted:

Done well, the careful analysis of strategic culture could help policy makers establish more accurate and empathetic understandings of how different actors perceive the game being played ... Done badly [it] could reinforce stereotypes about the predispositions of other states and close off policy alternatives deemed inappropriate for dealing with local strategic cultures.25

What follows is the basis of an analytical framework with which to explore German security policy through the prism of strategic culture, one on which the remainder of the book proceeds.

**Defining strategic culture and its composition**

A strategic culture is a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, held by a collective and arising gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experiences.

A strategic culture comprises three elements. Firstly, there are the deeper, basal, qualities that have their origins in the primordial or formative phases of a given strategic culture; these are here called *foundational elements*. Foundational elements comprise basic beliefs regarding the use of force that give a strategic culture its core characteristics. Importantly, foundational elements are highly resistant to change. Extending out of these foundational elements are the observable manifestations of the strategic culture: the longstanding policies and practices that actively relate and apply the substance of the strategic culture’s core to the external environment, essentially by providing channels of meaning and application. These aspects of strategic culture – here called *regulatory practices* – are less resilient to change. Midway between the foundational elements and regulatory practices are the *security policy standpoints*, the contemporary, widely accepted, interpretations as to how best core values are to be promoted through policy channels, in the sense that they set the preferences for policy choices.
Change in a strategic culture

The existence and functioning of the three components mean that a strategic culture is in a continual state of self-evaluation vis à vis external realities, as well as changes within society. Naturally in times of continuity and stability this evaluation will be muted and less evident, whereas in times of great turmoil or rupture, evaluation, through elite debate and other forms of contention, may be highly visible as the strategic culture goes through a phase of adjustment, renewal or even collapse, depending on how valid existing core values are.

Change in a strategic culture comes in two principal forms: fine-tuning and fundamental, with the former variant being the more frequent. Change in the form of fine-tuning may occur when issues have arisen, from either domestic or international sources, that have challenged or at best sat uneasily with the established foundational elements of the strategic culture. Challenges which pressure the existing strategic culture and policy modes will be interpreted, or ‘read’, by elites in differing ways, especially at times of great uncertainty. Whereas during periods of certainty and stability a dominant ‘reading’ of the meanings of foundational elements and preferred policy modes prevails and is largely uncontested, at times of ambiguity a number of opposing readings emerge, all vying for dominance. In this context a strategic culture is finely tuned, or adjusted, to match existing core values to new situations through reworked security policy standpoints as seen through observable changes in security policies and practices.

Fundamental change of a strategic culture is a far less common phenomenon. It is more abrupt in nature, occurring when trauma is sufficiently severe as to nullify the existing strategic culture, giving rise to the establishment of new core beliefs, leading subsequently to new policies and practices. This fundamental change to or collapse of a strategic culture is best described as a situation of ‘collective infancy’.26 Related to this theme of change is the issue of policy inertia: even in the event of a foundational element being challenged, certain practices or policies may resist change or adjustment. The normal functioning relationship between foundational elements and regulatory practices may be disturbed if a certain policy practice has become so ingrained that it can be a force for inertia, appearing as a lag or even an ill-suited policy to pursue.

This conceptualisation of change begs the question as to how a strategic culture is actually transmitted among its agents and through time
to new generations. Arising out of the past a strategic culture can be seen as a part of what sociologist Maurice Halbwachs called ‘historical memory’ and which he regarded as part of the collective memory. A strategic culture as the embodiment of past collective experiences, tied to war and the use of force, ’is stored and interpreted by social institutions’. Hence the substance of a strategic culture reaches the actor both through written records as well as through commemorations that serve to reinforce memory. This means that subsequent generations, who had not lived through the initial or formative experiences that gave rise to a strategic culture, are nevertheless subjects of it.

This way of thinking about the transmission of strategic culture is in line with the notion that institutional practices shape and sustain knowledge. So long as a strategic culture is deemed viable, its material manifestations will be sustained and thus serve to shape the content and structure of knowledge, this will permit only certain new possibilities to be considered by decision-makers since they inherit an existing form of knowledge which will serve to frame their options and dispose them to act in a certain role. However, subsequent generations are not irretrievably tied to the existing strategic culture. By assessing the relevance and utility of their strategic culture they may seek to restructure the institutions that provide them with the knowledge to think about and design security policies; as Halbwachs posits, new generations are engaged in a process of ‘counterposing its present to its own constructed past’.

The functioning of strategic culture

What the relationship between strategic culture and behaviour might be is a perennial issue which revolves around the question of whether or not strategic culture is regarded as a falsifiable concept. Two lines of discord run on this issue: there are those who seek a falsifiable notion of strategic culture which leaves room in analysis for non-strategic cultural variables and their influence on behaviour, thereby attempting to break the nexus between strategic culture and behaviour. Conversely there are those who see strategic culture as a non-falsifiable concept: the link between it and behaviour cannot be severed because strategic culture is the all-encompassing milieu through which behaviour is mediated – in other words, all behaviour is culture-dependent. On the important issue of falsifiability this book complies more with the latter position, regarding strategic culture as a concept that defies falsification.
In adopting this stance, the study will not attempt to pit strategic culture against other explanatory factors, variables or theories.

In their attempts to construct a falsifiable concept of strategic culture, some authors have suggested that policy behaviour can occur outside of the milieu of strategic culture. Such behaviour, outside of familiar patterns, which contradicts the existing strategic culture will, it has been argued, prompt dissension and opposition; if this does not occur, then strategic culture can be seen to be falsified or at least weakened. However, it is argued here that even when policy behaviour appears to be at odds with the values and norms of a strategic culture, this does not entail the debasement of that strategic culture; moreover the existence of altercation and protest against new policies does not necessarily imply a weakening or falsification of strategic culture. The relationship between strategic culture and behaviour is much more nuanced, and the key to understanding this is the relationship between the foundational elements, the security policy standpoints and the regulatory practices.

The three types of component that make up a strategic culture are in a dynamic relationship, which means that a strategic culture can and will alter. Change occurs most commonly in the form of fine-tuning as policies mutate to address any desynchronisation of the strategic culture and to reaffirm the connection between the external environment and the foundational elements. The foundational elements of a strategic culture therefore set the outermost parameters of a state’s realm of possible behaviour, a sphere of legitimacy, in short, determining what is ‘normal’ for it to do. In this sense the foundational elements, through the security policy standpoints, define interests and priorities, which in turn determine certain policy preferences and choices above others by setting an agenda excluding some options while including others. This provides a framework of reference for policy actors that ultimately shapes their conception of a situation and provides them with a bounded repertoire of goals and tools. If the policies they pursue are to be successful, policy-makers must act within the constraints of the strategic culture.

Policy-actors, then, are neither cultural dupes nor prisoners but are fully aware of their strategic cultural context. They cannot contradict foundational elements, but they can try to modify regulatory practices to meet the way in which they interpret, or read, the foundational elements in a new context. Hence the idea that behaviour can exist outside of the strategic cultural context is false, unless a complete collapse
of a given strategic culture occurs. Seen in this way a strategic culture will not only constrain behaviour by precluding certain options but will facilitate behaviour in various intensities, which may, on first inspection, seem at odds with the existing strategic culture.

The context in which a state finds itself is also crucial in determining how a strategic culture affects behaviour. At times of stability and certainty the influence of strategic culture on behaviour may not be visible at all, since the culture is in synchronisation with the external environment. At times of flux, however, when the strategic culture itself is under pressure, the nexus between strategic culture and behaviour may become more direct, and may be seen in the way policy-makers seek to maintain a clear and familiar policy path to follow, often through recourse to historical precedence, former successful policies and lines of argumentation imbued with lessons of the past. This idea that context matters is similar to Anne Swidler’s ideas on the relationship between a general culture and behaviour. Swidler posits that in ‘settled times’, when there is no tension between a culture and the external environment, cultures independently influence action from a distance, whereas in ‘unsettled’ times, periods of shock or trauma, when that culture is dislocated from the broader environment, it will exert a direct influence, guiding behaviour, almost as an ideology. This idea can be transposed quite successfully to West Germany during the Cold War – the ‘settled period’ – and the united Germany after the Cold War – the ‘unsettled period’.

_Who is the referent of a strategic culture?_

Who or what is the appropriate referent or focus of analysis in the study of strategic culture is again a contested issue, for essentially whose strategic culture are we talking about? Should one consider purely the views of elites in either the security and/or military spheres? Or should broader public opinion also be brought under analysis? Most strategic culture analysis focuses on elites, whether they be purely the military or those in the broader political–military decision-making sphere. In the existing literature there is in general little discussion about mass beliefs or opinion, and where it does exist it is generally conflated with elite opinion. The position taken here on the question of the referent of a strategic culture is that political–military elite voices within the ‘national strategic community’ are of greatest relevance, while the broader public sphere is seen rather as the general contextual milieu.
Elites, or ‘strategic cultural agents’ as they are called here, are reflective of broader societal moods and act as ‘gatekeepers’ of a strategic culture, since they are at the forefront of decision-making. Holding a more detailed awareness and knowledge of security issues, they are agenda-setters and thereby push and pull the national discourse in certain ways. Furthermore, in terms of the debate elucidated earlier on the most appropriate level of analysis, elites blend and mediate between the international, domestic and individual levels. This elite preference is bolstered here because it is believed that public opinion is not only problematical to conceptualise but, more importantly that it is of little importance in connection with security policy-making. It is also posited here that elite and broader public opinion may not correspond totally, especially at times of great change when elites respond instantly and subsequently will attempt to shore up public support, which may have lagged, in line with their position.

Conclusion

Strategic culture clearly provides a rich conceptual foundation with which to consider German security policy and perspectives on the use of force. With an emphasis on how historical experience and collective memory shapes policy behaviour, strategic culture as a concept has great resonance in the case of contemporary Germany. From its initial articulation in the 1970s, strategic culture has undergone conceptual refinement and empirical development to an extent that it now offers a viable alternative to the more traditional rationalist approaches in the field of security studies. Despite this, the chapter demonstrated that strategic culture is a contested concept, its explanatory power questioned and research agenda rather disparate. To address these issues, this chapter has built on a number of existing studies that mobilised strategic culture or related concepts to create a viable conceptual framework which can be applied to the case of Germany in understanding changing perspectives on the use of force, and also to further the conceptual development of the notion of strategic culture. This subsequent framework for analysis establishes a number of factors, the most important of which are how a strategic culture and its constituent parts may be identified, how a strategic culture might change in different contexts and how it links with policy behaviour and affects choices.
This framework forms the basis for the remainder of the book, beginning with the identification of the origins of West Germany's strategic culture, before looking at the issue of change and the effects on policy behaviour.

Notes

3 Ken Booth and Russell Trood (1999) Strategic Cultures in the Asia Pacific Region (Basingstoke: Macmillan), p. 3.
11 Ibid., p. 8.
24 Germany and the use of force

21 Ibid., p. 16.
22 Ibid., pp. 20–1.
24 Ibid., p. 27.
Interest politics alone ... cannot account for Germany's pacifistic military security policy, nor does it provide a satisfactory explanation of Bonn's approach to national sovereignty or its aversion to unilateralism. One must look beyond material and political interests to the politics of national identity in post war Germany, which unfolded in searing domestic political debates over rearmament, reunification, and European integration carried out under the watchful eyes of neighbouring countries and allies.  

As shown in the previous chapter, the identification of a strategic culture should proceed with the pinpointing of the formative period of its creation. The formative period in the emergence of the Federal Republic's strategic culture is arguably far easier to locate than that of other cases. It is the 'collective infancy' represented in the notion of 'zero hour' (*Stunde Null*) in 1945, which signified a strategic cultural discontinuity and social trauma so profound that 'affective and evaluative schemes had to be re-learnt' in the new West German State, including matters relating to the place of the armed forces within politics and society and the use of military force.  

This relearning was determined partly by domestic contextual factors and partly by international impositions and demands. Importantly, what was a critical moment in German history was turned by the architects of rearmament and by the creation of the Bundeswehr into a critical juncture for the wholesale construction of a fresh strategic culture.  

The aim of this chapter is to draw out the antecedents of what came to be (West) German strategic culture and to identify the key debates and processes at work during its formative period. A detailed micro-study of the rearming of the Federal Republic is not needed here, as it has been more than adequately accomplished elsewhere. What is required, rather, is an account, through the lens of strategic culture, of
the creation of the Bundeswehr, together with a fusion of the international and domestic contexts of West German rearmament. The chapter shows that the forging of a new strategic culture in West Germany occurred through two principal channels: the imposition of the will and demands of the allies as to what kind of role the Federal Republic should play; and post-war domestic conditions in West Germany. Thus the emergent strategic culture was a result of what was externally demanded and what was internally offered. Essentially this configuration excluded certain options while necessitating the inclusion of others.

The context: *Stunde Null*

*Stunde Null* implies the total physical, moral and psychological devastation and trauma that prevailed in Germany at the close of the Second World War. The wake of *Stunde Null* brought with it a forced rethink of conceptions of identity, power and nationhood, since previous definitions had proved profoundly disastrous for both Germany and the international community. Although the very notion of *Stunde Null* is contested, it is argued here that, in the field of security policy and the organisation of the armed forces, the term accurately conveys the clear break with the past that prevailed after the Second World War and on which new policies and practices were constructed. One of the most obvious manifestations of *Stunde Null* was the central importance accorded to political rather than strictly military ideas in shaping the process of rearmament and the creation of the new armed forces. Bork and Gress speak of *Stunde Null* as a ‘basic emotion’, central to which was ‘a scepticism, indeed a rejection of all things military, contempt for the older generation and a broad rejection of political ideology’.  

To understand the meaning of something that has been called a basic emotion, although not easy, is vital in understanding the domestic context of West German rearmament. To fully understand and, more importantly, to see how it impacted on and influenced the rearming of West Germany, *Stunde Null*’s constituent parts must be unpacked and disaggregated into *exogenous* and *endogenous* factors.

**Exogenous factors**

The exogenous factors of *Stunde Null* imposed on Germany comprehensive and wide-reaching preventative measures to rid it of the
capacity, potential and will to either fight another war or raise armed forces. This was a fundamental part of the larger debellation of West Germany after the Second World War. In the blueprint for Germany’s unconditional surrender the allies spoke of their determination to destroy German militarism and Nazism. In pursuit of these aims and in the design of their rule over occupied Germany the allies declared that it was not their intention to destroy or enslave the Germans, but rather to give them the opportunity to prepare for the reconstruction of their lives on a democratic and peaceful basis. The subsequent political principles laid out by the allies for the government and treatment of Germany in the initial control period embraced the complete ‘disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production’. In realising this,

all German land, naval and air forces, the S.S., S.A., S.D. and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and nazism.

These aspects of allied policy towards Germany amounted to a ‘military emasculation’, aimed at destroying the roots of German militarism, viewed by the allies as residing predominantly in the general staff and the officer corps.

**Endogenous factors**

It is important to note that the allied policies of demilitarisation were viewed largely as legitimate by West German society, a significant difference from the situation after the First World War when allied punishment and reparation were deemed ‘unjust’, thus helping nurture the continuance of the German general staff and its political role. This time the obliteration of Germany’s sources of military power was neither publicly disputed nor resented, being instead accepted by and made the official policy of the new Federal Government. As von Friedeburg noted, in the construction of West Germany’s new identity and international rehabilitation, its peaceful economic and social reconstruction, military forces seemed totally irreconcilable.
Stunde Null brought with it an exhaustion of nationalism, in the form of a disavowal of Germany's militaristic past. The profound effects on German society of defeat in what had been an abnormal war resulted in the feeling of 'Never again'. This widespread determination to never again allow the military to play a central role in the destiny of the nation or to see military power play a defining role in foreign policy necessarily disposed a large sector of society to actively resist the rearming of West Germany. This public feeling was manifest in the idea of Ohne Mich, or 'count me out', a broadly based movement which came to characterise domestic reticence about and opposition to military issues. A further crucial aspect of Stunde Null was the defamation of the soldier, as seen in the collapse of the respect and prestige attaching to the vocation of the soldier and delegitimising of military values and traditions.

The manifestations of these external and internal aspects of Stunde Null were apparent in the Basic Law, which, in its initial conception, did not plan or make provisions for future armed forces. At its inception, the Federal Republic was a state without an army. It was not until the processes of rearmament were concluded that a mass of security and military-related laws were incorporated into the Basic Law in March 1956. What was present in the constitution in 1949 was a three-tiered construction of checks and balances, directly relating to the past, which together remained the cornerstones of the Federal Republic's security policies. This triad of constitutional clauses was constituted by:

- article 26, which sees as unconstitutional '[a]cts tending and undertaken with the intent to disturb the peaceful relation between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war';
- article 24, which permits the Federal Republic to enter a system of mutual collective security; and
- article 4, which declared: 'No one may be compelled against his conscience to render war service involving the use of arms.'

In both its exogenous and endogenous manifestations, the effects of Stunde Null were diametrically opposed to the rearming, in whatever way, of the fledging Federal Republic. However, the imperatives of rearmament rapidly accelerated and, together with Konrad Adenauer's disposition towards the regaining of sovereignty through alliance with the West, the task in hand became not so much if or when rearmament would occur, but how.
The rising imperatives of rearmament: ‘the requirements’

... like undertakers performing an amputation on a corpse. For five years we have been blowing up bunkers, cutting holes in air raid shelters, dismantling factories, silting harbours, banning the production of toy soldiers and pop-guns and re-orienting the German mind. Having stripped Germany of every possibility of defense, the irony of the sudden appeal to the Germans to get in there and defend what we believe in is obvious. It is like mentioning a rope in the home of somebody who has been hanged.7

The imperative of realising West German rearmament was from the very outset conceived of within a broader Euro-Atlantic setting. Even prior to Adenauer’s initial offers of a West German defence contribution and the subsequent deliberations over the European Defence Community (EDC) and then NATO membership, it was clear to many that rearmament was inevitable and the imperative was to make sure that West Germany was on the ‘right side’. With the exacerbation of East–West tensions in late 1947, US planners remained faced with the most alarming forecasts of potential conflict in Europe based on the operation plan ‘Offtackle’. Premised on this plan, almost all of Western Germany would be ‘occupied even in the best case scenario’, and Western Europe as a whole would have trouble holding a defensive line at the Pyrenees. With the profound dearth of manpower in Central Europe, the logical remedy, in the view of the US and the UK, was the rearmament of West Germany. In this context, a West German contribution was deemed an essential anchor in the West’s security, as a means of sharing the defence burden and of resisting emerging tendencies to create a neutralised zone in the heart of Europe. In West Germany, although the reappearance of uniformed Germans was still largely an illegitimate idea, the Christian Democratic leadership was predisposed to meet British and American interests in order to secure its own objectives, namely the acquisition of sovereignty, international rehabilitation as an equal through integration with the West, as well as solid allied security guarantees. In essence, the raising of a West German defence contribution was to be the ‘epoxy’, or glue, that bonded a mutually advantageous set of policies.
Internal discord: an armed force for what?

The real intensity and the nature of the Soviet threat, its bearing on the security of the Federal Republic and what would be the best means of dealing with it were issues of dispute in the party politics of the new West German State. Party-political discord over rearmament revealed the innate differences between the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) on their perception of the form that West German grand strategy should take and the best means to prioritise and realise national unity. For those reasons it is worth sketching out the principal differences between these positions before moving on to outline the ideas that won through.

Adenauer’s approach to the rearming of West Germany must be understood in the context of his Politik der Stärke (‘policy of strength’), but this was tempered by his conviction that West German rearmament was to be avoided unless absolutely necessary. In an interview in the Cleveland Plain Dealer on 3 December 1949, Adenauer reaffirmed his position that the rearming of the Federal Republic could be considered only if ‘there was no way out’,8 and was then plausible only in the context of a European army, with a German contingent under European command, since for Adenauer ‘neutralisation, non-alignment, no alliances, were sordid words’.9

In the wake of the interview, Adenauer’s conception of rearmament gained greater clarity. Three interrelated factors determined his attitude:

- the acquisition of sovereignty as a consequence of rearmament;
- security against the rearmament of the Eastern Zone by Soviet Russia;
- the establishing of a European Federation entry into NATO.

From this point onwards Adenauer became less ambiguous about his desire to actualise a West German defence contribution. Again, what he was never ambiguous about was his conviction that West German rearmament could occur only in the context of a broader West European framework, and that a West German armed force would have anything but an exclusively defensive function.

With the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950, which Adenauer likened to West Germany’s geopolitical situation, he was able to put more boldly the offer of a West German contribution to the defence of Western Europe, together with demands to end the occupation of the Federal Republic as a quid pro quo. On 29 August 1950 Adenauer
presented two memoranda to the Allied High Commission: one on the security of the Federal area, internally and externally; and another on questions relating to new structures for the occupation of the Federal Republic. The first outlined developments in the GDR, the creation of the Kasernierten Volkspolizei (KVP) and spoke of some kind of Federal police force to guard against internal subversion, at the same time calling on the allies to strengthen their own forces in the region; while the second made it clear that a defence contribution could be made only by a sovereign Federal Republic. Crucially for Adenauer, a less than sovereign West Germany under less than equal terms of allied tutelage would not be enough; moreover, continued occupation, in any shape or form, and the mere illusion of sovereignty might engender the type of anti-Western feeling prevalent in Germany after the First World War. In short, Adenauer saw that 'the rapid development of the army was the means to a political end, integration with the West'; and this close alliance with the West presented the Federal Republic with the only possible route to the ultimate goal of reunification. In 1950, when addressing the Bundestag on the issue of rearmament, Adenauer lucidly presented the situation as he saw it: 'the German defence contribution was necessary, the West wanted it, and the Germans owed it to civilization to produce it'.

Adenauer’s vision of rearmament, sovereignty and integration with the West was severely criticised by other voices and from the SPD. Strong anti-rearmament sentiments lay behind Gustav Heinemann’s resignation from his position as minister for internal affairs in 1950. Heinemann’s argument contrasted starkly with that of Adenauer, seeing that it was social rather than military rearmament that West Germany should move towards, which would thus enable the possibility of unification with the East and the construction of Germany as a neutralised zone.

Unsurprisingly, the opposition’s first response was a blanket refusal to even consider the prospect of rearmament, and as debate proceeded on the issue the SPD’s line of argument ran against that of the CDU on almost every count. It was the primacy of domestic politics, national unity and socio-economic reconstruction that guided the party’s position on rearmament. Moreover, party leader Kurt Schumacher saw that such considerations should not be the business of the fledgling Federal Republic as was dictated by the occupation statute. In opposition to Adenauer’s Politik der Stärke, the SPD at this time viewed rearmament as possibly squandering chances to realise national unity
by exacerbating Cold War tensions. The route to national unity and international rehabilitation could be secured only by resisting the entanglement of the Federal Republic within Euro-Atlantic structures and, initially, by repelling rearmament, until social conditions were improved and a European political authority had been created. The SPD’s position came to be increasingly at odds with the CDU’s and was increasingly intransigent, being heavily flavoured by anti-militarism and the pursuit above all else of national unity. By the time that NATO membership for the Federal Republic had become a possibility, the SPD was declaring that should West Germany enter the alliance all chances for national unity would be dead.

Discord between the CDU and the SPD persisted on security questions even after the rearmament of West Germany had been sanctioned. As seen in the fierce Bundestag debates in early 1956 over the structure of the new armed forces, the issue of manpower mirrored the two parties’ overall positions on the broader matter of rearmament. The SPD held the position that the Bundeswehr should be designed to balance the military presence in the GDR. Subsequently, for this task, a large standing force on the basis of universal conscription would not be necessary; indeed the return of conscription would compromise fundamental human rights and also require an amendment of the constitution. As the SPD conceived it, conscription would not be required to guard against the re-emergence of the armed forces as an isolated state within a state; moreover it would actively impede efforts at reunifying the two Germanies.

Meanwhile, in line with his strategy of equality and integration through rearmament, Adenauer favoured a large land-based force, and that necessitated the reintroduction of conscription. Without conscription, the argument ran, not only would the projected manpower structure of 500,000 men be unattainable, but the Bundeswehr would be unable to augment to around 1 million without a substantial reservist element ensured by conscription. This preference was bolstered, according to the CDU, by historical precedence, encapsulated in the belief that despite all attempts by politicians, professional armed forces in the Federal Republic would inevitably emerge as a dangerously isolated ‘state within a state’. Conscription was viewed by the party also as commensurate with the new democratic ethos of West Germany.

It was Adenauer’s ideas and the paradigm that ‘size matters’, the embedding of the FRG within Euro-Atlantic structures and the creation
of a 500,000-strong Bundeswehr based on conscription, that ultimately won through. The law on compulsory military service was passed in July 1956, closely followed by the alternative Civic Service Act. This configuration served a couple of objectives: it firmly embedded the Federal Republic, as an equal, within the Western camp; and it awarded West Germany political capital and a degree of sovereignty.

**Institutionalising West German rearmament**

Concern over the rearming of West Germany and its institutional setting in line with US plans was apparent in the French 'Pleven plan', as announced on 24 October 1950. The Pleven plan’s proposed Europeanising of the German problem through the creation of an EDC implied the dilution of West Germany’s role. Aside from presidential ceremonial guards, there would be no independent West German forces; there would be a single European uniform, and command and control would be directed from a supranational level, with ultimate authority in the hands of a Board of Commission. This body would have extensive powers, embracing the range of functions normally fulfilled by national ministries of defence, the army, navy, air force, the treasury and the chiefs of staff. The Pleven option, which foresaw the dispersal of West German soldiers under non-German command, would mean singularisation for the Federal Republic, since the potential for West German input to decision-making was from the very outset low, with West German soldiers being automatically denied high-ranking positions.

Although Adenauer put his personal credibility behind the EDC project, and was hugely disappointed when it collapsed, he was also keen to realise the accession of the Federal Republic to the Atlantic Alliance as an equal member. As detailed earlier, for Adenauer, NATO membership always entailed as much political capital as it did military security for the Federal Republic, by awarding him diplomatic and political leverage. The rejection of the EDC treaties by the French National Assembly on 31 August 1954 was to enable this possibility.\(^\text{12}\)

As noted above, even before the EDC option was dead and buried, Adenauer pursued the NATO and sovereignty option. According to Schwartz, Adenauer ‘regarded unlimited sovereignty as just as important as NATO membership’.\(^\text{13}\) Adenauer’s preference for West Germany’s NATO membership converged neatly with US and British designs. In London and Washington plans had already been drawn up on ways in which the Federal Republic’s entry in to NATO could be
realised. Soon after the French rejection of the EDC British diplomacy took forward the NATO option. The path eventually pursued was the ‘European Solution’, involving an extension of the 1948 Brussels Pact, which had made the Western Union into a Western European Union (WEU), incorporating both Italy and the Federal Republic. The WEU–NATO path paved the way for permanent British and American military contributions to continental Europe and also ensured West Germany’s entry in to NATO with the right balance of control and manoeuvrability. Despite ongoing SPD objections and the attempted mobilisation of union protest, the Bundestag ratified the Paris treaties in February 1995 and the Federal Republic entered NATO in May of that year. Subsequent to this, the Parliament passed a bill enabling the Government to raise an army of 6,000 volunteers. In assuring the rearment of the Federal Republic through membership in NATO, together with the acquisition of sovereignty, Adenauer proclaimed that ‘we have reached the target we had set for ourselves very quickly’.

**Designing a new armed forces: Soldat aus der Retorte**

Even before the rearment debates really took off, thinking about the prospect of a rearmed West Germany and what the substance of a new armed forces might be had already begun in military circles in Germany. General Graf Kielmansegg, one of Adenauer’s military advisors and a main protagonist in the internal design of the Bundeswehr, saw rearment as ‘inevitable’ already in 1946. What Kielmansegg and other early thinkers had to assure was that West Germany was on the right side and also to measure the likely internal and external demands and constraints on a new armed forces. Although Adenauer had little empathy with the military as a whole, and with the officer corps in particular, he was acutely aware of the meaning and the political influence a substantial armed forces would bring to West Germany. Since, as detailed above, Adenauer was conscious of the inherent connection between armed forces and sovereignty and for Adenauer a state without armed forces was ‘no state at all’.

Already, in 1948, Adenauer had begun to seek advice from former soldiers, most notably Generals Schwerin, Speidel and Heusinger, on the possibility of a future West German defence contribution. These former *Wehrmacht* senior officers and generals had respectable credentials and, importantly, shared Adenauer’s vision of a new large West German ‘post-national’ armed force located firmly within the Western
camp as an equal partner. Many of these discussions and plans were subsequently conducted within the frame of an embryonic defence ministry in the Dienstelle Blank, headed by Theodor Blank who had been assigned the position of 'Commissioner of the Chancellor for Questions Relating to the Augmentation of Allied Troops'. The accumulation of much of this early thinking and dialogue with ex-military officials was incorporated within the Himmeroder Denkschrift.17

The Himmeroder Denkschrift

Drafted in October 1950 and declassified in 1977, the Denkschrift represents the first systematic West German thinking on the design of a new armed forces. What comes across in the Denkschrift is an unyielding desire to fundamentally rethink the soldier’s relationship to state and society, to deal with the past and to root any new military firmly within a post-national setting and the legal–constitutional framework of the emergent Federal Republic. In this sense the Denkschrift demonstrates that the draftees were intensely aware of the changed domestic and international contexts in which a new armed forces had to be conceived.

