Britain’s Retreat from Empire in East Asia, 1905–80

Edited by
Antony Best

First published 2017

ISBN: 9780415705608 (hbk)
ISBN: 9781315889603 (ebk)

Chapter 3
Japan’s Twenty-One Demands and Anglo-Japanese relations
Sochi Naraoka

(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
3 Japan’s Twenty-One Demands and Anglo–Japanese relations

Sochi Naraoka

Preface

This chapter examines the impact that Japan’s Twenty-One Demands towards China in 1915 had on Anglo–Japanese relations, mainly focusing on the conflict that emerged in diplomatic negotiations and newspaper reports. The Twenty-One Demands were presented by the Ōkuma Shigenobu government to the Yuan Shikai administration in order to enlarge Japanese interests in China. They consisted of five groups, and the main contents were as follows.

- **Group I** confirmation of Japan’s seizure of German ports in Shandong Province
- **Group II** expansion of Japan’s interests in southern Manchuria and eastern Mongolia
- **Group III** Japanese control of the Hanyeping mining and metallurgical complex in central China
- **Group IV** the prohibiting of China from giving any further coastal or island concessions to foreign powers except for Japan
- **Group V** the compelling of China to hire Japanese advisors on finance and policing, empowering Japan to build three major railways, establishing a joint police organization of China and Japan and so forth

Groups I–IV were proposed with the intention of expanding Japan’s existing interests. It was natural that China was opposed to them. However, they were not unacceptable to the Allied Powers, considering that Japan had declared war against Germany on the basis of the Anglo–Japanese alliance in August 1914. On the other hand, most of the articles of Group V were not based on existing interests and were likely to conflict with the equality of commercial opportunity among all nations in China and the preservation of its territorial integrity. Therefore, not only China but also Britain, Japan’s main ally, and the United States, which had in 1899 required all foreign powers to agree to the above-mentioned principles, were strongly opposed to the demands. Japan succeeded in having China accept Groups I–IV in return for deleting Group V from the demands, but the relations between Japan and other countries became unprecedentedly worse. Therefore the issue of the Twenty-One Demands was a major turning point in Japanese diplomatic history.¹
There have been a lot of previous studies on this topic, many of which have focussed on US-Japan relations. The Wilson administration was much concerned about this crisis, and the then Secretary of State, William J. Bryan, issued a statement that refused to recognize the treaties concluded on the basis of Japan’s demands. This so-called ‘(First) Bryan Statement’ is regarded as the beginning of the American ‘non-recognition’ policy, which was revived in the 1930s. In America, some books on the ‘Demands’ were published straight after the First World War, and scholars such as Arthur Link and Noel H. Pugach produced further studies after the Second World War. Since then, Horikawa Takeo, Hosoya Chihiro, Kitaoka Shin-ichi, Shimada Yoichi, Takahara Shusuke and Kawashima Shin in Japan and Frederick Dickinson and Noriko Kawamura in the US have expanded the historiography.

In contrast, there have been relatively few studies focussed on Anglo–Japanese relations. One of the exceptions is Peter Lowe’s Great Britain and Japan, which was published in 1969. He produced as comprehensive a survey of public and private documents in Britain as possible, and analyzed the issue of the Twenty-One Demands in the context of the history of Anglo–Japanese relations. His study, based on clear evidence, succeeded in presenting a persuasive interpretation, and faults cannot be found with his conclusions. However, there is room for expansion of his study through the examination of Japanese primary resources which Lowe did not survey and to build on other recent studies. This paper attempts to re-examine how the diplomatic negotiations concerning the Twenty-One Demands proceeded and what impact they had on Anglo–Japanese relations.

In this paper, I will focus on the British newspapers and journalists which have been neglected in previous studies. British newspapers were in a serious dilemma in the face of Japan’s demands. Japanese expansion in China clearly had the potential to damage existing British interests, but Japan was a British ally and Japanese support was necessary for maintaining the war against Germany. The Manchester Guardian, whose position was near to that of the radicals and which reflected the interests of the commercial community of Lancashire, was critical of Japan’s demands and insisted that British interests in China should be protected. On the other hand, The Times, which was conservative and friendly with the Foreign Office, basically reported in favour of Japan.

The director of the Foreign Department of The Times in those days was Henry Wickham Steed. He took the lead in reporting on East Asia, gathering information from correspondents in the field and consulting other principal members of the company, including Sir Valentine Chirol, a former head of the Foreign Department. The correspondent responsible for East Asia was David Fraser. Although based in Beijing, he was practically a Tokyo correspondent as well, as he often moved between China and Japan collecting news material. Another correspondent, William Donald, worked in Beijing under Fraser’s guidance. This Australian journalist was clearly pro-Chinese and communicated closely with other pro-Chinese sympathizers such as George Morrison, another Australian journalist who was a former Beijing correspondent of The
Times and was now employed as a political advisor to President Yuan Shikai since 1912, and Paul Reinsch, the American minister in China. This paper examines their influence on the way in which The Times reported on the Twenty-One Demands, using documents from the News International Archives and the George Morrison Papers in the State Library of New South Wales.

The submission of the Twenty-One Demands

The Japanese government declared war on Germany on 23 August 1914 and took control of German possessions in Asia and the Pacific within three months. The German colonies in the Western Pacific north of the equator were occupied in October, and Qingdao – the German concession in China – fell in November. The biggest objective that the Japanese government wished to achieve on this occasion was to extend the privileges that it had acquired in Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War. In the peace treaty it had gained the right to lease Port Arthur and Dalian and to manage the South Manchurian Railways, but these rights were granted on a fixed-term basis and some of them were scheduled to expire in 1923. Faced with this troubling situation, Katō Takaaki, the Japanese foreign minister, thought that the Chinese might agree to extend the terms of the Japanese rights in Manchuria if Japan would return Shandong to China’s sovereignty.

However, the domestic political situation made it difficult for the Japanese government to act upon Katō’s blueprint. After the initial military success in Asia and the Pacific, many individuals within Japan started to advocate that their government should take this occasion to expand its interests in China. These individuals argued against the idea of handing Qingdao back. The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) also advocated that the government should take assertive measures to expand Japanese interests in China. Although Katō was critical of these opinions, he and the Japanese Foreign Office (Gaimushō) could not ignore them. It was due to strong pressure from the IJA that he ended up inserting the seven articles which belonged to the fifth group of demands – which were by far the harshest requests that the Japanese made towards the Chinese government. The Twenty-One Demands were drawn up by 3 December and the document was submitted to Yuan on 18 January 1915.

Katō was fully aware that the demands in Group V might induce a sharp reaction not only from the Chinese but also from the Western powers. Therefore he emphasized to the Chinese that the real demands lay in the first four groups (Group I–IV), and that the fifth group (Group V) were only ‘requests’. In addition, when Katō disclosed the contents of the Japanese conditions to the British, Russian, French and American governments, he showed them only the first four groups of demands, and deliberately concealed the articles which belonged to Group V. He was hoping that he could conclude the negotiations with the Chinese government as secretly and swiftly as possible, before the Western governments could learn about the contents of the Japanese demands.
Such negotiation tactics might have worked during the time of the Qing dynasty. However, the Japanese demands were extremely difficult for the new Chinese government to accept. China was, after all, going through a rapid growth of nationalism after the Xinhai Revolution of 1911–12. Yuan immediately leaked the contents of the demands, including the fifth group which had not been revealed to the Western governments, to journalists in China. By late January 1915 the fact that the Japanese had submitted twenty-one demands had become fully revealed, and resulted in unleashing widespread criticism towards Japan in the Chinese press. The phrase ‘Japan’s Twenty-One Demands’ started to gain a negative connotation during this period. In addition, the Japanese demands began to catch the attention of American newspapers around the same time. Before the Japanese government could make counterguidelines against such reports, numerous newspaper stories – including inaccurate ones – circulated around the press, and they contributed to creating a ‘rumour’ that Japan was intending to take drastic measures to expand its interests in China.

The Chinese leak of Group V and the rise of anti-Japanese opinion

Yuan attempted to arouse the suspicion of the Western governments against Japan by leaking the contents of Japanese demands, in the hope that these countries would intervene on his behalf. Therefore Yuan’s government continued to leak the information even after late January. The accurate details of the demands were communicated to Morrison by Yuan and his confidant, Cai Tinggan, sometime between 4 and 5 February. The information was then passed on to Sir John Jordan, the British minister to China. Around the same time, Donald gained the same information from Zhou Ziqi, the finance minister of the Chinese government, and Paul Reinsch, the American minister to China. On 7 February Donald telegraphed this information to Fraser, who at this time was in Tokyo, and the latter showed this document to Katō in an interview that they had the following day. The Japanese foreign minister had no alternative but to admit to the existence of Group V of the demands. In his memorandum, Fraser wrote as follows:

I ventured my surprise that his office had formulated such proposals, for he, with his knowledge of international politics, must have known quite well that all the foreign offices of the Powers concerned would be horrified to realize what Japan was aiming at. He interrupted me at once. ‘The demands were not formulated in my office; They were passed over to me by the military with instructions to have them presented to Yuan Shi-Kai without delay.’

Fraser also informed Sir Conyngham Greene, the British ambassador to Japan, about Group V. Greene then visited the Gaimushō on 9 February to strongly protest.
Donald forwarded a detailed report about Group V to London, which reached *The Times* headquarters by 10 February. As the Foreign Office and the Japanese embassy in Britain both denied the existence of the group, Steed decided to censor this section of Donald’s report before publication. In addition, *The Times* argued on 13 February through its editorial that the Japanese demands did not violate the territorial integrity of China and the principle of open door.

Eki Hioki, the Japanese minister to China, used these articles to inform the Chinese government that the British supported the Japanese demands. There also were many Japanese newspapers, such as *Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shim bun*, which referred to *The Times*’ criticism of China’s attitude over this issue. In contrast, the newspaper articles of *The Times* sparked a strong reaction in China. The *Peking Gazette*, an English newspaper that was sympathetic to the Yuan administration, published an editorial on 16 February which argued that *The Times*, steered by Japan, was leading the world in the wrong direction. Morrison, Donald and Jordan all supported this contention. Even in Britain, there were newspapers such as the *Manchester Guardian* which were critical towards Japan. This newspaper was read principally by individuals in the commercial and industrial sector of Lancashire, who paid great interest to trade in China. On 17 February it posted an editorial titled ‘Japan and China’ and, after reporting that there were currently many unofficial rumours circulating about the Japanese demands, raised its concern about the fact that ‘Japan’s action is in some ways scarcely compatible with the declared object of the Anglo–Japanese Alliance’.

Despite the fact that *The Times* forwarded articles which were somewhat supportive of the Japanese stance over this issue, most of the other newspapers were becoming increasingly critical towards Japan. In this environment, Yuan handed the full translation of the twenty-one demands to Morrison on 15 February. Morrison immediately forwarded this to Jordan, who passed it on to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, the next day.

The failure of Katō’s attempt for swift conclusion of the negotiations

As Katō wanted to ensure confidentiality over this issue, he did not relay information about the existence of Group V even to his ambassadors, including Inoue Katsunosuke, the ambassador to London. However, information about this issue was becoming an open secret by mid-February, and on 17 February the Japanese foreign minister decided to inform Inoue about Group V through a telegraph. In the subsequent communication, he added that he had chosen not to disclose the existence of the fifth group because it was fundamentally different in its substance from the first four groups. Inoue belatedly understood the situation, and forwarded three important telegrams to Tokyo two days later.

The first telegraph informed Katō that there had been a rapid growth of anti-Japanese sentiment in Britain. Inoue pointed out that while *The Times*
and the *Daily Telegraph* had not yet objected to the recent Japanese diplomatic manoeuvres in China, the *Manchester Guardian* was becoming increasingly critical towards Japan, and the ambassador duly forwarded a copy of the editorial on 17 February. Inoue added that the Japanese actions in China ‘could induce a strong reaction from the British public. ... If the [Japanese] imperial government fails to deal with this issue in a satisfactory manner, then it could be put into a very difficult situation in terms of diplomacy.’

The second telegraph pointed out that, if the fifth group of the demands were presented simultaneously with the other demands and became a focal part of the negotiations, then it would be difficult to convince the Western governments that there was a fine distinction between the fifth and the other groups of demands. Inoue also suggested that it was highly likely that the Chinese government had already leaked the full contents of the Japanese demands, and feared that the British government might accuse Japan of duplicity.