The three core aims of the meeting at Himmerod were to clarify:

- if, given the military and psychological prerequisites of the Western allies, a West German defence contribution could be made.
- how, in terms of organisation and command functions, a West German contingent could be realised in the context of a West European army; and
- in what form the build-up of West German troops could take place.

The contents of the Denkschrift echo Adenauer’s motif of Politik der Stärke, seeing that the overcoming of Soviet aggression could be achieved only through the raising of military strength in Western Europe, including a sizeable West German contribution. The Denkschrift was also explicit in its identification of a Euro-Atlantic framework as the only context in which security for the Federal Republic could be attained as well as that within which any West German defence contribution should thus be realised. Further defining features of the Denkschrift included the necessity of identifying clear legal constraints on the new military in terms of limiting its role to Europe and also in terms of placing the armed forces under the jurisdiction of the Federal government and under the scrutiny of both the Bundestag
and the Bundesrat. The *Denkschrift* also outlined the need to transform the relationship of the soldier to state and society, to which end a new *Inneres Gefüge*, or inner structure (the pre-cursor to *Innere Führung*, or moral leadership), was debated. The draftees were clearly mindful of the historical precedent and were adamant that any new German contingent should not become an isolated state within a state, subject only to its own rules and traditions. This time the individual soldier and the armed forces as a whole should be supportive and also equipped to enjoy democracy. To this end the *Denkschrift* spoke of the necessity of legally reducing the basic rights of the soldier only during the specific time of service and at the same time expanding to an unprecedented level the possibilities of democratic political participation for the soldier.

What is striking about this thinking is that the impetus came entirely from the Germans and, even more surprisingly perhaps, from the German military. Although Adenauer and other politicians had input to the design of civil–military relations and the armed forces’ internal structure, it was really a major concern only for the military, who realised that success for the Federal Republic and its armed forces was clearly going to be dependent on a radical rethink of the role of the armed force, its position in society and its relationship to politics. The ideas proposed at Himmerod were deemed too revolutionary by the allies who wanted to reinstitute the German soldier of the Second World War whose courage, discipline and stamina they had come to know. This new thinking on internal structures, it seemed to the allies, could actually weaken a new West German armed forces. One of the chief proponents of the Bundeswehr’s internal design noted that ‘it took some time to convince [the allies of] what German military thinkers actually envisaged and to persuade them of the merits of a thorough reconstruction of civil–military relations’.18

**Constructing rearmament: ‘the outcomes’**

The sections above presented the often opposing ideas as to if, how and in what form West German rearmament should proceed. The antecedents of the new West German strategic culture came from the fusion of an exogenously imposed will and set of demands, together with endogenous factors, namely the widespread anti-military sentiment present in West German society, together with efforts from sectors
of the political elite to rehabilitate the Federal Republic as an equal in Euro-Atlantic institutions and to achieve sovereignty.

Although the broad institutional frameworks for West Germany’s rearmament were in place by the mid 1950s it took some time to actually realise it. The Bundestag passed a bill in July 1955 for the raising of 6,000 volunteers and it took a further year to implement the Soldatengesetz. Furthermore, although the conscription bill was passed by Parliament in July 1956, it was not until the following April that the first conscripts were inducted. Such delays meant that rearmament fully in line with initial plans did not transpire until 1965, when twelve West German divisions were assigned to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command Europe).

Institutional frameworks: embedding West German security policy

The institutional embedding of West German security policy was comprised of political, strategic and spatial elements.

As a direct reflex to the past, rearmament took place in a setting of multilateralism, entailing a break with a traditional military vocation, namely one based on purely nationally based decision-making and command and control structures. Under article 24 of the Basic Law, which allowed West Germany to ‘enter a system of mutual collective security for the purpose of preserving peace’, the founding of the Bundeswehr was a crucial step in the rehabilitation of West Germany through its membership in NATO and the WEU within the Western community. Thus the Federal Republic’s security identity became a ‘substitute identity’, intimately bound up with the greater Western cause as demonstrated by its ‘penetrated’ security decision-making framework and the subordination of all West German troops to NATO’s allied command. The removal of national central command structures was a prerequisite for the allied sanctioning of rearmament, given the anti-democratic nature of previous German general staffs. Instead command was provided by an ‘integrated military commander’ (eventually SACEUR), which acted as the ‘guardian of German military interests’. The nullification of the German general staff was equally important as a prerequisite for domestic consent as recognised in the Himmeroder Denkschrift.

The Bundeswehr was conceived, legally activated and legitimised on the premiss that it was an armed force solely for the defence of West German territory and that of its NATO allies. This was based on a
conflict scenario of the Warsaw Pact as aggressor and NATO as the framework for the Federal Republic’s response. This scenario necessitated nuclear deterrence and forward defence, with the Bundeswehr to act as a ‘trip-wire’ geared to dissuade any potential aggressor from the threat or use of military force by virtue of its combat effectiveness and high level of operational readiness. In the words of a former Bundeswehr Generalinspekteur, the Bundeswehr had “to be good enough to fight in order not to fight”.  

The political and strategic aspects outlined above translated into a legally stymied territorial role for the Bundeswehr. Since the Federal Republic’s ability to raise forces and enter into a collective security system was restrained by the provisions of article 87a, which saw that the Bundeswehr could be deployed only for defence purposes or for some other reason explicitly outlined in the Basic Law, the remit of the Bundeswehr was tightly defined as relating only to the territorial defence of the Federal Republic and its NATO allies. Such a remit precluded unilateralism and collapsed national interests into those of the alliance as a whole. Despite West Germany’s entry into the United Nations in 1973, this spatially restricted definition of the Bundeswehr’s remit was further tightened by the Federal Security Council’s later decision in 1982 which ruled against the legality of deployments ‘out-of-area’, thus confirming the limited territorial role of the Bundeswehr.

Civil–military relations: at the heart of the matter

The institutional frameworks outlined above defined the outer parameters for the creation of the Bundeswehr; these satisfied the demands and expectations of NATO allies by offering them a viable large fighting force totally wedded to and serving the alliance. Despite this clear institutional framework, which also furthered Adenauer’s policy of ‘strength and equality’, patterns and practices of civil–military relations and the position of the soldier in both state and society also had to be reconceived if domestic complicity was to be assured. The success of the Bundeswehr in terms of acceptance and legitimacy at home would stem naturally from the degree of threat perception, but only if a resolute break with the ‘unhealthy’ civil–military relations that had previously existed was made.

This very difficult task, given that militaries tend to rely for their self-image and legitimacy on lengthy histories and traditions, could be achieved only through a range of balancing and checking measures,
with the aim of creating a soldier who considered himself – and was considered by society – to be supportive of democracy. The new armed forces were not to be held above, forced below or allowed to perpetuate themselves *within* the new State, but were rather to coalesce with the Federal Republic via an extremely broad interface of civil–military relations. Unlike earlier incarnations of the German military, which had been either too weak or too strong, the Bundeswehr was to find equilibrium with state and society chartered through constitutional law.

As was emphasised at Himmerod, of paramount importance for future civil–military relations, societal acceptance and the viability of a new military was a satisfactory dealing with the past. An optimal balance of the past with a view to the future, meant the salvaging of the best and workable parts of the past, together with a thorough appraisal of the soldier’s role in German history as well as the embracing of new ideas and formulas. Former Generalinspekteur Ulrich de Maizière describes the birth of the Bundeswehr as a ‘new creation with a tradition’, typifying the balance of old and new apparent in the forging of the Bundeswehr. Although the idea of *Stunde Null* is largely an accurate one for thinking about West German rearmament, and certainly the Bundeswehr did, to an extent ‘enjoy’ the grace of ‘zero hour’, it must be stressed that much of the past continued to play an important role in the design of the new armed forces.

In the years after Himmerod when the actual architecture of the Bundeswehr was being constructed, the difficulties of achieving an optimal balance of old and new became clear, given the exigencies of realising the Bundeswehr as soon as possible, the actual resources and manpower available, together with the doubts raised by the allies as to the desirability and feasibility of fundamental civil–military reform. Of prime importance was the requirement to enact the rehabilitation of the German soldier and to somehow desegregate his honour from the crimes of National Socialism. This was, to an extent, satisfied when both Adenauer and Eisenhower stated their personal recognition of the courageous endeavours of the German soldier and importantly made a distinction between the German soldier and the ideological servant of Hitler. This was crucial given that in terms of personnel, the Bundeswehr, up until the 1970s, largely had to rely on soldiers who had served in the Wehrmacht and the Reichswehr. The restoration of honour instilled a sense of worth and bolstered the self-image of the soldier, becoming an important factor in the formulation of a workable tradition for the Bundeswehr. Tradition for the Bundeswehr would have to
present a *de-glorification* and a disrobing of German militarism of its pomp and ceremony. The military in the Federal Republic had to escape from its reactionary past and somehow become a 'mascot' of the new democracy; this, moreover, had to be achieved at a time when most of its leading manpower were former Wehrmacht soldiers and when even the basic credentials of the new State were still in a process of gestation by society at large.

In the formulation of a workable tradition for the Bundeswehr the best parts of the past were to be salvaged while the less workable aspects were to form a standard by which the future soldier could gauge the balance of conscience, rights and duties central to his vocation. Parts of military life prior to the Third Reich and, most importantly, the great Prussian reforms under Scharnhorst formed part of a workable past; but military history was to be read through ongoing criticism and continued scrutiny. At the core of the emergent tradition lay the plot against Hitler's life of 20 July 1944, symbolising the Bundeswehr's accent on honour through conscience rather than honour through obedience. Together with the centrality of the Basic Law, a dynamic sense of history was created for the Bundeswehr, bridging the old with the new.

*Reconceiving the soldier in state and society*

Reconceiving the soldier in the West German State and its society involved two interconnected issues: the legal embedding of the Bundeswehr within a functioning democracy; and the reordering of the military's *Innere Ordnung* (inner order).

The notion of *Primat der Politik* (primacy of politics) as the leitmotif for the embedding of the Bundeswehr within the democracy of the Federal Republic was manifest in a dense and multifaceted set of practices and institutions that served to anchor and navigate all aspects of security policy-making into constitutional law. The context of rearmament precluded from the very outset the creation of an armed force solely under the jurisdiction of martial law or solely subject to partisan politics. Instead, the dictates of *Primat der Politik* meant that the armed forces and security policies were situated firmly within the executive and surrounded by a dense web of civilian control. Crucially the *Oberbefehl*, or supreme command, resided in the hands of a civilian defence minister and consequently of the chancellor at times of crisis; while the highest-ranking soldier, the generalinspekteur, quite unlike the general staff of former times, was to act only as a military 'advisor'
to his civilian superiors. Legislation on defence matters, including manpower structures and defence budgets, were securely a matter for the Bundestag and further enhanced by the Defence Committee. Augmenting the Primat der Politik were the functions of the Wehrbeauftragte, the parliamentary ombudsman for the armed forces, again empowered with extensive rights of access and scrutiny in assessing the correct implementation of Innere Führung in the Bundeswehr.

Also within the paradigm of Primat der Politik, adjudicating the balance of rights and duties in the life of the soldier was the new Soldatengesetz (Soldier's Law), which was essentially to ensure that democracy was not suspended in the military. The Soldatengesetz outlined the primacy of the soldier’s identity as a citizen, with all the freedoms that this entailed, while at the same time it specified the essential constraints on the soldier, in accordance with his profession, that require a limitation of his full rights during, but only during, the period of service: ‘Der Soldat hat die gleichen staatsbürgerlichen Rechte wie jeder andere Staatsbürger. Seine Rechte werden im Rahmen der Erfordernisse des militärischen Dienstes durch seine gestetzlich begründeten Pflichten beschränkt.’

Bürger in uniform and Innere Führung

The leitmotif for the intellectual, political and moral reform of the military, were Innere Führung and Bürger in Uniform (citizen in uniform). The ideas of Innere Führung and Bürger in Uniform were direct reflexive responses to the past, aimed at instilling in the soldier a high level of ‘thinking obedience’ to guard against Befehl ist Befehl (orders are orders) being used as an excuse for atrocities, and to prevent the establishment of the military as a Fremdkörper (alien body) or a state within a state again, by bridging the chasm between the military and society that had characterised all previous German states.

Behind these notions, developed principally by Baudissin, lay the desire to fundamentally reorder the military’s and the individual soldier’s place in and relationship to state and society. For Baudissin in the age of total warfare and ideological conflict ‘spiritual armament’ was as important for the success of the Bundeswehr as were material capabilities. For the soldier to accomplish his mission he would have to be fully furnished with those freedoms and rights to the military defence of which he commits himself; he was to be ‘given the feeling that he is a member of a free nation standing on the side of freedom’.
Baudissin stressed the notion that ‘German defence can be expressed only in the symbol of armed democracy’ and that ‘the potential which the German armed forces will add to European and Atlantic defence is closely connected with the extent to which the free way of life has meaning for Germans and the extent to which the German soldier identifies himself with it’.26

Put simply, *Innere Führung* is the programme and ethos for the internal order of the Bundeswehr and it is through adherence to the Basic Law and *Innere Führung* that the soldier as a *Bürger in Uniform* can be realised and maintained. Both notions are by definition dynamic in nature precluding, again as a direct reflex to the past, the emergence of the armed forces as a stolid, or worse, reactionary entity. *Innere Führung*, best understood as an ‘anti-ideology’, entails ‘civics education and moral leadership’, and is the tool through which the Basic Law gains meaning for the soldier by delineating both the possibilities and limits to his vocation, providing the link between values and standards in the Basic Law to leadership, education and training in the Bundeswehr. *Innere Führung* was aimed at ameliorating the tensions thrown up by the demands of military service and life as a full citizen; it ensures the operational readiness of the Bundeswehr on the one hand and the rights of the servicemen on the other. Through *Innere Führung* the old ‘warrior’ vocational model of the soldier was replaced by the representation of the soldier as more a ‘technician’, thus reducing the differences between the military and civilian society.

The *Bürger in Uniform* was the ideal and the reality which *Innere Führung* was to create. As already outlined, the *Bürger in Uniform* was to be a fully fledged member of society imbued with full rights of political participation and responsibility – to be circumscribed only by law and only for the duration of military service, the aim here in the basic architecture of the Bundeswehr being to dispose of the ideological caste of the military and to initiate the flourishing of a wide array of political and social ideas. This new political soldier, created with a view to the past and the dangers of both apolitical neutrality and overt politicisation of the military, was to engage fully with civilian politics in his right to vote and to stand for office.

Essentially, the Bundeswehr was to be as far as possible a mirror of society and was to be welded to that society through a broad interface of institutions and mechanisms. The place of the armed forces within society at large has continually been stressed: ‘the federal armed
forces, in so far as their tasks permit, take part in the intellectual, political and technical development of society.\textsuperscript{27} Through its range of practices, the Bundeswehr was intended to be reactive rather than reactionary, inclusivist rather than exclusivist, and pluralistic rather than monistic, and capable of emulating the broader liberal democratic credentials of the Federal Republic. The accent, then, was on a broad civil–military relationship and one that was inherently porous.

\textit{Conscription: a linchpin}

Wir sind dabei ein Werk der Demokratie zu schaffen. Die Wehrpflicht ist das legitime Kind der Demokratie.\textsuperscript{28}

As indicated earlier in this chapter, the adoption of universal male conscription as a basis for the Bundeswehr went far beyond being an issue of mere manpower. Conscription was a linchpin, coordinating external and internal requirements for rearmament; fulfilling both strategic demands for a large armed force within NATO and domestic requirements for a democratically viable armed force. Vibrant party-political debates in the 1950s on manpower structures replicated and symbolised opposing political conceptions and priorities on national unity, the importance of the Western alliance, the nature of the Soviet threat and conceptions of national interests. To reiterate, conscription was seen as a prerequisite by the Government right from the start in its conception of a large land-based armed force firmly grounded as an equal partner within the Western alliance driven by the desirability of \textit{Bundesfähigkeit} (alliance credibility).\textsuperscript{29} In contrast, the opposition’s design for rearmament envisaged a far smaller armed force with the expressed aim of balancing the military of the GDR.\textsuperscript{30}

The conception of the Bundeswehr that won through was, as outlined earlier, premised on Adenauer’s paradigm of ‘size and strength’. This necessitated the introduction of military service since such a large armed forces could not be achieved through volunteers alone, especially considering the desired augmented crisis strength of over 1 million soldiers. Thus compulsory universal conscription for a period of twelve months was introduced in September 1956. Conscription was further legitimised by the Government on the grounds that it was a manifestation of the democratic credentials of the new armed forces. It was elected as the best means to preclude the Bundeswehr’s isolation from society, to ensure the congruence of military and societal...
values, and to guard against the emergence of the military as a state within a state. As Theodor Blank argued, conscription would be vital in ensuring the democratic integrity of the armed forces:

Ein Berufsheer steht immer in der Gefahr, ein ‘Staat im Staate’ zu werden. Das militärische Eigenleben, wenn es nicht durch den laufenden Zustrom von Wehrpflichtigen aufgelockert wird, kann trotz allen guten Willens der politischen und militärischen Führung und der parlamentarischen Kontrolle zu einer Isolierung der Soldatenführer Der unmittelbare Kontakt zum ganzen Volk, der allein die auch militärisch notwendige Eingliederung in die staatliche Gesamtlage bewirkt, wird nur dann im wünschenswerten und notwendigen Ausmass vorhanden sein, wenn alle Männer verpflichtet sind, in dieser Armee zu dienen.31

Further justifying its position, the Government referred to the long tradition of conscription in Germany, placing the short and culpable existence of the Berufsheer as an interruption to this tradition. Conscription was placed as something almost natural to the German condition, while the professional armed force was the creation of an absolutist state; a reactionary or even ‘depraved’ type of armed force. This line of justification was drawn out by President Heuss in his famous dictum positioning conscription as the legitimate child of democracy, aiding and furthering the democratisation of the State by turning the defence burden in to a matter for all citizens. For Graf Baudissin and the other architects of the Bundeswehr too, conscription would be the means through which Innere Führung and Bürger in Uniform would gain real meaning and substance.

The SPD too was inclined to see the new armed forces as a break with German militarism, and it supported and provided input to the new internal order of the Bundeswehr and the practices of civil–military relations. However, conscription for the SPD, as already discussed, was neither strategically necessary nor a prerequisite for the democratisation of the Bundeswehr. Conscription, it was argued, was a totally reactionary idea and did not recognise the advent of the nuclear age in warfare; it would also impede the reunification of Germany by deepening its division. Furthermore, Fritz Erler challenged the notion that a professional armed forces endangered democracy and would necessarily develop into a state within a state. For Erler, the Geist of the whole military, whether a conscript or a professional force, would stem from leadership styles, rules and laws, rather than sources of manpower.

Conscription was introduced and legitimised as strategically necessary, but equally as the ultimate manifestation of the Federal Republic’s
Western democratic identity, ultimately becoming the 'clamp holding together the armed forces and society'.

Mapping West German strategic culture

After identifying the key disputes, processes and solutions that prevailed during the formative period of West German strategic culture, it is now possible to map its contours and substance, in line with the framework developed in the previous chapter.

A first step is to record the ideas and policy options that were rejected or not even spoken of during this early formative period; this will confirm what West German strategic culture 'was not about'. Again in the case of the Federal Republic this is relatively easy to ascertain, since the space for manoeuvre available to West Germany at this time was narrow, given the constraints imposed on it by allied dictates, coupled with widespread domestic reticence and opposition to rearmament. Thus from the very outset the range of possibilities was slim. The following ideas and provisions have been drawn out as those which were excluded from the process of rearmament from the very outset:

- that Germany was neither answerable nor responsible for the damage inflicted by it during the war;
- a reticence to accept the imposition of the allied will or to resent it;
- the re-establishment of unilateral security and military policies;
- a striving to return as a leader in European security;
- the seeking of a security alliance with the Soviet sphere;
- rearmament and reinstallation of the role of the soldier without conditions;
- the re-establishment of armed forces outside of parliamentary scrutiny;
- that military force remained a viable tool of foreign policy in the pursuit of national interests;
- that citizens should be compelled to perform military service; and
- that the mobilisation of armed forces could be premised on national sentiments.

Having identified what West German strategic culture was not about,
it is now expedient to outline what is was about, in other words what was included from the very outset.

**Foundational elements**

Chapter 1 detailed the foundational elements which provide the deeper – basal – qualities, or fabric, of a strategic culture that have their origins in the primordial or formative phase of development. These foundational elements, which comprise basic beliefs and values regarding the use of force, give a strategic culture its core characteristics and are highly resilient to change; these tenets, or ‘higher issues’, refer to those values and beliefs that are to be secured, protected and promoted. The foundational elements of West German strategic culture are identified as follows.

First, there is historical rupture. ‘Zero hour’ (*Stunde Null*) is positioned as a defining point which negates much of previous German history, especially recent history which is regarded as the ‘domain of shame and guilt’; these psychological aspects became a crucial ingredient in German security policy after 1945. Second, the use of force is no longer regarded as a justifiable tool of foreign and security policy, especially in the pursuit of national interests and twinned to this is the value assigned to the pursuit of stability and consensus-building. Third, the redundancy of militarism is evident in West German strategic culture: the military was no longer seen, by others or by itself, as the embodiment of national consciousness, identity and pride; moreover the vocation of the soldier was defamed and state and society was emasculated of all aspects of military culture. Fourth, an exhaustion of statism and nationalism prevailed: the nation state was rejected as the sole organising principle and referent of allegiance; indeed the State was seen as part of the problem and no longer the solution. This is manifested in the rupture with a ‘traditional’ military vocation, one based on national defence, grounded in realpolitik, enjoying sovereignty in policy-planning and policy-making.

**The linkage to policy preferences: security policy standpoints**

The foundational elements of strategic culture, as posited in chapter 1, steer policy preferences by excluding certain options while including others; they delineate the range of legitimate options and lay out a finite repertoire of possible options for the policy-maker to pursue. This
occurs through the emergence of security policy \textit{standpoints} which act as intermediary factors, or ‘transmitters’, between foundational elements and regulatory practices. The intermediary security policy standpoints of West German strategic culture are:

- an aversion to singularity, unilateralism and leadership in security matters; a predilection to multilateral solutions and to conceive and promote interests through these;
- a predisposition to promote stability in the security sphere;
- a preference for non-confrontational defence and deterrence, and an opposition to war-fighting strategies, while emphasising the broader political role of armed forces;
- a general restraint on the use armed force, coupled with strong antimilitary sentiments;
- an aspiration both to pursue a responsible, calculable and accountable security policy, and wherever possible to ‘make amends’ for previous wrongdoings;
- a commitment to the full integration of the armed forces within civilian politics and society, exerting strong political control over the armed forces and embedding them within multilateral structures;
- a determination to pursue compromise and build consensus on both domestic and international security policy decision-making levels.

These standpoints translate further into active policy choices – the regulatory practices of West German strategic culture.

\textit{Regulatory practices: governing premises and normative devices}

The regulatory practices of West German strategic culture are expressions of the foundational elements; they are observable manifestations, which are the policies and practices that actively relate and apply the substance of the strategic culture’s core to the external environment. Regulatory practices are less resilient to change, and are split into two types: \textit{governing premises}, the broader institutional boundaries that governed West German security policies since 1949; and \textit{normative devices}, which apply specifically to the territory of civil–military relations.

West Germany’s governing premises are expressed in

- the spatially stymied, legally defined, role of the Bundeswehr, foreclosing out-of-area deployments;
the embedding of West German armed forces within NATO command structures; and

the strategic and legally sanctioned design of the Bundeswehr for defence–deterrence purposes.

The normative devices can be summarised thus:

- an ombudsman for the armed forces and a civilian defence minister ensure parliamentary control of the armed forces;
- a limited political role for the Bundeswehr generalinspekteur;
- *Innere Führung* and *Bürger in Uniform*; and
- conscription and conscientious objection.

**The cocoon of the Cold War**

Despite numerous challenges, shifts in the international sphere and developments in West German security policy in the decades after rearmament, the tenets of West Germany’s strategic culture, as detailed above, persisted throughout the Cold War. This was due in no small part to the fact that a cross-party consensus emerged on key foreign and security questions, thus rendering West German strategic culture more robust and centripetal in nature. In the post-1950 period, especially from 1959 onwards, once the SPD had embraced EEC membership, earlier altercations over NATO and alliance strategy, as well as the issue of the Bundeswehr and its structure, tended to dissipate. This is not to say that challenges to existing modes and practices did not arise; but when they did West German elites chose policy options that were consonant with the existing strategic culture. Crucially, any attempts to question or fundamentally disagree with existing practices prompted debate and often fierce criticism. Among the numerous issues in respect of which West Germany’s freshly constructed strategic culture served to steer policy options, the question of the Bundeswehr’s remit and NATO’s nuclear strategy in the 1980s stand out as examples.

Altercation over the Bundeswehr’s remit surfaced when the Federal Republic became a member of the United Nations in 1973, a move which brought onto the agenda the issue of deploying soldiers for UN peace missions. Those in favour of West German involvement in this area argued that the Federal Republic’s economic strength should lead
to a greater willingness to contribute, militarily if needed, to global security. Although this idea went against the grain of West Germany’s existing practices, proponents pointed to article 24 of the Basic Law which permitted Germany to ‘enter a system of mutual collective security for the purpose of preserving peace’. Others, however, argued that West Germany’s willingness here was constrained by article 87a, which stipulated that the Bundeswehr could be used only for defensive purposes. A consideration of this debate through the prism of strategic culture is instructive. It reveals a minor tension between two central tenets of West German strategic culture – that of ‘reliable ally’ and ‘responsibility’ in security matters on the one hand, and that of ‘defence function only’ on the other; and when calls came for greater West German participation it was the latter tenet that predominated. The out-of-area issue in its pre-1989 context seemed thus to confirm that the mainstay of strategic culture remained in place. In sum, prior to the ending of the Cold War no alternative strategy was pursued: the Bundeswehr’s remit was not stretched beyond its original NATO ‘in-area’ defensive role, and, as the 1985 Defence White Paper saw it, ‘the central mission of the Bundeswehr has not changed’.

As NATO strategy developed through the 1980s a chasm emerged between West German elite and broader societal perceptions in the face of what appeared to many to be the onset of a war-fighting strategy, epitomised in the proposed stationing of so-called ‘Euro-missiles’ on West German soil. In the face of widespread public dissent, the SPD-led Government stuck with a pro-alliance, pro-US, policy, sanctioning the deployments as a means to enhance security through deterrence and seeing no ‘constructive alternative to the existing security policy’. This case seems similarly to reveal a number of points in relation to strategic culture – first and foremost, that Bonn’s behaviour was again consistent with the postulates of strategic culture. Crucially, West Germany’s position on the Euro-missiles sought to further the primacy of deterrence by bolstering its credibility and thus reducing the likelihood of nuclear war. Bonn’s policy sought also to maintain the coupling, or affinity, of West European defence with that of the US. In essence, by following the US-led NATO line throughout the period, as well as pursuing a concomitant policy of seeking détente and arms’ control, West German leaders were adhering to the core values of their strategic culture.

Throughout the period of the Cold War the foundational elements of West German strategic culture remained a self-reinforcing ‘protected
space’, and their substance was not questioned. Historical rupture, the core from which policies subsequently emanated, remained in place and was not challenged: the notion steered policy choices, and when pre-1945 traditions and policy perspectives were advocated they were swiftly discarded in favour of post-1945 ideas and practices. This rupture is closely tied to the continued prevalence of anti-statism and anti-nationalism, and any move to revert to statist–nationalist perspectives was rebutted, with the articulation of a clear preference for and a commitment to continued multilateralism. Akin to this, the negation of unilateralism and avoidance of singularity reinforced West Germany’s continued search for tight embeddedness, as an equal, within cohesive Euro-Atlantic structures. Furthermore, these institutional frameworks facilitated the articulation of a calculable, responsible policy style aimed at the promotion of stability. This enduring commitment to the furtherance of West Germany’s tight institutional frame continued even during the era of Ostpolitik which, under Brandt, did not question the Federal Republic’s membership of NATO and the EEC. A stolid repulsion of militarism also prevailed during this period, as seen in continued efforts to sustain and further West Germany’s formula for civil–military relations. Anti-military sentiment endured as a visible facet of security policy, together with a manifest evasion of the use of force as a reflexive tool of security policy. Indeed, general restraint remained a defining characteristic of the Federal Republic’s overall stance on security policy up until the ending of the Cold War.

How can these broad continuities and the persistence of strategic culture be explained? An answer is that the Cold War acted as a ‘cocoon’, actively precluding deviation from existing modes of thought and policy options. Bonn’s Western allies were largely content with the Federal Republic’s security policy profile. This was matched by West Germany’s limited manoeuvrability as determined by the East. On the top of this, the West German leadership and the broader population were disposed to pursue a low-key set of policies, which was underpinned by a flourishing and stable socio-economic system, something that Germany had never previously enjoyed.