The third and the last telegraph reported on the interview that Inoue had with Steed, who visited him on the day this telegraph was sent to Japan. Steed had a close relationship with many Japanese diplomats in London, and held a relatively favourable opinion of Japan. This sentiment had led him to conceal some of the contents of Donald’s report about the Japanese demands, and post an editorial that showed sympathy towards the Japanese position. Yet, even Steed felt compelled to inform Inoue that he was deeply concerned about the recent actions that the Japanese government had taken in China, as Steed had already been informed by Jordan that Donald’s report was accurate. He also told Inoue that British residents in Beijing were infuriated by the fact that the Japanese were utilising the opinion of *The Times* to support their case. After this interview, Inoue realized that the British government knew about the details of the Japanese demands, and requested Kato- for instructions.

The Japanese foreign minister duly permitted his ambassador in Britain to provide information about Group V, and Inoue did so in a meeting with Beilby Alston of the Foreign Office on 20 February and with Steed on the following day. Upon learning this, Grey decided on 22 February that he should revise British policy towards East Asia which had been based upon the belief that Group V did not exist, and communicated to the Japanese government through Greene that his government wished that British interests and the spirit of the Anglo–Japanese Alliance be respected.

Kato- complied with this request, but he also argued that ‘there was no particular intent to hide’ Group V as he hitherto had done, and also requested the British government not to intervene in the Sino–Japanese negotiations. He also reiterated to the Russian, American and French ambassadors that the fifth group ‘was not a demand’, and also that it ‘was not intended to violate the territorial integrity of China’. Yet, the Sino–Japanese negotiations had seen virtually no progress even after a month after the Japanese government had submitted its demands. Meanwhile, the Chinese criticism and the suspicion of the West towards Japan had become stronger. Kato-’s initial tactics to
conclude the Sino–Japanese negotiations as quickly as possible and present them as *fait accompli* to the Western governments had failed.

**Continuing difficulties**

Hioki, who was facing strong resistance from the Chinese, considered it impossible to settle this issue unless the Japanese government softened its attitude. On 12 February he advised Katō that the latter should prioritise the negotiations over the first four groups of demands, and leave the fifth group until the talks concluded. However, Katō rejected Hioki’s suggestion the next day and replied that there were ‘precedents’ for the Chinese government accepting demands similar to those in Group V when the Japanese government had requested them in the past. He therefore instructed his minister in Beijing not to back down over these demands until the Chinese considered them in a positive spirit.

While Hioki did not raise any objections to these instructions, there is evidence that suggests he was disappointed. When he met Fraser after the latter’s return to China in March, he said that he thought ‘the [Japanese] government had made a serious mistake’. However, the domestic political situation was making it increasingly difficult for the government in Tokyo to make compromises in the negotiations. As the contents of the demands had now been thoroughly leaked, Japanese newspapers sharply criticized the Chinese attitude, and demanded that the government be firm. Being the leader of the ruling party, Katō could not make compromises that might induce a public outcry, especially as a general election was scheduled to take place on 25 March. On 16 February the Ōkuma administration had approved a new draft of demands with only minor amendments, and authorized Hioki to promise that the Japanese government would give back Jiaozhou Bay around Qingdao, the German concession in China that was currently under the Japanese occupation, if the Chinese government would accept the Japanese demands.

The administration recognized that this was ‘practically the only bargaining card that it had’, and instructed its minister in Beijing that he should utilize it at his discretion.

There were no particular changes to the stance of the Japanese government towards Group V. Katō’s uncompromising attitude over this issue might also have been affected by the fact that the reaction of the Western governments towards these demands seemed much weaker than he had expected. When he communicated the contents of the fifth group to Greene, he believed that Britain would react adversely against the fifth article within Group V, which demanded concessions on railroads in south of China, and the sixth article which demanded that the Chinese government not concede Fujian province to any other power. However, Greene did not raise any particular objections towards these two articles, and he even said that he thought there was ‘no reason to think that the British government would consider anything particularly problematic’ about the Japanese demands over Fujian.
and French ambassadors in Japan showed interest in the fourth article within Group V, which mentioned Japanese arms sales to China, and the American ambassador showed concern about the third article which demanded joint Sino-Japanese police institutions in China, but they too did not raise strong objections. Perhaps this reaction made Kato somewhat optimistic that he could push through at least some of the demands in Group V. In face of the public outcry that the Twenty-One Demands had caused, it would not be surprising if Kato was looking for measures to appease public opinion and recoup the political influence of his party and administration by pushing the articles which initially were intended to be only ‘desired conditions’. As a result, Kato’s stance over the issue of the demands became inconsistent and inflexible; he would persist in pushing for some of the articles in Group V until May, when he submitted an ultimatum to China.

Yet, it was impossible for the negotiations to proceed as long as the Japanese government remained firm over the demands in Group V and the Chinese continued to be adamant that they would not discuss them. Under these circumstances, the next initiative that Kato took up was to resort to military intimidation. On 10 March he suggested in a Cabinet meeting that the Japanese government should postpone its planned withdrawal of troops from Manchuria and the Shandong peninsula, and send in another division. Yamagata Aritomo, one of the genrō who cast strong influence over the army, criticized this decision. However, Kato feared that under the current situation, even the negotiations over the interests in Manchuria might fail if he did not take any additional measures. The foreign minister’s suggestion was approved by the Cabinet, and thus the Japanese military presence in China was reinforced by mid-March.

This only resulted in hardening Chinese attitudes even further, and also made Western governments more suspicious about Japanese intentions. When Jordan met with Yuan on 13 March, the latter told him that the negotiations were proceeding smoothly, but he could not be responsible for what might come of any resort to force. On the other hand, the criticism within Japanese political circles and media against the Chinese attitude towards the Japanese demands also became stronger after the military reinforcement. The ruling party, the Dōshikai, managed to win a landslide victory in the general election which was held under conditions of strong excitement, as if the country were in the midst of a war. However, the negotiations still showed no sign of progress even in April, and hit deadlock.