The question that flows from this concerns the effect of the ending of the Cold War on the existing strategic culture. More specifically, how did the events of 1989–90 and the demise of a relatively settled period influence Germany’s strategic culture, now writ large on the newly unified state in the context of a less predictable and ‘unsettled’ period? This question is addressed in chapter 3.
Notes


12 The EDC programme had changed substantially from the (French) Pleven Plan’s conception of the project. In the original design West Germany’s rearmament would have been ‘contained and supervised’ by the French, and the development of the EDC was, for the French, insufficiently restrictive on West Germany’s military potential.
This required the removal of the occupying forces and the cancellation of the state of emergency clause in the German Treaty, as well as the voluntary self-limitation of personnel and equipment to the quotas as had been proposed in the EDC, including ABC weapons. The Paris treaties enabling the FRG’s entry to NATO were almost unquestioned within the governing coalition, and in the final vote in the Bundestag the SPD was essentially out on a limb, with 320 votes against 150.

The official title of this is Denkschrift über die Aufstellung eines deutschen Kontingents im Rahmen einer internationalen Streitmacht zur Verteidigung West-Europas (Working Paper on the Raising of a German Contingent in the Framework of an International Armed Force for the Defence of Western Europe). The Denkschrift was released for public use in 1977; it can be found in full in Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg and Norbert Wiggershaus (1977) Himmeroder Denkschrift vom Oktober 1950: Politische und Militärische Ueberlegungen fuer einen Beitrag der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur Westeuropäischen Verteidigung Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Karlruhe: G. Braun); hereafter, Himmeroder Denkschrift.

Interview with General Graf Kielmansegg, Bad Krozingen, Freiburg, April 1998.


Interview with General de Maizière, Bonn, May 1998.


‘The soldier has the same citizenship rights as any other citizen. His rights are legally limited in the context of his military service’: Soldatengesetz, §6.


Regulation 10/1 of 1972 (ZDF), issued by the Ministry of Defence, on the principles of leadership in the armed forces; see chapter IV, ‘Self-Image of the Soldier’, article 222.


Despite opposition claims that the Paris treaties did not bind the Federal Republic to raising a large peace time armed force of 500,000 men, it was an emphasis on ‘size’ – thus requiring the introduction of military service – that came to be the route followed. The EDC treaty had prescribed conscription as the basis of its manpower; also all other NATO states at the time had conscription, and for this reason alone West Germany could not be different. Additionally, from the outset of its deliberations on the rearming of West Germany France saw that the only path for West Germany was conscription.

‘There is always the danger that a professional armed force will evolve into a “state within a state”. Without conscription and the constant flow of conscripts, which make the military less of an exclusive entity, armed forces may become isolated – despite the good intentions of military and political leaders and parliamentary control. Direct contact with the population at large, this alone is the agent of integration into the fabric of the State, which is also desirable from a military perspective too. This will exist only to the desirable and required extent if it is compulsory for all men to serve in the armed forces’: Theodor Blank in BMVg Fü S1 5 (ed.) (1975) Entscheidungen (11) – Auszüge aus Debatten des Deutschen Bundestages und des Bundesrates über die Wehrverfassung und die innere Ordnung der Bundeswehr 1955–56 (Bonn), sections 153–8.


3

Germany and the use of force I:

adjusting to life after the Cold War

What does a nation do with its liberated power in the post-bipolar age
when the 40-year-old strategic threat has disappeared that previously
posed all the major questions and delivered most of the major answers?1

The Bundeswehr has always been less a manifestation of statehood than
a means of defending against the Soviet threat. With this threat gone, the
very existence of the German military is in question.2

The ending of the Cold War gave rise to a range of pulls and pressures
both from within and from outside of Germany to respond to the
changes in the European security environment and to rethink the exist-
ing tenets of West Germany’s security policies. The statements quoted
above from Josef Joffe and Wolfgang Schlör capture the fundamental
quandaries that confronted German thinking about the use of force and
the role of the armed forces in the wake of the events of 1989–90. At
stake at this time was how the new Germany’s perspectives on the use
of military force could be re-orientated, away from the orthodoxy of
the previous forty years, to ensure Germany’s standing as a credible
and important ally equipped to deal with unprecedented risks and chal-
lenges in line with the pervading strategic culture. The steep learning
curve and incremental policy adjustment that occurred during the
1990s are examined in this chapter through the prism of the changing
role of the Bundeswehr during the period between the wars in the Gulf
and Kosovo of 1990 and 1999. In this time-frame the pace of change
was relatively swift, as German security policy exhibited an increasing
willingness to use armed force as part of a broadened repertoire of
security policy tools.

As this chapter demonstrates, the magnitude of the challenges for
German thinking about the use of force that were posed by the ending
of the Cold War surpassed the fracture that had occurred in West Germany over the intermediate nuclear force debates in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the consensus was challenged over NATO strategy. The dilemmas thrown up by the ending of the Cold War exposed some fundamental issues at the core of German strategic culture, raising the question of the relationship between Germany’s past and contemporary security policy choices, while also disturbing the balance that had existed between the expectations of and the demands on German security policy from both inside and outside of the Federal Republic. The events of the late 1980s and early 1990s threw into confusion and discord what had been central tenets of West German security policy: a robust cross-party consensus, a legally defined remit for the armed forces; the Bundeswehr as a conscript force; and the guiding principle of deterrence above the active use of force.

**Armee ohne Feindbild**

As a result of the demise of the Soviet threat, the Bundeswehr became an *Armee ohne Feindbild*, or armed force without a concept of an enemy. Having been an armed force created, legitimised and organised purely within the context of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr, more than any other West European armed force, clearly faced a more fundamental set of tasks relating to re-orientation and reform. Indeed the challenge after 1989–90 amounted to the imperative of comprehensively reconceiving and recasting the Bundeswehr and its mission as an armed force, but also its place within society and politics at large.

The acquisition of sovereignty in security matters, together with the incorporation of numbers of the *Nationale Volksarmee* (NVA) and the capping of the Bundeswehr, under the proviso of the Two + Four Treaty, from 500,000 to 370,000 provided the numerical parameters for the task of redesigning the Bundeswehr. Further impulses derived from the reworking of NATO into a predominantly political as opposed to military entity and a shift from flexible response and forward defence towards a more diversified remit. The consequences of the first Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement, which removed the Soviet Union’s ability to launch a surprise attack on Western Europe, something that had always been a basic assumption in Western security planning and specifically in the Bundeswehr’s design and posture, provided a further structural change influencing Germany’s thinking about
security. Concurrently with these exogenous changes, notions of a ‘maturation’ of Germany in foreign and security policy terms came to the fore, with a growing number of German and non-German elites interested to see the new Germany shouldering a greater part of the burden in European and global security. In the midst of this, the CDU-led Government in 1991 commissioned an expert report which, in its conclusions, surmised that the Bundeswehr’s role could and should be expanded beyond national territorial defence to ‘make military contributions to international security within the collective defence alliance of NATO, the United Nations and possibly also the EC/WEU and future Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) commitments in order to preserve territorial sovereignty’.

Such thinking was, however, ahead of its time. The evolution of German security policy and, as part of this, a greater willingness to use armed force emerged over time in an incremental fashion, the journey beginning with Germany’s (non-)involvement in the Gulf War of 1990–1.

The trajectory of change

Change was initiated by the effects the Gulf War had both on German thinking about security and on the thinking of Germany’s allies about Germany’s role as a security actor, the combined effects of which brought about a reappraisal of the role of the Bundeswehr and its geographical remit. This in turn prompted a CDU-led strategy of progressively stretching the boundaries of armed forces’ use through increasingly bold deployments. This strategy was checked, though not stopped, by the constitutional debates of 1994 about the legality of ‘out-of-area’ missions. Since then and as seen most vividly in the cases of Kosovo and East Timor, a trajectory of change was initiated in the 1990s, with existing taboos breached, old convictions revised and the role played by military force becoming a more routine and uncontroversial aspect of German security policy.

Political catharsis and the Gulf War

The massive international effort to halt Saddam Hussein has suddenly confronted West Germans with all their deeply confused emotions about the role of their country’s military.
The Germans were geared to show they weren’t a danger, and they then were asked to do something very much outside of familiar patterns. Military participation in the Gulf was ostensibly ruled out by rather than for the Germans. Constituting the first post-Cold War exogenous shock to established practices and policies, the conflict brought with it a marked intensification in the international expectations placed on Germany. At the same time, the war had a cathartic effect among German elites, unleashing a debate on the status and purpose of German military power after the Cold War.

German participation in the Gulf on a level akin to that of Britain or the United States was never on the agenda. Almost like a reflex, the legal strictures restraining Germany’s use of armed force were espoused by the leadership, who amid managing the unification process, were keen to demonstrate continuity in Germany’s foreign and security policies, not least because the Soviet Union had yet to ratify the Two + Four Treaty. This stance was fortified by domestic reticence over and active protest against not just German participation but the allied campaign more broadly. The possibility of a UN-mandated military contribution to the international effort was mooted, however, by parts of the governing CDU. In mid-August the Government proposed the deployment of 4–6 German minesweepers in a WEU naval force located in the Persian Gulf, thus potentially breaching the spatial limits of the Bundeswehr’s remit. Pressure for this commitment came most vocally from Kohl, his advisor Horst Teltschik and Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, who argued that Germany should consider this deployment on the grounds of alliance solidarity and as a repayment to the US for facilitating German unification – dubbed a ‘moral and political debt’. The key argument levied here was that the prevailing status of the Bundeswehr was unsatisfactory, and in a changed international environment Germany had no choice but to assume a greater degree of responsibility, one commensurate with the country’s economic power.

Failing to mobilise support for a Gulf deployment, however, and having concluded alongside its coalition partner that the Basic Law did not permit such a contribution, Kohl presided over less sensational moves, including the sending of mine-sweepers to the Mediterranean and Germany’s assumption of the role of paymaster and provider of logistical support. Even the dispatching of eighteen Bundeswehr Alpha jets under the auspices of NATO’s Allied Mobile Force to Turkey was challenged by opposition parties and became possible only after a great deal
of internal debate and on the back of relentless Conservative petitioning that the jets were to act as a deterrence and the move was a necessary duty to Turkey, which was, after all, a NATO ally. Still the SPD contended that the Government’s deployment to Turkey was overtly offensive in nature, was not in line with the Basic Law and not in accordance with NATO’s collective defence mechanism. Despite this and the overwhelming public opposition to German involvement at any level, Kohl pushed forward the move, stressing that if Germany did not fulfil its allied duties NATO as a whole would be endangered.

A discernible shift in both policy and the public mood emerged in January 1991 in response to the presentation of Saddam Hussein as a contemporary incarnation of Hitler and revelations that German firms had been players in the arming of Iraq, which had now begun to target Israel. From that point onwards Germany showed a greater readiness to deploy its armed forces as part of the international effort, as seen in the sending of German minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the war, as well as Bundeswehr assistance in the relief mission for Kurdish refugees between April and June 1991. Importantly, these actions went beyond the spatial limits of the Bundeswehr’s remit, easing in a new precedent, while being justified on humanitarian grounds and linked to notions of German ‘responsibility’.

The catharsis occasioned by the Gulf War was made up of five interconnected elements:

- Discord emerged between external demands and conditions within Germany. Policy-thinking was caught between expectations and fears at home and abroad, and sought to do justice to both. As a result, the sanctity of existing constitutional constraints on Bundeswehr deployments and Germany’s eurocentrism became jaded, with both allies and portions of the German elite showing dismay and frustration at the invoking of strict spatial limits, lack of German commitment and solidarity with the West, and reliance on cheque-book diplomacy.

- Differing and often contradictory readings of Germany’s new security environment and prescriptions as to how German security policy and use of the Bundeswehr should best be pursued came to the fore. What transpired in the course of the conflict was a tension, even a dialectic, among certain foundational elements of German strategic culture: namely, how a parochial stance of restraint was to be maintained if other core values, such as solidarity with the alliance or responsibility towards Israel, could not be served this way. Also, how
could a renewed singularity be evaded if Germany maintained a stymied military role, potentially at odds with that of her NATO allies?

- What emerged was a dominant CDU-led paradigm for what post-Cold War German security should be about and how it was to be practised. This paradigm, which was actually already in gestation in the 1980s and was subsequently practised and promoted in the numerous post-Gulf War deployments, actively stymied the opposition’s voice in security matters, and later effectively impelled parts of the SPD towards the CDU’s position.

- The Gulf War made plain that between the excesses of pacifism and militarism there was a *potential* option for the use of German military force; that new security challenges could not be defined so neatly as it had been, signifying that Germany’s response could not formulated as a straight ‘yes’ or ‘no’.

- The Gulf War also revealed the still active internal constraints on Germany becoming a state ‘like any other’, which could use armed force, legitimately and unproblematically, in the pursuit of national interests. The conflict made plain that Germany’s conception of its interests had more to do with ‘higher issues’, such as credibility in the alliance, concern over Israel and the transparency to others of its actions, than it had to do with more conventional notions of a state’s interests.

*An incremental approach to the use of force*

In the wake of the Gulf War it was the CDU’s reading of the appropriate and most responsible path for Germany to pursue that was realised, first through Bundeswehr deployments in Somalia, Cambodia and Yugoslavia. Essentially, the CDU attempted to alter the existing interpretation of the Basic Law through actual Bundeswehr deployments in order to set new precedents for the role of the armed forces. Although the Bundeswehr’s missions in these countries were not of a combative nature, they clearly set new parameters and stretched what had been the existing interpretation of the Bundeswehr’s role.

The UNTAC mission to Cambodia in May 1992, with around 140 Bundeswehr soldiers, saw Germany participating actively in a UN peacekeeping mission, and with the opposition’s approval. The Cambodia deployment signified Germany’s growing willingness to shoulder part of the security burden and was viewed by the new Defence Minister
Volker Rühe as ‘ein Beitrag zu einem neuen Kapitel deutscher Verantwortung’ (a contribution to a new chapter in German responsibility). Under the auspices of UNOSOM II, in May 1993, the German Government sanctioned the second Bundeswehr Blauhelm-Mission in Somalia, making available armed forces consisting of 1,640 men for transport, logistic and engineering work for an undertaking that had a more overt peace-enforcing intent than the first. Importantly, the German Government interpreted the Bundeswehr’s participation as purely humanitarian, though UNOSOM II was manifestly a peace-enforcing operation. Foreign Minister Kinkel, for example, defined the Bundeswehr’s deployment in Somalia as distinctly humanitarian, and as such sanctioned and legitimised by paragraph 2 of article 87a of the Basic Law.

Since July 1992 the Bundeswehr had been engaged in the former Yugoslavia as part of the monitoring of the Adriatic embargo, which was generally viewed as legitimate and certainly within the designated NATO area/non-combatant perception of the Bundeswehr’s role. However, the AWACS missions to control and enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia did not comply with existing criteria and was considered by the FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei, Liberal Party) as an illegal action. Domestic obstruction from the FDP not only challenged Germany’s new commitment to her NATO allies but the NATO effort as a whole, since around one-third of AWACS personnel were to come from the Bundeswehr. This prompted the CDU to argue again that any German intransigence on the matter might threaten the credibility and coherence of the alliance as a whole.

Debating ‘out-of-area’ deployments

The so-called out-of-area debate, ostensibly about the legality of deployments beyond NATO territory and the requisite constitutional clarification, clearly revealed the opposing political stances on the crucial issue of what Germany’s new security role should and could be. The legalistic debate centred around articles 24 (entry to a system of collective security) and 87a (defensive purposes or for any other explicitly outlined role only) of the Basic Law, which in the existing interpretation, as discussed in chapter 2, had codified the Bundeswehr’s role as limited to one of defence within NATO area only or for overtly humanitarian operations. The rupture of 1989–90 gave renewed political topicality to the issue of the spatial remit of the Bundeswehr, with some
quarters arguing that a wider role was now both desirable and possible within existing legal provisions. Essentially, Germany could now fulfil its UN obligations and take part in a wider range of tasks under UN or WEU mandates without constitutional change or amendments. Conversely, for many, the existing interpretation of the Bundeswehr’s role still held and what was now needed was the setting of clear political parameters for the Bundeswehr’s remit to avoid the unwanted extension of its role. A further line of argument pressed for an actual change to the constitution as a means of legally sanctioning and thus facilitating Germany’s involvement in UN-mandated peacekeeping operations.

The Government’s response to the ending of the Cold War saw the CDU–CSU (Christlich-Soziale Union) pushing for an enlargement of the Bundeswehr’s remit without the prerequisite of a constitutional clarification. Essentially, the gaining of sovereignty brought with it a renewed responsibility, which, according to Chancellor Kohl, enabled Germany through article 24 of the constitution to go beyond minimalist ‘Blue Helmet’ missions to active military support in line with the UN charter. Within these goals both the CDU and the CSU stressed the continuing centrality of NATO’s role. At the heart of this position were, most notably, Kohl and his Defence Minister Rühe, whose conception of the role of the Bundeswehr it was that eventually won through.

The Conservative drive for an extended role for the Bundeswehr served three specific aims.

- It would enhance the broader European project by strengthening a European aptitude in security matters.14 Rühe, in particular, was very vocal on this matter: urging Germany not to ‘think nationally in a narrow way’, he went on to say that for Germany to renouce on this matter would hinder ‘others from developing a European capability to act’.15

- Greater participation fulfilled the desire to evade a new German singularity in security matters. By demonstrating a greater readiness to fulfil alliance commitments through deployments, the divergences between countries like Britain and France and Germany would be reduced. Rühe stressed that Germany’s credibility rested on its participation in actions, and that Germany’s distinctiveness in security matters was clearly undesirable.

- Germany could execute a responsible foreign policy only were its power to be acknowledged, and sometimes being responsible would
necessitate a willingness to use armed force. Writing in April 1991 Karl Lamers had warned that if Germany ‘were to act obliviously to her power this would be irresponsible and raise mistrust, and that Germany, without forgetting history, must move to being as normal as possible’. Similarly, drawing his conclusions from the Gulf War, Kohl contended that for Germany ‘there could no longer be a niche in world politics, no flight from responsibility; we intend to make a contribution to a world of peace, freedom and justice’.

Until 1992 FDP thinking on security matters was dominated by the leitmotif of Genscherism, which, guided by a more benign, civilised vision of international politics proffered a holistic conception of security, espousing notions of a Weltinnenpolitik (world domestic policy), together with the nurturing of collective security and pan-European institutional frameworks, placing great faith in a rebirth for the UN and seeking the empowerment of the CSCE framework, incorporating the Soviet Union as an equal partner. In this vision, both NATO and the EC were to become more pan-European in their design, the ultimate goal being the creation of a European Federation. On the role of the Bundeswehr, the party advocated the changing of the constitution to fit new realities of the post-Cold War era, to mandate a limited remit for the Bundeswehr that would include participation in UN sanctioned missions globally, something which had to be legally defined, clearly and decisively. In short, at this point the FDP’s standpoint was that the Bundeswehr, once its new remit was constitutionally sanctioned, should be deployed in overtly humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, though not in a peace-enforcing role. After Genscher’s departure, which undoubtedly gave the CDU more room for manoeuvre, Klaus Kinkel as new party leader and foreign minister wielded less power than his predecessor in terms of both coalition politics and foreign and security policy. Any notion there may have been of a strong Liberal presence in security policy was largely thwarted, since this Liberal position, or reading, did not fit with or was unable to adjust to the dominant reading prescribed and practised by the CDU–CSU.

In 1990 the SPD appeared to be pulling in a direction very different from that of the CDU–CSU, calling for a reduction in the Bundeswehr to a figure below 250,000, together with a far narrower interpretation of the Basic Law for the Bundeswehr’s remit. At its Bremen conference in 1991 the SPD supported, in principle, the idea of a change in the Basic Law to make it possible for the Bundeswehr to engage out-of-area in a non-combatant peacekeeping capacity,
stressing the need for a new consensus to emerge in society at large which could only then lead to a constitutional amendment. This stance was then gently reversed, beginning at the Wiesbaden Party Conference in 1993, by which time the party had to take account of the Government’s ongoing and increasingly bold deployments of the Bundeswehr in Cambodia and Somalia. Although still espousing very broad notions of security, privileging peacekeeping and collective security, and rejecting any moves that would re-militarise both German and European security policies, the Wiesbaden interpretation of peacekeeping certainly differed from that of 1991. While Gulf War-type scenarios were rejected outright and the notion that the Bundeswehr should ever become a freely deployable intervention force deplored, the SPD’s conception of Bundeswehr peacekeeping did come to include the enforcing of UN embargoes. The party’s position and voice were also hampered by fairly hefty internal dissensus. Among those inclined to activism, Hans-Ulrich Klose, Karsten Voigt and Rudolf Scharping argued that Germany should go beyond peacekeeping to participate in UN combat missions; their voices were challenged by the pacifist wing of the party, which, in pursuit of an amilitaristic German security policy, sought to construct a party position premised on a non-military security profile, a more limited remit for the Bundeswehr, together with a firm commitment to disarmament across Europe.

As the Government’s boldness grew in deploying the Bundeswehr, the SPD was prompted to seek constitutional clarification, to set clear legal limits and a restriction on the deployment of the Bundeswehr to UN peacekeeping only. In an attempt to halt the CDU–CSU’s strategy, the SPD contended that Germany’s participation in the June–July 1992 embargo was a further move towards a dangerously reflexive military policy and that the manoeuvres in the Adriatic were not humanitarian, but were rather part of the Government’s attempts to bolster the Bundeswehr’s extended remit.

Although issues of security and peace had always been at the core of Green ideology, Bündnis90–Die Grünen had little influence in the early stages of the out-of-area debates, suffering from an inability to transpose their principles into practical policies. On the fringes of party politics, it was the former Communists – the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS) – who protested against expanding the Bundeswehr’s remit in any shape or form. In applying its anti-militaristic principles, the PDS proffered moves for a grand demilitarisation of Germany.21
Given the prevailing dissensus among party positions premised on the differing readings identified above the issue became a constitutional matter. The first step in the legal debate over the role of the Bundeswehr was taken in 1993 when the FDP (which had, in fact, supported the mission) and the SPD saw that Germany’s engagement in the AWACS mission was outside of existing constitutional boundaries and that the position of the Bundestag had been infringed. In this round of the constitutional wrangle the result served to empower the CDU’s stance, with a majority of 5 judges to 3 seeing that the Government was legally entitled to take the decision to allow German troops to support the implementation of the UN resolution. The issue of Bundeswehr deployments was then taken once more to the Constitutional Court in 1994 when the SPD campaigned against the Government’s decision to partake in UNOSOM II, and in NATO and WEU naval forces in the monitoring of the UN embargo against Yugoslavia in the Adriatic.

The court’s ultimate decision

In mapping the trajectory of change in Germany’s post-Cold War security policy, the Constitutional Court’s decision of 12 July 1994 is of central significance. This decision essentially ratified the CDU–CSU strategy of incrementally extending the Bundeswehr’s remit, without recourse to constitutional amendments. The decision gave a clear green light to further Bundeswehr deployments by dismissing SPD and FDP objections to the Bundeswehr’s involvement in Somalia and Yugoslavia. Importantly, the decision made no distinction between peace-enforcement and peacekeeping deployments, and it sanctioned the Bundeswehr’s use in NATO and WEU missions to carry out UN Security Council decisions or actions under direct UN authority. The court’s decision, based on article 24, paragraph 2, article 59, paragraph 2 (first sentence) and article 87a of the Basic Law, decreed that Bundeswehr participation in UNOSOM II, in NATO and WEU naval forces in the Adriatic in UN-mandated monitoring of the embargo against the Federation of the Republics of Yugoslavia and the AWACS mission imposing the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia were verfassungsconform (conformed to the constitution). This meant that, at least in theory and according to the Basic Law, the Bundeswehr could be deployed in a whole range of missions, including future Gulf War-type scenarios, provided that the Government sought Bundestag approval.
An important upshot of the constitutional resolution of the out-of-
area issue was that the debate about Bundeswehr deployments lost its
legalistic character, though it remained intensely party-political and
highly contentious. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court’s findings
did not initiate an end to Germany’s restrained style of security pol-
icy, nor did it signal an abrupt and irreversible change to established
perspectives on the use of force at both elite and public levels. Straight
after the Karlsruhe decision Defence Minister Rühe declared that
deployments would be judged on a case-by-case basis and that Ger-
many would continue say ‘no’ more than ‘yes’; Foreign Minister Klaus
Kinkel also stressed that the substance of German foreign policy would
remain ‘non-military’. 24

From IFOR to SFOR: Germany gets to grips with the use of force

German security policy post-Karlsruhe reflected a sustained restraint,
as seen in November 1994 when the Government showed great reserve
when asked to supply Tornadoes to help NATO protect the withdrawal
of peacekeepers (UNPROFOR) from the former Yugoslavia. When
pressed in December, the Government did oblige, justifying the move
on grounds of alliance solidarity, but stated also that no German
ground troops would be committed.

In Spring 1995, Germany felt a greater compulsion to act and impor-
tantly made the switch from purely financial assistance to the
deployment of fourteen jets to a NATO base in northern Italy. Although
this move was significant in demonstrating a willingness to use force,
the deployment was painstakingly defined to avoid embroilment in
actual combat and restricted to ‘protecting and assisting’. The Bun-
destag supported this move on 30 June 1995, with 386 Abgeordnete
(members of Parliament) in favour and significant numbers of the
opposition – SPD and the Greens – supporting the deployment. The
deployment was framed by its proponents as intimately tied to ‘broader
and higher issues’, namely the creation of a common European foreign
and security policy, and the credibility and perception of Germany
around the world.

The success of the Government’s strategy of gradually but decisively
extending the Bundeswehr’s remit appeared to be further consolidated
with enhanced parliamentary support for IFOR in November 1995.
This time the majority in the Bundestag in support of deploying the
Bundeswehr had grown to 543. As in previous deployments, the Bundeswehr was not to take part in a combat mission between warring sides, but was rather to act as part of NATO’s back-up support, stationed outside Bosnia as a ‘junior partner’. Again broader and higher issues were clearly at stake guiding the deployment, with Defence Minister Rühe claiming that it was ‘immoral not to be involved’.

Rühe drew confidence from the broad parliamentary acquiescence in respect of IFOR: ‘In a few years a new consensus has formed with regard to the core tasks of German security policy and to the job and the role of the German armed forces. I both welcome and I am thankful for this development.’ This consensus appeared to be validated once more when on 13 December 1996 the Bundestag sanctioned Germany’s participation in SFOR, which replaced IFOR, with 499 members of Parliament supporting the motion. Again support came from large numbers of SPD and Green parliamentarians who voted with the Government. Significantly, in SFOR the Bundeswehr was actually deployed inside Bosnia as an ‘equal partner’.

Again, Rühe drew weighty conclusions from the Bundestag’s decision, declaring that on the 13 December 1996 the deputies in the Bundestag quietly liquidated the remainder of Germany’s political and military special role (Sonderrolle) which Germany had played for half a century due to its history; the latter also serving as pretext for a policy after unification which neither matched the realities of world politics, nor Germany’s new position and increased weight.

Continued party-political discord: the basis of a fragile consensus

It is evident that the CDU-led Government’s incremental approach of enacting more and more Bundeswehr deployments in the 1990s succeeded in forging a new reality. This had the effect of marginalising those voices that had previously called for the continuation of a more limited role for the armed forces. What in effect happened was that elements of the SPD and the Greens moved more in line with the CDU’s reading of how best German ‘responsibility’ in the security field could be met and what role the Bundeswehr should play. Greater Red–Green approval and support for the governing coalition’s position as seen in IFOR and SFOR, and in Kosovo in 1999, flowed from the Constitutional Court’s endorsement of the Government’s interpretation of the Basic Law, as well as the skilful handling of the policy adaptation by
Defence Minister Volker Rühe. Above all it was the ongoing bloody war in the former Yugoslavia, in which all non-military measures to stop ethnic cleansing had proved ineffectual, that prompted the shift in perspectives to support the CDU–CSU’s programme. However, despite this, an all-inclusive enduring consensus on the Bundeswehr’s new role remained elusive at this time, suggesting that the CDU’s proclamations of a new consensus in security policy were somewhat premature. Certainly, German security policy had developed considerably through the 1990s, though there remained in Germany factions strongly in favour of restraint, presenting barriers to a fuller normalisation of security policy. In other words, the notion prevailed that the use of the German armed forces would continue to be governed on a case-by-case basis and that the main role of the Bundeswehr would remain that of national and alliance defence. Echoing such sentiments, Rühe himself maintained in 1997: ‘Eine darüber hinausgehende Interventionsfähigkeit wollen wir nicht’ (‘We do not want a total outright intervention capacity’).

The party-political scene continued to be marked by contrasting conceptions of the remit of the Bundeswehr and its place in Germany’s security policy. Although part of the governing coalition, the FDP differed in its security concept from its coalition partners, perhaps not so much in terms of ends as in institutional means. Liberal security thinking remained preoccupied with notions of German responsibility and duty, and of the need to play a more active role in assuring global security. After the Constitutional Court’s decision in 1994, Foreign Minister Kinkel, for example, argued that because of its past Germany has a moral duty to preserve peace and participate in collective actions, often with force:29 non-participation was viewed by the Liberals as an irresponsible policy, a dangerous Sonderweg. Where the Liberal position departed from that of the CDU–CSU was in the its vision of the role that the Bundeswehr should play, globally, in support of missions mandated by the UN and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

The declarations of the SPD’s Foreign Policy Congress of June 1997 revealed just how far the SPD had been forced to deal with the CDU’s strategy. The party had come a long way from ‘humanitarian support operations’ and ‘peacekeepers only’ under UN command to a more ‘calculable, reliable and Euro-compatible stance, which would allow for ‘Bosnia-style peacekeeping operations’30 within the framework of the UN or OSCE. The party’s Hannover congress of December 1997
confirmed this shift, with the party declaring that the Bundeswehr should be available for all kinds of military operations that have the blessing of the UN, thus erasing the former delineation made by the SPD between 'yes' to peacekeeping and 'no' to peace-enforcement. This shift notwithstanding, the SPD continued to proffer a far more programmatic stance on the role of the Bundeswehr, with the aim of tightly controlling the extended use of the armed forces. Even after the Karlsruhe decision and the party's strong support for SFOR and IFOR, the SPD remained critical of what it saw as the Government's open-ended approach which could lead to a security policy in which the Bundeswehr was all too readily deployed. In addition, a sizeable grouping within the party still clung to more pacific arguments, rallying against the more realist segment of the party that 'not all of today's risks can be solved with military means'.