**Rising British mistrust of the Japanese**

The negotiations reached an impasse, but ultimately a compromise was reached. Viewed from the outside, it seems that Britain might have helped bring about that compromise, but from the perspective of those involved directly the compromise was a result of pressure from Japan’s elder statesmen. First let us consider the way in which Britain handled the situation.
As the details of the demands Japan had issued to China came to light in Britain, members of the Foreign Office and the press quickly became more critical of Japan. Unfavourable articles about the Japanese demands began to appear in newspapers in mid-February, leading to a barrage of questions about the Twenty-One Demands in Parliament. The members asking questions were all ‘backbenchers’, and they elicited no more than curt replies from Foreign Secretary Grey and Neil Primrose, the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs. Thus Ambassador Inoue initially reported that the issue would have negligible political impact. Of course, as Grey explained to Inoue, it would put him in a very difficult position if a breakdown in Sino–Japanese relations led to a situation developing that was opposed to the objectives of the Anglo–Japanese alliance; a rise in anti-Japanese sentiment inside Britain was certainly not something he could afford to ignore.

In fact, from March to April the Foreign Office was inundated with letters from companies and groups with deep connections to China insisting on a halt to the Japanese advance into China and the protection of British profits. Chief among the groups that applied such pressure were: the British-American Tobacco Company (2 March); the China Association (24 March, 1 April); the Manchester Chamber of Commerce (27 March); the London Chamber of Commerce (12 April); and the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce (15 April). On 6 April the Chinese representatives on the Legislative Council adopted an emergency measure asking the British government to support China on the grounds that Japan’s demands violated the principles of equal trading opportunity and Chinese territorial integrity.

On 8 March Grey met with Counsellor Honda Kumatarō to inform the latter of his own views of the Twenty-One Demands. As he had done in the past, Grey expressed his understanding – up to a point – of Japan’s expansion of its position in Manchuria. He went on to state that the only Japanese demands with a direct impact on British interests were related to railways, suggesting that, with the exception of Article V of Group V, none of the other demands were particularly problematic. He was most concerned about the possibility that a collapse in the negotiations would cause instability in China that could harm British interests. Grey expressed those reservations clearly, putting Japan on warning:

The concessions related to the British railways are, as it were, minor points. What causes me anxiety is the possibility of political developments arising out of the Japanese negotiations with China. … I think that China should make concessions. At the same time, I do hope that Japan will attempt to persuade China patiently in order not to cause a breakdown in the negotiations.

Although Grey adopted a reserved tone during this meeting, claiming that the fifth article of Group V was a ‘minor point’, he actually took the matter quite seriously. On 10 March he had Greene deliver a memorandum to Katō insisting...
that Japan should respect Britain’s railroad interests in southern China, revealing Britain’s absolute opposition to Group V, Article V. Katō did not respond to the document, but he must have felt the need to take British views into consideration.

On 15 March Secretary of State Bryan delivered the first ‘Bryan Statement’, a memorandum dated 13 March, to the Japanese ambassador Chinda Sutemi. Based on Bryan’s goal of peacefully resolving the conflict, the memorandum, produced with revisions from within the State Department, expressed objections to four of the articles in Group V. Compared to the British response, it raised objections to more of the items, but it did not object to the demands Japan was making in regards to Manchuria or Shandong; in contrast to previous American efforts to keep Japan’s interests in Manchuria in check, the note had a placatory tone that implied the Americans had retreated. Accordingly, Katō did not find the document especially threatening. When Greene met with Katō on 17 March, he observed that Katō did not seem to be taking the note very seriously.

After the existence of Group V came to light, however, British journalists grew increasingly mistrustful of the Japanese. When Steed met Counsellor Honda on 24 February, he promised not to publish editorials on the Sino–Japanese talks in his paper for the time being, in the interest of promoting mutual Anglo–Japanese understanding. Yet in a letter to Fraser he revealed that his confidence in Japan was already crumbling, although he felt that the whole question of their relations with Japan would depend on the war and there was very little use in quarrelling with the Japanese now.

Perhaps that explains why *The Times* published an article entitled ‘Japanese Pressure on China: Fear of a Crisis’ on 12 March, with additional reporting on the story appearing on 16 and 19 March. Between 1 and 16 April the paper frequently featured stories on the Sino–Japanese negotiations: ‘Japanese Demands On China: Six Points Settled’ (1); ‘The Japanese Claims On China: Extra-Territorial Rights’ (2); ‘Supply Of Arms To China: Japanese Demands Resisted’ (3); ‘Japanese Interests In China: Important Statement by Count Ōkuma’ (5); ‘Japanese Trade Policy: Conflicts with British Interests, The Demands on China’ (6); ‘The Japanese Claims On China: Embargo on the coast’ (13); and ‘Japanese Demands Of China: The Railway Concessions’ (16). Unlike other newspapers, the editorial section of *The Times* was not critical of Japan, but it was clear that the paper’s overall tone had changed; Katō began to perceive that *The Times* was featuring more ‘sensational’ stories that were inconvenient for Japan.

Katō responded by sending a telegram to Inoue on 17 April, instructing the latter to explain to Steed the issue surrounding the railways in southern China (the fifth article of Group V) that were of concern to the British and to request that he stop publishing articles that were unfavourable towards Japan. Based on those directives, a meeting between Honda and Walter Scott, the deputy chief of the foreign news desk, was scheduled for 30 April. From that meeting until the final stage of the negotiations, *The Times* would continue to refrain from publishing strong criticisms of Japan.
Fraser, the correspondent then in Tokyo, did not agree with Steed on this point. Meeting with Katō for a second time on 22 February, Fraser questioned him further on the details of Group V. According to Japanese accounts, Fraser agreed with Katō’s explanation, replying that all of the Japanese demands seemed reasonable and the problems of the British railways would be easily solved between Britain and Japan in the future. Unlike his predecessor Morrison, Fraser was not necessarily biased towards China, which led Katō to hope that he would write articles that showed an understanding of the Japanese point of view. He told Hioki to win Fraser over and ‘manipulate’ him when he returned to Beijing in April.

As he watched the negotiations unfold, however, and as criticisms mounted against the Japanese, Fraser adopted a more critical stance towards Japan. He was particularly concerned about the issue of the railways in southern China. When he met with Hioki on 19 April, Fraser criticized Japan, insisting that the Japanese demands regarding the railways in southern China were a challenge to British interests, and that the ways of the Japanese government could hardly be justified. After returning to Peking, Fraser wrote articles based on his reporting in Japan, but Hioki observed that he had been forced to change his outlook because those articles were attacked and mocked by British living in China. It appeared to Hioki that Fraser regretted meeting with Katō as he felt deceived by him. In fact, Fraser wrote in a letter to Steed dated 17 March that he thought the British Foreign Office had not realized that Katō was a ‘pretty slippery gentleman’ and Hioki a ‘certain little liar’.