As with the SPD, the Green's position on the role of the Bundeswehr was defined by opposition to the dominance of the CDU–CSU paradigm, the celerity of events, especially in the former Yugoslavia, together with its desire to become Regierungsfähig (fit to govern), all of which prompted a sizeable turnabout in the Green's position on the use of force. The first manifestation of this was in 1993 when the Green's Regional Council voted for both German participation in UN missions in cases of outright aggression and genocide and for UN military intervention in Bosnia. Since that time, sizeable portions of the party voted alongside the Government and the SPD in support of Bundeswehr deployments in both IFOR and SFOR. Its 'realist' party leader, Joschka Fischer, later to become Federal Foreign Minister, assisted the Greens' move away from a stance based on rigid abstention to the use of force and disengaged pacifism. In a policy paper in which he called 'for a redefinition of the Greens' foreign policy principles', Fischer pleaded for the party's principle of non-violence to be adjusted in the light of massacres in Bosnia. The party's apparent turnabout in support of Bundeswehr deployments was a transient phenomenon however. Fischer had his aims thwarted, with the official party programme on the use of force remaining uncompromising. Once more, and with a view to the Federal elections in September 1998, the leadership attempted to redefine the Greens' foreign policy principles at the party's congress in Magdeburg in March 1998. However, once again the leadership's aims were thwarted when the congress voted against the motion. Just as in the first draft of the Green's election programme 'Green Is the Change', the 1998 version still aimed at abolishing both NATO and the
The Greens’ position was that only in cases of genocide, and then only with a UN mandate, should the Bundeswehr be used.

Of perhaps less consequence at this stage of developments was the perspective of the former Communist Party on the use of force: the PDS’s stance resulted in the most uncompromising policy of any of those in the German political spectrum, one that was, in some ways, similar to the fundamentalist Green position which had prevailed during the Cold War. The PDS advocated the active demilitarisation of international politics, the abandoning of the Bundeswehr being a first step in this pursuit. Apparently unaffected by the progress of the CDU–CSU-led enlargement of the Bundeswehr’s remit in the 1990s, the PDS rejected the idea of combat missions under the UN or ‘any other flag’; instead, the OSCE, as a regional organisation of the UN, should be developed to become the central structure of a European Peace Order.

The politics surrounding the purpose and role of the Bundeswehr in the 1990s is quite revealing. While on the surface German security policy had undergone a revolutionary change, domestic perspectives on the use of force remained splintered in nature, despite the decision of the Constitutional Court in 1994 and the significant levels of support gathered by the Government for Bundeswehr deployments in the former Yugoslavia. Clearly, a full-fledged robust consensus, similar to that which had previously governed the use of (West) German armed forces prior to 1989, had not by 1998 transpired. The new German perspective towards the use of force was characterised by a greater disposition to consider using the Bundeswehr in a wider range of missions. Consensus and agreement to actually deploy armed forces, though, would be governed by strict criteria, which would include the presence of a UN mandate, a multilateral framework, a clear mission statement, as well as an unambiguous humanitarian dimension. Events of the following year which eventually led to the war in Kosovo, signified a further critical juncture in the transformation of German security policy, challenging the existing criteria which had evolved over the previous nine years about the use of force and compelling Germany to breach a further taboo in the use of the Bundeswehr.

Germany and Kosovo: a Rubicon crossed?

Germany’s engagement in Kosovo was the Bundeswehr’s first combat mission since its inception, speaking volumes for the evolution in
German perspectives on the use of force that had transpired since 1989–90. But the significance of Kosovo as part of the trajectory of change also derives from the fact that it was a Red–Green Government, having come to power in 1998, that sanctioned the Bundeswehr’s deployment. The positions taken by the new SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer were radically different from the lines pursued by both the SPD and the Green Party at earlier points in the decade. This seeming qualitative change in the role of the German armed forces was heralded as a ‘defining moment in the politics of the new Germany’, a Zäsur (rupture) in German foreign policy and a move that would lead Germany to arrive at NATO’s fiftieth anniversary celebrations as ‘a full partner with a new attitude’. Germany’s involvement in Kosovo certainly was qualitatively different to any other previous deployment, principally because this time the Bundeswehr was engaged in an offensive military operation against a sovereign state without a clear mandate from the UN. Given the importance of the war in Kosovo to the transformation of Germany’s security policy, the next section goes into some detail about the context and evolution of the conflict and Germany’s involvement.

Germany’s commitment to the Kosovo region had become apparent back in 1997 when, as part of the Contact Group, both Paris and Bonn pushed for greater diplomatic efforts to help ease growing tensions between Albanian Kosovans and Serbians who considered Kosovo to be a full part of Greater Serbia. With a view to ameliorating these tensions, Germany and France promoted the idea that Milosevic might reduce the Serb military presence in the region if sanctions were relaxed on Belgrade. Belgrade’s intransigence on the matter, however, led NATO to issue warnings of military action should Milosevic maintain his position in Kosovo. However, at this stage of events the alliance appeared to lack the mettle to carry through these threats, and so embarked on a protracted negotiation with Milosevic, continuing to warn that if Serbia’s posture in the region remained unchanged then NATO would strike. The only concession won by NATO at this point was Milosevic’s agreement to allow an OSCE unarmed observer force into Kosovo, under the protection of armed forces, which included a small Bundeswehr contingent, stationed in Macedonia.

Despite the alliance’s continued predilection for a diplomatic solution, NATO began to muster support among members in the event that bombing should become a necessity. When Germany was asked if it would be prepared in principle to make a contribution to a NATO
operation against the Serbs, which would be devoid of a UN sanction, the outgoing CDU–CSU–FDP Government responded positively. This unequivocal ‘yes’ was reaffirmed by the new Red–Green coalition, once in office in October 1998, and also gained the full support of the Bundestag.39

In the meantime, an armistice was brokered in October 1998 between Milosevic and US Special Envoy to the Balkans Richard Holbrooke, thus bringing renewed optimism for a diplomatic solution to the conflict. However, this interregnum was brutally interrupted by the discovery, on 15 January, that there had been a massacre of Albanian peasants in the village of Racak, carried out by Serb forces. This event was a critical juncture in the run-up to the war and was decisive in shifting the mood in the West towards finding a solution, and with it came fresh threats of bombing from the alliance. This renewed dedication to resolve the crisis, but with a strong preference to avert a military engagement, was also fuelled by NATO’s forthcoming fiftieth anniversary, which would have been somewhat overshadowed had not the alliance been seen to be doing something credible. The subsequent Rambouillet talks thus illustrated that no one was yet ready to press the button and that the threat of force was better than the use of force. The talks held during 6–23 February and then in Paris in mid-March brought the Albanian Kosovans and the Serbs to the negotiating table with the aim of hammering out an agreement on an autonomous Kosovo, coupled with the withdrawal of Serb troops. After some deliberation, the Albanian Kosovans signed the agreement, thereby acceding to the notion of an autonomous rather than a fully independent Kosovo, whereas their Serb counterparts were not prepared to sign such an accord. Crucially, Belgrade was resistant to the removal of its troops from Kosovo. The ultimate failure of all political efforts to resolve the crisis led NATO to fulfil its earlier threats of military action, and an air offensive was launched on 24 March 1999. Germany’s contribution to the air-strikes came in the form of four Tornado aircraft stationed in Placenza,40 which although relatively small did represent a new form of deployment, differing substantially from previous Bundeswehr missions.

When commenting on why Germany should commit to the NATO operation Chancellor Gerhard Schröder stated that Germany had a ‘moral obligation’41 to be fully involved and that ‘there was no other option open but to end the murdering in Kosovo’.42 Schröder argued that the principle of ‘never again war’ inherent in German security
policy had to be superceded by a ‘higher principle’, namely that of stopping the killings and deportations of Albanian Kosovans. Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping made similar comments when explaining the rationale behind Germany’s involvement. Scharping saw that just as the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995 had forced a turnabout in German thinking on the use of force in Bosnia, so the nature of the conflict in Kosovo made Germans see things differently, and that it was Germany’s responsibility to use force to end the war.

A key characteristic of German policy over Kosovo was the ongoing emphasis on diplomacy. Given that at the time Germany had possession of the EU and WEU presidencies, the new Government played a defining role in the diplomatic activity to resolve the conflict without recourse to military action. In this sense the Government pursued a ‘dual-track’ approach, combining a firm commitment to NATO’s aerial bombardment, together with intensive diplomatic efforts aimed at averting military action. Inherent in Germany’s diplomatic behaviour were strong traits of multilateralism through the use of international institutions and bodies (i.e. G8, the EU, Quint) as means towards a solution. Through the special Kosovo summit in April in Cologne particularly, Germany, as president of the EU, took forward the idea of a broad stability pact for South-East Europe, promoting the importance of bringing the countries of the region into closer forms of co-operation with the EU. Germany was also active within the Quint grouping and, later, the G8 through the Bonn summit in June by foraging a set of conditions, and garnering international support for them, for the cessation of the war. Additionally, Germany sought to forge cooperative standpoints and consensus, thereby legitimising and legalising sanctions and conditions. This was evident especially in Germany’s success in bringing the UN into the equation by inviting General Secretary Annan to the EU special summit on Kosovo in Cologne. Lastly, Germany pursued an inclusivist strategy of seeking to involve both China and Russia in the process towards the resolution of the conflict. A peace plan proposed by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in early April, though not accepted by Germany’s partners, encapsulated Germany’s whole approach to the conflict. The plan proposed a twenty-four-hour break in NATO bombing on the condition that Milosevic began the withdrawal of Serb troops from Kosovo. It also promoted a co-operative approach to conflict resolution, in that it sought to incorporate both China and Russia in to the decision-making process with the aim of internationally isolating Serbia. Inherent to the plan was a desire to
garner international legitimacy for the alliance’s mission and to stabilise the region as a whole through substantial socio-economic measures.

Conclusion

The mapping of developments in German security policy after 1989–90 reveals a clear trajectory of change in perspectives on the use of armed force, seen most clearly in the increasingly bold Bundeswehr deployments of the 1990s, both within and outside of the European theatre. Germany’s involvement, first in Kosovo and then East Timor, under the auspices of the UN’s INTERFRET mission, seemed to draw a firm line under the process of change – by the end of the decade the re-orientation of the German armed forces seemed both complete and successful.

Much had indeed changed, though this chapter has sought to demonstrate that, on further inspection and through a more nuanced reading of the politics surrounding the use of the Bundeswehr, far from residual constraints relating to the use of force remain in place within Germany and that, crucially, these forces and factors continue to influence the deployment of its armed forces. Determining the use of the Bundeswehr is the rather complex and incomplete consensus which underpinned the various deployments in the 1990s. Cross-party agreement was forged in the case of Bundeswehr deployments in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and so on, because of the close fit of the exigencies of such crises with existing ways of thinking about the use of force in Germany, and which, crucially, were in line with the postulates of German strategic culture. Future conflict scenarios and security challenges may not, however, gel quite so well with German thinking.

With a focus on German responses to September 11 2001 and the ‘War on Terror’, chapter 4 aims to substantiate this claim by showing the limitations to the trajectory of change in German security policy and the power of strategic culture in shaping perspectives on the use of force.

Notes


3 Until unification the peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr stood at around 495,000 (the original 1955 figure); the reduction to 370,000 had to be tackled alongside the virtual growth of the Bundeswehr due to the absorption of former NVA personnel, which brought the total strength at the time of the NVA’s take-over at around 520,000 (by the summer of 1990 the size of the NVA had already shrunk to 100,000; all senior personnel over 55 years of age were sacked by the first democratic government of the GDR while around 60,000 soldiers of all ranks absconded). A Bundeswehr of less than 370,000 was desirable given financial constraints and cuts in the defence budget; subsequently the aim was to have, by the year 2000, 38,000 officers, 122,000 NCOs, 40,000 enlisted personnel other than NCOs and 135,000 conscripts, augmented by some 3,000 reserve officers and 137,000 civilians. See ‘Ein Staat – ein Armee: Streitkräfte im vereinigten Deutschland’, IAP-Dienst Sicherheitspolitik (1 August 1990).


5 ‘Ashamed to be in Uniform’, Independent, 17 August 1990.


10 Germany acted as the key base for the marshaling of Western troops and as financier to the sum of around DM18 billion, which was almost 10 per cent of all international expenditure on the war and its consequences; see Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher (1992) Deutschland und der Irak-Konflikt: Internationale Sicherheitsverantwortung Deutschlands und Europas nach der deutschen Vereinigung, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik, no. 68 (February) (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der DGAP), pp. 47–52;


12 Prior to engagement in UNOSOM II Germany had played a role from August 1992 in the international airlift.

13 The interpretation was confirmed in 1982 by the Federal Security Council which ruled that an out of area deployment would only be legal if a conflict was both a violation of international law and an attack on the Federal Republic. This was despite West Germany’s entry to the UN in 1973.


26 See ‘Information über die Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an der Stabilisierung der Friedens im ehemaligen Jugoslawien SFOR’, BMVg Presse- und Informationstab Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Bonn, 16 December 1996.

27 *Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, no. 3 (March 1997), p. 48.
31 Speech at the SPD Foreign Policy Congress: 'Challenges of the Twenty-First Century', 18 June 1997, Bonn.
33 At the party's conference in Kassel in Autumn 1997 leader Joschka Fischer failed to turn round the party to a more pragmatic position on the use of German armed force: see, e.g., 'Die Annäherung der Grünen an die Realität vollzieht sich im Scheckentempo', *Handelsblatt*, 17 November 1997, p. 2.
37 'Stopping the Catastrophe', *Newsweek*, 26 April 1999, p. 29.
38 Subsequent to the air campaign Germany committed around 8,000 troops to KFOR.
39 Five hundred members of Parliament supported a German contribution.
41 'Stopping the Catastrophe', *Newsweek*, 26 April 1999, p. 32.
43 'Stopping the Catastrophe', *Newsweek*, 26 April 1999, p. 32.
45 These conditions were to cease all combat activities and killings; to withdraw military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; to agree to the deployment of an international security force; to permit the unconditional return of all refugees and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid; and to join in putting in place a political framework for Kosovo based on the Rambouillet talks.
Germany’s engagement in Kosovo in a combat capacity appeared to have shifted the parameters of German security policy and perspectives on the use of force, apparently to ‘solidify the new consensus’ over foreign and security policy. Indeed, Kosovo did seem to confirm that the trajectory of change already apparent in the 1990s was leading to a normalising of Germany’s relationship with the use of force. However, in the light of events between 2001 and 2003 such conclusions appeared to be somewhat premature and the extent of the new security policy consensus exaggerated. Certainly, Schröder’s declared ‘unconditional solidarity’ with the United States in the immediate wake of September 11 2001 and the subsequent deployment of Bundeswehr soldiers to Afghanistan in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom were firm expressions of Germany’s commitment to having a role in international security and accepting the utility of armed force. However, the subsequent transatlantic spats and divisions within Europe over US policy towards Iraq revealed, in a very vivid way, the limits to and peculiarities of Germany’s approach to the use of force.

This chapter continues the analysis of the evolution of German security policy, with a focus on the role of the armed forces between 2000 and 2003. This time-frame takes in Germany’s leadership role in Macedonia, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, as well as the US-led war on terror as its enlargement to include Iraq. German security policy during this time exhibited traits of both old and new thinking; furthermore it was characterised by an interplay of short-term domestic political goals with more entrenched long-standing beliefs and values about the use of force and role of multilateralism. As a consequence, the 2000–3 period brought to the fore the fragility and complexity of the elite-level political consensus and extent of public
support which had grown up around and sanctioned the enlargement of the Bundeswehr’s role during the previous decade.

Commencing with an examination of Germany’s role in Macedonia, the chapter moves on to discuss Germany’s response and conduct in the wake of September 11 2001, framed by Schröder’s notion of ‘unlimited solidarity’. The deployment of a sizeable Bundeswehr contingent to Afghanistan, made possible only through a Vertrauensfrage (vote of confidence) in the Bundestag, was a further indicator of the intricacy of the German perspective on the use of force. Analysis then turns to the widening focus of Bush’s war on terror to include Iraq and the German response to it, which, from the very beginning, ruled out the possibility of the Bundeswehr’s involvement in any ‘military adventure’. The fall-out from Iraq for Germany’s international relations following Donald Rumsfeld’s relegation of Germany to ‘Old Europe’ brings the chapter to a close. Throughout, attention will be paid to the ‘domestics’ of German security policy-making as a means of substantiating the claim that a new and robust consensus on the use of force remained elusive and how policy in the early part of the twenty-first century was formulated on the back of an incomplete and complicated national consensus.

Leadership in Macedonia

Beginning in 2001 the Bundeswehr began what became a series of deployments in Macedonia when in March ethnic Albanians clashed with the army and police of Macedonia. Against the backdrop of the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s, Germany responded swiftly to the possible eruption of violent conflict. After the EU and NATO had brokered a ceasefire and established a framework for the resolution of the conflict, Germany pledged troops to the NATO-led force tasked with weapons’ collecting and safeguarding UN and OSCE observers who were in place to monitor political reforms. Schröder’s resolute commitment to German intervention in Macedonia, which was called for in the name of NATO solidarity as well as to prevent a second Kosovo, was not fully supported within the governing coalition. Swathes of SPD and Green members of Parliament questioned the proposed deployment, as too much of an emphasis, it was claimed, was being placed on the use of military force, which they did not see as the best way to stabilise the region. Furthermore, the
CDU contended that it would support the operation only if the Bundeswehr was awarded more resources to carry out the mission effectively. Eventually, Germany’s participation was secured only through the support of the opposition parties, and the Bundestag approved the deployment by 497 votes to 130 on 29 August 2001.

Operation ‘Essential Harvest’ was widely regarded as a success, though its initial one-month duration was viewed as having been too short. The proposed successor mission, ‘Amber Fox’, was to be a full UN mission (Essential Harvest had been only ‘praised’ by the UN). In the new mission, Germany was to play a leading role, supplying as many as 600 soldiers. The proposal met with broad Bundestag approval, opposition coming only from the PDS and five members of the CDU. The mission was again viewed as a great success and a tribute to the Bundeswehr’s leading role; reforms in Macedonia, however, did not move as swiftly as hoped, so that Germany’s participation in the region was extended a number of times.

On the surface the Bundeswehr’s deployment in Macedonia may seem to have confirmed the continuation of the post-Kosovo trajectory of change, involving a closer acquaintance with the use of force; nevertheless, as noted above, the proposal to deploy led to animated debate in the Bundestag, reminiscent of debates in the mid-1990s, and the decision to deploy had been far from consensual. Political parties were initially divided internally on the issue, especially the Greens and the SPD, while the CDU linked its support to a call for more defence spending. The CDU also called for the rule relating to the parliamentary majority required to sanction Bundeswehr deployments to be abandoned, as a means of empowering the executive’s decision-making capacity, making Germany more responsive at times of international crisis. The case of Macedonia and the domestic debate demonstrate very clearly that, despite Kosovo, no clear-cut consensus on the Bundeswehr’s role had been reached and that the use of force remained highly contested.

While Germany was undertaking a leading role in Macedonia, international attention shifted to the US with the dramatic events of September 11 2001. One of the many effects of that day was the emergence of a fundamental difference between US and German perspectives regarding the use of force and how best to combat the sources of global terrorism. The transformation that US foreign policy underwent after (and arguably even before) September 11 brought into focus the peculiarities and continuities present within German security thinking. The
next section discusses at some length the evolution of US perspectives on the use of force within the changing context of transatlantic relations.

The changing contours of transatlantic relations

The change in German security thinking at the beginning of the twenty-first century took place within an already evolving context of transatlantic relations. Developments on both sides of the Atlantic in the field of foreign and security policy were setting out quite different European and American agendas and perspectives on the use of force in international politics in the 1990s. Two processes stand out here as illustrative of the nature of this evolution: the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); and the emergence of a neo-conservative strand in US foreign policy thinking.

Efforts at emboldening the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy with a military dimension had been largely ineffectual until the end of the 1990s, when the project was given a greater impetus by the war in Kosovo together with a renewed Franco-British commitment to the project. The events of 1999 compelled EU member states to create a viable military component to empower their collective external role and voice in the world. While disputes arose regarding the extent of the ESDP’s potential autonomy and its relationship to NATO, many of these issues were resolved over time, and by September 11 the EU seemed to be on course to fulfil its security policy ambitions.

In Germany, meanwhile, although it appeared that Berlin had been getting to grips with the use of force, as seen in the resolution of the out-of-area debate by the mid-1990s and the subsequent deployment in Kosovo, the change in leadership from Kohl to Schröder in 1998 witnessed a more domestically focused German foreign policy, as seen in the new chancellor’s initial apparent lack of interest in foreign affairs. Soon after the Federal election there appeared to be a predilection for preserving Germany’s interests, especially in the context of the EU.3 Furthermore, there were quite substantial anti-military elements on the left of the SPD, now in government, which, combined with the presence of the Green Party, with Joschka Fischer as the newly appointed foreign minister, suggested that the former security policy trajectory pursued by the CDU–CSU might be aborted. Although the Greens had gone some way in the 1990s in modifying their position on the use of force vis à vis civil war in the former Yugoslavia, at its
grassroots pacifism remained a central tenet of the party’s ideology. Given these factors, the Red–Green coalition was not exactly poised to continue along the route proposed by the previous CDU-led Government. In short, Germany’s security policy seemed set to become far more introverted and conditional. Although it was the Red–Green coalition that in 1999 had sanctioned the Bundeswehr’s Kosovo deployment, one with an overtly combative character, the decision to deploy was accompanied by a strong humanitarian rationale, thus enabling the Government to shore up domestic and parliamentary support.

Change was also afoot across the Atlantic with the emergence of new foreign policy thinking, which in its essence cut across the grain of the EU’s (and Germany’s) overtly multilateralist approach to security issues. The neo-conservative narrative, as Elizabeth Pond calls it, was already in gestation in the 1990s, but it was not until September 11 2001 that it gained the currency to move more centrally into mainstream US security thinking. The core elements of this body of thought drew on a strong belief in US supremacy and espoused the use of pre-emptive military action and ad hoc coalitions. Undercurrents of change in this direction were evident in Charles Krauthammer’s 1990 Foreign Affairs article ‘The Unipolar Movement’, Paul Wolfowitz’s 1992 draft defence policy guidelines, which espoused the merits of pre-emptive military strikes and in Robert Kagan and William Kristol’s calls for a ‘neo-Reaganite foreign policy’, notions which were to later inform Bush’s strategy for the war on terror.

The core tenets of this foreign policy thinking did not, however, figure prominently in the pre-September 11 period of the new Bush administration. As Pond notes, given that the Bush presidential campaign had barely touched on foreign policy issues and that the new president appeared to be quite unfamiliar with international affairs, there was a widespread assumption that he would ‘govern from the middle’ and opt for continuity, especially in transatlantic relations. The terrorist attacks on the US on September 11 provided a powerful source of justification, indeed self-righteousness, for those who had sought to revise US thinking and espoused the merits of pre-emptive military strikes. Thus over the course of the subsequent twelve months Bush’s foreign and security policy came to be imbued with clear traits of neo-conservative thinking which were ultimately codified in a new US national security strategy in 2002 and subsequently applied to Baghdad in 2003. This policy was also underpinned by a powerful intellectual discourse which extolled the virtues of US supremacy and, crucially,
the vast divergences between American thinking about power and the use of force and that of Europe, with its preference for ‘soft power’. In this vein, Robert Kagan argued in 2002 that Europeans and Americans did not share a common view of the world, expressed in the phrase ‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus’. Kagan’s take on European and US differences resounded in US foreign policy circles and helped bolster the new foreign policy paradigm, or ‘big idea’ underpinning US foreign policy. Moreover, such thinking contributed to US–European divergence and discord in the foreign policy sphere which, disguised to an extent by the solidarity exhibited straight after September 11, became increasingly marked in early 2002.

This brief consideration of the changing context of transatlantic relations would seem to indicate that even without the events of September 11 quite substantial differences relating to the use of force were already in place within the Atlantic community. The ramifications of these changes had particularly strong effects upon US–German relations. Differences between Washington’s and Berlin’s positions on a range of international questions had seen a marked change in tone in bilateral relations well before autumn 2001. The extent of the Bush administration’s willingness to forgo multilateralism, as seen in the proposed National Missile Defence (NMD) system, the US refusal to ratify the Kyoto Treaty and the International Criminal Court, was already of profound concern for Berlin.

**September 11 and Germany’s ‘unconditional solidarity’**

Germany’s initial response to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, on September 11 2001 was a pledge of unlimited solidarity with the US, a response which contrasted sharply with that of Bonn’s position during the Gulf War of 1991. The chancellor was also quick to claim that Germany was obliged to participate with military means in order to secure stability in the world. Schröder’s early declara-
tion of solidarity was subsequently backed at home by firm cross-party support, except for that of the PDS. Berlin’s solidarity also extended to its full support for the US’s invocation of NATO’s (article 5) collective defence mechanism. Unlimited solidarity did not, however, translate into unconditional support for an immediate US military response to the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks. Crucially, at both elite and societal levels reticence on the use of force and fear of US unilateralism
pervaded the German debate. Subsequently, Schröder’s pledge of solidarity, coupled with domestic restraint, led to protracted problems on the home front, as well as to altercation with the US.

Germany’s reserved stance on a war in Afghanistan focused on the fear that the US would over-react and respond unilaterally, which could lead to an uncontrolled escalation of conflict in the wider Middle East. Consequently, Germany pursued its traditional preferences for a multilateral approach explicitly aimed at tackling the roots of terrorism via political as well as military means, as was evident in both Schröder’s and Fischer’s international diplomacy shortly after September 11. In this early phase Germany had an important role in the consolidation of an international alliance against terrorism, Fischer in particular working to forge a common EU diplomatic response to the attacks on the US and seeking also to embolden the UN. Illustrative of the German approach was Berlin’s facilitating of the UN-sponsored conference in Bonn in late November on the construction of a post-Taliban regime for Afghanistan, a process in which both Fischer and Schröder invested considerable personal credibility and which led to the Bonn accords and subsequently to the establishment of an interim Government in Afghanistan.

The attacks of September 11 also prompted great concern within Germany regarding its internal security, when it transpired that a number of the hijackers had resided and been educated at universities in the Federal Republic. Moreover, intelligence suggested that Germany was home to over 30,000 members or supporters of militant Islamist organisations, some having links to Al Qaida. Given such revelations, interior minister Otto Schilly introduced two ‘security packages’, approved by the Bundestag in December 2001, aimed at clamping down on the operations of such groups. Additional measures were introduced by Finance Minister Eichel which focused on undermining the financing of these groups by establishing new measures to scrutinise unusual patterns of cash-flow in bank accounts.

The call to arms

The US waited until early October to commence its war in Afghanistan. The US strategy, despite the invocation of NATO’s article 5, reflected a strong US desire to lead the military campaign and to forge a ‘coalition of the willing’. It was in this context that Schröder’s pledge of solidarity with the US was tested, when in November President Bush
made a formal request for a German military contribution. At this point, the unlimited solidarity pledged and consistently reaffirmed by the chancellor, together with his statement of 11 October pledging a military contribution to the war in Afghanistan, met with staunch domestic opposition. Schröder was thus caught in his own rhetoric, while aside from the PDS no party would openly condemn the US's right to pursue the perpetrators of September 11 at the same time there was no great enthusiasm, generally or among the Red–Green coalition itself, to have German troops engaged in what was seen as an undesirable and risky military campaign. Consequently, the chancellor had to have recourse to the full range of possible tactics if he was to fulfil his pledge to the US.

On 6 November 2001 Schröder announced, in response to the US request, that 3,900 Bundeswehr troops would be made available for the campaign against terror. To rally support around this contribution of troops, proponents pointed to Germany’s international responsibility, its role as a transatlantic partner and the general credibility of German foreign policy; they pointed also to UN resolution 1368, passed after September 11, condemning terrorism and recognising the right of nations to self-defence. Those opposed to the deployment pressed for continued restraint, urging that multilateralism was important and that vital political and social measures needed to be integrated into Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ if it were to properly address the sources of global terrorism. While the Cabinet approved Schröder’s plan for the Bundeswehr’s deployment, which also met with broad approval from the CDU, the CSU and the FDP, support was far from forthcoming from substantial elements of the governing coalition, with both SPD and Green members of Parliament arguing vociferously against the chancellor’s designs, for the reasons mentioned above. Consequently, the stability of the coalition was under stress. In the case of the Bundeswehr’s deployment in Macedonia, Schröder had been content to allow the Bill to run on the back of support from the opposition parties; in this instance, however, given the gravity of the issues and his own weak domestic position, Schröder saw it as crucial to get the backing of his own coalition. The chancellor subsequently decided to tie the issue of a Bundeswehr deployment to a vote of confidence in his Government. The Vertrauensfrage had been used only three times in the Federal Republic’s history, and in this instance Schröder used it to ask those disagreeing with his policy to either support him or to let the Government fall.
On Friday 16 November the Bundestag debated whether Germany should make available 3,900 Bundeswehr troops to participate in the war in Afghanistan and whether the SPD–Green coalition should remain in government. On these two issues Bundestag members were permitted a single vote.

In his opening statement Schröder explained why the Vertrauensfrage was being used, together with the reasons why Germany should send troops to Afghanistan. The Vertrauensfrage was legitimate, Schröder posited, as the deployment issue was one of fundamental importance. Broad support was required, as Germany needed to show both at the international as well as the domestic level that the governing coalition was willing and able to back the deployment. On the second point, Schröder stressed that German foreign and security policy should be seen as consistent and in line with multilateralism, that it was important for Germany to be seen as a reliable ally, able and willing to make contributions to international security alongside allies and partners. Schröder also emphasised that the Bundeswehr deployment was part of a broad effort to bring peace to Afghanistan and that in this sense it was not a war of aggression. The chancellor made it clear that the military campaign was only one element of the wider political and humanitarian effort to rebuild Afghanistan and reinstate civil society. Throwing his weight behind the chancellor, soon-to-be defence minister Peter Struck argued that should Germany renege on the deployment all chances would be lost for it to have a stake in the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan.

The Bundestag debate which followed illustrated the various strands of thinking apparent in German politics on the use of force. Speaking firmly against the war, the PDS saw that a military campaign in Afghanistan was not the most appropriate means of tackling international terrorism; moreover, such an undertaking could spark a new divide between the Islamic world and the West. Since the CDU and the CSU supported the deployment, criticism was instead levied directly at the coalition’s inability to govern. Aside from noting the damage inflicted on Germany’s international reputation and relations with the US by Schröder’s recent dalliances, the CDU pointed to the disastrous record of economic under-achievement since 1998. In a similar vein, the CSU charged the chancellor with incompetence and naïvety in the field of international politics.
Although support for the chancellor was eventually forthcoming, Schröder was berated from all sides for linking the deployment issue to a vote of confidence. The CDU accused Schröder of playing politics with an issue which, while they fully supported, should not have been attached to a vote of confidence in his Government. Stalwart pacifists in the Green Party, meanwhile, as well as many SPD parliamentarians were affronted that they should be forced to forgo their fundamental principles and support going to war in order to save the Government. In the end the confidence vote was supported by 336 to 326 votes. Of the 8 Greens who had opposed the sending of troops, in a symbolic move 4 voted with the Government and 4 against, in demonstrating both their allegiance to the Red–Green coalition and their sustained opposition to the war and Germany’s contribution to it. No doubt Schröder was helped in his endeavours by an improving situation on the ground in Afghanistan: by the time of the Vertrauensfrage the Northern Alliance was holding Kabul, many Taliban strongholds were weakening, and it appeared that war might not a prolonged undertaking – all factors which would have encouraged both the Greens and the SDU to run with the chancellor.

The Red–Green coalition was thus saved and Germany committed 3,900 troops to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The contours and the substance of the Vertrauensfrage demonstrated, however, important factors that were to shape German security policy behaviour over the coming year. Crucially, although the leadership was able to garner support from within its Red–Green ranks, the loyalty of 16 November was highly conditional, thus demonstrating that the coalition remained far from united regarding the US-led war on terror and Germany’s role within it. Crucially, over seventy members of Parliament who had supported the motion added to their vote a written explanation, mainly to qualify that they had substantial doubts about the military deployment, but voted ‘yes’ in order to keep the coalition in power.

Extending the war on terror

The rather delicate domestic setting of Germany’s contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom was to evolve further during the next half year, taking German thinking even farther away from that of the US about extending the scope and intensity of its war against terror. The German discourse remained focused on the need to address the
underlying social and economic sources of terrorism and to do so without relying on a purely military approach. What emerged around this time in Germany was a clearer articulation of the essence of Berlin’s security thinking, as seen in the notion of a 'New Era of Engagement', a comprehensive strategy aimed at closing the poverty gap, re-engaging in a new North–South dialogue and intercultural exchange between the West and the Muslim world.

Early 2002 saw an entrenching of Germany’s reluctance to extend its participation in America’s anti-terror campaign. Afghanistan was one thing, but the notion of pre-emptive strikes against other states – now part of the Bush administration’s political rhetoric – clashed head-on with German perspectives and reasoning. The increasing belligerence of US policy, its identification of ‘rogue states’ and its articulation of the ‘axis of evil’, which included Iran, Iraq and North Korea, fanned flames of mistrust and disbelief over US policy already existing in the Federal Republic, as well as elsewhere in Europe.

The annual Munich Security Seminar in February 2002 became a platform for both Americans and Europeans to air their views over the international situation. Unsurprisingly, the war of words in Munich led to a firming-up of the contrasting European and US perspectives on how to proceed with the war on terror. Paul Wolfowitz berated the Europeans for their lack of military prowess and confirmed that the US would, in the future, feel quite free to pick and choose its allies and partners, warning that NATO states should no longer consider themselves to occupy positions of privilege. In a similar line of argument Senator John McCain trumpeted the US’s right of unilateralism, stating his belief that the US already held a mandate for military action against terrorism worldwide. Focusing on Iraq, McCain argued:

A day of reckoning is approaching. Not simply for Saddam Hussein, but for all members of the Atlantic Community, whose governments face the choice of ending the threat we face every day from this rogue regime or carrying on as if such behaviour, in the wake of September 11th, were somehow still tolerable.

While the US delegates ’bought home’ the message to the Europeans, and in doing so clearly spelt out their agenda for Iraq, German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping stated that there were no plans afoot for an invasion (of Iraq) and, furthermore, that it would be naïve to believe that Europe would support such military action.
Bush’s identification of Iraq as a rogue state and part of the ‘axis of evil’, with links to Al Quaida, led the US administration to view it as the next battleground in its war on terror. The US held that Baghdad was in direct violation of the 1991 peace agreement and UN Security Council resolutions, and reasoned that the best way of addressing this situation was to bring about ‘regime change’. Unsurprisingly, this conclusion and the strategy of pre-emption that it implied collided with current thinking in a number of – mostly – West European capitals, especially Berlin and Paris.

The German response to the US’s expansion of the war against terror to include Iraq was always going to be less than unenthusiastic. As argued earlier, the ‘domestics’ of the Macedonia deployment, the fragility of elite support for the deployment to Afghanistan, combined with the overwhelmingly negative reception in Germany of US neo-conservative foreign policy thinking with its preference for pre-emption and unilateralism, were vital indicators of Schröder’s inflexible policy on Iraq. Indeed, opposition to US foreign policy objectives could arguably be observed even in the days after September 11 2001: Germany’s ‘unlimited solidarity’ was coupled to a commitment by Schröder that Germany would not participate in ‘adventures’ and that if it were to come to the aid of its allies Germany would have to be fully consulted prior to the initiation of any military force. In other words, the chancellor had already laid down his ‘red-lines’ for consultation and a preference for restraint back in September 2001.

Towards the end of the summer of 2002 the question of Iraq moved to centre-stage. The heightening rhetoric in the US, which was pointing to a military strike in the near future, strengthened Schröder’s resolve to give the situation and diplomatic means more time, and, crucially, to have the UN, not the US, rule on how much longer the weapons’ inspectors should remain in Iraq. Denouncing the US’s ‘military adventurism’, Schröder also maintained that a US-led war in Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein would detract from the war against terrorism and endanger the West’s relations with the Islamic world. It was in this context that the notion of a Deutsches Weg, ‘a German way’, was articulated by the chancellor in describing a specifically German approach to international affairs, and also to demonstrate to the US that it would be Berlin’s objectives and priorities that would determine the German stance on Iraq. Schröder’s critics berated the idea of ‘a
German way’, arguing that it sent out confusing messages to Germany’s allies, suggesting a return to some dangerous new Sonderweg, out of kilter with the Federal Republic’s foreign policy tradition.

The transatlantic discussion, such as it was, about extending the scope of the war on terror and the use of force to Iraq was cut somewhat short when, on 26 August 2002, US Vice-President Dick Cheney called for preventive military action to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein, an announcement allegedly not communicated to Germany in advance. Thus a wide-ranging debate was eclipsed, America’s resolve to use force in Iraq, unless Saddam Hussein left the country, intensified and Europe’s divisions over the issue hardened, with Germany’s position drifting even farther from that of the US.

War and the Federal election

During the course of the SPD–Green Government’s term in office, Schröder was transformed from a chancellor with little apparent interest in foreign policy and an election agenda in 1998 front-loaded with domestic reform issues to a leader who in 2002 mobilised anti-war sentiment to successfully win a second term in office.

Weakened by a poor economic record and facing a strong challenge from the CDU–CSU led by Edmund Stoiber, Schröder seemed certain to lose the forthcoming Federal election in September 2002. Seizing the initiative and responding to the widespread domestic reticence towards US policy and anti-war sentiment in the country as well as within the governing coalition, the chancellor affirmed his opposition to a war with Iraq, even were there to be a UN mandate, and pledged to keep Germany out of any conflict. On September 22 the Red–Green coalition secured a victory, albeit the slimmest in the Federal Republic’s history. Schröder’s electoral success was not, however, celebrated across the Atlantic. With reverberations still fresh in the air from the German justice minister’s likening of Bush’s foreign policy endeavours to those of Adolf Hitler, US Secretary for Defence Donald Rumsfeld claimed that the chancellor had poisoned US–German relations. Moreover, at a NATO defence ministers’ meeting in Warsaw held shortly after the German election, Rumsfeld refused to meet with his counterpart Peter Struck.

The resolute stance taken by Schröder in September 2002 left little room for any adaptation or modification and, importantly, lost Germany any real leverage that might still have been possible to pressure
Bush into pursuing a more restrained approach towards Iraq. Moreover, the effect was to isolate Berlin, nullifying any influence it might have exerted on other European partners. In this way, Germany actively contributed to the EU’s inability to present a common voice, and in this context it became apparent, shortly after the election of September 2002, that Schröder’s strategy had perhaps been a step too far. The German press was already decrying him for damaging American–German relations and after a direct intervention by the US ambassador to Germany objecting to the anti-Americanism pervading the Government, the chancellor set about trying to pull Germany out of its self-inflicted isolation.

A temporary semblance of normality to relations was reached when Bush and Schröder declared their mutual intention to get back to ‘business as usual’. Berlin was keen to throw off the anti-American label while seeking to reaffirm that still more time was needed to find a diplomatic solution to Iraq and that Germany would not participate in any military adventure. At the same time, the Germans were keen to prove their value as allies, able and willing to pull their weight in international security. Defence Minister Struck announced in November that, together with The Netherlands, Germany would take joint-leadership of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, emphasising that Germany was now a substantial contributor to international peacekeeping missions, with over 10,000 Bundeswehr troops currently deployed overseas. Despite these overtures, a standoff over Iraq was clearly visible on the horizon, with Germany standing alongside France.

Europe divided

By Spring 2003 European perspectives on the US’s Iraq strategy had become polarised between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’. On 20 January Germany and France initiated a debate about terrorism, including the issue of Iraq, in the UN security council, a move which, according to Elizabeth Pond, left Colin Powell feeling ambushed and led directly to a hardening of his rhetoric, especially as the Franco-German manoeuvre, later confirmed by the French foreign minister, had essentially put the break on a second UN resolution.

The Franco-German initiative unleashed a wave of indignation across both Eastern and Western Europe. The substance of the emerging
intra-European discord revolved around the question of ‘who speaks for Europe?’.

While the Franco-German proposal at the UN claimed to be speaking in Europe’s name, contrary voices proposed a different European discourse, one which appeared in the form of a letter (on behalf of ‘the Eight’) on 30 January 2003 in the Wall Street Journal. Published under the header ‘Europe and America must stand united’, the letter was signed by the leaders of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the UK, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Denmark, and testified to the central importance of transatlantic solidarity after September 11 and the enduring underlying value of the relationship. The letter was essentially an overt signal of support for US policy towards Iraq. In quick succession an even bolder declaration of kinship and support for the use of force vis à vis Iraq came in a similar letter from ‘the Vilnius Ten’ group of Central and South-East European states.

This profound lack of consensus in Europe revealed a number of things. Not only did it pose serious doubts about the EU’s capacity to construct a coherent foreign and security policy, but it demonstrated the relative demise of the Franco-German dynamo in an EU of twenty-five members and with it the notion that this very special bilateral relationship could continue to set the EU’s foreign policy priorities and agenda. Maintaining that their position was more representative of the European perspective – since even within those countries that had signed the letter of the Eight domestic opposition to a war was extremely strong – Berlin and Paris continued to claim the moral ‘European’ high ground. However, with the subsequent letter of support from the ‘Vilnius Ten’, also endorsing a US war on Iraq, the idea that the Franco-German perspective was still truly representative of an enlarged EU was clearly swept away. Intra-European acrimony was further exacerbated by President Chirac’s lambasting of Central European states for their behaviour and for having ‘missed a good opportunity to shut up’. But Chirac took it a step further, revealing innate French fears that the forthcoming enlargement of the EU would bring in Central European ‘trojan horses’, more Atlanticist than European in their preferences, in his castigation of Warsaw et al. by threatening that France would not ratify their entry to the European Union.

Unsurprisingly, the Franco-German move at the UN at the end of January and the subsequent acrimony in Europe prompted a set of responses from Washington. As noted above, even Colin Powell, previously a voice of reason within the US administration, now seemed
set on going to war, not least because by this time America had built up a sizeable military presence in the Gulf. Moreover, the American's believed that, despite its rhetoric, France would come on board at the eleventh hour and support the use of force without the need for a second UN resolution. These events also prompted Donald Rumsfeld to articulate the notion of an 'old' and a 'new' Europe, denouncing both Germany and France as 'Old Europe' and praising 'New Europe', including Central European states, for supporting the US stance on Iraq.\textsuperscript{24}

Europe’s fractured perspectives on Iraq had the effect of empowering the US administration’s resolve to go to war. As Washington observed, ‘France and Germany do not speak for Europe’, while the ‘majority of Europe’s democracies’ backed a war to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein.\textsuperscript{25} Rumsfeld et al.’s lambasting of Germany and France did not abate, Germany being singled out as lacking gratitude for America’s role in rescuing the country from Nazism in 1945 and in bringing about unification in 1990. Furthermore, given Berlin’s clear refusal to honour its NATO commitments, questions were posed as to whether the US should relocate its troops away from Germany to East-Central Europe after the war. Typically, Rumsfeld went a step further than most and grouped Germany together with ‘those states’, such as Cuba and Libya, not helping the US.\textsuperscript{26}

Germany’s behaviour during February and March remained grounded by the desire to avoid a military conflict. To that end Germany, together with France and Russia, pressed for an open-ended extension of the UN weapons’ inspectors’ remit in Iraq and, at the same time, in the context of NATO discussions refused to support the formal authorisation of advance military planning, instigated by the US, to help Turkey defend itself in the event of war. While Schröder was quick to assure Turkey that if push came to shove Germany would indeed come to Turkey’s aid, the chancellor was resolute in his opposition to such a move, and with France and Belgium argued that NATO should not pre-empt any decision by the UN Security Council on a second resolution and that by implementing such plans NATO would be locked into an intractable ‘logic of war’.\textsuperscript{27} The rift over Turkey prompted commentators on both sides of the Atlantic to decry the death of multilateral security institutions. While the Bush administration placed the blame firmly on those European states, but particularly France and Germany, for their profound lack of support and of undermining NATO by failing to fulfill their alliance obligations, Germany
saw that it was America’s drive, no matter the cost, to invade Iraq and its consistent disregard for consultation that had actually undermined multilateralism.

From mid-February until the beginning of the invasion little ground was made up between the two camps. Although the German Government shifted its position somewhat by identifying with the EU’s stance on the use of force as a last resort, a move which met with the strong approval of the CDU–CSU, Schröder was quick to deny that he had done a U-turn. The chancellor’s pledge to reject German participation in any war and his refusal to sign up to a UN resolution that permitted one remained set in stone. Interestingly, it was around this time that the CDU and the CSU appeared to be departing from Stoiber’s previous dictum, not dissimilar to Schröder’s, that Germany should not participate in any military adventures. After chiding Schröder for the damage inflicted on German–American relations, the leader of the CDU, Angela Merkel, declared that military invention should be supported if peaceful attempts to disarm Iraq failed and, furthermore, that German participation would be possible in such action ‘in accordance with our means’.

Germany, alongside Russia and France continued to pursue the UN route and on 5 March issued a joint statement that they would not let through a resolution authorising the use of force, a move which had little effect in holding back the impetus towards war, as two days later the US and the UK issued Iraq with a deadline. On 16 March a pre-war council was held between the US, the UK and Spain, and two days later it became evident that the US was to give up its pursuit of a second UN resolution. The invasion of Iraq commenced on 19 March, the task force being overwhelmingly American and British.

Speaking in early April, Schröder defended the stance he had so resolutely taken over the previous six months, reaffirming that Germany would not take part in the war and arguing that there had been an alternative, ‘but we were not able to prevent the war unfolding’. The chancellor went on to argue that the Iraq crisis presented an opportunity for Europe to improve its collective mechanisms and policies in the field of security. Schröder also confirmed that Germany would meet its alliance obligations, and to that end Germany sent Fuchs NBC reconnaissance vehicles to Kuwait (under the auspices of ‘Enduring Freedom’), permitted allied forces to use Germany for their staging areas, provided 3,500 additional Bundeswehr soldiers to guard US military installations in Germany, and sent Patriot missile defence
systems to Israel and Turkey. Schröder also used the opportunity to pursue the agenda for the post-war Iraq and, in particular, stressed the central role that must be played by the UN in constructing a new political and economic order.\(^{50}\)

**Conclusion: Iraq and its aftermath**

The period after the war in Kosovo saw German security policy diverge sharply with many of the expectations of Berlin’s allies and partners about how German attitudes to the use of force had been largely ‘normalised’. Over the course of the previous decade Germany had come to say ‘yes’ fairly routinely regarding Bundeswehr deployments; thus by issuing an uncompromising ‘no’ on Iraq, Germany’s behaviour seemed almost like a reversal of the previous policy trajectory. A close inspection of events shows that it was primarily the ‘domestics’ of German security policy that were diametrically opposed to US strategy on Iraq, and it was these that obviated Germany’s support. Already in Macedonia, and then more strikingly over Afghanistan, domestic weariness at both elite and societal levels about the necessity of a German deployment had set in. However, whereas a strong case for the use of force, as in both of these examples, could be coupled with policy initiatives for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation with strong humanitarian elements – all factors important to the capture of German domestic support – in the case of Iraq this was not possible. Schröder’s room for domestic manoeuvre over Iraq was fairly limited, and the task confronting him, of somehow defining a role for Germany in the war on terror and ensuring that this was compatible with a fragile domestic consensus, was not easy. The final result, though inflexible and at odds with Germany’s professed multilateralism and transatlantic solidarity, transpired since the US’ perception of the threat posed by Iraq and the best means for dealing with it contrasted sharply with that of Berlin.

In the aftermath of Iraq German security policy came to be focused on three interrelated matters: the re-building of relations between Germany and the US; the construction of a viable ESDP; and the reform of the Bundeswehr.

Already by the end of April 2003 US–German relations were improving, although, despite a series of high-level meetings, it remained unclear whether the relationship would resume ‘normality’ in the full
sense. Despite Schröder’s claim that the relationship was ‘vital’ and Fischer’s declaration that the ‘United States is a totally decisive factor for peace and stability in the world’, adding that he believed that ‘Europe would never be militarily strong enough to guard its own security’, a former US ambassador to Germany saw that Schröder’s dispute with the US over Iraq ‘was an opening shot of a new disloyal, confused and weak Germany’. While Germany remains committed to the ESDP, towards the end of 2003 foreign policy pundits were pointing to a possible ‘swing back’, albeit of limited extent, in Germany’s security policy perspectives and, importantly, a return to Atlanticism, though its relationship with the US would be more one of equals than it had been prior to 2001.

The fractured European perspectives on the use of force which transpired over the course of 2002–3 had important ramifications for the EU’s ambitions as a security actor and crucially for the relationship between NATO and a future ESDP. Prior to September 11 2001, EU states had made moderate progress towards their commitment to produce a collective military capacity, but Iraq had the effect of potentially turning the ESDP into a mini-project of France, Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany as a vehicle to rival NATO with its own ‘autonomous’ planning staff. Over the course of 2003 such fears largely died down, not least because Germany largely back-tracked from France’s goal of an exclusive ‘defence union’. When Britain became a contributor to the debate over a separate planning staff, the German position was aligned more with that of the UK, which was that any EU planning staff should be located within NATO.

The ESDP was given further shape and form through the drafting of an EU security strategy paper by Javier Solana in mid-2003. The objective of the paper, to be accepted by the European Council at the end of year, was to set out the substance and priorities of the ESDP. Much of the document was not new, since it referred to the importance of international law, multilateralism and the variety of ‘soft’ power tools already available to the union. What was innovative about the document was an articulation of the need, in extraordinary cases, for pre-emptive military action. Unsurprisingly, it was this particular dimension of the draft paper that the Germans sought to water down.

An issue that had been gaining in clarity since 1999, though one which was brought into sharper relief by the war in Iraq, concerned the deficiencies in the Bundeswehr’s post-1990 reform programme. The war on terror focused attention on the military prowess of the
US and in turn the manifold ways in which Europe’s collective military capacities paled in comparison. In this context, the rather unhurried pace of the Bundeswehr’s modernisation became a point of concern for both domestic and external audiences. It is to this issue that I turn in chapter 5.

Notes

2 Five Greens and two Social Democrats withheld their votes.
5 Ibid., p. 8.
7 Pond (2004), p. 3.
8 Passing 611 out of 666 possible votes.
11 Subsequently Germany made a broad contribution to the military conflict in the form of Fuchs armoured reconnaissance vehicles; an airborne medical evacuation unit, special forces, transport units and a naval contingent.
14 Ibid.
19 See ‘Who Speaks for Europe?’ The Economist, 8 February 2003.
20 Slovakia also signed up to this letter, but on the day after it was published.
21 See ‘Who Speaks for Europe?’
23 ‘Is Poland America’s Donkey or Could it Become NATO’s Horse? The Economist, 10 May 2003.
28 ‘The Tune Changes – a Bit’, p. 43.
29 Ibid.
30 Policy statement by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder on the international situation and on the results of the European Council, Brussels, 3 April 2003; available online: www.bundesregierung.de.
31 ‘We’re Not Children!’ The Economist, 17 May 2003, p. 38.
Redesigning the Bundeswehr?

Since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the Bundeswehr has faced, and mastered, a series of singular situations: unexpected reunification of East and West Germany; the imperative to absorb the East German People’s Army (NVA); and the calls for German out-of-area deployments in crisis areas. Yet, despite successfully responding to all of these challenges, the Bundeswehr has still to master another formidable obstacle: reforming itself.  

The enlargement of the Bundeswehr’s remit to embrace a far wider set of security tasks in the 1990s called for a realignment of its structures and capacities. At the forefront of this project, at least in the early 1990s, was a need to modernise the Bundeswehr, to create a deployment capability based on rapid reaction for low-intensity peacekeeping. In time, and especially after the war in Kosovo of 1999 and renewed efforts at the EU level to create an effective military dimension (ESDP) to boost the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), expectations and pressures for swifter and more far-reaching reforms emerged, with many of Germany’s allies and partners eager to see a greater commitment to modernise the Bundeswehr as well as increase defence spending. Stimulus for change was then provided by the events of September 11 2001 and the subsequent US-led war on terrorism, which served to finally explode the longstanding assumption that national and alliance territorial defence was central to the Bundeswehr’s mission and rationale.

Certainly, the Bundeswehr at the start of the twenty-first century is a very different entity from that of the Cold War era. Reflecting the developments discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the process of defence reform in Germany over the past decade has been remarkable. However, as this chapter shows, all efforts at reforming the Bundeswehr, to
make it more suited to contemporary security challenges, have been characterised by controversy and hampered by financial uncertainties. As a consequence, a considerable inconsistency emerged between Germany’s stated security policy goals and the growing willingness to use armed force, on the one hand, and the Bundeswehr’s physical and materiel capability to respond effectively. This chapter considers the numerous phases and highlights key developments in the Bundeswehr’s transformation since the ending of the Cold War, starting with the reduction of the forces’ overall size and moving on to the subsequent reviews and measures adopted to improve the effectiveness and deployability of the Bundeswehr.

Phase 1 (1990–97): a new role for a streamlined Bundeswehr

The most immediate sources of change impacting upon the design of the Bundeswehr came from external impetuses at the end of the Cold War. Specifically, the strictures of the Two + Four Treaty’s framework and the size limitations of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty both enforced an upper limit of 370,000 on the Bundeswehr by 1994. Furthermore, the process of absorbing parts of the former East German armed force, together with the demise of NATO’s forward defence strategy, presented a new set of coordinates within which to redesign the unified Germany’s post-Cold War armed forces.

New thinking about the design of the armed forces, above and beyond the question of overall size, began to emerge thereafter as part of the nascent debate in Germany about the kind of security actor the new Germany should be, especially against the background of the Gulf War. Bringing this new thinking into focus was the so-called ‘Stoltenberg Paper’, drafted in February 1992 by Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, officially called Militärpolitische und Militärstrategische Grundlagen und Konzeptionelle Grundrichtung der Neugestaltung der Bundeswehr (The Reform of the Bundeswehr: Conceptual Framework for Military Policy and Strategy). This document challenged the existing tenets of (West) German security policy, conceiving as of ‘vital’ interest to Germany any conflict in the world, but especially in the Middle East or North Africa, and in global trade and access to resources. Unsurprisingly, the paper met with expressions of disquiet and was seen by many to herald a dangerous new era of Germany ‘going it alone’. Such thinking was clearly too much too soon, bearing in mind the
highly contested and at this stage far from certain notion of an extended remit for the Bundeswehr, as chapter 3 indicated.

The *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* (Defence Policy Guidelines; hereafter *VPR*) of November 1992 represented the most cohesive policy document thus far. Though in substance much the same as the Stoltenberg Paper, Volker Rühe’s *VPR* managed to present its programme and the enlargement of German security interests in a more palatable form. The *VPR*’s programme was premised on the assumption that Germany was ‘no longer exposed to a direct military threat involving an offensive war in Europe’. Subsequently, ten vital security interests were identified, including:

- the prevention, containment and resolution of crises and low-intensity conflicts;
- the active maintenance of nuclear and naval powers of the transatlantic alliance;
- the continuation of European integration and the development of a European defence identity, a continued partnership as equals with the US and the maintenance of the US military presence in Europe;
- the consolidation of democratic, economic and social progress in Europe;
- the maintenance of free world trade and unhindered access to raw materials in the framework of a just world economic system; and
- a continued commitment to progress in arms’ control processes for stability in and for Europe.

In the Defence White Paper of 1994, published after the Constitutional Court’s decision (July 1994) on the legality of out-of-area deployments, the Bundeswehr’s mission was defined as contributing to ‘multinational NATO and WEU crisis-management activities, together with the capability to participate in an appropriate manner in operations conducted under the auspices of the UN and the CSCE on the basis of the Charter of the UN and the Basic Law’, alongside the existing ‘capability to build and employ defensive forces adequately to deal with what is at present an unlikely contingency, but at the same time the worst-case scenario, namely having to defend Germany and the Alliance’. By broadening the scope of German security interests, conceiving of a new role for the Bundeswehr and facilitating a wider range of deployments, these review documents and policy directives laid the basis for a series of defence reforms, which honed in on the need to
streamline the Bundeswehr and prepare it for a wider set of missions. Two main issues were addressed at this stage: the control of the armed forces and their structure.

Since its inception, the Federal armed forces had been devoid of a national command and control structure. Moreover, on the basis of the Blankenese Erlass, the generalinspekteur – the highest ranking Bundeswehr soldier – was never part of the chain of command between the civilian defence minister and individual inspektoren of the three services, in peace and war. However, in the context of Germany’s greater engagement in peacekeeping missions, the VPR of March 1992 saw that some form of national operational command body spanning all three services would be required to facilitate the effective delivery of Germany’s crisis-management activities. A tangible result of these demands was the establishment of the German Army Operational Command in August 1994, which came into force in January 1995 and unified the command structure for all three services in peacetime operations, being independent of but parallel to NATO multinational structures. The enhanced role of the generalinspekteur, again justified as aiding the smooth running of operations, was enacted, propelling the generalinspekteur into the chain of operational command in ‘peacetime only’. This implied that in peacetime operations – meaning all operations outside of the defence of German and/or NATO territory (i.e. out-of-area operations) – the generalinspekteur became part of the chain of command between the defence minister and the three service inspektoren. Further enhancing the generalinspekteur’s position a führungszenrum of around sixty-five staff was assigned to him in early 1995.