In contrast to The Times, the Manchester Guardian was strongly critical in its stories on Japan. It continued actively reporting on the Sino–Japanese negotiations well into March, and published an editorial on 13 March entitled ‘The Japanese Demands’, which argued that, ‘What we have to do is to interpret the Japanese Demands in the light of Anglo–Japanese Treaty.’ In that context, the paper sent the Japanese government into a panic when, on 18 March, it suddenly published a scoop entitled ‘A Complete List of Japan’s Demands on China: Formidable Programme in Five Sections, Comparison with the Version First Given by Japan’, which compared the full text of the demands Japan had submitted to China with the unofficial list of demands (which excluded Group V) that Japan had released to the Great Powers, including Britain. Inoue sent a telegram to Katō on 20 March, reporting that, ‘Ever since the exposure in the Manchester Guardian, radical papers, including that publication, have gradually become increasingly aggressive.’ Since the Chinese government was exerting pressure on the British government, Inoue was concerned that ‘this may lead to a troublesome situation for Japan’.

On 30 March Inoue met with Walter Langley, the assistant under-secretary at the Foreign Office who supervised the Far Eastern Department, and asked him to try to find out who had leaked the information to the Manchester Guardian. Langley assured him the leak did not come from within the British government. The true source of the leak was never revealed, but, as the article
carried the byline ‘from our correspondent’, it seems likely that its special correspondent in China, Bertram Lenox Simpson, had obtained the information from someone in Yuan Shikai’s administration.

Throughout the months of March and April, the paper continued its daily coverage of the Sino–Japanese negotiations. The main articles were: ‘Japan and China: The United States Note’ (19 March); ‘United States & Japan: The Chinese Agreement of 1908’ (23 March); ‘China and Japan: An Army of Defence Round Pekin’ (24 March); ‘China and Japan: Military Measures Round Pekin’ (30 March); ‘Japan and China: Tokio’s Reply to American Note’ (31 March); ‘Japan and China: A Favourable Turn’ (3 April); ‘Japan’s Demands upon China: The Premier’s Statement’ (5 April); ‘Japan and China: A Suave Comment in Pekin’ (7 April); ‘Japan and China: British Railway Interests’ (14 April). In a meeting with Ambassador Greene, Katō lamented, ‘This sort of information leak is terrible. Now it will be difficult to reach a compromise.’

The settlement caused by the final notification

In late April the Sino–Japanese talks appeared to have stalled, and within the Japanese government those arguing in favour of taking a hardline stance against China were gaining momentum. In an editorial on 22 April, the Tōkyō Asahi shimbun called for a ‘firm resolution’, insisting that it was time to prepare for the opening of hostilities. Other national papers like the Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shimbun and the Jiji shimpō also adopted a tough stance, although they did not go so far as to insist on a declaration of war. The party publication of the ruling Dōshikai party, the Hochi shimbun, blamed the Chinese for the breakdown in the negotiations, while the opposition Seiyūkai party paper, the Chūō shimbun, criticized the government for its ‘failure of diplomacy’ and spoke out strongly against compromising with the Chinese. After meeting on 21 and 24 April, respectively, members of the Dōshikai and the Seiyūkai resolved that the Ōkuma Cabinet should carry out its demands. Stirred on by the ultranationalists Tōyama Mitsuru and Uchida Ryōhei, the Kokumin Gaiko-Do-meikai (People’s Diplomacy League; a political group formed the previous year that supported an uncompromising foreign policy) sponsored a social gathering on 27 April devoted to discussion of the ‘China problem’, and it was attended by over two hundred activists.

Yamagata Aritomo, Matsukata Masayoshi, Inoue Kaoru, and Ōyama Iwao, the four senior statesmen with the most political power, all lamented the situation that had developed, but there was nothing they could do about it. When Matsukata met with Hara Takashi, president of the Seiyūkai, on 19 April, he claimed that he and Yamagata had read about the demands that Japan had issued to China in the newspaper; neither of them had seen any of the diplomatic documents. Several days earlier, Prime Minister Ōkuma had visited Matsukata to report that the issue in China would soon be resolved, but now there was no sign of a resolution. Matsukata told Hara, ‘I am
overcome with dread when I think about the future of our diplomacy. 

Somehow, information on the state of affairs in the Ōkuma Cabinet made its way to the senior statesmen either via Home Minister Ōura Kanetake, Yamagata’s trusted friend, or Mochizuki Kotarō, a Dōshikai-affiliated member of the Diet who acted as Inoue Kaoru’s private secretary. Nevertheless, there was hardly any mutual understanding between the government and the senior statesmen. Thus, the senior statesmen remained in the dark as the negotiations moved into their final stage.

At a Cabinet meeting on 20 April, Kato proposed offering the ‘return of Jiaozhou Bay’ to the Chinese, and his proposal was accepted. Of course it would not be an unconditional return; four conditions would be attached, including the right to develop a harbour in the former German leasehold in Jiaozhou Bay and to build an exclusive Japanese concession, as well as concessions to be shared with the other Great Powers. Kato hoped that this compromise would finally bring the negotiations to an end. The following day, Kato and War Minister Ichinosuke Oka visited Yamagata’s residence together to read him the text of the revised proposal that had been adopted by the Cabinet (they did not give him a copy of the document). Yamagata believed that the Japanese demands were still too unreasonable, even in the revised proposal, and he responded with the following candid remarks:

As I have already explained, I fundamentally disagree with you. As I peruse the list of demands, I see many items that could be easily achieved if Sino–Japanese relations improved, without any particular need to stipulate them in a treaty. The great powers, in particular, are not likely to greet any of these demands favorably. Looking back over the last forty odd years of imperial diplomacy, in the days when Ito (Hirobumi) and Inoue (Kaoru) were in charge, the utmost care was given to all matters involving Europe and the United States. The cabinet was consulted even on issues that individual bureau chiefs decide today based on their own discretion, and those issues were discussed in cabinet meetings that lasted into the night. Now, after the Sino–Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars have established Japan as one of the world’s great powers, it may not be necessary to show as much consideration to the Western powers as we did in the past, but it would be too vain of us to consider Japan’s current status to be equal to that of Great Britain.