Step-change in Bundeswehr force structure was prompted first by NATO’s London Declaration of 1990, which heralded the move away from forward defence. Reacting to this, already in 1991, Generalinspekteur Klaus Naumann outlined what change in the European security environment meant for the Bundeswehr. In addition to the usual protection of German citizens, he stressed that to remain credible within the alliance an enhanced readiness to partake in collective actions to preserve peace within the framework of the UN Charter would have to be realised. This, he said, would require a re-orientation of the Bundeswehr to include also verfügbar (rapid reaction) forces. Again it was Volker Rühe’s VPR which provided a greater focus to these ideas by delineating force structure into rapid reaction, main defence and basic infrastructure–augmentation forces.
The crisis-reaction forces (Krisenreaktionskräfte; hereafter KRK), created in the mid-1990s, were a manifestation of Germany’s adaptation to new security demands. Seen as a ‘priority element’ of the Bundeswehr, the KRK were created as a 50,000–strong body comprising elements of all three services and designed for the whole spectrum of guerrilla warfare to Gulf-style combat missions with high mobility and a geographically unlimited operational capability. This critical delineation of Bundeswehr tasks into crisis management, out-of-area and national–NATO defence was confirmed in the Konzeptionelle Leitlinien zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr (conceptual guidelines for the further development of the Bundeswehr; hereafter, KLL), issued directly after the Constitutional Court’s ruling in July 1994. The KLL based its plans on a 340,000 strong Bundeswehr, including a large conscript body whose service period was reduced to one of 10 months. The mainstay of manpower would continue to reside in the ‘main defence force’, designed for the territorial defence of Germany with elements of the KRK deployable in 3–7 days and the rest in 15–30 days. Guidelines issued later in the decade, including the Bundeswehrplan 1997, confirmed again the Bundeswehr’s commitment to develop a crisis-management aptitude, expecting that by 2009 the Bundeswehr would be armed with the appropriate weaponry. For such tasks as freeing hostages and combating terrorism Kommando spezialkräfte (special commando forces) were established, between them comprising around 100 soldiers who were to be ready by the year 2000. Such proposals were issued on the basis of a large armed force, with a peacetime strength of some 338,000 soldiers and an Aufwuchs-fähigkeit (augmentation strength) of some 650,000–700,000. Crucially, all planning documents were premised on the maintenance of conscription.

By the close of the CDU–CSU–FDP’s long tenure of office much had been accomplished in the sphere of defence reform, especially regarding the size of the armed forces, which had shrunk to 333,000 by 1998. Through a combination of external and internal pressures the political will had emerged in Germany to underwrite the expansion of German’s capacity to project its forces beyond its borders and the commitment to redirect the Bundeswehr towards a crisis-management role. However, as Mary Elise Sarotte noted in 2001, ‘will’ is not a synonym for the actual ‘capacity’, for force projection, and that too much gradual and unhurried reform retarded the overall modernisation of the Bundeswehr and, in turn, hindered Germany’s ability to act. At the
heart of the matter was that bold political statements and new defence policy guidelines were not met or followed through by tangible and far-reaching defence reforms.

Three interrelated issues lay behind this. First, although in practice the chief role of the Bundeswehr had *de facto* moved from being a stolid bulwark of deterrence towards active participation in crisis management, as seen in the process of change from Cambodia to Kosovo discussed in earlier chapters, national and alliance defence remained enshrined as the core tasks of the Bundeswehr. Second, and as a result of this mismatch, the Bundeswehr of the late 1990s was very much 'two armies', comprising the larger and less well equipped main defence forces, with a substantial conscript element and geared to territorial defence, and the smaller all-professional crisis-reaction component, better equipped and geared for out-of-area missions. Third, maintaining a commitment to this divided structure, as well as to keeping conscription, in the context of ever-increasing Bundeswehr deployments placed acute strains on the German defence budget, which remained stagnant in the 1990s. Defence spending dipped to an unprecedented low of around 1.6 per cent of GDP in the 1990s at a time when the European NATO average remained at around 2.2 per cent of GDP. Coupled with this, Germany was spending too much on Bundeswehr personnel and infrastructure costs to the detriment of equipment and research and development, areas of investment needed to enhance Germany’s capability to project force.

Clearly the upshot of this was that on the eve of the Red–Green coalition’s assumption of power in 1998 the reform process was incomplete. Competing priorities, a mismatch of role conceptions and realities combined with inadequate defence spending stymied the Bundeswehr’s efforts at capacity-building in this first phase of reform.


Against this background, fresh efforts were made to re-focus the reform of the Bundeswehr in the immediate wake of the Federal elections of September 1998, efforts were then given greater impetus by the 1999 war in Kosovo and the lessons drawn from it for the future of European security. The Kosovo experience exposed the serious deficiencies in Europe’s collective ability to present a common voice on foreign policy questions and to project armed force without recourse to US
leadership. A result of this was a renewed effort at emboldening the EU’s CFSP mechanisms and in particular to develop an effective military arm into what came to be known as the European Security and Defence Policy. Germany’s own plans for defence reforms at this time dovetailed with broader efforts in motion at the EU level to enhance Europe’s crisis-management military capacity and, particularly in the light of Kosovo, to be able to deal with any future deployments at the higher end of the Petersburg (peacekeeping) tasks. The relevance of Germany and its defence reforms to the ESDP project is considerable and should not be underestimated. As the largest EU state, and having made significant pledges to the ESDP and the ‘Headline Goals’ established at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 – to make a national contribution of around 15,000–20,000 troops to the proposed pool of 50,000–60,000 EU operational forces to be in place by 2003 and to commit itself to covering 15–20 per cent of the overall costs of this project – Germany’s capacity to address shortcomings in its defence spending and force structure reform now had broad European ramifications.

The context of reform

The need for a full appraisal of German security policies and attendant considerations on Bundeswehr force structure was outlined as an objective by the SPD when in opposition in 1997. Once in government in 1998 the Red–Green coalition re-fired the momentum, initially through a Bestandsaufnahme, or stocktaking, of the status of the German armed forces. This led the new SPD Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping to conclude that the Bundeswehr was still organised for Cold War scenarios, that it lacked the necessary capabilities for crisis-management tasks and that interoperability with Germany’s allies was under threat. Finally, he saw that consistently low levels of defence spending had meant that the Bundeswehr had suffered from a lack of investment, a problem which was becoming even more acute due to rising expectations presented by NATO’s Defence Capability Initiative and the ESDP. In sum, a situation had transpired whereby the Bundeswehr was on the brink of becoming an ineffective ‘hollow force’, with the enormity of its problems and deficiencies pointing to the urgency of a thorough review.

On the back of this conclusion, which was widely shared by political and military elites, a renewed effort at rooting out the problems
associated with the Bundeswehr’s current structure and articulating concrete plans for reform was initiated. A first step was the creation of an independent ‘blue ribbon’ commission body chaired by former president Richard von Weizsaecker comprising experts on security and the armed forces drawn from politics, the media and academia. The Weizsaeker Commission, as it came to be known, was joined by a further investigation headed by Generalinspekteur Hans-Peter von Kirchbach as part of a BMVg review of the Bundeswehr. A third report and set of recommendations were then delivered by Defence Minister Scharping himself, which, while corresponding in some ways to the other two reports, were quite distinct and subsequently provided the broad framework within which defence reforms were enacted.

Why there were three parallel review processes underway in 1999 became the subject of intense interest and speculation. Theories about Scharping’s own career ambitions and rivalry with Chancellor Schröder entered the mix, with suggestions that up until 2000 Scharping’s mind was not fully focused on the job of reforming the Bundeswehr. At this point he realised that the tenor of the Weizsaeker Commission was already going to be too radical and far reaching in its recommendations and thus prompted Von Kirchbach to draw up a BMVg-led report, which, he believed, would be more grounded, modest and realistic. Certainly, Von Kirchbach’s set of recommendations was more realistic and ‘do-able’ than that of Weizsaeker, though for Scharping they were far too conservative and out of step with the times. This line of reasoning suggests, therefore, that Scharping concluded that he would have to write a report himself. A second take on why three reform proposals emerged suggests that Scharping was indeed very much in control of the process and masterminded an ethos of competition and conflict between Weizsaeker and Von Kirchbach. Perhaps knowing all along that the two sets of recommendations would diverge, Scharping was able to emerge with his own report as the voice of reason and pragmatism. A final interpretation of how the reform process got underway suggests that Scharping sought to garner the greatest possible extent of expert input and broad consultation to ensure that all angles of the reform process were covered, hence the two expert reports, plus his own interpretation and set of recommendations.
The Weizsäcker and Von Kirchbach reports

The Weizsäcker Commission’s remit, outlined early in 1999, was to perform a thorough stocktaking of developments over the previous decade, to assess current demands, needs and provisions of German security policy, and to make recommendations and proposals regarding the future organisation and direction of the armed forces in terms of both quality and quantity. The commission was tasked with identifying medium- to long-term solutions to them. At the core of the commission’s report, published on 23 May 2000, was the crucial claim that the ‘Bundeswehr is too big, badly organised and increasingly out of step with the times’; furthermore, the report asserted that the Bundeswehr had ‘no future in its current structure’. It was scathing about the effects of the present form of military service which, it was argued, produced an excess of manpower to the detriment of actual operational forces and also thwarted attempts at much-needed modernisation.

The commission saw that the ‘yardstick’ for Bundeswehr reform should be the capacity to participate, simultaneously and indefinitely, in two crisis-response operations. Against this scenario was the proposed diminution of the Bundeswehr from around 320,000 to 240,000 by the year 2006. Of that number, around 140,000 would be fully operational, equipped and trained for crisis-management activities in an alliance context. In the cause of improved effectiveness the report also argued for greater streamlining in the command structures of the Bundeswehr and, principally, to bring the generalinspekteur more centrally into the chain of command. Twinned with this, Germany’s response, coordination and conduct in crisis-management activities should be enhanced through the creation of an Einsatzrat (deployment council). A new ‘strategic partnership’ with industry was proposed as a source of more funding for research and development to jump-start the modernisation of the Bundeswehr. Other reinforcing measures were proposed, including sizeable cuts in civilian posts and general infrastructure, and the closure of some 40 per cent of army bases. Finally, the Weizsäcker Commission proposed a DM2–3 billion rise in annual defence spending to realise a more effective modern armed force.

The tone of Von Kirchbach’s report was far less ambitious and paled in comparison to that of the Weizsäcker Commission, giving greater emphasis at the beginning of the report to territorial and alliance defence as prime functions of the German armed forces. Consequently, thinking guided by the status quo pervaded the document,
which posited that the Bundeswehr should be reduced to 290,000 by 2010, a significantly smaller reduction over a longer time-frame from what was envisioned by the Weizsäcker Commission. That said, Von Kirchbach was mindful of the investment needs of the Bundeswehr and, like the Weizsäcker Commission, proposed a refocusing of defence spending and a greater emphasis on research and development and the acquisition of modern weaponry with a view to improving the Bundeswehr’s strategic deployability and Germany’s interoperability with its allies.

The Weizsäcker and Von Kirchbach proposals illustrated the scope of German thinking about security at this crucial time of the Bundeswehr’s post-Cold War development. Elements of both continuity and change characterise the two reports, suggesting that the Bundeswehr, still in 2000, was caught between ‘old’ and ‘new’ security thinking. This statement is particularly apt when considered in the context of how the documents attempt to prioritise the role of the Bundeswehr and the related issue of conscription. Both sets of proposals regard the territorial defence of Germany and its alliance as a key task, if not the priority, of the Bundeswehr, a notion quite out of step with developments elsewhere in Europe and the doctrines of Germany’s partners. Certainly, Weizsäcker’s report was concerned with other security challenges and an array of non-traditional security problems, but ultimately it regarded territorial collective defence as the most significant task for German security policy. As noted above, Von Kirchbach’s report was even more conventional in its risk-prioritising, citing article 87a of the German Basic Law as the continued rationale for the Bundeswehr.

What flows from this conception of the role of the Bundeswehr is a continued strong preference for conscription which is present in both sets of recommendations. To be brief, as this is discussed in chapter 6, although the number of conscripts inducted annually and the length of their service time would have to be changed, both reports subscribed fully to the vitality of conscription within the new Bundeswehr’s manpower structure. For the Weizsäcker Commission, conscription provided a good insurance policy and flexibility against an uncertain future, while also acting as an indispensable means of recruitment. Von Kirchbach’s report viewed conscription as similarly crucial, especially to the Bundeswehr’s capacity to raise a reserve component for the ‘backbone of Germany’s national territorial defence capability’.17
Scharping's programme of reforms

Subsequent to the issuing of the Weizsaecker and Von Kirchbach reports, Scharping drew up his own programme for reform, entitled *Die Bundeswehr – sicher ins 21. Jahrhundert: Eckpfeiler fuer eine Erneuerung von Grund auf* (The Bundeswehr – Advancing Steadily into the Twenty-First Century: Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal). The plans proposed by Scharping, which were approved very rapidly by the Cabinet, presented ideas and prognoses that on most points fell roughly between the recommendations of the two earlier reports.

The programme of reforms tackled the themes of renewal, re-orientation and optimisation, and began with an analysis of Germany’s new security situation, seen as characterised by a ‘large range of military and non-military risks that are hard to estimate in terms of how they will develop’. Taking account of this new context a Neues Fähigkeitsprofil (new capabilities’ profile) set the political and military parameters of the Bundeswehr’s role, emphasising above all that Germany should be equipped and able to help shape NATO policy through both qualitative and quantitative contributions. According to the profile Germany would be equipped for the early detection of crises, to initiate moves to enhance the interoperability of command and control structures, to improve on the mobility and flexibility of the Bundeswehr, while maintaining the capability to substantially augment the armed forces at times of crisis. Underlying Scharping’s articulation of new tasks for the Bundeswehr was an emphasis on territorial defence as the basic role of the armed forces. The content of planned manpower reform was premised on the requirement that in the event of NATO–EU missions, the Bundeswehr is able to field up to 50,000 troops for a year or conduct two medium-sized operations requiring up to 10,000 troops, each for a number of years, simultaneously fielding forces for a number of smaller missions.

The ‘cornerstones’ of Scharping’s reforms related to the size, structure and composition of the Bundeswehr, so that:

- it would be a fully alliance-compatible and ‘Europe-capable’ force capable of carrying out both collective defence and peace-support operations;
- the three services would be equipped with technologically up-to-date armaments, especially in areas urgently needed for the broader mission spectrum; and
the implementation of the reforms was enabled by a ‘dynamic financial framework’.

Following Cabinet approval of Scharping’s proposals for the Bundeswehr on 14 June 2000, the BMVg set about detailing how the guidelines would be implemented in the form of a Grobausplanung, which was issued in September 2000. The key aspects of these planning documents are outlined below:

Size and composition of the Bundeswehr

There would be 255,000 active troops, 22,000 ‘non-active’ troops undergoing long-term professional training and 5,000 reservists undergoing full-time service. This total of 282,000 was to be constituted by some 200,000 professional soldiers, around 80,000 conscripts, 3,000 of them undergoing active-duty training (a reduction by 40 per cent), and 2,000 reservists (a 50 per cent reduction). This configuration was to be achieved by:

- a reduction in the peacetime civilian infrastructure (down from 140,000 to 80,000), giving the Bundeswehr an overall strength of around 360,000, and an augmented wartime strength of 500,000 military personnel;
- an increase from 66,000 to around 150,000 in the Bundeswehr’s operational forces – 80,000 to be available after a very short period of preparation – with a further 105,000 troops forming the basic military organisation, assigned to national defence tasks; and
- the number of conscripts to fall by around 40 per cent, from 135,000 to 80,000, with flexible service time introduced.

Structure and funding

- There was to be a streamlining of Bundeswehr command and control structures to enhance its role in multinational missions, including the establishment of a joint-operations command to lead all three services, and an increase in the power of the generalinspekteur.
- An increase in investment as part of the overall defence budget from around 25 per cent to 30 per cent would be made by directing the projected savings through manpower reforms and the pruning of
infrastructure, with no substantial rise in defence spending, in order to improve capabilities.

- The Bundeswehr’s strategic deployment capacities were to be improved, together with a build-up of air- and sea-transportation competences, and the creation of a space-borne reconnaissance capacity enabling Germany to make its own assessments of crisis situations.

The reception of the reforms

Even prior to the official release of Scharping’s report, debate on the future of the Bundeswehr had centred principally on the issues of conscription and the financing of the reforms. After the premature leakage of the Weizsaecker report, the SPD defended the commission’s work and argued that the report had more value than any previous discussions on the role of the Bundeswehr, though at the same time Scharping charged that the commission’s proposal on conscription would, if implemented, undermine equity and fairness in its practice. The Green element of the coalition conceded that the report’s recommendations were a ‘Zeichen des Mutes für notwendige Reformen’ (an indication of a strong desire to enact necessary reforms). The CDU meanwhile charged that the report threatened the future of conscription, which, were it to be abolished, would endanger the stability of the Bundeswehr. The CSU had similar reservations, seeing the recommendations as tantamount to the abolition of conscription ‘through the back door’.

There was domestic concern over the reform of the Bundeswehr, in particular whether it could be accomplished without a rise in defence spending. The Weizsaecker Commission had argued that to meet new objectives the defence budget would have to be increased in the short term so that savings could be made in the long term, but Scharping posited that the reform process could indeed be financed exclusively through the redirection of existing funds via cuts, rationalisation and a ‘strategic partnership’ between the armed forces and industry. Scharping’s rather scant attention to financial detail in his reform plan and continued insistence that much of the reform could be achieved by expected savings and greater efficiency proved problematical, especially when confronted with the economic plans of Finance Minister Hans Eichel and his concern to see an decrease in overall defence spending. Despite Eichel’s agreement in May 2001 to provide additional finance
to the BMVg, Scharping’s programme of reforms was carried out in the context of a diminishing defence budget, which in real terms has been reduced by around 25 per cent since 1990.

At the international level, Scharping’s proposals met with broad approval on both sides of the Atlantic by Germany’s allies and partners, who saw that the general pattern of the reforms, when implemented, would help bridge the deficiencies that had hitherto been apparent in the Bundeswehr’s performance. However, while allies generally responded positively to Scharping’s initiatives, there was some concern that the proposed internal restructuring would not be enough to bring the Bundeswehr up to scratch: US Secretary of State for Defence William S. Cohen, for example, commenting on the German reforms, stated that all European NATO members must acknowledge that ‘real dollars’ would have to be put behind their defence reforms. Nevertheless Cohen was confident that Scharping’s reforms would enable Germany to play a leading role in the building of Europe’s defence capabilities.21

A discrepancy between means and ends

Developments in this second main phase (1998–2001) of defence reform in Germany brought into focus once more the complex web of issues and problems surrounding attempts to restructure the Bundeswehr. Despite renewed efforts by the Red–Green coalition after 1998, the reform of the Bundeswehr continued to be characterised by mutually conflicting goals. At the crux of this lay burdensome financial constraints, which limited defence planners’ scope to enact radical and far-reaching reforms, so that the reshaping of the armed forces and the defence sector generally could be carried out only via efficiency and cost-cutting measures. There was subsequently little bold thinking either about changes to Scharping’s own proposals or about finance for much-needed major projects, including procurement, during this period. There was also the issue of risk prioritisation, which differed between the expert reports commissioned by Scharping in 1999. German security thinking appeared to be caught between two eras, with plans for the reform of the Bundeswehr exhibiting the need to prepare for national and alliance territorial defence, while at the same time creating an enhanced readiness to partake in peace-support operations. Again, this way of thinking was burdensome for the reform process. It kept Germany’s defence doctrine out of step with those of its partners.
and allies, and brought into question Berlin’s ability to fulfil capability pledges made at the EU and NATO levels.

A conclusion to draw here is that, despite the war in Kosovo and the enlargement of NATO, which also took place in April 1999, German thinking about security remained stymied by old preoccupations, which manifested themselves in Scharping’s defence reforms. The effects of this were captured neatly by commentator Francois Heisbourg who called the process ‘Germany’s non-revolution in military affairs’, decrying Germany for not doing enough, especially for reducing defence spending maintaining the size of the Bundeswehr and for keeping conscription.22

Phase 3 (2001–3): reforming the reforms

It was against this background of still inadequate Bundeswehr reform that a further phase of activity aimed at modernising the armed forces and enhancing Germany’s capabilities emerged. This time, the immediate impulse for change, the events of September 11 and the subsequent US-led war on terrorism, was arguably more profound and of greater significance than any previous episode. Crucially, these events were almost to pulverize the residues of old security thinking in Germany and to instigate a more radical programme of reform. In this context it is not surprising that the full effects of Scharping’s reform programme of 2000 were not felt. The events of September 11 notwithstanding, those earlier reforms had been plagued by ongoing financial constraints, as well as problematical timing, and they were also bruised by the political spin and scandal emanating from the resignation of General Von Kirchbach shortly after the submission of his report and then the sacking of Rudolf Scharping just before the Federal election in 2002. As a consequence, plans were already afoot to reform the existing reform process.

Despite Berlin’s aversion to the war in Iraq in 2003, the events of September 11 2001 and what followed unquestionably provided a powerful impetus to a reconsideration of the principles guiding German thinking on the use of force, which in turn produced a greater resolve to reform the Bundeswehr.

Other factors came in to play, amplified by the war on terrorism. By early 2003 Germany had large numbers of troops deployed abroad in peacekeeping missions, and was thus over-stretched, moreover
relentless cuts in public spending in Germany continued to impinge upon the Bundeswehr’s capabilities. The existing reform programme was doing little to ease this; nor was it able to provide an indication that things would get any better in the short–medium term. Moreover, continued efforts to save and redirect funds via a scaling down of large procurement projects, such as the order of A400M military transport aircraft and the promise of further base closures to release more immediate funds for the Bundeswehr’s operational tasks were proving insufficient. Such attempts to ‘square the circle’ – to do more in the absence of additional funds, while maintaining a declaratory commitment and a sizeable element of the Bundeswehr geared towards territorial defence – were proving to be undeliverable. Berlin’s ultimate response to this emerging quandary came in May 2003 in the form of a fresh formulation of Germany’s Defence Policy Guidelines.

Guidelines for a changed security environment

The new Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (VPR) were issued by Scharping’s successor Peter Struck. Succeeding those drafted by Volker Rühe back in 1992, the new VPR set out new principles shaping Germany’s security policy, identified new challenges and began to prescribe the types of response and programme of reform required to meet Germany’s contemporary security environment.23 Struck’s guidelines represent Germany’s consolidated response to the events of September 11 2001 and the subsequent US-led war on terrorism. The ambitions sketched out in the document demonstrated that lessons had been learnt and that Germany was cognisant of the military capabilities required of it. Moreover, the new VPR contains an effort to ‘re-found’ US–German relations in the wake of the Iraqi War, as well as to consolidate the ESDP and NATO as a ‘partnership’ rather than a ‘rivalry’. What marks out the 2003 guidelines from all previous statements and reform programmes is the document’s more contemporary conceptualisation of security risks, which is less at variance with the doctrines of Germany’s allies and partners than had hitherto been the case. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the VPR is a reprioritising of the likely challenges to Germany’s security and, consequently, of the rationally and tasks of the Bundeswehr, with implications for the areas of defence reform to be prioritised.

The main proposition of the document is that ‘defence’ has to be understood as exceeding traditional responses to conventional attacks
on Germany or its allies: defence has to be reinterpreted to include the prevention of conflicts and crises, and the joint-management of rehabilitation following crises and conflicts. Capturing Struck’s new conceptualisation is the notion that German interests have to be defended at the Hindukush. The new VPR sees that ‘defence can no longer be narrowed down to geographical boundaries, but contributes to safeguarding our security wherever it is in jeopardy’.

Substantiating this fresh conceptualisation of defence is a re-founding of the main tasks of the Bundeswehr to include a far wider spectrum of operations. Since there is no conventional threat to German territory at present or in the foreseeable future, ‘the Bundeswehr will focus on operations in the context of conflict prevention and crisis management, as well as in support of allies, also beyond NATO territory’.

Bringing these claims together is the clear articulation of a new main task for the Bundeswehr: international conflict prevention and crisis management, including the fight against international terrorism, are seen as the ‘likelier tasks to be fulfilled by German armed forces for the foreseeable future’.

Certainly, the new VPR maintains that it is prudent for Germany to maintain the capability to guard against a conventional attack on national territory; it dismisses, however, the notion that capabilities should continued to be sustained purely for this purpose.

This bold articulation of a broader, potentially more proactive, set of tasks for the Bundeswehr will determine its structure and shape a renewed effort at reform. The VPR states that five main capability objectives will provide the contours for the Bundeswehr’s modernisation: command and control; intelligence collection and reconnaissance; mobility; effective engagement; support and sustainability; survivability and protection. It sees that the enhancement of Germany’s aptitude in these areas, alongside the capabilities of its allies, will enable the Bundeswehr to deliver its new tasks.

As bold as Struck’s VPR may be, tight financial constraints are still in force, curtailing real innovation and casting doubts on the capacity to deliver tangible change. Given that the defence budget will remain, until at least 2006, at Euro 24.4 billion per year (around 1.5 per cent of GDP), getting the Bundeswehr ready for its new tasks will have to be accomplished again through savings and the redirection of funds into much needed investment projects. In an attempt to counter his financial confinement, Struck continued in the same vein as his predecessor to prune back Bundeswehr infrastructure, close bases and
reduce the scope of large-scale procurement projects, often to the annoyance of European partners, with the aim of saving around Euro 2.4 billion. Struck’s room for manoeuvre will also be shaped by the commitment to conscription, also present in the VPR of 2003, a policy which will continue to make sizable manpower demands on the defence budget.

Domestic reception of the VPR again honed in on two crucial areas: conscription and finance. Both the Greens and the Liberals support the abolition of conscription and consequently called for amendments to the guidelines. The CDU, meanwhile, supported the general direction of the guidelines, but argued that the current defence budget was far too low to modernise the Bundeswehr for its new tasks.

Adding flesh to the VPR were details delivered in early 2004 regarding the size and structure of the Bundeswehr. In mid-January, Defence Minister Struck together with Generalinspekteur General Wolfgang Schneiderhahn set out further drastic cuts for the defence sector. Again the Defence Ministry’s plans were not without controversy. Not only did Struck’s reform programme prompt a discussion on the future of conscription and the Zivildienst, but the projected cuts to the army’s budget gave rise to disagreement within the ministry and the early retirement of Heeresinspekteur Gert Gudera. Headlining the announcement was the slashing of defence spending by Euro 26 billion, to be attained principally through the planned closure of some 110 bases over the next 8 years. Accompanying this were plans for the greater stratification of the Bundeswehr and a reduction in its overall size by around 35,000. Struck announced that the Bundeswehr would comprise 35,000 rapid-deployment troops, a 70,000 strong stabilisation force for Balkan-type peacekeeping missions, together with a force of 137,500 soldiers providing a general supporting and logistical role.

Outlook: the Bundeswehr in the twenty-first century

I began this chapter by asserting that during the 1990s a mismatch emerged between Germany’s greater readiness and political will to use armed force and its actual capacity to deliver and meet new expectations. The overview of the reform process and attempts at modernising the Bundeswehr makes it apparent that at the start of the twenty-first century Germany is finally catching up with its allies in respect
of defence sector reform. Although much has changed over the course of the past thirteen years – and, certainly, the extent of that change has been remarkable – strong structural factors remain in place and serve to impede a fuller realisation of reform. If success is measured by the meeting of targets and deadlines, the adequate performance of given tasks and being seen by allies and partners as a credible actor, then Germany’s performance is somewhat patchy; in short, Berlin should be doing better.

As Sarotte notes a profound lack of urgency, especially in the 1990s, a rather closed-minded approach to security issues, an unflagging support of conscription, together with limited funds all contributed to the slow pace of Bundeswehr reform throughout the period.27 Although the events of September 11 2001 and the war on terror have helped to initiate fresh thinking in Germany, most of the constraining factors and forces of inertia persist and are likely to keep the reform momentum at its sluggish current pace. One area on which the impact of reform efforts has been particularly ineffectual is conscription, an issue to which I turn in chapter 6.

Notes

3 Verteidigungspolitische Rightlinien (Bonn: Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 26 November 1992).
5 Ibid., paragraph 513.
6 VPR, para 31.
9 The Krisenreaktionskräfte embodied around 15 per cent of the manpower of the Bundeswehr, comprising 37,000 army; 12,300 airforce and 4,300 naval personnel; for its structure, see Michael Ludwigs (1995) ‘Die
Krisenreaktionskräfte der Bundeswehr Vorgaben für eine neue Streitkräftekategorie’, *Wehrtechnik*, vol. 9, pp. 7–9.

10 *Konzeptionelle Leitlinie zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 12 July 1994).


12 The Headline Goals were to be able, by 2003, to deploy and sustain 50,000–60,000 troops for at least one year for the purpose of Petersberg tasks; to establish new political and military bodies and structures within the EC to enable the EU to have the political guidance and strategic direction for its operations; to create frameworks for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO; to ensure the contribution to EU military crisis-management of non-EU NATO states and other interested parties; and to instigate a non-military crisis-management mechanism.


14 *Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr* (Berlin, Bonn: BMVg, 23 May 2000).


16 The entire report (a 179-page document; hereafter, ‘the report’) is available online:www.bundeswehr.de/ministerium/politik_aktuell/Bericht.

17 Eckwerte für die Konzeptionelle and Planerische Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr Zussamenfassung und Schlussfolgendungen, available online: www.welt.de/go/bundeswehr/index.html?id=162.


20 CSU General Secretary Thomas Goppel quoted in *ibid*.


27 This argument is more fully developed by Sarotte (2001).
The endurance of conscription

Universal conscription is an element of Germany’s security insurance and will continue to be indispensable.¹

I believe that conscription is an essential instrument for the Bundeswehr’s integration into society. Therefore, it shall remain.²

The conscription puzzle

When considered against the expansion of the Bundeswehr’s remit during the 1990s and the associated efforts at restructuring its armed forces, Germany’s stalwart commitment to retaining conscription is an area of profound stasis, an anomaly warranting further investigation. In the face of ever-more acute strategic, economic and social challenges to the utility of compulsory military service since the ending of the Cold War, conscription was maintained and developed in Germany in the 1990s by both the CDU- and the SPD-led Government to enhance its relevance and thus ensure its survival. Moreover, the issue of conscription’s future, whenever it has been debated in Germany over the past decade, has been hampered by the overwhelming support given to the practice by the Volksparteien, as well as the Ministry of Defence; as a consequence, no serious consideration has been given to alternatives to conscription.

This situation sets Germany apart from countries across Europe (and beyond) where the trend has been away from the mass-armed force premised on compulsory military service and towards fully professional smaller forces. Germany’s lack of engagement with the issue of conscription derives from the prevailing belief among the political and military elite that, stripped of its compulsory military service element, the
Bundeswehr would become irretrievably undemocratic and that undesirable changes to the form and substance of Germany’s foreign and security policy would follow. The potency of this conviction is apparent in the discourse surrounding Bundeswehr staffing structures and, more specifically, in the justifications levied in support of conscription throughout the 1990s.

This significance of conscription in Germany after 1989 has been noted by a number of commentators who have generally seen that the endurance of the practice is best explained by socio-historical reasons, or ideational factors, relating to ‘the weight of the past’, an entrenched political–military culture informed by Germany’s past and culture – features, it has been argued, that ensure the policy’s path-dependence and obstruct the way to change. Even the most ardently realist prognoses of German security policy have acknowledged conscription’s special status. Geoffrey van Orden, for example, commented: ‘The debate over conscription goes to the heart of the contemporary German dilemma over the function of the armed forces.’ Others, coming from a more constructivist perspective, have made similar observations about the significance of the draft. John Duffield, for one, posited that the anti-militarism innate to German political culture ‘has fostered a strong, if not universal, attachment to conscription, despite its disadvantages in the circumstances of the post-Cold War era and even though it has no longer been necessary to prevent a replay of the militaristic excesses of the past’. Thomas Berger came to the same conclusion, maintaining that the reality of a specific political–military culture within Germany is the chief reason for the perpetuation of conscription, expressive of the drive to weld together German society and its military. Such comments about the peculiar, historically determined, inertia surrounding conscription have rarely issued in analysis beyond this labelling of conscription as somehow ‘special’. With such observations as a starting-point, I attempt in this chapter to explore the puzzle of conscription and to explain why, in the face of factors that challenge the efficacy of conscription, its practice has been perpetuated and seems set to form a substantial part of the Bundeswehr’s current mixed personnel composition.

It is worth sketching out the place of conscription in the context of West German rearmament before considering the present state of play. As explained in chapter 2, conscription acted as a linchpin in the rearming of West Germany, meeting a range of military, social and political requirements prevalent at the time. Crucially, the introduction
of conscription enabled the new Bundeswehr to build up a substantial personnel base and augmentation strength within the context of NATO, thus contributing to West Germany’s international rehabilitation. Furthermore, conscription, alongside a number of other new civil–military mechanisms, served as a bridge-builder between the new armed forces and a society largely opposed to the rearmament process and suspicious of all things military. An upshot of this was that conscription over time became more than just a staffing mechanism, symbolising the new democratic ethos of the Bundeswehr and playing a significant role in building up the Federal Republic’s political capital and credibility as a security actor.

Annually throughout the Cold War up to 200,000 young men were inducted to the armed forces as *Grundwehrdienstleistende*, alongside its regular personnel and reservists, to enable the Bundeswehr to reach its augmented wartime strength of around 1 million personnel. During the Cold War, as was noted in 1973 in a government report, a move away from compulsory military service was deemed plausible only in the instance of a ‘substantially changed security situation [that would] permit a considerable reduction of standing forces’, and which could lead to ‘an examination of the conversion of the Bundeswehr into an all-volunteer force’. The enduring Cold War bipolarity and the sustained burden of expectation on the Federal Republic to produce a land-based large armed force naturally perpetuated conscription, the practice of which was largely uncontested throughout this period. Consequently, until the watershed of 1989–90, the only changes made to military service came in the form of lengthened or shortened service time in response to changes in the intensity of the security environment and the projected number of young men available at given times for military service. Between 1956 and 1961 conscripts served for a period of 12 months; after 1962 and until 1971 service time was extended to 18 months, but was subsequently shortened to 15 months after 1972. Then, in 1984, it was decided, partly in response to the declining birth rate, that from 1989 the length of military service would return to eighteen months.

The ending of superpower hostilities in 1989–90 nullified existing plans to extend the duration of military service from 1989 onwards. Beyond this, little else changed in Germany’s conscription policy thereafter. Indeed, in spite of the seismic geopolitical changes of 1989–90 – and considering the ongoing unpopularity of compulsory military service, especially among young people, as seen in consistently high levels
of conscientious objectors which had begun to soar already in the 1970s – in successive reform documents and efforts to reshape the Bundeswehr to meet new post-Cold War security challenges, continuity rather than change characterised the policy and politics of conscription. This static situation in Germany stands in stark contrast to change elsewhere in Europe and sets Berlin aside from its main partners in terms of the personnel structures of its national armed forces. The diminishing utility of conscription has already been recognised by many other European states, where moves have been underway since the ending of the Cold War to abolish the practice in favour of fully professional or 'all-volunteer forces' (AVFs). For example, France, Belgium and The Netherlands had concluded already in the mid-1990s that their security needs were better served by smaller, more mobile, forces comprised purely of professionals. Spain, Italy, Portugal and the Czech Republic have also followed suit and begun the process of establishing smaller AVFs, processes which have not, however, been without difficulties and controversy in all of these countries.

The reasons why these states decided to make the switch to fully professional force structures are clear. They relate, first and foremost, to a proven need, which emerged over the course of the 1990s to enhance the operational readiness and interoperability of national armed forces, necessitating smaller, better trained, better paid and better equipped modern armed forces – a model which tends to negate the value of the conscript. The norm of small and efficient armed forces has emerged and has shaped the decision by most NATO and EU member states to go fully professional. Meanwhile, the more steadfast conscript states in Europe have remained so due to exceptional circumstances. They are either neutral, like Switzerland, are engaged in ongoing territorial disputes, as are Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, or are not part of a security alliance, the situation, for example, with Austria. Appreciated in this context, Germany's inability or unwillingness to commence with a full debate on the merits of conscription is quite unique.

What characterised the issue in Germany in the 1990s was a pervasive 'non-debate' surrounding conscription. Certainly, the issue bobbed in and out of the political commentary, the abolition of the draft being promoted by fringe elements of the political class, as well as by interest groups; but a measured and comprehensive appraisal of conscription was bypassed. Conscription did acquire greater topicality soon after 1998 when the Red–Green coalition came to power and launched a renewed effort at Bundeswehr reform through processes
which, as chapter 5 explained, focused on both reducing its overall size and its modernisation for new missions. What this effort at reform brought into focus were the inherent difficulties associated with simultaneously redesigning the Bundeswehr as a modern armed force and perpetuating conscription, difficulties which would continue to undermine Bundeswehr efforts at reform.

Although Rudolf Scharping’s reform programme made some significant changes and began to bring the Bundeswehr more in line with Germany’s allies and partners, it side-stepped the endemic problem of funding and, crucially, failed to engage fully with the issue of conscription. The commitment to conscription was also bolstered at the constitutional level, after the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe confirmed the legality of conscription in April 2002 and, moreover, found its practice to be independent of the intensity of the security environment, but dependent on government policy. This decision was, unsurprisingly, embraced by the SPD, which declared that the practice was still a success and that Germany would stick with it in the long term, Defence Minister Scharping adding that he hoped the court’s ruling would bring to an end the legal discussion of the future of conscription. The main opposition parties, the CDU and the CSU, also welcomed the court’s ruling, regarding conscription as necessary both to Germany’s security needs and in integrating the armed forces within society.

In the second wave of defence reforms initiated by the Red–Green coalition a pledge was made as a bargain between the pro-conscription SPD and the pro-reform Greens to examine the future of conscription, which was outlined by the coalition treaty in the wake of the Federal election in September 2002. However, rather than heralding a far-reaching discussion about the merits of conscription or signalling the beginning of the end of conscription, as some quarters believed, efforts at reforming the Bundeswehr in the Red–Green coalition’s second term of office stuck with the pro-conscription orthodoxy. This stance was ultimately confirmed in the VPR of May 2003, which stressed, *inter alia*, the continued vitality of conscription and its importance for German security policy. Subsequently, in line with current plans but prior to the fleshing out of the defence reforms articulated by Peter Struck in January 2004, around 107,000 conscripts served in the Bundeswehr, for a period of nine months, indicating that around one-third of its ‘active’ personnel in 2002–3 was made up of conscripts.

Peter Struck’s reform plans of January 2004 to reduce defence spending by around Euro 26 billion, accompanied by drastic cuts (of around
35,000) in the overall size of the Bundeswehr have raised, perhaps for the first time, serious questions about the viability of maintaining conscription; Struck was, however, quick to confirm his commitment to the draft at least until 2006. Despite this commitment, it is possible that 2004 will mark the beginning of the end of the draft in Germany. Already, Struck’s reform programme has prompted many to conclude that conscription will be abolished in the medium term, together with the Zivildienst, the civilian alternative to military conscription, a prospect with immense consequences for Germany’s social services and health sector. These points notwithstanding, the ending of conscription, when it comes, will certainly be a complex phenomenon, accompanied by protracted political debate.

Conscription: under fire from all fronts

By perpetuating conscription Germany is committed to a policy at odds with both the Bundeswehr’s de facto main role and the personnel structures of key allies and partners, a discrepancy of increasing concern outside of Germany. Challenging the utility of compulsory military service are a number of factors and processes, resisted by Germany, which are now discussed.

Conscription’s diminishing strategic rationale

Fundamental changes to the intensity of Germany’s strategic environment after 1989 challenged the role, organisation and purpose of its armed forces, presenting an opportunity, or critical juncture, for an appraisal of its practice of conscription. Crucially, the entire range of strategic assumptions, and with them the rationale for conscription, of West Germany began to dissipate with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and implosion of the Soviet Union. Manifesting this change, the German Ministry of Defence declared in its first post-Cold War White Paper, in 1994, that ‘for the foreseeable future there exists no existential threat to the territorial integrity of Germany and that of her allies’. The evaporation of this threat was underlined in April 1999 when NATO was enlarged to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. From that point on, Germany has been bordered to the east by NATO fellow-member states. The point here is that, already by the end of the century, the territorial defence rationale for conscription was
substantially weakened. NATO’s second eastern enlargement, in 2004, to embrace another seven states – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – erodes the territorial defence rationale for conscription even further.

Chapters 3 and 4 detailed the changes in German security thinking after 1989–90, as seen most vividly in the incremental alterations to the role of the Bundeswehr, that gradually extended its remit to include out-of-area crisis-management missions. Through deployments in Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia, and then Kosovo, Macedonia, East Timor and Afghanistan, German security policy came to be focused more on out-of-area missions, which became the principal role of the Bundeswehr, a focus largely accepted across the nation’s political spectrum. Germany’s combat role in Kosovo in 1999, a critical juncture in this development, considerably increased the momentum to modernise the Bundeswehr, an objective given even greater impetus by the events of September 11 2001 and the subsequent war on terrorism, imposing on German security thinking a global perspective and exploding the notion that traditional national and alliance defence remained the core tasks of the Bundeswehr. In short, the nature of Bundeswehr deployments throughout the 1990s and beyond have demonstrated the extent to which German armed forces have shifted from a remit based on territorial defence, necessitating a large land-based force, towards a more active role in out-of-area missions requiring highly trained and well-equipped forces, deployable globally with rapidity. Certainly, much in the Bundeswehr’s personnel structure has altered over the past decade, with modernisation efforts proving to be moderately effective in building up a crisis-reaction capacity and reducing the ratio overall of conscripts to professional soldiers. However, the key point here is that as the Bundeswehr’s role extends, especially in the context of the security challenges after 2001, as already depicted in the VPR of 2003, the strategic rationale for conscription is irreversibly diminishing.

Who serves? Violating the universality of conscription

Alongside the diminishing strategic rationale for conscription are a range of additional factors that cast doubt on its relevance. One issue which, over the past decade, has become increasingly problematic is that of Wehrgerechtigkeit, or the extent of equity in who is inducted to perform military service and who is not. The issue promises to continue to become increasingly pertinent in the current context of the
fewer young men needed for conscript service, which challenges the constitutional claim for the universality of the practice and, ultimately, the notion of ‘citizen in uniform’. The situation has arisen in Germany in which only around half of an age cohort actually undergoes basic military service; many of the rest wait to complete their conscript service but never get drafted; others, as conscientious objectors, opt for the Zivildienst; while a further portion are exempted on health grounds or are ineligible for other reasons. In short, all this implies that Germany has moved unwittingly from universal conscription to a selective practice. Consequently, the notion that conscription is the ‘legitimate child of democracy’ and a central tenet in the democratic framework of civil–military relations in Germany is under stress.

Financing the Bundeswehr – squaring the circle?

Further pressure on the sustainability of conscription is exerted by the dictates of defence spending discussed in chapter 5. The crux of the problem is how conscription, which claims a sizeable proportion of the defence budget, can be balanced with equipping the Bundeswehr for its new missions, which requires greater expenditure on research and development and on the professional element of the force. This quandary and the pressure it exerts on conscription will become only more acute in the context of a static defence budget, coupled with sustained demands on Germany to commit more readily to European procurement projects, NATO deployments and ESDP requirements. Not only is the German defence budget relatively small, but the way in which it is spent presents problems for the Bundeswehr. Germany currently spends around 1.6 per cent of its GDP on defence, compared to 2.4 per cent in the UK and 2.6 per cent in France; moreover Berlin spends less than half of what France and the UK currently do on research and development. It is in this context that Germany is trying to reconcile a commitment to conscription with enhanced Bundeswehr deployment and crisis-management capacities. It is clear that by shedding conscription this financial quandary would be at least eased, releasing much needed funds to kick-start the modernisation process.

These strategic, social and financial pressures on conscription have mounted in Germany since the ending of the Cold War, and they have increased since September 11 2001. Moreover, international interest and concern about the pace of German defence reforms, and conscription in particular, has grown in recent times. While Brussels and
Washington once stopped short of calling for Germany to abolish conscription, focusing rather on defence spending and the need to invest more heavily in research and development to help the ESDP as well as NATO modernisation goals, in more recent times criticism of conscription has become less ambivalent.\(^{17}\) The continuation of conscription and the bottleneck it represents in the process of Bundeswehr modernisation have finally been acknowledged and were among the key issues raised by the outgoing NATO Secretary-General George Robertson during a visit to Germany in November 2003. Speaking about NATO’s changing role and the need to enhance collective capabilities by comprehensive modernisation programmes, Robertson urged Germany to do more in the way of modernising the Bundeswehr and referred explicitly to professionalisation as a means of increasing effectiveness.\(^{18}\)

In the long run, therefore, the tasks of equipping the Bundeswehr for new missions while sustaining conscription within a horizontal defence budget appear to be increasingly problematic. Put simply, in the unlikely event of the defence budget rising in the near future and given that the Bundeswehr continues to expand its crisis-management capacities, financial considerations point to a winding down of conscription. However, despite these pressures and incentives to abolish conscription, there is in Germany a resolve to maintain, indeed to enhance, the practice of conscription. Both the CDU- and the SPD-led Governments sought to fudge these increasingly complex issues by declaring a commitment to establish a core capability for crisis management while making ‘intelligent’ use of universal conscription.

*The substance of the German (non-)debate*

An active resistance to abandoning conscription was apparent throughout the 1990s and continues in the current reform process. A complex web of mutually reinforcing arguments sustains conscription, with debates running along lines of argument similar to those levied in establishing conscription in West Germany in the 1950s.

Four interrelated categories of justification and legitimisation lodged in support of conscription form the basis of a sturdy cross-party consensus incorporating the mainstay of the SPD, the CDU–CSU and the Ministry of Defence. Dissent from this consensus comes from the Green Party, the PDS and the FDP, plus small elements of the SPD, especially the Young Socialists. As ‘gatekeepers’ of the pro-conscription consensus
the Volksparteien have guarded against its abolition since the ending of the Cold War. Consequently, over the past decade there has been no assumed need for a fundamental discussion on the merits of conscription. A taboo has come to surround the issue, and conscription has become almost sacrosanct, with any questioning of the status quo viewed as bordering on the heretical.

When in government with the CDU–CSU until 1998, elements of the FDP attempted to make the abolition of conscription part of the party’s profile. A group of younger Liberals began to argue that conscription was no longer strategically or socially functional and should be abolished. In a series of newspaper interviews Jürgen Koppelin and Rainer Brüderle countered all of the pro-conscription arguments of the CDU–CSU–SPD, but especially that a shift to AVF would inevitably lead to the return of the ‘state within a state’ syndrome. Throughout, these young Liberals’ involvement with the issue, the party leadership, the CDU and the Ministry of Defence defended conscription by well-worn and familiar arguments. Towards the end of the summer of 1997, with the final decision on the Liberal Party’s stance pending, the issue became particularly volatile, with Defence Minister Volker Rühe warning that the issue, unless satisfactorily resolved, could become a ‘coalition matter’. The Liberals’ decision, reached in the autumn, was that the continuation of conscription would be party policy for the 1998 Federal election.

The taboo surrounding conscription kicked in once more in the spring of 2000, even before Scharping had announced his programme of defence reforms. The leaking of the recommendations of the Weizäcker and Von Kirchbach reports for the reform of the Bundeswehr, commissioned by the Government, elicited a swift condemnation from the CDU which charged that the planned reforms, specifically the shortened duration of service for conscripts which would allow little time for training, threatened the future of military service, and that, in turn, would destabilise the Bundeswehr. The CSU was even bolder in expressing its concerns, arguing that the plans amounted to the abolition of conscription ‘through the back door’. The Green Party’s opposition to military service naturally became of greater consequence when they formed a governing coalition with the SPD in September 1998. The official party position was, and remains, that conscription is obsolete, an Auslaufmodell, and should be abolished in favour of a smaller AVF of some 200,000 soldiers with greater transparency of structure and subject to enhanced parliamentary
control, well-equipped for its main tasks – collective security, peace support and humanitarian missions. Conscription, from the Greens’ perspective, acts as a block to the effective reform and modernisation of the Bundeswehr and is unnecessary as a means of integrating the armed forces within society.\(^\text{23}\)

Having backed down on the issue in 1998, the FDP made the abolition of conscription part of its election manifesto for the 2002 Federal election. The party argued that the maintenance of conscription was not only ill-suited to Germany’s security needs, but that the very notion of compulsory military service was out of step with patterns of contemporary citizenship. The Liberals’ contribution was to point to the imperative of shedding conscription in favour of an all-professional, well-trained and highly deployable military, equipped with modern weaponry.\(^\text{24}\) The third anti-conscription voice is that of the former-communist PDS. The party’s position on conscription is bound up with its broader aims of abolishing the Bundeswehr and securing the gradual demilitarisation of German foreign and security policy, as expressed in the party’s slogan: \textit{Nein zur Wehrpflicht ist ein nein zum Krieg} (‘A “no” to conscription is a “no” to war’). On this route towards demilitarisation, the PDS envisages a Bundeswehr of some 100,000 soldiers, twinned with the pursuit of non-military crisis-resolution mechanisms in the form of the UN and the OSCE.\(^\text{25}\)

\textit{In defence of conscription}

Although the gatekeepers of the conscription consensus may disagree on the length of military service and the degree of flexibility to be permitted in the system, they remain united in promoting its continuation and levy the same kinds of arguments in its support. It is this broad consensus which has ensured that conscription remains sacrosanct. The first line of argument in support of conscription emphasises continuities in Germany’s security requirements. The 1994 Defence White Paper posited that national and alliance territorial defence remained the core task of the Bundeswehr, ‘supplemented’ by German participation in multinational conflict prevention and crisis management.\(^\text{26}\) It dictated a fairly sober geopolitical analysis of Germany’s perpetual \textit{Zentrallage}, leading to a role conception ‘of defending the heart of Europe’ and a force structure which necessitated conscription.\(^\text{27}\) The ‘continuity of role’ argument rose in prominence at the time of France’s decision to suspend conscription in the spring of 1996 and its potency
continued, despite Germany’s disposition to use armed forces in out-of-area deployments in Kosovo as well as in Afghanistan. Both the Weizäcker and von Kirchbach reports on the future of the Bundeswehr viewed national and collective defence of the alliance as a priority, thus necessitating conscription. Even after the events of September 11, the continuity of role argument was applied, Generalinspekteur Harald Kujat arguing that among the Bundeswehr’s tasks national and alliance defence remained a high priority. Similarly, in his spring 2002 paper for the CDU on the reform of the Bundeswehr, Volker Rühe stated the necessity of conscription on security grounds, seeing that without the draft the armed forces would not be able to reach the numbers necessary to meet its national and alliance defence commitments, as well as its crisis management tasks.

Even in the VPR of 2003, which in many ways represented a dramatic shift in the fundamentals of German security thinking by signalling a departure from the primacy of national–alliance territorial defence, conscription was justified on the strategic grounds of ‘operational readiness’ and ‘effectiveness’.

A second line of argument levied in support of conscription draws directly on the lessons of German history and combines both the negative aspects of Germany’s pre-1945 military past and the positive aspects of the Federal Republic’s experience with the Bundeswehr as the first conscript army in the democratic German State. At the heart of the argument is the conviction that conscription is the best means of preventing a return to the ‘state within a state’ syndrome. This line of reasoning finds its expression in a raft of arguments positing conscription’s vital function in firmly establishing the Bundeswehr and matters of security within every sector of politics and society, thereby guarding against alienation and acting as an effective form of societal control over the military. Throughout the 1990s this line of argument served as a powerful restraint on discussions over the future of conscription, figuring prominently in Bundestag debates over the Bundeswehr’s structure. The balancing role played by military service in civil–military relations continued in the context of the 2002 elections. For example, in the SPD’s manifesto it was claimed that conscription would continue to assure that the Bundeswehr of the future is firmly anchored in society. In a similar vein, the CDU’s position on the future of the Bundeswehr and its critique of Scharping’s reform programme depicted conscription as providing meaning to the notion of ‘the citizen in uniform’ and as a societal anchorage for the armed forces.
A third principal argument in support of conscription revolves around the notion of Kultur der Zurückhaltung (culture of restraint), denoting the long-term restraint and general amilitary character of German foreign and security policy, stemming from the former Federal Republic’s security identity. This line of argument was particularly prominent in the 1990s’ out-of-area debates, but has subsided somewhat since the Bundeswehr’s Kosovo deployment. The argument’s rationale was that, in the absence of conscription, defence planners would be freed from a number of moral questions and hindrances confronting decisions on Bundeswehr deployment, because, as an AVF, it would be a readily deployable tool of foreign policy, disposed to military adventurism. This argument views conscription essentially as a force for cautious restraint in security policy, rendering policy-makers more accountable to society and democratic politics. The Kultur der Zurückhaltung argument was a particular favourite of Chancellor Kohl: when speaking in 1996 of not giving up the ‘time tested system of military service in Germany’, he was making a clear connection between conscription and the self-restraining and checking policies of the Bonn Republic.

The fourth argument is that the participation of conscripts is the best means of assuring the professionalism and high performance standards of the Bundeswehr, and that conscription is a source of continuous regeneration. Policy-makers do not accept that the professionalism of the Bundeswehr is determined by the preponderance of voluntary career soldiers in its composition, preferring to see its professionalism as shaped by the societal influences brought into the military by young conscripts, whose participation engenders a more ‘intelligent armed force’. This message has been strongly reinforced by the Bundeswehr itself, Harald Kujat arguing that conscription is necessary for the rejuvenation of the armed forces from ‘the bottom up’.

The broad pro-conscription body mobilised these four arguments successfully, ensuring that the future of conscription was secure and seemingly untouchable. Such lines of justification, however, became increasingly untenable over the course of the 1990s, so that by 2003 the perpetuation of conscription had come to be at odds with the Bundeswehr’s role, effectiveness and credibility. To begin with, the strategic rationale for conscription, Germany’s Zentrallage, has largely evaporated. As noted earlier, NATO’s enlargement in 1999 created a new strategic reality for Germany by eliminating its frontline status. The
inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary within the alliance provided a fundamentally new context to Germany’s eastern border. Moreover, the notion that Russia is a military threat is now arguably redundant, with relations between NATO and Moscow firmly framed in the ‘19 + 1’ mechanism. Moreover, the pro-conscription lobby’s notion that the practice remains essential for assuring Berlin’s Bündnistreue (alliance commitment) and Bündnisfähigkeit (effective capacity within the alliance) is questionable. Again, changed strategic realities since 1989–90 are such that Germany’s standing within the alliance is now arguably best promoted by a military capacity that is readily deployable, rather than by maintaining a large land-based force geared to deterrence. George Robertson’s comments, in Berlin in late 2003, calling for swifter and more comprehensive reforms in Germany, underline this argument.

The Kultur der Zurückhaltung argument is also inconsistent with post-1990 realities, especially given that the remit of the Bundeswehr was extended during the 1990s to include out-of-area and combat missions, previously deemed unconstitutional, despite the maintenance of conscription. The civil–military relations argument also is rather weak: conscription is important in ensuring contact and exchange between society and the armed forces, though in doing so it is just one element of an elaborate framework of civil–military relations aligned with a range of parliamentary organs that ensure democratic control over the armed forces and security policy-making in general. Viewed from this perspective, the argument that in the absence of conscription democratic oversight of the Bundeswehr would be lost, resulting in an isolated and undemocratic military force, is difficult to sustain.

Two final considerations provide strong incentives to switch to an AVF. First, a scaled-down professional force would bring about savings in personnel costs. The French experience provides a positive example here: since suspending conscription, personnel costs in the French armed forces have been cut by around one-sixth, allowing resources to be redirected to modernisation projects. Second, that conscription serves to maintain the professional standards of the Bundeswehr is contested by the view, generally held outside of official circles, that conscription, far from infusing the armed forces with quality, is a source of lowly educated, unmotivated, young men who ‘end up’ undergoing military service. 35
Breaking the conscription taboo?

Conscription as it is practised in Germany is imbued with distinctive qualities, making it as argued earlier an issue of more than just manpower. It is regarded as a key factor in sustaining aspects of the former Federal Republic’s security policy, especially its restraint and in influencing democratic civil–military relations. In terms of the broader transformation of the Bundeswehr and its mission, attempts to deal with conscription have been characterised by inertia.

The evidence presented in this chapter, in particular the manifest mis-match between Germany’s changed strategic environment and the raft of arguments raised in support of conscription signifies that a ‘taboo’ surrounds the practice. Clearly, elites are cognisant of the highly complex issues surrounding conscription – the fragile public consensus that upholds conscription and the range of auxiliary tasks conscription serves, most notably the benefits of the Zivildienst. They are also attentive to the need to present German security policy to both the domestic audience and neighbours and allies as continuous with the old Federal Republic’s restrained and self-monitoring security policies. Such concerns were evident in the governmental management of the conscription debate throughout the 1990s, particularly at critical junctures, including the French decision to move to an AVF as well as the FDP’s intra-party activity on the future of conscription. These episodes were witness to the swift condemnation of any questioning of or dissension from the pro-conscription consensus and the invocation of well-defined and familiar lines of justification. This pursuit was by and large supported by the main opposition of the time, the SPD, which came to confirm its position in support of conscription, defending its perpetuation along the same lines as the governing CDU–CSU. Crucially, this level of governmental support for conscription continued after the change of government in 1998.

That conclusion notwithstanding, the prospects for change in the context of the ongoing modernisation of the Bundeswehr are not to be ruled out. Developments during 2004 may mark the beginning of a national debate about the future of conscription. An opportunity has long been available for Germany to reappraise its conscription practice, though conditions thus far have been insufficiently permissive to bring about innovation and change. However, to bring about change, not only do the political conditions have to be right, but the change process itself has to be initiated and managed by sets of individuals.
Peter Struck’s tenure since 2002 as SPD defence minister has coincided with permissive international and domestic conditions which are increasingly taken to undermine the value and purpose of conscription. Indeed, ever since Germany’s engagement in Kosovo in 1999 conscription has been a thorn in the side of the Bundeswehr’s modernisation endeavours. Moreover, the SPD’s coalition partner, the Green Party, has long given well-reasoned and firm support to the change to an AVF and has thus been able to exert pressure on the SPD. Moreover, the burden of international expectation on Germany to shed conscription has become far more marked in recent times.