As far as these demands on the Chinese are concerned, it would have been appropriate to design them so that one or two of the items would bring mutual benefits for the Western powers too, but the current list of demands is too heavily skewed toward Japan’s own interests. When dealing with the Westerners, it is not advisable to give them the impression that Japan is bullying the weak. It may be necessary to make a final resolution if our demands regarding Manchuria and Mongolia are rejected, but as I already told you, we should not go to war simply because the items in Group V were not accepted.
Katō responded optimistically, arguing that ‘China will happily agree to most of our demands’ because Japan was going to return Jiaozhou Bay. In the event that China rejected the revised proposal, Yamagata asked, ‘Do you intend to declare war immediately?’ Although Yamagata was slightly relieved when Katō replied, ‘No, we will continue our discussions’, he went on to caution the latter on a number of additional points. Katō sought the senior statesmen’s approval so tenaciously that, on the following day, he was ultimately able to obtain their consent to the Cabinet resolution after Yamagata contacted Matsukata and Inoue.

Subsequently, Katō kept in contact with Hioki as he re-evaluated the revised proposal, which was approved by the Cabinet on 26 April. In that revision of the document, the third article of Group V (merger of Chinese and Japanese police forces) was retracted. As for the rest of the items in Group V, however, although they were supposed to be excluded from the treaty and concessions were supposed to be made along the lines of the Chinese government’s demands and official exchange notes, the same demands, strongly reflecting the spirit of the original Japanese text, were still being made.70

When he submitted the revised proposal to the Chinese, Katō simultaneously delivered an unofficial announcement to the British via Ambassador Inoue. His goal in doing so was to gain British understanding of the conclusion of the Sino–Japanese treaty in regards to the issue of the railways in southern China (the fifth article of Group V), which had caused so much agitation among the British. Inoue announced to Grey that the revised proposal represented the greatest compromise Japan was willing to make, arguing, ‘However the situation develops from this point, it is entirely up to the Chinese.’ Grey responded by saying, ‘In the unfortunate eventuality that these events should lead to a rupture, I implore you to ensure that they do not, as a result, clash with the objectives of the Anglo–Japanese Alliance.’71 On the grounds that the demands were so numerous and so complex, he refrained from stating his personal opinion until the Foreign Office had a chance to inspect them carefully.72 According to Langley, Grey had originally ‘expected more of Katō’, but now he had lost faith in him: ‘He could not hide his opinion that the alliance was faltering.’73 Grey was becoming increasingly mistrustful of Japan, and he had no intention of taking the Japanese explanation at face value. He intended to scrutinize the Japanese to ascertain their true intentions.

On 1 May China’s foreign minister, Lu Zhengxiang, gave Hioki the Chinese response to the revised Japanese proposal. The document was adamant in its rejection of almost all of Group V, arguing that ‘all of those items violate the sovereignty of the Republic of China, the treaty rights of the Western powers, and the principles of equal opportunity.’ There was still a wide gap between the Chinese position and the terms contained in Japan’s revised proposal. When Katō read the Chinese response on the morning of 2 May, he began thinking about resolving the situation with a final notification.74
At a Cabinet meeting held on 3 May Katō proposed a plan to issue a final notification insisting that China concede to the revised document of 26 April, and the Cabinet members agreed to this suggestion. When the Cabinet met with the senior statesmen at the Prime Minister’s residence on 4 May, however, all three of them – Yamagata, Matsukata, and Ōyama – objected to the plan.

Yamagata began the disagreement during the meeting. As soon as he took his seat in a room full of Cabinet ministers sitting in a row, he began grumbling at Ōkuma and Katō in a tone that was both provocative and derisive: ‘What a mess! Now that we’re in this situation, it might be tough for you, Mr. Foreign Minister, but how about if you go to Beijing and sort things out personally?’ The silence continued, and when Navy Minister Yashiro Rokurō said that the foreign minister could not leave the country during a national emergency, Yamagata shouted, ‘Stop quibbling!’ Finance Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō, who was in attendance at the time, said, ‘It felt like a fire was going to break out.’ Since the outbreak of First World War, Katō had rushed into entering the war against Germany and issuing the Twenty-One Demands without sufficiently discussing those decisions with the senior statesmen, and Yamagata was disgusted with him. Yamagata’s reprimand at the meeting was an eruption of the dissatisfaction he had been feeling towards Katō since the previous year.

Katō had no intention of visiting Beijing as an ambassador, but he asked Yamagata what he thought the government’s next step should be. Yamagata responded, ‘If we can make concessions that do not cause problems, we should compromise. Surely we cannot compromise on the Manchuria question, but there must be items in Group V that we could compromise over without making trouble.’ Matsukata agreed with Yamagata’s view. Next, Yamagata said, ‘I merely stated my opinion for your reference’, and, after asking for ‘the Cabinet to resolve the matter for itself’, he left the room. Without reaching a consensus, that morning’s meeting was adjourned.

In a subsequent account by the industrialist Takahashi Yoshio, Yamagata was recorded as being resigned to the idea of committing troops to ‘matters of life and death for the nation’, such as Manchuria, but he viewed all of the items in Group V as nothing more than ‘trivialities’. Convinced that mobilizing troops over such insignificant issues would cause Japan to lose face on the world stage, Yamagata put all of his energy into stopping ‘such shameful negotiating tactics’. Yamagata had distanced himself from the Ōkuma Cabinet, but now that Japan had finally come to the brink of war with China, he began doing everything in his power to influence the government. Inoue had been keeping the Cabinet under his tutelage, but since illness prevented him from attending the meeting he contacted the Ōkuma Cabinet by telephone from his villa in Okitsu. He criticized the government for submitting ‘unnecessary conditions’ and asked the Cabinet to return Qingdao and seek accord with the Western powers.

After the 4 May meeting between the senior statesmen and the Cabinet ministers ended, the ministers remained in the room and continued their
deliberations; in the middle of the night, an important telegram arrived from Grey. It was more sternly written than any of the previous British messages, effectively demanding that Japan remove Group V. What follows is a quotation from the main section of the telegram:

I earnestly hope there will not be rupture between Japan and China, if, as I believe, the only outstanding question now is Part v of the Japanese demands. ... I hope, therefore, that Japan will either not press these points or make it clear that her demands do not bear the construction that is being placed upon them in some quarters.