Indications of the likely shape of debate in Germany over conscription will become clearer in the first half of 2004 as the ramifications of Struck’s latest plans become apparent. What is already evident is that opposition parties are gearing up for a confrontation over the issue, with the CDU and the CSU condemning Struck’s plans for focusing on purely financial matters to the detriment of strategic concerns. Of even greater consequence, and illustrative of the interconnectedness of conscription with other policy sectors, has been the response of the Federal ministry dealing with the alternative Zivildienst. With around 90,000 young men each year undertaking a ten-month duty of alternative service in the social sector, the possibility of conscription’s abolition has prompted planners already to consider how they might deal with Germany’s growing demand for social and health provision in the absence of the ‘Zivi’. An idea already mooted has been the introduction of a voluntary ‘social year’ for both males and females.36

Struck’s ever bolder resolve to reshape the Bundeswehr, to better equip it for its new missions and to lessen defence spending, demonstrates that he is already what Hyde-Price and Jeffery call an ‘entrepreneur of change’, able to head up sizeable reform initiatives in line with broader national reform goals. Will Struck extend his entrepreneurial skills to tackle conscription? Will Struck be the German defence minister to preside over its abolition? Whether the demise of conscription is foreseeable or not yet on the horizon, its abolition will be a protracted process, characterised by complexity, political emotion and financial wrangling.
Notes


10 Scharping’s plans set out to have around 77,000–80,000 conscripts serving within a Bundeswehr of some 280,000 soldiers at any given time. As an integral part of the programme of reforms is to improve on the delivery and attractiveness of the draft, it has been made an *Abschnittweiser Wehrdienst* (flexible military service in stages), giving young men the option of serving 9 months in one stretch or a 6-month block of basic service followed by three months in two tranches over the next 2 years; alternatively, conscripts may serve for an extended period of up to 23 months: see BMVg (2000) *Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr Grobbausplanung Ergebnisse und Entscheidungen* (Bonn: BMVg); and Scharping (2000).

11 The Constitutional Court rejected the recommendation of a lower court in Potsdam which ruled on the case of Volker Wiedersberg, a conscientious objector to the draft in the former GDR, who was then forced to serve after unification.


The endurance of conscription

15 See the Bundeswehr website: www.bundeswehr.de.
22 Thomas Goppel quoted in *ibid*.
7

Conclusions: Germany, the use of force
and the power of strategic culture

German perspectives on the use of force have evolved rapidly since the ending of the Cold War and today Germany is one of the key contributors to global peacekeeping missions, with an estimated 10,000 Bundeswehr soldiers currently deployed overseas. Seen in this way, Germany has become a ‘net contributor’ to European and international security. Certainly, taboos have been broken and in many ways Germany has cultivated a less rigidly restrictive approach to the use of armed force, in particular circumstances. It is, however, clear that, despite changes, current German thinking about the use of force is pervaded still by significant continuities with the past, largely because of the enduring role and influence of Germany’s distinctive strategic culture.

By returning to the central conceptual concerns of the book, my aim in this chapter is to consider the three key questions posed in the Introduction in relation to the evidence presented in chapters 1–6. The first of these questions concerns identification: what is German strategic culture? The second is about change: to what extent and in what form did change in the external security environment after 1989–90 impact on German strategic culture? The third relates to behaviour: in what ways has strategic culture affected behaviour and shaped policy choices?

Identifying Germany’s strategic culture

In identifying West Germany’s strategic culture I began by characterising its formative period, during which all previous values, beliefs and practices regarding the use of force were rendered obsolete, as exemplified by the notion of Stunde Null. A state of ‘collective infancy’, or
strategic cultural *rupture*, followed in that new affective and evaluative schemes regarding the use of force have had to be constructed *ab initio*. These new policies and practices are grounded in a fresh set of core values and beliefs, born of domestic contextual factors, combined with the will and demands imposed by the Western allies in their configuration of what is required *externally* and what can be offered *internally*. What makes up (West) German strategic culture are properties of three kinds, identified as:

- **foundational elements** – the core values and beliefs of the strategic culture;
- **security policy standpoints** – the intermediary dispositions or preferences arising out of the foundational elements that shape actual policy choices and practices; and
- **regulatory factors** – the governing premises and normative devices that promote core values to the external environment as dictated by the intermediary security policy standpoints.

The foundational elements, extrapolated from a consideration (in chapter 2) of aspects, both domestic and international, of the rearming of West Germany, were identified as historical rupture, the relegation of the use of force, depletion of militarism and the exhaustion of nationalism. The policy preferences arising out of the foundational elements were seen to be determined by a range of security policy standpoints, which also were extrapolated from the consideration of West German rearmament. During the Cold War, those security policy standpoints were:

- an aversion to singularity, unilateralism and leadership in security matters;
- the promotion of stability, with an emphasis on deterrence;
- a general restraint in military matters, reinforced by widespread antimilitary sentiments;
- dedication to the pursuit of responsible and calculable security policies generated by the need to ‘make amends’;
- a commitment to fully integrate the Bundeswehr within society and the parliamentary system; and
- co-operation, compromise and consensus-building, domestically and internationally, on security matters.
These security policy standpoints created strong dispositions which translated further into observable policies comprising governing premises and normative devices. Briefly, the governing premises represent the spatial, strategic and political parameters governing the Bundeswehr’s organisation and role; while the normative devices relate to the broad civil–military framework in West Germany; the parliamentary control of the armed forces, the limited role of the Generalinspekteur, *Innere Führung* and *Bürger in Uniform*, and conscription and conscientious objection.

West German strategic culture did not fundamentally change, following its initial consolidation, during the Cold War; and, after its ending, there was a relatively settled period throughout which the foundational elements and the external environment were largely mutually reinforcing, thus obviating fundamental alterations in policy direction. Any changes that did result from challenges to existing practices were seen to be in line with the postulates of German strategic culture and, moreover, actually sought to further them. An important aspect of this was the consolidation of security policy through a strong consensus among the main parties as to the basic substance, organisation and direction of West German security policy.

**Strategic culture, change and the ending of the Cold War**

The second question, relating to change after 1989–90, considered that if the existing (West) German strategic culture was the product of the Cold War – ‘a settled period’ – during which the foundational elements, security policy standpoints and, subsequently, the regulatory factors were in sync with external realities, then the exogenous shocks and changes – an ‘unsettled period’ – brought about by the ending of the Cold War could usher in a state of collective infancy and a cultural rupture–discontinuity with previous affective and evaluative schemes similar to those of 1945 and the years immediately afterwards. In sum, the principal question here is if, as a result of the ending of the Cold War, Germany’s strategic culture has changed, and if so in what forms have the changes taken?

Chapter 1 posited that change in a strategic culture comes in ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘fundamental’ forms (see pp. 18–19). On the basis of the evidence here presented, change in German strategic culture after 1989–90 did not happen as strategic cultural theory might dictate: the
rupture brought about by the ending of the Cold War should have led to a fundamental break in strategic culture and a reconstruction of all affective and evaluative schemes in line with fresh foundational elements relating to the unified Germany’s new position in Europe and acquisition of full sovereignty. Instead, through an examination of changing perspectives on the use of force in Germany throughout this period, it can be argued that the ending of the Cold War was not followed by a state of ‘collective infancy’ in Germany akin to that which followed the Second World War. Essentially, none of the foundational elements of the existing strategic culture was fundamentally challenged, disregarded or rendered obsolete, but, as I argue below, rather came to be reinterpreted and reapplied through adjustments in security policy standpoints and, subsequently, into policies and practices, some of which were adjusted to suit the new external environment.

German strategic culture, then, was fine-tuned rather than fundamentally changed after 1989–90, with different readings and prescriptions being drawn from the negative and positive points of orientation set in the strategic culture. Moreover, and importantly here, even in cases of observable and purposeful policy changes and seeming departures from existing practices, namely Kosovo, such moves were in line with the original postulates of the strategic culture. I demonstrate below that German security policy behaviour after the ending of the Cold War was informed more by West Germany’s experiences after 1945 than by its immediate circumstances arising since 1989–90.

The impact of the ending of the Cold War

The Gulf War, as the first major challenge to Germany’s security policy after the Cold War, began the prising open of strategic culture by dislodging the neat consistency that had held during the Cold War between external realities and foundational aspects, a dislocation which had a number of effects.

First, various aspects of German security policy came into tension or even confusion with each other. This was manifest in the emergence among the political elite of differing and often opposing ‘readings’, prescriptions and views to the change and as to what form Germany’s response should take. Certainly, these faultlines had already begun to surface in the 1980s but gained greater prominence at the end of bipolarity, which provided Germany with more room for manoeuvre to potentially broaden its repertoire of policy options. At the same
time, and reinforcing the prospect of change, international expectations rose in favour of greater German participation and burden-sharing in collective security.

These central tensions and quandaries revolved around the notion that since the Second World War a defining feature of the Federal Republic had been that bellicosity should be renounced, militarism rejected and that never again should German soldiers be sent to a war front. However, at the same time West Germany had, over the past fifty years come to cherish and profit from a set of security policies heavily imbued with notions of responsibility and reparation, twinned with an enduring commitment to act as a reliable member of the Western community and especially to avoid unilateralism and any notion of a renewed Sonderweg. Crucially, whereas during the Cold War these principles could all be equally and, more or less, satisfactorily met, with the ending of bipolarity, and especially during the Gulf War, these aspects came to contradict each other. Essentially, how could a principled policy of military abstention be maintained if a commitment to responsibility and membership in the Western community would be potentially jeopardised by not partaking in peacekeeping operations? Equally, how could a renewed singularity, or Sonderweg, be avoided if Germany was unable or unwilling to participate in multilateral security ventures?

A deep sense of confusion thus emerged within Germany in the 1990s as to how best to respond to new crises and to meet all of the demands on and expectations of it, in terms both of its allies and of the dictates of its strategic culture. Commenting on this in 1991, Uwe Nehrlich said that ‘Germans were geared to show they weren’t a danger, and they then were asked to do something very much outside familiar patterns’. Similarly, Bundeswehr Generalinspekteur Klaus Naumann noted: ‘The Gulf War showed very clearly just how confused and sensitive many Germans are when it comes to the use of military force, in particular, German military force.’

The outbreak of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia exacerbated these tensions and confusions, reinforcing the question of whether German history still pointed to restraint from military engagement or whether that same history now led Germany to embrace active military participation. More than the Gulf War, Yugoslavia showed how there could be a possible option for the use of military force that was between the excesses of pacifism and militarism, showing that for Germany a principled practice of non-violence was no longer tenable in post-Cold War Europe.
In short, this period saw the rupture of a consensus which had thus far been a central characteristic governing German strategic culture. New paradigms of varied intensities challenged the dominant practices of restraint and reticence, all of which, importantly, were grounded in the same historical memory but proffered differing responses and prescriptions. In other words, agents contested what the foundational elements through security policy standpoints now meant and should mean, and what new security policies should subsequently be pursued.

After the breach of the Gulf War there was a protracted period of adjustment in strategic culture and the playing out of ideas, as can be seen in the emergence of the CDU-led paradigm which espoused Germany’s greater disposition to use military power and in the numerous political and legal challenges mounted against it. Bundeswehr deployments to the Gulf region after the war, as well as to Cambodia and Somalia, together with domestic endeavours to reform the Bundeswehr, are representative of the concrete steps taken by the CDU in adjusting the governing premisses to match the foundational elements in line with the CDU’s own reading of the changed external realities and its prescription of the appropriate German response to them. During this and the subsequent period of negotiation, the various ‘cultural agents’ referred to in chapter 1, most prominently the political parties and ministries, were actively pursuing the hegemony of their own readings and policy prescriptions.

Following this period of negotiations consolidation of the dominant reading proceeded, as was manifest in the final decision of the Constitutional Court, in July 1994, and thereafter in the broad support given to the governing coalition for its deployment of Bundeswehr troops in Bosnia and Kosovo later in the decade. Nevertheless, as noted in chapter 4, a full consolidation and the building of a new domestic consensus regarding the use of force on a scale similar to that of pre-1989, proved elusive.

The mechanisms of change

Something of the historic rupture of 1945 persists still within German strategic culture, with Stunde Null remaining a central and defining element in the construction of policy, principally as a compass by which to steer a course between what is possible and what is not. Stunde Null
thus remains a central focus of remembrance and as a point of trauma shared collectively by post-war generations, as witnessed in the systematic mobilising of Germany’s past and the rupture of 1945 to legitimise or delegitimise, as the case may be, particular policy options. This was especially evident in the party-political debates over the out-of-area deployment of the Bundeswehr and in the continued promotion of conscription. Here policy choices were clearly shaped by shame and guilt and by a continuing commitment to reparation. Crucially, no ‘new root of legitimacy’, unrelated to Germany’s historic rupture with the past after 1945, emerged, and this is further confirmation that German security policy continues to depend more on the formative implications of the ‘collective infancy’ of 1945 than on the more immediate influences emanating out of 1989–90.

The second foundational element, relating to the relegation of the use of force, has also persisted. Although the Bundeswehr has been deployed with increased frequency since 1990 and has broken its former out-of-area constraints, the use of force is clearly still not regarded as the means for the resolution of all crises and conflicts; neither is it seen as an automatic or natural tool for the pursuit of national interests. This was particularly the case following September 11 2001, when German perspectives on the use of force clashed with new American thinking about pre-emptive military strikes. Bundeswehr deployment is still viewed largely as a last resort and then only in circumstances where military force is unambivalently required for the resolution of a conflict and where a goal is in sight. In short, no assumption that the Bundeswehr should be deployed in a full range of missions has taken hold, and reticence continues to govern the question of the Bundeswehr’s deployability.

Militarism remains an illegitimate ideology. The Bundeswehr has not sought to reconstruct itself as a more traditional form of armed force nor has the practice of conscription been reconfigured in the form of *Schule der Nation* in the context of national unification. The negation of militarism has been manifest in the reluctance to shed conscription and in the continued commitment to maintaining and strengthening the tools of *Primat der Politik* and existing civil–military relations.

Finally, the pursuit of multilateral options in dealing with security matters and the conceiving of interests via institutions have continued to be actively promoted, and both testify to the enduring exhaustion of nationalism. The broad institutional setting of German security
policy has been further confirmed through a number of bilateral and trilateral initiatives. Moreover, the ongoing desire to avoid singularity and to maintain its status as a reliable ally has prompted Germany to participate more readily in military deployments, since to abstain would jeopardise its place within the alliance and put it out of step with its allies. In this sense, then, the Bundeswehr is regarded as an armed force within an alliance rather than an embodiment of purely national military strength.

The explanation for the endurance of these foundational elements of Germany’s strategic culture was alluded to earlier when it was observed that the events of 1989–90 did not herald an emergent collective infancy, as had been the case in 1945. This time the existing foundational elements inherited from West Germany were simply writ large on the unified Germany and were deemed both valid and workable. Crucially, although since 1989–90 new formative experiences have entered the domain of strategic culture, in the absence of a collective infancy following major trauma, all new challenges to and expectations placed on Germany have been filtered and assessed through existing strategic cultural milieu.

Reaffirming German strategic culture

What, then, accounts for the observable changes in German perspectives on the use of force since 1989–90, allowing the Bundeswehr to become involved in missions during the 1990s? Change is explained by a number of adjustments facilitated by the security policy standpoints.

To reiterate, during the Cold War the foundational elements of West German strategic culture found expression through the security policy standpoints. As detailed in chapter 1, these standpoints were: an aversion to singularity and unilateralism combined with a commitment to reliability as an ally; the promotion of stability; the preferment of deterrence and of the political role of the Bundeswehr; a general reticence regarding the use of armed force; the pursuit of responsible security policies; a commitment to extensive civilian control of the armed forces and to consensus-building in security matters at both domestic and international levels. Prior to 1989–90 these standpoints found expression in the regulatory practices of West German strategic culture – the governing premises and normative devices.

It is significant that with the ending of the Cold War a number of the security policy standpoints came into tension or contradicted one
another, or else lost relevance and had to be adjusted to maintain the consistency of the foundational elements and policies. The important aspects of this change are outlined below.

The aversion to singularity–unilateralism, which had previously been assured through West Germany’s firm allegiance to the alliance, of which it was a member, and through a commitment to the defence of national and alliance territory, could be assured in its new post-Cold War incarnation only by a demonstration of its reliability as an ally and its readiness to participate in out-of-area crisis-management activities. This then furthered the broader political role of the Bundeswehr of assuring Germany’s position and credibility within the alliance. Crucially, if Germany was to successfully resist being relegated to the position of junior partner within the alliance a greater capacity and willingness to deploy the Bundeswehr had to be created in the 1990s.

Tied to this is the objective of practising a set of responsible security policies. Whereas prior to 1989–90 this was best achieved through West Germany’s low-profile stance of restraint and by meeting allied requirements, after the ending of the Cold War responsibility dictated a more active restrained stance. Had Germany not extended the remit of the Bundeswehr, then some of its basal functions – generating credibility within the alliance and exercising responsibility in security policies – would not have been fulfilled. These ideas were apparent in the CDU’s prescribed role for the post-Cold War Bundeswehr. In an unpublished essay of 1991 Karl Lamers called for Germany to acknowledge its own strength and the responsibility that this entailed, seeing that it would be irresponsible of Germany to act as if oblivious to its strength, which would only engender mistrust. Lamers thus advocated that Germany, without forgetting its history, become as ‘normal’ as possible. Kohl voiced a similar conviction in 1991 that ‘minimalist solutions’ (Blue Beret) missions would not suffice, and that participation in UN Chapter VII missions would display Germany’s willingness to shoulder some of the burden for international security. Defence Minister Rühe concurred that Germany’s credibility rested on such actions, emphasising that Germany’s ‘difference’ from other countries in security matters was clearly undesirable.

A number of security policy standpoints were, then, put under pressure in Germany’s adjustment to new circumstances. An aversion to singularity, the furtherance of the Bundeswehr’s broader political role, responsibility in security policy and the maintenance of restraint were,
to varying degrees, articulated in new ways in order to best serve the existing foundational elements. Restraint or reticence in security matters changed in the sense that it became less rigid and uncompromising, although restraint remains a distinctive quality of German strategic culture and policy as a whole. Likewise, a preference for stability and consensus-building has remained intact; while in the area of civil–military relations and the civilian control of the armed forces no tension developed and no adjustment has been required.

The preferences expressed by Germany’s security policy standpoints in some cases took on different implications, thereby facilitating certain policy changes, all of which pointed to the necessity of extending the Bundeswehr’s remit. The persistence of the existing foundational elements as well as the security policy standpoints meant that unless Germany extended this remit it would be acting against the dictates of its strategic culture, a situation which, as argued earlier, would not transpire if a strategic culture is intact.

This, then, confirms the continuation of the German strategic culture after the ending of the Cold War. Following the ideas of culture and change advocated in chapter 1, change in strategic culture is perfectly consistent with culturalist postulates if it occurs in the form of an adaptation to an altered situation and if the function of the change is to maintain the consonance of existing cultural patterns.

To further substantiate this idea it is important to identify the options and possible policy paths that were rejected or excluded from the outset. What is clear is that at the time of the debates over the out-of-area role of the Bundeswehr, there was no question but that Bundeswehr action would be undertaken within a collective framework, whether of the UN, the OSCE or NATO. Likewise there was no real questioning among the political elite as to the continuance of NATO membership – earlier consideration of this by some SPD politicians was dubbed an ‘abortive debate’. Any moves towards a re-nationalisation of German military force was totally excluded, as was the idea of a neutral Germany. A new, more reflexive, armed forces with a global reach, able to be deployed with rapidity, was never considered a possibility – it took time enough for the Bundeswehr’s crisis-reaction forces to be created. Furthermore, the institutions that exercise parliamentary control over the armed forces and the broader framework of civil–military relations were not questioned; nor did the Bundeswehr come to seek the enhancement of its position in politics and society.
On the basis of these considerations, it can be asserted that German strategic culture was not changed by the ending of the Cold War; rather, it successfully adapted during the 1990s to its new circumstances.

Strategic culture and policy behaviour

The issue of change within a strategic culture is intimately tied to the latter’s relationship to security policy behaviour. It was posited earlier that all security policy behaviour is dependent on strategic culture and that behaviour outside of the domain of a given strategic culture will occur only if that culture has fundamentally changed or collapsed. A second hypothesis was that the influence of strategic culture on behaviour will depend on contextual factors. In settled times of certainty strategic culture will influence behaviour indirectly, at a distance, while in unsettled periods of greater ambivalence strategic culture will directly govern behaviour almost as an ideology. With the ending of the Cold War the impacts of strategic culture on German security policy behaviour were far more direct, with the nexus between policy and strategic culture being close.

From the time of the Gulf War onwards German security policy behaviour has visibly been governed by strategic culture, as can be seen most vividly at the level of discourse and in the multifarious processes of inclusion and exclusion that characterised the formulation of standpoints and policies. In the form of strategic culture both positive and negative points of orientation were provided, thus setting the parameters of possible options, by providing decision-makers with a finite repertoire of policies to pursue. At the same time policy-makers became acutely aware of strategic culture as the framework for their actions and of the pressures and expectations this placed on them. This was evident in the vocabulary of strategic culture discourse – ‘the weight of the past . . .’, ‘responsibility leads us to . . .’, ‘history does not permit us to . . .’ – and so on – use of which became more pronounced to add a sense of legitimacy or to justify the adoption or rejection of certain policy paths, for example in the of the out-of-area debate and the issue of conscription.

Facilitating change: the Bundeswehr’s out-of-area role in the 1990s

Change in the Bundeswehr’s remit to include the possibility of out-of-area deployments came about via the facilitating role played by strategic
After the initial tensions, a protracted period of negotiation and policy adjustment, followed by the emergence and broad acceptance of the CDU-led paradigm, German strategic culture actively provided the impetus for the enlargement of the Bundeswehr’s role.

In the context of change within German strategic culture after 1989–90, while the foundational elements remained intact, security policy standpoints took on new significance, leading to changes in observable policies. Of central importance here were the new interpretations of the responsibility and calculability of security policy, of what constituted a solid and credible ally and of what equality meant within the alliance that eventually came to force the change apparent in the Bundeswehr’s remit. That change, however, was neither immediate nor unbounded. In the period immediately after 1989–90 strategic culture impacted on behaviour by actively constraining change in the Bundeswehr’s role. At the time of the Gulf War, there was resistance to a shift to a more participatory contribution that went beyond Germany’s traditional role of paymaster. Strategic culture at this time thus influenced German policy by acting directly as a brake, preventing action outside of familiar patterns.

Subsequent change in strategic culture’s role was initiated by a number of factors which served to invalidate how that culture affected behaviour. First, an overt imbalance emerged between the demands and expectations of allies and domestic audiences as to the kind of role Germany should now play. Germany came under fire from Western allies for lack of commitment, reliance on cheque-book diplomacy and a stance seemingly justified by increasingly questionable constitutional claims. At the same time German society was coming to terms with unification and was thus disposed to see the continuation of restrained, low-profile, policy. Thus tensions transpired since elites had to mollify an anti-war public while showing a commitment to the anti-Iraq alliance. This tension was bridged by considerable financial commitments on the part of Germany, plus the deployment of Bundeswehr Alpha Jets to Turkey, a NATO partner, a move legitimised to a weary German polity as being for defensive purposes only.

In the wake of the Gulf War and the onset of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the tensions within strategic culture became both more acute and of a kind that were not so easily bridged using existing policies and practices. From this point onwards, then, strategic culture came to more actively facilitate change in security policy behaviour as notions of responsibility, credibility within the alliance and the desire
to resist a renewed singularity steered a course towards a more varied Bundeswehr remit and, with it, a greater crisis-reaction capacity.

*Hindering change: conscription as sacrosanct*

In contrast to the Bundeswehr’s remit, change did not occur in the practice of conscription; indeed, as chapter 6 showed, every opportunity was taken to strengthen the practice after 1989–90. This situation came about because there was, at least until 2001, no tension in strategic culture acute enough in those areas governing conscription to force a change in policy. Essentially, the prevailing strategic culture actually validated the continuance of conscription in Germany following the Cold War.

The initiation of conscription in 1956 and its incorporation within the Basic Law issued directly from two facets of the Federal Republic’s strategic culture: deterrence and civil–military relations. In this way conscription performed a dual role, enabling the Federal Republic to create a vast augmentable armed force, thereby positioning the Bundeswehr as the central feature in NATO’s European defence, while also performing a normative role in the Federal Republic’s prescription for civil–military relations in preventing the Bundeswehr’s re-emergence as a state within a state. Throughout the Cold War, with West German strategic culture in consonance with the external environment, conscription endured as a means by which to service Bonn’s position within the alliance and to fulfil civil–military requirements.

The chief (strategic) rationale for conscription in Germany was largely eclipsed by the ending of the Cold War, as seen most vividly in the Bundeswehr’s out-of-area crisis-management remit. This should have led to a diminished use of conscription, or at least have seen the onset of serious debate on the utility of the practice, whereas conscription has in fact endured as a practice: it has been reworked and endorsed through a range of essentially non-strategic lines of argumentation.

Crucially, the practice of conscription is sustained by a broad and apparently robust range of factors in German strategic culture in the form of civil–military arguments tied to Germany’s past. This is evident in the way the majority of the political elite read the ending of the Cold War and what it meant for conscription. It is also manifest in the very nature of the post-1989–90 ‘non-debate’ over conscription and in the well-worn arguments invoked in its support, as detailed in chapter 6.
Tensions in strategic culture are, however, apparent still, and these will come to challenge the perpetuation of conscription. As external security conditions change, especially after September 11, and German society evolves new meanings and values to assign to the foundational elements of its strategic culture, the practice of conscription may come under terminal stress. In particular, it is the emergent tension between the Bundeswehr’s extended remit and broader political role, on the one hand, and the commitment to conscription, on the other, factors increasingly at odds with one another, that will ultimately bring strategic culture to render conscription obsolete. Thus far, this tension has been managed by efforts to modernise the practice of conscription while preparing the Bundeswehr for its out-of-area role and retaining a sizeable commitment to national and alliance defence.

In short, strategic culture has actively worked for the continuance of conscription and against the switch to an AVF. It is clear, then, that the maintenance of conscription cannot be satisfactorily explained by anything other than strategic culture.

September 11 2001 – a critical juncture?

The events of September 11 2001 and the subsequent war on terror brought fresh challenges to German thinking about the use of force, in many ways bringing about a new unsettled period. Two interrelated questions arise in this context. First, did September 11 lead to a reversal of trends in German security policy on the use of armed force? Second, has German strategic culture undergone a transformation as a result of the recent changes in the security environment?

Germany’s perspectives on the use of force over the course of 2001–3 were in line with the existing postulates of German strategic culture. Rather than signifying an actual reversal of the post-1989 trend, which saw the Bundeswehr being deployed in ever wider missions, Afghanistan and Iraq signified that there were clear limits to this trend and, crucially, that the use of force was contingent on particular factors and conditions. Moreover, German security policy after September 11 brought into focus the complex domestic consensus regarding the Bundeswehr’s role. The tenor of US foreign policy thinking and its strategy for Iraq had little resonance with German strategic culture and thus mitigated against Germany’s active military support in three main ways. First, US strategy posted military force at its core; second, it failed to take into account consultative and multilateral fora; and,
third, it was largely bereft of a vision or strategy for post-conflict reconstruction.

With regard to the question of change, German strategic culture was certainly challenged by Afghanistan and Iraq, though the result was one rather of fine-tuning than of fundamental change. Germany’s commitment to Afghanistan as contrasted to its inflexibility towards Iraq demonstrated the strength of the influence exerted on policy, at different points, by strategic culture. Nevertheless, in the face of quite adverse challenges German strategic culture remained robust at its core. What transpired during this phase was arguably a firming-up of German strategic culture through a more orthodox reading and its application to an inflexible policy. A hypothesis that might be spun from this would be that in the light of the challenges thrown up by September 11 Germany’s existing strategic culture peaked in its capacity to sanction a wider range of military missions and Germany may subsequently opt to deploy the use of force in more predictable, less sensational, overtly humanitarian contexts.

Outlook: Germany, the use of force and the power of strategic culture

From a contemporary vantage point a Germany more self-assured in security issues seems to be emerging. Berlin is likely to be increasingly able and willing to decide whether to deploy its troops and, crucially, to defend its stance and choices on the basis of its own interests and priorities. This is a symptom of a broader undercurrent of intellectual change in German politics and society, and suggests that German strategic culture is maturing in line with the Berlin Republic’s growing sense of confidence. Additionally, the ‘domestics’ of future German security policy may remain fragile and complex, and as a result the role of the Bundeswehr and its reform programme, not to mention the issue of conscription, will continue to be highly contested and politicised issues.

In conclusion, it can be said that Germany’s strategic culture has not changed in a fundamental sense since its inception in the aftermath of the Second World War. Its vitality and relevance have persisted and continue to govern contemporary German perspectives on the use of force. Although the ending of the Cold War heralded a formative period for German security thinking, and while its security policy clearly has come a long way since 1989, Germany’s negative experiences prior to
1945, coupled with positive formative experiences post-1945, as embodied in its distinctive strategic culture, have had – and will continue to have – a decisive impact on Germany’s thinking about the use of force.

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