At that point, the Cabinet ministers’ agenda focussed on whether or not to remove Group V from the final notification. Their discussion continued until the dawn, but ultimately, after a proposal from Home Minister Ôura, they decided to remove Group V. After the draft of the final notification was formally approved by the Cabinet on 5 May, Ôura visited the three senior statesmen – Yamagata, Matsukata, and Ôyama – to gain their informal consent. On 6 May another meeting between the Cabinet ministers and the senior statesmen was held at the prime minister’s residence, and the text of the final notification was formally approved. Based on that decision, a meeting was held with the Taisho emperor in attendance, during which it was determined that the final notification would be submitted to the Chinese. Hioki handed the final notification to the Chinese foreign minister on 7 May.

During that time, Grey reached out to the Japanese once again, asking them on 6 May to bear in mind the spirit of the Anglo–Japanese alliance and resolve their negotiations with the Chinese amicably. On the other hand, Jordan, joined by the ministers from Russia and France, visited Lu Zhengxiang on 5 May, and together they pressed him to accept the demands. The Chinese government maintained its bold stance in the face of Japan’s final notification, but once it had been delivered and it was clear that the American intervention the Chinese were counting on was not forthcoming, they despairingly agreed to the demands. Foreign Minister Lu notified Hioki of the decision to consent to the final notification on 9 May. The Chinese and Japanese governments worked together to consolidate and revise the phrasing of the document, and on 25 May the treaty and attached official notices were signed. Thus, the Sino–Japanese negotiations that had continued for roughly four months ended in a compromise.

**Evaluation of the Twenty-One Demands**

On 10 May the *Manchester Guardian* argued that China had yielded to the Japanese ultimatum and had saved itself from the violent action which was being threatened by Japan. Both were ‘congratulated’ in an editorial titled as ‘China’s decision’. The newspaper highly rated the deletion of Group V as follows:
We gladly acknowledge that Japan, in presenting her ultimatum, has substantially modified her demands. She has, in particular, postponed ‘until a suitable opportunity in the future’ those demands in clause 5 which were an undoubted attack on China’s independence …

Nevertheless, it also expressed its anxiety as it thought that the demands which Japan had not withdrawn and China had accepted were serious enough. It was obvious that the newspaper was still wary of Japan, although it expressed a welcome for the compromise reached by the two countries.

Taking a contrary approach, The Times highly praised the way in which the Japanese government had conducted itself in the final stage of the negotiations. In an editorial titled ‘The Far Eastern Compromise’ on 10 May, the newspaper argued that ‘China and Japan have adjusted their differences, and the war cloud in the Far East has been dispersed’, and ‘all the questions in Group V, of these proposals, except the Fukien [Fukian] question, on which a compromise had been already reached, disappeared.’ The following sentences in the editorial indicate that The Times still had confidence in Japan, Britain’s ally, to some extent:

While the courage and the good sense of the Japanese statesmen in making these extensive modifications in their first proposals are deserving of the highest praise, the reflection is inevitable that more caution in formulating their original demands and greater tact in the conduct of the negotiations might have ensured them the advantages they have acquired without resort to so drastic a step as the issue of the ultimatum. … The masses in Japan may be disappointed at the compromise to which the EMPEROR and his advisers have come, but friendly observers abroad will see in it a fresh proof that her statesmen fix their gaze upon the far-off future, and have the sagacity and the courage, even in moments of popular excitements, not to prejudice it by grasping in the present for more than the present can safely yield.

However, contrary to the editorial, some journalists on The Times already felt a deep-rooted distrust towards Japan. After the negotiations were concluded, Fraser summarized the whole process as follows. Being the only Western journalist who had interviewed both Katō and Hioki, his views are worthy of attention:

The conclusion at which I have arrived, after watching things in Tokyo for six months, is that Japanese Government have no policy in regard to China. Nor does there seem to me to be any individual statesman in Japan possessed of convictions as to the line Japan ought to follow in China – That is to say, any revealed statesman, with convictions founded on knowledge & understanding of the situation. Every politician in Japan thinks Japan ought to do certain things in China, but the opinions of most of them are based on blissful ignorance of outside considerations, such as the feelings of the Chinese and the interests of other Powers.
Conclusion

This paper has examined the various impacts of Japan’s Twenty-One Demands on Anglo–Japanese relations, mainly focussing on diplomatic negotiations and newspaper reports. The Japanese government required the Yuan Shikai administration not to leak the contents of the demands to the outside world and failed to inform the Great Powers, including its ally, Britain, of Group V which might conflict with Chinese sovereignty. Group V included demands to expand Japanese influence over the Chinese government, thus outmanoeuvring Britain. It breached the trust between the two countries. Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki was conscious of this, but was compelled to attempt such an unreasonable tactic because of the pressure from the hardliners in Japan.

Yuan Shikai leaked information on the negotiations in order to arouse an anti-Japanese movement in China and create distrust towards Japan among the Great Powers. Yuan did this to break the ties between Japan and the Great Powers. The leak was remarkably effective, and China succeeded in inviting international criticism of Japan at the beginning of the talks.

From the present point of view, China’s leaking of this information was reasonable, and so Katō, who did not predict this move, appears to have been inept. However, it can be said that he was only following precedent. In the Sino–Japanese negotiations immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese government had agreed not to leak information to the outside and no other countries had intervened. The Chinese broke the practice of the last ten years and resisted fiercely as the Twenty-One Demands were much greater than the ones required before then. The media, which was increasingly developing after the Revolution in 1911, supported the government and stimulated Chinese nationalism. One of the reasons why the negotiations over the demands came to a deadlock was that the Japanese government did not recognize both the excessiveness of its policy and the changes in Chinese politics and society.

This paper has also analyzed in detail the final stage of the negotiations after the leak of the Chinese government. The British government trusted the Japanese and did not believe in the rumours about the demands when the negotiations started, but its attitude became more severe after it became clear that it had been kept in the dark. After this, it attempted to restrain the Japanese government by repeatedly insisting that the objectives of the Anglo–Japanese alliance should be kept in mind. Among the British newspapers, the Manchester Guardian stood at the forefront of attacks on Japan. On the other hand, The Times refrained from criticism, but the journalists who had treated Japan with favour to some degree, such as Henry Wickham Steed and David Fraser, lost their confidence.

The negotiations between China and Japan came to a deadlock at the end of April, and some of the Japanese newspapers began to insist on war in case of their complete breakdown. But the elder statesmen, particularly Yamagata
Aritomo, urged Katō to moderate the demands and the British government reiterated its interpretation of the terms of the alliance. Katō therefore made the decision to delete Group V and attempted to make a compromise with Yuan by sending an ultimatum requiring China to accept the fixed demands. Some Chinese politicians insisted on continued resistance, but Yuan, with no prospect of American intervention and with the Entente Powers, including Britain, recommending the avoidance of war, eventually yielded. As a result the Chinese government accepted the principal demands of Groups I–IV.

The Japanese government thus succeeded in securing the interests which it had thought the most important by concluding an agreement with the Chinese government. Therefore it can be seen that the negotiations ended in a Japanese victory. That is why Yuan Shikai has been unfortunately regarded as a traitor to his country. Nevertheless, Japan lost Chinese confidence during this crisis and many Chinese began to regard Japan as an ‘enemy’ standing in the way of the construction of a new country. It is doubtful therefore whether the methods the Japanese government used to secure its interests were reasonable. In addition, British politicians and diplomats began to distrust Japan through their experience of this episode. While the value of the Anglo–Japanese alliance was not fundamentally questioned as the Great War continued, the Twenty-One Demands severely damaged British confidence in Japan and contributed to the termination of the alliance in 1922.

Notes


David Fraser (1869–1953) was originally from Scotland and adopted as correspondent by The Times in 1904. He became a Beijing correspondent, succeeding George Morrison, in 1912. He was the author of A Modern Campaign, or War and Wireless Telegraphy in the Far East, London: Methuen & Co., 1905.

Another Tokyo correspondent was J.H. Penlington, but he was not trusted by London and left to only less important news.

William Donald (1875–1946) was a Beijing correspondent of The Times from November 1914 to March 1915. Afterwards he worked as a Beijing correspondent of the New York Herald and the editor of the Far Eastern Review. He later became a political adviser to Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek. His biography is E.A. Selle, Donald of China, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948.


J.O.P. Bland (1863–1945), the former Shanghai correspondent, was also a regular contributor to The Times, but seems not to have reported on the Twenty-One Demands.

Times Newspapers Limited Archive, News UK and Ireland Limited (TNL), London, Fraser Papers, autobiography (draft), file 5.


NGM Katō to Hioki (Beijing), 15 Feb. 1915; Hioki to Katō, 16 Feb. 1915, pp. 161–4; The National Archives, London (TNA), FO371/2322 Jordan (Beijing) to Grey, 16 Feb. 1915, tel. 31; and Mitchell Library, Sydney (ML), G.E. Morrison Papers, Morrison to Tsai Ting-Kan, 16 Feb. 1915.


ML, Morrison papers, diary entry 15 Feb. 1915, and Morrison to Tsai Ting-Kan, 15 Feb. 1915.

TNA FO371/2322 Jordan to Grey, 16 Feb. 1915, tel. 32, and Jordan to Grey, 18 Feb. 1915, tel. 33.
26 NGM Minute on Katô's interview with Greene, 22 Feb. 1915, pp. 587–90.
29 NGM Hioki to Katô, 12 Feb. 1915, pp. 152–3.
31 TNL, Fraser Papers, DSF/3 autobiography (draft), file 5.
33 NGM Minute on Katô's interview with Greene, 22 Feb. 1915, pp. 587–90.
35 TNA FO371/2323 Jordan to Grey, 13 Mar. 1915, tel. 55.
36 Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 244.
40 TNA FO371/2323 Colonial Office to Nicolson, 7 Apr. 1915, No. 41009.
42 Ibid.
43 NGM Minute on Katô's interview with Greene, 10 Mar. 1915, pp. 607–11.
44 Takahara, Wilson Gaiko, Ch. 1.
48 TNL, Steed papers, TT/ED/HWS/1/David Fraser, Steed to Fraser, 12 Mar. 1915.
49 Times, 12, 16 and 19 Mar. 1915.
50 Times, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13 and 16 Apr. 1915.
51 NGM Inoue to Katô, 17 Apr. 1915, p. 686.
53 NGM Inoue to Katô, 17 Apr. 1915, p. 686.
54 NGM Hioki to Katô, 19 Apr. 1915, pp. 334–5.
55 TNL, Steed papers, TT/ED/HWS/1/David Fraser, Fraser to Steed, 17 Mar. 1915.
56 Manchester Guardian, 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12 and 17 Mar. 1915.
60 Manchester Guardian, 19, 23, 24, 30, 31 Mar. 1915 and 3, 5, 7 and 14 Apr. 1915.
61 NGM Minute on Katô’s interview with Greene, 15 Apr. 1915, pp. 681–3.
62 Tôkyô Asahi shimbun, 22 Apr. 1915.
64 Hôchi shinbun, 24 Apr. 1915 and Chûô shinbun, 23 Apr. 1915.


For this meeting, see Shouyô Kurabu (ed.), *Taishoshoki Yamagata Aritomo*, pp. 24–7.


TNA, FO371/2323 Grey to Greene, 29 Apr. 1915, tel. 112.

TNA Jordan papers, FO350/14 Langley to Jordan, 30 Apr. 1915.

For the final stage of the negotiations, see Naraoka, *Taika Nijuikkajyo Yokyu*, pp. 240–7.


TNA FO371/2324 Grey to Greene 3 May 1915, tel. 119.

Shôyô Kurabu (ed.), *Taishoshoki Yamagata Aritomo*, pp. 30–1.

Manchester Guardian, 10 May 1915.

TNL, Steed papers, TT/ED/HWS/I/David Fraser, Fraser to Steed, 1 Aug. 1915.

However, this evaluation of Yuan Shikai is recently changing even in China and Taiwan. For the detail, see Kawashima, *Kindai Chugoku*, and Yo Kaitei, *Nicchu Seijigaikokankeisi no Kenkyû: Daitichijisseikaitaisenki o Chusinni*, Tokyo: Fuyoshobo shuppan, 2015.

For the views of Grey and British diplomats, see Lowe, *Great Britain and Japan*, pp. 255–8.